[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WHY DID THE TRUMP ADMINISTRA-
TION FIRE THE STATE DEPARTMENT
INSPECTOR GENERAL?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
September 16, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-117
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
43-319PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Bulatao, Hon. Brian, Under Secretary for Management, United
States Department of State..................................... 16
String, Mr. Marik, Acting Legal Advisor, United States Department
of State....................................................... 30
Cooper, Mr. R. Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for
Political-Military Affairs, United States Department of State.. 35
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 88
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 89
Hearing Attendance............................................... 90
STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly.. 91
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 93
WHY DID THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FIRE THE STATE DEPARTMENT INSPECTOR
GENERAL?
Wednesday, September 16, 2020
House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Engel. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come
to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any point, and all Members will have
5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions
for the record, subject to the length limitations in the rules.
To insert something into the record, please have your staff
email to the previously circulated address or contact full
committee staff.
As a reminder to Members, staff, and others physically
present in this room, the guidance from the Office of Attending
Physician, masks must be worn at all times during today's
proceedings, except when a Member or witness is speaking.
Please also sanitize your seating area. The Chair views these
measures as a safety issue and, therefore, an important matter
of order and decorum for this proceeding.
For members participating remotely, please keep your video
function on at all times, even when you are not recognized by
the Chair. Members are responsible for muting and unmuting
themselves. And please remember to mute yourself after you
finish speaking. Consistent with House Resolution 965 and the
accompanying regulations, staff will only mute Members and
witnesses as appropriate, when they are not under recognition,
to eliminate background noise.
I see that we have a quorum. And I now recognize myself for
opening remarks.
Let me welcome our witnesses. As I have let the Ranking
Member know, I will be going considerably longer than the
customary 5 minutes for my statement this morning and, of
course, I will yield to Mr. McCaul for the same amount of time
I consume. But we do have a lot to go over before we hear from
our witnesses.
On the evening of May 15th, a Friday, the President
notified Speaker Pelosi that he was removing the State
Department Inspector General Steve Linick. The law requires 30
days notice to fire an IG, so Mr. Linick's last day was
technically June 14th. The President and the Secretary,
however, violated the spirit of the law by immediately placing
Mr. Linick on leave, and locking him out of both his office and
his email.
In the days that followed, both the President and Secretary
Pompeo made clear that the firing came at Mr. Pompeo's urging.
I predict that today we may hear the refrain repeated that
the President has the power to fire an inspector general
whenever he wants to, so long as he provides the reason for the
firing to Congress. No one is doubting that. I do not think in
the last 4 months I have heard anyone say otherwise. The
President has that power.
But we have seen again and again in the last 4 years, the
President shows very little reluctance to abuse his power. And,
in May when Mr. Linick was removed, the President had been on a
firing spree of inspectors general, the executive branch's
independent watchdogs who help provide accountability and
transparency in our government.
With that in mind, and in view of information provided to
the committee that Mr. Linick's firing may have been
retaliatory in nature--again something that would represent an
abuse of power--the committee launched an investigation into
Mr. Linick's removal, along with the Committee on Oversight and
Reform, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority
Office. While the State Department has refused to date to
produce any of the records we requested related to the firing,
witnesses have come forward and given us a lot of good detail
and context. Reports in the press have shed even more light on
this matter.
Now, here is what we know.
Mr. Linick's firing was not a spur-of-the-moment decision.
While Mr. Linick was told on May 15th that he was being pushed
out, his temporary replacement Ambassador Steve Akard had
already been lined up for a month or more. In his affidavit to
the committee, Mr. Akard said that Mr. Bulatao contacted him
either on April 9th or April 15th saying that Mr. Linick's
ouster was imminent, and asking him if he would assume the IG's
responsibilities on an acting basis.
Over the next few weeks, Mr. Bulatao and Mr. Akard spoke
several more times, including on May 14th and May 16th that Mr.
Linick's removal was going forward.
We know that at the time Mr. Linick was fired his office
was conducting two investigations involving Secretary Pompeo's
conduct. The first probe dealt with allegations that the
Secretary and his wife misused government resources for their
own personal benefit.
According to Mr. Linick's testimony, his team began
reaching out to the Office of the Secretary requesting
documents in late 2019. Mr. Linick stated that about the same
time he spoke to Mr. Bulatao, among other senior officials, to
let them know he was seeking information. In his words, his aim
was ``not to surprise the 7th floor,'' meaning the Department's
liaison with news of this probe.
Mr. Linick said that his office had contacted State
Department Executive Secretary Lisa Kenna about this matter as
well. Indeed, Ms. Kenna, in her interview with the committee,
testified that in March of this year the OIG requested
documents related to the Pompeo's travel. Like Mr. Linick, Ms.
Kenna discussed the matter with senior Department officials,
again among them Mr. Bulatao, and also Mr. String.
Ms. Kenna also stated that ``every time there is an
invitation to Mrs. Pompeo that involves travel I get it to the
Under Secretary for Management, and he makes the
determination.'' The Under Secretary of Management being Mr.
Bulatao.
Ms. Kenna authorized the search for these documents, but
Mr. Linick was fired before they were turned over to the OIG.
According to Ms. Kenna, the documents were only sent to the OIG
after Ambassador Akard had taken over the IG's office. We
presume the OIG's work on this matter was ongoing, so we do not
know all the details. Press reports have also alleged that
Secretary and Mrs. Pompeo used government employees to handle
personal errands.
Ms. Toni Porter, an advisor to the Secretary, told us in an
interview that the Secretary and Mrs. Pompeo, who is not a
State Department employee, often had Ms. Porter work on matters
of special interest to the Secretary, which apparently included
making dinner reservations and helping with the Pompeo's
personal Christmas cards.
According to the press earlier this week, exposed email
traffic involving Mrs. Pompeo, Ms. Porter, and Ms. Kenna,
indicating that Mrs. Pompeo and Ms. Kenna both understood an
assignment to Ms. Porter to be of a personal nature that worked
to keep a tight circle of government employees who worked on
these matters. The committee has learned that there has been a
large number of complaints to the OIG about the way the
Secretary and Mrs. Pompeo were misusing Department resources
for non-official matters.
This alleged misuse of resources is not just for personal
errands, it seems to be focused on the Pompeo's political
future. Specifically, there is the question of the so-called
Madison Dinners, a series of dinners the Pompeo's have hosted
in the State Department's ornate 8th floor.
Ms. Porter testified that the Pompeos conceived of the
dinners as a way to ``expand the understanding of State
Department work.'' The only problem with that explanation is
that aside from the extensive planning that goes into these
dinners, barely anyone from the State Department attends them.
In fact, the Secretary is the only Department official who
attends the closed door dinners: no senior diplomats, no
regional experts, none of the people who on a day to day basis
carry out State Department work, just the Secretary, a token
foreign dignitary--a requirement in the State Department to pay
for the dinners--and a dozen or so guests hand-picked by the
Pompeos, nearly all Republican officials or people tied somehow
to right wing politics, money, or media.
Ms. Porter's testimony suggests that the foreign dignitary
was a box-checking exercise; that the Protocol Office would
sometimes swap out one dignitary for another while the Pompeos
kept a tight grip on the political side of the guest list.
Ms. Porter also stated that since the Pompeos began hosting
these dinners they have built a data base to keep track of all
the people they invited, who has attended, email addresses,
mailing addresses. Ms. Porter, whose first work for the Pompeos
goes back decades, and involves planning the Congressman's
fundraisers, calls it a management tool.
While it is understandable that the State Department
protocol team keep, track of who was invited to official
events, Mrs. Pompeo also had that list sent to her private
email address, according to Ms. Porter. Suddenly a normal
assistant saw something more like a political contact tool.
These dinners were reportedly paid for out of the State
Department's so-called K Fund, which can be used for
``confidential requirements in the conduct of foreign affairs,
as well as other authorized activities that further the
realization of U.S. foreign policy objectives.'' This fund is
overseen by Under Secretary Bulatao.
I asked my staff to review the most recent unclassified
reports to Congress on this fund, which was sent in a package
with classified material, and are held in the SCIF. That raised
an eyebrow or two among people who understand State Department
budgets. The Pompeos have reportedly hosted about 20 of these
dinners. And after a hiatus brought on by the COVID pandemic,
the dinners restarted in earnest on Monday, with three more
reportedly scheduled in the next few weeks.
The second probe dealt with the Department's May 2019 use
of an emergency provision of the Arms Export Control Act to
push through more than $8 billion in arms sales to Gulf
countries. The OIG finished its work on the matter and released
its report last month.
There is a lot to unpack here, and it is important that we
lay it all out.
In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition launched an
intervention in the civil war in Yemen aimed at countering the
Iranian-backed Houthi forces that had seized control of Yemen's
capital. The Obama Administration initially supported this
effort through arms sales and logistical support. Our partners
in the Gulf face very real security challenges that threaten
freedom of navigation and U.S. troops stationed in the Middle
East.
Over time, however, it became increasingly clear that the
Saudis were acting recklessly in the way they were carrying out
that campaign with U.S. weapons. Civilian casualties mounted. A
humanitarian crisis began burning out of control. The Obama
Administration pushed pause on the sale of American weapons to
the Saudis and their partners.
When President Trump took office, it was an early priority
of his Administration to get the flow of weapons going again.
The concerns about civilian casualties had not gone away. And
lawmakers on both sides of the aisle, myself included, began
putting holds on sales of the most lethal weapons used in this
war, most notably, a sale notified in April 2018 for 120,000
Paveway precision-guided munitions, sometimes called smart
bombs.
Congress also passed legislation requiring the
certification from the Administration that the Saudis were
taking adequate steps to reduce civilian casualties.
On August 9th, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition blew up a
school bus, killing more than 25 children and injuring scores
more. Just over a month later, in spite of this, Secretary
Pompeo certified to Congress that the Saudi and Emirati
Governments were ``undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce
the risk of harm to civilians.''
Congress did not buy it, and the holds on these weapons
sales remained in place for nearly 9 more months while the
carnage went on unabated in Yemen.
Mr. Charles Faulkner, who until last summer was an official
in the State Department Legislative Affairs Bureau, told us in
his interview that Congress' concerns about civilian casualties
were legitimate. In fact, he said that many State Department
officials shared those same concerns.
How could you not? We have seen all the images: collapsed
buildings, twisted metal, mangled bodies, starving children.
We, in Congress, challenged the Administration to provide
assurances that U.S. weapons would not be used to kill
civilians or destroy civilian infrastructure. But Secretary
Pompeo wanted a different way forward. After all, as Mr.
Faulkner tells us, moving ahead with lots of weapons sales was
a major priority for the White House.
For Mr. Pompeo, the logjam in Congress had to be broken. In
April 2019, Mr. String told Mr. Faulkner that he had found a
way to do it: tell the world the sky was falling.
Under the Arms Export Control Act an administration can
bypass the normal congressional approval process by declaring
an emergency. Mr. Faulkner testified that he was worried about
what impact such an action would have on the Department's
relation to Capitol Hill. After all, Senator Menendez's and my
concerns about civilian casualties had not diminished.
Nevertheless, on May 24th, 2019, the State Department notified
Congress that the Administration was declaring an emergency
and, therefore, moving forward with 22 arms sales, packages
mostly for Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
As I noted earlier, no one doubts the emergency provision
exists in the law and that the executive branch has the power
to invoke that authority. To my knowledge, no one has suggested
otherwise, despite some of the spin you have heard from the
State Department. But the question since last May has been:
``Did Secretary Pompeo abuse that power when he declared an
emergency? Was the emergency phony? Was it a mere pretext to
circumvent congressional oversight?''
Those questions are why Members of this committee asked Mr.
Linick in June of last year to look into that decision. The
findings of that probe are eye-opening.
The OIG found, consistent with what I just said, that the
emergency declaration did not violate the letter of the law.
That is because Congress did not define the term ``emergency,''
leaving it up to a normal administration's common sense. But
the OIG also stated explicitly that it did not assess whether
there was a real emergency underlying that declaration.
Frankly, they did not need to make that assessment; the facts
speak for themselves.
The unclassified portion of the report lays out a time line
for the emergency declaration that aligns with Mr. Faulkner's
testimony. Namely, that it took nearly 2 months, from April 3d
until May 24th, 2019, for the emergency declaration to make its
way through the State Department---7 weeks, far longer than the
30-day congressional review period under the normal
notification process codified in the law.
The report also tells us, underneath redactions, that the
Department insisted the OIG slap on top of the version released
to the public that Mr. Pompeo determined on May 4th that he
wanted to send the emergency notification to Congress no later
than May 24th. An emergency that you can plan for 7 weeks in
advance isn't an emergency, as far as I am concerned,
especially when the regular congressional review process would
have taken less time.
I have to note that Mr. Cooper testified before this
committee last year that the emergency that required this
extraordinary action arose between May 21st, 2019, when Mr.
Pompeo briefed Congress, and May 24th, 2019, when the
declaration was transmitted to us. That testimony was false.
The report also indicates that most of the arms packages
have not been delivered yet, and likely will not be during this
calendar year. Again, what kind of wartime emergency can be
addressed with weapons that arrive 2 years later? And the
answer, obviously, is none.
There was no emergency. Ranking Member McCaul and I offered
an amendment to last year's NDAA that would have better defined
the word ``emergency.'' But in my view, the nonsense that the
Department pulled to get around Congress is a secondary
question.
Yes, I believe it was an abuse of power and an affront to
our system of checks and balances. I believe the Department
made false representations to this committee. But what is this
really about?
Many of us here in Congress saw the situation on the ground
in Yemen and said, Enough. We thought that before we shipped
instruments of death overseas, adequate precaution should be in
place to ensure that those instruments would not be used to
blow up school buses or funeral processions. We did not want
the United States to be party to the slaughter of innocents.
But Mike Pompeo's State Department did not see it that way.
His view is summed up in this sentence from the OIG's report,
and I quote: ``OIG found the Department did not fully assess
risks and implement mitigation measures to reduce civilian
casualties and legal concerns associated with the transfer of
PGMs included in the Secretary's May 2019 emergency
certification.''
Didn't assess the risk; did not try to reduce civilian
casualties; did not deal with legal concerns. This isn't
describing the Saudis or Emiratis, it is describing our own
State Department under the Trump Administration, under Mike
Pompeo.
Now, think about that funding in the broader context I have
just laid out and ask yourself why did not they do those
things? Was it an oversight? In the mad rush to get weapons out
the door after Mr. Pompeo made that emergency declaration did
those questions just fall by the wayside?
Of course, the answer is of course not. The emergency was
declared specifically so that the State Department could avoid
answering those questions. And how do we know that? Because
those are the precise questions Congress was already asking.
That is why we held up the arms sales. What are the risks? What
are we doing to reduce civilian deaths?
This is a deeply damning report. Now that we have seen it,
the findings of our own investigation into the IG's firing make
more sense, namely, that State Department officials have been
trying for months to suppress the findings.
In his testimony, Mr. Linick said that Mr. Bulatao and Mr.
String attempted to bully him by saying that the OIG should not
be looking into this matter, that it was a policy decision
outside the OIG's purview. Of course, it is entirely legitimate
for an IG to examine policy implementation. Again from Mr.
Linick's testimony, Mr. Bulatao seemed not to understand the
role of an independent IG.
It is also quite noteworthy that Secretary Pompeo refused
to be interviewed for the OIG's review. Mr. Linick stated last
year he approached Mr. Bulatao, Mr. String, and Deputy
Secretary Biegun about scheduling the interview. The
Secretary's team suggested that Mr. Linick conduct the
interview personally. Mr. Linick told Mr. String that he was
amenable to the idea, so long as one other member of the OIG
staff could be present as a witness. The Secretary's team
apparently ignored that request and, instead, Mr. Pompeo was
never interviewed by Mr. Linick. Instead, Mr. Pompeo provided
the OIG with a written statement that it had never requested.
When the pandemic hit in March and the OIG was wrapping up
its work on this matter, Mr. Linick considered the issue
unresolved and hoped to find some time in the future to discuss
this interview with the Secretary, which he continued to
discuss with Mr. String. But, before he and Mr. String reached
an accommodation, Mr. Linick was fired. Everything Mr. Linick
said suggested that he considered an interview with Mr. Pompeo
to be an important piece of unfinished business.
Mr. Linick's temporary replacement, Mr. Akard, learned
quickly that Secretary Pompeo was particularly interested in
this report. According to Mr. Akard's affidavit during his
first 2 weeks on the job, both Deputy Secretary Biegun and Mr.
Bulatao called him expressing Mr. Pompeo's curiosity about when
the OIG's work on arms sales would be done.
Mr. Akard recused himself from that process and from the
probe into the misuse of resources. That was sensible, as Mr.
Akard had deep conflicts of interest in addition to service as
Acting Inspector General. He retained his role in the State
Department as the director of the Office of Foreign Missions in
which he reported both to Mr. Bulatao and Secretary Pompeo. It
is easy to see how this would affect his work.
If Mr. Akard began an investigation into a matter the
Secretary did not want reviewed, Mr. Akard's career in the
State Department could potentially suffer.
The roll-out of this report a little more than a month ago
is also now shrouded in controversy. Even before the OIG
released the report, there was a background briefing to press
on the report's findings. But it was not the OIG that held this
briefing, it was the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
specifically Mr. Cooper, under the guise of a ``senior State
Department official.'' They stole a page right out of Attorney
General Bill Barr's playbook: the report was not yet public,
the press did not have copies, neither did Congress.
Nevertheless, Mr. Cooper, who was not an author of the
report but was himself interviewed as a fact witness in the
probe, tried to spin the media with his most favorable
interpretation of events. The State Department tried to take an
early victory lap because the OIG found that they did not
technically break the law. It is all reminiscent of Attorney
General Barr going out and saying the Mueller Report exonerated
the President.
The next day the unclassified version of the report was
released to the public with a number of key redactions. The
public version of the report hid the time line that undercuts
the Department's claim of an emergency. In the public version,
the time line only runs from May 21st, when Mr. Pompeo briefed
Congress, to May 24th, when the emergency certification was
sent to Congress. Hidden are the other dates stretching back to
early April when the emergency authority was first considered.
Other redactions hid the fact that few of the weapons at the
time of the OIG's review had been delivered.
The OIG has since provided us the memoranda showing that it
was Mr. Cooper himself who demanded those redactions, working
in consultation with Mr. Joshua Dorosin, the deputy in Mr.
String's office. To reiterate, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Dorosin, and Mr.
String were all interviewed by OIG as witnesses in this matter.
In fact, Mr. Dorosin was sent by the Department early in this
investigation and tried to convince my office not to push the
documents or witnesses in this matter without disclosing that
he was a witness himself.
The fact that none of them recused themselves from dealing
with the OIG report before it was released is baffling, a
glaring lapse.
And, finally, on the arms sales matter we have the question
of the classified annex. A considerable chunk of the OIG's
findings and recommendations are hidden in the classified
section, and about 40 percent of that section is also hidden
under redactions, and not even Members of Congress are
permitted to see behind.
And, again, Mr. Cooper decided the members of this coequal
branch of government, that this committee which authorizes and
oversees the State Department, should not have access to the
OIG's findings. It boggles the mind.
So, to recap, we have two OIG investigations that are
potentially embarrassing to Mr. Pompeo. In March 2019 both of
these probes are ramping up, getting closer and closer to the
Secretary and his top advisors.
Then in April, Mr. Bulatao tells Mr. Akard that Steve
Linick's days as IG are numbered.
After a few weeks of back and forth with the White House,
Mr. Linick is out.
In the aftermath, Mr. Pompeo pushes Mr. Linick's
replacement to find out when the arms sales report is going to
be ready. And when Ms. Porter is contacted by the IG to sit for
an interview dealing with misuse of resources, Mr. Bulatao
assures her that there is no need to rush to get it on the
calendar.
Now, Secretary Pompeo, in Mr. Bulatao's version of why Mr.
Linick was fired, centers on how The Daily Beast obtained
information about a draft OIG report dealing with the legal
personal practices by Brian Hook, another high-ranking State
Department political appointee. After the article ran, senior
Department leadership wanted an investigation into the leak,
including the possibility that the draft report leaked from the
OIG.
I have to note here the reporting in the press was all
accurate. The IG did find that Mr. Hook engaged in prohibited
personal practices, discriminating against a career employee.
He was not disciplined by Secretary Pompeo or Under Secretary
for Management Bulatao. He is still at the Department despite
press reports indicating that he was leaving.
Mr. Bulatao has claimed that Mr. Linick did not do what he
promised, which is, namely, to chase down the leak. Mr.
Linick's testimony directly contradicts that in precise detail.
Mr. Bulatao has pointed to the fact that Mr. Linick did not
turn over the complete findings of the leak investigation,
findings that cleared Mr. Linick and his office. Mr. Linick
addressed that as well, saying he was concerned that members of
the OIG staff named in the report could face retaliation.
Well, guess what? As soon as the State Department finally
got hold of that report they leaked it to The Daily Caller,
names and all. Mr. Linick was no dummy.
We will get into more of that later. But, Mr. Bulatao, I
consider the version of events you laid out in your June 1st
letter to be misleading at best, and urge you to think long and
hard if you are considering repeating those claims here on the
record. It ultimately will be up to the American people to
decide which version of events is more credible.
Did Mr. Pompeo fire his agency's independent watchdog
because of the way he handled his investigation into unproven
allegations of a leak in the OIG? Or did Mr. Pompeo fire him
because he was getting closer and closer to matters that were
embarrassing to Mr. Pompeo and his family, matters that
implicated the State Department in a scheme to bypass Congress
and sell lethal weapons that might be used for war crimes?
To me, the IG's firing fits into something much bigger:
everything we are looking at--the arms sales; the misuse of
resources; firing of the IG, followed by the effort to smear
him; the excruciating process of getting the State Department
to cooperate with the investigation, with this investigation;
and the constantly shifting conditions and snide letters
explaining to Congress how we should conduct oversight; the ad
hominem attacks on myself and my staff; the lies.
Mr. Bulatao, we did not hear from you for 4 months. You
would not take yes for an answer. At first you wanted to brief
us. Well, this is an investigation, not a policy concern. We
needed information in a formal setting on the record.
Then we had you scheduled to be here in July. Deputy Biegun
called me the last minute, despite the Department's claims that
I refused to speak to him, imploring me to postpone the
hearing, which I did. When we tried to reschedule, you moved
the goal posts, laying out a laundry list of new conditions. We
had to drop requests for all the other witnesses. We had to
have a joint hearing with the Oversight Committee. We could
only hear from you for 2 hours.
What this is all about is that you and Secretary Pompeo
apparently think you should be able to do whatever you want and
not face accountability or scrutiny of any kind. Congress is
blocking weapons sales: find a way around.
The IG is looking at how the Secretary spends taxpayers'
money: fire him.
The report shows that we made up a phony emergency and did
not do our due diligence to prevent civilians from being
killed: cover it up, spin it, hide it in the classified annex,
redact, redact, redact.
The Foreign Affairs Committee is investigating: blow them
off, cancel their briefings, call them names, tell them we know
better.
And you pat yourself on the back when it is determined that
you technically followed the process laid out in law. More
Yemeni children may die, but your scheme to make an end-run
around Congress was not illegal strictly speaking.
Congratulations.
There is at the highest levels of the State Department a
fundamental misunderstanding, as far as I am concerned, of the
way our government is supposed to work, of the way public
service is supposed to work. It explains why Mr. Pompeo is
potentially facing contempt in this body in which he used to
serve. I still hope we will find a way to avoid that, but we
will have to see what happens.
I appreciate everyone's indulgence. These are complicated
matters, and it is important that our Members and those
watching understand the whole timeline. We have a lot more to
cover.
I will soon recognize our witnesses for 5 minutes each for
an opening statement, pending which I will yield to our Ranking
Member Mr. McCaul for as much time as he would like to use.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Under
Secretary Bulatao, and Assistant Secretary Cooper, Advisor
String for your presence.
Before addressing the substance of today's hearing I would
be remiss if I did not take this opportunity with senior State
Department officials here today to acknowledge that yesterday,
for the first time in 25 years, Israel established diplomatic
relations with two Arab countries. I had the honor to be in
attendance yesterday at the White House when these historic
Abraham Accords were signed.
In my opinion, this is a game changer for the Middle East.
It is a bad day for Iran. And it would not have occurred but
for the extensive diplomatic engagement of this Administration.
So, congratulations for this historic accomplishment.
The news of Inspector General Linick's firing did come as a
surprise. Inspector generals are an essential tool in helping
Congress execute its constitutional oversight of the executive
branch. And any time one is terminated, it naturally will raise
some questions. However, inspector generals, like other
officers in the executive branch, as the chairman stated, do
serve at the pleasure of the president.
I also want to emphasize that the Inspector General has a
team, and their investigative work continues even after
removal. And while I believe the President complied with both
the law and with precedent from previous administrations in his
termination of Mr. Linick, some questions surrounding his
removal remain, and thus why we are having the hearing today.
I am pleased, though, that all three of you are here to
shed more light to the public on the President's decision. And
I do think it will be revealing, and I think we will understand
it better.
And it is important to note that this is not the first
action Congress has taken regarding this matter. Over the
course of this year the committee has conducted multiple
interviews with current and former State Department personnel,
spoken to Acting Inspector General, and conducted an interview
with Mr. Linick himself. My hope is with today's hearing that
these key witnesses can answer any outstanding questions so we
can put this matter behind us and turn our attention to the
pressing matters that we have before us prior to the end of
this Congress.
I want to thank the witnesses for their service to the
State Department, and to the Nation, and to its employees
around the world. And I will say for the members' benefit there
will be a classified briefing after this hearing. And just
given the information I have received, I believe it will be
very insightful to the members, insightful for the reasons that
were taken by the President in firing Mr. Linick, especially as
it pertains to national security.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Pursuant to notice, the committee is
convened today to hear testimony on why the President fired the
Inspector General. Our witnesses this morning are the Honorable
Brian Bulatao--sorry if I have mispronounced your name--Under
Secretary of State for Management; Mr. Marik String, the Acting
State Department Legal Advisor; and the Honorable R. Clarke
Cooper, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military
Affairs.
As a matter of custom on this committee, we do not swear in
witnesses, but obviously you are all required by law to answer
questions from Congress truthfully.
Without objection, your complete written testimony will be
made part of the record of this hearing. And I recognize you
for 5 minutes each to summarize your testimony.
Mr. Bulatao, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN BULATAO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Bulatao. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, and
distinguished members of the committee, I appear here today on
a matter of great importance and great interest to both the
committee and to the Department of State, and that is the
critical role Inspector Generals have in reviewing and
promoting the efficiency and the effectiveness of the
operations of the executive branch, particularly the Department
of State.
With your approval, I would like to submit a written
statement for the record. I will try and keep my remarks as
brief as possible.
Let me start by saying I have had the privilege of working
with many Inspector Generals over the last 30-plus years,
starting with my service as an infantry officer in the United
States Army; continuing in my role as the chief operating
officer of the Central Intelligence Agency; and currently now
in my capacity as the Under Secretary of State for Management.
Through these experiences I have gained firsthand
appreciation for the critical role that IGs play in the
executive branch. An effective IG illuminates. They shine the
light on the areas that we need to improve, preventing and
detecting waste, fraud, and abuse, so that we can collectively
achieve outstanding results. We rely on the role of the IG to
serve as a catalyst for effective management and internal
controls, especially given the scope and our operations in
every part of the globe.
Unfortunately, Steve Linick did not fulfill this role. His
failures were substantial and numerous, and fell into three
broad categories:
Failure to execute on the core mission of the IG; failure
to take care of the IG team; and failure to lead with
integrity.
Let me expand upon each of those. Let me talk about failure
to execute on the core IG mission. If you go to the State IG
website you will see what their mission is. That is to conduct
independent audits, inspections, and investigations.
First, Mr. Linick failed to complete the Fiscal Year 2019
annual audit of the State Department financial statements in a
timely manner, as required by laws passed by Congress. The
agency financial reports are a key accountability document and
principal report to the President, the Congress, and to the
American people to disclose our financial status regarding the
assets and resources that you have entrusted to us.
If we fail to get the audit right, I am not sure how
effective we can be in identifying waste, fraud, and abuse. And
many of you that have been in the private sector know that if
we do not get audits right, then we have a big red flag going
on.
Second, why did we miss our critical deadline? The IG, Mr.
Linick, failed to select a capable independent auditor in the
spring of 2019. The one selected by IG Linick's Technical
Evaluation Panel lacked the experience and the skill to
complete the audit so the Department had no choice but to
remove the lead auditor and restart the annual audit.
By the way, there was a very real risk that we would have
no opinion done by the time it was over.
Third, why were we in the position of selecting a new
auditor? The independent auditor from the previous year, that
was directly supervised by the IG, had to be replaced due to a
critical and deeply disturbing failure, which requires a
classified setting to more fully explain.
The investigative report that dealt with this failing in
August 2017 noted the following, and I quote: ``oversight by
the OIG was demonstrably ineffective . . . ultimately placing
the Department's information as well as its reputation, human
capital, and operations at a considerable unnecessary risk.''
So, just on this core of conducting independent audits we
had demonstrable ineffectiveness for oversight, we have had a
failure to select a qualified auditor, and we failed to get our
audit turned in in a timely manner. One out of 100-plus
agencies that turn in their financials to OMB.
Let's look at the second core IG mission, inspections.
The total number of IG inspections at our overseas posts
decreased by approximately 10 percent year over year for the 12
months ended March 2019. This is all pre-COVID.
Let's look at the third core IG mission, investigations.
The total number of preliminary inquiries closed declined--
by the way, closed means we have opened it, the IG is reviewing
it, and then they have been able to close it--the total number
of preliminary inquiries closed declined by 27 percent year
over year ending March 2020. So, again, not pre-COVID.
There are some significant performance issues.
Let me move to the second broad category that I mentioned,
failure to take care of the IG team.
First, there were some major red flags in the OIG
Department's 2019 annual employee viewpoint survey, known as
the FEVS survey. The Secretary had made a big push to increase
our response rate. And we doubled the total number of responses
to that survey from 2017. I think we had the highest percent
response rate in many, many years. Over half of our 38
assistant Secretary-led bureaus improved or maintained in all
three major index categories year over year.
Let me make sure you understand what those three index
categories are. That is employment engagement, that is employee
satisfaction, and that is diversity inclusion. So, over half of
our 38 improved in all three of those categories. Many improved
in at least two of those categories, or one.
There was one out of our 38 bureaus led by an assistant
Secretary for the same time period year over year, that
declined in all three of those categories. That was the Office
of OIG.
What is more concerning to me is when I focus in on the
satisfaction index, which let me tell you what that really
means. This is the willingness, it measures the willingness to
recommend the organization as a good place to work. The IG's
Office experienced double-digit decline since 2016. We got a
problem, and it starts with leadership.
Second, this failure in leadership resulted in year-long
key vacancies, including the deputy IG, the general counsel.
And it does not surprise me now, seeing what the results of the
FEVS survey were, that such a negative trend and folks'
willingness to recommend the IG as a good place to work, no
surprise that it took a long time to try and fill that No. 2
position and why it stayed vacant for 12 months.
Third, the OIG failed to provide status on training on the
fundamental values of diversity and inclusion. It is our one-
team theme. We talk about professionalism, integrity,
responsibility, and respect. And the OIG responded, and I
quote, ``these are not our core values.''
And, again, it does not surprise me, because when I look at
specific aspects of the employee survey I will highlight these
three.
One question: employees, IG employees are protected from
health and safety hazards on the job? The negative or neutral
responses were 24 percent worse for the IGs than the Department
writ large.
Another question: my organization has prepared employees
for potential security threats? 40 percent of the IG's work
force answered negatively or neutral to that question, 40
percent. At the State Department we had about 10 percent answer
negative or neutral. That is a significant red line for me.
The work I do is important? That answer was 42 percent
worse than the State Department write large. Again, there is a
leadership challenge here in the IG.
Let me hit my third broad area that I mentioned. This is
the failure to lead with integrity, and the one that is very
concerning to me.
First, the IG failed to self-report a leak of a draft IG
report in September 2019 to the Council of Inspector Generals
on Integrity and Efficiency, known as CIGIE--I will just call
it the Integrity Council--as he was directed to by the
Department. Instead, he hand-selected his own investigator,
this was the DoD IG, without informing the Department.
The deputy Secretary informed IG Linick very clearly that
if he encountered any issues with referring this in writing to
the Integrity Committee, these allegations of wrongdoing by him
or by his designated staff members, to promptly inform him of
any issues. That never happened.
Second, he then repeatedly refused to share this report
with the Department. He reports to and is under the general
supervision of the Secretary of State by law and is not above
accountability. The IG withheld the DoD IG report from the
Department leadership and, as far as we know, the entire IG
team, despite there being numerous requests calling into
question to see this report.
The IG's testimony suggested that we never asked for a
copy. This is just plain false.
Third, and very disturbing, the DoD IG report lead found
that the IG emailed the highly sensitive draft report to his
personal account on multiple occasions. I am not talking about
two or three times, I am talking about eight times in the month
of August, which is a clear violation of the OIG's own IT
policy. Those mailings to his personal account were within
weeks of the draft report being leaked to the media. This may
explain why he refused to provide the report to the Department.
IG Linick also admitted to speaking to Mr. Glenn Fine, the
principal deputy IG at DoD, and actually Mr. Fine is the one
that ended up being selected by the IG to conduct the
investigation. Nobody recused themself from that. That is a
major issue, a major conflict of interest in my mind.
Fourth, in apparent attempt to shift the blame, IG Linick
opened his own leak investigation in the Department for the
very same issue that we asked him to refer to the Integrity
Council, even though the leak that was in the media was
attributed to, and I quote, ``two government sources involved
in carrying out the investigation.''
By the way, anybody in the State Department that touched
that report we were going to look at them just as much.
Everybody needed to be looked at. Unfortunately, the IG decided
to look at our folks, just as he was not asking the Integrity
Council to look at his team.
Fifth, upon removal, he was instructed not to return to his
office nor to contact his employees without prior
authorization. We understand that he repeatedly violated this
instruction and sought access to IG work product after the
removal.
So, let me conclude here. The IG's removal was not about
retaliation on any specific report or investigation. There have
been a variety of unsubstantiated allegations in the media that
the Secretary recommended removal of the IG because of some
awareness of these investigations. Nothing could be further
from the truth.
The deputy Secretary of State has issued a letter making
clear that Secretary Pompeo was never briefed by the Deputy
Secretary, the former Deputy Secretary, myself as Under
Secretary of Management, nor the Executive Secretary on any
investigation, allegations of misuse of government resources.
This is just unequivocally without any factual basis or truth.
The committee has sought hours of depositions from three of
our civil servants in which the vast majority of time was spent
on issues unrelated to the removal of the Inspector General.
All three staffers stated multiple times that they had no
information regarding the removal. And all three stated they
only found out about it after the removal occurred.
Let me just say, this removal was about an IG who in my
mind was increasingly falling short of expectations. IG
Linick's performance failed across all three areas. He failed
to deliver and execute on the core IG mission. He failed to
take care of his IG team. And he failed to lead with integrity.
The IG's failure to perform in just one, one of these
critical areas is sufficient to trigger a major loss of
confidence.
The Department deserves an IG that illuminates, not
denigrates. The Department deserves an IG that promotes our
shared values, not demotes them.
And I look forward to your questions on why the
recommendation was made for the removal of the IG. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bulatao follows:]
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Chairman Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Bulatao. And I
apologize for butchering your name before.
Okay, Mr. String.
STATEMENT OF MR. MARIK STRING, ACTING LEGAL ADVISOR, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. String. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
invitation to appear today.
The committee initially requested my testimony in
connection with my prior position as Deputy Assistant Secretary
in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, which I left nearly
16 months ago. I understand that committee members may also ask
questions today related to my current role as Acting Legal
Adviser for the Department. I will do my best to address your
questions based on my best recollection, consistent with my
professional obligations as an attorney, and respect for the
attorney-client privilege.
The decision to remove a sitting Inspector General is
committed exclusively to the President. We have provided the
committee with a letter from the Office of White House Counsel
that describes how the President's decision in the case of Mr.
Linick was consistent with the requirements of the Constitution
and of Federal law, as recognized by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
As that letter notes, President Trump's notices to Congress
used language similar to that used by former President Obama
when he removed an Inspector General, noting that he ``no
longer'' had ``the fullest confident'' in his ability to serve
as Inspector General.
In connection with today's hearing, the committee has also
raised issues related to the Secretary's May 2019 emergency
notification. I would like to touch briefly on the notification
as well.
First, the Department fully cooperated with the Office of
Inspector General's review of the Secretary's emergency
notification. The OIG interviewed 46 Department staff and
received a significant number of documents, as requested. The
Department did not stand in the way of the completion of the
OIG's report, which ultimately concluded that the ``Emergency
Certification Was Properly Executed.'' In fact, we facilitated
its completion.
Second, as the Department explained in its letter to the
committee in June 2019, my designation as Acting Legal Adviser
had, to my knowledge, no connection to the Secretary's decision
to exercise his emergency authorities under the Arms Export
Control Act. The designation was set in motion more than a
month before this time when the then-Legal Adviser announced
her departure in April.
As I recall, the Office of the Legal Adviser developed the
legal advice with the career attorneys in the Office of the
Legal Adviser in advance of my transition to the office. I was
expected to serve as a bridge between the former legal adviser
and the confirmation of a new legal adviser based on my
significant relevant experience and understanding of the
functioning of the Office of the Legal Adviser.
Leading that team of talented lawyers over the past 16
months has been a distinct honor and privilege, and I
appreciate their professionalism and commitment to serving our
Nation, especially during these extraordinary times.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look
forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. String follows:]
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Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper.
STATEMENT OF MR. R. CLARKE COOPER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, members of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the topic of today's
hearing is, ``Why did the Trump Administration Fire the State
Department Inspector General?'' I will provide you the most
comprehensive and honest answer I have:
I do not know.
With that, I would like to turn to matters of substance. I
am glad to finally have the opportunity to apprise you of the
status of our efforts to support our security cooperation
partners in the Middle East.
Two weeks after I took office in May 2019, Secretary Pompeo
certified to you an emergency existed requiring the sale of
certain defense articles and services to Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. In the days following
certification I sat before your committee and testified that a
combination of factors led the Secretary to determine the
situation constituted an emergency and prompted him to make
certification, including the significant increase in
intelligence reporting on threat streams related to Iran; the
clear, provocative, and damaging actions taken by Iran's
government; and the need to affirmatively respond to military
capability requests from our partners.
As such, any response I provided members' questions during
that 2019 hearing, including Representative Levin, must be
understood in the context of my opening statement and State for
the record, as well as my complete testimony before Congress,
all of which are part of the public record, all of which are
certainly available on what I would say the extended version of
C-SPAN, or the full version of C-SPAN.
Events since that time serve only to magnify the challenge
Iran poses to the region and demonstrate the Administration is
on the right side of history. One can draw from the line of
attacks by the Iranian-supported Houthi on Saudi Arabia, to
Iranian cruise missiles and drone attacks on key oil
facilities, to attacks on U.S. forces and facilities in Iraq by
Iran and Iranian-backed militias, to instability in Lebanon,
and so on.
As I wrote to you last month, since the Administration
proceeded with the sales subject to emergency certifications as
provided for in the law, Iran and the partners and proxies it
supports continue to threaten not only U.S. partners, but have
directly targeted U.S. personnel and military forces and
facilities in the region.
On that note, I would be delighted to brief the committee
at a classified level on Iran, and am ready to do so as soon as
this morning's closed session takes place, subject to the will
of the chairman.
But let me draw for you another line, from sanctions and
emergency certifications dating back over 40 years, to the
designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization this spring, to the
certification of emergency arms transfers to our partners and,
ultimately, ultimately, as Mr. McCaul referenced this morning,
the signing of the transformative Abraham Accords, not 24 hours
ago and barely a mile from where we sit today.
For this momentous normalization agreement between key
American security cooperation partners in the Middle East,
there is a common thread running along all of these actions--
ours and our partners--the need to establish a shared
capability to respond to Iranian threats, be they direct or
from proxies or partners, convention or unconventional,
economic or military.
And while we may disagree on some of the specifics of these
responses, I know--I know--that you, Mr. Chairman, as you
acknowledged in your opening statement, we do see eye-to-eye
when it comes to the nature of the threat that Iran poses, and
the need to ensure the security of our key partners in the
region.
Mr. Chairman, the recent Inspector General report into the
emergency arms sales did not question these facts. It did not
question the nature and existence of an emergency. Instead, the
IG Report concluded the Secretary's emergency certification was
executed in accordance with the requirements of the Arms Export
Control Act.
It is also true, however, the IG felt the Department could
do more to reduce the risk of civilian casualties, and that may
be as a result of U.S.-provided arms. That is a finding I not
only accept, but which I, my bureau, the Department, and this
Administration take to heart, which is why we were working to
address, well before the IG even put pen to paper, and which we
will continue to address.
In April 2018, President Trump released an updated United
States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, or CAT, that, for the
very first time ever, made it the explicit policy of the United
States to facilitate ally and partner efforts, through United
States sales and security cooperation efforts, to reduce the
risk of national or coalition operations causing civilian harm.
A year later, in March 2019, the President reaffirmed
Executive Order 13732, which directs U.S. Government agencies
to engage with foreign partners to share and to learn best
practices for reducing the likelihood of and responding to
civilian casualties, including through appropriate training and
assistance.
So, since the CAT policy was updated, the Department of
Defense and the Department of State have been working together
tirelessly to implement this guidance. We see reducing the risk
of civilian harm as an enterprise-wide, inter-agency challenge,
and have responded with a systemic program of reforms and
innovations, examples of which I would like to briefly describe
for the committee right now.
We have created a new methodology to help us assess the
risk of civilian harm associated with arms transfer, and have
made process improvements to ensure our decisionmaking is
informed by those assessments.
The Defense Department has developed a new training
curriculum for partners and allies on reducing civilian harm,
and is developing a tailorable toolkit of advisory materials
and services, essentially bespoke to the partner.
DoD also identified a set of technical solutions to help
partners reduce the risks of civilian harm, while also
enhancing combat effectiveness. For example, the Advanced
Targeting Development Initiative, or ATDI, is a suite of
technical solutions and training intended for partners who
deploy and use certain U.S. munitions, including Precision-
Guided Munitions, or PGMs.
The ATDI provides enhanced support to key technical aspects
of weapons employment and their proficiency, such as Target
Coordinate Mensuration, Weaponeering, and the Collateral Damage
Estimates. These capabilities enable allies and partners to hit
their intended targets, and do that accurately; achieve the
precise damage intended, and do so with the ability to estimate
collateral effects in advance, and modify their engagements
accordingly.
With these processes, analytics, and toolkits now in hand,
we also have been increasing our outreach to partners, and
engaging with them proactively in discussions on how they can
reduce the risk of civilian casualties to its lowest possible
level. The right time for that conversation is now.
These are significant and serious efforts, and they have
been underway for quite some time. I am encouraged, Mr.
Chairman, that both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates have purchased Advanced Targeting Development. In
doing so, they made clear their commitment to reducing the risk
of harm to civilians, even as they battle an adversary who,
judging by the frequency and inaccuracy of the Houthi drones,
the Houthi rockets, and even ballistic missile attacks, would
appear they have no such compunction.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, during my time as Assistant Secretary
of State for Political-Military Affairs, the Department and the
Administration have identified the right threats, made the
right decisions under the right policies to support the right
partners.
It is a team of national security professionals I am very
much proud to be a part of. And I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]
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Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
We will now go to the question part of our hearing. I will
now recognize members for 5 minutes each, pursuant to the
rules. All time yielded is for the purpose of questioning our
witnesses.
Because of the hybrid virtual format of this meeting I will
recognize Members by committee seniority, alternating between
Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let
our staff know, and we will come back to you.
If you seek recognition you must unmute your microphone and
address the Chair verbally. And as we start questioning, I will
start by recognizing myself.
We have so much to cover today, but at the outset I want to
correct the record on a few things. I regret that Mr. Pompeo
has attacked this committee, its staff, and myself during the
course of this probe, all of it unfounded. And so, while I am
glad you are all here today, it should not have taken this long
from the start.
I asked that you, Mr. Bulatao, appear for a transcribed
interview to discuss why the Inspector General was fired. The
Department rejected my offer and urged that you brief the
committee privately.
I think it is clear why that was not enough for us. When
the committee conducts an investigation of this importance, it
has to be done formally and on the record. We needed you and
your colleagues to speak on the record before Democrats and
Republicans on this committee to answer serious questions about
the IG's firing.
When the State Department offered that you testify, I
immediately accepted. The Department pulled you back from our
hearing at the last moment, and they conditioned your testimony
on your not talking to anyone else on the record. I hope
everyone here today understands that we could not accept that.
So, again, it is good the three of you are testifying now
but, frankly, we should have been able to do this a few months
ago, and without the acrimony we have experienced.
So, let me ask this question for everybody. Would you all
agree that inspectors general serve an important function
providing accountability and transparency? I would like to know
yes or no.
I want to start with Mr. Bulatao.
Mr. Bulatao. Yes, Mr. Chairman. They perform a critical
function.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Inspector General
performs a very critical function.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. String.
Mr. String. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I agree.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Would you all agree that firing an IG in order to cover up
wrongdoing would be an abuse of power? And yes or no. Let's
start again with Mr. Bulatao.
Mr. Bulatao. If you assume there is a cover-up of any
wrongdoing, yes.
Chairman Engel. Mr. Cooper?
Mr. Cooper. The firing of the IG is the purview of the
executive. If there was due cause, as has been laid out, there
is no cover-up.
Chairman Engel. Okay. Mr. String.
Mr. String. Mr. Chairman, as we have described, the IG
serves at the pleasure of the President.
Chairman Engel. Okay. I am not quite getting an answer, but
Okay.
Let me ask you all this: do you acknowledge Congress'
constitutional responsibility to conduct oversight of the
executive branch policies and operations? Yes or no. Mr.
Bulatao.
Mr. Bulatao. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I understand the oversight
responsibility of Congress.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, yes, understand the Article I
authority and oversight of Congress.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. String.
Mr. String. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I recognize the oversight
responsibility of the Congress.
Chairman Engel. One last thing. Do you think I am
conducting this investigation for my own personal
aggrandizement?
Let me answer that question. I do not enjoy this. Many of
you have known me for a long time and understand that it is my
profound preference to advance legislation and hold hearings in
this committee in a bipartisan fashion. We call this committee
the most bipartisan committee in Congress.
And we always say that politics stops at the water's edge.
And I believe very, very strongly in that. So, for me this has
not been the most pleasant way to bring my 3-decade-long
congressional career to a close. But I will tell you myself why
we are here.
We have real concerns on this committee that the firing of
Mr. Linick was an abuse of power. And in the 4 months we have
tried to get answers the State Department leadership has been
petulant, insulting, evasive. The fact that we had to drag you
up here kicking and screaming, itself makes me think that the
Department has been trying to hide the truth.
But, at this point we have heard all the excuses, we have
heard all the half-truths, and we are past strongly worded
letters and phony outrage. So, I want to be clear in this
hearing room, my expectation is that you give this body the
respect it deserves and answer our questions.
I yield the balance of my time, and recognize the ranking
member for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first talk about, a little bit about policy.
Secretary Cooper, you talked about this. You know, I think in
foreign policies it is very important to define who you allies
are and who your enemies are. That is why the chairman and I
disapproved of the Iran deal under the previous administration
because it empowered the largest State sponsor of terror.
I believe Iran is our enemy, and their proxies, the Houthi
rebels, are the enemy.
I think it is ironic, the timing of this hearing when just
yesterday we had this historic Abraham Accord, the first peace
deal in the Middle East in 25 years, a quarter of a century,
based upon the policies of this Administration. And I know the
media may not pay a lot of attention to it, but it was
historic. And I was there, proud to be there yesterday.
I approved of the sale of these weapons to Saudi Arabia, to
Jordan, and to UAE who came forward as our ally yesterday with
Israel against Iran. I also approved it because they are
precision-guided, as you mentioned. It actually decreased
civilian casualties because of the precision-guided weapons.
I think the threat from Iran is real, and that is why the
Secretary made this policy decision to sell the weapons, as did
the President.
But, I want to go to Secretary Bulatao. I think the issue
at stake here is was this a permissible firing? Of course the
President, as legal counsel stated, has the authority, but did
you have justification to do this?
And you cited basically three main reasons, any of which I
think would be adequate for the firing. But the first one is
the failure to complete an annual audit mandated by Congress.
The failure which actually violated the laws mandated by
Congress. Can you tell me just on that one alone what impact
does that have on the State Department?
Mr. Bulatao. Thank you, Ranking Member. The impact is while
we quickly recognized the team needed to come together to
actually help focus and make sure that we did complete the
audit, although 60 days later than it was required to turn in,
the good news on that is a lot of the working level team from
the inspection--the audit team from the IG came together.
The disappointing news is that there was no IG leadership.
I went to those weekly meetings to make sure we got that back
on track. Not once did I see the IG Linick there himself.
I went to when we actually got it done and we acknowledged
the hard work that the team did, again there was a missing
Inspector General Linick there. He was just absent for the
process.
Mr. McCaul. And it is hard to lead a department, the
largest one in the U.S. Government, one of the largest, when
you cannot even conduct an audit; right? I mean, that has
consequences?
Mr. Bulatao. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. Serious consequences.
Mr. Bulatao. Well, if the role of the IG, who has been
designated with the role to conduct this independent audit,
cannot be done, how can we identify those areas that we have
potential waste, fraud, and abuse? How do we know the assets on
the balance sheet, the liability that is stated there? How do
we know where these obligations are going?
There are some significant areas that if we----
Mr. McCaul. Which is the core mission of an IG is looking
at waste, fraud, and abuse.
Mr. Bulatao. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. And that is what an audit will reveal.
The second thing that is going to come out in the
classified briefing that I cannot get into, but in your
testimony you said the auditor put our national security at
considerable risk. And I know you probably cannot comment on
that. But I just want to reiterate that statement, because for
the press reporting this hearing I think that is a very
important point: failure to manage the IG team, with key
vacancies; failed on diversity inclusion. The IG is saying
these are not our core values.
I would think on both sides of this aisle, both Democrat
and Republican, that those are core values of this Nation is
diversity inclusion.
Failed to lead with integrity. Leaks a draft report to the
media that is not even shared with the Secretary.
And then, finally, these allegations of personal
misconduct, the Secretary did not even know about these
allegations because he did not see the report. So, the idea
that somehow that led to the firing of Mr. Linick really is
factually the evidence does not support that because the report
was not given to him. He had no knowledge of these allegations,
so how can that create some fiction that he fired Mr. Linick
because of these so-called allegations of personal misconduct?
To me it is mystifying.
I am glad you are here. I am glad we are going to get
through this exercise. But I think this Nation and the State
Department has far more serious business, and this committee
does as well.
And I do appreciate the chairman's comments, though, about
this committee, our oversight functions. And under Article I of
the Constitution it is embodied in what our founding fathers
stood for. But I think it is time to move on.
And with that, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Before I call on Mr. Sherman I just want to
say that I, too, was at the White House yesterday, and I, too,
think that the accords between Israel and the Arab States are
good and important. And I commend the President and everybody
who was involved with it. But, obviously, this is a separate
issue that we are talking about.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you for having this virtual and in-
person hearing. And after I ask my questions I will vacate my
spot here so that others can ask their questions in person.
The questions before us is why was the Inspector General
fired? Mr. Bulatao offers us two rather easily dismissed ideas.
The first is that the audit report was late.
As co-chair of the bipartisan CPA Caucus, and the only
professional auditor in this room, I assure you that was not
the reason. If you look at the Department of Defense and other
departments, the State Department being a few weeks late with
its audit report is tiny compared to other agencies and their
late or nonexistent audit reports.
But if being late with reports is reason to fire somebody,
why are we focusing just on audit reports? They are not matters
of life and death. State Department foreign policy and this
committee's decisions affect life and death, and they are
chronically late.
So, Mr. Bulatao, since you are running management over
there, since these legally required reports are incredibly
late, would not you yourself resign if late reports, critically
necessary for policy matters of life and death, are late under
your watch?
But then we are told that we should fire the attorney--the
Inspector General because of low morality according--low morale
in surveys. Mr. Bulatao, if you had any integrity, you would
also be calling for the resignation of Secretary Pompeo.
All of us in this room know what morale is like in his
State Department. And we do not have to rely on surveys where
maybe somebody does not want to say anything bad that hurts
their immediate supervisor because they and their immediate
supervisor are all united. But this State, the service in the
State Department is a incredibly difficult and depressing thing
to do. And we have people with media contacts in the State
Department right here on this committee.
If low morale is reason for someone to be fired, look up,
not down.
So, the real question here is why was the attorney
general--or Inspector General fired? And there are two possible
reasons. One is that he was investigating the myriad of ways in
which State Department resources were being used to meet the
political and personal needs of Secretary Pompeo.
Or, two, that a bizarre decision was reached to evade
Congress on the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia and nearby
countries.
I agree with Mr. Cooper. Which of these two? You say you do
not know. I do not know.
But, I am going to focus on evading the law because that is
a matter of life and death: those weapons kill. And so we ask,
what is the emergency?
The emergency is that Congress might prevent the
Administration from doing what it wants. You see, the emergency
here is that--is not that an imperial presidency would shred
the Constitution, but rather that Congress would assert its
constitutional rights and endanger the imperial presidency.
The ranking member puts forward the idea that because
success was reached in an important aspect of the Middle East
that, therefore, we--violations of the Constitution and the
laws we pass to implement it is retroactively legalized.
I have read the Constitution. There is nothing in there
that says the executive branch can ignore congressional
prerogatives if they are able to do, arrange a peace agreement
with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.
Now, Mr. Faulkner testified that the murder and
dismemberment of Jamal Khashoggi was perceived as the
emergency. The emergency was Congress might actually look at
these arms sales and reach a different conclusion. They ``made
it harder'' to get the sales approved. And, of course, the
President says he saved the crown prince's ass for
accountability for that murder.
Mr. String, who did you talk to at the White House about
this emergency declaration and the need to issue it to prevent
Congress from rejecting the arms sale? Did you talk to Mr.
Jared Kushner? Did you talk to Peter Navarro?
Mr. String. Thank you, Congressman, for those questions.
Just one point of clarification. I believe, as I recall,
Congress did vote on these sales ultimately.
But to your question, I do not recall ever speaking with
Mr. Kushner during my time in the Political-Military Affairs
Bureau.
I recall speaking to Mr. Navarro, but I do not recall
speaking to him about any particular emergency declaration.
Mr. Sherman. And since this is a--you have been interviewed
as a fact witness on this, is it also appropriate for you to be
the lawyer and the fact witness in this matter?
Mr. String. Thank you for that, that question, Congressman.
So, I take ethics obligations very seriously, as we all do
in the Department. We have consulted. I have consulted
extensively with the career designated agency ethics official
in the Department. He has confirmed that attendance in meetings
by those who were also interviewed was entirely appropriate in
this case. And a few facts support that view.
First, the IG review was not an investigation of misconduct
by the Investigations Unit, rather it was a----
Mr. Sherman. I believe my time has expired. And we
understand the gist of your answer. And I will just say that if
people are going to be fired because there is low morale, it
starts at the top.
I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank our
distinguished witnesses.
I am glad that this committee has finally accepted one of
your numerous offers to appear before us. We are here today
because the members of this committee care about accountability
in our government. And that is the case, and if it is the case
then I have one question.
Why are some of my colleagues defending former Inspector
General Steve Linick? Under his leadership, the number of
inspections conducted by the DoD OIG across embassies worldwide
declined significantly. Former IG Linick also failed to
complete a financial audit of the Department in a timely
manner, and had to ask for an extension. His appointment of an
unqualified auditor set the process back even further.
He was further investigated by the DoD's Office of
Inspector General for being the leak behind a sensitive draft
evaluation of a State Department official. And I find it
particularly egregious as a person who is privileged to hold a
Top Secret security clearance for decades.
At the time of his departure, Mr. Linick was under
investigation for leaking classified information to the press,
and had sent sensitive material to his personal email account
numerous times in the span of 6 months, again an egregious, an
egregious accusation.
When he received the DoD Inspector General Report on March
17th, which detailed a number of improprieties committed under
his own IG rules, Mr. Linick decided not to inform State
Department leadership that he had the report. And during his
testimony before members in early June, Mr. Linick denied that
this report was even of interest to the Department.
He then went on to make numerous other claims in testimony
that would explain why the report was not delivered, starting
by blaming the Department itself, and its leadership, for
failing to followup on the report's status, to then saying that
he preferred to relay the results of the report in person, then
to citing COVID-19 for not conveying the report in a timely
fashion, to then saying that there was no reason for him to
keep the report away from key stakeholders, to finally
admitting on pages 124 and 125 of the DoD IG Report that he
knew the Department leadership wanted the results of the
investigation.
Mr. Linick intentionally sat on an IG Report. Think about
that for a moment. An inspector general chose to withhold the
results of an important investigation that could compromise his
reputation and career. The only mistake this President made in
firing Steve Linick was not doing it sooner.
Let this hearing serve as yet another example, regrettably
so, that demonstrates how the Left wastes taxpayer resources,
they are willfully defending a former Inspector General in the
name of accountability, all the while blatantly ignoring the
fact that Mr. Linick failed to hold himself accountable. There
is simply no good reason why Mr. Linick withheld the DoD
Inspector General Report instead of providing it to the
Department leadership as he should have, none at all.
My colleagues on the other side have made numerous
incorrect claims regarding this topic. Unfortunately for them,
facts matter. If this committee wants to answer their own
question, why did the Administration fire the Inspector
General? I can tell them the answer. Mr. Linick was a threat to
the principle of accountability in government plain and simple.
I commend the President for exercising his authority
granted by the U.S. Congress to remove Mr. Linick from office.
The fact that members of this committee would defend Mr.
Linick's conduct runs contrary to our duty to maintain the
public trust.
I do have one question for Under Secretary Bulatao. Does
the IG have the legal right to withhold final internal reports
from the Department leadership?
Mr. Bulatao. Congressman Perry, that is why we have asked
the IG to refer this matter, investigation on his conduct to
the Integrity Counsel, because the requirement in the IG Act
requires that report to come to the leadership of the
Department. So, the answer is no, it should not--does not have
that authority to withhold that.
Mr. Perry. Does not have the authority. But did withhold
it, did not he?
Mr. Bulatao. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perry. All right. I yield the balance of my time, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman yields his time.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me see if I can get something, understand some things.
And I will ask my questions of Mr. Bulatao.
So, did you, Mr. Bulatao, recommend to Mr. Pompeo that Mr.
Linick be fired? And did Mr. Pompeo then take that to the
President? How did that? Did you recommend it to Mr. Pompeo?
Mr. Bulatao. Congressman, I cannot speak about my
conversations with the Secretary. The Secretary has already
made it known it was his recommendation to the President to
remove the IG.
Mr. Meeks. I'm asking about your role. Did you make that
recommendation or was that recommendation straight to Mr.
Pompeo or the President?
Mr. Bulatao. That recommendation was from the Secretary to
the President.
Mr. Meeks. So, you were just instructed to go fire Mr.
Linick?
Mr. Bulatao. Well, the Deputy Secretary had the
conversation regarding the removal of the IG. I was part of
that phone conversation.
Mr. Meeks. Well, I am saying you had a meeting with Mr.
Linick; is that not correct? And you fired him on a Friday
night in mid-May. That was you; correct?
Mr. Bulatao. No, sir. That is the point I was trying to
make.
There was a phone call on May 15th, in the evening, in
which case the Deputy Secretary of State notified Mr. Linick
the President had lost confidence in his ability and was
removing him from the role of Inspector General at the State
Department. I was on that phone call.
I then proceeded to provide administrative instructions to
Mr. Linick, and let him know that he would receive a letter as
soon we hung up from the White House Personnel Office notifying
him of his removal, and that he would be placed on 30 days of
administrative leave pending a final removal date.
Mr. Meeks. So, was Mr. Linick given a reason why he was
being fired?
Mr. Bulatao. Congressman, as I, I just stated, Mr. Linick
was told by----
Mr. Meeks. Based upon what you heard. You were on the phone
call. Did he, was he given a reason?
Mr. Bulatao. Yes, he was give----
Mr. Meeks. He said he asked for a reason. Was he given one?
Mr. Bulatao. Yes. He was provided the reason that I just
stated.
Mr. Meeks. But he said he was not given one, that he was
shocked to get--not to get any explanation after 7 years on the
job for why he was being fired with no warning. So, are you
saying Mr. Linick is a liar?
Mr. Meeks. Congressman, what I am saying is the Deputy
Secretary informed Mr. Linick the President, at his authority,
his discretion had lost confidence in his ability and,
therefore, was removing him from the role of IG. That was the
reason provided to Mr. Linick Friday evening on that phone
call.
Mr. Meeks. See, what confuses me is the fact that 2 days
after he was fired I believe it was you that told The
Washington Post that he was fired because of a pattern of
unauthorized disclosures or leaks. Was that not you?
Mr. Bulatao. Well, as I----
Mr. Meeks. Did you not inform The Washington Post of that?
Mr. Bulatao. Congressman, as I laid out in my testimony
earlier, there were numerous reasons why I believe personally
that the Inspector General failed to perform. I talked about
those three core areas where he failed to perform.
Mr. Meeks. Yes or no, did you tell The Washington Post that
the reason that he was fired was because of a pattern of
unauthorized disclosures or leaks? Yes or no.
Mr. Bulatao. Again, the comments that were made----
Mr. Meeks. It is a simple yes or no.
Mr. Bulatao. I do not to my recollection----
Mr. Meeks. Either you did or you did not.
Mr. Bulatao. I do not to my recollection recall having a
direct conversation with The Washington Post.
Mr. Meeks. Well, I am going to direct you to that
Washington Post. Because it seems as though, to me, that Mr.
Linick testified he was not given any information. So, now
after your, after reading your testimony today there are many
reasons that are now being given.
And I agree with Mr. Sherman in that if it is legitimate
because he failed to lead with integrity, then we have to look
at the top. And it is evidenced by what is taking place, by the
number of career diplomats and talent that have left the State
Department as a result of Mr. Pompeo and the low morale that
there is.
So, let me just, one more question. I see I am running out
of time.
And I remind you, I understand that you are not under oath,
but if you provide false testimony that would be a Federal
crime of a false statement.
Did Mr. Linick tell you that he had talked to CIGIE and
CIGIE had informed him that CIGIE was not the appropriate body
to conduct the investigation into the leaks? Yes or no.
Mr. Bulatao. The question that I asked Inspector General
Linick is if he had provided a written referral to the
Integrity Council, CIGIE. The answer was no, he did not provide
a written referral. Instead, what he described to CIGIE was
that the State Department was looking to investigate his
office.
That is not the instruction we provided Inspector General
Linick. What we said is----
Mr. Meeks. But your letter----
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. We are investigating you,
Inspector General Linick, because of allegations of potential
unauthorized disclosure.
Mr. Meeks [continuing]. To the State Department, your
letter to the State Department only learned months later.
Mr. Bulatao. That is what we had asked him to refer to
CIGIE. That did not happen.
Mr. Meeks. Your letter, sir, your letter, sir, to the State
Department said the Department only learned months later that
the referral was not made to CIGIE but to a different IG. Now,
again, Mr. Linick testified that your statement isn't true, and
that he told the Department at the time that CIGIE did not have
jurisdiction and that he did not--and that he had been advised
by CIGIE to get another IG's office to do that, not a violation
of anything or anything.
It seems to me, sir, that with these multiple after-the-
fact reasons the insinuations that were made by the chairman of
the committee that could this be a cover-up by the Secretary
and the President? Because it seems to me when you look at
Webster and the definition of cover-up is an unusually
concerted effort to keep an illegal or unethical act or
situation from being made public.
And what has taken place in Yemen, and the killing of
innocent individuals, and getting around Congress to get this
to have the sale of someone who is friendly, based upon the
President's own admission the crown prince, him and his son-in-
law, seems to me, sir, to be leading to an actual cover-up, and
the IG was going his job and he was being stopped by you, the
Secretary of State, and the President of the United States.
I yield back my time.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman yields.
Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank
you for being here and your testimony and your patience.
Mr. Bulatao, you said in the very beginning the critical
role the IG plays in the executive branch is to shine light on
areas that need to be improved, and to improve those. And,
obviously, we all think that is a good thing because we want to
get rid of waste, fraud, and abuse. I think we are all in
agreement with that.
Then you mentioned the three key missions, as Chairman
McCaul pointed out: mission execution, protect the team, and
lead with integrity.
Just for the record, for clarity, were those three things
upheld by IG Linick?
Mr. Bulatao. No, sir.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Mr. Cooper, you said that you were not sure
why he was relieved. Do you feel that IG Linick lived up to
those three mission statements?
Mr. Cooper. Based on the information provided here today,
no.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Mr. String?
Mr. String. Congressman, I believe Under Secretary for
Management laid out a comprehensive case as to the failings of
the IG on those three metrics.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. So, for the record, IG Linick did not meet
what he was tasked to do.
It has been said in this testimony, Under Secretary Bulatao
and Mr. Cooper, that President, the President has personal,
just personal will to remove an IG at will. Is that correct?
Everybody is in agreement with that?
Mr. Bulatao. Yes, sir. It is his authority.
Mr. Yoho. It is his authority.
Mr. String, and Mr. Cooper, I know you want to say.
Mr. String. His executive authority.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. At his discretion; right?
Does removing an IG due to lack of confidence in that
individual constitute an acceptable, and acceptable reason for
removal of an IG?
Mr. String. Sir, that rationale has been upheld by the
courts.
Mr. Cooper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bulatao. Yes, sir.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. So, we are all in agreement with that. And
that is good because the hypocrisy that we see, or the double
standard when we go back to President Obama when they removed
IG Walpin in 2009, who was investigating, he was the IG for the
Corporation for National Commerce Services, the Federal agency
overseeing organizations like AmeriCorps. And they, AmeriCorps,
was granted by this agency, or AmeriCorps granted to this non-
profit $850,000.
As IG Walpin went through, it was St. HOPE ultimately had
to repay $400,000 because what they found out is St. HOPE was
run by soon-to-be Sacramento Mayor Kevin Johnson, who was a
large donor to the Obama Administration. And they found that
the money had been used. It was supposed to be to help tutor
local students, redevelop some buildings, and enhance theater
and art programs.
Walpin's team found out, however, that the money had been
used instead to pad staff salaries, meddle politically in a
school board election, and have AmeriCorps members perform
personal services for Mr. Johnson, including washing his car,
the Journal reported.
So, when this gets exposed, I think it was Norm Eisen and
Mr. Johnson went after this guy and removed him because they
said that President Obama did not have his full confidence.
So, the hypocrisy we are seeing here today is just
unconscionable. Just it amazes me, this committee is supposed
to be apolitical. We pride ourselves on that. But I am not
seeing it. In fact, I have not seen it this whole year, Mr.
Chairman, and it saddens me.
And so, with what I have heard from you, the relieving of
duty of IG Linick was more than acceptable. It was not
President Trump just did not have confidence in this guy, he
failed to meet the required time period.
Chairman Engel. Will the gentleman finish? The gentleman's
time has expired.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back.
Thank you, gentleman. And I appreciate the job you do.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bulatao, can we just--Bulatao, Okay, thank you--Mr.
Bulatao, the committee asked the Inspector General to review
the false 2019 emergency that the Administration declared to
pursue that $8 billion in arms sales. And since then, we have
learned that the IG's investigative work was largely done by
the end of 2019.
Inside the Department, obviously the buck stops with
Secretary Pompeo, right, he is the one who makes, he is the one
who makes determinations like this about the emergency?
Let me just go on, Mr. Bulatao. Mr. Linick testified that
in this inquiry you, like always, were the gatekeeper for
Secretary Pompeo and that you, as per his testimony, in this
case helped keep the gate shut. He asked in late 2019 for an
interview with the Secretary, and you asked Mr. Linick for the
topic areas he wanted to discuss with the Secretary. That's
right, isn't it? And what were those specific topics that the
IG told you he wanted to discuss?
Mr. Bulatao. Congressman, as I recall that conversation I
asked the IG are there any areas that I can help you with,
which was normal, normal thing I did during our biweekly
meetings.
Mr. Deutch. Right.
Mr. Bulatao. And what he responded to me was, yes, there
is. We are complete, we have completed our investigation of the
Saudi arms sale, except for interviewing the Secretary.
Mr. Deutch. Right. And he----
Mr. Bulatao. My question to him----
Mr. Deutch. Did he, and did he, right, so did he give you
any information on the topics that he wanted.
Mr. Bulatao. My question to him was----
Mr. Deutch. Well, I am just asking you the question. Did he
give you topics that he wanted to discuss with the Secretary?
Mr. Bulatao. Not at that time.
Mr. Deutch. Ever?
Mr. Bulatao. Oh, I can tell you, I can tell you the
circumstances that----
Mr. Deutch. I do not need the whole story. I just want to
know what the topics were that he wanted to discuss with the
Secretary.
Mr. Bulatao. He wanted to discuss the policy decisions that
went into that decision.
Mr. Deutch. Right. Did he want to ask about conflicts of
interest in the emergency declaration process? Was that, did he
tell you that?
Mr. Bulatao. What we ended up doing was----
Mr. Deutch. No, I am just asking. Did he ask?
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. Asking me----
Mr. Deutch. I do not want to know what you ended up doing.
Mr. Bulatao. Asking me to write down questions.
Mr. Deutch. Did he ask you about conflicts of interest?
Mr. Bulatao. The questions were written down and we
provided answers to those.
Mr. Deutch. No, no, I understand. I am asking very
specifically, and I would like you to respond specifically, did
he want to ask about conflicts of interest in the emergency
declaration process?
Mr. Bulatao. I was not involved with those conversations
with the Inspector General. That is what I am trying to tell
you.
Mr. Deutch. Did he want to ask about Jared Kushner's
involvement in the arms sale? Did you know that? Was that made
clear to you at any point?
Mr. Bulatao. I was not involved with conversations with the
IG nor----
Mr. Deutch. You had no idea what he wanted to speak to the
Secretary about?
Mr. Bulatao. I just told you what he wanted to speak to the
Secretary about.
Mr. Deutch. And there was no specific, nothing specific?
Mr. Bulatao. That is what we were asking. That is the
conversation we were having. We were trying to understand that
in order to, in order to schedule the time.
So, what I committed to the IG is help us understand what
you need to ask. We will try and get you the time to go and
meet with the Secretary.
Mr. Deutch. No, no, no, I am not asking--right, I am not
asking about specific questions. I am asking did he raise with
you the topics in any more specificity than you are telling us
now?
Mr. Bulatao. Not, not with me.
Mr. Deutch. With whom then?
Mr. Bulatao. I was not involved in any other----
Mr. Deutch. Was there anyone--the buck stops with the
Secretary. You are going to make the determination about
whether this interview takes place, so, not with you. Is there
anyone that you are aware of that the Inspector General
detailed the subject matter that he wanted to discuss with the
Secretary?
Mr. Bulatao. He provided a list of written questions that
we then subsequently answered upon getting those questions.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. String, are you aware of any of the topics
that he wanted to discuss?
Mr. String. Congressman, as Under Secretary Bulatao----
Mr. Deutch. Are you aware of any, just are you aware of any
of the topics that he, that the Inspector General wanted to
discuss?
Mr. String. He was focusing on the policy decisions,
Congressman.
Mr. Deutch. I understand. With specificity, was there any
specificity?
Did he want to ask about Secretary Pompeo's knowledge that
the Saudis had previously used weapons that the U.S. sold them
to commit possible war crimes? Was that something specific that
might or--that he explained?
Mr. String. Congressman, you are getting into----
Mr. Deutch. Just a yes or no.
Mr. String. You are getting into some internal
deliberations.
Mr. Deutch. I am just asking about the topics. There is
no--I am not asking about deliberations. I am asking did the
Inspector General tell you or anyone that you are aware of at
the State Department that he wanted to discuss with the
Secretary of State whether Secretary Pompeo had knowledge that
the Saudis had previously used weapons that the U.S. sold to
them to commit possible war crimes? Or, did he want to ask
about Jared Kushner's involvement in the arms sales?
I am not worried about deliberations. I want to know
whether you were aware of what he wanted to discuss with the
Secretary. It is just a yes or no question.
It is just a yes or no question.
Mr. String. Thank you, Congressman. So, you are getting
into investigatory questions posed by----
Mr. Deutch. No, I am not. I am not getting into questions.
I am not. I am asking about topics. There is nothing
classified, there is nothing about--I am not asking about
internal deliberations. None of that has anything to do with
the Inspector General simply telling you that these are the
topics he wanted to discuss with the Secretary of State.
Mr. String. Congressman----
Mr. Deutch. And I am asking you whether he gave you those
topics?
Mr. String. Congressman, again, he was looking at the
policy decisions and a time line for----
Mr. Deutch. Did he give you, was there, was there the kind
of specificity that I have asked about? That is all I am
asking. It is a yes or no question.
Mr. String. Congressman, the questions presented by the IG
were focused on the policy deliberations.
Mr. Deutch. I understand. I understand.
I am asking when he came to you, Mr. Bulatao, you are the
gatekeeper. When he wanted to meet with the Secretary of State
did he provide to you, or to Mr. String, or to anyone at the
State Department a list of topics that he wanted to discuss
with the Secretary? I do not want general policies. I want to
know did he give you any of those specifics; yes or no?
Mr. Bulatao. Congressman, my role was not the gatekeeper,
my role----
Mr. Deutch. Yes or no.
Is there anyone on this panel who can answer this question?
It does not seem that difficult. And when all you want to do,
Mr. Chairman, when all you want to do is tell me that he wants
to talk about policies, we, guess what, we know that that is
what he wanted to talk about. And we are trying to figure out
why he was not allowed to do it and why he was ultimately
fired. And you cannot even tell us whether these were the
issues that he wanted to talk about.
If you are aware that he wanted to talk about policy, then
it certainly sounds like you are aware of exactly what those
policies were, and Secretary Pompeo deserves to give the
American people some answers to these questions and some
accountability.
And I yield back.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All that time cutting you off maybe gotten the answer that
they were looking for. He said, you know, ultimately Mr.----
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Kinzinger, I was asking a yes or no
question.
Mr. Kinzinger. I am not going to argue with you about it. I
am just making the point that that was about a 3 minute thing
that if they would have been able to develop maybe you would
have gotten the answer you were looking for.
In terms of why, we want to ultimately get to why he was
fired, I think, sir, you put out a really good reason. And
quite honestly, I think had you not fired him we may be here at
this very moment attacking you for not firing him for not
having everything done on time. And it is the season we are in.
And I appreciate you all being here. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this hearing.
You know, oversight is, of the executive branch is
something we do. It is core to what we do. And I believe we
should be using this precious platform not for politics but for
advancing foreign policy priorities. We have the Russians
meddling in yet more European elections, potentially even in
ours.
Belarus we have going on. Peace deals being signed.
Communist China is continuing to grossly violate the human
rights of the Uyghurs and Hong Kong. Yet, we are using this
time to debate something that past administrations have done,
which is to fire an inspector general for failing to do their
job.
We need this, hopefully maybe after the election, to get
back to focusing on big, important things going on around the
world.
Assistant Secretary Cooper, I want to first start off with
the important role that the Political-Military Affairs Bureau
at the State Department plays in American foreign policy.
How do arms sales support our foreign policy priorities?
And why is it important that the State Department maintains the
authority over arms sales?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman. And it is not just the
authority over arms sales, it is also the authority and the
imprimatur on Title 22 and Title 10 security assistance. So, it
is the whole package.
But, if one looks at arms transfers, arms sales, security
assistance, this would be including of IMET, International
Military Education and Training, all of those things are
implements to actually achieve our foreign policy objectives.
Essentially our chiefs of mission forward, our embassies
forward have a host of toolkit available to them.
These implements that reside within the political-military
portfolio are some of the most significant and some of the most
tangible implements of foreign policy that we provide. They are
often there to make sure that a partner is able to actually,
from a security standpoint, not only provide for their
security, their sovereignty, in many cases there is a shared
burden or shared adversity that they are facing on our behalf.
And in some cases we have partners that are actually
prosecuting on our behalf.
So, if one looks in the whole total of the package of what
is available, it is to enable partners, bring them closer
together. It is also essentially the grandest level of burden
sharing.
But, I would go back to all security assistance, even the
security assistance that resides under the Department of
Defense authority, at the end of the day there is State
Department imprimatur and concurrence on that because we want
to make sure, regardless if it is an excess defense article,
something new, we want to make sure that it actually does
contribute to those ways and means of a strategic end.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, let me ask you something. Do we have
non-friendly competitors out there that could fill this void if
we do not?
Mr. Cooper. We absolutely do.
Mr. Kinzinger. Like who?
Mr. Cooper. Well, if we look from Great Power competition
we are looking at our adversaries, our competitors in places
like Moscow and Beijing. You mentioned them earlier. It is why
we have tailored some of our foreign military assistance, some
of our foreign military financing to encourage partners to come
closer to the United States, to be interoperable with our
forces, to be interoperable with, say, NATO allies. It is why
we have some specialized programs like the CRIF, the Countering
Russian Influence Fund, and a more recent one, the CCIF, the
Countering Chinese Influence Fund.
All of these, again, are part of that broader toolkit that
we make available to our chiefs of mission.
In many cases there is a suite of these tools that also are
tied to arms transfers.
Mr. Kinzinger. Let me ask you, also, real quickly, when you
talk about Yemen, real quick, 200, there has been over 200,000
deaths. The U.N. estimated that nearly 18,000 were combat-
related civilian casualties. How have the Houthis, or how has
Iran attempted to address non-combat-related death?
Mr. Cooper. In an open fora I can tell you very clearly
that there is, as I mentioned in my testimony, there is no
compunction, there is no rule of armed conflict that is being
followed by Tehran. There is none of that by the Houthi rebels.
If anything, we have seen a direct threat to civilian
populace. And that is, again, something I would be happy to
talk to in more detail in a classified space. But do know that
when we talk about the risk to civilians, the risk to civilian
infrastructure, the Houthis, they have no parameters.
Mr. Kinzinger. Excellent.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Chairman, can you hear me?
Chairman Engel. Yes. We can hear you fine.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Since the beginning of the conflict in March 2015 in Yemen
it has clearly risen to a worldwide humanitarian crisis: 24
million people, 12 million children all in humanitarian need,
127,000 dead, 13,500 children targeted. So, I am about to ask
some questions to Mr. Bulatao about documents, about
transparency, about information.
But, I want people to focus on two things, two images: 44
children targeted and killed in a school bus; another image
just within the last 3 months of almost a dozen other children
killed. One strike occurred the celebration of a newborn boy.
He did not survive. He did not live to be 1 week old.
So, with that in mind I would like to ask questions of Mr.
Bulatao, if I have that right. It is Bulatao; is that correct,
Mr. Bulatao?
Mr. Bulatao. That is correct. Bulatao.
Mr. Keating. I just want to get it as correct as I could.
You oversee the State Department's Bureau of
Administration; correct?
Mr. Bulatao. Correct.
Mr. Keating. And that, in part, oversees information
provided to Congress and our requests; correct?
Mr. Bulatao. That is part of the scope of responsibility,
sir.
Mr. Keating. Indeed, it includes the congressional Document
Production unit; correct?
Mr. Bulatao. Correct.
Mr. Keating. And this was started under the Obama
Administration at the request on concerns with Benghazi. They
reprogrammed $4 million so to be able to respond quickly to
congressional investigations. And, indeed, then Congressman
Pompeo, part of the Benghazi Committee, sought thousands and
thousands of documents produced.
Does that congressional document unit still exist today?
Mr. Bulatao. It is an element within the A Bureau that,
again, has responsibility for document production----
Mr. Keating. Okay.
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. To share with the relevant----
Mr. Keating. The State Department, indeed, the State
Department told us it had spent $8.1 million on this department
since it was established. So, let's take a second to see what
the American people are getting for their money.
How many documents has the State Department produced in
response to this committee's questions into the President's
communications with Vladimir Putin?
Mr. Bulatao. Congressman, I do not know what the actual
numbers are on that. I am happy to take that question for the
record and respond back.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. These questions, and if you do
not know, that is fine.
How about our request into the intelligence surrounding
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, how many documents
were produced at our request?
Mr. Bulatao. Congressman, again, for specific topics you
want I am happy to take those questions for the record.
Mr. Keating. All right. How many documents did the
Department produce pursuant to a subpoena issued around the
delay in arms production for Ukraine, suffering under Russian
aggression? How many?
Mr. Bulatao. Well, let me, let me speak more broadly,
Congressman.
Mr. Kinzinger. So, let me just finish this set, because I
think I will help you out.
What is the total number of documents at our request
related to security threats against Ambassador Masha
Yovanovitch? How many?
Mr. Bulatao. Again, Mr. Congressman, our team produces
thousands of documents----
Mr. Keating. All right. All right.
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. Every year on behalf----
Mr. Keating. If you do not know we cannot----
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. Of Congress in order----
Mr. Keating. How about our request for diplomatic cables?
Sir, this should be, this should be an easy one. I will get to
it at the end.
Our request for diplomatic cables regarding the COVID-19
virus, what about those documents?
Mr. Bulatao. Those requests----
Mr. Keating. Same answer?
How about our request for documents on the decision to
withdraw from the World Health Organization?
Mr. Bulatao. Again, Mr. Congressman, if you would allow me
to answer, what I am going to tell you again, our team produces
thousands and thousands of documents every year.
Mr. Keating. Okay, Okay. Well, I will tell you again, this
is the answer from the committee, tell me if I am wrong. How
many pages has the Department produced about the firing of this
Inspector General that we requested a month-and-a-half ago?
Now, I want to tell you why I am surprised you do not know
the answer to this question, because your team does not have to
do much research. The answer is zero documents produced to this
committee. Zero. That should not take a team-backed approach to
calculate that.
So that State has spent $8 million on a unit you oversee,
and the purpose is to produce documents to Congress, yet you
produced zero documents on key oversight investigations by the
House committee with the primary jurisdiction over the State
Department operations.
And yet, Secretary Pompeo got to work rushing documents
immediately, after the day the impeachment trial ended, to a
Senate investigation, blatantly political, President Trump's
political opponent. This was even raising bipartisan concerns
in the Senate, a smear built on Russian disinformation, a
scheme which Russian agents were involved in, friends with Rudi
Giuliani, were trying to assist. And how many pages for that
investigation?
And I do not think you will know the answer to this so I
will give it to you. Your team could do some work and find this
because the answer is now up to over 16,000 pages for that.
Zero for all our requests as a committee.
And this committee has made it clear we are not going to
stand for the Secretary of State, Secretary Pompeo, which is
staffed by, overseeing a staff of dedicated, non-partisan
professionals, to become used to select for campaign purposes.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Chairman, I will ask unanimous consent to
place the rest of my statement in the record and ask Mr.
Bulatao how the irony occurs that you failed--you fired Mr.
Linick for not providing information, yet you are not providing
core information and, indeed, sir, under that criteria you
established you should be fired yourself.
And I yield back.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Zeldin.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It would have been nice if Mr. Bulatao was able to give any
of his answers just now as we were listening to my colleagues
working their way down the 2020 resistance bingo card of words:
Ukraine, Yovanovitch, Russia, Putin. I think it would be nice
if Mr. Bulatao was actually able to speak.
This committee remains obsessed with irresponsible,
reckless, and hyper partisan attempts to take down this
Administration at any cost, including last year's impeachment
debacle, which we just heard reference, and now with this
charade desperately trying to score cheap dishonest political
points at the expense of Secretary Pompeo.
It is sad that this once great committee had been
embarrassing itself with the tactics and rhetoric during this
probe, dividing this committee, dividing Congress, and dividing
our country.
I have participated in almost all of the transcribed
interviews that your colleagues have agreed to have with the
committee from the very beginning of this investigation.
The committee interviews, under oath, revealed that no one
who testified spoke to Secretary Pompeo about the
investigations of the arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Susan
Pompeo's travel.
Secretary Pompeo himself has said he was not aware of
ongoing investigations in his correspondence with this
committee. There is zero evidence, zero evidence, supporting
the conspiracy theory that the Secretary was aware or attempted
to influence in any way the IG's ongoing investigations.
Mr. Bulatao's opening statement clearly lays out the poor
job IG Linick had done in investigating the Brian Hook leak. On
September 13th, 2019, the Daily Beast published an article
entitled ``State IG Set to Recommend Discipline for Trump's Top
Iran Hand.''
This article was leaked from an ongoing IG investigation
into political retaliation against career employees at the
State Department. Leaks have been a major issue in this
Administration and IG Linick, clearly, did not take it
seriously enough.
Mr. Linick exhibited inappropriate behavior under his own
IG rules when he purposefully withheld the IG's report
investigating a leak into his office from the department for
inconsistent reasons.
First, he said that he did not share with the department
because no one followed up. Then he said he did not share with
the department because he wanted to tell Deputy Secretary
Biegun in person. And then he cited COVID-19.
As Mr. Bulatao lays out in this opening statement, Mr.
Linick failed to carry out the core mission of the IG.
According the IG Linick, he had asked the former DoD inspector
general to conduct an internal investigation after being told
by the Council on Inspector General on Integrity and Efficiency
and two other IG offices that they could not conduct the
investigation.
It seems to me that if there is an investigation into an
IG's office, that IG should not be the one shopping around for
someone to investigate their office.
When the report was finalized, Mr. Bulatao, did Mr. Linick
send you a copy of it as you requested?
Mr. Bulatao. No, he did not.
Mr. Zeldin. Did you ever speak to Secretary Pompeo about
the IG's ongoing investigations?
Mr. Bulatao. No, I did not.
Mr. Zeldin. Bottom line, it was not possible for Secretary
Pompeo to fire Mr. Linick because of the ongoing investigation
since he had no knowledge of this work by the IG.
As you lay out in your testimony, Mr. Bulatao, there are
numerous reasons you recommended firing Mr. Linick, and again,
it is appropriate to reiterate that the president has the
authority to hire and fire appointed personnel.
This whole House Foreign Affairs Committee investigation
has been nothing more than a fishing expedition and the
Democrats are still sitting here today with nothing at the end
of their hook.
I appreciate all the witnesses for being here to testify
today. I hope after today this issue is finally closed. And no,
as far as calling on Secretary to resign, I actually think it
would be fantastic to sit here and say, thank you, Secretary
Pompeo, for all of the progress.
It was yesterday's announcement. It was killing Qasem
Soleimani, killing Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, eliminating ISIS
caliphate, moving the embassy in Israel to Jerusalem,
recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights,
withdrawing from the fatally flawed Iran nuclear deal, getting
the Taylor Force Act signed into law. That is just the Middle
East and that is just a recap of some of it.
I do not want to see Secretary Pompeo fired. I want to say,
thank you, Secretary Pompeo, and to all of you I wish that you
were not here so you could go back and just do your darn jobs
making America greater than ever.
I yield back.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Bera.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is pretty rich to hear my Republican colleagues talk
about this but, I appreciate the fact that I heard Mr.
Kinzinger say our main job is to do oversight, and that is our
main job.
The reason why I love the United States is our founding on
the rule of law spelled out in the Constitution, which talks
about the checks and balances.
I am not a lawyer but I would like to ask Mr. String a
couple questions since he is a lawyer and it is accurate, I
believe, for me to portray Mr. String as the lead legal counsel
and the acting legal counsel for the L Bureau.
So I know the rules that we are held in Congress under that
suggest we have to keep all our documents, emails, et cetera,
that pertain to policy decisions that we make and how we arrive
at those decisions.
There is communication that happens on Gmail we have got to
make sure those are--those are also catalogued, especially
around policy decisions and how we make those decisions.
And I know my Republican colleagues certainly know that
even after a Secretary of State leaves office, it is still our
responsibility to conduct oversight because that is what they
did with former Secretary of State Clinton. They even set up a
special committee to do investigation of correspondence, et
cetera, because they understood that.
So, Mr. String, as lead legal counsel, and this is really
for all the State Department employees, you know, whether it is
5 months from now or 5 years from now, there will be an
administration that will want to look back and identify
documents, correspondence, et cetera, that led to policy
decisions.
Mr. String, is it your recommendation that every State
Department employee, absent the Secretary of State, keep those
documents? They do not destroy any of those documents; they
keep correspondence and emails, and that would be the letter of
the law?
[No response.]
Mr. Bera. Mr. String?
Mr. String. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes. As you know, document preservation is something we
take very seriously under the Federal Records Act, and so we
take significant steps to ensure compliance with that.
Mr. Bera. So if there's a transition to a new
administration 5 months from now, any employee that were
destroying legal records, documentation, corresponding--
correspondence as it pertains to policy decisions and
deliberations. Again, whether that is on the Gmail server or
elsewhere, that would be illegal.
Is that correct, Mr. String?
Mr. String. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
So destruction of documents would not be something that
would be consistent with the Federal Records Act.
Mr. Bera. I guess let me clarify. Would it be illegal to
destroy documents?
Mr. String. To destroy Federal records that were required
to be preserved under the Federal Records Act? That would be
inconsistent with the law.
Mr. Bera. Okay. So, again, just the message to any State
Department Employees, you know, oversight does not stop when an
administration leaves. We will continue to conduct oversight.
We will continue to look into how decisions were arrived to
better understand those decisions. You know, hopefully, there
is nothing there.
But the fact that we have not been able to get the
administration to work with us to talk about, you know, the
rationale behind going around Congress for the Saudi arms
sales, who approved and wrote those decisions, who cleared
those decisions, that is something, legitimately, if we have an
administration that is willing to cooperate with us, we can go
back and look at.
And, again, for every State Department employee, you know,
we just heard from lead legal counsel that says any destruction
of documents, any destruction of correspondence, even if it's
on your personal Gmail server or Gmail account, would be
considered illegal and, you know, we certainly will be looking
into that. That is of concern.
I am out of time. So, again, I will yield back to the
chairman.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Titus.
[No response.]
Chairman Engel. Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. I just lost you for a second. Thank you.
Chairman Engel. I did not want to lose you.
Ms. Titus. Yes. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
I have listened with interest to all the discussion about
the inspector general. I just want to return to the Madison
dinners for a little while. They are making the news again.
I think many of you probably saw this article that was in
the paper. These are dinners, so-called Madison dinners, in the
Madison Room that are hosted by the Secretary and his wife.
They are restarting this week and they are using taxpayer
money.
So I would like to present some statistics that have been
reported in press accounts. Twenty-nine percent of the invitees
came from the corporate world.
Another 25 percent came from the media, which was mostly
conservative media. Just 14 percent were diplomats or foreign
officials and those names seemed to be interchangeable.
Finally, every single member of the House or Senate who has
been invited is a Republican. Roughly, two dozen of these
dinners have been held since April 2018 when Mr. Pompeo took
office as Secretary of State and at least three more are
planned to be held not at the Madison Room but at the Blair
House.
Does that sound accurate to you, I would ask your
witnesses?
Mr. Bulatao. Congresswoman, I do not have access nor do I--
am involved in any of the invitations or the execution of the
Madison dinners.
Ms. Titus. And I believe that may be the point. But we do
not have any indication that Democratic members have ever
attended these or--we've been hearing about how foreign policy
is not supposed to be political. Politics--partisan politics
stop at the country's border, at the water's edge. How many
times we have heard that.
We have heard our Republicans criticize us this morning for
making this political, and yet no Democratic members have
attended these or been invited as far as we know. Is that
correct?
Mr. Bulatao. Let me--let me make this comment on it. I
think American foreign policy is uniquely a reflection of the
broad spectrum of American society.
Secretary Pompeo recognizes the strongest foreign policy--
--
Ms. Titus. I appreciate that. I appreciate that. A yes or
no--yes or no. I am sorry. Yes or no, any Democrats have been
at this--these dinners that are supposed to be about foreign
policy?
Mr. Bulatao. Again, Congresswoman----
Ms. Titus. I think the answer is no.
Mr. Bulatao. Congresswoman, I do not have that answer----
Ms. Titus. All right. I guess you----
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. Because I am not involved in the
Madison dinners.
Ms. Titus. Okay. Well, is anybody there at the table
involved in these dinners?
[No response.]
Ms. Titus. Apparently no, so----
Mr. Cooper. No, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. Okay. Well, we had Toni Porter before this
committee and she was involved in the dinners. She was the
former person who planned fundraisers for Mr. Pompeo's
campaigns and now she plans these Madison dinners.
Her recollection is that aside from Mr. Pompeo himself
there were no State Department diplomats or foreign experts at
any of these dinners. She said usually it was just herself and
a protocol officer. They set up the dinner but they did not go
behind the closed doors.
However, it did take a lot of foreign--State Department
staff because you had caterers, security officers, facilities
management to set these up.
So it took a lot of time and effort, and many of the--talk
about morale, many of the people at the State Department did
not think this was an appropriate use of their time.
Who did attend these dinners, however, was Mrs. Pompeo, and
I believe you know the answer to this even though you were not
involved, she is not a State Department employee. Is that
correct?
Mr. Bulatao. Mrs. Pompeo is not a State Department
employee. But as the spouse of the Secretary, she is involved
in many official functions and representational events.
Ms. Titus. Okay. And yet, she had all the information from
the dinners and the people who attended the dinners sent to her
personal email. Is that correct?
Mr. Bulatao. I could not hear your question, Congresswoman.
Could you please repeat?
Ms. Titus. All right. I said and even though she is not a
member of the State Department, not an employee of the State
Department, she had all of the information from the people who
attended these dinners sent to her personal email. Was that--
maybe that was for a Christmas card list or something. I do not
know. Is that correct?
Mr. Bulatao. Congresswoman, it would not be--as the host,
as part of the host team for a representational event, for Mrs.
Pompeo attending that event with the Secretary to know who was
going to be at any event.
So all events like that in terms of representational,
whether they are domestic or overseas, it would be appropriate
to send the list of attendees.
Ms. Titus. Even though she is not an employee and we do not
know what information was included that was sent to her besides
addresses and names to put in her personal Rolodex, perhaps to
use for a future political campaign for Mr. Pompeo.
But do not you think it is a little odd that we also heard
that no information was prepared for Mr. Pompeo for these
dinners?
No briefings, no facts, no figures, nothing to use to
explain the State Department's work or what they were doing in
a particular country, which was allegedly the function of these
dinners? Nobody did any of that? They did not really care about
talking about any of that?
Mr. Bulatao. Congresswoman----
Ms. Titus. Do you think that is appropriate? Don't you
think that is a little odd?
Mr. Bulatao. The Secretary is well-versed on a multitude of
foreign policy issues. That is his job as our lead diplomat.
I believe these events are a valuable opportunity to
educate disparate elements of our society about current foreign
policies and to introduce foreign diplomats to Americans. I
think they serve a useful function.
Chairman Engel. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Ms. Titus. Especially for movie stars and press and all
that. But let us also remember, and I will yield back in just a
second, Mr. Chairman. These are--these dinners are paid for by
taxpayers. They pay for these dinners.
And yet, I wonder what taxpayers' benefit is from these
dinners hosted for Mr. Pompeo and Mrs. Pompeo to make political
contacts for their future. When they were looked into, shortly
thereafter that is when the firing of this inspector general
occurred.
And I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Engel. Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The chairman, in his opening statement, laid out a pattern
of corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement occurring at the
Trump State Department, and as I was listening it seemed more
like examples from dictatorships around the world that our
country has a history of condemning.
And in the face of staggering evidence of misconduct and
lawlessness, it is important we take a moment to applaud the
men and women at the State Department who continue to serve as
this Administration erodes our standing in the world, works
around enacted legislation to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, or
fires those brave enough to investigate their wrongdoing.
So, Secretary Bulatao, I want to begin with you. I want to
ask you some statement--about some statements Secretary Pompeo
made. When the Secretary was asked about whether he knew the
fired inspector general was investigating him, he claimed that
he had no knowledge of this.
Here is what he told the Washington Post: ``It is not
possible. My recommendation to the president was based on any
effort to retaliate for any investigation that was going on or
is currently going on because I simply do not know.
I am not briefed on it so it is simply not possible for
this to be an act of retaliation. End of story.'' That was the
end of his quote.
That was not true, was it? Because there were two
investigations the IG was doing of the Secretary. One involved
his role in bypassing a congressional prohibition on arms sales
to Saudi Arabia, and as the New York Times revealed, Secretary
Pompeo knew that the inspector general was investigating this
issue because the inspector general had asked to interview him
and Secretary Pompeo refused and instead chose to answer
written questions.
So it is indisputable that Secretary Pompeo knew about this
investigation.
The other investigation was examining whether Secretary
Pompeo and his wife abused his office by asking State
Department employees to run personal errands for them.
Mr. Linick, the inspector general, told the committee that
he spoke to you and Deputy Secretary Biegun in late 2019 about
the fact that his staff would be requesting documents from the
office of the Secretary related to the alleged misuse of
government resources by Secretary Pompeo and his wife.
And he said he told you this so that you and the Secretary
would not be surprised and would understand why they were
requesting those documents. Mr. Linick testified under oath,
under the penalty of false statement, rather, when he told the
committee this.
So my first question, Mr. Bulatao, was Mr. Linick lying
when he told the committee that he spoke with you about this
investigation in 2019 months before he was fired?
That is a yes or a no.
Mr. Bulatao. No. Let me make----
Mr. Cicilline. Okay. So he was not lying?
Mr. Bulatao. No. No. Let me clarify to the question there.
Mr. Linick never talked to me about that in 2019. No, he
did not talk to me about that.
Mr. Cicilline. Okay. So, Mr. Bulatao, I find this very hard
to believe. Secretary Pompeo is one of your oldest and closest
friends. You have known him since your days at West Point. You
were business partners.
And you are asking this committee to accept that you
cannot--that you did not, in fact, have a conversation with the
inspector general where you were told that he was conducting an
investigation of a person close--one of your closest friends
for abusing his office. I find that very hard to believe.
Now, Mr. Linick also requested----
[Simultaneous speaking]
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. To the Congress.
Mr. Cicilline. You said he did not speak to you. I do not
believe you. Mr. Linick then requested documents for his
investigation of Secretary Pompeo's misuse of staff.
You were aware of these document requests, correct?
Mr. Bulatao. No.
Mr. Cicilline. You were not--you were not aware that
document requests were made of the Secretary?
Mr. Bulatao. No. What I--what I was aware of was that the
inspector general was conducting a preliminary inquiry on
travel----
Mr. Cicilline. Okay. So change the word. Preliminary
inquiry, which is another word for investigation, of the
Secretary, correct?
Mr. Bulatao. No. The topic that I was informed of, and I
received an email from the IG's office, was they were
conducting a preliminary inquiry on official travel.
Mr. Cicilline. And did you tell Mr. Pompeo that he and his
wife were under investigation for allegedly misusing State
Department staff?
Mr. Bulatao. No, sir.
Mr. Cicilline. Again, I find that difficult to believe,
sir.
Again, Mr. Pompeo is one of your closest friends.
Mr. Bulatao, did you--Secretary Pompeo has said that he
recommended to President Trump that Mr. Linick be removed from
office. This was a big step for the Secretary to take. I
presume he discussed it with you.
Mr. Bulatao. The Secretary mentioned that he was going to
make a recommendation to the president sometime in early April.
Mr. Cicilline. And I presume, Mr. Bulatao, that when he
made that--when you had that conversation with Secretary Pompeo
you must have thought to yourself, oh my goodness, this will
look bad. If you fire an inspector general who is investigating
you and your wife for misconduct it will look bad. And you must
have given him some advice or at least told him about that.
Mr. Bulatao. Again, Congressman, you keep alluding to that
I knew about some kind of investigation about----
Mr. Cicilline. But you just said you knew about a
preliminary inquiry.
Mr. Bulatao. About travel. That's what I told you. About
travel.
Mr. Cicilline. An investigation----
Mr. Bulatao. And I welcome an investigation about travel.
It is good. We got to make sure we get travel right. So that
was not an issue.
There was no issue about the IG investigating travel. None
whatsoever, although I was surprised when the Secretary
mentioned that he was going to do that because I was surprised
it took him that long.
Mr. Cicilline. Well, Mr. Bulatao, what you are saying----
[Simultaneous speaking]
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. Performance.
Mr. Cicilline [continuing]. To be frank with you, just does
not add up. We know that Mr. Pompeo was not telling the truth
when he denied knowing about the IG's arms sales investigation.
I think he is also misleading the public when he denies
knowing about the investigation of his misuse of State
Department employees----
Mr. Bulatao. I think it's outrageous that you are calling
the Secretary of State a liar.
Mr. Cicilline [continuing]. Just as he tried to obfuscate
the reasons around Mr. Linick's firing and stymie everyone
except his best friend from coming forward, coming to Congress
to tell us what happened.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Castro.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen,
for being here, for your testimony today.
Since the beginning of his presidency's term, many of us
have been very concerned about President Trump's undermining of
the rule of law, including his use of the State Department and
the Secretary of State to do it, and also his disregard for the
oversight function of the legislative branch and that is why I
believe you see a lot of the questions that you have been
fielded today.
And you all made the point that one of your chief
complaints with Inspector General Linick was that he was not
providing you the information that you needed to do your jobs.
I am saying that you all so far are not providing us the
information that we need to do our jobs and in so doing are
probably permanently changing the balance of power between the
executive branch and the legislative branch by burying
everything in either disregard or forcing everything to go to
court.
So I sent a letter to the department on August 25th raising
a number of questions regarding the use of department resources
to facilitate the Secretary's speech to the RNC including on
issues that are directly under your purview, Mr. Bulatao, such
as the use of staff time--such as the use of staff on official
time for that purpose, and I have yet to get answers from the
department.
I want to ask you today whether you will commit to this
committee that you will provide answers to those questions and
provide a full accounting of the expenses incurred during the
Secretary's travel to Israel.
Now, before you answer, I want to say this. If you have
nothing to hide, why do not you call provide us the information
that we are looking for?
If it is clear that nothing was done wrong, why not send
over the documents that we have requested? Again, this is
consistent with a string of what I would consider an abuse of
ignoring the legislative branch, and the temptation then is the
next time you get either a Republican or a Democratic president
that the executive branch is going to make--is going to issue
the same abuses.
And also before you answer the question, please know that I
am requesting two things: No. 1, that whatever documents
pertaining to that inquiry exist that they be protected and not
destroyed at any time, and second, if we do not wrap this
investigation up, because I am chair of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations for this committee, I am going to
ask this committee to make sure that those investigations
continue past November and past January.
With that, please.
Mr. Bulatao. Congressman Castro, again, we take very
serious the role of oversight for this committee. I will work
with our legislative affairs team to understand where the
status of that document request is.
I will also note that the Secretary of State himself made
known that his remarks were in no way used any resources from
the department. It was in his personal capacity and no
resources from the department were used in him making those
remarks.
But I will followup and understand where that document
request is and we will continue to work to comply with our
oversight requirement.
Mr. Castro. And I understand that he--that he issued that
statement and I respect that statement. But as you know, this
is not just about one person's word. We are entitled to engage
in an oversight function and we have not been provided the
documents and the resources that we need to do our jobs.
So I am asking you, please give us what we need.
All right. You know, I want to ask Mr. String, because it
remains stunning to me that Mr. Pompeo recorded a speech for
the RNC while he was on official travel in Jerusalem. In fact,
it shattered decades-long norms that have kept our diplomats in
the State Department out of politics.
In fact, this raised such serious concerns that, as
chairman of the Oversight Committee, I raised a number of
questions to the department about this abuse.
But we have also learned in October and November 2019
President Trump asked the Secretary to speak at one of his
campaign rallies. Apparently, the Secretary wanted to but,
ultimately, backed down in light of the existing guidance.
Is this correct?
Mr. String. Congressman, thank you--thank you for the
question and I will echo what the under secretary said about
our commitment to responding to the committee's request.
So as I recall, there was a period in 2019 when that issue
that you raised came up and it was reviewed.
Mr. Castro. So the issue did arise? That request was made
by the president to the Secretary of State?
Mr. String. I do not know the details of it, Congressman.
My recollection is that it was an issue.
Mr. Castro. Okay. With that, I am out of time. I yield
back.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I have criticized both the Obama and Trump Administrations
for supporting a Saudi-led military coalition that has
committed multiple war crimes in Yemen. This is not a partisan
issue. It is a moral issue and a criminality issue.
I previously served active duty in the military as a JAG,
and one of my responsibilities was to advice commanders on the
law of armed conflict. It is clear to me that officials in the
State Department and the Department of Defense have potential
legal liability for aiding and abetting war crimes.
That is one reason that on December 16 the Obama
Administration halted a shipment of precision guided munitions
to Saudi Arabia, because they realized the Saudis were using
these very precise weapons to precisely target and kill
civilians at funerals, wedding parties, civilian marketplaces,
hospitals, and recently a school bus filled with children.
Unfortunately, the Trump Administration reversed this sale
and these are the kinds of weapons being used in war crimes
that Mr. Cooper and Mr. String worked so hard to let Secretary
Pompeo and Donald Trump bypass congressional oversight.
And now we learned this past Monday the New York Times has
confirmed what some of us were told, that in 2016 State
Department lawyers wrote a memo that concluded, quote,
``American officials could plausibly be charged with war
crimes,'' unquote.
So, Mr. String, I have been asking for a copy of this memo
for years. Let me ask you, have you read that 2016 memo?
[No response.]
Mr. Lieu. Would you like me to repeat my question, Mr.
String?
Mr. String. No, Congressman. Thank you for the question.
To the best of my recollection, the first time I read about
a 2016 memo was in the press a few days ago.
Mr. Lieu. So you were not aware that the inspector general
got a copy of this 2016 memo as the Daily Beast had reported?
Mr. String. Congressman, in 2016 it was, obviously, under
the previous administration. So I was not in the State
Department at that point. To the best of my recollection,
again, I do not recall hearing about a 2016 memo until I read
it in the press.
Mr. Lieu. Okay.
Mr. Bulatao, were you aware of this 2016 memo?
Mr. Bulatao. Again, I was confirmed as the under secretary
May 19 and I am not aware of this 2016 memo.
Mr. Lieu. Okay.
And Mr. Cooper, the New York Times reported that some of
the folks in the political and military bureau had already seen
this memo. Have you seen this memo?
Mr. Cooper. No, Mr. Lieu. But I want to go back to the
beginning of the hearing today where I cited the Trump
Administration reaffirming a previous executive order to
actually commit to enabling and training to prevent civilian
casualties and also citing, going back to spring of 2018, for
the updated conventional arms transfer policy which
specifically addresses the need to mitigate and reduce the risk
of civilian casualties.
So as far as addressing the issue, yes, I am very familiar
with it, which is why we have developed the advanced targeting
initiative per the direction of President Trump and his
conventional arms transfer policy.
So the issue is not new. As you noted, it is one that has
vexed several administrations and the work continues.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. First, I thank you for those efforts.
I note that since the spring of 2018 it actually have not
worked because that school bus filled with children was very
precisely struck by precision-guided munition.
Now, I have a question related to what the OIG also said.
The OIG found that the State Department failed to fully assess
risks and implement mitigation measures to reduce civilian
casualties and legal concerns associated with the transfer of
precision-guided munitions included in the Secretary's May 2019
emergency certification.
Do you agree with the OIG's findings? And if you do not,
why not?
Mr. Cooper. What I said we agreed to is that more could be
done. There certainly had been assessment to that point. In
fact, we remind the committee that before the emergency
certification process and decision point the work on all these
cases, the interagency assessment on the applicability, the
requirements that were needed for our partners in Saudi Arabia,
in the United Emirates, and in Jordan had been addressed and
had been notified to Congress.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. I would additionally request----
Mr. Cooper. What I added is that the work--there is
additional work that needs to be done, Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Lieu [continuing]. Please read the memo. All three
witnesses, please read that 2016 memo, and the second request
is please give Congress a copy of that memo.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our
witnesses, thank you for being with us today.
I would like to speak about Secretary Pompeo's senior
advisor, Toni Porter, who voluntarily sat for a transcribed
interview before this committee and answered our questions
about the Secretary's misuse of official resources, a topic
about which she also spoke to the IG about.
Mr. Bulatao, how long have you known Ms. Porter and what
are her official duties?
Mr. Bulatao. I have known Ms. Porter for probably, roughly,
5 years.
Mr. Phillips. Okay. And her official duties?
Mr. Bulatao. She serves as a special advisor to the
Secretary. In that role, her role is to help maximize the
productivity and the impact of the Secretary as our lead
foreign policy expert on behalf of the American people.
Mr. Phillips. Okay. So she works for the State Department,
not the Pompeos personally? Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Bulatao. She is an employee of the State Department.
Mr. Phillips. Okay. And taxpayers pay her salary, over
$140,000----
Mr. Bulatao. Yes.
Mr. Phillips [continuing]. A year? That is correct?
Okay. I am sure you know, Mr. Bulatao, that as a public
employee, government employee, that she has a legal
obligation--Ms. Porter, that is--to, quote, ``use her official
time in an honest effort to perform official duties,'' end
quote, which to all of us means when the government is paying
you, you have to be working for the government.
So my question is Mrs. Pompeo, the Secretary's wife, is not
a government employee. So running errands for her could not be
considered an official duty. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Bulatao. Mrs. Pompeo is not a government employee. That
is a fair statement.
Mr. Phillips. So running an errand for her would not be
considered an official duty?
Mr. Bulatao. Who was running the errand? I am not clear.
Mr. Phillips. In this case, we are speaking about Ms.
Porter.
Mr. Bulatao. Yes. What----
Mr. Phillips. Any public--let me ask, any public employee
running an errand for an executive branch official.
Mr. Bulatao. Well, again, what public employees choose to
do on their own time, if it is not violating their work matters
or any of the guidelines that we placed out would be up to
them.
Mr. Phillips. But running official--running errands for
officials is not considered an official duty.
Mr. String, let me ask you, it would not be considered
legal to--for the Secretary or anyone at the State Department
to direct Ms. Porter to do work for Mrs. Pompeo. Is that
correct?
Would it be legal for the Secretary or anyone else at the
State Department to direct Ms. Porter to do work for Susan
Pompeo?
Mr. String. You are asking a hypothetical question?
Mr. Phillips. No, just a yes or no question.
Mr. String. I have not reviewed the--well, I have not
reviewed the transcript and I think it would depend on a lot of
factors.
Mr. Phillips. I am not asking about the transcript. Is it--
is it legal for the Secretary or anyone at the State Department
to direct Ms. Porter to do work for Susan Pompeo? Plain and
simple, yes or no. This is not a hard question.
Mr. String. Again, Congressman----
Mr. Phillips. It might be hard question for you.
Mr. String [continuing]. The transcript was just released.
I have not----
Mr. Phillips. We all know the answer.
Mr. String [continuing]. I have not reviewed the
transcript.
Mr. Phillips. I am not asking about the transcript, Mr.
String. You know what I am asking. It is a yes or no question
you are unwilling to answer. We all know the answer.
You know that the law provides that, quote, ``an employee
shall not encourage, direct, coerce, or request a subordinate
to use official time to perform activities other than those
required in the performance of official duties or authorized in
accordance with law or regulation.'' That is how the law reads.
Ms. Porter testified she arranges private dinners for the
Pompeos and their family.
So, Mr. String, another question. If that is true, is that
an appropriate use of Ms. Porter's time when she is on the
clock? Arranging private dinners.
Mr. String. Congressman, again, you are referring to, I
believe, items in a transcript that I have not had the chance
to review.
Mr. Phillips. I am just--I am asking a yes--Mr. String, I
am making it so easy. A yes or no question. Is that legal? In
that hypothetical, is that legal?
Mr. String. Congressman, I appreciate your question and I
know----
Mr. Phillips. You will not answer the question.
Mr. String [continuing]. I understand what you are asking.
But this is a--you are asking for a legal conclusion about a
transcript----
Mr. Phillips. I am asking for a simple answer.
Mr. String [continuing]. That I have not reviewed.
Mr. Phillips. Every one of us in this entire city knows the
answer to the question, apparently other than you. It has been
reported that in exchange for her six-figure government salary
that Ms. Porter walks Mrs. Pompeo's dog and drives the dog to
doggy daycare.
One more question, Mr. Stringer. Are these appropriate
activities for a State Department official to be doing on the
clock of the taxpayer? One more opportunity.
Mr. String. Again, Congressman, I have not reviewed the
transcript. I do not know the specifics. But what a State
Department employee chooses to do on his or her personal time--
--
Mr. Phillips. You have said this--with all due respect,
sir, you have said the same thing five times in a row.
Lisa Kenna, the executive secretary who assists Mr. Pompeo
in his actual job, claimed in her interview with the committee
that she and the diplomats who work for her only assist Mrs.
Pompeo when she is formally invited to official events or
travel for protocol purposes.
But just this weekend the media reported the Mrs. Pompeo
was demanding that Ms. Porter spend her official time at work
sending out the Pompeo's personal Christmas cards.
So the beat goes on. You know, I--gentlemen, it is hard for
all of us to go back to our districts at a time like this with
COVID, people struggling so mightily having to make ends meet
and explain to them why our Secretary of State cannot do what
everybody else does, which is either find the time to do it
themselves but, certainly, not on the taxpayers' dime.
I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Omar.
Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman.
In 2016, the Saudi targeted a funeral in Sanaa, Yemen,
killing a hundred civilians. The Saudi government admitted to
this in a press statement, said that they did this without
taking any precautionary measures to ensure the location was
not a civilian one.
Mr. String, were you--are you aware of this?
Mr. String. Congresswoman, what timeframe was that?
Ms. Omar. 2016.
Mr. String. I was not in the government at that period of
time.
Ms. Omar. That was not the question, sir. I asked if you
are aware of it.
Mr. String. I have--Congresswoman, I have a vague
recollection of that, although I was not in government. I was
in private legal practice at the time. But I----
Ms. Omar. Thank you.
How about Mr. Cooper?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I can say in my previous capacity in the National Security
Enterprise before going over to the Department of State----
Ms. Omar. It is just a yes or no question. I do not have
too much time.
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. I was acutely aware of Houthi
actions in Yemen dating back years.
Ms. Omar. Were you aware--were you aware of this, yes or
no?
Mr. Cooper. I was aware of the Houthi threat and the--and
the cause of the ongoing civil war that did bring the death and
displacement of Houthis.
Ms. Omar. Were you aware of--were you aware of the actions
of Saudi Arabia in killing a hundred civilians and not taking
precautionary actions and admitting to it? That is the
question, yes or no.
Mr. Cooper. So the--the answer to your question is we could
do better on mitigating civilian casualties, full stop. No one
is arguing that.
Ms. Omar. So I would take that as a yes. The Obama----
Mr. Cooper. But to a specificity about a particular entity
in 1916 I cannot--I cannot answer that.
Ms. Omar. I reclaim my time. The Obama Administration
suspended sales of certain weapons including precisionary-
guided missiles because they were afraid that this hardware
will be used to kill civilians.
In 2017, the Trump Administration decided to resume the
arms sales. It sought unique written assurance from Saudis that
they would comply with the law of war.
Mr. String, are you familiar with this?
Mr. String. Congresswoman----
Ms. Omar. Again, yes or no.
Mr. String. Congresswoman, I believe this veers into
potentially classified material. So I am not comfortable
talking further about that item.
Ms. Omar. Okay. So we can assume that the Trump
Administration was also concerned that Saudi Arabia might use
weapons we sell to them to target civilians. Would you consider
targeting civilians as a crime of war, Mr. String?
Mr. String. Congresswoman, the specific targeting and
intentional targeting of civilians would be--would be very
concerning.
Ms. Omar. Concerning or a crime of war? I am confused.
Mr. String. If there was specific intent to target
noncombatants, that would be inconsistent with a variety of
laws.
Ms. Omar. So it seems odd that we should seek those kind of
assurances and making sure that they were not targeting
civilians but we are still selling weapons to them, that they
are confessing to have used to commit such crimes.
Mr. String, can you give me another specific example where
we sought such assurances?
Mr. String. As a--as a general matter, Congresswoman, we
seek assurances from partners for a variety of reasons around
the world and I can say that we are aware of the issues that
you raise.
We take the issues very seriously. It is not just at the
State Department. It is an interagency issue, and I can assure
you that the U.S. Government is focused on continuously and
comprehensively addressing these issues through a variety of
the training measures that Assistant Secretary Cooper mentioned
earlier, including training and other forms of assistance.
Ms. Omar. All right. So with all of that, in June--on June
11th, 2018, the Saudi coalition targeted and destroyed Doctors
Without Borders treatment facility in Yemen, and on August 9th,
2018, using weapons from the United States that we sold to
them, the Saudis targeted a school bus in northern Yemen,
killing dozens of children.
In 2018--June 2018--Senator Menendez had put a hold on
future arms sales to Saudi Arabia because of these concerns of
targeting civilian casualties. Chairman Engel did the same
thing.
Are you aware of this, Mr. String, and do you think these
were legitimate concerns?
Mr. String. Just so I understand, Congresswoman, are you
asking whether I was aware of the concerns expressed by some
Members of Congress?
Ms. Omar. Yes, and the fact that the Saudis targeted and
destroyed the Doctors Without Borders and targeted the school
bus.
Mr. String. Congresswoman, yes, my recollection I was aware
of concerns at that time.
Chairman Engel. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Mr. Bulatao. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Chairman, would it be possible to take a 5-minute
health break? We have been at this for about 3 hours. A quick
5-minute restroom break.
Chairman Engel. Certainly. Five minutes. I think we have
votes coming so that is why we want to speed it. Want to try to
get through the whole thing before the vote. But 5 minutes
recessing.
[Recess.]
Chairman Engel. Okay. We will continue.
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to our panelists for being here.
I have a long convoluted markup. That is why I have been
coming back and forth.
I chair the Government Operations Subcommittee, which has
jurisdiction over inspectors general.
So, Mr. Bulatao, could you describe for us your
understanding of the roles and functions of an IG--of an
inspector general?
Mr. Bulatao. The inspector general reports to the head of
the agency. It is under the direct supervision, according to
the IG Act. They have the responsibility to identify areas of
waste, fraud, and abuse.
They have the mission to conduct independent audits, to
conduct inspections and to conduct investigations, and they
have a strong commitment to be independent of any inappropriate
influence.
Whether that influence is coming from within their agency
or from Congress or from any other place, there is a commitment
to be independent from inappropriate influence.
Mr. Connolly. Would you--would you believe--do you believe
that an IG is subject to a supervisor's review and approval of
the subject matter that IG may be pursuing by way of
investigation?
Mr. Bulatao. Again, the IGs have wide latitude to
investigate lots of areas, and that is my point. They are
independent from any kind of inappropriate influence.
Mr. Connolly. So you, according to Mr. Linick, had
conversations with him, in fact, about the subject matter he
was proposing to or actively investigating. Is that correct?
Mr. Bulatao. Are you referring to a specific subject
matter?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I guess I am starting with the general
and I will get to the particular. But I am following up on your
description and their broad independence, and we are now in the
territory of what is proper and what is not proper about a
supervisor choosing to intervene by way of discussion on the
subject matter of a pending investigation by an IG.
And I asked you--we have testimony from Mr. Linick that you
did have conversations with him about such subject matter and I
am asking you to confirm that that is true, that you had
conversations with him about ongoing investigative matters.
Mr. Bulatao. Mr. Congressman, many times the IG would ask
are there areas that we should look at. So, of course, they
asked for my input----
Mr. Connolly. Did you----
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. On areas that he thought would be
helpful so we could help prioritize what his priorities were in
areas that we thought needed attention.
Mr. Connolly. Quite right. So he approached you to
solicit----
Mr. Bulatao. And--yes, and I----
Mr. Connolly. But the question here is did you go to him?
Because he described some of those conversations that you
initiated with him as, from his perspective, bullying.
Mr. Bulatao. That is a mischaracterization. I can recall
the conversation that I had with IG Linick on that topic. The
exact conversation went along the lines of me asking Mr. Linick
if there are any areas that I could help him on.
Mr. Connolly. Help him?
Mr. Bulatao. Yes. Assist him. I normally do that in our
biweekly----
Mr. Connolly. Was one of those areas the issue of arms
sales to Middle East?
Mr. Bulatao. Yes, in that conversation Mr. Linick described
to me--he said we are complete with the arms sale report. This
would have been in early 2020 timeframe. It may have been at
the very end of the year.
He said, we are complete. We are done. We just need to
finish it by interviewing the Secretary, and I said, great, let
me try and figure out when we could do that, how fast we can do
that.
Help me understand how much time do you need, because the
Secretary is getting ready to go out of town. He is going to be
traveling for multiple weeks straight.
Mr. Connolly. So----
Mr. Bulatao. So my endeavor was to help the IG complete
whatever he needed on the arms sale. That was the first time I
was made aware that there was any such inspection ongoing was
in January or the end of 2019 or early 2020.
Mr. Connolly. So just to be clear on the record because my
time is running out, under oath it is your testimony that you
never bullied Mr. Linick or sought to bully him with respect to
any ongoing investigation. Is that correct?
Mr. Bulatao. That is correct. If asking questions is
bullying, then--there was no bullying going on.
Mr. Connolly. So stipulated. And that you did not seek to
derail or suppress or influence in any undue way an
investigation with respect to arms sales in the Middle East
that Mr. Linick was conducting or had completed.
In fact, it is your testimony not only did you not do that,
you sought to facilitate his access to the Secretary of State
in order to put the final touches on that report. Is that
correct?
Mr. Bulatao. It is correct, and even in--even in the IG's
testimony he says no, the under secretary did not try and stop
me from this work. He said it several times. He said it on his
testimony on page 206 and he said it on page 208.
Mr. Connolly. My time is up.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. Wild.
Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to direct
my questions to Mr. Bulatao, and my predicate for my questions
is primarily going to be the affidavit about Ambassador Stephen
Akard, which--I am not going to go through the contents of that
in detail. I think we have all seen it and know what is in
there.
But it is worth noting that Mr. Akard's appointment was
first announced right after Mr. Linick was fired. But he
resigned only a few months later.
I mean, Mr. Akard resigned only a few months later in
August after being forced to recuse himself from involvement in
the arms sales matter and the investigation into the Pompeo's
misuse of resources.
So my first question to you is who suggested the Ambassador
Akard should be the one to replace Mr. Linick?
Mr. Bulatao. Congresswoman, we were--many candidates we
wanted to understand who would be best qualified to serve in
that role so we looked according to folks that were in the
department for at least 90 days or folks that were already
serving in a Presidentially appointed Senate-confirmed
position. Ambassador----
Ms. Wild. I am sure there were many people you considered.
I am going to reclaim my time and just ask who suggested that
Ambassador Akard be the one to replace Mr. Linick?
Mr. Bulatao. There was--there were myself and the deputy
secretary that looked to evaluate potential candidates.
Ms. Wild. And did you speak to Mr. String about it?
Mr. Bulatao. I do not recall a comment, only in that I
would have generically asked Mr. String when we looked to
replace what are the rules and the requirements that we need to
follow so that we are going in accordance with all legal
guidelines.
Ms. Wild. And it is correct that you contacted Mr. Akard
back in April--mid-April, a full month before--and told him
that Mr. Linick was going to be removed imminently?
Mr. Bulatao. I do not remember the exact date. It would
have been around mid-April where I would have had an initial
conversation with Mr.----
Ms. Wild. And so you admit that that conversation took
place, yes, regardless of the date?
Mr. Bulatao. Sometime around April there would have been a
conversation----
Ms. Wild. Okay.
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. Asking about his interest.
Ms. Wild. And Mr. Akard has told us that you told him that
he could also expect a call from Secretary Pompeo to express
his views of the Office of the IG. Do you remember telling him
that?
Mr. Bulatao. I do not recall making that comment.
Ms. Wild. And if that--but you do not deny making that
comment?
Mr. Bulatao. No, I do not recall making a comment that you
just stated and I do not have the benefit of the transcript. So
I am not sure what context that statement was made in.
Ms. Wild. And if that comment were true, it suggests to me
that Secretary Pompeo was trying to influence the inspector
general position before Mr. Akard even started. Do you know
anything about what Mr. Pompeo wanted to tell Mr. Akard before
starting as IG?
Mr. Bulatao. Again, there was no statement of that that I
recall making to Mr. Akard. I do--I will tell you what I
remember calling in to him.
What I said to him is there is a huge trust deficit between
the department and the IG, and the leadership of the
department, including the deputy, the Secretary, all of the
leadership, really wants to find a person who can help to
restore and build the bridges of that trust deficit.
Ms. Wild. And all of that that you have just relayed is
information that you would be able to relay directly to Mr.
Akard? That would not be something that the Secretary would
need to impart to Mr. Akard, would it be?
Mr. Bulatao. No.
Ms. Wild. Okay. And do you know whether Secretary Pompeo
wanted to convey to Mr. Akard subjects that should be stayed
away from in terms of IG investigations?
Mr. Bulatao. Again, the Secretary was not involved in any
of these discussions regarding trying to identify a
replacement. He was not involved in saying, I want to have a
conversation, I want to do any of that. I have no recollection
of those statements as you characterize them.
Ms. Wild. Well, did he have any role at all in the choice
of Mr. Akard?
Mr. Bulatao. At the very end, the deputy secretary and I
briefed him on our nomination. We explained to him that
Ambassador Akard had served in several regions of the
department.
He was a Foreign Service officer. He had served as a
consular officer in South/Central Asia. He has served as a
political econ officer in the EUR region. He had served as an
executive assistant in the exec sec.
He has served as the acting chief of staff in the E Bureau
for Economic, Energy, and the Environment and that he would be
a good choice to start to rebuild that trust deficit that we
saw.
Ms. Wild. Okay. So your answer suggests to me that
Secretary Pompeo had no real awareness of who Mr. Akard was
until you informed him of his credentials.
Mr. Bulatao. That is not what I am suggesting. What I am
suggesting to you is what we described to the Secretary as our
rationale----
Ms. Wild. Okay.
Mr. Bulatao [continuing]. For nominating Ambassador Akard
as a replacement.
Ms. Wild. Now, there was also a suggestion that Ambassador
Akard should keep his job in the Office of Foreign Missions
where he was one of your subordinates in addition to taking on
the role of IG. And is that correct?
Mr. Bulatao. That is not correct. The conversation we had
with Ambassador Akard is you absolutely need to divorce
yourself from any decision authorities or operations.
As a matter of fact, we need to delegate your authorities
in the Office of Foreign Missions to your deputy. You should
not have any operational or any day-to-day contact with your
team.
You need to focus on being the full time acting IG, and
when that acting assignment is done we will then move those
delegations of authorities back to you. But from a operational
perspective you just need to separate and divorce yourself from
that role.
Chairman Engel. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Mr. Levin.
Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for appearing.
Mr. Cooper, it is good to see you again.
Last year, I asked you about the timing of the emergency
declaration, noting that when Secretary Pompeo briefed Congress
on May 21st, 2019, he made no mention whatsoever of any
emergency. Here is what you said.
[Video is played.]
Mr. Levin. But an emergency did not pop up in those 3 days.
The department was cooking up this emergency almost 2 months
earlier. I gave you the chance then to correct yourself but you
doubled down.
Now, I have just--I have read your letter laying out the
long history of bad acts by Iran to justify this emergency
declaration.
But none of that changes the fact that your testimony that
an emergency arose between May 21st and 24th just was not true.
Were you lying to the committee or did you have bad
information?
Mr. Cooper. Congressman, as you said, I covered this fully
in my August 17 letter to you and there was a copy that was
provided to the chairman. But I do appreciate the opportunity
to yet again set the record straight here. I stand by my
statements.
They were faithfully summarizing everything, the factual
basis for the emergency that reflected the Secretary's
certification that was submitted to Congress----
Mr. Levin. Okay. I am----
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. And to the dates, to be clear, Mr.
Levin, between May 21 and May 24, the Secretary made the
decision to exercise a long-standing statutory authority due to
the emergency circumstances described in his certification,
which we reenumerated in my testimony, which you decided to not
fully show the entire video.
Mr. Levin. All right. Mr. Cooper----
Mr. Cooper. I categorically reject repeated partisan
political attempts to publicly mischaracterize my remarks.
Mr. Levin. Okay. Mr. Cooper, your remarks were--stand for
themselves. We just played them.
Mr. Cooper. Play all of them, Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. That is what you actually said. That is what you
actually said.
Mr. Cooper. Don't parse them.
Mr. Levin. Let us talk about the OIG report. The State
Department, in fact, we understand it was you personally, sir,
demanded unprecedented redactions on this unclassified report.
Those redactions deal with the time line, the very information
that contradicts your testimony.
The report shows the department first proposed using this
emergency authority on April 3d, that the first drafts of that
emergency were circulated on April 23d, and that on May 4th,
Secretary Pompeo handpicked the day 3 weeks in the future on
which he would send you up here to claim an emergency had
suddenly appeared.
Those dates are nowhere near the May 21st to May 24th
window you testified to, and you covered them up, literally,
with a big black box in the redactions.
Who asked for those redactions, sir? Who signed the letter
to the OIG pushing for them? Was it you, yes or no? Did you ask
for them, sir?
Mr. Cooper. No. But I want to tell you----
Mr. Levin. Okay. Then let me ask Mr. String.
Mr. Cooper. Congress received full--Congress received an
unredacted report. Mischaracterizing----
Mr. Levin. So----
Mr. Cooper. Congress received a full report, sir.
Mr. Levin. I understand that, sir. That is not what I am
asking you about.
Mr. Cooper. But----
Mr. Levin. Sir----
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. You asked a question about
redacted passages. That is internal information.
Mr. Levin. Sir, I am going to reclaim my time and continue
asking Mr. String. Did you ask for those redactions, sir? Yes
or no.
Mr. String. Congressman, I would like to----
Mr. Levin. I am going to ask you to answer the question,
sir. Did you--it is not a complicated matter. Did you ask for
those redactions?
Mr. String. The unclassified report that was provided to
Congress, as I understand it, was fully nonredacted.
Mr. Levin. The public report.
Mr. String. But the elected representative of the American
people----
Mr. Levin. Who asked for the--who asked for the redactions
in the report that was public?
Mr. String. Well, the elected representatives----
Mr. Levin. Okay. You are not going to answer the question.
Mr. String, did anyone in your office tell Mr. Cooper that
he might have an ethics problem if he pushed to redact in this
report? If he pushed to redact the time lines which
contradicted his testimony to the Congress?
Mr. String. Not to my awareness.
Mr. Levin. Okay. And when did you first see a draft of the
declaration with the redactions?
Mr. String. Just a clarifying question. The declaration?
Mr. Levin. Well, let me--let me ask Mr. Cooper.
What is the first day that you learned an emergency would
be certified to Congress on May 24th? Was it that first day?
Was it April 3rd? Was it April 4th? What was the first day that
you learned of this?
Mr. Cooper. Congressman, first of all, I was confirmed by
the Senate April 30th. I was serving an additional capacity in
the National Security Enterprise earlier in April, not at the
State Department.
As far as the decision process, the--it would have been
before the Secretary certified it. Again, that window is
between May 21, 24 where he made the decision----
Mr. Levin. So are you saying you never knew before May
21st?
Chairman Engel. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Cooper. Congressman, we had to provide him the
opportunity to make that decision.
Mr. Levin. So you did know before?
Troubling. All right, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I----
Mr. Cooper. No, what is troubling are the Houthi threats
and the Iranian threats to U.S. interests and our partners.
That is troubling, Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. Sir, the process of dealing with the U.S.
Congress stands on its own as a responsibility of the State
Department and every other part of the executive branch, and
you cannot hide behind what we all agree are the very important
foreign policy concerns that we all share. You cannot hide
behind them, sir.
I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Ms. Spanberger.
Mr. Cooper. By congressional notification it is public.
Ms. Spanberger. I reclaim my time.
Yesterday the State Department Office of Inspector General
sent HFAC four letters that were part of a back and forth
between the IG's office and the State Department. I will begin
with questions for Mr. Cooper.
On July 10th, 2020, about 2 months after Mr. Linick was
fired and a week after Mr. Bulatao postponed his last scheduled
appearance before the committee, you sent a memo to the State
Department Office of the Inspector General asking them to make
redactions in the draft arms sales report. Is this correct?
Mr. Cooper. If you are referring to the----
Ms. Spanberger. Yes or no, sir.
Mr. Cooper. We sent a memo to release the report, ma'am.
Ms. Spanberger. And the Office of the Inspector General
interviewed you as a witness in this probe last November. Is
that correct?
Mr. Cooper. Say that again. You stepped away from the mic
for a sec.
Ms. Spanberger. And the Office--the OIG interviewed you as
a witness in this probe last November. Is that correct?
Mr. Cooper. That is correct, and that is withstanding with
the OIG----
Ms. Spanberger. So you were asking for redactions about an
investigation of something you had personally been involved in,
the arms sale. Is that correct?
Mr. Cooper. No, ma'am. What is correct is that we--any
assistant secretary or bureau leader would be part of any----
Ms. Spanberger. But, sir, you were before Congress last
year talking about those very arms sales. So you are now saying
that you were not involved in them?
Mr. Cooper. Ma'am, no. What I was saying is we were part of
the report that was being done. It is normal course of business
for the Inspector General to sit down and interview all of us
who were part of the process.
Ms. Spanberger. But you did not--Okay. So you were asking
for redactions about an investigation and something that you
had been involved with. Who told you to write that memo?
Mr. Cooper. There are no redactions in the report sent to
Congress. The redactions that were done were to protect on
deliberate decisionmaking matters.
Ms. Spanberger. So the challenge there, though, is that the
OIG, of course, disagreed with you. So I am very concerned, as
I believe we all should be, about civilian casualties and what
appears to be the administration's lacking commitment to
reducing civilian staff deaths.
When it came to the section of the report on civilian
casualties, you recommended, and I am quoting here, that the,
quote, ``OIG consider removing this element from the
unclassified report in order to allow that that report be
finalized, briefed to Congress, and released to the public.''
If the OIG had taken your advice, the public would never
have seen the part about the civilian casualties. Congress
would not talk about it and we would be in the dark. Is that
correct, sir?
Mr. Cooper. That isn't to my recollection because we
actually supported the finding that we do more on civilian
casualties.
Ms. Spanberger. Okay. So in response to your request for
that information to be classified, the OIG wrote back on July
21st and they did not mince words. They said that you failed
to, quote, ``properly invoke a claim of privilege that would
justify withholding the information.''
It further stated the department's proposed redactions
appear to be overly broad, and do not conform to U.S.
Government practices.
What is more, your redactions would cover, quote,
``nonpriveleged factual information'' about, quote, ``specific
actions taken by the U.S. Government.'' They gave you all 3
days to get back to them with defensible redactions.
On July 27th, past the deadline, the deputy legal advisor,
Joshua Dorosin, wrote back to the guidance that you had
received, and in the July 27th memo to the OIG Mr. Dorosin
wrote this.
It claims that, quote, ``The Inspector General is subject
to the supervision of the Secretary.'' Now, while those words
do appear in the IG Act, Mr. Dorosin left out that the courts
had been very clear that the, quote, ``supervision phrase''
does not, quote, ``include any authority to compromise the
investigatory rights conferred to Inspectors General.''
The letter further points to U.S. v. Nixon to claim that
the OIG has to defer to Secretary Pompeo in these redactions.
So in response, Mr. Cooper, the OIG gets back to you on
August 3d with their final version of the report and we know,
despite your best efforts, that unclassified report still notes
the administration did not do enough to mitigate civilian
casualties.
So to recap what we are looking at, Mr. Bulatao and Mr.
String tried and failed to shut down the investigation.
Secretary Pompeo got IG Linick fired.
Mr. Bulatao puts one of his own subordinates, which my
colleagues have talked about, and then immediately starts
trying to influence, through your efforts, Mr. Cooper, the arms
sale report only to find out that that would not be successful.
Since then, the department has tried and failed to get
Congress to drop its investigation and, in the end, you and
your colleagues tried to cover up the most alarming reports,
parts of that report, with big black redaction boxes and put
them in a classified annex.
Mr. Cooper, if the department has done the due diligence to
make sure these weapons were not being used to slaughter
civilians, it seems like you all could have saved yourself a
lot of time trying to cover up the fact that you were
preventing these--trying to cover up the fact that you were not
preventing these needless deaths.
But it does not appear that that was important to you.
Instead, families have suffered and I am glad--and I appreciate
that you have come before Congress today.
But rather than trying to keep this information out of the
public view and, certainly, out of the hands of Congress, you
have done a disservice to the department.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Trone.
[No response.]
Chairman Engel. Okay. We will go to Mr. Malinowski.
Oh, I am sorry. No, we will not.
Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Under Secretary, I would like to go back to the problem
that the State--at the State Department, what appears to be
politically motivated retaliation against career employees.
It seems to stretch back to 2017 and 2018 during Secretary
Tillerson's tenure. We certainly hope that Secretary Pompeo
would not allow such conduct. But it does seem that politicized
retaliation is too often the case of--been the case of this
Administration.
So this is the environment in which Mr. Linick was working
when you demanded that he hand over a Department of Defense
Inspector General's report with conclusions in the
investigation into the alleged leak of the State OIG work
product that you ordered him to get to the bottom of and that
included the names of people at the State Department--I am
sorry, at State OIG who had been investigating the department
for politically motivated retaliation.
So, Mr. Linick credibly testified, and I can certainly
understand this, having been involved in organizations such as
this, that he was concerned for his staff when the department
sought out this report and he said, I quote, ``I could imagine
the department using information in the report against them and
wanted to make sure that their confidentiality was protected.''
So my first question is just a baseline question. Do you
think that politicized retaliation has occurred at the
department during this Administration against career employees
due to their perceived ethnic, national, or work for prior
administrations?
Mr. Bulatao. Congresswoman, as I stated in my confirmation
hearing, which was back in July, I said that once I was in
place we would do everything in our power to make sure that
there were only merit-based factors being used to evaluate
employees.
Ms. Houlahan. So the answer is that you do not think that
this has happened? Because the IG has a report that says that
this has, in fact, happened historically.
Do you think it is wrong? It seems as though you do think
it is wrong, and I agree, for people to be targeted for those
particular reasons other than performance.
Mr. Bulatao. And to clarify, the IG report found out of the
five Foreign Service officers investigated that four were no
fault found with----
Ms. Houlahan. So five minus four--like, so I am missing the
point that you are trying to make. Are you trying to say that
there is--there has never been a case where there has been
discrimination?
Mr. Bulatao. I am referring--I am referring to the specific
case because it did contain the sensitive information that was
leaked somehow and it----
Ms. Houlahan. So I am just going to reclaim my time because
I know that votes are going to be called and I want to move on.
Secretary Pompeo did say that there is no place in the
State Department for people to be targeting employees based on
their national origin or because they were perceived as not
being sufficiently loyal to the president and you seem to have
indicated that as well.
Have you ever personally participated in this sort of
targeting, Mr. Bulatao?
Mr. Bulatao. No, I have not.
Ms. Houlahan. So we know that Mr. Linick was more than
willing to prove to you that his staff had not leaked the IG
report.
But his concern, which was very well founded, as it turned
out, was that the DoD IG report proving his staff's innocence,
could and would be used to bully and target his line employees
for simply doing their work, and it was actually done.
And I am assuming that you know that on June 9th, a right-
wing media outlet published the entire unredacted DoD IG report
that concluded that Mr. Linick and his staff actually did not
cause the leak. Is that true?
Mr. Bulatao. Well, I do not know who published it. But the
only person that had it at that time was the IG, and then the
IG turned it over to Congress.
Ms. Houlahan. And that is kind of what I am trying to get
to the bottom of. Did you release or authorize the release of
that unredacted information?
Mr. Bulatao. No, we never received the report directly.
Ms. Houlahan. Do you know who did?
Mr. Bulatao. I am unaware who may have done that.
Ms. Houlahan. Can you tell me today that you are confident
that the leak of this unredacted DoD IG report to the right-
wing media did not come from the State Department?
Mr. Bulatao. I am unaware of what sources of that
unredacted version of that report came from.
Ms. Houlahan. So if you are not aware of where it is coming
from, are you trying to get to the bottom of where it might
have been leaked from? Because it is evident that it was not
leaked from the sources that you are specifically blaming at
this point in time.
Mr. Bulatao. Actually, that is incorrect, Congresswoman. We
have actually gone back to the council--CIGIE council to look
at this again because what came out from the DoD investigation
is that it was a very superficial investigation.
There was not a thorough investigation done, and our
understanding as why that was done is the way the IG
characterized that investigation to his pal in the DoD IG. So
if it was not done properly we are asking the integrity
committee to please look at that again.
Ms. Houlahan. It just seems as though this report in its--
in its leaking and nonredacted form is further evidence of an
administration that has a culture of retaliation, and it would
seem that you should be aggressively looking for where this
report might have come from and been leaked to in order to be,
I guess, trying to give us the impression that this is an
administration that is about retaliation against employees who
have indicated any sort of nonallegience to this president.
And I am, unfortunately, out of time and I appreciate you
coming. But I am really surprised and disappointed because it
does feel as though that this Administration has a pretty
consistent course of firing people who do not appear to agree
with them for one reason or another, and that is a
disappointment to me.
I yield back.
Chairman Engel. The gentlewoman yields back.
Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper, how does the provision of Paveway bombs for
bombing targets in Yemen help Saudi Arabia or how did it help
Saudi Arabia meet an emergency imminent threat from Iran to its
oil fields, to shipping in the Gulf, targets in Iraq and
Lebanon that you mentioned, all the threats that you mentioned?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you for that question. So the key word
there is precision guidance. They are available not just for
defenses of which you just enumerated but it is also to
actually address targets, to mitigate any targeting on anything
that would be of Saudi interest.
Mr. Malinowski. None of those things were being hit from
Yemen. Those were direct Iranian threats against Saudi
oilfields, shipping. Paveway bombs are not defensive weapons
against those kinds of threats.
Mr. Cooper. I would like to add that--in a classified fora
I would like to further provide information on specificity on
threats of not just infrastructure----
Mr. Malinowski. Let me just ask you here----
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. But civilians as well.
Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. What share of those Paveways
have been delivered at this point?
Mr. Cooper. Anything that would have been a direct
commercial sale would have been delivered. In fact, I would
note that at the time the OIG concluded the report we had asked
them to update it. Their date of information was old. It was in
late 19----
Mr. Malinowski. Were the Paveways delivered within, say,
two or 3 weeks of the emergency declaration?
Mr. Cooper. They were--I could not tell you the exact date
but they were delivered--those were some of the first things
delivered because they were ready for delivery.
Mr. Malinowski. Okay.
Mr. Cooper. Anything that was foreign military sales which
would have acquired additional development----
[Simultaneous speaking]
Mr. Malinowski. Why--let me move on. Why did you spend 2
months deliberating and executing a decision to use this
emergency declaration when you could have gotten the sale
through in a month by going through the normal congressional
notification?
Mr. Cooper. Speaking of notification, all the sales had
been notified to Congress. This was part of the open and
transparent process that we have.
It is a feature, not a bug. If anything, it does show that
we are stronger against our adversaries who do not have
transparent processes.
But to your question as to on meeting those conditions,
some of those conditions that we laid out was the Secretary of
the United States providing confidence and assurance to our
partners, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in particular--
--
Mr. Malinowski. I understand.
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. While making--sending a message to
Tehran.
Mr. Malinowski. And that is a policy goal that is ever
present. It is not an emergency.
Now, let me go through civilian casualty mitigation. Spring
of 2017, we made a real effort. The Trump Administration made a
real effort, laying out actual conditions to Saudi Arabia for
the receipt of these weapons.
And those conditions were not just about training, sir.
They were also--they included the provision of a no-strike list
with 33,000 specific targets.
Are you aware that the Saudi air force has continued to
strike specific coordinates on the no-strike list that the
United States gave them since that was handed over, in fact,
repeatedly handed over? Yes or no.
Mr. Cooper. I could speak fully in another fora about the
target integrity and challenges that are--that the partners
have had to meet from the Houthi rebels and others.
Mr. Malinowski. I look--I look forward to that. They have
precisely continued to strike targets that we have precisely
identified them as being on a no-strike list.
Sir, if you were teaching me to drive for 5 years and I
continued to hit passersby, continued to total my car, would
you continue to give me the keys?
Mr. Cooper. Sir, we have a partner that is under extreme
threat, a continuous threat and a developing one.
Mr. Malinowski. Yes, I----
Mr. Cooper. Those include our interests. We remain
steadfast and shoulder-to-shoulder in our partnership.
Mr. Malinowski. Okay. State Department talking points, and
you know what? I do not think under those--you know, we have
gone from actually providing conditions to the Saudi, from
serious people like General Jim Mattis, to having you sit here
and tell us that the new and improved policy is we are giving
them a tool kit--we are giving them a suite of technical
solutions when they have continued to deliberately and
precisely hit targets we have asked them not to hit.
Mr. String, one of the recommendations in the IG report,
reportedly, was that the department, quote, ``update its
analysis of legal and policy risks related to selling these
bombs to Saudi Arabia.''
Why was that recommendation moved to the classified annex
of the report? Why is that classified?
Mr. String. Congressman, if I understand your question
correctly, you are asking about a classified recommendation?
Mr. Malinowski. I am asking about a report that that was
moved to the classified annex. Why was that classified?
Mr. String. I do not have specific recollection of the
deliberations by the IG that went into that. But I am not
comfortable talking here about anything in the classified
annex.
Mr. Malinowski. And then let me just, finally, ask you I do
not care whether you saw a memo from 2016. I saw it. I was a
assistant secretary at that point. But you are the acting legal
advisor.
Is it still the view--is it still your view--is it still
the view of the Office of the Legal Advisor that State
Department officials potentially face personal legal liability
if they provide weapons to a partner country without adequate
safeguards as to mitigating civilian casualties when you have
this 5-year record of war crimes being committed and documented
by our partner? Is it still--is that still the view of your
office?
Mr. String. Congressman, thank you for that question. We
are very aware of the issues that you raised. We take the issue
very seriously and all of the legal work that we do in the
Office of the Legal Advisor ensures to the maximum extent
possible that the risk is reduced as close to zero as possible.
Mr. Malinowski. That is a mission statement. It is not an
answer to my question. Is it still your view that U.S.
officials face, potentially, personal legal liability if
adequate safeguards are not met?
I am not asking you whether those safeguards have been met.
Obviously, that is a much more controversial question. But as a
legal matter, is that still the view or have you changed it?
Because that was the view at the office.
Mr. String. Again, Congressman, our legal work, our legal
analysis, ensures that the U.S. Government, across the
government, takes every possible effort to address this serious
issue.
I can assure you we take it very seriously in the Office of
the Legal Advisor and other bureaus in the department and
throughout----
Mr. Malinowski. If they do not, do they, potentially, face
personal legal liability?
Mr. String. Congressman, I have answered your question.
Mr. Malinowski. You have not, actually.
Mr. String. I am not going to get into specific legal
conclusions. But I can tell you that we take the work very
seriously and that work continues.
Mr. Malinowski. Let me just say, if we find out at some
point that you or any other official in the State Department
has changed that analysis, it would be an incredibly serious
matter and, personally, I would consider you to face personal
legal liability for that decision.
With respect, I yield back.
Mr. Bulatao. Mr. Chairman, can I offer a clarification on a
statement for the record that I made to Congresswoman Houlahan
earlier?
When I was making the statement that I had not received the
DoD report, I mean I had not received it from Director Linick.
The department did receive a copy of that report at the same
time that Congress received it prior to Linick's interview here
on the committee.
Chairman Engel. Okay. Thank you.
That concludes the questioning of our witnesses, and let me
make an announcement since we are voting.
In a change of plans, in agreement with the State
Department we are going to cancel the classified session that
we had originally scheduled. The Department has indicated its
willingness to schedule classified calls for any Members who
wish to followup on this matter.
So this will wrap up our proceedings for today. I thank our
witnesses for their time, and without objection the Committee
on Foreign Affairs is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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