[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AMTRAK'S RESPONSE TO COVID 19
=======================================================================
(116-63)
REMOTE HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES,
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 9, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
43-104 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DON YOUNG, Alaska District of Columbia
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BOB GIBBS, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ROB WOODALL, Georgia JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JOHN KATKO, New York HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
BRIAN BABIN, Texas Georgia
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina DINA TITUS, Nevada
MIKE BOST, Illinois SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas JARED HUFFMAN, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida MARK DeSAULNIER, California
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON, Vice Chair
Puerto Rico ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ROSS SPANO, Florida TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota GREG STANTON, Arizona
CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida
GREG PENCE, Indiana LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
MIKE GARCIA, California COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
ABBY FINKENAUER, Iowa
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
HARLEY ROUDA, California
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois, Chair
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
BRIAN BABIN, Texas ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
MIKE BOST, Illinois FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas MARK DeSAULNIER, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
ROSS SPANO, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota District of Columbia
GREG PENCE, Indiana EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio) ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas, Vice Chair
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Daniel Lipinski, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials:
Opening statement............................................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Arkansas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials:
Opening statement............................................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure:
Opening statement............................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chairman, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, prepared statement............................. 71
WITNESSES
William Flynn, President and Chief Executive Officer, National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak):
Oral statement............................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Arthur Maratea, National President, Transportation Communications
Union:
Oral statement............................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Amy Griffin, Local 1460 President, Transport Workers Union of
America:
Oral statement............................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Jim Mathews, President and Chief Executive Officer, Rail
Passengers Association:
Oral statement............................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 30
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford:
Statement of Ross Capon, Consultant.......................... 72
Letter of September 3, 2020, from Randal O'Toole, Senior
Fellow, Cato Institute..................................... 78
APPENDIX
Questions to William Flynn, President and Chief Executive
Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak),
from:
Hon. Eric A. ''Rick'' Crawford............................... 81
Hon. Lloyd Smucker........................................... 102
Hon. Scott Perry............................................. 104
Hon. Garret Graves........................................... 106
Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Arthur Maratea, National
President, Transportation Communications Union................. 127
Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Jim Mathews, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Rail Passengers Association........... 129
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
September 9, 2020
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Amtrak's Response to
COVID-19''
_______________________________________________________________________
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials will meet on Wednesday, September 9, 2020, at 11:00
a.m. in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Cisco Webex
to hold a hearing titled ``Amtrak's Response to COVID-19.'' The
hearing will examine the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on
Amtrak and Amtrak's response, including workforce cuts and
reductions in train service. The Subcommittee will hear
testimony from Amtrak, the Transportation Communications Union,
the Transport Workers Union of America, and the Rail Passengers
Association.
SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
SUMMARY
As of September 2, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has killed
more than 170,000 Americans and disrupted every facet of
life.\1\ The pandemic's impacts are apparent in many sectors,
including all modes of transportation. Amtrak's current
ridership rates are a fraction of its 2019 levels and have
dipped as low as five percent of regular operating levels.\2\
To help mitigate the effects of the pandemic, Amtrak received
$1.02 billion in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act.\3\ In May 2020, Amtrak requested an
additional $1.475 billion, and also announced plans to reduce
costs by cutting 20 percent of its workforce and significantly
reducing long-distance service. More recently, Amtrak has
estimated that $4.8 billion will be necessary to maintain
service and avoid furloughs. With no certainty on fiscal year
(FY) 2021 funding, Amtrak has started the process of cutting
2,050 jobs effective October 1, 2020, a 14 percent cut in its
workforce.
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\1\ CDC, Daily Update of Totals by Week and State (last accessed
September 2, 2020), available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/
covid19/index.htm.
\2\ USA Today, Amtrak to cancel Acela Express trains in Northeast
as coronavirus reduces demand (March 22, 2020), available at https://
www.usatoday.com/story/travel/2020/03/22/amtrak-cancels-acela-trains-
northeast-coronavirus-reduces-demand/2895882001/.
\3\ P.L. 116-136.
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AMTRAK STATUS AND NETWORK
Amtrak is tasked with operating a national rail passenger
transportation system that ties together existing and emergent
regional rail passenger service and other intermodal passenger
services.\4\ This system includes the Northeast Corridor (NEC),
long-distance routes, and short-distance routes operated by
Amtrak.\5\ To provide national passenger rail service, Amtrak
runs more than 300 trains per day, services more than 500
stations located in 46 states and Washington, D.C., and
operates a network that stretches more than 21,000 miles across
the country.\6\ Of all Amtrak passenger trips in 2019,
approximately 38 percent were taken on the NEC; 48 percent on
state-supported routes; and 14 percent on long-distance routes.
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\4\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 24701.
\5\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 24102.
\6\ Amtrak, FY 2019 Year End Ridership, available at http://
media.amtrak.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/FY19-Year-End-
Ridership.pdf.
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COVID-19 RESPONSE AND CARES FUNDING
In light of the global pandemic, Amtrak continues to face
historic ridership lows for all routes, with overall demand at
a fraction of regular ridership.\7\ In March 2020, Amtrak's
overall ridership dropped by 95 percent.\8\ As of July 2020,
overall revenue was down 82 percent compared to 2019, with the
NEC revenue down by 93 percent, state-supported route revenue
down by 83 percent, and long-distance routes down by 61
percent.\9\ Ticket sales have been limited to 50 percent train
capacity to allow for safer social distancing.\10\
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\7\ USA Today, supra, note 2.
\8\ Id.
\9\ Trains Magazine, Amtrak Leadership Defends Value of Triweekly
Service as Short-Term Move, (August 17, 2020) available at https://
trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2020/08/17-amtrak-leadership-continues-
movement-toward-triweekly-operation.
\10\ Amtrak, Amtrak Sets a New Standard of Travel, available at
https://www.amtrak.com/planning-booking/policies/
coronavirus.html?intcmp=wsp_tab_link_coronavirus_tab1.
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Earlier this year in March 2020, Amtrak received $1.02
billion in supplemental FY 2020 funding in the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, including a
requirement that Amtrak provide any worker furloughed as a
result of efforts to prepare or respond to COVID-19 the
opportunity to be recalled to their job as service levels were
restored.\11\ Amtrak cut NEC route frequency at that time,
reducing Northeast Regional service levels by 60 percent and
cancelling Acela service completely.\12\ Northeast Regional and
Acela services returned in June 2020 on modified schedules.\13\
The CARES Act emergency Amtrak funding included $239 million to
supplement the states-supported routes, with language limiting
the states' financial responsibility to 80 percent of the
amount paid in 2019.\14\
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\11\ P.L. 116-136.
\12\ USA Today, supra, note 2.
\13\ Boston Globe, Amtrak Resumes Modified High Speed Acela Service
in Northeast Corridor; Implements Safety Measures, (June 1, 2020),
available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/06/01/metro/amtrak-
resumes-modified-high-speed-acela-service-northeast-corridor-
implements-safety-measures/.
\14\ P.L. 116-136.
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In May 2020, Amtrak requested an additional $1.475 billion
in supplemental funding for FY 2021 to help respond to fallen
demand. Amtrak's FY 2021 funding request incorporated planned
workforce reductions of 20 percent and lower frequency long-
distance and NEC service, which it claimed would achieve a $500
million reduction in operating expenses.\15\ The Health and
Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions (HEROES) Act did
not include any Amtrak funding.\16\
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\15\ Amtrak, Supplemental Funding Letter to Congress, (May 25,
2020), available at https://media.amtrak.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/
05/Amtrak-Supplemental-FY21-Funding-Letter-to-Congress-Final-Signed-
5.25.20.pdf.
\16\ H.R. 6800, 116th Congress (2020).
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The House FY 2021 Transportation, Housing, and Urban
Development (THUD) Appropriations bill, which passed the House
at the end of July 2020, would provide a total of $10.05
billion for Amtrak and its state partners. This includes $2.05
billion in regular budget authority for Amtrak's National
Network, an increase of $50 million above the FY 2020 enacted
level.\17\ The THUD bill also includes an additional $8 billion
in economic recovery funds for Amtrak, including $5 billion for
the NEC and $3 billion for the National Network. Attached to
this recovery money is a requirement that the funding be used
to prevent employee furloughs and that no funds may be used to
reduce the frequency of rail service on any long-distance or
state-supported route below frequencies for such route in FY
2019.\18\ The Senate has not yet acted on any FY 2021
appropriations package.
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\17\ H.R. 7617, 116th Congress (2020).
\18\ Id.
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On August 24, 2020, Amtrak updated its FY 2021 supplemental
funding request. This request seeks $4.8 billion in FY 2021
funding for Amtrak operations. The new number reflects Amtrak's
updated ridership projections--now estimated at 34 percent of
2019 levels, rather than 50 percent as Amtrak had previously
forecast. The new request includes additional money for state-
supported Amtrak service and Railroad Rehabilitation and
Improvement Financing (RRIF) loan assistance, as well as an
estimate of funds needed to avoid furloughs or long-distance
service cuts. Finally, the request seeks $496 million to cover
``revenue risk'' in case Amtrak's ticket sales and other
revenues fall short of projections.
SAFETY AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR PASSENGERS AND EMPLOYEES
Given the highly contagious nature of the coronavirus, the
safety of Amtrak's workers and passengers has been a major
concern.\19\ Amtrak currently requires customers and employees
to wear masks.\20\ The railroad made changes to station arrival
procedures and gate procedures, increased cleaning frequency,
and put up physical distancing signs in high traffic areas in
some stations.\21\ Amtrak has also added enhanced filtration
systems to passenger cars.\22\
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\19\ Business Insider, Is it safe to travel by train during a
pandemic? (July 31, 2020), available at https://
www.businessinsider.com/is-train-travel-safe-coronavirus.
\20\ Amtrak, Amtrak Sets a New Standard of Travel, available at
https://www.amtrak.com/coronavirus.
\21\ Id.
\22\ See id., (describing new booking policies).
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PROPOSED CUTS TO LONG-DISTANCE SERVICE AND WORKFORCE
In May 2020, Amtrak announced plans to significantly reduce
both its workforce and long-distance service due to the
financial effects of the coronavirus.\23\ In a memo to
employees, Amtrak outlined plans to cut 20 percent of the
Amtrak workforce (approximately 4,000 jobs) by October 1,
2020.\24\ Amtrak offered a buyout to some employees, with 510
acceptances. On September 1, 2020, Amtrak announced 2,050 job
cuts, including 1,995 bargaining unit employee furloughs.
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\23\ Wash. Post, Amtrak to Cut up to 20 Percent of Workforce as
Coronavirus Takes Toll. (May 27, 2020), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2020/05/27/amtrak-cut-up-20-
percent-workforce-coronavirus-takes-toll/.
\24\ Id.
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Amtrak is also set to temporarily reduce service to three
days per week, until at least Summer 2021, on 12 of its 15
long-distance routes.\25\ These changes are scheduled to begin
on October 1, 2020, except for Silver Star and Silver Meteor
service reductions, which began in July 2020.\26\
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\25\ The Auto Train, which runs from Virginia to Florida, will
maintain daily service. The Cardinal line, running from New York City
to Chicago, and the Sunset Limited line, running from New Orleans to
Los Angeles, regularly run three days a week.
\26\ USA Today, Amtrak to reduce New York-Florida trains starting
July 6, with more cuts coming Oct. 1 (June 29, 2020), available at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/2020/06/29/amtrak-reduce-new-
york-florida-trains-starting-july-6/3254400001/.
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Though ridership and revenue remain lower due to the
pandemic, ticket revenues from long-distance trains increased
71 percent, from $6.8 million to $11.6 million, from April to
May 2020.\27\ At the same time, NEC ticket revenues increased
from $1.5 million to $2.4 million and state-supported route
revenues increased from $2.3 million to $3.5 million; almost
half of the long-distance service revenue.\28\ The long-
distance routes targeted for service reductions currently make
up more than 60 percent of Amtrak's current total revenue.\29\
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\27\ Trains Magazine, Amtrak Plans Triweekly Service for Almost All
Long-Distance Trains as of Oct. 1, (June 15, 2020), available at
https://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2020/06/15-amtrak-plans-
triweekly-service-for-almost-all-long-distance-trains-as-of-oct-1
\28\ Id.
\29\ Trains Magazine, supra, note 7.
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Amtrak previously attempted long-distance service
reductions to achieve cost savings in 1995. On the advice of an
outside consultant, Amtrak decreased 11 long-distance routes to
a tri-weekly timetable to cut costs. After these service cuts
had either become permanent or removed in favor of regular
schedules, Congress evaluated the financial impact. Pursuant to
the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report that
discussed the long-term effects of long-distance route
reductions.\30\ Noting that Amtrak closed four routes,
shortened six, and reduced service frequency on 11 routes, the
GAO found that:
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\30\ Govt. Accountability Office, Intercity Passenger Rail:
Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes (May 1998), GAO/RCED-98-151,
available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/225657.pdf.
Amtrak achieved $54 million in cost savings in fiscal year
1995; however, it subsequently restored much of this service
because the ridership and financial performance of routes with
less than daily service were worse than anticipated . . .
[D]uring fiscal year 1996, Amtrak's overall ridership dropped
by 1.1 million passengers, or 5%, and anticipated reductions in
operating costs were not realized on routes with reduced
frequency of service.
Amtrak told GAO that cost savings from less-frequent
service were not realized because riders were not willing or
able to adjust their plans to less-than-daily service, and
less-frequent service caused inefficient usage of equipment and
otherwise failed to cut costs.\31\
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\31\ GAO, supra, note 29.
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Former Amtrak executives publicly discussed the 1995 long-
distance service reductions, and concluded that they were
ineffective.\32\ At a September 2000 Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation oversight hearing, former
Amtrak President George Warrington testified, ``I will tell
you, though, that generally, in retrospect, all of those
eliminations back in 1995 and 1996 ended up costing the company
more in lost revenue than we were able to take out in the way
of expenses, given the fixed-cost nature of the operation.''
\33\
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\32\ Trains Magazine, Former Amtrak President Revisits Previous
Move to Triweekly Service, (Aug. 3, 2020), available at https://
trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2020/08/03-former-amtrak-president-
revisits-previous-move-to-triweekly-service.
\33\ George Warrington testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Oversight Hearing
on Amtrak, (Sept. 26, 2000), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg85968/html/CHRG-106shrg85968.htm.
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SERVICE CHANGES ON STATE-SUPPORTED ROUTES
Amtrak has been coordinating with States to develop service
and reduction plans for state-supported routes operated under
Section 209 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement
Act (PRIIA). For FY 2020 service, this process has been eased
considerably by the CARES Act provisions that supplement state-
supported route funding and limit the States' funding share to
80 percent of FY 2019 levels.\34\ The State-Amtrak Intercity
Passenger Rail Committee (SAIPRC), a multi-agency body whose
members include 20 agencies in 17 States, Amtrak, and the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), has held discussions
about 2021 planning.\35\ Amtrak included an additional $260
million for state-supported routes in its May 2020 supplemental
funding letter, accompanied by testimonials from transportation
leaders in North Carolina and Wisconsin.\36\ Without a funding
stopgap like the CARES Act provision to supplement state-
supported routes and replace lost revenues, States will need to
make hard choices about the service levels they can sustain.
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\34\ P.L. 116-136.
\35\ State-Amtrak Intercity Passenger Rail Comm., https://
www.saiprc.com/.
\36\ Amtrak, supra, note 15, at 7.
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RETURNING TO NORMAL OPERATIONS: CHALLENGES AHEAD
Amtrak, along with its workers and State partners, faces
many challenges in the months and years ahead. Amtrak estimates
that ridership for FY 2021 will be down 34 percent from 2019
levels. This ridership drop results in less revenue--which is
necessary to fund operations, pay workers, support State rail
service, and maintain a state-of-good repair. As travel
restrictions are lifted, Amtrak must work to convince riders
that trains are a safe travel option in comparison to other
travel options.
If Amtrak does in fact institute the long-distance service
cuts that are currently planned, there will be additional
barriers to getting back on track. Amtrak plans to restore
long-distance service based on a series of metrics that it says
measure public health, future demand, and current performance.
Amtrak contemplates restoring service between May 26 and June
30, 2021, at the earliest.\37\ For routes that are not restored
by June 2021, Amtrak will reevaluate the route's viability in
the FY 2022 planning cycle.\38\
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\37\ Amtrak, Restoring Long Distance Service, available at https://
www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/
corporate/position-papers/white-paper-amtrak-long-distance-restoration-
plan.pdf.
\38\ Id.
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All metrics must be met before restoration of service on a
given route. Amtrak's service restoration metrics are:
1. LAdvance Bookings: Amtrak will compare passenger ticket
bookings made by February 2021 for travel in June 2021 to
passenger ticket bookings made by February 2020 for travel in
June 2020. To restore service, 2021 levels must be at least 90
percent of 2020 seating capacity.\39\ The metric, intended to
forecast summer ridership, accounts for travel booked four
months in advance.
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\39\ Id.
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2. LRidership Levels: Amtrak's second metric requires
Amtrak to reach ridership levels equal to or exceeding 90
percent of the projections found in Amtrak's COVID-19-adjusted
first quarter Fiscal Year 2021 operating plan.\40\
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\40\ Id.
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3. LPandemic Recovery: Amtrak's third service resumption
metric reflects the rate of COVID-19 infections. To resume
service, COVID-19-related hospitalization rates in the regions
through which a given long-distance train operates must show
stable or declining trends by February 15, 2021.\41\
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\41\ Id.
If Amtrak cuts long distance service, it will likely face
an uphill battle to restore that service to previous levels.
This could have a significant impact on travel options for many
rural areas that depend on Amtrak long-distance service.
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Amtrak ``Restoring Long Distance Service'' memo.
Appendix B: ``Amtrak System Map''.
APPENDIX A
Restoring Long Distance Service
Amtrak is committed to operating a national rail network
that serves customers across the United States. In response to
the COVID-19 pandemic, we have already made temporary
reductions in service frequency to our Northeast Corridor (NEC)
and State Supported services. We are now extending similar
temporary reductions to most of our Long Distance routes,
effective October 1.
To be clear, our temporary reductions and subsequent plan
to restore this service are dependent on sufficient federal
assistance (at least $3.5 billion in FY21 assuming a 50%
systemwide ridership level, but additional assistance could be
required if ridership does not reach this level), but in order
to best protect our passengers' and employees' health, and to
make the best possible use of limited taxpayer investment, we
will consider the following metrics to decide when to restore
each affected Long Distance service:
1. LPublic Health--Is the COVID-19 pandemic under control?
LAmtrak will assess COVID-19-related
hospitalization rates in the regions through which a given Long
Distance route operates. If those rates are stable or declining
as of February 15, 2021, this condition will be met.
2. LFuture Demand--Are customers booking trips near the
same rate as in 2020?
LAmtrak will compare advance bookings for June
2021 (as of February 15, 2021) to advance bookings for June
2020 (as of February 15, 2020). If the percentage of available
seat- and room-miles booked in 2021 is at least 90% of the 2020
percentage, this condition will be met. (Note that calculations
of availability for 2021 will reflect any caps on ticket sales
to promote social distancing, as well as any other relevant
measures adopted to minimize COVID-related risks.)
3. LCurrent Performance--Is ridership close to our
projections in our operating plan?
LAmtrak will compare systemwide ridership levels
for the fall (Q1 of FY 2021) with our FY 2021 operating plan,
which already accounts for reduced ridership due to COVID. If
the number of passengers is at least 90% of the projected
figure, this condition will be met.
If all three conditions are met for a given Long Distance
route, then in February 2021, we will begin working to restore
service along that route. Depending on the particular route,
that restoration could be complete as early as late May, and no
later than June 30, 2021. If any route is not yet ready to be
restored when we conduct our review, we will apply an updated
version of the criteria described above as part of the FY 2022
planning cycle (or sooner, in the event of dramatic improvement
in demand prior to that point).
Before the pandemic, 4.6 million of our 32 million annual
passengers traveled on Amtrak's Long Distance routes. COVID-19
has changed a lot, at times causing our total ridership to drop
by more than 95% from FY 2019 levels--but Amtrak is still
America's Railroad, and we are still committed to serving our
customers and connecting communities across the nation.
APPENDIX B: AMTRAK SYSTEM MAP \42\
\42\ The numbers on this map correspond to the routes as follows:
1. Cascades; 2. Coast Starlight; 3. Capitol Corridor, San Joaquin; 4.
Pacific Surfliner; 5. Empire Builder; 6. California Zephyr; 7.
Southwest Chief; 8. Sunset Limited; 9. Blue Water, Carl Sandburg,
Hiawatha, Hoosier State (discontinued as of July 2019), Illini,
Illinois Zephyr, Lincoln, Pere Marquette, Saluki, Wolverine; 10.
Missouri River Runner; 11. Heartland Flyer; 12. Texas Eagle; 13. City
of New Orleans; 14. Lake Shore Limited; 15. Capitol Limited; 16.
Cardinal; 17. Crescent; 18. Maple Leaf; 19. Adirondack, Empire, Ethan
Allen; 20. Keystone, Pennsylvanian; 21. Vermonter, Valley Flyer
(initiated August 2019); 22. Downeaster; 23. Northeast Corridor; 24.
Carolinian, Piedmont, Virginia; 25. Auto Train, Palmetto; 26. Silver
Meteor, Silver Star. Where State-Supported and Long-Distance routes
overlap, the State-Supported route is shown.
AMTRAK, General and Legislative Annual Report & Fiscal Year 2020
Grant Request, available at https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/
projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/reports/Amtrak-
General-Legislative-Annual-Report-FY2020-Grant-Request.pdf, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WITNESSES
LMr. William Flynn, President, Amtrak
LMr. Arthur Maratea, National President,
Transportation Communications Union (TCU/IAM)
LMs. Amy Griffin, President, Local 1460, Transport
Workers Union of America (TWU)
LMr. Jim Mathews, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Rail Passengers Association
AMTRAK'S RESPONSE TO COVID-19
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2020
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:07 a.m., in
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Webex, Hon.
Daniel Lipinski (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Lipinski. The subcommittee will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
today's hearing and ask questions.
Without objection, so ordered.
This is a hybrid hearing. I want to remind Members of key
regulations from the House Committee on Rules to ensure this
hearing goes smoothly.
Members must be visible on screen for the purposes of
identification when joining this hearing.
Members must also continue to use the video function on
today's software platform, Cisco Webex, for the remainder of
the time they are attending this hearing, unless experiencing
connectivity issues or other technical problems.
If a Member is experiencing any connectivity issues or
other technical problems, please inform committee staff as soon
as possible, so you can receive assistance. A chat function is
available for Members on the Cisco Webex platform for this
purpose. Members can also call the committee's main phone line
at (202) 225-4472 for technical assistance by phone.
Members may not participate remotely in any other
proceeding that may be occurring simultaneously.
It is the responsibility of each Member seeking recognition
to unmute their microphone prior to speaking.
To avoid any inadvertent background noise, I request that
every Member keep their microphone muted when not seeking
recognition to speak.
Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I will
request that the Member please mute their microphone.
Finally, despite this being a hybrid hearing, I want to
emphasize that all the standard rules of decorum apply.
As the chair of today's hearings, I will make a good faith
effort to provide every Member experiencing connectivity issues
an opportunity to participate fully in the proceedings.
Members will have a standard 5 minutes to ask questions.
To insert a document into the record, please have your
staff email it to the committee clerk, Mike Twinchek.
This hearing also is being livestreamed for the public to
view.
And with that, I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes
for an opening statement.
Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to today's
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee
hearing on Amtrak's response to COVID-19. As you can see, we
are doing a hybrid hearing today, with most Members and our
witnesses remote to safely conduct this hearing.
I want to wish everyone participating or watching this
hearing my best during these tough times, and I hope everyone's
family and loved ones are safe.
Before we get started, this is my first opportunity to
publicly congratulate William Flynn, who became Amtrak's CEO
less than 5 months ago. There could not be a much tougher time
to begin this service.
[Microphone unmuted.]
Mr. Lipinski. I think we got that corrected, the mute
there.
So I wish Mr. Flynn well.
COVID has wreaked havoc on the health and economic welfare
of Americans, just as it has done across the globe.
Economically, the travel industry has been especially hard hit.
I understand Amtrak faces serious financial issues and other
strains on its operations. We will hear specifically about this
directly from Mr. Flynn.
I have always been a strong advocate for Amtrak, because it
provides an important public service: national passenger rail
service. It is critical that all of us, especially everyone at
Amtrak, always keep in mind that it is, first and foremost, a
national public service, though this does not mean that it
should not be run well.
In addition, as everyone watching knows, I have been a
staunch advocate for the men and women who work at Amtrak. It
is essential that they all are treated fairly, especially in
the midst of an unprecedented pandemic that has caused economic
hardships for millions of Americans and their families.
That brings me to the issue of furloughs recently announced
by Amtrak. Congress recognized the financial difficulty Amtrak
is experiencing because of a steep drop in ridership, and
provided over $1 billion in CARES Act funding for Amtrak, with
the understanding that part of the funds would be used to
prevent furloughs. So Amtrak's announcement that they will
furlough over 2,000 employees on October 1st is extremely
disappointing.
I understand that, technically, we are about to begin a new
fiscal year. But one of the biggest frustrations I and other
Members have is that Amtrak has had months to come to Congress
and request additional funding to help keep workers on payroll.
The principal reason Amtrak didn't get any money in the Heroes
Act passed by the House was that Amtrak didn't submit a
supplemental request until 10 days after passage. To make
matters worse, Amtrak is just now submitting their amended
fiscal year 2021 supplemental request to Congress, less than 1
month before the current fiscal year expires, and Amtrak plans
to implement these furloughs.
But frustrations aside, I believe that Congress needs to
act quickly to prevent furloughs and avoid long-distance
service cuts.
First, the furloughs won't actually save the Federal
Government that much money, because the workers furloughed will
be eligible for railroad unemployment insurance, which is
funded through taxes paid by workers and their employers--in
this case, Amtrak.
Second, we tried cutting long-distance service to 3 days a
week under President Clinton in 1994. Congress, on a bipartisan
basis, led by Mississippi Republican Senator Trent Lott,
eventually rejected those cuts, and restored long-distance
service to 7 days a week because cutting long-distance service
economically hurts rural communities, undermines Amtrak's role
as a national passenger rail system, and actually doesn't save
that much money. Congress' view on this has not changed in the
past 25 years.
Finally, we should reject these cuts because most of us on
this committee believe that whenever this pandemic is over,
Amtrak should go back to running the service it had before this
pandemic. We cannot just flip the switch, so to speak, if
Amtrak is going to lose valuable workers, know-how, and riders
because of these cuts.
Ultimately, the furloughs and long-distance service cuts
are misguided, and weaken our national passenger rail service.
It is important we hear from Amtrak CEO William Flynn today,
and his long-term vision for Amtrak, and why Amtrak is making
these cuts.
Finally, I feel it necessary to remind Amtrak that, while I
strongly support our Nation's passenger railroad, Amtrak must
heed and not ignore Congress' desire that it work well with
others, including commuter railroads like Metra in northeastern
Illinois, as well as States and local municipalities. Too often
it feels like Amtrak is happy to take money from Congress and
then ignore Congress' directives. That is not helpful,
especially when Amtrak needs much more from Congress right now.
With that, I recognize Ranking Member Crawford for his
opening statement.
[Mr. Lipinski's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Lipinski, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Illinois, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to today's Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee's hearing on Amtrak's
response to COVID-19. As you can see, we are doing a hybrid hearing
today with most members and our witnesses remote to safely conduct this
hearing. I want to wish everyone participating or watching this hearing
my best during these tough times. I hope everyone's family and loved
ones are safe. Before we get started, this is my first opportunity to
publicly congratulate William Flynn who became Amtrak's CEO less than
five months ago. There could not be a much tougher time to begin this
service; I wish you well.
COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on the health and economic welfare of
Americans, just as it has done across the globe. Economically, the
travel industry has been especially hard hit. I understand Amtrak faces
serious financial issues and other strains on its operations, and we'll
hear specifically about this directly from Mr. Flynn. I've always been
a strong advocate for Amtrak because it provides an important public
service--national passenger rail service. It is critical that all of
us, especially everyone at Amtrak, always keep in mind that it is
first-and-foremost a national public service. Though this does not mean
that it should not be run well. In addition, as everyone watching
knows, I have been a staunch advocate for the men and women who work at
Amtrak. It is essential that they are all treated fairly, especially in
the midst of an unprecedented pandemic that has caused economic
hardship for millions of Americans and their families.
That brings me to the issue of the furloughs recently announced by
Amtrak. Congress recognized the financial difficulty Amtrak is
experiencing because of a steep drop in ridership and provided over $1
billion in CARES Act funding for Amtrak with the understanding that
part of the funds would be used to prevent furloughs. So Amtrak's
announcement that they will furlough over 2,000 employees on October
1st is extremely disappointing. I understand that, technically, we are
about to begin a new fiscal year. But one of the biggest frustrations I
and other members have is that Amtrak has had months to come to
Congress and request additional funding to help keep workers on the
payroll. The principal reason Amtrak didn't get any money in the HEROES
Act passed by the House was that Amtrak didn't submit a supplemental
request until 10 days after passage. To make matters worse, Amtrak is
just now submitting their amended FY21 supplemental request to Congress
less than one month before the current fiscal year expires and Amtrak
plans to implement these furloughs.
My frustrations aside, I believe that Congress needs to act quickly
to prevent furloughs and avoid long distance service cuts. First, the
furloughs won't actually save the federal government that much money
because the workers furloughed will be eligible for Railroad
Unemployment Insurance, which is funded through taxes paid by workers
and their employers--in this case Amtrak. Second, we tried cutting long
distance service to three days a week under President Clinton in 1994.
Congress on a bipartisan basis led by Mississippi Republican Senator
Trent Lott eventually rejected those cuts and restored long distance
service to seven days a week because cutting long distance service
economically hurts rural communities, undermines Amtrak's role as a
national passenger rail system, and actually doesn't save that much
money. Congress' view on this has not changed in the past 25 years.
Finally, we should reject these cuts because most of us on this
Committee believe that whenever this pandemic is over, Amtrak should go
back to running the service it had before this pandemic. We cannot just
flip the switch so to speak if Amtrak is going to lose valuable
workers, know-how, and riders because of these cuts. Ultimately, the
furloughs and long distance service cuts are misguided and weaken our
national passenger rail system.
It's important we hear from Amtrak CEO William Flynn today on his
long-term vision for Amtrak and why Amtrak is making these cuts.
Finally, I feel it necessary to remind Amtrak that while I strongly
support our nation's passenger railroad, Amtrak must heed, and not
ignore, Congress' desire that it work well with others, including
commuter railroads like Metra in northeastern Illinois, as well as
States and local municipalities. Too often it feels like Amtrak is
happy to take money from Congress and then ignore Congress' directives.
That is not helpful, especially when Amtrak needs much more from
Congress.
With that, I recognize Ranking Member Crawford for an opening
statement.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. I also want to thank our witnesses for
being here today.
Our hearing today is to review Amtrak's response to the
COVID-19 pandemic.
In March, Congress gave Amtrak over $1 billion in
additional funding to offset pandemic losses and avoid
furloughs. Since that time, however, Amtrak has significantly
cut its routes and announced that it is laying off 20 percent
of its workforce--that is almost 4,000 people--by October 1st,
2020.
Amtrak has also more than doubled its fiscal year 2021
funding request from just over $2 billion to almost $5 billion.
I am troubled that Amtrak is receiving and requesting record
amounts of funding, while cutting services of thousands and
thousands of jobs.
Amtrak also recently requested a waiver of its Buy America
requirements to purchase equipment from foreign countries. When
I asked for more specifics in a July letter, Amtrak could not
provide even the most basic information, including the costs
and origins of the equipment. Amtrak should not be spending its
taxpayer-provided bailout money on foreign goods, while cutting
American jobs and services.
I welcome new Amtrak CEO Bill Flynn. I look forward to
hearing about how he is responding to the COVID-19 crisis, but
also his thoughts on other important issues, including his
plans for meeting Amtrak's congressionally mandated requirement
of making a profit.
Thank you again to all our witnesses for being here today,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
[Mr. Crawford's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Arkansas, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Thank you, Chairman Lipinski, for holding this hearing. I also want
to thank our witnesses for being here today.
Our hearing is to review Amtrak's response to the COVID-19
pandemic. In March, Congress gave Amtrak over $1 billion in additional
funding to offset pandemic losses and avoid furloughs. Since that time,
Amtrak has significantly cut its routes and announced that it is laying
off 20 percent of its workforce, or almost 4,000 people, by October 1,
2020.
Amtrak has also more than doubled its fiscal year 2021 funding
request from just over $2 billion, to almost $5 billion. I am troubled
that Amtrak is receiving and requesting record amounts of funding while
cutting services and thousands of jobs.
Amtrak also recently requested a waiver of its Buy America
requirement to purchase equipment from a foreign country. When I asked
for more specifics in a July letter, Amtrak could not provide even the
most basic information, including the costs and origins of the
equipment. Amtrak should not be spending its taxpayer-provided bailout
money on foreign goods while cutting American jobs and services.
I welcome new Amtrak CEO Bill Flynn. I look forward to hearing
about how he is responding to the COVID-19 crisis, but also his
thoughts on other important issues including his plans for meeting
Amtrak's Congressionally mandated requirement of making a profit.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Crawford. The Chair will now
recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Graves,
for an opening statement.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Sorry about that, Mr. Chairman,
sorry about that. I was muted.
Mr. Lipinski. OK. Go ahead.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. I want to thank you for holding
this hearing, and I do want to thank all the witnesses for
attending.
Obviously, today's hearing is a great opportunity to review
how Amtrak has handled the COVID-19 pandemic. Now, prior to the
crisis, Amtrak was coming off its best year ever. In 2020,
Amtrak was expecting to make a profit for the first time in
almost 50 years. But after the pandemic, Amtrak obviously
reported that its ridership dropped by 95 percent, and its
revenues were down 82 percent, compared to the 2019 levels.
Today is also Amtrak CEO Bill Flynn's first appearance, as
you pointed out, before the committee since taking over in
April, and I welcome Mr. Flynn. He comes to Amtrak after
several years working in various roles in the private-sector
transportation industry. His experience includes high-level
positions in, obviously, the aviation industry with Atlas, and
maritime industries, and also working for a Class I freight
railroad.
And I know many of the members on the committee on both
sides have worked with Bill as he has served in various roles.
And I have always found Bill to be both effective and
forthright in many of his past positions, and I expect that is
going to be the same case for Amtrak and his leadership at
Amtrak.
I look forward to hearing from Mr. Flynn on his update when
it comes to Amtrak's COVID-19 response, and I am also
interested in hearing about his future plans for Amtrak,
including recovering from the pandemic, and restoring
ridership, and meeting the congressional mandate of turning a
profit.
So with that, again, thanks to all the witnesses, and I
look forward to the discussion. I would yield back.
[Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
I want to thank Chairman Lipinski for holding this hearing, and I
want to thank our witnesses for attending.
Today's hearing is a good opportunity to review how Amtrak has
handled the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to this crisis, Amtrak was coming
off its best year ever. In 2020, Amtrak was expecting to make a profit
for the first time in its almost 50-year history. After the pandemic
hit, Amtrak reported that its ridership dropped by 95 percent and its
revenues were down by 82 percent compared to 2019 levels.
Today is also Amtrak CEO Bill Flynn's first appearance before the
Committee since taking over in April. I welcome Mr. Flynn. He comes to
Amtrak after several years working in various roles in the private
sector transportation industry. His experience includes high level
positions in the aviation and maritime industries, and also working for
a Class I freight railroad.
I know many of the Members of this Committee on both sides have
worked with Mr. Flynn as he's served in these various roles. I have
always found Mr. Flynn to be both effective and forthright in many of
his past positions. I expect that will be the same for his leadership
of Amtrak.
I look forward to hearing Mr. Flynn's update on Amtrak's COVID-19
response. I am also interested in hearing about his future plans for
Amtrak, including recovering from the pandemic, restoring ridership,
and meeting the Congressional mandate of turning a profit.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Graves. I now would like to
welcome the witnesses on our panel: Mr. William Flynn,
President and CEO of Amtrak; Mr. Arthur Maratea, national
president, Transportation Communications Union; Amy Griffin,
president of Local 1460, Transport Workers Union of America;
and Mr. Jim Mathews, president and chief executive officer of
the Rail Passengers Association.
Thank you for participating today, and I look forward to
your testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record.
Since your written testimony has been made part of the
record, the subcommittee requests that you limit your oral
testimony to 5 minutes.
And with that, Mr. Flynn, you may proceed for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM FLYNN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK);
ARTHUR MARATEA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, TRANSPORTATION
COMMUNICATIONS UNION; AMY GRIFFIN, LOCAL 1460 PRESIDENT,
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA; AND JIM MATHEWS, PRESIDENT
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, RAIL PASSENGERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Flynn. Good morning, Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member
Graves, and Ranking Member Crawford, and members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the kind welcome and the
opportunity here to address the committee.
As you know, I am Bill Flynn, Amtrak's recently appointed
President and CEO, and I am here to discuss our company's
response to COVID-19.
But I have to start my remarks by thanking our dedicated
employees who have more than risen to the pandemic challenge.
Our highest priority is always going to be the safety of our
customers and the safety of our employees, and I am truly proud
of our team's efforts.
Amtrak has been an early leader throughout the crisis,
instituting social distancing requirements, employee pay
protection, mask requirements, and now COVID-19 testing for all
of our employees on an as-requested basis. We are also
partnering with a leading university to study airflow and
ventilation in our railcars, and working with others to
strengthen our disinfecting protocols.
I want to thank you for the INVEST in America Act. And, if
enacted, we finally have the funding we require to modernize
our system, add more trains and new routes across our Nation,
and receive the priority treatment from our host railroads that
your constituents deserve. Simply put, it is the game changer
we have always hoped for.
Amtrak did deliver record performance in fiscal year 2019,
and fiscal year 2020 was set to be another record year. But as
the pandemic's effect took hold in March, our ridership
plummeted by 97 percent. In February, we carried more than
80,000 daily passengers. But in April, there were less than
4,000 passengers, with corresponding impacts on our revenues.
Thanks to the CARES Act, we have managed to survive these
difficult times for fiscal year 2020. But unfortunately, our
ridership and revenue are still down more than 80 percent.
We recently updated our forecast for fiscal year 2021, and
we now anticipate needing up to $4.9 billion in funding to
operate and invest in our network, support our partners, and
address various congressional concerns, such as avoiding
employee furloughs and maintaining daily long-distance service.
But given the current uncertainty of COVID-19 supplemental
funding or fiscal year 2021 appropriations levels, we must be
prudent and prepare for the situation at hand, while hoping for
the best.
Therefore, as explained this summer, we are implementing
our plans to adjust our service and workforce levels beginning
in October. As difficult as these actions are, if we do not
take such cost-saving measures and fail to receive supplemental
funding, we anticipate burning nearly $250 million each month.
At this rate of loss, we would be forced to take drastic
measures with long-lasting impacts on the company, on our
employees, and on our network.
As you know, we have already reduced service on both the
Northeast Corridor and State-supported routes, and we now plan
to extend temporary frequency adjustments to most of our long-
distance trains. But let me be clear: these adjustments are
temporary. There is no secret plan or hidden agenda, as critics
may suggest. Many of your districts have long-distance service,
and I have heard your concerns loud and clear. And please know
that I am 100 percent committed to our long-distance network
and to its future. By way of example, we continue to make
investments that demonstrate this commitment today, and I can
point to our purchase of 75 diesel locomotives for this service
line.
Until our ridership recovers, we must make difficult
workforce adjustments, as we cannot continue to indefinitely
fund a workforce too large for the number of passengers we are
serving. Many States have told us that they will be unable to
partner with Amtrak unless we reduce our costs to better align
with ridership.
Having grown up in a rail labor family, I know how hard
furloughs can be, and we are working hard to minimize impacts
to our employees. Earlier this year we implemented several
cost-saving measures. But given the continued lack of riders
and uncertain funding, we plan to reduce our workforce by
approximately 2,050 agreement and management positions.
Going forward, we will do everything in our power to return
furloughed employees to work as soon as possible, and we are
going beyond our contractual requirements to provide extended
and no-cost healthcare coverage during this period.
Intercity passenger rail remains one of the safest, most
efficient, and most sustainable forms of transportation. Once
the pandemic passes, Amtrak stands ready to grow and serve more
of America in large cities and in rural communities, thereby
providing thousands of good, living-wage jobs for skilled
employees in the process.
Please know that I am committed to working through this
crisis with you and with other stakeholders to manage these
near-term challenges, while safeguarding Amtrak's future.
Thank you for your time and support, and I look forward to
your questions.
[Mr. Flynn's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Flynn, President and Chief Executive
Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
Introduction
Good morning, Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and
Members of this Subcommittee. Thank you for calling this hearing today
to discuss Amtrak and COVID-19. My name is William Flynn, and this is
my first opportunity to testify as Amtrak's president and chief
executive officer, a position I assumed in April of this year.
Let me begin by thanking this Subcommittee for drafting and
advancing the Rail Title of the INVEST in America Act. This critical
piece of legislation proposes historic levels of federal investment
that will help Amtrak rehabilitate or replace its aged assets, such as
100-year-old bridges, tunnels and 40-year-old trains, and expand our
services. The bill also includes important policy reforms, such as
passenger train preference enforcement to ensure on-time performance on
our host freight railroads, an expedited process for host railroad
access, and substantial grant funding that will help Amtrak evolve,
expand, and modernize our network so that we can connect more Americans
to the places they want to go. If enacted, the INVEST Act will be a
game changer for Amtrak and intercity passenger rail. It is what
Americans deserve, and I applaud your bold leadership and thank you for
your confidence in Amtrak.
Let me also take this opportunity to thank the thousands of Amtrak
employees who have risen to the challenges associated with COVID-19 and
have remained focused on Amtrak's mission to provide safe, reliable
transportation to our customers and your constituents. Ticket agents,
conductors, train attendants, red caps, cleaners, and dozens of other
specialties are doing their part to keep America moving, and I am very
proud of to be a part of the team.
I come from a railroad family. My father and uncle were locomotive
engineers, and my brother was an Amtrak conductor and local union
chair. My first transportation job during summer break from college was
working on a maintenance-of-way gang that was installing welded rail on
the Northeast Corridor (NEC) in New England. In 43 years in the
transportation industry, I have had the opportunity to serve in a
multitude of roles in ocean shipping, airline, and railroad companies.
These connections deepen the honor I feel to lead Amtrak, and I will do
all I can to further Amtrak's important mission to serve the country.
As Amtrak finished FY 2019 and even through the first five months
of FY 2020, the company was in a stronger position than at any time in
its soon to be fifty-year history. Ridership, revenue, and financial
performance were at record levels. Amtrak was on track to generate
passenger revenues exceeding operating expenses in FY 2020 for the
first time ever. The company was preparing to take delivery of next
generation Acela trainsets for its high-speed NEC service, and had a
bold vision of expanding train service in new and existing corridors
across the country.
Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic then hit this nation. Amtrak,
like all transportation providers, was hit especially hard. In a matter
of weeks, Amtrak's ridership plummeted by 97% and we undertook
immediate actions to protect the health and safety of our customers and
employees and reduce capacity.
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the CARES Act, which provided
important emergency funding to Amtrak and our state partners in order
to minimize the negative financial impacts of COVID-19 during FY 2020.
Unfortunately, recovery has been slow, and our ridership and revenue
are still down over 80% compared to a year ago. It has become clear
that the pandemic's impacts will extend through, and almost certainly
beyond, FY 2021 as well, and Amtrak, along with our state partners, are
now working to plan for the year ahead.
What I would like to do today is discuss with you Amtrak's response
to COVID-19 thus far, including how we ensure our customers and
employees are safe and healthy, as well as the steps we have taken to
manage the loss of revenue. I would also like to focus on two issues
that I know are important to this subcommittee: how we must adjust our
workforce and our train service given the pandemic's impacts on our
ridership. Finally, it is important to understand what happens after we
get through this pandemic and the vision for Amtrak and intercity
passenger rail for the future.
Amtrak's Response to COVID-19
To provide more detail about how Amtrak has responded to COVID-19,
let me offer a quick summary of the steps we have taken since the
crisis began to unfold in late winter of this year.
Our number one job is to provide a safe work and travel environment
for our employees and our riders. In January, as concern about the
virus spreading in the U.S. started to emerge, we began reminding
employees about the need to be vigilant about hand washing and
sanitizing. As it became clearer that we were about to face a serious
public health crisis we developed a safety plan, and over the past
several months we have worked to inform and execute our plan with the
best available information.
We have taken many actions to minimize health and safety risks to
our customers and employees. They include:
Requiring masks for passengers and employees on our
trains and in our facilities.
Limiting reservations on trains (other than in private
sleeping room accommodations) to allow social distancing.
Adopting and continuously refining new and enhanced
cleaning procedures on our trains and in our stations.
Instructing all employees whose jobs can be performed
remotely to work from home.
Distributing supplies of Personal Protective Equipment to
employees across the country.
Providing every employee infected by or exposed to COVID-
19 with up to two weeks of pay protection to safeguard their households
and ensure that ill employees stay home. (Similarly, absenteeism due to
COVID-19 symptoms has not been subject to the application of our
attendance policy.)
Enhancing our web site and mobile application with
features like improved boarding guides and train capacity indicators
that help our customers to make safe traveling decisions.
Installing protective plastic barriers in our cafe cars
and in our stations to support physical distancing, and hand sanitizer
dispensers on all our trains.
Contracting with Quest Diagnostics to make voluntary
COVID-19 testing available to all employees. While our employees
primarily rely upon testing available at no cost to them through the
CARES Act, this service will provide additional confidence that we are
taking the necessary steps to mitigate the risk of infection among our
workforce.
Creating a research partnership with a leading university
to study airflow, ventilation, and air filtration systems in passenger
railcars to determine if additional measures would further reduce the
possibility of airborne spread of infectious particles on our
equipment.
Working with RB, the makers of Lysol, to strengthen our
comprehensive disinfection protocols for trains, stations, and lounges.
The partnership will launch in NEC stations and on the Pacific
Surfliner route, before expanding across our network.
Partnering with the George Washington University Milken
Institute School of Public Health to secure ongoing technical expertise
and guidance to enhance Amtrak's comprehensive coronavirus pandemic
response.
We have prominently communicated information about our response to
COVID-19 and the changes we have made to address it to our passengers
through Amtrak.com, social media and station signage. We have also
communicated openly and frequently with our employees through employee
advisories and companywide town halls. During the townhalls, we have
briefed employees on new developments and answered their questions, the
responses to which are made available to all employees on our intranet.
In addition, our labor relations team has met at least weekly with
representatives of our unions.
COVID-19's Financial Impact
We, along with our state partners, have seen stunning revenue
losses as a result of the precipitous decline in ticket sales due to
COVID-19. As of early March, Amtrak was on track to generate FY 2020
passenger revenues greater than operating costs for the first time in
our history. Over the next few weeks, ridership on our trains plummeted
by 97%, and since then only a small portion of our passengers have
resumed traveling. Our latest projections are that in FY 2020, Amtrak's
revenue loss from ticket sales will be $1.266 billion, which would be
only 55% of what it was in FY 2019.
To try to align with the current depressed demand for service,
manage our financial losses, and continue to make investments in
capital projects for future riders, we made several cost-cutting
decisions:
We have reduced service frequency and train capacity on
the NEC, and on our state supported routes in partnership with our 20
state partners.
We deferred and/or restructured $600 million in capital
projects.
We dramatically reduced overtime.
We offered voluntary unpaid time off to our employees.
Several of our unions agreed to defer previously
negotiated wage increases, for which we are grateful.
The reduced number of trains meant that while our
agreement employees have not been furloughed, their earnings have been
impacted by a reduction in hours worked.
The 401k match for our non-agreement employees was
suspended, and their pay was reduced 7-22% based on a tiered system for
the remainder of FY 2020. I have not drawn a salary during this
difficult time.
A combination of these cost controls and the FY 2020 CARES Act
funding allowed us to avoid involuntary layoffs and furloughs during
this fiscal year.
Adjustments to Train Service
In the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic's onset, we
reduced service frequency on both the NEC and state-supported routes by
approximately 70%. On the NEC, Acela service was suspended entirely,
along with all but a few Northeast Regional trains; and in consultation
with our state partners we reduced service on 10 of our 28 state-
supported routes and suspended all service on 14 others. Some service
has since been restored, including a limited number of Acela trains
that resumed operation on June 1. A complete list of the service
reductions and the restorations made to date is appended to my
testimony.
We have joined with our state partners in urging Congress to
provide additional funding to help offset the lost revenue that our
state partners are experiencing during the pandemic. We are gratified
that Congress included additional funding for FY 2020 in the CARES Act,
and that the House appropriations bill includes such funding for FY
2021. We will continue to work closely with Congress to find the best
way to help our state partners out during these difficult times. We
recently updated our forecast and now anticipate needing up to $4.9
billion in funding to operate and invest in our network, support our
partners, and address various congressional concerns like avoiding
employee furloughs and maintaining daily long distance service.
In addition to changes in service frequency, we have also adjusted
the number and types of cars operated on individual trains, as well as
on-board food service, ticketing policies, and other aspects of our
customer service. We made these changes to facilitate social
distancing, match capacity to reduced demand, avoid unnecessary
expenditures, and accommodate COVID-19 driven changes in customer
preferences and state partner service change requests on state-
supported routes.
We are in the process of finalizing our FY 2021 Operating Plan.
Unlike years past, that Plan will undoubtedly require frequent
adjustments to reflect both the presently unpredictable progress in the
battle against COVID-19 and the equally unpredictable impact COVID-19
will have on Americans' willingness to travel during the year ahead. We
will constantly evaluate external developments, and changes in Amtrak
ridership, ticket revenue, and customer preferences, as we refine that
Plan, adjust service levels to match demand, and provide state partners
with the changes in services they request. I should note that the
Operating Plan includes as one of its assumptions the availability of a
vaccine. Should a vaccine not become available, or be extensively
delayed, this will have significant negative consequences for our
projections.
Long Distance Frequency Reductions
Throughout FY 2020, Amtrak has continued to operate its long
distance trains on their normal, pre-pandemic service frequency,
despite huge ridership drops and service reductions--or outright
service suspensions--on every other North American intercity passenger
service. Airlines, intercity bus companies and the Alaska Railroad have
all made major reductions in service, as Amtrak has done on the NEC and
our state-supported routes. VIA Rail Canada, our Canadian counterpart,
has suspended all service on its long distance routes until at least
November 1.
In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, we hoped that passenger
demand would increase appreciably on long distance routes during what
is normally their peak Summer season. Because of the resurgence in
COVID-19 infections and the continuing reluctance of travelers to take
any trips, particularly long trips on public transportation, that did
not happen. In June and July, ridership and revenues on long distance
routes (excluding the Auto Train) were down by nearly two-thirds
compared to the same months in 2019--even though we had not made the
huge reductions in service implemented on nearly all of our other
routes.
The two thirds reduction in revenues has had a major impact on long
distance financial performance. While long distance trains had
significant operating losses prior to COVID-19 ($475 million in FY
2019), in normal times they cover most of the out-of-pocket costs such
as fuel, commissary supplies, host railroad payments, and wages and
benefits for on-board employees that are incurred by each train that
operates over a route. Therefore, operating service three times a week
rather than daily ordinarily would not produce significant and
immediate cash savings.
However, these are not ordinary times. Since ridership and revenues
on long distance trains (other than the Auto Train) have fallen
precipitously, we are incurring huge, additional operating losses for
each train we operate--for the benefit of just a third of the normal
number of passengers. Given that, we felt that it would be
irresponsible to continue spending a much larger share of our limited
funding to provide the same frequency of service for a much smaller
number of remaining passengers, particularly as we entered the Fall/
Winter season when monthly long distance ridership normally declines up
to 40% from the Summer peak.
Beginning in October, we will temporarily reduce service on most
long-distance routes from daily to three times per week. The exceptions
are the Auto Train, which will continue to operate daily; the Silver
Meteor, which began operating four days a week in July to provide daily
service between New York City and Miami in combination with the Silver
Star, which was reduced to tri-weekly operation and operates a similar
route between New York City and Miami; and the Cardinal and Sunset
Limited, which already operate three times a week.
Like the more significant service reductions we have made on our
NEC and state supported routes, these long distance frequency
adjustments will be temporary. As ridership returns, we intend to
restore service frequency to previous levels. We remain committed to
our long distance system.
If Amtrak receives less than $4.9 billion and there is no
congressional directive related to long distance service, we will
evaluate three metrics to decide in February of next year whether to
restore daily service on each affected long distance route.
1) Public Health: Is the COVID-19 pandemic under control? Are
COVID-19-related hospitalization rates in the regions through which a
given long distance route operates stable or declining?
2) Future Demand: Are customers booking trips near the same rate
as in 2020? Is the percentage of available seat- and room-miles booked
for 2021 (as of February 15, 2021) at least 90% of the percentage for
June 2020 (as of February 15, 2020), taking into account any caps on
ticket sales to promote social distancing or other relevant measures
adopted to minimize COVID-19-related risks?
3) Current Performance: Is ridership close to our projections in
our operating plan? Was systemwide ridership in the First Quarter of FY
2021 (October-December 2020) at least 90% of the projected figure in
our FY 2021 operating plan, which already accounts for reduced
ridership due to COVID-19?
If all three conditions are met for a given long distance route, we
will restore daily service along that route between late May and June
2021. If any route is not yet ready to be restored when we conduct our
review, we will apply an updated version of the criteria described
above as part of our FY 2022 planning cycle (or sooner, in the event of
a dramatic improvement in demand prior to that point).
One thing I want to make absolutely clear: these long distance
frequency reductions are temporary. We are committed to continuing to
operate our current long distance network and to improving the service
we provide to our long distance passengers. However, we need two things
from Congress to enable us to provide a viable long distance service
when the COVID-19 pandemic is at last behind us. The first is increased
funding for essential long distance capital investments, particularly
equipment. Most of the passenger cars we operate on our long distance
trains are already, or will soon be, more than 40 years old. These cars
have reached the end of their useful lives and must be replaced if we
are to maintain current long distance services.
The second thing we need from Congress is the ability to enforce
our statutory right to preference over freight trains. The greatest
threat to the future of our long distance network is not COVID-19 but
rather poor on-time performance that diminishes the value of these
services to our customers. The leading cause of delays to our long
distance trains is the failure of some of our host railroads to comply
with this longstanding legal obligation to provide Amtrak trains with
preference over their tracks. During FY 2019, our trains incurred over
one million minutes of delays due to freight train interference on host
railroads. While freight train interference also affects some state
supported routes, our long distance passengers--who have the same right
to arrive at their destinations on time as passengers on the Amtrak-
dispatched NEC--bear the brunt of these railroads' inability or refusal
to obey the law. We are very grateful that this Committee included a
provision in the INVEST in America Act that gives us the ability to
enforce our preference rights.
Our commitment to the future of our long distance network is
reflected in the many investments we are currently pursuing, despite
funding limitations that the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated, to
modernize our long distance service and enhance its safety.
Capital projects to improve accessibility for customers
with disabilities and the experience of all customers when they use our
stations are under construction at eight stations served only by long
distance trains; projects at 16 more long distance-only stations are
out for bid or in final design.
We are taking delivery of the last of the 130 Viewliner
II cars that have replaced the long distance cars that were the oldest
equipment in our fleet; we are refreshing the interiors of our other
long distance passenger cars with new seat cushions, upholstery, and
carpet.
We have ordered 75 new Amtrak Long Distance Charger 4,200
horsepower (ALC-42) diesel locomotives that will begin the replacement
of our long distance locomotive fleet; and we are planning for the
acquisition of the next generation of long distance passenger
equipment.
We continue to invest in track upgrades across multiple
long distance routes, including major upgrades on the Southwest Chief
route and improvements to Chicago-area tracks used by the Cardinal, and
are working to install positive train control (PTC) technology or make
other safety enhancing investments on portions of eight long distance
routes.
Adjustments to Workforce
From the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, what has been most
important to us other than ensuring the safety of our passengers and
employees is preserving the jobs of our workforce. Avoiding involuntary
reductions in force was not only the right thing to do, it was also
necessary to safeguard the skills, talent, and experience of our
employees, our most valuable asset. The aid extended to Amtrak by the
CARES Act allowed us to make it through FY 2020 with no involuntary
furloughs or layoffs.
With the CARES Act funding running out, and the increasing
recognition by everyone in the travel industry that it will be years
before travel demand returns to normal, we recognize that we cannot ask
Congress and the taxpayers to continue to pay all of the employees for
whom we will not have any work in the foreseeable future. Likewise, as
the state partners who provide funding for our State-Supported services
struggle with unprecedented fiscal challenges brought about by COVID-
19, many of them have made it clear to us that they will not be able to
continue to pay for those services unless we reduce our costs to
reflect the significant reductions in the number of trains operating,
and the much greater losses in ticket revenues. Other companies in the
travel industry--an industry severely decimated by COVID-19--are facing
the same dilemma. Most major airlines have announced plans to reduce
their workforces by 20% or more when the CARES Act prohibition on
airline employee furloughs ends on September 30.
While we see no alternative to workforce reductions, we have taken
every possible step to minimize the number of people whose jobs will be
impacted. As I mentioned earlier, we offered voluntary unpaid leave to
our employees and implemented other cost-saving measures that enabled
us to stretch out our CARES Act funding. When it became apparent that
we would have to become a smaller company, we implemented a voluntary
separation incentive program in which 521 agreement-covered and
management employees elected to participate. As we undertake painful
but necessary reductions of 100 management employees and 1,950
furloughs among our agreement forces, we will continue to communicate
with our employees, their union representatives, and Congress regarding
adjustments to our workforce. Going forward, we will do everything in
our power to bring employees who must be furloughed back to our
workforce as soon as possible.
Looking at both the temporary changes to our long distance service
and our recent workforce reductions, I must emphasize that Amtrak
really had no choice but to take these actions, given the uncertainty
in our federal funding. Without these vital cost saving measures, we
will burn through nearly $250 million each month, ultimately forcing us
to take drastic measures that would have wide-ranging impacts on the
company, our employees, and our ability to serve our customers. If this
continued long enough, we would eventually face insolvency.
Capital Commitments
The biggest challenge Amtrak has faced since we began operation in
1971 is the lack of dedicated and reliable capital funding. One of the
most significant accomplishments Amtrak has made in recent years is
that our increased revenues and more efficient operations have enabled
us to set aside money from our annual appropriations, which in years
past were used primarily to subsidize operations, so that we can fund
critically important capital projects. In addition to the long distance
investments I already mentioned, the most urgent investment needs
include replacement of the 45-year old Amfleet I fleet that provides
most of our NEC and much of our state supported service and major
capital projects such as Portal North Bridge, New York Penn Moynihan
Train Hall, and desperately needed improvements at Chicago Union
Station.
Some have suggested that Amtrak should not alter its services or
workforce to reflect the greatly reduced ridership and financial
changes wrought by COVID-19, but should instead take money out of these
capital commitments and use it to fund regular operations for the
duration of this crisis. I cannot emphasize too strongly that
cannibalizing these capital funds is the wrong approach. Using scarce
capital funding to operate nearly empty trains would not be productive,
nor would it be a prudent use of the American taxpayer's investment in
Amtrak. Rather, it would preclude us from undertaking projects that
will increase safety, enhance reliability, and improve convenience in
ways that will benefit tens of millions of our customers in FY 2021 and
the years ahead. It is also critical that Congress understands that
slashing capital spending would not prevent workforce reductions since
much of this capital spending goes for the wages and benefits of the
Amtrak employees who work on capital projects. Maintaining and
improving infrastructure supports a large, dedicated, skilled
workforce, representing approximately 2,000 full time equivalent
employees. To be clear, cutting capital spending would also result in
workforce reductions.
It is also misleading to call our capital needs discretionary. Some
of our capital dollars are restricted by law from being used for other
purposes, such as the federal dollars Congress has directed us to set
aside for ADA compliance, upgrades to the Southwest Chief route, and
important safety technology for certain corridor routes. The Northeast
Corridor Commission estimates that the NEC has a more-than-$40 billion
state-of-good-repair backlog. When we delay the replacement of century-
old infrastructure, the Amtrak employees who would perform the work on
those projects bear the immediate cost. But the Amtrak and commuter
train passengers who use the NEC every day also pay the cost, as they
endure the unreliability that comes with depending on infrastructure
never meant for today's demands. We cannot allow the COVID-19 crisis to
cost us projects that are essential to restoring and maintaining normal
operations and will dramatically improve the safety, reliability, and
quality of our services for many decades to come.
Amtrak's Future
2020 has been a hard year for the country and for Amtrak. We will
be grappling with the effects of the pandemic for years to come.
However, it is important to remind ourselves of deeper trends that
still bode well for Amtrak's future, despite the setbacks we are
currently facing. COVID-19 has not changed the fact that intercity
passenger rail is the most efficient and the most environmentally
responsible way to serve the transportation need of the megaregions
throughout the country whose rapid population growth will continue. It
has not changed the need to address highway congestion by steps other
than adding more lanes. In fact, highway congestion is already
returning as travelers resume driving between cities and avoid air and
transit travel due to social distancing concerns. Nor has COVID-19
reduced the requests Amtrak receives from communities and elected
officials across the country for service in corridors and regions we do
not serve today. Finally, the extraordinary increase in unemployment
that COVID-19 has spawned has reinforced the need for many additional
good, living wage jobs for skilled employees of the kind that Amtrak,
and the companies from which we buy equipment, goods, and services,
provide.
We want to be ready to provide the passenger rail service America
needs as the country returns to normal: along the Northeast Corridor
where the much-anticipated replacement of the Acela fleet will begin
next year; on our state-supported routes and new intercity corridors,
where we see our greatest opportunities to meaningfully address the
carbon crisis and enhance mobility as our population continues to grow;
and in the small towns throughout rural America where our long distance
trains help connect our riders to their family and friends. In the
meantime, I am committed to working through this crisis with you, our
employees, our state partners, our customers and other stakeholders to
best manage the near-term challenges while protecting the future we all
want for intercity passenger service in the next 50 years.
Thank you for your time and your support of Amtrak. I look forward
to your questions.
COVID-19 Service Reductions on Northeast Corridor and State-Supported
Routes
Note that daily totals for some routes may be averages.
Acela: Suspended entirely March 23-June 1. Currently
operating 4 daily round trips.
Northeast Regional: Most service initially suspended
Currently operating 10 round trips Washington-New York City and 8 round
trips New York City-Boston on weekdays, and reduced service on
weekends.
Adirondack: Suspended Albany-Montreal since March 17.
Blue Water: Unchanged
Capitol Corridor: Operating 8 daily round trips, down
from 12, with reduced weekend service.
Carolinian: Suspended entirely April through June. Now
operating with reduced capacity.
Cascades: Operating 1 round trip Seattle-Portland-Eugene,
down from 4; no service Vancouver, BC-Seattle.
Downeaster: Initially suspended entirely; now operating 4
round trips, down from 5.
Empire Service: Operating 9 weekday round trips, down
from 12, with reduced service on weekends.
Empire West/Maple Leaf: Initially reduced to 1 daily
round trip, now 2, down from 3. Service suspended between Niagara
Falls, New York and Toronto, Canada.
Ethan Allen: Suspended north of Albany since March 17.
Heartland Flyer: Unchanged.
Hiawatha: Initially suspended; now operating 4 weekday
round trips, down from 7.
Illini/Saluki: Operating 1 daily round trip, down from 2.
Illinois Zephyr/Carl Sandburg: 1 daily round trip, down
from 2.
Keystone: Suspended March 18 to June 1. Full service
recently restored Harrisburg-Philadelphia; Philadelphia-New York City
suspended except for 1 weekday round trip.
Lincoln Service: Operating 2 daily round trips, down from
4.
Missouri River Runner: 1 daily round trip, down from 2.
New Haven-Springfield/Valley Flyer: Operating 5 daily New
Haven-Springfield round trips, down from 8; 1 round trip north of
Springfield, down from 2.
Pacific Surfliner: 6 daily round trips between Los
Angeles and San Diego, down from 13; 4 of normal 5 round trips north of
Los Angeles.
Pennsylvanian: Suspended March 19; resumed June 1.
Pere Marquette: Suspended March 21; resumed June 29.
Piedmont: Operating 1 daily round, down from 3.
San Joaquins: Operating 4 daily round trips between
Bakersfield-Oakland, down from 5. Bakersfield-Sacramento service
suspended.
Vermonter: Suspended north of New Haven since March 26.
Wolverine: 1 daily round trip, down from 3.
Washington-Roanoke: Unchanged.
Washington-Newport News: Full service recently restored.
Washington-Norfolk: 1 daily round trip, down from 2.
Washington-Richmond: 1 daily round trip suspended.
Mr. Lipinski. And thank you, Mr. Flynn. We will now move on
to Mr. Maratea. Mr. Maratea, I hope that I pronounced that
correctly this time.
Mr. Maratea. Thank you, Chairman. Yes, you did. Perfect,
right on the mark.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you, Ranking
Member Crawford, Chairman DeFazio, for allowing me to speak
today on the impact of COVID-19 on Amtrak's workforce.
My name is Artie Maratea, national president of the
Transportation Communications Union.
TCU is the largest labor unit on Amtrak, representing
approximately 1,600 workers in the clerical, fireman,
supervisory, and other crafts. I am here on behalf of Amtrak
workers to urge Congress and President Trump to act now to
preserve our Nation's railroad, protect Amtrak workers from
getting furloughed, and reauthorize the extension and expansion
of RUI benefits, so that thousands of railroaders continue to
put food on the table.
Today the immediate future of Amtrak's workforce is largely
uncertain. With the additional funds from the CARES Act drying
up, and overall ridership severely reduced compared to last
year, Amtrak now stands at the edge of a fiscal cliff. Absent
action from Congress, October 1st will mark the beginning of
severe workforce and service reductions, nationwide.
This House of Representatives passed their fiscal year 2021
THUD bill, which included $10 billion in operating, capital,
and emergency response grants for Amtrak, and a requirement to
maintain the workforce and route frequencies. On behalf of
Amtrak workers, I call on the Senate to pass the House bill and
for President Trump to sign it today.
The COVID crisis has been a nightmare for all of us, but
particularly for the transportation sector. That is why TCU has
been outspoken about the size of aid Amtrak would need early
on. Last week Amtrak finally increased their fiscal year 2021
supplemental request to $2.9 billion, which includes
maintaining the workforce and long-distance frequencies.
Unfortunately, they also began issuing furlough notices to all
of their crafts in the event Congress doesn't provide adequate
funding.
And just to be clear, if Amtrak receives no supplemental
funding on October 1st, the damage will be catastrophic.
According to Amtrak, service cuts would be severe, and
furloughs would amount to approximately 60 percent of the
workforce. These are the same frontline transportation workers
that have been coming in to work day after day during the
pandemic at great risk to themselves and their families. Many
have contracted the virus. Some have died.
You can understand my frustration and why Amtrak workers
are so scared for their future. While many Americans have had
the luxury of working from home, these Amtrak workers have been
putting their lives on the line to keep our fragile economy
moving. Our people have sacrificed, and now they are faced with
losing their jobs come October 1st. These people need action,
and they need it now.
Unfortunately, Amtrak workers are indeed furloughed. The
CARES Act, the expansion of railroad unemployment insurance,
has already expired. But these thousands of railroaders will be
immediately thrown into a system that is already under immense
pressure.
President Trump's memo addressing unemployment insurance
attempts to provide a $300 expanded benefit for regular, State-
based unemployment insurance. Unfortunately, President Trump's
memo does nothing for railroaders, as it fails to include them
in the expanded benefit. It doesn't even mention railroad
unemployment insurance.
And to make matters worse, unlike every other unemployment
insurance program in the country, railroad unemployment is
unique, since it is the only one subject to budget
sequestration. This means that not only will furloughed
railroaders not receive the expanded benefits, but the regular
RUI checks will be reduced by 6 percent. This is unfair, and
Congress should fix this today.
Fortunately, this House of Representatives has once again
already paved the way. The Heroes Act included both an
extension and expansion of RUI, as well as removing it from
sequestration. On both RUI and Amtrak funding, we urge the
Senate to follow the House's lead, and act now to prevent the
kind of economic collapse that would occur if our
transportation modes and workers are left to wither on the
vine.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[Mr. Maratea's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Arthur Maratea, National President,
Transportation Communications Union
I want to thank Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and
Chairman DeFazio for inviting me to speak today on the impact of COVID-
19 on the Amtrak workforce.
My name is Artie Maratea, National President of the Transportation
Communications Union (TCU).
TCU is the largest labor union on Amtrak, representing clerical
crafts, ticket clerks, station agents, onboard service staff, customer
service representatives, supervisors, coach cleaners, car repairmen,
and others.
I'm here on behalf of these thousands of Amtrak workers to urge
Congress and President Trump to act now to preserve our nation's
railroad, protect good jobs at Amtrak, and reauthorize the extension
and expansion of RUI benefits so that thousands of railroaders--Amtrak
or otherwise--can continue to put food on the table.
Amtrak's Outlook
Today, the immediate future of Amtrak's workforce is largely
uncertain. With the additional funds from the CARES Act drying up, and
overall ridership continuing to be severely reduced compared to last
year, Amtrak now stands on the edge of a fiscal cliff. Absent action
from Congress, October 1st will mark the beginning of severe workforce
and service reductions nationwide.
Amtrak's heavily-criticized May 25th Supplemental Grant Request
initially outlined their intention to furlough up to 3,700 employees
and reduce most long-distance trains from daily to three times per
week. TCU and others disagreed with Amtrak issuing a self-defeating
proposal that volunteered the elimination of employees--our members.
Others, such as the Rail Passengers Association (RPA), were similarly
outraged by Amtrak's proposed reduction of long-distance train
frequencies. Indeed, these actions align with former Amtrak CEO Richard
Anderson's long-sought goal of gutting the National Network. To this
point, Amtrak's proposal for returning long-distance service, once cut,
leaves too many unanswered questions, and fails to guarantee its return
to pre-COVID levels.
Many in the Senate also expressed their frustrations with Amtrak's
proposals, including Republican Senators Daines (MT), Cramer (ND),
Hoeven (ND) and Braun (IN), as well as Democratic Senators Tester (MT),
Bennet (CO), Heinrich (NM) and Udall (NM). We thank these Senators for
standing up for Amtrak workers and service.
Our own analysis of Amtrak's May 25th request shows that the
proposed savings don't add up, while shifting much of the financial
burden to taxpayers.\1\ Regardless, Amtrak's proposal relied on getting
$1.5 billion in supplemental funding--a figure critics believed would
be grossly insufficient, even in the earlier days of the pandemic, and
which has proven true with Amtrak's most recent updated request.
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\1\ Transportation Communications Union: ``Amtrak cuts save less
than you think'' 8/3/20 [Attachment A]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If Congress fails to act, and Amtrak receives no supplemental
funding on October 1st, the damage to the railroad would be
catastrophic: according to Amtrak, furloughs would amount to over
10,000 employees (approx. 60% of the workforce) and service cuts would
be severe across all business lines.
There is indeed wide bipartisan agreement that Amtrak should
continue to exist as our National Passenger Railroad. The question
before us today: when will Amtrak and Congress take action to ensure
its survival? Today? Or after it's too late.
On July 28th, TCU, TWU and other rail labor unions issued our
request for $4.5 billion in supplemental funding for Amtrak [$6.5
billion total FY21 funding].\2\ RPA supports bold funding as well. This
House of Representatives included $10 billion in operating, capital,
and emergency response grants in their THUD appropriations bill.
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\2\ Transportation Trades Dept., AFL-CIO letter to Congressional
Leadership on Amtrak funding, 7/28/20 [Attachment B]
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What is Amtrak doing? It took Amtrak until this past week to
finally increase their FY21 supplemental request to $2.9 billion [$4.9
billion total].
Don't get me wrong: we're glad Amtrak came to their senses, but
what took them so long? Airlines and Transit agencies have had their
grant request figures out for months. It feels like Amtrak had to be
shamed into asking for adequate help. And just as the airlines' payroll
support program seeks to protect airline workers from furlough, any
funding provided to Amtrak by Congress must guarantee protections for
the workforce and daily long-distance service.
Again, we're glad Amtrak's request is finally moving towards their
true needs to maintain the workforce and long-distance routes. Sadly,
it comes a mere three weeks before the new fiscal year.
You can therefore understand my frustration, and why thousands of
Amtrak workers are so scared about the next few months. While many
Americans have had the luxury of working from home, these Amtrak
workers--as well as their counterparts in other transportation modes--
have been putting their lives on the line to keep our fragile economy
moving, at great risk to themselves and their families.
To date, Amtrak has done a reasonably acceptable job protecting our
members and riders from COVID-19 transmission, including mandating
masks for both employees and riders. However, there have been some
concerns. For example, some Onboard Service crews have complained
they're given inadequate supplies of PPE and cleaning agents to last
the duration of their roundtrip shift deployment. These workers--and
many others in the transportation sector--need assurances and support
as the pandemic continues.
TCU is very supportive of legislative efforts to establish strong
federal mandates on issues like the provision of PPE and cleaning
protocols, including language in the HEROES Act, an amendment that was
included in H.R. 2 offered by Rep. Chuy Garcia, as well as S. 3884, the
Essential Transportation Employee Safety Act of 2020.
As September 1st, 3,843 Amtrak workers have had to quarantine and
miss work, 462 have contracted the virus, and, sadly, some have died.
These people have sacrificed, risking exposure to themselves and their
families, and now they're faced with losing their jobs come October
1st.
The House of Representatives has been proactive in trying to put
some certainty in their lives by averting this nightmare scenario.
Amtrak workers were thrilled to see the FY2021 funding numbers in
the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development (THUD) appropriations
bill, which included $10 billion for Amtrak's operating and capital
budgets, as well as to respond to the pandemic. The bill also requires
Amtrak to retain its workforce and train frequencies, provisions that
must be included in any supplementary funding agreement.
This is the kind of bold action that Amtrak workers need--and they
needed it yesterday.
TCU strongly urges the Senate to follow the House's lead, and act
now to ensure that Amtrak workers can stay on and continue to move
Americans across the country.
Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Without immediate action from Congress, Amtrak will be sending
thousands onto the Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) rolls.
Unfortunately, RUI is dire straits as well. The expansion and extension
of RUI that was included in the CARES Act expired on July 31st, and the
additional funds provided to the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) for
administering these increased benefits are nearly gone.
On August 8th, President Trump issued a Memorandum attempting to
unilaterally address the lapsing of the Unemployment Insurance
expansion. His memo attempts to provide a $300 expanded benefit for
regular State-based Unemployment Insurance. Unfortunately, President
Trump's memo does nothing for railroaders as it fails to include them
in the extended benefit.
And, while I'm on the topic, the Senate Republican Leadership's
July 27th draft coronavirus relief package failed to include RUI as
well.
The current maximum benefit under Railroad Unemployment Insurance
(RUI) is $80 per day, or $400 per week. Unfortunately, in 1985, the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act mistakenly included
RUI on a list of programs subject to sequestration, railroaders must
now take an artificial 6% hit to their RUI checks.
This is a slap in the face to railroaders who deserve every bit of
their earned benefit. Congress should fix this unfairness today.
Please note that no other Unemployment Insurance program is subject
to sequestration, only railroaders. I can think of no better time to
remedy this unfairness than today, when so many railroaders are being
furloughed, and families of the unemployed need every dollar they're
owed.
That's why the Rail Labor Division (RLD) joined the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) and the American Short Line and Regional
Railroad Association (ASLRRA) wrote a joint letter urging Congress to
remove RUI from the list of programs subject to sequestration.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ RLD-AAR-ASSLRA May 4th, 2020 letter to Congressional leadership
calling for RUI to be removed from sequestration [Attachment C]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The House has at least heard our calls for help as they addressed
issues surrounding railroad unemployment in the HEROES Act, which
expanded and extended RUI until January 31st, 2021, while also removing
RUI from the list of sequestration programs.
Again, we urge the Senate to pass this legislation today.
Amtrak workers, our transit workers, and millions of Americans need
Congress to act NOW to prevent the kind of economic catastrophe that
would occur if our transportation modes are left to wither on the vine.
We ask Congress to provide urgent funding to Amtrak in order to
preserve our nation's passenger railroad, keep people employed, and
provide vital transportation access to all the places that Amtrak
serves.
Thank you for allowing me to testify.
attachment a
Corrected: August 3, 2020.
Analysis: Amtrak's proposed workforce cuts save less than you think
Introduction
On May 25th, 2020, Amtrak issued its FY2021 Supplemental grant
request in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its resulting impact
on the company's financial position. The railroad argued that the
severe downturn in ridership--down 95% at its worst--would require
significant federal assistance to stay afloat. Their request asks for
$1.475 billion in funding to supplement Amtrak's regular $2.04 billion
grant request, for a combined $3.515 billion for FY2021.
Amtrak leadership also conveyed their plan to cut operating
expenses in order to reduce the size of tax-payer assistance, and
``reduce enormous losses and protect funding for our critical capital
needs'' (Amtrak FY21 Supplemental, Pg. 4). Amtrak proposes the round
figure of $500 million, broken out as $150 million in savings from
reduced capacity and frequencies of routes (i.e. the reduction of long-
distance train service from daily to 3x a week), and $350 million in
savings from workforce reductions.
This memo will focus on the costs associated with furloughing 3,190
employees for one year (3,700 proposed furloughs minus the 510
employees that took VSIP), to include direct costs to Amtrak as well as
costs to taxpayers resulting from the furloughs. For additional
reading, please review the Rail Passengers Association's (RPA) analysis
on the public costs of reducing long-distance train services.
On its face, Amtrak's proposal to reduce its workforce by up to 20%
( 3,700 people) seems like a prudent move by any company in dire
financial straits. However, due to the nature of the service, the
unique costs of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) system,
ancillary costs associated with health insurance and healthcare
utilization, and the costs of training new hires upon resumption of
service, the savings to taxpayers are nowhere close to what Amtrak
advertises in their FY2021 Supplemental grant request.
Summary
Amtrak initiated a Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP)
which culminated in the planned exit of 510 employees: 226 management,
and 284 agreement (aka ``union'') personnel. Amtrak set separation
payments at $20,000 per management employee and $10,000 per agreement
employee, for a total cost to Amtrak at $7,360,000.
Subtracting 510 employees from the stated 3,700 announced furloughs
leaves 3,190 employees to be furloughed beginning on October 1st, 2020,
per Amtrak's proposal. The following is our estimation of the flawed
and misleading savings Amtrak is reporting as part of the plan outlined
in their FY2021 Supplemental Grant request, and how the amount the
proposed savings is not close to what is being proposed, only saving
Amtrak and taxpayers approximately $40,826,168 after factoring in all
costs attributable to the furloughs.
Please note that this paper does not address the potential
destruction of Amtrak as we know it, by reducing long-distance routes
from daily to 3x week, and the loss of economic activity that would
befall small communities across America as a result.
Analysis
The following analysis should be read along with the accompanying cost
spreadsheet. Please cite the spreadsheet for detail regarding
calculations, estimates and assumptions.
Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI)--Amtrak is part of the
Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) system, which is a benefit
administered through the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), and serves as
the unemployment insurance system for railroad workers in place of
State-based UI. Under the RUI system, normal benefits last for 26
weeks, with an additional 13 weeks for tenured railroaders (those with
over 10 years of railroad service). The CARES Act added an additional
13 weeks onto RUI resulting in 52 weeks total (26+13+13=52 weeks).
Based on the 52-week benefit term period (and the assumption of
tenured 10-year railroaders), and the normal $400/week benefit, regular
Railroad Unemployment Insurance will cost taxpayers $66,352,000. And
while this would not be borne out on Amtrak's balance sheet, they are
still considered tax dollars via the federal government.
Using the same figures in the preceding paragraph but using the
$600/week benefit, per CARES Act, the expanded benefits would cost
taxpayers an additional $74,646,000 if continued for all 52 weeks.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Congress is currently debating amending the UI expansion and
extension that was part of the CARES Act, but due to time constraints
and impending legislation we chose to calculate as if the expansion is
to be continued for the foreseeable future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RUI Employer Tax Increases--Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI)
contributions are paid by railroad employers, not employees. There is a
separate variable surcharge tax applied to all railroad employers, but
for the purposes of this analysis we will only discuss the ``Experience
Rate'' placed on an employer because it is reactive to the employer's
usage of the RUI system.
To explain the Experience Rate: if Company X uses RUI frequently
(i.e. furloughs people often), Company X pays more in the subsequent
years (the experience rate is based on a 5-year average so as not to
sticker-shock employers with a tax increase). The rate is formulated
based on payouts from RUI versus Company X's remaining compensation
base.
[Again, there's also a Surcharge placed on all employers depending
on whether the RUI account's funds are running low (the threshold is
indexed annually), but we won't include those calculations here since
it would be difficult to ascribe what percentage of the Surcharge Tax
increase would be attributable to Amtrak's furloughs.]
Since individual employer overall tax rates are not disclosed, we
have to estimate based on prior instances of mass furloughs to a
Carrier, and the resulting experience rate increases over the several
years that followed. We estimate the individual experience rate to
Amtrak would be increased to at least 4.93% in the first year it is
counted (2022), with the rate gradually decreasing over the next few
years. [Remember: the experience rate is a 5-year average of the
company's utilization of the RUI system, so a single mass furlough will
impact the company's taxes for several years.]
In addition, the Experience Rate tax is only applied to approx. the
first $20,000 of an employee's annual earnings, or $1,666 per month.
It's currently $1,655 in 2020, but we index to $1,666/mo or $20k/year
for 2022 calculation and reuse that figure for simplicity (even though
the figure would actually be higher in subsequent years 2023-26).
Therefore, based on the remaining workforce of 14,900 and at an annual
taxable base of $20k per employee, the total annual taxable
compensation for Amtrak would be $298 million.
Using $298 million as the compensation base subject to taxes, and
the estimated increased tax rates projected over 5-years, we can
project a total Experience Rate tax increase on Amtrak of $43,270,494--
all due to the one-time furlough of 3,190 employees.
Lost Health & Welfare Contributions--Currently, Amtrak employees
contribute $228/month towards their health insurance. Amtrak has agreed
to carry furloughed employees on their health insurance for a year
after Oct. 1st. While this is indeed a nice benefit--and was called out
by union officials and agreed to by Amtrak--the end result is still an
added cost to Amtrak as a result of furloughs, and therefore is
expected to cost Amtrak $8,727,840 for FY2021 in lost contributions
from furloughed employees.
Increased Healthcare Utilization by Furloughed Employees--Amtrak is
self-insured and as such must make payments of the costs, on a monthly
basis, for their workers utilization of healthcare services. Rail Labor
estimates increases their utilization by at least 8%. This is
conceptually supported by an National Institute of Health (NIH) study
that found that employees who retain their Health Insurance after
furloughs are announced.\2\ It is therefore estimated the additional
usage of the healthcare system by furloughed workers will cost Amtrak
$8,160,000 in premium increases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Hamad, R., Modrek, S., & Cullen, M. R. (2016). The Effects of
Job Insecurity on Health Care Utilization: Findings from a Panel of
U.S. Workers. Health services research, 51(3), 1052-1073. https://
doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12393
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak's Training costs due to Furloughs--Amtrak will incur
training costs to replace approximately 80% of the furloughed workforce
when service and ridership returns to prepandemic levels. This
percentage is from past experience on Amtrak.
According to an Amtrak OIG analysis, Amtrak spent between $40-$45
Million on training in 2009. This is the last year that this
information has been available. According to the report, more than half
of the training dollars were spent on new employees. After calculating
the per employee cost and adjusting for inflation, the 2020 cost of
training is $12,401 per new employee. Applying the percentage of
employees who did not return to Amtrak after furlough (80%), 2,552
employees will need to be trained at a cost of $30,889,408.
Conclusion
The COVID-19 crisis is taking a toll on all transportation modes,
and Amtrak is no different. While ridership revenues are down across
all of Amtrak's business lines (NEC, Long-Distance, State-Supported),
that does not mean that people aren't continuing to ride, or that
ridership won't return once the pandemic abates. Indeed, Amtrak's Long-
Distance trains have lost less ridership than other business lines,
indicating a resilient and dedicated ridership that is choosing Amtrak
for intercity travel, both for its quality experience and the ability
to be more socially distant.
This memo has shown, from a purely cost-standpoint, why Congress
should think twice before adopting Amtrak's FY2021 Supplemental request
proposal. As we've shown, the net savings for Amtrak and taxpayers
associated with furloughing 3,190 employees is relatively minimal
compared to the drastic service reductions. In addition, the skilled
workforce that Amtrak relies on to operate and deliver a top-quality
experience would be decimated by these cuts, and retraining employees
after the pandemic abates would not only cost Amtrak millions, but
would inevitably delay and complicate Amtrak's ability to restart in a
timely manner.
The Transportation Communications Union (TCU/IAM) is the largest
union on Amtrak, representing approx. 6800 employees in various
clerical, onboard service, supervisory, and maintenance crafts. On
behalf of our members, we strongly encourage Congress to fully fund
Amtrak in a manner that keeps our people employed and running trains at
robust frequencies.
_______________________________________________________________________
Transportation Communications Union (TCU/IAM)
Legislative Department
Bill DeCarlo,
Nat. Vice President & Nat. Legislative Director.
Dave Arouca,
Asst. National Legislative Director.
Amtrak saving & costs associated w/furloughing employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak's Proposed Savings (via FY21 Supplemental)
Assumed base figures
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY19 total employees (per Amtrak FY19 year-end 18,600
corporate profile):.................................
FY21 total expected employees (FY19 minus proposed 14,900
workforce reductions)...............................
Proposed employee furloughs (3,700 minus 510 VSIP)... 3,190
Average Amtrak salary:............................... $87,847
Amtrak's proposed total salary cost savings:....... $280,231,930
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TCU's calculated costs associated w/furloughing 3,190 employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lost H&W Contributions............................... $8,727,840
RUI--Regular......................................... $66,352,000
RUI--Expansion (+$600)............................... $74,646,000
Est. increased RUIA Experience Rate taxes on Amtrak.. $43,270,494
VSIP costs........................................... $7,360,000
Estimated increased Healthcare costs (from increased $8,160,000
utilization)........................................
Est. cost to retrain employees (based on rehiring $30,889,408
same number of ``proposed furloughs''):.............
------------------
Total Amtrak/taxpayer costs for fuloughing:........ $239,405,742
ACTUAL net savings from furloughing 3,190 $40,826,188
employees:......................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lost Health & Welfare (H&W) Contributions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs.......................... 3,190
Monthly employee HC contribution:.................... $228
Monthly total employee HC contribution:.............. $727,320
Annual total employee HC contributions............. $8,727,840
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) Costs--Regular
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs.......................... 3,190
Weekly RUI (per employee):........................... $400
Weekly RUI Costs (total):............................ $1,276,000
Total RUI expansion costs (52 weeks available):.... $66,352,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI)--Expansion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs.......................... 3,190
Weekly RUI expansion (per employee):................. $600
Weekly RUI Costs (total):............................ $1,914,000
Total RUI expansion costs (39 weeks available):.... $74,646,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RUI Employer Tax Increases \**\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak compensation base subject to RUI Experience $298,000,000
Rate taxes (only applies to first $20k in comp. per
employee):..........................................
Est. 2022 RUI Experience Rate........................ 4.97%
Est. 2022 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $14,803,746
Est. 2023 RUI Experience Rate........................ 4.93%
Est. 2023 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $14,700,042
Est. 2024 RUI Experience Rate........................ 2.64%
Est. 2024 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $7,881,504
Est. 2025 RUI Experience Rate........................ 1.71%
Est. 2025 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $5,081,496
Est. 2026 RUI Experience Rate........................ 0.27%
Est. 2026 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $803,706
------------------
Est. Experience Rate total cost as a direct result $43,270,494
of furloughs:.....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
226 management x $20k buyout......................... $4,520,000
284 agreement x $10k buyout.......................... $2,840,000
------------------
Total VSIP cost:................................... $7,360,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Healthcare Costs (not including vision/dental)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furloughed Employees................................. 3,190
Amtrak healthcare costs, per employee, per month $2,500
(avg)...............................................
Amtrak's monthly healthcare costs for furloughed $7,975,000
employees...........................................
Amtrak's annual healthcare costs for furloughed $95,700,000
employees...........................................
Est. percentage increase in healthcare costs due to 8%
increased utilization: \***\........................
2021 premium increase in usage est................. $8,160,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak's cost to train new hires (post-pandemic)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report: ``Amtrak spends between $40-45 million on $42,500,000
training each year'':...............................
Report: ``More than half spent on new employees'' $22,100,000
(Extrapolation: multiply by 52%)...................
Report: ``Amtrak hired 1097 new employees over first 1,097
6 months of 2009''..................................
Extrapolate annual new hires by multiplying x2)...... 2194
2009 training costs per new hire (divide new hire $10,073
training costs / Est. 2009 total new hires) =.......
Adj. for inflation, expressed in 2020 $$............. $12,104
New hires to retrain after pandemic: 80% of those 2,960
furloughed don't return.............................
Cost to train new hires after pandemic:............ $30,889,408
Source: Amtrak OIG report on Training and Employee Development (2009)
https://amtrakoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/
Training%20Eval%20Report%20Final.pdf...................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\**\ NOTE: RUIA taxes on employers expand and contract based on
utilization of the RUI system. Part of the tax calculation is based on
a railroad employers individual ``experience rating''--a calculation
of how much they utilize RUI. This rate varies from the minimum of
0.65% to a maximum 12% based on the employer's experience rating. The
tax is also based on a 5 year average of the company's utilization of
RUI, and is a measure of their usage versus their remaining
compensation base. Furthermore, the application of the tax is capped
at $20k per employee, lowering the taxable base. Our calculations are
based on a 5-year impact to Amtrak's experience rate tax, derived from
acquired knowledge of another large railroad that recently experienced
similar furlough trends.
\***\ NOTE: Rail labor estimates that, on average, employees that retain
their health insurance after being furloughed increase their
utilization by 8% during their remaining covered period. This is based
on previous experiences with groups of furloughed members. This is
also backed up by a National Institute of Health (NIH) study that
looked at the healthcare utilization of workers at plants where
furloughs had been announced during the Great Recession (https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4874827/): ``In particular, it
suggests an increase in overall utilization concerning for
``hoarding'' of health care or worsening health, but a relative
decrease in outpatient care and increase in emergency care among those
at high-layoff plants. The latter results confirm findings from the
previous literature that suggest foregone preventive care among
employed individuals during economic downturns with potentially
negative long-term health consequences. This study suggests that the
health and social impacts of increased job insecurity experienced by
workers during the recent recession may still emerge even as the
economy improves.''
attachment b
July 28, 2020.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House,
United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. Kevin McCarthy,
Minority Leader,
United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. Mitch McConnell,
Majority Leader,
United States Senate, Washington, DC.
Hon. Chuck Schumer,
Minority Leader,
United States Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Speaker Pelosi, Leader McConnell, Leader McCarthy, and Leader
Schumer:
As Congress continues to negotiate the terms of its next COVID-19
relief package, we call on you to include emergency supplemental
funding to preserve Amtrak, the critical services it provides, and the
livelihoods of its employees. Similar to other modes of passenger
transportation, Amtrak has seen ridership fall as much as 95% on
certain routes over the course of the pandemic. In response, Congress
wisely provided critical financial assistance to the carrier through
the CARES Act.
Unfortunately, the ongoing impacts of the pandemic have denied
Amtrak the revenue it requires to operate a national intercity
passenger rail service and continued financial assistance is necessary.
Without additional support, the viability of Amtrak is unequivocally at
risk. To this end, we request that Congress include $4.5 billion in
supplementary funding in its next COVID relief package. These funds
will allow Amtrak to remain operational, to keep its dedicated
workforce connected to wages and benefits like healthcare, and prevent
the need for disastrous service cuts on the National Network.
The result of not providing this level of funding will be dire. The
most recent request presented by Amtrak is deeply insufficient, and by
its own admission its plan will send thousands of employees, up to 20%
if its workforce, to the unemployment lines beginning on October 1.
Further, this plan would reduce the frequency of many of Amtrak's long
distance routes from daily to three times a week. These routes serve
small towns and rural communities who depend on the daily service
Amtrak provides and will not operate on full schedules without
financial support and the workforce required to operate them.
Further, while we strongly support continued assistance for Amtrak,
it is critical that these funds are used to benefit Amtrak's employees
and the travelling public. We therefore urge that any supplementary
funding provided to Amtrak be made contingent on prohibitions against
using the funds to furlough employees or reduce service and route
frequencies.
On behalf of Amtrak's workforce, we call on you to take decisive
action to protect Amtrak workers, and the integrity of the service they
provide, to overcome the current crisis and safeguard the future of
intercity passenger rail service, and we thank you for your
consideration.
Sincerely,
Larry I. Willis,
President, Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO.
attachment c
May 4, 2020.
Hon. Mitch McConnell,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Chuck Schumer,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Kevin McCarthy,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Majority Leader McConnell, Speaker Pelosi, Minority Leader
Schumer, and Minority Leader McCarthy:
On behalf of the Rail Labor Division of the Transportation Trades
Department, AFL-CIO, the American Short Line and Regional Railroad
Association, the Association of American Railroads, and the Teamsters
Rail Conference, we thank the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S.
Senate for passage of the CARES Act. We are especially appreciative of
your efforts to ensure that railroad workers, through Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) enhancements, were provided similar
protections and benefits as other hardworking Americans during this
pandemic.
As Congress considers additional legislative packages to address
the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, we urge you to continue providing parity
in unemployment and sickness benefits for railroad workers.
Additionally, continued investment in the Railroad Retirement Board
(RRB) is critical to ensure RUIA benefits and protections can be
delivered in an expeditious manner during this extraordinary time.
Specifically, we respectfully request:
An additional $11.5 million in administrative funds to
support the Agency as it continues in this expanded telework posture to
aid in the move toward paperless processing, self-service portals, and
other critical IT enhancements; and
The removal of RUIA from the effects of sequester, which
causes an artificial reduction in unemployment benefits, below
statutorily provided amounts. This would not result in an adverse
impact on the federal budget. State-administered UI programs are not
subject to this reduction.
Your continued support for the men and women who are on the
frontlines moving America's essential goods is greatly appreciated.
Thank you for your consideration of these important requests.
Rail Labor Division of the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-
CIO.
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association.
Association of American Railroads.
Teamsters Rail Conference.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Maratea. Next we will have Ms.
Griffin.
Ms. Griffin, you may proceed.
Ms. Griffin. Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford,
and members of the committee. On behalf of the members of the
Transport Workers Union of America, thank you for holding this
important hearing to discuss the damaging impacts COVID-19 has
had on Amtrak frontline workers, as well as the railroad's
response.
The TWU represents over 150,000 members at railroads,
airlines, transit systems, and other industries. TWU members,
like other critical frontline workers across the country, have
suffered greatly from this virus and the economic fallout. More
than 90 percent of TWU members, including all of our members at
Amtrak, are frontline transportation workers who have been
deemed essential during this pandemic.
Nearly 10 percent of TWU members have tested positive, or
have been quarantined from the virus. However, these numbers do
not account for the additional emotional and mental toll the
virus has taken on me and my colleagues.
Despite these serious challenges, TWU members have
continued to provide essential services across the country. I
greatly appreciate the opportunity to share both my own
experience and the experience of Amtrak workers during the
COVID-19 crisis. This is an issue with which our union is,
unfortunately, all too familiar. As a lead service attendant
for Amtrak's onboard service for 32 years, president of
Transport Workers Union Local 1460, and most importantly, as an
American, I feel it is my duty to serve under these dire
circumstances. Amtrak workers have persevered through this
crisis by relying on each other more than the railroad.
At the beginning of the crisis, when Amtrak claimed it
could not find masks or sanitizer for our members, the TWU
secured proper PPE and distributed it to the frontline
workforce. Today, while access to protective equipment and
supplies is no longer an issue, we have been forced to trade
best practices between ourselves as the company's pandemic
policies put the frontline workforce at much more risk of
exposure.
This past July, while working my regular position as lead
service attendant on the DC to Boston Amtrak Acela route, I was
notified by my supervisor that I had been in contact and
exposed to an employee who tested positive for COVID-19.
Despite the significantly increased chance of spreading the
virus, the railroad still expected me to work the rest of my
scheduled days without seeking testing.
Fearing the possibility of infecting passengers and
coworkers on my train, I elevated my concerns, and was
ultimately told that I would work the trip back from Boston to
DC, potentially exposing hundreds of passengers needlessly. And
then I would be taken out of service at the end of the route.
On the next day I was not removed from service. After again
elevating the situation through my union, I was finally taken
offline and told to quarantine for 14 days. However, the
railroad abruptly ended the quarantine early, and I was never
tested for COVID-19 before I returned to work.
My experience is typical of the approach Amtrak has taken
towards their workforce and the potential spread of COVID-19.
There is currently a lack of coach cleaners, as a result of the
coronavirus. Amtrak has chosen to leave these positions vacant,
making it harder for the cleaners to sanitize the cars
properly.
The frontline workforce is working hard every day to
overcome these unnecessary handicaps, and keeping the traveling
public safe. This is why it is extremely disheartening that
Amtrak plans to furlough 20 percent of us beginning in October.
Per Amtrak management, as many as 10,000 workers at the
railroad could be impacted by these reductions. Every one of
these workers is key to responding to the current pandemic and
to our economic recovery. These are devastating numbers that
require immediate action from Congress.
Amtrak's management's recent decisions make it clear that
these cuts are not necessary in any case. For example,
management has committed to restarting the 401(k) match for
themselves beginning in October, just as the first set of
frontline workers will be sent into unemployment. In November
pandemic pay cuts for management expire and they will return to
full pay. Meanwhile, onboard service workers remain at
significantly reduced hours for the foreseeable future.
We urge Amtrak to reverse course and prioritize the rank-
and-file frontline workers who interact directly with our
riders, rather than themselves. All this will be much easier if
Congress can come together to provide at least $4.5 billion in
additional support for the railroad. This money would not just
keep thousands employed, but preserve safe and healthy rail
travel for the communities we serve.
Thank you for allowing me to speak today, and I look
forward to any questions you may have.
[Ms. Griffin's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Amy Griffin, Local 1460 President, Transport
Workers Union of America
Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and members of the
committee, on behalf of the members of the Transport Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, I wanted to thank you for holding this important
hearing to discuss the damaging impacts COVID-19 has had on Amtrak
frontline workers, and Amtrak's response.
The Transport Workers Union represents over 151,000 members across
the rail, aviation, transit, universities, utilities and services
sectors. TWU members, like other critical frontline workers across the
country, have suffered from the threats this virus has posed to our
daily lives. More than 95% of TWU members are frontline transportation
workers who have been deemed ``essential workers'' during this
pandemic.
Nearly 10% of TWU members have tested positive or been quarantined
from the virus. However, these numbers don't account for the additional
emotional and mental toll the virus has taken on my union colleagues as
they live in fear of potentially bringing this virus home to their
families, losing co-workers and friends, and potentially serving as a
vector for the virus to members of our family, community, or workplace.
Despite these threats, TWU members have continued to provide essential
services across the country. At airports, train stations, bus depots,
and as custodians, fighting in the frontline so our first responders
are able to make it to work in hospitals, clinics, police and fire
stations.
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share both my own
experience and the experiences of Amtrak workers during the COVID-19
crisis. This is an issue with which our union is, unfortunately, all
too familiar. My colleagues and I at Amtrak have witnessed firsthand
the disastrous effects this pandemic has caused on our personal lives
and to the economy.
Amtrak's 20,000 employees include the TWU members who work onboard
providing food and beverage service to passengers, as well as carmen
and cleaners who work to maintain, repair, and service Amtrak cars in
the rail yards. As a Lead Service Attendant for Amtrak's On-Board
Service for 32 years, President of Transport Workers Union Local 1460,
and most importantly as an American, it is my duty to serve even under
these dire circumstances.
Under Amtrak's on-board service, TWU members who provide much of
Amtrak's food and beverage services have kept working their routes,
allowing safe, comfortable train travel to continue, even if on a more
limited basis. These workers also have had to fight for adequate
protections in the face of a pandemic. At the beginning of the crisis,
when Amtrak claimed it could not find masks or sanitizer for our
members, the union secured proper PPE and distributed it to the
frontline workforce. We have actively engaged and fought with the
railroad to ensure that enhanced cleaning and infection prevention
protocols such as temperature checks mandatory mask policies for
passengers are in place on all routes. While access to PPE supplies is
not an issue anymore, Amtrak's COVID-19 policy is potentially putting
employees at risk.
This past July, while working my regular position as Lead Service
Attendant on the Amtrak Acela, en route to Boston from Washington, DC,
I was notified by my supervisor, Jamal Philips, that on July 24 I had
been in contact and exposed to an employee who had tested positive for
COVID-19 and that Amtrak's medical department would be in contact with
me.
Fearing of possibly infecting passengers and coworkers on my train,
I contacted our TWU Railroad Division Director John Feltz to make him
aware of what was happening. Mr. Feltz contacted On Board Service
General Superintendent Anella Popo, and strongly suggested that I
should be removed from my position at the New York Penn Station and be
replaced by another employee. Ms. Popo contacted the medical department
and they advised her that they would be in contact with my direct
supervisor Jamal Philips. Supervisor Philips then contacted me and
stated that the medical department said that I could continue to Boston
if I were not showing symptoms, and that they would remove me from
service the next day.
On the next day, I was not removed from service. I again contacted
Mr. Feltz and in a 3-way conservation with Ms. Popo, Mr. Feltz, and
myself, she responded that it must have been a mistake and she would
have the situation corrected, which to her credit she did. I was
removed from service and told to quarantine for 14 days. After 10 days
of quarantine, however, I was contacted by Amtrak's medical department
and told that since I was ``not showing'' symptoms of COVID-19 I could
return to service the next day.
I was never tested for COVID-19 before I returned to work. And just
do you know, there is also a lack of coach cleaners as many of them
have been out on sick leave from the coronavirus, and Amtrak does not
fill these vacancies. This has made it hard for Amtrak's coach cleaners
to sanitize the cars properly.
Keeping coach cars, maintenance facilities, and employee break
rooms sanitized is time-consuming and labor-intensive. It is work that
is done by people committed to making sure Amtrak is safe--not just for
our coworkers, but more importantly for the traveling public.
This is why it is extremely disheartening to learn that Amtrak
plans to furlough 20% of its workforce, including 700 on-board services
workers represented by TWU, beginning in October. I'll be honest, this
is like a slap in the face. These are my brothers and sisters who have
put their lives on the line during this pandemic. We have continued to
go to work when our government has asked everyone else to stay home.
The increased exposure and risk we have faced because of this is not on
our job description. In return for the brave effort my colleagues have
made over the past six months, the railroad is threatening the
livelihoods of 2,000 essential workers. This is not acceptable.
But it's not just TWU workers that are being affected by the
proposed cuts. Per Amtrak management, as many as 10,000 workers at the
railroad could be impacted by workforce reductions. These are
devastating numbers that require immediate aid from Congress.
It also requires Amtrak to re-think some of the decisions that will
be made in the coming months as we face these drastic cuts. For
example, management has committed to reinstituting the 401(k) match for
managers in beginning in October, just as the first set of frontline
workers will be sent onto unemployment.
Likewise, in November, all of management's pay cuts expire and
their full pay will be reinstituted, while onboard service people who
had their hours reduced from 180 per month to 150 will remain that way
for the foreseeable future. We urge Amtrak to prioritize the rank &
file, frontline workers who interact directly with our riders, the
people who are facing job loss, rather than themselves.
Amtrak is an essential service in this country--it ensures that
communities across the country have access to all of our economy. But
the railroad is powered by frontline workers, like me, who service
customers, clean cars, fix engines, and drive locomotives.
We are urging Congress to provide at least $4.5 billion in support
for the railroad not just to help keep our jobs but preserve this
industry and sustain the communities we serve.
That is not possible without the frontline workers who are the
railroad. It is our hope that we can all work together to ensure the
survival of Amtrak, and more importantly, protect these workers who
have already sacrificed so much, and continue to do so every day.
Thank you for allowing me to speak today and I look forward to any
questions you may have.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Ms. Griffin.
Mr. Mathews, you may now proceed.
Mr. Mathews. Thank you, sir. Good morning. And thank you,
Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and all of the
members of this subcommittee, for your leadership on passenger
rail.
I am Jim Mathews. I am president and CEO of the Rail
Passengers Association. We are the oldest and largest group
speaking for more than 40 million Americans who rely on trains
of all kinds: long distance, short corridor, and commuters. We
know Amtrak faces tough choices from the pandemic, but our
members have watched with growing alarm since May as plans take
shape to degrade essential service by cutting 12 out of 15
long-distance routes to only 3 times a week.
This morning I would like to highlight one of the most
crucial findings from our new modeling of this plan's effects.
Dropping daily service in 30 States would inflict staggering
economic damage in America's heartland, but produce only
minuscule savings. We were glad to see the bold vision this
committee laid out in the Moving Forward Act, and we were also
glad to see House appropriators respond to your vision by
including $10 billion in Amtrak grants for fiscal year 2021.
These remain the right answers for the long term.
But we are also glad to hear that Amtrak is working with
you on a no-harm supplemental request to at least maintain
nationwide daily service and prevent massive layoffs. We
support this request wholeheartedly. Failure to act on some
kind of bare bones supplemental would deal a catastrophic blow
to not only long-distance routes, but also State-supported and
commuter trains, as well: truly essential daily service and the
foundation for future growth.
But even a bare bones supplemental would mean great
hardship for millions of Americans and hundreds of smaller and
rural communities. Over 62 million people live in so-called
flyover country. One-quarter are veterans. Another quarter are
seniors over 65. Intercity rail has always played an outsized
role in these towns. It is even more true today, during the
pandemic. Passengers with health problems can more easily and
safely make socially distanced trips on Amtrak.
The numbers tell this story. Since the pandemic began in
March through the end of July, NEC ridership was down nearly 90
percent, but long-distance routes were off only 68 percent.
Today, during COVID, long-distance makes up 45 percent of
Amtrak's revenues, compared with 21 percent a year ago, and has
contributed the largest single share of Amtrak revenues in
every month since March. That could all change on October 1st,
if Congress can't act.
If I could have our slides, please.
We have always said that passenger rail is an economic
engine in America's heartland. In 2018 we codeveloped a rail
service benefits model with the University of Southern
Mississippi's Trent Lott Center, and we used it to look at
Amtrak's three-times-a-week plan.
Next slide, please.
And we found that the 12 routes in Amtrak's cross hairs
contribute some $4.8 billion to the communities served every
single year.
Next slide, please.
I can also report today that cutting daily service could
drop at least a $2.3 billion bomb on flyover country, while
possibly only saving Amtrak $213 million. Overall, the damage
could top $3 billion if Amtrak's planned 9 months of degraded
service stretches another quarter to a full year.
I am finished with the slides, thank you.
Some Amtrak communities will be hit especially hard. That
is because several big airlines now say they will drop service
when the CARES Act expires. In fact, of 67 cities facing air
cutbacks, nearly half, 31 of them, would also lose trains, from
Sacramento and San Antonio to Charleston and Tampa. These
routes touch nearly every corner of our country.
On the Empire Builder in eight States, from Illinois to
Washington, those towns face a nearly $400 million blow. The
north-south City of New Orleans, between Illinois and
Louisiana, today produces nearly $134 million in economic
benefits; 3x service could wipe out as much as $88 million of
that.
Simply put, the drastically reduced utility of a nationwide
network operating only 3 days a week on mismatched schedules,
making connections difficult or impossible, will gut these
services. And snatching as much as $3.1 billion from our
hardworking heartland during a historic recession for the sake
of only $213 million in savings to Amtrak seems, to us, to be
bad public policy.
And it also ignores history. Amtrak tried this in 1994. It
didn't work then, and it is not going to work now. Passengers
travel for the same reasons today as they did then, and they
will skip the ride for the very same reasons.
In closing, we think [inaudible] a better way: cut some
costs, while preserving daily service by simply running shorter
trains. Fewer locomotives mean less fuel burn, fewer coaches
mean less maintenance. But continued service means continued
opportunities to earn badly needed revenue, the largest single
pandemic revenue contributor since March. When gas tax revenues
flatlined, Congress didn't let the Federal Highway
Administration close highways 4 days out of 7. Congress
shouldn't stand by and allow our national railroad to impose 3x
service on hundreds of hardworking towns across America's
heartland, towns which, in many cases, can afford it the least.
Strong investment in Amtrak could position our country for
recovery. But at the very least, preserving daily service will
stave off disaster in flyover country.
Thank you.
[Mr. Mathews' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jim Mathews, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Rail Passengers Association
Introduction
Good morning, and thank you Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member
Crawford, and all of the members of this Committee for holding this
hearing to focus attention on our nation's intercity rail network at
this critical juncture. I firmly believe what the Congress decides to
do about rail and transit between now and September 30 will have
important and lasting impact for hundreds of Amtrak-served communities
and millions of Americans.
My name is Jim Mathews, and I am President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Rail Passengers Association, the oldest and largest
national organization giving a voice to more than 40 million rail
passengers in the U.S. Our mission is to improve and expand
conventional intercity and regional passenger train services, support
higher speed rail initiatives, increase connectivity among all forms of
transportation and ensure safety for our country's trains and
passengers. I am honored to have the opportunity to testify before you
today on behalf of our 28,000 members from all across the U.S. I am
also conscious of the duty I have to share their growing sense of alarm
over the diminishment of an essential service upon which their
communities rely.
Today, I will talk about the challenges this once-in-a-generation
pandemic poses for America's rail passengers, and the consequences
governmental inaction poses to the cities, towns, and rural communities
connected by our intercity rail network. I understand well that Amtrak
faces real and difficult choices, and that without financial aid there
are far greater risks to the network than thrice weekly (3x) service
for long-distance routes--we could lose entire corridors, permanently.
Our Association was thrilled by the level of investment in
passenger trains laid out by this committee in the Moving Forward Act.
This bold, forward-thinking infrastructure bill would not only get our
rail system through the current pandemic, it would put millions of
Americans back to work building a truly world class transportation
network.
We were also glad to see House appropriators respond to the vision
outlined in H.R. 2 by including $10 billion in grants for Amtrak in the
FY 2021 transportation budget passed out of the House in July.
We wholeheartedly endorse this level of investment as the right
course for America's passengers and the U.S. economy, and we continue
to believe that this is the best way forward for our passenger-rail
system.
We understand, however, that Amtrak can maintain existing service
levels at significantly lower levels of investment. We're heartened to
hear that Amtrak is working with Congress to establish a no-harm
supplemental budget request. Our Association continues to believe that
maintaining daily service across the National Network and preventing
massive furloughs and layoffs of Amtrak workers should be the floor,
not the ceiling. As Amtrak Chief Operating Officer Stephen Gardner
noted in a March 22nd article in the Washington Post, ``Eventually this
will pass, but none of the bridges or [train] cars or any of the things
we have that are old and need to be replaced will get younger as a
result of this crisis.'' We wholeheartedly agree and continue to
support the bold vision of this Committee and of your appropriations
colleagues to make the investments we need so that rail service can
help restore the U.S. economy.
When I testified before this committee less than a year ago, I was
able to speak about the unique moment of strength passenger rail in the
U.S. found itself in, enjoying record ridership and record levels of
federal funding. Now, however, COVID-19 has devastated the travel
sector. Americans are foregoing travel of all types in an attempt to
keep themselves, their families, and their fellow citizens safe. The
result has been that, during ``the COVID Period'' (i.e., March-July
2020), Amtrak revenues are down 83 percent compared with the same
period in 2019. This unprecedented decline in demand for passenger
transportation has forced U.S. rail and transit operators to navigate
extraordinary difficulties to keep these systems afloat.
Our Association understands all of these factors. And we recognize
the difficult decisions and tradeoffs Amtrak's leadership has had to
make and will continue to make. Theirs is not an easy task.
However, even with these exogenous shocks to demand, the fact
remains: Amtrak is an essential service for tens of millions of
Americans and hundreds of communities. We were quite pleased with
Amtrak President & CEO William Flynn's May 25th statement to Congress
that the railroad understands ``how important Amtrak service is to the
nation and, particularly, small communities across the nation where we
play a unique role in connecting these communities to the rest of
America.'' However, reducing service on the 12 of the 15 long-distance
routes--a vital transportation link to the 40 percent of the nation's
small and rural communities that it serves--to only three days per week
speaks much louder than words. Whatever the reasons, reducing
frequencies across the National Network will drop a $2 billion-dollar
bomb on ``Flyover Country.''
Defining an Essential Service
It's worth taking time to be explicit about what we mean when we
say Amtrak is an ``essential service'' to the communities it connects.
For many, it's easier to understand why a service like the Northeast
Corridor (NEC) is necessary; without the 2,200 daily trains and 260
million annual trips the NEC carries, the regions this corridor links
would grind to a halt. How can a single daily train to a small town
also be accurately described as ``essential'' to the people it serves?
To understand, you have to look at the dearth of transportation
options faced by rural and small-town Americans. Over 62 million people
live in so-called ``Flyover Country,'' a quarter of whom are veterans,
another quarter are senior citizens over the age 65. Intercity rail
plays an outsized role in these communities, with almost one-fifth of
Amtrak's passengers traveling to or from a rural station with no access
to air service.
Think of what this implies for just a single use-case. Long-
distance trains, frequently used by senior citizens and passengers with
mobility impairments, provide access to healthcare facilities that
would otherwise be too expensive or difficult to reach. In an August
letter to the U.S. Senate advocating for daily service, the Station
Host Association of California, an independent volunteer organization
operated in cooperation with Amtrak, shared its frontline experiences
helping passengers navigate our rail system:
``Particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, long distance
trains provide accessible bedrooms ensuring privacy and
cleanliness for any passengers who may need to travel within or
out of state, and for whom the more public setting of an
airplane creates a health risk. The private rooms on the
overnight trains provide an additional level of safety to
travel during a pandemic while minimizing exposure to the
virus. However, if the tri-weekly service intervals do not
match the passengers' needs, then the entire benefit is moot.''
So while travel demand is down broadly, coronavirus has actually
made these passenger rail services more necessary for certain segments
of the population.
These are just a few of the many reasons Amtrak's long-distance
routes have proved to be the most resilient business line in the face
of the pandemic. Amtrak's own ridership numbers back this up. Since the
crisis began through the end of July, NEC revenues are down 90 percent
from the same period last year, compared with a 64 percent decline for
the National Network. Ridership has also flatlined across the NEC, down
88 percent. By contrast, ridership on the long-distance routes is down
only 68 percent during the COVID Period.
Fig 1.1
Fig 1.2
Perhaps one of the more significant statistics is that during the
COVID Period, Amtrak's National Network of long-distance intercity
passenger routes has contributed 45 percent of Amtrak's revenues,
compared with 21 percent a year ago. Moreover, the so-called ``money-
losing long-distance routes'' have contributed the largest single share
of revenues in every month since March.
Make no mistake: these trains are essential to the communities they
serve. Congress didn't let the Federal Highway Administration close
highways four days out of seven when gas tax revenues flatlined, and it
shouldn't stand by and allow Amtrak to introduce 3x service to hundreds
of communities across the U.S.
Airlines Eliminating Service to Amtrak-Served Cities
These cuts will fall especially hard on a subset of Amtrak
communities that will see a simultaneous reduction in rail service and
air service on October 1st. Several major airlines announced last month
that they will drop service to dozens of cities upon the expiration of
the CARES Act. Rail Passengers looked at service reduction
announcements released by 11 air carriers and found that of 67 cities
seeing air services cut, 31 would also see cuts to passenger rail
service (see: Appendix B).
Airlines have been walking away from mid-sized markets for decades,
and it is clear that this trend will only accelerate in the wake of
COVID-19 as passengers shy away from a mode of travel they fear is
unsafe. An August survey of consumer sentiment conducted by Boston
Consulting Group found that 60 percent of U.S. consumers worry about
being infected from flying, and 70 percent of respondents expect travel
spending will not return to normal for more than a year. This will
further erode the business model for midsized airports, leaving more
and more Americans disconnected from job opportunities, educational
institutions, and critical health services.
Rail Passengers firmly believes that running daily trains could put
Amtrak in a position to expand its market share in this environment.
Amtrak offers a unique product: a socially distant way to move around
the country. Our government should be increasing access to rail
service, not diminishing it.
Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Daily Service
I've said it to this committee before, and I'll say it to anyone
who'll listen--it's not a question of if trains make money, it's about
who trains make money for. Rail corridors generate value by acting as
economic engines in the communities they serve--through jobs, retail,
mobility, tourism and real-estate development. The ``profit'' goes not
to Amtrak, but to the communities served, often to the tune of billions
of dollars.
We decided it's not enough to say it, we've got to put our money
where our mouth is. That's why I invested our association's resources
in 2018 to co-develop a rigorous economic model with the University of
Southern Mississippi's Trent Lott Center. We've used that model to
quantify the economic return on passenger rail corridors in a way that
hasn't been done previously.
This time, we've modeled a preliminary, high-level analysis of the
economic consequences of Amtrak's decision to cut its daily intercity
passenger services back to only three runs per week. Unfortunately,
even the most conservative assessment is dire: to save $213 million,
Amtrak's nine months of daily service cuts could drop at least a $2.3
billion bomb on Flyover Country, a figure that could rise above $3
billion if the cuts remain in place for the full year.
This is tied directly to passenger-rail's role as an economic
engine in the communities it serves. The existence of Amtrak buoys the
economies of hundreds of towns and cities all across America. Degrading
that service means withdrawing those benefits from millions of
Americans, even those who don't necessarily ride the trains themselves,
because in many cases lives and livelihoods depend on the routes'
operation.
We examined six National Network services--the City of New Orleans,
the Empire Builder, the combined Silver services, the Southwest Chief,
the Texas Eagle and the Crescent. Together, these six intercity
passenger rail routes serve 30 states plus the District of Columbia,
and Rail Passengers estimates that they produce $2.4 billion every year
in economic benefit. In fact, Amtrak's existing group of daily long-
distance trains (excluding the Auto Train) collectively produce some
$4.7 billion in economic benefits which are widely distributed
throughout America's heartland.
These benefits take many forms, which our model attempts to
capture. Whether traveling for vacation, personal reasons or business,
visitors spend money at their destinations, paying for hotels or other
lodging, patronizing restaurants, shopping or buying local items. By
doing this they support the hotel workers, the restaurant waiters and
cooks, retail and entertainment outlets, and they generate sales tax
revenues for the communities they visit. The local workers also
contribute to the local tax base, further spreading the economic
benefit. Meanwhile, because those visitors have left their cars behind,
they're not imposing wear and tear on highways and roads, and they're
avoiding the risk and cost of injuries or even death from car crashes.
Cutting service reduces these benefits. Rail Passengers' model
estimates that Amtrak's plans would slash the $2.7 billion produced by
the six services we examined down to just a little more than $800
million--a more than $1 billion hit on just those routes alone during
the proposed nine-month period of reduced service, or $1.5 billion on
an annualized basis. Systemwide on an annualized basis, America's
Amtrak-served communities could absorb a $3.1 billion body-blow. This
after already reeling from the effects of a deep economic recession.
Fig. 1.3
Some of the poorer states will be among those hit hardest. In the
case of the Silver services, Amtrak decided to degrade service months
ahead of the October 1st plan outlined for the rest of the system,
leaving some of the South's poorest communities to absorb an even
harsher punishment than the rest of the country. Combining the Silver
Star and Silver Meteor into a single route and then cutting back daily
service means many Star-served stations have already seen a 50 percent
reduction in service--communities like Southern Pines and Hamlet, N.C.,
or Camden, Columbia and Denmark in South Carolina. Those stations
account for 13 percent of the Star's ridership. The Census Bureau
reports that more than two-thirds of Southern Pines' population is non-
white, and some 14 percent of the town's residents are estimated to
live below the poverty line. So, too, Denmark, SC, is majority non-
white, and 15 percent of residents are below the poverty line.
But make no mistake. The damage is not confined to a handful of
towns or just one region of the country. Amtrak's National Network
touches nearly every corner of our country, and the economic pain will
be felt in 30 states and the District of Columbia. Communities in eight
states served by the popular Empire Builder route from Illinois to
Washington State (with a portion of the train split to Oregon) will
absorb a $391 million annualized economic loss. The seven states
traversed by the Texas Eagle will lose $318 million, and states from
New York to Florida and in-between will feel the hit twice, from losses
of service on the Crescent ($153 million) and the Silver services ($251
million).
Fig. 1.4
(Rail Passengers would like to acknowledge our volunteer members
and our partners at Transportation 4 America, who participated in the
preliminary research we needed for this rapid-response study and helped
to gather and collate the state-level tourism data we needed for our
modeling exercise.)
A Better Route Forward
Even if we are to analyze 3x service proposal narrowly, we still
can't support it as an operating plan based on its merits. The U.S. has
been down this path before, and it didn't work.
In the mid-1990s, Mercer Consulting advised Amtrak leaders to
eliminate several long-distance routes, shorten others, and take 11
routes down from daily to three and four times per week. In Fiscal Year
1995, the first year of diminished operations, Amtrak's network saw a
decrease of 13 percent in total route miles and saved $54 million.
However, the General Accounting Office (the government watchdog now
known as the Government Accountability Office) reported to Congress
that the very next year Amtrak lost 1.1 million riders--a 5 percent
drop in ridership--and never saw the savings they had projected for the
11 routes with less-than-daily service. A functioning passenger
transportation service requires reliable and frequent connections. And
there is nothing to suggest that the buying and traveling habits of
today's riders are much different from those in 1994.
One of our members, former BNSF Railroad train dispatcher Mark
Meyers, performed an analysis of 3x on the present-day network. He
found that three-times weekly service--a 57 percent cut in overall
service--only cuts the number of on-board crew starts by 38 percent and
engineer-crew starts by 36 percent, while producing large compensable
layovers for some of the affected crews. Equipment use is only cut 40
percent. Staffing at stations would be cut only minimally because even
3x weekly trains arrive over the course of more than five days, which
would require a second station staff position to continue to be filled.
The problem will be exacerbated by missed connections. The
devilishly tricky math of ensuring that one set of trains that only
runs three days a week can connect reasonably to another set of trains
also running three days a week guarantees that many thousands of
journeys simply won't be taken. This is because a passenger planning on
a connection would have to work backwards from her planned arrival date
while taking into account not only that her original train is running
only three out of seven days, but that so, too, is her connecting
train. And in many instances, those trains will not mesh.
Some $39 million of connecting revenue flows through Amtrak's
Chicago Union Station alone, and the 3x schedule disrupts all of these
connection patterns.
The California Zephyr and the Texas Eagle are particularly hurt.
For example, travelers taking the Eagle to Chicago hoping to connect
for a further eastbound trip on the Capitol Limited or the Lake Shore
Limited can only make a same-day connection on Mondays and Saturdays.
Going westbound it's even worse--with the exception of a single
connection from the Cardinal on Tuesdays, not a single Amtrak long-
distance train will offer a same-day connection in Chicago to the
westbound Eagle. All passengers will have to assume a hotel stay in
Chicago, perhaps even a multi-day stay. That will be enough to lead
most passengers to forego the trip. Eagle connections from other routes
accounted for nearly 12 percent of connecting travel through Chicago in
Fiscal 2019, and this plan would largely eliminate those connections.
On Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays and Sundays, westbound
passengers hoping to connect to the California Zephyr would be out of
luck. The Cardinal will only have a same-day Zephyr connection on one
day each week, Saturdays, and passengers from the Capitol, Lake Shore
and City of New Orleans will only get a same-day connection on
Saturdays and Mondays.
If this seems complicated in written testimony, think of how
complicated it will be for the average passenger trying to work out the
best departure day to take a journey connecting to another train. The
utility of a schedule like this to the traveling public quickly
approaches zero for all but the most leisurely of trips. And as we
know, despite a popular narrative, pure leisure trips are not the
majority of trips on Amtrak.
The drastically reduced utility of a nationwide network of trains
operating only three days a week on schedules that make connections
difficult or impossible helps to explain why ridership will plummet
even more than many observers would expect, driving catastrophic
economic losses to the communities served.
We've already seen the negative effect this has on ridership. While
the long-distance average was down 62 percent in July over the same
period last year, Silver Star bookings--already subject to 3x service,
losing four days of intra-Florida service--were off 72 percent in that
same period. In light of Amtrak's metrics for returning service, this
is a statistically significant reduction.
Amtrak has acknowledged this fact in the construction of its 3x
schedule, with railroad management explaining that the decision to run
the Star/Meteor on successive days ``was made to allow for more
efficient use of operating crews while assuring availability of crew
resources for all journey segments . . . While from a marketing
standpoint alternating days may have had some utility for some
customers, our overall demand patterns by day of week do not differ
materially and do not justify the operational risk.''
We understand that Amtrak leadership sincerely believes that this
is the only choice available to the railroad. But the facts we've just
outlined demonstrate that this choice is bad public policy for the
country. Amtrak will throw away a little more than half the daily
frequencies but will lose two-thirds of the ridership and save only 38
percent of the crew costs, squeezing out at most $213 million of
savings while hurting the taxpayers in 30 states to the tune of as much
as $3 billion.
Rail Passengers instead proposes an alternative: continue to run
daily long-distance trains with shorter equipment consists for the
duration of the pandemic. This has been the compromise in place since
the crisis began in March, and it has served Amtrak well so far. As
we've noted above, operating every day with shorter consists the 12
daily intercity passenger trains Amtrak plans to cut back have
contributed the largest single share of Amtrak's revenues in every
month this year since the pandemic began. Slashing daily frequencies to
three times per week would only ensure that the long-distance trains
would sink to levels similar to those being seen in Amtrak's other
business lines. By contrast, running shorter consists but maintaining
daily frequencies would preserve connections and jobs and allow
Amtrak's National Network ridership to return to previous levels
organically, all while still lowering some operating costs.
Conclusion
Amtrak is a taxpayer-supported public service. Its object is not
profit, but to serve the Nation. It cannot fulfill its mandate by
cutting service for half the country during one of the most severe
economic crises our nation has experienced and during a pandemic that
has made air travel a perilous gamble for millions of Americans. Our
association, our 28,000 members and the millions of American passengers
call upon Congress to provide Amtrak with the necessary financial
relief to operate a full network in this pandemic, and to include
safeguards for all Amtrak-served communities and Amtrak workers facing
cutbacks and furloughs.
appendix a--economic analysis of long-distance route service cuts
appendix b--announced airline service cuts to cities
Cities highlighted in yellow are projected to see cuts to both air
service and Amtrak service (long-distance and/or State-supported
trains) on October 1st following the expiration of CARES Act service
protections.
Source: One Mile At a Time, https://onemileatatime.com/us-airlines-
will-stop-flying-to-dozens-of-cities/
appendix c--image from amtrak timetable
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Mathews.
We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will
be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will begin by recognizing
myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Flynn, Ms. Griffin mentioned this in her testimony, and
I was made aware that, at an Amtrak townhall on July 29th that
you attended, your team said that the 401(k) match will return
for management employees on October 1st, and the pay cut for
certain management employees that they took will be restored in
early November. Can you confirm that this information is
accurate?
And if it is, do you think it is appropriate to restore the
401(k) matches and the pay for management employees when you
are furloughing over 2,000 employees and cutting vital train
service?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you for your question, Mr. Chairman. So,
yes, it is accurate that during that townhall meeting we
discussed restoring the 401(k) match.
At the beginning of the pandemic we took the initiative to
reduce expenses, and I referred to that in my remarks. And so
we did cut the 401(k) match for all management employees.
The 401(k) program was put in place some years earlier,
when we eliminated the defined benefit pension plan, and in
exchange for eliminating what was viewed to be a very
attractive pension plan with a much lower cost 401(k) match, we
cut those expenses at the beginning of the pandemic. We thought
that it was an appropriate action to take because, while it
would have impact to total compensation for our employees, it
wasn't immediate take-home pay.
But we have heard loud and clear from our employees that
taking that match away had significant impact to them. And I
will point out, of course, there were no cuts to any agreement
benefits at that time. So, considering the equities of the
situation, it made sense to us to restore the 401(k) match at
the beginning of October.
On a voluntary basis, we--well, for me, on a voluntary
basis, I elected to take no compensation when I joined the
company at the beginning of April 15th, in view of the economic
crisis that our company was suffering.
We took substantial cuts across our management ranks. And
when I compare those cuts to reductions that other management
teams and other transportation industries have taken, I believe
those cuts were larger and deeper, in terms of how far down the
management ranks they went.
Mr. Lipinski. Mr. Flynn, I do appreciate that. I appreciate
taking no compensation. The question is, should this be
restored to management while we are furloughing frontline
workers?
Mr. Flynn. My view is we are restoring a basic level of
pay, considering all the equities, to ensure that we also
retain now a smaller group of management people, as a result of
furloughs and VSIP, so that we can properly run the railroad.
Mr. Lipinski. Well, I think that that is not going to be
looked on well, just for the equity. But let's move on.
If Congress gives you the $4.8 billion by October 1st, as
you indicated, will you commit on the record to rescinding the
furloughs and rescinding the cuts to longer distance service?
Mr. Flynn. I will commit that we will do as directed by
Congress. And if that $4.9 billion instructs us to rescind the
furloughs and rescind the service cuts, we will do that.
Mr. Lipinski. If Congress does not provide any additional
supplemental funding in the COVID relief bill or appropriations
package, what other cuts can we expect to workers in service?
Mr. Flynn. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, is that providing the
$2 billion and nothing else, or providing nothing?
Mr. Lipinski. Let's say if $2 billion was provided.
Mr. Flynn. We would be in a very, very difficult position,
as a company, Mr. Chairman.
As I mentioned in my testimony, our cash burn is about $250
million a month right now. And so we would have to make very
dramatic reductions across the company in order to stave off
bankruptcy, I would argue, in the long term, certainly very,
very significant challenges to run this company or operate this
company on behalf of our customers and with our employees in
the near term. So substantial reductions in all services, and
perhaps elimination of some LD services, if that is the cash
burn we are having and no supplemental funding.
Mr. Lipinski. Well, it would be good to see what those
would be, just as we are looking at the providing of funding.
As I said, I support providing the funding, but we want to know
what additional cuts may be.
And I am running out of time here. So for the purpose of
the record, are you willing to work with me to amicably resolve
some local issues that I have, including Chicago Union Station
contract disputes between Amtrak and Metra, and the request of
Lemont, Illinois, for a new Amtrak stop on the Lincoln Service?
So I just want to get you on the record. Will you work with
me to help to resolve these local issues?
Mr. Flynn. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman. And, as I
mentioned, I did meet with the Metra CEO, and we talked about
some very useful measures we can take. And we will continue to
work to resolve our differences.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. I appreciate it.
My time has expired. I will now recognize Mr. Crawford for
5 minutes.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Flynn, in your written testimony you stated that the
leading cause of delays to our long-distance trains is the
failure of some of our host railroads to comply with this
longstanding legal obligation to provide Amtrak trains with
preference over their tracks. Can you clarify that remark?
Because the data sets I have examined show that FTI accounts
for only a small percentage of overall Amtrak delays, at least
on the lines I have examined.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you. Thank you, Ranking Member Crawford.
I think we stand by our remarks we publish every month and
our statistics, which are available online, the number of
minutes of delay that we experience on each of our host
railroads, and have done that for quite a long period of time.
We regularly and routinely find passenger trains are not given
preference over freight railroads. And that is what our
statistics and our experience reflect.
And that is why, in part, we were encouraged in the INVEST
in America Act, that there is language there that would provide
us a private right of action to be able to enforce our
statutory rights.
Mr. Crawford. I have been closely following the metrics and
standards rulemaking out of the FRA. Understanding the need for
preserving Amtrak ridership, and providing Amtrak riders with a
safe and positive experience, it would make sense to me for
Amtrak to revisit current schedules to account for actual
runtime. Can you explain how you are working with freight
railroads on lengthening some of your schedules, in light of
the new FRA metric?
Mr. Flynn. Well, we are working with the FRA to have the
new standards and metric rule finally issued. That hasn't been
issued yet.
We are in regular routine correspondence and communications
with the FRA about the schedules that we have in place, and how
those schedules could be adjusted. We have a team of people
here who are simply dedicated to the working relationship with
our Class I railroads, and they speak with the Class I
railroads regularly, in some cases at least once a week on the
different scheduling issues we may have.
Mr. Crawford. Can you commit that Amtrak is willing to
lengthen schedules, where it is appropriate?
Mr. Flynn. I am not sure I can answer that question. I am
not sure what ``where it is appropriate'' means. We have a
schedule requirement of 80 percent on-time arrival within 30
minutes. I don't know what your ``appropriate'' means, from the
railroad point of view. We would need to really dig into the
details. And we would need a final rule on standards and
metrics for me to be able to do that.
Mr. Crawford. OK. All right. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Crawford.
The Chair will now recognize Mr. Sires for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A lot has been made of
the use of enhanced cleaning procedures, advanced air
filtration systems, limited reservations, a lot of cleaning.
What has been the feedback from rail passengers on the process?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you for that question, Congressman Sires.
The feedback has actually been very positive, both in terms of
our customer satisfaction surveys, and focus groups that we
have with our customers. We have regular focus groups,
virtually, with our most frequent passengers.
And I can say also, anecdotally. I ride our trains between
New York and DC quite regularly. I get to speak with our
onboard service staff and with customers. And we have received
very positive feedback on all----
Mr. Sires. So you will be meeting with the Rail Passengers
Association members?
Mr. Flynn. I am certainly available always to meet with
anyone that is representing our customers. And, as I mentioned
in my remarks and in my filed testimony, we continue to
investigate what more we can do to enhance that environment.
Mr. Sires. So they are--they certainly are aware of your
efforts.
Mr. Flynn. I believe they are. And we continually
communicate all the steps that we are taking, all the different
actions that we have not only taken in terms of cleaning, and
the cleaning protocols, but we have enhanced our communications
with our customers to give them more information about service,
about the trains.
For example, if you were to book a train today, you could
understand what that level of booking is. And you may find that
you want to book another train with just fewer passengers on
it. Those are the kinds of enhancements that we provide, and we
communicate them.
Mr. Sires. So the question I have also about the furloughs
is, have you have broken it down by State? For example, New
Jersey, how many people will lose their jobs if this were to go
through?
Mr. Flynn. So we talk about 1,950 furloughs that we are
going to announce. They are going to occur in October, and they
are by craft. And they would depend on--it could well be that a
person works in New York but resides in New Jersey, so that is
further work that we need to do. But we can certainly provide
that.
Mr. Sires. Because I represent the northern part of the
State, which is very heavily congested. And a lot of people
work at Amtrak. So I am just wondering what the impact is going
to be in that area for people being furloughed.
Mr. Flynn. Yes, I want to get back to you with the accurate
information, but I do understand that the number of employees
who will be furloughed who identify themselves as New Jersey
residents is a relatively small number. And I mean something
less than 25.
Mr. Sires. For New Jersey?
Mr. Flynn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sires. So I assume that these--all right.
Mr. Flynn. But what we will----
Mr. Sires. Is that the reason, because of the Northeast
Corridor?
Mr. Flynn. Pardon me, sir?
Mr. Sires. Is that the reason--the reason, is it because it
is the Northeast Corridor, and it is very active in that area?
Mr. Flynn. Yes, sir. But we will be happy to provide the
committee staff with the numbers by State, so all the Members
can have that information.
Mr. Sires. OK, I appreciate that. Thank you very much.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Graves for 5
minutes.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it, and my question is for Mr. Flynn.
I am very optimistic, given your background in the private
sector, that you are going to be able to meet that mandate for
profitability and be successful.
And I know it is, obviously, not an ideal situation to take
over an unprofitable business in the middle of a pandemic. That
makes it that much harder.
But can you just give the committee your perspective or
your ideas on how you are going to be able to achieve that
mandate, and hopefully turn Amtrak around and make it
profitable?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Ranking Member Graves. That is a
great question.
What we fundamentally believe, of course, is that we are in
a pandemic. Earlier in the year we might have thought that the
shape of the recovery would look perhaps like a V, or look like
a U, but that is not the case.
What we believe, of course, is that the service we provide
is essential, that there is real demand for our service. And as
we come out of that pandemic, there will be a combination of
regaining our prior customers, as well as attracting new
customers to our services. And we are engaged in some of that
now.
At the end of fiscal year 2019, we had, as a company,
dramatically reduced losses on an adjusted operating income
basis, and were well on track to have its first positive year
in 2020. What that tells me is that our customers value the
service that we provided, and the results were such that the
amount of earnings we were generating in 2019 and into 2020
meant that the supplemental grants that we would get from
Congress, we could use for capital investment and
infrastructure that is desperately needed here.
I believe that future is still out there for Amtrak. I
think it is a few years away, because we still don't know what
the shape of the recovery is. But our vision is growth and
expansion. There is a true demand for an intercity passenger
rail service in the corridor, from our States, and in our long-
distance network, and in particular many metropolitan corridors
that exist on that network.
So I was excited to have the opportunity to lead Amtrak
when I accepted the position at the beginning of the year. I
had a belief there of what the future could be, and I still
hold that belief. It is just further out in the future now than
I might have thought of in early March.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, I appreciate it. And
again, thanks for your testimony.
And I would yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Mr.
Payne for 5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
speak this day, and to welcome all the witnesses.
The CARES Act included an important section that provided
payroll grants to airlines and their contractors, so that
airline employees would be kept on payroll and avoid furloughs.
The term of that requirement is set to expire at the end of
this month. Do you think that any extension of the CARES Act
payroll grant provision should be extended to Amtrak employees,
as well?
And that is to all the witnesses.
Mr. Flynn?
Mr. Flynn. OK, thank you, sir. I wasn't sure if you wanted
me to respond first.
So we did receive just over $1 billion in the CARES Act. We
have not furloughed any of our employees at this point in time.
The furloughs that we have announced take effect in October.
In our supplemental grant discussions and submissions we
have identified the amount of supplemental funding that would
be required for us to avoid furloughs and [inaudible] retain
the full service.
Mr. Payne. OK. Anyone else?
Mr. Maratea. Yes, Mr. Congressman. We would definitely
support extending the CARES Act. In my testimony before, the
CARES Act funding protections for [inaudible] and long-distance
frequencies [inaudible] of Amtrak. So we would absolutely be
supportive.
Mr. Mathews. Mr. Payne, I would like to add to that from
the point of view of the rail passengers.
Our passengers really do rely on those frontline employees,
particularly when you start looking at the number of disabled
folks, elderly folks, people who need that extra hand. We
really would very much hate to see anything happen to some of
those frontline folks.
Our friends at TCU and TWU--and not only on the trains, but
even in the call centers. For example, you know, now, if you
are looking at the strange connection pattern that we are going
to see of three times weekly service, and the drastic
[inaudible] of connections in Chicago, planning a trip is going
to become an incredibly complicated exercise. And having expert
[inaudible] employees on the other side of that phone line to
make that connection clear to a passenger is also going to be
very important.
So whether you are looking at folks on the trains, or
dealing with customers in remote ways, we would be very
supportive for those folks to have that aid.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
And Mr. Flynn, I understand that COVID-19 has upended the
transportation industry across the country, and cost Amtrak
billions in lost revenue. We know that Amtrak plans to furlough
2,000 employees, approximately 10 percent of the workforce, at
the end of September. Now, I am sure these furloughs are your
attempt to mitigate these revenue losses. We are here because
Amtrak has requested $4.9 billion in additional funding from
Congress to deal with the revenue shortfall.
Amtrak is a public entity, and the profits should not be
the priority. Passenger safety and service quality must be
priorities. What would happen if Congress fails to provide the
funding you are requesting?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Payne.
Well, first, I fully agree with you that safety is our
number-one priority, and safety informs everything that we do,
regardless of the level of funding. The level of funding
affects the level of operations, but never the level of safety.
If we are not able to achieve supplemental funding, as I
replied to Congressman Lipinski and his question, we would have
to make substantial other service reductions across the
company, and that also means we would have to adjust the
workforce [inaudible] that we have.
In addition, we also have to reduce our level of capital
expenses [inaudible] capital expenditure, of course, whether
that [inaudible] structure, and some of the other longer term
capital projects, such as our bridges and tunnels [inaudible]
and our capital program [inaudible] Amtrak [inaudible]
reduction in service, a reduction in employment, a reduction in
[inaudible] very difficult choices that we have to make.
Mr. Payne. OK, well, thank you. And my time is up.
And I would yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
I just want to remind everyone to make sure you mute when
you are not speaking. And hopefully Mr. Flynn also--the
connection seemed to be going bad. Hopefully it will get back
to the way it was.
The Chair will now recognize Mr. Perry for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will address my
questions to Mr. Flynn, as well.
And in your written testimony it states that Amtrak was on
track to generate passenger revenues exceeding operating
expenses in fiscal year 2020 for the first time ever, prior to
the COVID-19 outbreak. In other words, Amtrak was going to turn
a profit before COVID-19 devastated ridership. And if true,
that would be welcome news to the taxpayers.
And I don't think I need to remind you that the American
taxpayers provided Amtrak with over $100 billion in subsidies
over the nearly 50-year history. And I heard you talk to the
ranking member about the same claim, if I can use that term.
I am just wondering, can you explain, then, why Amtrak
counts State-funded operation subsidizes as passenger revenue,
but does not count Federal subsidies in the same manner?
Because it seems to me that--I am not familiar with this
accounting standard whereby you leave certain things out and
put certain things in. So if you can explain that one, and also
explain why Amtrak does not include depreciation costs in total
expenses for its unaudited monthly performance report, but
includes these costs in total expenses for Amtrak's audited
financial reports.
These practices appear to be done in order, in my opinion,
to hide the amount of losses Amtrak runs every year. But I
certainly want to give you the benefit of the doubt. And how do
these accounting practices improve the ability of Amtrak,
Congress, or the American people, for that matter, to evaluate
Amtrak's financial viability?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Perry. Can you hear me
OK?
Mr. Perry. I do have you loud and clear at the moment.
Mr. Flynn. OK, good. Well, thank you very much.
So your question really gets to the financial reporting of
the company, and are we reporting on a GAAP basis, or are we
reporting on adjusted operating income basis.
The numbers that I referred to in my answer to several of
the other Members so far were indeed talking in terms of
adjusted operating income, which, in the private sector, it
would often be called EBITDA. And you also mentioned that this
does not include depreciation, and that is exactly right. So,
the largest difference between adjusted operating income and
GAAP is the exclusion, or--of EBITDA, for discussion purposes.
Many companies across varied industries often talk in terms
of EBITDA or some form of adjusted operating income to provide
investors--if we are talking about a publicly traded company--
with as accurate a view of the core operating results of the
company.
But GAAP, of course, is the bottom line, and we report on
that. The biggest number is depreciation, which largely
addresses the catchup in investing that the company is doing in
fleet and other infrastructure. That hasn't been done for many,
many years. But we report both, and both are available on the
Amtrak website.
Mr. Perry. Well, I am just going to--because I want to move
on to a couple of other questions. I remain unconvinced about
the difference between State and Federal subsidies and how they
are reported. I don't see the difference. And I don't think
many of my bosses, my constituents, do, either.
Amtrak's latest supplemental funding request includes $4.9
billion in anticipated expenses for fiscal year 2021 to operate
and invest in the network. According to Amtrak's own figures,
though, total expenses for fiscal year 2019 were $4.198
billion. Can you explain why? Why is this such a vast
difference? I mean, that is a lot of money. What is the
difference there, $4.198 billion to $4.9 billion?
Mr. Flynn. All right. So I want to just come back to your
State question for just a second, please.
The State revenues are reported in other revenue, and it is
what the State pays us to actually perform service. So we
operate quite a few State-supported trains. And, for example,
in Pennsylvania, the Harrisburg to Philadelphia line, the
Keystone Service, is a State-supported train. They sell the
capacity, the tickets. They put a price on those tickets and
pay us the operating cost of running the train, maintaining
track infrastructure.
And based on Ernst and Young, who is our outside auditor,
Ernst and Young provided us the accounting guidance that said
that is where you should properly account for the revenues, or
the moneys you receive from the State, because we are providing
a physical service. We would be happy to meet with your office
or provide more detail----
Mr. Perry. OK.
Mr. Flynn [continuing]. Out of time.
But without being difficult, could you please repeat the
question? I was thinking----
Mr. Perry. Yes, I----
Mr. Flynn [continuing]. Of the answer of your prior
question when you were asking that question, so I apologize.
Mr. Perry. I am out of time, but I would like to know the
difference between the $4.9 billion request and the $4.198
billion expense for 2019. Why is there such a delta there? That
is a lot of money, and I am trying to figure out what the
difference is there.
Mr. Flynn. Well, I think the expense there is a total
expense on a GAAP basis. And so there are hundreds of millions
of dollars of depreciation in that number.
The $4.9 billion request as we go forward on fiscal year
2021, first of all, addresses the revenue shortfalls that we
are experiencing as a result of the drop in ridership. It
includes moneys, if Congress so directs, that we do not
furlough employees. And so it would be covered in that. It
includes operating expenses for the long-distance network, if
we are directed to operate a 7-day service. It also includes
moneys for the States and commuter railroads, based on what
they have told us they need and what revenues, frankly, they do
not have, but still want us to continue to operate a higher
level of service.
We would be very happy to meet with your office or your
staff and provide greater detail, since we are out of time on
that question, sir.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Mrs.
Fletcher for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to all of our witnesses for being here today. This is an
important hearing, and I am glad to have the witnesses here to
testify about the COVID-19 pandemic's impacts that are evident
across so many sectors.
From the energy industry here in my district, to
transportation systems across the country, sectors are under
strain from the disruption and the danger that the pandemic
presents. And Amtrak, as we have discussed and heard about,
already has plans to furlough 700 onboard service workers
beginning in October, because of the uncertainty in funding
they face. And that is something that, unfortunately, we are
seeing across the country, and is of particular concern here, I
know, for this committee.
So, while Congress did provide in the CARES Act, I am
concerned that the billion dollars that was provided has fallen
short when Amtrak's overall revenue was down 82 percent in
July, compared to 2019, and where the ridership of these long-
distance routes is 61 percent, as we have discussed a little
bit already this morning.
So this--it was an important lifeline, but we still don't
know--and I think Amtrak still has yet to provide a detailed
accounting of--how it spent those funds from the CARES Act. So
I am concerned, but also would like to know how and when we
will know how the CARES Act funding has been spent.
So, Mr. Flynn, could you first address when a detailed
accounting of CARES Act funding can be completed and made
available to Congress and to the public?
Mr. Flynn. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mrs. Fletcher. We
are closely tracking every dollar that we spend under the CARES
Act, and the Amtrak OIG recently issued a--I won't say a full
report, but an interim update on Amtrak's expenditure and
recording of the tracking of those expenditures just several
weeks ago.
In addition, we provided the FRA and the committee staff
with a detailed accounting of how we have expended so far the
CARES moneys that we have been provided, and would be happy to
provide that to your office so you could have those details,
because we are reporting that now on an ongoing basis, ma'am.
Mrs. Fletcher. OK, thank you. Yes, that would be useful, I
think, for all of us to have that, and to address this question
of the funding.
Also in your testimony, Mr. Flynn, you mentioned the
metrics Amtrak claims to use to decide when to bring back daily
long-distance service on each route. And the three factors are
public health, measured by COVID-19 hospitalization rates;
future demand, measured by whether customers are booking trips
near the same rate as 2019; and then the current performance,
or how close ridership is to operating planned projections.
I believe that cutting long-distance service to the 3 days
per week may unavoidably slash demand because the service
becomes less convenient for passengers. And certainly we heard
some concerns from our colleagues in the Northeast Corridor. We
know in other parts of the country, where there is less
frequent service, that there is an impact on demand.
So given that predicament, how will Amtrak guarantee the
long-term prospects of the daily long-distance routes?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you. Our view is we will continually
evaluate our long-distance services with a view to restoring
our long-distance services. That is our commitment. And you
talked about the three areas we want to take a look at.
So first of all, we want to look at just the state of the
pandemic. Has it subsided, or are we in a situation where we
have a phase 2, or a second wave of the pandemic? And that is
just practical and common sense.
The other thing in that public health that we are going to
be looking at is whether there is, indeed, an effective vaccine
or vaccines that have been developed and are also effectively
being distributed and made available to the public, because we
believe that is absolutely the inflection point as to when the
public is going to feel safer about traveling again.
In terms of level of ridership, it is comparing the level
of ridership against a low level of capacity that already
exists. So we are not going to compare the level of ridership
or future demand in 2021 against 2019, because they are simply
not comparable. The level of utilization or load factor that we
will be looking at would be load factor against very, you know,
already reduced capacity or frequency. So it would account for
perhaps a lower level of ridership as a result of a lower level
of frequency.
And then the third area, Congresswoman, that we are going
to look at is just our state of the company, and what level of
funding have we received.
So I think they are three pretty commonsense metrics to
look at. It is something we are going to look at on a continual
basis.
And our goal here is to grow our company, not shrink our
company. And so, as we come through the pandemic, and we see
demand improve, we clearly want to be growing the company. And
that would include, certainly, our long-distance network.
And one other point I will make. We are certainly going to
need the help and the cooperation of our host railroads in
order to not only restore service, but grow service. Thank you.
Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you so much. I have used up all my
time, so I want to thank you for your answers, and thank all of
our witnesses for being here.
And I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Rodney
Davis. Rodney, we hope that you are doing well.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. And
great to be with you. Sorry I couldn't get on the call earlier.
I had something else already previously scheduled.
Mr. Flynn, welcome. Great to see you again. I look forward
to continuing to work with you in this new capacity of yours.
I don't know if you are aware of this or not, but one of my
constituents, one of my local mayors, has been nominated to
serve on your board of directors, Mayor Chris Koos of Normal,
Illinois. I certainly hope the Senate can confirm him and the
rest of the slate so they can get to work. He knows the issues
with Amtrak in central Illinois inside and out. I am very proud
to have him serving with you, and I look forward to you and he
working together.
I know that this is a tough time, as my colleagues have
mentioned, as you mentioned in your testimony, Mr. Flynn,
financially for Amtrak, passengership, ridership. Obviously,
those numbers have gone down. But now I think it is the time to
address some of the institutional issues that exist with on-
time service for Amtrak, while the passengership and the
ridership is not at levels where it is impacting them.
We have an issue with the Saluki and the Illini in central
Illinois with on-time service. And there has always been a
conflict between the local railroad, who owns those tracks, and
Amtrak service. And it seems like a constant game of back and
forth.
Now, I would like to get your commitment to work with the
railroad, especially on those two lines, to try to address the
short shunt issue that has been driving some of these on-time
service issues when the passengership is higher. And what are
you guys doing now, with ridership down, to address some of
those concerns, Mr. Flynn?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Davis. It is good to see
you again.
Well, you raise an excellent point. So, with lower levels
of train operations, indeed, our level of on-time performance,
frankly, has improved. And some of those lower levels of
operations are, indeed, Class I host railroads, which suggests
to me that real improvement is available and achievable, and
why we were excited to see it in the legislation, the right of
private action.
We are, specifically in Illinois, in discussion with the
Canadian National Railway on levels of service and on
operations, certainly for the Illini and the Saluki, but also
for other operations that we have in and out of Chicago. And
our belief is, while the COVID-19 certainly has created
challenges for the long-distance services--frankly, all of our
other services--the number-one issue we have in long-distance
service is cooperation with the Class I railroads to deliver a
much higher level of on-time performance.
I personally have spoken with the CEO of Canadian National
Railway, but our teams are working with them on a regular
basis. I believe it is solvable, but it has to be solved, and
it hasn't been.
Mr. Davis. Well, I appreciate that. And I agree with you,
Mr. Flynn. I hosted a community roundtable with representatives
of Amtrak and of the CN in Champaign, Illinois, and Urbana,
Illinois, a few months before COVID hit. And I was assured by
the CN and also by Amtrak that we were this close to the
technological advancement that would make sure we were ready to
address the on-time performance of those two lines in
particular, which have abysmal on-time performance measures.
Now, I certainly hope, as we move forward, that you could
reiterate to the CN--and I will do the same--that we certainly
hope that this technology could be tested now, just to see if
it addresses some of the short shunt issues on those two lines.
Because if we are not testing it now, and if there is not the
cooperation now, I am afraid we are going to go back to the
same old, same old once we get there.
So if I can be helpful in urging the CN to work with you on
testing this technology, please let me know. Or if you have any
other ideas, I would like to give you the rest of my time to
make those ideas known.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. So we certainly understand the
testing that needs to be accomplished with the short shunting
situation that you describe. However, the folks and the
technology that is going to test that are from the U.K.
Indeed, I am not going to blame everything on COVID, but
this is one situation where I do believe that COVID-19 has had
an impact to get this testing done. It is certainly something
that we want to do, and our job certainly is to improve the
level of service everywhere, and certainly on these routes.
Mr. Davis. Well, great. I just got off another call with
Members of Parliament from the U.K., so maybe we can get the
technology installed and provide the technical assistance via
Webex or Zoom. I am sure Chairman Lipinski can help us do that.
Anyway, I yield back my time. Dan, I took it all.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Davis. Thanks.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. We will now move on to Mr.
Malinowski.
You are now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Flynn.
I can only begin to imagine what it is like to take this
leadership position at Amtrak at a moment of such crisis, when
ridership is down 95 percent. And I want to tell you how much
we appreciate how much responsibility you are bearing on your
shoulders right now, and your willingness to serve in this job,
and to take our tough questions. We are all trying to pull
together and keep this extraordinary railroad strong to help it
survive this crisis.
I do want to come back--speaking of tough questions--
though, to the topic that Chairman Lipinski raised with you
about the 401(k) contributions and the furloughs. I listened to
your answer. I completely understand where you are coming from,
and I completely understand why an Amtrak employee would want
to see those contributions resume.
But I am, I think, somewhat more concerned about those
employees who may no longer be employees, if they are
furloughed or lose their jobs. I have constituents in that
category. I just heard from one this morning, in fact.
And I wonder, for example, if you believe that you have to
move in this direction, why restore the full 7 percent? Why not
2 or 3 percent?
Why did Amtrak decide to move forward the date of
restoration from January to October? Because originally, you
told the employees it would be January, and now you are telling
them October.
Is this all or nothing here, given the fact that so many
people may lose their jobs?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you for the question, Congressman
Malinowski. It was a decision--the restoration decision was
really a--I would call it balancing the equities that were
involved. The vast majority of our employees that we are
talking about are frontline managers and supervisors who often
are making less than the agreement employees that they
supervise, and their benefits are not as rich as the benefits
can be for our organized employees.
We were hearing loud and clear from our employee base just
how concerned they were about the lack of the match. I had
explained earlier, I think to Chairman Lipinski, that the 7-
percent contribution is substantially less than what the
contribution would be under a defined benefit plan that prior
existed here.
So it was a management judgment call, sir. And I thought,
along with the senior leadership team here, that it seemed to
be the right thing to do at the time, in part considering
retention of employees. It is tough to furlough anyone. It is
tough to lay anyone off. I come from a railroad family myself.
I was 6, 7 years old, 2 years in a row my father was
furloughed. He was a locomotive engineer on the New Haven
Railroad. And I don't remember all the details, but I remember
the anxiety our family felt when that happened, and--as a
little 6- or 7-year-old--I don't remember a lot, but I do
remember that period of time. And so it was a very difficult
decision, personally.
Mr. Malinowski. I am sorry, we don't have that much time,
but could you convey to us, whether you know it now or after
the hearing, how much this is going to cost, so that we can
help evaluate this balance? Because you have to balance laying
people off and paying people these benefits, which they richly
deserve, I agree with you. But either way, there is a cost, and
it would help us understand the balancing decision better if we
knew exactly how much this is going to cost.
Mr. Flynn. Yes, off the top of my head, I don't have the
number. But I would be very happy----
Mr. Malinowski. What about bonuses? Because I also
understand Amtrak does have bonus programs for its management
employees, bonuses that are tied to performance. Have those----
Mr. Flynn. Our bonuses are wiped out----
Mr. Malinowski. OK.
Mr. Flynn [continuing]. Bonuses this year. And our long-
term incentive bonuses, or the long-term incentive plan, is
wiped out for the next 3 years.
Mr. Malinowski. OK. Very quickly, on a happier note, the
Portal Bridge, the first stage of the----
Mr. Flynn. Yes.
Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. Gateway project, we got the
first grant announcement from the FTA. Can you give us an
update on moving towards the construction phase of that
incredibly important project?
Mr. Flynn. Yes, it is incredibly important, as you say, and
so we are working very closely with New Jersey Transit to
ensure that the FTA, the Federal Transit Administration, has
everything they need so that they can enter into the full
funding grant agreement that is required.
And we are also very pleased to see the DOT commit more
than $765 million to the project. And we are hoping for the
possible start of construction in early 2021, but certainly a
very important project for us and for all of our customers.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski. The Chair will now
recognize Mr. Babin for 5 minutes.
Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate it.
I wanted to ask some questions of Mr. Flynn, as well.
I appreciate all of our witnesses being here, but Mr.
Flynn, according to the Cato Institute, Amtrak currently
receives a Federal subsidy of roughly 30 cents per passenger
mile. And compare that to the aviation industry, which receives
a subsidy of roughly 1 cent per mile. Do you believe this is an
appropriate balance, here, subsidy per passenger mile, for
Amtrak?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. I am not specifically aware of
the numbers, but certainly I can address the question.
Due to being an essential service, we are receiving the
subsidies, as you point out. We are generating an operating
income adjusted basis. In fiscal year 2019 and before, and well
into 2020, we were generating a surplus on our Northeast
Corridor, essentially a break-even level of operation in our
State-supported network--perhaps a few pennies here and there.
But the operational subsidy fundamentally underpins our long-
distance services.
And so the vast majority, if not all of that subsidy, if we
were to do it on a service line basis, would be in the long-
distance service.
Dr. Babin. OK. Well, it just seems to be quite a
discrepancy between, you know, 30 times greater than what we
are seeing for the aviation industry.
My second question would be when Amtrak received over $1
billion as part of the CARES Act here in Congress, we were
expecting that this was going to help avoid layoffs and
furloughs. However, Amtrak then announced that it would
potentially be cutting roughly 3,700 jobs by October the 1st,
2020, while increasing its fiscal year 2021 funding request by
almost $1.5 billion. How do you reconcile cutting those jobs,
while asking a dramatic increase in the amount of $1.5 billion?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. The slightly above $1 billion
that we were fortunate to receive in the CARES Act really
addressed our level of operations in fiscal year 2020. In early
March, when we were first trying to gauge the impact of what
the level of ridership would be post--or in the pandemic, we
anticipated about a 50-percent level of ridership in fiscal
year 2021, as compared to fiscal year 2019, which--I will call
it our last full normal year.
That simply hasn't happened. Our level of ridership is
going to be about 34 percent of fiscal year 2019. The
supplemental request that we made in May, as you point out, was
just about $1.5 billion. It presupposed that we would have some
level of furloughs, as well as a reduction in the long-distance
service, and about $500 million of cost reductions that, as a
management team, we would achieve, in part through furloughs,
and in part through other operating expenses being reduced.
Dr. Babin. OK, and then I have got about 1 minute left or
so.
What is your plan for Amtrak to increase ridership, restore
services, and work towards making a profit in the next few
years?
I know that is a big question, but if you can answer, hit
some of the high points about your plans.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. Well, our plan is, indeed,
ultimately to grow our company. We are going to have a very
challenging 2021. I don't know about 2022 at this point, but it
will be difficult, I imagine. We won't see ridership levels
start to return until we have a vaccine that is widely
distributed and the public assumes that conditions have
changed.
We can restore services on our long-distance network. We
can restore services in the NEC. We can increase the level of
State-supported routes. And frankly, many of the States were
looking for increased levels of service before COVID pandemic.
I believe that there is a great demand, latent demand and real
demand, for our services after COVID. And I think that we can
grow on new corridors, as well as regain customers that we have
and, importantly, attract new customers to our business. That
is a very high-level, very quick answer, but there is a lot of
thought and detail behind that, sir.
Dr. Babin. OK, thank you. My time has expired, so I
appreciate that very much. We wish you the very best.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Babin. And Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Mrs.
Napolitano for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Griffin and Mr. Maratea, are you concerned that COVID
will be used as an excuse to furlough employees permanently,
even when ridership levels return?
Ms. Griffin. Thank you for the question, and yes, I am.
Mrs. Napolitano. Mr. Maratea?
Mr. Maratea. Yes, Congresswoman. Yes, I do believe that
they would use COVID-19 as an excuse to furlough people. Quite
frankly, in the written brief that we just saw, they are
looking for work pool concessions that were a shock to us. We
never heard of anything during our months of talking with
Amtrak.
Mrs. Napolitano. Then----
Mr. Maratea. [Inaudible] as an excuse.
Mrs. Napolitano. Mr. Flynn, do you share your budget report
with labor?
Mr. Flynn. Can you hear me, Congresswoman?
Mrs. Napolitano. Yes.
Mr. Flynn. Yes, we do. We keep labor informed of, really,
everything that we are doing----
Mrs. Napolitano. No, your budget reports, your budget
reports. Actually, your expenses, what you are spending on--
CARES Act for COVID.
Mr. Flynn. Oh, so yes. All of our financial reports are
publicly available on our website.
Mrs. Napolitano. No, no, I mean directly to them, not the
public.
Mr. Flynn. Well, I am not specifically aware that we
formally send them a report every month, but we have indeed
shared our results with labor, and we speak with them, many
labor leaders, on a regular basis.
Mrs. Napolitano. All right. Ms. Griffin and Mr. Maratea, do
you have any comment?
Ms. Griffin, Mr. Maratea?
Mr. Maratea. Ms. Congresswoman, we have never received any
financial updates. They might be on the website, but we never
received them.
Mrs. Napolitano. Ms. Griffin?
Ms. Griffin. I have never received any.
Mrs. Napolitano. It would behoove the agency to share with
them, so they know where the money is spent. If you are doing
the 401(k) only to certain people, what justifies your being
able to do that?
Then the next question I have--I am from California, and
three of the five busiest State-supported routes are in
California. Has the ridership on these routes not on the
Northeast Corridor diminished to the same proportion as
ridership on the Northeast Corridor?
What is being done to assist State-supported routes and our
workers on these routes being furloughed differently than
workers on other areas of Amtrak operations?
Mr. Flynn. So State-supported routes in California, the
three JPAs, are very important operations for Amtrak and
important for the State----
Mrs. Napolitano. I know that.
Mr. Flynn [continuing].Congresswoman. We are operating a
level of train service based on what the three JPAs instruct us
to operate. So they make the decision of how many trains we
should operate during COVID and post-COVID. So we respond to
them. They make the, I would say, the business decision on how
many trains to operate.
And our State partners are certainly working with us, but
also insisting that we keep our costs low. And in part, that
gets to what level of employment base will we have to support
the services. It is something that we hear about from the three
JPAs regularly as part of our ongoing discussion with them as
we are planning for 2021 levels of service, ma'am.
Mrs. Napolitano. All right. Well, I would suggest that you
communicate with all your employees, your labor organizations,
and have some transparency so they can see why you have to do
what you do.
And I support Amtrak. No doubt they do a great job, and I
support the employees. But I would wish that the organization,
with you being new onboard, that you might consider connecting
with them to allow them to see why you are doing the things you
are doing, and not have to come up before us, and explain it to
Congress.
I think that the waiver of Buy American, we want to keep
things in America. We want to do more manufacturing in America.
So I suppose that there might be some need for it, but let's
look at how important that is to your organization.
And, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Smucker for
5 minutes.
Mr. Smucker. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I appreciate you holding
this hearing. I would like to address some comments to Mr.
Flynn, as well. I have some questions, as well.
But first, I recognize that I know you have taken
leadership of this organization during a particularly
challenging time. The coronavirus has certainly taken a
tremendous toll on families, businesses, and workers all across
my district and across the country. And I know that----
Mr. Lipinski. Mr. Smucker?
Mr. Smucker. Yes?
Mr. Lipinski. Mr. Smucker, if you will hold for a second
there, can you turn your camera on? It doesn't appear to be on.
Mr. Smucker. Sorry. I must have hit that when I muted
myself. Sorry about that.
Mr. Lipinski. All right.
Mr. Smucker. That wasn't on.
So, as I was saying, as individuals have shifted their work
habits and travel, I know that there has been a tremendous toll
on Amtrak. And so it has got to be a tough time to take on the
leadership of an organization like this, and I want to
congratulate you, and understand that it's a difficult time.
Rail is important to our transportation infrastructure, and
I support rail passenger service, as well. It is important in
my community, particularly Amtrak. The Keystone line runs right
through the district that I represent. Lancaster Station is one
of the busiest stations in Pennsylvania, right behind 30th
Street Station, and so it is important.
You have talked a little bit about the virus impact on
Amtrak, but I specifically want to sort of understand what has
happened on the Keystone line, and then have some specific
questions.
You said ridership was down 97 percent, I believe, overall.
What have you seen on the Keystone line?
Mr. Flynn. So 97 percent was the immediate impact, Mr.
Congressman, in March, April, and May. Our ridership has
recovered about 20 percent. So we are down 80 percent. On a----
Mr. Smucker. And did that track similarly on the Keystone
line?
Mr. Flynn. The Keystone line was actually the first of the
State-supported lines to shut down. Early in the pandemic, at
the direction of SEPTA, the Keystone line was shut down for a
period of time, and I think, in part, because of the COVID
outbreak, or incidents of COVID within several of the SEPTA
operations itself.
We are happy that the Keystone line has been reinstated,
and we are operating the Keystone line for SEPTA today, as we
speak. I don't, off the top of my head, know the specific level
of ridership, but that is certainly something we can get back
to you with.
Mr. Smucker. How is the----
[Microphone unmuted.]
Mr. Smucker. I am sorry?
Mr. Flynn. It would be similar, although several of the
commuter services or State-supported lines that operate more
like a commuter service have had a bit higher level of
ridership as people are returning to work, more than people are
taking leisure travel. I just don't have the number, off the
top of my head.
Mr. Smucker. Yes. Do you know how the revenue compares year
to date, compared to last year at this time?
Mr. Flynn. I don't have that, off the top of my head,
Congressman Smucker. I will have to get back----
Mr. Smucker. If you can get that information, that would be
great for me to know that.
You mentioned it is a State-supported line. How does
Amtrak's capital investment in the Keystone line compare to the
investment from the Commonwealth?
Mr. Flynn. Another area I would have to get back to you on.
Mr. Smucker. Sure.
Mr. Flynn. I don't recall that number, off the top----
Mr. Smucker. I would be glad to get that from you later.
Do you know what percentage of the Amtrak stations along
the Keystone line are ADA compliant?
Mr. Flynn. I do not. I do know that we are making
substantial investments in ADA compliance, and certainly the
Keystone line is part of that. We have a requirement----
Mr. Smucker. And I am sorry, I am almost running out of
time. Do you know what percentage of those upgrade projects
were paid for by Amtrak, as compared to by the State, by the
Commonwealth?
Mr. Flynn. Most of it is paid by Pennsylvania, sir, in my
understanding.
Mr. Smucker. Do all of the Amtrak revenues outside of
ticket sales, including fees generated from other rail line
utilizers and additional revenue, get reinvested back into the
Keystone line?
Mr. Flynn. Keystone revenues into Keystone line? The
Keystone line is part of the entire Northeast Corridor, and so
there is a very comprehensive set of rules and legislation
under 212----
Mr. Smucker. I am going to stop you, I am sorry. I am at
the end of my time here. You might be able to guess what I am
getting at.
During the committee's markup earlier this year, I offered
an amendment that would transfer the Keystone line to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Next week, when the House returns
to session, I plan to offer that amendment as a bill. I just
would like to ask you, don't you think that, at this time, that
Amtrak is losing money on the Keystone line, particularly with
the challenges now? Don't you think that transferring the line
to the Commonwealth would put Amtrak in better financial
standing?
Mr. Flynn. I don't, sir. I think making a short-term
decision over the long-term level of operations, I don't think
it would be a good decision.
Mr. Smucker. As I said, I know rail service is important.
And I think at this time, with these challenges, I think it is
important we consider outside-of-the-box innovations to better
serve the American people.
But I thank you for your answers, and I look forward to
some of those answers coming forward. Thank you.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Cohen for 5
minutes.
[Pause.]
Mr. Lipinski. Do we have Mr. Cohen?
[Pause.]
Mr. Lipinski. OK, the Chair will now recognize, then, Mr.
Garcia.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Lipinski
and Ranking Member Crawford, for convening this timely hearing.
Like my colleagues, I am deeply concerned about the changes
that we are hearing about at Amtrak. Concerned, but not
surprised, given the magnitude of this pandemic. I do not envy
the tough decisions that you are having to make at this time.
But no one could have predicted the financial onslaught the
transportation sector would suffer when the pandemic first
struck.
Since March we have quickly seen ridership drop
precipitously, and the financial disaster that COVID has been
for so many sectors. It has been especially clear in Chicago,
where almost 1,300 Amtrak workers live and work every day.
The vast majority of frontline workers at Amtrak--train
operators, engineers, and the like--are union members. They
make decent, livable wages, thanks to their good-paying union
jobs. For Amtrak employees getting the pink slip, the decision
is crippling. Frankly, my constituents are feeling the pain.
Not only have they kept our economy moving, but they have done
so at the risk of their own health and that of their families,
as well. Still, we are letting them down, and you are letting
them go.
In our preliminary conversations with representatives from
Amtrak in Chicago, I was informed that nearly 200 employees in
the Chicagoland area will be either furloughed or severed
entirely. Mr. Flynn, can you confirm the number of furloughed
versus fired employees we can expect from this proposed action
at Amtrak, both nationally and in Chicago or Illinois?
Mr. Flynn. So thank you very much for your question,
Congressman Garcia. Furloughed would apply to any union-
represented employee. So they are not severed from the company.
They have rights of return to service on a seniority basis, and
those seniority recall rights, or the recall rights, are
indefinite. The only time a union employee would be severed
would be if the union employee did not accept a return to
service when so advised. And so they retain those rights.
A management employee, however, does not have a right of
recall. And so management employees are severed when
furloughed. I think we are severing about 100 people. Again, a
very difficult decision to do. Management employees--100
total--management employees have the right to reapply, or apply
to be rehired, one year or more after their severance.
I don't have, off the top of my head, specific Chicago
numbers, but would be happy to provide that.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. If you would. And then, will these
families receive any severance or extended benefits? What about
healthcare?
Mr. Flynn. Well, that is a very important question. Thank
you, sir.
So we have gone beyond our contract requirements with our
union-represented employees, and they will have full healthcare
coverage at no cost to the employee or his or her family
through September 30th of 2021. For a management employee, we
have reduced COBRA for them for a period of months after they
are severed from the company.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And can you briefly--changing
gears--shed light on the type of service changes we can expect
in Chicago?
I understand several interstate routes like trips to
Detroit and through Wisconsin will be heavily impacted. And
brief me, please.
Mr. Flynn. Our long-distance routes that come through
Chicago will go to a 3-day-a-week service, those that are not
already there will go to a 3-day-a-week service from a 7-day,
although a couple are already at 3-day-a-week.
And then the State-supported routes will be dependent on
what the States tell us they want us to operate. We don't
control that.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. I wanted to ask you more indepth
about the thousands of people in Indiana, Wisconsin, and the
collar counties of Chicago that rely on State-supported Amtrak
trains to get to work or family. But I will skip that, because
my time is running out.
If the THUD Act were enacted instead of languishing in the
Senate under Mitch McConnell's desk, how would that additional
funding be utilized beyond the $4.9 billion you have requested?
Mr. Flynn. So if we were to get the $10 billion of funding
that THUD has spoken to, about $4.9 billion would be used for
the--as we have already described, in the incremental
supplemental expense. And then the other $5 billion would be
used both across our company, some in the Northeast Corridor,
but the majority, or greater than half, in our national
network. And we would use it to invest in fleet, our bridges
and tunnels, as well as in workforce training and working with
our labor unions to develop internships and job training
opportunities.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Great. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you for your indulgence.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Garcia. The Chair will now
recognize Mr. Fitzpatrick for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding, for
holding the hearing today. Thanks to all the panel for being
here with us today. My question is for President Maratea.
I was wondering if you could walk us through and explain to
the committee what TCU has done to assist Amtrak with reducing
its overall costs of doing business.
Mr. Maratea. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
First, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your ongoing
support for the Amtrak workforce, and for leading a bipartisan
letter, along with Congressman Moulton, supporting emergency
relief funding for Amtrak, and protections for our workers. You
have also shown time and again that you support and care about
Amtrak workers, even standing with us at our rally in freezing
cold February in Philadelphia.
To answer your question, what have TCU members been doing?
Most recently our onboard workers have received a 10-percent
pay cut. By putting them on the actual list, their guaranteed
money has been reduced. And that is continuing. Many employees
took voluntary leave without pay to help Amtrak. They lost a
week's pay per month. And we have also said to Amtrak, ``What
could we do to work together to try to make other side
agreements,'' which, unfortunately, we have not had any
movement on.
To go back a little further, I negotiated the last round of
the contract bargaining. I was the lead spokesman for our
coalition. Meeting with Amtrak, they wanted major needs from
us. One was relief on their healthcare. Not short-term--long-
term relief on their healthcare plan.
We buckled down, rolled up our sleeves, and we attacked it.
By making a whole new healthcare plan for the first 5 years of
an employee's employment before they can go into the higher
level plan, which, according to our numbers, generated $4
million over those 5 years of savings. Rolling it out for the
future, 10 years, would generate $17 million, and over 25
years, $72 million, which Amtrak needed for stability in their
healthcare.
We also increased our membership cost share that, during
term, would have generated $20 million in money back to Amtrak
for our employees. Plus, on wages, they needed relief early on,
and we gave them that relief by adding a 6-month zero in the
front of the contract, and basically taking a 1.25 for 18
months of the first 2 years of that contract. Industry
standard, everybody was getting a 2.5. Again, we took 1.25 and
backloaded that deal to help Amtrak, both for the future, and
future employment for our members.
We have a long history of bargaining with Amtrak, sitting
down, and rolling up our sleeves and making things work. We
have added part-time agreements in our call centers and our
ticket windows, anything we could do to keep our people moving.
And this is just a small step in the right direction that we
had to take time and time again to make things work.
And that is why it is a little disheartening to see our
frontline people, who, when you talk about heroes, these guys
are the heroes. These brothers and sisters are your frontline
people: ticket clerks, ushers who are cleaning the station,
doing spot cleaning so everybody stays safe, and now risking
their lives and families, have to go out and take a--lose their
job.
And to further respond to the congressman's question, I
just want to add--and I am sorry, Congressman--the managers, if
they hold rights to the union, they come back. They don't hit
the street. And most managers hold rights. They paid us dues.
They come back, they bump. So that has to be taken into
consideration. The TCU has always stepped up, and we have many
times. We will.
I hope that answers your question, Congressman.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Yes, thank you, Mr. Maratea.
And to Chairman Lipinski and all my colleagues on the
committee, I just think it is important that we remember and
recognize these frontline workers. We hear that term used a
lot. These people actually should be included in that
definition. As you just heard Mr. Maratea walk through, they
have significant skin in the game, and have made tremendous
sacrifices. And when we talk about Amtrak, we got to start the
conversation with the men and women who are on the front lines.
So, sir, thank you for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Ms.
Norton for 5 minutes.
[Pause.]
Mr. Lipinski. Ms. Norton, are you there?
Ms. Norton. I am sorry, can----
Mr. Lipinski. OK, go ahead, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Norton. OK, I am sorry. I must have been muted.
I particularly appreciate this hearing. Amtrak is on the
Northeast Corridor, and Washington Union Station is its second
busiest station, nationwide. Of course, I represent the
District. It is a question first for Mr. Flynn.
Mr. Flynn, I know the continuing or competing pressures you
have. You have got a decrease in ridership, a drop in revenue.
You have got new safety protocols. And yet, I know capital
improvements are continuing, for example, the Portal North
Bridge, among others. I would like you to answer how you are
able to continue capital improvements in the middle of this
economic and health crisis that Amtrak faces.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Ms. Norton. The capital improvements
that we continue to pursue are improvements that have been
pursued for a long time, as you know, and we believe are
essential improvements for the company and for our riders.
Ms. Norton. Where does the revenue come from for these
improvements?
Mr. Flynn. The revenue for the improvements comes from
Congress. It is moneys that are allocated to us, working
jointly with the Department of Transportation and the Federal
Railway Administration and FTA, where appropriate.
So Portal North, for example, is, I believe----
Ms. Norton. So have there been any cuts in the revenue you
have gotten from Congress for these improvements?
Mr. Flynn. No, there haven't been any cuts. The capital
funding is fairly specific as to what it is intended to do, and
these are investments in 100-year-old infrastructure.
I am not sure if you can hear me. I am getting a----
Ms. Norton. I can hear you. Yes, I can hear you. And I
understand the importance of these capital improvements, I am
simply trying to reconcile the funds you are not receiving, for
example, from Congress in the Heroes Act, funds you need so
badly, and your ability to continue to fund capital
improvements in and across the country, it looks like. But I
take it that those funds were already appropriated.
Mr. Flynn. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. For the capital improvements.
Mr. Flynn. Yes, ma'am. Those funds were appropriated. And
certainly additional consideration for capital expenditures in
CARES, as well.
Ms. Norton. For--in CARES, all right.
I am intrigued, upon learning of your partnership, I will
call it, with RB, which is the maker of Lysol. Ms. Griffin of
the Transport Workers Union earlier testified about lack of
coach cleaners. I am wondering about this new partnership to
strengthen disinfectant protocols for trains and stations, and
I am interested in it because you are trying this out first in
Washington Union Station and on our Pacific Surfliner, but in
Washington Union Station, which is one of the busiest in the
Northeast Corridor.
So could you give us some greater detail on these enhanced
protocols that you will be using on Amtrak in this new
partnership with the maker of Lysol?
Mr. Flynn. Yes, ma'am. So Lysol, the RB product Lysol, is
one of very few products that the Food and Drug Administration
has determined to be effective against COVID-19, and effective
against other coronaviruses of different types.
And what we are doing is we are constantly researching,
seeking to understand what more can we do to mitigate and/or,
essentially, eliminate the potential for our customers and our
employees to contract COVID while in a station or on a train.
And so, in working out this agreement with Lysol, they are
providing us with what the FDA has determined to be a very
efficacious product. They are also working with us and
providing advice to us on how we can enhance the cleaning
protocols that we employ on the trains. In fact, before they
would sign this agreement with us, they did a very
comprehensive review of what we are doing, because while we are
cobranding with Lysol, they are cobranding with us, and they
weren't going to cobrand with an entity that they didn't feel
had the right level of protocols and actions in place.
And so we are testing it first in the stations, as you
pointed out, now. We believe those products could also be
useful on the train. But that is a next step that we are doing
with the company RB for their products.
Ms. Norton. That is reassuring. Thank you very much, and I
see my time has expired.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Ms. Norton. The Chair will now
recognize Mr. Balderson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Chairman Lipinski. It is great to
have Mr. Flynn here today.
Mr. Flynn, thank you for being here, and I want to thank
Amtrak for their service through these trying times. But I
appreciate you being here.
Mr. Flynn, I would like to follow up on a point my
colleague, Congressman Perry, made earlier regarding
depreciation. On November 8, 2019, Amtrak announced its lowest
ever adjusted operating loss of $29.8 million for fiscal year
2019. In that same statement, Amtrak went on to project a
profit for 2020, which would be a first in Amtrak's near 50-
year history. If depreciation was included in this financial
reporting, what would Amtrak's net loss have been in 2019, and
what would the projection have been for fiscal year 2020?
Mr. Flynn. If we were to add back the depreciation, it
would be about, say, $750 to $800 million. So at an adjusted
operating income basis, I believe that fiscal year 2019 was a -
$29 million, or near break-even on that level. You would have
to add back to $750 million or so of depreciation, and there
may be some other expenses in there, but that would get you to
about an $800 million loss on a GAAP basis. And it is a similar
level, sir, of depreciation going into fiscal year 2020. I
don't know the exact number, but it would increase somewhat,
but not of an order of magnitude.
Mr. Balderson. OK, good to know, thank you.
The next question would be, assuming a level playing field,
including workforce protections and safety standards, would you
oppose opening certain national network routes for a
competitive bid, if that meant driving down cost and improving
service?
Mr. Flynn. Well, I have--certainly not a question I have
considered, and I appreciate your asking that, Congressman.
But as a first impression to me, no, I don't believe we
would operate or open up our long-distance routes for
competitive bids at this point in time. We have a hard enough
time just getting on the network with our host railroads to
operate the services that we provide. More operators create
more complexity, among other things. And I would imagine it
could be highly disruptive to us, and I would imagine it could
be highly disruptive to the Class I railroads.
And I think that would also--such a situation there, I
think, would certainly jeopardize employment opportunities for
our current employees, were that----
Mr. Balderson. OK, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I can't see the clock. How is my time?
Mr. Lipinski. You have 2 minutes.
Mr. Balderson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Flynn, my last question, then, I understand you worked
for a Class I railroad, and I know you are familiar with the
importance of freight railroads to our economy. How do you plan
to work with all classes of freight railroads to strengthen a
relationship between those railroads and Amtrak to eliminate
conflicts and improve on-time performance?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. I did have the opportunity to
work for CSX for several years a while ago. And so I do believe
I have a Class I freight railroad perspective. And I believe we
can certainly coexist, but I think we can do more than coexist.
I believe we can both prosper. Freight railroads make an
important contribution to our economy, broadly, and so does
Amtrak.
And so I think, if we could have standards and metrics in
place, clarify the ground rules there, obtain the right of
private action, I believe we can sit down with the Class I
railroad and absolutely work to an operating profile that
allows for high-quality, on-time operations for both our
passenger operation and our host railroad's freight operation.
Mr. Balderson. Mr. Flynn, thank you very much for taking
the time to be here, and please pass along our thanks to Amtrak
employees for their frontline workers, and being out there, and
God bless them, and stay safe and healthy.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my remaining time.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Mr.
Lowenthal for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all--
and to the ranking member, and thank you to all the panelists
on this very interesting issue on--talking about Amtrak and the
future of Amtrak. I would like to really focus in on Amtrak's
response to COVID-19, specifically. My first questions are to
Ms. Griffin.
Ms. Griffin, in your written testimony you provide a
concerning account of your experience in July, when you were in
contact with a COVID-19-positive colleague. You took steps to
notify your supervisors, to initiate protocols that would
remove you from further service to avoid further spreading the
virus. However, you were not immediately removed from service,
and were only removed after further intervention from
supervisors.
Most concerning to me is that you were told by Amtrak to
return to service after only 10 days, and were never tested for
COVID before returning to work. While you did not display any
symptoms, we know that asymptomatic individuals spread the
virus just as much. In fact, a study that has just recently
been published in last month's Journal of the American Medical
Association's Internal Medicine found that asymptomatic and
presymptomatic individuals carried as much of the virus as
those who were exhibiting symptoms.
Since your experience in July, do you know if Amtrak has
instituted a different process to remove possibly infected
individuals from work, and to ensure that they are COVID-free
before returning to work?
Ms. Griffin. Thank you for your question. And as far as I
know, no, it is the same procedures as I went through.
Actually, I have been quarantined twice through Amtrak with
possible exposure. And this has been the same protocol.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you.
Mr. Flynn, what went wrong in Ms. Griffin's case?
Mr. Flynn. Well, I paid very close attention to Ms.
Griffin's testimony as she was describing the conditions and
circumstances to the committee. And I am going to ensure that
we look into those details very closely.
We require that our employees quarantine after we confirm
exposures, real exposures to another employee. And if they are
on the road, we ask them to isolate on the return trip. And
also, we require a 14-day period of time.
I can't comment, again, specifically on Ms. Griffin's
circumstances. I believe she might have just said that the
first time that she quarantined it was for 14 days.
Ms. Griffin. Ten days.
Mr. Flynn. Well, again, I want to look into the details of
that. I don't know if 10 days was an elapsed total of 14 days
since the exposure. I don't know, and it wouldn't be
appropriate for me to presuppose any of that. But as I said to
you, and I confirmed to Ms. Griffin, who is on the panel here
with me, I will certainly look into those details.
Mr. Lowenthal. So, and I----
Mr. Flynn. But we do require our employees to quarantine.
We do pay-protect our employees when they are on quarantine. So
far, we have had, for example, 3,921 employees that we have
pay-protected, and not only because they were potentially
exposed or exposed, but if they believe that they had some
exposure, or if they had some of the symptoms of COVID. We have
had 1,845 employees test for COVID, 482 tested positive, of
which only 7 are current. And we are now providing testing on
demand, which is over and above CDC guidelines, to any employee
that requests it, sir.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. Thank you for describing the
processes that Amtrak has in place to ensure that potentially
infected employees are not on duty, or in trains, or in the
stations.
My next question is, does Amtrak have any processes in
place to contact trace COVID-infected passengers? What happens
if a passenger tests positive a day or two after their train
trip? Do employees who worked on that train, do they find out
about that? So, if you could, describe that process, also.
Mr. Flynn. Yes, we do have contact tracing in place, our
workers and, where we can, with our passengers. And what I mean
by where we can is that we don't always know where a passenger
sits on a train. We did actually have an early COVID case
passenger as early as March on a train from Chicago to St.
Louis. We were able to contact virtually everyone on the
train--there weren't a lot of riders on that train--not just
everyone in the car, but certainly all of our employees. And so
we are also working with the public health departments to
continue to do so.
Mr. Lowenthal. Well, thank you. Thank you, Ms. Griffin, and
thank you, Mr. Flynn, for that testimony. I am very concerned
about the processes that are in place, and whether examples of
Ms. Griffin, where things did not work out as well as she would
have liked, that they have improved.
And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Carson for 5
minutes.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chair. Am I on? OK. Yes. So my
question----
Mr. Lipinski. We can hear you, but your camera is not on.
We can't see you.
OK, there you go.
Mr. Carson. I had to logon online. It is Webex. So my
question is for Mr. Flynn regarding Beech Grove.
I have been very concerned about the furloughs you are
considering. I am especially concerned about the possible
impact on maintenance facilities. Can you tell me if you plan
to cut positions at Beech Grove?
I would also appreciate, in writing, any plans you have to
change the workforce levels at the Beech Grove facility.
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Carson. We are not
furloughing any employees at Beech Grove. In fact, a number of
our Beech Grove employees did take the VSIP, the voluntary
separation, and retire. So, in fact, we are actually hiring
some employees in Beech Grove to backfill the positions.
As you know, Beech Grove requires some substantial capital
investments over the next several years. But as we develop
future plans about Beech Grove, or plans that would impact
Beech Grove, we would be very happy to advise your office of
what those plans would be.
Mr. Carson. Thank you. That would be a big help. Thank you
very much.
But Mr. Mathews, I appreciate listening to your testimony
about the damage being done to the passenger rail service in
the Midwest by reducing the daily service on long-distance
routes. Indianapolis was previously served, and benefitted from
this.
To Mr. Mathews, can you elaborate on what happens to
Midwestern cities when daily services are cut? Do you think
Congress should mandate daily services?
And if anyone else wants to jump in about a congressionally
mandated daily service, chime in.
Mr. Mathews. So, well, yes, sir. Our position is that, yes,
these services should be, at a minimum, daily. And the reason
for that is because of the multiplier effect that these
services have in the communities.
We have heard a lot this morning, an assertion that Amtrak
is required by Congress to make a profit. It is not. It is
required to minimize subsidies. And when we have the
conversation about profit, that ignores the benefits that the
communities receive, and we talked about that, and the Midwest
is a perfect example of that.
When we looked at the effect of the long-distance routes,
12 of the 15 long-distance routes that would be affected by
these cuts, those routes together contribute about $4.7, $4.8
billion to the economy. That is the profit. The profit is going
to those communities that are served. And whether you are
looking at places like St. Louis or Indianapolis or anywhere in
the Midwest, these services provide an outsized benefit in
terms of tourism, in terms of visitor spending, in terms of
taking vehicles off the road. All of those impacts are
measurable, quantifiable.
Amtrak itself used to talk about $7.4 billion of value to
the economy that was created. We think that number is actually
a lowball. We think it is actually a little higher than that.
When you cut the daily service down to three times a week,
you don't just cut 4 days' worth of ridership. The ridership
declines more than that because of the diminished utility, and
because of the diminished connections.
Chicago is an enormous connection point, as you know, and
that is going to be a particularly difficult situation for the
Midwest, because a lot of those connections, because they are
difficult to make, those trips simply won't take place. Thirty-
nine million dollars of revenue, of connecting revenue, flows
through Chicago alone. And a lot of these trips are going to
originate in Chicago and flow through the Midwest, and those
trips will not take place because the network does not have the
utility required to make those trips worthwhile.
So those are people that will not be getting off in those
smaller towns, will not be spending their money in those towns,
will not be eating in the restaurants, and will not be
supporting the local economy. And that is a big blow. It is
already a big blow, and it is only going to get worse.
Mr. Carson. Thank you. Thank you both.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Carson. The Chair will now
recognize Mr. Lynch for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Yes, Mr. Chairman, can you hear me?
Mr. Lipinski. We can hear you and we can see you.
Mr. Lynch. All right, well, that is good. Two for two.
First of all, I want to thank you, Chairman Lipinski, for
keeping your focus on this. This is a very important issue. And
I appreciate the witnesses trying to help.
Mr. Flynn, going back to the CARES Act, we pushed through
$1 billion, hoping that that would help recapitalize Amtrak so
that you could avoid furloughs. Then we put through $10 billion
in addition to that, on the transportation appropriations bill.
And then, under H.R. 2, we actually, I thought, were very
generous to Amtrak by supporting $30 billion for Amtrak over
the next 5 years. And to be honest with you, I thought we were
very generous.
And just so you know, during the debate of H.R. 2, I had an
amendment. The amendment would have prohibited any furloughs,
layoffs, or reductions in force during the term of this
pandemic. And yet, the feeling between Amtrak and members of
the committee and staff was that, with this generous funding of
Amtrak, that this would be unnecessary, and that I should
withdraw my amendment. And so in good faith--in good faith--I
did. I withdrew that amendment that would have prohibited what
you are doing right now. So I am not happy about that.
I just want to tell you that there are consequences to your
decision.
In good faith, I supported all that funding for Amtrak. And
as a matter of fact, while my district is at one end of the
Northeast Corridor that provides a profit for Amtrak, I am
entirely comfortable, and I fully support Amtrak using the
profit that they would make in the Northeast Corridor to help
our Midwestern and Southern and Western States, some of those
red States, those rural areas that would be without service. So
I support that. I don't think that we should cut out those
lines of service, those long-haul lines that don't necessarily
benefit my district, but I think benefit the country.
I hope you take very seriously the credibility that you
will lose by engaging in these furloughs, and the reputational
damage that comes to Amtrak management because of this
decision. These 2,000 line workers are very important to us.
They are the heart and soul of Amtrak. And I appreciate that
the management personnel are important, as well.
We are going through a rough patch right now. And I think
this decision, you are not keeping faith with our line workers
for Amtrak, you are not keeping faith with the people who drive
those trains and maintain those trains every single day. I
really have some deep misgivings about my own decision to pull
that amendment.
So, I am asking you to rethink that. We are all in this
together. I don't think that your decision to furlough these
2,000 employees is going to save the day, quite honestly,
because cutting them out is going to reduce service. Cutting
them out is going to continue to spiral that bottom-line
deficit. And you are going to lose the faith of Members of
Congress like me, who were behind you and supportive of you,
because of this decision.
So do you have any other alternatives, other than what you
are suggesting right now with this furlough decision?
Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Lynch. These are really
very difficult decisions, and ones that we all feel very
personally.
As you pointed out, if H.R. 2 were to become law, it would
be game-changing for Amtrak on many, many levels, including the
ability to retain everyone employed, and to retain the long-
distance service.
Should the economic recovery, as proposed under THUD
legislation, that would be some multiple of game changing. I am
not sure what the right adjective is for that.
But we don't have that funding certainty yet. And that is
why, in the $4.9 billion supplemental that we presented to the
committee, and had discussions with staff and with Members, it
is about retaining employees who would otherwise be furloughed,
or may be furloughed and then recalled, and the long-distance
service.
As I mentioned in a response to another member of the
committee, we had quite a bit of input from a wide array of
stakeholders, including the Senate, and including in the
administration that said, ``You need to, in your request, look
at those areas where, given the very, very low levels of
ridership you are experiencing, you need to engage and you need
to take some self-help in reducing cost,'' and those are the
equities we are simply trying to balance.
And I heard everything you said, which is why, in my
remarks here today, I was pointing out levels of funding, given
a 34-percent level of ridership in 2021 as compared to 2019,
that we would require.
Mr. Lynch. Well, you know, I think we have got to hang
together, and I just do not see the support that I think we owe
to our line workers. I just don't see it in this, these 2,000
furloughs. So I would encourage you to revisit that decision.
The other piece of the question I had was the vendor
bidding on contracts that may result in jobs being exported
overseas, lost in the United States and then exported overseas.
Do you have anything to say about that?
Mr. Flynn. We did receive a waiver to purchase some very
specific track-laying equipment from overseas, and we did that
after the FRA and the committee satisfied themselves it was
absolutely necessary and not available.
If you are referring to a recent RFP for IT work, that has
certainly very strongly been brought to my attention--I was
unaware--by both----
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Flynn [continuing]. Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member
Graves, or by Chairman DeFazio, specifically. And we have
adjusted that RFP and taken out the ability of the responder,
or the successful responder, to outsource that IT programming
work.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Flynn. We had some other RFPs, and we also made those
changes, as well.
Mr. Lynch. All right. Under the circumstances, you could
see how you would be under severe criticism for doing that. But
I appreciate that you have revisited that, and I am glad you
are listening to Chairman DeFazio, and happy that at least the
IT portion of that has been retained.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back, and I want to thank
the witnesses for their help with the committee at this
hearing. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.
Are there any Members who have not had a chance to ask any
questions?
All right, hearing none, I want to thank the witnesses for
your testimony.
I think Mr. Lynch's comments there at the end were a very
good way to conclude. We need to be supportive of the workers
at Amtrak. I am sorry that Mr. Maratea and Ms. Griffin didn't
have more of an opportunity here to field questions, but I
think everyone understands that Mr. Flynn is really in the
driver's seat here for what is happening.
But Amtrak needs the support and the help from Congress. I
was very happy to hear at the end, I was not aware--I sent that
letter, along with Chairman DeFazio, about the outsourcing of
the IT jobs. So I am very glad to hear that that has been
changed, that the option has been changed. That is good news to
hear from you, Mr. Flynn.
But we are going to have to continue to talk about the need
to make sure that Amtrak workers are taken care of, and also
that Amtrak passengers receive the service that they deserve,
and when the pandemic is over, that we can return to all of the
service. Which is very questionable, if we have cuts to service
in the meantime.
But I want to thank all the witnesses again for your
testimony.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such time as the witnesses have provided
answers to questions that may be submitted to them in writing.
I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments and information
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record
of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
And with that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chairman, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chairman Lipinski and Ranking Member Crawford, for
calling today's hearing to discuss Amtrak's response to COVID-19.
The COVID-19 pandemic has wrought devastating public health and
economic impacts--185,000 Americans dead to date and tens of millions
of job losses. And the numbers just keep going up.
Sadly, the Trump administration and Senate Republicans have turned
a blind eye to the pressing needs of average Americans by stonewalling
House-passed measures and downplaying the clear need for another relief
bill. Their tactics have needlessly cost our country more lives and
jobs. The bottom line is that the challenges facing us in this pandemic
are far from over. Similarly, the challenges Amtrak faces from COVID-19
are far from over.
Like every other transportation mode, Amtrak has been hammered by
the COVID-19 pandemic. At one point in March, ridership across Amtrak's
network was down 95 percent. Even now, ridership and ticket revenues
are significantly down across the network . . . and Amtrak is
estimating that it will take several years for ridership to fully
recover. For example, ridership on the Cascades route through my home
state of Oregon is down significantly--from 85,700 riders in July 2019
to 6,400 in July 2020. Right now, Amtrak estimates that, in 2021,
they'll have 34 percent of the systemwide riders that they had in 2019.
That means roughly 34 percent of the ticket revenues used to operate
its trains, reduce its state-of-good repair backlog, improve service,
and pay workers.
In July, the House passed a comprehensive infrastructure bill, H.R.
2, the Moving Forward Act, that provided Amtrak $29 billion in funding
over five years and would invest in infrastructure to jumpstart a post-
COVID economic recovery. Also in July, the House passed a FY 2021
appropriations bill with $10.05 billion for Amtrak, including $8
billion of recovery aid for Amtrak and its state partners to help keep
the trains running and workers employed.
And from the Senate, we've heard . . . crickets. No leadership, no
accountability. Abandoning its responsibility to legislate, the Senate
went on recess while the COVID-19 pandemic continued and millions
without work saw cuts to their unemployment benefits take effect.
As a result, on October 1st Amtrak will cut 2,050 people from its
workforce. These include workers who provide onboard services; assist
passengers as Red Caps and ticket and station agents; work as
conductors and engineers operating trains; as well some management
staff. Thanks to strong Federal labor protections, these are good jobs
that pay wages that sustain American middle-class families. To show the
real-world impacts of these cuts, we will now hear a voicemail my
office received from an Amtrak conductor who just learned that he will
be furloughed.
[Committee staff will play audio recording of Amtrak conductor
discussing his fear and concern and asking for Congressional support.]
To make things harder for Amtrak employees, these job losses come
at a time of high unemployment. Though the unemployment rate recently
rebounded to 8.4 percent from historic highs of 14.7 percent in April,
the rate was at 3.5 percent in February. And 29 million Americans are
still drawing some form of jobless benefits. It won't be easy for laid-
off Amtrak workers to find new jobs with wages that allow them to pay
their mortgages and support their families.
In addition to cutting jobs, Amtrak plans to drastically reduce
service. Amtrak has already cut Northeast Corridor service frequencies
and worked with states to trim state-supported route frequency. Now on
the chopping block is long-distance service. This service, which
connects rural and urban areas around the country, has fared better
than the rest of the service lines, with long-distance ridership down
62 percent from the previous year, versus a reduction of about 80
percent for the Northeast Corridor and state-supported routes.
Still, Amtrak plans to cut almost all of its daily long-distance
routes to just three times per week. The impacts of this change will
trickle down, limiting travel choices for rural Americans, hurting
cross-service connections, damaging rider loyalty, and taking money
away from the towns and cities along the routes that benefit from
Amtrak service.
While Amtrak has announced metrics it will use to resume daily
service on long-distance routes, I have concerns about slashing service
on the routes where demand has fallen less dramatically. I also worry
about creating a chicken-or-the-egg situation where reduced frequencies
cause lower rider demand, making the metrics impossible to achieve.
This could lead to service cuts that linger for years and dramatically
hurt Amtrak's long-distance network.
The truth is that daily service is vastly more convenient than
three days a week, and Amtrak will have an uphill battle to rebuild
demand if it's offering less attractive service options. As the travel
economy recovers, Amtrak should be capitalizing on the advantages of
long-distance travel by train, including Amtrak's trains' effective
ventilation and air filtration and the options for better social
distancing than other transportation modes. Amtrak also has added
enhanced safety and cleaning measures, instituted contact-less
notification measures to improve the safety of traveling, and has, for
months, required passengers and Amtrak workers to wear face coverings
onboard trains.
I'm curious to hear from the witnesses today on Amtrak's COVID-19
response and recovery, and the ways that job and service cuts hurt
workers and threaten the future of Amtrak's rail network. Thank you.
Statement of Ross Capon, Consultant, Submitted for the Record by Hon.
Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford
I am an independent consultant and president emeritus of the Rail
Passengers Association (RPA, formerly National Association of Railroad
Passengers) which I led as executive director and then president and
CEO from 1976 to 2014. I do not represent RPA but I am in frequent
touch with my successor, Jim Mathews, and generally support his
testimony. From 1971-75, I worked for the Massachusetts Secretary of
Transportation & Construction and was responsible for one of Amtrak's
earliest state-supported trains.
Massive reductions in long-distance service are ill-advised and may
well be irreversible. The ``restoration metrics'' Amtrak has presented
are a trap; Amtrak's statement that ``the service reductions are
temporary'' is not credible, nor is the notion that Amtrak can drop so
much service and restore it by June 30, 2021, while meaningfully
reducing taxpayer costs.
The long-distance trains are more resistant to COVID-19 than are
Amtrak's short-distance trains. Starting in April, long-distance train
revenues have exceeded revenues of NEC and State-supported trains
combined. Also, Amtrak's plan worsens the nation's economic inequality,
since long-distance coach travelers are Amtrak's lowest income market
segment.
Intercity travel now is dominated by three factors--concern about
health, ability to telecommute and availability of alternatives.
Amtrak deserves praise for good work in creating the healthiest
possible environment for staff and passengers, and in promoting that
fact. For some travelers, this likely has tipped the balance from air
to rail. It is ironic that Amtrak now plans to remove so much of this
service.
Telecommuting has challenged commuter rail and Amtrak's short
corridors. Many former riders, if they can work from home, see no (or
much less) need to travel.
A key reason long-distance travel has returned more strongly than
shorter rail trips is that many longer trips were not work-related
before the pandemic, and for many people the alternatives are less
attractive or--for the car-less--non-existent. Indeed, the
transcontinental trains serve regions where Greyhound has over the last
decade done its heaviest route reductions. Coach demand for short
round-trips is likely to increase and would be hit hard by planned
service reductions.
Amtrak paints long-distance service reductions as leveling the
playing field with its short corridors where the number of trains per
day has been reduced. This is wrongheaded.
First, ridership on the short-distance trains has declined more
sharply than has the number of short-distance departures.
Second, ``less-than-daily'' weakens the network far beyond the
impact of ``three trips versus seven.'' There is an existential
difference between providing daily service vs. telling people they must
wait two to five days for the next train, or that their trip newly
requires one or more overnights at an intermediate point. (Tables on
pages 6-8 \\ show days and times of arrivals and departures at
Portland, Sacramento, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Chicago, and
Washington.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\\ Editor's Note: The page numbers listed for the tables
refer to Mr. Capon's original statement and not as the statement
appears in this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, anyone wishing to travel from the East to Arkansas or
Texas is out of luck because the Texas Eagle departs Chicago on the
days after the three East Coast trains arrive there. This is good for
private car owners since Amtrak no longer offers same-day switches in
Chicago for an extra fee, but it is not good for the general public. As
well, Wednesday's California Zephyr departure from Chicago will have no
connections from the East or South.
Amtrak often quotes systemwide figures and polls which hide the
stronger performance of long-distance routes.
Mr. Flynn's May 25 letter to Congress: ``We know from
recent polls that approximately half of those surveyed expressed
reluctance to ride a train in the next six months.''
Stephen Gardner's August 4 letter to me: ``Amtrak has
never faced a situation of losing 95% of its riders and revenues in the
space of two weeks . . . Although there were early signs of a small
recovery in the Long Distance sector, the pandemic in the United States
shows no signs of slowing.'' This invites the incorrect assumption that
ridership on routes serving COVID-challenged states significantly
weakened.
In attempting to convince political leaders and the public that the
service reductions will be temporary and will yield significant
financial savings, Amtrak asks us to ignore the huge costs of making
and reversing these changes. Here are just the sales and marketing
``front end'' costs:
The immediate ``negative marketing'' effect of the May 25
announcement, which led some people to think service reductions were
immediate.
Sales are open out 11 months and were not closed until
mid-August, after which the reservation bureau had to contact any
passenger whose itinerary completely or partly involved canceled
trains, attempt to rebook, or issue refunds.
Then there are the ongoing costs:
Long talk times for reservation agents attempting to
match days desired with days on offer. Some connecting passengers would
find their trip impossible or requiring costly overnight layovers.
Skyrocketing hotel and meal costs of missed connections,
anxiety for passengers, and ``brand risk'' for Amtrak. Today, if a late
train misconnects, the passenger is accommodated for one night. Under
the October plan, the layover would be two or three nights (four or
five in some Florida-train cases). Misconnects result from big delays
due to freight train incidents or weather, and Amtrak mechanical
problems--not from the handful of minutes associated with adding or
removing private cars.
Amtrak continues health insurance for workers for a year
after they are furloughed.
Will surplus rolling stock be maintained or cannibalized?
Will the cost of restoring it become part of an unacceptably high level
of ``adequate funding'' [Flynn's May 25 letter] Amtrak will request to
restart service?
Finally, the restart costs:
Significant marketing expenses, almost like a new
service, will be incurred to convince travelers that daily service has
returned. How far in advance will service restoration be announced? The
further in advance, the better the load factors once service begins,
but also the more publicity is wasted because it will reach people who
see the promotion but want to travel before service resumes.
Rehiring and requalifying/retraining skilled personnel--
if they are available.
Amtrak (in the above-referenced August 4 letter) quoted $945
subsidy per long-distance passenger for April and May. Outside Zoom,
home delivery companies and the like, few economic activities in those
months were sustainable. Ridership has grown significantly since the
spring and should continue to grow if the service is not dramatically
reduced. Also, how much of that $945 is allocated fixed costs that will
not disappear when service is reduced--certainly not before June 30,
2021?
Tri-Weekly History:
Amtrak began the Coast Starlight and the California Zephyr's
Denver-west segment in 1971 as tri-weekly trains. In 1973, they were
converted to daily as summer experiments which proved so successful
they became permanent.
Amtrak President George Warrington testified to the Senate Commerce
Committee on September 26, 2000, that less-than-daily service on select
routes in 1995-96 ``ended up costing [Amtrak] more in lost revenue than
we were able to take out in the way of expenses, given the fixed cost
nature of the operation'' p. 99 (computer p. 103).
Short Distance, Long Distance:
The September 1 New York Times Amtrak report ends with Stephen
Gardner saying long-distance rail is ``a small part of our business. We
need to be where the people are.'' Right now, as noted on page one,
Amtrak long-distance is where the money is, reflecting the devastating
impact of COVID-19 on shorter runs. There is some concern about long-
distance ridership suppression, including cases where sales have been
blocked even though seats were available (after taking into account
Amtrak's COVID-related restrictions on sales). Cases brought to my
attention include California Zephyr eastbound trips that originated
August 10 and 24 and September 5.
Gardner's quote recalls the June 26, 2019, Senate Commerce
testimony of then Amtrak President and CEO Richard Anderson: ``We
should be looking at breaking up some of those long-distance trains and
figuring out how we serve the American consumer to provide high-quality
service in short-haul markets where they're using that service today.''
This implies new short-distance corridors where neither state DOT or
host railroad circumstances are supportive. For segments like
Charlotte-Atlanta or Jackson-New Orleans to thrive, speeds and
frequencies would need to be increased, at huge costs. Prospects for
such investments are limited and include the Colorado Front Range and
New Orleans-Mobile which face challenges; neither are segments of
existing long-distance routes.
Certainly, there is a strong case for Amtrak's short-haul markets.
That is reflected in at least thirty years of organic growth in those
markets; now 14 states fund such service. California's June 5, 1990,
election was pivotal. California voters approved Propositions 116, 108
and 111, forcing Caltrans to move towards genuinely balanced
transportation. Props 116 and 108 produced almost $3 billion for rail;
Prop 111 generated major additional funding for transportation,
including transit.
Today, as noted, short corridors are more vulnerable to
telecommuting--and to the negative impacts of Amtrak's long-distance
reductions. Amtrak's May 25 request said ``the elimination of any of
the state services would result in increased costs to the remaining
services, as common network costs are reallocated, further increasing
the financial pressure on the states that wish to continue their rail
service.'' Similarly, reduction of long-distance service would harm
state services on the cost side and also eliminate revenue from
connecting passengers. The latter effect would be particularly harsh
for the Oklahoma City-Fort Worth Heartland Flyer, about 30% of whose
passengers connect to/from the Texas Eagle.
Private cars and charter trains:
This statement is pro bono except for this paragraph. My major
client is American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO).
The Association appreciates Section 9219 of HR 2--and indeed most of
the bill's passenger rail provisions. AAPRCO believes that the more
positive approach to private cars and charter trains envisioned in that
provision would yield valuable revenue for Amtrak--revenue that is more
important now than ever. In particular, the elimination of key access
points such as Tucson, Arizona; Jacksonville, Florida; Whitefish,
Montana, and Huntington, West Virginia, seem counterproductive, as does
the restriction of charter trains to Amtrak's existing network.
Suspension of Amtrak Package Express:
Here again, Amtrak is turning away revenues. ``Effective October 1,
2020, Express shipping service on Amtrak's regularly scheduled
passenger trains will be suspended until further notice. The last date
for accepting these shipments will be September 15, 2020, which will
ensure all shipments will reach their final destinations before October
1st . . . In addition, human remains will not be accepted.'' https://
www.amtrak.com/express-shipping
Perhaps this was yet another casualty of ``universal tri-weekly''
service. It also appears that management neglected the business and was
overcharging for it. When something is carried on a train that is
operating anyway, rates charged should cover direct costs plus a
reasonable profit margin. In contrast, the Amtrak Inspector General
said ``Management stated that [Amtrak] will use the results of its
costing analysis to confirm that the pricing for each private railcar
activity exceeds both the direct and fully allocated costs of
performing that activity'' [Report OIG-A-2019-003, February 6, 2019,
page 14]. This is pricing to drive away business and also appears to
have been applied to Express shipping. By contrast, Robert Menzies,
owner and board chair of the freight shortline Aberdeen, Carolina &
Western Railway, says, ``We carry sand even though it might not cover
full cost like chemicals and plastics, but sand does cover variable
cost and contribute to our fixed costs.''
Amtrak has a fleet of new baggage cars ideal for handling express.
RAILnet-21 https://www.railnet-21.com/ is a legislative proposal
leveraging private funds against a federal loan, fully secured by a
third-party, investment-grade repayment guarantee, to bring Amtrak-
owned infrastructure to a state-of-good-repair. This proposal
recognizes that Amtrak-owned infrastructure, primarily the Northeast
Corridor, constitutes a huge financial drain that threatens Amtrak's
entire network. Under RAILnet-21, Amtrak-owned infrastructure would be
leased to an infrastructure management organization (IMO) selected by
the Surface Transportation Board. The IMO would be a railroad subject
to FRA, STB, and DOT IG oversight, and required to comply with the
Railway Labor Act, the Federal Employers Liability Act, the Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Act, etc. The IMO would be required to hire all
current Amtrak infrastructure employees; assume their collective
bargaining agreements where-is, as-is; honor their seniority; and
recognize their labor representation. The IMO--in order to make the
substantial infrastructure investments required to achieve its business
goals and satisfy its statutory mandates--would hire additional
unionized personnel in the field and in its offices, both from which
Amtrak has been laying off employees. Amtrak would remain the nation's
rail passenger carrier, and the IMO would be statutorily proscribed
from offering any form of revenue train service on the NEC or
elsewhere.
Not surprisingly, Amtrak leadership is skeptical, having written:
``We don't believe that the RAILnet concept offers value to the company
or to the NEC at this time and we believe that most, if not all, of the
central tenets underlying the proposal have deep flaws or are
practically unworkable'' [Stephen Gardner, August 4 letter]. However,
given the unfortunate direction Amtrak is now taking, and Amtrak's
funding requirement (per the Northeast Corridor Commission) of at least
$45 billion to achieve state-of-good-repair, Congress should (a) get
Amtrak to explain the ``central tenets underlying [RAILnet's] deep
flaws'' and why RAILnet is ``practically unworkable,'' and (b) grill
Robert Serlin and his colleagues on RAILnet-21. Both conversations
should include discussion of the impact of COVID-19 on NEC passenger
revenues.
Thank you for the Committee's hard work on intercity rail passenger
issues, and for considering my views.
appendix
Arrival & Departure Days at Key Connection Points Under Amtrak's
Forthcoming ``Tri-Weekly Everywhere'' Scheme
The number in parentheses after the time is the Monday of the
October 2020 week when reduced service begins on that route. (This will
be a challenge for some October travelers using two or more routes with
different tri-weekly implementation dates.)
Connections at Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Train From At Chicago To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29 Cap Ltd........................... Wash/Martinsburg/PGH/ 8:45 (5)
CLE/TOL/South Bend MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
58 City of N.O....................... NOL/Jackson/Mem/Carb 9:15 (5)
MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 Lake Shore Ltd.................... BOS/NYP/Alb/Buff/CLE/ 9:50 (12)
TOL/South Bend MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
51 Cardinal.......................... NYP/WAS/WSS/CIN/INDY 10:00
MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21 Texas Eagle....................... 13:45 (12) StL/Little Rock/Texas/
TuFSu Tucson/Maricopa/[LAX]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
22 Texas Eagle....................... [LAX]/Maricopa/Tucson/ 13:52 (12)
Texas/ MWSa
Little Rock/StL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Cal Zep............................ 14:00 (5) Omaha/Denver/SLC/Reno/
MWSa Sac/Bay Area
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Emp Bldr........................... 14:15 (19) StPaul/Fargo/Havre/
MThSa Whitefish/
Spokane/Portland/
Seattle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 SW Chief........................... 14:50 (12) KC/Garden City/La Junta/
MThSa Flagstaff/
SanBernardino/LAX
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 SW Chief........................... KC/Garden City/La Junta/ 14:50 (12)
Flagstaff/ MThSa
SanBernardino/LAX
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Cal Zep............................ BayArea/Sac/Reno/SLC/ 14:50 (5)
Denver/Omaha MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 Emp Bldr........................... Seattle/Portland/ 15:55 (19)
Spokane/ MThSa
Whitefish/Havre/Fargo/
StPaul
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 Cardinal.......................... 17:45 INDY/CIN/WV/WSS/WAS/NYP
TuThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 Cap Ltd........................... 18:40 (5) South Bend/TOL/CLE/PGH/
MThSa Martinsburg/Wash
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
59 City of N.O....................... 20:05 (5) NOL/Jackson/Mem/Carb
MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48 Lake Shore Ltd.................... 21:30 (12) South Bend/TOL/CLE/Buff/
MThSa Alb/NYP/BOS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connections at Portland, OR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Train From At Portland To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Builder............................ Chicago/WI/MN/ND/ 10:10 (19)
Whitefish/ MWSa
Spokane
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Starlight......................... 14:25 (12) Sacramento/Oakland/LAX
MWSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Starlight......................... LAX/Oakland/Sacramento 15:32 (12)
TuThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 Builder........................... 16:45 (19) Spokane/Whitefish/ND/MN/
TuThSa WI/
Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connections at New Orleans
(currently single-overnight for every Sunset and City of New Orleans trip; the Sunset has been tri-weekly since
before Amtrak's creation)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Train From At New Orleans To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20 Crescent.......................... 7:00 (5) Meridian/Birmingham/ATL/
SuTuTh Charlotte/
Charlottesville/WAS/NYP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Sunset............................. 9:00 Houston/San Antonio/NM/
MWSa Tucson/
Maricopa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
58 City of........................... 13:45 (5) Jackson/Memphis/Carb./
New Orleans SuWFr Champaign/
Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
59 City of........................... Chicago/Champaign/Carb./ 15:47 (5)
New Orleans Memphis/ SuTuF
Jackson
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19 Crescent.......................... NYP/WAS/Charlottesville/ 19:32 (5)
Charlotte/ MWSa
ATL/Birmingham/Meridian
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Sunset............................. LAX/Maricopa/Tucson/NM/ 21:40
San Antonio/ TuFrSu
Houston
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crescent to Sunset--Monday & Saturday arrivals require 2 nights in New Orleans; Wednesday arrival 3 nights
Sunset to Crescent--all trips require 2 nights
City of New Orleans to Sunset--all trips 1 night
Sunset to City of New Orleans--Sunday arrival requires three nights; Tuesday one, and Friday two. (Arriving
Sunday connects to the same 58 [Wednesday] as arriving Tuesday.)
Connections at Sacramento
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Train From At Sacramento To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Coast Starlight................... Seattle/Portland/Eugene/ 6:35 (12)
Klamath Falls SuTuTh
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 California Zephyr.................. 11:09 (5) Reno/SLC/Glenwood
TuThSa Springs/
Denver/Omaha/Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 California Zephyr.................. Chicago/Omaha/Denver/ 14:13 (5)
Glenwood Springs/SLC/ SuWF
Reno
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Coast Starlight................... 23:59 (12) Klamath Falls/Eugene/
MWF Portland/Seattle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connections at Los Angeles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Train From At Los Angeles To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Sunset............................. NOL/Houston/San Antonio/ 5:35
El Paso MWF
NM/Tucson/Maricopa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Chief.............................. Chicago/IA/KS/CO/ 8:15 (12)
Albuquerque MWSa
Flagstaff/San
Bernardino
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Starlight......................... 10:10 (12) Bay Area/Sacramento/
MWF Portland/Seattle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Chief.............................. 18:00 (12) San Bernardino/
TuThSa Flagstaff/Albuquerque
CO/KS/IA/Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Starlight......................... Seattle/Portland/ 21:00 (12)
Sacramento SuTuTh
Bay Area
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Sunset............................. 22:00 Maricopa/Tucson/NM/El
SuWF Paso
San Antonio/Houston/NOL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Starlight arrivals:
Sunday--3 nights to Sunset; 2 nights to Chief
Tuesday--1 night to Sunset; 2 nights to Chief
Thursday--1 night to Sunset; 2 nights to Chief
Starlight departures:
Monday and Wednesday same-day connections from Chief; effectively no connection on Friday.
All three Sunset arrivals have same-day connections.
Connections at Washington, DC
(Silver Service reductions took effect July 6, 2020)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Train From At DC To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
98 Silver Meteor..................... Miami/Orlando/ 7:07
Jacksonville MTuWTh
Savannah/Charleston/
Richmond
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20 Crescent.......................... NOL/Meridian/Birmingham 9:53 (5)
Atlanta/Charlotte/ MWF
Charlottesville
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
51 Cardinal.......................... 11:00 Charlottesville/
SuWF CharlestonWV
Cincinnati/IND/CHI
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 Capitol Ltd....................... Chicago/South Bend/ 13:05 (5)
Toledo SuTuF
Cleveland/Pittsburgh
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
92 Silver Star....................... Miami/Tampa/Orlando/JAX 14:38
Savannah/Columbia/ SuMSa
Raleigh/RVR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
91 Silver Star....................... 15:05 RVR/Raleigh/Columbia/
SuFSa SAV
JAX/Orlando/Tampa/Miami
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29 Capitol Ltd....................... 16:05 (5) Pittsburgh/Cleveland
SuWF Toledo/South Bend/
Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 Cardinal.......................... [CHI]/Indianapolis/ 18:19
Cincinnati SuWFr
CharlestonWV/
Charlottesville
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19 Crescent.......................... 18:30 (5) Charlottesville/
SuTuFr Charlotte/Atlanta
Birmingham/Meridian/NOL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
97 Silver Meteor..................... 19:25 San Bernardino/
MTuWTh Flagstaff
Albuquerque/CO/KS/IA/
Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Same-day connections from eastbound Cardinal to southbound Meteor not sold.
Letter of September 3, 2020, from Randal O'Toole, Senior Fellow, Cato
Institute, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford
September 3, 2020.
Hon. Daniel Lipinski,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. Rick Crawford,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and members of the
subcommittee:
My name is Randal O'Toole and I am a senior fellow with the Cato
Institute and author of Romance of the Rails: Why the Passenger Trains
We Love Are Not the Transportation We Need, as well as of several
policy papers about Amtrak. Thank you for allowing me to submit
comments for the September 9, 2020 hearing on Amtrak.
I love passenger trains and ride them whenever I get the
opportunity, but I don't think other people should have to subsidize my
hobby. Objectively, the COVID-19 pandemic has proven that Amtrak is an
insignificant and obsolete part of our transportation system and does
not deserve the attention and federal funds given to it by Congress.
Even before the pandemic, Amtrak's contribution to transportation was
less than a rounding error.
According to table 1-40 of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics'
National Transportation Statistics, Amtrak carried the average American
less than 20 miles in 2018. For comparison, Americans bicycled an
average of 26 miles per year and walked an average of more than 100
miles per year. Motor coaches carried more than ten times as many
passenger miles as Amtrak; domestic airliners more than 110 times; and
automobiles more than 750 times as many passenger miles as Amtrak.
Nationally, Amtrak carried just one-tenth of one percent of passenger
travel.
Amtrak brags that it carries more people than the airlines in the
Northeast Corridor. But it admits that it carries just 6 percent of
intercity travel in the corridor, with the airlines carrying 5 percent
and the rest going by bus or automobile. While no one keeps an exact
record, based on bus schedules and average bus loads, I estimate that
intercity buses alone carry about 25 percent more passenger miles in
the corridor than Amtrak.
Amtrak's insignificance has been underscored by the current
pandemic. In a crisis such as the pandemic, the relative worth of
various modes of transportation can be assessed by how much they are
affected by the crisis and how quickly they rebound.
By these criteria, Amtrak did not perform well. According to
Amtrak's Monthly Performance Reports, compared with the same months in
2019, Amtrak lost more than 95 percent of its riders in April, 92
percent in May, 85 percent in June, and 81 percent in July. In
contrast, according to the Federal Highway Administration's Traffic
Volume Trends, the year-over-year decline in driving was 40 percent in
April, 26 percent in May, and 13 percent in June. July data are not yet
available but traffic monitor INRIX estimates that July 2020 driving
was slightly more than in July 2019.
People drove because they needed to both cope with the pandemic and
take care of their daily needs. They did not ride Amtrak because
intercity passenger trains did not serve those needs.
Further evidence of Amtrak's failure to meet people's
transportation needs can be seen in the decline of its fare revenues.
For October 2019 through February 2020, Amtrak fares averaged 38 cents
per passenger mile. With the pandemic, this quickly declined, with
fares falling to 26 cents per passenger mile in April and 22 cents in
June.
Amtrak's irrelevance would be unimportant if it were a profit-
making company. There are many fields in which small companies can
profit and thrive despite having only a tiny share of their markets.
But Amtrak is far from profitable, nor will it ever be profitable.
This contradicts Amtrak's claims that its operations lost only
$29.8 million in 2019 and that it was on its way to making an operating
profit in 2020 if the coronavirus hadn't intervened. Amtrak was able to
make these claims only by cooking its books in two different ways.
First, Amtrak counted $235 million in operating subsidies provided
by 18 states as ``passenger revenues.'' State subsidies to passenger
trains are no more passenger revenues than federal subsidies, yet
Amtrak counts only the state subsidies as passenger revenues, not the
federal subsidies.
Second, Amtrak ignored the second largest line item in its budget:
depreciation, which was $870 million in 2019. Depreciation is included
as an operating cost in Amtrak's audited consolidated financial
statement for 2019, but Amtrak left it off when it claimed in press
releases and other public statements that it lost only $29.8 million.
If Amtrak were truly a private company, such omissions would be
considered securities fraud.
Deleting the state subsidies from passenger revenues and adding
depreciation to operating costs increases Amtrak's actual operating
loss to $1.13 billion, which is 38 times as much as Amtrak claimed.
Clearly, with such a large operating loss, Amtrak is never going to be
profitable. Amtrak claims that its trains in the Northeast Corridor are
profitable, and it is only the long-distance trains that lose a lot of
money. It makes this claim without allocating depreciation to
individual routes. Amtrak admits that it has developed an accounting
system that makes such allocations, but it has never published the
results.
Recognizing that most of the infrastructure owned by Amtrak is in
the Northeast Corridor, I made a rough calculation of the profits or
losses per passenger mile for Amtrak's three groups of trains: the
Northeast Corridor, state-supported day trains, and overnight long-
distance trains. I found that they all lost about the same amount of
money per passenger mile. This will disappoint those who think we might
be able to privatize the Northeast Corridor.
Depreciation is more than just an accounting fiction that was
imposed on railroads years ago by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
It represents the amount of money a railroad needs to spend or set
aside to deal with wear-and-tear on its physical plant. Being able to
set aside that money is a signal to investors that the railroad is well
managed.
Railroads that can't cover depreciation with their operating
revenues end up deferring necessary maintenance and capital
replacement. Amtrak is in this situation today. Railroad passenger cars
are fully amortized and should be replaced after about 25 years. Yet,
according to table 1-33 of National Transportation Statistics, the
average age of Amtrak passenger cars in 2015 was 31 years. Amtrak
hasn't replaced many cars since then, so the average age today must be
close to 36 years.
The Northeast Corridor, most of which is owned by Amtrak, suffers
from a huge state-of-good-repair backlog. According to the Northeast
Corridor Master Plan Working Group, the corridor has $52 billion of
capital replacement needs. Not all of that is attributable to Amtrak,
but most of it is needed if Amtrak is to continue to operate. Amtrak's
failure to allocate depreciation to individual routes deceptively
ignores this problem.
Federal subsidies, state capital grants, and state operating
subsidies to Amtrak in 2019 totaled to nearly $2.5 billion. This works
out to 38 cents per passenger mile, the federal share of which is 30
cents. Since ticket revenues averaged just 35 cents per passenger mile,
subsidies cover more than half the cost keeping Amtrak running. In
contrast, subsidies to flying averaged about a penny per passenger mile
in 2017 and subsidies to driving averaged less than a penny per
passenger mile in 2018, the latest years for which data are available.
Instead of debating about which Amtrak routes should receive daily
service, which should be three days a week, and which should not be
served by passenger trains at all, Congress should simply give Amtrak
an incentive to operate and let it decide where it is most effective.
That means promising Amtrak a fixed subsidy per passenger mile. Whether
that subsidy should be a penny, as it is for the airlines and highway,
or the 30 cents that Amtrak receives today is a matter for debate, but
as much as I personally love passenger trains I don't see that the
benefits Amtrak produces justify greater subsidies than other modes of
travel.
Responding intelligently to the pandemic means recognizing that
some modes of travel are more resilient than others in the face of
unexpected events (black swans). Those unexpected events can include
terrorist attacks, natural disasters such as hurricanes or wildfires,
financial crises, or epidemics.
One mode of travel has proven itself to be most resilient in the
face of all of these unexpected events: motor vehicles and highways.
Rather than penalizing automobiles, as some advocate, in favor of modes
that are less resilient, Congress should recognize the advantages of
motor vehicles in a wide range of conditions and end its favoritism
towards other modes. Congress does not need to favor motor vehicles as
they are the mode of choice for 80 percent of our travel even without
such favoritism. Instead, Congress should either ending federal
subsidies to all modes of travel or reduce those subsidies to be at
parity with one another.
Thank you for your consideration.
Yours truly,
Randal O'Toole,
Senior Fellow, Cato Institute.
Appendix
----------
Questions from Hon. Eric A. ''Rick'' Crawford to William Flynn,
President and Chief Executive Officer, National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak)
A. Schedules & On Time Performance (OTP)
Question 1. Is it correct that no segment of a schedule should be
shorter than the minimum achievable run time for the segment?
Answer. Schedules are designed with the following components:
Pure Running Time: The least amount of time that a
passenger train will take to operate between two points over the
train's optimal route, operating at maximum authorized speeds with the
most favorable possible signal aspects on that route.
Recovery Time: Time added to the schedule to help a train
``recover'' to the published schedule in the event that it encounters
delays.
Miscellaneous Adjustment: Additional recovery time in the
schedule, typically for a specific reason, such as a planned meet with
another passenger train.
Dwell Time: Time scheduled at station stops for passenger
detraining and boarding and any required servicing of the train or crew
changes.
The minimum possible scheduled time for a given segment between two
stations will be equivalent to the Pure Running Time of the segment,
however, many segments also include additional Recovery Time and
Miscellaneous Adjustment minutes to absorb delays experienced by the
train.
Question 2. Please provide a table showing the minimum run time for
each Amtrak train. Please include within the table the last time the
minimum run time was validated against the present schedule in
coordination with the host for each Amtrak train.
Answer. Please see the attached exhibit that provides the Pure
Running Time and total scheduled time by train. All train schedules in
operation have been agreed upon with each host railroad over which the
train operates. The Pure Running Time of a segment is periodically
updated at either the host railroad's or Amtrak's request.
Question 3. If operations remain unchanged, but your schedules are
lengthened, could that improve Amtrak's On Time Performance (OTP)?
Answer. Lengthening the schedule inevitably changes the operation;
when a schedule is modified, the host railroad is required to dispatch
the Amtrak train differently in order to meet the new schedule.
Lengthening the schedule allows for additional time to delay the train
and inconveniences our passengers who would otherwise be able to travel
to their destination in less time. And of course, lengthening the
schedule costs Amtrak and its passengers more time, money and
inconvenience.
The premise of this question fails to recognize the historical
reality: when Amtrak has lengthened schedules in the past, on-time
performance has become worse. For example, after the on-time
performance of the Sunset Limited plummeted due to increased freight
train interference in the early 2000s, Amtrak lengthened the train's
schedule by approximately three hours eastbound and more than two hours
westbound in the hope that this would improve OTP. Unfortunately,
performance deteriorated further: OTP fell to just 4% in 2004 and
ridership dropped due to chronic delays and the longer schedules, which
required that key markets such as Mobile and the Mississippi Gulf be
served in the middle of the night. See also the response to Question
C1, which describes the similar deterioration in the on-time
performance of VIA Rail Canada's Canadian after major schedule
lengthening. Schedule lengthening is not an antidote to poor OTP.
Question 4. Amtrak seems to emphasize faster service as more
important than strong OTP. How does Amtrak assess the trade-off between
modestly longer schedules and higher OTP?
Answer. Amtrak's statutory mission requires schedules that are both
trip-time competitive with other modes of travel and operated with a
high degree of reliability. Amtrak has made significant changes to
schedules when justified, but often host railroad claims that schedules
should be lengthened are not supported by data or experience.
While some host railroads assert there is a trade-off between
longer schedules and on-time performance, that is a false choice.
Current schedules already include plenty of ``pad'' to absorb delays
and lengthening schedules provides more opportunity to delay
passengers. Further, what some host railroads deems to be a ``modest''
schedule change has historically included the addition of as many as
several hours to the schedule--drastic and unnecessary schedule changes
when OTP could be improved by simply enforcing the law that ensures
Amtrak trains receive preference on freight railroads.
Amtrak is required by statute to offer ``efficient and effective
intercity passenger rail mobility consisting of high-quality service
that is trip-time competitive with other intercity travel options.''
Statute also requires that Amtrak ``operate Amtrak trains, to the
maximum extent feasible, to all station stops within 15 minutes of the
time established in public timetables'' and ``implement schedules based
on a systemwide average speed of at least 60 miles an hour that can be
achieved with a degree of reliability and passenger comfort.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See 49 U.S. Code Sec. 24101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For many of Amtrak's trains, schedules already reflect an average
speed that is far below 60 miles per hour and offer limited trip-time
competitiveness. Communities and passengers across the country deserve
intercity passenger rail service that meets the standards set forth
under law and schedules must be designed accordingly.
Question 5. A significant problem with measuring Amtrak customer
OTP is that it involves using Amtrak schedules that are badly outdated
and inaccurate. Will you commit to ensuring that these schedules are
accurate and updated, including lengthening as necessary, especially
when used to enforce OTP?
Answer. All schedules in operation have been agreed upon with every
host railroad and state partner associated with each train. Amtrak and
host railroads discuss schedules frequently--every week, in the case of
several host railroads--and schedule modifications are regularly
implemented, including changes for host railroad maintenance
activities. Schedule accuracy is also tested regularly using
statistical analysis and ride study programs. It would not be correct
to say that Amtrak schedules are outdated and inaccurate.
The customer OTP metric accurately reflects the customer
experience, in that it provides the percentage of customers that arrive
at their detraining station on time, which also allows for a grace
period of 15 minutes, in addition to the recovery time ``pad'' included
in the schedule. Amtrak has used the customer OTP metric as our
internal measure of reliability since October 2018 and has engaged host
railroads since then to seek to adjust schedules as needed to ensure
the schedules are aligned with the metric. In addition, Amtrak is not
opposed to lengthening schedules, provided Amtrak trains are receiving
the preference over freight transportation required by law. We are not
willing to inconvenience our customers solely to allow freight
railroads to put freight ahead of people.
Question 6. Do you agree that if a State sponsor prefers to trade
off a shorter or longer schedule for greater OTP for its state-
supported route, and it is willing to bear any additional associated
costs and the host is agreeable, you should honor the State sponsor's
wishes? If you do not agree, please explain why. If you do agree,
please provide an example where this has occurred.
Answer. All schedules for state supported trains are approved by
the respective state partners and designed to meet their transportation
needs. If the state partner would prefer a longer schedule and is aware
of all the cost implications, and the host railroad is providing Amtrak
trains with preference over freight transportation, Amtrak would be
agreeable to implementing such a change. There are many examples of
state supported schedules being modified, including lengthening the
schedule, to accommodate host railroad maintenance of way projects,
such as several Michigan Service trains this summer. However, the more
frequent scenario that we encounter is a host railroad refusing to
agree to implement schedules that state partners propose or support.
Question 7. The data for measuring Amtrak train performance is
collected by Amtrak. To ensure proper monitoring of train performance
and improved OTP, will you commit to sharing with your hosts real-time
station-specific ridership data, historic station-specific ridership
data, and Amtrak's projections of future station-specific ridership
data?
Answer. There is no ``real-time'' station-specific ridership data
available. Amtrak passengers can book reservations and purchase tickets
up to and even after they board an Amtrak train.
Amtrak already provides host railroads with the following:
Direct access to the Amtrak network and its on-time
performance and delay database, which includes:
Real-time and historical delay entries for every train
in the Amtrak network.
Real-time and historical station arrival and departure
times for each train.
Real-time and historical train status reports for any
train.
Reports that provide real-time accounting of updates
and source information for delay entry data and station times.
Reports that provide historical arrival and departure
information for any station by train and by route.
Some host railroads have opted to receive a data feed
throughout the day (nearly real-time) that provides all delays, train
status information, Amtrak crew information, and other data directly to
host railroad systems of their choosing.
Daily customer on-time performance report that includes
the customer on-time performance for each train traveling over the host
railroad for the prior day, month to date, quarter to date, and fiscal
year to date.
Quarterly ridership report that shows the number of
detraining passengers by station for each train for each of the
preceding four quarters.
Daily ridership data by train and station, subject to
execution of a nondisclosure agreement to prevent disclosure of this
commercially sensitive data.
B. Preference and Coding of Delays (FTI/HRD)
Question 1. The freight railroads claim to give Amtrak's trains the
highest traffic priority on their lines. What more do you think freight
railroads should do in order to meet their obligation to provide
preference to Amtrak's trains? Are railroads required to hold freight
traffic even if it is not necessary for the Amtrak train to arrive on
time in accordance with its schedule?
Answer. Freight train interference caused 1 million minutes of
delay to Amtrak trains in FY 2019, which demonstrates that on many host
railroads Amtrak trains are not receiving the preference over freight
transportation required by law, despite any claims by host railroads to
the contrary. On any given day, Amtrak trains are directed into sidings
to allow freight trains to pass. While a freight railroad may claim
this represents their ``highest priority'' this is not acceptable for
Amtrak passengers trying to get to a business meeting or to visit a
relative. Recovery time is included in all schedules to absorb delays
encountered by a train. However, if there is sufficient time in the
current schedule for a freight train to delay an Amtrak train and still
arrive on time, that schedule would be a strong candidate for
shortening the schedule to offer passengers and communities a more
trip-time competitive and effective transportation service.
Question 2. Is it correct that when the Surface Transportation
Board (STB) proposed a policy regarding preference it did not agree
that preference is absolute (i.e., always requiring that Amtrak trains
go first, even where no explicit exception to preference applies) (See
Ex parte 728 (December 28, 2015))?
Answer. This is incorrect insofar as it fails to account for the
fact that the STB later withdrew the proposed Policy Statement.
On December 28, 2015 the STB issued a ``proposed Policy Statement''
(Proposal) in Docket No. EP 728 regarding STB investigations of poor
on-time performance, which it characterized as ``a potential starting
point for parties to consider when developing evidence'' for OTP
investigations, and stressed that the Board was ``not making any
binding determinations.'' The STB sought public comment on the
Proposal, so that interested parties ``may suggest other
interpretations'' of Amtrak's preference rights as it pertained to OTP
investigations. The Proposal was a severe departure from the clear
language of the statute, as well as positions of the DOJ and other
agencies regarding the meaning and effect of Amtrak's right to
preference.
Indeed, on July 28, 2016, the STB withdrew the proposed Policy
Statement, stating that its approach to preference issues would be
``developed and refined in the context of specific'' STB OTP
investigations. Any statements in the Proposal regarding how the Board
would interpret Amtrak's statutory right to preference are therefore
null and of no effect. The Board has not issued any decision or
guidance interpreting the scope of Amtrak's statutory right of
preference since then.
Question 3. Do you know how many minutes the freight railroads
delayed their own trains due to Amtrak? If the railroads are delaying
their own trains much more than they are delaying Amtrak, does that
suggest that they are providing Amtrak with preference?
Answer. While Amtrak has repeatedly sought basic information from
freight host railroads regarding the operating plans and performance
data for their freight trains, analogous to information that Amtrak
provides host railroads for its own trains, nearly all requests are
denied even when there is a non-disclosure agreement in place intended
specifically to cover this type of information.
If any host railroad believes that providing preference to Amtrak
materially lessens the quality of freight transportation provided to
shippers, the law allows the host railroad to apply to the Surface
Transportation Board for relief from the obligation to provide
preference. Not one host railroad has ever sought such relief.
Question 4. Your written testimony stated that it does not make
economic sense for Amtrak to expend capital funding to operate ``nearly
empty trains'' (See Written Testimony at pg. 9). Does that same
principle prove that freight railroads should not be required to park
and hold their trains in the name of absolute preference to allow
Amtrak's ``nearly empty trains'' to proceed without delay?
Answer. The referenced testimony stated that ``[u]sing scarce
capital funding to operate nearly empty trains would not be
productive.'' (Emphasis added.) As the testimony indicated, Amtrak does
not intend to do that. Instead, we have adjusted service frequency on
all our services to reflect greatly reduced passenger demand due to
COVID-19. The trains we are operating on our host railroads continue to
carry a significant number of passengers--and those passengers are no
less important. Every passenger has a right to arrive at their
destination on time.
Question 5. On page 7 of your written testimony you state that long
distance passengers bear the brunt of host ``railroads' inability or
refusal to obey the law'' regarding Amtrak preference. Please elaborate
on what is meant by ``inability.'' Further, please explain how you can
claim a ``preference'' requirement has been violated in a situation
where a host is unable to obey it.
Answer. Amtrak trains sometimes do not receive preference over
freight trains due to the poor training or overwork of dispatchers,
rather than a deliberate decision or practice of giving freight trains
preference over Amtrak trains. Fatigue or insufficient training are not
excuses for violating the laws and regulations governing railroad
operations--or, for that matter, for violating traffic laws. Some
railroads have claimed inability to provide preference but have offered
no evidence of that. If a railroad was truly unable to give Amtrak
trains preference over freight trains without materially lessening the
quality of freight transportation it provides to shippers, the statute
(49 USC 24308(c)) allows the railroad to ask the Surface Transportation
Board (STB) to establish preference rights of freight and Amtrak trains
on reasonable terms. No railroad has ever made such a claim to the STB.
Question 6. Does Amtrak have evidence that host railroads are not
following the law that requires them to give preference to Amtrak? If
so, please provide this evidence and documents to the Subcommittee.
Over the last 30 years, have any of Amtrak's host railroads been found
by a court or agency to have violated its preference obligation?
Answer. Freight train interference is the largest cause of delay to
Amtrak trains traveling on host railroads. The high level of freight
train interference on some host railroads demonstrates that they are
prioritizing freight trains over Amtrak trains, a violation of Amtrak's
legal right to preference.
While other organizations can defend themselves when their rights
are being violated, only the United States Attorney General can enforce
Amtrak's right to preference, which is why Amtrak supports preference
enforcement legislation currently under consideration in Congress.
The Department of Justice found in 1979 that the Southern Pacific
was not providing Amtrak preference, despite the Southern Pacific's
claims to the contrary, and brought an enforcement action that resulted
in a consent decree. We believe a similar conclusion would be reached
if there were a court or agency proceeding today to determine whether
some host railroads are giving preference to Amtrak trains.
Question 7. Your written testimony states that ``the leading cause
of delays to [y]our long distance network is the failure of some of
[y]our host railroads to comply with th[e] longstanding legal
obligation to provide Amtrak trains with preference over their
tracks.'' (Written Testimony at pg. 7). However, data reviewed shows
that Freight Train Interference (FTI) is not the greatest cause of
Amtrak train delay.
Answer. The evidence clearly supports the statement that the
leading cause of delays to our long distance network is the failure of
some of our host railroads to comply with their longstanding legal
obligation to provide Amtrak trains with preference over their tracks,
as shown in the table below.
CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Delay Type for Long Distance Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage
Responsible Party Delay Code Delay Description Delay Minutes of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad....................... FTI................... Freight Train 657,910 27%
Interference.
Host Railroad....................... DSR................... Slow Orders........... 341,760 14%
Host Railroad....................... PTI................... Passenger Train 212,517 9%
Interference.
Amtrak.............................. SYS................... Crew and System....... 193,852 8%
Host Railroad....................... DCS................... Signals............... 166,203 7%
Amtrak.............................. HLD................... Hold for Passengers or 121,448 5%
Baggage.
Amtrak.............................. SVS................... Servicing............. 100,991 4%
Host Railroad....................... RTE................... Routing............... 99,330 4%
Third Party......................... WTR................... Weather............... 79,484 3%
Amtrak.............................. ENG................... Engine................ 74,037 3%
Amtrak.............................. OTH................... Other................. 60,055 2%
Amtrak.............................. ADA................... Hold for Passenger 58,630 2%
Mobility.
Host Railroad....................... CTI................... Commuter Train 51,662 2%
Interference.
Host Railroad....................... DMW................... Maintenance of Way.... 46,105 2%
Amtrak.............................. CON................... Connection Hold....... 34,373 1%
Third Party......................... TRS................... Trespasser............ 34,236 1%
Third Party......................... POL................... Police Hold........... 33,401 1%
Amtrak.............................. ITI................... Late Inbound Train.... 26,966 1%
Amtrak.............................. CAR................... Car Mechanical Issue.. 17,950 1%
Host Railroad....................... DTR................... Detour................ 14,174 1%
Third Party......................... DBS................... Debris................ 10,811 0%
Amtrak.............................. INJ................... Injury................ 9,535 0%
Third Party......................... MBO................... Movable Bridge Opening 5,500 0%
Third Party......................... CUI................... Customs............... 375 0%
Amtrak.............................. CCR................... Cab Car Mechanical 274 0%
Issue.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 7a) First, the ``Reports & Documents'' page on
Amtrak's website (last accessed Sept. 23, 2020) shows delays
attributed to host railroads, but no reports comparing that to
all sources of delay, or even showing all delays attributed to
Amtrak or third parties.
Answer. Amtrak delays, including the top two delay categories, are
reported for every train and route in the Federal Railroad
Administration's Quarterly Report on the Performance and Service
Quality of Intercity Passenger Train Operations, published every
quarter since September 2010, as Congress directed, and publicly
accessible on the Federal Railroad Administration website [https://
railroads.dot.gov/passenger-rail/amtrak/rail-service-metrics-and-
performance-reports].
The ``Host Railroad Report'' posted to the Amtrak website [https://
www.amtrak.com/reports-documents], as the name suggests, is designed to
provide performance information related to host railroads. The report
also provides the total Amtrak and Third-Party delays for trains
operating over the six major host railroads, as shown in the excerpt
below.
Question 7a.i.). Please direct the Subcommittee to
public reports that have that information you relied
upon. If Amtrak publishes data for ``host responsible''
delays but fails to publish equivalent data for Amtrak
responsible delays, that creates a false and misleading
picture that hides Amtrak's responsibility for causing
delays and unfairly suggests that hosts are responsible
for Amtrak's own poor performance. Accordingly, if
Amtrak is not publishing equivalent data on delays
attributable to Amtrak, will you commit to publishing
complete delay information in the future?
Answer. Amtrak delays, including the top two delay categories, are
reported for every train and route in the Federal Railroad
Administration's Quarterly Report on the Performance and Service
Quality of Intercity Passenger Train Operations, published every
quarter since September 2010, as Congress directed, and publicly
accessible on the Federal Railroad Administration website [https://
railroads.dot.gov/passenger-rail/amtrak/rail-service-metrics-and-
performance-reports].
The ``Host Railroad Report'' posted to the Amtrak website [https://
www.amtrak.com/reports-documents], as the name suggests, is designed to
provide performance information related to host railroads. The report
also provides the total Amtrak and Third-Party delays for trains
operating over the six major host railroads.
Question 7a.ii.). There are concerns about the accuracy
of what Amtrak codes as ``Host Responsible Delays.''
For example, Amtrak includes Passenger Train
Interference (PTI) within Host Responsible Delays,
which includes delays caused by interference with
Amtrak's own trains, even if delays due to such
conflicts are unavoidable by the host. Is that correct?
If so, would Amtrak also be responsible for some of
these host delays, as PTI is a greater source of delay
for State-sponsored services than FTI?
Answer. Host railroads make all dispatching decisions regarding
which trains are allowed to go first and which trains must wait on
their rail lines. When two Amtrak trains are operating on a host
railroad and must meet or pass each other, the host railroad is in
complete control of each train's movement, which means they control the
amount of any delay experienced by the Amtrak trains. Amtrak schedules
contain recovery time so Amtrak trains operating on-time can meet one
another without impact to on-time performance. When an Amtrak train is
delayed by a freight railroad causing a train to operate off-schedule,
it frequently results in additional delay to both Amtrak trains.
The duration of a passenger train interference delay can vary
substantially from one host to another depending on the efficiency of
the host railroad's operation, dispatching effectiveness, and the
amount and quality of rail infrastructure that a host has chosen to
provide. Schedules agreed upon with each host railroad are designed to
specifically account for any scheduled meets between Amtrak trains.
The largest cause of delay to state supported trains is freight
train interference, not passenger train interference, as shown in the
table below.
CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Delay Type for State Supported Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage
Responsible Party Delay Code Delay Description Delay Minutes of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad....................... FTI................... Freight Train 339,410 15%
Interference.
Host Railroad....................... PTI................... Passenger Train 311,491 14%
Interference.
Host Railroad....................... DSR................... Slow Orders........... 290,221 13%
Host Railroad....................... DCS................... Signals............... 189,393 9%
Host Railroad....................... CTI................... Commuter Train 174,986 8%
Interference.
Amtrak.............................. SYS................... Crew and System....... 154,472 7%
Host Railroad....................... RTE................... Routing............... 112,646 5%
Amtrak.............................. HLD................... Hold for Passengers or 88,202 4%
Baggage.
Amtrak.............................. OTH................... Other................. 81,424 4%
Amtrak.............................. ADA................... Hold for Passenger 71,236 3%
Mobility.
Host Railroad....................... DMW................... Maintenance of Way.... 64,561 3%
Amtrak.............................. ENG................... Engine................ 61,401 3%
Third Party......................... WTR................... Weather............... 44,626 2%
Amtrak.............................. ITI................... Late Inbound Train.... 42,576 2%
Third Party......................... POL................... Police Hold........... 41,732 2%
Third Party......................... TRS................... Trespasser............ 37,737 2%
Amtrak.............................. SVS................... Servicing............. 31,214 1%
Amtrak.............................. CAR................... Car Mechanical Issue.. 15,725 1%
Third Party......................... MBO................... Movable Bridge Opening 13,791 1%
Amtrak.............................. CCR................... Cab Car Mechanical 9,141 0%
Issue.
Amtrak.............................. CON................... Connection Hold....... 7,925 0%
Third Party......................... CUI................... Customs............... 7,662 0%
Third Party......................... DBS................... Debris................ 7,396 0%
Host Railroad....................... DTR................... Detour................ 7,227 0%
Amtrak.............................. INJ................... Injury................ 2,910 0%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7b) Data fails to support your claim that host carrier freight
train interference is the greatest source of Amtrak delays to
long distance trains. Please review and confirm in writing for
the subcommittee the following facts, which are based on
Amtrak's calendar year 2019 data:
Question 7b.i.). The delays your conductors attribute
to Amtrak-caused delays accounted for 30% of the total
delays to long distance trains, whereas delays
attributed to FTI accounted for only 26% of total
delays;
Answer. This statistic highlights the severe impact that freight
train interference has on Amtrak trains: a single delay category,
freight train interference, is responsible for nearly as many delay
minutes as all 11 categories of Amtrak delays combined. The delay data
for CY 2019 are provided below.
CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Responsible Party for Long Distance Services
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage
Responsible Party Delay Minutes of Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad............................... 1,589,661 63%
Amtrak...................................... 698,111 30%
Third Party................................. 163,807 7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Delay Type for Long Distance Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage
Responsible Party Delay Code Delay Description Delay Minutes of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad....................... FTI................... Freight Train 657,910 27%
Interference.
Host Railroad....................... DSR................... Slow Orders........... 341,760 14%
Host Railroad....................... PTI................... Passenger Train 212,517 9%
Interference.
Amtrak.............................. SYS................... Crew and System....... 193,852 8%
Host Railroad....................... DCS................... Signals............... 166,203 7%
Amtrak.............................. HLD................... Hold for Passengers or 121,448 5%
Baggage.
Amtrak.............................. SVS................... Servicing............. 100,991 4%
Host Railroad....................... RTE................... Routing............... 99,330 4%
Third Party......................... WTR................... Weather............... 79,484 3%
Amtrak.............................. ENG................... Engine................ 74,037 3%
Amtrak.............................. OTH................... Other................. 60,055 2%
Amtrak.............................. ADA................... Hold for Passenger 58,630 2%
Mobility.
Host Railroad....................... CTI................... Commuter Train 51,662 2%
Interference.
Host Railroad....................... DMW................... Maintenance of Way.... 46,105 2%
Amtrak.............................. CON................... Connection Hold....... 34,373 1%
Third Party......................... TRS................... Trespasser............ 34,236 1%
Third Party......................... POL................... Police Hold........... 33,401 1%
Amtrak.............................. ITI................... Late Inbound Train.... 26,966 1%
Amtrak.............................. CAR................... Car Mechanical Issue.. 17,950 1%
Host Railroad....................... DTR................... Detour................ 14,174 1%
Third Party......................... DBS................... Debris................ 10,811 0%
Amtrak.............................. INJ................... Injury................ 9,535 0%
Third Party......................... MBO................... Movable Bridge Opening 5,500 0%
Third Party......................... CUI................... Customs............... 375 0%
Amtrak.............................. CCR................... Cab Car Mechanical 274 0%
Issue.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 7b.ii.). Delays attributable to Amtrak
exceeded FTI delays by over 110,000 minutes; and
Answer. This question compares a group of 11 delays to a single
delay category. Host railroads caused more than 1.6 million minutes of
delay to long distance trains, equivalent to 3 years of delay, and
freight train interference delays alone accounted for 657,910 minutes
of delay.
Question 7b.iii.). Nine of the 15 long distance
services had more minutes of Amtrak delay than FTI
delay, and FTI delay was not the major cause of total
delay for any Amtrak long distance service.
Answer. This statement is incorrect. Freight train interference
delays were the largest cause of delay for 14 of the 15 long distance
services, and slow orders were the largest cause of delay for one long
distance service, as shown in the table below.
CY 2019 Leading Cause of Delay for Long Distance Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service Largest Cause of Delay Responsible Party Delay Minutes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Auto Train.............................. Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 30,953
California Zephyr....................... Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 63,154
Capitol Limited......................... Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 61,050
Cardinal................................ Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 9,056
City of New Orleans..................... Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 27,732
Coast Starlight......................... Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 37,068
Crescent................................ Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 59,694
Empire Builder.......................... Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 82,087
Lake Shore Limited...................... Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 49,129
Palmetto................................ Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 13,367
Silver Meteor........................... Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 21,929
Silver Star............................. Slow Orders............... Host Railroad............. 22,855
Southwest Chief......................... Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 49,947
Sunset Limited.......................... Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 63,390
Texas Eagle............................. Freight Train Interference Host Railroad............. 70,086
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 8. Is it correct that the difference between Amtrak caused
delays and FTI is even greater for state-supported routes? Please
review and confirm in writing for the subcommittee the following facts,
which are based on Amtrak's calendar year 2019 data for state-supported
routes:
Question 8a) FTI delay accounted for just 15% of total delays,
and FTI delays were less in number than delays caused by meets
with Amtrak's own passenger trains (i.e., PTI);
Answer. Freight train interference delays were the largest cause of
delay to state supported trains in CY 2019, amounting to nearly 340,000
minutes, equivalent to 236 days of delay caused by freight trains
alone, as shown in the table below.
CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Delay Type for State Supported Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage
Responsible Party Delay Code Delay Description Delay Minutes of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad....................... FTI................... Freight Train 339,410 15%
Interference.
Host Railroad....................... PTI................... Passenger Train 311,491 14%
Interference.
Host Railroad....................... DSR................... Slow Orders........... 290,221 13%
Host Railroad....................... DCS................... Signals............... 189,393 9%
Host Railroad....................... CTI................... Commuter Train 174,986 8%
Interference.
Amtrak.............................. SYS................... Crew and System....... 154,472 7%
Host Railroad....................... RTE................... Routing............... 112,646 5%
Amtrak.............................. HLD................... Hold for Passengers or 88,202 4%
Baggage.
Amtrak.............................. OTH................... Other................. 81,424 4%
Amtrak.............................. ADA................... Hold for Passenger 71,236 3%
Mobility.
Host Railroad....................... DMW................... Maintenance of Way.... 64,561 3%
Amtrak.............................. ENG................... Engine................ 61,401 3%
Third Party......................... WTR................... Weather............... 44,626 2%
Amtrak.............................. ITI................... Late Inbound Train.... 42,576 2%
Third Party......................... POL................... Police Hold........... 41,732 2%
Third Party......................... TRS................... Trespasser............ 37,737 2%
Amtrak.............................. SVS................... Servicing............. 31,214 1%
Amtrak.............................. CAR................... Car Mechanical Issue.. 15,725 1%
Third Party......................... MBO................... Movable Bridge Opening 13,791 1%
Amtrak.............................. CCR................... Cab Car Mechanical 9,141 0%
Issue.
Amtrak.............................. CON................... Connection Hold....... 7,925 0%
Third Party......................... CUI................... Customs............... 7,662 0%
Third Party......................... DBS................... Debris................ 7,396 0%
Host Railroad....................... DTR................... Detour................ 7,227 0%
Amtrak.............................. INJ................... Injury................ 2,910 0%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 8b). Amtrak delays accounted for 28% of total delays;
and
Answer. Host railroads were responsible for 67% of delays and
Amtrak was responsible for 26% of delays, as shown in the table below.
CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Responsible Party for State Supported Services
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage
Responsible Party Delay Minutes of Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad............................... 1,489,935 67%
Amtrak...................................... 566,226 26%
Third Party................................. 152,944 7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 8c). Delays attributed to Amtrak exceeded FTI delays
by more than 275,000 minutes.
Answer. This statement compares a category of 11 delays to a single
delay type. The correct comparison is between Amtrak and host railroad
delays: host railroad delays to state supported trains exceeded Amtrak
delays by more than 900,000 minutes. Freight train interference was the
largest type of delay to state supported trains, amounting to nearly
340,000 minutes of delay in 2019.
Question 9. How can Amtrak prove that there is a level of
preference violations when Amtrak does not record a category of delays
due to alleged preference violations? Does Amtrak categorize delays as
FTI only when Amtrak views the delay as due to a preference violation?
Should the FTI delay category be broader than that? Is your delay
category of Host Responsible Delays not also broader than FTI? Please
delineate and explain each item or criteria utilized in the delay
category and Amtrak's justification for its usage.
Answer. Freight train interference delays are delays to Amtrak
trains caused by freight trains. These delays represent clear evidence
of violations of Amtrak's rights to preference as required by law.
There are eight types of host-responsible delays--information
publicly available in the monthly Host Railroad Report posted to the
Amtrak website \2\--as summarized in the table below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.amtrak.com/reports-documents
Types of Host-Responsible Delays
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host-Responsible Delay Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commuter Train Interference............... Delays from meeting or
following commuter rail
trains.
Detour.................................... Delays from detours.
Freight Train Interference................ Delays from freight trains.
Maintenance of Way........................ Delays from host railroad
maintenance of way
activities.
Passenger Train Interference.............. Delays from meeting or
following other intercity
passenger rail trains.
Routing................................... Dispatching delays.
Slow Order................................ Delays from slow orders,
except for heat or cold
orders which are coded as
third-party weather delays.
Signals................................... Signal-related delays.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For each delay, the following details are reported to the extent
known, based on direct observations, train bulletins, radio traffic,
and information relayed by the engineer, dispatcher, maintenance of way
staff, signal maintainers, other train crews, and others:
Location names or mileposts.
Train symbol or number and/or locomotive number (with
railroad initials) for other trains causing delay.
Mileposts or other locations, speeds, and track number
for slow-order delays.
Names and aspects for signal delays.
Engine or car number (with initials for non-Amtrak
equipment) for mechanical delays.
Locations for diversion delays, and track numbers routed
from/to.
Additional comments and information regarding the
circumstances of the delay.
Question 10. We are troubled by the appearance that Amtrak's delay
data includes supposed delays to its trains even when the delay is
planned for as part of its schedule, or when a train makes up lost
time, or even when the delayed train is not actually late. Does your
delay data include these items? If Amtrak categorizes trains as delayed
without regard to their actual schedule and whether they are on time,
will you clarify these different delays in the data that present to the
public?
Answer. Delays in a given segment of a route are recorded against
the Pure Running Time for that segment, as a ``delay'' represents an
impediment to the movement of the train. Amtrak's detailed approach to
delay recordation provides actionable information, allowing both Amtrak
and the host railroads to take corrective action to reduce delays,
improving the on-time performance of Amtrak trains. Customer OTP, on
the other hand, reflects the performance of the train based on the
public schedule and provides a clear picture of the customer
experience.
C. Proposed Private Right of Action
Question 1. You stated that Amtrak needs the ability to enforce its
right of preference over freight trains, but there are non-Amtrak
passenger rail services throughout the country that run on time without
any right of preference. Why do you think that Amtrak needs the ability
to enforce its right of preference over freight when other non-Amtrak
passenger rail services run on time without such a preference?
Answer. Preference of passenger trains over freight trains is
essential to providing on-time passenger rail service. The question
provides no evidence to the contrary.
The experience of VIA Rail Canada, Canada's intercity passenger
rail operator, demonstrates the dire consequences to passenger rail in
the absence of a right to preference over freight transportation. As
noted in a 2016 Special Examination Report of VIA Rail by Canada's
auditor general, ``in Canada, passenger trains do not have the right of
way. Therefore, VIA's trains are frequently required to yield to
freight traffic, which sometimes results in significant delays.'' \3\
These delays due to lack of preference have decimated the performance
of VIA's principal long distance train, the Toronto-Vancouver Canadian.
In 2009, VIA added an extra night to the Canadian's schedule with the
expectation that this would improve its poor on-time performance.
Instead, on-time performance plummeted to just 8% in 2018 and some
trains operated as much as 43 hours late, ``impeding VIA Rail from
effectively providing a viable travel service'' according to VIA's
2019-2023 Corporate Plan.\4\ In that year, VIA added an additional 12
hours to the Canadian's schedule, but on-time performance continued to
deteriorate according to VIA's Second Quarter 2019 Report.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.viarail.ca/sites/all/files/media/pdfs/About_VIA/
VIA%20SPECIAL
%20EXAMINATION%20REPORT%20FINAL.pdf
\4\ https://www.viarail.ca/sites/all/files/media/pdfs/About_VIA/
our-company/corporate-plan/
Corporate_Plan2019.pdf, pg. 9.
\5\ https://media.viarail.ca/sites/default/files/publications/
VIA_Q2_2019_EN_1.pdf, p. 37
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak's own experience also validates the vital need for real
preference enforcement. Around the time of the enactment of the
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, which included
the metrics and standards provisions regarding on-time performance, the
average on-time performance of long distance trains increased 45 points
to 75%. However, after the Association of American Railroads initiated
litigation regarding the metrics and standards provision, the average
on-time performance of long distance trains fell 22 percentage points
within a year. The data confirms that freight host railroads limit the
freight train interference delays to Amtrak passengers when there are
real consequences for violating Amtrak's right to preference.
Question 2. Regarding enforcement of preference, does the Passenger
Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 allow Amtrak to enforce its
rights regarding underperforming services at the STB? Is that right
insufficient to keep Amtrak trains on time because the STB does not
share Amtrak's view regarding the requirements of preference?
Answer. The reason that Section 24308(f) of the Passenger Rail
Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) is not a sufficient tool for
enforcing the federal law giving Amtrak trains a right of preference
are the actions of the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and
certain freight railroads to block the applicability of that statute at
every possible turn. Moreover, whatever views the current members of
the STB may have regarding the requirements of preference has nothing
to do with why the existing provisions of the PRIIA are insufficient to
keep Amtrak trains on time.
Section 24308(f) of PRIIA allows Amtrak to begin a proceeding to
have the STB investigate poor OTP, but only if OTP falls below certain
triggers. The statute contains two triggers, and the AAR and certain of
the freight railroads banded together shortly after PRIIA was passed to
bring litigation to invalidate both of those triggers.
The first trigger for an action under Section 24308(f) is that the
host railroad fail to meet certain metrics and standards developed by
FRA and Amtrak pursuant to PRIIA Section 207. FRA and Amtrak did
develop those metrics and standards, after notice and comment, but AAR
and certain freights sued the Department of Transportation, claiming
that Section 207 and the metrics and standards developed under them
were unconstitutional. The case went up to the Supreme Court and back
down to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, where--after ten years of
litigation--it was finally held that the statute was generally
constitutional but that the metrics and standards would need to be
developed again. FRA and Amtrak have begun that process, but it is not
certain that AAR and the freights will not attempt to invalidate them
again in order to keep Amtrak from enforcing its rights to preference
at the STB.
The second trigger for an STB action under Section 24308(f) is that
an Amtrak train fall below a certain percentage OTP. At the AAR's
request, the STB, through notice and comment rulemaking, determined how
OTP would be measured for purposes of that provision. The AAR and
certain freight railroads promptly challenged the STB's rule in the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the rule was invalidated.
The result of the litigation brought by the AAR and freight
railroads is that the two existing cases Amtrak had brought under PRIIA
were dismissed by the STB. Any STB proceeding Amtrak brought after
issuance of new metrics and standards could once again be nullified by
future judicial challenges.
Question 3. Is it the case that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is
empowered to enforce the freight railroad's preference obligation? How
many preference enforcement actions has Amtrak asked the DOJ to bring
over the past 30 years? How many actions has the DOJ refused to bring?
Please provide the details of any cases or refusals to bring cases.
Answer. Under 49 USC Sec. 24103(a)(1), only the Attorney General
of the United States (DOJ) may bring a civil action when a freight
railroad refuses, fails, or neglects to discharge its duties and
responsibilities under certain provisions of the law, including
Amtrak's right to preference under 49 USC Sec. 24308(c). However, the
Attorney General is only empowered to seek equitable relief, rather
than monetary relief such as damages caused by the unlawful behavior.
In the 47 years since the preference law was enacted, the DOJ has
only commenced one case to enforce Amtrak's preference rights. That was
in 1979, in a case against what was then the Southern Pacific (since
merged into Union Pacific). In that case, the District Court for the
District of Columbia entered a Consent Order under which Southern
Pacific was ordered to ``accord to the operations of the Sunset Limited
between New Orleans and Houston a preference over freight trains in the
use of Southern Pacific's rail lines in accordance with'' the
preference law, as well as other requirements to support that order.
Since then, Amtrak has attempted to convince the DOJ to enforce
federal preference law when appropriate, but without success. Because
DOJ does not represent Amtrak but only other federal agencies, it has
no obligation to enforce Amtrak's preference rights or to prioritize
preference enforcement over enforcement of other federal laws. Amtrak
does not have a record of every conversation or meeting with
representatives of the DOJ or the DOT over the past 30 years regarding
preference and so cannot answer with certainty your question about
every instance where Amtrak asked the DOT or DOJ to enforce Amtrak's
preference rights.
Question 4. Without evidence that violations of preference are a
significant problem for Amtrak, is it worth the potential lost time,
expense, and harm to relationships that would be caused by Amtrak
threatening or litigating preference claims against the very hosts it
needs to work with to provide quality service? Should the right of
preference be limited to instances where FTI represents the majority of
all delays to a service? Should it at least at least be limited to
instances where FTI exceeds all other sources of delay that cannot be
reasonably controlled by the host?
Answer. Freight train interference--violations of Amtrak's right to
preference--caused 1 million minutes of delay to Amtrak trains in FY
2019. That is equivalent to nearly two years of delays to passengers.
It is the leading reason why the on-time performance of long distance
services was only 42% last year, with a third of long distance routes
less than 30% on time. This disregard of the law is a fundamental
challenge to Amtrak's ability to provide reliable service and meet our
mission set forth by Congress in statute.
Amtrak has repeatedly sought to work with host railroads to jointly
reduce delays, which has led to important successes and reliable
service for some routes. However, long-term and consistently reliable
performance cannot be achieved systemwide without the real possibility
of preference enforcement.
Amtrak would prefer not to litigate preference claims, but history
has proven that the only times when Amtrak is provided with reliable
service across the system is when a real threat of preference
enforcement has existed. Around the time of the enactment of the
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA), which
included the metrics and standards provisions regarding on-time
performance, the average on-time performance of long distance trains
increased 45 percentage points to 75%. After the Association of
American Railroads initiated litigation regarding the metrics and
standards provision of PRIIA, the average on-time performance of long
distance trains fell 22 percentage points within a year.
Amtrak's right to preference protects our customers, our mission,
and is an essential element in providing reliable service. Passengers
will experience more reliable service when more host railroads comply
with the law.
Federal law provides that the right of preference is not limited to
the instances that the question suggests it should be limited to, and
for good reason. It should be noted that the law provides an
opportunity for host railroads to demonstrate that providing preference
would materially lessen the quality of freight transportation provided
to shippers and seek relief from the law, but no freight railroad has
every sought such relief. It is therefore appropriate to assume that
relief has never been required. Excusing repeated host railroad
violations of preference that did not exceed some arbitrary threshold
would be no different than allowing drivers who repeatedly run red
lights to avoid paying fines until they receive a large number of
tickets.
Question 5. You verbally suggested that increased OTP during this
period of reduced train operations supports the need for a private
right of action for Amtrak to enforce preference. But data shows that
most of the improvement in OTP during this period has been the result
of reductions in Amtrak delays rather than freight delays. For long
distance trains, for example, during April 1, 2020, through August 30,
2020, a period of reduced freight and passenger operations, the average
FTI delay per train decreased by 14 minutes from 2019, whereas the
average delay per train caused by Amtrak decreased by 34 minutes. Does
this suggest that Amtrak could achieve its OTP goals by reducing its
own delays or adding time to the schedule to account for delays it
cannot eliminate and delays the Host cannot control?
Answer. No. In fact, the question lays bare the unfortunate
reality: while Amtrak continues to make great strides in reducing its
own delays, many freight host railroads continue to prioritize freight
over passengers, failing to comply with their legal obligations to
provide Amtrak trains with preference. Freight train interference
delays are entirely within the control of host railroads and represent
the largest cause of delay to Amtrak trains. In the period referenced
by the question (April 1, 2020 to August 30, 2020), there were 35% more
freight train interference delays to long distance trains than all
Amtrak delays combined. Moreover, freight train interference is just
one type of host railroad delay. Considering all host railroad-
responsible delays to Amtrak trains, there were 234% more delay minutes
caused by host railroads than all delays caused by Amtrak.
The greatest single opportunity for improving the on-time
performance of Amtrak trains is to reduce freight train interference
delays. In CY 2019, there were nearly 11,000 hours of delay to Amtrak
long distance train passengers from freight train interference alone,
equivalent to more than one year of passengers waiting for freight to
operate first. The fact that some freight host railroads have elected
not to reduce delays merely proves there is much more for host
railroads to do to comply with the law. America's rail passengers
deserve nothing less.
D. Private Sector Contracting
Question 1. One idea for helping Amtrak become more efficient and
profitable is contracting out services to the private sector. How can
Amtrak partner with the private sector on passenger rail operations and
services on a broader scale?
Answer. Amtrak already contracts out many services that other
entities can better provide at a lower cost. Examples including
commissary operations for on-board food services and servicing of
Amtrak equipment at remote terminals. We also have many contractual
arrangements and partnerships with private sector entities in areas
such as station development and provision of bus services that connect
with our trains. We are open to other opportunities for contracting and
partnering with private entities that will improve financial
performance and service quality and are not inconsistent with legal
requirements or collective bargaining agreements.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that contracting out
services does not necessarily reduce costs, and can lead to
degradation, loss of control over, or impairment of services. When
Amtrak began operation in 1971, it contracted with private railroads to
perform virtually all aspects of its operations and services, which
resulted in high costs and poor service quality. Recognizing this,
Congress amended the Rail Passenger Service Act in 1973 to direct
Amtrak to ``operate and control directly, to the extent practicable,
all aspects of the rail passenger transportation it provides'' (49
U.S.C. 24305(a)(2)). Amtrak's assumption of direct operation and
control of most aspects of its services significantly reduced costs and
improved service quality. More recent experience of Amtrak and other
passenger railroads with privatization of services, discussed in detail
in a white paper entitled ``Should Amtrak Services and Infrastructure
be `Privatized'?'' on Amtrak's Stakeholder FAQs website
(``Privatization White Paper''),\6\ demonstrates that privatization is
not a magic panacea that would make Amtrak profitable, but rather can
increase costs, diminish operational performance and customer service,
and jeopardize safety and continued operation of services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/
public/documents/
corporate/position-papers/white-paper-amtrak-privatization.pdf
Question 2. You testified that certain National Network routes for
competitive bid would create more complexity. Please explain what you
meant and include any evidence that supports this claim.
Answer. Competitive bidding for National Network routes--which the
Federal Railroad Administration and a Midwestern state unsuccessfully
attempted in recent years, as discussed in the Privatization White
Paper \7\--would create additional complexity, and increase
administrative and oversight costs, because Amtrak would no longer
control aspects of the services it provides to passengers that were
privatized; terms under which Amtrak would continue to provide other
aspects of those services would have to be negotiated or determined
through adjudicatory proceedings; and the provision of services by both
Amtrak and other entities would create inefficiencies, customer
confusion, and disputes over responsibility for ensuring safe
operations and addressing service deficiencies that do not exist when
all aspects of a service are provided or controlled by a single
operator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid.
Question 3. Please answer each the following questions in detail:
Question 3a) Do you agree that opening routes up for
competitive bid could drive down costs? If not, please explain
why, including evidence supporting this denial.
Answer. As discussed in detail in the Privatization White Paper,\8\
the costs to taxpayers in Great Britain increased greatly after rail
services were privatized; in September, British rail regulators
announced that the government would reassume control over rail services
and end franchising of routes to private operators. The Midwestern
state that partially privatized an Amtrak state supported route
terminated that arrangement after just 17 months when the private
operator sought large increases in the state's payments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Ibid.
Question 3b) Do you agree that opening routes up for
competitive bid could improve service? If not, please explain
why, including evidence supporting this denial.
Answer. Privatization of Great Britain's rail services resulted in
degradation of service quality, including severe overcrowding and poor
on-time performance. (See Jones, Owen, ``Why Britain's Trains Don't Run
on Time: Capitalism,'' New York Times, April 4, 2017.) \9\ As discussed
in the Privatization White Paper,\10\ during the first year of partial
privatization of a Midwestern Amtrak state-supported route, mechanical
delays, which were attributable to problems with the contractor's
equipment, increased 35%.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/opinion/why-britains-trains-
dont-run-on-time-
capitalism.html
\10\ https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/
public/documents/
corporate/position-papers/white-paper-amtrak-privatization.pdf
Question 3c) Do you agree that opening routes up for
competitive bid would likely create jobs in communities along
Amtrak routes? If not, please explain why, including evidence
supporting this denial.
Answer. No. The creation of jobs in on-line communities due to the
operation of passenger rail service is heavily dependent on increasing
the number of passengers carried, since this translates into more
commercial activity and more spending by visitors on hotels,
restaurants, entertainment, etc. As indicated in the Privatization
White Paper, ridership declined by more than 10% following partial
privatization of a Midwestern Amtrak service.
Unsuccessful privatization efforts have led to discontinuance of
passenger rail services, which eliminates both railroad jobs and other
jobs in on-line communities that are dependent upon passenger rail
service. A Canadian intercity passenger rail service was suspended in
2015 when the newly-selected private operator was unable to fulfill its
contractual obligations, and subsequent efforts to find a suitable
private operator were unsuccessful. The service has never resumed. See
Kelly, Lindsay, ``Rail supporters reboot search for third-party
operator,'' Northern Ontario Business, March 4, 2016.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ https://www.northernontariobusiness.com/regional-news/sault-
ste-marie/rail-supporters-
reboot-search-for-third-party-operator-371850
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Buy America Waiver
Question 1. On August 13, 2020, you responded to Ranking Member
Crawford's letter regarding the Buy America waiver Amtrak sought to
purchase foreign equipment. None of Amtrak's responses directly
answered the questions posed by Ranking Member Crawford. Accordingly,
please respond directly to each of the following questions without
restating the responses Amtrak provided in the August 13, 2020, letter.
Question 1a) Please list all items/equipment for which the Buy
America waiver was sought.
Answer. Between March 2018 and May 2019, Amtrak issued three
requests for proposal (RFP):
One railbound tunnel crane
One track laying machine
Eight two-man rail car movers with heavy cranes,
railgear, and rail car couplers (and related equipment)
In the case of the tunnel crane and the track-laying machine, the
request was sent to multiple potential offerors; in the case of the
rail car movers, the request was sent to a single bidder based on a
previous RFP. In two of three cases, the request was also posted
publicly on Amtrak's website.
Question 1b) Please list the cost of all items purchased or
sought to be purchased with the Buy America waiver.
Answer. This procurement process continues to be ongoing. As Amtrak
negotiates the contracts, some elements of the contract have remained
at play. Pricing, as is common to any business negotiation, is a
critical part of a contract negotiation. We are happy to report that
over the past several weeks, Amtrak and vendors have finalized two of
the three negotiations and contracts have been issued:
Railbound Tunnel Crane--$12,979,205.00
Two-man Rail Car Movers--$7,464,000.00
The third and final contract for the Track Laying Machine remains
under negotiation, but we are happy to follow up with your staff with
that information once that contract has been issued. We expect to
complete that TLM negotiation in the coming months. In the meantime, my
team can be available to discuss this with you or your staff if you
have any additional questions.
Question 1c) Please list the country or countries where the
equipment was sought from or purchased.
Answer. Equipment was purchased or will be purchased as follows:
Railbound Tunnel Crane--Switzerland
Two-man Rail Car Movers--Canada
Track Laying Machine--Germany
Question 1d) Please state whether the equipment was, or will
be, purchased using funding provided through the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. If so, how much
of the CARES Act money is or will be spent on the equipment?
Answer. Amtrak closely tracks how CARES Act funds are used,
consistent with the terms of the legislation and our agreements with
the FRA. No CARES-provided funding has been or will be used to acquire
the equipment that was part of this procurement. At all stages, the
waiver process has been independent of the pandemic, and of Congress's
financial response to the pandemic.
This is a snapshot of the waiver request timeline and process:
Amtrak first sought an Amtrak Buy American waiver weeks
before the first confirmed COVID-19 case, months before the first U.S.
case.
This process began approximately six months before
enactment of the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136).
The FRA's public notice of Amtrak's request preceded the
execution of CARES Act grant agreements.
I want to reiterate my earlier message that this waiver request, a
process that began over two years ago now, is a step Amtrak rarely
takes and that we worked hard to avoid. On average, Amtrak spends just
under $2 billion a year on products and services. Since 1992, when the
FRA began posting waiver requests, Amtrak has requested six waivers
under the FRA statute (49 USC Sec. 22905(a), formerly 49 USC Sec.
24405(a)) and the Amtrak statute, 49 USC Sec. 24305(f). Of the six
requested waivers, only five have been required. (One of the waivers,
for the Amtrak High Speed Rail Prototype Trainsets, ultimately was not
utilized.)
Amtrak's request for a waiver of its domestic buying preference
requirements is not the product of an elective choice; rather, it is
the result of market realities and Amtrak's need for equipment that
meets certain technical specifications the company is unable to change.
Amtrak sought to acquire the relevant equipment from manufacturers that
can meet Amtrak Buy American requirements without a waiver but was
unable to do so; the FRA has granted Amtrak's request based on narrow
criteria that Congress spelt out in statute.
F. Amtrak Accounting
Question 1. According to the Cato Institute (see Cato statement
submitted for the record), Amtrak currently receives a federal subsidy
of roughly thirty cents per passenger-mile, whereas the aviation
industry receives a subsidy of roughly one cent per mile. What specific
amount do you think is an appropriate subsidy per passenger-mile for
Amtrak?
Answer. Since the referenced testimony does not indicate how the
subsidy per passenger mile figures were calculated (e.g., whether
indirect federal, and all aviation trust fund, spending on the aviation
industry was included), we are unable to assess the accuracy of the
comparison. We believe that the level of federal funding Amtrak
receives should not be based upon an arbitrary per passenger-mile
figure, but rather on the benefits the country receives from investing
in Amtrak.
The approximately $2 billion Congress has invested annually in
Amtrak in recent years, is a tiny fraction of what the federal
government spends on competing transportation modes. For example, in
2017, according to data compiled by the Congressional Budget Office,
federal spending on highways exceeded Amtrak's federal grant by a
factor of more than thirty to one.\12\ The funding Congress has
provided to Amtrak has produced a very high return on investment.
Significant, sustained investments in intercity passenger rail service,
comparable to those in other countries, would result in much higher
ridership, more efficient operations, and economies of scale that would
significantly reduce expenditures per passenger-mile, as has occurred
on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54539
Question 2. Does Amtrak use benefit-cost analysis when determining
long-distance service?
Answer. Amtrak's decisions about long distance service levels
reflect many factors, but are always informed by the mission, goals,
and other directives Congress has spelt out for Amtrak in statute,
including the requirements that we operate a ``national rail passenger
transportation system'' (49 USC Sec. 24701), defined in a way that
explicitly includes long distance routes (49 USC Sec. 24102), and that
we use our best business judgment to minimize governmental subsidies
(49 USC Sec. 24101). Our business judgment is of course informed by
cost-benefit analyses, and such analyses have prompted or supported
major decisions about long distance service; the pre-pandemic
transition to flexible dining on many eastern (single-night) routes and
the post-pandemic reduction of service levels are two recent examples.
Question 3. Do you acknowledge Amtrak's Congressionally-mandated
mission of making a profit as contained in the Rail Passenger Service
Act of 1970? Please answer each of the following questions in detail.
Answer. Amtrak has never had a Congressionally-mandated mission of
making a profit. The referenced provision in the Rail Passenger Service
Act of 1970, which stated that Amtrak was to be a ``for-profit
company'' was amended in 1979 to provide that Amtrak was to be
``operated and managed as a for-profit company.'' (49 U.S.C.
24301(a)(2), emphasis added). The legislative history of the 1979
amendment indicates that it reflected the fact that Amtrak could not be
profitable.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has found that there was
``little evidence . . . in the legislative history'' of the 1970 Act to
support the ``assert[ion] that Amtrak was intended by Congress to be a
profit-making enterprise.'' CRS noted that whatever expectations there
were that Amtrak might eventually become profitable were premised on
the assumptions that the federal government would provide the
significant funding required to develop faster service in high-density
corridors and that Amtrak would not be required to continue to operate
a national network of unprofitable routes. CRS found that neither pre-
condition had been met. (See CRS, ``Amtrak Profitability: An Analysis
of Congressional Expectations at Amtrak's Creation'' (June 26, 2002).)
\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL31473
Question 3a) COVID-19 considerations aside, do you agree that
trying to make a profit should be a goal for Amtrak?
Answer. We believe that operating an efficient service in a
business-like manner that makes optimal use of available public funding
should be Amtrak's goal. Like Amtrak's long distance routes, virtually
all of the airline and intercity bus routes that serve rural regions of
the United States receive significant federal subsidies, without which
these services would disappear. Every dollar we save is a dollar we can
reinvest into the railroad to ensure we can better serve our customers
and your constituents.
Question 3b) COVID-19 considerations aside, do you believe that
Amtrak should operate in a fiscally responsible way that seeks
to minimize wasting taxpayer money?
Answer. We agree that Amtrak should operate in a fiscally
responsible way. We disagree with the implication that providing
funding for intercity passenger rail service is a waste of taxpayer
money.
Question 3c) Do you believe providing good service and making a
profit are in conflict?
Answer. While providing good service is not in conflict with
operating in a financially efficient manner, an expectation that a
national network of intercity passenger rail service could be
profitable is unrealistic. As indicated in the CRS report,\14\ Amtrak
was created because the private railroads that then provided intercity
passenger rail service were all losing huge amounts of money operating
passenger rail service that became inherently unprofitable after post-
World War II public investments in competing transportation modes. No
country in the world has a profitable passenger rail system that does
not require public funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Ibid.
Question 3d) Looking beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, please
explain in detail your plan to ensure that Amtrak makes a
profit and meets its Congressional mandate. If you do not
believe Amtrak should make a profit, please explain.
Answer. As discussed above, Amtrak does not have a congressional
mandate to make a profit.
Question 4. What are the losses, per train or per passenger-mile,
when taking into account the depreciation of equipment?
Answer. Amtrak uses the group method of depreciation (group method)
in which a single composite depreciation rate is applied to the gross
investment in a particular class of property or equipment, despite
differences in the service life or salvage value of individual property
units within the same class. While we know how much depreciation has
been recorded for a particular group, we do not calculate equipment
depreciation per train, which would vary from day to day depending upon
the number and type of equipment units assigned.
Question 5. The previous Amtrak CEO developed accounting figures to
factor in depreciation of equipment to each individual route but did
not publish this information. Will you agree to publish this
information and provide it to this Committee? If not, please state your
reasoning.
Answer. Depreciation is not a cash expense and not a good measure
of the day-to-day operating expenses of a route or the cost of
replacing railroad assets. For that reason, our adjusted operating loss
(similar to EBITDA) is a much better measure of route profitability.
Many public companies, across varied industries, often talk in terms of
EBITDA, or some form of adjusted operating income to provide investors
with an accurate view of the core operating results of the company. You
can see the adjusted operating loss for a route in our publicly
available ``Monthly Performance Report'' on the Amtrak.com website
under ``Reports.'' \15\
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\15\ https://www.amtrak.com/reports-documents
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G. COVID-19 and CARES Act
Question 1. As a result of the coronavirus, many states are facing
budget deficits and financial difficulties. What is Amtrak's plan for
working with the states in 2021, specifically regarding the state-
supported routes?
Answer. We appreciate the tremendous financial strain that the
coronavirus has created for our state partners. Our overarching goal as
we navigate the coronavirus is to preserve all of our state supported
services, so that as we emerge from this pandemic we can continue to
provide mobility and connectivity to the states in support of economic
recovery. To do this, we believe the foundation must be continued
emergency federal funding to Amtrak and our state partners to replace
the lost ticket revenue resulting from reduced travel associated with
the coronavirus. In addition to this emergency funding, we are working
to make our operating agreements with states as flexible as possible so
that we can all respond as nimbly as possible to our quickly changing
environments.
Question 2. Amtrak's Office of Inspector General recently found
that Amtrak is utilizing a ``legacy process'' to calculate state
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) Section
209 payments and that management will not have an ``alternative''
billing and methodology system implemented before the end of this
fiscal year. How can states trust that Amtrak will implement
alternative billing and cost methodologies before their next service
agreements are signed?
Answer. Under PRIIA Section 209 and the FAST Act, the cost sharing
methodology is governed by the State-Amtrak Intercity Passenger Rail
Committee (SAIPRC), of which Amtrak is a member along with states
funding state supported services and the Federal Railroad
Administration. Changes to the cost sharing methodology must be
approved by all parties. Amtrak has repeatedly expressed its openness
to considering alternative approaches to the process we have today. We
look forward to collaborating with our SAIPRC partners to investigate
these alternatives but based on the way the statute was designed Amtrak
cannot unilaterally change the existing processes.
Question 3. Amtrak's state-supported routes have identified clear
reductions in service because of the COVID-19 pandemic but have not
seen corresponding decreases in their cost of service. On state routes,
what costs does Amtrak consider to be fixed and what costs does Amtrak
consider to be variable?
Answer. From October 2019 to February 2020, the period in FY 2020
prior to COVID-19, Amtrak ran 1.2M state supported train-miles per
month, which resulted in Section 209 operating costs of $62.1M per
month. From March through August 2020, based on guidance from state
partners, Amtrak ran only 552K state supported train-miles per month,
resulting in Section 209 operating costs of $44.5M per month. To
clarify, these costs during COVID-19 are lower than they were prior to
COVID-19 based on the reductions in service.
A railroad is an entity where many costs are fixed. Certain costs
can be fixed or variable based on the time period. Please see the
following table, which we shared with our state partners during one of
our weekly (now bi-weekly) conference calls where we address COVID-19
related issues:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%
Cost Labor More Variable More Fixed Note
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host RR............................ na Access fees, NRPC officer......... Minor costs from some
incentives. hosts even if no
Amtrak service
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel & Power....................... na Fuel................. Negligible........... Note that fuel
management
activities charged
in T&E Additive
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T&E Crew Labor..................... 95% Labor................ Extra board, some Variability
costs at smaller can be short-run and
crewbases. long-run
Long lead
times for crew
qualification,
training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car & Loco Maint. & Turnaround..... 55% Labor, materials..... Facilities, shop Variability
tools and equipment. can be short-run and
long-run
Long lead
times for
qualification,
training for certain
crafts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On-Board Passenger Technology...... na Cellular access fees Fixed support costs
driven by installed
base.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OBS Crew........................... 95% Labor, provisions.... Negligible........... Variability
can be short-run and
long-run
Lower lead
times for
qualification,
training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commissary Provisions.............. na Cafe provisions...... E.g., paper towels... Includes some
consumables used
outside of food
service
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Route Advertising.................. na Media placement...... na................... Determined by
individual states
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reservations & Call Centers........ 40% Labor................ Technology........... BPO call center
provider offers
greater variability
of labor costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stations--Route.................... 70% Labor................ Facilities........... Variability can be
short-run and long-
run
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stations--Shared................... 70% Labor................ Facilities........... Variability can be
short-run and long-
run
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Station Technology................. na Access fees driven by Fixed support costs.. See above
installed base.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commissions and Res. System Access. <1% Commissions.......... na................... Costs driven by
revenue purchased
through specific
channels
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Customer Concession................ <1% Credits, refunds..... na................... Costs driven by
passenger counts;
category has
decreased
substantially due to
accounting changes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecting Motor Coach............. Low Yes.................. na................... Determined by
individual states
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional/Local Police.............. 97% Labor................ Support costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Block & Tower Operations........... 97% Labor................ Technology........... These costs have been
decreasing over
years as remaining
manual towers are
automated /
centralized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terminal Yard Operations........... 95% Labor................ Extra board, some Variability
crew base costs. can be short-run and
long-run
Long lead
times for crew
qualification,
training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insurance.......................... na Some insurance costs Some costs determined Some costs
vary by activity by insurance market. controllable by
levels. Amtrak, some costs
determined by larger
insurance market
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 4. The Amtrak Office of Inspector General recently found
that Amtrak was not providing states with clear data on how service
changes due to coronavirus would affect state costs. This data is
especially important as states face budget shortfalls due to
coronavirus. Please explain how Amtrak is working to fix this problem.
Secondly, will Amtrak agree to provide states with this data? If not,
please state why. If so, please share a copy with the Subcommittee and
notify the Subcommittee when this sharing occurs.
Answer. The question above about fixed and variable costs shows the
blend of fixed and variable costs at a railroad. When service changes,
variable costs change but most of the time fixed costs do not.
Different state supported routes have different mixes of fixed and
variable costs, based in part on their geography; their infrastructure;
service decisions that have been made by states; and more. Together,
these factors make it challenging to forecast how service changes will
change costs. To address this issue, Amtrak has introduced a simplified
forecasting approach for FY 2021 that will make it possible to provide
states with estimated costs of service changes much more quickly.
Please find attached an example of the kinds of forecasts we have
provided states for different service levels on various state supported
routes.
H. Amtrak Police
Question 1. Do the workforce layoffs and furloughs announced by
Amtrak include members of the Amtrak police department? If so, how many
employees of the Amtrak police department are affected and how does
this decision impact passenger safety?
Answer. No members of the Amtrak Police Department were furloughed,
and one member was laid off. That employee was a senior continuity of
operations manager and was in a support position tasked with
establishing corporate-level business continuity programs.
Question 2. Earlier this year, the Amtrak Office of the Inspector
General reported issues with Amtrak's ability to define the role,
priorities, and size of the Amtrak police department. Please explain
how Amtrak is addressing these issues.
Answer. Issued on July 1, 2020, Amtrak OIG report OIG-A-2020-012
\16\ offered four primary findings and three recommendations. To
address them, Amtrak has committed to:
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\16\ https://amtrakoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/OIG-A-2020-
012%20APD.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Facilitate discussions between the Executive Leadership Team
and the Board of Directors to reach a consensus on what APD should be
doing. The results of those discussions will inform the mission and
objectives of the department, which will incorporate them into its
strategic plan. In addition, the Executive Safety and Security Council
will ensure that APD appropriately executes its strategic plan and
ensures that it is incorporated into the company's integrated Safety
and Security Policy. As part of this effort, APD has engaged a
consultant to assist in the preparation of a strategic plan, due winter
2021. APD has engaged with the ELT for their input and feedback, which
will inform the strategic planning process, scheduled for December 7,
2021. APD has always been clear on its public safety mission of
protecting life, property, and infrastructure.
2. Review staffing models from partner agencies and best practice
guidelines from police research organizations to develop a data-driven,
risk-based process to recommend an optimal size for APD. The department
expects to have a proposal to senior leadership during the first
quarter of FY 2021. Additionally, APD leadership will use the results
of a recently commissioned audit of the contract security services the
company uses to develop proposals on alternative staffing options. APD
intends to maximize agreements the company has in place and reallocate
resources accordingly, to more effectively supplement APD sworn
officers. APD leadership will forward the audit results and its related
recommendations to the Executive Leadership Team for consideration and
action. Also, APD is in the process of evaluating its current goals and
metrics as part of the APD Security Management System annual review
process. At the September 2020 Board meeting, APD presented its FY 2021
goals and metrics to the ELT and the Board, who approved them then. The
target completion date for these tasks is March 31, 2021.
3. Remediate identified weaknesses with the Computer Aided
Dispatch system and optimize several of the current IT platforms to
improve workload data. Management stated that APD will use the improved
workload data to inform decisions it makes about the size and
allocation of its staff. In addition, IT is working with APD to
determine the best reports and metrics it needs to inform its decisions
about staff composition and allocation, and train APD staff on the use
of any resulting dashboards and reporting tools it generates. The
target completion date for this effort is July 1, 2021.
I. Miscellaneous
Question 1. Who should decide Amtrak's National Network routes:
Congress, Amtrak, or someone else? Please elaborate on your rationale
this decision.
Answer. Amtrak's 1997 reauthorization gave Amtrak responsibility
for determining its route network, and directed Amtrak to ``operate a
national rail passenger transportation system which ties together
existing and emergent regional rail passenger service and other
intermodal passenger service'' (49 U.S.C. 24701). Section 209 of the
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 made states
responsible for funding most of the costs not covered by revenues of
routes of less than 750 miles in length (other than the Boston-to-
Washington Northeast Corridor), which means that the continued
operation of such routes, and the initiation of new less than 750-mile
routes, is determined by states (subject to operational constraints and
the availability of necessary funding and equipment).
Amtrak believes that it is appropriate that Amtrak, which is
required by the Rail Passenger Service Act to operate and be managed as
a for-profit business and to make the best use of available resources,
determine Amtrak's long distance route network. We also believe that
states should continue to be responsible for determining whether to
initiate or continue operation of state supported routes they primarily
fund, but that expansion of Amtrak service to corridors and regions
that are underserved or not served by existing Amtrak services will
require the federal government and Amtrak to play a greater role in
initiating or expanding under-750-mile corridor services and providing
the funding necessary to accomplish this. Finally, we recognize that it
is ultimately up to Congress, which funds the operating losses and
capital costs of Amtrak's long distance network and the state supported
route costs that Amtrak pays, to set the policy for what passenger rail
service Amtrak will provide.
Question 2. Amtrak currently requires any claims against it to be
arbitrated. Do you think that arbitration is a fair, reasonable, and
highly efficient means of alternative dispute resolution? Will you
agree to continue this policy? If not, please state why in detail.
Answer. Amtrak's arbitration program is consistent with other major
Amtrak initiatives to improve the overall customer experience, and
Amtrak adopted it for two simple reasons: to expedite resolution of
claims and to reduce unnecessary litigation costs.
First, Amtrak's arbitration program provides a much quicker
resolution of claims and much faster compensation to injured parties
than court litigation, while retaining most important aspects and
protections of the civil litigation system: convenient venues
throughout the country; legal representation; an independent
decisionmaker; authorization for appropriate discovery; and the ability
of a prevailing claimant to be awarded damages and all other relief
available under applicable law. The major difference is that
arbitration provides a resolution in less time--generally well within a
year of filing--by avoiding unnecessary discovery and other time-
consuming proceedings, and the often years-long wait for a trial date
on overcrowded court dockets. This is especially advantageous now, with
the significant backlogs facing U.S. courts due to closures associated
with the COVID-19 pandemic. There is no comparable backlog in the
arbitration system, and arbitrations can be held remotely if necessary
or desired by the parties.
Second, in its oversight of Amtrak, Congress has directed Amtrak to
``use its best business judgment in acting to minimize United States
Government subsidies.'' Arbitration achieves that aim by streamlining
the scope, and thus the expense, of the traditional civil litigation
proceeding. The only beneficiaries of protracted and extraordinarily
expensive court litigation are the lawyers, whose fee agreements can
consume up to 40 percent of a successful claimant's award.
Amtrak's arbitration program has been carefully crafted to meet the
standards for such programs set forth in Supreme Court and other
judicial rulings, proving false the vague assertions that our program
violates passengers' constitutional rights. Indeed, the program goes
far beyond those standards in order to provide a fair, flexible, and
easy-to-utilize process for our passengers. Amtrak has a fundamental
commitment to Congress to be a careful steward of taxpayer funds.
Amtrak spends roughly $2-3 million annually--some $11 million over the
last five years--for outside counsel to represent the Company with
respect to passenger claims. We believe arbitrating disputed passenger
claims under our policy will reduce those costs significantly; that is
money that can then be spent in safety programs and other passenger
service and care programs.
For these reasons, Amtrak plans to continue with this policy for
the foreseeable future.
Question 3. Section 11207 of the FAST Act requires Amtrak to
eliminate operating loss from food and beverage services. Despite this
fact, there has been Congressional support for Amtrak serving expensive
gourmet meals.
Question 3a) In light of COVID-19 and other financial
difficulties, do you believe Amtrak should be offering meals
such as filet mignon and French toast to passengers?
Answer. Section 11207 of the FAST Act's prohibition on using
federal funds to cover operating losses associated with food and
beverage service (previously codified at 49 U.S.C. Sec. 24321(d)) was
repealed by P.L. 116-159 on September 30.
Amtrak offers traditional dining with sit-down meal service on six
long distance routes with trip times over 30 hours, and to sleeping car
passengers on the Auto Train between Virginia and Florida. Sample menus
may be found online.\17\ While Amtrak does not serve filet mignon,
French toast, a popular offering in diners and fast food restaurants,
is one of the breakfast choices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ https://www.amtrak.com/onboard/meals-dining/dining-car.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to COVID-19, only the Auto Train currently offers traditional
dining. On other long distance routes we are temporarily offering
sleeping car passengers the flexible dining service we have introduced
in recent years for sleeping car passengers on most shorter (one-night)
long distance routes. Flexible dining, which offers pre-plated meals
picked up from an attendant or delivered to rooms, is described on our
web site, where one can also find sample menus.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ https://www.amtrak.com/onboard/meals-dining/flexible-
dining.html
Question 3b) Will you follow the law and ensure that Amtrak's
meal options are fiscally prudent, eliminate financial losses,
and do not result in an unnecessary waste of taxpayer money?
Answer. Notwithstanding the repeal of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 24321(d),
improving financial performance of food service remains one of Amtrak's
goals. We will continue to make smart business decisions that seek to
provide a positive customer experience while at the same time
minimizing costs. As on airlines, most of which provide (complimentary)
meal service to all passengers on trips of much shorter duration than
trips on Amtrak's long distance trains, offering food service that is
both cost-efficient and meets customers' expectations and dietary
requirements is essential to optimizing financial performance.
Question 4. Do you support or oppose the use of private cars on
Amtrak trains and charter trains operated by Amtrak?
Answer. Amtrak supports the use of private cars on Amtrak trains
and charter trains operated by Amtrak. In 2018, Amtrak revised its
policies related to both these activities to ensure we conducted them
with the highest standards of safety, to minimize operational impacts,
and to ensure the associated fees fully covered all the related costs.
You can find all our private car information, as well as a link to our
detailed private car policy, on our web site.\19\ For charter trains,
the relevant information is also on the Amtrak site.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ https://www.amtrak.com/privately-owned-rail-cars
\20\ https://www.amtrak.com/charter-your-private-train
Question 5. Last year, some of Amtrak's creditors filed suit
alleging inappropriate handling of Amtrak's Alstom-Bombardier HHP-8
locomotives.
a) Is it true that Amtrak has retired all those locomotives
after only 10 years of revenue service?
b) What is Amtrak doing with the retired HHP-8 locomotives
today?
c) Is this situation indicative of Amtrak's typical fleet
maintenance practices?
Answer. As this matter is subject to on-going litigation, we cannot
comment at this time under guidance from our counsel.
Question 6. If funding and financing were put in place tomorrow,
what would the timeline be for the Gateway Program? When would the new
Hudson River tunnel open? When would rehabilitation of the existing
tunnel be completed?
Answer. We and our partners continue to do everything in our power
to advance Gateway, and we are optimistic that significant progress
will be made in the coming year. Portal North Bridge will begin
construction in 2021. Early work on Hudson Yards Concrete Casing
Section 3 began in September. And additional Gateway projects, such as
Sawtooth, Dock Bridge, and Penn Station Expansion, are advancing into
the design phase and NEPA review. The Hudson Tunnel Project is a 10-
year program: approximately seven and a half years for construction of
the new tunnel, then a year and a half per tube for rehabilitation of
the existing century-old tunnel. The broader Gateway Program, including
expansion of Penn Station New York, the Sawtooth Bridges Replacement,
and Portal South Bridge, among others, could be delivered by 2035 if
all funding and financing were in place, and assuming that all
necessary approvals and permits were granted expeditiously.
Question 7. Can you discuss the reasons for variations in load
factor for Northeast Corridor, State-Supported, and Long-Distance
routes?
Answer. Load factors on a given route or service line are driven by
the capacity (seat-miles) offered on the trains, the level of total
demand (passengers) on the trains, the distance those passengers choose
to travel (passenger-miles), and the distribution of the various
destinations along the length of the route served. Load factors in any
period can vary based on decisions regarding capacity offered and by
customer behavior, which in turn can be influenced by the economic
environment, competition, product pricing, and a host of other external
factors. Variations in load factors across the service lines in FY 2020
reflect the myriad differences across these variables in a fluid
environment under great stress given the role of the pandemic in daily
life. While a commercial airliner traveling from one city to another
city could achieve a 100% load factor, a train that serves multiple
destinations along a route is much less likely to do so. Conversely,
that same airliner can only sell each seat once for a given trip,
whereas an Amtrak train often sells a given seat multiple times. (For
example, someone may travel from Washington to Baltimore and detrain,
at which point a second person may ride from Philadelphia to New York
in that seat, and then a third could ride from New York to Providence.)
For a long distance train, it is also worth noting that sleepers tend
to support a higher load factor than do coaches, such that the total
load factor for a long distance train is an average between the full or
nearly full sleepers and the coaches, which have more turnover and are
relatively less full.
Questions from Hon. Lloyd Smucker to William Flynn, President and Chief
Executive Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
Question 1. What is the Keystone Line's current ridership as of 9/
24/20 and do you believe projected passenger demand warrants full
service?
Answer. Actual Keystone ridership in the first eleven months of FY
2020 was 761,987, with a forecast September ridership of 19,586, for a
projected total FY 2020 ridership of 781,573. (Please note that service
was entirely suspended for more than two months earlier in the year as
a result of the ongoing pandemic; service between Philadelphia and New
York City remains reduced.)
As one of Amtrak's state supported services, the Keystone is
supported by funding from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
accordingly, service levels reflect the Commonwealth's wishes. Amtrak
is committed to continuing to work with all its state partners to
provide the level of service they wish to see.
Question 2. How does Amtrak's CY2020 revenue from the Keystone line
compare to this time last year?
Answer. In January and February Keystone revenue in CY 2020 was up
year-over-year, in keeping with the performance of many other routes.
Because of the pandemic, revenue in subsequent months has lagged FY
2019 levels.
Actual Keystone ticket revenue in the first eight months of CY 2020
was roughly $10.2 million, with a forecast September ticket revenue of
roughly $564,000. Keystone ticket revenue in the first eight months of
CY 2019 was roughly $31.4 million, and September 2019 ticket revenue
was roughly $4.0 million. The CY 2020 figures reflect the suspension of
Keystone service for more than two months, as well as reductions in
service.
Question 3. How does Amtrak's capital investment over the past 5
years in the Keystone line compare to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania's investment in the line over the same timeframe?
Answer. Capital expenditures for Fiscal Years 2016 through 2020 by
Amtrak, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and SEPTA on Keystone Line
infrastructure and Keystone Line stations served by Amtrak were
approximately:
Amtrak................................ $99.7 million
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.......... $66.1 million
SEPTA................................. $43.0 million
------------------------
Total............................... $208.8 million
The figures for Pennsylvania and SEPTA reflect the amounts they
provided to Amtrak (including any unpaid billings) or reported; Fiscal
Year 2020 expenditures are pre-audit. The SEPTA figures reflect
investments on the portion of the Keystone Line between Philadelphia
and Thorndale predominantly used by SEPTA trains and passengers; they
include funding provided to SEPTA by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and the Federal Transit Administration.
Question 4. As of 9/24/2020 what percentage of Amtrak stations
along the Keystone line are ADA compliant?
Answer. Amtrak is solely responsible for ADA compliance at two of
the 11 stations on the Harrisburg Line (Parkesburg and Middletown) and
shares ADA responsibility with other entities at six stations (Paoli,
Coatesville, Lancaster, Mount Joy, Elizabethtown, and Harrisburg). Of
those eight stations:
two are fully compliant (Paoli and Mount Joy);
four are not fully compliant, but platforms and trains
can be accessed by passengers using wheelchairs (Lancaster,
Elizabethtown, Middletown, and Harrisburg); and
two are not compliant (Coatesville and Parkesburg).
SEPTA is responsible for ADA compliance at three stations used
predominantly by SEPTA trains and passengers. Of these stations, Exton
is compliant and construction of investments at Ardmore and design of
investments at Downingtown to bring these stations into compliance are
underway.
Of the six stations that are not fully ADA-compliant for which
Amtrak has or shares ADA responsibility:
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation is
progressing projects to replace the Middletown and Coatesville stations
with new, fully ADA-compliant stations; and
design or construction of improvements to bring three
other stations (Parkesburg, Lancaster, and Harrisburg) into full
compliance is underway.
Amtrak expects that all components of Amtrak-served stations on the
Keystone Line for which we have ADA responsibility will be fully ADA
compliant by 2026. In recent years, Amtrak's expenditures on ADA
compliance have exceeded the amounts that Congress has directed us to
spend. We remain committed to working with Congress, and with the
commuter railroads, states, municipalities, and other entities that
have or share ADA compliance responsibility at the majority of our
stations, to achieve full compliance at all stations.
Question 4a) What percentage of those completed upgrade
projects were paid for by Amtrak compared to the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania or other entities?
Answer. The following are the approximate expenditures since 2009
for completed ADA compliance projects at the 11 Keystone Line stations:
Amtrak................................ $23.6 million
SEPTA................................. $57.0 million
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.......... $59.0 million
------------------------
Total............................... $139.6 million
The figures for Pennsylvania and SEPTA reflect the amounts they
provided to Amtrak (including any unpaid billings) or reported; Fiscal
Year 2020 expenditures are pre-audit. The SEPTA figures reflect
expenditures at the Paoli and Exton stations predominantly used by
SEPTA trains and passengers; they include funding provided to SEPTA by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Federal Transit
Administration. The Amtrak figures do not include the $11 million
Amtrak has spent on completed ADA compliance projects at William H.
Gray III 30th Street Station in Philadelphia, which is served by
Keystone Service trains but is not located on the Keystone Line.
Question 5. Do all Amtrak revenues generated on the Keystone Line
aside of ticket sales, including fees generated from other rail line
utilizers get reinvested back into Keystone line?
Answer. Sec. 209 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement
Act defines ``Keystone Line'' as the segment between Philadelphia and
Harrisburg; the Keystone segment between Philadelphia and New York is
treated as part of the NEC, and revenues generated along that segment
of track are credited accordingly.
The revenues generated from travel between Philadelphia and
Harrisburg are credited against the operating costs that Pennsylvania
is responsible for under the Sec. 209 formula. Those revenues are not
specifically segregated and used for investments, but they are used to
offset the state's obligation, for operating purposes.
SEPTA access charges are assessed and allocated based on the PRIIA
Sec. 212 formula; revenue based on real estate that Amtrak owns (i.e.,
from retail leasing in William H. Gray III 30th Street Station) is
handled separately, along with an allocation of costs that support that
revenue.
Questions from Hon. Scott Perry to William Flynn, President and Chief
Executive Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
Question 1. In response to my question about the questionable
accounting practices at Amtrak, you stated:
``So, the largest difference between adjusted operating income
and GAAP is the exclusion of EBITDA for discussion purposes.
Many companies, across varied industries, often talk in terms
of EBITDA, or some form of adjusted operating income to provide
investors, if we're talking about a publicly traded company, to
provide investors with as accurate a view of the core operating
results of the company. But GAAP, of course, is the bottom line
and we report on that.
The biggest number is depreciation which largely addresses the
catch up in investing that the company is doing in fleet and
other infrastructure. That hasn't been done for many, many
years.''
According to the Congressional Research Service, Amtrak changed its
definition of ``total expenses'' to exclude depreciation and other
items in 2017--not ``many, many years'' ago.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See ``Table I. Amtrak Revenues, Expenses, and Federal Support,
FY2015-FY2019, Notes.'' Page 5. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45942.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Can you please provide me with Amtrak's justification for why they
chose to make such a definition change in 2017?
Answer. In Amtrak's audited consolidated financial statements,\21\
the definition has not changed: ``depreciation and amortization'' is
included within ``total expenses'' for FY 2014 through FY 2019 (i.e.,
all years for which the statements are posted), as it will be in the FY
2020 statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ https://www.amtrak.com/reports-documents
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CRS figures for Amtrak's ``total expenses'' in the linked
report agree with Amtrak's own reported total expenses for FY 2015 and
FY 2016; note that their figures in FY 2017 through FY 2019 are
actually lower, not higher, than Amtrak's reported totals. It is
possible that the cited note is referring to a change Amtrak made in
its monthly performance reports. During FY 2018, we began reporting
adjusted operating results in those documents, specifically, to be more
consistent with how management views financial data and in an effort to
make sure various reports were consistent.
Question 2. Along those same lines, in response to my question
about the difference between FY19 operating expenses and the FY21
request:
``Well, I think the expense there is the total expense on a
GAAP basis. And so, there's hundreds of millions of dollars of
depreciation in that number.''
As the Congressional Research Service clearly indicates, the FY19
total operating expenses cited do not include depreciation.
According to your opening statement,
``Therefore, as explained this summer, we are implementing our
plans to adjust our service and workforce levels, beginning in
October. As difficult as these actions are, if we do not take
such cost saving measures and fail to receive supplemental
funding, we anticipate burning nearly $250 million, each month.
At this rate of loss, we would be forced to take drastic
measures with long lasting impacts on the company, on our
employees, and on our network.''
Assuming you reach the anticipated burn rate for each of the 12
months for FY21, the annual burn rate would be $3 billion without
adjusting service or workforce levels. This seems to contradict your
answer that the $4.9 billion is necessary if
``Congress so directs that we do not furlough employees'' and
``operating expenses for the long-distance network, if we're
directed to operate a seven-day service.''
Can you please explain why the request exceeds the annual burn rate
by $1.9 billion and why it exceeds the ``total expenses'' reported by
Amtrak from FY19 by more than $700 million?
Answer. The $250 million ``burn rate'' figure to which I referred
assumes that Amtrak does receive its requested level of base funding
($2.040 billion) but does not receive its requested level of
supplemental funding (an additional $2.817 billion). The requested
level of supplemental funding works out to roughly $235 million per
month--somewhat less than the burn rate we discussed.
Amtrak's $4.857 billion combined FY 2021 request (base +
supplemental) for Amtrak and its state partners exceeds Amtrak's FY
2019 total expenses ($4.397 billion, as reported in our publicly
available audited consolidated financial statements) \22\ primarily
because it includes roughly $500 million to replace payments that our
cash-strapped Sec. 209 and Sec. 212 partners would otherwise need to
make for the state supported service we provide, and for use of the
NEC. Note that $500 million exceeds the difference between these two
figures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/
public/
documents/corporate/financial/Amtrak-Audited-Consolidated-Financial-
Statements-FY2019.pdf
Question 3. I understand that some of the $4.9 billion comes due to
lost passenger revenue and state subsidies.
Does Amtrak expect passenger revenue and state subsidies to
increase during FY21 as the economy reopens or are they projected to
remain flat and what impact will that have on future viability/need for
additional federal funds moving forward?
Answer. We expect a gradual increase in ridership and passenger
revenue as the fiscal year progresses, with ticket revenues remaining
near current, COVID-affected levels through February, followed by
gradual upticks beginning in March; we estimate that we could achieve
close to 50% of pre-COVID levels by the end of FY 2021. Under such a
scenario, total state subsidies would double their normal levels, from
roughly $235 million to roughly $470 million (absent CARES-style
assistance). However, these expectations entail a great deal of
uncertainty, and reflect assumptions about conditions over which Amtrak
has no control (e.g., progress towards development and widespread
distribution of a vaccine for COVID-19).
Question 4. Further, the request for $4.9 billion seems to exceed
Amtrak's transportation footprint--Amtrak carries less one tenth of one
percent of National passenger travel. It also raises significant
fairness questions about providing additional subsidies exceeding
Amtrak's total expenses from FY19 when Congress has yet to provide any
assistance to direct, private competitors of Amtrak. The Motor Coach
Industry carries more than ten times as many passenger miles as Amtrak
does and they have been devastated by the COVID-19 pandemic, yet they
are expected to subsidize their competitors while they suffer.
How can the $4.9 billion request be justified in light of Amtrak's
small footprint and the lack of funding for its direct competitors?
Answer. The level of emergency financial aid Congress provides to
Amtrak does not, and did not, constrain Congress from providing
emergency funding to other modes of transportation. The $50 billion in
federal funding Congress provided to the airline industry, which
competes with Amtrak, in the CARES Act dwarfs the approximately $1
billion that Amtrak received. While the CARES Act did not provide
direct funding to the motor coach industry (the vast majority of whose
ridership is attributable to charter and commuter passengers for whom
Amtrak does not compete), it provided over $2 billion for the Federal
Transit Administration's Section 5311 program that can be used for
rural intercity bus service, and most motorcoach companies are small
businesses eligible for Payroll Protection Program funding.
Nonetheless, because Amtrak has partnerships and contractual
relationships with hundreds of motor coach companies throughout the
country that provide connecting Thruway bus service for Amtrak
passengers to communities we do not directly serve and substitute
service during Amtrak disruptions, we share the concern about the
impact of COVID-19 on the motor coach industry.
Of Amtrak's $4.857 billion FY 2021 funding request, $2.040 billion
is simply our base annual funding request--effectively a continuation
of pre-pandemic funding levels. We are requesting an additional $2.817
billion for Amtrak and its state partners in response to unprecedented
effects of the ongoing pandemic, which has caused a massive and
sustained reduction in ticket revenue that will likely continue for
many months. (Included in this amount is the $546 million that would be
required if Congress determines that Amtrak should not furlough any
employees and should continue to operate pre-COVID-19 service frequency
on all long distance routes.) Without this additional funding, Amtrak
will need to defer numerous capital projects and procurements critical
to our future; we are advised by our state partners that many of them
may be forced to cancel corridor train service, which could prove very
difficult to restore; and perhaps 2,400 corresponding additional jobs
(linked to the aforementioned capital projects and state supported
service) could be at risk.
Question 5. Finally, you offered to meet with me and my office to
go through these issues in further depth.
Can you please have your staff arrange such a briefing with my
Legislative Director?
Answer. We are always available to meet with you and your staff;
our Government Affairs team will work to schedule a meeting.
Questions from Hon. Garret Graves to William Flynn, President and Chief
Executive Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
Question 1. Amtrak often treats the long distance routes like they
are isolated, land-based cruise ship routes. But thousands of riders
make connections between long-distance trains and other service,
including state-supported routes, commuter lines, Northeast Corridor
services, Amtrak's connecting bus services and a host of other
transportation options.
On the Gulf Coast, our New Orleans to Mobile route will connect
with three of Amtrak's long-distance services in New Orleans, and this
connectivity played a significant role in applications for CRISI and
REG grants from the FRA. In awarding grants to the project, the FRA
recognized that the ability to connect with multiple long-distance
services at New Orleans made the project more viable.
Amtrak's decision to cut back nearly all long-distance services
jeopardizes the viability of services like those which are being
actively rebuilt in the Gulf States. Decreases in long-distance routes
will threaten the future of the Mobile-New Orleans route and future
phases of the project, leaving local stakeholders feeling like there
isn't a future for passenger rail in our region.
How can Amtrak better coordinate with the FRA to ensure that
federal dollars toward infrastructure improvement projects with non-
Amtrak passenger rail components are not wasted?
Answer. Amtrak already works in close coordination with FRA to
ensure that federal funding for rail infrastructure investments--both
for existing or planned Amtrak services such as restoration of New
Orleans-Mobile service, and for projects that have non-Amtrak
components but will benefit Amtrak--is spent on projects that will make
the best use of federal dollars. As a member of the Gulf Coast Working
Group chaired by FRA, Amtrak has worked with FRA, the Southern Rail
Commission (SRC) and other stakeholders for nearly five years to
identify the optimal infrastructure investments to facilitate
restoration and reliable operation of Amtrak service between New
Orleans and Mobile. We have also worked with SRC and other Gulf Coast
stakeholders on successful applications to FRA for federal funding, for
which Amtrak has agreed to contribute funding to the required non-
federal match. In addition to working with FRA on projects that
directly benefit Amtrak services, we regularly advise FRA of
applications for federal rail funding grants by states, commuter and
freight railroads that we support because we believe they would provide
an indirect benefit to passenger rail.
We are very cognizant of the importance of facilitating
connectivity between planned state supported routes like New Orleans-
Mobile and our long distance network. The many benefits that will be
realized from the investments that the federal government, and Amtrak,
states and local governments, have made or committed to make to restore
New Orleans-Mobile service will not in any way be affected by the
temporary reductions in service frequency Amtrak is making on two of
the three long distance routes with which that service will connect in
New Orleans. As I stated in my testimony, Amtrak plans to restore daily
service on all the routes on which service frequency is being reduced
due to dramatic reductions in passenger demand attributable to COVID-19
once ridership demand returns. We hope that progress in addressing
COVID-19, and resulting increases in ridership, will result in
restoration service by June of 2021, in accord with the criteria for
service restoration I described in my testimony.
The reality is that the delay in reintroducing New Orleans-Mobile
service, and the greatest threat to the service going forward, has not
been due to Amtrak, but rather action or lack thereof by the service's
host railroads. In early 2016, Amtrak operated a very well received
demonstration train along the proposed route. The enthusiasm of the
crowds of people across the region who turned out to show support for
the service reflected Amtrak's own enthusiasm for the new service and
was representative of our commitment to the endeavor. However, the
return of service to the Gulf Coast has been delayed by a lack of
cooperation from the freight host railroads. CSX initially demanded $2
billion in capital investment to restore service consisting of just two
daily Amtrak trains. In contrast, the Congressionally directed Gulf
Coast Working Group concluded in a report issued July 2017 that $117.67
million in capital investment would be needed.\23\ We are currently
progressing another study with the host railroads and continue to
advocate for a fair and expeditious process to return Amtrak service to
the Gulf Coast region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/
17156/2017-07-17_Gulf%20Coast%20
Working%20Group%20Report%20to%20Congress%20%28Main%20Section%29-
%20Final.pdf
Question 2. Last week, Long-Distance trains provided 30 percent all
bookings, and 55 percent of all revenue to Amtrak. More revenue than
State-Supported and Northeast Corridor services combined. In addition,
Long-Distance services have gained riders and revenue every month since
April.
How can Amtrak justify the decision to cut a service that is
outperforming its other service sectors and has shown consistent
improvement?
Answer. Roughly seven months since the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic, ridership and revenues on long distance routes (other than
the Auto Train) are still two-thirds below FY 2019 levels and showing
no indications of significant improvement as we enter the fall/winter
period when monthly long distance ridership normally decreases by up to
40%. As a result, every long distance train we operate is incurring
large, increasing and unsustainable cash losses, while carrying few
passengers.
While reductions in long distance ridership and revenues since the
onset of COVID-19 have not been have as large as the reductions on our
state supported and Northeast Corridor services, a major reason for
this is that we have continued to operate pre-COVID service frequency
on most long distance routes while significantly reducing, and in some
cases suspending, service frequency on virtually all other routes.
Question 3. As the Rail Passenger Association pointed out in their
testimony, losses to local economies from Long-Distance service cuts at
over $2.3 billion nationally, including $179 million on the trains
serving Louisiana alone. Today, do you understand the economic impact
of focusing service cuts on less urban parts of the country?
Answer. During the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic,
virtually all the service reductions Amtrak made were on Northeast
Corridor and state supported routes that predominantly serve more
urbanized regions. While service frequency on both the Northeast
Corridor and our state supported route network was reduced by over 50%,
and some state supported routes were suspended entirely at the request
of state partners, the only reduction in long distance service
frequency was the consolidation of our two daily New York-Miami trains
into a daily service in early July.
While we have endeavored to maintain service frequency on long
distance routes, we must operate within our financial means and use our
taxpayer-provided resources as efficiently as possible. As of this
writing, we have not received any additional funding for Fiscal Year
2021 to make up for the massive decreases in revenues we are
experiencing as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. If Congress provides
sufficient additional funding, it would be possible to avoid or reverse
long distance service reductions.
Amtrak understands that long distance trains deliver significant
economic benefits to the communities and states that they serve.
However, most of the economic benefits attributable to Amtrak's
services, such as the passengers' expenditures on hotels, restaurant
meals and entertainment and recreation at the destinations to which
they travel, are driven by the number of passengers traveling. When
ridership declines by two-thirds, as is the case on our long distance
routes, there is a proportionate decrease in these expenditures, even
if passengers engage in normal activities at their destination.
Appendix A
as referenced in question A.2
Pure Running Time and Total Scheduled Time by Train
All times provided in hours:minutes:seconds format. Days of operation
reflect pre-pandemic operations.
Acela
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2100.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:52:00 02:28:36
2103.................................. M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 222.10 02:55:00 02:28:54
2104.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:49:00 02:28:36
2107.................................. M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 222.10 02:53:00 02:27:36
2109.................................. M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 02:53:00 02:25:36
2110.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:50:00 02:28:36
2117.................................. M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 02:52:00 02:24:12
2119.................................. M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 02:55:00 02:26:00
2121.................................. M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 02:51:00 02:26:00
2122.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:50:00 02:28:30
2124.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:49:00 02:28:30
2126.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:52:00 02:30:12
2128.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:50:00 02:28:30
2150.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 06:41:00 05:32:42
2151.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.56 06:46:00 05:40:42
2153.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:49:00 05:35:48
2154.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 06:45:00 05:34:48
2155.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.46 06:40:00 05:34:12
2155.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:40:00 05:34:36
2158.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 06:56:00 05:34:42
2159.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:46:00 05:35:48
2160.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 06:56:00 05:37:48
2163.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:51:00 05:35:48
2164.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.06 06:46:00 05:37:18
2165.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:48:00 05:35:48
2166.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 456.96 06:40:00 05:36:36
2167.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:51:00 05:35:48
2167.................................. Thu...................... Boston--South Sta........ New York................ 231.66 03:45:00 03:09:48
2168.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 06:50:00 05:37:42
2168.................................. M-F...................... New York................. Boston--South Sta....... 232.26 03:49:00 03:09:12
2170.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 06:45:00 05:39:06
2171.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:46:00 05:35:48
2172.................................. M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 06:48:00 05:39:54
2173.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:53:00 05:35:12
2173.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ New York................ 231.66 03:45:00 03:09:48
2175.................................. M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:39:00 05:34:24
2190.................................. M-F...................... New York................. Boston--South Sta....... 232.46 03:48:00 03:07:42
2203.................................. Sat...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 02:58:00 02:27:30
2205.................................. Sun...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 02:59:00 02:26:54
2208.................................. Sat...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:51:00 02:30:36
2213.................................. Sun...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 02:59:00 02:27:30
2215.................................. Sun...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 02:54:00 02:27:30
2218.................................. Sat...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:00:00 02:30:36
2222.................................. Sun...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:55:00 02:30:36
2224.................................. Sun...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:55:00 02:30:36
2228.................................. Sun...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 02:55:00 02:30:36
2248.................................. Sat...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 07:07:00 05:37:24
2249.................................. Sat...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:58:00 05:37:18
2250.................................. Sun...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 07:03:00 05:38:00
2251.................................. Sat...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:53:00 05:37:18
2252.................................. SaSu..................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 07:17:00 05:39:48
2253.................................. SaSu..................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.56 06:54:00 05:40:18
2254.................................. SaSu..................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 06:53:00 05:39:48
2255.................................. Sun...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:59:00 05:37:18
2256.................................. Sun...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 06:55:00 05:39:48
2257.................................. Sun...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:59:00 05:37:18
2258.................................. Sun...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 06:51:00 05:39:48
2259.................................. Sun...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:54:00 05:37:18
2260.................................. Sun...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 06:51:00 05:39:48
2261.................................. Sun...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:54:00 05:37:18
2275.................................. Sun...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 06:50:00 05:36:06
2290.................................. Sat...................... New York................. Boston--South Sta....... 232.46 03:48:00 03:06:12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adirondack
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
68.................................... Daily.................... Montreal, QC............. New York................ 368.20 10:30:00 07:58:54
69.................................... Daily.................... New York................. Montreal, QC............ 368.81 10:55:00 07:50:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Auto Train
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52.................................... Daily.................... Sanford, FL.............. Lorton, Va.............. 877.00 16:59:00 14:58:00
53.................................... Daily.................... Lorton, Va............... Sanford, FL............. 877.00 16:58:00 14:47:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blue Water
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
364................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Port Huron, MI.......... 318.50 06:31:00 05:21:00
365................................... Daily.................... Port Huron, MI........... Chicago, IL............. 317.70 06:25:00 05:11:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
California Zephyr
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5..................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Emeryville, CA.......... 2525.62 52:10:00 43:40:00
6..................................... Daily.................... Emeryville, CA........... Chicago, IL............. 2520.32 51:40:00 43:34:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capitol Corridor
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
520................................... M-F...................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 01:58:00 01:38:00
Square).
521................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:03:00 02:38:00
522................................... M-F...................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 01:58:00 01:38:00
Square).
523................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:03:00 02:38:00
524................................... M-F...................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:04:00 02:34:00
525................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:03:00 02:38:00
527................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:06:00 02:38:00
528................................... M-F...................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:09:00 02:34:00
529................................... M-F...................... Auburn, CA............... Oakland, CA (Jack London 126.10 02:59:00 02:34:00
Square).
530................................... M-F...................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 01:58:00 01:38:00
Square).
531................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland Coliseum, CA.... 94.60 02:03:00 01:47:00
532................................... M-F...................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:04:00 02:34:00
534................................... M-F...................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 01:58:00 01:38:00
Square).
535................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland Coliseum, CA.... 94.60 02:03:00 01:47:00
536................................... M-F...................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Auburn, CA.............. 126.10 02:57:00 02:26:00
Square).
537................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:03:00 02:38:00
538................................... M-F...................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:09:00 02:34:00
540................................... M-F...................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 01:58:00 01:38:00
Square).
541................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 134.90 03:04:00 02:38:00
542................................... M-F...................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:04:00 02:34:00
543................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.60 01:46:00 01:39:00
Square).
544................................... M-F...................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 02:59:00 02:34:00
545................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.50 01:57:00 01:39:00
Square).
546................................... M-F...................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:04:00 02:34:00
547................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:13:00 02:38:00
548................................... M-F...................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 02:06:00 01:38:00
Square).
549................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.60 01:56:00 01:39:00
Square).
550................................... M-F...................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.50 01:59:00 01:38:00
Square).
551................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.50 01:57:00 01:39:00
Square).
553................................... M-F...................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.50 01:57:00 01:39:00
Square).
720................................... SaSu..................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 01:56:00 01:38:00
Square).
723................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:02:00 02:38:00
724................................... SaSu..................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:04:00 02:34:00
727................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:03:00 02:38:00
728................................... SaSu..................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:04:00 02:34:00
729................................... SaSu..................... Auburn, CA............... San Jose, CA............ 171.50 04:05:00 03:33:00
732................................... SaSu..................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 02:03:00 01:38:00
Square).
733................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.60 01:56:00 01:39:00
Square).
734................................... SaSu..................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 01:56:00 01:38:00
Square).
736................................... SaSu..................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 01:56:00 01:38:00
Square).
737................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:03:00 02:38:00
738................................... SaSu..................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:04:00 02:34:00
741................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:03:00 02:38:00
742................................... SaSu..................... San Jose, CA............. Auburn, CA.............. 171.60 04:01:00 03:22:00
743................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... San Jose, CA............ 135.00 03:08:00 02:38:00
744................................... SaSu..................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:03:00 02:34:00
745................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.60 01:56:00 01:39:00
Square).
746................................... SaSu..................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Sacramento, CA.......... 89.60 01:56:00 01:38:00
Square).
747................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.60 01:46:00 01:39:00
Square).
748................................... SaSu..................... San Jose, CA............. Sacramento, CA.......... 135.00 03:03:00 02:34:00
749................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.60 01:56:00 01:39:00
Square).
751................................... SaSu..................... Sacramento, CA........... Oakland, CA (Jack London 89.60 01:56:00 01:39:00
Square).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capitol Limited
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29.................................... Daily.................... Washington Union Station. Chicago, IL............. 813.50 17:40:00 14:41:00
30.................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Washington Union Station 814.30 17:25:00 14:31:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cardinal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50.................................... TuThSa................... Chicago, IL.............. New York................ 1152.70 23:59:00 22:40:18
51.................................... WeFrSu................... New York................. Chicago, IL............. 1152.70 24:00:00 22:37:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carolinian
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
79.................................... M-F...................... New York................. Charlotte, NC........... 718.10 13:30:00 10:25:24
79.................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Charlotte, NC........... 718.10 13:38:00 10:25:24
80.................................... MoTuWeSa................. Charlotte, NC............ New York................ 717.70 13:50:00 10:28:12
80.................................... ThFrSu................... Charlotte, NC............ New York................ 717.70 13:50:00 10:28:12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cascades
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
500................................... M-F...................... Eugene-Springfield, OR... Seattle, WA............. 307.80 06:20:00 05:17:00
501................................... Daily.................... Seattle, WA.............. Portland, OR............ 186.40 03:30:00 03:00:00
502................................... SaSu..................... Portland, OR............. Seattle, WA............. 186.40 03:30:00 03:06:00
504................................... M-F...................... Portland, OR............. Seattle, WA............. 186.40 03:30:00 03:06:00
505................................... Daily.................... Seattle, WA.............. Eugene-Springfield, OR.. 307.80 06:20:00 05:11:00
506................................... SaSu..................... Eugene-Springfield, OR... Seattle, WA............. 307.80 06:30:00 05:17:00
507................................... Daily.................... Seattle, WA.............. Portland, OR............ 186.40 03:30:00 03:00:00
508................................... Daily.................... Eugene-Springfield, OR... Seattle, WA............. 307.80 06:20:00 05:17:00
511................................... M-F...................... Portland, OR............. Eugene-Springfield, OR.. 121.40 02:35:00 02:11:00
513................................... SaSu..................... Portland, OR............. Eugene-Springfield, OR.. 121.40 02:35:00 02:11:00
516................................... Daily.................... Seattle, WA.............. Vancouver, BC........... 156.00 04:00:00 03:29:00
517................................... Daily.................... Vancouver, BC............ Portland, OR............ 342.40 08:10:00 06:43:00
518................................... Daily.................... Portland, OR............. Vancouver, BC........... 342.40 08:00:00 06:35:00
519................................... Daily.................... Vancouver, BC............ Seattle, WA............. 156.00 04:10:00 03:43:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
City of New Orleans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
58.................................... Daily.................... New Orleans, LA.......... Chicago, IL............. 936.05 19:30:00 15:50:00
59.................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. New Orleans, LA......... 936.05 19:27:00 15:40:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coast Starlight
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11.................................... Daily.................... Seattle, WA.............. Los Angeles, CA......... 1379.40 35:15:00 27:22:00
14.................................... Daily.................... Los Angeles, CA.......... Seattle, WA............. 1379.40 33:46:00 27:18:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crescent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19.................................... Daily.................... New York................. New Orleans, LA......... 1393.40 26:14:00 24:45:30
20.................................... Daily.................... New Orleans, LA.......... New York................ 1393.30 26:46:00 24:43:18
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Downeaster
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
680................................... M-F...................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 145.06 03:20:00 03:03:30
681................................... M-F...................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:20:00 03:00:00
682................................... M-F...................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 145.06 03:20:00 03:03:30
683................................... M-F...................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:20:00 03:00:00
684................................... M-F...................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 145.06 03:20:00 03:04:30
685................................... M-F...................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:15:00 03:00:00
686................................... M-F...................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 145.06 03:20:00 03:03:30
687................................... M-F...................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:25:00 03:02:00
688................................... M-F...................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 145.06 03:20:00 03:03:30
689................................... M-F...................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:10:00 03:00:00
690................................... SaSu..................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 145.06 03:15:00 03:03:30
691................................... SaSu..................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:20:00 03:00:00
692................................... SaSu..................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 144.16 03:20:00 03:05:00
693................................... SaSu..................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:20:00 03:00:00
694................................... SaSu..................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 145.06 03:20:00 03:03:30
695................................... SaSu..................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:20:00 03:00:00
696................................... SaSu..................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 145.06 03:20:00 03:03:30
697................................... SaSu..................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:20:00 03:01:00
698................................... SaSu..................... Brunswick, ME............ Boston (North Station).. 144.16 03:20:00 03:05:00
699................................... SaSu..................... Boston (North Station)... Brunswick, ME........... 143.56 03:10:00 03:00:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Empire Builder
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27.................................... Daily.................... Spokane, WA.............. Portland, OR............ 345.90 07:35:00 06:30:00
28.................................... Daily.................... Portland, OR............. Spokane, WA............. 345.90 07:28:00 06:39:00
7..................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Seattle, WA............. 2135.01 46:10:00 38:00:00
8..................................... Daily.................... Seattle, WA.............. Chicago, IL............. 2135.21 45:15:00 37:50:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Empire Service
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
230................................... M-F...................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 130.70 02:20:00 02:10:00
232................................... M-F...................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.20 02:23:00 02:11:00
233................................... Daily.................... New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:29:00 02:11:00
234................................... M-F...................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.20 02:25:00 02:11:00
235................................... M-F...................... New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:29:00 02:11:00
236................................... M-F...................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.20 02:25:00 02:16:00
237................................... M-F...................... New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:24:00 02:09:00
238................................... Daily.................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.20 02:35:00 02:16:00
239................................... M-F...................... New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:40:00 02:10:00
241................................... Daily.................... New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:29:00 02:11:00
242................................... M-F...................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.20 02:33:00 02:16:00
243................................... M-F...................... New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 134.10 03:47:00 02:22:30
244................................... Daily.................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.20 02:35:00 02:12:00
245................................... M-F...................... New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:29:00 02:10:00
250................................... Fri-Sun.................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.00 02:30:00 02:15:00
252................................... FrSa..................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.00 02:30:00 02:15:00
253................................... Fri-Sun.................. New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:29:00 02:10:00
254................................... Sun...................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.00 02:35:00 02:11:00
255................................... Fri...................... New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:29:00 02:10:00
256................................... Sun...................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.00 02:35:00 02:15:00
259................................... Fri-Sun.................. New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:29:00 02:10:00
260................................... Fri-Sun.................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.00 02:30:00 02:15:00
261................................... Fri-Sun.................. New York................. Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 130.80 02:29:00 02:09:00
280................................... Daily.................... Albany/Rensselaer, NY.... New York................ 131.20 02:40:00 02:12:00
281................................... Daily.................... New York................. Niagara Falls, NY....... 448.50 08:50:00 07:18:00
283................................... Daily.................... New York................. Niagara Falls, NY....... 448.50 08:50:00 07:18:00
284................................... Daily.................... Niagara Falls, NY........ New York................ 446.90 08:58:00 07:22:00
288................................... Sun...................... Niagara Falls, NY........ New York................ 446.90 08:46:00 07:18:00
290................................... M-F...................... Rutland, Vt.............. New York................ 233.27 05:30:00 04:28:54
291................................... Daily.................... New York................. Rutland, Vt............. 232.88 05:31:00 04:29:00
292................................... FrSa..................... Rutland, Vt.............. New York................ 233.07 05:30:00 04:27:54
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heartland Flyer
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
821................................... Daily.................... Oklahoma City, OK........ Fort Worth, TX.......... 205.10 04:02:00 03:28:00
822................................... Daily.................... Fort Worth, TX........... Oklahoma City, OK....... 205.10 04:02:00 03:28:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hiawatha
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
329................................... M-F...................... Chicago, IL.............. Milwaukee, WI........... 85.50 01:29:00 01:19:00
330................................... Mo-Sa.................... Milwaukee, WI............ Chicago, IL............. 85.50 01:42:00 01:24:00
331................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Milwaukee, WI........... 85.50 01:29:00 01:19:00
332................................... Daily.................... Milwaukee, WI............ Chicago, IL............. 85.50 01:29:00 01:18:00
333................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Milwaukee, WI........... 85.50 01:29:00 01:19:00
334................................... Daily.................... Milwaukee, WI............ Chicago, IL............. 85.50 01:29:00 01:18:00
335................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Milwaukee, WI........... 85.50 01:29:00 01:19:00
336................................... Daily.................... Milwaukee, WI............ Chicago, IL............. 85.50 01:29:00 01:18:00
337................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Milwaukee, WI........... 85.50 01:29:00 01:19:00
338................................... Daily.................... Milwaukee, WI............ Chicago, IL............. 85.50 01:29:00 01:18:00
339................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Milwaukee, WI........... 85.50 01:37:00 01:22:00
340................................... Daily.................... Milwaukee, WI............ Chicago, IL............. 85.50 01:29:00 01:18:00
341................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Milwaukee, WI........... 85.50 01:29:00 01:19:00
342................................... Daily.................... Milwaukee, WI............ Chicago, IL............. 85.50 01:29:00 01:18:00
343................................... Fri...................... Chicago, IL.............. Milwaukee, WI........... 85.50 01:29:00 01:19:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illini/Saluki
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
390................................... Daily.................... Carbondale, IL........... Chicago, IL............. 313.75 05:30:00 04:42:00
391................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Carbondale, IL.......... 313.75 05:30:00 04:38:00
392................................... Daily.................... Carbondale, IL........... Chicago, IL............. 313.75 05:30:00 04:42:00
393................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Carbondale, IL.......... 313.75 05:30:00 04:38:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keystone
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
600................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:31:00 02:38:42
601................................... M-F...................... Phila. 30th St........... Harrisburg, PA.......... 104.25 01:50:00 01:32:00
605................................... M-F...................... Phila. 30th St........... Harrisburg, PA.......... 104.25 01:55:00 01:32:00
607................................... M-F...................... Phila. 30th St........... Harrisburg, PA.......... 104.25 01:45:00 01:25:48
609................................... M-F...................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:45:00 02:41:48
610................................... Sat...................... Harrisburg, PA........... Phila. 30th St.......... 102.45 01:45:00 01:31:24
611................................... Sat...................... Phila. 30th St........... Harrisburg, PA.......... 104.25 01:50:00 01:32:00
612................................... Sun...................... Harrisburg, PA........... Phila. 30th St.......... 102.45 01:50:00 01:31:24
615................................... Sun...................... Phila. 30th St........... Harrisburg, PA.......... 104.25 01:47:00 01:30:48
618................................... Mo-Th.................... Harrisburg, PA........... Phila. 30th St.......... 102.55 01:40:00 01:30:18
619................................... M-F...................... Phila. 30th St........... Harrisburg, PA.......... 104.25 01:51:00 01:32:00
620................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... Phila. 30th St.......... 102.55 01:41:00 01:29:48
622................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... Phila. 30th St.......... 102.55 01:41:00 01:29:48
637................................... Sun...................... New York................. Phila. 30th St.......... 90.60 01:21:00 01:08:00
639................................... M-F...................... New York................. Phila. 30th St.......... 90.60 01:24:00 01:09:30
640................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:30:00 02:43:36
641................................... M-F...................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:28:00 02:43:18
642................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:31:00 02:37:42
643................................... M-F...................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:19:00 02:39:36
644................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:10:00 02:33:06
645................................... M-F...................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:29:00 02:39:36
646................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:16:00 02:38:42
647................................... M-F...................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:18:00 02:36:00
648................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:10:00 02:33:06
649................................... M-F...................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:55:00 02:45:42
650................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:21:00 02:36:54
651................................... M-F...................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:26:00 02:41:00
652................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:49:00 02:48:54
653................................... M-F...................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:24:00 02:41:30
654................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:42:00 02:39:12
655................................... M-F...................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:29:00 02:45:00
656................................... M-F...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:28:00 02:39:42
658................................... Fri...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.15 03:20:00 02:38:36
660................................... SaSu..................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:29:00 02:43:12
661................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:19:00 02:41:00
662................................... Sat...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:29:00 02:39:42
663................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:35:00 02:43:00
664................................... SaSu..................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:19:00 02:37:42
665................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:29:00 02:40:48
666................................... SaSu..................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:37:00 02:39:42
667................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:31:00 02:41:00
669................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:27:00 02:40:48
670................................... SaSu..................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:27:00 02:39:42
671................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Harrisburg, PA.......... 194.85 03:36:00 02:41:00
672................................... SaSu..................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:29:00 02:39:42
674................................... Sun...................... Harrisburg, PA........... New York................ 193.05 03:29:00 02:39:42
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lake Shore Limited
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
448................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Boston--South Sta....... 206.60 21:30:00 20:14:00
449................................... Daily.................... Boston--South Sta........ Albany/Rensselaer, NY... 198.20 05:10:00 04:18:00
48.................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. New York................ 983.00 19:57:00 15:20:30
49.................................... Daily.................... New York................. Chicago, IL............. 980.20 19:10:00 15:00:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lincoln Service
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
300................................... Daily.................... St. Louis, MO............ Chicago, IL............. 281.30 05:25:00 04:47:00
301................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. St. Louis, MO........... 281.30 05:20:00 04:34:00
302................................... Daily.................... St. Louis, MO............ Chicago, IL............. 281.30 05:40:00 04:47:00
303................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. St. Louis, MO........... 281.30 05:35:00 04:46:00
304................................... Daily.................... St. Louis, MO............ Chicago, IL............. 281.30 05:40:00 04:47:00
305................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. St. Louis, MO........... 281.30 05:30:00 04:46:00
306................................... Daily.................... St. Louis, MO............ Chicago, IL............. 281.30 05:40:00 04:47:00
307................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. St. Louis, MO........... 281.30 05:30:00 04:46:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maple Leaf
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
63.................................... Daily.................... New York................. Toronto, ON............. 530.50 12:25:00 09:15:00
64.................................... Daily.................... Toronto, ON.............. New York................ 529.10 13:35:00 09:14:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri River Runner
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
311................................... Daily.................... St. Louis, MO............ Kansas City, MO......... 279.10 05:40:00 05:00:00
313................................... Daily.................... St. Louis, MO............ Kansas City, MO......... 279.10 05:40:00 05:00:00
314................................... Daily.................... Kansas City, MO.......... St. Louis, MO........... 279.10 05:40:00 04:59:00
316................................... Daily.................... Kansas City, MO.......... St. Louis, MO........... 279.10 05:40:00 04:59:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Northeast Regional
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
111................................... M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:37:00 02:55:30
121................................... Sun...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:24:00 02:45:30
122................................... Sun...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:16:00 02:53:24
123................................... Sun...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:30:00 02:49:30
124................................... SaSu..................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:29:00 02:53:12
125................................... M-F...................... New York................. Newport News............ 413.30 08:44:00 06:08:30
126................................... Sun...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:20:00 02:50:42
127................................... WeThFr................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:24:00 02:40:36
129................................... M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:26:00 02:48:36
130................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:30:00 02:53:12
131................................... Sat...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:36:00 02:51:00
132................................... Sun...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 08:42:00 06:31:48
133................................... Fri...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:21:00 02:41:06
134................................... ThFr:.................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:23:00 02:47:24
135................................... SaSu..................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 07:57:00 06:18:24
136................................... Fri...................... Washington Union Station. Springfield MA.......... 365.96 07:08:00 05:31:12
137................................... M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 08:12:00 06:15:24
138................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:31:00 02:58:42
139................................... Sun...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 07:50:00 06:15:36
140................................... SaSu..................... Washington Union Station. Springfield MA.......... 365.96 07:29:00 05:27:42
141................................... M-F...................... Springfield MA........... Washington Union Station 365.86 07:13:00 05:26:00
141................................... M-F...................... Springfield MA........... Washington Union Station 365.86 07:23:00 05:26:00
141................................... M-F...................... Springfield MA........... Washington Union Station 365.86 07:18:00 05:26:00
143................................... Sun...................... Springfield MA........... Washington Union Station 365.86 07:21:00 05:29:00
145................................... Sun...................... New York................. Roanoke, VA............. 452.40 08:52:00 07:14:30
146................................... Sat...................... Washington Union Station. Springfield MA.......... 365.96 06:57:00 05:26:42
147................................... Sat...................... Springfield MA........... Roanoke, VA............. 593.16 12:58:00 09:57:30
148................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Springfield MA.......... 365.16 07:25:00 05:31:12
149................................... Sun...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 08:27:00 06:17:36
150................................... SaSu..................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 08:00:00 06:19:18
150................................... Sat...................... New York................. Boston--South Sta....... 232.46 04:14:00 03:29:36
151................................... MoTu..................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:26:00 02:46:30
152................................... SaSu..................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:37:00 02:52:12
153................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:27:00 02:48:30
154................................... Sun...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:26:00 02:53:12
155................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:29:00 02:46:30
156................................... SaSu..................... Roanoke, VA.............. New York................ 452.40 09:06:00 07:27:12
157................................... Sun...................... Springfield MA........... Norfolk, VA............. 586.63 12:38:00 09:10:00
158................................... Sun...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:35:00 02:58:12
159................................... Sat...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:31:00 02:48:30
160................................... Sun...................... New York................. Boston--South Sta....... 232.46 04:17:00 03:26:12
160................................... SaSu..................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 07:53:00 06:17:30
161................................... SaSu..................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 07:53:00 06:17:54
162................................... Sun...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 08:02:00 06:22:00
163................................... Sat...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 07:58:00 06:17:36
164................................... SaSu..................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 08:07:00 06:32:18
164................................... SaSu..................... Richmond, VA............. Boston--South Sta....... 566.96 10:47:00 08:21:18
165................................... Sun...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 08:23:00 06:18:06
166................................... Sun...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 07:52:00 06:22:00
167................................... Sat...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 08:12:00 06:16:36
168................................... Sat...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 08:01:00 06:23:48
169................................... Sun...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 07:52:00 06:14:00
170................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 07:54:00 06:16:06
171................................... M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Roanoke, VA............. 684.16 13:40:00 10:55:24
172................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 08:03:00 06:27:24
172................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 07:53:00 06:20:24
173................................... M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 07:55:00 06:15:30
174................................... M-F...................... Newport News............. Boston--South Sta....... 645.86 13:10:00 09:43:24
175................................... M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 07:56:00 06:14:36
176................................... M-F...................... Roanoke, VA.............. Boston--South Sta....... 684.76 13:52:00 10:59:24
177................................... M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 08:06:00 06:24:00
178................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 08:18:00 06:23:48
179................................... M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ New York................ 231.66 04:09:00 03:26:54
180................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:14:00 02:49:24
181................................... SuTuWeFr................. New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:27:00 02:49:30
182................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:20:00 02:50:42
183................................... M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:24:00 02:43:00
184................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:25:00 02:52:12
185................................... M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:22:00 02:45:30
186................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:27:00 02:52:42
187................................... M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:21:00 02:43:00
189................................... [Sun..................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:29:00 02:47:30
190................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.56 07:54:00 06:16:24
190................................... M-F...................... New York................. Boston--South Sta....... 232.46 04:13:00 03:26:12
192................................... Sat...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:25:00 02:53:12
193................................... M-F...................... New York................. Washington Union Station 225.10 03:17:00 02:45:12
194................................... Sat...................... Newport News............. Boston--South Sta....... 645.76 12:48:00 09:40:24
195................................... SaSu..................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.56 07:52:00 06:15:42
195................................... SaSu..................... Boston--South Sta........ Richmond, VA............ 566.16 10:29:00 08:08:42
196................................... Mo-Th.................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:25:00 02:54:42
198................................... WeFr..................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:26:00 02:50:42
82.................................... Sat...................... Richmond, VA............. Boston--South Sta....... 566.96 10:51:00 08:15:54
82.................................... Sat...................... Washington Union Station. New York................ 225.10 03:26:00 02:53:42
84.................................... M-F...................... Norfolk, VA.............. New York................ 445.77 08:18:00 06:38:42
84.................................... M-F...................... Norfolk, VA.............. New York................ 445.77 08:15:00 06:35:12
85.................................... M-F...................... New York................. Richmond, VA............ 334.70 06:10:00 04:37:06
86.................................... M-F...................... Richmond, VA............. Boston--South Sta....... 567.06 10:38:00 08:14:24
86.................................... Wed...................... Washington Union Station. Boston--South Sta....... 457.36 07:58:00 06:17:24
87.................................... SaSu..................... New York................. Norfolk, VA............. 445.77 08:31:00 06:37:00
88.................................... SaSu..................... Norfolk, VA.............. Boston--South Sta....... 678.03 13:25:00 10:05:54
93.................................... Mo-Th.................... Boston--South Sta........ Norfolk, VA............. 677.63 13:01:00 09:59:30
93.................................... [Fri..................... Boston--South Sta........ Washington Union Station 456.76 07:48:00 06:15:30
94.................................... M-F...................... Norfolk, VA.............. Boston--South Sta....... 678.03 13:10:00 10:03:06
95.................................... M-F...................... Boston--South Sta........ Norfolk, VA............. 677.23 12:54:00 10:01:00
96.................................... Sun...................... Newport News............. Boston--South Sta....... 645.76 13:37:00 09:40:24
99.................................... SaSu..................... Boston--South Sta........ Newport News............ 644.56 12:26:00 09:44:06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pacific Surfliner
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1564.................................. SaSu..................... Los Angeles, CA.......... San Diego, CA........... 128.60 02:56:00 02:20:00
1584.................................. SaSu..................... Los Angeles, CA.......... San Diego, CA........... 128.40 02:59:00 02:20:00
1767.................................. SaSu..................... San Diego, CA............ Goleta, CA.............. 241.30 06:25:00 04:36:00
564................................... M-F...................... Los Angeles, CA.......... San Diego, CA........... 128.60 02:59:00 02:20:00
579................................... Daily.................... San Diego, CA............ Los Angeles, CA......... 128.60 03:01:00 02:22:00
580................................... Daily.................... Los Angeles, CA.......... San Diego, CA........... 128.60 02:52:00 02:20:00
584................................... M-F...................... Los Angeles, CA.......... San Diego, CA........... 128.40 02:54:00 02:20:00
593................................... Daily.................... San Diego, CA............ Los Angeles, CA......... 128.60 02:59:00 02:22:00
763................................... Daily.................... San Diego, CA............ Goleta, CA.............. 241.30 06:01:00 04:36:00
767................................... M-F...................... San Diego, CA G.......... oleta, CA............... 241.30 06:11:00 04:36:00
768................................... Daily.................... Goleta, CA............... San Diego, CA........... 241.30 06:15:00 04:42:00
774................................... Daily.................... Los Angeles, CA.......... San Diego, CA........... 128.60 02:55:00 02:20:00
777................................... Daily.................... San Diego, CA............ Goleta, CA.............. 241.30 05:51:00 04:36:00
785................................... Daily.................... San Diego, CA............ Los Angeles, CA......... 128.60 02:59:00 02:24:00
796................................... Daily.................... Goleta, CA............... San Diego, CA........... 241.30 06:27:00 04:35:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvanian
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42.................................... Daily.................... Pittsburgh, PA........... New York................ 430.65 09:20:00 07:23:54
43.................................... Daily.................... New York................. Pittsburgh, PA.......... 432.35 09:08:00 07:17:18
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Palmetto/Silver Service
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
89.................................... MoThSa................... New York................. Savannah, GA............ 835.50 15:01:00 12:01:54
90.................................... WeFrSu................... Savannah, GA............. New York................ 836.80 15:36:00 12:14:36
91.................................... Fri-Sun.................. New York................. Miami, FL............... 1521.50 30:55:00 25:08:30
92.................................... ThFrSa................... Miami, FL................ New York................ 1520.00 31:00:00 25:02:48
97.................................... Mo-Th.................... New York................. Miami, FL............... 1391.20 27:21:00 21:36:42
98.................................... SuMoTuWe................. Miami, FL................ New York................ 1391.20 26:50:00 21:26:30
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pere Marquette
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
370................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Grand Rapids, MI........ 176.83 04:04:00 03:45:00
371................................... Daily.................... Grand Rapids, MI......... Chicago, IL............. 176.03 04:08:00 03:45:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Piedmont
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
73.................................... Daily.................... Raleigh, NC.............. Charlotte, NC........... 183.10 03:10:00 02:48:00
74.................................... Daily.................... Charlotte, NC............ Raleigh, NC............. 182.70 03:11:00 02:49:00
75.................................... Daily.................... Raleigh, NC.............. Charlotte, NC........... 183.10 03:10:00 02:48:00
76.................................... Daily.................... Charlotte, NC............ Raleigh, NC............. 182.70 03:11:00 02:49:00
77.................................... Daily.................... Raleigh, NC.............. Charlotte, NC........... 183.10 03:10:00 02:48:00
78.................................... Daily.................... Charlotte, NC............ Raleigh, NC............. 182.70 03:11:00 02:49:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Joaquin
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
701................................... Daily.................... Bakersfield, CA.......... Sacramento, CA.......... 280.60 05:37:00 04:26:00
702................................... Daily.................... Sacramento, CA........... Bakersfield, CA......... 280.60 05:31:00 04:25:00
703................................... Daily.................... Bakersfield, CA.......... Sacramento, CA.......... 280.60 05:23:00 04:26:00
704................................... Daily.................... Sacramento, CA........... Bakersfield, CA......... 280.60 05:31:00 04:25:00
710................................... Daily.................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Bakersfield, CA......... 313.50 06:21:00 05:00:00
Square).
711................................... Daily.................... Bakersfield, CA.......... Oakland, CA (Jack London 313.50 06:15:00 05:01:00
Square).
712................................... Daily.................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Bakersfield, CA......... 313.40 06:21:00 05:00:00
Square).
713................................... Daily.................... Bakersfield, CA.......... Oakland, CA (Jack London 313.50 06:15:00 05:01:00
Square).
714................................... Daily.................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Bakersfield, CA......... 313.40 06:21:00 05:00:00
Square).
715................................... Daily.................... Bakersfield, CA.......... Oakland, CA (Jack London 313.50 06:15:00 05:01:00
Square).
716................................... Daily.................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Bakersfield, CA......... 313.50 06:21:00 05:00:00
Square).
717................................... Daily.................... Bakersfield, CA.......... Oakland, CA (Jack London 313.50 06:18:00 05:01:00
Square).
718................................... Daily.................... Oakland, CA (Jack London Bakersfield, CA......... 313.50 06:21:00 05:00:00
Square).
719................................... Daily.................... Bakersfield, CA.......... Oakland, CA (Jack London 313.50 06:17:00 05:01:00
Square).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Southwest Chief
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3..................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Los Angeles, CA......... 2321.50 43:10:00 36:32:00
4..................................... Daily.................... Los Angeles, CA.......... Chicago, IL............. 2321.50 42:50:00 36:34:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Springfield Shuttles
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
400................................... SaSu..................... Springfield MA........... Greenfield.............. 38.31 01:08:00 00:59:00
409................................... Sun...................... Springfield MA........... New Haven CT............ 65.30 01:22:00 01:14:36
417................................... M-F...................... Springfield MA........... New Haven CT............ 65.30 01:23:00 01:14:36
450................................... Sat...................... New Haven CT............. Springfield MA.......... 65.10 01:23:00 01:16:06
460................................... Sun...................... New Haven CT............. Springfield MA.......... 65.10 01:23:00 01:16:06
461................................... SaSu..................... Greenfield............... New Haven CT............ 103.61 02:41:00 02:06:36
463................................... Sat...................... Springfield MA........... New Haven CT............ 65.30 01:22:00 01:14:36
464................................... SaSu..................... New Haven CT............. Springfield MA.......... 65.10 01:24:00 01:16:06
465................................... Sun...................... Springfield MA........... New Haven CT............ 65.30 01:23:00 01:14:36
467................................... Sat...................... Springfield MA........... New Haven CT............ 65.30 01:22:00 01:14:36
470................................... M-F...................... New Haven CT............. Springfield MA.......... 65.10 01:23:00 01:16:06
471................................... M-F...................... Greenfield............... New Haven CT............ 103.61 02:43:00 02:06:36
473................................... M-F...................... Springfield MA........... New Haven CT............ 65.30 01:23:00 01:14:36
474................................... M-F...................... New Haven CT............. Springfield MA.......... 65.10 01:25:00 01:16:06
475................................... M-F...................... Springfield MA........... New Haven CT............ 65.30 01:23:00 01:14:36
476................................... M-F...................... New Haven CT............. Springfield MA.......... 65.10 01:23:00 01:16:06
478................................... M-F...................... New Haven CT............. Greenfield.............. 103.41 02:43:00 02:14:36
488................................... SaSu..................... New Haven CT............. Greenfield.............. 103.41 02:53:00 02:15:06
494................................... M-F...................... New Haven CT............. Greenfield.............. 103.41 02:48:00 02:14:36
495................................... M-F...................... Greenfield............... New Haven CT............ 103.61 02:42:00 02:06:36
499................................... SaSu..................... Greenfield............... Springfield MA.......... 38.31 01:08:00 00:52:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sunset Limited
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1..................................... SuTuFr................... New Orleans, LA.......... Los Angeles, CA......... 2004.40 46:35:00 34:59:00
2..................................... WeFrSu................... Los Angeles, CA.......... New Orleans, LA......... 2004.40 45:40:00 34:59:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Texas Eagle
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21.................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. San Antonio, TX......... 1307.30 32:10:00 24:22:00
22.................................... Daily.................... San Antonio, TX.......... Chicago, IL............. 1307.10 30:52:00 24:30:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vermonter
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
54.................................... SaSu..................... Washington Union Station. St. Albans, VT.......... 621.87 13:20:00 10:07:48
55.................................... M-F...................... St. Albans, VT........... Washington Union Station 621.57 12:47:00 10:01:48
56.................................... M-F...................... Washington Union Station. St. Albans, VT.......... 621.07 12:40:00 10:00:18
57.................................... SaSu..................... St. Albans, VT........... Washington Union Station 621.57 13:13:00 10:08:06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wolverine
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pure
Total Total Time Running
Train # Days of Operation Origin Destination Miles (hh:mm:ss) Time
(hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
350................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Pontiac, MI............. 310.30 06:19:00 05:11:00
351................................... Daily.................... Pontiac, MI.............. Chicago, IL............. 312.10 05:42:00 04:58:00
352................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Pontiac, MI............. 312.90 06:14:00 05:07:00
353................................... Daily.................... Pontiac, MI.............. Chicago, IL............. 312.10 06:05:00 05:03:00
354................................... Daily.................... Chicago, IL.............. Pontiac, MI............. 312.90 06:05:00 05:07:00
355................................... Daily.................... Pontiac, MI.............. Chicago, IL............. 312.10 06:05:00 05:05:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix B
as referenced in question G.4
Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Arthur Maratea, National
President, Transportation Communications Union
Question 1. Your testimony included an analysis that examined the
financial result of Amtrak furloughing 3,190 employees for one year.
However, Amtrak President Bill Flynn testified to the fact that Amtrak
would instead be furloughing 2,000 employees. In light of this new
information, please submit an amended version of your ``Amtrak savings
and costs associated with furloughing employees'' spreadsheet that
reflects the financial result of the updated employee furlough number.
Answer. Thank you for your question regarding our analysis of the
total cost of furloughs to Amtrak and taxpayers. Per your request, we
have updated our analysis to calculate based on Amtrak's September 2nd,
2020 announcement that it intends to furlough at least 2,000 employees
on October 1st, 2020. Please see the updated savings and costs
spreadsheet attached.
NOTE: The following is in response to Chairman Peter DeFazio's Question
for the Record (QFR) for the September 9th, 2020 hearing ``Amtrak's
Response to COVID-19'', before the House Railroads Subcommittee. This
updated cost/savings analysis recalculates based on Amtrak's proposed
furlough of 2,000 employees on Oct. 1st, 2020.
Amtrak saving & costs associated w/furloughing 2,000 employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak's Proposed Savings (via FY21 Supplemental)
Assumed base figures
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY19 total employees (per Amtrak FY19 year-end 18,600
corporate profile):.................................
FY21 total expected employees (FY19 minus proposed 16,600
workforce reductions)...............................
Proposed employee furloughs (Amtrak announced 2000 2,000
furloughs on 9/2/2020)..............................
Average Amtrak salary:............................... $87,847
Amtrak's proposed total salary cost savings:....... $175,694,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TCU's calculated costs associated w/furloughing 2,000 employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lost H&W Contributions............................... $5,472,000
RUI--Regular......................................... $41,600,000
RUI--Expansion (+$600)............................... $46,800,000
Est. increased RUIA Experience Rate taxes on Amtrak.. $28,785,906
VSIP costs........................................... $7,360,000
Estimated increased Healthcare costs (from increased $4,800,000
utilization)........................................
Est. cost to retrain employees (based on rehiring $19,366,400
same number of ``proposed furloughs''):.............
------------------
Total Amtrak/taxpayer costs for fuloughing:........ $154,184,306
ACTUAL net savings from furloughing 2,000 $21,509,694
employees:......................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lost Health & Welfare (H&W) Contributions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs.......................... 2,000
Monthly employee HC contribution:.................... $228
Monthly total employee HC contribution:.............. $456,000
Annual total employee HC contributions............. $5,472,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) Costs--Regular
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs.......................... 2,000
Weekly RUI (per employee):........................... $400
Weekly RUI Costs (total):............................ $800,000
Total RUI expansion costs (52 weeks available):.... $41,600,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI)--Expansion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs.......................... 2,000
Weekly RUI expansion (per employee):................. $600
Weekly RUI Costs (total):............................ $1,200,000
Total RUI expansion costs (39 weeks available):.... $46,800,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RUI Employer Tax Increases \**\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak compensation base subject to RUI Experience $298,000,000
Rate taxes (only applies to first $20k in comp. per
employee):..........................................
Est. 2022 RUI Experience Rate........................ 3.28%
Est. 2022 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $9,774,400
Est. 2023 RUI Experience Rate........................ 3.25%
Est. 2023 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $9,685,000
Est. 2024 RUI Experience Rate........................ 1.74%
Est. 2024 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $5,185,200
Est. 2025 RUI Experience Rate........................ 1.12%
Est. 2025 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $3,337,600
Est. 2026 RUI Experience Rate........................ 0.27%
Est. 2026 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:........... $803,706
------------------
Est. Experience Rate total cost as a direct result $28,785,906
of furloughs:.....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
226 management x $20k buyout......................... $4,520,000
284 agreement x $10k buyout.......................... $2,840,000
------------------
Total VSIP cost:................................... $7,360,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Healthcare Costs (not including vision/dental)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furloughed Employees................................. 2,000
Amtrak healthcare costs, per employee, per month $2,500
(avg)...............................................
Amtrak's monthly healthcare costs for furloughed $5,000,000
employees...........................................
Amtrak's annual healthcare costs for furloughed $60,000,000
employees...........................................
Est. percentage increase in healthcare costs due to 8%
increased utilization: \***\........................
2021 premium increase in usage est................. $4,800,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak's cost to train new hires (post-pandemic)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report: ``Amtrak spends between $40-45 million on $42,500,000
training each year'':...............................
Report: ``More than half spent on new employees'' $22,100,000
(Extrapolation: multiply by 52%)...................
Report: ``Amtrak hired 1097 new employees over first 1,097
6 months of 2009''..................................
Extrapolate annual new hires by multiplying x2)...... 2194
2009 training costs per new hire (divide new hire $10,073
training costs / Est. 2009 total new hires) =.......
Adj. for inflation, expressed in 2020 $$............. $12,104
New hires to retrain after pandemic: 80% of those 1,600
furloughed don't return.............................
Cost to train new hires after pandemic:............ $19,366,400
Source: Amtrak OIG report on Training and Employee Development (2009)
https://amtrakoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/
Training%20Eval%20Report%20Final.pdf...................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\**\ NOTE: RUIA taxes on employers expand and contract based on
utilization of the RUI system. Part of the tax calculation is based on
a railroad employers individual ``experience rating''--a calculation
of how much they utilize RUI. This rate varies from the minimum of
0.65% to a maximum 12% based on the employer's experience rating. The
tax is also based on a 5 year average of the company's utilization of
RUI, and is a measure of their usage versus their remaining
compensation base. Furthermore, the application of the tax is capped
at $20k per employee, lowering the taxable base. Our calculations are
based on a 5-year impact to Amtrak's experience rate tax, derived from
acquired knowledge of another large railroad that recently experienced
similar furlough trends.
\***\ NOTE: Rail labor estimates that, on average, employees that retain
their health insurance after being furloughed increase their
utilization by 8% during their remaining covered period. This is based
on previous experiences with groups of furloughed members. This is
also backed up by a National Institute of Health (NIH) study that
looked at the healthcare utilization of workers at plants where
furloughs had been announced during the Great Recession (https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4874827/): ``In particular, it
suggests an increase in overall utilization concerning for
``hoarding'' of health care or worsening health, but a relative
decrease in outpatient care and increase in emergency care among those
at high-layoff plants. The latter results confirm findings from the
previous literature that suggest foregone preventive care among
employed individuals during economic downturns with potentially
negative long-term health consequences. This study suggests that the
health and social impacts of increased job insecurity experienced by
workers during the recent recession may still emerge even as the
economy improves.''
Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Jim Mathews, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Rail Passengers Association
Question 1. Your testimony included an analysis that examined the
financial result of Amtrak reducing service on its long-distance routes
to three times per week. Please submit any economic impact analyses
that you have for individual states.
Answer. As you know, the analysis we prepared for our September 9th
testimony focused on six of Amtrak's existing 12 daily long-distance
National Network routes. In response to your question, we performed
additional analysis on the effects of three-times weekly service on 30
served states. Please note, our state-level analyses on these issues
address only the long-distance routes through a given state. We did not
calculate the inevitable effects from cutbacks on state-supported
business lines in those same states, nor did we account for connections
between state-supported services and long-distance routes. As a result,
we believe these numbers are more than conservative.
Overall, Rail Passengers' analysis found that we can expect the
long-distance service cuts to eliminate about 4.7 million annual
riders, and that would drive a total annualized loss of at least $2.3
billion to the economies of those states--a figure that is well beyond
either any savings Amtrak might be able to claim from the service
reductions, or the typical annual appropriation used to support the
operation of these routes.
This figure encompasses Direct effects, which includes factors such
as visitor spending, avoided travel costs versus other modes, effects
from reduced pollution and the effects of reduced vehicle-miles
traveled per passenger on road maintenance and road fatalities and
incidents.
Our model also includes Indirect factors, such as the effects on
sales tax collections, real-estate, and additional local employment.
Our model is based on passenger-rail's quantifiable, observable
role as an economic engine in the communities it serves. Most benefit-
cost models look only at factors such as number of riders, fares
collected, direct operating expense and related areas. But the
existence of Amtrak buoys the economies of hundreds of towns and cities
all across America--in fact, we estimate that the long-distance
National Network alone produces nearly $5 billion each year in economic
benefits, plus another $2 billion in Amtrak spending nationwide.
Degrading that service means withdrawing those benefits from millions
of Americans, even those who don't necessarily ride the trains
themselves, because in many cases lives and livelihoods depend on the
routes' operation.
Whether traveling for vacation, personal reasons or business,
visitors spend money at their destinations, paying for hotels or other
lodging, patronizing restaurants, shopping or buying local items. By
doing this they support the hotel workers, the restaurant waiters and
cooks, retail and entertainment outlets, and they generate sales tax
revenues for the communities they visit.
Those local workers in turn also contribute to the local tax base,
further spreading the economic benefit. Meanwhile, because those
visitors have left their cars behind, they're not imposing wear and
tear on highways and roads, and they're avoiding the risk and cost of
injuries or even death from car crashes.
Cutting service drives down ridership and by doing so reduces these
benefits.
We have produced three tables which detail the results of this
analysis for each of the 30 states considered. The first table is a
summary ranking the economic losses by state. The second table ranks
the states by ridership losses. The third table supplies the state-by-
state detail.
Table 1_States Ranked By Economic Losses Table 2_States Ranked
By Ridership Losses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............. California......... $519,800,803....... 1............. Illinois.......... 849,266
2............. Illinois........... $403,676,817....... 2............. Florida........... 594,948
3............. Florida............ $278,443,713....... 3............. California........ 541,797
4............. Texas.............. $256,434,548....... 4............. Virginia.......... 326,367
5............. Virginia........... $142,177,506....... 5............. Washington........ 237,719
6............. Washington......... $106,826,168....... 6............. Texas............. 196,283
7............. North Carolina..... $77,992,755........ 7............. Oregon............ 181,963
8............. Colorado........... $72,644,114........ 8............. Colorado.......... 177,588
9............. South Carolina..... $55,059,008........ 9............. Pennsylvania...... 172,244
10............ Pennsylvania....... $48,914,041........ 10............ North Carolina.... 160,275
11............ Oregon............. $43,431,309........ 11............ Missouri.......... 120,454
12............ Montana............ $38,158,312........ 12............ South Carolina.... 117,683
13............ Georgia............ $34,306,923........ 13............ Louisiana......... 115,995
14............ Missouri........... $31,029,227........ 14............ Georgia........... 93,132
15............ Wisconsin.......... $28,510,460........ 15............ Minnesota......... 86,725
16............ Louisiana.......... $27,768,541........ 16............ Mississippi....... 80,859
17............ Mississippi........ $24,193,548........ 17............ Montana........... 79,746
18............ Minnesota.......... $22,801,058........ 18............ Maryland.......... 78,775
19............ New Mexico......... $22,682,457........ 19............ New Mexico........ 76,746
20............ North Dakota....... $18,774,381........ 20............ North Dakota...... 66,437
21............ Indiana............ $17,674,277........ 21............ Arizona........... 65,451
22............ Arizona............ $16,450,744........ 22............ Wisconsin......... 62,698
23............ Maryland........... $15,557,269........ 23............ Indiana........... 58,030
24............ Nebraska........... $8,817,043......... 24............ Tennessee......... 42,616
25............ Kansas............. $8,158,626......... 25............ Iowa.............. 33,842
26............ Iowa............... $7,115,380......... 26............ Alabama........... 33,642
27............ Alabama............ $5,974,693......... 27............ Nebraska.......... 32,646
28............ Tennessee.......... $3,845,363......... 28............ Kansas............ 30,546
29............ Delaware........... $1,661,800......... 29............ Delaware.......... 27,818
30............ Idaho.............. $383,258........... 30............ Idaho............. 4,420
--------------------- -------------------
$2,339,264,141..... 4,746,712
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3--Detailed Analysis Results By State
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Economic Losses By State Estimated Ridership Declines (annualized)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indirect Total State FY2019 RPA-Modeled 3x Annualized
Direct Losses Effects\\ Impact Ridership Ridership Ridership Loss
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama.............................................. $2,418,904 $3,555,789 $5,974,693 51,195 17,553 33,642
Arizona.............................................. $6,660,220 $9,790,524 $9,790,524 99,600 34,149 65,451
California........................................... $210,445,669 $309,355,134 $519,800,803 824,473 282,676 541,797
Colorado............................................. $29,410,573 $43,233,542 $72,644,114 270,242 92,654 177,588
Delaware............................................. $672,794 $989,007 $1,661,800 42,332 14,514 27,818
Florida.............................................. $112,730,248 $165,713,465 $278,443,713 905,356 310,408 594,948
Georgia.............................................. $13,889,443 $20,417,481 $34,306,923 141,722 48,590 93,132
Idaho................................................ $155,165 $228,093 $383,258 6,726 2,306 4,420
Illinois............................................. $163,431,910 $240,244,907 $403,676,817 1,292,361 443,095 849,266
Iowa................................................. $2,880,721 $4,234,659 $7,115,380 51,499 17,657 33,842
Indiana.............................................. $7,155,578 $10,518,699 $17,674,277 88,307 30,277 58,030
Kansas............................................... $3,303,087 $4,855,539 $8,158,626 46,483 15,937 30,546
Louisiana............................................ $11,242,324 $16,526,217 $27,768,541 176,514 60,519 115,995
Maryland............................................. $6,298,489 $9,258,779 $15,557,269 119,875 41,100 78,775
Minnesota............................................ $9,231,198 $13,569,861 $22,801,058 131,973 45,248 86,725
Mississippi.......................................... $9,794,959 $14,398,590 $24,193,548 123,046 42,187 80,859
Missouri............................................. $12,562,440 $18,466,787 $31,029,227 183,300 62,846 120,454
Montana.............................................. $15,448,709 $22,709,603 $38,158,312 121,352 41,606 79,746
Nebraska............................................. $3,569,653 $5,247,390 $8,817,043 49,679 17,033 32,646
New Mexico........................................... $9,183,181 $13,499,276 $22,682,457 116,788 40,042 76,746
North Carolina....................................... $31,576,014 $46,416,741 $77,992,755 243,896 83,621 160,275
North Dakota......................................... $7O,600,964 $11,173,417 $18,774,381 101,100 34,663 66,437
Oregon............................................... $17,583,526 $25,847,783 $43,431,309 276,900 94,937 181,963
Pennsylvania......................................... $19,803,256 $29,110,786 $48,914,041 262,110 89,866 172,244
South Carolina....................................... $22,291,096 $32,767,911 $55,059,008 179,083 61,400 117,683
Tennessee............................................ $1,556,827 $2,288,536 $3,845,363 64,851 22,235 42,616
Texas................................................ $103,819,655 $152,614,893 $256,434,548 298,692 102,409 196,283
Washington........................................... $43,249,461 $63,576,708 $106,826,168 361,747 124,028 237,719
Wisconsin............................................ $11,542,696 $16,967,763 $28,510,460 95,410 32,712 62,698
Virginia............................................. $57,561,743 $84,615,762 $142,177,506 496,646 170,279 326,367
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Rail Passengers Association modeling estimate
\\ Indirect effects include community-level effects such as sales taxes, real-estate, local employment and other similar factors