[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION DURING THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 14, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-132
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-927 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and The Environment
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois, Ranking
GREGORY MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
DAVID TRONE, Maryland RON WRIGHT, Texas
JIM COSTA, California MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
Gabrielle Gould, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Froman, The Honorable Michael, Chairman, Mastercard Center for
Inclusive Growth............................................... 8
Donfried, Dr. Karen, President, German Marshall Fund of the
United States.................................................. 20
Ellehuus, Ms. Rachel, Deputy Director, Europe Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 32
Carafano, Dr. James Jay, Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign
Policy, E.W. Richardson Fellow, The Heritage Foundation........ 41
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 73
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 74
Hearing Attendance............................................... 75
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION DURING THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC
Tuesday, July 14, 2020
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
Energy, and the Environment,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC,
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., via
Webex, Hon. William R. Keating(chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Mr. Keating. The House Foreign Affairs subcommittee will
come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have
5 days to submit statements, extraneous materials, and
questions for the record subject to the length limitations in
the rules. To insert something into the record, please have
your staff email the previously mentioned address or contact
full committee staff.
Please keep your video function on at all times, even when
you are not recognized by the chair.
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves,
and please remember to mute yourself after you have finished
speaking. Consistent with House Res. 965, the accompanying
regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as
appropriate when they are not under recognition to eliminate
background noise.
I see that we have a quorum present. I really thank all of
you. This has been the third hearing of this subcommittee in a
week, all very well-received.
And I will now recognize myself for opening remarks.
Pursuant to notice, we are holding the hearing to discuss
the importance of transatlantic cooperation during the COVID-19
pandemic.
We are tragically on our way to 600,000 deaths from COVID-
19 worldwide during what has been the most significant upheaval
in global security and stability since World War II. Everyone's
life has changed dramatically. Hundreds of thousands of
families are mourning the loss of loved ones. I have six
friends who have passed away. Millions have lost their job.
Businesses have gone under. Our most vulnerable have been
disproportionately impacted, whether frontline and healthcare
workers, minority communities, victims of domestic violence,
among many others.
Further serious issues we face domestically and
internationally were not put on hold during this crisis. Last
month, a call for equality echoed around the globe. The murder
of George Floyd sparked a movement calling us to urgently
address systemic racism and the senseless killing of black and
brown people here in the United States, Europe, and around the
world. These issues cannot wait until the pandemic is over. And
we, along with the democracies in Europe, must protect the
fundamental right to exercise those core freedoms while also
managing the spread of disease.
Internationally, threats from our adversaries have not
abated. Last week, this committee covered in depth the threats
we face from the Kremlin after reports broke late last month
that the Russian GRU put bounties on American troops.
We also have unprecedented times that we are dealing with
communities around the world turning to their governments to
make incredibly difficult decisions. At the local level, as
with all of you here, I felt this in my own district. We have
worked tirelessly to untangle supply-chain issues, help
individuals navigate pandemic-unemployment issues, fight for
small-business loans for those hit by the economic fallout from
the pandemic. And we field questions from schools and
businesses wondering when they should open up safely, how to do
it, what guidance is available to them.
In this committee and in the Armed Services Committee, on
which I share, we watch as dictators and authoritarian
governments, like Hungary and Poland, have used this pandemic
as an opportunity to consolidate power and sow great
instability.
The challenges we face today are the most complicated,
heartbreaking, urgent challenges that I have seen in my
lifetime. We need every strength and every resource we can. And
we have to work together in doing so, which brings us to the
focus of the hearing today.
It is reckless, unnecessary, and ultimately futile to do
this alone. This is the time to really drop all barriers we
have and to cooperate. Because if a lab in the U.K. is close to
a vaccine and a lab here in the U.S. has that missing piece, we
cannot wait for them both to figure it out on their own.
Because if a school system in Germany has learned that their
method of sending children back to school is or is not working,
I want the school district in my hometown to know whether that
works or whether it is not and if they could utilize that
information.
That is how we save as many lives as possible, because that
is our number-one priority right now. We all want to go back to
normal in our lives, but for what cost? How many thousands of
lives? Our best option for moving forward is to lead with the
best information and the best solutions available.
Unfortunately, that is not the theme we have seen from
President Trump's Administration. From pulling the United
States out of the World Health Organization, the Paris climate
accord, cutting back on the European Deterrence Initiative,
taking a quarter of our troops--or signaling that you will take
a quarter of our troops out of Germany, to signaling a go-it-
alone approach on vaccines, these are not the decisions that
will make us safer in the short term or the long term.
No one has all the answers; no one has all the resources.
This pandemic is just too big for any one country, as great as
it may be. And, you know, the virus knows no borders. Americans
deserve the best information, the best solutions from their
government. And if those come from cooperation with our closest
allies and partners, including Europe, which at the present
time is experiencing some success in trying to control this
virus, then we need to do everything in our power to work
together on this.
So I would like to thank our esteemed panel. I would like
to have discussions I know that will surface around what we can
do, discussions on tariffs, on pharmaceuticals, on working
together for PPE supply-chain issues, coordination, coupling
this coordinated approach with our efforts at self-sufficiency,
not limiting ourselves to a nationalistic approach.
So, I gather today to come forward, and I now yield to my
ranking member for an opening statement.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to all the witnesses, thank you for being here today.
Let me just say, you know, I think the very first thing we
can do is recognize the role that China has played in this.
Unfortunately, even that seems to be partisan now, as I have,
you know, friends that say that China is a distraction from the
real issue, et cetera. We have to recognize their role at the
beginning of this. And I think if we can get to that without
trying to see it as an opportunity to declare racism or use
political points, we can solve this problem together, as
Republicans, as Democrats, and also as Americans, with our
counterparts across the sea.
So, again, thank you, Chairman, for calling this hearing.
The EU and NATO, they are not just allies; they are our
most important allies. And we all understand that strong
alliances protect us from aggressors and guard our shared
values. Now, the alliance must adapt to continue to face the
threat brought on by the COVID pandemic.
I believe that the calls for the United States to retreat
from our global obligations are dangerous. The U.S. cannot face
this challenge alone. We must rely on the relationships we have
built over the past decade or more, past decades, to defeat
this pandemic.
While cooperation sometimes is difficult, it has shown that
that transatlantic relationship is strong. Because of our
alliances, our Nationhas repatriated hundreds of thousands of
citizens to their home countries, built nearly 100 field
hospitals, supplied over 25,000 beds, and deployed thousands of
medical personnel to help those countries that were hit the
hardest. Last of all, as the world faced a shortage of
lifesaving ventilators, the United States began shipping them
to our European allies, including France, Spain, and Italy.
Could more be done? Absolutely. We must all learn from our
past mistakes so that we can contain and better respond to
future pandemics.
We must also work together to pull ourselves out of the
current economic environment that we find ourselves in. Now,
more than ever, the U.S. and the EU need to cooperate on free
trade to recover from this pandemic. The U.S. and the European
Union are the world's two largest economies. Closer trade
cooperation will be critical in recovering from this, while
pushing back against China's debt diplomacy. Projects like the
Three Seas Initiative could not only be a game-changer for
Europe's energy markets but would provide an avenue for
stronger U.S.-EU cooperation.
As this pandemic spread, we quickly learned the many
lessons, like the dangers of centralized supply chains in
China. To better respond to future threats, we have to
diversify supply chains by bringing some of those jobs home.
However, it would be irresponsible to believe that we can bring
all of them back into the United States. So, instead of leaving
them in China, we should incentivize closer cooperation within
our hemisphere and Europe.
Let us not forget that the Chinese Communist Party silenced
doctors, hid the virus until it was too late, and tried to
cutoff PPE from reaching European and American markets. It
bears repeating again. Additionally, the CCP has tried to
strain the U.S.-EU relationship through disinformation
campaigns. Luckily, last month, the EU Commission finally
acknowledged the threat posed by the communist regime.
Finding a cure to COVID-19 is a national priority for every
nation around the world, but that is why close U.S.-EU
collaboration, like the work being done between Pfizer and
Germany's BioNTech, will be critical in developing the drugs
needed to reopen our economies. The West is racing to find a
cure; the CCP is racing to steal that cure.
Last, we clearly need leadership of the World Health
Organization. However, if we want to bring about change at the
WHO, we should be at the table. Walking away, we cede our
ability to shape this body to the Chinese, who are the reason
that we are holding this hearing today.
I will say, however, that the WHO needs to be held
accountable to the fact that they ignored the pandemic at the
beginning. The head of the WHO was the tie-breaking vote
against declaring this a pandemic. We now know that there was
close discussion with the Chinese Communist Party, and we know
that they ignored advice from Taiwan because of their belief
that Taiwan should not be recognized as an independent nation.
Let's be clear: Taiwan is an independent nation, and China,
the Chinese Communist Party specifically, is not a friend and,
no matter how much money they give to the WHO or the United
Nations, do not have the world's interests at heart. So, as
much as we may criticize the United States or any other
country, I think to compare that in any way to the pure evil of
the Chinese Communist Party would be apples and oranges.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing. Thank you to the witnesses. And I will yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Keating. I thank the ranking member and share his
comments that both of our opening statements made and the real
fact that Europe and the U.S. are both facing great challenges
but that we also have within these challenges the chances for
greater opportunity.
And along those lines, we have an extraordinary list of
people here, each bringing their own perspective, each an
important perspective, to how we can look at these challenges,
meet them together, as we did with SARS and Ebola, but also to
learn from each other in the process and to talk about areas
where there can be greater cooperation that can really spawn
from our common threat with this virus.
Ambassador Michael Froman is the vice chairman and
president of strategic growth at Mastercard. He is the former
United States Trade Representative, former Assistant to the
President, and former Deputy National Security Advisor for
International Economic Affairs.
Dr. Karen Donfried is president of the German Marshall
Fund. She is a former Special Assistant to the President and
Former Senior Director for European Affairs at the National
Security Council.
Ms. Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director of the European
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
She is the former Principal Director for European and NATO
Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the
Department of Defense.
Dr. James Jay Carafano is the vice president of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and
Foreign Policy and an E.W. Richardson fellow at The Heritage
Foundation.
I will now recognize the witnesses for 5 minutes. And,
without objection, your prepared written statement will be made
part of the record.
First, Ambassador Froman, you are now recognized for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL FROMAN, CHAIRMAN, MASTERCARD
CENTER FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Mr. Froman. Well, thank you, and good afternoon, Chairman
Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, and members of subcommittee.
It is good to see many of you again.
As the chairman said, my name is Mike Froman. I am the vice
chair and president of strategic growth at Mastercard, former
U.S. Trade Representative and Deputy National Security Advisor.
And it is a pleasure to appear here to provide Mastercard's
perspective on the importance of transatlantic cooperation
during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.
As all of you know, Mastercard is a global technology
company in the payment sector which connects consumers,
financial institutions, merchants, governments, and other
organizations and enables them to use a trusted network to make
electronic forms of payment safely and securely and engage in a
wide range of transactions in the digital economy.
We also provide an array of information services and
cybersecurity tools, as well as solutions for digital identity
to ensure that people are who they say they are online.
We process transactions in over 150 currencies and 200
countries and territories, making us the most widely accepted
payment brand in the world.
And as part of our longstanding commitment to inclusive
growth, Mastercard has joined the crucial effort to combat
COVID-19. Among other actions, we have committed $250 million
of financial support, products, services, and technology over
the next 5 years to support the vitality of small businesses
and the financial security of their workers.
We have also committed tens of millions of dollars in
emergency grants to address the immediate needs of communities
in which we operate and to help rebuild the economy in light of
the crisis.
And, very importantly, we have committed $25 million and
worked with the Gates Foundation and Wellcome in the U.K. to
establish the COVID-19 Therapeutics Accelerator, which seeks to
expedite the discovery, development, manufacture, and
distribution of treatments and diagnostics to address COVID
worldwide. That effort has now attracted more than $300 million
of support from the U.K. Government and philanthropies on both
sides of the Atlantic.
And I mention these efforts because they underscore the
importance of both transatlantic cooperation and public-private
partnerships in the COVID-19 era. To combat both the health and
the economic effects of COVID-19, it is going to take a
concerted effort of both the private and the public sector here
and abroad, including with our partners in Europe.
Together, the U.S. and Europe have built an integrated,
rules-based global economy, resulting in decades of
unprecedented and peaceful growth. The pandemic has shined a
bright light on the need to work together to address the major
challenges facing that economy.
Let me start with China. The United States and Europe share
a common objective in determining how best to integrate an
economy as large and important as China's into the rules-based
system. That requires that we promote consistent and
enforceable global rules pertaining to policies that mandate or
encourage noncommercial technology transfer, address the impact
of State-owned enterprises and the use of State subsidies,
protect intellectual property rights, and ensure fair market
access.
Next, the maintaining and development of global standards,
particularly with regard to new technology, is a critical area
for transatlantic cooperation. The world has spent the better
part of a century designing standards to facilitate global
commerce, but today we see a rising trend of nations advancing
localization requirements, including those that prohibit the
transfer of data across borders, imposing technical standards
that preclude competition, and promoting local monopolies. We
cannot fully achieve the benefits of global growth in an
archipelago world where every country operates as an island.
We also need to work together to update the global trading
system, which has not kept pace with the evolution of the
global economy. For example, no economic sector could benefit
more from rules that facilitate trade than the services sector.
According to WTO, services account for about two-thirds of
global value-added trade. They account for four out of five
jobs in the United States. Yet this is a sector where trade
rules are the weakest. As strong services economies, the U.S.,
U.K., and EU have a common interest in doing better, including
by advancing our negotiation of an e-commerce agreement.
With respect to WTO reform, there are a number of potential
areas for transatlantic cooperation. The U.S. and our European
allies generally agree that the WTO must develop evidence-based
criteria for determining which country is developed and
developing and, therefore, what level of obligation they are
held to.
Our governments also agree on the need to strengthen WTO
rules on industrial subsidies. We need to ensure that WTO
members promptly and comprehensively notify their subsidies to
the WTO. And we need rules to address subsidies channeled
through State-owned enterprises.
Finally, the United States, U.K., and EU should be able to
work together to develop and implement reforms that would
ensure that the WTO dispute settlement system functions and
does so consistent with its mandate.
A comprehensive U.S.-U.K. FTA could potentially provide the
United States with an opportunity to develop new approaches to
trade, including with respect to digital trade, financial
services, and emerging technologies, with a like-minded ally
who plays a pivotal role in the global economy.
Finally, let me say a word about two issues that have the
potential to constrain transatlantic cooperation: the
unilateral imposition of a digital services tax and sanctions.
There are certainly circumstances that warrant the
imposition of economic sanctions. That said, weaponizing
finance through the imposition of broad-based, unilateral
sanctions runs the risk of incentivizing others to develop
alternative mechanisms for conducting international trade and
clearing transactions.
Such sanctions have the potential for creating unintended,
enduring, and broad-ranging consequences for the centrality of
the U.S. dollar, dollar-based institutions, and payment
networks, far beyond the specific country being sanctioned.
For these reasons, whenever sanctions are on the table, the
U.S. Government should consider a targeted, tailored approach,
working wherever possible with allies like the EU, which would
strengthen the action while minimizing the risk of unintended
consequences.
I appreciate the opportunity to share our views on these
issues with the subcommittee. Thank you for the time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Froman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Kinzinger. You are muted.
Mr. Keating. I was muted during that myself. I was just
going to introduce Dr. Donfried and say, I will let you know,
in case you do not have a timer in front of you on your screen,
roughly when the 5 minutes is up.
Dr. Donfried.
STATEMENT OF DR. KAREN DONFRIED, PRESIDENT, GERMAN MARSHALL
FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
Dr. Donfried. Thanks so much, Chairman Keating, Ranking
Member Kinzinger, and other members of the committee. It is
wonderful to have the opportunity to address the importance of
transatlantic cooperation during the pandemic.
The views I express are mine alone, not those of the German
Marshall Fund.
Allies matter. They especially matter when times are tough.
And these are tough times.
Unfortunately, as the pandemic confronted Americans and
Europeans, rather than boosting cooperation, the pandemic
exposed just how bad relations have gotten. This fraying of
transatlantic ties reflects years of disagreements over defense
spending, trade, technology, and much more.
Nonetheless, the pandemic should spur us to move beyond
ongoing disputes and focus on forging cooperative responses. I
would like to highlight three opportunities.
First, the U.S. and Europe should cooperate on ensuring
reliable supplies of PPE, personal protective equipment, and
developing a vaccine, as both the chairman and ranking member
have suggested.
There are calls on both sides of the Atlantic to no longer
rely on other countries for PPE. U.S. interests will be best
served, however, if we aim not for strict self-sufficiency but
for broad resilience by implementing existing plans for
stockpiling, encouraging diversity of supply, and keeping trade
free of barriers. That goal could be best achieved by
cooperating with our closest allies to build more integrated
supply chains across the transatlantic space to ensure that
neither the United States nor our European allies are dependent
on critical supplies from China or Russia.
The race to develop a vaccine illustrates a similar tension
between the impulse to withdraw from the world and the impulse
to cooperate with like-minded countries. The competitor of the
United States and Europe in the vaccine space is China, and we
need to foster cooperation on the vaccine between the U.S. and
Europe to allow for more effective competition.
Second, the U.S. and Europe should cooperate to provide
reliable information to our citizens during the pandemic. Facts
may be stubborn things, but the World Health Organization has
warned about an ``infodemic'' of false information about the
coronavirus.
GMF analyzed outlets sharing false content and developed a
policy roadmap on how to combat the ``infodemic.'' It is useful
not only for U.S. policymakers but also as a basis for a
transatlantic policy dialog given the shared interest in
safeguarding the information ecosystem.
GMF's Alliance for Securing Democracy is tracking Chinese
and Russian State-based messaging, which shows how the pandemic
has spawned an epidemic of online disinformation. Congress has
a key role to play on drafting legislation to combat
disinformation, and we can learn valuable lessons on how Europe
is responding.
One important arrow in our quiver to combat both
misinformation and disinformation has been the federally funded
media entities, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
overseen by the U.S. Agency for Global Media. The Agency's new
CEO set off a firestorm of controversy when he immediately took
action to fire top executives and remove the boards of the
constituent entities last month. In Congress, bipartisan
concern has been expressed in both chambers, including by this
committee.
Chairman Keating, thank you for your leadership and
bipartisan efforts in support of U.S. international
broadcasting to ensure individuals living in closed systems can
access outside information.
Third, we need transatlantic cooperation to meet the
challenge of China. Chinais a commercial partner and rival as
well as a political adversary of the United States and Europe.
Given this multifaceted relationship, both sides of the
Atlantic are struggling with how to manage China's rise and the
accompanying challenges.
Unfortunately, the United States and Europe have largely
addressed these challenges separately. During the initial part
of the coronavirus outbreak, both Europe and the United States
turned inward, putting in place export bans and tariffs on
medical equipment. All of our countries were slow to help each
other.
China was particularly quick to exploit the vacuum created
by this harsh transatlantic reality, shipping needed medical
equipment. GMF mapped China's assistance to 27 countries across
Europe and found that the aid reflected national and economic
interests, not simply humanitarian impulses.
A recent public opinion survey, ``Transatlantic Trends,''
produced by GMF and partners, shows how Americans, French, and
Germans see China's influence increasing but also how they see
China's influence as ever more negative.
These public attitudes match the transatlantic conversation
among both EU and U.S. government officials, who now
acknowledge that the two sides need to do more together on the
China challenge. I believe a congressional-European Parliament
dialog would help establish a common transatlantic perspective
on China.
To conclude, these proposed initiatives are one way to
express transatlantic solidarity to meet the specific
challenges of this pandemic, and to position the United States
and Europe for a post-COVID-19 world marked by great-power
competition. It is in our shared interest to face the current
reality of COVID-19 together.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Donfried follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
And now the chair recognizes Ms. Ellehuus.
STATEMENT OF RACHEL ELLEHUUS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Ellehuus. Perfect pronunciation, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Ms. Ellehuus. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
opportunity to appear before you today.
These are tough times for our country, but I have no doubt
that we are stronger when we work together as a Nation and with
our allies and partners. Our European allies and partners are
vital to the U.S. economic welfare and national security.
Whether we are safeguarding an open and fair trade system,
deterring our adversaries, or assisting one another in
counterterrorism and law enforcement operations, our European
allies and partners magnify U.S. reach, power, and legitimacy
around the globe.
The importance of this cooperation is even more critical
when it comes to transnational threats such as COVID-19. Much
like climate change, the virus does not respect national
borders. Equally, it cannot be managed by any one country or
organization alone.
In the early days of the crisis, the immediate instinct was
for every nation to act for itself, yet the imperative of a
coordinated approach quickly materialized.
NATO sprung into action. It used its Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Coordination Cell to coordinate requests for and
offers of assistance from allies and partners, matching donors
and providers, and drawing on its transport capabilities to
move the materials.
The European Union, which has no mandate for public health,
found ways to assist its member-States with coordination and
funding. The Commission, for example, is pooling information
from all EU member-States regarding each country's opening
status, levels of risk, health requirements, and numbers of
cases and death. The EU has also played an important funding
role, both on funding a vaccine and treatment for COVID-19, to
a pilot program to support development of innovations to tackle
the virus.
Unfortunately, what is still lacking, despite some
improvements of late, is U.S. leadership. The current
administration has not assumed the global leadership role that
we saw traditionally played by George Bush during the AIDS and
SARS crisis and President Obama during the H1N1, Zika, and
Ebola epidemics, where the U.S. rallied countries to mount an
international, coordinated response. Our competitive, go-it-
alone approach to handling the pandemic will have costs with
our allies.
The President's unilateral announcement in March of a
travel ban against 26 countries occurred without prior
consultation with the EU. More recently, we declined to
participate in various international coalitions that are
pooling resources and risk in the global race to develop a
vaccine.
The Administration has also shown little interest in
assisting developing countries, having failed to spend most of
the $1.6 billion in emergency assistance that Congress
allocated in March.
Equally troubling, the U.S. approach to the pandemic has
become a part of a broader geopolitical competition with China,
causing paralysis in the Security Council. Rather than working
with our allies and partners to hold the WHO accountable and
demand a more effective response, the Administration
precipitously halted funding to the WHO and announced our
intent to withdraw from the organization at a critical time.
Shocked, yet not surprised, our allies and partners see
this as a continuation of our habit of unilaterally withdrawing
from international commitments, like the IMF Treaty, the Paris
climate accords, and the Treaty on Open Skies.
Meanwhile, security and defense challenges have not
subsided. NATO has seen an uptick in cyber attacks and
disinformation during the pandemic. Early in the pandemic,
Russian media falsely suggested that a British facility created
the coronavirus and deliberately planted it in China.
Subsequent disinformation efforts blamed the source of the
outbreak on U.S. and European elites and its spread on the U.S.
military. Since January, the EU's External Action Service has
logged more than 110 cases of Russian disinformation.
Russia is also pushing boundaries on the conventional
front. Three times in the week of March 7, they flew their
strategic bombers over the Barents, Norwegian, and North Seas.
While the jets were promptly met by NATO forces, it is clear
that Russia hoped to take advantage of a less contested
airspace to probe further south than in the past.
In light of these provocations, it is vital the U.S.
maintain its presence in Europe and NATO continue to reinforce
its deterrence and defense posture. The investments enabled by
the European Deterrence Initiative--and I would like to thank
Congress for its consistent support in this regard--ensure that
NATO is ready to deter and defend against the full range of
threats.
Sustaining this progress will not be easy. Prior to the
pandemic, 2020 was on track to be the sixth consecutive year of
growth in NATO defense spending. And while NATO's defense
budgets are likely to remain stable in the near term, the
economic damage created by COVID-19 will create downward
pressure on defense spending in the near term--in the medium
term.
Finally, a note on China. The pandemic has moved Europe
closer to the U.S. view on China. Moreover, disinformation
efforts by China to cover up and deflect blame for the pandemic
have exposed its authoritarian tactics and raised questions
about its motives. The recent U.K. decision to reduce Huawei's
access to the U.K. market may be a reflection of this.
In addition to NATO's ongoing discussions for standards of
communications and critical infrastructure, the U.S. and EU
must work together on a transatlantic approach to align
standards and rules--for example, with regard to foreign
acquisitions, emerging technologies, and supply chain
resilience.
With that, I will close and thank you for your time and the
honor of joining you today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ellehuus follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Staff. Sir, you are muted.
Mr. Keating. You know, remember in the beginning they said
they would keep my unmuting on? But that is not true.
The chair recognizes Dr. Carafano, and I hope he has
overcome some of the technical issues that he was dealing with.
Dr. Carafano.
He may not have. We will give him a few minutes just to see
if that can be rectified. If not, we will move forward to some
questions that we might have.
Let me get through the introductions, and if Dr. Carafano
comes in in the next minute or two, we will put him on.
I will recognize members for 5 minutes each, and, pursuant
to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes of
questioning our witnesses.
Because of the virtual format of this hearing, I will
recognize members of the committee by seniority, not
necessarily when they came on, and I will alternate between
Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, let our staff
know right away, and we will circle back to you.
If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone,
something that I have learned a couple of times already, and
address the chair verbally.
I will now start--quickly, I will see, Dr. Carafano, are
you back?
Evidently not. So I will recognize myself for questions.
Prior to COVID-19 affecting both Europe and the U.S., the
relationships had frayed, the tensions were greater, even
though we had common challenges, particularly from China and
from Russia.
I always put into perspective that members of parliament,
elected officials in Europe, just like ourselves, have
constituencies. They are answerable to those. So it is
important to know what is happening with those constituencies.
And one of the things that I did notice is, the early polls
showed a great unfavorability with the United States. And that
clearly would affect members of parliament.
However, recent polls have indicated in the midst of this
crisis that people in Europe were asked who would they like to
lead efforts dealing with this outside of their own countries,
and the majority of those people said the United States. So
this is clearly an opportunity for us right now to go back and
strengthen this transatlantic relationship at a time of crisis.
I would just like to quickly ask all of our witnesses,
where would you start? What would be your top priority to try
and launch a U.S. action to try and move down this path?
Because it is an opportunity.
I can start with whoever wants to jump in first. We will
give the others time.
We have no takers. I will do it in the--I will go to
Ambassador Froman.
Mr. Froman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you said, I think there are a wide range of
opportunities to get things back on track in terms of
cooperation. The most urgent right now is dealing with the
COVID response and, as some of the others have noted, working
together on therapies, diagnostics, and a vaccine, making sure
that they are developed and distributed globally in a way that
is equitable, as well, to address that challenge.
I will leave the military and security issues to others on
the panel who are more expert in that. I would say, on the
economic side, we are going to need to cooperate to make sure
the stimulus programs that every country is doing are as
coordinated as possible and, when there are challenges to them,
that they are not withdrawn in an uncoordinated fashion.
And then, similarly, on the trade side, resolving some of
the bilateral disputes we have and finding ways to work
together on third-party issues, whether it is with China or
with regard to the WTO.
Mr. Keating. Okay.
Dr. Donfried, do you have any thoughts? Where would you
start?
Dr. Donfried. Thanks so much.
Just two quick points. One, to buttress your comment that
there is an opening, I just want to share some of the findings
from this public opinion survey, ``Transatlantic Trends,''_
because there is a question about which actor is most
influential in global affairs. The survey was taken twice, in
January, so before the pandemic, and then again in May. In both
instances, Europeans and Americans see U.S. influence in the
world as most significant. Now, there was a drop in U.S.
influence, but it is still dominant.
You see China's influence growing over that period of
January to May, but, as I mentioned earlier, Europeans
increasingly see China's role as a negative one. So there is an
appetite for leadership, and there is an opportunity for the
U.S. to step in.
The second point is that, we should do our best to
cooperate on the highest-profile issue out there as it relates
to COVID-19, which is finding a vaccine. There is nothing that
animates us more right now than the pandemic, and, within that,
it is a vaccine or successful treatments that would allow us to
return to some semblance of our pre-pandemic lives. So, if the
United States and Europe can move out together on that, I think
it would be a powerful move.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Ms. Ellehuus.
Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you.
Not surprisingly, I will echo the three buckets. As you
said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, saving lives is the priority.
So I would encourage the United States to join its European
allies and partners in the development of a global COVID-19
vaccine effort, as well as equitable access to the vaccine for
all.
The door certainly remains open. I think as Representative
Kinzinger pointed to, there is some great cooperation going on
among private-sector companies; we just need that government-
to-government cooperation to overlay itself on top and provide
some direction and leadership.
I think, fortunately, in terms of military cooperation,
both bilaterally and within a NATO context, the U.S. does
continue to lead. The European Deterrence Initiative is alive
and well, and NATO allies are stepping up to revise the command
structure and adapt the alliance to take into consideration
things like the growing threat from China and disinformation.
So I think we are on a good track there, but we just need to
stick together.
Mr. Keating. Great.
I have been told that Dr. Carafano is back online. He will
be recognized for his opening statement. If he wants to
incorporate any of the answers to this as part of that, feel
free.
Dr. Carafano.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, VICE PRESIDENT, KATHRYN
AND SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FOREIGN POLICY, E.W. RICHARDSON FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Dr. Carafano. Thank you. I am happy to waive the opening
statement and just jump into the conversation. I apologize for
the technical difficulties, but I have figured out a
workaround.
What I would have said in my opening statement is, all of
this is in the context of the great-power competition. COVID
did not stop that. In some ways, it has accelerated it. And the
number-one priority for the transatlantic community to thrive
in this environment is restarting our economic engine.
So I would put anything to do with transatlantic
partnership and economic recovery as absolutely the priority.
Everything else, I think, is just really smokescreen if we
cannot get our economy up and running again.
I think a great place to start is the Three Seas
Initiative. It involves a number of very important European
partners. The United States has already committed to that. It
has committed to that in a constructive way by bringing in the
Blue Dot Network as a standard for international investment.
I think the U.S. could double down on the investment we are
already making. I think it could expand it to areas outside of
energy cooperation. I think that would be a very powerful and
important way to jump in, in a way that is already established.
This is already taking off and running. The next conference is
in October.
Second, behind that, as quickly as we seal a U.S.-U.K.FTA,
I think that is an important step in building economic--and
then the other thing, I really think that a digital free-trade
agreement, e-commerce agreement, is achievable and really
important in opening up U.S.-European economic innovation and
creativity.
I think the Europeans were wrong to press the United States
to enter a pact to increase taxes on Big Tech. I think the U.S.
was right to lead the OECD negotiations. I think in the USMCA
agreement and in the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement we have
a good framework for what a good deal would look like, and I
think it is time for the U.S. to really move out and press--
take the momentum and press for an initiative on that front.
Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you very much, Doctor.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger,
for his round of questions.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have to say I am very impressed by Representative
Costa's--it looks like he is a benevolent spirit floating
around a beautiful canyon. So it has put me in a great mood.
So, anyway, thank you guys for all being here, as I
mentioned.
Dr. Carafano, I have three questions for you and then one
for Mr. Froman so we can plan our time accordingly.
So, Dr. Carafano, in a post-COVID-19 era, how do you
perceive the Three Seas Initiative helping to reboot the
economic recovery of Central Europe?
And, also, could you briefly touch on, you know, what
role--how do we get Europe to push back against the temptation
of accepting the, quote/unquote, ``free money'' that will come
from China in the recovery process?
Dr. Carafano. Thank you.
So the Three Seas Initiative is really about building
north-south infrastructure, which I think is enormously
attractive not just to the Central Europeans and to the Baltic
States and to Southern Europe but should be attractive to all
of Europe, because that is potentially a new engine of economic
activity that really is going to benefit all of Europe.
I think all of Europe recognizes that. There are obviously
trillions of dollars of investment in infrastructure that is
needed. And I think the private sector is looking for places to
invest where there is money on a return on investment. And I
think the bulk of this will be done with private-sector money.
And I think the private sector is willing to step in. It is
looking for the commitment from European partners that they are
going to green-light these projects. It is looking for
confidence from the United States that the United States sees
that it is an investment worthwhile, that the European Union
sees that it is an investment worthwhile.
It has not just the added benefit of new economic
opportunity for all of Europe, but it creates new avenues for
energy security for Western Europe which will greatly enhance
the stability and security of Western Europe----
Mr. Kinzinger. Can I----
Dr. Carafano. Yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. I am going to interrupt you real quick and
say, when we are talking about energy issues, can you talk also
about the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and how important are
additional sanctions for that, to stop that?
Dr. Carafano. Well, I think Nord Stream 2 just undermines
all of this. Nord Stream 2, by essentially creating a
workaround, would really kind of destroy the incentives for all
these projects.
And we have seen some real successful initiatives recently.
So, for example, the Croatia LNG ports, going forward, they
have sold every cubic foot of natural gas for the next 3 years.
That is a small but important step, and there is growth
capacity there.
And so there is lots of interest in looking for these
projects, and I think what Nord Stream 2 does is it undermines
the economic case for all of this. These are projects that are
very doable. They carry very little political risk, and they
bring enormous benefits.
And I think that is the third pillar, which is, you know,
we do not think of Three Seas as a military project, as a
strategic initiative, but, from a practical perspective, you
are strengthening the frontier of NATO. You are creating north-
south infrastructure which is completely dual-use, and you are
making that part of Europe more resilient against Russian
pressure.
So it literally is the lowest-hanging fruit. And, to me,
the great advantage is, it is an investment to the United
States. We are not lending money. We are investing money. And
we will probably make a very decent rate of return on that.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Froman, let me ask you, how has the pandemic and the
resulting economic fallout affected the U.S.-U.K. and U.S.-EU
trade negotiations? What do we need to be aware of?
Mr. Froman. Well, I think, just practically, it has slowed
down any engagement with either, just because everyone is
preoccupied in other ways.
I do think there is potential to get both back on track in
the near future and that, with the U.K., there is great
potential, as I mentioned, to explore new rules around digital
economy, around new technologies with a like-minded partner
that could set a standard, building on USMCA and elsewhere to
take that forward.
With the EU, there are some traditional issues of dispute
that we have, particularly over agriculture, which are no
easier now than they were several years ago to resolve. I see
Congressman Costa laughing; he knows them well.
But I think there, too, the dialog has evolved so that,
while a big, comprehensive free-trade agreement that has been
pursued in the past may not appear possible at the moment, it
could be possible to work together on things like e-commerce,
on digital economy.
And I do believe, I am optimistic that there are ways of
squaring the circle between protecting privacy, which has been
an issue between the U.S. and the EU in the past, and allowing
for the free flow of data across borders, which creates so much
value and innovation for the technology communities and for
consumers, very importantly, most importantly, on both sides of
the Atlantic.
Mr. Kinzinger. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. I appreciate you and all
the witnesses.
Mr. Keating. Yes. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Mr. Meeks of New York.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Chairman Keating. It is fantastic.
You have some great witnesses here.
And I thank each and every one of you for your testimony.
Let me start with Mr. Froman, you know, because I know we
have had conversations before, and I do agree when you say that
public-private partnerships are critical to addressing major
economic and social challenges. And, you know, I just had a
conversation with someone on another committee in that regard
and seen it work.
But my question to you is, what do you see as potential
barriers to strengthening the transatlantic private and public
partnerships as the United States and Europe allies seek to
stimulate growth in the aftermath of COVID-19 and to maximize
both taxpayer dollars and yet leverage the expertise provided
by industries like yours?
Mr. Froman. Thank you, Congressman.
You know, I think, as you note, a lot of these issues that
we are dealing with on both sides of the Atlantic we are only
going to solve if we bring the private sector to the table.
Government support is important, philanthropic support is
important, but unless we can really mobilize the ingenuity, the
resources of the private sector, it is very hard to address a
lot of these issues successfully.
I think one of the great obstacles, to answer your
question, is a lack of trust--a lack of trust on both sides of
the Atlantic. There is a lot of concern in Europe that American
companies are going to come in and buy up some of their crown
jewels or play a dominant role in their economy. And I think we
have to find ways of bridging that distrust so that we can
cooperate with each other.
Cooperation among the private sector generally works pretty
well. You know, we know how to do that with each other. But
where we can reassure governments that we are there to be a
partner and a problem-solver on the issues that they care about
most.
And I will just use one example from our own experience. In
the context of COVID, we worked not only the U.S. Government
through Direct Express Program of the Treasury Department but
with governments all over the world to help them make social
disbursements to individuals and small business to get through
this crisis.
And the more that we can demonstrate to them that we are
willing and able to bring our technology and our products and
services and expertise to the table to help them on their
issues, I think the more success we will have in building the
trust necessary for true public-private partnerships.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you for that.
And, you know, one of the frustrations I have, as a Member
of Congress, as the President pulls us out of all these
multilateral organizations, the latest being the World Health
Organization, is, what do we do, what do I do, as a Member of
Congress, to make a difference?
And, Dr. Donfried, you had talked about--and I think Ms.
Ellehuus also--about the resumption of annual United States-EU
summits and other summits that may bring parliamentarians and
parliamentarians together.
And what role do you think that these summits play? And do
they fill a gap? Are they significant and important for us to
have these conversations and
[inaudible] The significance and where the U.S. Congress
stands as it pertains to these multilateral organizations?
Dr. Donfried. I am happy to jump in. It was Rachel who
mentioned resuming those annual U.S.-EU summits, so I will
certainly have her speak to that, but I do think the more
contact there is, the better.
I want to pick up on something that Mike just said about
trust. Because when we think about alliances, I always ask, how
do you define an alliance? First, the countries in an alliance
share values. That is certainly true with the U.S. and Europe.
We also share interests. And we trust each other. I do think
that there has been a big wrecking ball that has affected trust
negatively in the transatlantic relationship over recent years.
We have to start rebuilding that trust, whether through
annual U.S.-EU summits or through stepped-up engagement between
the U.S. Congress and European parliamentarians, both the
European Parliament in Brussels and national parliament.
Because we share interests and values, we can coordinate
policy on all of the areas the witnesses have spoken about, and
I really would encourage increased parliamentarian dialog.
Thank you, Congressman.
Ms. Ellehuus. Karen, I am happy to pick up on the idea of
U.S.-EU summits. We used to do these annually. And then there
were a number of working groups that were subject-specific and
really just linked to whatever was timely. So, in these days,
it would probably be the things we have discussed today, like
the pandemic; healthcare; generally speaking, economic recovery
and how to work together in pushing back against China.
I think, though, the one thing we have to see in a bigger
context, though, is that the U.S.'s withdrawal from some of the
multinational treaties, like INF and JCPOA and Open Skies, are
not necessarily a problem in and of themselves. There are a
number of European allies who also view these treaties and
agreements as imperfect. But where I would really differ with
the approach that has been taken so far is that the answer is
to walk away.
I would like to see more open letters, whether it is on the
WHO or it is on arms control, between the U.S. and EU allies.
Maybe not the whole European Union, but it could be contingents
of like-minded allies, possibly bringing in Australia and
Japan. Making statements on things where we share a common
concern, and talk about how we fix these agreements rather than
tearing them down.
It is much harder to build something from scratch and to
get everybody on board again, much easier to tweak it at the
margins and update it and adapt it to today's problems.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
I am out of time. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Representative Wagner from Missouri.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this
hearing.
And thanks to all of our distinguished witnesses.
I would like to especially welcome Ambassador Froman, vice
chairman of Mastercard, who employees 3,200 of my constituents
and has proven to be a real ally in the fight to end human
trafficking.
So I thank you so very much for that and many other things.
The U.S.-European relationship has long been a source of
stability, and I am confident that cooperation between the
United States and its partners across the Atlantic will improve
our ability to respond to complex global health crises going
forward.
Dr. Carafano, how effectively are our European partners
pushing back on the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda
campaign and sharing the truth of the CCP's egregious
mishandling of the coronavirus outbreak? Do you anticipate that
European countries will be more willing to oppose Chinese
predatory investment practices and push to control
international organizations?
Dr. Carafano. Well, thank you for that question.
I think the trend line is positive for a stronger European
coordinated response on China. And I think this gets to the
larger narrative. I mean, we seem to have created a scenario
that the challenges in the transatlantic relationship are
really about this administration. I think doing that is a
mistake, because the reality is, the issues are far deeper.
They have been developing for some time. Many of them have to
do with European perceptions of their external environment,
including different European views on Russia and very, very
diversified European views on China.
What we have seen in the last 4 years, though, is, despite
the fact that transatlantic relations have been actually quite
contentious and the relationship with China is maybe the
defining challenge of Europeans, the trend is that Europeans
are moving more toward a position that looks more like the
United States: I mean, if you look at, for example, the shift
in the U.K. on Huawei investments; Central European countries
are much more skeptical of the Europeans.
Now, I am not being Pollyannaish about this, that there is
a unified European perspective on China. There isn't. That
actually is one of the greatest challenges to Europe, not just
to the transatlantic relationship.
But I think bringing transparency to Chinese activity--and
I think COVID has been an example where many, many players in
the NGO field and countries have done that, and that has helped
move it in the right direction.
I think transparency is the key weapon of the free world.
The more we explain what the Chinese Communist Party is doing,
the more countries will make better choices in terms of
developing a position----
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
Mr. Carafano [continuing]. That looks more unified across
the free world.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
Ambassador Froman, I am glad that you mentioned efforts to
reform the World Trade Organization as a potential area for
increased transatlantic cooperation.
How might the United States and European countries work
together to ensure the rules governing trade reflect the
rapidly evolving global economy?
Mr. Froman. Well, thank you, Congresswoman, and I think,
really, the WTO is an example of three things. It is a forum
for negotiating agreements; it is a place where countries
monitor each other's trade policies, including their subsidy
policies; and it is a place for dispute resolution. And right
now, all three parts are effectively deadlocked.
I think if the U.S. and the EU came together--and,
historically, it has been the U.S. and the EU that have really
driven the development of the global trading system--I think we
have so many common interests across all three, I think we
could move things forward.
Of course, it is an organization of 160 countries. So
whether it is China or India or any number of other countries
that might stand in the way of consensus and make some of that
reform difficult, but we should be prepared, then, to work with
each other, like coalitions of the willing, so to speak, to
move ahead like like-minded countries and create what we call
open plurilateralism, where ourselves and the EU and a few
others get together to move things along, and anybody else who
is willing to sign on to those rules could join----
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
Mr. Froman [continuing]. And that could help----
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
Mr. Froman [continuing]. Build the system.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
Two weeks ago, Estonia hosted a virtual foreign ministers
meeting for members of the Three Seas Initiative, a
multilateral effort to accelerate economic development and kind
of interconnectivity in the strategically critical region
between Baltic, the Black, and the Adriatic Seas.
Dr. Donfried, I know I have limited time, but given
mounting evidence that Russia is increasingly willing to accept
high levels of risk in its campaign to undermine U.S.
influence, how should the United States be proactively looking
for ways to tighten cooperation with Three Seas Initiative
countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic nations in this
post-pandemic world, in zero seconds?
Dr. Donfried. I think there are lots of opportunities. The
Administration has a strong relationship with Poland. We share
the same concerns about Russian behavior, and we will continue,
I think, in a transatlantic fashion to be deeply engaged in
standing up to Russia and being resilient to that threat. Thank
you.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
I appreciate the chair's indulgence, and I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Representative Titus from Nevada.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
to all the witnesses' very eloquent presentations.
You know, we know that the coronavirus is a public health
issue. It is also an economic crisis. But it is a crisis of
democratic governance, and, unfortunately, we have seen a lot
of examples recently of authoritarian governments using the
pandemic as an excuse to crack down on their populations and
consolidate power. We have seen human rights abuses. We have
seen journalists attacked. We have seen a lot of this in
Eastern Europe. And I am afraid we are going to be dealing with
the impacts of democratic backsliding that has taken place
during this virus for many years to come.
I am particularly concerned about Ukraine's backsliding on
some of their promised reforms, and I am wondering if all of
you could address how we can work with Europe to shore up
Ukraine and be sure that it moves toward the west as well as
support other, more--you know, some fragile democracies during
this time.
Dr. Carafano. Well, I will just start with one brief
comment. One of the areas where I think the U.S. has really
lagged is in public diplomacy, and particularly the work of the
Agency for Global Media. We have new leadership there. It is
very controversial, but I would love to see a strong bipartisan
effort really looking to see what we can do to make that agency
a more powerful and effective tool, particularly in talking
with our friends in Western Europe.
Ms. Titus. Anybody?
Ms. Ellehuus. Yes. This is Rachel. Just not to take up your
time, I think that the European Union can play a strong role in
addressing democratic backsliding, particularly some of the
eastern allies that you mentioned, like Poland and Hungary, are
major recipients of EU stability funds that help bolster their
countries. Maybe making those conditional on progress on some
of the democracy and rule of law indicators that you mentioned
would help incentivize good behavior.
In terms of shoring up our assistance to Ukraine, I think
we could be better at coordinating with other like-minded
allies, like Poland, Lithuania, United Kingdom, and the Baltic
States, who also invest a significant amount of money there.
Thank you.
Ms. Titus. Okay.
Dr. Donfried. This is Karen. Can you hear me?
Mr. Keating. Yes.
Ms. Titus. Uh-huh.
Dr. Donfried. Oh, thank you.
Congresswoman, I just wanted to point out the really
important work that USAID is doing in that region of Eastern
Europe. The German Marshall Fund has a trust called the Black
Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, and we are regranting U.S.
aid dollars to civil society actors in Ukraine and other
countries that border the Black Sea. The argument is that
democracy isn't just about free and fair elections, but it is
helping citizens hold government accountable. And for countries
that are still coming to terms with a long communist past,
building that strong civil society is a critical piece of what
we can be doing.
I just want to applaud the work USAID is doing through
organizations like GMF and the fact that there has been
consistent congressional support for that. I cannot underscore
the importance of that enough.
Thank you.
Ms. Titus. You know, I completely agree with you. I serve
on the House Democracy Partnership that works very closely with
USAID, and a number of these countries that we tend to think
that they are more in underdeveloped countries, but that that
is not the case when it comes to building that civil society
and that accountability and going after corruption. We think
that strong legislatures are the key to a strong government, so
what happens between elections is as important as what happens
on election day.
I am concerned, though--and I have--I know the chairman--I
would like to talk to him more about this--about the recent
appointment in the White House to be in charge of the USAID,
because I fear that he or she, both, are going to take us in
the wrong direction and have a record of statements that are
very contrary to what we have expected from USAID.
Mr. Keating. Great. Any other questions?
Ms. Titus. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
The chair recognizes Representative Fitzpatrick from
Pennsylvania. If your video is not on, please put it on,
Representative, according to the rules.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you to the panelists for being here today.
And just wanted to have--or get your honest feedback and
thoughts, perspectives on the World Health Organization.
Obviously, what we are here to talk about today is
transatlantic cooperation.
We all know that there have been an incredible amount of
loss of life and a loss of wealth as a result of this pandemic.
And, you know, if my dates are right, sometime as recently as
mid-January, the World Health Organization tweeted out that
they believed that there was no human-to-human spread of
coronavirus. So the question there becomes: How do we react to
this?
You know, I agree with Representative Kinzinger. We have to
remain at the table. We need to be seated at the table, for
sure. But what is the best response to this as far as a--you
know, once we get through this, a sort of after-action report,
audit into WHO? How should it impact their funding? How should
it impact the way the world views WHO, and the U.S. in
particular?
That is to anybody on the panel.
Mr. Froman. Congressman, it is Mike Froman here. And I am
no expert on the WHO, but let me just say that, as you and
Ranking Member Kinzinger said, we have got to remain at the
table. And if there is one lesson from one crisis after
another--and this is only the latest--it is U.S. engagement,
U.S. leadership is absolutely critical to shaping the rules and
the institutions that we need to deliver global public goods.
And the WHO is one of those. Whether it is through the G7 or
the G20 or through our membership in a number of multilateral
organizations, other countries look to us to provide both the
intellectual and the diplomatic leadership to get things done.
And going--looking ahead, I think figuring out how best to
apply that leadership to reengage and to make sure that we are
focused on reforming these institutions, updating them, and
making sure they have the resources that they need to succeed
is going to be a critical function for the U.S.
We have now--we have demonstrated through this crisis that
we are all so interconnected and that the welfare of one part
of the world very much affects the welfare of the other. We
cannot deploy--we cannot pretend that we can put up a wall and
keep ourselves away from the pandemic or another transnational
threat, and, therefore, it requires U.S. leadership.
Dr. Carafano. Jim Carafano. If I could just State briefly,
one of the things I highlighted in my written statement is
this. Look, international organizations are no longer just
about setting international norms in cooperation. They are
literally a new battleground in great power competition, and I
think we have to be realistic about that, and we have to have a
strategy that deals with these malicious influences. So I
actually do not think it is sufficient to just say we have to
stay at the table.
What we need is a strategy to either get organizations to
reform. We have to figure out if we--they do not--if we do not
need to be there, we can withdraw. And if we--if is it an
essential activity and we cannot get reform, then we have to
figure out how to replace them.
I think, in the case of WHO, clearly what we need is a set
of concrete expectations about appropriate behaviors that
address the failures of the WHO. And we would need to hold
participation and money to addressing that list, and I am happy
to provide for the record some suggestions for that, if that
would be helpful for the committee.
Dr. Donfried. I would argue that this is another example
where you can see the power of cooperation with Europe. The
U.S., if it stays at the table, stays in the WHO, and seeks to
reform that institution, will find European allies, who have
been very clear that they see a real need for WHO reform as
well. So why not use this moment to speak with our European
allies about what that reform agenda could look like? Surely we
will have more impact the larger the number of allies that we
have in the WHO to drive that reform.
We are more powerful when we work together with other like-
minded countries. Thank you.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you.
I just want to close by saying, you know, on the topic,
which is the topic of this hearing, transatlantic cooperation,
I cannot think of a more important thing for that to center on
than WHO reform, because I think we all recognize now that
there was very little oversight of WHO, No. 1.
And, No. 2, if people did not realize before, they should
realize now how incredibly important the functions of that
agency are; that they are responsible for alerting the world to
highly contagious pathogens that can cause an immense amount of
damage both to human life and to economic growth throughout the
world.
So utilizing some kind of international tripwire system,
which would be part and parcel to the sentinel surveillance
system, or some kind of tripwire that would identify any type
of novel outbreak at its source and require reporting, so that
other countries can put up their guardrails to whatever--to
whatever level they see fit to protect their nations, I think,
is going to be incredibly important.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keating. All right. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Vice Chair Spanberger from Virginia.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And to all of our witnesses today, thank you so much for
being with us. I am grateful for you all bringing your
expertise to this committee.
Ms. Ellehuus, I would like to begin with you. As you all
know very well, NATO does more to support U.S. interests than
many people realize or could imagine. For example, the allied
COVID-19 response efforts facilitated the delivery of critical
medical supplies and the deployment of medical professionals to
the United States. Additionally, the NATO Support and
Procurement Agency has supported allies and partners through
the COVID-19 relief acquisition and transport, and NATO members
have been able to request and receive PPE through the NATO
Logistics Stock Exchange.
Could you elaborate a bit on how NATO has contributed to
the COVID-19 response, and particularly how the United States
has or has not engaged with that coordinated response, first
piece?
And then, second, as we are looking toward the future, when
we look at our infection rates, when we look at the potential
for additional waves into the future, how could NATO members,
including the United States, ensure that we are most
effectively responding at home and also best utilizing and
strengthening the existing mechanisms that exist within our
NATO partnership?
Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you. I actually think that NATO is a
bright light in terms of U.S. leadership and cooperation. NATO,
as I said in my testimony, was very quick to start coordinating
donors with countries that needed assistance. Of course, NATO
has very few commonly owned capabilities, so it draws on the
resources of its member States.
But among the aircraft that were used to transport that
equipment was the Strategic Airlift Consortium, which is a
grouping of allies who purchase C-130 aircraft and share hours
on those flights for exactly these types of situations,
emergency transport requirements. So I would like to see a bit
more pooling and sharing of resources in the future on these
high demand, low-density type of capabilities, like strategic
and tactical lift, as well as some intelligence capabilities.
NATO has also played a great role in terms of resilience.
Their Civil Emergency Protection Cell has done resilience
assessments of all the NATO allies. So they look at how well or
poorly they were prepared to withstand COVID-19 and similar
crises in the future, whether manmade or natural. And the next
step would be for NATO to update their baseline requirements on
resilience, so things like energy, telecommunications, supply
chain security. What do we need to make all of those things
more resilient? And I do think that, in the future, part of
that answer are these political discussions going on at NATO
about the baseline requirements with regard to China in all of
those areas.
And the final area where I think there is progress for NATO
to be even better prepared in the future would be some
consideration of stockpiling. We do not want to spend all the
alliance's resources on preparing for eventualities that might
not come to pass, but if it is something--even if it is low
likelihood but high consequence, NATO should consider that in
its defense planning and resourcing decisions.
Thank you.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Froman, a followup question very much related to
that one. There appears to be a fair amount of potential for
improvement about how it is that we can optimize our medical
supply chain and the security of that supply chain to ensure
that for future waves we do not have the same challenges that
we faced as it related to nasopharyngeal swabs or reagents or
PPE.
Could you discuss how the United States and our European
partners could work together to diversify our medical supply
chains to improve our own health and resiliency and also serve
the potential goal of reducing dependence on countries like
China?
Mr. Froman. Thank you, Congresswoman. You know, I think
companies have been looking at their supply chains now for some
time. For a while, it was because costs in China were already
going up on their own 20 percent a year. And then due to the
trade tensions with China, there was a concern about being
overly reliant on suppliers coming from that market.
Now COVID, of course, has underscored the importance of
looking at supply chains and looking at it from an operational
risk perspective. Can we afford from a risk perspective to be
so dependent on one country or to be so dependent on supply
chains that are so extended around the world? And that has led
companies to move supply--either to diversify supply chains in
the region, move them closer to home, or, in fact, move some of
the production back to home, and in each case it will be
somewhat different.
Where there are critical supplies, then we do need to look
at what needs--what can we--what do we absolutely need to have
produced in our country and what can we rely on trade and
exports from allies nearby? And I think that is the key
question that we are going to have to work our way through.
There is always a risk of fighting the last battle, which
is, let's look at nasal swabs, when the next battle may not
have anything to do with a pandemic or nasal swabs or tests. We
just need to look more generally at the resilience of our
supply chains, the diversification, and then where there is an
absolute strategic priority, whether it needs to be
domestically.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me go over. I yield
back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you very much.
And that goes, Ambassador Froman, for intermediate products
in the supply chain as well, which are critical.
The chair recognizes Representative Burchett from
Tennessee.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And just for the
record, I hate following Ms. Spanberger. That is why nobody
wanted to follow Jimi Hendrix at Woodstock, because her grasp
and knowledge of these topics are--surpass my 6 years of
undergraduate studies at the university. So I am always--I
always like hearing from her, especially with her perspective
and her background. That is an all----
Mr. Keating. Well, you could be the Leon Russell
representative.
Mr. Burchett. Yes. I play at 6:30 in the morning. Everybody
would cuss me.
Hey, I appreciate you all being here. And, Mr. Chairman,
again, excellent, excellent panel, once again. I hate having to
say that to you every time, but, dadgummit, it is the truth.
I am concerned about Beijing's mishandling of the COVID-19,
the CCP subsequent disinformation campaign. And how can the
U.S. stress to its European allies and partners the need to
take the threat from Beijing more seriously. You know, I was
glad the UK did not get in--on the Huawei with their 5G, and
they got off that. And so I will just ask, and I quit. Any of
you all can jump in.
Dr. Donfried. I am happy to jump in. I think that is a
critical area for transatlantic cooperation, and I do believe
that there has been a real sea change in European attitudes
toward China over the past year and a half. You see it in some
of the official statements that have come out and you see it in
terms of specific policy changes.
Europeans, both because of the extent to which China has
been buying up strategic investments across Europe, and because
of what China is doing on the human rights front, whether it is
their treatment of the Uighurs in Xinjiang, or what is
happening with Hong Kong, Europeans do understand the threat
posed by China. Now the question is how we, Americans and
Europeans, can try to, if not have a common policy, coordinate
much more effectively our policies.
You see, just today, National Security Advisor O'Brien is
in Europe meeting with his French, German, British, and Italian
counterparts on China. We saw Secretary of State Pompeo accept
an offer from his European counterpart to have a U.S.-EU dialog
on China. We do see that exchange is growing.
And I think one of the areas you mentioned, disinformation,
is a terrific example of an area where Americans and Europeans
have exactly the same assessment of the extent to which we are
seeing Chinese disinformation throughout our societies, both
trying to deepen the divisions in our societies and even affect
elections. I think these are vital areas for the U.S. and
Europe to cooperate on in standing up to China.
Thank you.
Dr. Carafano. I think this was really important that we get
it right in terms of the NATO context. I think NATO's primary
interest in dealing with China has to be China's capacity to
interfere in NATO's ability to defend its area of operations.
And so there really needs to be a robust dialog across NATO and
understanding what the Chinese can do to undermine NATO's
ability to do its mission and have a specific plan to deal with
that. It is not really about dialog with China. It is how do we
minimize the threats that China may pose--destabilizing threats
in this area of responsibility.
I think one great initiative would be great to see a NATO
center of excellence that looks at some of the aspects of
Chinese competition, including disinformation and economic
activity. I think that would be really useful for NATO.
Ms. Ellehuus. Hi there. I would just like to add a point on
our approach to Europeans now that they are moving closer to
our position. I think, you know, if you go back 3 or 4 years,
you see that the U.S. was equally trying to have a good
economic relationship with China and look aside against some of
the security interests.
I think we can really influence EU legislation on foreign
direct investments. They are already standing up the process,
very similar to our CFIUS vetting. I think shining a light on
the disinformation is important.
Increasingly, what we have seen in this COVID crisis is
China taking a page from the Russian playbook in terms of how
they execute disinformation. Before, it was about image
improvement for China. Increasingly, it is about undermining
Western democracies. And so we can work with European countries
to compare notes and tailor our response accordingly.
Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Okay. With the time expiring and no followup,
I will recognize Representative Cicilline of Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Ranking
Member Kinzinger for this very informative hearing. And thank
you to our witnesses for sharing your expertise.
I would like to first--I know all of our witnesses have
spoken about the importance of the U.S. playing a leadership
role in the development of a vaccine, but I want to ask at the
beginning: How does the coordination between the United States
and our European partners in this current pandemic differ from
the previous relationships and responses from other serious
health outbreaks; Ebola, H1N1? You know, how would you sort of
access the way the U.S. has responded to COVID-19 compared to
those other instances?
Ambassador Froman, maybe you want to start.
Dr. Carafano. Yes.
Mr. Froman. I am sorry. Go ahead. Go ahead.
Dr. Carafano. I think what is really key here is what has
made this so impressive is the economic impact. This is the
first global health
[inaudible] Which we have actually seen have wide-scale
economic impact at the same time.
So, you know, we had things like the Asian meltdown and the
Mexican economic meltdown, but having this economic crisis and
the--at the same time, that has been unprecedented. So I think
where we look at in terms of the U.S.-European cooperation is
that we cannot look at just we have to make better health
policy together; let's make a better economic policy together.
We have to make a better resilient policy together, which means
we have to be able to deal with these complicated factors
simultaneously, and many of them have an EU competency.
So the reality is U.S.-EU cooperation simply has to be more
constructive and productive if we are going to deal with this
in the future.
Sorry, Michael.
Mr. Froman. Absolutely. And I agree with all of that. I
would say that what has been interesting here has been the role
that the private sector, philanthropies, and nongovernmental or
quasi-governmental organizations have played here. And the way
the Gates Foundation, Wellcome, ourselves, the U.K. Government,
a number of philanthropists, Gavi, The Global Fund have all
been working to try and--CEPI--to find solutions here has been
absolutely--absolutely critical.
And I think, again, we have to look at--if we look forward,
investing in, as James said, in resilience, investing in health
systems, making sure that these countries around the world have
the capability of dealing with these issues, including in the
U.S., but also in other countries around the world.
The economic piece of this is absolutely critical. And here
is where the cooperation should be self-evident, whether it is,
again, through the G7, the G20, through the IMF and the World
Bank, the institutions that we have created together with the
EU to help manage international crises like this one.
Right now, we are sort of engaging in parallel play, and
central banks are doing their own thing. National governments
are doing their own thing. It is going to become increasingly
important that we have a coordinated response to ensure that as
people come back to work, as we return to--as we contain and
stabilize and some degree of normalcy and back to growth, that
we have got a coordinated approach, and the U.S. and the EU is
a good place to start.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
Ms. Donfried, I wonder if you could speak some about the
disinformation campaigns and how it has affected both the U.S.
and European COVID response plans, and I am, you know,
particularly interested in the role of China in both engaging
in and really actively spreading disinformation, and how we
might be working better with our U.S.--European partners to
respond to disinformation related to COVID-19, what we should
be doing with our social media platforms in partnership with
the European Union. But we have seen examples in this country
of widespread dissemination of misinformation that is likely
causing the death of Americans and obviously people around the
world, and it seems to me this is a place of a real opportunity
to partner closely with our allies. I would love to know your
thoughts on that.
Dr. Donfried. Thank you so much for the question. I want to
give a shout-out to some of my colleagues with GMF's Alliance
for Securing Democracy, who have been looking very closely at
the disinformation space. They literally track the messaging
that is coming from Chinese and Russian State-backed media, and
recently have added Iran to that mix as well.
The fascinating thing is that you see these State actors
not only spreading misinformation. There is some of that, and
that is deeply disturbing, but they are also trying to deepen
the fault lines in the U.S., for example, between people who
believe in vaccinations and anti-vaxxers. They are trying to
deepen those divides within the country and are very skillfully
using disinformation to do that.
I think the first thing is to understand what these actors
are doing and shine a spotlight on it, because transparency is
a good reaction to it. But then we also need to think about how
we defend ourselves better against it, and I am happy to share
with you some of the policy recommendations we have proposed.
We also believe that this is an area where the U.S. and
Europe can work very effectively together, because our European
allies see the same thing and are concerned about it. We have
seen the European Parliament establish a special committee on
foreign interference, and they will be producing a report
within a year. The European Commission has been very active in
the space.
I do think that together we can be even more effective not
only in exposing those disinformation campaigns, but in putting
in place policies that allow us to stand up to it.
Thank you very much. And I am happy to explore that in
greater detail with you.
Mr. Cicilline. I will absolutely followup with you, and I
thank you so much.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Staff. Sir, you are on mute.
Mr. Keating. Representative Wild from Pennsylvania.
Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is for Dr. Donfried. And this has been a really
interesting conversation that is, I think, very thought
provoking to all of us on both sides of the aisle.
The coronavirus pandemic we know to be a transnational
threat, and it certainly does not stop at one country's
borders. And as such, the world's leaders have to work
together--I think we are all in agreement on that--to contain
and conquer the virus.
The European Union has sought to lead international efforts
to develop COVID-19 treatments, diagnostics, and vaccines. In
addition, the U.S. Government has engaged in supporting and
funding the development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines
and treatments.
My question to you is this: How much collaboration
currently exists between the CDC and the U.S. and the EU's
equivalent ECDC, the European Center for Disease Prevention and
Control? And in what ways could health experts in the U.S. and
the EU cooperate more going forward?
Dr. Donfried, that is for you.
Dr. Donfried. Thanks so much for that question. I can share
with you that we at GMF had a series of discussions called
Brussels Forum, which is our annual signature conference, but
we could not meet in person this year, so we had virtual
sessions. One of them was with Dr. Debbie Birx of the White
House Coronavirus Task Force; she spoke very compellingly about
the extent to which health officials in both the U.S. and
Europe are cooperating on a day-to-day basis on COVID-19.
On the one hand, I do think the cooperation at that level
is still quite robust, but there definitely have been some
important political disconnects. Just to give one example of
that, we recently saw the German Government pay 300 million
euros to purchase 23 percent of a German biopharmaceutical
company called CureVac. The reporting was that the German
Government did that because President Trump had mused aloud
about potentially paying CureVac to relocate to the United
States.
Around vaccine production, we have seen countries
increasingly be concerned that a different country will be the
first one to get a vaccine, they will then hoard that vaccine,
at least initially and, therefore, it will not be available to
others.
I think cooperation between governments to complement what
we are seeing among health officials or universities or even
companies, would be a really useful antidote to what is being
now called vaccine nationalism.
Thank you.
Ms. Wild. Thank you. And I assume that we can agree that
more concerted U.S. and European cooperation would likely
expedite the development of a vaccine or treatment and its
eventual worldwide distribution. I know that we are, on both
sides of the Atlantic, considering ways to reduce medical
supply chain vulnerabilities, especially dependence on China
for PPE.
I would be interested in your thoughts in how the U.S. and
the EU might boost their existing trade in medical supplies,
and in what other ways they need to cooperate to ensure more
access to PPE and critical medical supplies.
Dr. Donfried. Thanks. First, I completely agree with your
conclusion that if there is greater cooperation between the
U.S. and Europe, we are more likely to have a vaccine more
quickly and, in fact, some of those other behaviors might lead
to a longer path to an effective vaccine.
On PPE, I very much agree with the comments Mike Froman
made earlier that what we want to do in terms of our supply
chains is make them more resilient, rather than just try to
produce everything ourselves. If we can create greater
resilience by having transatlantic supply chains on PPE and
other critical medical equipment, we will be very well served.
Those supply chains will be closer geographically, and we also
will not have that concern about an overdue reliance on a
country like China, which may not have our best interests at
heart. That idea of protecting and making more resilient those
supply chains, again, can be a common project and can serve
U.S. citizens and your constituents well.
Ms. Wild. You know, I am always a fan of good, healthy
competition, but it seems there are some areas, this one in
particular, where competition isn't necessarily what we want.
What we want to see is more cooperation, but thank you so much
for your comments and your responses.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Representative Trone from Maryland.
Mr. Trone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
And thank you to the witnesses.
Ms. Ellehuus, isolation, stress, feelings of insecurity,
and concerns about economic health and well-being play a huge
role in mental health. We have been seeing large increases in
the needs connected to mental health in the U.S. during this
pandemic. Are there any examples of European countries that
have recognized the importance of protecting mental health and
have addressed mental health issues during this time,
including, for example, with their healthcare workers who are,
you know, treating COVID-19 patients, and the population in
general?
Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you, Congressman. I am happy to go back
to my healthcare colleagues at CSIS and get you a more detailed
answer, but among the anecdotal stories I have heard from
European allies, you know, certainly one of the advantages that
they do have compared to the United States is a more
nationalized healthcare system. And so they are able to take
those stresses off their healthcare workers and rotate the
responsibilities a bit more. Also, in terms of PPE and medical
supplies, a lot of those were held by the national healthcare
system, more made available on a quick turn.
And then, finally, one of the things that I think is a
difference that I have observed is the deliberate isolation of
COVID cases from the normal business of what a hospital does.
So whether that is cardiac patients, mental health, a lot of
the hospitals in Europe have created special wards for the
COVID cases and not--recognizing that, even as the pandemic
goes on, there are other healthcare problems that need to be
addressed.
So I think one of the lessons we could learn from our
European allies and partners is this bifurcation of needs in
the hospitals and sort of triaging pandemic patients and those
with other issues. But, again, I will go back to the healthcare
experts that I work with and see if they have picked up on any
examples that are very specific to mental health.
Mr. Trone. I would appreciate that. I am afraid it is
getting left behind in many cases. The numbers are staggering,
what is happening.
Ambassador Froman, you were just speaking about supply
chain. And what are the current barriers for better
transatlantic coordination on supply chain?
Mr. Froman. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman. I think
there is now conversation going on about perhaps launching a
trade negotiation around lowering barriers, trade barriers,
tariffs on medical equipment. We have covered some of that.
When we installed the information technology agreement, we
covered some advanced medical equipment there. But there are
still tariffs on a wide range of products going across the
Atlantic, and now there is new attention paid to that.
So I am hopeful that whether it is, again, done between the
U.S. and the EU, or done more broadly at the WTO among some
group of countries, if not all of them, that we can begin to
eliminate barriers to trade in critical goods like that.
Mr. Trone. Great.
Mr. Froman. I would also say, just in response to
Congresswoman Wild's point, I think the good news is there is a
lot of cooperation going on between the U.S. and the EU and the
scientific community. The scientists are dealing with each
other. The Therapeutics Accelerator that we have launched with
Gates and Wellcome have given grants in the U.K. and Belgium
and elsewhere in Europe to do research, and we are hopeful that
that kind of work does produce the vaccine, treatments, and
diagnostics more quickly than we can do alone.
Mr. Trone. All right. Thank you.
Dr. Donfried, the Trump administration recently issued a
rule requiring foreign national students to return home if
their instruction is entirely, predominantly online. Could you
comment why that may be detrimental to transatlantic
relationships and our own pandemic recovery and our own
national interest?
Mr. Keating. If I could interrupt, Representative Trone.
While we have been having this hearing, the U.S. has
rescinded that requirement that foreign students taking online
courses return home, so I will let you rephrase the question if
you would like.
Mr. Trone. Excellent. We appreciate that.
Any opportunities--I am on the Ed and Labor Committee. Any
opportunities to learn best practices on transatlantic
cooperation in the area of our students and educators so they
can be more successful in the next year or so while this
pandemic continues? What can we take from Europe?
Dr. Donfried. Well, first, I think that is great news,
Chairman. Thank you for sharing it with us. There are lots of
reasons why it is great that that was overturned, but obviously
it very much benefits the United States to have the best and
the brightest from other countries, including across Europe,
studying here, and many of them staying here and contributing
to the health and well-being of this country.
In general, I think there are many things we can learn from
Europe, but in the educational field, because Europe is now
ahead of us in terms of managing this pandemic--and I do not
have the most recent figures, but I have figures from late
June--the Johns Hopkins University looks at the 7-day rolling
average of newly confirmed COVID-19 cases, and in late June,
across the 27 countries of the European Union, there were 3,832
new cases as compared to 38,000 cases in the U.S.
Because Europe is ahead of us, there are very helpful
lessons we can learn from them about what has worked and what
has not worked. That is true in the educational space. It is
true in terms of children going back to school and how to
manage that. It is also true in terms of the success they have
had with testing and contact tracing to keep that COVID-19
curve flattened. I think across all those areas, we should be
looking to Europe to see what we can do better here.
Thanks.
Mr. Trone. Thank you, Doctor.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
The chair recognizes Representative Costa from scenic
California.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think we
have got a good subcommittee hearing today and a productive
conversation.
Dr. Carafano, I do not think many of us disagree with the
points you made earlier about the need for reform, not only
with the World Health Organization, but the World Trade
Organization, and a host of other organizations in which we are
partners with the European allies of ours, whether it be a
formal alliance with the Union or with NATO.
However, I do not know how we do those things when we have
a administration that, in my view, seems to be hostile in its
approach toward participating in all of these efforts. I mean,
withdrawal of the Paris accord, threats toward removing
ourselves from NATO, notwithstanding the progress that I think
we are making in NATO, and other seemingly lack of willingness
to participate or to keep our allies informed as to our
decisions, our movements, and the go-it-alone attitude.
I mean, I think there is a lot of willingness. I am the
chairman of the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue, have been
involved for many years, the Transatlantic Policy Network that
involves the private sector. We cannot make these reforms if we
just walk away from the table.
Dr. Carafano. Thank you, Congressman. I agree that, you
know, dialog is part of the solution. My only point is we have
to be realistic. There are countervailing pressures,
particularly from China and Russia, which are working on
agendas that do not support this, and the----
Mr. Costa. But the----
Mr. Carafano [continuing]. And the question is how do you
accomplish reform.
Mr. Costa. But you accomplish reform by sitting down and
working together. Russia is our common adversary, going back to
Azimov and even before with Putin. They have attempted to
undermine Western democracies, longer in Europe, and now in our
country as well. China is a competitor, not an ally.
So, I mean, we still account for half the world's economy
between the United States and Europe with the rules-based
economy and adherence to it and shared values.
Dr. Carafano. Sir, I would point, you know, to the example
of WIPO, where the United States supported an alternative
candidate to the Chinese candidate. The alternative candidate
was elected. I think we have made great accomplishments there.
So I do think it is a case-by-case strategy for an agency
rather than just saying----
Mr. Costa. Well, I disagree. I think that there has been a
hostile attitude for the past 3 years. You cannot fix these
problems that admittedly are problems unless you are willing to
sit down and engage on the common solutions to fixing some of
these organization that, in many cases, we helped create, you
know, at the beginning.
The--I want to--my time is running out here. To two of our
other witnesses, Donfried and Ellehuus, given the nature of the
comments you made, what role--and we were in conversations with
them. We had a very robust activity, and members of this
subcommittee have participated, the chair and many other
members, in our regular meetings with the Transatlantic
Legislators' Dialogue. But this COVID-19 has really put a
constraint on our ability to try to act as that glue to
maintain the partnerships.
What suggestions might you have?
Dr. Donfried. I completely understand the chill that COVID-
19 has put on in-person meetings, and I would be the first to
agree that there is really no parallel substitute to an in-
person meeting, but I am actually amazed at how quickly all of
us have adjusted to virtual settings. I would encourage you to
continue convening as the TLD and bringing together those
parliamentarians, albeit using virtual tools and maybe breaking
into small groups to try to inculcate some of that relationship
building that is so wonderful about an in-person meeting.
I think the challenges of the pandemic increase the need
for those conversations and suggest you need a quickened pace
of those conversations because of the many problems.
Mr. Costa. We have a meeting tomorrow, and we have got--we
are trying to do it twice--once a month at least.
Michael, before my time is up, Mr. Ambassador, it is always
good to see you. What do you think the future prospects are
[inaudible] With the rest of this year and whether or not
we have a new administration vis--vis the EU and Brexit? You
testify in all these sticky issues, so--agriculture, but I
think it has to be on the table. I do not know if the chair
will give me the time and let you answer the question.
Mr. Froman. Well, look, I think----
Mr. Keating. Go ahead.
Mr. Froman [continuing]. The prospect of a U.S.-U.K. FTA is
there. It should be easier than TTIP was to negotiate.
On the other hand, the U.K. needs to sort out what its
future alignment with the EU is going to be going forward,
and----
Mr. Costa. Well, that has not happened yet. They are still
in problems with that as--I have been in----
Mr. Froman. That is right. That is right. Yes. It is very
difficult for them to negotiate an agreement until they know
where they are going to exercise their discretion and where
they are going to fall on Brussels on regulatory issues. I
think that is the key next step.
Mr. Costa. So we are really talking about 6 months or a
year away?
Mr. Froman. Yes. I think Ambassador Lighthizer has
expressed skepticism that it would get done over the course of
the remainder of the year.
Mr. Costa. Yes. That was my conversation with him 2 weeks
ago.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And we will continue to
work on all of the above.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative. I think things have
to be much more in alignment with U.K., the EU, and certainly
that is important to us as well.
The chair recognizes Representative Sherman from
California. Thank you.
You might be muted, Mr. Sherman. You might be muted.
Mr. Sherman. I--can I now be heard?
Mr. Keating. You can be heard.
Mr. Sherman. Great. Thank you for letting me participate in
this subcommittee's hearing.
We need to do more research on COVID. About a quarter of 1
percent of the money we have provided for this crisis has gone
to medical research. We have the capacity in that the
organizations, the researchers are available since virtually
all non-COVID medical research projects have been put on hold.
This is the only way that we are going to deal with the
trillions of dollars of harm that are done to the poorest
countries in the world. I mean, I wish we could have a much
larger foreign aid expenditure to help those countries, but I
know that if we can do the medical research, that benefits the
entire world.
It is also critical for our image in the world, because, as
Dr. Donfried has pointed out, we have not done as good a job as
Europe, let alone other countries, in handling this pandemic.
But if we can be the source of treatments and prophylaxis and
vaccines, that will help rebuild our image.
We have $5 billion in the HEROES Act--that, again, is about
one quarter of 1 percent of that Act--for the kind of medical
research that we need to do, and our standing in the world
depends upon us doing all we can for research.
Our alliance with Europe is based on values. You do not
need to share values to have a successful alliance. Roosevelt
and Stalin led the two most powerful nations in destroying Nazi
Germany. But the relationship we have with Europe is based on
values, and that enhances the alliance substantially. But we
have pulled out of the Paris accord. We have a President who
called NATO obsolete. He tried to take money from the Europe
defense initiative and put it in building a wall.
But more apropos to these hearings is this withdrawal from
the WHO, which obviously has little or no support anywhere else
in the world. The attack on the WHO has been on the theory that
the WHO accepted what China had to say without investigating
and verifying. Of course, the WHO has to rely upon the member
States. It does not have the capacity to go around them.
In contrast, the U.S. intel community, the most expensive
and most sophisticated intelligence system ever devised, did
know what was happening in Wuhan, China, and in January and
February, we chose to ignore it. So you cannot blame the WHO
for accepting what China had to say. You can blame us.
So we have all of these things impacting our image in
Europe, our ability to share values with Europe. The question
is: What can the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress
do over the next couple of years to rebuild America's image in
Europe and our relationship with our traditional allies?
I will turn to Ms. Donfried and anyone else who wishes to
answer.
Dr. Donfried. Thank you so much. You have hit on some
really important points. Your comment about the need for more
scientific research on COVID-19, which is important for our
understanding of the disease but also obviously for our
developing a vaccine, is certainly one important part of how
the U.S. is viewed in the world.
So many look to U.S. for leadership because of the ideals
that undergird this country, but also the fact that we live by
those ideals of openness and transparency.I was really struck
when_I read recently a comment by China's chief virologist; she
was saying that for China, if China is the first to develop
this weapon_meaning vaccine--``if China is the first to develop
this weapon with its own intellectual property rights, it will
demonstrate not only the progress of Chinese science and
technology, but also our image as a major power.''
It is clear that China sees this race to a vaccine as a
very important step in the way China is viewed globally. I do
think, for the U.S., together with its allies, to be the ones
who develop the vaccine will have an impact on how we are seen
in the world. How we manage the COVID-19 pandemic gets to
whether we are seen as competent.
Mr. Sherman. I wanted to hear also from Ms. Ellehuus.
Dr. Donfried. Sorry. Apologies.
Mr. Keating. Go ahead.
Mr. Sherman. If we could hear from her, if the chair will
indulge me.
Mr. Keating. Yes. Go ahead. Go ahead.
Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you.
I agree completely with what Karen said. I mean, it is
going to take some time. These relationships will not be
rebuilt overnight. Fortunately, to some extent, I think we can
point to our actions, despite some of the rhetoric that has
poisoned the relationship with allies and partners. So things
like the European Deterrence Initiative, things like a
continued U.S. forward presence in Europe, really matter in
establishing the baseline credibilities with our allies and
partners.
Going forward, though, I do think we are going to have to
sometimes subsume our own national interests to those of others
and recognize that the collective interests might have to be
put first. And I understand that is not always an easy choice,
but if we want to rebuild these relationships, it is going to
have to start from the bottom and allowing others to lead and
trusting in that leadership.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. If you could--I am going to try and--I lost my
video. If you have another question--I am going to try and shut
it off and get back on. So, Representative, if you have another
question, I am going to try to do that so I can close. I have
to be on the screen.
Could you do that, Representative Sherman?
Mr. Sherman. What would you like me to do?
Mr. Keating. Just ask another question. I am going to go
off and then back on, because I have to be on the screen to
close. And somehow my----
Mr. Sherman. Okay. I thank you for the additional time.
And I will ask Mr. Carafano. We have the Nord Stream 2
pipeline. That will make Europe somewhat dependent upon natural
gas supplies coming from Russia. Will Europe have the
alternative infrastructure so that if they have a dispute with
Russia, they can bring in natural gas, LNG facilities, or LNG
from the Mediterranean, et cetera?
Dr. Carafano. Well, thank you. I did want to make two quick
points on your last question, because I do think it is worth
remembering, one, that I think there is international consensus
that there is a need for reform in the World Health
Organization and, two, that the United States has not left the
World Health Organization yet. We have a year.
And if you are asking what can the committee do, the answer
is really simple: Put on the table the reforms that are really
needed, including reforms with international health
regulations, and hold the WHO to that. And then you can also
hold the Administration to that, those reforms.
I do think there is a constructive way forward, and--but to
your other point, I think, you know, we talked a lot about the
Three Seas Initiatives. I am very encouraged by modest
developments, for example, like the Croatian natural gas
facility, and some of the other pipelines. There is a number of
very small initiatives that can be enormously beneficial.
So, for example, you can run a natural gas pipeline into
Kosovo; that would be a very short run. It would be very
inexpensive. It would enormously improve Kosovo's energy
position. So I do think as the Nord Stream 2, there is enormous
that can be done, and I think, as Michael pointed out, there is
a lot of global money that is looking to invest. A lot of this
can be done with private sector money, and it is--so there is a
lot of opportunity there.
Mr. Keating. Great. Thank you. Thank you. A good question.
I am glad we had time for it, Representative.
I think our questioning is over. I just want to thank our
panel. It was a terrific panel.
I want to make note of the fact that, for the panel and
anyone else who is listening to this, we had 15 members onboard
for this subcommittee hearing, which is an extraordinary
number. I thinkit is a message of showing how interested our
committee is and Congress is on improving our transatlantic
relations, how we understand with the COVID-19 virus that,
indeed, there are not many silver linings but one opportunity
we have is to work closer with our transatlantic allies,
because we have to. It is in our interest, it is in their
interest, I think it is in a global interest to do that.
We also will be returning back to Congress next week and we
will be dealing with appropriations issues. And I think we will
find out that the House will come forward with appropriations
with strong investments on the international front in many
areas. So I think that, again, that will be another strong
signal of how important it is for us to be involved and that,
indeed, the House, both Republicans and Democrats, have a
strong commitment to global issues because we realize it is in
our self-interest--security interest, economic interest, and,
indeed, our healthcare interest, in terms of the values that we
share.
Representative Titus mentioned in the hearing that she
would like to see us get involved more formally as a committee,
weighing in on issues that she raised, with maybe the direction
of USAID. Global broadcasting obviously an issue as well. And
we plan to do that.
So thank you for a very important hearing at a critical
time for our country, for our European allies, and globally. We
hope to keep working with you.
With that, we will adjourn the meeting. Thank you again for
all of your longstanding help in these areas. This meeting is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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