[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE HEALTH, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES FACING LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, CIVILIAN SECURITY, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 15, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-116
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-943 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey, Chairman
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida, Ranking
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas Member
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota TED S. YOHO, Florida
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan JOHN CURTIS, Utah
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas KEN BUCK, Colorado
JUAN VARGAS, California MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
Alexander Brockwehl, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SIRES
Opening statement of Chairman Sires.............................. 3
WITNESSES
De Bolle, Dr. Monica, Professor, Latin American Studies Program,
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
Economics...................................................... 11
Camilleri, Michael, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program,
Inter-American Dialogue........................................ 17
Farnsworth, Eric, Vice President, Council of the Americas........ 21
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 34
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 35
Hearing Attendance............................................... 36
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions for Dr. De Bolle submitted for the record
from Chairman Sires............................................ 37
Responses to questions for Mr. Camilleri submitted for the record
from Chairman Sires............................................ 46
Responses to questions for Dr. De Bolle submitted for the record
from Representative Castro..................................... 53
Responses to questions for Mr. Camilleri submitted for the record
from Representative Castro..................................... 56
THE HEALTH, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES FACING LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN
Tuesday, September 15, 2020
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Civilian Security and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC,
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:02 a.m.,
via Webex, Hon. Albio Sires (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Mr. Sires. Good morning, everyone. Thank you to our
witnesses for being here today. This hearing, entitled ``The
Health, Economic, and Political Challenges Facing Latin America
and the Caribbean'' will come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have
5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions
for the record subject to the list of limitations in the rules.
To insert something into the record, please have your staff
email the previously mentioned address.
As a reminder to members, please keep your video function
on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair.
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and
please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
Consistent with H.R. 965 and the accompanying regulations,
staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate, when
they are not under recognition, to eliminate background noise.
I see that we have a quorum, and will now recognize myself
for opening remarks.
For the last 6 months, countries throughout Latin America
and the Caribbean have been devastated by the coronavirus
pandemic. This region has suffered nearly one-third of all
coronavirus deaths globally. Some governments took COVID-19
seriously and enacted strict lockdown measures, but still
struggled to contain the virus, due in part to structural
challenges like the high levels of informal employment, which
made it impossible for workers to make a living while under
quarantine.
Other leaders, like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, regrettably
followed the lead of President Trump who intentionally
downplayed the virus and dismissed the guidance of public
health experts, with profoundly tragic consequences.
Even today, as case numbers have become to level off in
some places, five of the 10 countries with the most coronavirus
cases globally are in Latin America. This virus is far from
being under control.
We also know that the region will be confronting the
secondary impact of the pandemic for decades to come. In Haiti,
where the United States has invested billions in taxpayer
assistance, international organizations are worried that
infant, child----
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Ms. Hallman. Hi, everyone. It looks like we are
experiencing some technical difficulties with the chairman. We
will get right back online in 1 second.
Mr. Sires. Can everybody hear me?
Thank you.
In Venezuela, the Maduro dictatorship has predictably
exploited the pandemic to further crush dissent and targeting
journalists, doctors, and aid workers who are there to speak
out.
In Bolivia, the interim government has persecuted over 100
opposition leaders on charges that Human Rights Watch contends
were politically motivated.
In Honduras, attacks on human rights defenders have
continued with complete impunity, including the kidnapping of
four Garifuna community leaders by individuals dressed in
police uniforms on July 18.
At this difficult moment, the United States should be
offering a steady and helping hand to our neighbors and allies
and providing consistent principled leadership in our
hemisphere. Unfortunately, President Trump has shown he is not
interested in bringing people together or providing value-based
global leadership. Instead of offering safe haven to those
fleeing political persecution, his Administration has exploited
the pandemic to expand its policies of using cruelty to deter
asylum seekers.
Two weeks ago, six colleagues and I sent letters to
President Trump condemning his Administration's action after
three Nicaraguan asylum seekers, who had been tortured by the
Ortega regime, were expelled at the U.S. border. President
Trump has talked tough on Nicaragua, but when it came time to
stand with those who put their lives on the line to challenge
the Ortega regime, his Administration placed its radical anti-
immigrant agenda above protecting American values in U.S.
foreign policy and interests.
I hope we can explore ways for the U.S. Government to
ensure our diplomatic and foreign assistance tool to help our
partners and allies in the region. I believe the U.S. has a
critical role to play in helping to lift up this hemisphere as
it emerges from a period of such darkness.
Today, on the first day of Hispanic Heritage Month, we must
reaffirm our shared commitment to working with countries across
this hemisphere as they combat the coronavirus pandemic, and
the many economic and political challenges that the pandemic
have exposed or exacerbated.
Thank you.
And I now turn to Ranking Member Rooney for his opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sires follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Chairman Sires, for organizing this
important hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for joining
us under these challenging circumstances.
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are among
the hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. With almost 6 million
confirmed cases, the region makes up almost 28 percent of
worldwide cases. Five countries, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia,
Peru, and Argentina, currently rank among the top 10 in total
number of cases globally, and Peru now has the worst COVID-19
death rate per capita in the world. With almost 280,000 deaths,
the human toll on the region has been disastrous. However, the
economic forecast for the region are increasingly troubling.
According to the International Monetary Fund's world
economic outlook update, the region is expected to see an
economic contraction of 9.4 percent, with almost every country
in the region in a recession. If these projections continue to
fruition, the region would be facing the worst economic
recession on record.
The countries of the Caribbean alone are projected to see a
GDP decline of 10.3 percent in 2020, following the impact of
the pandemic on the tourism industries.
There are also serious concerns that economic downturn in
the region will aggravate political and social instability that
was boiling over prior to the pandemic. The pandemic is also
straining the region's already fragile democratic institutions,
and testing the governance capacity of the region's
governments. These governments are challenged by systemic
corruption, and now the pandemic has contributed to increased
operations by the region's transnational criminal organizations
as the chairman referred to.
A recent research brief published by the United Nation's
Office on Drugs and Crime States that organized criminal
organizations are placing controls on items, such as masks and
disinfectants. The issue is especially concerning for the
countries of the Northern Triangle in Central America and
Colombia.
Further authoritarian regimes in Venezuela, Cuba, and
Nicaragua, as the chairman referred to, are exploiting the
pandemic to further oppress their people.
The Maduro regime's response to the pandemic is worse than
the already dire social and economic conditions in Venezuela
and has added to the suffering of the Venezuelan people.
In Nicaragua, the Ortega regime has failed to disclose the
real number of cases in the country, and continues to disregard
the threat. As the chairman referred to, we have a little of
that problem ourselves.
Lastly, the Castro regime in Cuba is trafficking Cuban
doctors and exploiting them under the context of the pandemic
for political purposes.
This pandemic has also exposed the malign nature of the
Chinese Communist Party. As the virus has spread, we learn more
about the Chinese Communist Party's failure to respond and
share relevant information with global health authorities that
could have stemmed the spread. However, unfortunately, we were
also briefed in January many times, and February as well.
The authoritarian regime in China, however, bleeds into
their entire global engagement, and I think that we need to
worry about them a great amount right now.
The pandemic provides an opportunity for the United States
to strengthen its engagement with other countries in Latin
America, and the Caribbean particularly, to demonstrate that we
are their preferred partner instead of China. It is clear that
China will attempt to capitalize on this pandemic, and is doing
it right now. This will require the U.S. to take a strategic
approach to supporting the region and combating the virus and
economic recovery efforts.
As always, the U.S. has stepped up to the plate to provide
$141 million in aid to the region, including PPE and masks and
ventilators, but we can always do more. The U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation will play a crucial role in
investments in the region, which I believe can help the
recovery and also its long-term economic well-being.
I also recognize and applaud the weekend's election of
Mauricio Claver-Carone as the new president of the Inter-
American Development Bank, but I also think it is important
that for him to be appointed, Latin America needs to be
consulted and have a role in this.
Actions taken now by the U.S. to instigate greater recovery
efforts in the Western Hemisphere will showcase our commitment
and desire to see the region prosper. Challenges originating
due to the pandemic will continue to emerge for many months to
come, but I am confident the pandemic can strengthen our
partnerships with Latin America and the Caribbean.
The United States must remain adaptable in our strategies
not only to help contain the virus, but to right against
exploitive transactional criminal organizations, as the
chairman referred to earlier, and corrupted authoritarian
regimes, as well as the growing and very malign influence of
China.
I look forward to the testimoneys of our witnesses, and
thank you again, Chairman Sires, for holding this hearing.
I yield back.
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Rooney.
I will now introduce our witnesses.
First we have Dr. Monica de Bolle. She is a professor in
the Latin America Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University,
and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics. She previously worked as a director for the
Institute for Economic Policy Research in Brazil, and was also
an economist at the International Monetary Fund.
In 2014, Ms. de Bolle was named Honored Economist by the
Order of Brazilian Economists for her contributions to the
Brazilian policy debate. She holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in
economics from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de
Janeiro, and a Ph.D. in economics from the London School of
Economics.
Dr. de Bolle, we welcome you to the hearing.
We will then hear from Mr. Michael Camilleri. He is
director of the Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program at the Inter-
American Dialogue. From 2012 to 2017, he served as the Western
Hemisphere adviser on the Secretary of State's policy-planning
staff, and as director for Andean Affairs at the National
Security Council in the Obama Administration. Mr. Camilleri was
also a human rights specialist at the Organization of the
American States, and worked as a senior staff attorney at the
Center for Justice and International Law. He holds a Bachelor
of Arts degree in history from the University of Notre Dame and
J.D. From Harvard Law School.
Mr. Camilleri, thank you for joining us today.
Finally, we will hear from Mr. Eric Farnsworth. He is the
vice president of the Council of the Americas where he leads
his Washington office. Prior to joining the Council of the
Americas in 2003, he had a long career in government working in
the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau, at the Department of
State at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and a
senior advisor to the White House special envoy for the
Americas during the Clinton Administration.
Previously, Mr. Farnsworth was managing director of
ManattJones Global Strategies, and advisory and strategic
consulting group. He holds a master's degree in public affairs
from Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.
Mr. Farnsworth, thank you for joining us today.
I ask the witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5
minutes and, without objection, your prepared written
statements will be made as part of the record.
We have been called to vote, and I would like to recess for
about 45 minutes until we finish our voting so we can get back
and not have any interruptions in the witnesses comments and
questions, so we will recess for about 45 minutes.
Thank you very much and thank you for your patience.
[Recess.]
Mr. Sires. Monica, I think you are first with your 5-minute
comments.
STATEMENT OF DR. MONICA DE BOLLE, PROFESSOR, LATIN AMERICAN
STUDIES PROGRAM, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, SENIOR FELLOW, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Dr. de Bolle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and
members of the committee. Good afternoon to you all. It is a
pleasure to be here.
So I will dive right in. The COVID-19 pandemic struck Latin
America in late February 2020. Governments in the region had at
least 2 months to prepare for the pandemic by adopting public
health strategies, economic rescue plans, and policies to
protect millions of informal and vulnerable workers throughout
the region. Despite the time advantage, none of these
preparations occurred.
Why? First, because of weak leadership, poor capacity, and
because some leaders, including President Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador in Mexico and President Jay Bolsonaro in Brazil,
minimized the dangers posed by a new and emerging disease.
As a result of these failures, the impact in Latin America
has been tragic. As of September 11, the region's five largest
economies combined, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and
Argentina, registered 6.8 million cases of COVID-19, or about
400,000 more than the United States, and hundreds of thousands
of deaths. The numbers may have been greater because of
substantial underreporting, lack of testing capacity, and no
systematic contact tracing protocols.
The toll of the disease has been particularly harsh. The
region's economies have suffered unprecedented drops in GDP,
rampant unemployment, and a full-blown humanitarian crisis
falling disproportionately on the poor.
Latin America's economy was already fragile before the
pandemic struck, leaving little room in public sector fiscal
stimulus. Even so, the response failure has made the situation
worse with the misguided view that policymakers had to choose
between public health policies, such as lockdowns, and
preserving the economy. Countries failed to control both the
disease and its economic fallout.
No sustained economic recovery can occur in the absence of
measures to control the epidemic. The absence of these measures
has led to uncontrolled epidemics throughout Latin America, and
they are unlikely to abate over the next several months.
As countries have returned to nearly normal conditions
since the first months of the pandemic, social distancing and
other restrictive measures have become politically and socially
untenable.
The outlook for the region is, therefore, grim.
Uncontrolled epidemics will continue the ravage the vulnerable
population, exacerbating already very high inequality and
poverty levels.
While many countries in the region have public health
systems, whether partial or fully public, these systems have
suffered from insufficient resources and financing, even during
the pandemic. Hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel are
heterogeneously distributed across most companies, adding to
the daunting task of vaccinating tens of millions, or even
hundreds of millions of people in different countries.
Brazil has been especially hard-hit by COVID-19 because of
its erratic leadership and mismanagement of the epidemic in its
early stages. The disease, which at first struck urban centers,
quickly spread through the country, hitting poor States in the
north and the northeast, where public health resources are
broadly unavailable. Strict lockdown measures were at first
imposed in some States, but President Bolsonaro consistently
undermined these efforts by blaming Governors for letting their
economies decline. Because of his callous indifference,
Brazil's leader was largely responsible for the failure of
early efforts to contain the epidemic. And notwithstanding his
disastrous performance in the GDP contraction of 11 percent in
the second quarter, President Bolsonaro's standing in opinion
polls has improved over the past few months.
Why? In April, Congress approved an emergency basic income
program of a generous cash payout to last 3 months, but with
the possibility of further extensions. Initially, Bolsonaro
resisted the program, but it then received unanimous
congressional approval, leading him to reap political gains.
Brazil's emergency basic income program has been a saving
grace in a dismal situation. The program eventually reached
about half of the country's population, or nearly 100 million
people, and helped sustain poor and vulnerable families
throughout the epidemic. It provided some support to the
economy. Its success not only helped President Bolsonaro's
political standing, but left the opposition without a viable
political narrative to highlight his failures.
Looking ahead, a major challenge will be addressing the end
of the program in early 2021, especially as unemployment will
remain likely in the double digits. Widespread bankruptcies, a
credit crunch, and questions over fiscal sustainability will
likely hamper efforts to reenact a similar cash transfer
program in the near future.
As the Brazilian economy was already weak before the
pandemic, and since there are no expectations that it will
improve much with an uncontrolled epidemic in place, the
outlook for Latin America's largest economy is nothing short of
grim.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. de Bolle follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Monica.
Michael.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL CAMILLERI, DIRECTOR, PETER D. BELL
RULE OF LAW PROGRAM, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
Mr. Camilleri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Rooney, members of the subcommittee. It is really a pleasure to
appear before you today and testify on the health, economic,
and political challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Honored as well to join my fellow witnesses whose expertise I
admire greatly.
I think as you, Mr. Chairman, the ranking member, and Dr.
de Bolle have discussed, the COVID-19 pandemic has had profound
public health and economic impacts in Latin America and the
Caribbean. I will focus my opening remarks on the second order
consequences of the pandemic for democratic governance in the
region, which I think could be equally significant.
While regional experiences surely vary, it is already clear
that the pandemic is exposing and exacerbating many of Latin
America's preexisting challenges. Income inequality, labor
informality, and weak social safety nets obligated millions of
citizens to choose between protecting their health and feeding
their families. Strained public finances and regressive tax
systems limited the steps governments could take to stimulate
their economies and support those most in need. Weak public
services and discrimination left vulnerable populations such as
migrants, prisoners, and indigenous and Afro-descendent
communities particularly exposed to COVID-19.
Food insecurity, already aggravated by factors such as
climate change, grew still worse as a consequence of COVID.
Corrupt public officials and cynical profiteers exploited the
health emergency for their own gain. And in some countries,
politicians used the pandemic to polarize society, while
authoritarian leaders exploited fragile checks and balances to
concentrate power and further erode civil liberties.
This last trend is worthy of particular attention.
Unsurprisingly, the strongmen leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela have used the health crisis to reinforce their grip,
including by persecuting those who criticized their pandemic
responses, or simply attempted to share accurate public health
information.
Unfortunately, we observe authoritarian tendencies in some
of the region's democracies as well. A recent Inter-American
Dialogue report details several troubling examples of
restrictions on free speech under the cover of combating COVID-
19, including in Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, and
Honduras.
The case of El Salvador is perhaps the most alarming.
President Bukele's pandemic response included deploying the
military and police to arbitrarily detain those accused of
violating stay-at-home orders, and then defying Supreme Court
rulings against these measures. Lately, Bukele has used his
private platform and his government agencies to attack the free
press, particularly ``El Faro,'' one of Central America's
leading investigative journalism outlets, which, last week,
broke the story of Bukele's secret negotiations with MS-13.
Most disturbing of all, Bukele seems to believe he enjoys the
support of the U.S. Government despite these actions.
In short, this is a highly challenging and uncertain time
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Strong, steady, principled
partnership from the United States will be vital to the
region's economic recovery and democratic trajectory. Today,
however, U.S. engagement with the region is inconsistent and
ideologically driven. Often, it is also counterproductive.
Cutting aid to Central America and abandoning
anticorruption missions only fuels instability and migration.
Loose talk of military options in Venezuela neutralizes the
democratic opposition and hands the Maduro regime a pretext for
further oppression. Indiscriminate tariffs disincentivize
nearshoring and deepen the region's reliance on China. Staying
silent on democratic abuses by friendly governments undermines
the United States' credibility to confront Latin American
dictators, while separating children from their families, gives
those dictators an easy retort to our invocations of human
rights.
And withdrawing from the World Health Organization in the
midst of a global pandemic sends the message that Latin America
should hedge its bets and look beyond the hemisphere for
reliable partners.
As the saying goes, hard times reveal true friends. The
present moment is one of deep challenges in our hemisphere, but
it offers the United States an opportunity to reinforce bonds
of cooperation and partnership with Latin America and the
Caribbean. By redoubling our focus and recalibrating our
approach, we can more effectively support our regional
partners, and advance U.S. values and interests in the
Americas.
Thank you once again. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Camilleri follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sires. You are on. You have to unmute yourself.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC FARNSWORTH, VICE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF
THE AMERICAS
Mr. Farnsworth. Well, Mr. Chairman, what a privilege it is
to appear again before you and Mr. Rooney and the subcommittee,
and I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify in this
virtual hearing on such an important topic. Both of you, as
well as the other members of the subcommittee, continue to
offer sound and meaningful leadership on issues that impact
literally hundreds of millions of people in the United States
and across the Americas, and we acknowledge, and very much
appreciate your efforts, and particularly during these
unsettled and challenging times in the hemisphere, so thank you
again.
Unfortunately, as we have heard already from both
witnesses, the near-term health and economic outlook for the
region, already suffering from a pre-pandemic downturn, is
challenging. But the good news is that the situation is not at
all hopeless. To be sure, the pandemic has amplified and
accelerated a number of preexisting trends.
Issues including the world's highest levels of inequality,
substandard housing, uneven healthcare and sanitation, and
patchwork social safety nets have made the pandemic much worse
across the region than it might otherwise have been. Of equal
importance, significant percentages of workers are stuck in the
informal economy, making economic shutdowns and quarantines
difficult, if not impossible, to implement and enforce. And
this does not even begin to account for the collapse of
Venezuela, whose economy and democracy have been destroyed by
Chavismo and where estimates suggest between 5-and 6 million
Venezuelans are now refugees in neighboring countries who are
hard-pressed to absorb them.
The World Bank has estimated that regional growth will
approach negative 10 percent this year, the worst performance
since meaningful records began to be kept in 1901. Projections
for a 2021 recovery are welcome, but, nonetheless, are in the 2
to 3 percent range for most countries which is well below
regional potential.
Latin America and the Caribbean are in a difficult
position. And China, for one, sees this reality and has already
laid the groundwork for stronger relations going forward. As I
have written frequently and previously testified, China's
agenda goes well beyond economic management and engagement,
encapsulating a growing spectrum of activities that seeks to
bend regional politics and relationships toward Beijing's world
view.
The novel coronavirus pandemic offers new opportunities to
expand efforts to win regional hearts and minds, which Beijing
has already seized, including the promise of a $1 billion
facility for regional vaccine procurement. This promise may or
may not, in the end, be fulfilled, but it has captured regional
attention and gained significant goodwill. Now, it is incumbent
on the United States to recognize the shifting ground and to
react appropriately.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, both of you and others on
this subcommittee have pointed to these as priority issues and
noted both the strength of U.S. relations with the region and
also our need to accelerate our efforts, particularly on the
trade and investment side.
Notably, Washington is taking actions to build a forward-
looking economic recovery agenda, among them the Americas Crece
program announced at the end of 2019 and enhanced financing
facilities through the newly minted Development Finance
Corporation.
These are solid steps. But in my view, more can also be
done to recapture the vision of a mutually supportive, open-
market, democratic agenda fusing regional ambitions with U.S.
national interests.
Fortunately, the United States is slated to host the next
Summit of the Americas in 2021. This will provide a tailor-made
opportunity to develop the sort of recovery agenda the region
is actively seeking, and which will be increasingly critical to
implement the longer the pandemic lasts.
In the first instance, addressing the healthcare crisis,
including broad distribution and wide access for cost-effective
vaccinations, will be paramount. It will also be an opportunity
for democratically elected leaders to create a newly regional
framework for health cooperation and pandemic management,
incorporating private sector expertise to address future
healthcare crises.
Second, economic recovery must be at the forefront of the
pending Summit of the Americas. Latin America already suffers
from one of the lowest levels of intra-regional trade
worldwide, for example. The gains from expanded intra-regional
trade would establish sounder economic footing, while helping
to moderate the cyclical nature of commodities markets. As
well, nations across Latin America and the Caribbean can focus
more attention on improving their respective investment
climates, and Mr. Rooney, the ranking minority member, has made
this case effectively many, many times.
For its part, the United States should come to the 2021
Summit with a robust economic expansion initiative. Absent a
massive economic financial package of debt relief and new
lending, renewal of the hemispheric trade and investment agenda
will be the best way to promote regional recovery, support U.S.
and regional economic interests, and renew a regional strategic
posture that China has begun to challenge.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the invitation to provide
testimony, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Farnsworth follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sires. Well, thank you very much for your comments.
You can hear me, right?
Okay. And we are now going to questions.
You know, one of the biggest questions that I have in my
mind is the situation in Venezuela. You know, Guaido goes up to
January, he finishes. Maduro has his sham legislative election
that he is planning on with all of his people are going to run,
and, obviously, he is going to steal another election.
So how does the United States continue to advocate
democracy in Venezuela, you know, as a sham legislative
election, and the end of Juan Guaido's mandate rapidly
approaching? How do we do that?
Well, do not all jump at once on this question.
Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to jump in,
although I am not sure my answer will be entirely satisfactory.
I share your concern. Your leadership on this issue has
been particularly important in calling attention to the
significant issues that face Venezuelan people and indeed the
hemispheric community because of the misrule and the
misleadership of Nicolas Maduro and his cronies.
The election that is scheduled for December 6th clearly is
going to be a sham election, as you have said. It is not free.
It is not fair. And the opposition has, by and large, suggested
that the best way to counteract that would be to boycott the
election so that there is no legitimacy lent to it.
So, I think what the United States can do in the first
instance is to, as we used to say in my State Department days,
try to buck up the opposition so that they maintain a unified
front, and so that there are not breakaway factions that are
trying to contest an election where the results are already
basically known.
But the broader question is how can the United States,
working with the international community, move Venezuela toward
the free and fair elections, which really is the condition
precedent for the beginning of recovery in that country? It is
a really difficult conundrum. The sanctions regime I believe
has been important; but, obviously, Mr. Maduro is still in
power. So, you know, should more of the same be done? Should
less be done? I think that is the issue that is going to
confront policymakers going into the new year, certainly
working with the Congress.
But the one thing I would say is this: There are huge
amounts of illicit money being made and moved in Venezuela
through illegal activities, illegal gold mining, drug
trafficking, and the like, and one of the best ways, I think,
to get at the regime is to stanch the flow of those financial
resources, and, frankly, to identify and to freeze those funds,
and then also to begin to seize them and take them back.
Once the economic incentives for illegal behavior are
removed, or at least reduced, perhaps the political dynamic in
Venezuela will change so that people will begin to see that
they really have to find a way out of this mess, frankly, that
Nicolas Maduro has created.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Yes, Dr. de Bolle.
Dr. de Bolle. Thank you.
I would just like to add that we face another daunting
challenge with respect to Venezuela dealing with its possibly
fraud--well, fraudulent elections in the middle of a pandemic.
It will be very hard to get other Latin American countries to
focus on the issues in Venezuela given that they have runaway
epidemics in their own countries.
And we should not lose sight of the fact that amongst the--
the 10 countries that have the largest or the highest per
capita death rate in the world right now are all in Latin
America. So just to bring that in.
Mr. Sires. Mr. Camilleri.
Mr. Camilleri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would certainly associate myself with some of the
comments that have already been made. Nicolas Maduro is clearly
determined to hold on to his de facto power in Venezuela by
whatever means necessary, and that includes, in all likelihood,
presiding over a fraudulent election in December as he has in
the past.
I do not think that efforts, whether by actors within
Venezuela, or by the European Union, to try to negotiate
conditions approaching free and fair elections should be
criticized. I think we have every reason to be skeptical of
those efforts, but I do not think we should be in a position as
the U.S. Government of sort of throwing cold water on those
efforts, though ultimately opposition unity around a position
and around a strategy looking forward will be important.
I think, you know, the longer-term questions that Eric
alluded to are critical. My view is that we need to be
principled; we need to continue to stand for democracy and
human rights in Venezuela; we also need to be realistic. And
the fact is, unfortunately, the Guaido interim government, the
National Assembly, the G4 are not in the same position they
were in a year or a year-and-a-half ago. The balance of forces
on the ground in Venezuela has tilted in favor of the Maduro
regime. And so, that will require us to calibrate our own
efforts. And, in my view, we need to be realistic about the
fact that some sort of negotiated pathway to free and fair
elections ultimately is the most realistic and the most
peaceful, frankly, path out of the awful situation that the
country finds itself in.
Thank you.
Mr. Sires. I think everybody is so preoccupied with their
own countries and their own problems with the pandemic that
they are not really focusing on Venezuela. I do not think they
are really even looking at it, because they are so wrapped up
in their own issues that it is going to be very difficult to
get a group of people again to support changes in Venezuela
like we did in the past.
Congressman Rooney, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
[no response.]
Mr. Sires. Congressman Sherman, you are on.
Mr. Sherman. Hello, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to participate in this hearing, even though I am
not a member of this subcommittee. And I want to thank you for
holding this hearing and allowing me to participate, because it
has been a year-and-a-half since the full committee has had a
hearing on Western Hemisphere, and Latin America, and that is
far too long for those of us who are not members of the Western
Hemisphere Subcommittee to focus on our own hemisphere. And the
events in Latin America often intersect with events elsewhere
in the world.
Just a couple of days ago, I was speaking to the Guatemalan
ambassador about an effort to grant GSP relief to Myanmar. So,
that is the kind of thing that needs the whole committee to
look at, because there are two reasons not to do it. One is
that Myanmar's human rights record is just despicable, and we
had hearings in the Asia Subcommittee about their treatment of
the Rohingya. And the second is, we should not be undermining
the help we provided the Guatemalan and other Central American
textile industries by doing something for a regime that is so
awful.
We are all troubled by the reports that Central American
refugees, women are being subject to forced hysterectomies.
Obviously, that needs to be investigated. The fact that this is
even--that we have an Administration in which it even needs to
be investigated, where it is even possibly true, shows how far
we have fallen. And, oh, my God, if it is turns out that this
whistleblower's complaints are accurate, then we have fallen
much lower than I ever thought we could.
I want to thank the chair for his comments about the regime
in Venezuela. And when it comes to fighting COVID, we can look
to the Western Hemisphere and judge our own reaction. We see
Brazil has taken a policy and has a Presidential personality
perhaps similar to our own, and their results are terrible,
along with our own, whereas Canada, a country where half of the
population lives within 50 miles of the U.S. border--you could
not have a country more closely related to ours--had zero COVID
deaths on the 13th of this month, and that is averaging five,
six, seven deaths a day, we are doing a much worse job here in
the United States by a factor of over 10, even accounting for
the difference in population.
Returning to Mr. Maduro, I am confused as to how he has
been able to turn a country with the largest petroleum reserves
in the world into a country where people are starving to death,
and I am confused as to why a country, which had the most
vibrant oil industry in South America, now is needing to import
oil or gasoline from Iran.
So, I wonder whether Ms. de Bolle, or any of the other
witnesses, can describe how he has so ruined the oil sector,
and what is this relationship with Iran?
Dr. de Bolle. Thank you. I would be happy to address the
question of how Venezuela's economic ruin happened. It has
actually been a process over many, many years, and it did start
with Chavez. So, just to remind ourselves, Chavez ran Venezuela
on an extremely populist platform. He spent way more, in terms
of fiscal resources, than he ever had the capability of
generating, even with a vibrant oil industry.
So in the end, when he passed away, and when he handed off
the country to Maduro, Venezuela was already in financial dire
straits. And then from then on, complete economic
mismanagement, together with, you know, Maduro's inclinations
toward, you know, just finding other partners to work with,
some of which illegal, led, you know, the country down this
path of ruin that we see it now.
Essentially what has happened is that over many years,
Venezuela has been impoverished by its political leadership.
And with that, given that it is a country that has always been
extremely dependent on oil, it has been impossible for
Venezuela actually to invest in the oil industry in the volumes
needed to maintain that industry functioning at a reasonable
level.
So apart from corruption, which is certainly a problem in
the oil sector, as well as in other parts of the Venezuelan
economy, there has also been dramatic underinvestment in the
oil industry, which has now led the country to this situation
where rather than being a very big net oil exporter, as they
used to be in the 1980's and the 1990's, they have now become a
net oil importer, which shows exactly how much you can squander
your country's resources and, you know, just basically run an
economy to the ground.
Mr. Sherman. So the refined petroleum they are getting from
Iran actually exceeds the amount of unrefined petroleum that
they are able to export to Iran or anywhere else? They really
are a net energy importer?
Dr. de Bolle. They are turning into a net energy importer,
yes.
Mr. Sherman. That is a level of mismanagement that I did
not think was possible, but sometimes we are surprised.
I yield back. And I thank the chairman for letting me
participate in this hearing.
Dr. de Bolle. Thank you.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Juan Vargas.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear
me?
Mr. Sires. Yes.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
And I apologize, I had to run to vote, so I apologize for
missing a bit.
Dr. Monica de Bolle, you spoke quite a bit about Brazil in
your testimony, and you, early on, said some things about
Mexico, but you did not go into depth on Mexico, to be frank. I
would be interested in knowing what you think about Mexico in
the sense you said that, obviously, in Brazil, the early
response was disastrous, but also not favorable to Bolsonaro,
but there was unanimous consent to give money to people to
allow them to at least support themselves and get the economy
back on its feet.
Could you talk a little bit more about Mexico?
Dr. de Bolle. Absolutely. Thank you.
So, Mexico actually had from--the starting position for
Mexico was very similar to Brazil's. So the playing down of the
seriousness and gravity of the epidemic, the whole issue of
playing up health measures against the economy and sort of
using this narrative that lockdowns and quarantines were going
to hurt the economy and, therefore, should not be used, all of
that was Mexican--Mexico and Brazil were basically doing the
same thing, and spent months doing exactly that. Brazil is
still doing it, and, to some extent, Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador in Mexico is still doing it as well.
The difference, the main difference between the two
countries is that while Brazil's economic policy management has
been pretty bad, they have not actually responded adequately to
the epidemic. So there is rampant, as I said, bankruptcies and
credit crunches all over the place. They at least managed to
enact this one emergency basic income program to sustain the
vulnerable population.
Mexico did not even get as far as doing anything similar to
what Brazil did on that front, so--and this is curious, because
Lopez Obrador, who is elected and who campaigned on, you know,
buoying the vulnerable, helping the poor, and all of that, has
actually left that segment of the population hanging dry in the
middle of the pandemic. And what is happening in Mexico right
now, just as in other Latin American countries, it is precisely
the poor and the vulnerable who are being hardest hit by both
the economic shock as well as, obviously, the shock coming from
the public health crisis.
Mr. Vargas. So, Doctor, if I could continue on this, and
any of the other people can jump in. So I live on the border in
San Diego. So, when I listen to the music, there is one
particular station that actually comes from Tijuana, so they
have to do these commercials about Mexico, about the political
parties. And one of the things that his party continuously says
is how they are helping the poor, how the poor really get the
help during this epidemic, and then he comes on and says, you
know, ``Before they always bail out the banks and the rich
guys, we are doing it with the poor."
But I do not see that. I mean, is that the case? I mean, it
just sounds like rhetoric.
Dr. de Bolle. It is rhetoric. There is no program. There is
no sort of emergency basic income, cash transfer like, you
know, supportive program, and these are all cash transfer
programs at the end of the day. There is nothing of the sort
going on in Mexico, and there is nothing of the sort going on
in many other places in Latin America. There are a few places
where something similar has been tried. Brazil is the one
country that has really done a very generous benefit, one that
does not actually fit with the fiscal restriction that the
country faces. But leaving that aside, you know, it is mostly
rhetoric in Mexico, which is surprising, because AMLO's
approval ratings continue to be not bad.
Mr. Vargas. I was going to ask that. It sounds like there
is rhetoric and there is action. It seems like the rhetoric has
gotten him political benefit. But is the prognosis for the
economy bad? Are we going to see the 9.4 percent recession
increase? What are we going to see in Mexico then, if it is all
rhetoric?
Dr. de Bolle. So the likely scenario for Mexico right now
is that there will be a very deep recession this year. I think
this is pretty much, you know, consensual amongst different
Latin America countries. Brazil and Mexico, the two largest
economies in the region, are the ones that are probably going
to face the deepest recession in 2020. And then looking out
into 2021, the situation does not get much better.
So the prospects indicate that for Mexico at least--Brazil
is a little different, but for Mexico at least, there is no
case for thinking about a recovery in 2021. Because if you have
not laid out the foundation this year for dealing with the
economic problems that are going to continue into next year,
then that, of course, does not improve your standings going
into 2021.
So if that turns out to be true, I do not expect his
political approval to last much longer, or at least not beyond
this year.
Mr. Vargas. I see that my time has run out, Mr. Chairman. I
want to thank--I guess I yield back. I cannot hear you. You are
muted, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sires. Do you have another question?
Mr. Vargas. I did, but----
Mr. Sires. Go ahead.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you. I apologize, I am going over. I do
not want to take anyone else's time.
But to the other two presenters, I mean, Mexico, obviously,
is a neighbor of mine. We just heard from the doctor now, but
do you see it the same way? I mean, I do not understand what
their--and they have just been in denial, and they have got all
sorts of COVID cases. I mean, how are they going to get out of
this? How are they going to get out of this?
Mr. Camilleri. Congressman, I very much agree with Dr. de
Bolle's analysis of the situation. The lack of fiscal stimulus
has been a surprise, given the ideology and the expressed
priorities of AMLO's government, although this commitment to
fiscal austerity has been a theme of his, really from the
beginning. It is a little surprising he did not revisit that in
the context of a pandemic that has really devastated the
economy. But, nonetheless, this is a trend, and it is one that
will put Mexico in a deep hole, and one that it will have to
kind of dig itself out from over the next year.
It is true that his approval ratings remain high, and I
think you spoke to this a little bit when you alluded to his
allusions to past corruption, to government that benefits the
elites in the country. A lot of that is true. And AMLO came to
power having sort of tapped into the broad public frustration
with governing elites in the country. Unfortunately, he has
been much less effective, I think, at building institutions and
building systems of governance that actually address the
corruption that he very, I think, accurately diagnosed. In
fact, what we see is him turning to a kind of doubling down on
a militarized approach to public security; as Monica mentioned,
a very kind of poor pandemic response in terms of the
deployment of public services, and even recognizing the gravity
of the situation. And on the rule of law front, I think some
real warning signs in terms of erosion of oversight bodies,
independent agencies, regular attacks on the free press and
civil society.
So, I think, unfortunately, there is a lot to be concerned
about south of the border, and not just the economic situation.
Thank you.
Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Vargas, may I make a comment or two?
Mr. Vargas. Yes.
Mr. Farnsworth. Thank you very much for the opportunity.
I think over the medium term, recovery is going to have to
be investment-led, and investment, you know, from the United
States, from Canada, and the USMCA, domestic investments in
Mexico and investments from elsewhere. But there does seem to
be a bit of complacency, perhaps. Now that USMCA has passed,
that investment flows are automatically and miraculously going
to regenerate. If only that were the case. It is clearly an
advantage to link Mexico to the rest of North America, but
there is also a lot of work that has to be done within Mexico
itself to draw the investment within the USMCA context.
And what we are seeing is some concern in the investor
community about actions that have been taken, perhaps on the
backtracking on the reform agenda around energy in particular,
but in other sectors as well, canceling contracts, that have
been previously, you know, agreed upon, and some other actions
like that.
And the investment community is very cautious. And, yes,
there are huge advantages that Mexico maintains, but also,
there are some actions that have cut the other direction that
have caused some concern.
The one thing that I would suggest, however, though, is
that there is a massive opportunity here, because as supply
chains are beginning to shift, particularly out of China, but
perhaps out of Asia more broadly, Mexico is perfectly
positioned geographically, culturally, historically, et cetera,
to build those supply chains with the United States, with North
America and, frankly, with the rest of Latin America.
Now is the time to be doing that. And I can tell you, with
direct knowledge, that there are other countries around the
region that are actively pursuing that approach, very
aggressively and very successfully, in some cases. I think
Mexico could do that as well, and that would clearly be one way
to, you know, support recovery over the medium term.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you,
and thank you for allowing me to go long. I apologize, but I
really do appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sires. You know, I want to talk a little bit about
Colombia. I recently sent a letter to the President of
Colombia, regarding the murder of five Afro-Colombians. It just
seems to me that during this pandemic, doing the deal with the
FARC, the securing long-lasting peace, enhancing the rule of
law, and ensuring greater economic and social inclusion has
taken a step backward. Can you comment on that in Colombia?
Michael?
Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Chairman, anyone in particular, or
Michael, go ahead.
Mr. Sires. Michael, go ahead.
Mr. Camilleri. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to speak on this. I fully share your concern and your
perspective. You know, while it is the case that overall
violence levels in Colombia have come down, there has been this
spate of killings of human rights defenders, of social leaders,
to demobilize FARC members, as well as, as you mentioned, this
very brutal killing of the five Afro-Colombian teenagers in
Cali, dozens of massacres in just the last few months.
So this takes us back to really some of the dark times in
Colombia, and I think you are right to shine a spotlight on
this, and to ask the authorities there to focus on these
challenges before they spiral out of control.
In the case specifically of the five teens in Cali, my
understanding is the alleged perpetrators have been identified
and arrested. That is obviously extremely important. Impunity
is one of the structural factors that leads to this kind of
violence in Colombia, and we see over and over again that,
especially Afro-descendant and indigenous communities are
disproportionately impacted. They tend to be present in zones
most afflicted by violence and conflict, and be marginalized
from State presence and public services.
So, thank you for your leadership on this, and I hope you
will continue to call it to the attention of our government, as
well as the authorities in Colombia.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Mr. Farnsworth. I am sorry, I missed that. You were----
Mr. Sires. Would you like to add something to this?
Mr. Farnsworth. Yes. Thank you, sir, just a very brief
comment. You know, it is a bane of U.S. foreign policy, I
think, to look at an issue and see an issue, and, perhaps,
conclude an issue and then move on to the next thing and kind
of forget sometimes about the need to maintain vigilance in
various activities.
I think Colombia, on a bipartisan basis, has been the top
foreign policy success story of the United States and the
Western Hemisphere for a long time. But having said that,
absolutely, there continue to be challenges, which have been
exacerbated by COVID, which have been exacerbated by the
collapse next door in Venezuela, by the polarization in
Colombia itself politically. There are some real issues here.
Having said that, I think it is entirely appropriate for
the United States, which has invested billions of dollars in
Colombia, alongside the Colombian people, to be very vigilant
in promoting a value set that is critically important for
Colombia to advance to the next stage of development--
protection of human rights, protection of the value structure
that we would hold dear ourselves in the United States. I think
that is an entirely appropriate approach to take.
But I would simply caveat that as well by saying the
challenges in Colombia are very large. The issues have not,
quote/unquote, been solved, and that partnership remains vital
and has to continue to remain vital.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Monica, do you have anything you would like to add?
Dr. de Bolle. No. The only thing I would add--and this goes
not only for Colombia but for other countries in the region--we
are at a very dangerous moment right now, because if we go back
to 2019, we saw demonstrations in the second half of 2019 being
sparked across the region. Colombia, they happened in Colombia
as well. Of course, Colombia was not the center of them. Most
of them were in Chile and Ecuador and other places. But at this
point in time, with the pandemic running rampant in all of
these places, with leadership being questioned, you know,
representation of democracy being questioned across the region,
the region is at a tipping point for another such social
upheaval event that we should be on the watch for. Thank you.
Mr. Sires. [inaudible] a little bit about Nicaragua--unless
Mr. Vargas has a question. No? Go ahead, Mr. Vargas.
Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, I do not. I am also interested in
the Nicaraguan response from our presenters. Thank you.
Mr. Sires. OK. I recently sent a letter to the President
regarding Valeska Aleman and Moises Alberto Ortega Valdivia,
regarding the fact that there they were deported. These people
were tortured in Nicaragua. They got to the border, and they
were asking for asylum, and the Administration just ignored
everything and sent these people back to Nicaragua, deported
them.
I mean, we got to stand for something. If we cannot give
these people some political cover, how do we expect them to
fight for democracy in their own country? Can anybody talk a
little bit about that? Michael, you want to start?
Mr. Camilleri. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to.
Mr. Sires. I am sorry I am using your first name, but it is
just a lot easier to see on the screen.
Mr. Camilleri. Fair enough, fair enough. Mr. Chairman,
thank you. Obviously, this flies in the face of the refugee
protections enshrined in U.S. law and international law. It is,
frankly, also really disheartening on a human level. These are,
as you mentioned, people who are literally putting their lives
on the line to defend the principles that we claim to stand for
as a country. It is hard to understand, when the Trump
Administration has been so vocal about the condemnation of
human rights abuses by the Ortega regime, how this sort of
thing could have happened.
And if you will allow me a final comment, this is precisely
the kind of hypocrisy, or perceived hypocrisy, that erodes, in
my experience, U.S. credibility in the region, and feeds the
false narrative that the defense of human rights is simply a
political instrument that we, as a country and as a government,
deploy selectively against adversarial governments.
When we do not practice what we preach, it makes it that
much harder for us to defend and promote the principles that I
think we do stand for as a government. So, thank you again for
calling attention to this.
Mr. Sires. Anyone else want to add something?
Mr. Farnsworth. I think what Michael said is spot on.
Mr. Sires. Sorry. Go ahead, Eric.
Mr. Farnsworth. I think what Michael said is spot on. This
is a tragic case. Hopefully, it was isolated and will not be
repeated. The truth of the matter is, though, if we are asking
people to stand up in their home countries, to take politically
difficult, even life-threatening actions, when they do that, it
is incumbent on us, in my view, to welcome them into our
country, if they need assistance.
Obviously, it is highly political, it is highly difficult
to determine, you know, certain claims from other claims, but
as a matter of principle, I think that should be the baseline,
and then we try to identify the individuals who may or may not
be seeking asylum in accordance with that.
But in Nicaragua, this is a country that has clearly
returned to authoritarian governance. Daniel Ortega did allow
an election at the end of the 1980's, his first term, and he
did respect that, but then, once he got reelected to office, he
is most likely going to make sure that such a circumstance does
not happen again.
So this is a country that is clearly headed in the wrong
direction. The human rights and democracy defenders within that
country are taking real risks at personal cost, and I think it
is incumbent on us to recognize that and to assist them where
we can.
Mr. Sires. Monica de Bolle.
Dr. de Bolle. Now I would just like to add my whole voice
to Michael's and Eric's. I completely agree with everything
that was said, and I would add that, you know, once we think
about the China issue and the concerns that we have about China
building bridges into the region, this is another sensitive
area that we should be well aware of.
If we are going to have the sort of policies toward Latin
America that actually leave the region in a worse place, then
evidently that leaves a very large room for China to be
involved in. So just wanted to add that comment.
Mr. Sires. Well, thank you very much. Thank you all. You
have been most gracious with your time and patience. I
certainly appreciate it, and I am always very happy to see you,
because I always get a lot of good information from you when
you come before the committee. And unfortunately we have to do
this through Zoom and it gets very complicated, but you are
real troopers and you are always there to help the committee
get informed on what is happening in the Western Hemisphere.
And I just want you to know as chairman, and a representative
of the other members, I do thank you for that. And we are going
to close now. Thank you for joining us today.
This virus has taken over 300,000 lives in Latin America
and the Caribbean. As countries throughout the region struggle
to get the coronavirus under control, we must further deepen
our engagement in this hemisphere, lifting up our Latin
American and Caribbean allies is in our interest, as the
security and the prosperity and the strength of the democratic
institution all have direct impact on us.
I thank our witnesses and the members for participating.
With that, the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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