[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING THE THREAT FROM ISIS
AND AL-QAEDA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 24, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-72
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
43-090 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey John Katko, New York
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Mark Walker, North Carolina
J. Luis Correa, California Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Max Rose, New York Mark Green, Tennessee
Lauren Underwood, Illinois John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Michael Guest, Mississippi
Al Green, Texas Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Val Butler Demings, Florida
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Max Rose, New York, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mark Walker, North Carolina,
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Ranking Member
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Peter T. King, New York
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Mark Green, Tennessee
officio) Mike Rogers, Alabama (ex officio)
Sandeep Prasanna, Subcommittee Staff Director
Mandy Bowers, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Max Rose, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Mark Walker, a Representative in Congress From the
State of North Carolina, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Witnesses
Mr. Michael Morell, Former Acting and Deputy Director, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA):
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Former Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for Political-Military Affairs, Former Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
EXAMINING THE THREAT FROM ISIS
AND AL-QAEDA
----------
Wednesday, June 24, 2020
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:02 a.m.,
via Webex, Hon. Max Rose (Chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Rose, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Slotkin, Thompson (ex officio), Walker, and Green.
Mr. Rose. OK, folks. Want to thank you all so much for
coming together for this subcommittee hearing examining the
threat from ISIS and al-Qaeda.
I am going to start off with an opening statement, and then
Ranking Member Walker will do so as well, and then we will go
into a brief order of process. Then we can really get to what
we want to do here, which is listen, to hear from our esteemed
panel, which we are just overjoyed and so honored to have here
with us here today.
OK. I guess we are waiting for Ranking Member Walker. We
will do that for a minute or two. He is apparently trying to
log on.
OK. Ranking Member Walker is on. Thank you, sir, for
joining us. It is good to see you.
Mr. Walker. Glad to be here, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rose. All right. We will get going.
OK. This hearing is held, as you all know, it is an on-
going global pandemic. The shifting of U.S. National security
priorities to resurgence of ISIS and the al-Qaeda demonstrated
endurance. Recent reporting has shown that actions by
international terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda remain a
persistent and pervasive threat to U.S. interests abroad and
the homeland.
This hearing will provide us with an opportunity to discuss
the current threat picture from these groups, how they fit into
our evolving National security challenges and policy challenges
that the Federal Government faces and how we can effectively
counter them. It is no secret that we are divided amongst many
competing priorities right now. But as I am sure, judging by
their testimonies that our witnesses will attest to, no matter
how many competing priorities we are faced with, the threat of
terrorism and the threat from ISIS and al-Qaeda does not
recede; it only complicates our efforts to address them.
ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to take advantage of vulnerable
populations, distracted governments, spreading their
propaganda, recruiting new members, taking advantage of safe
havens. They surely--and this is one thing that I know many of
us are going to hear about today is, how have they capitalized
on the instability of COVID-19? It is also clear that this
resurgence has not happened in a vacuum, and the geopolitical
priorities of the American people are shifting.
One thing that we would like to hear from today is, yes,
what are the fights that we must continue, what are the areas
in which we must show resilience, but what are the areas where
we cannot and should not be chasing ghosts? What are the areas
in which we maybe don't seek perfect stability? But on the same
end, we do not see a threat to the homeland.
It is clear as day that many of the American people are
united by the fact that they want to see us invest at home. But
as a New Yorker, I can tell you this, that the memory of 9/11
lives on. Not just a memory of 9/11, but the memory of a myriad
of other terrorist attacks that have occurred since then. How
do we respect the will of the American people all the while
keeping them safe?
To move on, I also, and I know many of us share this, would
love to hear about the importance of coalition building in this
effort. How do we, not just proactively and robustly, but how
do we efficiently and effectively fight the terroristic threat?
Particularly, the jihadist terrorist threat. How do we fight it
involving intelligence share, and how do we fight it involving
partner forces? Then, how do we fight the terrorist threat of
today, not just yesterday? We are certainly seeing a
resurgence.
In March, ISIS prisoners in Syria rioted; some appear to
have escaped. In April, members of an ISIS cell in Germany were
arrested after a plan to attack a U.S. Air Force base in the
country. In May, a Florida man was arrested who planned and
attempted to carry out a mass shooting in the name of the
Islamic State. Days later, the suspect's sister was shot dead
after attempting to stab a local law enforcement officer. Just
last month, the Department of Justice released information that
determined the terrorist attack on the Pensacola military base
in December was connected with an al-Qaeda affiliate group in
Yemen.
In addition, we would also love to hear today how can we
hold technology companies, particularly social media companies,
accountable? How do we innovate in and around this space,
understanding that the most likely threat we face comes from
that of someone who has been radicalized on-line, often without
traveling? What have we learned from the recent case in
Pensacola about how jihadists and terrorists are communicating
with al-Qaeda affiliates overseas?
Nearly two decades after the September 11 attacks at home,
we are at a crossroads in this rapidly-changing security
environment. We have to seriously reevaluate and update
America's approach to combatting terrorism. As a New Yorker and
as a patriot and as someone who is honored to stand today,
saying in a bipartisan manner, that we need to continue to
fight terrorism at home and abroad.
We thank the witness and the Members for being here today.
I look forward to making progress on this important issue.
[The statement of Chairman Rose follows:]
Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Max Rose
June 24, 2020
This hearing is being held amidst an on-going global pandemic, the
shifting of U.S. National security priorities, the resurgence of ISIS,
and al-Qaeda's demonstrated endurance. Recent reporting has shown that
the actions by international terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda
remain a persistent and pervasive threat to U.S. interests abroad and
the homeland.
This hearing will provide us with an opportunity to discuss the
current threat picture from these groups, how they fit into our
evolving National security challenges, and policy changes the Federal
Government can take to effectively counter them as the Government's
attention is divided among competing priorities. Abroad and at home,
ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to take advantage of vulnerable populations
and distracted governments to spread their propaganda, recruit new
members, and establish regional safe havens. It is also no surprise
that these groups have capitalized on the instability caused by COVID-
19. But this resurgence has not happened in a vacuum.
These groups continue to exploit the administration's short-
sightedness and lack of strategic thinking to regroup and reinvigorate
their operations. In Iraq alone, attacks from ISIS have rebounded--even
increased steadily since mid-2019. According to a recent report by the
U.N. Security Council, the Taliban continues to back al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan despite reaching an agreement with the administration to
draw down American troops.
Beyond the Middle East, ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates have also been
exerting influence and even competing for dominance in West Africa.
Their territorial claims threaten the stability of important regional
partners and the gains American diplomats, trainers, and advisors have
made over the last decade to strengthen the rule of law and bolster
economic development across the continent.
Diminishing the emphasis on dismantling terrorist networks in
Africa will allow for safe havens to exist just as when Osama bin Laden
operated al-Qaeda from Sudan in the 1990's. Additionally, I am deeply
concerned that the administration effectively abandoned the Kurds, our
allies in the Middle East, last year, and temporarily paused U.S.
counterterrorism operations in the region earlier this year.
Coalition building, effective diplomacy, and keeping our word--
these are all pivotal to the disruption of world-wide terrorist
threats. I fear these actions have hurt our Nation's standing around
the world, sending a signal to our current and future allies that the
United States will break its commitments when convenient. We must do
better. That starts with reassessing threats to the homeland as they
evolve around the world.
In March, ISIS prisoners in Syria rioted, and some appear to have
even escaped, threatening our security and regional stability. In
April, members of an ISIS cell in Germany were arrested after they
planned to attack a U.S. Air Force base in the country.
In May, a Florida man was arrested who planned and attempted to
carry out a mass shooting in the name of the Islamic State. Days later,
the suspect's sister was shot dead after attempting to stab a local law
enforcement officer. Just last month, the Department of Justice
released information that determined the terror attack on the Pensacola
military base in December was connected with an al-Qaeda affiliate
group in Yemen.
Although Department officials stopped short of saying the al-Qaeda
affiliate directed the attack, they admitted that the gunman
coordinated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula by sharing ``plans
and tactics.'' We have since learned that gaps in our information
sharing and vetting systems, as well a failure of current policies,
resulted in the attack that took the lives of 3 U.S. sailors and
injured 8 other Americans.
Just a few days ago, the threat of jihadist terrorism and the
threat of white supremacist terrorism intersected when we learned that
a white supremacist U.S. Army Private shared Classified information
about overseas troop movements with al-Qaeda, admitting that his goal
was to kill as many U.S. service members as possible.
Nearly 2 decades after the September 11 attacks at home, we're at a
crossroads in this rapidly-changing security environment and need to
seriously re-evaluate and update the American approach to combatting
extremism. I look forward to a conversation discussing how the
Government can effectively prioritize this threat amid competing
priorities.
Mr. Rose. I would like to now recognize the Ranking Member
of this subcommittee, the gentleman from North Carolina,
someone I sincerely respect and admire, consider a dear friend,
Mr. Walker, for his opening statement.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Chairman Rose. I appreciate your
passion about this. You have been relentless on this since Day
1. This isn't just a political talking point on you; this is
something from your heart, I admire that, and I want to applaud
you and continue to support you to do this. I apologize also
for being a couple of minutes late there.
This hearing is important. While I wish we were meeting in
person, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the continued
threat linked to Islamist terrorism.
Al-Qaeda declared war on the United States in 1996, and
followed up their words with the 1998 United States Embassy
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole
and the direct attack on the homeland on September 11, 2001.
From that, ISIS spawned from a split with al-Qaeda around 2013.
The new organization implemented an even more brutal and
violent ideology, killing and enslaving minority groups and
beheading their hostages. Their message appealed to 30,000-plus
foreigners--30,000--who traveled to join them, including over
200 Americans.
After years of persistent counterterrorism pressure, both
terror groups have suffered major territorial and leadership
losses. However, the terror threat did not remain overseas. The
FBI has testified on multiple occasions that they have over
2,000 open investigations between al-Qaeda and ISIS supporters
across the United States.
Over the past few years, we have seen a rise in competing
threats that have resulted in a diversion of resources that
risk creating an opening for terror organizations to regroup.
There is no doubt that the threat posed by nation-states is
increasing, particularly in cyber space. We have seen a rise in
global White supremacy extremism and domestic terrorism.
I applaud the Trump administration for recognizing the
challenge of emerging and competing threats in the 2018
National Strategy for Counterterrorism and for focusing on the
need to use counterterrorism to address these threats without
losing focus on those posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS.
As a Nation, we are also challenged with terrorism fatigue.
After nearly 2 decades of military action in Afghanistan, the
American public is ready for military forces to come home.
While I share this goal, it is essential that we maintain the
ability to deploy counterterrorism capabilities and gather
necessary intelligence to prevent power vacuums while
terrorists can regroup and plot.
I am also very concerned about reports that al-Qaeda and
ISIS-linked groups are expanding in Africa and Southeast Asia.
We have seen this movie before. After 9/11, al-Qaeda was able
to spread affiliate groups in Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere,
where they continued plotting, radicalizing, and carrying out
attacks. Maintaining counterterrorism pressure and coordinating
with the international community, we need to ensure that these
new hotspots do not turn into operational safe havens.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today about
the current state of al-Qaeda and ISIS and their
recommendations on how to implement a new strategy to counter
the terror threat.
Before closing, again, I want to congratulate Chairman Rose
on the birth of his first child a few months ago in this new
season. My best wishes to you and your family, Max. I
appreciate you very much.
Thank you, and I yield back time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Walker follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Mark Walker
June 24, 2020
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing. While I wish we
were meeting in person, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
continued threat linked to Islamist terrorism. Al-Qaeda declared war on
the United States in 1996 and followed up their words with the 1998
United States embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 attack
on the U.S.S. Cole, and the direct attack on the homeland on September
11, 2001. ISIS spawned from a split with al-Qaeda around 2013. This new
terror organization implemented an even more brutal and violent
ideology, killing and enslaving minority groups and beheading hostages.
Their message appealed to 30,000-plus foreigners who traveled to join
them, including over 200 Americans.
After years of persistent counterterrorism pressure, both terror
groups have suffered major territorial and leadership losses. However,
the terror threat has not remained overseas. The FBI has testified on
multiple occasions that they have over 2,000 open investigations
between al-Qaeda and ISIS supporters across the United States.
Over the past few years, we have seen a rise in competing threats
that have resulted in a diversion of resources that risk creating an
opening for terror organizations to regroup. There is no doubt that the
threat posed by nation-states is increasing, particularly in cyber
space, and we have seen a rise in global white supremacy extremism and
domestic terrorism.
I applaud the Trump administration for recognizing the challenge of
emerging and competing threats in the 2018 National Strategy for
Counterterrorism, and for focusing on the need to use our
counterterrorism tool kit to address these threats without losing focus
on those posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS.
As a Nation, we are also challenged with ``terrorism fatigue.''
After nearly 2 decades of military action in Afghanistan, the American
public is ready for military forces to come home. While I share this
goal, it is essential that we maintain the ability to deploy
counterterrorism capabilities and gather necessary intelligence to
prevent power vacuums where terrorists can regroup and plot.
I am also very concerned about reports that al-Qaeda and ISIS-
linked groups are expanding in Africa and Southeast Asia. We have seen
this movie before. After
9/11, al-Qaeda was able to spread to affiliate groups in Yemen,
Somalia, and elsewhere where they continued plotting, radicalizing, and
carrying out attacks. Maintaining counterterrorism pressure and
coordinating with the international community, we need to ensure that
these new hot spots do not turn into operational safe havens.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today about the
current state of al-Qaeda and ISIS and their recommendations on how to
implement a new strategy to counter the terror threat.
Before closing, I also want to congratulate Chairman Rose on the
birth of his first child a few months ago. My best wishes to you and
your family.
Mr. Rose. Thank you. Thank you, my friend. You know, it is
the Uncle Ranking Member for my kid.
Mr. Walker. All right. We will take it.
Mr. Rose. All right. So now we are just going to--myself
and the Ranking Member will just go back and forth very
briefly. I apologize. This will take us a few minutes.
So I thank the Ranking Member. With that, I will yield to
the Ranking Member for purposes of a colloquy.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could you please
explain our agreement on committee procedures during these
remote proceedings?
Mr. Rose. I thank the Ranking Member. Let me begin by
saying that standing House and committee rules and practice
will continue to apply during remote proceedings. Members will
be expected to continue to adhere to the rules of the committee
and the House.
During the covered period as designated by the Speaker, the
committee will operate in accordance with House Resolution 965
and the subsequent guidance from the Rules Committee in a
manner that respects the rights of all Members to participate.
Technology we are utilizing today requires us to make some
small modifications to ensure that the Members can fully
participate in these proceedings.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What could a Member
expect should they encounter technical issues during a remote
event?
Mr. Rose. Well, first, to simplify the order of
questioning, I will recognize Members for their 5-minute
question based strictly on seniority, as determined by our
subcommittee roster, a departure from our previous procedure.
Members must be visible to the Chair in order to be considered
present for purposes of establishing a quorum or for voting.
Members should make every effort to remain visible on screen
throughout the proceeding. If a Member is experiencing issues
with their video stream, they may proceed with solely audio to
ensure a connection, provided they have been identified
previously.
Again, in this hearing, Members are on mute. Members may
unmute themselves in order to be recognized for purposes of
their 5-minute questioning of the witnesses. At the conclusion
of speaking, Members will be expected to then mute themselves
to prevent excess background noise. In the event that a Member
does not mute themselves after speaking, the Clerk has been
directed to mute Members to avoid inadvertent background noise.
Should a Member wish to be recognized to make a motion,
they must unmute themselves and seek recognition at the
appropriate time.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am making sure I am
staying in order here with you there. I am looking here at my
notes here. What should Members expect regarding decorum during
a remote event?
Mr. Rose. In the event the Member encounters technical
issues that prevents them from being recognized for the
questioning, I will move to the next available Member in the
same party. I will recognize that Member at the next
appropriate time slot, provided they have returned to the
proceeding. Should a Member's time be interrupted by technical
issues, I will recognize that Member at the next appropriate
spot for the remainder of their time once their issues have
been resolved.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Finally, what should
Members expect if a vote is called during a remote event?
Mr. Rose. Members are reminded that they are only allowed
to attend one virtual event at a time. Should they need to
attend another committee's proceedings, please fully exit the
hearing before entering another proceeding. No zoom cheating.
Finally, all Members are reminded they are expected to
observe standing rules of committee decorum for appropriate
attire, you have a professional and apolitical background when
they are participating in any remote event.
Mr. Walker. All right. May it be on the record that it is
the first time that I have ever heard the term ``zoom
cheating.''
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rose. Also, just a few other things. In the event the
witness loses connectivity----
Mr. Walker. Yes.
Mr. Rose [continuing]. We will reserve their time. That
is--that is, I believe, all.
So with that, I ask unanimous consent to waive committee
rule 882 for the subcommittee during remote proceedings under
the covered period designated by the Speaker under House
Resolution 965.
Without objection, so ordered.
All right. The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the
full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson,
for an opening statement.
Is he still with us? Chairman?
OK. Is the Ranking Member, Mr. Rogers, from the great State
of Alabama, is he on?
OK. So now, I am really honored to welcome our panel of
witnesses. Our first witness is Mr. Michael Morell, former
acting and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Morell spent more than 3 decades at the CIA, at the center
of the Nation's fight against terrorism, our work to prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, our efforts
to respond to trends that are altering international landscape.
There is sincerely no major or minor terrorist incident in the
last 20 to 25 years that he has not been front and center of
combating. As someone who was in New York City on 9/11, I was a
teenager at the time, I thank you, sir, for keeping us safe.
Our second witness is Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, who
recently left the Department of Defense where she was senior
advisor for international cooperation to the under secretary
for acquisition and sustainment. Ambassador Kaidanow is the
former acting assistant secretary of state for political-
military affairs at the Department of Defense, former
coordinator for counterterrorism at the Department of State.
Ambassador Kaidanow also previously served as a deputy chief
official at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
Ambassador, thank you for your extraordinary service.
Our third and final witness is Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, a
senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
where he conducts research on how ISIS and al-Qaeda operate
around the world. He has been described as having an
encyclopedic knowledge of terrorist biography. Mr. Joscelyn has
served as a trainer for the FBI's Counterterrorism Division,
was the senior counterterrorism advisor to Rudy Giuliani in the
2008 Presidential campaign.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
or her statements for 5 minutes, beginning with the former
acting director of the CIA, Mr. Morell. Additional Member
statements will be submitted for the record.
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
June 24, 2020
Today's hearing provides an opportunity to assess the current
threat from al-Qaeda and ISIS. As we approach the 19th anniversary of
the September 11 attacks, we must remain vigilant. ISIS remains a
significant threat even as its ability to control physical territory is
severely limited. And although al-Qaeda may be more dispersed, it is
far from defeated.
Recently, we have been reminded of the ability of ISIS and al-Qaeda
to inspire and even direct attacks against the homeland and U.S.
interests abroad. Acts of terrorism within our borders--like in
Pensacola, Florida and Corpus Christi, Texas--show that our oversight
and focus remain critical. These attacks in particular targeted the men
and women of our military.
We must do everything we can to prevent future attacks in the
United States--especially on military bases. In cases like the
Pensacola attack, which was apparently linked to al-Qaeda, this must
include improved information sharing and reforming inadequate vetting
procedures among Government agencies. But the threats we face are not
just to our men and women in uniform--our communities continue to face
the threat of violence fueled by propaganda from ISIS and al-Qaeda.
That is one of the reasons I introduced H.R. 2476, the Securing
American Nonprofit Organizations Against Terrorism Act of 2019, and was
especially proud to see it become law. The program provides grants to
nonprofits and faith-based organizations in both urban and rural areas
to help secure their facilities against a potential terrorist attack.
The new law authorizes the grant program for years to come.
This is also an important time to note that DHS has been without a
permanent Secretary for well over a year now. To plan for the future of
the Department and stay one step ahead of the terrorism threats of
today and tomorrow, the American people need a permanent Secretary.
Counterterrorism involves a concerted effort that requires consistency,
vision, and leadership from a confirmed Secretary.
Before I conclude, I would be remiss if I did not mention that the
committee's oversight efforts on extremism will continue despite the
current administration's lack of effective partnership in providing
documents and briefings in a timely manner. One of our greatest
successes since September 11 has been acknowledging and addressing the
need to share information between the various Government departments
and agencies. I hope that the administration reevaluates their current
strategy and chooses to work with Congress, including ensuring that
policy makers are being informed of the most up-to-date threats.
With that being said, I look forward to a frank conversation with
the experts here today about the effectiveness of the current strategy
and policies aimed to combat ISIS and al-Qaeda. Specifically, I hope we
can shed light on emerging trends and identify new tools, policies, and
procedures to combat terrorist actors at home and abroad, while
upholding our American values.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MORELL, FORMER ACTING AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
Mr. Morell. Good morning, Chairman Rose, Ranking Member
Walker, Members of the subcommittee. It is great to be with you
today. I think this hearing is extraordinarily important. I was
honored to be invited. As your staff knows, I jumped at the
opportunity.
It is great to talk with you about the threats that our
Nation still faces from al-Qaeda and ISIS. I really want to
emphasize that word ``still,'' because I fear that as a
country, that we are losing our focus on terrorism, in large
part because most Americans think that al-Qaeda and ISIS have
been defeated.
Once we got Osama bin Laden, the idea was that al-Qaeda was
defeated. Once we took the caliphate away from ISIS, the idea
was that ISIS was defeated. I think there is a sense out there
that, on the part of most Americans, that an attack on the
homeland is no longer possible. I believe that those
perceptions are wrong, and dead wrong. That is why I think this
hearing is so vitally important.
As you noted, I spent 33 years at the agency. I spent the
first 15 of those focused on East Asia, focused on a different
issue. But in those last 18 years in assignments of increasing
responsibility, Mr. Chairman, I covered the whole world, right,
but my focus was almost entirely on counterterrorism.
There is a little paragraph in my testimony that I won't
read through of all of my touch points with terrorism. You
know, I am sort-of the Forest Gump of terrorism in terms of
being in the wrong place at the wrong time. But each of those
events that I--that I witnessed personally really seared into
me the danger that terrorists pose and the importance of our
counterterrorism work.
You know, in short, I have lived and breathed it for the
last 18 years of my career. It defined, it defined my career.
That is even before 9/11, right? Because I went to work--I went
to work for George Tenet in 1998, and I walked into a situation
where he was obsessed with al-Qaeda. That is where I really
learned about the group for the first time. So I was focused on
it before 9/11.
What I really want to spend a little bit of time on is the
lessons that those 18 years taught me and what the implications
of those lessons are for today. So there are 4 that I want to
share with you.
The first is that terrorism is a symptom. It is not a
disease. I think that is very, very important for us to
remember that. Until we address the disease, Mr. Chairman, I
think we are going to be dealing with the symptoms. I think we
are going to be dealing with the creation of terrorists and
their actions for a long time to come. I have real doubts about
whether we are going to be able, we and our partners, will be
able to deal with that disease. So I really believe that my
children's generation and my grandchildren's generation and
maybe your son's generation is still going to be fighting this
fight.
At the end of the day, you can't capture and kill your way
out of this. You know, that is an important aspect of keeping
ourselves safe, but it is not going to solve the long-term
problem.
A second lesson learned is that--and this could well be the
most important, Mr. Chairman--terrorist groups are very easy to
degrade. Once you get the intel and once you get the military
assets in the right place, they are extraordinarily easy to
degrade. But they are also very easy to rebuild. We have seen
it time and time again.
Whether they are in degradation mode, whether they are
being degraded, or whether they are in rebuild mode, depends on
a lot of things. But the most important thing it depends on is
the degree of counterterrorism pressure that is on the group.
When that pressure is there, they tend to be in degrade mode.
When that pressure is released, they tend to immediately shift
to rebuild mode. I think the policy implication of that is
pretty obvious to me.
The third lesson learned is it is impossible, I think, to
overstate the importance of a physical safe haven to a
terrorist group--a place in which they can feel relatively safe
and secure. A place from which they can strategize, train,
plot, and launch attacks. It is, therefore, absolutely critical
that we deny sanctuaries to these groups. When we don't do
that, history is clear that the threat increases dramatically,
including the threat to the homeland.
Then the last--the last lesson learned is that the smartest
of terrorists are creative and they are innovative. You know,
there are not too many Muhammadatists. There are not too many
that you would put in the category of extraordinarily bright
and extraordinarily capable, but those that are are very
dangerous.
I think examples abound that include Khalid Sheikh
Muhammad, right, who was the first to conceive of using
aircraft as guided missiles. The folks in AQAP in Yemen who
came up with innovative bomb designs, from the underwear bomb,
from printer cartridge bombs, from nonmetallic suicide vests,
to even experimenting putting explosive devices into human
bodies through surgery, to the ISIS Hollywood-quality, Madison-
style--Madison Avenue-style quality propaganda that is a real
danger to us and to the self-radicalization of Americans, as
you know.
Then I would put also in the creative category what AQAP
just did at Pensacola, right. They found a way around the
immigration defenses that we put in place after 9/11, and they
did that consciously. It resulted in the first foreign-directed
terrorist attack on the homeland since 9/11. That was just
several months ago. I think the implication is we need to be
equally imaginative in thinking about what they may be doing
and try to get in front of them.
Mr. Chairman, when I put all of these lessons together, I
come to the strong conclusion that we need to stay focused on
foreign terrorist groups. We need to continue and collect the
best intelligence we can on their plans, intentions, and
capabilities. We need, and I will emphasize this, working with
our allies and partners, to continue to keep pressure on them
and to make sure that they continue to be degraded.
I think we also need to think about--this is very, very
hard, and we should talk about it a little bit in the Q&A--but
it is very, very hard, but I think we need to think about how
do we--how do we play a role in getting at the disease rather
than just dealing with the symptoms?
In looking around the world, I have had, you know, many
specific concerns. Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Middle East,
Africa, but let me conclude my opening statement by pointing
out two issues of particular concern to me.
The first is ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Despite our
destruction of the caliphate, which was critically important
and needed to be done, and people who did that should be given
an awful lot of credit for it, you all know that ISIS is on the
rebound in the Middle East, in Iraq and Syria; that it is
reconstituting. ISIS attacks in Iraq are on the rise, 2 years
in a row now, including a significant one just a few weeks ago
in Samarra, just an hour's drive from Baghdad.
Even more worrisome, Mr. Chairman, and you mentioned this,
German authorities recently arrested 4 Turkmen sent by ISIS to
conduct an attack on a U.S. military facility in Germany. The 4
had already acquired weapons, and they were in the process of
acquiring explosives when they were--when they were arrested.
This suggests to me that ISIS may be in the process of
rebuilding its attack capability in Europe, which was a
capability we saw in devastating effect in Paris in 2015 and in
Brussels in 2016.
The second thing I worry a great deal about is al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan. The Taliban today is militarily and politically
stronger than at any time since 9/11. I believe that the
Taliban in its peace negotiations with the United States have
told us exactly what we want to hear in order to encourage us
to leave the country. I don't believe what they are saying
about what their intentions are. In fact, I believe that their
intention, which is absolutely achievable, is to overthrow the
current Afghan government and reestablish a dictatorship based
on Sharia Law.
I also believe that the Taliban will provide safe haven to
al-Qaeda, and that it will not do what is necessary to prevent
al-Qaeda from again becoming a significant threat to the United
States of America. The ties between the 2 groups are just too
close. It is years and years of fighting side-by-side. It is
years and years of shedding blood together. It is years and
years of intermarriages of their children. These 2 groups are
not, in my mind, separable.
Mr. Chairman, to sum up, I believe strongly, and let me
just emphasize this, I believe that we need to stay on the CT
watch or we are going to be hit again. Can't emphasize that
strongly enough.
Mr. Chair, that concludes my opening remarks, and I look
forward to you--to your and the committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Morell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Morell
June 24, 2020
Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to talk with you today
about the threats that our Nation still faces from al-Qaeda and ISIS.
I want to emphasize the word ``still'' because I fear that we are
losing our focus on terrorism--in large part because most Americans
think al-Qaeda and ISIS have been defeated and that a significant
attack on the homeland is no longer possible. I believe those
perceptions are wrong.
I spent 33 years at the Central Intelligence Agency. I spent the
first 15 years covering East Asian issues. The last 18 years, in
assignments of increasing responsibility, I covered the entire world--
but my focus was on counterterrorism.
As DCI George Tenet's executive assistant, I was the first person
called by CIA's Operations Center when al-Qaeda attacked our embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998; as President George W. Bush's
daily intelligence briefer, I was with him on 9/11 itself; as the
senior focal point for liaison with the British analytic community, I
was in London for Britain's 9/11, the subway and bus attacks there in
July 2005; I was part of the CIA leadership team when we, the British,
and Pakistanis foiled in August 2006 an al-Qaeda plot to blow up 10-15
airliners over the Atlantic Ocean, and as CIA's deputy director, I was
with President Obama when bin Ladin was brought to justice in May 2011.
I lived and breathed counterterrorism. It is what defined my
career, even in the 4 years before 9/11.
My 18 years focused on CT taught me, what I believe, are 4 critical
lessons about terrorism and counterterrorism. Allow me to share them
with you.
Terrorism is a symptom; it is not the disease. And, until
the disease is addressed, we will be dealing with the symptoms.
And because I have significant doubts that the disease will be
dealt with, I believe that my children's generation and my
grandchildren's generation are still going to be fighting this
fight. At the end of the day, you can't only capture and kill
your way out of this.
Terrorist groups are easy to degrade, but they are also
easily rebuilt. And, whether they are in degradation mode or in
rebuilding mode depends on many factors--but the most important
is the degree of counterterrorism pressure on the group. The
policy implication of this lesson is, I think, obvious.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of a physical
safe haven to a terrorist group--a place in which they feel
relatively safe and secure and from which they can strategize,
train, plot, and launch attacks. It is therefore critical that
terrorist groups be denied a sanctuary. When we don't do that,
the threat to the homeland increases significantly.
The smartest of terrorists are creative and innovative.
Examples abound and include Khalid Sheikh Muhammad who
conceived of using aircraft as guided missiles; ISIS operatives
who built a Hollywood-quality and Madison Avenue-quality, on-
line propaganda effort that resulted in ISIS-inspired attacks
in the United States; and, most recently, al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula finding a way around the border and
immigration defenses we put in place after 9/11, a success on
their part that resulted in the recent attack in Pensacola, the
first directed foreign terrorist attack on the homeland since
9/11. We need to be equally imaginative in defending ourselves.
When I put these lessons together, I come to the conclusion that we
need to stay focused on foreign terrorist groups; we need to continue
to collect the best intelligence on their plans, intentions, and
capabilities; and we need, working with our allies and partners, to
continue to keep pressure on them and continue to degrade them. And, we
need to be part of, to the best we can, an international effort to deal
with the disease, not just the symptoms.
In looking around the world, I have many specific concerns--ranging
from South East Asia to South Asia and from the Middle East to Africa.
Let conclude my opening statement by pointing out 2 issues of
particular concern.
ISIS in Iraq and Syria.--Despite our destruction of the ISIS
caliphate, which was critically important, I believe ISIS in
the Middle East is on the rebound, that it is reconstituting.
ISIS attacks in Iraq are on the rise, including a significant
one just a few weeks ago in Samarra, just an hour's drive north
from Baghdad. Even more worrisome, German authorities recently
arrested 4 Turkmen sent by ISIS to conduct an attack on a U.S.
military facility in Germany. The 4 had already acquired
weapons and were in the process of acquiring explosives when
they were arrested. This suggests ISIS is rebuilding its
capability to attack Europe--a capability that resulted in both
the 2015 ISIS attack in Paris that killed 130 and wounded 413
and the 2016 attack in Brussels that killed 32, wounding over
300.
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.--The Taliban today is militarily
and politically stronger than at any time since 9/11. I believe
that the Taliban, in its peace negotiations with the United
States, have told us what we want to hear in order to encourage
us to leave the country. I believe that the Taliban's
intention, which is achievable, is to overthrow the current
Afghan government and reestablish a dictatorship based on
Sharia Law. I also believe that the Taliban will provide safe
haven to al-Qaeda and that it will not do what is necessary to
prevent the group from again becoming a significant threat to
the United States. The ties between the two groups are close.
One of the most important is al-Qaeda's extremely tight
relationship with the Taliban's Haqqani Group. Siraj Haqqani,
head of the group, is one of the deputy leaders of the Taliban.
To sum up, I believe that we need to stay on the CT Watch or we
will be hit again.
Chairman, that concludes my opening remarks. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Rose. Mr. Morell, thank you so much again.
I now recognize Ambassador Kaidanow to summarize her
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR TINA KAIDANOW, FORMER ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, FORMER
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Kaidanow. Yes. Thank you. I think I will say just at
the outset that I associate myself with everything you said and
then some. We can talk a little bit more about some of those
issues.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Walker, honorable Members of
the subcommittee, first of all, it is an absolute privilege to
be here and to talk to you today on this really critical issue
of the potential threat that is coming still, as Mike says,
from ISIS and from al-Qaeda, as well as from other groups that
we are not discussing here today, but nevertheless, existing
and pop up now with regularity all over the world.
The esteemed panel of witnesses that you have assembled are
all veterans of the U.S. Government effort to contain the
threat of terrorism over the past years and to ensure the
security of the homeland. All of them, and I as well, have
grappled with I think what Mike was trying to, you know, to
very well give you a picture of, and that is the key questions
of how, No. 1, we can best protect our borders; No. 2, how we
can enlist our overseas partners in the counterterrorism
effort. Because, you know, this can't all be ours to do.
Unfortunately, we don't have the resources. We don't have
the ability--he mentioned the German attack. That's just one.
But we find ourselves now sort-of subject to a lot of the
resource issues. I will get to that in a minute. We don't have
the resources on our own to be doing this, and nor should we,
you know, portray it that way. We really need to give it to our
partners as something that is both beneficial to us but
beneficial to them as well.
A number of the attacks that we see these days are not
necessarily in the homeland, but, you know, they are associated
with us because they happened in Paris, they happened in
Brussels, they happen in places where our people are, and they
happen in places where we care about what happened in
democratic society.
So a key question, as I said, is how we can, you know,
enlist them in the counterterrorism effort. Then, finally, and
I think we, you know, again, this deserves a little bit of
thought, of how we can, or perhaps better said, whether we can
do anything to destroy the absolute root causes of the
terrorist problem. That question has consumed enormous amount
of attention, certainly in the U.S. Government, and I think
outside the Government as well.
I wish I could tell you that I thought, you know, (A),
there was an easy way to do that, and (B), we have made some
progress in it. I will tell you personally, I don't think that
is the case. I will come back to that in a second. But I think
it is really important to try to reach and grapple with that
question.
When I became the State Department coordinator for
counterterrorism, which is a statutorily-created position that
is designed to centralize all Department efforts on terrorism
and provide advice directly to the Secretary of State on those
matters, as well as coordinate closely to the National Security
Council with other important institutional players on CT and
Homeland Security, it was the beginning of 2014. Quite frankly,
nobody, perhaps other than some of our very good intelligence
analysts sprinkled through the system, had really heard of ISIS
as a feature of global terrorism.
When I left the job in 2016 to become the acting assistant
secretary for political-military affairs at the State
Department, the world had changed pretty dramatically. In the
span of about a year, a year-and-a-half, ISIS had gone from
small regional leftover presence from the first Iraqi war to an
absolute global threat, almost as virulent in its own way as
the COVID-19 virus pandemic is now. Which I know is a strange
kind of analogy, but it really has some, I think, some power,
because the idea is we never knew that something like this
could hit us in that way.
So what was the difference? What made it so lethal, more
lethal even when we think of al-Qaeda as a terribly, horribly
lethal group. Of course, it is. But in a very interesting way,
ISIS was something even very different, like a virus. I think
the answer lies in the ISIS-created tools and methodology that
had never been before been utilized as successfully by any
other group, and that had to do with social media.
Social media became what I would consider a vital hunting
ground for signing up an ISIS-foreign component, which Mike
mentioned--or I think actually the Chairman mentioned in his
opening statement--and building support outside of Iraq and
Syria. Absolutely, the Iraq and Syria problem remains.
Absolutely ISIS is a feature there. But guess what, it is a
feature pretty much everywhere. How did that happen? The West,
and not only the West, but those countries where recruitment
was especially large-scale, like Indonesia, like Jordan, other
places, were absolutely completely unprepared for these new
approaches and unable to muster that kind of flexibility to
push back.
Governments, for the most part, and I will just tell you
certainly democratic governments, are neither comfortable nor
effective as propaganda or counterpropaganda machines. They are
just not good at it. You know, we always talk about how do we
push back on that social media approach, how do we push back on
ISIS' ability to recruit. It ain't so easy. You know, it is not
so easy. You can't just hire a PR firm and then decide there is
an inherent and underlying lack of trust in what we say as a
Government all over the world. That, unfortunately, you know,
it gives us a handicap right from the start.
I think I am running out of time here, so I don't want to
go too much longer. But I do want to say, again, there is this
question of--Mike put it very well--what is the--what do we do
now if we are going to address some of this? Well, the basic
question comes back to resources. If we are going to do
anything, whatever it is we do, we have to decide it is a
priority for us strategically.
At the outset of the administration, we relooked at all the
things that we want to be doing, and we decided that, you know,
for good or for bad, we have let our ability to, you know,
contain or to stop the Russians and the Chinese all over the
world from doing things we didn't want them to do. Great power
competition has now become our No. 1 priority. That is fine.
But that is going to take up resources that, unfortunately,
used to be, at least in some measure, put against the terrorism
problem.
I think we are always going to have to constantly be
reevaluating where are we with these issues and how much
effort, resource energy, presence, you know--do we send drones,
as I said, to Africa? Do we send the same drones to Iraq and
Syria? Do we put them somewhere else entirely because we
believe the Chinese in Southeast Asia are making inroads? What
are we doing as a matter of priority?
So it is not an easy question to answer, but it is
something we really have to think about. That is why our allies
and partners overseas become very important. Again, we can't
fight this fight alone.
I am going to, I think, stop there. I do want to say,
again, I don't think there is an easy answer to the question of
how do you stop terrorism at its root. I don't think it is a
question of poverty. There is a lot of that that comes into
this, you know, sort of CVE approach, the combating violent
extremism. Maybe if we can, you know, create income and turn
people in a different direction, we will be able to stop them
from engaging in terrorist activities.
I don't think it is those people. I don't think it is the
people who, you know, are hungry. I think it is the people who,
unfortunately, feel disaffected, they are sitting in, you know,
Paris, they are sitting somewhere in Minnesota, they are
sitting somewhere. It is a second-, third-generation problem.
Their parents were poverty-stricken, very unfortunately came
here, wanted a better life, established themselves that way,
and now their children, unfortunately, are not feeling
empowered for whatever reason. That is something we have to try
and grapple with. It is not an easy thing.
I am going to stop there. I know there will be questions.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kaidanow follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tina Kaidanow
June 23, 2020
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Honorable Members of the
subcommittee, it is a privilege to be here and speak with you today on
the subject of examining the potential threat emanating from ISIS and
al-Qaeda. The esteemed panel of witnesses you have assembled are all
veterans of the U.S. Government struggle to contain the threat of
terrorism over the past years and ensure the security of the homeland.
All of them, and I as well, have grappled with the key questions of
how we can best protect our borders, how we can enlist our overseas
partners in the counterterrorism effort, and how we can--or perhaps
better said, whether we can--do anything to destroy the root causes of
the terrorist problem. That last question, in particular, has consumed
a considerable amount of time and attention, and I wish I could say we
have made great strides in eliminating the underlying sources of
terrorism. Unfortunately, I don't think that is the case, but I will
come back to that in a moment.
When I became the State Department coordinator for
counterterrorism, a statutorily-created position designed to centralize
all Department efforts on terrorism and provide advice directly to the
Secretary of State on these matters, as well as coordinate closely
through the National Security Council with other institutional players
on CT and homeland security, it was the beginning of 2014. Quite
frankly, no one--perhaps other than intelligence analysts sprinkled
throughout our system--had heard of ISIS as a feature of global
terrorism. When I left the job in 2016 to become the acting assistant
secretary for political military affairs at the State Department, the
world had changed dramatically. In the span of about a year, ISIS had
gone from a small regional leftover presence from the first Iraqi war
to a global threat--almost as virulent in its own way as the COVID-19
virus pandemic now.
How did this happen? What was the difference between ISIS and other
terrorist groups that had preceded it, even including al-Qaeda, which--
though highly dangerous and deadly--could not hold a candle to ISIS in
its rate of expansion or degree of lethality (and in fact there were
places in the world where al-Qaeda lost membership to ISIS as a
competitor)? The answer lies in the ISIS-created tools and
methodologies, which had never before been utilized as successfully by
any other group. Social media became a vital hunting grounds for
signing up an ISIS foreign component and building support outside of
Iraq and Syria. The West--and not only the West, but those countries
where recruitment was especially large-scale, like Indonesia or
Jordan--were completely unprepared for these new approaches and unable
to muster the flexibility to push back. Governments, for the most part,
and certainly democratic governments, are neither comfortable nor
effective as propaganda or counter-propaganda machines.
That put us all on the defensive more than the offensive, and
although we have gotten better at what we do, that is still largely
where we find ourselves. We do a better job these days at protecting
our borders and weeding out the individuals whose intentions may be
problematic. We have convinced many of our neighbors and our European
and other global allies that by enforcing their own borders and
encouraging a more robust law enforcement effort, they benefit both
themselves and the United States. We have stymied many attacks and
worked with communities across the United States, including immigrant
communities, to address the threat before it manifests itself in an
attack on the ground.
However, many issues remain. One is a resource problem--we can only
have so many priorities at a time. At the outset of the administration,
the White House and Defense Department drafted a new set of National
Security and Defense Security strategy documents to guide our efforts,
and it was decided that we had permitted our capabilities vis-a-vis the
great powers--specifically Russia and China--to atrophy, necessitating
a renewed push to regain our position in key parts of the world. The
war on terrorism, though important, was no longer the first or only
objective. All resource allocations are a function of strategic
priorities and necessities, and this is something that I believe needs
to be constantly reassessed. If we wish to push back on terrorism, we
will need to consider whether, for example, AFRICOM should have a
larger or smaller presence in the Sahel and elsewhere in the African
continent, or whether those resources--drones, personnel, etc.--are
more useful elsewhere.
Finally, I return to the question of whether we can truly eliminate
the sources of terrorism such that we would be able to wipe it out
entirely and be able with clear conscience to move our resources to
other efforts. I remain skeptical this is fully possible. As I
indicated, governments are not good at public relations--they and their
PR contractors are inherently subject to suspicion no matter how clever
we think we are in getting out a message. Nor is the elimination of
poverty or the creation of income-generating programs overseas likely
to quash the terrorist impulse, which is the idea behind the money
being thrown toward what's referred to as CVE or Combating Violent
Extremism. It's most often not the desperately hungry or work-starved
individual who turns to terrorism; it's the disaffected youth whose
immigrant parents probably tried hard to provide him or her a better
life and instead found their offspring attracted by the ISIS or
extremist message. We need to be vigilant in finding and dealing with
this small but potent group, here in the United States and overseas,
and ensure we are able to stop any potential violence before it comes
to us.
I'm sure we'll have a stimulating conversation today, so I will
stop here and allow the rest of the proceedings to move forward.
Mr. Rose. Thank you so much, Ambassador Kaidanow, for your
important testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Joscelyn to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, thank you, Chairman Rose, Ranking
Member Walker, and other Members of the subcommittee. I greatly
appreciate the invitation to testify today.
Obviously, we are living in turbulent times, and Americans
face many types of challenges. I think that is evident, in
fact, most immediately for myself that, even though I have
testified before Congress 21 times, this is the 21st time, this
is the first time I have done so from my dining room as opposed
to there in front of you. So, obviously, we are living in a new
world here.
But I do appreciate the fact you guys are taking the time
to address al-Qaeda and ISIS, even with everything that is
going on and all the threats that we face, because they both do
remain active threats to the United States. I am going to point
my comments today mostly toward al-Qaeda. The reason for that
is I think there is more agreement on the ISIS side of the coin
than there is on the al-Qaeda side of the coin. I want to sort-
of clarify a few things in my oral testimony.
You know, ISIS grabbed headlines in 2014 with its caliphate
claim and its over-the-top barbarism. That is understandable.
But what I think is often overlooked and people don't realize
is that al-Qaeda's goal from the very beginning since its
inception in the late 1980's was to create a caliphate. Osama
bin Laden was on the record saying this over and over and over
again. So was Ayman Al-Zawahiri. It is in their literature. It
is in their publicly-facing media, their propaganda. They say
it all the time. I think we have to take that seriously that
that is their overarching goal, even though they are very far
away from that today.
In some ways what ISIS did was they capitalized on al-
Qaeda's drive request to build a caliphate. They basically
claimed that they were able to bridge fruition or fulfill Osama
bin Laden's original mission.
Today, al-Qaeda and ISIS remain looked in a competition
across many different battlefields in many different areas
where they are waging insurgencies. The purpose of those
insurgencies is to clear out the existing political order or to
fill political vacuums with new Islamic emirates based on
Sharia law. The idea of that is to then use these Islamic
emirates as the basis for a new caliphate.
When you understand that, that explains why I think there
is an overarching idea. There many causes of radicalization,
many causes of terrorism, of course. This isn't the only one.
But as the glue that binds together their project, that
explains why we see threats everywhere from West Africa to
Afghanistan to this day. You can identify the groups that are
parts of ISIS or al-Qaeda in each one of those areas, and you
can show that their main goal is to establish a new Islamic
emirate in those areas.
Just to flash forward a little bit here and talk about how,
you know, the al-Qaeda threat and how it has persisted after
all these years. I wanted to give a sort-of a quick rundown on
recent activity, which I think a lot of Americans probably
don't even know has occurred since September 2019. Just to give
you an idea of what the threat sort-of perception that the
counterterrorism community, the CIA, the NSA, and others are
dealing with, the FBI here at home--obviously, I'm an
independent observer, but I watch what they are doing and what
they are dealing with. They are still dealing with an enormous
number of threats around the globe.
So in September 2019, the U.S. and Afghan forces hunted
down a guy named Asim Umar in Musa Qala of Helmand. Why is that
important? Well, Asim Umar was the first emir of al-Qaeda in
the Indian Subcontinent. He is a guy who repeatedly threatened
Americans. He was a guy who was involved in a very audacious
plot against U.S. warships in 2014. He is someone who oversaw
al-Qaeda's operations not only in Afghanistan on behalf of
where they were fighting on behalf of the Taliban, but also
throughout the region as al-Qaeda has tried to expand, indeed
as the name implies, throughout the Indian Subcontinent.
Now, what is interesting is another guy who was killed
during that operation was the courier of Umar, who was running
back and forth to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of al-Qaeda. Now,
Ayman al-Zawahiri still has, by a conservative estimate,
thousands of followers around the globe, perhaps tens of
thousands of people who are loyal to him up through the chain
of the command. I can map that out for you later, if you would
like.
But what is interesting too is that not only was this
courier running messages back and forth between Asim Umar and
Ayman al-Zawahiri, but just recently, General McKenzie, the
head of CENTCOM, says Ayman al-Zawahiri himself is in eastern
Afghanistan. A very curious and important remark. Because,
again, this is a guy who sits at the top of the chain of
command of a global organization.
Now, you flash forward from there, from September 2019 to
December 2019, December 6 to be precise, and that is when
Mohammed Alshamrani, the second lieutenant in the Royal Saudi
Air Force, perpetrated this shooting at Naval Air Station
Pensacola. As Mike Morell noted, this is a very significant
attack. It is the first one that received some level of
explicit direction and was successful since 9/11 by al-Qaeda.
There are lots of security challenges involved there. We can
talk about it.
The main thing, the main innovation that Alshamrani was
able to rely upon was basically easy-to-use encryption
technology on his two iPhones. You know, there has been some
discussion about trying to install backdoors on iPhones or
other personal devices to give our security and
counterterrorism officials a window and to try and monitor
these type of things. I am very wary of that. I think that
raises real civil liberty concerns and other issues for
tyrannies around the world where dictators can take advantage
of that back door. I hope we can talk about that a little bit
more as well.
But after Alshamrani executed this attack, the FBI
realized, after they cracked the security on his iPhone, that
he was communicating with AQAP operatives over the course of 4
years. So going from 2015 all the way up to December 5, the
night before his attack, in Pensacola via these 2 iPhones,
which he tried to destroy afterwards.
Then afterwards, after they got this intelligence, they
killed--the United States was able to hunt down and kill one of
his main handlers in Yemen. The United States also
reconstituted efforts to go after Qasim al-Raymi, the head of
AQAP.
Well, why is that important? Well, Qasim al-Raymi is a guy
whose biography, his dossier goes all the way back to 1990's in
Afghanistan when he was identified as a potential new leader
for al-Qaeda in al-Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan.
When he was killed, he was replaced by another al-Qaeda
veteran that goes back to 1990's. He is a guy named Khalid
Batarfi, another guy who is trained in al-Qaeda's camps and is
deeply anti-American and deeply beholden to the mission that
Osama bin Laden set forth so many decades ago now.
So that brings an issue that we talked about in FDD's Long
War Journal quite often, which is that some of these guys that
we are hunting and dealing with, they have careers that started
in the 1990's. If you go through our general, our military
chain of command, or our civilian leadership, just think about
the turnover we have had during that time. Yet al-Qaeda has
guys that have been groomed for literally a generation to lead
these roles, and that speaks again to Mike Morell's point about
this being a generational conflict. Some of these guys have
literally been in the game for a generation, in some cases,
even longer than that.
So going from there, from AQAP in Yemen, in March, New York
Times reported that 2 Shabaab operatives were arrested after
they were found to be engaged in flight training. So Shabaab is
al-Qaeda's so-called affiliate. It is really its regional
branch in East Africa where they are trying to build and
Islamic emirate. No. 2, Shabaab operatives were hunted down and
arrested, one in the Philippines, one in Africa, because they
were basically involved in some sort of flight training,
setting off concerns that they may be participating or planning
some kind of hijacking operation or some other sort of aerial
assault.
A lot of the details are murky, but I can tell you for a
fact that Shabaab has been experimenting as part of a cross-
regional team of al-Qaeda experts, Shabaab has been
experimenting with high-end explosives that they can get on an
airplane. In fact, I have got the photos from 2016 when they
actually blew a hole in the side of a Turkish airliner.
Our perception is that al-Qaeda hasn't given the go-ahead
to try that on other planes yet, but they are experimenting
with it. They are trying to get suitcase bombs through X-rays
and other technology in order to go after aviation. All these
years after 9/11, after all the plots that have been stopped,
they are still trying to do that.
Then if you go flash forward from there, on June 3 of this
year, just earlier this month, the French killed Abdulmalek
Droukdel, a long-time emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
One of the arguments that we have combatted through the years
is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb--now I will let you focus on
that for a second--al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb isn't really
al-Qaeda. We have heard this a long time.
Well, in fact, Droukdel was communicating regularly with
al-Qaeda team leadership. This was evidenced in Osama bin
Laden's files, which we have processed quite a few now of. The
French, after they killed him, they said that not only was
Droukdel who was killed in northern Mali, the emir of AQIM, but
he was also sitting on al-Qaeda's international or global
management committee. In other words, this is a guy who had a
say on al-Qaeda's global affairs far outside of his home base
in North and West Africa. It is that sort-of important, sort-of
connectivity or connective issue which we try and harp on
because I think it tells you a lot about al-Qaeda in 2020.
Finally, I think that earlier this month, mid-June now, the
United States launched a drone strike, a very targeted drone
strike against 2 al-Qaeda operatives in Idlib, Syria. This is
the latest in a series of drone strikes targeting al-Qaeda
operatives in Syria that are thought to pose a threat to the
West. One of them was a long-time companion of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, the founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq. He was the guy who--
this guy, Khalid al-Aruri his name is. He was implicated all
the way back to 2003 in the suicide bombings in Casablanca. So
this is a guy who has again another lengthy dossier who has
been in the game for a long time. He finally--I presume it was
the CIA, got him with a very special design drone missile known
as an R9X, which is very interesting, and we can talk about
that. But this gives you the perception that the CIA is still
hunting these guys around the globe.
I don't know how much--I think I am out of time. But I will
just wrap up by saying this: This is supposed to be a very
brief presentation, but think about the guys that I just
surveilled there in my oral testimony. You have threats from
Afghanistan, you have in Yemen, you have in Somalia, you have
in Mali, and you have in Syria. That is al-Qaeda 2020. Al-Qaeda
has a distributed leadership across those countries. It has a
distributed external operations capacity across those
countries. The United States is still hunting those guys on a
regular basis. I think that is often lost in sort-of our
discourse today about what is actually going, but it speaks to
the idea that this is, in fact, a long-term threat and a long-
term problem set that we are going to keep dealing with.
I thank you for giving me the chance to testify today, and
I welcome any questions you guys have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Joscelyn
Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and other Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. We are living in
difficult times. Americans have many threats to worry about. The
challenges we face are daunting--from the coronavirus pandemic to
domestic terrorists to foreign actors seeking to exploit our divisions
to various cyber threats. This committee has to monitor many different
types of issues, so I appreciate that you have not lost sight of the
fact that al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) are still active. Even
though most of their violence is carried out overseas, both groups are
deeply anti-American and would like to exploit any holes in our
defenses that they can find.
First, I would like to make several general observations. I will
then turn to a brief analysis of recent events. My general points are
as follows:
The U.S. military started pivoting away from the wars
against the jihadists in 2011 and 2012. Much of this pivot was
already completed by 2016. By the beginning of 2017, the United
States retained a small footprint in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Syria, as well as forces in Africa. Since 2012, the United
States has attempted to buttress local partners, as they have
been responsible for the bulk of the fighting on the ground in
these areas. This has worked better in some countries than
others. But the point is that America has not been invested in
large-scale counterinsurgencies for the better part of a
decade. Instead, the United States has complemented partner
forces with air strikes, special operations raids, and other
focused counterterrorism efforts. It appears that this ad hoc
strategy may be coming to an end, as America's greatly reduced
footprint could be withdrawn from several countries by next
year. In that event, the challenges for homeland security will
not go away. In some ways, the threats may become even more
difficult to detect and thwart.
Even if the United States stops fighting, the jihadists will
not. Al-Qaeda's leaders sought to spark a jihadist revolution
and, despite suffering many setbacks, they succeeded. The
jihadists today are waging insurgencies across Africa, hotspots
in the Middle East, and into South Asia. Their stated goal is
to build Islamic emirates, which could eventually join together
to form a new caliphate. Although some U.S. policy makers
dismissed this goal in the past, ISIS proved that this
motivation is very real.\1\ But it is also al-Qaeda's chief
goal and has been since the beginning. A new caliphate is not
close at hand, and many obstacles stand in the jihadists' way.
Yet an awful amount of violence has resulted from the
jihadists' caliphate quest, and they already have nascent
emirates in some regions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This is not intended to suggest that the jihadists' behavior is
monocausal. They can have multiple motivations. But from my
perspective, the jihadist ideology, including its caliphate quest, is
the glue that binds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISIS is not at the zenith of its power. But as many analysts
predicted, the end of its territorial caliphate did not lead to
the end of the group. ISIS is waging an insurgency across parts
of Iraq and Syria. It also has noteworthy ``provinces'' in
Khorasan (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of the surrounding
countries), the Sinai, Southeast Asia, Somalia, West Africa,
and Yemen. ISIS has terrorist networks in other areas. Many
across this network are openly loyal to Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi
al-Qurayshi, the successor to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. After
Baghdadi was killed last year, ISIS orchestrated a media
campaign to emphasize the fealty of its ``provinces.''
Al-Qaeda has survived the post-9/11 wars and America's
counterterrorism campaign. The group's base has spread from
South Asia into multiple other countries. Several
organizations, often described as al-Qaeda ``affiliates,''
serve as regional branches. These branches are each led by an
emir who swears his allegiance to the head of al-Qaeda. Since
Osama bin Laden's death in May 2011, that leader has been Ayman
al-Zawahiri. The official al-Qaeda branches are: Al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al-Shabaab in
Somalia. To this list we can add the ``Group for the Support of
Islam and Muslims'' (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or
JNIM), a wing of AQIM. Hurras al-Din in Syria is also part of
al-Qaeda's network, as are other groups based in Idlib. But al-
Qaeda's chain-of-command in Syria has been upset by a number of
internal rivalries, power struggles, and arguments over
jihadist strategy.\2\ In addition, al-Qaeda works through other
groups that are not official al-Qaeda branches but are
nonetheless part of its web. Such groups include the Pakistani
Taliban. Still other jihadist organizations are closely allied
with al-Qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Those disagreements have centered on Hay'at Tahrir al Sham
(HTS), which both the United States and the United Nations continue to
consider an al-Qaeda ``affiliate.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISIS and al-Qaeda remain locked in a competition for the
fealty of jihadists around the globe. Much of this competition
will take place at the local level, but international terrorism
could play a role in the rivalry, as these groups look to
outbid one another for the affection of would-be jihadists.
While there may be some cooperation between individual
commanders, the two mother organizations are at odds. ISIS has
developed an institutional hatred for al-Qaeda. In some areas,
such as Iraq, ISIS is definitively stronger. In other areas,
such as Somalia and Yemen, al-Qaeda has the upper hand. In West
Africa, the two are currently close in strength, though that
can change. Any assessment of relative strength in Syria is
difficult due to al-Qaeda's management problems and other
factors. And an assessment of their relative positions in
Afghanistan is complicated by the fact that al-Qaeda and
affiliated groups are embedded within the Taliban-led
insurgency. Al-Qaeda has deliberately sought to mask the extent
of its operations in Afghanistan.
The Trump administration's withdrawal deal with the Taliban,
signed on February 29 in Doha, has not put an end to the
terrorist threats emanating from either Afghanistan or
Pakistan. I have critiqued various aspects of the deal at
length elsewhere, including during previous Congressional
testimony, so I will not repeat all of those criticisms in
writing here.\3\ But some basic observations are in order.
Nearly 4 months have passed since that agreement was signed.
During that time, the United States has drawn down to 8,600 or
fewer troops. It is not clear what, if anything, the United
States has received in return. The Taliban went on the
offensive against the Afghan government immediately after the
accord was finalized. The Taliban has not renounced al-Qaeda.
In fact, the Taliban continues to lie about al-Qaeda's presence
in Afghanistan, claiming the group has not been located in the
country since the days of its Islamic Emirate in 2001.\4\ As
far as I am aware, the Taliban has not taken a single action
against al-Qaeda or any of the al-Qaeda-affiliated groups known
to be fighting inside Afghanistan. Only 2 passages of the
February 29 accord specifically mention al-Qaeda, and both of
those repeat the same language. The Taliban has supposedly
agreed to prevent al-Qaeda from using Afghan soil to threaten
the United States or its allies. But the Taliban has made that
same claim repeatedly since the 1990's. It was clearly a lie
then. Without any verification or enforcement mechanisms--and
there are no such provisions specified in the text of the deal
released to the public--there is no reason to think the Taliban
is telling the truth now. As long as al-Qaeda's decades-long
relationship with the Taliban remains unbroken, it will be a
source of strength for al-Qaeda's global network, including in
its rivalry with ISIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See: ``No Deal Is Better Than a Bad Deal,'' The Dispatch, March
4, 2020. (https://thedispatch.com/p/no-deal-is-better-than-a-bad-deal).
See also: Thomas Joscelyn, ``The Trump Administration's Afghanistan
Policy, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
September 2019. (https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190919/
109992/HHRG-116-FA00-WState-JoscelynT-20190919.pdf)
\4\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Taliban falsely claims al-Qaeda doesn't
exist in Afghanistan,'' FDD's Long War Journal, June 15, 2020. (https:/
/www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/06/taliban-falsely-claims-al-
qaeda-doesnt-exist-in-afghanistan.php)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both al-Qaeda and ISIS spend most of their resources waging
insurgencies. But a part of each organization is focused on
attacking the West. With that in mind, I turn now to a summary
of recent events, focusing on the al-Qaeda threat and how it
ties back to terrorism in the United States and Europe.
A brief summary of recent al-Qaeda activity and counterterrorism
operations.
The most recent al-Qaeda attack in the United States came on
December 6, 2019, when Second Lieutenant Mohammed Alshamrani (Al-
Shamrani) opened fire at Naval Air Station Pensacola in Florida,
killing 3 U.S. service members and wounding 8 other Americans. AQAP
claimed ``full responsibility'' for the Saudi's attack in a video
released on February 2. AQAP's claim was not empty bluster. After
cracking the security on Alshamrani's 2 iPhones, both of which he tried
to destroy, the FBI discovered he had ``significant ties'' to AQAP.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Department of Justice, Press Release, ``Attorney General
William P. Barr and FBI Director Christopher Wray Announce Significant
Developments in the Investigation of the Naval Air Station Pensacola
Shooting,'' May 18, 2020. (https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-
general-william-p-barr-and-fbi-director-christopher-wray-announce-
significant)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alshamrani was a committed jihadist before he entered the United
States. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), Alshamrani was
``radicalized'' by 2015, ``connected and associated with AQAP
operatives,'' and then joined the Royal Saudi Air Force with the intent
of conducting a ``special operation.''\6\ As a member of the Royal
Saudi Air Force, he entered a prestigious training program that gave
him access to U.S. military bases. Throughout his time in the United
States, Alshamrani regularly communicated with AQAP members. While in
the United States, Alshamrani ``had specific conversations with
overseas AQAP associates about plans and tactics,'' was ``communicating
with AQAP right up until the attack,'' and ``conferred with his
associates until the night before he undertook the murders.''\7\
Alshamrani also made sure that AQAP could exploit his attack for
propaganda purposes. He saved his final will to one of his iPhones and
obviously sent a copy to AQAP. AQAP's media operatives displayed it on-
screen during its February video claiming ``full responsibility'' for
the shooting.\8\ The United States also used intelligence recovered
from Alshamrani's phones to identify his associates, including an AQAP
operative known as Abdullah al-Maliki, who was subsequently targeted in
an air strike.\9\ It is possible that the United States stepped up its
efforts to kill AQAP's emir, Qasim al-Raymi, as a result of the
Pensacola shootings. While the United States and its allies have hunted
Raymi for years, he was finally killed in a drone strike in Yemen in
January.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Ibid.
\7\ Ibid.
\8\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Press Release, ``FBI Director
Christopher Wray's Remarks at Press Conference Regarding Naval Air
Station Pensacola Shooting Investigation,'' May 18. 2020. (https://
www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-director-christopher-
wrays-remarks-at-press-conference-regarding-naval-air-station-
pensacola-shooting-investigation).
\9\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Khalid Batarfi succeeded Raymi as AQAP's emir. Like Raymi, Batarfi
is an al-Qaeda veteran whose career traces to the 1990's in
Afghanistan, where he was trained and indoctrinated. Batarfi is more of
an ideologue and thinker than Raymi. Immediately upon assuming AQAP's
top post, Batarfi continued to release a religious lecture series that
is intended to purify the jihadists' ranks and counter the Islamic
State. In addition to his religious work, Batarfi has long managed an
operational portfolio that extends far outside of Yemen. According to a
panel of experts that reports to the United Nations Security Council,
Batarfi was responsible for a terrorist plot that was foiled in Jordan
in July 2017.\10\ AQAP attacks, such as the one in Pensacola and the
2015 massacre at Charlie Hebdo's offices in Paris, are smaller in scale
and focused on specific targets. Though the group is mired in a
complex, multi-sided war in Yemen, it is always possible that AQAP will
try to execute more deadly attacks abroad. Batarfi is openly anti-
American. In a message released in 2018, Batarfi called on al-Qaeda's
followers to ``rise and attack'' Americans ``everywhere.''\11\ Batarfi
is likely a member of al-Qaeda's senior management, as his predecessors
in AQAP's hierarchy have served similar dual roles as both AQAP's
leaders and top figures in al-Qaeda's global network.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Analysis: AQAP remains under pressure,''
FDD's Long War Journal, May 26, 2018. (https://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2018/05/analysis-aqap-remains-under-pressure.php).
\11\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism,
``Country Reports on Terrorism 2018,'' 2019, page 319. (https://
www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2018/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 3, Abdulmalek Droukdel, the long-time emir of AQIM, was
killed in a counterterrorism raid in Mali. Florence Parly, France's
minister for the armed forces, announced that her country carried out
the operation. U.S. Africa Command subsequently confirmed that it
played a supporting role, providing intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance to the French. Droukdel was a major figure in al-Qaeda's
global network. For instance, files recovered in Osama bin Laden's
Abbottabad compound show that he reported directly to al-Qaeda's senior
leadership, requesting guidance on personnel, hostage-taking
operations, negotiations with the government of Mauritania, and other
matters.
France's Parly identified Droukdel as a member of al-Qaeda's
``management committee.''\12\ And the French government described him
as Zawahiri's ``third deputy.''\13\ Therefore, from France's
perspective, Droukdel was not only the emir of AQIM, but was also a
senior figure in al-Qaeda's global hierarchy. This is consistent with
our understanding of al-Qaeda's current organizational structure, as
the group's senior managers and decision makers are found in multiple
geographic locales.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``French forces kill al-Qaeda's North African commander,''
Associated Press, June 5, 2020. (https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/french-
forces-kill-al-qaeda-north-africa-commander-1.5601037).
\13\ The French military's statement, claiming Droukdel was
Zawahiri's ``third deputy,'' can be found here: French Ministry of the
Armed Forces, ``Point de situation des operations du 05 au 11 juin
[Update on operations from 05 to 11 June],'' June 11, 2020. (https://
www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/points-de-situation/point-de-situation-
des-operations-du-05-au-11-juin).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While most of AQIM's efforts are focused in North and West Africa,
there is some connective tissue between the al-Qaeda arm and the
group's global terrorist ambitions. An operative known as Younis al
Mauritani helped broker the merger of AQIM's predecessor organization,
the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, with al-Qaeda in 2006.
Mauritani went on to play a senior role in al-Qaeda's external
operations arm, planning attacks against American and European targets.
Mauritani was captured in Pakistan in 2011 and repatriated to his home
country. But I always point to his biography as an example of how
AQIM's men are not entirely focused on Africa. It is possible that some
other AQIM figures will follow a similar career trajectory. As of this
testimony, AQIM has yet to announce a successor to Droukdel. But there
are multiple capable replacements. And his demise is not the end of al-
Qaeda's war-fighting capacity in North and West Africa. Both AQIM and
its spawn, the ``Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims'' (Jama'at
Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM), will continue to fight on. So
will their rivals in the Islamic State's local ``province.''
In mid-June, 2 senior al-Qaeda operatives were targeted in a drone
strike in Syria's Idlib province.\14\ One of them, Abu al-Qassam (also
known as Khaled al-Aruri and Abu Ashraf), was an al-Qaeda veteran whose
jihadist career dates back to the 1990's. He was one of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi's closest companions, as the two grew up together in Jordan and
then worked side-by-side from the early 1990's until Zarqawi's demise
in 2006. He was also Zarqawi's brother-in-law. The other was a jihadist
known as Bilal al-Sanaani, a nom de guerre indicating that he was from
Yemen. Abu al-Qassam was a top figure in Hurras al-Din (HAD), an al-
Qaeda group that was established after months of jihadists infighting
in Syria. HAD's leadership objected to the moves made by Hay'at Tahrir
al-Sham (HTS), an organization formerly known as al-Nusrah Front, which
was an official branch of al-Qaeda until July 2016. As result of
various intra-jihadist disputes and other setbacks, al-Qaeda's chain of
command in Syria remains murky. Multiple groups fighting inside Syria
have ties to al-Qaeda. And as the unclaimed air strike in mid-June
demonstrates, the United States continues to target those terrorists
who are thought to be especially worrisome.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``U.S. reportedly targets 2 senior al Qaeda
figures in air strike in Syria,'' FDD's Long War Journal, June 14,
2020. (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/06/u-s-reportedly-
targets-2-senior-al-qaeda-figures-in-airstrike-in-syria.php).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It should be noted that Abu al-Qassam was 1 of 5 senior al-Qaeda
figures set free by Iran in 2015. The 5 were reportedly exchanged for
an Iranian diplomat who was held hostage by AQAP in Yemen. Abu al-
Qassam and 2 of the others made their way to Syria, where all 3 have
now perished in the U.S. drone campaign. The other 2, Saif al-Adel and
Abdullah Abdullah (a.k.a. Abu Muhammad al-Masri), evidently decided to
stay in Iran, and from there they have weighed in on the jihadist
controversies inside Syria. During 1 on-line squabble, Abu al-Qassam
himself wrote that the 2 al-Qaeda veterans ``left prison and they are
not imprisoned'' inside Iran. Abu al-Qassam claimed that Adel and
Abdullah ``are forbidden from traveling until Allah makes for them an
exit,'' but ``they move around and live their natural lives except for
being allowed to travel.''\15\ Unlike their brethren in Syria, Adel and
Abdullah are safe from America's drones inside Iran, because the United
States has never launched air strikes against al-Qaeda there. The
Iranian regime has a complex relationship with al-Qaeda. Although the 2
are often at odds, the Iranians have also allowed al-Qaeda to maintain
a ``core pipeline'' on their soil. This facilitation network allows al-
Qaeda to shuttle operatives and communications across the Middle East
and South Asia.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Ibid.
\16\ Some commentators have claimed that merely pointing to Iran's
``agreement'' with al-Qaeda is part of some conspiratorial scheme to
start a war. That claim is nonsense. The formerly ``secret deal''
between the Iranian government and al-Qaeda was documented by the Obama
administration in a series of terrorist designations and other official
statements by the Treasury and State Departments. See: Thomas Joscelyn,
``State Department: Iran allows al Qaeda to operate its `core
facilitation pipeline','' FDD's Long War Journal, September 19, 2018.
(https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/09/state-department-iran-
allows-al-qaeda-to-operate-its-core-facilitation-pipeline.php). In
addition, it should be noted again that Iran and al-Qaeda are often at
odds, including in Syria and Yemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The mid-June air strike in Idlib was the latest in an infrequent
drone campaign in northern Syria. The targets have been select al-Qaeda
leaders and operatives thought to pose a threat to the West. In
February 2017, one of Ayman al-Zawahiri's top deputies, Abu al-Khayr
al-Masri, was killed in a drone strike. It appears that an R9X missile
was used in that targeted air strike and then again earlier this month
in Idlib. In late 2018, Iyad Nazmi Salih Khalil (a.k.a. Abu Julaybib
al-Urduni), was killed in an air strike in late 2018. Like Abu al-
Qassam, Abu Julaybib was close to Zarqawi. The United States then
conducted air strikes against al-Qaeda targets in June and August 2019.
And in December 2019, another senior HAD official, Bilal Khuraysat, was
killed. Khuraysat was a significant ideological figure, as he penned
tracts defending al-Qaeda and criticizing the Islamic State, among
other topics.
Al-Qaeda's senior leadership retains a presence in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. In September 2019 American and Afghan forces killed Asim
Umar, the first emir of AQIS, during a raid in the Musa Qala district
of Helmand.\17\ Umar and his comrades were embedded within a Taliban
stronghold and they were protected by one of the Taliban's ``shadow
Governors.'' Umar's courier was also killed during the raid. According
to the Afghan government, that same courier ran messages back and forth
to Ayman al-Zawahiri.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Bill Roggio, ``Afghan intelligence confirms death of AQIS
emir,'' FDD's Long War Journal, October 8, 2019. (https://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/10/afghan-intelligence-confirms-
death-of-aqis-emir.php).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That same month, the White House confirmed that Hamza bin Laden,
Osama's biological and ideological heir, had been killed in a
``counterterrorism operation.''\18\ The White House did not explain
when or where, only saying that Hamza had met his demise somewhere ``in
the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.'' The Trump administration added that
Hamza ``was responsible for planning and dealing with various terrorist
groups,'' but did not name those organizations. In my view, it is
likely that Hamza was working with the Afghan Taliban, among other
groups. Like his father and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Hamza swore his own oath
of fealty to the Taliban's emir. A monitoring team that works for the
U.N. Security Council recently reported that a Taliban delegation met
with Hamza in the spring of 2019 to ``to reassure him personally that
the Islamic Emirate would not break its historical ties with Al-Qaeda
for any price.''\19\ The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is what the
Taliban calls its totalitarian regime. Similarly, the U.N. team
reported that Ayman al-Zawahiri met with a Haqqani Network delegation
in February 2020 to discuss the agreement struck between the United
States and the Taliban.\20\ The Haqqani Network is an integral part of
the Taliban.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ White House, ``Statement from the President,'' September 14,
2019. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-from-
the-president-10/).
\19\ United Nations Security Council, ``Eleventh report of the
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to
resolution 2501 (2019) concerning the Taliban and other associated
individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability,
and security of Afghanistan,'' April 30, 2020, page 12. (https://
www.undocs.org/S/2020/415).
\20\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.N. monitoring team cited intelligence and reporting from
member states. It is not possible for me, as an outsider, to inspect
these sources. But it is likely within the purview of this committee to
ask the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies about these
reports and the current status of Taliban-al-Qaeda relations. Such
questions are especially important given that the head of U.S. Central
Command, General Kenneth McKenzie, recently claimed that Zawahiri is
based in eastern Afghanistan.\21\
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\21\ U.S. Central Command News Transcript, ``MEI engagement with
General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.,'' June 11, 2020. (https://
www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Transcripts/Article/2216473/mei-engagement-with-
general-kenneth-f-mckenzie-jr/).
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This brief synopsis of al-Qaeda shows that the organization
maintains a cohesive international network nearly 19 years after the 9/
11 hijackings. Its leadership is distributed across several countries.
And while much of al-Qaeda is focused on wars ``over there,'' some part
of the organization remains focused on carrying out attacks over here.
Mr. Rose. Absolutely.
I thank you all so much for your extraordinary testimony. I
will remind the subcommittee that we will each have 5 minutes
to question the panel.
Before I recognize myself, one last thing, without
objection, the gentlewoman from New Mexico, Ms. Torres Small,
will also be permitted to sit and question the witnesses.
With that, I will now recognize myself for questions.
I want to--it seems that what the 3 of you are saying is
the threat is still here, but we also have to skate to where
the puck is going. Let's think about how this threat is
evolving.
So I want to introduce 4 points, 4 ideas. Then,
particularly, Mr. Morell and Ambassador Kaidanow, I would like
to hear your thoughts on this.
The first is, is H.R. McMasters said, I think very
pressingly, that you either fight America asymmetrically or
stupidly. So with that being said, how--are we seeing the
emergence of any State-level support for ISIS, al-Qaeda, or for
other non-state actors, not with the explicit intent of
regional power, as what I think we see more so with Iran, but
with the intent of attacking the United States of America,
attacking our homeland?
Second, one of the threats that I am most concerned with in
2020 and beyond is the notion of a multi-layered attack by a
ISIS, al-Qaeda-like actor using cyber tools and let's say a
small arms attack of sorts. What are we seeing from ISIS and
al-Qaeda with their capacity to utilize cyber tools to inflict
harm?
Second is the Southern Border. Can you please speak to what
is the potential for a threat from ISIS or al-Qaeda at the
Southern Border? This is something that the President speaks
about very frequently, has used it as a justification for the
border wall. I am going to ask you if you could speak to that,
the nature of that threat.
Then last, if what you are saying is true in that this is
now here to stay for generations to come, should we be
considering building multilateral institutions as we have for
peacekeeping, finance, health, and so on and so forth, to more
permanently, as we have with NATO, address the issue of cyber--
excuse me, of terrorism?
Mr. Morell, we will start with you.
Mr. Morell. OK. So let me start at the bottom. Let me talk
about multilateral institutions. I think the point I would make
is that, you know, a huge part of counterterrorism operations
are intelligence. A huge part of counterterrorism operations
are intelligence, right. You can't do them without first-rate
intelligence. Intelligence services outside of the Five Eyes,
and even within the Five Eyes, it is quite compartmented.
Intelligence services don't like multilateral exchanges,
multilateral sharing, multilateral cooperation. They like
bilateral. The reason is pretty simple, because what you are
willing to do and what you are willing to share is based on
trust. So as you expand the number, you make it much more
difficult for people to be willing to share.
So I don't think multilateral institutions are going to be
particularly helpful, because I don't think intelligence
services are going to be willing to share within those
multilateral institutions.
On the question of any states supporting ISIS and al-Qaeda
from the perspective of, you know, supporting a task, I don't
see any. You know, I would love to hear what Tom has to say
about that.
In terms of cyber tools, I left Government in 2013, so I
don't know what the intelligence says now, but, you know, up to
that point and what I see in the open media and in experts--in
the work of experts like Tom is I don't see a lot of terrorist
interests in cyber. It just doesn't have the same kind of
effect that they are looking for.
I think another really important point with regard to cyber
is the kind of effects that you might--that a terrorist group
might see as catastrophic would be attacks on our critical
infrastructure, right? So if a terrorist group is going to
focus on a cyber attack, that is where they would focus,
because that can create a catastrophe.
Those kind of cyber tools that can do that are the most
sophisticated in the world, and that is where our defenses are
the best. So it is only a handful of nation-states that have
those kind of sophisticated tools. In fact, only 2 that I know,
outside of--2 in terms of our adversaries have those kind of
tools. So even if the terrorists wanted to get there, it would
be extremely difficult for them to get there in terms of
bringing about a catastrophic attack as opposed to just kind-of
a nuisance attack on cyber.
The Southern Border, I am not an expert on, so I will leave
that to somebody else.
Mr. Rose. Ambassador, is there anything you would like to
add to that? Feel free to pick any of the 4. You don't have to
go through all.
Ms. Kaidanow. Sure, and I appreciate that. I would
associate, again, myself with everything Mike said. I would
just add maybe a couple of thoughts.
It is not just that intelligence is the key to divining,
you know, what the intent of some of these groups are and the
level of trust, and the trust is bilateral, as he said, more
than it is multilateral. That is absolutely correct. But it is
also the case, I think, at least it was in my experience, you
know, part of what we did at the State Department, the biggest
part of what we did at the State Department was try and marry
our homeland security needs on the one hand and the ability,
again, to rope in, if you will, our European and other allies
to do--not just European, all over the world, to do the kinds
of things that would, in theory, extend our border out.
So in other words, our border is no longer, you know, on
the East and the West Coast. Our border becomes Indonesia. Our
border becomes Saudi Arabia. Our border becomes those places
where otherwise we might find that people are coming we don't
want.
The way you do that is, theoretically, is you engage, you
know, the relevant institutions in those countries, whether it
is their internal affairs ministry, which is usually where you
want to be, you know--and that is not necessarily the same
people who are doing their visa work. That is not necessarily
the same people who are, you know, deciding who comes in and
who goes out of those countries. It is not--and so there is a
lot of--what you find was however disassociated we were before
9/11, in other words, FBI didn't talk to CIA and so on and so
forth, that same disassociation, that same lack of
communication exists almost everywhere in the world. Not only
does it exist, but you can be shocked--even in places like
France where, you know, they have, again, several various
institutions that are dealing with these issues, homeland
security-ish, you know, they have, again, you know, an intel
agency, they have other agencies that are doing law enforcement
and so forth.
The only way sometimes they talk to each other is through
us. They don't like giving out their secrets. They don't like
talking about, you know, what it is that they do for a living.
They think that is their bread and butter.
So we find that it is a challenge for us almost anywhere we
go, on a bilateral basis, to get what we need from the
countries. I think that is a worthwhile effort, personally. I
think it is really important, because again, we are not going
to be able to do these things by ourselves. I think we have
made some strides, actually.
The CIA, I can't talk about it in this particular, you
know, venue, but the CIA has some programs that we utilize to
try and, you know, get at these problems. You know, border
issues are sort-of very, very--when you can't be always on the
offensive, and you need to try, but when you can't be, you need
to have a strong defense. That defense needs to be, you know,
not just, again, us but us and our allies.
So I think that is an important point to think about when
we think about, you know, multilateral versus bilateral. We are
not even at the stage yet where we can get all of our bilateral
friends together in a way that we can keep trying.
Just one other small thing, and that is, I agree with the
cyber. I haven't seen any evidence necessarily that, you know,
these groups necessarily--and Tom may have more on this--are,
you know, there yet. But I would say, if they end up having
even just a few people who are pretty good at the hacking
thing, you can find that there is--you know, it is not
resource-heavy. It is not resource-intensive.
So I think that you need to keep an eyeball on it. I don't
think necessarily they are there yet; they are certainly not in
the capability mode of like Iran or China. No, of course not.
But I do think that they are in a place where, you know, if
they decided, or if there was someone who was particularly
interested in those issues. As you said, I think, Mike, they
were extremely innovative at the outset of, you know, the
caliphate push and so forth. They still remain innovative. They
haven't shown us necessarily that they are doing these things
on the cyber side, but I wouldn't exclude it.
Then, finally, just the last thing is the emergence of, you
know, state support. I don't see that, but I will say, and I
totally believe this, having served in Afghanistan, if that--if
we give that up, if we are now in a position--I know you
haven't talked about how much money we have wasted and so on,
and I am not here to dispute a lot of that; you know, I get it,
but ``wasted'' is a big word. I still find that we have created
a system in Afghanistan that at least can sustain itself for
the time being. If we give the Taliban, you know, complete
political ability to kind-of come in there and now take over, I
think we are taking an enormous risk. That is my particular
feeling on the subject. But, again, I served there, so maybe I
am biased. But that is my very strong feeling.
I know, Chairman, you have also been there and in--down in
Kandahar, and I think, you know, you may feel differently, but
we need to think about our investment. We need think about the
dangers that are still associated with Afghanistan. I will stop
there.
Mr. Rose. Sure. No, no. I was just agreeing. You were
thinking about the high-level stuff, so we really value your
opinion.
Mr. Walker, you have 5 minutes, my friend.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to start with Mr. Joscelyn. Your testimony
highlights the long history and interconnectedness of the
Taliban and al-Qaeda and that despite having signed an
agreement with the United States, the Taliban will never
disavow the terror organization, it seems. What are your
recommendations for pressuring the Taliban into creating an
international coalition to pressure the Taliban and strengthen
the Afghan government? Can you address that?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the
question. As I am sure several of you are aware, I have been
highly critical of the deal of February 29, the deal in Doha,
that was signed between the State Department and the Taliban. I
am a nerd who tracks the Taliban every day of my life and have
for about 20 years, you know, so I know how they think. I think
Mike Morell is exactly right when he says he doesn't trust them
and that they want--they just said what they had to say in
order to get us out.
We have inspected the language of the agreement, and what
they are saying actually is no different from what they said
since the 1990's. You can check the 9/11 Commission report,
page 111, first, to be precise, and what the Taliban told
Ambassador Richardson when they said that Osama bin Laden and
al-Qaeda didn't pose a threat to the United States or the West.
They are saying the same thing now. As far as I can tell, there
is nothing in the agreement to verify or ensure that they are
not lying now as they have lied since the 1990's.
As one side note, one nerdy side note, we are in the middle
of processing al-Qaeda's literature in Urdu, actually, which
documents their role fighting on behalf of the Taliban against
ISIS in eastern Afghanistan. I am happy to share all that once
we are done. But why is that important? Well, that type of
detail is the type of detail we deal in that shows exactly what
Mike Morell said, that the relationship between al-Qaeda and
the Taliban is very close, at a personal level. There is
intermarriage. The 2 are wedded at different points. The Long
War Journal's position has been that the U.S. Government hasn't
taken a holistic view of that relationship. Certainly, the U.S.
military hasn't taken a holistic view of that relationship. For
many years--I am very jaded at this point. I don't think they
are going to get it right or actually put the pressure points
on them to effect the real break between the two because, quite
frankly, when I have these conversations, a lot of times, the
policy makers don't even understand what that relationship
looks like.
So what we have done is we have set forth a series of
criteria in an article in Politico and in my previous testimony
before House Homeland Security and other committees. We said,
here are the criteria we would look for to affect a real break,
what that would look like, and I can just--none of those have
been satisfied by the Doha agreement.
Mr. Walker. Thank you for answering that. I have got 2 more
questions, so if we can move on to try to get these in, if
possible, but the information is very important, so I don't
want to cut anybody short.
I want to go back to Ambassador Kaidanow. Given your
service in Afghanistan, you have had first-hand understanding
of the violence and the inhumane treatment of the people,
particularly the women of Afghanistan, under Taliban rule.
Would you mind taking a moment and remind us of what life was
like for the Afghan people and provide any recommendations for
how the United States and the international community can
pressure the Afghan government to protect its people and their
rights?
Ms. Kaidanow. Yes. I mean, you are, I think, quite right.
The fact of the matter was that certainly under Taliban rule,
it was a very, very difficult situation, certainly for women. I
think, generally speaking, you know, the Taliban were not even
effective as governance. Although what was attractive at the
time, I think, to the people of Afghanistan was there had been
so much turmoil and so much sort-of, you know, upheaval that at
least what the Taliban brought, in their view, was some sort of
measure of order. Yes, but a measure of order of what nature?
The problem is, you know, from our point of view,
obviously, (A), provide safe haven for further terrorist
attacks, not just there but anywhere, you know, globally that
these groups operate. But more to the point, though, for the
people of Afghanistan, it was a disaster, and for the women of
Afghanistan, it was something so terrible that it is really
hard to describe.
So I can tell you that when I was there--so I was there
from about 2012 to 2013, through 2013. You know, the constant
refrain from the women of Afghanistan was please don't desert
us, please don't leave us. This law will go back to where it
was, and we are deadly afraid. You know, some of that may have
been rhetoric, but I honestly will tell you, I mean, if I were
a woman in Afghanistan, I would feel the same way.
So I think the human rights picture will be, you know, at
risk. No question. I mean, there just is no question, you know.
We have to ask ourselves, of course, how much does that matter
to us? Again, a new way of many, many things we care about in
the world, and we do. We care about many things. What is our
priority set? How do we send, you know, that to the top of the
list or, you know, the No. 2 thing on the list?
We can't do everything. Is there a way to try and ensure--
and Tom, you know, referenced this in the new, is it going to
build a, you know, reliable and useful, you know, political
agreement that is going to stand the test of time, the Taliban
have to make some sort of meaningful--and ``meaningful'' is the
key word and very hard to judge--but they have to make to some
kind of meaningful, you know, promises that they can actually
keep. I am not so sure I've seen that.
But, you know, again, that is what the administration needs
to keep in mind. It is not just a matter of getting the hell
out. If you get the hell out and the situation remains
unstable, what you are going to find is you are right back
where you were, you know, not that long ago, and it does have
implications for us in terms of our security, even leaving the
human rights picture aside, which we do care about. So yes.
Mr. Walker. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rose. Thank you, Mr. Walker.
We will now move on to Ms. Lee from the great State of
Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much. This
is a very important hearing. As I listen to the witnesses, I
hesitate to say that I am traveling down memory lane. Thank you
for your service to this Nation as well and those witnesses.
I visited Afghanistan on many occasions, and I certainly
did not carry the burden of our brave men and women. But I did
go during the time of the Afghan war, and I am reminded of
Members of Congress, women Members of Congress that joined in
the newly-formed government to help give input to the
constitution which, in essence, gave much power and recognition
to women. Those women were then ultimately elected to the
parliament.
Unfortunately, as we deviated in policy from Afghanistan
and went to Iraq, those same women, many of them as
parliamentarians, were murdered in their home districts because
of the rise of the Taliban, al-Qaeda. Schools that we had
formed, girls' schools, were destroyed. So we are in an
important moment as to what our next steps will be.
I want to raise the question on that backdrop to Mr. Morell
to take a deep dive into the impact of the Taliban lying in the
negotiations and where that puts us, and then to Mr. Joscelyn,
where you have such a strong portfolio and memory of the
characters, if you will, that played a role. Can you share with
us the rising characters in the Taliban and al-Qaeda to speak
to the issue of the disposing of the present government in
Afghanistan and putting forward a Shia government, which would
undermine all progress that has been made, and I fear, a
bloodletting of all of those people who love democracy?
Mr. Morell, would you proceed with that question that I
asked you?
Mr. Morell. Yes, ma'am. So I think the biggest consequence
of our deal with the Taliban, which would not have been
possible had they been candid with us about their intentions,
is that we have empowered them politically. We have given them
much credibility inside Afghanistan and, quite frankly, outside
Afghanistan than they deserve. That worries me as they move
into negotiations with the government of Afghanistan, and, you
know, it worries me for where we ultimately end up.
Let me add to that, ma'am, that, look, I understand the
dilemma that we find ourselves in here. You know, I understand
that Americans want out. President Obama wanted out. President
Trump wants out. The American people want us out. I get that. I
don't want young men and young women fighting for the United
States without political support. So unless somebody's willing
to stand up and make a compelling case for why we need to stay,
then our only alternative is to figure out, if we're not
there--and believe me, we won't be there for long, even in an
embassy. If we leave militarily, it won't be long before the
Taliban takes over, and we won't be there at all.
So if we are not there, then we are going to have to figure
out how to collect intelligence on al-Qaeda and ISIS and other
groups in Afghanistan, from outside Afghanistan, and we are
going to have to figure out, from a military perspective, how
to reach out and touch those groups to degrade them if we have
to. That is not impossible. Obviously, it is more difficult to
do it from outside than inside, but it is not possible. We did
it in the FATA. We were not in a FATA in Pakistan, and we
successfully collected intelligence and successfully degraded
the enemy in a FATA, so it is not impossible. But we have got
to figure that out because I think that is where we are headed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Mr. Joscelyn, a deep dive into who the characters are but
as well with the backdrop of what Mr. Morell said and the
danger that is created for the region in Afghanistan in
particular.
Mr. Joscelyn. Congresswoman Lee, let me first say this: I
think of all the times that I have testified, I think I have
testified before you more often than any other Member of the
House of Representatives.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Joscelyn. I always say that you cut to the chase
quicker than anybody, and you certainly did here with the
question about the top leadership.
The Ambassador raises an important point, which is exactly
right, which is the Taliban hasn't shown any willingness to
compromise on its political objectives, really, in Afghanistan.
What are those political objectives? Well, Hibatullah
Akhundzada is the Amir of the Faithful for the Taliban. You may
have heard that phrase, that title, Amir of the Faithful,
before. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, of course, was the first Amir of
the Faithful. That is the title that is known to be used by
caliphs, Muslim rulers over all Muslims. It is absolutely an
authoritarian title that they have taken upon themselves and
for Hibatullah Akhundzada.
That is not the title that somebody takes if they are going
to take a ministerial post in a new Afghan government, is it,
right? You are not going to have the Amir of the Faithful who
is going to run the border security or something for a new
Afghan government. You know, this is something that speaks to a
long-standing religious and ideological sort of commitment on
their part to reinstall the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and
resurrect it to power. That has been their political objective
all along.
Now, what is interesting too, I said earlier, that I set
forth the criteria about what a real break to the Taliban al-
Qaeda would look like. Well, the first thing I said was that
Hibatullah Akhundzada would renounce, would publicly disavow
Ayman al-Zawahiri's buyout, his oath of allegiance to him. This
is a very serious matter for the jihadis. The buyout, the oath
of allegiance, is something that they say hangs around their
neck. What it means is that if you violate the buyout, the
person you are swearing it to has the right to take your head
off, right, and Zawahiri has sworn his buyout to Hibatullah
Akhundzada.
So al-Qaeda, this al-Qaeda network that I mapped out in my
oral testimony at the beginning, all those entities that I
mentioned, they have all recognized the religious legitimacy of
that buyout, that oath of allegiance. Yet to this day,
Hibatullah Akhundzada has not renounced Ayman al-Zawahiri's
buyout. So that is a very important point from a theological
and ideological perspective.
Now, underneath Hibatullah Akhundzada is a guy named Siraj
Haqqani, Sirajuddin Haqqani. He is a U.S.-designated terrorist.
I am sure Mike Morell, in particular, is well aware of him
because his guys were involved in one of the deadliest
operations against the CIA ever in December 2009, I think it
was, when they killed, I think it was 7 or 8 CIA officers, a
really horrible attack. It was orchestrated by Ayman al-
Zawahiri.
The Haqqanis have their hooks into all the nasty characters
in the region. Haqqanis actually bred and incubated al-Qaeda in
eastern Afghanistan. You go back all the way to the 1980's.
Haqqani--Siraj's father, Jalaluddin, was one of Osama bin
Laden's first and earliest benefactors. He is somebody who was
personally invested in Osama bin Laden's rise. Today, his son
is the Deputy Amir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. His
network is--we can detail at some length all the ties between
the Haqqani network and al-Qaeda, including the fighting that
is going on right now. That remains unbroken. There is no
evidence of a break there. There is all sorts of intermarriage
and all sorts of confluence of interest there.
I can go on, but that gives you two examples just of the
top leadership here where Hibatullah Akhundzada we know has--
there is a blood oath that has been sworn to him by al-Qaeda
that is unbroken, and Siraj Haqqani is part of a legacy that
goes back to the 1980's of an unbroken alliance between the
Haqqanis and al-Qaeda. These are 2 very, very important points
that I think have not been addressed by the February 29 Doha
agreement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses. As we
pursue domestic terrorism, we cannot leave these vital--how
should I say it--information points and potential danger to the
United States and the world. I look forward to continuing this
discussion, and thank you all for your service.
Mr. Rose. Ms. Lee, thank you for the last few decades,
striking fear into the witnesses of Homeland Security
testimony. You are absolutely phenomenal. It is an
opportunity--it is a great opportunity to serve with you.
Mr. Green, our Ranger, you are up.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again,
congratulations on the newest member of the Rose family. We are
with you guys.
My question is, I think, to Mr. Morell. First, let me thank
all the witnesses for being here and for the Chairman putting
this together. I served--to give you a little bit of my
background, I served as a Night Stalker, Task Force 21, Task
Force 121, Omaha, many others, in both Afghanistan and Iraq,
worked with other Government agencies on many missions
downrange. I want to thank you and your people and your
organization for all that they do for the safety of this
country.
My question is about the alignment that we see in the
Middle East, creating an almost bipolar Sunni versus Shia axis
and those Shia militia, in particular in Yemen and in Syria. I
wondered if you or someone could comment on the Shia militia
and where they are today in this un-Classified setting.
Mr. Morell. Sure. The Shia militia is in Iraq. The Shia
militias in general, but primarily in Iraq, pose a significant
threat to the United States, to our diplomats, and to our
military, the folks in Iraq. We have seen that time and time
again. They are linked significantly to the Iranians in terms
of funding, in terms of weapons, in terms of even training.
That link between the Iranians and the Shia militia in Iraq
has been broken a bit as a result of the death of Qasem
Soleimani. You know, he was extraordinarily hands-on and had a
tremendous amount of influence with those groups. The new
leadership of the Quds Force, less dynamic, doesn't speak
Arabic, less well-known to the west of Iran, doesn't have the
same clout. I mean, I was just struck recently where he paid a
visit to Iraq, I think it was his first visit, and he actually
had to get a visa. Qasem Soleimani never needed a visa to go to
Iraq.
So I think there is less Iranian control today over those
Shia militia. It is not totally gone, but it is still--it is
still there, but it is less, and that is both a good thing and
a bad thing. You know, it gives the Iraqi government an
opportunity to possibly pull them in a little closer, but it
also creates the opportunity that they do something stupid with
regard to the U.S. presence in Iraq that even the Iranians
don't want them to do.
It is a very serious problem, and, you know, the whole Shia
terrorism piece, right, is something we don't talk about very
much. But Hezbollah in particular has significant capabilities
that, since 9/11, they have decided to stay away from us
because of what we would do to them if they take a significant
attack. But we all should remember that prior to 9/11,
Hezbollah killed more Americans than any other terrorist group.
Mr. Green. Yes. Thank you for saying that. I want to shift
gears a little bit but stay in the same place. Again, this may
be a better question for you, but anyone who wants to chime in.
Erdogan and some of the activities in northern Syria that have
been going on, how does that disrupt U.S. security? How does
that disrupt our efforts to take on Shia militias, Shia militia
groups, Iran's efforts to again align this Shia access from
Lebanon all the way around to Yemen? What are your thoughts on
where Erdogan fits into this and how it is interrupting what we
are trying to do there?
Mr. Morell. Yes. Let me ask Tom if he has thoughts on that.
Mr. Joscelyn. Yes. Well, what is interesting about this
question is, right now, on the same computer, I have a bunch of
telegram channels the jihadis are running. One of the hot
debates is over the relationship between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham,
which is in Idlib, and its relationship with Turkey, because
what HTS, we will call it, what they did was they basically
came up with a compromise position with the Turks in order to
allow Turkish forces in Idlib to prevent Assad, Russia, and the
Iranians from overrunning the province.
Now, this brings us back to Chairman Rose's question
earlier. This actually raised a theological issue of
jurisprudence on their behalf about how close you can get to
Turkey or how close you can work with them, and that is the
subject of the on-going dispute because, basically, al-Qaeda
decided a long time ago they can cut deals with apostate
governments if it sort-of furthers their long-term objectives.
There are all sorts of details. We can talk about that. Turkey,
though, has become at the center of the controversy because of
everything that is in Idlib. Right now, infighting, another
round of infighting has broken out between the jihadis in Idlib
over this issue and related issues.
The problem I have with Turkey is that too often I find
them to be duplicitous in all of this. So there were members of
ISIS, commanders of ISIS, including one of the amirs of Mosul,
that actually left for Turkey after Mosul fell, and the United
States Treasury Department and the Iraqi government had taken
an unusual step of identifying him and his address in Turkey
from where he was operating because the Turkish government was
not being cooperative. We can identify other ISIS figures along
those lines, and we have identified al-Qaeda figures in Turkey
who have operated there for years. In fact, there is a guy
named Mohammed Islambouli. He is the brother of Khalid
Islambouli, the assassin of Anwar Sadat.
I have Mohammed Islambouli's Facebook page as one of my
favorite go-tos every day because he would document his journey
through Istanbul and where he was going. He is somebody I am
certain came across Mike Morell's radar at CIA through the
years because CIA has known who he is for a long time. He is a
fully made man in al-Qaeda. It was always curious to me that he
was advertising that he was bouncing from block to block in
Istanbul, Turkey, and the Turks didn't do anything about it.
So it is that sort of duplicity and problems that you are
dealing with here. It is very complex, there is a lot to it,
but that sort-of gives you my lay of the land, anyway.
Mr. Green. Thank you. It doesn't seem like it is any harder
than right there, that northern strip of Syria. So thanks.
Ms. Kaidanow. Do you mind? I would add just maybe like a
couple of lines on that.
You know, Erdogan is constantly overreaching, constantly
thinking that he can manipulate, you know, groups and ideas and
places that he is not as good as he thinks he is at doing. But
just the fact that he thinks that means that we need to be
very, very cautious, again, about how we deal with Erdogan, how
we deal with Turkey. You know, it was, it is, it remains clear
that he wants to be the key player in that part of Turkey--and
I am sorry--in northern Syria to preserve what amounts to an
offshoring of all of the, you know, refugees that came into
Turkey that now they can push back out because it is such a
burden on the Turkish State.
So there is that aspect of it, not to mention the security
aspect of, you know, again pushing out borders. He has to be
good to the Russians for that reason. He has to be--even if he
doesn't like it, he has to be--he has to do deals, you know,
obviously with the Syrians who are embedded with the Russians.
So he is very confident, and that is what he conveyed to our
President. He is very confident that he can--you know, just
leave me alone and let me do what I want to do in northern
Syria; life will be dandy. We have given him an awful lot of
swag, and that is very dangerous for a whole host of reasons.
So I don't want to get into too much more into it, but
just--I mean, I think we have to think of the Erdogan side of
this, not just the, you know, the ex-realist view.
Mr. Green. Absolutely.
Mr. Rose. OK. Thank you.
We will now move on to Ms. Slotkin from the great State of
Michigan, who I am sure you all have actually worked with. She
spent her entire career fighting this fight, and if she wasn't
a great Member of Congress, we would have had her bump one of
you to be a witness.
Ms. Slotkin, you are up.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, Chairman Rose.
Good to see everybody and, indeed, I have very fond
memories of working with many--2 of the 3 panelists at least.
So I guess my quick questions are, you know, Tina, as you were
saying and Mike referred to, you know, we got out of Iraq in
2011. I remember very clearly in the winter of 2014, you know,
the CIA came up for the ``World-wide Threat'' hearing and told
Congress, I mean, I was at the Pentagon at this time, that we
are seeing al-Qaeda affiliates, al-Qaeda types kind-of take
over more towns and more areas in Anbar, and we are worried to
see them more active. Then by the time June rolled around, they
had rolled through Mosul. They had taken over, you know, a huge
swath of territory in Iraq and Syria.
So I guess my question is, what signs do we have, if any,
that similar type of behavior is going on and reconstitutioned?
Maybe I will start with Mike, if you wouldn't mind. Just what
are some similarities between what we see them starting to do
now and what we saw them starting to do in early 2014?
Mr. Morell. You know, I think--so, first of all, Elissa, it
is great to see you. Congresswoman, I am sorry. I am sorry.
Ms. Slotkin. That is OK.
Mr. Morell. It is great to see you, and congratulations to
you on all you have accomplished since you left.
So I think, you know, when I think back to the growth of
ISIS and the explosion, right, it really started with the
withdrawal from Iraq, and that led to a rebound, an almost
immediate rebound in al-Qaeda in Iraq. You could almost feel it
immediately because the pressure came off. The Iraqis--not only
were we not there militarily to help the Iraqi military deal
with AQI, but for some reason, the Iraqis stopped all
cooperation, including intelligence cooperation. You know, I
guess they wanted to define their sovereignty, you know, in as
significant way as possible, and all of that led to an
immediate rebound in AQI.
Then they look across the border, right, and they see the
civil war going on in Syria, and they decide that is the place
to be, right? That is where the fight is, that is where we want
to be, and they go across the border. The al-Qaeda senior
leadership in south Asia doesn't like that and tells them not
to do it but, you know, they do it anyway, and they change
their names. Al-Qaeda in Iraq operating in Syria isn't a cool
name, so they changed their name.
Then they grew, you know, rapidly in Syria because they
were, (A), fighting, and as you fight, you get better; and (B),
they were acquiring weapons as they overran Assad's weapons
depots. So they were getting their hands on some pretty
sophisticated weapons. They were getting this flow of
foreigners, right, to come fight with them because it was the
place to be.
You know, we were watching all of that, and I say--what I
tell people is, up to that point, the IC did a pretty good job
in telling that story and being on top of that. Where we fell
significantly short was when they came back to Iraq and they
started to grab territory, we misjudged the capabilities of the
Iraqi military. You know, we thought the Iraqi military would
do a better job fighting what is now ISIS, what used to be AQI,
and they didn't, right. They fell apart, and they broke and
they ran, essentially. So that is how they got to where they
got to in terms of the size of their caliphate. So they are
constrained now, right, in being able to do that.
I don't know how good the intelligence is today. I don't
see it, so I don't know how good it is. I would assume we have
a decent picture into what the ISIS leadership is up to and
what it is thinking, but they are constrained from doing the
same thing they did before by the fact that the coalition,
although less than it was, right, and putting less pressure on
ISIS than it did before, it is still operating. The fact that
the Iraqi military, with us there--I would worry again about
what would happen if we left, but with us there, it is capable
of dealing with an ISIS that tries to grab territory.
So I don't see them being able to go down the road they did
before and being able to move and gain strength in different
places and being able to, without the United States there, take
on the Iraqi military. So I am not as worried--I am not as much
worried about them creating another caliphate and grabbing
territory.
I am very worried about them finding safe haven along the
Iraq-Syria border from which to plan operations in Europe, from
which to create new propaganda videos. Don't forget, all these
old ones are still available for people to go look at. Hey,
that is still there. But to be able to create new ones and
create a new narrative about their reconstitution and their
rebound that again motivates young people to go out and people
in general to go out and conduct attacks on their behalf. You
know, most concerning, as we talked about, is the ability to
direct an attack in Europe.
Ms. Slotkin. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, so I
will leave it there. But thanks, and great to see Mike and
Tina, and thanks to all of our witnesses.
Mr. Rose. Thank you again, Congresswoman Slotkin.
I think we are all going to take the liberty now of doing a
second round of questioning. So with that, I do want to give--
if anyone else would like to respond to Congresswoman Slotkin's
question, I want to give you the opportunity to do so.
Ms. Kaidanow. If you will allow me just, again, a couple of
words. First of all, Elissa, congratulations. It is so nice to
see you. If you ever want, I am happy to kind-of come and talk
to you about some of the other stuff, you know, not just this,
but some of the defense stuff that we were doing when I was
there, but I will leave that off-line.
But, you know, I think Mike is exactly correct. I hate to
say this, but this is really--you know, we are trying to
grapple with not just what is the problem set, but what is
the--how do you address this? I mean, you know, this is--the
tough question for us always is OK, so we know. ISIS is a
threat of one variety or another. Al-Qaeda remains a threat of,
you know, a very large variety. We have all these other, you
know, regional issues that we are going to have to deal with.
We have the potential of a European-based or European attacks,
all that. What do we do to effectively, at least semi-
effectively, push back on any of that? It is a very tough
question, very layered, very complex.
You could stay here all day talking about, you know, some
of this. But I will say, and this is an uncomfortable answer,
and it gets right back to the question of, you know,
Afghanistan and so on, our presence means something. Our
presence there, just what Mike was describing in Iraq and
Syria, what we know about Afghanistan, other places where, you
know, our being there matters.
Now, it is expensive. It can be very, very costly. It is--
you know, it is all sorts of painful. But on the other hand, I
will just tell you, you know, let's look at, you know,
Afghanistan. It is not just, you know, what does the Taliban
do. No, no. It is what does the government of Afghanistan can
mean for our Government that is actually, you know,
substantively going to sit and mean anything. It is what is the
calculus of the Pakistanis when they look at that, you know,
situation, and are they willing to invest in a stable
Afghanistan? What do the Indians do and how, you know, do the
Pakistanis regard the Indians, because for them, this is just a
three-way war kind of situation. You know, all sorts of
regional concerns and regional stability issues that also
impact on our overall security.
All this goes right back to, are we there or aren't we
there? I am not saying--please believe me, I am not saying that
we have to, you know, sort-of send our people everywhere in the
world. I am just saying there are costs that you really have to
think about. If you are willing to accept that cost, that is
fine. Mike is exactly correct. If we are going to leave
Afghanistan, we at least need to know how the hell we are going
to get the intel and how we are going to address the immediate
terrorism problem because it is going to come.
But the larger question, I think, is not even just the, you
know, potential for attack. It is the, oh, my God, what happens
if the Pakistanis and the Indians start to go at it, the
Taliban sides--there is that element of the Taliban becomes
more prevalent in Afghanistan, sides with the, you know, with
the Pakistanis--I see Mike wants to add to this. So, you know,
I think that there is a lot of consequence here that we need to
think about.
But, you know, we stayed 40, 50, 60 years in Germany for
some of the same reasons. You know, why is it that the cost of
a, you know, relatively small presence, which means something
and says something to, you know, our allies and our partners or
to our enemies sometimes, is that too much to bear? We are
going to have to think about those things. So anyway, sorry to
have to throw the hard--you know, the hard questions into this,
but it really is important to think about.
Ms. Slotkin. Thanks, Tina.
Mr. Rose. Mr. Joscelyn or Mr. Morell, anything you would
like to add to that?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir. I just wanted to add that we tend to
be--and I would love to know what Tom thinks about this. We
tend to be focused--when we look at Afghanistan, we tend to be
focused on the reconstitution of al-Qaeda and the potential for
attacks against the United States, whether somewhere else in
the world or, you know, God forbid, in the homeland. But I
think one of the things that we need to think about is a
reconstitution of a Taliban state in Afghanistan, the potential
impact of that on radicalization in Pakistan.
You know, the influence used to come the other way, right,
from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Now I worry that if Afghanistan
ends up where I think it is going to end up, then I worry about
the influence going the other way and an increase of
radicalization in Pakistan, which could lead to a disaster
scenario of a radical government in Pakistan that happens to
have nuclear weapons.
Mr. Joscelyn. So if I may add to that just real quick, that
is exactly right about Pakistan. The big problem here in
Pakistan and Afghanistan is what I have termed the wheel of
jihad. So the Pakistani state supports and harbors the Afghan
Taliban, Afghan-Taliban leadership, which is then in bed with
al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, some of which actually
attack the Pakistani state and Pakistani civilians. So that is
why the wheel of jihad that remains sort-of unbroken after all
these years.
The problem in the Pakistani calculation, precisely to Mike
Morell's point there, is that their calculation is that they
contain this piece indefinitely and that they basically can use
it to gain control and access over Afghanistan. The problem is
that when you take one notch down the wheel, when you move from
Afghan-Taliban senior leadership to the next step over to al-
Qaeda senior leadership, they are already aggressively looking
at what they are going to do in Pakistan, Kashmir, and the
region. That is why al-Qaeda and the Indian Subcontinent was
stood up in 2014. They were saying we are not just about
Afghanistan. We are looking at the whole Indian Subcontinent.
So that is inherently an idea that is destabilizing that they
are trying to accomplish.
Now, we have also been following their literature, which is
not often looked at in Urdu and Pashto. Their Urdu literature
earlier this year for al-Qaeda, they have already repositioned
it from looking at Afghanistan to saying, no, we are looking at
the whole region now. So they had a lengthy periodical that
would come out every month, it was about 120 pages or so in
Urdu, that was named after the Afghan jihad. That has already
been repositioned to look at Kashmir and India and Pakistan.
The naming, the branding, everything, it is all now saying we
have got--the Americans are leaving, we have won. This a
victory for the Taliban and our allies in Afghanistan. We are
going to consolidate the emirate there, but we are looking at
the whole region.
So in my oral testimony, I mentioned Asim Umar, who was the
first head of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. His mission
under Ayman al-Zawahiri was, in fact, to use Afghanistan and
other safe havens as a place to launch operations and extend
their networks throughout the Indian Subcontinent, and that is
going to keep coming.
But just one other point on Iraq to answer your question
just for 1 minute. You asked about ISIS in Iraq. One of the
things that has happened is there is a seam, a political seam
that has led to a security seam between Kirkuk, the Kurdish
regional government's area of control, and the Iraqi federal
government's area of control. ISIS has exploited that routinely
because, basically, again, wherever there is a vacuum there, we
know that they are going to find it, and they found it, and
they have been executing a large number of attacks. They are
mainly low-scale attacks but not the big, massive operation we
saw in Hadith or elsewhere in previous years. But they have got
a steady drumbeat of these attacks going on in Kirkuk, in the
Kurdish-controlled areas, in Diyala and other areas outside of
Baghdad, so it is something to keep a look on.
Just to wrap this up, one of the reasons why--you know, as
Mike mentioned earlier, that you keep the pressure on them, you
can degrade them, but they bounce back. One of the reasons they
bounce back is they are organized as insurgencies, and there is
all sorts of redundancies and built-in sort-of in these
insurgencies to basically keep them coming, so that when you do
knock out the top tier, there are guys right underneath them.
In fact, you know, the guy who is now the leader of ISIS
right now, Abu Ibrahim al-Qurashi, otherwise known as Hajj
Abdullah, right, he has been in the game since al-Qaeda and
Iraq's formation all the way back to 2003, 2004. How many more
guys are there like that, you know? I don't think anybody
really knows, but they have got enough to keep going, that is
for sure.
Mr. Rose. Again, thank you all. I think we have time for a
few more questions. So let me kind-of try to refocus this
around protecting the homeland and as that relates to
technology and Afghanistan. I say this as a Member of Congress,
a New Yorker, and someone who was a platoon leader in
Afghanistan. The American people cannot fathom us staying there
forever, so it is already America's longest war. I have got
buddies who have deployed 4, 5, 6, 7 times there. The area I
patrolled in Shah Wali Kot is now completely controlled by the
Taliban. So we also just don't want to be stupid and waste
blood and treasure.
Mr. Morell, you hit on a great point, which is that this is
a global threat, and we have done this in other places without
acting as a land-holding power. So let's say we do leave
Afghanistan. What do we do then? How do we utilize the tools we
have been employing, whether it is in Libya or the 20 other
countries where we have fought this threat? What then do we do?
Because the American people should not stand this much longer,
and I say this as someone who deeply cares about National
security.
Then, second, how are these terrorists communicating right
now, would you say? I think that we have seen progress with the
major social media companies cracking down on this, the
establishment of global internet forums to counter terrorist
resident NGO, the appointment of an esteemed executive
director, resourcing the problem. Still much more to be done,
but it seems to me that now the problem really does lie in the
telegrams, in the video games, and the other forms of
communications. What do we do about them? How do we go on the
offensive as it pertains to that issue as well?
Just in reverse order. Maybe, Mr. Joscelyn, we will start
with you.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, just on the communications piece real
quick, you know, the issue is social media and other platforms,
they evolve very quickly, exactly what the Ambassador said
earlier about the extensive use of their tools and just how
innovative and how they have been able to evolve so quickly in
this regard.
For example, you know, obviously, Twitter was the first
generation, and Facebook, were the first generations of ISIS'
foray into the social media world. They migrated very quickly.
They use Telegram more often than anything else. I can show you
at some point in time my own computer. I have about 400 jihadis
channels on Telegram I follow, many of the ISIS channels that
regenerate, many al-Qaeda channels that don't need to
regenerate because nobody takes them down, you know they have
been there for a long time. In fact, earlier last year, the
European Union--Europol--I am sorry. Europol actually worked
with Telegram to take down hundreds of ISIS channels.
Now, what was interesting about this is I have nom de
guerres and aliases on the channels, with Telegram as well; I
also operate under my own name. The account under my own name
was taken down, and it took me about 3 or 4 weeks to convince
them that, in fact, you know, I am just a guy who works on this
stuff. I am not somebody who is actually on their side, you
know. When they reinstated me, I came back, and I was able to
see what channels existed.
None of the al-Qaeda channels had been taken down. Many of
the ISIS channels remained in place. So the sweep got people
like me but didn't get a lot of the bad actors, so it is an on-
going issue.
But when they did this, when Telegram and Europol did this,
and they went to go knock out all of these channels, what it
created for us was this problem where we now have to follow--I
now have accounts on platforms called Riot, RocketChat, Hoop. I
am forgetting some. There are just so many of these now, and
they are on all of them, and they generate content very
quickly.
All of these have--not all of them, but many of them have
private messaging capabilities, which means you don't even need
to be in an actual messaging app like WhatsApp or Signal. You
can go through one of these social media messaging applications
and you can connect with somebody very quickly and start
getting instructions or start getting the details on how to
operate. It has become a complete nightmare from all the people
I talk to in the counterterrorism world and law enforcement
world, a complete nightmare for them on that. I will leave it
there, but that is how I would address the cyber part of this
or the communication part of it.
Mr. Rose. Thank you, sir.
Ambassador.
Ms. Kaidanow. Yes. Just in addition on this communication
thing, absolutely, Tom is right, they are innovative like you
would not believe. I think there is a good-faith effort being
made by a lot of the--especially the larger, you know, firms on
the communication side, you know, the Facebooks, the others,
but I would [inaudible] what they are using is exactly what was
described.
Not only are they using that stuff, but here is the deal.
We are never going to catch up. We can't do counter content
because we cannot ever create content fast enough, well enough,
whatever, to give them something that is going to be meaningful
to them or trustworthy to them. So that whole effort, as far as
I am concerned, I am sorry, is not well-used, and our money
there is not well-used, and we continue to do it. I am not sure
why.
I think what you need to be doing is monitoring that stuff.
But then as an adjunct, as Mike can attest, all intel is a
conglomeration of many things. You have got the incoming from
the communications side. You have HUMINT. The HUMINT is also
what you need to develop because you are going to have to rely
on somebody to tell you something or at least to give you some
signal you should be watching X, Y, or Z or whatever.
There are ways--it is not going to be foolproof ever, but
you are going to be able--and we are better at this than we
used to be. It is not to say, again, that we are going to catch
all the bad guys. We are just not. But there are ways to
collate, let's say, what we do know, you know, so some of that
will be successful, and we have to just keep trying to get
better at that. I think that is the way.
Tom just demonstrated to you some really cool, innovative
things he is doing even on, you know, the non-Classified side.
So I think that, you know, there are ways of addressing this.
The other thing I would say, though, and again, we go back
to the presence, no presence, staying, not staying. I don't
know that we need the kind of presence that we had, let's say,
the size of presence that we have had in some of the places. I
think it is possible to have a very small, very targeted
presence in some of the places that we really hear about,
Afghanistan being one of them, in which we signal just by
virtue of this very small group of people. You know, our tail
tends to be larger than it should be, you know. You don't need
18 cooks for, you know, a platoon of guys. They are very
resourceful. They can do what they need to do, especially if
they are CT-oriented and so forth.
What you need is, you know, a very, very targeted, very
small but nevertheless, you know, present bit of business, and
that is really what you have to decide. Is that worth it to you
or is it not worth it to you? Because otherwise, you are going
to be doing both, on the intel side what Mike described, and
then on the political side, you are going to have to think
about what the implications are so that you, you know, are
cognizant that more will have to be done to make up for your
loss of presence. I just--you know, I think that is an honest
assessment. It is not a pleasant one, it is not an easy one,
but it really is the case, so----
Mr. Rose. Mr. Morell.
Mr. Morell. Mr. Chairman, I would just add I agree
completely with the Ambassador and with Tom. You know, in
particular, the point about the more advanced the technology
that the bad guys are using in particular with regard to
encryption, the more HUMINT becomes important, right. The more
it becomes important to be at one of the ends of the
conversation, and having a human being there is--becomes more
important in this new technology world we are in. So I think
that is an important point.
You know, with regard to Afghanistan, I think we have to
think about how we leave, you know. I think we are leaving.
That is my judgment. I don't think it is necessarily the right
answer, but I think that is what is happening. So I think we
need to think about how we leave, and I would strongly
encourage us not to empower and embolden the Taliban as we do
so, No. 1.
No. 2, we really have to think about not only our presence
there, but also the financial assistance that we provide to the
Afghan government, which is well over $5 billion. Don't know
the exact number.
But, you know, pulling our forces out is one thing. Taking
away that financial assistance? I believe the Afghan government
would collapse overnight without that financial assistance. So
nobody talks about that. I don't know where that stands in the
negotiations or how the administration is thinking about it. I
just don't know, but it is incredibly important that that money
continue to flow even if the troops are out.
Then, as I said, we are going to have to figure out how we
collect intelligence and how we are able to reach out and touch
them, and I think we have got to think about both partners,
particularly on the intel side. On the military side, we have
got to think about, OK, where do we do that from? What are the
platforms? You know, are they sea-based? Are they in central
Asia, central Asia-based? Where are those platforms going to
be? I think the intel piece is actually easier than the action
piece in terms of taking care of the problem once you are not
there anymore.
Mr. Rose. Thank you again.
Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Chairman. I do have one more
question for Mr. Joscelyn, if I could get that in.
In your testimony, you suggest that there has been a
decade-long reduction in U.S. counterinsurgency activities in
Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Northern Africa, and that these
activities have been placed with more of an ad hoc targeting
strategy. Without committing more U.S. Forces to the
battlefield, I would like to know what recommendations you
might have to improve intelligence collection and
counterterrorism targeting to ensure a sustained pressure
campaign against these terror organizations.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, thank you for the question,
Congressman. What I would say is, you know, there is a lot of
talk these days about endless wars, and believe me, I get it. I
never thought that I would be covering this stuff for as long
as I have, but I don't have any skin in the game like others do
or deployed to Afghanistan over and over again or other areas,
so I have a tremendous amount of respect for them and their
families. I understand that there are a lot of people who are
frustrated and just want out.
What I would say is, when you look at the big picture, the
United States shifted away from the large-scale
counterinsurgency platform of a decade ago. It really ended
around 2011, 2012. At the peak, we had about 200,000 U.S.
service members in Iraq and Afghanistan. When I first did this
assessment last year, the number was less than 30,000 across
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. I think today it is less than
20,000.
My view is I don't think we can go to zero in all these
areas and still have intelligence collection, still have the
capacity to go get terrorists, go get the guys that I am
talking about in my oral testimony and that you see in my
written testimony. I think we are going to need some sort of
footprint, and that is the problem right now is I don't think
that the talks are really aimed at what it should be, which is
what is the right size of this sort of footprint overseas.
Afghanistan provides all sorts of challenges going forward.
You know, as we have said, the U.S. military, you know, has had
a hard time tracking al-Qaeda in Afghanistan all these years.
We have had many conversations along these lines, even with
larger number of forces there. I think it is going to get even
more difficult if we fully depart from the country, which I
think I agree with Mike Morell and I said publicly, I think it
is coming.
In that vein, I would get the agreement that was signed
with the Taliban on February 29, and I would look particularly
at section 1, subclause F. What that clause says is that the
United States, not only after it says we are leaving
Afghanistan, it says the United States will not use military
force or even threaten military force against Afghanistan going
forward after the U.S. withdrawal.
That agreement, in effect, taken at face value, says the
United States doesn't have the right to protect itself and
defend American interests and Americans going forward from the
emergence of counterterrorism threats in Afghanistan. It is one
of the clauses that hasn't received any public scrutiny but
really should. Because even if all you want is for the United
States to get out of Afghanistan today and leave all the
troops, nobody should pretend like we are not going to have
terrorist threats emerging from that region going forward
because, of course, we are.
So I think the big question, really, to my mind, is it
seems that we have come to this place now where even the lower
footprint, the smaller footprint is not tenable. In Africa, you
have around 6,000 American service members who are basically
working with the French and local partners and others to keep
these insurgencies at bay and take out high-value targets.
To the Ambassador's point about, you know, building
coalitions and working with partners, that is exactly right. It
is what we should be doing, but unfortunately, right now,
everything is about just removing American troops as opposed to
finding stable alliances or stable platforms for going forward.
Because the bottom line is we are going to have to reintroduce
American forces in some of these areas once these threats sort-
of metastasize to a point where it becomes obvious to everybody
that is a threat, just like ISIS did in 2013 and 2014.
Mr. Rose. Thank you again, Mr. Joscelyn.
Is there something else?
Mr. Walker. No. I just yield back to you, Chairman. Thank
you.
Mr. Rose. Thank you, Mr. Walker.
Ms. Slotkin, if you would like to close us out with another
question.
Ms. Slotkin. Sure. So just on the conversation of what our
successful presence looks like abroad. You know, I am a former
CIA officer, and I did 3 tours alongside the military in Iraq
and worked on this issue, basically, my entire professional
life. So I am a big, big believer that you have to keep
pressure on these terrorist networks or else they do grow back,
they do expand, they do claim territory, and then they do
threaten us directly and our allies.
So I am a big believer, but I am also the representative of
a lot of people who say is the juice worth the squeeze? You
know, most people would say I want to know that my Government
is protecting me from terrorist groups and from attacks on the
homeland. Absolutely. But then when they see that the cost of
the counter-ISIS campaign from 2014 to 2019 was $765 billion,
that is the entire cost of funding our entire Defense
Department for 1 year. The question is, is the juice worth the
squeeze? When the request that has come in this year is $845
billion for Iraq and Syria when we have less than 7,000 forces
on the ground in those two countries, I am as big a believer as
anyone, but we have got to be able to look at people with a
straight face and say that the juice is worth the squeeze.
So can one of you explain to me, and more importantly to
our constituents, how the juice is worth the squeeze? If it is
not, on these present locations, how do we get to a leaner,
meaner presence that allows us to have that cost-benefit
analysis that makes sense to the average person?
Mr. Morell. So maybe I will go first, but I look forward to
the comments of my colleagues. It is the question. I mean, you
are at the heart of it, and as I think, there are two answers
that come to mind for me, Congresswoman.
One is that I think it is incumbent upon our political
leadership to include Members of Congress to make the case that
the threat remains and that the threat is dangerous and that we
need to protect ourselves. You know, I have a particular
political philosophy. I don't know if it is widely shared, but
my view is that political leaders need to lead, not follow;
lead their constituents, not follow them, but that is for
another debate. So I do think it is incumbent upon the
President and Members of Congress to tell the American people
exactly what the threats are and why it is important that we
stay focused on them. So that is one.
Two is that is--the figures you cited, that is way too much
money for the number of troops we are talking about. That is
shocking to me that that is the number. If I were the
President, I would send them back to the drawing board and have
them resize that number, because it sounds outrageous to me.
But I think the more important point to me is as I would
think about how to structure our ability to both spy on and
then degrade these groups, I would want to do it as a
coalition. So I would want to bilaterally on the intelligence
side use as many partners as we can use to get the information
we need. As you know, there are partners we can count on, and
there are some partners we can't, but I think we should rely on
our partners as much as we can to collect the intelligence we
need. Then I think we should rely on our partners as much as we
can to actually action those targets and that we, the United
States of America, only action targets when we absolutely have
to, when there is no other choice.
So, you know, I look at some parts of the world where U.S.
Special Forces have been able to train local partners to be
fairly effective against the radicals who happen to live in
their countries. I think that is a great model. I think we
should be very thankful to the French government for what it
has been able to do in Africa, in West Africa, and that should
be a model, right, where we encourage our partners to actually
take action that if they didn't take, we might have to take.
So I think we really have got to think hard about what does
a coalition look like to do both the intelligence piece and the
degradation piece, because I don't think we can justify the
numbers even with a truthful and candid evaluation of the
threat.
Mr. Joscelyn. So, you know, the Defense Department budget
is [inaudible] figures, and part of what I learned is that
transparency is not always forthcoming and that their
categories are fuzzy. So I strongly encourage Congress, of
course, to continue its oversight efforts, and some effort
within the Defense Department to classify portions of the
budget or parts of the budget, I just don't agree with that. I
think the American people need to know how much money is being
spent and what it is being spent on.
Now, my understanding of this is that, you know, a lot of
the wasteful spending--although I am sure there is absolutely
wasteful spending on what I will call the 9/11 wars for sure in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Absolutely. A lot of the
wasteful spending is on these big defense platforms it may not
even be necessary to use going forward. You can see this in
this new book, The Kill Chain, by Chris Brose, who used to work
for the Senate and Senator McCain, which goes into great
detail. He has all sorts of detail that I didn't have which
really explains how this wasted money on basically big, high-
end weapons didn't really make any sense for the threat
environment we are in.
You can also look at Anthony Cordesman for CSIS. He has an
announcement he does of the budget, the defense budget, and he
tries to break it down in as much detail as he can. What he has
shown, to my satisfaction, is that, basically, the 9/11 wars
became a priority part of the defense budget a long time ago.
So I think, you know, he said, for example, in Afghanistan, it
is still a lot of money. I am not saying there isn't waste,
there is a lot of waste, but it is about $30 billion a year now
out of over $700 billion in total budget and maybe even less
than that. The projections are showing it is going to be less
than that.
So, overall, I think 9/11 wars don't cost the lion's share
of the defense budget, but there is still money to be trimmed
there. I am sure there is still waste, absolutely. You can go
through that.
On Iraq, Congresswoman, what number did you say for the
Iraq number? Was that 845? How much was that, exactly?
Ms. Slotkin. So the fiscal year 2021 request for the
Department of Defense, and I am on the Armed Services
Committee, is $845 million.
Mr. Joscelyn. Million. OK.
Ms. Slotkin. Yes. Not billion.
Mr. Joscelyn. Yes. I thought so. Yes. I was a little taken
aback when I heard billion. I said, whoa, you know. No,
million: $845 million is probably about right. My understanding
of it is less than a billion. I am sure there is money that
could be trimmed there as well.
I think the point, to my mind, is you are asking the
absolute right question. It is a question I have struggled
with, and I am not going to claim to have all the right
answers. I know after covering this for many years, there is a
lot of wasted money. Sometimes, some places we are much more
efficient. The United States is much more efficient at using a
small-scale footprint than in others. The problem going forward
is I don't think the people are having that right cost-benefit
analysis question that you are asking right now or debate about
this. I think the question is much more about just getting out
of everywhere, and that is certainly what I see the President
has wanted to do for quite some time. Thanks.
Mr. Rose. OK. So with that, I do just want to thank our
witnesses for their absolutely invaluable testimony, and of
course, your extraordinary service. You have really dedicated
your lives and your careers to this fight, and we are just
extraordinarily grateful, Democrats and Republicans, for all
that you have done for this country.
So the Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses. We ask that you respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions. Without objection,
the committee record shall be kept open for 10 days.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]