[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S
AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY, PART 2
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 22, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-118
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: govinfo.gov,
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-957 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of James Comer, Kentucky, Ranking
Columbia Minority Member
Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Jim Jordan, Ohio
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
Jim Cooper, Tennessee Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Jody B. Hice, Georgia
Jamie Raskin, Maryland Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin
Harley Rouda, California Gary Palmer, Alabama
Ro Khanna, California Michael Cloud, Texas
Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Clay Higgins, Louisiana
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Peter Welch, Vermont Chip Roy, Texas
Jackie Speier, California Carol D. Miller, West Virginia
Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Mark E. Green, Tennessee
Mark DeSaulnier, California Kelly Armstrong, North Dakota
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan W. Gregory Steube, Florida
Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
Jimmy Gomez, California
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Rashida Tlaib, Michigan
Katie Porter, California
David Rapallo, Staff Director
Daniel Rebnord, Chief Counsel
Cameron MacPherson, Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
Christopher Hixon, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on National Security
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Chairman
Jim Cooper, Tennesse Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin, Ranking
Peter Welch, Vermont Minority Member
Harley Rouda, California Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Michael Cloud, Texas
Mark DeSaulnier, California Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Mark E. Green, Tennessee
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Bob Gibbs, Ohio
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 22, 2020............................... 1
Witnesses
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Special Representative for
Afghanistan Reconciliation, Department of State................
Oral Statement................................................... 4
David F. Helvey, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Department of
Defense
Oral Statement................................................... 7
Written opening statements and statements for the witnesses are
available on the U.S. House of Representatives Document
Repository at: docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
Documents entered into the record during this hearing and
Questions for the Record (QFR's) are listed below/available at:
docs.house.gov.
* Letter from Lower House of the Parliament National Interest
Preservation Group of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan;
submitted by Subcommitte Chairman Stephen Lynch.
* Questions to be answered in writing following the
negotiations; submitted by Subcommittee Chairwoman Carolyn
Maloney.
* Questions for the Record: to Mr. Ambassador Khalilzad;
submitted by Chairwoman Maloney.
* Questions for the Record: to Mr. Helvey; submitted by Rep.
Robin Kelly.
EXAMINING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S
AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY, PART 2
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Tuesday, September 22, 2020
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Oversight and Reform
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:06 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Lynch, Cooper, Welch, Rouda,
Wasserman Schultz, Kelly, Plaskett, Lawrence, Grotham, Foxx,
Cloud, Higgins, and Green.
Also present: Representative Malinowski.
Mr. Lynch. The committee will now come to order. Without
objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the
committee at any one time. I now recognize myself for an
opening statement.
Good morning, everyone. Before we begin, I would like to
take a moment to honor the memory of the late Supreme Court
Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg was a force for
good on the Supreme Court and a true champion for justice,
equality, and the balance of power in our representative
democracy. May she rest in peace.
To commence with our hearing, 11 days ago, our country
marked the 19th anniversary of the September 11 terrorist
attacks. Like Pearl Harbor, 60 years early, September 11 will
forever be etched in American history as a date that we will
never forget. And we will always remember the 2,977 souls that
we lost on that horrific day.
After the 9/11 attacks, the United States went to war
against al-Qaida and their Taliban hosts in Afghanistan. Since
then, the conflict has taken the lives of 2,448 American
servicemembers, and injured tens of thousands more.
In a significant milestone earlier this year, the United
States and the Taliban on February 29 signed an agreement for
bringing peace to Afghanistan, which outlined a way forward for
the complex and complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by mid-2021.
In exchange, the Taliban promised to come to the negotiating
table with the Kabul government to prevent terrorist groups,
such as al-Qaida, from using Afghanistan to stage attacks
against the United States and our allies.
Despite multiple indications that the Taliban had not fully
met their commitments under the February agreement, the Trump
administration has steadily withdrawn U.S. forces from
Afghanistan, which has seated much of our leverage to help
shape the future of Afghanistan for its people and our national
security interests.
In fact, in an interview airing over the weekend, former
Trump administration and National Security Advisor, H.R.
McMaster, described the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan as quote, ``an unwise policy.'' Instead, he argued
that what we require in Afghanistan is a sustained commitment
to help the Afghan Government and help the Afghan security
forces continue to bear the brunt of this fight.
Since U.S. forces began to withdraw from Afghanistan
following the February agreement, security conditions on the
ground have deteriorated. In June, the Department of Defense
estimated that the Taliban sustained levels of violence five
times higher than those observed during a February 2020
reduction in violence, period. And U.S. CENTCOM command--
Commander General Kenneth McKenzie later described these
escalations as not consistent with someone negotiating in good
faith.
Nevertheless, after months of violence, delay, and a
contentious prisoner exchange, the government of Afghanistan
and the Taliban finally met in Doha earlier this month to begin
intra-Afghan negotiations. Many Afghans remain deeply
distrustful of the Taliban's true intention. In particular,
many Afghans, especially women and girls, are justifiably
concerned that human rights and democratic gains they have
achieved with the U.S. support since 2001 could become
jeopardized if the Taliban return to power through force or
through a negotiated settlement.
Given the legacy of past failures, we must remain clear-
eyed about the stakes at this moment. If the Taliban are
unwilling or unable to abide by their commitments, or if
political negotiations collapse, the resulting crisis will
likely have a grave consequence for those Afghan people,
regional stability, and international security.
So, I'm grateful to our witnesses, especially
representative for Afghan reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad.
Thank you, Ambassador. And Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs, David Helvey. Thank you,
Mr. Secretary, for being here today to answer our questions
about the risks and the Trump administration's ongoing efforts
to bring the U.S. war in Afghanistan to a close.
While we are all eager for our sons and daughters in
uniform to return home, it is also important that we do not
needlessly or recklessly bargain away the rights and freedoms
that the Afghan people have gained at such a huge cost in
American coalition and Afghan lives. With that, I will now
yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin, our ranking member, Mr.
Grothman, for his opening statement.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you much. Thank you much, and a very
important topic and continues to be an important topic, and I'm
glad that you're having this hearing.
I am pleased to have these witnesses here today. Through
the hard work of the Trump administration, there may very well
be a prospect for peace in Afghanistan at last. They've had
other successes in the Middle East. Recently, Bahrain and the
United Arab Emirates entered into treaties of peace, diplomatic
relations, and full normalization between those countries and
the state of Israel, something that I never would have dreamed
about a few years ago. Those agreements will have an immediate,
positive, and lasting impact on the prospects for peace in the
region. The Trump administration's prioritized peace in
Afghanistan is its strategy, and the goal is to ensure that the
country does not become a haven for terrorist activity in the
future.
The U.S. and the Taliban entered into a joint declaration
this February with stipulations that the Taliban would cease
attack in coalition forces in exchange for U.S. troops draw-
down. The declaration also came with the condition that the
Taliban and the Afghan Government entered into peace
negotiations with a discussion of cease-fire firmly on the
table. Although these peace negotiations were delayed for
months, they commenced on September 12 of this year, and I am
hopeful that the negotiations--the negotiators reached an
agreement that leads to stable and long-lasting peace in
Afghanistan--one that protects the rights of all citizens in
the country, including women.
The obstacles we face are complex. We cannot afford to be
deterred. I am interested to hear from the Ambassador how we
get this right, despite the challenges that lie ahead. More
than 2,400 brave men and women have lost their lives in
Afghanistan, fighting on behalf of the United States, either
during Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Freedom's
Sentinel.
The U.S. has been invested in Afghanistan for 19 years,
with the U.S. taxpayer cost for warfighting or reconstruction
reaching $1 trillion for 2001. That $1 trillion, by the way,
would sound a lot bigger a year ago than it does now. The cost
for monetarizing the lives of U.S. soldiers cannot continue. I
applaud this administration for seeking to bring an end to this
conflict.
We've got to get this right. It isn't just the Afghan
people who benefit. The veterans who fought, and the American
people deserve to have a peaceful Afghanistan that does not
permit terrorists to operate in that country, to perpetuate tax
against the United States.
I am going to emphasize again what a great job I think
you've done. How foreign affairs is a difficult thing, and I am
not being partisan here, but, you know, I can't help but wonder
if President Trump was the President in 2001, whether we would
have gone so, I would argue, overboard like President Bush did,
I don't think we would have.
Again, I think if President Trump had been elected and took
office in 2009, we wouldn't have the herky-jerk pulling out of
Iraq, which I think was also disastrous.
So, you know, I think he's kind of hitting that sweet spot
from between where President Bush was and President Obama did.
And I really appreciate you guys being part of his team.
I am pleased to welcome you here today. Your leadership is
having a positive effect on Afghanistan. I want to thank the
Trump administration for their efforts to bring about a
peaceful solution. And I look forward to your testimony today.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields back. One housekeeping
matter here. Without objection, the gentleman from New Jersey,
Mr. Malinowski, shall be permitted to join the subcommittee and
be recognized for questioning the witnesses, as procedure
allows.
Now, I would like to introduce our witnesses. Our first
witness today is Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who is the
special representative for Afghan Reconciliation at the
Department of State. And we will hear from David F. Helvey, who
is performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Indo-Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense.
In accordance with the committee rules, would you both,
please, rise and raise your right hand.
Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to
give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Let the record reflect that the witnesses have both
answered in the affirmative. Please be seated.
Without objection, your written statements will be made
part of the record. With that, Ambassador Khalilzad, you are
now recognized for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD, SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONCILIATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to join you in offering condolences to the Ginsburg
family, and may her soul rest in peace.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Grothman, and
distinguished members of the committee, I regret the
circumstances did not allow me to appear before this committee
sooner. During the last several months, I regard making myself
available to Congress as one of my most significant and
important responsibilities, and I welcome this opportunity
today, and I am honored to brief you.
I was appointed the U.S. Special Representative for
Afghanistan Reconciliation in September 2018 with a mandate to
find a diplomatic formula that brings an end to America's
longest war, reduces the burden on the U.S. military and
taxpayers, provides the best chance for a sovereign, unified,
and representative Afghanistan, at peace with itself and its
neighbors, and respectful of the human rights of all its
citizens, and most importantly, ensures terrorists can never
again use Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United
States and our allies.
Underlying this mandate was an assumption that there was no
realistic or viable military solution to this complex conflict.
To pursue these objectives, we engaged in direct talks with the
Taliban and the Afghan Government in parallel. Our goal was to
secure counterterrorist guarantees from the Taliban, alongside
their commitment to engage in direct negotiations with the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on a political settlement and
permanent and comprehensive cease-fire.
Eighteen months of intense diplomacy led to two significant
milestones: On February 29, the United States and the
Government of Afghanistan jointly declared their commitment to
reach a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement to end
the war in Afghanistan, including guarantees to prevent the use
of Afghan soil by any international terrorist groups or
individuals against the security of the United States and its
allies.
A condition-based timeline for withdrawal of the U.S. and
coalition forces from Afghanistan. A political settlement
resulting from inter-Afghan dialog and negotiations between the
Taliban and inclusive negotiating team of Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, and a permanent and comprehensive cease-fire.
That same day, the United States signed an historic
agreement with the Taliban that would make negotiations
possible. That agreement has four elements: The first is a
commitment by the Taliban to prevent any group or individual
from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United
States and its allies. On that, we have seen some progress.
It's also important to stress that since the signing of the
agreement, the Taliban have instructed their forces to refrain
from attacks on U.S. and coalition forces. There have been no
American deaths as a result of Taliban attacks since the
agreement was signed. And we continue to engage regularly with
the Taliban to oversee the implementation of our agreement with
respect to these issues and to address issues of concern.
The second is a timetable for withdrawal of American and
coalition forces. That withdrawal is condition-based. We are on
the path to reduce troops to levels between 4-and 5,000 by this
fall. And further withdrawals will be determined based on
conditions on the ground and delivery by the Taliban on their
commitments.
The third is a start of Afghan peace negotiations. As you
know, the talks opened on September 12, a truly historic
moment. The Afghan delegation from the parties to the conflict
that are sitting across from each other without international
mediators or facilitators have the opportunity to bring an end
to more than 40 years of war in their country. The talks are an
Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process where two warring sides are
negotiating a roadmap for the future of their country. The
Afghans are yearning for peace, and there is overwhelming
support among them for these talks and for a political
settlement.
Finally, the Taliban agreed that the permanent and
comprehensive cease-fire would be on the agenda in Afghan peace
negotiations. By any measure, the current levels of violence
are too high. We know that the reductions are possible. The
Taliban carried out two Eid cease-fires and earlier, a seven-
day reduction in violence preceding the February 29 signing of
the agreement between the United States and the Taliban.
We hope that the current negotiation will soon lead to a
significant reduction in violence by all sides, reducing the
number of Afghans getting killed or wounded. A reduction of
violence will help build the trust necessary for these talks to
succeed. We, for our part, will continue to press for this
objective.
A political settlement in Afghanistan needs broad,
internal, regional, international support. We have worked
closely with Afghanistan's neighbors and international partners
to build support for Afghanistan's peace negotiations. You can
see the impact of that effort in the list of countries and
organizations that were represented at the opening ceremony of
the Afghan peace negotiations on September 12, and in the U.N.
Security Council Statement welcoming the start of these
negotiations.
These achievements are the result of two years of intense
diplomacy, and have already resulted in American lives saved,
the burden on the American taxpayers listened, and giving the
Afghans historic opportunity for a political settlement that
ends their long war.
Now, with an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process and
delegations that represent the country's strength and
diversity, including the Afghan Government's political leaders,
members of civil society, women, and religious, and ethnic
minorities, the people of Afghanistan have reason to hope
again.
I have urged the Afghanistan leaders to take advantage of
the opportunity for a political settlement now available to
them. Unfortunately, Afghan leaders did not behave responsibly
or judiciously after the Soviet forces departed their country
as a result of a resistance movement that had been backed by
the United States. Instead of cooperating and agreeing on a
political formula for their country, they started a vicious
civil war. We will help Afghanistan seize historic moment, and
avoid repeating what happened in the 1990's. But, ultimately,
the responsibility is theirs.
Our strategy going forward, Mr. Chairman, is: one,
continuing holding the Taliban to the commitments they made in
February 29 agreement, including on combating international
terrorism and discussing a permanent and comprehensive cease-
fire at the peace negotiations; two, adjust our force posture
consistent with the agreement and conditions in Afghanistan. We
are on a path to reduce our troops, as I said before, to
between 4-and 5,000, and with further reductions possible, but
based on conditions.
I want to assure this committee that we will always
maintain the ability to protect the United States. But staying
in Afghanistan militarily is not an end in itself. Our goal for
Afghanistan is a nation of peace with itself and with its
neighbors, and firmly aligned with the United States and our
allies against international terrorism; three, support the
party's effort to reach a negotiated political settlement while
speaking out about our values. The inclusion of women and
religious and ethnic minorities in the negotiations is a
landmark step in the right direction. The United States will
continue to advocate their values, including electoral
democracy, rights of women and religious minorities, rule of
law, free speech, and free press.
At the same time, we recognize that only Afghans can find a
sustainable formula that's unique to their history and culture.
While we do not seek to impose our system on others, we have
made it clear to the negotiators that their choices and combat
will affect the size and scope of future U.S. assistance. Then
this is the position shared by Afghanistan's other major
donors. Four, continue to work with regional international
partners and donors to build international support for
Afghanistan peace. Negotiations and support of our Afghanistan
long-term stability and self-reliance.
While we have reasons to be hopeful, we are under new
illusions about the challenges ahead. The conflict in
Afghanistan is especially complex, and negotiators will have to
overcome personal interest and political differences, while
representing diverse constituencies. We expect that there will
be setbacks and obstacles. This task that we have carried out
so far has been, as required, a diverse and dynamic team made
up of State Department foreign service officers, civil
servants, and detailees leads from across the U.S. Government.
We have also partnered closely and effectively with the
Department of Defense, especially General Scott Miller, the
Commanding General of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
The whole-of-government effort reflects the best, in my
judgment, of American diplomacy. Mr. Chairman, ranking member,
and distinguished members, I'm grateful for the opportunity to
share this summary of the effort that we have made, challenges
and progress of the past two years. And I look forward to your
guidance, feedback, and support as we seek to consolidate this
moment of promise to end this war responsibly. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Ambassador. Secretary Helvey, you are
now recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID HELVEY, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDO PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Helvey. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Grothman. I would also like to acknowledge
Chairwoman Maloney, who has joined other members of this
committee. I would like to thank you, again, for the
opportunity to brief you today on our strategy for Afghanistan.
In the wake of the 19th anniversary of the attacks on
September 11, 2001, there's perhaps no more fitting time to
discuss with Congress, or with the American people, the
importance of our mission in Afghanistan in keeping America
safe against terrorist attacks. It's my privilege to focus my
remarks today on the Department of Defense's strategy in
Afghanistan, the criticality of our partners--partnerships in
achieving our objectives, and our expectation of the Taliban in
upholding their commitments under the U.S. Taliban agreement.
Pursuant to the 2017 South Asia Strategy, the Department of
Defense's key objective in South Asia is to ensure that
Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists who
may threaten the United States or our allies. The strategy
prioritizes ending the war through a political process,
acknowledging that there is no military solution to the
conflict. To achieve this objective, the Department conducts
two complementary missions: one, the NATO-led Resolute Support
Mission, which is focused on training, advising, and assisting
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, or ANDSF; and
the second is the U.S. Counterterrorism Mission that works with
our Afghan partners to mitigate terrorist threats.
We actively combat ISIS Khorasan, al-Qaida, and other
terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Although these terrorists are
severely degraded, continued pressure on them remains vital to
ensuring that our homeland is never again attacked as it was on
September 11, 2001.
On February 29, 2020, an historic agreement was signed
between the United States and Taliban. And the release to end
of a parallel U.S.-Afghanistan Joint Declaration served as a
pivotal moment in the path toward peace in Afghanistan. Since
then, U.S. forces have adjusted to adhere to U.S. commitments
within the agreement. We have reduced our force level to 8,600
and turn five bases over to our Afghan partners.
The commander of U.S. forces and Afghanistan's authorities,
however, have not changed. U.S. forces continued to defend the
ANDSF against the attacks by the Taliban, and we are not
conducting offensive attacks against the Taliban.
We have long maintained that our force presence in
Afghanistan is conditions-based. This August, the President
made a determination that the conditions in Afghanistan were
sufficient to reduce our force presence to between 4,000 and
5,000 by the end of November 2020. At this force level, we
maintain the core aspects of the train, advise, and assist, and
our counterterrorism mission. First and foremost, however,
we're maintaining the ability to protect the force in
Afghanistan.
I would like to make clear that the Secretary has not
issued orders to reduce military personnel below this 4,000 to
5,000 level in Afghanistan, although, we are conducting prudent
planning to withdraw to zero servicemembers by May 2021 if
conditions warrant for the U.S.-Taliban agreement. As Secretary
Pompeo said in Doha, the Taliban must uphold their
counterterrorism guarantees to the United States. We also
expect the Taliban to meaningfully participate in Afghan peace
negotiations, and to do their part in preventing outside actors
from negatively impacting the peace process.
Over the last seven months, our ANDSF partners have
conditioned to demonstrate resilience in the face of high
levels of violence, resolve in their fight against
international terrorist organizations, and a commitment to a
better, more secure, and prosperous Afghanistan. But for
progress toward peace to continue, the Taliban must reduce
violence against the Afghan security forces and Afghan
civilians. Taliban violence, quite frankly, has been
unacceptably high for too long.
We urge the Taliban, the Afghan Government, and the Afghan
people to choose a path toward peace. Peace agreements are not
signed between friends. They're negotiated between parties that
must reconcile a shared desire for peace against years of
bloodshed and grievance. We are encouraged that the Afghan
peace negotiations are underway, and are supportive of the
Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process.
Last, the Department of Defense remains committed to
transparency to the American people regarding our efforts in
Afghanistan. The Department understands that certain efforts on
the way to peace, like the recent prisoner releases, will cause
painful emotions to resurface for the families who lost loved
ones on September 11, 2001, and in Afghanistan, over the
subsequent years.
Their sacrifices are not lost on us. It is because of these
sacrifices that we have advanced progress toward making America
safer, and ensuring that Afghanistan is never again used as a
safe haven for terrorists. These decisions, though difficult,
remain focused on achieving the same noble end state for which
so many have fought. We're grateful, and we continue to honor
their sacrifice.
Mr. Chairman, ranking member, members of the committee,
thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I'm
happy to take any questions that you may have.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much. I will now yield myself
five minutes for questions. First of all, Ambassador, I want
you to know that I fully appreciate the difficulty of your
task. As someone--I was elected on September 11, the day of the
attacks in the Democratic primary in Massachusetts. I
immediately came to this committee. I have been a member for 19
years now and have had many, many, many trips to Afghanistan,
and I understand the complexity that you face, and the
difficult task that you face. So--but nothing that I ask or say
here from this chair diminishes the difficulty that you face.
And we appreciate your service to our country and your efforts
on our behalf. We do. We appreciate that.
We had a chance to meet with the Afghan team, Ashraf Ghani
and his team, at the Munich Security Conference. We also met
with the U.S. negotiating team as well, at the negotiations--at
the Munich Security Conference some months ago. And we learned
that the U.S. negotiations did not include, as a priority, the
status of women and girls in Afghanistan. And I got a letter
yesterday from, I think it's 19 members of the Afghan
Parliament.
And I am going to ask unanimous consent to enter into the
record the letter from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
Lower House of the Parliament National Interest Preservation
Group, to this committee. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Lynch. It says, it's rather pointed, and it's--in its
message. And one of the most important excerpts of this two-
page letter, I will read as follows: It calls upon the United
States to rise to the occasion, and I am quoting now, rise to
the occasion by standing up for the great cause of women's
rights, which is indisputably human rights, and let this deal,
this agreement, be known as one that preserved the rights of
every Afghan man and woman, not a deal that prevents little
girls from going to school, not a deal that leads to the
destruction of our institutions, and not a deal that backtracks
on the great achievements of freedom and democracy. Those
achievements purchased at a high price among U.S.
servicemembers as well as coalition and Afghan forces as well.
How is it that--and I understand that you don't set the
parameters for negotiations, you conduct them. So, this is not
your decision. But how do we--how do we demonstrate to the
Taliban that the status of women and girls is a major priority
in restoring that country's stability, advocating for human
rights in that country, when we don't list it as a priority in
our negotiations, but instead leave it to the Afghans to fight
that fight? Isn't that--that's an American ideal. It's a
democratic ideal. And please explain how--how omitting that as
a priority for us, for our country, helped the Afghan
Government achieve a lasting peace?
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, Chairman, for that question and
sentiment, and belief behind it. I want to assure you that
human rights, women's rights, the rights of minorities and
children, indeed, all citizens of Afghanistan, particularly,
women, is of a highest importance to the United States. And I
have a track record personally in helping the Afghan women when
the post-9/11 government was drafting the constitution, that we
stood with them. And I want to, through this hearing, want to
assure the Afghan women that we will be with them.
We have--I have met just--I just arrived from Doha, and I
met with the women members of the delegation twice before
leaving for the United States. And I have left the team behind
to--while I'm gone, to make sure that, in the negotiations, the
women's future of the achievement that I am very proud of, and
we should all be proud of.
Mr. Lynch. Ambassador, I have to interject, though.
Mr. Khalilzad. Please.
Mr. Lynch. We were told by the Afghan team and the U.S.
team that the status of women and girls in Afghanistan was not
a lead priority for us. That it was going to be the part of the
Afghan Government to negotiate that. Am I wrong in that,
because I have been told that by both sides in the
negotiations?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, of course, that the negotiations that
resulted in the agreement was signed and dealt with four issues
that I described, and one of which is inter-Afghan
negotiations. And as I mentioned in my statement, to us, these
negotiations are not yet completed, because the four elements
are a package agreement. The terrorism, withdrawal into Afghan
negotiations including----
Mr. Lynch. But none of those four, specifically, raise--
none of those four parts. The part that you're referring to was
the part that you were going to hand off to the Afghans to
negotiate. That was part of the--one of the four. That was one
of the four elements.
Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
Mr. Lynch. And it could contain anything, right? The part
that you give to the Afghan Government could contain anything.
But the issues that we supported, obviously, national security,
interest of the United States, and I understand that, that's
very important, very important priority.
Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Lynch. But I also think the status of after all we've
been through, the most important accomplishment, I think in 50
years looking back, we taught a quarter of a million Afghan
women how to read and write. It's probably going to be the
biggest impact in that country in the next 50 years. It will be
the one accomplishment that we can look at that made a
difference, but not yet. And yet, the rights of women and girls
was not included as a priority for us going into negotiations,
and the Taliban knew that. And I just think that it undermined
their efforts and our efforts by neglecting that priority.
Mr. Khalilzad. I respectfully, very respectfully disagree.
This is an unfinished package yet. We are in the middle of it.
Some things have been settled. Two issues have not been settled
yet. And even with regard to the issues we have reached an
agreement on, implementation, we are watching closely. And we
will be involved, although it's Afghan-owned and Afghan-led
negotiations, we will be involved, and we will monitor, and we
will express ourselves forcefully. And I want to assure you
that the women's rights issues, the achievement that we should
be very proud of--and I'm glad you have listed what we have
achieved--we will be very supportive, and depending on
decisions that they make, that will affect the future of U.S.
policy toward Afghanistan.
Mr. Lynch. I appreciate that. I have far exceeded my time
limit. I want to thank you. I just think it should have been
established at the outset, not in the middle of negotiations
introducing that as an issue.
I want to yield to my friend and colleague, the gentleman
from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, and I will afford him the extra
time that he needs.
Mr. Grothman. That's OK. Thank you. That's very kind of
you. I'm not sure, you have a very, very difficult job, but I
want to begin by kind of letting you describe what a difficult
of a job it is.
How many ethnic groups are there in Afghanistan, or do you
have a general idea?
Mr. Khalilzad. Over a dozen.
Mr. Grothman. OK. How many different major, what I call
major languages?
Mr. Khalilzad. Three or four major languages.
Mr. Grothman. So, you're dealing with people with different
languages. Has there traditionally been a lot of religious
freedom in Afghanistan?
Mr. Khalilzad. There have been tension between religious
parties, but Afghanistan generally has been historically a more
moderate kind of relations among sects within Islam, and in
terms of relations with non-Muslim minorities as well.
Mr. Grothman. As I understand it, there are many, many,
different ethnic groups. The Taliban, insofar as they fight,
it's not even a regular army, is it? It's a variety of
different people, they come and they go?
Mr. Khalilzad. Oh, yes, there are tribes besides ethnic
groups, and there are political parties. There are the old
elite of Afghanistan representing tribes and ethnic
leaderships, and also, the new elite now, which is as a result
of what the Chairman mentioned that the Americans encountered
with Afghanistan.
And they're all now around the table to negotiate a roadmap
where they can have their differences, their different
priorities and background but they can live in a peaceful
environment in Afghanistan and search and agree to a formula.
Mr. Grothman. How many American soldiers passed away last
year in Afghanistan?
Mr. Helvey. Thank you for that question. The data has it as
17 U.S. military personnel passed away under hostile actions in
20----
Mr. Grothman. What if you were to go back three or four
years?
Mr. Helvey. In 2019, the numbers were slightly elevated as
violence had increased as the Taliban was posturing. But in
recent years, the numbers were, in 2018, 13 service personnel
were killed; in 2017, there was 11. In 2016, there were nine.
But since the February 29 agreement was signed, there have been
no U.S. service personnel killed in Afghanistan.
Mr. Grothman. Let me have you repeat that again. That's one
of those things as you almost--if I repeat it back home, people
won't even believe the numbers. Can you say that again?
Mr. Helvey. Zero U.S. service personnel have been killed
since February 29 when we signed agreement with the Taliban.
Mr. Grothman. Wow, so in the last seven months, no
Americans have been killed in Afghanistan, right? That's what
you're saying, seven months without any--that's a pretty
incredible job you guys are doing over there.
OK. I think there are people who feel that you have got to
hold some troops over there. It's important to hold some troops
over there. But there are obviously people who feel, unless we
kind of change some of the gender differences over there that,
you know, we ought to maybe be a little bit--get more involved
there. Are there any other countries around the world that if
we begin to go down this path of America must get involved
until they straighten things out, that you can imagine that
maybe we also would have to get involved in, if that's the
standard?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we have very many instruments in our
toolbox, and we stand proudly for the value that we had at our
universal values, but different instruments come to be brought
to bear. And on when there is a threat to the national
security, the armed forces have their role and responsibility.
Mr. Grothman. I am under the impression, for example,
Pakistan will be a country that, you know, forced marriages,
that sort of thing, not unusual, honor killings, right?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. We, obviously, that is inconsistent and
we, with our values, and we oppose it, but we don't send the
armed forces to enforce that change. We use economic leverage,
we need diplomatic leverage, political relations, assistance
programs to shape behavior. And I think we will continue to
have leverage in Afghanistan, and we would use that leverage to
make sure that our values are respected, and to the maximum
extent possible.
Mr. Grothman. We have done that a lot already. It's a great
thing. Yes, I agree with my subcommittee Chairman here. We have
made a lot of progress, haven't we?
Mr. Khalilzad. Historic progress.
Mr. Grothman. And because the United States was there,
right?
Mr. Khalilzad. Afghans are living longer because of our
presence. They are living longer, they are healthier than they
were--although, still there is a long way to go. More Afghans
are--have access to education. More Afghans have access to
telephones to communicating, and networking with each other and
with the rest of the world. It is a different country than it
was in 2001. And I keep telling them, when I talk with the
Taliban, that this is not their father's Afghanistan, this is
different Afghanistan, and they need to adjust and accommodate
that change.
Mr. Grothman. No, they're very nice, I just found something
else here, and I will tell you, you know in the 20 years since
we've been there, the population of Afghanistan has almost
doubled? Did you know that? It's kind of amazing. OK.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields. The Chair now recognizes
the distinguished Chair of the full Committee on Oversight, the
gentlewoman from New York, for five minutes of questions.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you very much, and welcome to our
panelists. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your
determination to hold this hearing, and recognizing the
responsibility of Congress to conduct oversight of the war in
Afghanistan. Thank you, too, for your very sharp pencil
pointing at how women and girls are treated. We know that when
women succeed, nations succeed. And nations that respect their
women and protect them have less violence, less terrorism, and
it is an investment for peace in the world to advance the
rights of women.
Mr. Ambassador, as a New Yorker, I am painfully aware of 9/
11, where so many people were innocently killed in New York and
the Pentagon and on Flight 93, going straight to our Capitol.
Americans were just killed for being Americans in peaceful
areas. And I remember the tapes, the advertisements, the
propaganda coming out of Afghanistan from Osama bin Laden, and
others: Come to Afghanistan. We'll train you to go out and kill
Americans. This is where we plotted it. It's so easy. We're
here freely living. We're training. Here are our training
places.
We went into Afghanistan to make sure that they would not
be training people to kill our allies and Americans and come
back at us. Yet, I don't see anything in your agreement on
February 29 that really makes sure that this does not happen
again. And, in fact, over the weekend, the Former National
Security Adviser McMaster said, and I quote, ``Terrorist
organizations who pose a threat to us are stronger now than
they were on September 10, 2001.''
So, I am concerned about the withdrawal of U.S. forces,
will it leave a power vacuum that al-Qaida and other terrorist
groups can exploit again to plot attacks against Americans and
our allies? And your response?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, first, it's great to see you.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Khalilzad. And, of course, I share with you, I was in
the White House when 9/11 happened. I remember that very
vividly, and it affected my own life and the trajectory of my
personal circumstances. So--and what you described the
situation during that time is exactly right. But I respectfully
disagree to say the terrorists in Afghanistan, in particular,
are stronger today, al-Qaida, than they were at that time. And
we did discuss that in another setting in detail, and I think
you should ask the intelligence community to brief you on that.
With regard to going forward, the agreement with the
Taliban, they have made commitments not to allow the kind of
things that you said that were taking place at that time. No
training, no fundraising.
Mrs. Maloney. Mr. Ambassador, my time is almost up, and I
would love more of a conversation in writing on how we can
enforce and make sure any time there's any activity, we can
come back in, or maybe we should stay until there's more
security there.
But I do want to followup on the Chairman's questioning on
women. In 2017, in a bipartisan way, we passed a very strong
bill, the Women Peace and Security Act, that recognize when
rights and status of women are protected, societies are less
violent, there's less terrorism.
Yet, in the agreement signed earlier, there was nothing in
it to protect the rights of Afghan women and girls, and we know
that they were murdered for going to school, they were not
allowed to learn, they could not work, they could not protect
themselves in any way. And as our chief negotiator, you have
said that the talks have to be Afghan-led, and that's true. But
we have leverage as the United States to stand up for the
protection of women and girls. And I'd like, in your remaining
time, to tell us exactly how you are going to protect them.
I also ask unanimous consent to place into the record a
series of questions to be answered in writing as we followup on
these negotiations. This is very, very important to our
country----
Mr. Lynch. Without objection, so ordered.
Mrs. Maloney [continuing]. And, I believe, world peace. So,
what was specifically in there to protect women and girls and
to protect us from being attacked again?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the protection regarding security, as
I said, there are specific commitments by the Taliban.
Mrs. Maloney. But is there enforcement? What if they do not
do them? How do we----
Mr. Khalilzad. We are free from the commitment that we have
made. That's why I say it is condition-based. That means they
don't deliver on the commitment, we don't have to withdraw
forces. We adjust our force posture. Those are decisions that
our management will have to make. But this is not an agreement
that is based on trust. It is an agreement that is a package.
What they do and what we do, and the two are linked with each
other.
With regard to women's rights, the Afghan negotiations, the
peace negotiations are not finished yet. We have had the phase
dealing with terrorism and forces completed, but that has
opened the door to two other issues, the future of Afghanistan
and complete and permanent cease-fire. And I want to promise
you, I assure you, I know of your strong commitment and
feelings in this regard, and that reflects our values and my
instructions that we will work very hard to make sure that the
gains that have been made are built upon.
And we will press all sides in this regard, and we will
have the leverage of future relations and assistance in
addition to what is going on currently to advance the agenda
that we have on our values and that I share. And you have been
a champion, and I salute you for the work that you have done in
this regard.
Mr. Lynch. The gentlelady yields back.
Mrs. Maloney. I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
North Carolina, Ms. Foxx, for five minutes of questions.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I may use up that
extra time you took assuming my colleague didn't.
You know, I find it very interesting--I want to thank our
witnesses first of all for being here. And I find it really,
really interesting that our colleagues are here today
castigating the work that's being done by the Trump
administration to bring peace to Afghanistan, and focusing so
much on the role of women.
I have been a fighter for women's rights and women's
equality all of my life, but I find it really interesting that
the hypocrisy comes out. I mean, we hear about the fight for
women in Afghanistan. I remember very well when President Obama
was President, the issue of Boko Haram, and the women being
stolen away by Boko Haram. And every Wednesday for several
years, we were asked to wear red on behalf of Boko Haram. Lots
of statements made by the Obama Administration about getting
these women back. Not a single one of those women was rescued
under the Obama Administration. Nothing was done by the Obama
Administration to advance the cause of women.
And yet, here we are raising this issue suddenly when the
President is having such success in Afghanistan, suddenly this
is being held up, there is a gold standard being held up here
that was never held up under the Obama Administration.
So, I want to thank you both for the success that's being
had in Afghanistan. We all want to see peace around the world.
We want to see the senseless war ended. And I think it's very
encouraging that since the agreement was signed, we have had no
deaths of U.S. soldiers. We don't want any deaths of any
soldiers under any administration.
Now, Mr. Ambassador, I'll get to my questions. You have
said that a political solution, including a peace agreement
among Afghans, is the only realistic option at the present
time. I personally agree with you. Do you believe such a
solution is achievable given that the Afghan Government and the
Taliban are starting off negotiations very far apart?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, thank you, ma'am, for what you said. I
want to also say that women also want peace. They want the war
to end. I know many Afghan mothers who have lost their children
to this war that has been going on for 40-plus years. So, we
should not forget that.
As to the plausibility, likelihood of agreement between the
government and the Taliban, I think they're under a lot of
pressure from the people that he must come to an agreement.
This Afghan negotiation, the search for peace is very popular,
politically, among the Afghan people. I have seen a recent poll
that shows the support, perhaps more than 80 percent of the
population.
But you are right, there is a big gap between the two
sides, and there will be difficulties and challenges, no doubt.
But I believe that they have a serious opportunity, a real
opportunity not present in the last 40 years, and thanks to the
American diplomacy and the sacrifices of the men and women of
our military, that this opportunity has been made available to
them.
We will help them if they need that help to come together,
but ultimately it is their decision, it's their responsibility.
But difficult, yes, but possible, sure. Vital that they do for
their own people and for their own country.
Ms. Foxx. Well, you know, there's a saying in this country,
which I assume is probably true in any country in the world, If
mama's not happy, then nobody's happy. And I agree with you, I
don't think there are any more people, no one has a more vested
interest in the safety of children than mothers. And I have no
doubt that the mothers in Afghanistan are not happy with the
loss of their children.
Would you talk a little bit more about the status of the
troop draw-down based upon the joint agreement. And do you
believe--and the current trajectory, we'll continue to draw
down troops, or will the timeline need to be revised?
Mr. Khalilzad. I will ask David if he would comment on
that.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
Mr. Helvey. Thank you for that question, ma'am. As I
mentioned in my opening statement, since the signing of the
agreement on February 29, we have reduced our forces per the
terms of that agreement to 8,600 forces, and we have continued
that reduction based on guidance and direction from the
President and the Secretary.
Right now, based on the conditions, the plan is to achieve
somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 U.S. service personnel in
Afghanistan by the end of November 2020. We have received no
orders--the Secretary has issued no orders to reduce below that
level at that time. Obviously, the terms of the agreement
specified zero by May 2021, but this is fundamentally, to use
words that Ambassador Khalilzad has said, this is fundamentally
conditioned-based.
So, we will be watching very carefully to assess the
conditions, Taliban's compliance with its term--with the terms
of its agreement, and that will be used to inform decisions on
further and future withdrawals.
We can continue to perform the core elements of primary
missions which is train, advise, and assist our Afghan partners
in the counterterrorism mission. We are also providing for the
security of the forces that are there within that number, based
on the conditions that we currently see.
Ms. Foxx. And my assumption is, again, that future actions
are based, as you said, on the conditions on the ground, and
the fact that we've had no deaths since the agreement was
signed is a very hopeful sign. And as long as things are going
in the right direction, then we're very hopeful that we'll be
able to withdraw on schedule. That's what I'm hearing you say,
and I know we all pray that that is going to be the situation.
And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Vermont, who
has had many trips to Afghanistan, has been active on this
issue for a very long time. We now recognize for five minutes
Mr. Welch.
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much, Chairman Lynch. And thank
you, Ambassador. Really appreciate your presence here.
The question I ask is, if the Taliban ultimately prevails
and is in charge in Afghanistan, what is the U.S. position or
what is your recommendation with respect to providing economic
assistance to that impoverished country; whereas I understand
it, 90 percent of people are below the poverty line living on
$2 a day?
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, sir. I don't accept the
proposition, just for the , that the Taliban will prevail.
We're in a stalemate situation.
Mr. Welch. Let me interrupt here. Let's stay on that. I
mean, first of all, I applaud your work, and I believe it is
time for the United States to be out of Afghanistan, but I also
think it's important for us to be clear-eyed about this.
Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely.
Mr. Welch. As I understand it, the government that we've
had in Afghanistan that we've supported has never had popular
support, and the Taliban have refused to have direct
negotiations with the elected government, and it's only having
conversations with the government, the quote, ``elected
government,'' as well as opposition leaders. Is that true?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. Now they're negotiating, the Talibs,
and that's an achievement of this effort that the government-
led delegation, that includes political forces and inclusive,
includes women, civil society, the Taliban and what said they
wouldn't sit with the government, now they are sitting across
the table with a government-led delegation.
Mr. Welch. Here's where I want us to be clear-eyed. The
elected government in Afghanistan has had one backer, and
that's essentially the United States. We propped them up with
troop support and with a trillion dollars of expenditures and
hundreds of billions of dollars of aid, most of which has gone
missing.
It is not unreasonable to expect that the Taliban that's
managed to sustain itself is ultimately going to be in charge
in Afghanistan. My question to you is, how does--what's the
U.S. policy toward a government that may well be Taliban led?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, restating without repeating what I
said about my assumption, but as far as assistance that
Afghanistan needs, through the Taliban, we have legal and
policy issues that preclude that at the present time. So, if
the Taliban become part of a future government, what we would
do is an issue for the United States, for Congress, and the
executive branch should decide. Policy currently is we are not
in a position to provide assistance to Taliban.
Mr. Welch. Right. This second question is, in the
negotiations, was there any discussion about the fact that
throughout our time, throughout our time in Afghanistan,
Pakistan in the tribal territories were used as safe havens,
and what arrangements are made to diminish or eliminate the
threat that comes to the United States through the continuation
of the Pakistani safe havens?
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you for that important question. Part
of the challenge, as you alluded to, is regional environment
and Pakistan, in particular. The Pakistani leaders have been
helpful for the effort that I have been making to encourage a
political settlement. We also, as part of this effort with help
from our allies, are looking at an agreement between
Afghanistan and Pakistan that neither side's territory would be
used against the other. And we're hoping that by the time that
these other negotiations are over, we could also achieve as a
success in that regard.
I think that one benefit of peace in Afghanistan is
connectivity and trade and economic development in the region,
and General Bajwa, said, the leader of the military forces in
Pakistan, the nations do not develop; regions develop. And one
potential implication and positive one is a greater economic
trade and cooperation, and that links Pakistan/Afghanistan to
central Asia for the benefit of all. Your point is obviously
well taken.
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I applaud the success in
getting some kind of peace arrangement, but I think we've got
to be clear-eyed that the likelihood is the Taliban will be in
charge, that country will continue to be very impoverished, and
the instability in that region continues.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Cloud, for five minutes.
Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Chairman.
And thank you, Ambassador and Secretary, for being here.
Appreciate the work. I think we all acknowledge the
difficulties of working in that region, a region where we in
America probably have more of a centralized national identity
of Afghanistan than those actually living in Afghanistan. Very
fractured, and then you're dealing with, of course, Taliban and
the Afghan Government, which have kind of conflicting goals.
It's been said that this is the longest war a number of times
in this hearing, which--in our U.S. history.
Secretary, could you speak to the authorizations for our
presence in Afghanistan? What authorities do we have to be
there, is my question?
Mr. Helvey. It's my understanding that we're there under
the terms of the authorization, the use of military force post-
911. And the mission that we have in Afghanistan is to conduct
counterterrorism and then supporting that, as do our NATO
mission, is for train, advise, and assist of our Afghan
partners.
Mr. Cloud. Right. So, our primary role is counterterrorism?
Mr. Helvey. The U.S. role primary mission is
counterterrorism with the train, advise, and assist.
Mr. Cloud. Right. OK. I ask this because, you know, does
humanitarian abuses--I mean, our founding documents talk about
inalienable rights, but does humanitarian abuses of any nation
give us authority to occupy or to invade a nation?
Mr. Helvey. I mean, as Ambassador Khalilzad said, look, we
want to live our values and our principles, and we have a
number of tools that we can use to accomplish that and to
advance those goals, advance those ideals.
Mr. Cloud. Right.
Mr. Helvey. Using military force is one of the tools that
we have, but that's not the only tool that we have, and that's
typically not the tool that we use to pursue those types of
values and principles. I mean, there's economic tools,
diplomatic tools, other aspects of our government and our
country that we can use to advance those.
The mission that we have in Afghanistan, the reason why our
military force is there, is focused on, as I've said before,
ensuring that Afghanistan never again is a safe haven for
terrorists that can strike the United States or our allies.
Mr. Cloud. Right. I think we all hope for the best that in
a negotiated peace we would be able to have the best settlement
that would respect the human rights of all people through
diplomatic channels. But I do think it's important that we
recognize that the President was right to prioritize the
drawdown of troops, the removal of troops from Afghanistan,
while protecting the counterterrorism efforts there. You know,
recognizing that threats have changed over the last 20 years
and notably, of course, with China, even when we talk about
human rights abuses, we can talk about what's going on through
the international organized criminal activity that happens even
through our border, and the women and children that are
affected in our communities because of that. So, it's important
that we prioritize that.
Could you touch on, Ambassador, some of the notable
successes and yet what are a couple of the notable challenges
that remain in actually seeing the results of a negotiated
peace?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the successes are first in terms of
Afghans is a start of peace negotiations between the government
and the Taliban, which I have said is unprecedented, given the
long war. And from our point of view, the successes, why we
have the right to defend the Afghan Security Forces, their
attack, but the Taliban have adhered to the commitment largely
not to attack U.S. personnel and the U.S. Forces. And that's
allowed us to be able to carry out the mission that we have,
the core mission, that hasn't changed, but to do it at much
lower numbers.
Mr. Cloud. And you mentioned no U.S. casualties.
Mr. Khalilzad. There is fewer U.S. casualties, including
wounded, compared to the same period, if you compare it to last
year or the same period of time. But I think that if we
succeed--and I'm not assuming necessarily that we will. I mean,
this is unpredictable, complicated, difficult circumstances--
then we would have helped Afghanistan achieve the peace that
they are yearning for the people, but at the same time, lower
very dramatically the cost to ourselves. And hopefully--and
that will be the test that there will be no terrorism from
Afghanistan threatening the United States.
These are all objectives and we have work to do to achieve
those goals, and there will be challenges and set backs, but I
see among the alternative that we have that what we're doing is
the best option for the United States and for Afghanistan, I
might say so.
Mr. Cloud. I had one more question. We know Iran and Russia
are at work in the region trying to undermine our efforts, of
course. How much of that is motivated by anti-American designs
or how much of it is regional--trying to expand regional
influence even against each other?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, for Iran, I believe, it's largely
anti-American. And they would like to keep us entangled there
and under pressure, suffering costs of different kinds. With
regard to Russia, I believe where there is an American
dimension, but they also have concerns like us about ISIS,
which is a threat to them and their policy support for some
elements is based on that, primarily based on that concern.
But they have been largely supportive of our diplomacy, as
indicated in the Security Council or in the discussions that
they have had with the Taliban encouraging them to agree to a
cease-fire or reduction of violence and negotiating with the
government. So, Iran is largely negative. Russia is mixed, in
my view.
Mr. Cloud. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Rouda, for five minutes.
Mr. Rouda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
bringing us together for this hearing. And thank you to the
witnesses as well.
By now, we are all very familiar with The New York Times
story reporting that Russia offered bounties to the Taliban to
kill U.S. soldiers. And we're not in a classified setting, so I
won't ask anything about specific intelligence underlying this
reporting, but like most Americans, I'm very concerned that
Russia and other outside actors may be providing various levels
of support to the Taliban and concerns that this administration
has not stood up to Russian President Putin on behalf of our
troops that are deployed overseas.
So, Mr. Helvey, at the unclassified level, can you speak to
the support outside actors such as Russia and Iran are
providing to Taliban and other forces within Afghanistan?
Mr. Helvey. Thank you for that question. We are aware and
we know that there are outside actors, including Russia and
Iran, but also there's others that are engaged in malign
influence in Afghanistan. Some of this has been through the
provision of weapons funding and other types of support.
Obviously, with respect to the specific question, as we are
always looking at threats to our forces and we put the
protection of those forces as among the top priorities that we
have, as any commander would have. And since those reports have
come out regarding Russian programs, we've been looking
specifically to identify corroborating information. We've not
yet found it, but we continue to look for that because we want
to understand the threats and to be able to address them.
Mr. Rouda. And as we've done the troop reduction and the
anticipated troop reduction, have you seen an increase in that
influence by these outside entities, these foreign countries?
Mr. Helvey. We see a continued interest, a continued
presence, and a continued effort to gain influence. I wouldn't
be able to say if it's increased or decreased, but particularly
with respect to lethal attacks or violence against U.S.
military personnel as we've indicated before that we've had no
U.S. combat deaths since we signed the February 29 peace deal
with the Taliban.
Mr. Rouda. Right. But it's not just U.S. personnel; it's
also Afghanis, and also, support civilians for the U.S.
military. But let me ask you, what do you see as the primary
objective of Russia, as an example, in using this type of
influence within Afghanistan?
Mr. Helvey. As the Ambassador mentioned, yes, I think it
appears that Russia's primary interests is related to expanding
its influence in an area that it has historically had influence
in. Some of it is related to its concerns over ISIS-K, ISIS
Khorasan counterterrorism. Some of it is also related to
frustrating the United States.
So, I think, you know, Russia's motivated by a number of
interests in Afghanistan, and we've been watching that very
carefully.
Mr. Rouda. And I believe it was recently that H.R.
McMaster, the former national security advisor, might have been
on 60 Minutes, but he was talking about the alumni, for a lack
of a better term, of ISIS and al-Qaida entering the country as
foreign fighters. And can you talk a little bit about--and he
said this is a much worse situation than what we saw
previously. Can you talk about the influx of these foreign
fighters and what that can mean to the instability in the
region?
Mr. Helvey. We are obviously watching, monitoring very
carefully and vigorously pursuing our counterterrorism
objectives. I'm not familiar with the comments that General
McMaster made about that, but what I do know is that al-Qaida
and ISIS Khorasan have been under tremendous amount of pressure
in Afghanistan. That's one of the areas that we are very much
focused in degrading and preventing those terrorist groups, or
any others, from operating in Afghanistan from being able to
use Afghanistan as a safe haven to plan, plot, and execute
attacks against the United States.
Mr. Rouda. And that leads me to my next question. I would
actually like you to elaborate a little bit more on that, while
we have--our counterterrorism efforts have had successes in
Afghanistan, there's still aspirations within those terrorist
organizations within Afghanistan. Can you talk about
capabilities and aspirations by them?
Mr. Helvey. I think it is clear that ISIS-K and al-Qaida
and al-Qaida in the Indian subcontinent do have aspirations,
and that's one of the things why we want to be able to maintain
this pressure on the groups today, but also going back to the
negotiations that we had with the Taliban and the commitments
that the Taliban undertook with us. We are looking for making
sure that the Taliban lives up to its obligations and its
commitments to us with respect to counterterrorism. So far,
they are not fully compliant, so we have work to be done there.
I think we know that. The Taliban knows it.
And, ultimately, what we want to be able to see in
Afghanistan is an enduring peace. And in that type of
environment, the terrorist organizations, terrorist groups will
not be able to operate, will not be able to plan, will not be
present. So, that's the focus, and we're looking to get the
Taliban to adhere to its commitments.
Mr. Rouda. Thank you, Mr. Helvey. Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador.
And I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Higgins, for five minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, if you don't mind, please explain to those
watching and to this committee, describe the economic
conditions in Afghanistan, please, for a citizen, a resident of
Afghanistan, describe the economic conditions.
Mr. Khalilzad. My impression is that Afghanistan is a very
poor country, of course, and the conditions have improved
significantly compared to prior to U.S. engagement. As I said
before, healthcare has improved, longevity has improved, per
capita income has improved, but that's from a very, very low
base in a country still extremely poor. Unemployment is high
and income is unevenly distributed, but there is a very
substantial part of the population. The President of
Afghanistan in one of his statements recently said 90 percent
of the population lived in poverty. That was his statement,
which is worse than it has been sometimes in the past, but so
it's a very, very poor country; dependent a lot on foreign
assistance, especially American assistance, in terms of paying
salaries and meeting its obligations.
Mr. Higgins. So, that assessment is reflective of my
understanding and our research. And I think it's just important
for the Americans watching to understand just how economically
challenged the people of Afghanistan are and, therefore, the
importance of our current negotiations seeking a lasting peace
and stability within the Nation to allow economic prosperity.
It's in my opinion, and I believe my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle would agree, that economic stability can
only be achieved if there's some stabilization regarding the
elimination of conflicts, and therein lies the Taliban.
So, Ambassador, do you believe that the Taliban can be
trusted in negotiations to eliminate terrorist training
facilities and the tendency toward allowing terrorist training
facilities or encouraging and developing terror training
facilities within Afghanistan? Do you think that there's a
chance that our peace negotiations can establish an environment
within Afghanistan that will not afford the opportunity for
terrorists to train and from which to perhaps launch attacks
against the United States?
Mr. Khalilzad. On the first point you made, I agree with
you. And with peace and participation by all key forces in the
country, there is an opportunity for Afghanistan to have
economic development. They have mineral resources. They have a
good geography in one way in terms of being a land bridge
between Central Asia, which has vast resources and South Asia
where the population and the markets. And, therefore, we're
looking at with other donors and assistance, investment, trade
to stabilize or consolidate any peace agreement.
On your second point, it's not a question of trust,
Congressman; it is a question of making it in their interest
not to allow that. And that is, the Taliban want to be accepted
as a legitimate partner. They want to receive assistance and to
have good relations, and we have to make those things that they
need conditional and be continuously monitoring and reacting so
that they deliver on the commitments that they have made.
They say they have learned the lesson from the past and
that they will not allow terrorist to use the territory against
us. And we've taken some steps and they've taken some steps,
but we need to make it in their interest not to enter--
necessarily rely on trusting them.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for that answer.
Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I yield.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms.
Wasserman Schultz, for five minutes.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador and Mr. Secretary, while we're right to debate
how we responsibly withdraw our troops from Afghanistan, I did
as a senior member of the Appropriations Committee, and so I'm
also concerned about the future of our continued nonmilitary
and civilian assistance to the Afghan Government.
Since 2001, the U.S. has committed hundreds of billions of
taxpayer dollars to support Afghan reconstruction, which has
been critical to support the livelihoods of the Afghan people
and especially Afghan women and girls. Now, I share the
Chairman's concerns, both Chairwoman Maloney and Chairman
Lynch, but the U.S.-Taliban agreement reached in February does
not explicitly protect the rights and status of Afghan women
and girls.
So, Ambassador Khalilzad, will the State Department and
USAID continue to provide gender-related programming in
Afghanistan regardless of what happens during intra-Afghan
negotiations?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we are committed to support the Afghan
Government and both economic assistance and humanitarian
assistance to Afghanistan, and that's where we are right now.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Right. But I'm specifically asking
you, will the U.S. continue to provide gender-related
programming in Afghanistan regardless of what happens during
intra-Afghan negotiations?
I'm concerned about the--what I've seen as a reduction in
the prioritization of the continued rights and progress of
Afghan women and girls. I mean, you're the chief negotiator in
Afghanistan. Making sure that--are you having conversations
with Secretary Pompeo, Administrator Barsa, Director
Richardson, about continuing the absolute necessity to continue
these vital programs?
Mr. Khalilzad. We have said--I've been instructed to say
and the Secretary himself has said, while we want to reduce the
military costs through these negotiations to achieve peace for
the Afghans and our own security, we are committed for the long
term in terms of Afghanistan, providing assistance to
Afghanistan, and that we anticipate that given that we want the
long-term partnership to include assistance, including on
issues that you have described. That has been a general
directive that I'm operating under.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Is it a priority of the
administration to include in the negotiations and the ongoing
assistance that we provide to the Afghan people that there is
continued advancement and improvement of the rights of Afghan
women and girls? I'm not hearing you even say the word ``women
and girls.''
Mr. Khalilzad. The rights of women and girls and
minorities, indeed of all Afghans, but especially those that
you mentioned, is a high priority of the United States and that
will remain so.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. OK. What about other foreign
assistance, development, and reconstruction programs? Should
U.S. assistance be sustained regardless of the U.S.-Taliban
agreement or ongoing intra-Afghan talk?
In March 2020, Secretary Pompeo announced that the U.S.
would withhold a billion dollars in assistance to Afghanistan
due to political impasse between leaders in the Afghan
Government. I'd like to know where we are in ensuring that we
understand what the criteria are for continuing that
assistance.
Mr. Khalilzad. On future assistance, and you also referred
to the negotiations, of course, it depends what happens in
these negotiations and what decisions the Afghans make. And our
decisions regarding assistance will be influenced by the
decisions that they make. So, while we would like to have long-
term partnership and assistance program to the Afghans, but
that will depend obviously on implementation on what the
agreement is in terms of our interests and our values, and
we'll decide based on that.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. OK. In June, Ambassador, you told
reporters, quote: ``I think the money is cut and the
implementation is with the Pentagon.'' But the Secretary,
Secretary Pompeo said the political impasse was, quote,
resolved, implying that the reduction in U.S. assistance would
not take place.
So, Mr. Helvey, did DOD suspend a billion dollars in
assistance from Afghanistan, which I would assume would have
been without congressional authorization or notification, or do
you still plan to?
Mr. Helvey. Thank you for that question, ma'am. The
Secretary is still making a decision on how he'd like to move
forward with a reduction in ASF, Afghan Security Forces, funds
for Fiscal Year 2020 per the announcement that Secretary Pompeo
made. But if I could just offer that, you know, support for the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces through the Afghan
Security Forces fund, or ASF, is now perhaps more important
than ever.
You know, we believe that a strong and capable ANDSF
focused on combating terrorist threats in defending the Afghan
people is going to be our best chance supporting and defending
U.S. interests.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you. I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. Lynch. The gentlewoman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Green, for five minutes.
Mr. Green, you may need to unmute. I know you're out there.
The Chair now--while we're trying to find Mr.--while we're
trying to find the communications with Mr. Green, we're going
to call on Ms. Kelly from Illinois for five minutes.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you. Trying to get to my questions. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
A few months after taking office, President Trump outlined
a new strategy for the United States and Afghanistan. During an
August 2017 speech, he stated: Conditions on the ground, not
arbitrary timetables, will guide our strategy from now on.
America's enemies must never know our plans or believe they can
wait us out.
But three years later, Trump seems to be doing exactly the
opposite of what he promised to do.
Under the February 29 peace agreement, the United States
agreed to reduce the number of troops in Afghanistan from about
13,000 to 8,600 by mid-July 2020, followed by complete
withdrawal by May 2021. And despite repeated administration
assurances that our withdrawal from Afghanistan is, quote,
conditions based, President Trump has allegedly, and I quote:
Repeatedly voiced a desire to leave Afghanistan sooner than the
timetable laid out in the February 29 peace agreement.
The facts on the ground seem to bear that out. In mid-June,
CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie announced that the United
States had already met its commitment to reduce U.S. troop
levels in Afghanistan to 8,600, almost a month ahead of time.
General McKenzie also recently told Voice of America that the
U.S. would be down to about 4,500 troops in Afghanistan by late
October, which is consistent with the President's stated
aspirations to have fewer than 5,000 troops in Afghanistan by
the 2020 election.
Ambassador, what incentive do the Taliban have to meet
their commitments under our agreement with them if the U.S. is
withdrawing forces even faster than the timeline detailed in
that same agreement?
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, Congresswoman. I want to say that
the agreement that I have negotiated to adjust forces downward
depending on conditions. And although there have been
reductions that you describe, that those reductions has not
meant that we cannot do the mission that our forces have. But I
believe that once we get to 4,500 or so, as you said, between
4,000 to 5,000, we would have to evaluate before we reduce
further, based on the agreement, whether the conditions are
such that further reduction will not undermine our ability to
carry out the mission that the United States is committed to in
Afghanistan.
I believe the Taliban would like us to leave and they think
we want to leave. And I've said, true, we would like to leave,
but departure depends on the conditions. If they can deliver on
the commitment they have made, then we would like to withdraw
our forces and bring the troops home. And if we are to stick to
that agreement, we need to implement condition-based adjustment
downward in forces or adjustment in forces, and I believe we
are committed to the terms of the agreement.
Ms. Kelly. Has President Trump or anyone in the White House
ever told you that U.S. force levels in Afghanistan should be
reduced to a certain level by November 2020 election? And what
about Secretary Pompeo? And if they have discussed this with
you, what number did they say?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, as you said, the CENTCOM Commander has
said what the forces would be by November or in November, which
is between 4,000 to 5,000. But I know, I would like to ask
David to comment further, that our Defense Department, our
military leaders believe that with those forces, the 4,500, we
will be able, given the conditions present, able to do the
mission, which is go do counterterrorism and to, with allies,
help the Afghan forces.
Ms. Kelly. And, Mr. Helvey, has Secretary of Defense Esper
ever told you that U.S. force levels in Afghanistan should be
reduced to a certain level by November 2020 election?
Mr. Helvey. Ma'am, what the Secretary of Defense has said
to me and publicly is, you know, we're looking to get to
between 4,000 and 5,000 troops in Afghanistan by the end of
November 2020.
Ms. Kelly. OK. Thank you.
My time's almost up. I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from the Virgin
Islands, Ms. Plaskett, for five minutes.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for holding this hearing. I just want to share that I share
your view that while the start of the Afghan negotiations is an
important step in ending decades of conflict, we cannot assume
that it will inevitably lead to peace.
With the U.S. withdrawing forces from Afghanistan, we have
lost much of our leverage against the Taliban to hold them to
their commitments, especially their promise to sever ties with
the terrorist organizations and to continue negotiations with
the Afghan Government. In a May 2020 report, the U.N. Security
Council found, quote: The Taliban regularly consulted with al-
Qaida during negotiations with the United States and offered
guarantees that it would honor their historical ties. Al-Qaida
has reacted positively to the agreement with statements from
its acolytes celebrating it as a victory for the Taliban cause
and less for global militancy.
And then in August, the lead inspector general for
Operation Freedom's Sentinel released its quarterly report to
Congress, which covers the periods of April 1 to June 30, 2020,
several months after the U.S. agreement with the Taliban. And
that report found that the Taliban continued a high tempo
attack targeting the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces and maintained its ties with al-Qaida, conducting some
attacks alongside members of al-Qaida's regional affiliate al-
Qaida in the Indian subcontinent.
Ambassador, Ambassador Khalilzad, do the Taliban still
maintain ties with al-Qaida?
Mr. Khalilzad. First, Congressman, thank you. You stated
that the intra-Afghan negotiations is a positive development. I
agree with you. But that wouldn't have been possible without
the agreement and without the condition-based adjustment in the
force. This is a package.
With regard to terrorism, al-Qaida, in this setting what I
can say is that the Talibs have taken some steps based on the
commitment that they have made, positive steps, but they have
some distance still to go. And whether we go further down
beyond that 4,500 will be contingent on them delivering on the
commitments that they have made. So, we are in the middle of
the process and the picture that is
[inaudible] progress, but it's not completed. Neither has
our force reduction----
Ms. Plaskett. So, Ambassador----
Mr. Khalilzad.--our withdrawal has not been completed, and
the two things are very much alike.
Ms. Plaskett. So, Ambassador, would you say that that
means, sir--excuse me, does that then--would you then say that
they still maintain some ties with al-Qaida? Is that what
you're saying?
Mr. Khalilzad. As I said before, in this setting what I can
say is that they've taken some positive steps. We look for more
steps before we are satisfied, and----
Ms. Plaskett. So, more steps meaning----
Mr. Khalilzad.--I believe that once we reach to 4,500, we
would do an evaluation of ties and actions that they've taken
and make decisions based on that.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. So, the fact that they need to
take more steps would lead me to conclude, sir, that you do, in
fact, agree that there are still some ties with al-Qaida if
more steps need to be taken. Are there benchmarks or indicators
that the United States is using to monitor the extent to which
the Taliban continue to maintain those relations with al-Qaida
or with terrorist groups?
Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. We are monitoring that very closely. We
have an interagency jointly chaired by Defense and state
monitoring compliance of Taliban compliance with regard to
commitments they have made.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. We all know--and thank you for
your testimony--a lot is at stake here with the start of the
intra-Afghan negotiations. If these discussions fall apart, the
Afghan people will suffer and our homeland security could be at
risk. While we all hope for a peaceful resolution to the
conflict, what do you think will happen if negotiations between
the Kabul Government and the Taliban do not succeed?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we hope that they will succeed, and we
will do all that we can to be helpful. This is a historic
opportunity for Afghan leaders. The people are tired of war.
They want an end to the war. We will protect our interest, of
course, in all circumstances, but the Afghan people will suffer
if there is no peace agreement.
Ms. Plaskett. So, the Afghan people will suffer if there's
no negotiation, if it's not successful. And as you have said,
your government will do what's necessary to protect its
interests?
Mr. Khalilzad. I did.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
After almost two decades of war, it would be devastating if
the Taliban were able to wrest control of Afghanistan from the
Kabul Government and al-Qaida were able to regain the safe
haven enjoyed prior to September 11.
I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr.
Comer, for five minutes.
Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you and the ranking member for holding this
very important hearing. I don't think I need to remind anyone
in here that public opinion on the war in Afghanistan is very
strong with an overwhelming majority of Americans now favoring
a withdrawal and an end to this very long war.
I have to mention that I'm proud to represent Fort Campbell
Military Base in Ft. Campbell, Kentucky. We've had a lot of
brave women and men serve, currently serving in Afghanistan,
have given their lives, have gotten injured for the cause, and
I appreciate their service. I also represent many National
Guard units in Kentucky that have had many forces in
Afghanistan over the years.
Ambassador, you mentioned success. We all want to see
success in Afghanistan. What, sir, is your definition of
success and when would that success be achieved?
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, sir. Of course, long-term success
is in Afghanistan the end state, which we want the country
that's at peace within it and with the neighbors, that doesn't
pose a threat to the United States or our allies, and respects
the human rights of its citizens and that they end the conflict
with each other and there is permanent cease-fire.
But that end--getting to that end will be through stages.
And right now, we are at the stage of start of the negotiations
among Afghan in regard to the future of Afghanistan. And we
have the commitments from both the government and the Taliban
on terrorism-related issues to us. So, this is not an act that
magically we get to the end point. It goes through process and
stages and steps by all sides, and we are in a hopeful moment.
There will be difficulties and challenges, as I said, but we
are in a better place than we have ever been with regard to
peace in Afghanistan in the last 40 years.
So, that's something. That's something to be said about
where we are, but agreement or success is not assured and there
are spoilers. People who prefer the status quo to a peace
agreement because personal wealth, access to money, access to
power, these are all important considerations. So, difficulties
are there, but I'm hopeful.
Mr. Comer. Mr. Helvey, let me switch gears. And you
mentioned, obviously, the goal is to ensure that terrorist
cells cannot operate in Afghanistan, and I think that's a
bipartisan goal. That's why we went there in the first place.
My question is, is there a way to achieve that without having
American troops on the ground?
Mr. Helvey. Thank you for that question. And from our
perspective, the mission that we have is to ensure that that
doesn't happen. Now, we can do that in a couple of different
ways. One, there are things that we do directly in Afghanistan,
but I think an important part of this is the work that we're
doing with our Afghan partners to buildup the capabilities of
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces through the
contributions that we've made, the work that we've done, not
only through the Afghan Security Forces fund, but the work that
we're doing with our partners in NATO, to buildup those
capabilities so that the Afghans themselves are able to pursue
shared counterterrorism objectives.
So, that's part of our enduring mission there in
Afghanistan is to help ensure that we have a capable and strong
Afghan partner that we can work with and that can operate
ultimately on its own.
Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Michigan, Ms.
Lawrence, for five minutes.
Mrs. Lawrence. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I appreciate that women are included in Afghan Government's
negotiating team, but I also fear that multiple high-profile
attacks against prominent Afghan women in recent months may be
a dangerous sign of things to come. In August, Fawzia Koofi,
one of Afghan's Government female negotiators, was injured in
an apparent suicide attempt. During a recent incident that same
month, Saba Sahar, an actress and director, was shot in Kabul.
And in July, the Taliban reportedly executed a woman prisoner
guard, shooting her eight times after abducting her from a bus.
Mr. Ambassador, I serve on the Women's Caucus here in
Congress and very active in laws and policy to protect women's
rights and freedoms in America. What specific steps are you and
the Department of State taking to protect the rights and status
of women and girls in Afghanistan?
Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. I
believe that protecting the rights of Afghan citizens, their
human rights, particularly women and minorities, are one of our
highest priorities. This speaks to our interest but especially
to our values, and we're committed to advancing and protecting
those values and those interests.
Mrs. Lawrence. Can you give me some specific language or
programming to ensure that you are achieving that goal?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, specific, for example, was that we
insisted that women be included in the negotiating team. I'm
speaking about my role, which is as a peace process in
negotiations, and women are included in the negotiating team,
including Fawzia Koofi that you referred to.
Mrs. Lawrence. Yes.
Mr. Khalilzad. And we meet--I have met twice with the
Afghan women delegates that are in Doha. And we have said that
as negotiations go on, although it's Afghan's own, Afghan led,
that our future assistance, support, will depend on what
decisions are made. And in those decisions, the rights of women
protecting the achievements of the past will be central.
Mrs. Lawrence. Mr. Ambassador, have you received any
assurances from the Taliban that they intend to protect the
right and the status of Afghan women and girls? Have you
received from them in a negotiation the actual language or
commitment to protect women and girls from the Taliban? Have
you received that?
Mr. Khalilzad. They have spoken on this positively that
women have the right to education, to work, to be ministers,
but, you know, it's less important--although it's important,
but less important what they say, we will see what they do if
they become part of a future government. And that, in turn,
will affect our policy toward them and toward Afghanistan.
Mrs. Lawrence. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, if we are to
continue to set a moral example for the rest of the world, we
cannot abandon women and girls of Afghanistan's to be oppressed
by the Taliban again. And I want to be very clear that we as a
government, I feel strongly, that instead of hopes and dreams,
that we actually negotiate policies to protect women and girls
in our agreements.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The gentlelady yields back.
I do want, just a matter of clarification, Fawzia Koofi was
injured in an assassination attempt; she was not injured in a
suicide attempt.
Mr. Khalilzad. I agree with you.
Mr. Lynch. Just want to clarify that. And she returned to
negotiations afterwards, so pretty heroic in her regard.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Malinowski, for five minutes.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, we've already established at this hearing that
the Taliban continues its cooperation with al-Qaida. Have they
instructed their followers explicitly to discontinue that
cooperation, yes or no?
Mr. Khalilzad. I have--I need a different setting to
comment on that.
Mr. Malinowski. OK. Well, the cooperation we've established
continues. Is it even a requirement of our agreement with the
Taliban explicitly that they stop their cooperation with al-
Qaida?
Mr. Khalilzad. The condition of the agreement that will
affect what we do that they do not host, they do not train,
they do not allow fundraising for terrorist groups such as al-
Qaida, and that they----
Mr. Malinowski. But the agreement does not--excuse me. The
agreement does not say al-Qaida. It simply says terrorist
groups.
Mr. Khalilzad. No. It does say al-Qaida.
Mr. Malinowski. It says al-Qaida with respect----
Mr. Khalilzad. Such as al-Qaida.
Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. With respect to allowing a tax
from Afghan soil to the United States, but it explicitly does
not say al-Qaida when it comes to cooperation with terrorist
groups. Presumably al-Qaida resisted that.
Mr. Khalilzad. The categories I just enumerated applies to
al-Qaida as well.
Mr. Malinowski. That's not in the agreement. And if you can
show me another part of the agreement that explicitly says
that, I would appreciate it.
Would it violate the agreement if the Taliban conducted any
of those activities with al-Qaida from Pakistani soil, yes or
no?
Mr. Khalilzad. That would--we would regard that as a
violation, but the agreement is about Afghanistan.
Mr. Malinowski. Correct. So, the agreement does not
preclude them from cooperating with al-Qaida to attack
Americans from Pakistan. And the Taliban operates on both sides
of the----
Mr. Khalilzad. We would regard that as a violation if they
did.
Mr. Malinowski. Interesting. Well, I wish it were in the
agreement itself.
Would it be violating our agreement with the Taliban if the
Taliban stoned a hundred women to death in a soccer stadium,
yes or no?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, our agreement has four parts. I don't
know we're in accord, so I have to explain this. It's a little
complicated.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, I've read it and I haven't seen
anything that would include that. So, am I right or wrong?
Mr. Khalilzad. I just think the issues of what happens, the
future of Afghanistan and relations between Taliban and other
groups and how a future government deals with its population,
what they do will affect what we do in terms of our assistance
program.
Mr. Malinowski. Correct. So, it's not a condition in the
agreement, nor would it violate the agreement if the Taliban
were, for example, assassinating Afghan Government officials or
attacking or trying to assassinate members of Afghan civil
society, as the Afghan Government believes they're doing now.
Is that correct?
Mr. Khalilzad. As I said, we are--our objective is to bring
Afghans together to negotiate the future in which they can live
in peace with each other. And depending on whether they do or
not and what policies that government pursues, we will respond
to that based on what we do or don't do.
Mr. Malinowski. Got it. But I'm talking about the
conditions for withdrawal. Because you say in your testimony
that our withdrawal is conditions based.
Mr. Khalilzad. If condition is terrorism----
Mr. Malinowski. So, let me just be very clear. Are there
any conditions tied to the withdrawal other than they not shoot
at our troops as we leave and not allow attacks on the United
States from Afghan soil?
Mr. Helvey, are there any other conditions tied to the
withdrawal in the agreement? Yes or no?
Mr. Helvey. The agreement, as the Ambassador is saying,
does specify not only do they have commitments for
counterterrorism and our expectations for which they're not
fully compliant, there is moving forward in intra-Afghan
negotiations or the Afghan peace negotiations, which they have,
there are specific provisions not attacking our forces, but we
do have expectations of a reduction in violence, and the
violence that we are seeing today is too high----
Mr. Malinowski. Understood. I'm glad that that is our
expectation, but, again, the Taliban have made no commitments
in that regard. And, look, we haven't just promised to withdraw
fully. We've also pressured the Afghan Government to release
Taliban prisoners, terrorists, which they have done. We've
promised to lift sanctions against Taliban leaders. If we're
going to leave, and many Americans want us to leave, why give
them these gifts on the way out?
Mr. Khalilzad. Well, because we just don't want to leave,
because we could have left. We didn't need anybody's permission
to leave. It is because we want a peace agreement to end the
war in Afghanistan, but that's not what the Afghan people want.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, that's not a condition of our----
Mr. Khalilzad. It's difficult--well, we have four elements
in the agreement, as I said, and that's a package which has
intra-Afghan negotiation and a permanent cease-fire. And
without those difficult decisions--and I know we're not happy
about those release of prisoners, but those difficult decisions
were necessary to get to where we are where peace negotiations
can start. And we will decide based on what happens in the
peace negotiations and what they do on the terrorism front.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, let me just say in conclusion, I hear
you saying things like the Taliban have learned their lesson
and the Taliban want good relations with the outside world and,
sir, I have to say, it strikes me as incredibly naive.
This is a totalitarian movement that seeks power in
Afghanistan. Not peace, but power. And to base our hopes on--to
base our policy on the hope that somehow it has changed its
nature, while providing all of these concessions up front, and
the only thing that they promise to do is to stop shooting at
us as we leave, I think--look, we're all for peace, and I
understand people want to leave, but I think what you're
selling us is not peace; it is a fairy tale to make us feel
better about leaving Afghanistan.
And with that, I yield.
Mr. Khalilzad. Now, Mr. Chairman, we're not giving an
accounting on the words of the Talibs. The agreement is
condition based on our management if we are to implement the
agreement with them to see behavior, just not words. And I also
would like to say that among the alternatives that we face,
this is the best available, given the constraints and
alternatives available.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. In closing, I want to thank--hearing no further
questions, in closing, I want to thank the panelists. Thank
you, Ambassador, thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony
here today. I want to commend my colleagues for their very
active participation on this important discussion. This is
certainly a momentous time for Afghanistan and the region, and
a moment of great consequence.
With that, without objection, all members will have five
legislative days within which to submit additional written
questions for the witnesses, through the Chair, which will be
forwarded to the witnesses for their response. And I ask if
there are further questions, that the witnesses to please
respond as promptly as you are able.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]