[House Hearing, 116 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 116-63] ALARMING INCIDENTS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN THE MILITARY--HOW TO STOP IT? __________ HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ HEARING HELD FEBRUARY 11, 2020 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 42-962 WASHINGTON : 2021 SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL JACKIE SPEIER, California, Chairwoman SUSAN A. DAVIS, California TRENT KELLY, Mississippi RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming California, Vice Chair PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas JACK BERGMAN, Michigan DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico MATT GAETZ, Florida LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia Craig Greene, Professional Staff Member Glen Diehl, Professional Staff Member Danielle Steitz, Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- Page STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Military Personnel..................... 3 Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel................. 1 WITNESSES Beirich, Heidi L., Ph.D., Co-Founder and Chief Strategy Officer, Global Project Against Hate and Extremism...................... 4 Brooks, Lecia J., Chief Workplace Transformation Office, Southern Poverty Law Center............................................. 8 Ethridge, Joe E., Jr., Chief, Criminal Intelligence Division, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command....................... 28 Grabosky, Robert S., Deputy Director, Law Enforcement, Strategic Programs and Requirements, U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations................................................. 31 McMahon, Christopher J., Executive Assistant Director, National Security Directorate, Naval Criminal Investigative Service..... 29 Miller, Stephanie, Director, Accessions Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness......... 24 Pitcavage, Mark, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Center on Extremism, Anti-Defamation League.............................. 6 Reid, Garry, Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence................ 26 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Beirich, Heidi L............................................. 51 Brooks, Lecia J.............................................. 107 Ethridge, Joe E., Jr......................................... 135 Grabosky, Robert S........................................... 142 McMahon, Christopher J....................................... 139 Pitcavage, Mark.............................................. 85 Reid, Garry, joint with Stephanie Miller..................... 127 Speier, Hon. Jackie.......................................... 49 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: Ms. Speier................................................... 149 Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: Ms. Speier................................................... 155 ALARMING INCIDENTS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN THE MILITARY--HOW TO STOP IT? ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 11, 2020. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jackie Speier (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL Ms. Speier. The Military Personnel Subcommittee will come to order. The hearing today is to discuss a very important issue and one that hopefully we will get some important answers to. This issue could not be more urgent. Three weeks ago, a New York Times article revealed that the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] had arrested seven members of an organization called The Base, a dangerous White supremacist group. They aren't your parents' neo-Nazis. The Base is an accelerationist, paganistic, anarchic group whose name speaks to the admiration for al-Qaida and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. They hate Jews and African Americans, but they don't like President Trump or the United States either. Their goal is to use terrorism to start a race war and collapse the United States. Triggering societal collapse may be a sick fantasy, but the reality is that domestic terror has claimed more lives than international terror since 9/11. Last week, FBI Director Wray told the Judiciary Committee that he had, quote, ``elevated racially motivated violent extremism to a national threat priority at the same band with homegrown violent extremism and ISIS,'' unquote. Our enemies, especially Russia, exploit these racial tensions to divide and weaken American society. The head of The Base lives in Russia. Russia likely supports White supremacist groups in the United States and Europe, and Russia targets our service members with disinformation. When our enemies take advantage of our vulnerabilities, our national security is threatened and dependent on a sufficient response. The threat also has specific implications for the Personnel Subcommittee. First, White supremacist terror groups and communities value military skills that would enable them to commit terrorism or fight a race war. They recruit vets to join and train their members, seek to infiltrate sympathizers into the military, and many members claim to have military experience. This doesn't make White supremacist terror groups unique. Al- Qaida also recruited members of the Egyptian and Saudi militaries. Second, there are several warning signs that individuals with White nationalist and supremacist tendencies are, in fact, serving in our military. Recent high-profile examples include a Marine attending the 2017 Charlottesville rally, a Coast Guard officer arrested with a cache of weapons, and a West Point grad espousing hate on social media. Last week, a Military Times survey showed that the number of troops who have witnessed evidence of White supremacist and racial ideologies in the military increased from 22 to 36 percent from 2018 to 2019. Like in previous decades, as supremacist activities, marked by events such as Charlottesville, have increased in recent years, it has likely increased in the military as well. And supremacists in the military put service members' safety, recruitment, and retention at risk. Third, I am concerned that the military doesn't take this threat seriously enough, have the tools it needs, or dedicates sufficient resources to the threat. Our accessions and vetting enterprise lumps White supremacist activity in with gang affiliation rather than treat it as a national security issue on par with foreign terror. That lack of urgency and focus trickles down to commanders and enlisted leaders, who don't appear to be sufficiently apprised of this threat or taught how to deal with it. Even if they are dealing with it, the military lacks statistics to prove it, in part because of the absence of a standalone UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] extremism article. This raises hard questions about whether military law enforcement needs additional authorities to combat this terror threat. Today we will be joined by two panels. The first will consist of experts from organizations that study, track, and educate on extremism. On the second, we will have DOD [Department of Defense] officials responsible for the accessions policy for the military, counterintelligence, law enforcement, and security, and the military criminal investigations agencies. I would like to focus on three main concerns today. First, what is the scope and magnitude of this threat, and what are its impacts? Second, what is being done to prevent these individuals from entering the military and then find, investigate, and prosecute them? Do military leaders take this issue seriously enough? Some of the testimony will suggest that many of them are just administratively discharged; nothing further is done about them. That is inconsistent with our need to make sure that the country is secure as well. Third, what additional tools might we need to give the military to combat this threat? Before I introduce the first panel, let me have Ranking Member Kelly have his opening remarks. [The prepared statement of Ms. Speier can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Chairwoman Speier. I wish to welcome both of our panels to today's hearing. I have dealt with White supremacy on the front lines as a district attorney. From murders to rapes, to assault, to intimidation, to officer shootings, I have dealt with all those things in my district in Mississippi during my time as a prosecutor and a district attorney there. But I have also served in the military for 34 years. No group is more diverse or culturally integrated than our United States military--none, anywhere. We must keep it that way. It should be a cultural site where people can go to know what right looks like. And we have to keep it that way, which means this is an important hearing to make sure that we keep us at the basis that we are. I think extremist activities of any kind are unacceptable and cannot be tolerated in the military. They cut to the very core of what the military was founded on: good order and discipline. George Washington once wrote, ``Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable, procures success to the weak and esteem to all.'' The thought of extremist activities like White supremacy pervading the military is in direct contrast to the foundation of what the military stands for. As a former brigade commander and a battalion commander in combat, I can tell you from experience that soldiers must and do trust each other with their lives, regardless of their backgrounds or the colors of their skin. Service members are judged based on their ability to perform their job and the content of their character, and any other distinctions have no place in the military or in society. I am interested in understanding the true magnitude of these issues from today's witnesses. As I was preparing for this hearing, I realized we don't have a lot of reliable data on this. Aside from a recent newspaper poll on racist behavior in the military, we have few solid statistics on extremist behavior in the military. The definitive data we do have comes from the Department of Defense, where there have been 21 criminal cases involving White supremacy over the last 5 years amongst all four services and components. DOD is now tracking investigations into White supremacy, as well as other extremist activities, and sharing this information with the FBI. This is a step in the right direction on the law enforcement side, but I think data is a huge key to unpacking the issue. We need to define the problem and get reliable data on how prevalent it is in the military. On panel one, I would like to understand the magnitude of extremist and White supremacy activities all across society and what data is being tracked outside of the military. I am also interested in your recommendations specifically as they pertain to training and data collection for the military. On panel two, I would like to hear about the Department's screening processes and the ongoing monitoring of extremist activities. My understanding is there may be a gap in the reporting of the noncriminal cases that have been handled administratively by commanders that resulted in an administrative discharge. I would like to understand DOD's way forward on this issue and whether we also need to have standardized training across the services. I want to thank our witnesses and our chairwoman for being here today. Thank you, and I yield back. Ms. Speier. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly. Thank you, witnesses, for joining us today. You will have 5 minutes to present your testimony. I would also like to ask unanimous consent that non- committee members be allowed to participate and ask questions after all the committee members have had the opportunity to ask questions. Without objection? Mr. Kelly. Without objection. Ms. Speier. So ordered. Okay. Our first panel starts with Dr. Heidi Beirich, co- founder and chief strategy officer of the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism; Dr. Mark Pitcavage, senior research fellow at the Center on Extremism at the Anti-Defamation League; and Ms. Lecia Brooks, chief workplace transformation officer at the Southern Poverty Law Center. We will take a short recess and switch out to our second panel at the end of the first panel. So would you like to begin? STATEMENT OF HEIDI L. BEIRICH, PH.D., CO-FOUNDER AND CHIEF STRATEGY OFFICER, GLOBAL PROJECT AGAINST HATE AND EXTREMISM Dr. Beirich. Yes. I would like to thank the esteemed members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today. It is a great honor. My name is Heidi Beirich. I have a Ph.D. in political science from Purdue University, and I am the co-founder of the newly established Global Project Against Hate and Extremism. For the last two decades, I have researched extremist activity in the United States and monitored White supremacists in the military, often forwarding that information to military investigators. I also argued, as I will today, for more vigilant practices and stronger policies to root out extremists from the ranks. Nothing I say in my remarks today should be taken to impugn the honorable men and women who serve in the Armed Forces, whose efforts I applaud. Barring White supremacists from the military is of the utmost importance. As my written testimony documents, the problem of White supremacists in the ranks is a serious and growing one. Many of us know of former soldiers with extremist views who have gone on to commit serious acts of terrorism. Timothy McVeigh and Oklahoma City is the one that most people usually think of, but this isn't an old problem. Just in this past year, Active Duty troops have been found to be involved in White supremacist groups responsible for murders and domestic terrorism plots and, in some cases, international terrorism. And White supremacy and the terror associated with it is on the rise--in fact, bucking the trend of declining rates of terror globally. We have a growing White supremacist movement both in the United States and abroad. Some of these folks are training White supremacists in other countries on military tactics. This is a significant threat to our troops, to the American public, and folks in other countries. The armed services' own soldiers know that White supremacy is a problem. It has already been cited. The Military Times has done a poll 3 years in a row that shows between one in four and one in three soldiers are aware--have encountered White nationalism or racism in the Armed Forces. So here are just my top-level recommendations to deal with White supremacy in the Armed Forces. It is very clear that screening measures need strengthening. The military doesn't have a tattoo database, for example, that shows extremist tattoos. It doesn't have clear procedures to investigate social media accounts, which is where you find most extremism nowadays. It might be wise to consider how the online activities of Active Duty troops are monitored. The recent arrest of a Coast Guard lieutenant who had all this kind of horrible stuff online tells us what this could lead to if we are not paying attention. Military recruits do fill out questionnaires that ask whether they have been a member of an organization dedicated to terrorism, but this process relies on self-reporting, and it is unclear how much that self-reporting is verified. There is need for more rigorous enforcement procedures and data, as has already been mentioned by the ranking member. The regulations against racism and White supremacy are generally strong, but if they are not enforced, they are paper tigers. Current regulations have penalties that are largely left up to commanders often at the unit level. There appears to be no process to track people expelled for ties to White supremacist groups. There is little data in the public domain to know how serious this problem is. All of these are serious issues, as well as it being unclear how information on extremists in one branch are shared with other branches or the Guard or the FBI. There need to be mandatory reports every year about the levels of White supremacy in the military. There was a House amendment that intended to add questions about White nationalism to military climate surveys that was dropped out of the National Defense Authorization Act. I would suggest that this should be looked at again. The Pentagon's, you know, investigatory task forces in each branch should be looked at, how they look at extremist networks, what level of investigatory resources exist there. And then data should be generated so that we know how serious the problem is. There are also loopholes in the regulations for other kinds of extremists. One example are folks involved in the anti- government militia movement. These are people who believe in war against the Federal Government and are increasingly anti- immigrant and anti-Muslim. And some of these organizations have thousands of members and specifically try to recruit from the Armed Forces. So that is something I would suggest also needs to be looked at. The military needs to report hate crime statistics to the FBI. Frankly, all Federal agencies need to. But this is another piece of data that would be helpful for understanding these problems. And there also is evidence the existence of extremists in the ranks is now contributing to worldwide terrorism. Members of the most violent American neo-Nazi groups have recruited veterans from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Active Duty service members, and that military expertise is now being shared with White supremacists in other countries. This is something else that merits examination. I also want to say that it is very important that everybody in leadership speak out against White supremacy in the ranks. This is a bipartisan issue. It has been for a long time. And it should really be a no-brainer that this has to be done by everybody from the Commander in Chief on down. So, in closing, I want to just say that I agree with former Joint Chiefs Chairman General Joseph Dunford, who said, ``There is no place for bigotry and racism in the U.S. military or the United States as a whole.'' I hope the policy suggestions I provided here and in writing can bring us closer to eradicating these ideas from the ranks of our incomparable Armed Forces. It has been an honor to speak here. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Beirich can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] Ms. Speier. Thank you, Dr. Beirich. Next is Dr. Pitcavage. STATEMENT OF MARK PITCAVAGE, PH.D., SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTER ON EXTREMISM, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE Dr. Pitcavage. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Kelly, distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. I am Mark Pitcavage, a senior research fellow with ADL's [Anti- Defamation League's] Center on Extremism. It is an honor to appear before you today to address the issue of White supremacy in the U.S. military. For decades, ADL has fought against hate, anti-Semitism, and extremism in all forms by exposing extremist groups and individuals who spread hate and incite violence. Today, ADL is the foremost nongovernmental authority on domestic terrorism, extremism, hate groups, and hate crimes. The issue of extremism in the military is one ADL's Center on Extremism has tracked for years. We alert the services about military members tied to extremism, provide assistance upon request to recruiters and investigators, and offer training on extremism and related subjects. For example, ADL provides annual training to the command staff of the Army Criminal Investigation Command and Provost Marshal General. In 2009, ADL wrote then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, urging him to take measures to deal with White supremacy in the Armed Forces. The problem has only grown in urgency since then. In my testimony, I would like to share important context about the nature of extremism in the Armed Forces. Our Active and Reserve Components are large enough, numbering over 2 million men and women, to reflect broader American society in key ways, including the presence of extremism. Each time the White supremacist movement has surged in the U.S., that surge has been mirrored by a similar increase within the Armed Forces. It happened during surges in the 1980s, the 1990s, and in 2008 to 2011. Today, it is happening again, as the U.S. is experiencing a surge in White supremacy propelled by the rise of the alt- right, which has brought many young, newly radicalized White males into the White supremacy movement. This is aggravated by the spread of hate online. With each surge, the military incurs not only an increase in extremists but also increases in crime and violence that accompany that. Extremists in the military have planned terrorist acts. They have engaged in murders and hate crimes and stolen weapons and military equipment. And they provided information to other extremists. The current surge of White supremacy is no exception. Less than 2 weeks ago, Coast Guard Lieutenant Christopher Hasson was sentenced in Federal court to 13 years in prison in connection with a plot to commit domestic terrorism. Prosecutors described Hasson as a man inspired by racist murderers, who intended to exact retribution on minorities and those he considered traitors. Had law enforcement not caught him, they noted, we would now be counting the bodies of the defendant's victims. Internet searches Hasson made included ``where do Congressmen and Senators live when they are in DC [District of Columbia],'' ``how to rid the U.S. of Jews,'' and ``most liberal Federal judges,'' among others. Hasson wrote, ``I can't strike just to wound. I must find a way to deliver a blow that cannot be shaken off.'' Other extremists in the military in recent years have distributed information related to explosives and WMDs [weapons of mass destruction], assaulted people during White supremacist rallies, acquired bombs and explosive materials, and used a firearm to threaten members of a mosque. Even more have been exposed attending White supremacist events, joining extremist groups, distributing racist propaganda, and posting to White supremacist chat rooms and forums online. The presence of extremists in the Armed Forces is dangerous to service members, their families, and others, and harmful to the good order, discipline, morale, and effectiveness of our troops. It is a problem that the military cannot afford to ignore. ADL's experiences working with the services have caused us concern that policies and regulations are not always widely or uniformly implemented, nor are key personnel always trained in systematic fashion. We encourage you to work with the Department and the services to ensure uniformity and clarity of regulations, to provide proper training for those involved in recruitment, discipline, and military justice on how to respond to evidence of extremism. We offer our expertise and experience to help the services tackle this issue, including developing curricula or train-the- trainer events. Most importantly, we encourage all DOD and military leaders, as well as you, to speak out against hate. Setting an example from the top is essential. We must protect the men and women who protect our Nation. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Pitcavage can be found in the Appendix on page 85.] Ms. Speier. Thank you, Doctor. Next is Ms. Brooks. STATEMENT OF LECIA J. BROOKS, CHIEF WORKPLACE TRANSFORMATION OFFICE, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER Ms. Brooks. Thank you. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Kelly, committee members, thank you so much. My name is Lecia Brooks. I am the daughter of a veteran of the Korean War. I am the mother of a son who proudly served the U.S. Army for two tours. This issue is deeply personal to me. The White nationalist movement in the United States is surging and presents a serious danger to our country and its institutions, including the U.S. Armed Forces. Recent investigations have revealed dozens of veterans and Active Duty service members who are affiliated with White nationalist activity. This is far from a new problem. In fact, the Southern Poverty Law Center has been documenting White nationalists and White supremacist infiltration of the military and urging officials to take action since 1986. In that year, we wrote Defense Secretary Weinberger and exposed the fact that Active Duty Marines at Camp Lejeune were participating in paramilitary Ku Klux Klan activities and even stealing military weaponry for Klan use. In December 2019, as was mentioned, it was reported that the National Defense Authorization Act was altered in the U.S. Senate to remove the mention of White nationalists in the screening process for military enlistees. According to the 2019 poll that was referenced by the Military Times, 36 percent of Active Duty service members who were surveyed reported seeing signs of White nationalism or racist ideology in the U.S. Armed Forces. In the same survey, more than half of the service members of color reported experiencing incidents of racism or racist ideology. A number of plots by White nationalists have been thwarted. The arrest of Lieutenant Christopher Paul Hasson, a 49-year-old serving in the Coast Guard, provides a recent example. Hasson, who had also spent time in the Marine Corps and the Army National Guard, was recently sentenced to more than 13 years in prison. He explicitly identified as White nationalist and advocated for the establishment of a White ethnostate. SPLC [Southern Poverty Law Center] has identified dozens of former and active military personnel among the membership of some of the country's most dangerous White nationalist and White supremacist groups. Those groups include the Atomwaffen Division, a neo-Nazi group whose members have allegedly been responsible for five murders since 2017. Brandon Russell, who launched Atomwaffen in 2015, served in the Florida Army National Guard. After his roommate Devon Arthurs killed two other roommates, who were also members of Atomwaffen, police found explosive materials. A framed photo of Army veteran and Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh was found in Russell's bedroom. He also possessed fliers that read, ``Don't prepare for exams, prepare for a race war.'' It appears Russell joined the National Guard in order to receive the kind of skills he would need to prepare for that potential race war. All together, investigators have found seven members of Atomwaffen who have served in the military. Because of their sophisticated weapons and explosives training, those members significantly increase the group's potential to carry out deadly attacks. Russell has since been sentenced to 5 years in prison on charges related to the explosive materials found in the apartment. From prison, he has attempted to send instructions for building explosives to another member of the neo-Nazi group. The recent arrest of two trained soldiers, one from the United States and one from Canada, who belong to a terroristic White nationalist group called The Base have heightened our fears that they are now forming paramilitary cells. In 2006, the SPLC released a report highlighting the continuing presence of White nationalists in the military and once again reached out to ask the Department of Defense to implement a zero-tolerance policy on White supremacy. And again in 2008 and 2009, we wrote letters to the DOD urging investigations. Today, the SPLC offers the following recommendations. One, adopt and rigorously enforce a zero-tolerance policy on White nationalists and supremacist activity across all branches of the military. Two, require an annual report from military leadership that includes an audit of all investigations and resolutions of White nationalist and White supremacist activity. Three, blunt the reach and impact of White nationalist and supremacist ideology by offering support services that work to deradicalize Active Duty service members and veterans exposed to hateful and violent messages. We urge this committee and this Congress to use its powers to purge from its ranks those who would mar the reputation and courageous work of our dedicated U.S. service members. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. Brooks can be found in the Appendix on page 107.] Ms. Speier. Thank you, Ms. Brooks. Thank you for your testimony. It is jarring, to say the very least, and is a very important wake-up call for all of us. You have offered a number of recommendations. I would like to maybe use Lieutenant Hasson, to the extent that there is public information. Was there social media--maybe I should ask this of the next panel, actually. Let me ask you this. We have the dark web. So individuals can gravitate to the dark web to engage in their social media if they are so inclined. How would you recommend that the military do the kind of monitoring that is necessary? Doctor. Dr. Beirich. Well, honestly, oftentimes, to find social media accounts, you don't really have to go into super-secret areas to find them. It is material that tends to be oftentimes on everything from Facebook accounts, Twitter accounts, or in places like 4chan, which are searchable. That is not to say that there aren't areas of the web that are hidden and hard to get to to find this information, but people are shockingly open about their extremist views. And it is the kind of material that should be easy for investigators or people talking to potential recruits to verify, especially if they are self-reporting that they are not involved in terrorist organizations or extremist organizations. You can find a lot of this material without too much difficulty. And I would advise that that seems like the first screening mechanism that should be done. A workplace would do the same with employees, right? And this is the military. So you can find a lot. That doesn't mean it is all there, but there is a lot. Ms. Speier. All right. Anyone else? Doctor. Dr. Pitcavage. Thank you. I agree with what my colleague Dr. Beirich said. There is extremist material on the dark web, but the dark web is dark to extremists as well, and it is easier for them to find other extremists and other extremist material on the regular internet. And, unfortunately, there are many places and many platforms online, from large mainstream social media platforms and other tech platforms to more obscure ones, where they can do that. And a lot of this is actually accessible to people who want to investigate this or want to monitor this if they are educated on where to look and what to look for. And so this is not necessarily an insurmountable problem. This is something that can be tackled to at least a certain degree. Ms. Speier. You each identified Active Duty and former service members in the ranks of extremist organizations. Are you able to distinguish how many are Active Duty and how many are former? Ms. Brooks. I don't have that listing. I could get that for you, though, Chairwoman. Ms. Speier. That would be helpful. Thank you---- Ms. Brooks. Okay. Ms. Speier [continuing]. Ms. Brooks. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] Ms. Speier. Anyone else have any comments on that? Dr. Beirich. I was going to respond in the same way. I did provide some of that in the written testimony, but I could provide it for the record. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 149.] Ms. Speier. In your estimation, as you have sought to inform the military investigators of information that you have uncovered, how have they responded? Dr. Beirich. Well, for the years that I was working at the Southern Poverty Law Center, this was one of my main areas of work. And I would say that starting in some of the time period that Ms. Brooks pointed out, in 2006, 2008, there was a reluctance on the part of the military to take these issues seriously. I remember at one point myself and some of my colleagues brought dozens and dozens of forum pages of Active Duty service members from a website called New Saxon, a neo-Nazi website, and showed that these people were praising Hitler, using racial slurs, they were Active Duty, and something needed to be done. And the military at that time was not very responsive to our idea that prior regulations only required card-carrying members of hate groups to be removed from the military. But that changed in 2009. So the regulations were tightened up and strengthened. The question, I think, really, at this point, is things about loopholes, like militia members who are in the service; anything that sort of is more blatantly racist, as opposed to hardcore White supremacist, how it is treated; and how the regulations are enforced. That would be my suggestion--screening mechanisms, enforcement. And then there is just a lack of data--right?--for the public to know exactly what is happening. Ms. Speier. Thank you. Would any of you like to respond further? Ms. Brooks. To Dr. Beirich's list, I would add anonymous, kind of, reporting and the continuous reporting, not just in an investigatory manner but something that happens consistently, that there is some way to monitor it regularly. Ms. Speier. Do you think there should be a bystander responsibility to report? Ms. Brooks. I do. I mean, the ranking member mentioned that our military is our shining star, and we need to do everything that we can to ensure that it remains that way. I think that the oath that folks take when they join the military demands it. Yes. Ms. Speier. Thank you. Ranking Member Kelly. Mr. Kelly. You can only swear a true allegiance to one cause. You either are--the United States of America or whatever organization that is. And I think you are exactly right. Ms. Brooks. Uh-huh. Mr. Kelly. I have been the direct target of an assassination attempt by an extremist. Not of the same line, but I have been a direct target. A guy tried to shoot me from here to you, tried to shoot me in the chest for no reason other than he didn't like my political views, but he didn't know me. We have to stamp this out. One is too many. And it is easy to look at it as a small issue, unless you are the one who the small issue is over. And so every single person who violates the oath and allegiance to the United States of America and to the military of America should be rooted out, because they can't have an allegiance to both. So, that being said, I want to ask you, what can we do in the current military to either train or change cultural ideas or issues to identify people who are violating that oath and allegiance to our United States of America? What can we do to train that better or to change the culture better? Yes, sir. Dr. Pitcavage. Thank you. So one of the axioms of fighting extremism and terrorism is, if you see something, say something. So, first, we need to encourage people to say something when they see something. But the fact is we also have to give people educated eyes. We have to give them the training, the ability to be able to recognize signs, whether those signs are online, whether those signs are in the real world, manifestations that appear in the real world, of this sort of extremism. Military recruiters need this. Initial-entry trainers need this. Advanced trainers need this. Company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers need this training. EO [equal opportunity] folks need this training. So, if you establish a foundation where people are educated on what to look for, the signs, and then there are expectations--clear regulations as well as expectations on how to report, how to investigate, how to deal with problems that emerge, then you are allowing people to see things and say things and do things. Mr. Kelly. You know, I joined the military in the 1980s, so I have seen a significant culture change from the 1980s until today, 34 years, and it is gotten better every year. Now, that doesn't mean there haven't been blips where it has gotten worse and better, but I can tell you, we are a lot better today than we were in December of 1985, when I joined. But I think, what can we do--like, when someone makes sexist jokes, that can lead to sexual harassment, which can lead to sexual assault, because it creates a culture where that is okay. And the same thing with, when someone makes a racist joke or a racist comment, it can lead to racism, which leads to the extremists, where you take that out in violent acts and all those things. So my question is, how do we better screen potential applicants, and how do we identify those in the ranks to get them out before they become to the extremist level? Dr. Beirich. Well, I just wanted to add, the social media issue is important. Training, as Dr. Pitcavage said, is absolutely important, setting standards from the get-go when somebody comes into the military about what is expected and what is not. But I do think, in addition to everything that Dr. Pitcavage said, there is the issue of how big or how dedicated the investigatory mechanisms are in the military to look for exactly these problems, especially when they escalate. Training can be dealt with; with a sexist remark, a racist remark, you want to stop that immediately, you want to set standards. But to find hardcore extremists, it is going to be a little more difficult. They may try to hide what they are up to. You know, it is hard to know. And some of the press reports I have been reading about all of this in the last few weeks indicate that perhaps there aren't the investigatory mechanisms and sharing of information at the level of the criminal investigative services across the agencies that needs to be there. And I would suggest that be beefed up. Mr. Kelly. And, finally, I just have a few more seconds left, but I think it is incumbent--and I am talking not to you guys at the table today but all of DOD across and every leader, from the team level, at the E-5 level, to the four-stars in command of large organizations. We must not allow any of these things to take place. And when we see it wrong, we have to correct it on the spot, and we have to let people know we won't tolerate any type of racism, sexism, or anything throughout the military. And thank you guys for being here today and testifying on this very important matter. I yield back. Ms. Speier. Thank you. Ms. Haaland, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Haaland. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you all so much for being here this afternoon to talk on this important topic. I come from a district with a large Hispanic population that makes up 40 percent of my constituents. This diversity is what makes our communities rich. And I will continue to fight for all groups to have equal access to opportunities and the right to serve in an inclusive and dignified environment. Let me be clear: Hateful ideologies of any kind have no place in our military. Ms. Brooks, this past August, media outlets reported that a master sergeant in the Air Force was an active member of Identity Evropa, one of the most visible neo-Nazi and White supremacist organizations in Colorado. The Air Force released a statement saying, ``Racism, bigotry, hatred, and discrimination have no place in the Air Force,'' but Sergeant Reeves remained in the Air Force. Only recently, after facing intense pressure, did the Air Force decide to begin the process of removing him from the military, and that is a concern to me. Wouldn't you agree that this undermines diversity initiatives as well as morale and unit cohesion? And could you elaborate? Ms. Brooks. Thank you so much for the question. You are absolutely right; it goes against all of what the U.S. Armed Forces are about. And I would just say a bit about Identity Evropa. They are a very noxious group of White nationalists who spread the very disinformation that Chairwoman Speier was mentioning earlier. And it is important, as far as the education campaign and the things that we need to do to address these issues, is to challenge this misinformation or this disinformation. White nationalists advocate for a White ethnic state. They put forth conspiracy theories with respect to White genocide and the Great Replacement. It is nothing to be played with. If we allow these noxious beliefs to continue, as our diversity continues across the country, this is what we are dealing with. You spoke to the diversity in your area, in your district, and the U.S. is experiencing a great demographic shift. And that is not playing well with a lot of White folks, and so they are putting forward this false narrative that there is a White genocide afoot. So it is extremely important that we address this head-on, because it does undermine everything that the military is all about. Ms. Haaland. Thank you. And based on your expertise--I think I know the answer to this--would you say that the services should adopt a zero- tolerance policy for personnel that are involved in these---- Ms. Brooks. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Haaland [continuing]. Organizations? Ms. Brooks. The Southern Poverty Law Center's first recommendation is that we adopt and rigorously apply a zero- tolerance policy. As you say, you can't on the one hand say that we don't stand for racism, you know, we won't stand for racism of any kind, and then allow members to remain in the Armed Forces. Ms. Haaland. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. And, Madam Chair, I yield back. Ms. Speier. Thank you, Ms. Haaland. Mrs. Davis, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you all for being here. Ms. Brooks, I just wanted to turn to you first for a second. And I know that the Southern Poverty Law Center does a tremendous amount of tracking and research. And have you all been sharing--I guess, how long has the relationship with the military been going on? And do you see it having changed over the last few years? I think that, you know, the comment is sometimes made that, well, the military just didn't take it seriously enough on some issues. Talk to us a little bit more about that. How would you characterize it? Ms. Brooks. Thank you for the question. The military, the Department of Defense in particular, has been very receptive. As I mentioned in my oral testimony, and it is documented in the written testimony, it goes back to 1986. And then-Secretary of Defense Weinberger was very receptive and made a strong statement against White supremacists in the military. And as Dr. Beirich mentioned, it sometimes shifts over time. We recall [Under] Secretary of Defense Chu, who thought that our report was alarmist. So it depends on, kind of, who is in office. But we won't give up sharing the information that we have, sharing the research, because it is just that important to us. Mrs. Davis. And is that an ongoing, like---- Ms. Brooks. Oh, yes, it is an ongoing relationship. The Southern Poverty Law Center also has ongoing relationships with law enforcement. The research that we do with respect to monitoring hate and extremism, we do it so that we can share it with folks on the ground, with law enforcement on the ground, with our military leaders, with leadership of any kind. We want to put a stop to this---- Mrs. Davis. Yeah. Ms. Brooks [continuing]. So we share it with people who can put a stop to this. That is why we are so grateful to the subcommittee for holding this hearing. And we implore you and the Congress to do something with the research that we provide, in addition to what Dr. Beirich provides. And I will just say that Dr. Beirich has driven the research for the Southern Poverty Law Center for the last 20 years. So the fact that I am talking about her research now, and Dr. Pitcavage, you can trust it implicitly. Mrs. Davis. Yeah. Thank you. And I am not sure, Ms. Brooks, if you mentioned this or either one of you, just talking about blunting the ideology. And it was mentioned that there are support services to do that. What are we looking at? Ms. Brooks. I did mention that. There are currently no support services. Because the spread of White supremacy or White supremacist ideology is so pernicious and people are so susceptible to these messages, we want to not only, kind of--we want to support people through it, right? We want to offer a way for people to recover from the hateful messages and violent messages that they might receive and may believe. Oftentimes we are dealing with young recruits, who are just susceptible. So we don't want to just kind of throw people out; we want to find ways to deradicalize them. It takes a little bit of work to convince people of this ideology, and it will take a little bit of work to convince them that it is not true. So---- Mrs. Davis. Yeah. I guess I am wondering about whether we have the capacity within the military, in terms of having trained personnel who can deal with this in an ongoing way. Ms. Brooks. I think the resources are there, and I think that there are resources within the Armed Forces to find the people that can help the military carry out some of these support services. I know that. Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Okay. Thank you. I also wanted to just ask you a little bit about, you know, what you see from our military leaders. There was an example of a young man, supposedly, who used graffiti, and it turned out it wasn't quite what people thought. But the Superintendent of the Academy used some very strong words to say, if you are going do this, you know, get out of our military. And I remember a number of years ago, around sexual assault, there happened to an Australian--I believe it was Australian--general, you know, who made similar comments. And, at that time, we felt that maybe our leaders aren't given, sort of, the go-ahead to make strong statements like that. Would you like to kind of assess that sense of whether you think that military leaders are able to say things that are pretty strong and tell people to get out of our military if this is the way you feel? Doctor. Dr. Pitcavage. I would be happy to address that. And I think the example that you brought up is an example of a leader who exhibited leadership and spoke out very forcefully on an issue that came up under his purview. And we have seen over the years with the military and issues related to this that leaders lead. One of the reasons why the integration of the Armed Forces that occurred after World War II occurred far more smoothly than a lot of people expected was because, from the top down, leaders led. They spoke out; they set expectations. In no uncertain terms, they let people know what was going to happen. Now, some officers didn't like that, and they left the military and joined White supremacist groups and spoke out against desegregation. But they didn't do it in the military. Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Dr. Pitcavage. And we have had examples of superlative leadership in this regard recently related to this issue as well, too, when chiefs of staff spoke out after Charlottesville, the White supremacist event there and the death of the young activist there, spoke out forcefully against hate, against White supremacy, against extremism. And those are voices we need to encourage, and those are the voices that we need more of. And our military leadership is certainly capable of being that voice. Mrs. Davis. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you. Ms. Speier. Ms. Luria, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mrs. Luria. Thank you. And thank you to the panel for being here to discuss this important issue today. You mentioned in your testimony a recent Military Times poll that revealed that more than one-third of respondents and more than half of minority respondents said that they had personally witnessed examples of White nationalism or ideologically driven racism within the ranks within the recent months from the time that the poll was taken. We agree that the DOD policies regarding White supremacist and extremist activities must be clear, they must be transparent. And, you know, I have looked here at this DOD policy. It dates to 2009, with a revision from 2012. And, as we know, there is a rapidly evolving use of social media and different means for spreading information. Are there specific things due to the policy, you know, being almost a decade old that you think merit, you know, updating or revision by DOD or the services to make this policy more enforceable, more relevant to current technology or any of those other aspects? Yes, Dr. Pitcavage? And, Ms. Brooks, as well, I think you also referenced in your written testimony the same survey from Military Times. Dr. Pitcavage. I think you bring up a key issue. You know, extremism constantly evolves, and so the methods the military must take to deal with extremism evolve too. Our current regulations, you know--actually, parts of them date back to the 1960s. And they were appended in the 1980s, appended again in 1990s, appended again when you mentioned it. But I think there are some specific things that we may want to look at. So, for example, White supremacy today is less group- dependent than it used to be. In part because of the internet, you can be very active in the White supremacist movement without necessarily belonging to a specific group. Yet, if you look at our regulations, a lot of them refer specifically to organized groups rather than a broader movement. That may be something that needs to be addressed. But we may also want to take a look at those regulations more comprehensively and holistically to see, like, from the top, from the start to the finish, maybe they need to be rewritten to deal with modern circumstances, rather than just modifying or appending, you know, once more. Ms. Brooks. Thank you for the question. I would add that, I would encourage military leaders to listen to their troops. This Military Times survey was about 1,600 people, and they surveyed people in the military. They themselves said that they saw the whole scourge of White nationalism, White supremacy being a greater threat to the homeland than, you know, foreign terrorism or anti-immigration combined. And I would also point out that you referred to the incidents where service members of color experienced racist incidents. And I think it is important to point out that they saw swastikas on military bases, they saw individuals using the Nazi salute with one another, there were, you know, kind of, graffiti--things that we find that we wouldn't expect to find in the military. I completely agree with my colleague that certainly the regulations need to be updated, but the important thing is that we take a serious stand. As was said, after the desegregation of the Armed Forces, it was from the top to every single person in the military, saying, you know, on the same page--saying from the same page. And that needs to happen again when we are talking about White supremacy and White nationalism. There can be no equivocation. Mrs. Luria. Thank you. Dr. Beirich, did you have anything further to add on this topic with the remainder of my time? Dr. Beirich. Just one addition. I agree with what was said here about taking a look at these constantly appended regulations, but the fact of the matter is, if they are not applied, it is pointless. And this case in Colorado, where a person who is in Active Duty military service and is a member of Identity Evropa, would be banned based on the 1985 regulations that Weinberger put in place. So he was demoted a rank, not removed from military service. So, you know, if you don't follow through with the whole process, it is a little pointless. And so I would suggest that be looked at very seriously. Mrs. Luria. Thank you. I yield back. Ms. Speier. Thank you. Ms. Escobar, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am very grateful that we are having this discussion. And to our panelists, thank you very much for being here and for sharing this important information with us. To our second panel, I hope that everyone is listening with an open mind. I represent El Paso, Texas, which was targeted last summer, on August 3rd. We had a domestic terrorist who confessed to driving over 600 miles and 10 hours because, he said, he wanted to essentially slaughter Mexicans and immigrants. And he lamented the, quote/unquote, ``Hispanic invasion.'' And these are words that he repeated that we have heard from some of the most powerful leaders in the land, the same language used to describe members of my community by some of our elected officials. So this is, I think, a very important discussion. And I think something that was mentioned earlier, we have to call this out. When we don't call it out, we essentially give it cover. When we give it cover, we give it life and we give it power. And there is no greater testament to that than what happened in El Paso, Texas, on August 3rd. I am going to open up this question to all three of our panelists. I want to first acknowledge that military leaders have taken steps to publicize their opposition to the hatred and extremism that has been on display at events like the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. And I applaud our military leaders for saying unequivocally that those are not our values. However, I was deeply disappointed to see an individual nominated for the top personnel job at the Department who has espoused a dangerous and radical intolerance for multiculturalism in America, which is essentially the foundation of who we are as a country. J. David Patterson was a Presidential appointment, but he previously served as a principal deputy under secretary. Should we be concerned that someone who--obviously, he was a Presidential nominee, but he was within the Department of Defense for many years and rose through the ranks. What does it tell us, that someone is able to ascend in this manner with these kinds of views about minorities and about America? Dr. Beirich. Well, I will just say that I think it is completely unacceptable. You cannot have somebody working in the Department of Defense, involved with the Armed Forces, the Pentagon, who doesn't believe the bedrock principles about equality. And that has been said from, you know, top generals and other officials for a very long time and is stated in these regulations. So it just should not be the case that somebody who disagrees with that vision of our society and how it is reflected in the Armed Forces should be in any position of power. Ms. Escobar. Yes, sir. Dr. Pitcavage. Representative, first, I would like just to say that I share the grief that you felt over El Paso. I grew up in El Paso. My family still lives in El Paso. And I used to--excuse me--I used to ride my bike to the place where the shooting occurred. I think Representative Kelly made an excellent point when he talked about the military as being one of the most diverse institutions in our country. Forty percent of our military personnel, Active Duty military personnel, are a racial or ethnic minority. More than 50 percent of the women in the services are. And our military recognizes over 200 religious faiths. And we need leaders, civilian and military leaders alike, who appreciate, acknowledge, and support that diversity, which is a strength. Ms. Escobar. Absolutely. Ms. Brooks. And adding my condolences, as well, and to you. I think it shows us and reminds us that one person--and I think the ranking member mentioned--that one person can do so much damage. That is why it is important for each of us to call it out each and every time. Ms. Escobar. And with the very limited time I have, Dr. Beirich, you mentioned screening mechanisms. Could you give us an example of one of the--like, what we could do, something tangible? Dr. Beirich. Well, I think one of the most important things here is, what happens with recruits when they come in is they self-report what their activities have been and so on. It is not very detailed. It says things like, have you been part of a domestic terrorist organization or something along those lines. I think the questions should be deeper. There should be more about people's racial views, views about ethnicity, religion. And I also think that people that are coming into the military need to report basically what their social media accounts look like and then be verified. Whether that is to intervene at that point to help someone move away from these views or it is to simply say, this is an unacceptable situation. So those are the kinds of things that I would look at. And military climate surveys should include questions about these issues, as was proposed by the House in this last Defense Authorization Act, and they don't right now. So the Military Times polls now, 3 years in a row, which show these horrifying numbers of how many people have seen White nationalism and extremism in the military, are a stand-in for that--right?--and the military should be collecting that information. And let me just say, with the 2017 Military Times poll, if the numbers are accurate to the full amount of Active Duty troops at that time, which was about 1.3 million, it would mean 325,000 people in the Armed Forces had seen White nationalism or racism. That is a pretty extraordinary number. And, given the numbers, as Dr. Pitcavage just pointed out, that is a whole lot of minority troops--right?--troops of color, who are suffering under this situation. And, frankly, it would be a hostile work environment if it was in---- Ms. Escobar. Uh-huh. Ms. Beirich [continuing]. The civilian world. So, I mean, it is a serious matter. And data is needed, and then that data needs to be addressed. Ms. Escobar. Thank you all. Thank you, Dr. Pitcavage. I yield back. Ms. Speier. Thank you. Mr. Cisneros, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thanks to our panel for being here today. How can the Department better prepare service members, for instance, of White nationalist groups attempting to recruit them? Could they benefit from something akin to counterintelligence training to counter White nationalist recruitment? And I know, Dr. Pitcavage--and I am sorry if I mispronounce your name--but you mentioned, like, a lot of that is done over the internet now. But how do we go to out there and how do we train the troops--is there a way to train them--to kind of recognize when they are being recruited to these specific groups? And how do we prevent that? Dr. Pitcavage. Well, I think that is a really interesting question. I think we warn our military personnel about a number of different dangers, a number of different issues, including those online. The services all have social media policies that warn them about scams, that warn them about all sorts of dangers that they might encounter online. It is possible, similarly, to warn them to look for some of the signs that they may be targeted by an extreme group that is trying to provide them with false narratives, that is trying to indoctrinate them, that is trying to radicalize them. And so I think there are steps that we could do to make the troops more aware that this is one of the things out there that people might try to do. Mr. Cisneros. I would love to hear from the other two panelists as well. Dr. Beirich. Well, I think that what Dr. Pitcavage said is right. I mean, it is not as though there aren't primers out there about the signs of White nationalism, the symbols of White nationalism, some of the main groups. This is all information that could be shared, that unit commanders could be trained on. You know, I have found that there just are some missing issues: that there is no extremist tattoo database in the military to use to identify these things, and, as a result, investigators aren't trained on what these symbols are. In the case of this Atomwaffen group that had an Active Duty guardsman in it, he had a tattoo of his very scary neo-Nazi organization on his arm, and nobody knew what it was about. So I think there is a whole lot of education on the investigatory level, on the recruitment level, and then for the troops in general on, sort of, signs to look out for for White supremacists trying to recruit them. Because they are absolutely trying to recruit them. Mr. Cisneros. Uh-huh. Ms. Brooks. And I completely agree. And I would add that we really all need to talk about it, it needs to be okay to talk about it. I would imagine that conversations happened, again, referencing the desegregation of the Armed Forces, people talked about it and they talked about how to manage it and handle people's concerns and anxieties. And we need to approach this, I think, in the same way. And once we do that and we have established some mechanisms to train and to educate folks, then we can demand a zero- tolerance policy and then offer support services to those who are not able to meet the mission. Mr. Cisneros. Okay. According to an article in ProPublica in 2018, the Atomwaffen Division, a violent neo-Nazi group tied to five murders and a bomb plot, at least some of their members were serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. And you just stated that. I again ask the panelists, in your opinion, how high a priority is the focus of military leadership on eliminating White supremacy from our military ranks? And I know you said there were regulations that we have written, but my other question too is, why haven't we put these groups in the UCMJ, outlawing them in the UCMJ? Dr. Beirich. Well, that is a very good question, and it is hard to know how to answer what you are saying. The only data that I could find is that about 25 troops, not all of them White supremacists, were removed in a 5-year period for extremist ties. I think those numbers are ridiculously low. Just in the testimonies that we have written for you all here, all of us, we have documented more than that in the last year. So I think that there is a big problem here in trying to figure out how many investigations go on of this, who is identifying extremists, how is this being reported. There is supposedly a report the Pentagon does every year internally on White supremacy in the military. Is that happening? What is it indicating? I mean, it is just very hard to answer your question because there is no transparency and no data. Mr. Cisneros. Go ahead, sir. Dr. Pitcavage. I would just like to agree that, without being alarmist about the nature of the problem, there is a problem about White supremacy in the military, but our military leadership may not realize the full extent of it simply because the data and the transparency is not there. Mr. Cisneros. Uh-huh. All right. Well, with that, I am out of time, and thank you very much. And I yield back. Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman. Now we will hear from the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for giving me an opportunity to waive onto the committee today. I want to thank the members of the Military Personnel Subcommittee for your work. You wrestle with some of the thorniest issues that face Congress and the House Armed Services Committee. Ms. Brooks, I think you are right, we should listen to our soldiers. There are a lot of ways that the military can: commanders in the chain of command, EO officers, inspector generals, JAG [Judge Advocate General] officers, chaplains, and also climate surveys. And, Dr. Beirich, you mentioned in your testimony about the watering down of a provision in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] that was offered by the House. I was the lead author, joined by a number of my colleagues. These hearings are often an opportunity for us to really establish the record that supports what we are trying to accomplish in the NDAA. In that amendment, it was very specific. It said that the Secretary of Defense will include-- or shall include in the workplace and equal opportunity, command climate, and workplace and gender relations surveys administered by the Office of People Analytics of the Department of Defense, questions regarding whether respondents, if ever, experienced or witnessed in the workplace supremacist activity, extremist activity, or racism--it probably also should include anti-Semitism--and whether you have reported activity described in paragraph 1. It was watered down to include extremist activity. And I think, Ms. Brooks, in your written testimony, you pointed out how, in the screening procedures, that too was watered down. Somewhere between the House and coming through conference, someone, somebody, some organization has an aversion to the use of either ``White supremacy'' or ``supremacist'' activity in the NDAA, and it gets watered down. So could you please make the strongest argument why, whether it is in screening or whether it is in the survey, we have to be specific? Dr. Beirich. Well, let me just say, aside from the danger to the troops themselves, especially troops of color--and thank you for pursuing this issue, because I think it is critically important--the biggest problem is that White supremacy is distinct from other forms of extremism, and it is deadly to the United States. We have had far too many former soldiers--Timothy McVeigh is best known, but Eric Rudolph, who bombed the Olympics in 1996, and many other soldiers who have been involved in serious domestic terrorist attacks were people who shared that particular point of view. And those people then are coming out of the military and joining up with groups like The Base that was mentioned here, Atomwaffen, or they are Active Duty, and they are a threat to the American public, and they are a threat to people overseas anywhere White supremacy is functioning, anywhere our troops are if they are involved in these issues. And White supremacy is a distinct problem. It is also indigenous to the United States. I don't think we should forget this, right? White supremacy is born and bred out of our history. And it needs to be tackled. The Armed Forces have been a shining light in calling this out, so we should be specific. We need to know, do people around you have White supremacist views, White nationalist ideas? What are you seeing? This is really critical information to stop domestic terrorism, hate crimes, all kinds of violence. Mr. Brown. Thank you. Ms. Brooks. Ms. Brooks. Thank you so much. I appreciate your efforts as well. And I completely agree with everything that Dr. Beirich said. I would point your colleagues in Congress back to the joint resolution that was passed unanimously post-Charlottesville. And in there, they rejected--and they named it--White nationalism, White supremacy, neo-Nazism as hateful expressions of intolerance that are a contradiction to the values that define the people of the United States. We cannot just say these things post-crisis or post- massacre. We have to be about trying to thwart these attempts every day, because, as Dr. Beirich said, I mean, it is a clear and present danger. I don't know how to make it more clear. Our history shows it, and we will just continue to repeat it until we face it head-on. White supremacy is just that serious. Mr. Brown. Thank you. I yield back, Madam Chair. Ms. Speier. Thank you. I would like to just ask one last question. The Base, as an organization, had an intention to derail some trains, kill some people, poison some water supplies. What do you know about The Base? And do we have representatives here in the United States that are associated with that organization? I know the leader appears to be in Russia. But what do we know about---- Dr. Beirich. Well, from the arrest that you mentioned in your opening remarks, we know that we have members of The Base here in the United States, which, I should just point out, the name itself is a translation of ``al-Qaida.'' So it shows you that there is this symbiosis in terms of dangerous, dangerous threats. And, yes, they have a violent, violent--the list of what they have been arrested for is very scary, including murdering people. And there are, you know, probably certain dozens of members of this organization in the United States and also abroad. What was interesting in that case is there was a member of the Canadian military who was also arrested, so it shows that this is an international problem. And it is run out of Russia-- right?--which is a red flag as well. So it is a serious matter. Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you. Any other comments? Dr. Pitcavage. Dr. Pitcavage. I think one thing that is worth pointing out about The Base is that it is part of a new wave of White supremacist group that are called accelerationist groups. And accelerationists are extreme in a very unique way. They believe that present society is not redeemable. They can't shape it into the White-dominated or White-only society that they seek; that the only thing that they can do is actually destroy our society and then build something new from the ashes. And so accelerationists believe that any sort of violence, anything that will destabilize the system, even senseless violence, is actually good if it will help bring down the system that they so want to destroy and replace. And, you know, groups like that, you know, are particularly dangerous and are particularly liable to engage in violent acts. Ms. Speier. Anything further? All right. Any---- Mr. Kelly. No, ma'am. Ms. Speier. All right. I want to again thank you all for your testimony this afternoon. It was very enlightening. We will now take a short recess and switch out to our second panel. [Recess.] Ms. Speier. The hearing will come to order once again. I would like to welcome our second panel. We are joined this afternoon by Mr. Garry Reid, who is the Director for Defense Intelligence, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Ms. Stephanie Miller, Director of Accessions Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Mr. Joe Ethridge, Chief, Criminal Intelligence Division, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command; Mr. Christopher McMahon, Executive Assistant Director, National Security Directorate, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service; and, finally, Mr. Robert Grabosky, Deputy Director of AFOSI [Air Force Office of Special Investigations] Law Enforcement, U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Mr. Reid, we will begin with you. Mr. Reid. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member. On behalf of the entire team here, I would just like to convey our appreciation for your time and interest and for the committee's support to the Department in getting at this problem. If you would allow, Madam Chair, I represent the background investigation piece of this process. And in a logical order, I would like Ms. Miller to begin, and then I will come back and do it, because it is the front end on accessions, and then we will go through to the military departments. Thank you. Ms. Speier. That is appropriate. Ms. Miller. STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE MILLER, DIRECTOR, ACCESSIONS POLICY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS Ms. Miller. Good afternoon, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Stephanie Miller, and I am the Director of Accessions Policy under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I am pleased to appear before you today to provide testimony on this important issue. And I want to take a moment to thank the members of the first panel for their knowledge and expertise in this area, which the Department truly does value. As Director of Accessions Policy, I am responsible for the oversight of all matters pertaining to the recruitment and accession of both officers and enlisted personnel. In this capacity, I am responsible for establishing policy in recruitment matters, overseeing the establishment and adherence to enlistment standards, providing oversight of resources, managing the accessions process, and other matters relating to the general sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force. Each year, the Department recruits approximately 400,000 applicants for military service, of which approximately 250,000 individuals actually contract into the All-Volunteer Force. We remain committed to recruiting high-quality applicants representative of the Nation that they will serve. And while today's economy has brought challenges to military recruiting, the Department has been steadfast that the services should and will adhere to our established policies and only enlist officers and enlisted candidates that actually meet our high standards. The life cycle of military personnel from accessions processing to separation is a complex process which is constantly evolving based on best practices and newly learned information. The beginning of the life cycle starts with each new member, whether enlisted or officer, undergoing a thorough screening process to ensure that they meet the high standards of today's military. This multitiered screening process enables a holistic review of each applicant. And using the tools available, we believe we have been effective at screening for individuals that have extremist ideologies or support extremist groups, but we continuously review our policies, our practices, and our methods for improvement. For example, the Department has recently launched a centralized screening capability that vets all accessions to identify and resolve indicators of questionable allegiance. And this new vetting process has proven successful over the summer in identifying unique adverse information not always available solely from the standardized background investigation form, the SF-86. Recruiters play a very critical role in assessing the qualifications and intents of the applicant. Each applicant is interviewed by a recruiter to obtain as much information and documentation as possible about the individual's qualifications for military service. At our military entrance processing stations, applicants undergo a full physical by trained military professionals and background searches of law enforcement and other records. Applicants answer questions about any involvement with law enforcement agencies, including arrests, charges, citations, parole or probation, detention, and any other form of potentially adverse adjudication regardless of the outcome. Furthermore, all applicants undergo an advanced fingerprint check, which provides a preliminary review of the history of any involvement with law enforcement, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subsequent background checks screen recruits for extremist ties, including FBI investigative and criminal history files checks, terrorist and subversive activities checks, local law enforcement agency checks, and a review of the violent gang file at the National Criminal Information Center. Upon entry into the armed services, the Department, the military services, and the individual share a responsibility to ensure that members are afforded the opportunity to serve with dignity and respect in a very inclusive environment. The Department's overarching guidance is clear that military personnel must reject active participation and must not actively advocate supremacist, extremist, or gang criminal doctrine, ideology, or causes, including those that advance, encourage, or advocate illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, ethnicity, or national origin or those that advance, encourage, or advocate the use of force, violence, or criminal activity or otherwise advance efforts to deprive individuals of their civil liberties. Beyond this overarching guidance, the Department continues to work with the services and other agencies to provide commanders and senior military leaders the tools that they need to keep informed about the activities or adverse behaviors of service members. Commanders, working with key stakeholders such as the services' criminal investigative offices, are swift to take appropriate action when warranted. We are gaining additional insights on service members through the deployment of new technologies and have also explored additional testing and screening techniques that assess a range of personality dimensions to identify applicants who best fit with the military's culture of treating all personnel with dignity and respect. In conjunction with more traditional qualification batteries, such as the ASVAB [Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery], these tools can be utilized as part of a whole-person applicant screening process and can tell us a great deal about the likelihood of successfully completing initial entry training, the first term of enlistment, and the ability of that individual to adapt to the rules, regulations, and requirements of military culture. DOD remains committed to ensuring that all personnel are treated with dignity and respect in an inclusive environment free from unlawful discrimination and maltreatment. This effort is accomplished while keeping each person's civil liberties intact. And while this is not always an easy endeavor, it is critical to protect our service members and those service members who we are sworn to protect throughout the country. Madam Chairwoman, I look forward to answering your questions in this manner and appreciate you offering this opportunity to discuss this very important issue. Ms. Speier. Thank you, Ms. Miller. Mr. Reid. STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND SECURITY), OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE Mr. Reid. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Kelly. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify on my oversight of personnel security policy and the steps we take in the Department of Defense to develop and sustain a total workforce that embodies our values as Americans. I will focus my opening remarks on background investigations, insider-threat programs, and continuous evaluation, as these are the primary authorities and capabilities we employ to identify persons with extremist ideologies and deny them the opportunity to serve in the Department of Defense. Where indicated, we also ensure they are investigated for any policy violations or criminal behaviors and are held accountable for their actions. Once a person has been selected for military service, the Department initiates a comprehensive background investigation. All applicants must complete the ``Questionnaire for National Security Positions'' published by the Office of Personnel Management as Standard Form 86, or the SF-86. All military applicants, regardless of job code, must pass a rigorous background investigation that significantly exceeds the basic standards applied to many non-military persons that enter public service. This is a choice made by the Department of Defense in recognition that there is a high level of public trust in our military that necessitates a strong commitment to ensuring persons with criminal, extremist, or other undesirable characteristics are not allowed to serve in our ranks. Applicants are asked probing and detailed questions about their personal conduct, job history, encounters with law enforcement, drug use, credit, foreign travel, and associations with organizations dedicated to terrorism, the use of violence to overthrow the U.S. Government, and the commission of acts of force or violence to discourage others from exercising their constitutional rights. Background investigators supplement and enrich the self- reporting data on the SF-86 with information provided by former educators, employers, coworkers, and neighbors of the applicants. Investigators check Federal and State law enforcement databases for criminal history and review public records, credit reports, and other automated data sources. Where needed, investigators initiate additional checks, including personal interviews. This information is aggregated in a report of investigation and submitted to a certified adjudicator, who assesses overall eligibility to hold a sensitive position and for military service against the 13 Federal adjudicative guidelines. Of the guidelines, personal conduct, criminal conduct, and allegiance to the United States are the primary criteria used to vet personnel that exhibit any extremist behaviors. While cases with allegiance are uncommon, overall, these three guidelines combine for almost half of the denials for military personnel. And keeping in mind, the prior screening Ms. Miller described happens in front of this, so you have already narrowed down to a more selective population by the time we run this. Applicants with favorable background investigation results are subject to two sets of monitoring procedures throughout their military service. Each of our military departments manage their own insider- threat programs that serve as a conduit for reporting behaviors of concern that are observable in the workplace. All DOD personnel are mandated to report such behavior against the reporting thresholds for insider threat that are similar but not identical to the Federal adjudicative guidelines. The DOD component insider-threat hubs provide reporting to a central DOD insider-threat center, led by our Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency. Presently, all DOD personnel are covered by at least 1 of the 43 insider-threat hubs distributed across the Department, and reporting of suspicious or alerting behaviors is steadily increasing. Any behavior that crosses an established threshold is assessed and acted upon by insider-threat hubs, the chain of command, or security managers within the owning component. In addition to monitoring for insider-threat behaviors at the component level, the Department also conducts a continuous evaluation program at the DOD level. Presently, 1.9 million DOD personnel are enrolled in our continuous evaluation system, and the Department has plans to enroll the full population by October 2021. Continuous evaluation complements insider-threat reporting by providing data from outside the Department with automated monitoring of multiple government, commercial, and public data sources for indicators of behavior that violate established standards of conduct. When alerts from continuous evaluation data sources indicate unacceptable behavior, the responsible security manager submits an incident report that is subsequently reviewed by the chain of command and the DOD Central Adjudications Facility. If appropriate, the incident can be referred to a law enforcement or counterintelligence investigation. If indicated, the subject can be ultimately removed from eligibility to hold a position and processed for separation from military service. Madam Chair, I will just close by highlighting that this is a dynamic process that is always in a state of improvement. As some members know and we briefed here, and supported by Congress, the government is in the process of adding additional controls in what we call the personnel vetting enterprise, moving to a continuous vetting model across the entire government. So everything I have described to you will continue to be refined and enriched to where we have the greatest degree of awareness of where threats are across the Department, including those posed by those with extremist attitudes. Thank you, Madam Chair, for your time, and I look forward to your questions. [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Reid and Ms. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 127.] Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Reid. Mr. Ethridge. STATEMENT OF JOE E. ETHRIDGE, JR., CHIEF, CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND Mr. Ethridge. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee. I am Joe Ethridge, Chief of the Criminal Intelligence Division, Army Criminal Investigation Command [CID]. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to provide testimony on the important issue of racially motivated extremist threat. As the Chief of CID's Intelligence Division, I am responsible for identifying and assessing criminal threats confronting the Army and assisting in developing courses of action to prevent or mitigate. The CID identifies soldiers suspected of participating in extremist activities in multiple ways, to include chain-of- command reporting, local police, the media, public-facing social media searches, tip-line reports, and FBI domestic terrorism investigative reporting. We evaluate these reports to identify supporting facts. The majority of the soldiers identified as participating to some extent in extremist activities are not subjects of criminal investigations. The more common scenario is participation in an online forum that might be expressing extremist or supremacist views. In these instances, CID notifies commanders via information report for action in accordance with Army policy. Commanders have the authority to counsel, train, and take disciplinary action to preserve good order and discipline in the unit. Additionally, CID notifies the DOD Consolidated Adjudications Facility and the Intelligence and Security Command for personnel security adjudication. The CID initiates investigations when indications or allegations of a crime are present. In early 2019, CID observed a small increase in criminal investigations initiated with soldier participation in extremist activities as a component. Specifically, there were 7 criminal investigations initiated with an extremist-activity component in 2019, in comparison to an average of 2.4 per year in the fiscal year 2014 to 2018 period. This includes soldiers from all components--Active Duty, National Guard, and the Army Reserve. During the same time period, the Federal Bureau of Investigation notified CID of an increase in domestic terrorism investigations with soldiers or former soldiers as suspects. The FBI reporting also clearly stated that extremist organizations were actively seeking veterans' skills. In May 2019, the Provost Marshal General of the Army and I briefed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and members of the Army Staff on the CID and FBI observations. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army directed the formation of a working group to review current policies and procedures to prevent and address extremism in the ranks. The working group recommended several adjustments to the Army policy for soldier participation in extremist activity stated in Chapter 4-12 of Army Regulation 600-20. That is Army Command Policy. The revision of AR [Army Regulation] 600-20 is scheduled for release in the second quarter of this year. Internally, CID expanded its liaison relationship with the FBI, traditionally centered on the National Joint Terrorism Task Force and the National Gang Intelligence Center, into the FBI's Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit. In summary, over the past year, CID has increased collection efforts, informed Army leadership of our observations, participated in the review and changes to Army policy, expanded our relationship with law enforcement partners, and made notification to commanders. Additionally, CID has formulated a request to the Army Inspector General to add unit implementation of extremist activity policy that is encapsulated in AR 600-20 as a focus area for the next inspection cycle for Army-wide inspector general inspections. The Army is postured to identify extremist activity in the ranks and has both the policy and the leadership tools to prevent emergence as a pervasive issue. Madam Chairwoman, I am happy to answer any questions you or the members of the subcommittee may have at this time. [The prepared statement of Mr. Ethridge can be found in the Appendix on page 135.] Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Ethridge. Mr. McMahon. STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. McMAHON, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE, NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE Mr. McMahon. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Kelly, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on extremism in the military. I am Christopher McMahon, the Executive Assistant Director of the National Security Directorate for the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, NCIS. I am pleased to have the opportunity this afternoon to appear before you and provide testimony on this topic. As Executive Assistant Director of the National Security Directorate, I lead our investigations and operations confronting the intelligence and terrorism threats posed to the Department of the Navy personnel, assets, research, and technologies. My team also addresses all force protection issues affecting the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps, to include expeditionary force engagements, ship visits, and static forces support. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service is currently conducting multiple domestic terrorism investigations involving racially motivated extremism directed against or affecting the personnel in or associated with the Department of the Navy. These investigations receive immediate priority attention. Our highly skilled civilian Federal law enforcement professionals use all available resources to address these matters, working closely with the FBI, our fellow military criminal investigative organizations, and additional Federal and local partners to address these threats. Over the course of fiscal year 2018, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service experienced an increase in the number of domestic extremism related reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation involving Department of Defense-affiliated personnel. In response to these referrals and to more accurately reflect the scope of these incidents, NCIS established the unique case category ``domestic terrorism'' for investigative and operational reporting purposes. NCIS generally defines domestic terrorism as terrorism perpetrated by individuals and groups inspired by or associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature. NCIS investigates crimes associated with domestic extremist organizations when there is an apparent Federal violation, identified violent extremist ideology, and an active service member or current Department of the Navy civilian employee who has expressed an aspiration to further the identified violent ideology by threats, acts of violence, or other enabling criminal activity. For instances in which a crime is suspected, a general crimes investigation under the appropriate case category within NCIS for the crime is initiated. NCIS does not pursue investigations of Department of the Navy-affiliated individuals who simply make statements indicating they share the beliefs or a subset of the beliefs held by domestic extremist groups unless information exists indicating their activities meet this threshold. In investigations where it is determined crimes are not evident, information is passed to appropriate commands for administrative actions deemed appropriate by the commands involved. In conclusion, the predication for domestic terrorism investigations typically comes from command complaints, other investigative agency referrals, or tips. For example, NCIS maintains formal information-sharing agreements with the FBI on terrorism matters. These same well-established channels serve as the primary method of information sharing on domestic terrorism matters involving Active Duty service members or current Department of the Navy employees. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. McMahon can be found in the Appendix on page 139.] Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you. Mr. Grabosky. STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. GRABOSKY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, LAW ENFORCEMENT, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS Mr. Grabosky. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you on this topic. As the Deputy Director for Law Enforcement, Strategic Programs and Requirements Division, Headquarters, Air Force Office of Special Investigations [OSI], I help oversee policy, training, and the resources necessary to guide major criminal investigations impacting Department of the Air Force. OSI has agents assigned to over 250 locations around the world, to include 22 locations with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, engaged in collaborative efforts with other Federal law enforcement partners on matters of mutual concern, such as matters involving domestic extremism. Pertaining to the topic of possible White supremacists within the ranks of the military, Department of the Air Force and OSI are very concerned with early identification and timely resolution of matters involving possible extremist activity affecting good order and discipline within our Air and Space Forces. In fact, Department of the Air Force has a written punitive policy pertaining specifically to participation in extremist activities. The policy specifically states military personnel must reject active participation in criminal gangs and other organizations that, among other things, advocate supremacist, extremist, gang doctrine, ideology, or causes. Military members who violate this policy are subject to disciplinary action under Article 92 for failure to obey a lawful order under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is important to note that the Air Force policy dictates mere membership in the organization is not prohibited. OSI has investigative responsibility to investigate these matters where military members who are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice are suspected of active participation in extremist or supremacy groups prohibited by the Air Force instructions. Since 30 September 2019, OSI received about nine reported incidents involving possible supremacy activity on the part of Air Force members. These incidents came to our attention in various ways. Out of the nine reports, OSI opened eight investigations and referred one incident to Security Forces for further investigation. Out of the eight OSI investigations, only one involved active participation by the member. One incident was disproven, and the remaining six involved inappropriate or racially insensitive verbal comments or online postings, which was referred back to command for action. For the one active participation incident, the accused's command administered administrative action and a reduction in rank. As an impartial and independent investigative agency for the Air Force, OSI does not make recommendations on potential punitive or administrative actions. It is also important to note OSI conducted more than 2,500 criminal investigations in 2019. Most of these criminal investigations involved some form of data exploitation, such as extraction of information from cell phones, other personal computer devices, or reviews of social media applications. Our law enforcement data exploitation activities over the past year of thousands of devices and social media accounts have not resulted in identifying additional extremist activity within our Air and Space Forces. Even though the amount of extremist incidents for Department of the Air Force remains small, OSI and its criminal investigative agents remain vigilant to identify and quickly resolve matters involving possible extremist activity affecting good order and discipline within our Air and Space Forces. I thank the committee for the opportunity to provide insight into some of the exceptional work our agents do every single day, and I look forward to providing additional information as this hearing continues. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Grabosky can be found in the Appendix on page 142.] Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you. Let me start with you, Mr. McMahon. In your statement, you make the statement, ``NCIS does not pursue investigations of Department of the Navy-affiliated individuals who simply make statements indicating they share the beliefs of a subset of the beliefs held by domestic extremist groups.'' So, if I say I am a racist, I am not going to be investigated, I am not going to be evaluated as to whether or not I should be kicked out? Mr. McMahon. Ma'am, so we, NCIS, would not actually conduct an investigation. We would refer that back to the command of the member who is--is a member of that command. So we would refer that member back to the command, provide the command that information, the information that we have gained in any sort of manner, and then allow the command to take care of them in the appropriate manner. Ms. Speier. All right. Mr. Grabosky, you said specifically that ``mere membership in the organizations is not prohibited.'' But if you had a tattoo of that organization, that would be actionable? Mr. Grabosky. Chairwoman Speier, mere participation is not something that OSI actually investigates. We actually investigate the active participation of a member. There are many avenues within the military, including command or equal opportunity offices, that conduct investigations of viewpoints of individuals. If it does not rise to the level of a felony investigation of active participation, we don't get involved in---- Ms. Speier. Okay. You are missing my point. Mr. Grabosky. I am sorry. Ms. Speier. You are saying active participation equals something like a tattoo but active participation does not equal being a member of one of these extremist organizations, and I find that astonishing. Mr. Grabosky. According to Air Force policy right now, active participation is actually attending rallies, fundraising for them, or actually being part of the organization and actively involved in it. Ms. Speier. But if you are a member, that is a level of activity. I think we need to look at that. Ms. Haaland had referenced an Air Force individual who was not dismissed or discharged. Can you explain to us why? Mr. Grabosky. The information received to us of being part of an extremist organization, we opened an investigation, we produced a report, and we provided it to command, and command took action. As I said in my statement, OSI does not get involved in determining punishments. That is in the legal realm of the United States Air Force, and the investigative agency is not involved in that process of making a decision. Ms. Speier. And, in your experience, have you found that when you have completed your investigations and referred them back to the command, are you ever made aware of whether or not they take action? Mr. Grabosky. Yes. If it rises to the level of administrative action, we get an after-action report that we have to update our files with. Ms. Speier. And do you convey that to the FBI? Mr. Grabosky. If it rises to the level for criminal indexing, yes. All our investigations abide by criminal indexing of convictions. In this incidence, I believe he received an administrative punishment, which does not get reported to the FBI as a criminal conviction. Ms. Speier. Can you explain to us--okay. So, in this case, he remains in the military. He had nonjudicial punishment, it sounds like. Is that correct? Mr. Grabosky. I am aware that--I believe he received a letter of reprimand. Ms. Speier. So it was even--it was a letter of reprimand. Mr. Grabosky. Correct, ma'am. Ms. Speier. So no action taken regarding rank, pay, anything like that. Mr. Grabosky. He received an administrative reduction in rank by one rank, in conjunction with the letter of reprimand. I am aware of that. Ms. Speier. And can you remind us again what he was actually engaged in? Mr. Grabosky. He was an active participant of Identity Evropa. Ms. Speier. So he is an active participant in this---- Mr. Grabosky. He was fundraising. Ms. Speier. He was fundraising for this organization, and he is still in the military. Mr. Grabosky. As I said, ma'am, that is a decision that is beyond the criminal---- Ms. Speier. I realize my disbelief is not something that should be registered to you but to his command, but I am astonished by it, because I think the potential for placing our service members at risk is so great. In the cases that you have--and if you can answer this, if you would like--that you have investigated, how many of them come to your attention because of a bystander, another service member who alerts you to it? Mr. Ethridge. Ma'am, I can't give you a specific count, but---- Ms. Speier. Majority? Minority? Mr. Ethridge [continuing]. Tip line--I wouldn't say it was a majority, but a common way for us to receive complaints is through the tip-line process. We have an automated tip line. Normally the source of those tips is a fellow soldier or a family member. Ms. Speier. Is that the case for all of you? Mr. McMahon. Mr. McMahon. Ma'am, all of the 14 ongoing investigations we are in the process of investigating right now have all come to us via the FBI. So we are working in partnership with the FBI. At this time, we haven't had one complaint come forward off of our tips line regarding White supremacy groups or any other racially motivated groups. Ms. Speier. I have exceeded my time, so I will come back for a second round. Ranking Member Kelly. Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to talk to you two, because you are the guys who have the authority to do something. And it amazes me--I just completed a course last week, and there is a book, ``Great New Work,'' and we had to read that. But in it, it talks about the 1944 OSS [Office of Strategic Services]--which is the precursor of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]--sabotage manual for Germany, written by William Donovan, and it was the field manual. And it said things like, ``Insist on doing everything through channels. Never permit shortcuts to be taken in order to expedite decisions. Make speeches. Talk as frequently as possible and at great length. Illustrate your points. When possible, refer all matters to committees. Make committees as large as possible, preferably be more than five. Bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible. Haggle over wording and details.'' You guys are Department of Defense, okay? The climate survey that we have talked about--we have a great Secretary of Defense. Secretary Esper is outstanding. And he is a business guy; he gets this. Why don't we write in the climate survey and ask the question that we want? You don't need congressional authority to do that, I don't think. I think you can write into your entry exam the exact questions that you want. I think you can put in the--you or someone, one of your counterparts, can write in the exact questions. And it doesn't just need to be White supremacy; it needs to be any--because we have to identify what it is in specifics. If it is White supremacy, we can't use the word ``extremism,'' but if it is something other than White supremacy, we can't use the word ``extremism.'' We have to use the specific words. So you can write into a climate survey to find out what it is. The second thing is the actions, it is--these guys can't do anything. They don't have the authority to prosecute or to say, this shall result in this. But at the DOD level, at the Department-head level somewhere, you do have the authority, without congressional authority, to say, if you are found as an active, passive, any other member in this organization or these organizations, you shall be removed from service or you shall be reduced in rank or you shall be criminally charged. We do have that authority. And I would just ask that--sometimes I think we get a big bureaucracy, and I really--you ought to go read that OSS field manual, and you will go, ``Holy cow, that sounds like 90 percent of American businesses today and all of our government and all of our organizations.'' And we have to get away from that. And I think you guys can do that. So, that being said, what recommendations can you make for us to root out White supremacy or any other type of extremism? What can we do better to keep them out and to identify them and get them out? Ms. Miller. Yes, sir. And I certainly appreciate your comments. The responsibility to incorporate the requirement into climate surveys is within the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. While my expertise is in accession, I am part of the Personnel and Readiness team, and so I understand that our colleagues who are experts with respect to our climate surveys are in the active effort right now to research and determine the best way to ask those questions to glean the most information possible. And so they are actively engaged, and we can provide an update on that work to the committee on their efforts in that regard. We do have, certainly, command climate surveys, and we have workforce equal opportunity surveys, both at the Active and the Reserve level, that do ask questions about racist and extremist group experience that they may be knowledgeable about, or hate crime incidents. And we do collect data on that and have for a number of years. The data that we have is slightly different than the results that we have seen from the Military Times poll, and so we want to take into account the information that they have collected. The information that the Department has collected is more---- Mr. Kelly. I mean, I understand that, but what we have to do is, we know there are things we need to know right now. Ms. Miller. Yes, sir. Mr. Kelly. And so we can get the perfect answer and the perfect wording, or DOD can write a policy which asks the question and gets specific, and guess what? We don't have to write the question, we don't have to put--``Have you experienced any type of terrorism, racism,'' and put it down there and say, ``Please write in.'' That may be a more effective way, because then we get what they really think it is. But I think we have to execute, because, if not, we are relying on outside data, which is not scientific, which is the best that we have right now. But you have the capability through command and control to ask the question that gets us the data so we can make specific decisions to get it better. And my time is about to run out, but I thank you guys, and I think we are doing a lot of things right. But I think you guys can get the specifics without waiting for congressional authority to do that, and I would just ask that you please do that. And thank you all for what you do and for being here, and especially my law enforcement guys. As a former DA [District Attorney], I always appreciate you all. And I yield back. Ms. Speier. Mrs. Davis. Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I know that several of you in the investigative services mentioned your work and the importance, really, of having the terrorist and subversive checks. But I am wondering, can you give us some more understanding of what happens after you have picked up something that concerns you? You toss that over to the FBI or--it sounds like a lot of things come to you from the FBI. So how does that work? And what is it that really triggers concern, and what doesn't? Mr. McMahon. Ma'am, I will take the lead on this one. When the FBI refers something generally to us, that is kind of how it flows back. If there is a military member or somebody attached specifically, for myself, to the Navy or the Marine Corps, the FBI refers that back to NCIS to work the investigation collaboratively. Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Mr. McMahon. At that point in time, usually what triggers that is either some online activity, that basically they find somebody online they can actually actively identify that that person is associated with the Navy or the Marine Corps and that they have potentially talked about being able to procure weapons or take some sort of action. And so they refer that back to us. And we work that collaboratively with the FBI, looking to, you know, continue the investigation, monitor the activity not just online but holistically during the investigation, and then also look for any sort of other ties that they might have to other individuals within the military to make sure that we are, kind of, rooting out any additional problems that might exist. Mrs. Davis. Can you share, is it more usual that there are a number of people involved? Or this is sort of a loner, in many cases? Is it possible to---- Mr. McMahon. Again, I am going off limited data, as was talked about earlier in the earlier panel. With the 14 investigations that we have specifically focused on domestic terrorism, it is a little bit of a mixed bag. There are a few investigations that have indicated one or two other members that are in communication. But quite often they are involved in a group that the other members are not current military, potentially maybe have been foreign military--or former military. But, currently, a lot of times, they are just in communication with people that are just espousing the same viewpoints. Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. Mr. Ethridge, did you want to comment on that? No? Oh, okay. That is fine. Thank you. Before the Marines United scandal, it is my understanding we certainly didn't check people's social media when they were being recruited. Is that correct? Or were you looking at social media at that time? Ms. Miller. So I can answer that, ma'am. So, right now, social media checks are not a part of the recruiting process. That is an element that we are working in collaboration with our colleagues in the intelligence community to determine how best to potentially incorporate that requirement. Mrs. Davis. I think when that happened I was shocked, actually, that you didn't do that. Because certainly, as Members, you know, even within our offices, that is something that people talk about. And, often, people are very aware that, you know, we ask them to show us some of--you know, to show us, would they mind sharing that information. So if we are not checking that at recruitment, isn't that a real gap? Ms. Miller. So, right now, the recruiting process is a multitiered approach, starting with a recruiter who asks a number of questions during the recruitment interview. And, also, we pull local record checks, and then we also do the FBI check that I had mentioned before with the fingerprint check. And then, once we have that information and the individual appears to be suitable for military service, if they are contracted, then they fill out that SF-86 form that we mentioned that initiates the background investigation process. And Intelligence then takes it from there, and they can do additional work beyond what we have done at an initial entry level. And Mr. Reid can speak more to that. Mr. Reid. And once they sign that SF-86, for the past 3\1/ 2\ years it has been written in that form, that they are granting consent to limited--I will say ``limited''--social media monitoring. It has to be publicly facing. We cannot go behind passwords, we cannot look in private chat rooms, et cetera. We don't do that on scale for every background investigation right now. We have the ability to do it if there are investigative leads that come through the process I described. We would like to do it on scale for everybody all of the time. We are still developing the right tools. There are pitfalls here. There is false information, of course, online. Mrs. Davis. Uh-huh. We understand. Mr. Reid. There is identity resolution. There is use of handles and avatars, that you sometimes don't quite know what you have. But, earlier on, you mentioned our work with the Office of People Analytics, one of the members mentioned that. The Personnel Security Research Center are great partners of ours. We are in the midst of yet another pilot to figure out how to do this. There are great returns on personal conduct and some on allegiance, making disparaging remarks where you think you are in private and it is associated with an anti-government attitude. So we see promise there. Our investigative friends can do this when we have leads and things that we really need to get into. In terms of a screening protocol, we haven't found the right success model yet. But we have the ability to do it if we need to. Mrs. Davis. Do you need help from Congress to do that better? Mr. Reid. I don't think so. I knew you would ask. We have-- well, no. You have given us the authority. And insider threat, by the way, you know, for the last three NDAAs, we have gained more scope of insider threat. Insider threat is a great tool. The things I described that we do in background investigations, those are Federal guidelines. Those are set by the DNI [Director of National Intelligence] for security and the Director of OPM [Office of Personnel Management] for suitability. We don't get wiggle room as an agency to do our own, right? Because there is a reciprocity factor. Insider threat is a much more flexible framework. We have, as I mentioned, programs in every one of our components. They are building; the reporting is building. And for my military criminal investigative organization colleagues, what they represent to you, they are enforcing U.S. Code. These things--and it was mentioned on all the panels today, that these behaviors fall below U.S. criminal code. But we have policies, we have military security policy. Separating someone from the service administratively sometimes takes time, and sometimes we don't rush to do it because we want to reserve the ability to take full action. But if an individual exhibits behaviors, even though they are below a criminal investigative charge, it is very likely going to make them unsuitable for a security clearance. And every member of the U.S. military has to qualify for a Secret clearance, whether they have access to Secret information or not. That is the bar that I describe. So it is very likely, without getting into any specific case, that when you follow through on the administrative side, an individual loses their eligibility to serve, and they get separated. It takes a little time sometimes. Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Ms. Speier. Mr. Cisneros. Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you all for being here today. Ms. Miller, I believe it was you who commented about the background checks and part of that that they do, and you look at the gang file. But a lot of these White supremacist groups, these alt-right groups that are committing some of this violent activity, like what happened in Charlottesville, aren't on the gang file. They are not classified as gangs. A lot of these international White supremacist groups that are becoming more popular online and that people are joining aren't classified as terrorist groups. So when you are doing these background checks, these groups aren't popping up, it is not going up there. What are we looking for, then, to kind of classify them if they might be part of these groups? Ms. Miller. That is an excellent question, sir. Thank you. I mentioned the multilayered approach that we take, and that really does start with the recruiter who does this in- depth interview with the applicant. And they ask about a number of qualifying factors, the traditional ones of citizenship and age, level of education, any past criminal records, medical history, drug use. And then they also ask about tattoos. And tattoos, as we have learned, is one of the best ways to help identify whether an individual has had a current or past history of engagement with any sort of extremist or gang activity. And our colleagues in the first panel mentioned the importance and the value of knowing those tattoos. For many years, the recruiters in our military entrance processing stations had multiple, you know, files, large binders, with copies and images of tattoos to try to help educate them and help identify tattoos. What we have learned is that the landscape of tattoos evolves so rapidly, and it is very difficult to maintain currency on those, sort of, static resources and references. And so we agree with our colleagues in the first panel that having access to timely information about tattoos and branding is very important. And so one of the requirements that we now include is, for any sort of concerning or questionable branding or tattoo, there is a requirement to take images, as appropriate, of those markings and to actually engage local law enforcement and to engage the FBI and to actually ascertain more information about those markings. And that is a very important step of part of what we do. And then, also, the recruiters do a lot of work in terms of working with family members. They spend an incredible amount of time in their community, and so they get to know what are some of the prevalent concerning indicators in those communities. They talk to school counselors, they talk to school resource officers, they talk to local police. And so they will get a sense of who this individual is and the company he or she may keep. And so that is some of the preliminary work that we do before we hand it over to more formal channels and more formal investigative channels. Mr. Cisneros. Yeah. Now, Mr. Reid, you said, you know, the investigative officers, they are enforcing U.S. Code, right? But the military, the Department of Defense has policy. We have a zero- tolerance policy when it comes to drugs. Why don't we have a zero-tolerance policy when it comes to White supremacy? You know, Mr. Grabosky had stated that being a member of this organization isn't illegal, or it is not against the policy, but only if you are active. You know, would we let a member of al-Qaida or a member of ISIS into our military if they said, ``Well, I am a member, but I am not active''? Why aren't we doing this the same for these White supremacist groups? Mr. Reid. Sir, I believe we do have a policy, in that, again, your eligibility for service is hinged to the Federal adjudicative guidelines, and one of those guidelines speaks to engaging in behavior that denies others their basic constitutional rights. So any involvement with a group that espoused those views, and membership and involvement with that group, although it may be below the level of a criminal code violation, would be a disqualifier for a decision by an adjudicator on the continued eligibility of that individual. Mr. Cisneros. So you are saying, if somebody is a member of that group, they are not eligible to--one of these White supremacist groups--they are not eligible to serve in the U.S. military? Mr. Reid. They could be disqualified based on their participation. The front-end questionnaire asks questions, are you a member of any of those groups? If they withhold information, they falsified the form, which, by the way, is a criminal Federal offense also, but it also, again, goes to loyalty and honesty, which are adjudicative guidelines. So there are 13 guidelines, and they crisscross in many instances, where, as I mentioned earlier, personal conduct, criminal conduct, allegiance are the main categories. There are other categories, terrorism categories. Alignment with any of those activities would be an element of an investigative file. And keep this in mind--I know you are running out of time. We are going to this continuous evaluation. We are already doing it. So we don't wait until the next reinvestigation anymore like we used to. These are occurring every day. We have public records checks, other checks, where, if this comes to light--insider threats, someone mentions anything to an insider-threat officer, chain of command, it is going to go to a security manager, it is going to go to an insider-threat hub, and they are going to pull the string on that and find out what is going on, and if it is there, they are going to take action. Mr. Cisneros. All right. Well, Madam Chairman, I just want to say this one last thing, and it really is: This is a bigger problem in our country, and it is something that we need to work on. It is not only a military problem; it is something that we need--these groups, they need to be classified as domestic terrorist groups, as gangs. And we need to recognize what they are; these international organizations are terrorist organizations. And, with that, I yield back. Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Cisneros. Mr. Reid, Ms. Miller--and, Ms. Miller, we have worked together on a number of issues. I have a high regard for you. But I am really flummoxed by what we have heard tonight-- today--soon to be tonight. In this policy, it says that any of these active participation in gangs or organizations is prohibited. So if it is prohibited and we have an Air Force service member who is actively fundraising for this despicable organization, why is he still in the military? Ms. Miller. Ma'am, we will have to refer you to the Air Force to gain more details on that specific case. To your point, yes, the policy does say it prohibits active participation, which includes fundraising, demonstrating, rallying, recruiting, training, organizing, leading members, distributing material, wearing gang colors and, to your point earlier, tattoos or other brandings. And so, therefore, those are the type of indicators that need to be evaluated when determining whether there has been a violation of this policy, which then could therefore lead to, you know, certainly administrative separation and other actions against the individual. As it pertains to that case and as Mr. Reid indicated earlier, the services often work very deliberately through that process. And there is an element of due process consideration, and so sometimes that does take time. But we will have to refer you to the Air Force to garner specific details about that individual case. Ms. Speier. But here is the problem. If all of these cases that you work very hard to investigate are then referred to the command and there is total discretion within the command, there is not equal due process, there is not equal parsing out of punishment, if we don't have a standard. And, you know, if I am a member of the Sierra Club, I espouse all of their values. If I am a member of an organization that is specifically interested in doing harm to the United States, I believe and will be supportive of that. So I have a real problem with the vagueness of these policies and the distinction between active participation and membership. And I think these policies have to be updated. They are woefully inadequate for what we know today is a very serious domestic terrorism problem. So we are going to hopefully be working with you to try and develop, you know, clearer outlines. One last question I have, and then I will turn it over to Mr. Kelly. What training is being provided to commanders now about White supremacism specifically, the accelerationist community, and a number of these organizations that we referenced here today? Ms. Miller. Ma'am, my capacity here today is accessions, as I mentioned, and so I am not an expert, per se, on the level of training that commanding officers may receive. But the policy requires training. It requires training at the entry-level training point; it requires routine and regular training and certainly all the way up to the commanding officer level. So we will have to take that question back and make sure that the committee gets a fulsome answer from those who are responsible for that. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 151.] Ms. Miller. One point I think that is very helpful is that each command has an equal opportunity advisor. And equal opportunity advisors, I think, are a very important asset in that command triad. And they do receive training specifically on extremism and White supremacy, actually, largely pulling from information from the ADL and the Southern Poverty Law Center, to help educate them to look for concerning signs and indicators within their command and to advise their commanding officers on what to recognize. And so I do think that that is a valuable asset. Ms. Speier. And I will just finally say, I would like to associate myself with Mrs. Davis' comments. Any job application today requires that the review that takes place looks at social media. So our reluctance or timidity in wanting to do that at the front end in accession makes no sense. I mean, this is the 21st century, and that is how people communicate. And if we can't look at that, then we are not necessarily doing this fulsome review as we have individuals become members of the military. I will now turn it over to Mr. Kelly. Mr. Kelly. I would just ask that you guys please look at requiring that when you do administrative action or UCMJ, okay, when these guys do the hard work, that you make them report that to DOD so that we can collect that data. Because without that, we don't know what is happening below. So if you would require that they--number one is, people are usually more accountable on things that they have to report. We know that from almost anything. So I think that is an easy fix. Now I am going to ask you guys, what can Chairwoman Speier and myself--what authorities do you need to better do your job to not just--and White supremacy is what we are talking about today, but whether it is other organizations, it doesn't matter to me; they are all bad to the order and discipline of the military. So what authorities do you need from us to make your job easier? What can we do to give you authorities? Ms. Miller. I know Mr. Reid already answered that similar question. I will echo his sentiments, that I believe the Department has the authorities that we need to work after this issue. Certainly, the continued evolution and development of additional tools and capabilities, particularly as it comes to social media scraping, I believe, will be very informative, especially during the accession process. But there are some initial challenges and hurdles that we need to work through before we can implement that on a large scale. Mr. Kelly. Now the really hard question. For you two guys, and then we will--and I am not ignoring you all, but these are the decision makers, or at least you influence the decision makers. I would ask, what is one thing that you can do with your current authorities that immediately, incrementally, make a difference in either identifying members of organizations that are adverse--White supremacists, any other group that are adverse to the interests of the United States Government, and then, also, or that punishes them or makes a punishment even, someone who is in an organization like that? Let's be for real. If they are a member, it doesn't matter whether you can catch them being active; they are not passive. They didn't join it to be passive. And so, if there is anything, what can you do that you can do or influence your superior to do to make that immediately either to keep them out or get them out? Mr. Reid. I apologize, sir. I didn't exactly hear the question you wanted me to answer. Mr. Kelly. Under the authorities--I asked what authorities you need from us, and you said none. So, in your current job, what can you do, what one simple thing can you do, to make it easier either to keep people out, identify them, or get them out of the DOD? Mr. Reid. I think you hit on a very good one, and that is, if we could find a way to extend our reach--of the things we do in background investigations, as I indicated, we cannot apply those at the Federal level until an individual has been placed on contract and signs a consent form. So that space that exists prior--left of that is a difficult space for us to operate in. Among other things, especially when you talk about social media, any time I am going to go check any of that, I am going to get other U.S. person information. And we run into a lot of obstacles with privacy concerns, civil liberty concerns, and EO [Executive Order] 12333 concerns about third-party information. Any American that is chatting with other people is probably chatting with other Americans that are not part of my interest sphere. So it is a complex thing. If you could help us figure out-- -- Mr. Kelly. I get all that, but you would be surprised what you can just find out with a simple Google of an individual---- Mr. Reid. Yes, sir. But we---- Mr. Kelly [continuing]. Which is public information that they put out. But thank you. And real quickly, if you can answer, please, Ms. Miller, tell us what we can do to get you the authorities. Ms. Miller. One of the things that we are working on right now is to expand our scope of engagement with the FBI, specifically the Domestic Terrorism Task Force and the criminal gang files. We do a level of work with local law enforcement in the local gang activity. The information that is available at the FBI is limited to law enforcement, and so that is not necessarily information that we can provide to 20,000 recruiters across the country. And so we have a working group right now to determine how best to share that information and at what level so that we can continue to update them real-time on emerging patterns and tattoos and markings. And so that is work that we are doing right now and, I think, will be very helpful. Mr. Kelly. And I want to end with, guys, you are setting the standard for America, and thank you. You are doing an outstanding job. So I don't want--but I still want to get better. A guy used to say: Good, better, best; good get better, and better get best. I believe in that in everything we do. And please look at the climate survey. I don't think you guys need our authority to ask the right questions to identify issues. And so I would just ask, either influence or do that. And, with that, I yield back, Chairwoman. Ms. Speier. All right. Lots of food for thought here. We look forward to working with you. This is a serious issue. I think you recognize that we are taking it very seriously. So we thank you for your contributions today and your work that you do every day. And, with that, we stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X February 11, 2020 ======================================================================= ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD February 11, 2020 ======================================================================= [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING February 11, 2020 ======================================================================= RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER Dr. Beirich. The only data I have on this front is what has been reported in the press. In my testimony, the following are active duty soldiers who were found to be connected to extremist ideas/groups:Coast Guard Lieutenant Christopher Hasson, arrested Feb. 2019. A former active-duty Marine and member of the Army Guard, Hasson was found to be plotting a mass murder of elected officials of the Democratic party and media figures.\1\ After seizing his computer and other electronic devices, investigators found evidence that Hasson was a long-time white supremacist who held violently racist views even before his first enlistment in the military. He was sentenced in 2020 to 13 years in prison. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/inside-u-s-military-s- battle-white-supremacy-far-right-ncna1010221 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In April 2019, Master Sergeant Cory Reeves was identified as a member of the white supremacist group Identity Evropa. He was only demoted one rank after an initial investigation. In December, proceedings into his activities opened with the possibility of discharge.\2\ He remained employed by the Air Force until after this hearing was held. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ https://www.denverpost.com/2019/12/17/air-force-identity- evropa-cory-re eves/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In September 2019, the FBI arrested Jarrett William Smith, a soldier stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, and charged him with providing expertise to extremists that could lead to the creation of explosives and weapons of mass destruction.\3\ He was interacting with a member of a neo-fascist Ukrainian group, the Right Sector, and was interested in fighting in Ukraine. The FBI said Smith discussed in an online chat a plan to conduct an attack within the United States. Smith was reportedly searching for more ``radicals'' like himself and discussed killing members of an anti-fascist network as well as destroying cell towers or a local news station. Later he suggested a major American news network as a target of a vehicle bomb. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/us/us-army-soldier-arrested- Jarrett-William-Smith.html --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In December 2019, two men, Brandon Trent East and Dalton Woodward, were kicked out of the Georgia National Guard after they were reported to be leaders of the racist pagan group, Ravensblood Kindred, part of the larger white supremacist Asatru Folk Assembly.\4\ According to press reports, the men had attended a speaking event by white nationalist Richard Spencer in 2017, and one of them was on active duty in Afghanistan when his ties to white supremacy were disclosed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/2-men-kicked-out-national- guard-over-alleged-white-supremacist-n1107591 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Also in 2019, the Huffington Post exposed seven members of the U.S. military actively posting on a Discord chatroom as part of the white nationalist organization Identity Evropa.\5\ They included two Marines, two Army ROTC cadets, an Army physician, a member of the Texas National Guard and one member of the Air Force. Their names are: Stephen T. Farrea. Jason Laguardia, Jay C. Harrison, Christopher Cummins, Joseph Kane, Dannion A. Phillips and Christopher Hodgman. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ https://www.huffpost.com/entry/white-nationalists-military- identity-evropa_n_5c8ab70ae4b0 d7f6b0f1094b --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2018, Marine Lance Corporal Vasillios G. Pistolis, was expelled from the Marine Corps for his ties to the neo-Nazi Atomwaffen Division (AWD). He was removed after participating in the Charlottesville riots in 2017, where he was engaged in violent assaults. Pistolis later bragged about his involvement online with other members of AWD.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/ 08/01/marine-with-alleged-neo-nazi-connections-booted-from-the-marine- corps/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2017, Brandon Russell, Pistolis's roommate, was arrested after one of their roommates, Devon Arthurs, killed two of their other roommates in a Tampa apartment. Investigators on the scene discovered a cache of weapons, detonators and volatile chemical compounds, including a cooler full of HMTD, a powerful explosive often used by bombmakers, and ammonium nitrate, the substance used by Timothy McVeigh in the Oklahoma City attack. Russell was also in possession of two radioactive isotopes, americium and thorium. At the time of his arrest, Russell had been serving in the 53rd Brigade Special Troops Battalion of Florida's Army National Guard. In 2013, John Charles Stortstrom, a mechanical engineer who worked for the Army at its Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) in Maryland, was suspended after published reports disclosed that he was among 150 white nationalists who attended a conference of the white nationalist American Renaissance, a race science outfit. American Renaissance included a photo on its website of Stortstrom with the caption, ``Engineer. Republican. Racist. Military bomb maker.'' \7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2013/07/08/after-hatewatch- story-maryland-military-engineer-suspended --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2012, Nathan Wooten, a member of the Missouri National Guard, was arrested for running and supplying weapons to a neo-Nazi paramilitary training camp in Florida.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ https://theweek.com/articles/833960/american-militarys- extremist-problem --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Also in 2012, two other soldiers, U.S. Army Sgt. Anthony Peden and Pvt. Isaac Aguigui, were arrested after murdering a former soldier and his girlfriend in an attempt to cover up their assassination plot against then-President Barack Obama.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ https://psmag.com/social-justice/does-the-american-military- have-a-problem-with-far-right-extremism --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2009, Marine Lance Corporal Kody Brittingham, stationed at Camp Lejuene, N.C., was arrested on an armed robbery charge. A search of his barracks turned up a journal containing white supremacist material and a plan to kill Obama.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ https://www.journalnow.com/news/local/former-lejeune-marine- charged-with-threatening-obama/article_0c645db5-0529-53ad-aeee- e1ed3f7cf96b.html --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There are additional sources of information on active duty troops that could be considered. In 2009, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported on leaked private emails of the neo-Nazi National Socialist Movement (NSM). The emails showed that several people who identified themselves as active military personnel contacted NSM over the prior two years to express interest in the organization, including at least one soldier who subsequently joined.\11\ In 2008, the SPLC issued a report revealing that 46 members of the neo-Nazi web forum New Saxon had identified themselves as active-duty military personnel. It quoted a racist skinhead who wrote that he had joined the Army and specifically requested an assignment where he would be able to learn how to make an explosive device.\12\ And in 2006, an SPLC report showed that a number of military personnel had joined racist and neo-Nazi groups such as the Fourth Reich, Aryan Nation, National Alliance, National Socialist Movement, and others.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2009/09/03/leaked-neo- nazi-e-mails-show-contacts-military-personnel \12\ https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/ 2008/evidence-shows-racist-skinheads-enlisting-military \13\ https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/ 2006/several-high-profile-racist-extremists-serve-us-military --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I would suggest that it would be helpful to look at all military reports on this issue. For example, in 2003, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division advised the FBI of six active-duty soldiers at Fort Riley, Texas, who were affiliated with the Aryan Nations. One was the neo-Nazi group's point of contact in Kansas and sought to recruit members from within the military.\14\ There may be other such internal reports. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/ 2008/fbi-reports-extremists-military --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I also mention several other individuals who are former military. These include Timothy McVeigh, Eric Rudolph, Wade Michael Page, all of whom committed acts of domestic terrorism. There are far more examples such as these. In 2020, two members of the neo-Nazi The Base were arrested and had previous military training: Brian Mark Lemley was a cavalry scout in the Army and Patrik Jordan Mathews previously served as a combat engineer in the Canadian Army Reserve, indicating that the reach of white nationalism is a problem for foreign military services as well. According to New America, 21 military veterans were identified as having committed or attempted an act of violence as a right-wing extremist between 2001 and 2013.\15\ [See page 10.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ https://psmag.com/social-justice/does-the-american-military- have-a-problem-with-far-right-extremism --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ms. Miller. Training on supremacism is provided to incoming commanders and senior enlisted personnel during pre-command/senior leader courses. Military Department and DOD policy on extremism, including white supremacism are reinforced to commanders. Additionally, commanders are informed of the options within their authority, and the potential impact of extremism on the good order and discipline of their command. The training provided to commanders supplements training provided throughout their careers, as also required by DODI 1325.06, during their pre-commissioning training, throughout their professional military education, as well as other training such as Equal Opportunity and Threat Awareness and Reporting. [See page 41.] ? ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING February 11, 2020 ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER Ms. Speier. As you mentioned in your testimony, the military has faced a white supremacist threat before, and our country is currently dealing with an international terror threat that manifests through radicalized lone actors. We don't have to reinvent the wheel to deal with this threat. What lessons from these other fights are relevant here? And how should we apply them? Dr. Beirich. The main lesson here is the need to tighten up regulations as additional problems are presented to the military. Each time the white supremacist threat has presented itself, the military has taken measures to keep hate groups and their members out. This started in 1985 with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and his banning of card-carrying hate group members from the Armed Forces. After Timothy McVeigh's bombing a set of more stringent regulations was again put in force. Again, in 2009, after it was disclosed that many soldiers were posting hate on social media, the regulations were tightened. Today, the areas where changes need to be made are on screening incoming recruits and improving the enforcement techniques used to root out extremists from the military. A tattoo database is urgently needed as are mandatory examinations into hate on social media accounts run by potential recruits. It is clear that the problem today may not be regulations banning extremists from the ranks, but rather their enforcement. During the testimony given after I testified, it was clear that members of the investigative services for the different military branches were applying different standards. In particular, the Air Force representative said ``mere membership'' in an extremist group did not disqualify someone from the ranks. But the current regulations do ban such membership. My strongest suggestion is that a hard look at the investigative services be undertaken to make sure the same standards against racists in the ranks are applied across the board. There may be a need for training/retraining on this point for members of the investigative services and all of those in command. Troops should also be trained on these regulations. Also, it may be a good time to consolidate all the regulations relating to this matter in one new set of principles. All staff could then be retrained to follow those new regulations. It does not appear the regulations are wanting, but rather their application is. But that is something that needs to be substantiated through a serious investigation of this matter. In the end, all hate group members and anyone expressing hate ideas needs to be identified. And they should have no place in the military. For more garden variety racist ideas expressed by troops, there must be intervention of some sort to show troops why such ideas are wrongheaded and hurtful to morale, troop cohesion, etc. and not compatible with military service. And, most importantly, decisions on these matters must be taken out of the hands of unit commanders. It should be mandatory that any allegations of such matters are reported up the chain of command and handled at a different level than the unit. This will allow for more coherent and standardized decisions in these matters. Ms. Speier. As you mentioned in your testimony, the military has faced a white supremacist threat before, and our country is currently dealing with an international terror threat that manifests through radicalized lone actors. We don't have to reinvent the wheel to deal with this threat. What lessons from these other fights are relevant here? And how should we apply them? Ms. Brooks. We must move past a ``zero tolerance'' response to the presence of white supremacism in the military. In both the military and civilian worlds, we need to invest in programs that steer individuals away from extremism and deradicalize those who have adopted extremist beliefs or joined hate groups. We must prioritize research that builds and tests ``off-ramping'' programs--already successfully in use in Europe--in the United States. And we must prioritize this work in the active-duty and veteran community. In Europe, social programs--such as the Aarhaus model--have been developed that provide evidence-based indications of positive models for dealing with the complexities of ``off-ramping'' civilians who have become radicalized. These programs are community-minded and focus on breaking down barriers and promoting healthy interactions with civil society. They prioritize counseling and build resilience to extremism that is more lasting than punitive responses. Although individuals must be held accountable for their actions and allegiances, further stigmatization and alienation of veterans hinders their recovery. For example, as numerous scientific studies and reports have underscored, some veterans feel that care and support around the issue of post-traumatic stress diagnoses paints the entire military and veteran communities as broken, struggling and in need of special care. Extremism in the military is a complex, human problem that has been addressed time-and-again over the past four decades. It costs human lives. We must first study these complexities before we can understand them and work to diminish the presence of white supremacists in the ranks of our armed forces. The following is a list of compounding recommendations for addressing the complexities of this problem: 1. While it is imperative that the threat of extremism in the military is addressed, public officials and military commanders must understand that remedial action may trigger further radicalization and could help turn a radicalizing individual toward violent extremism. Instead of a one-size-fits-all approach, we believe in a multi-tiered approach centered on prevention and early intervention based on studies that highlight the individual nature of radicalization. When necessary, we recommend evidence-based deradicalization programs. 2. Experts in this field will need access to the relevant corridors of the military to design credible prevention and intervention programs that address the problem of extremism within the Armed Forces. Public health service members in the military (such as psychologists, psychiatrists, military social workers) will be able to provide critical input that ensures these programs take into consideration an awareness of military culture. 3. Establish a commission made up of experts in the fields of prevention and intervention in radicalization, deradicalization and de- escalation (``off-ramping''), and identify evidenced-based best practices and programming across all branches of the military for veterans reentering civilian society and corresponding resources available through VA services, clinics and hospitals. 4. Use the recommendations of the commission to establish a tiered process to address radicalization that begins with counseling but leads to discharge only as a final consequence. These programs must be rigorously evaluated. 5. Use the recommendations of the commission to create evidenced informed trainings intended to inoculate against radicalization at entry, throughout an individual's military career, and reentry into civilian life. Train recruiters, officers (commissioned and noncommissioned), and investigators on best practices recommended by the commission. 6. Require an annual report from military leadership that includes an audit of all investigations and prevention measures taken regarding white supremacist activity within the ranks of the military. These reports should, to the largest degree possible, be made public so that it can inform the military's response to this problem going forward. Ms. Speier. As I relayed in my opening statement, Director Wray has indicated that the FBI has elevated the white supremacist terror threat to the same level as the international terror threat. Are the military criminal investigative organizations, or MCIOs, also treating those threats with equal urgency and aligning resources appropriately? What steps have you taken to ensure that commanders understand the gravity of this threat? Director Wray also mentioned that he's stood up hate crime-domestic terror fusion cells, are there MCIO representatives present too? Mr. Ethridge. The Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) greatly values the terrorism investigation expertise and leadership of the FBI. In 2019, the FBI welcomed CID to expand our partnership, traditionally centered on the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and the international terrorism threat, to focus on the Racially Motivated Violent Extremist threat. CID added agent and analyst representation in the FBI's Domestic Terrorism Operations Section, Counterterrorism Division, in addition to the Army personnel assigned to the NJTTF and the installation-level relationships maintained with regional JTTFs. The FBI partnership ensures timely notification of Army personnel suspected of crimes related to extremist activity. Additionally, the CID provides the FBI information on the training and performance history of former Army personnel suspected of criminal activity. Commanders are responsible for maintaining good order and discipline in their units. To assist, CID notifies Commanders when there are indications of extremist activity present. Over the past year, CID has increased collection efforts, informed HQDA of our observations, participated in the review and changes to Army policy, expanded our relationship with law enforcement partners and made notifications to Commanders. Additionally, CID has formulated a request to the Army Inspector General to add unit implementation of extremist activity policy (Army Regulation 600-20) as a focus area for the next inspection cycle. The Army is postured to identify extremist activity in the ranks and has both the policy and leadership tools to prevent emergence as a pervasive issue. Ms. Speier. As I relayed in my opening statement, Director Wray has indicated that the FBI has elevated the white supremacist terror threat to the same level as the international terror threat. Are the military criminal investigative organizations, or MCIOs, also treating those threats with equal urgency and aligning resources appropriately? What steps have you taken to ensure that commanders understand the gravity of this threat? Director Wray also mentioned that he's stood up hate crime-domestic terror fusion cells, are there MCIO representatives present too? Mr. McMahon. NCIS is confronting racially motivated violent extremism (RMVE) threats with the same urgency as the FBI. Responding to an increase in NCIS cases and referrals from the FBI, NCIS established the unique case category Domestic Terrorism for investigative and operational reporting purposes. This allows NCIS to more accurately reflect the scope of the incidents and to align investigative resources against this emerging challenge. To ensure commanders understand the gravity of the RMVE threat, NCIS immediately briefs commands when there are indications of service member affiliation with RMVE groups under their command--regardless of evidence of criminal activity. Briefing programs have been updated to include information on domestic extremism. The command briefings not only educate commanders, but also serve as another opportunity to advise all service members of prohibited activities. Recognizing this problem cannot be addressed solely through criminal investigations, NCIS also convened a working group of Department of Navy commands to coordinate resources, identify existing policies, and determine areas of focus in an effort to raise the visibility of this issue as priority with commanders. NCIS maintains a physical presence at FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces within all major fleet concentration areas. This presence allows for direct NCIS visibility on domestic terrorism issues that could impact the Department of Navy. Additionally, NCIS maintains a senior level liaison officer at the National Joint Terrorism Task Force with immediate access to all relevant information and FBI Sections addressing this threat. This includes daily interaction with the FBI Domestic Terrorism Operations Section. NCIS has conducted multiple joint investigations and operations with the FBI targeting RMVE activity in the military. Ms. Speier. As I relayed in my opening statement, Director Wray has indicated that the FBI has elevated the white supremacist terror threat to the same level as the international terror threat. Are the military criminal investigative organizations, or MCIOs, also treating those threats with equal urgency and aligning resources appropriately? What steps have you taken to ensure that commanders understand the gravity of this threat? Director Wray also mentioned that he's stood up hate crime-domestic terror fusion cells, are there MCIO representatives present too? Mr. Grabosky. OSI is a federal law enforcement agency with responsibility for conducting criminal investigations, counterintelligence and specialized investigative activities, and integrated force protection for the United States Air and Space Forces. As such, all threats potentially impacting our forces are thoroughly investigated and taken seriously. OSI maintains a full-time presence on the local and national Joint Terrorist Task Forces (JTTFs) that monitor and provide Domestic Terrorism (DT) information to OSI HQ and field units for action. Additionally, through its own Insider Threat (InT) program, OSI monitors key data streams to provide early indicators of potential threat activity. These data streams, fused with the information provided by the Air Force InT Hub, provide information ranging from local arrest information to background data used for security clearance adjudication. This information, as well as information provided through local and federal law enforcement partnerships, are the key elements driving OSI's DT efforts. Currently, OSI does not have full-time representation at the hate-crime domestic terrorism fusion cell at FBI HQ. However, OSI is closely aligned with our FBI counterparts with 21 agents assigned to full-time JTTF locations, one agent and analyst at the National JTTF, and two liaison officers assigned to FBI HQ. OSI also has 66 special agents who are part of FBI Counterintelligence Task Forces (CITF) at 55 FBI offices around the country providing OSI access to FBI information systems. Finally, OSI agents and analysts closely work with the Domestic Terrorism Fusion Cell via the domestic terrorism operations section of the FBI counterterrorism division and are well postured to support investigations and operations responding to racially motivated violent extremist threats. OSI informs and educates commanders of all threats that may impact the force, to include threats from DT. The primary method of keeping commanders apprised of the seriousness of violent extremist threats, both domestic and foreign, is through routine threat information sharing with local commanders and senior Air Force leaders. OSI is a primary member of the commander's Threat Working Group that examines all source information and responds to threats to the local installation, mission, and personnel. Additionally, each OSI field operating location produces two annual reports that contain specific threat information tailored to their Area of Responsibility (AOR): a Criminal Threat Assessment (CTA) and a classified Local Threat Assessment (LTA). The LTA deals primarily with foreign terrorism and counterintelligence threats, while the CTA deals primarily with criminal threats and domestic terrorism. OSI thanks the Committee for the opportunity to provide additional insight into some of the exceptional work our agents do every day to protect Department of the Air Force personnel and resources, and we look forward to provide additional information as needed.