[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COAST GUARD AND PORT INFRASTRUCTURE: BUILT TO LAST?
=======================================================================
(116-34)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 25, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-852 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, SAM GRAVES, Missouri
District of Columbia DON YOUNG, Alaska
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD,
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland Arkansas
RICK LARSEN, Washington BOB GIBBS, Ohio
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
JOHN GARAMENDI, California RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., ROB WOODALL, Georgia
Georgia JOHN KATKO, New York
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana BRIAN BABIN, Texas
DINA TITUS, Nevada GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
JARED HUFFMAN, California MIKE BOST, Illinois
JULIA BROWNLEY, California RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida DOUG LaMALFA, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania
MARK DeSAULNIER, California PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Chair BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York Puerto Rico
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
GREG STANTON, Arizona ROSS SPANO, Florida
DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas GREG PENCE, Indiana
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
ABBY FINKENAUER, Iowa
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
HARLEY ROUDA, California
------ 7
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York, Chair
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BOB GIBBS, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
JOHN GARAMENDI, California BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire, Vice SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)
Chair
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation:
Opening statement............................................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation:
Opening statement............................................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chairman, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure:
Opening statement............................................ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, prepared statement............................. 63
WITNESSES
Panel 1
Rear Admiral Nathan A. Moore, Assistant Commandant for
Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast Guard:
Oral statement............................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Nathan Anderson, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
Government Accountability Office:
Oral statement............................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Panel 2
Rear Admiral Ann C. Phillips, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Special Assistant
to the Governor for Coastal Adaptation and Protection, Office
of the Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia:
Oral statement............................................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Daniel Cox, Ph.D., CH2M-Hill Professor in Civil Engineering,
Oregon State University:
Oral statement............................................... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Sean B. Hecht, Co-Executive Director, Emmett Institute on Climate
Change and the Environment, University of California at Los
Angeles School of Law:
Oral statement............................................... 50
Prepared statement........................................... 52
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Letter Referenced in Testimony of Rear Admiral Phillips, Dated
February 22, 2019, from Matthew J. Strickler, Secretary of
Natural Resources, Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the
Governor, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Anthony G. Brown.... 63
Statement of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Submitted
for the Record by Hon. Anthony G. Brown........................ 66
APPENDIX
Question from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Rear Admiral Nathan
A. Moore, Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics,
U.S. Coast Guard............................................... 69
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Rear Admiral Nathan A. Moore,
Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast
Guard.......................................................... 69
Questions from Hon. Stacey E. Plaskett for Rear Admiral Nathan A.
Moore, Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S.
Coast Guard.................................................... 70
Questions from Hon. Bob Gibbs for Rear Admiral Nathan A. Moore,
Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast
Guard.......................................................... 71
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Nathan Anderson,
Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government
Accountability Office.......................................... 72
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Nathan Anderson, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability
Office......................................................... 73
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Rear Admiral Ann C.
Phillips, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Special Assistant to the Governor
for Coastal Adaptation and Protection, Office of the Governor,
Commonwealth of Virginia....................................... 74
Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Rear Admiral Ann C.
Phillips, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Special Assistant to the Governor
for Coastal Adaptation and Protection, Office of the Governor,
Commonwealth of Virginia....................................... 75
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Daniel Cox, Ph.D.,
CH2M-Hill Professor in Civil Engineering, Oregon State
University..................................................... 77
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Daniel Cox, Ph.D., CH2M-Hill
Professor in Civil Engineering, Oregon State University........ 78
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Sean B. Hecht, Co-
Executive Director, Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment, University of California at Los Angeles School of
Law............................................................ 78
Question from Hon. Rick Larsen for Sean B. Hecht, Co-Executive
Director, Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment, University of California at Los Angeles School of
Law............................................................ 80
COAST GUARD AND PORT INFRASTRUCTURE: BUILT TO LAST?
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room
2253, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Maloney. The committee will come to order. Thank you
all for being here. To start, I would ask unanimous consent
that the chair be authorized to declare a recess during today's
hearing, if needed.
Without objection, so ordered.
Well, good afternoon and welcome to this afternoon's
hearing to take stock of the conditions of the Coast Guard's
shoreside infrastructure and the risks facing ports and
maritime operators in this new era of climate uncertainty.
When Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck the Caribbean and
Southeast United States in 2017, it was, of course, the Coast
Guard who worked tirelessly and relentlessly to conduct search
and rescue, reopen ports, remove debris, and bring lifesaving
relief to hurricane-stricken areas.
At the same time, however, it is worth remembering that the
Coast Guard's own shoreside infrastructure, which is vulnerable
and located directly along the coastline, suffered over $800
million in damages. Offices lost roofs, communications went
dark, and piers suffered extreme damage from flying debris.
In Puerto Rico, while servicemembers worked to save lives
across the island, their own families were forced to relocate
from shoreside facilities rendered inoperable and inhospitable.
To date, many of the servicemembers working in Sector San Juan
still work out of trailers while their base remains under
repair.
This circumstance was not solely an issue of extreme storms
in freak events. Rather, these events provide a painful
snapshot of the very tenuous operating conditions Coast Guard
servicemembers work through, caused by the Service's
longstanding mismanagement of the maintenance and repair of its
shoreside infrastructure and housing.
Few people realize it, but the Coast Guard owns or leases
more than 20,000 shore facilities, far and away more real
estate than all other properties under the control of the
agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, yet the
Service's outdated, uncoordinated, and underresourced
infrastructure management policies and practices have resulted
in a $2.6 billion backlog in deferred maintenance, repairs, and
reconstruction.
That servicemembers have been reported to conduct repair
work while off duty is not only a slight to those members, but
a condemnation of the Coast Guard's collective leadership in
this area that would allow such mismanagement to persist at the
expense of a workforce already strained and stretched thin. And
that is simply unacceptable.
Furthermore, the deterioration of the Coast Guard's
shoreside infrastructure will only be exacerbated by climate
change. We spend billions on new assets, cutters and aircraft,
that are critical, indeed, to execute the Coast Guard's 11
statutory missions, while at the same time the basics--piers,
boathouses, barracks, airstrips--slowly crumble away. That is
not semper paratus.
You know, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Karl
Schultz, has stated that it is his objective to ensure that the
Coast Guard is ready, relevant, and responsive. And we need to
add resilient to that list of the three R's.
As sea levels rise, extreme storms become more powerful,
and coastal lands subside or erode away, the Coast Guard needs
a rigorous new strategy to identify, design, budget and build
its shore infrastructure. It is up to this committee, of
course, and this Congress to provide the Coast Guard with the
resources necessary to address its infrastructure backlog and,
even more importantly, to build infrastructure that will be
more durable and less costly to maintain over its lifetime.
If we are apportioning blame, we should look in the mirror
as well. We must additionally take stock of our commercial
ports and maritime terminal investments in the coastal zones.
Each year, more than 1.2 billion metric tons of foreign
commerce comes through American ports.
If the United States wants to remain globally competitive
and avoid future dislocation of the maritime supply chain at
vital ports, such as the Port of New York and New Jersey, right
down the river from my district, we need a rigorous assessment
of our critical port infrastructure and its vulnerability to
coastal hazards, especially sea-level rise. To date, no such
assessment exists, and I will be interested to hear our second
panel's thoughts on this idea.
Whether you believe climate change is a hoax, and I
certainly hope you do not, the reality is that Government
agencies, local communities, maritime stakeholders and others
are dealing with the physical, observable impacts caused by
climate change, and those impacts are happening right in front
of us. They are happening now.
So let's talk about how we can adapt to and mitigate these
impacts. This hearing brings together an exemplary panel of
experts from coastal engineering, adaptation planning, and risk
management, to illustrate how agencies like the Coast Guard
might better adapt to increasing coastal hazards.
In closing, today's extreme flood is tomorrow's daily high
tide. To successfully navigate a changing climate will demand
strategic design, planning, and investment across the public
and private sectors, and we need to do that in time to do us
some good.
As a Government and economy deeply invested and dependent
upon a global maritime supply chain, how we respond to this
challenge today will have a direct bearing on whether we
maintain our standard of living or not. This hearing will help
us intelligently assess the vulnerability of the maritime
transportation system and build back better as we move into an
era of unprecedented risk.
[Mr. Maloney's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney, a Representative in
Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Good afternoon, and welcome to this afternoon's hearing to take
stock of the condition of the Coast Guard's shoreside infrastructure,
and the risks facing ports and maritime operators in this new era of
climate uncertainty.
When Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck the Caribbean and Southeast
United States in 2017, it was the Coast Guard who worked tirelessly and
relentlessly to conduct search and rescue, re-open ports, remove
debris, and bring lifesaving relief to hurricane-stricken areas.
At the same time, however, the Coast Guard's own vulnerable
shoreside infrastructure, much of it located directly along the
coastline, suffered over $800 million in damages. Offices lost roofs,
communications went dark, and piers suffered extreme damage from flying
debris. On Puerto Rico, while service members worked to save lives
across the island, their own families were forced to relocate from
shoreside facilities rendered inoperable and inhospitable. To date,
many of the service members working in Sector San Juan still work out
of trailers while their base remains under repair.
This circumstance was not solely an issue of extreme storms and
freak events. Rather, these events provide a painful snapshot of the
very tenuous operating conditions Coast Guard service members work
through caused by the Service's longstanding mismanagement of the
maintenance and repair of its shoreside infrastructure and housing.
Few people realize it, but the Coast Guard owns or leases more than
20,000 shore facilities--far and away more real estate than all other
properties under the control of agencies within the Department of
Homeland Security. Yet, the Service's outdated, uncoordinated and
under-resourced infrastructure management policies and practices have
resulted in a $2.6 billion dollar backlog in deferred maintenance,
repairs and reconstruction.
That service members have been reported to conduct repair work
while off-duty is not only a slight to those members, but a
condemnation of the Coast Guard's collective leadership that would
allow such mismanagement to persist at the expense of a workforce
already strained and stretched thin. This is simply unacceptable.
Furthermore, the deterioration of the Coast Guard's shoreside
infrastructure will only be exacerbated by climate change. We spend
billions on shiny new assets--cutters and aircraft that are critical to
execute the Coast Guard's eleven statutory missions--while their piers,
boathouses, barracks, and airstrips slowly crumble away. Semper
Paratus, indeed.
You know, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Karl Schultz,
has stated that it is his objective to ensure that the Coast Guard is
Ready, Relevant and Responsive. Well, I say we add ``Resilient'' to
that list, too.
As sea levels rise, extreme storms become more powerful, and
coastal lands subside or erode away, the Coast Guard needs a rigorous
new strategy to identify, design, budget, and build its shore
infrastructure.
It is up to this committee and this Congress to provide the Coast
Guard with the resources necessary to address its infrastructure
backlog, and even more importantly, to build infrastructure that will
be more durable and less costly to maintain over its lifetime.
We must additionally take stock of our commercial ports and marine
terminal investments in the coastal zone. Each year, more than 1.2
billion metric tons of foreign commerce comes through American ports.
If the United States wants to remain globally competitive and avoid
future dislocation of the maritime supply chain at vital ports, such as
the Port of New York/New Jersey downriver from my district, we need a
rigorous assessment of our critical port infrastructure and its
vulnerability to coastal hazards, especially sea level rise. To date,
no such assessment exists, and I will be interested to hear our second
panel's thoughts on this idea.
Whether you believe climate change is a hoax, or not, the reality
is that government agencies, local communities, maritime stakeholders
and others are dealing with the physical, observable impacts caused by
climate change that are happening right now. So, let's talk about how
we can adapt to and mitigate these impacts.
This hearing brings together an exemplary panel of experts from
coastal engineering, adaptation planning, and risk management to
illustrate how agencies like the Coast Guard might better adapt to
increasing coastal hazards.
In closing, today's extreme flood is tomorrow's daily high tide. To
successfully navigate a changing climate will demand strategic design,
planning, and investment across the public and private sectors. As a
government and economy deeply invested in and dependent upon a global
maritime supply chain, how we respond to this challenge today will have
a direct bearing on whether we maintain our standard of living, or not.
This hearing will help us intelligently assess the vulnerability of the
marine transportation system and build back better as we move into an
era of unprecedented risk.
Mr. Maloney. I would now like to call on the ranking member
for any remarks.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman Maloney.
As we all know, since 2000, the Coast Guard was faced with
its cutters and aircraft operating more than 50 miles offshore
becoming obsolete. Understandably, the Coast Guard has chosen
to focus its extremely limited capital acquisition funds to the
purchase of those assets, and there is good news on that front.
The Coast Guard just announced the home port for its 42nd Fast
Response Cutter, and the Coast Guard has awarded a contract for
construction of the 10th and the 11th National Security Cutter.
The Coast Guard has also acquired new medium-range patrol
aircraft and is recapitalizing its long-range patrol aircraft.
Unfortunately, the single largest recapitalization contract for
the Offshore Patrol Cutter is not executable, and we await the
Coast Guard's solution to that problem.
However, while the Coast Guard has made those important and
significant investments, it has developed a large and growing
shoreside construction and maintenance backlog, and its IT
systems have aged to the point that the Coast Guard operations
are constrained. Investments in those areas are becoming
crucial if we expect the Service to continue to carry out its
missions.
The Coast Guard estimates its construction and deferred
maintenance backlog is $2.6 billion, but this is a one-for-one
replacement of assets and does not reflect a strategy for
carrying out Coast Guard missions in an efficient manner.
Given the specific needs of the Coast Guard for coastal
facilities, the Service is particularly vulnerable to the
impacts of coastal storms, yet GAO has found that the Coast
Guard does not follow the Department of Homeland Security's
risk management framework. In addition, the GAO found that the
Coast Guard has not identified all the shoreside assets that
are vulnerable to potential storm damage, such as piers and
runways.
I am also interested in whether the Coast Guard has
followed through on its modernization effort. It has
established the Shoreside Infrastructure Logistics Center, but
it seems to continue to operate a highly decentralized
infrastructure repair and maintenance operation out of its six
civil engineering units.
I look forward to hearing from Rear Admiral Moore how the
Coast Guard is centralizing its review and prioritization of
shoreside infrastructure. I am also interested to know more
about how the Coast Guard is preparing facilities for its new
cutters and aircraft. The new assets are larger and more
sophisticated than the old assets and require improved
shoreside support. I am hopeful that the planning process for
those assets and their support infrastructure is being well-
coordinated.
Fortunately, my district does not suffer direct impacts by
coastal storms, but I sympathize for my coastal colleagues. I
know subcommittee member Congressman Graves of Louisiana has
had major flood events in his district, and Congressman Weber
has floods going on right now in Jefferson County, Texas. In
addition, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands were visited by
Hurricane Karen yesterday. Therefore, I look forward to hearing
the suggestions of witnesses on panel 2 for the construction of
more resilient port facilities to better withstand such coastal
storms and flooding.
[Mr. Gibbs' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation
As we all know, as far back as 2000, the Coast Guard was faced with
its cutters and aircraft operating more than 50 miles offshore becoming
obsolete. Understandably, the Coast Guard has chosen to focus its
extremely limited capital acquisition funds to the purchase of those
assets.
And there is good news on that front. The Coast Guard just
announced the homeport for its 42nd Fast Response Cutter, and the Coast
Guard has awarded a contract for construction of the 10th and 11th
National Security Cutters. The Coast Guard has also acquired new medium
range patrol aircraft and is recapitalizing its long-range patrol
aircraft.
Unfortunately, the single largest recapitalization contract for the
Offshore Patrol Cutter is not executable, and we await the Coast
Guard's solution to that problem.
However, while the Coast Guard has made those important and
significant investments, it has developed a large and growing shoreside
construction and maintenance backlog, and its IT systems have aged to
the point that Coast Guard operations are constrained.
If we expect the Service to continue to effectively carry out its
missions in the future, investments in these areas are crucial.
he Coast Guard estimates its construction and deferred maintenance
backlog at $2.6 billion, but this is a one-for-one replacement of
assets and does not reflect a strategy for carrying out Coast Guard
missions in the most efficient manner.
Given the specific needs of the Coast Guard for coastal facilities,
the Service is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of coastal
storms. Yet GAO has found that the Coast Guard does not follow the
Department of Homeland Security's Risk Management Framework. In
addition, GAO found that the Coast Guard has not identified all
shoreside assets that are vulnerable to potential storm damage such as
piers and runways.
I am also interested in whether the Coast Guard has followed
through on its modernization effort. It has established the Shoreside
Infrastructure Logistics Center but seems to continue to operate a
highly decentralized infrastructure repair and maintenance operation
out of its six civil engineering units.
I look forward to hearing from Rear Admiral Moore about how the
Coast Guard is centralizing its review and prioritization of shoreside
infrastructure.
I am also interested to know more about how the Coast Guard is
preparing facilities for its new cutters and aircraft. These new assets
are larger and more sophisticated than old assets and require improved
shoreside support. I'm hopeful the planning process for those assets
and their support infrastructure is well coordinated.
Fortunately, my district does not suffer direct impacts by coastal
storms, but I sympathize for my coastal colleagues. I know Subcommittee
Member Garret Graves of Louisiana has had major flood events in his
district, and Congressman Weber has floods going on right now in
Jefferson County, Texas. In addition, Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands were hit by Tropical Storm Karen yesterday.
Therefore, I look forward to hearing the suggestions of witnesses
on Panel II for the construction of more resilient port facilities to
better withstand such coastal storms and flooding.
Mr. Gibbs. Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding the hearing
today, and I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
I would now like to recognize Chairman DeFazio for any
remarks.
Mr. DeFazio. I thank the chairman. I wish that I could
stay. I, unfortunately, have to be in a briefing on the 737 MAX
very shortly. So I just want to first recognize a member of the
second panel, Dr. Daniel Cox--and I know how hard it is to get
here from Oregon; I appreciate him traveling--a professor at
the College of Engineering, Oregon State University, and has
tremendous experience in dealing with coastal engineering
resilience. And hopefully, his testimony will give us some
direction.
The Coast Guard has been mentioned. There is a $2.6 billion
backlog. I think the Coast Guard has for many years done an
excellent job with not enough resources. I have been to many
stations where the Coasties themselves are doing the work. We
are maintaining some very unique older boats in the Northwest
and the facilities are beautiful, but we need to better partner
with the Coast Guard and better invest. The Coast Guard is the
only uniformed service that has not done extensive studies on
the impacts of climate change, sea-level rise, and more violent
weather events. It is critical before we invest some of this
$2.6 billion in areas that will be more at risk, that we will
take into account what we should do to better protect these
facilities in the not too distant future or--heck, you know,
given what has been going on this year--next year.
So I hope to hear from the Coast Guard on that. We did put
a provision in the Coast Guard authorization, which passed out
of the House quite some time ago. And the, Senate as usual, is
dithering around. But we did put a provision in there to
require that the Coast Guard do such an assessment, and I think
it will be experts like Dr. Cox who can help you work your way
through this.
So we don't want to have to rebuild it twice, and that goes
to all of our infrastructure. Surface infrastructure, 47,000
bridges need substantial repair or replacement; 40 percent of
the National Highway System deteriorated to the point where you
have to rebuild it; and transit. And we have to make those
investments in a way that anticipates the continued detrimental
effects of climate change, and the Coast Guard should do
likewise.
So I am fully supportive of any initiatives the Coast Guard
takes in this area. I am supportive of getting them more
resources to deal with these problems.
[Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chairman, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this afternoon's hearing to
assess the Coast Guard's substantial backlog in deferred maintenance
and repair for its infrastructure, and examine policies to ensure that
our Nation's port infrastructure is built to withstand the impacts of
climate change.
I want to take a moment first, to acknowledge Dr. Daniel Cox, an
esteemed professor in the College of Engineering at Oregon State
University (OSU) and an expert on coastal engineering and thank him for
traveling from Corvallis to testify on today's second panel.
OSU for decades has been a leader in ocean and coastal engineering
research. I look forward to hearing more from Dr. Cox about OSU's
ongoing initiatives to improve building codes to better withstand river
flooding and coastal storm surge.
According to a study released earlier this year by the Government
Accountability Office, the Coast Guard has a deferred maintenance and
repair backlog of $2.6 billion for its shore side infrastructure,
housing, and support facilities. And this total only reflects those
needs for which the Coast Guard has affixed a cost estimate--the
backlog is likely much, much higher.
It is no reach to conclude that while the Coast Guard's active duty
force may be Semper Paratus, or Always Ready, the vital infrastructure
that every service member relies on to perform their demanding work
falls far short from meeting that motto.
Consequently, unless we address the circumstances that have
contributed to this backlog, the situation will get much worse, much
faster.
If anything was made clear by the recent hurricanes over the past
three summers that made landfall in the Southeast United States and the
Caribbean, Coast Guard facilities and port infrastructure in general
are exposed to increased risks wrought by more powerful, slower moving
hurricanes, higher storm surges, torrential rains and more frequent
flooding.
To address facilities damaged through these storms, Congress
provided the Coast Guard with more than $1.4 billion in emergency
supplemental appropriations to rebuild and recover from the
devastation, and more importantly, to rebuild to more resilient
construction standards. I expect Admiral Moore to provide an update on
this rebuilding.
Clearly, this funding was necessary to get affected Coast Guard
units back up and operational. But just as clear to me is that this is
no way for the Congress or the Coast Guard to address a chronic
liability impacting operational readiness and capability.
A long-term strategy must be developed to address the backlog in a
systematic and dedicated manner. Moreover, such a strategy should be
guided by new modeling and data management systems, paired with modern
advances in coastal science and engineering.
We must completely re-think where we locate Coast Guard units, and
how we build the facilities they depend on to meet mission needs. For
if we do not, all we will accomplish is to continue to throw good money
after bad and end up with a Coast Guard less able to meet the
increasing risks of operating along our Nation's shores. We can, and
ought to, do better.
Mr. DeFazio. And, again, I wish I could stay, and I can't.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maloney. Well, I thank the gentleman.
I should also point out I will also be required on the
House floor at some point during the course of today's hearing,
so I may also have to depart for a period of time, depending on
the floor schedule. So I apologize in advance that I miss some
of the testimony today.
But I would like to thank our first two witnesses: Rear
Admiral Nathan Moore, Assistant Commandant for Engineering and
Logistics; and Mr. Nathan Anderson, Director of Homeland
Security and Justice for the Government Accountability Office.
Gentlemen, we thank you both for being here.
Without objection, your full statements will be included in
the record. And since your written testimony has been made part
of the record, the subcommittee requests that you limit your
oral testimony to 5 minutes.
With that, Admiral Moore, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL NATHAN A. MOORE, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
FOR ENGINEERING AND LOGISTICS, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND NATHAN
ANDERSON, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Admiral Moore. Chair Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, members
of the subcommittee, good afternoon and thank you for the
opportunity to speak about Coast Guard infrastructure today,
and thank you for entering my written testimony into the
record, as you have stated.
As the Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics,
I am honored to lead the 5,000 men and women of the Coast Guard
dedicated to maintaining our diverse portfolio of operational
assets and shore-based infrastructure. As I speak to you today,
our engineering and logistics workforce is providing critical
support to Coast Guard operations around the clock and across
the globe. Every Coast Guard mission begins and ends at a shore
facility. Not only is our shore infrastructure relevant to
operations, it is essential to our readiness.
The Coast Guard is all about readiness. Admiral Schultz has
outlined in the Coast Guard strategic plan that a resilient
shore infrastructure is directly connected to operational
readiness and successful mission execution. While my engineers
take pride in our efforts to support operations, we face
challenges related to the maintenance and recapitalization of
our infrastructure. As the largest shore asset portfolio in the
Department of Homeland Security, much of the Coast Guard's
infrastructure is aging faster than we can maintain or replace
it.
With the growing depot-level maintenance and
recapitalization backlogs totaling more than $2.7 billion, our
installations are geographically dispersed and range from large
operational or industrial facilities in urban areas to small
tactical units in remote areas. As many of our facilities are
located on or very near the coast, they experience the daily
corrosive effects of saltwater and wind and are vulnerable to
flooding and increasingly severe weather. The devastation that
we have seen from recent hurricanes underscores that risk.
Despite these challenges, we have observed the benefits of
modern resilient infrastructure at locations where we have made
investments. Thanks to support from both the administration and
Congress, we have constructed new facilities to resilient
standards, with high return on investment. We are working
expeditiously to execute nearly $1.2 billion in supplemental
procurement, construction, and improvement appropriations for
the 2017 and 2018 hurricanes. We make our infrastructure more
resilient by modernizing design specifications and construction
technologies at every opportunity.
We aim to maximize our limited resources to invest in
resilient infrastructure that directly enhances the Coast
Guard's operational readiness. For example, our new
infrastructure at Sector Houston-Galveston has proved critical
to Hurricane Harvey response operations, during which the Coast
Guard rescued 11,000 people. We have recapitalized the 100-
year-old facilities in Massachusetts and recently finished
facilities for new aircraft and cutters in Alaska, California,
Hawaii, North Carolina, and New Jersey, with others under
construction in Guam and Texas.
Despite this progress, the Coast Guard has made and
continues to make difficult decisions within a constrained
budget environment to balance the recapitalization of our
operational assets with investments in our shore
infrastructure.
We thank the Congress for the opportunity to further
communicate our infrastructure needs through the annual
Unfunded Priority List. Our fiscal year 2020 UPL includes over
$570 million to address our most critical shore infrastructure
priorities. At the same time, we continue to align our property
with our mission needs. Since receiving direct sale authority
in 2010, we have divested more than 205 real property assets
and deposited more than $26 million in proceeds into the Coast
Guard housing fund, which supports the recapitalization of
housing for our servicemembers and their families.
While we highlight our progress, we recognize that we can
do even better. With the benefit of insightful reviews from the
Government Accountability Office, we are already improving our
shore infrastructure management practices and incorporating
them into our strategic planning.
Moving forward, we will employ a holistic approach that
includes establishing performance goals and measures to track
the effectiveness of our investments, aligning our shore
infrastructure portfolio with mission needs, to include
pursuing divestitures, establishing more detailed guidance for
planning boards, and employing modeling to optimize our
investments.
In closing, as one of the Nation's five Armed Forces, the
Coast Guard's ability to remain semper paratus, always ready,
to answer the Nation's call, fundamentally depends on reliable
and resilient shore infrastructure. With the support of
Congress and the administration and informed by GAO's
recommendations, we will continue to overcome our
infrastructure challenges and successfully execute our missions
in service to the Nation. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify today, and I look forward to your questions.
[Admiral Moore's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Nathan A. Moore, Assistant
Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast Guard
Good afternoon Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to testify today and thank you for your continued support of the United
States Coast Guard.
As a global maritime Service, the Coast Guard provides operational
capabilities essential to a wide range of national security needs. With
a variety of unique authorities, in addition to our organic missions,
the Coast Guard operates daily in partnership with other Federal
agencies to carry out law enforcement, regulatory, and emergency
response missions. As a member of the Intelligence Community, the Coast
Guard helps to secure the seas by combating transnational criminal
organizations and ensuring the safety of commercial activities on
America's waters and abroad. As a member of the Armed Forces, the Coast
Guard supports Department of Defense operations by providing Joint
Force capabilities.
The Coast Guard excels at safeguarding American security and
economic prosperity because of our distinct set of capabilities and
authorities. Thanks to your unwavering support, the Coast Guard
consistently succeeds in providing these critical services to the
Nation.
All Coast Guard missions begin and end at shore facilities. The
Coast Guard's Directorate of Engineering and Logistics, which contains
the Office of Civil Engineering, is a professional, specialized, and
innovative organization that manages a diverse portfolio of shore
facilities nationwide. These facilities enable our operations, support
our workforce, and strengthen our ability to remain Ready, Relevant,
and Responsive. Our facilities are geographically distributed along
America's coasts and inland waterways, allowing the Coast Guard to
maintain presence throughout the Nation's Marine Transportation System,
Exclusive Economic Zone, and strategically important areas of the high
seas. In all these areas, the Coast Guard's presence ensures that our
national interests are protected.
The Coast Guard's Civil Engineering Program executes construction
and sustainment of shore infrastructure in support of Coast Guard
personnel and their families, enabling mission resilience in the face
of natural and man-made threats. Our goal is to maximize the lifecycle
of Coast Guard shore infrastructure--from docks and hangars to housing
and childcare facilities--managing assets using globally recognized
standards, such as the International Organization for Standardization
55000, and benchmarking to industry and other agency best practices.
By holding ourselves to these standards, we deliver mission-ready
facilities, which support Coast Guard operations around the world. We
continuously adapt and improve our processes to maintain our current
portfolio of facilities and pave the way to meet our shore
infrastructure demands of the future.
The Coast Guard invests wisely, using strategic and risk-based
decision-making to improve shore asset performance. Nevertheless, we
want to do even better. The Civil Engineering Program manages the
largest shore asset portfolio in the Department of Homeland Security,
with over 41,000 assets, valued at $20 billion.
As the shore plant inventory ages, funding challenges affect our
ability to maintain our facilities. Infrastructure scoring
methodologies derived from the American Society of Civil Engineers give
our portfolio an overall grade of C minus. Our deferred maintenance
backlog continues to grow and at present exceeds $900 million. Our
shore infrastructure recapitalization backlog is now more than $1.7
billion, with over 100 projects currently identified and estimated.
These projects address deficiencies in facilities that play a
direct support role in front line Coast Guard operations and personnel
support. They include operational facilities like bases, sectors, small
boat stations and aviation facilities, as well as family housing and
support facilities. The highest priority projects from the backlog are
included in the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Unfunded Priority
List (UPL). These projects comprise $62 million in critical facility
improvements to support our new cutters, $79 million in housing, family
support and training facility needs, $391 million for improvements and
recapitalization of operational facilities, and $6.7 million to
recapitalize aids to navigation. Additionally, the FY 2020 UPL includes
$35.7 million for critical shore depot-level maintenance.
To improve, the Coast Guard must shift from corrective to
preventative facilities maintenance, establish enterprise-level
strategic management for the appropriate facility inventory, and
implement modern information technology (IT) systems to aid in
decision-making for infrastructure investments. Implementing modernized
IT systems is especially important because of the decentralized nature
of the Coast Guard's shore infrastructure portfolio. The dynamic
balance of these elements is the framework that will allow us to define
affordable solutions for the Coast Guard's long-term shore facilities
requirements and improve the resiliency and energy efficiency of our
infrastructure.
Your support makes a palpable impact. In 2018 and 2019, the Coast
Guard completed $152 million in shore infrastructure recapitalization,
improving the physical condition and resilience of facilities in
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, California,
Oregon, and Hawaii. We awarded contracts for another $73 million of
construction in Maine, Virginia, South Carolina, Texas, California,
Alaska, and Guam.
We further appreciate Congress taking action to support the Coast
Guard in the wake of recent natural disasters. Following the
devastating hurricane seasons of 2017 and 2018, you provided nearly
$1.2 billion in disaster supplemental funding to reconstitute damaged
Coast Guard infrastructure with a focus on improving resiliency. We are
working diligently to execute repair and reconstruction projects, and
restore the full capability of our shore plant as quickly as possible.
While we are proud of these achievements, we appreciate the review
of external agencies like the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
We view these external agency reviews as opportunities to assess our
internal processes, identify capability gaps, and develop plans of
action to better manage our shore infrastructure program.
In its February 2019 report on Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure,
GAO found that the Coast Guard met, fully or partially, six of nine
leading practices for managing shore infrastructure. It provided six
recommendations to improve our program. The Coast Guard concurred with
these recommendations and is in the process of implementing several
actions for improvement. One such action includes the recent
implementation of a process guide for facility condition assessments
which streamlines, standardizes, and improves our ability to identify
and prioritize deficiencies across the shore infrastructure portfolio.
The Coast Guard is also working to develop clear performance goals and
baselines to track the effectiveness of maintenance and repair
investments as well as a framework by which we can validate the
alignment of our shore infrastructure assets with mission needs. To
better manage our vast, decentralized shore portfolio, the Coast Guard
is working to modernize its IT applications to improve investment
scenario modeling, analyze trade-offs, and optimize decisions among
competing investments. All of these initiatives will help us make
capital investments in a smarter and more effective manner.
GAO further recommended a new assessment focused on how the Coast
Guard manages risk in order to improve the resilience of shore
facilities. Based on the nature of our missions, Coast Guard facilities
are in areas prone to hurricanes, flooding, earthquakes, and other
natural disasters. The Nation trusts that the Coast Guard will continue
to act as a first responder after theses disasters, which underscores
the importance of our facilities remaining ready for operations. To
proactively address risk management for shore infrastructure, the Coast
Guard is completing a study to assess risk from natural disasters
across our infrastructure portfolio. To us, it's not just simply
maintenance, repairs, and construction--it's about building a robust
and resilient shore plant that will enable the Coast Guard to fulfill
its many responsibilities in the maritime domain, support our national
interests, and protect the nation for decades to come.
Coast Guard shore infrastructure readiness is a critical component
of the Service's ability to carry out its missions. Your stalwart
support, and that of the Administration, ensures the Coast Guard will
continue to be Semper Paratus, Always Ready, to answer the Nation's
call.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for
all that you do for the men and women of the United States Coast Guard.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Anderson.
Mr. Anderson. Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. My testimony today
discusses our findings and recommendations from three recent
reports on Coast Guard's management of its shore
infrastructure. I will discuss the condition of the Coast
Guard's shore infrastructure, actions it has taken to improve
its management of shore infrastructure, and key actions the
Coast Guard needs to take to better manage these assets, which
may help us save money and reduce risks.
Regarding the condition of the Coast Guard's shore
infrastructure, the Coast Guard's inventory is vast, aging, and
vulnerable to damage from extreme weather. The Coast Guard
houses more than 20,000 shore facilities with a replacement
value of over $18 billion, and nearly half are beyond their
service lives. The Coast Guard data show that it will cost at
least $2.6 billion to address current and deferred maintenance
and recapitalization backlogs.
Now, recent funding levels and with existing business
practices, it will take the Coast Guard nearly 400 years to
address the projects currently on their backlogs. This brings
me to my next point. The Coast Guard has taken some steps to
manage its aging infrastructure. Specifically, the Coast Guard
classifies its infrastructure under a tier system that
differentiates mission critical assets from mission support
assets. Additionally, Coast Guard guidance prioritizes
investments in infrastructure for frontline operations, such as
piers or runways, over assets like administrative buildings.
The Coast Guard has also initiated an assessment of
vulnerabilities that its shore infrastructure faces. From 2015
to 2018, the Coast Guard analyzed occupied buildings for
vulnerabilities to natural disasters, such as hurricanes and
earthquakes.
However, significant work remains if the Coast Guard is
going to make headway on reducing its backlog and to ensure
wise use of limited resources. And this brings me to my final
point about key actions the Coast Guard needs to take. First,
the Coast Guard should employ models to optimize infrastructure
investments. Earlier this year, we found the Coast Guard used a
model to optimize its investment in aviation pavement for the
repair of assets such as runways. This model showed that
changing when and where such repairs take place could save
nearly $14 million. Despite having this model, the agency has
not yet implemented the model's results. The Coast Guard should
use the results of this model and should employ such models to
its entire portfolio of shore infrastructure, which may enable
it to achieve cost savings across its 12 other asset lines.
Second, the Coast Guard should standardize facility
assessments. In February 2019, we found that different units
responsible for assessing the condition of infrastructure did
not always follow consistent processes, and inconsistent
processes raise questions as to whether the Coast Guard has the
information it needs to set risk-based priorities for shore
infrastructure and subsequent project selection decisions.
Third, the Coast Guard needs to fully implement DHS's risk
management framework to improve shore infrastructure
resilience. In a report we issued today, we found that the
Coast Guard has not fully aligned its processes for improving
shore infrastructure resilience with DHS's five key steps for
critical infrastructure risk management.
Since 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $2 billion
in supplemental funding to rebuild and repair Coast Guard
infrastructure after severe storms. Data show it is often far
cheaper to enhance the resilience of infrastructure before
extreme weather strikes rather than to fix it after it is
damaged. Nevertheless, while the Coast Guard selects projects
to fund every year from its backlogs, officials were unable to
verify that they consistently select projects with resilience
in mind, that is, projects that will protect infrastructure
before it is damaged and cost pennies on the dollar compared to
rebuilding after extreme weather. Aligning its processes with
DHS steps would provide greater assurance that the Coast Guard
is investing resources to minimize potential damage and
expenses caused by future extreme weather events.
In closing, while the Coast Guard faces significant
expenses and time to repair, recapitalize, and make more
resilient its shore infrastructure, it can augment its business
practices in such a way that more efficiently allocates its
resources and better positions the agency to respond to risks
from extreme weather.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gibbs, members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to
take any questions you may have.
[Mr. Anderson's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nathan Anderson, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Chairman Mahoney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our recent work, including
a report that is being released today, on the condition of the U.S.
Coast Guard's (Coast Guard) shore infrastructure and recommendations we
have made to improve it. The Coast Guard, within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), is the principal federal agency charged with
enforcing laws intended to prevent death, injury, and property loss in
the maritime environment. All Coast Guard missions begin and end at the
shore.\1\ To help carry out its missions, the Coast Guard owns or
leases more than 20,000 facilities--such as piers, boat stations, air
stations, runways, and housing units--at more than 2,700 locations.
Such infrastructure are often positioned along the nation's coastlines
where facilities can be vulnerable to damage from extreme weather. We
have reported that some Coast Guard facilities have required repair and
recapitalization after being damaged by superstorm Sandy, and
hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and Matthew.\2\ The costs for some of
those recovery efforts, combined, were about $1 billion.\3\
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\1\ Under 6 U.S.C. 468(a), the Coast Guard's 11 statutory
missions are divided between ``non-homeland security missions'' and
``homeland security missions.'' Non-homeland security missions include
(1) marine safety, (2) search and rescue, (3) aids to navigation, (4)
living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement), (5) marine
environmental protection, and (6) ice operations. Homeland security
missions include (1) ports, waterways, and coastal security; (2) drug
interdiction; (3) migrant interdiction; (4) defense readiness; and (5)
other law enforcement.
\2\ In general, recapitalization refers to major renovation or
reconstruction activities (including facility replacements) needed to
keep existing facilities modern and relevant in an environment of
changing standards and missions. Recapitalization extends the service
life of facilities or restores lost service life. See, among other
reports, GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading
Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least $2.6
Billion, GAO-19-82 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-82],
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2019).
\3\ The Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-
2, 127 Stat. 4, 28 (2013) appropriated around $274 million to the Coast
Guard for Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements for necessary
expenses related to the consequences of Hurricane Sandy. Bipartisan
Budget Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64, 82-83 (2018)
appropriated around $719 million to the Coast Guard for Acquisition,
Construction, and Improvements for necessary expenses related to the
consequences of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and Matthew.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In my testimony today, will discuss (1) the condition of the Coast
Guard's shore infrastructure, (2) actions the Coast Guard has taken to
improve its management of shore infrastructure, and (3) key actions
needed for the Coast Guard to better align its management of shore
infrastructure with leading practices and key risk management steps.
This statement is based on three reports we issued from October
2017 to September 2019 on Coast Guard shore infrastructure, including
management of its boat stations, overall shore infrastructure, and
shore infrastructure resilience, as well as selected updates we
conducted in September 2019 on Coast Guard efforts to address our
previous recommendations.\4\ To perform our work for the previous
reports, we analyzed relevant Coast Guard documents, management
processes, as well as applicable laws, regulations, and data for
managing Coast Guard shore infrastructure. We also interviewed Coast
Guard officials responsible for managing shore infrastructure. Further
details on the scope and methodology for these reports are available
within each of the published products. In addition, to conduct our
selected updates, we reviewed Coast Guard information about actions
taken to address recommendations we had made in our previous reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Close Stations Identified
as Overlapping and Unnecessarily Duplicative, GAO-18-9 [https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-9] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2017); Coast
Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading Practices Could Help
Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least $2.6 Billion, GAO-19-82
[https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-82], (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21,
2019); and Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Processes for Improving
Resilience Should Fully Align with DHS Risk Management Framework, GAO-
19-675 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-675] (Washington, D.C.,
Sept. 25, 2019).
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We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
The Coast Guard owns or leases more than 20,000 facilities
consisting of various types of buildings and structures.\5\ The Coast
Guard's shore infrastructure is organized into five product lines and
13 asset types, known as asset lines.\6\ For example, within its shore
operations asset line, the Coast Guard maintains over 200 stations
along U.S. coasts and inland waterways to carry out its search and
rescue operations, as well as other missions such as maritime security.
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\5\ According to Coast Guard guidance, a building is generally
defined as a fully enclosed structure that is affixed to the ground, in
which personnel work or live or where equipment is stored. Buildings
include regional operations centers, aircraft hangars, and houses. A
structure is generally defined as any other construction affixed to the
ground that does not meet the definition of a building. Structures
include helicopter landing pads, docks, and aircraft runways.
\6\ Coast Guard's five product lines and the 13 asset lines within
them are: (1) Tactical Operations--Aviation, Waterfront, Shore
Operations; (2) Mission Support--Civil Works, Base Services,
Industrial; (3) Mission Readiness--Housing, Community Services,
Training; (4) Strategic Operations--Sector/District, Technology; and
(5) Waterways Operations--Fixed and Floating Aids to Navigation (ATON),
Marine Environmental Response and Signal Equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Much of the Coast Guard's infrastructure is vulnerable to the
effects of extreme weather and can be costly to repair or replace after
major storms. From December 2005 through June 2019, the Coast Guard
received about $2 billion in supplemental appropriation funds to, among
other things, rebuild or relocate 15 facilities damaged by hurricanes.
During this time, the Coast Guard relocated facilities further inland
or to higher ground, upgraded facilities to be more resilient, and
designed new facilities with features to protect them from natural
disasters. For example, after being damaged by Hurricane Ike in 2008,
the Coast Guard relocated a regional facility in Houston, Texas further
inland to help protect the new facility from extreme weather. The
facility was also designed to withstand wind speeds of up to 115 miles
per hour. In February 2017, the Coast Guard's Civil Engineering program
also issued guidance intended to increase the likelihood that new or
recapitalized buildings would be designed to withstand natural
disasters, and to enable the Coast Guard to better manage risks to its
operations and personnel, among other things.\7\
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\7\ U.S. Coast Guard, Shore Facilities Planning Factors Job Aid
(Norfolk, VA: Feb. 23, 2017). The Coast Guard guidance establishes
building elevation requirements to account for storm surge, sea level
rise, or periodic flooding, and utility and communication system
placement to ensure operational continuity and safety, among other
things.
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Almost Half of the Coast Guard's Shore Infrastructure is Beyond Its
Service Life, and Project Backlogs Will Cost at Least $2.6 Billion to
Address
We found in February 2019 that the condition of the Coast Guard's
shore infrastructure was deteriorating and almost half of it was past
its service life \8\--resulting in (1) recapitalization and new
construction and (2) deferred maintenance backlogs of at least $2.6
billion as of 2018.\9\ In 2018, the Coast Guard graded \10\ its overall
shore infrastructure condition as a C minus \11\ based on criteria it
derived from standards developed by the American Society of Civil
Engineers. Table 1 shows information about the number of assets,
replacement value, service life of, and condition grades assigned by
the Coast Guard for each of its asset lines for fiscal year 2018.
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\8\ According to the Coast Guard its overall shore inventory has a
65 year service life, and its asset service life ranges from 6 to 75-
years, depending on the type of asset.
\9\ GAO-19-82 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-82].
\10\ The Coast Guard assigned each asset line a letter grade to
provide a snapshot of what the Coast Guard considered the condition of
its shore infrastructure to be for that year. Adapted from standards
used by the American Society of Civil Engineers, the Coast Guard
considered the following eight attributes: Capacity, Funding,
Operations and Maintenance, Resilience, Condition, Future Need, Public
Safety, and Innovation. As noted by the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2018
shore infrastructure reports, these infrastructure grades provide a
broad basis for performance analysis and consider how well the Coast
Guard is able to achieve mission objectives in relation to its
dependencies on shore infrastructure.
\11\ According to the American Society of Civil Engineers, an ``A''
is generally excellent condition, a ``B'' is in good to excellent
condition, a ``C'' is in mediocre/fair to good condition but showing
signs of deterioration and increasingly vulnerable to risk, a ``D'' is
in poor to fair condition and mostly below standard, and an ``F'' is
failing/critical, unfit for purpose, and in an unacceptable condition
with widespread advanced signs of deterioration.
Table 1: Asset Numbers and Replacement Values, Percent of Assets Operating Past Service Life, and Condition
Grades of Select Assets, for Fiscal Year 2018 as Determined by the U.S. Coast Guard
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of
assets
Number of Replacement Value Percent of assets operating more 2018 condition
Asset line assets ($ in millions) past service than 5 years grade
life past service
life
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation 334 2,570 63 35 D
Base services 4,180 880 50 33 C-
Civil works 6,665 1,872 55 33 C
Community services 1,135 1,394 68 37 D+
Housing 2,901 2,923 28 26 B-
Industrial 52 467 57 38 D-
Sector/District 459 2,029 27 16 C
Shore operations 1,056 1,951 38 19 B
Technology 1,910 835 24 15 D+
Training facilities 174 421 35 25 C+
Waterfront 1,577 2,494 55 26 C-
Total 20,433 17,835 46 29 C-
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard documents. GAO-19-711T
Note: Table excludes two asset lines--fixed and floating aids to navigation and signal equipment--which are
used to mark federal waterways to safeguard maritime safety and commerce, among other things. We have ongoing
work related to Coast Guard's fixed and floating aids to navigation.
The Coast Guard does not have complete service life data on all of its assets. For example, the Coast Guard
does not have data on the remaining service life for 16 percent of its aviation assets.
According to the American Society of Civil Engineers, upon which Coast Guard based its grades, an ``A'' is
generally in excellent condition; a ``B'' is in good to excellent condition; a ``C'' is in mediocre/fair to
good condition but showing signs of deterioration and increasingly vulnerable to risk; a ``D'' is in poor to
fair condition and mostly below standard; and an ``F'' is failing/critical, unfit for purpose, and in an
unacceptable condition with widespread advanced signs of deterioration. The formula the Coast Guard uses to
assign grades is based on a number of factors, including the results of its facility inspections, and the
percent of assets past service life is independent of the grade calculation. According to Coast Guard
officials, in 2018 some of its data on shore infrastructure may not be complete if field inspectors did not
identify and record problems at facilities they inspected. As a result, condition grades could be overly
positive.
The aging and deteriorating condition of the Coast Guard's shore
infrastructure has led to at least $2.6 billion in deferred
construction projects and maintenance backlogs. With almost half of its
infrastructure past its service life, and given recent Coast Guard
funding requests for its shore infrastructure, it will take many years
for the agency to address these backlogs. For example, in 2018 the
Coast Guard estimated that it would take almost 400 years \12\ to
address just the $1.774 billion recapitalization and new construction
backlog--assuming an overall 65-year service life and that funding
would continue at the fiscal year 2017 appropriations level. This time
frame estimate excludes the Coast Guard's $900 million deferred depot-
level maintenance backlog.\13\ Table 2 provides information on the
Coast Guard's two shore infrastructure backlogs as of August 2018.
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\12\ The number of years it would take to address the backlog is
dependent on appropriated amounts, which have varied considerably.
\13\ This estimate is as of August 2018. Deferred depot-level
maintenance consists of major maintenance tasks that are beyond the
capability of an individual unit, such as replacing exterior doors and
windows.
Table 2: U.S. Coast Guard's Estimated Shore Infrastructure Backlogs, as
of August 2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Backlog
Account Total ($ in Description
millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Procurement, 1,774 The backlog for which the Coast Guard
Construction, and had prepared cost estimates included
Improvements 125 recapitalization and new
construction projects. In 2017, the
Coast Guard removed 132 projects from
the backlog that it determined were no
longer a priority.
Deferred Depot- 900 The backlog had increased by $300
Level million since fiscal year 2012 and
Maintenance includes more than 5,600 deferred
maintenance projects.
Total 2,674 --
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend: ``--'' = not applicable.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data. GAO-19-711T
According to Coast Guard officials, in 2017 the Coast Guard reviewed
all projects on the recapitalization backlog to determine if each
project was needed and valid based on input from area leadership,
Civil Engineering Units, and facility engineers, and removed projects
that it determined were no longer necessary based on mission change,
alternative solutions, or the need being met through another project.
The Coast Guard was not able to identify the estimated total cost for
the 132 projects it removed.
Nevertheless, the size and estimated costs of the Coast Guard's
backlogs may be understated. We found in February 2019 that the Coast
Guard's estimated costs did not include hundreds--or the majority--of
the projects on the recapitalization and new construction backlog. For
example, we reported that there were 205 projects on the backlog
without cost estimates.\14\ Officials explained that they had not
prepared cost estimates for these projects because they were in the
preliminary stages of development.\15\
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\14\ In 2017, the Coast Guard removed 132 projects that it
determined were no longer necessary based on mission change,
alternative solutions, or the need being met through another project.
We did not assess the process the Coast Guard applied to remove
projects from its list. The Coast Guard was not able to identify the
estimated total cost for projects it removed.
\15\ In 2018, the Coast Guard's projected costs for individual
shore projects with cost estimates ranged from $2 million to about $95
million per project. We did not evaluate the Coast Guard's cost
estimating practices.
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Coast Guard Has Taken Initial Steps toward Improving Its Management of
Its Shore Infrastructure
Our previous reports have identified various steps the Coast Guard
has taken to begin to improve how it manages its shore infrastructure.
Some of the steps the Coast Guard has taken align with leading
practices for managing public sector backlogs and key practices for
managing risks to critical infrastructure, including identifying risks
posed by the lack of timely investment, identifying mission-critical
facilities,\16\ disposing of unneeded assets,\17\ and beginning an
assessment of shore infrastructure vulnerabilities.\18\ Specifically,
the Coast Guard has:
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\16\ GAO-19-82 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-82].
\17\ GAO-18-9 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-9].
\18\ GAO-19-675 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-675].
Identified risks posed by lack of timely investment. In
February 2019, we found that the Coast Guard had a process to identify,
document, and report risks to its shore infrastructure in its annual
shore infrastructure reports for fiscal years 2015 through 2018.\19\
These reports identified the types of risks the Coast Guard faces in
not investing in its facilities, including financial risk, capability
risk, and operational readiness risk. The Coast Guard met this leading
practice to identify risk in general terms--for example, in terms of
increased lifecycle costs, or risk to operations.
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\19\ According to leading practices, agencies should identify the
types of risks posed by not investing in deteriorating facilities,
systems, and components because this is important for providing more
transparency in the decision making process, and for communicating with
staff at all organizational levels. See GAO, Federal Real Property:
Improved Transparency Could Help Efforts to Manage Agencies'
Maintenance and Repair Backlogs, GAO-14-188 [https://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-14-188] (Washington, D.C., January 23, 2014).
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Identified mission-critical and mission-supportive shore
infrastructure. In February 2019, we found that since at least 2012,
the Coast Guard had documented its process to classify all of its real
property under a tier system and established minimum investment targets
by tier as part of its central depot level maintenance expenditure
decisions.\20\ These tiers--which range from mission-critical to
mission-supportive assets--were incorporated into guidance that Coast
Guard decision makers are to follow in their deliberations about
project funding, and to help them determine how to target funding more
effectively. For example, Coast Guard guidance for fiscal years 2019
through 2023 prioritized expenditures on shore infrastructure
supporting front line operations, such as piers or runways, over shore
infrastructure providing indirect support to front line operations,
such as administrative buildings.
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\20\ Leading practices state that agencies should identify
buildings as mission-critical and mission-supportive to help establish
where maintenance and repair investments should be targeted, to ensure
that funds are being used effectively. See GAO-14-188 [https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-188].
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Assessed selected buildings for vulnerabilities. We
issued a report today that discusses the Coast Guard Civil Engineering
program's efforts to conduct a vulnerability assessment of its owned
and occupied buildings,\21\ which the Coast Guard initiated in 2015 and
aims to complete in 2025.\22\ The Coast Guard calls this infrastructure
review the Shore Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment. The focus of
Phase I of this assessment, completed in 2019, was to determine the
vulnerability of certain occupied buildings to 10 natural
disasters.\23\ Further, the assessment results are intended to assist
with contingency planning by identifying which Coast Guard facilities
are likely to remain operational after a natural disaster.
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\21\ According to DHS's Risk Management Framework, it is important
to identify assets that are both nationally significant and those that
may not be significant on a national level but are, nonetheless,
important to state, local, or regional critical infrastructure security
and resilience and national preparedness efforts.
\22\ See GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Processes for
Improving Resilience Should Fully Align with DHS Risk Management
Framework, GAO-19-675 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-675]
(Washington, D.C., September 25, 2019).
\23\ Specifically, the Shore Infrastructure Vulnerability
Assessment analyzed all Coast Guard owned and occupied buildings over
1,000 gross square feet for vulnerabilities to natural disasters. The
10 natural disaster vulnerabilities assessed were: seismic/ earthquake,
flood, tsunami, sea level rise, coastal vulnerability index (CVI),
hurricane/typhoon wind, wildfire, volcano, tornado/wind, and drought.
CVI quantifies the likelihood that physical changes may occur in the
coastal zone based on analysis of the location's tidal range, ice
cover, wave height, coastal slope, historical shoreline change rate,
geomorphology, and sea level rise. The Coast Guard's CVI analysis was
based on the U.S. Geological Survey National Assessment of Coastal
Vulnerability to Sea-Level Rise.
During Phase I of this assessment, completed in 2019, the Coast
Guard analyzed 3,214 buildings, almost 16 percent of its
infrastructure, for vulnerabilities to disasters such as floods,
earthquakes, and hurricanes. The analysis identified Coast Guard-wide
infrastructure vulnerabilities to coastal risks such as shoreline loss,
coastal erosion and earthquakes, as well as tsunami risks on the West
Coast of the United States, Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii, and immediate and
serious flood risks in Puerto Rico and the Gulf and East Coasts. The
Phase I report recommended that Coast Guard units and contingency
planners consider these vulnerabilities when preparing contingency
plans or making capital investments. The Coast Guard has also initiated
a follow up effort involving structural analyses for buildings it
believes to be more susceptible to damage from earthquakes and wind.
Officials involved said their aim is to complete this effort in 2025.
Coast Guard Has Not Fully Applied Leading Practices and Key Risk
Management Steps in Managing its Shore Infrastructure
The Coast Guard has taken actions to begin to improve its shore
infrastructure management. However, as we previously reported, the
Coast Guard has not fully applied leading practices and key risk
management steps to improve its shore infrastructure management.
Specifically, we found, among other things, that the following actions
could help improve the Coast Guard's shore infrastructure management
efforts:
Employ models for predicting the outcome of investments
and analyzing tradeoffs. In February 2019, we found that a 2017 Coast
Guard Aviation Pavement Study employed a model that found that the
Coast Guard could more efficiently prioritize investment in aviation
pavement.\24\ A subsequent Coast Guard aviation pavement plan
recommended actions to use the study results and potentially save $13.8
million. However, we found that the Coast Guard had not fully
implemented its own recommended actions to achieve the cost savings.
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\24\ To ensure that investment decisions are aligned with agency
missions and goals, agencies should employ models to predict the future
condition and performance of its facilities as a portfolio, according
to leading practices. GAO-19-82 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-
82].
Additionally, we found that while a similar analytical approach
to efficiently prioritizing investments in aviation pavement could be
applied to all of the shore infrastructure asset lines, the Coast Guard
had not applied the approach to other asset lines. By not employing
similar models across its asset lines for predicting the outcome of
investments, analyzing tradeoffs, and optimizing decisions among
competing investments, the Coast Guard is missing opportunities to
potentially identify and achieve cost savings across other asset lines.
We recommended that the Coast Guard employ models for its asset lines
that would predict the investment outcomes, analyze tradeoffs, and
optimize decisions among competing investments. The Coast Guard agreed
with our recommendation but as of August 2019 had not addressed it. The
Coast Guard stated that it plans to assess the use of modeling tools
used by the Department of Defense as well as other alternatives to
enhance its real property asset management capability. We will continue
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to monitor its actions.
Dispose of unneeded assets. In October 2017, we found
that disposing of unneeded assets, such as closing unnecessarily
duplicative boat stations,\25\ based on a sound analytical process,
could potentially generate $290 million in cost savings over 20
years.\26\ Specifically, the Coast Guard identified 18 unnecessarily
duplicative boat stations with overlapping coverage that could be
permanently closed without negatively affecting the Coast Guard's
ability to meet its mission requirements, including its 2-hour search
and rescue response standard.\27\ In 2017, the Coast Guard affirmed
that its leadership believes the study remains valid, but as of
September 2019 it has not closed any stations. Figure 1 depicts the
extent of the Coast Guard's overlapping boat and air station search and
rescue coverage, as identified by the Coast Guard, some of which the
Coast Guard determined to be unnecessarily duplicative.
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\25\ In 2010, federal law required that within departments and
government-wide we identify programs, agencies, offices, and
initiatives with duplicative goals and activities and report annually.
Pub. L. No. 111-139, 21, 124 Stat. 29 (2010), 31 U.S.C. 712 Note.
See GAO's Duplication and Cost Savings web page for links to the 2011
to 2017 annual reports: http://www.gao.gov/duplication/overview.
Overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals,
engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target
similar beneficiaries. Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or
programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same
services to the same beneficiaries.
\26\ GAO-18-9 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-9]. In February
2019 we reported that leading practices state that agencies should
efficiently employ available resources, limit construction of new
facilities, and that facilities that are not needed to support an
agency's mission should be disposed of whenever it is cost effective to
do so. GAO-19-82 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-82].
\27\ Coast Guard guidance calls for its stations to plan to arrive
to the scene of the search and rescue distress cases within their area
of responsibility within 2 hours. The analytical process the Coast
Guard used to identify unnecessarily duplicative stations was designed
to ensure the Coast Guard was able to meet or exceed requirements to
maintain search and rescue coverage, and to account for such factors as
boat downtime and surge capacity to respond to incidents. Further, the
boat station analysis did not include consideration of potential search
and rescue responses by the Coast Guard's air stations and facilities,
which can provide additional overlapping coverage. U.S. Coast Guard,
U.S. Coast Guard Addendum to the United States National Search and
Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search
and Rescue Manual, COMDTINST M16130.2F (Washington, D.C.: January
2013).
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Figure 1: Overlap of U.S. Coast Guard Search and Rescue Coverage
Provided by Boat Stations, Air Stations, and Air Facilities,
May 2017
In February 2019, we found that 5 of the 18 boat stations
recommended for closure had projects listed on the Coast Guard's
current project backlog.\28\ For example, Station Shark River, in New
Jersey, was recommended for recapitalization in fiscal year 2017,
despite Coast Guard recommendations to close the station in 1988, 1996,
2007, and 2013.\29\ Notably, the Coast Guard has made multiple attempts
in previous years to close such stations but was unable to due to
congressional intervention, and subsequent legislation prohibiting
closures.\30\
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\28\ Leading practices state that agencies should efficiently
employ available resources, limit construction of new facilities, adapt
existing buildings to new uses, and transfer ownership of unneeded
buildings to other public or private organizations to align real
property with mission needs. In addition, facilities that are
functionally obsolete, not needed to support an agency's mission, not
historically significant, or not suitable for transfer or adaptive
reuse should be demolished whenever it is cost effective to do so,
under this leading practice.
\29\ Projects added to the recapitalization and new construction
backlog in 2017 involving stations previously recommended for closure
included Station Oxford in Maryland, Station Ocracoke in North
Carolina, Station Fortescue in New Jersey, and Station Kenosha in
Wisconsin.
\30\ Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-457, 102 Stat. 2125, 2126
(1988). Id. at 350, 102 Stat. 2156. See also, 14 U.S.C. 910
(formerly cited as 14 U.S.C. 675). See Howard Coble Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-281, 225(b), 128
Stat. 3022, 3039 (2014). See also, 14 U.S.C. 912 (formerly cited as
14 U.S.C. 676a). In 1990, we reported that the Department of
Transportation Inspector General recommended that the Coast Guard close
21 stations, and the Coast Guard recommended additional closures. See
GAO/RCED-90-98 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-98]. We have
reported on the Coast Guard's efforts to close stations over many
years. In 1994, we reported that the Coast Guard had created a new
process for determining the need for boat station changes. We also
found that the new process included detailed criteria to evaluate the
appropriate need for stations, such as boating and economic trends and
the availability of alternative search and rescue resources. The Coast
Guard then unsuccessfully attempted to close stations in 1995 using
this process, and again in 2008. GAO, Coast Guard: Improved Process
Exists to Evaluate Changes to Small Boat Stations, GAO/RCED-94-147
[https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-94-147] (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
1, 1994); See also, GAO-18-9 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-9].
In October 2017, we recommended that the Coast Guard establish
and implement a plan with target dates and milestones for closing boat
stations that it has determined provide overlapping search and rescue
coverage and are unnecessarily duplicative. In February 2019, we
further recommended disposing of unneeded assets to more efficiently
manage resources and better position the Coast Guard and Congress to
address shore infrastructure challenges. The Coast Guard agreed with
our recommendations. As of September 2019, the Coast Guard reported
that it was considering changes in the operational status of several
stations, such as closing the stations during the winter months when
they conduct few, if any, search and rescue cases. The Coast Guard
estimated that it will continue to consider changes until March 2020.
These are positive steps, but we continue to believe that it is
important for the Coast Guard to dispose of unneeded assets. Given the
Coast Guard's competing acquisition, operational, and maintenance
needs, and its existing $1.774 billion project backlog of
recapitalization and new construction projects, these actions may help
to mitigate some of its resource challenges. We will continue to
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monitor the Coast Guard's efforts to implement these recommendations.
Report shore infrastructure project backlogs accurately.
In February 2019, we found areas in which the Coast Guard could
increase budget transparency for shore infrastructure by accurately
reporting project backlogs and costs in Congressionally-required
plans.\31\ Specifically, we found that the Coast Guard had not provided
accurate information to Congress necessary to inform decision-makers of
the risks posed by untimely investments in maintenance and repair
backlogs.\32\ For example, the Coast Guard had not provided complete
information to Congress in its Unfunded Priorities Lists of shore
infrastructure projects, including information about tradeoffs among
competing project alternatives, as well as the impacts on missions
conducted from shore facilities in disrepair.\33\ We also found that
Coast Guard budget requests related to shore infrastructure for fiscal
years 2012 through 2019 generally did not identify funding to address
any backlogs of deferred maintenance or recapitalization, except for
one fiscal year--2012--when the Coast Guard requested $93 million to
recapitalize deteriorated/obsolete facilities.
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\31\ According to leading practices, agencies should structure
maintenance and repair budgets to differentiate between funding
allotted for routine maintenance and repairs, and funding allotted to
addressing maintenance and repair backlogs, among other things. GAO-19-
82 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-82].
\32\ Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act, 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-213, 213, 126 Stat. 1540, 1552-53 (codified as amended at 14
U.S.C. 5102, formerly cited as 14 U.S.C. 2902). The Coast Guard was
statutorily required to annually provide a list of each unfunded
priority, including unfunded shore infrastructure priorities, to
certain committees of Congress to support the President's budget, and
its 5-year Capital Investment Plan. 14 U.S.C. 2902 (2018). See 14
U.S.C. 5108.
\33\ The term `unfunded priority' means a program or mission
requirement that (1) has not been selected for funding in the
applicable proposed budget; (2) is necessary to fulfill a requirement
associated with an operational need; and (3) the Commandant would have
recommended for inclusion in the applicable proposed budget had
additional resources been available, or had the requirement emerged
before the budget was submitted. 14 U.S.C. 2902(c) (2018). See 14
U.S.C. 5108.
We also found that the Coast Guard had not provided accurate
information about its requirements-based budget targets for shore
infrastructure in its budget requests. According to Coast Guard
officials, a requirements-based budget is an estimate of the cost to
operate and sustain its shore infrastructure portfolio of assets over
the lifecycle of the asset, from initial construction or capital
investment through divestiture or demolition.\34\ Further, we found
that Coast Guard recapitalization targets showed a far greater need
than was reflected in the appropriations it requested from fiscal years
2012 through 2019. Specifically, Coast Guard targets for
recapitalization of shore assets indicated the Coast Guard needs $290
to $390 million annually for its recapitalization efforts. However, its
budget requests for fiscal years 2012 through 2018 have ranged from
about $5 million to about $99 million annually.
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\34\ According to the Coast Guard, its requirements-based budget
planning is based on industry standards and that it aligns with the
National Academy of Sciences benchmarks for sustainable facility and
infrastructure management. National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences, Stewardship of Federal Facilities: A Proactive
Strategy for Managing the Nation's Public Assets (Washington, D.C.:
National Academies Press: 1998).
We recommended that the Coast Guard include supporting details
about competing project alternatives and report tradeoffs in
Congressional budget requests and related reports. Without such
information about the Coast Guard's budgetary requirements, the
Congress will lack critical information that could help to prioritize
funding to address the Coast Guard's shore infrastructure backlogs.
While the Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation, in August 2019
officials reported that they will continue to develop budgets as the
agency has done but will include additional information in future
required reports to Congress. We will continue to monitor these
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actions.
Fully implement DHS's Critical Infrastructure Risk
Management Framework. In September 2019, we found that the Coast Guard
has taken some steps to improve the resilience of its shore
infrastructure by rebuilding storm-damaged facilities and initiating a
vulnerability assessment, but its processes to improve shore
infrastructure resilience are not fully aligned with the five steps DHS
has identified for critical infrastructure risk management (DHS
Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework).\35\ The five steps
include: (1) setting goals and objectives, (2) identifying critical
infrastructure, (3) assessing and analyzing risks and costs, (4)
implementing risk management activities, and (5) measuring the
effectiveness of actions taken.\36\
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\35\ See GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Processes for
Improving Resilience Should Fully Align with DHS Risk Management
Framework, GAO-19-675 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-675]
(Washington, D.C., September 25, 2019).
\36\ In 2013, DHS updated its National Infrastructure Protection
Plan guidance for critical infrastructure owners and operators to
emphasize security and resilience as the primary aim of homeland
security planning efforts for critical infrastructure. As part of this
effort, DHS established a five step risk management framework for
assessing critical infrastructure (DHS Risk Management Framework) and
recommended that owners and operators of critical infrastructure
whether private or public use the framework to identify priorities,
articulate clear goals, mitigate risk, measure progress, and adapt
based on feedback and the changing environment. See, Department of
Homeland Security, 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience
(Washington, D.C.: December 2013).
We found that the Coast Guard is not positioned to provide
decision makers with complete details of which infrastructure
facilities are critical, and the type of information the DHS Critical
Infrastructure Risk Management Framework recommends for making cost
effective risk management decisions. The Coast Guard identified
occupied buildings that may be important to operations and assessed
their vulnerability through its Shore Infrastructure Vulnerability
Assessment process, but this process did not identify all shore
infrastructure assets that are critical to its missions--such as
aircraft runways--or screen them for all vulnerabilities, such as
flooding. Similarly, we found that while the Coast Guard identified
almost 800 buildings that may be vulnerable to tornadoes and another
1,000 buildings vulnerable to hurricanes, it has not analyzed the
potential consequences, such as economic losses, costs for rebuilding,
and impact on mission, should this infrastructure suffer damage from
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those vulnerabilities.
Without a complete understanding of both the vulnerabilities of
its infrastructure and the consequences to its mission operations if
its infrastructure is damaged, the Coast Guard risks questionable
recapitalization investments for improving resilience when selecting
projects to fund. Such an understanding is especially important given
its existing project backlogs of at least $2.6 billion. The five steps
of the DHS Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework are
intended to guide decision making and prioritize actions to more
effectively achieve desired outcomes. Therefore, in September 2019 we
recommended that the Coast Guard implement risk management processes
that more fully align with the five key steps outlined in DHS's
Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework to better guide its
shore infrastructure investment decisions. The Coast Guard agreed with
our recommendation. It stated that it plans to make progress towards
implementing the recommendation while developing and implementing its
Component Resilience Plan, in accordance with the recently mandated DHS
Resilience Framework.\37\ It intends to complete these efforts by the
end of 2021. The Coast Guard also intends to develop, by July 2020,
goals and objectives for measuring the effectiveness of actions taken
to identify resilience readiness gaps and resource needs. We will
continue to monitor these efforts.
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\37\ In 2018, DHS required all operational components to
participate in the development of the DHS Resilience Framework,
including developing individual component resilience plans, to guide
DHS's approach to resilience planning. According to the Coast Guard
officials, their plan was submitted to DHS in August 2019.
Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
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respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
We will now proceed to Members' questions under the 5-
minute rule. I will begin by alternating between the majority
and the minority. I will begin by recognizing myself for 5
minutes.
Admiral Moore, there were some eye-popping parts of Mr.
Anderson's testimony. Would you like to respond to any of that?
I mean, I can ask you about each one or I can just let you go.
Admiral Moore. Well, I think I can say, sir, just as an
opening statement, that we are certainly appreciative of GAO's
recommendations. And I think for me, as the chief engineer of
the Coast Guard, as we work through our plan and how we get
after this issue when we see the readiness that is impacted in
the field, we really appreciate the outside look that an
organization like GAO gives us.
They have created in this report six specific
recommendations, and we concur with all six of those. In fact,
we have already taken action on a couple of them, most recently
some of this standardized facilities condition assessments. I
actually control that out of my office and signed that out
about a month ago, and we are doing that now Coast Guard-wide.
So I think, you know, as an overall statement, I would
certainly say we appreciate the outside look, and we are taking
action to address those recommendations.
Mr. Maloney. Anything in the report you disagree with?
Admiral Moore. Not as a functional, you know, set of
comments. I mean, no, sir. I mean----
Mr. Maloney. So we can expect progress on all those
recommendations?
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. I have got my folks working
towards each one of those six recommendations, and we have
detailed timelines on how to get there.
Mr. Maloney. Let me try and understand the scope of the
problem. So I am told that 46 percent of the shore
infrastructure is beyond its service life, that the project
backlog will cost at least $2.6 billion. But, as I understand
it, the majority of projects don't have cost estimates. And of
the projects that do, they represent less than half of the
total number of projects. The average cost for the ones that do
have cost estimates is about $17 million. And if you are doing
the math, you get to a notional number that would be far in
excess of the $2.6 billion total cost.
So how do we, in the absence of cost estimates for the
majority of the projects, have any idea what the true size of
the backlog is, or can you shed some light on that?
Admiral Moore. Yes. Thank you, sir. We do have cost
estimates and different fidelity. What I would say about that
backlog is everything on the backlog is not equal. There are
certainly projects on that list that are more critical to our
operations and to our support of our personnel, in terms of
housing, et cetera. So we focus our effort and the limited
funding that we do have for shore infrastructure on those
projects that are executable.
So, while the backlog itself is large, we certainly focus
our efforts on things that we believe are executable and
projects that we are going to actually undertake to increase
our readiness.
Mr. Maloney. Admiral, could you also say a word about the
risk management framework that DHS has, and could you expand on
that? Is that the same process you are talking about
implementing, or are you talking about something else?
Admiral Moore. Sir, that risk management framework is
something a little bit different. Underneath the Department of
Homeland Security's guidelines, we have submitted our first
component plan for resilience. My office just signed that out a
couple months ago.
That is our first effort into a plan for resiliency, and
included in that are several specific steps that we are taking.
One is a complete shore infrastructure vulnerability analysis
that we have undertaken for all of our facilities. We have
started with a phase 1 report, which we have completed already,
which analyzes all of our facilities against natural threats,
such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, tsunamis,
wildfires, that kind of thing. Phase 2 will be to look at our
buildings, based on seismic and wind vulnerabilities. And then
phase 3 is what are we going to do about it. Phase 3 is the
actual plan for how we tackle that. So that is all underneath
the component plan for resilience that we submitted to DHS.
Mr. Maloney. Can I ask you for a little preview of coming
attractions on that? I have only got about a minute. But do you
have any visibility into that phase 1 assessment? I mean,
common sense would tell you they are all on the water, aren't
they? I mean, are all of them vulnerable to sea rise? How
sweeping is that finding going to be?
Admiral Moore. I think, at some level, all of our
infrastructure is vulnerable. It is all on or near the water
and accessible to that air, salt air in particular, and water.
Different levels of vulnerability, though.
The initial assessments that I have seen will show us that
there are some locations where you are in an elevated location.
Some locations are newer than others, so built to modern
standards.
Mr. Maloney. Is it fair to say that common sense or an
early glimpse at the survey would suggest that you are going to
have a sweeping set of concerns, that the scope of this issue
could be massive? Is that fair to say?
Admiral Moore. It is going to be a significant backlog of
work in addition to what we already know, but I think we
already know most of it, sir. I think that is where--you know,
we have been doing this for years, and we know that these
assets that we place on the water are vulnerable to these
natural threats. So it will be a significant report, but I
don't think there will be that much new information that we
didn't already know.
Mr. Maloney. All right. I thank the gentleman.
I yield to Mr. Gibbs.
Mr. Gibbs. Thanks.
Thanks, Admiral, and thanks, Mr. Anderson, for being here.
Admiral, in your testimony, you talk about how the shore
facilities are directly connected to all operations, which is
obvious, I think. And then Mr. Anderson testified about 400
years to fix the backlog, which is staggering. So, obviously, a
lot of planning and prioritization is going to have to occur
with funding, of course.
Admiral, is the shoreside infrastructure planning
initiative separate from the planning, design, and acquisition
process for the new assets?
Admiral Moore. Sir, there is some overlap there. We use our
same people, our same set of resources to attack both those
problems. We have what is called a Major Acquisition Systems
Infrastructure budgetary line item, MASI we call that. The MASI
account is specifically programmed to us for the arrival of new
assets, so new ships, aircraft, C4IT, basically to prepare the
shore infrastructure for arrival of those new assets.
So what we do is we fold together that MASI funding for new
assets with our current depot shore infrastructure money that
we use for existing assets because there is obvious overlap
there as we roll assets into our operating bases today.
Mr. Gibbs. Yes, it is important to have that coordination,
you know, is what you are saying. OK. The GAO found that the
piers and airstrips are not necessarily included in the $2.6
billion maintenance and repair backlog. What actions need to be
taken to review those assets so we have a more complete Coast
Guard capital assets backlog?
Admiral Moore. Sir, we do include piers and runways and all
those facilities, including housing, into that backlog. So,
again, everything on the backlog is not equal. There are some
things that are deemed more essential. We look at anything
supporting that operational readiness. We look at our housing
program, any of those things that directly affect our members
as most important.
Again, we have a very detailed prioritization process that
we use on 6-month intervals to analyze all of those projects
and prioritize which ones are going to be funded.
Mr. Gibbs. What would be the long-term impacts of operation
of the Coast Guard personnel of carrying such a large backlog?
Admiral Moore. Sir, thank you for asking that question. We
know there are impacts to our people on this. I mean, we talk a
lot about boats and aircraft and cutters that get underway, but
in particular on the housing side, there are significant
impacts to our people as we face backlogs there.
Our people do tremendous things, and we have seen the
recent response to Hurricane Dorian and the Coast Guard being
on scene there quickly. And, from my perspective, we realize
that all of that response a couple weeks ago to the Bahamas,
all that response came from shore facilities and assets where
we are struggling on the shore infrastructure side. So the
impacts to our people are real, both operationally and from the
housing front.
Mr. Gibbs. Recently, Ranking Member Sam Graves toured the
Barbers Point in Hawaii, the hangar there, which has an
unfunded mandate listed for a $100.5 million project that would
include housing, the C-130Js and the MH-65s.
What is the likelihood this funding will be included in the
administration's fiscal year 2020 budget request? Are you guys
recommending for that to be in there?
Admiral Moore. Sir, we continue to make tough choices as we
look at our funding constraints on where we place new assets
and what gets put into the budget for acquisition. I can tell
you from the shore infrastructure side, a new hangar facility
is needed in Hawaii, and that is why you see that on the
Unfunded Priority List.
We greatly appreciate the ability to provide that list to
you and to demonstrate our highest priority needs, and that Air
Station Barbers Point hangar is certainly one of them.
Mr. Gibbs. OK. I appreciate that. When we talk about
modernization, we saw with Hurricane Katrina and the
restructuring called modernization. Does the Coast Guard intend
to implement a national process of reviewing and rating
individual projects? I guess that is where we get into the
prioritization. How are we doing that and reviewing each
individual project?
Admiral Moore. We have a very detailed process. I mentioned
these every 6-month reviews. We centrally review projects for
prioritization, and then we regionally review them as well, and
that way we get a field operator's perspective and also a
centralized view for the larger recapitalization projects. That
process is very time-tested and well-worn for us. It gives us a
good opportunity to provide those highest prioritized projects.
Mr. Gibbs. I have just got one last question before I run
out of time. Of the 10 recommendations in the last 3 GAO
shoreside infrastructure reports, how many have been fully
implemented, partially implemented, or received no action?
Admiral Moore. Sir, I would have to refer to the record to
give you a detailed breakdown from all 10 of those reports, but
we have taken action on a significant number of GAO's
recommendations, including this most recent report. As I
mentioned, we are in agreement with all six of those
recommendations.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. The gentleman, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, gentlemen.
Admiral Moore, can you kind of give us a little bit of
color in terms of with this deferred maintenance and the repair
backlog, about the impact on the mission? Give us some
examples. You know, how is it impacting the mission? How is it
impacting your members' families? Just kind of tell us a story
or two.
Sometimes we get lost in these numbers, or at least I do,
and I like to--I haven't yet been out to visit a Coast Guard
facility. It is on my list. I am new to this committee. But
tell us about the impact.
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. We would be happy to host you at
any facility any time to show you. I can think of lots of
impacts, I mean, and specific examples. If we think on the
maintenance side in my world, we have infrastructure at our
Coast Guard yard in Baltimore where we have cranes for doing
that heavy work in the dry-docks and docksides. And on the
shore infrastructure budget, we have been unable to fund repair
of those cranes, and that ends up meaning that we deliver ships
a little later. The work has to be done harder, sometimes in a
more expensive, more manual way.
If you look at operational units, places where we have
piers, where we have temporary shore tie facilities set up
because the electrical system may not be as robust as we need
it to be. We have places in housing where we badly need to do
renovations and remodeling. We have office space that often
has, you know, sort of substandard ventilation equipment and
things that need to be upgraded.
So all that puts a stress on our people. And when we ask
them to go out and do these hard missions and do the Nation's
business, it makes it much more difficult for them.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
And for Mr. Anderson, you gave us a time period in which it
would take for the Coast Guard to get well, in terms of the
backlog and the maintenance. What was that time period again?
Was that 40 years?
Mr. Anderson. 400.
Mr. Brown. 400 years. Tell me a little bit about the
assumptions you make, and is that a flat sort of steady level
of investment? Is that a declining investment in maintenance
and repairs? What are some of the assumptions that you made to
reach that?
Mr. Anderson. Unfortunately, the news doesn't get better.
That is a 400-year estimate, based on projects that are on the
backlog right now and does not consider any projects that will
come on in future years. And that is clearly going to happen.
That is just a reality.
So the assumptions that we used were what is being spent
right now on the backlogs, what is being requested from
Congress, and what is being appropriated for the purposes of
trying to buy that down.
Mr. Brown. And just so I understand sort of like the
magnitude of this $2.6 billion in backlog, could either of you
tell us, what is the current year's appropriation and spend for
maintenance and repair of infrastructure?
Admiral Moore. Sir, I am happy to take that one. For fiscal
year 2019, we had $195 million enacted, in our enacted budget
for us. We are looking at about the same level with the
President's budget for fiscal year 2020, about $200 million.
That is in our depot-level shore maintenance funding.
We also have a significant chunk of money for the new
acquisitions that come online. So most of that is also shore
infrastructure. In terms of depot maintenance, it is around
$200 million a year, sir.
Mr. Brown. Got it. I think this will probably be my final
question. Admiral, you mentioned that the Coast Guard has
divested itself of how many properties you mentioned?
Admiral Moore. It is just over 200 in the past----
Mr. Brown. And that is real property? OK.
Could you just tell a little bit about your process, the
criteria that you use to divest of certain properties, and does
that list of criteria include your ability to maintain it?
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. We do look at--we are really
constantly looking at our shore infrastructure portfolio for
opportunities to divest. As we bring new assets online, there
is a constant balance of what the shore footprint needs to look
like to support those assets and operate them.
Housing is also a significant portion of that. We have over
3,000 housing units, both owned and leased, around the world.
So we do go through a rigorous process of determining where we
can divest certain properties, and we follow the standard
Federal procedure for doing that, including providing a real
property report to the Congress every year of our progress.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
I will yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Weber.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, you say there are 5,000 Coasties. Was that what I
understood you to say?
Admiral Moore. In my organization, shore----
Mr. Weber. In your organization.
Admiral Moore [continuing]. Maintainers. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weber. OK. Can you break those out by State? Do you
know how many are in each State? I mean, not here, but----
Admiral Moore. I can take that for the record, sir. We can
provide that.
Mr. Weber. You can get that for me. And one of the
questions I had is, in the shoreside infrastructure planning
initiative, is it separate from the planning, design, and
acquisition of new assets?
Admiral Moore. They are linked. To answer your question,
yes, they are separate, but they are linked through that MASI
account. So the idea of that is we bring new infrastructure on.
We know that we are going to be--we want to make sure that new
infrastructure that comes with new assets is a complement to
what we already have.
Mr. Weber. As more and more disasters happen--and Ranking
Member Gibbs alluded to it--you know, we are the first three
coastal counties of Texas from Louisiana, that other foreign
country, coming down the gulf coast. And both Hurricane Harvey
inundated us and then Imelda inundated us just a week ago.
And the Coast Guard has been great, you know, being Johnny
on the spot and just doing everything needed. But as more and
more disasters happen, is it pushing that planning process back
for acquisition of new assets?
Admiral Moore. No, sir, it really isn't. You know, in my
world, in the maintenance world and in rebuilding the shore
infrastructure, we have been very fortunate and very
appreciative of the hurricane supplementals that we receive
from Congress. That supplemental funding has provided us the
ability to repair projects from the damage that we received in
the storms.
Our shore infrastructure that happens around the country
elsewhere is, you know, is largely a--you know, those are
separate projects, obviously, that go on around that.
I would say specifically for, in your district, sir, and in
other coastal areas, we have made great strides in resiliency
of those facilities. And I think about Sector Galveston and
Sabine Pass there that were destroyed by Hurricane Ike back in
2008.
Mr. Weber. I have been to both.
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. And you likely know that the day
after Hurricane Harvey came through, we were operating out of
those facilities.
Mr. Weber. Absolutely.
Admiral Moore. What that shows me is, if we make a wise
investment and recapitalize at new resilient standards, we
won't have to come back and do this again.
Mr. Weber. So 400 years that he is talking about, we won't
have to worry about this.
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. That is exactly right.
Mr. Weber. Yeah, I got you. You said there are 200
properties that you all have divested of. How many properties
would you say are on our ledger sheet?
Admiral Moore. Estimating, I think we have got around
10,000 properties of different size. Some are very small; some
are large. But it is around 10,000.
Mr. Weber. And you said you had divested some of the
properties around the world? You had housing units, I think
3,000 housing units in the world?
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir, including places like Guam and
obviously the outer-continental locations in Alaska and
everywhere. So----
Mr. Weber. Are we divesting ourselves of those?
Admiral Moore. The ones that are no longer needed. I mean,
we are constantly looking at where we need more housing, where
we no longer need housing, based on changes in our footprint,
changes in the local economies, ability to support our members,
et cetera.
Mr. Weber. Are you divesting of those properties,
obviously, in the various 50 States?
Admiral Moore. We are. It isn't restricted by any
particular geography. We look at it holistically.
Mr. Weber. And is there a list of those who may be on the,
quote/unquote, ``chopping block''?
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. That real property report that we
provide every year details the assets that we are in the
process of divesting.
Mr. Weber. OK. Does it take into account the length of
waterways that move a lot of commerce, like Mississippi or the
Sabine-Neches Waterway? Does it take that into account?
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. I mean, before we make any
decision to pursue divestiture, all those factors are included.
Mr. Weber. So you do an analysis on the amount of freight
or trade or the military personnel, as you may know, Beaumont,
Port of Beaumont in my district moves more military personnel
and equipment than any other port in the other lesser 49
States.
And so you all take that into account as you are looking at
those divestitures, and you have a list of those that you might
be considering that is every year?
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. I mean, that real property report
tells us exactly where we are at, which ones have been
divested, and how we are moving forward in the process.
Mr. Weber. I would like to get that list, if I could,
Admiral, if you could get that to my office. I am basically out
of time. I am going to yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Plaskett.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, gentlemen. I always have to bring up that
the Coast Guard has been exemplary in the Virgin Islands, and
we could not do many of the things that we do to protect
ourselves without their support. And so I am grateful for that.
Acting Director Anderson, the Coast Guard received over
$700 million in supplemental appropriations to restore
facilities damaged by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria and then
Matthew. How has disaster funding been applied by the Coast
Guard to rebuild island facilities to date?
Mr. Anderson. Portions of that question I may have to get
back to you on. We do have some indepth analysis about where
the funding went, which stations were hardened as a result of
some of that.
But what I can say is the Coast Guard does deserve credit
in this space for using the supplemental appropriations to
rebuild and repair to higher building standards. There have
been several instances where doing so has actually saved money
down the road when extreme weather has struck those same areas
again. Sector Houston-Galveston was an example of that.
Ms. Plaskett. You're discussing in Texas?
Mr. Anderson. Exactly. It was a role model effort there,
where it was hardened; the infrastructure was hardened. When
extreme weather struck, they were able to use that as a central
command post and do a lot of their emergency operations out of
that.
Ms. Plaskett. OK. Do you see mechanisms in place for
creating strategies to do improvement in this?
Mr. Anderson. Our central point of our report that was
issued today is really that the Coast Guard has an opportunity
to be a little bit more forward-looking in this space. And what
I mean by that is getting supplemental appropriations after the
fact and hardening that infrastructure after the fact is good,
but there are some statistics out there by the National
Institute of Building Sciences that says for every dollar
invested in resilience, you save $3 to $12 down the road. So
doing it on the front end helps.
And what we haven't seen is that integration of vulnerable
facilities, vulnerable infrastructure, kind of integrating that
into the project selection when you are trying to buy down the
backlog. So that is an opportunity the Coast Guard has.
Ms. Plaskett. OK. So not just using those that are damaged,
but recognizing those that need hardening so that they will be
able to withstand?
Mr. Anderson. Exactly. And that comes from having a firm
and comprehensive understanding of where the vulnerabilities
are. Our report that we issued today found that the Coast Guard
has information on 16 percent of its infrastructure.
Ms. Plaskett. What can we do to support them in being able
to do that?
Mr. Anderson. Well, I think it is important to note that
when making resource allocation decisions, not having 100
percent certainty of what vulnerabilities exist, more
information is needed.
And my understanding of the shore infrastructure
vulnerability assessment, which is the main process that the
Coast Guard follows, it won't be complete until 2025. So from
now until 2025, you are operating with 16 percent visibility as
to what the vulnerabilities are.
Ms. Plaskett. Admiral Moore, did you want to add anything
to that?
Admiral Moore. I thought first I could mention, in terms of
the work on the islands there and the idea of the hurricane
reconstitution funding, we have provided detailed expenditure
plans to Congress for both those supplementals for 2018 and
2019, and those details, you know, specifically by project what
we are working on there throughout the whole effort. So that
information is available to be provided so you understand
exactly what work is being done.
As far as the resiliency, I completely agree. I think,
first of all, we are making an effort to make sure that
anything we build to monitor resiliency standards withstands
future storms and we don't have to come back and spend that
money twice.
We do very much appreciate the recommendation to include
that resiliency analysis into our construction decisions, and
we are going to take that forward for action.
Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. You know, I look at Sector San
Juan, which is responsible for all of the Coast Guard
throughout my district, and they suffered an estimated $156
million in infrastructure damages due to Maria 2 years ago. And
I am just thinking about the particular vulnerabilities that
those of your sectors that are in what may be considered far-
flung areas may face with respect to that.
And then, you know, how do you need support from us? I am
concerned about supplementals and those which kind of segregate
the Territories, which then puts you in a more vulnerable
state, in terms of doing your infrastructure bills. But is
there any other thing you would like to add?
Admiral Moore. Thank you, ma'am, for the opportunity. There
is one particular area that would be very helpful for us within
the housing portfolio. We have talked about housing a little
bit here today, but we have a backlog that is significant
there, and it is included in that larger backlog. And many of
our homes where we need maintenance, we don't have the funding
within our budgetary constraints to get there either.
We do have a housing fund that, as we divest properties, we
have been able to put money into that fund. We have got about
$26 million in there currently. However, we can't access that
fund without an appropriation. So, if we could have the
authority to access our housing fund without a direct
appropriation, that would give me the funding and really the
flexibility to be able to attack our most critical housing
issues.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you.
Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
Rear Admiral Moore, the GAO found that the documented $2.6
billion Coast Guard shoreside maintenance backlog does not
necessarily include piers and docks. And I understand that the
Coast Guard Great Lakes icebreaker home ports are in desperate
need of major repairs.
And I am told that the Coast Guard pier at Sault Ste.
Marie, Michigan, which is a major logistics location,
particularly during ice season--we have a lot of ice on the
Great Lakes in winter if some of you who live in warmer
climates haven't been there. You are always welcome to come
from Texas. But those logistics locations are crumbling. They
are unable to accommodate fuel trucks, and the Coast Guard pier
in Detroit has a failing electrical shore tie to provide
electrical power to cutters moored there. We just visited; my
whole team went to the Coast Guard facility in Sturgeon Bay in
my district, and they are in a building that is a century old.
They are doing great work, by the way, and they didn't complain
about it, but that is a concern for me.
Is there a cost estimate for doing the work at Sault Ste.
Marie or for Detroit that you know of?
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. There
are cost estimates for those two projects, both Sault Ste.
Marie and Detroit. I am aware of those two. That is part of our
shore depot maintenance fund, so you won't see a specific line
item for that, because those are repairs to existing
facilities, not hurricane damaged but, you know, just repairs
that need to be done.
So we do have cost estimates. Those are competing through
our process for funding, and I am aware of exactly what you are
talking about.
Mr. Gallagher. So I guess, just to clarify, my
understanding, were any funds requested for Sault Ste. Marie in
the fiscal year 2019 Coast Guard budget request? Would they be
subsumed within that broader pot you mentioned?
Admiral Moore. They are within that pot of AFC-43 depot-
level maintenance, and we have prioritized those projects for
funding in the future.
The other thing I could point out is on our Unfunded
Priority List, the UPL also has an item for this depot
maintenance facility money. So projects like what needs to be
done at Sault Ste. Marie and in Detroit, those would both fall
under that account. So there is actually opportunity there on
the UPL as well.
Mr. Gallagher. So we will see them on the Unfunded Priority
List, both Detroit and Sault Ste. Marie?
Admiral Moore. What you will see is the line item that says
AFC-43 depot-level maintenance. That includes all of our repair
work at our own facilities, so it is a broader pot of money
that we can use for those facilities. But what I am telling you
is those two projects are prioritized within that pot.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, then what I would ask--and, obviously,
this is something you can take back--if there are cost
estimates, if we can work with you to sort of see those cost
estimates and a timeline for dock repairs. I think we all want
the same thing here, and so I would just love to work with the
Coast Guard on that issue if you can take that back. Let the
record show he is nodding.
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir, I can do that.
Mr. Gallagher. And I know it is outside your
responsibility, but let everyone at the Coast Guard know we are
keenly interested in another icebreaker on the Great Lakes. I
am hearing from my constituents in northeast Wisconsin that
there was not enough icebreaking on the Great Lakes this past
winter. Some ships weren't even able to head out on the first
day that the locks opened because they were afraid of ice
damage. And I think it is imperative we get another icebreaker
of the Mackinaw size on the Great Lakes.
So take that for what it is worth. And, again, for my
colleagues from warm climates, the cold builds character. So I
would be happy to host you in my district.
Mr. Weber. Yes, but the warm climate builds tourism.
Mr. Brown [presiding]. Mr. Lowenthal.
Mr. Lowenthal. I don't want to deal with climate changes
with just adding to tourism.
Admiral Moore, thank you for being here. I apologize for
coming a little late. I was in another hearing. I want to ask
you about the critical issue of how the Coast Guard manages its
assets and how you mitigate some of the risks that are posed by
sea-level rise and other aspects of climate change. What are
the models?
I am primarily interested in the standards or what do you
use or the anticipated levels of sea-level rise or flood risk
and vulnerability do you use, does the Coast Guard use when
designing new facilities. What do you see as the standard or
when you are trying to assess critical infrastructure risks?
Can you give us more about what level of--you know, how you
predict the future, or what you are using as your model?
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir, I will be happy to do that. Any of
the new shore infrastructure that we are building, any of the
hurricane supplemental work that we are doing to reconstitute
those facilities, that is all done to modern resiliency
standards.
So we employ modern building codes. We do things like
relocate facilities upland so you are not--you know, you may
have a lot of older facilities that are low-lying, even stilted
in some areas. We are able to move those inland a little bit
and upland. And so what we end up doing is building 2 feet
above the FEMA 100-year flood plain that is a requirement now.
Mr. Lowenthal. Two feet above?
Admiral Moore. Two feet above the 100-year flood plain
level that FEMA has set.
So, again, the idea is as we spend this money, the precious
money that we get for shore infrastructure, we don't want to
have to spend it twice.
Mr. Lowenthal. Do you anticipate in your thinking the level
of sea-level rise, what you see in terms of specifically in
terms of how that will impact your infrastructure, and what
sea-level rise you anticipate in the next 20 to 30 years?
Admiral Moore. Sir, for me, you know, on the engineering
side, civil engineering side, we are working to the modern
standards. We basically follow the guidelines for what modern
construction standards and resiliency metrics would mean. That
is probably the best answer I can give you.
Mr. Lowenthal. All right. I want to also talk about, you
know, the subcommittee has supported the Coast Guard's
important mission in the Arctic. We have sought to increase
resources dedicated to this region as we open it up to
commercial and to recreational kinds of activities.
And so you must maintain a presence, it is required in the
Arctic to execute your statutory mission. But so far, as I
understand, you have done little to maintain the Arctic shore
infrastructure that you have.
Can you speak to the Arctic shore infrastructure needs and
what the Coast Guard is using to address climate impacts like
thawing permafrost on the existing and future sites?
Admiral Moore. Yes. In the Arctic, what we do every year is
a typical exercise called Arctic Shield. That is seasonally
based, primarily around the summer, but it is a scalable,
expeditionary style of operations.
So that gives us the opportunity to adjust to weather
conditions or population moves or ship traffic or that sort of
thing. That idea of having sort of a scalable mobile
expeditionary style response helps us in the Arctic.
To answer your question about shore infrastructure, we are
putting significant investment into Kodiak, sir. That is where
we know we are going to be home porting major ships. That will
be our hub for Coast Guard housing in the future, and we have
housing listed on our Unfunded Priority List at Kodiak. We have
shore facilities that we are using that acquisition
infrastructure funding for to be ready for those new ships in
Kodiak. That is where our focus is today.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. And, finally, I want to express
my concern about DHS's July section 503 notification that it is
going to reprogram, I think it is $24.4 million from the Coast
Guard, to fund additional ICE detention beds and transportation
resources.
You know, members on this committee have fought to make
important progress to grant the Coast Guard the resources it
needs to capitalize first the first response cutter, the
National Security Cutter programs after cuts were mandated by
sequestration. I am disappointed that DHS has diverted these
funds, and what is the impact of the diversion of these funds
going to be?
Admiral Moore. Sir, from my perspective, in the maintenance
organization, none of that funding is coming out of my
organization in maintenance. I would have to refer to DHS for
questions about that.
Mr. Lowenthal. So you are not--Mr. Anderson, do you have
any response to that?
Mr. Anderson. No, I don't. I would also have to say that is
a better question for either a DHS witness or a Coast Guard
witness.
Mr. Lowenthal. I mean, I don't know why we are giving
money, and then it is being taken from one purpose and used for
another outside of--you know, the Coast Guard has come and said
that they really need these resources, and now they have been
diverted to ICE for detention beds. And I am just telling you I
am very disappointed.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Lowenthal.
My understanding is that there are no further questions by
members of the subcommittee, so I would like to thank our first
witnesses for your testimony. Your contribution to today's
discussion has been very informative and helpful.
And since there are no further questions, I will now call
up panel 2. I would like to welcome as they are coming forward
our next panel of witnesses: Rear Admiral Ann C. Phillips,
special assistant to the Governor for coastal adaptation and
protection, Office of the Governor, for the Commonwealth of
Virginia; Dr. Daniel Cox, CH2M-Hill professor of civil
engineering at Oregon State University; and Mr. Sean Hecht, co-
executive director for the Emmett Institute on Climate Change
and the Environment at the University of California at Los
Angeles School of Law.
I thank you for being here today, and I look forward to
your testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record.
I also ask unanimous consent to include in the record a
letter from the Commonwealth of Virginia's secretary of natural
resources that Admiral Phillips references in her testimony.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information is on pages 63-65.]
Mr. Brown. As with the previous panel, since your written
testimony has been made a part of the record, the subcommittee
requests that you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
Admiral Phillips, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL ANN C. PHILLIPS, U.S. NAVY (RET.),
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE GOVERNOR FOR COASTAL ADAPTATION AND
PROTECTION, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
DANIEL COX, Ph.D., CH2M-HILL PROFESSOR IN CIVIL ENGINEERING,
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY; AND SEAN B. HECHT, CO-EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, EMMETT INSTITUTE ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF
LAW
Admiral Phillips. Thank you, Acting Chairman Brown and
Ranking Member Gibbs and members of the subcommittee. It is an
honor to have an opportunity to testify before you all today on
this very important topic.
I am Ann Phillips. I am the special assistant to the
Governor of Virginia for coastal adaptation and protection. I
am a retired surface warfare officer who drove and commanded
ships for the Navy for 31 years. I have served abroad in Guam
and Lisbon and operated extensively with NATO in partnership
with peace nations. I retired in 2014 as a rear admiral and
commander of Expeditionary Strike Group 2 and since then have
been involved in multiple efforts to highlight the impacts of
climate change as a national security issue. Now I work for the
State of Virginia where climate change has a significant impact
on our coastal communities and Federal infrastructure today.
There is an urgent need for coordinated Federal efforts to deal
with the impacts.
This subcommittee can help by recognizing climate
resilience and disaster preparedness as one of the country's
greatest and most immediate needs and taking action to address
that need now. In Virginia, we have experienced over 18 inches
of relative sea-level rise in 100 years. We expect to see
another 18 inches by midcentury. The duration, severity, and
impacts of flooding have all increased substantially, and
coastal storms are magnified as a result.
We are not simply preparing; we are already living with
water. We have a water-based economy, all at risk. Our keystone
is our Federal presence, arguably the largest concentration in
the Nation, including our largest naval base, Naval Station
Norfolk, as well as the only shipyard where we build aircraft
carriers and one of only two places where we build nuclear-
powered submarines. We also host the Coast Guard's Atlantic
Area Command, Fifth District, and Force Readiness Command. We
are home to the Port of Virginia, the sixth largest container
port by traffic volume in the country. We have a tremendous
beach and water-related tourism industry along with aqua
culture and fisheries industries. And, finally, our waterfront
property and housing stock are a key source of property tax
income for our localities.
To coordinate across Federal, State, and local partners,
Virginia has focused on collaborative opportunities, including
the Hampton Roads Intergovernmental Pilot Project, or IPP;
joint land use studies conducted through the Department of
Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment; and Army Corps of
Engineers' feasibility studies under the 3x3x3 process
authorized in the 2014 Water Resources Reform and Development
Act.
The intergovernmental pilot project I speak of, which was
conducted from 2014 to 2016, was initiated through the National
Security Council and convened by Old Dominion University. It
brought together over 200 Federal, State, and regional
professionals to develop a whole-of-Government and community
set of solutions and processes to prepare for sea-level rise
and recurrent flooding in the Hampton Roads region.
This work is the subject of a recently completed
dissertation by Dr. Hannah Teicher, who studied local and
Federal alliances at both Hampton Roads and San Diego,
California. Dr. Teicher found that the shared risks between
installations and the communities that surround them bring
great potential for joint adaptation planning and, in fact,
drive a need for it. She also determined two key enabling
mechanisms as critical to initiating and reinforcing alliances
between Federal, State, and local partners: recognizing
independence and constructing credibility.
As a direct outcome of this regional collaboration
conducted by the IPP, intergovernmental pilot project, Hampton
Roads embarked on a series of joint land use studies funded by
the Office of Economic Adjustment. These included the cities of
Newport News and Hampton, Norfolk, and Virginia Beach, and a
third study just underway in Chesapeake and Portsmouth. These
studies help us understand compatible use of infrastructure by
Federal, in particular DoD, and local partners and how climate
and recurring flooding impacts and outcomes affect their
environmental resilience.
Virginia localities in the Commonwealth were also partnered
with the Army Corps on two coastal storm risk management
studies to further define the needs of communities dealing with
rising waters and storm surge. Our local governments are in the
need, and Virginia has laid groundwork to prepare elsewhere.
We struggle with our general assembly who has been
reluctant to take funded action on climate change and sea-level
rise. Under Governor Northam, however, we are taking bold and
substantive action to address this threat. Governor Northam
signed Executive Order 24, increasing Virginia's resilience to
sea-level rise and natural hazards, in November of 2018. This
directs the Commonwealth to determine the vulnerability of and
set standards for State-owned infrastructure; develop a coastal
protection master plan for the State of Virginia; and to
coordinate, collaborate, and communicate across and with
Federal and local governments to ensure aligned objectives.
Even with strong State action, we cannot do this alone. The
actions of the subcommittee are vitally important to protecting
people and property. And, again, I ask that you recognize
climate resilience and disaster preparedness as one of the
country's greatest and most immediate needs to protect American
infrastructure and our economy.
We also ask that the subcommittee help States organize and
prioritize flood control projects, including those underway
with the Army Corps of Engineers; deliver timely Army Corps and
Office of Economic Adjustment studies, and consider third-party
analysis and study; and also include strong environmental
review.
In Virginia, we are committed to building capacity for our
coastal communities and to collaborating with our Federal and
local partners, and we know we have no time to waste. Time and
tide wait for no man.
Mr. Brown. Admiral, can you close out your statement?
Admiral Phillips. Thank you. Yes, sir. Thank you again for
the opportunity to offer this testimony. I look forward to your
questions.
[Admiral Phillips' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Ann C. Phillips, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
Special Assistant to the Governor for Coastal Adaptation and
Protection, Office of the Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia
Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify to you
today. It is a privilege to be before you at this hearing to discuss
this very important topic.
My name is Ann Phillips, and I currently have the honor to serve as
the Special Assistant to the Governor of Virginia for Coastal
Adaptation and Protection. I am a retired Surface Warfare Officer--I
drove and commanded ships for the United States Navy for 31 years,
served abroad in Guam and Lisbon, Portugal, and operated extensively
with NATO and Partnership for Peace nations. I retired in 2014 as a
Rear Admiral and Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group TWO. My
experience in coastal adaptation and protection, along with climate and
national security, stems from my work as Chair of the Surface Force
Working Group for the Navy's Task Force Climate Change while still on
active duty, and from my work since retiring, chairing the
Infrastructure Working Group for the Hampton Roads Intergovernmental
Sea Level Rise Pilot Planning Project from 2014 to 2016, and as a
member of the Advisory Board of the Center for Climate and Security,
and on the Board of Directors for the Council on Strategic Risks.
I've been asked to address the need for collaboration across and
between Federal facilities and the maritime related businesses and
communities that surround them, in the context of the current and long
term risk to infrastructure, the economy, and social fabric of
Virginia's coastal communities as viewed from my position as Special
Assistant to the Governor. I would like to first set the stage in
Coastal Virginia today, then describe what is at risk, and how
Virginia's unique coastline intensifies that risk. I will then describe
Virginia's efforts and intent to prepare, adapt and protect our Coast,
and the actions that we as a Commonwealth and that our coastal
communities are taking to align our actions with those of our Federal
partners. Finally, I will touch on what Congress can do to help as we
prepare for our collective climate-changed futures.
Setting the Stage
Climate change has a significant and intensifying impact on our
coastal communities in Virginia today. Rising sea levels lead to
recurrent nuisance flooding, caused by high tides, accompanied by wind,
and/or increased intensity and frequency of rainfall, or any
combination of the three. These circumstances intensify the impact of
coastal storms and hurricanes and the accompanying flooding and storm
surges. Coastal Virginia deals with water where we did not plan for it
to be, and that impedes the expected pattern of life, in some form,
nearly every day. This is our ``new normal''--it affects every aspect
of our lives in ways that we do not yet understand, or even realize. My
current position works at the local, regional, state and national level
to foster action across the whole of government, community and society
to address and build resilience to this existential threat and to
protect and adapt Coastal Virginia.
Virginia's Unique Risk
We have a water-based economy in Coastal Virginia. The cornerstones
of that economy are:
Our Federal presence, arguably the largest concentration
in the nation--in particular Department of Defense with Navy as the
largest service represented, and including the substantial commercial
industry surrounding military and commercial shipbuilding, maintenance
and repair. We are also home to the Coast Guard's Atlantic Area
Command, US Coast Guard Fifth District, (Both in Portsmouth) USCG Force
Readiness Command (Norfolk), Coast Guard Sector Hampton Roads, Coast
Guard Base Support Unit Portsmouth, and one of the Coast Guard's
largest Training facilities, Coast Guard Training Facility Yorktown.
The Port of Virginia--large and expanding capacity with
multi-modal access reaching from the East Coast to west of the
Mississippi River
Beach and Water-related Tourism
Water-adjacent and dependent agriculture, aquaculture,
fisheries, commercial property, and housing stock
All of this is supported by critical public and private utility and
transportation infrastructure, as well as a substantial medical/
hospital presence, and the universities, schools, and public
infrastructure sustaining cities, counties and towns, along our coast.
Virginia's large military and Coast Guard concentration is bound to
the water by the very nature of its mission, and at risk from the
threat of sea level rise and climate change impacts. In their 2016
report, ``The Military on the Front Lines of Rising Seas,'' the Union
of Concerned Scientists found that a 3-foot increase in sea level rise
would threaten 128 coastal DOD installations [including US Coast Guard
Facilities] in the United States, 43% of which are Navy facilities
valued at roughly $100 billion.\1\ In its own 2019 ``Report on Effects
of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense,'' the Department
found that 53 of its mission-critical facilities are currently
vulnerable to recurrent flooding, with 60 such facilities vulnerable
within the next 20 years. When other hazards from climate change are
considered (wildfire, drought, desertification), 79 total DOD
facilities are vulnerable at present. In Virginia, five Hampton Roads
area facilities are on the US Navy and US Air Force list of most
vulnerable infrastructure released in June 2019, including Naval Air
Station Norfolk, Naval Air Station Oceana, Naval Support Activity
Hampton Roads, Naval Support Activity Hampton Roads-Northwest Annex,
and Joint Base Langley-Eustis.\2\ US Coast Guard facilities are also
vulnerable, and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2019 addresses
this, at least in part, by including direction similar to that to DOD
included in the 2018 NDAA. Specifically, that the Coast Guard identify
its top 10 most vulnerable facilities, and address adaptation and
mitigation needs and costs related to impact on its missions and
facilities.\3\ A 2008 study by the Organization for Co-operation and
Economic Development, ranked the Hampton Roads metropolitan area as the
10th most vulnerable in the world related to the value of assets at
risk from sea level rise.\4\
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\1\ ``The US Military on the Front Lines of Rising Seas,''
Executive Summary (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016), https://
www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/front-lines-of-
rising-seas-key-executive-summary.pdf.
\2\ United States Department of Defense, ``Report on Effects of a
Changing Climate to the Department of Defense,'' January 2019, https://
media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/29/2002084200/-1/-1/1/CLIMATE-CHANGE-REPORT-
2019.PDF.
\3\ Rep. DeFazio, Peter A., ``Coast Guard Authorization Act of
2019,'' Pub. L. No. H.R. 3049, 407 (2019), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3409/text.
\4\ RJ Nicholls et al., ``Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure to
Climate Extremes--Exposure Estimates,'' Environment Working Papers
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2008.), http:/
/www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ENV/
WKP(2007)1&doclanguage=en.
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The Department of Defense and our federal partners are the largest
employers in the state \5\ and Virginia's percentage of gross domestic
product derived from the federal presence in the state is 8.9% (the
highest percentage of any state).\6\ Virginia also has the highest rate
of defense personnel spending of any state, and is second only to
California in defense contract spending and defense-related contract
spending. The Hampton Roads region hosts federal facilities that are
unique and not easily replicable in other locations, including our
largest Naval Base, Naval Station Norfolk, as well as the only shipyard
where we build aircraft carriers and one of only two places where we
build nuclear-powered submarines--Newport News Shipbuilding, owned by
Huntington Ingalls Industries. The City of Portsmouth is home to
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, one of only four Navy-owned and operated
nuclear repair shipyards in the United States, and very vulnerable to
flooding. Portsmouth also hosts US Coast Guard Atlantic Area Command,
US Coast Guard Fifth District, Coast Guard Sector Hampton Roads, and
Coast Guard Base Support Unit Portsmouth, all in flood-vulnerable
areas.\7\ Joint Base Langley-Eustis, with Fort Eustis in the City of
Newport News and Langley Air Force Base in the City of Hampton are also
vulnerable. Langley AFB, which deals with rising water as a matter of
routine, and has done considerable work to make its facilities
resilient, has taken up much of the overflow from the impact to
aviation training for the F-22 Strike Fighter from Tyndall Air Force
Base after Hurricane Michael's impact on that facility last year.\8\
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\5\ ``Virginia Statewide Community Profile'' (Virginia Employment
Commission, 2019). https://virginiawlmi.com/Portals/200/
Local%20Area%20Profiles/5101000000.pdf
\6\ ``Defense Spending by State, FY 2017'' (US Department of
Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment, March 2019).
\7\ ``FEMA Flood Map Service Center / Search By Address,'' accessed
September 16, 2019, https://msc.fema.gov/portal/
search?AddressQuery=USCG%20Portsmouth%2C%20Virginia
#searchresultsanchor.
\8\ ``Tyndall AFB Personnel, F-22s Temporarily Relocate to Hawaii
and Alaska,'' U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, accessed July 17, 2019, ttps:/
/www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1682655/tyndall-
afb-personnel-f-22s-temporarily-relocate-to-hawaii-and-alaska-bases/.
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The Eastern Shore of Virginia hosts NASA's Flight Facility at
Wallops Island, which includes the Virginia Space and Mid Atlantic
Regional Spaceport, NASA flight test facility, National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Administration and Federal Aviation Administration
facilities, and the Navy's Surface Combat Systems Center Range. These
facilities are unique. For example, the Navy Surface Combat Systems
Center Range, the only such test range on the East Coast of the United
States, supports the majority of new construction combat systems
training for the Fleet.
We also are home to the Port of Virginia, the third largest
container port on the East Coast and sixth busiest port by container
traffic volume in the United States. A multi-modal port with facilities
located in Hampton Roads in the cities of Norfolk, Portsmouth, and
Newport News, and with barge service to the Port of Richmond and an
Inland Port intermodal transfer facility in Front Royal, Virginia,\9\
the Port of Virginia is the only East Coast port with federal
authorization to dredge to a 55 foot channel depth, and generates a
total of $60 billion in economic activity for the Commonwealth.\10\
With a focus on sustainability, the Port of Virginia works to build
resilience, aligned with the surrounding communities. Much like the
regions' federal facilities, however, its future resilience is
inextricably linked to that of the surrounding cities and other
localities that support and provide its critical utilities,
transportation, logistics, and supply chain infrastructure.
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\9\ ``NAFTA Region Container Traffic--2017 Port Rankings by TEU's''
(American Association of Port Authorities, 2017).
\10\ ``About the Port of Virginia,'' accessed July 18, 2019, http:/
/www.portofvirginia.com/about/.
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Coastal Virginia's substantial tourism industry generates direct
travel-related expenditures exceeding $5.2 billion in our Coastal
region \11\. Virginia boasts wide beaches, access to a myriad of water
sports and recreational activities, as well as natural tidal
marshlands, unique barrier island structures, and we are a critical
stopover on the North Atlantic migratory bird flyway, all incredible
facilities and natural amenities, and all at extreme risk.
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\11\ ``The Economic Impact of Domestic Travel on Virginia Counties
2017: A Study Prepared for Virginia Tourism Authority'' (U.S. Travel
Association, August 2018), https://www.vatc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/08/2017-Economic-Impact-of-Domestic-Travel-on-Virginia-and-
Localities.pdf.
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Our substantial aquaculture and wild fishing industries generate
over $1.4 billion in annual sales,\12\ including oysters, crabs, and
the largest clam industry on the East Coast of the United States.\13\
These industries are vulnerable to both sea level rise and ocean
acidification and warming. The infrastructure necessary for their
success ties them to low-lying areas near the water--vulnerable to
flooding--and accessibility to workplaces and docks is becoming a
challenge during the more frequent high tide flooding that impacts road
access, as well as activities on the waterfront. Ocean acidification
and warming will affect the ability of some species to survive and
reproduce in Coastal Virginia waters--in particular shellfish,
endangering the wild-caught and grown seafood industry treasured by the
Chesapeake Bay region.\14\ For Virginia, this may be only a matter of
time as such impacts have already been observed in the Pacific
Northwest region of the United States, costing that region over $110
million dollars and putting 3,200 jobs at risk.\15\
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\12\ ``Fisheries Economics of the United States 2016'' (U.S.
Department of Commerce, NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service, 2018),
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/content/fisheries-economics-united-
states-2016.
\13\ Thomas J. Murray and Karen Hudson, ``Economic Activity
Associated with Shellfish Aquaculture in Virginia 2012,'', https://
www.vims.edu/research/units/centerspartners/map/aquaculture/docs_aqua/
MRR2013_4.pdf.
\14\ ``Virginia Is Highly Vulnerable to Ocean Acidification''
(Natural Resources Defense Council adopted from Ekstrom et al., 2015,
February 2015), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/state-
vulnerability-VA.pdf.
\15\ ``New Study: Rapid Ocean Acidification Threatens Coastal
Economies in 15 States,'' 2015. NRDC Press Release https://
www.nrdc.org/media/2015/150223.
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Finally, our waterfront property and housing stock is a challenge
we share with many other coastal states. Within the next 30 years--the
lifespan of a typical mortgage--as many as 311,000 coastal homes in the
lower 48 states with a collective market value of about $117.5 billion
in today's dollars will be at risk of chronic flooding (more than 26
times a year or about every other week). By the end of the century, 2.4
million homes and 107,000 commercial properties currently worth more
than $1 trillion altogether could be at risk, with Virginia's coastal
real estate significantly exposed. The expected Virginia homes at risk
in 2045 currently contribute about $23 million in annual property tax
revenue. The homes at risk by 2100 currently contribute roughly $342
million collectively in annual property tax revenue.\16\ In an ongoing
Comprehensive Sea Level Rise and Recurrent Flooding Study conducted by
the City of Virginia Beach and Dewberry, the annualized losses today in
that City alone result in residential damages of $26 million annually
due to coastal flooding events. If no action is taken, with 1.5 feet of
additional sea level rise, expected within 20-30 years, that number
increases to $77 million annually, and with 3 feet of additional sea
level rise, forecast within 60-70 years, to $329 million annually, a
12-fold + increase.\17\
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\16\ ``Underwater: Rising Seas, Chronic Floods, and the
Implications for US Coastal Real Estate'' (Union of Concerned
Scientists, June 2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/global-
warming-impacts/sea-level-rise-chronic-floods-and-us-coastal-real-
estate-implications.
\17\ CJ Bodnar, ``Comprehensive Sea Level Rise and Recurrent Flood
Study'' (Dewberry and City of Virginia Beach, May 2019), https://
www.vbgov.com/government/departments/public-works/comp-sea-level-rise/
Documents/slr-update-ccouncil-5-7-19.pdf.
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Collaborative Opportunities: The Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise And
Resilience Intergovernmental Pilot Project
Virginia has a longstanding and vital relationship with our Federal
partners, in particular the Department of Defense and Coast Guard, for
reasons already stated. In 2014, the Hampton Roads region in particular
had an opportunity to become part of a strategic partnership project
effort to address and create practices by which Federal, State and
Local partners could come together to identify and address climate
impacts, and develop a codified process for achieving collaborative
solutions. This project, initiated through the National Security
Council, was the Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise and Resilience
Intergovernmental Planning Pilot Project (Intergovernmental Pilot
Project or IPP). Convened by Old Dominion University, the IPP was one
of four federal and three Department of Defense climate preparedness
and resilience planning pilots.\18\ In correspondence as the then
Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and the
Environment, Mr. John C. Conger designated the Navy as lead service
supporting the Hampton Roads Pilot Project.\19\ The intent of this
pilot as stated by then Deputy Secretary Conger, was to leverage the
Department of Defense's existing relationships and resources, develop
additional partnerships and develop a process by which regional
preparedness and planning processes that supported both the Department
of Defense mission and surrounding communities could be developed.\20\
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\18\ ``June 27, 2016 IPP SC Consensus Resolution'' (The Steering
Committee of the Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise Preparedness and
Resilience Intergovernmental Planning Pilot Project, June 27, 2016),
https://www.floodingresiliency.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IPP-
Consensus-Resolution-All-Signatures.pdf.
\19\ John Conger, ``Memoradum for Assistant Secretaries of the
Army, Navy and Air Force: DoD Climate Preparedness and Resilience
Planning Pilots'' (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, October 29, 2014).
\20\ John Conger.
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The Intergovernmental Pilot Project (IPP) in Hampton Roads ran for
two years from June 2014 to June 2016, and brought together more than
200 federal, state and regional professionals over the two-year period.
Focused on collective holistic understanding of shared challenges and
developing solutions to prepare for sea level rise and recurrent
flooding impacts in the Hampton Roads Region, the IPP developed a
series of final reports, and included five key priorities for
action.\21\
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\21\ Emily E. Steinhilber et al., ``Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise
Preparedness and Resilience Intergovernmental Pilot Project. Phase 2
Report: Recommendations, Accomplishments and Lessons Learned'' (Old
Dominion University, October 2016), https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/
hripp_reports/2/.
First: Set standards--including but not limited to sea
level rise scenario planning, first finished floor elevation, and
building code, and ensure that those standards are common across
regions and localities with similar anticipated impacts from climate
change and extreme weather to facilitate aligned planning and
resilience efforts.
Second: Ensure the support of a consortium of
universities, to guarantee the best possible science and engineering
technology is available to decision-makers.
Third: Collect, analyze, process and share data. Shared
data enables common regional understanding and analysis of outcomes,
essential to the success of any collaborative planning effort.
Fourth: Develop an understanding of what is critical and
what is vulnerable from the context of shared infrastructure
dependencies and interdependencies. Without a full and agreed-upon
understanding of the nature of critical infrastructure affected by
rising waters, it will be very difficult to develop a regional holistic
plan.
Fifth and finally, develop a plan and a set of strategies
to achieve desired outcomes and then a process to fund the work
necessary to achieve those outcomes. The financial instruments that we
will use to pay for these challenges have not yet been developed, and
federal support and collaborative alignment across communities is
essential to address shared impacts.\22\
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\22\ Steinhilber et al.
At the conclusion of the IPP, the steering committee and advisory
and working group committee chairs signed a resolution recommending
paths forward that the region might consider.\23\ While the resolution
was not ultimately adopted at a regional level, many of the
recommendations have been taken up and implemented by cities,
localities, and the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission, and
many more are under consideration today. Those adopted include: setting
standards, establishing a consortium of universities, and collecting
and sharing data at a regional level. At the state level, Virginia is
developing an analysis of critical and vulnerable infrastructure. Our
challenge, like that of our Federal partners and fellow coastal and
riverine states remains: how will we pay for this? \24\
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\23\ ``June 27, 2016 IPP SC Consensus Resolution.''
\24\ Steinhilber et al., ``Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise
Preparedness and Resilience Intergovernmental Pilot Project. Phase 2
Report: Recommendations, Accomplishments and Lessons Learned.''
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The Intergovernmental Pilot Project was also one of two regional
collaborative efforts analyzed in a recently completed doctoral
dissertation by Dr. Hannah M. Teicher for her PhD in Architecture for
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies
and Planning, in June 2019.\25\
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\25\ Hannah M Teicher, ``Climate Allies: How Urban/Military
Interdependence Enables Adaptation'' (Doctoral Dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, 2019), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/122193.
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Her dissertation addresses the critical essential elements of this
committee hearing, and can provide extensive value to Congress and the
Federal Government as it works to address collaborative planning across
and between Federal, State and local partners.
I have included Dr. Teicher's Dissertation ``Climate Allies: How
Urban/Military Interdependence Enables Adaptation,'' as an attachment
to this testimony, available at the link cited below.
Dr. Teicher identifies key points and outcomes highlighting the
value of such partnerships and alignments between communities and
regional entities, and their Department of Defense and other Federal
partners.\26\
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\26\ Hannah M Teicher.
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In particular, she states ``the shared risks between installations
and the communities that surround them bring great potential for joint
adaptation planning and in fact drive a need for it''. Her research
found that, by using the circumstances and processes already in
existence in these two unique communities of practice, ``Hampton Roads,
Virginia and San Diego, California employed the most readily available
joint planning mechanisms'' to elevate their broader adaptation agenda.
In Hampton Roads, the IPP led to Joint Land Use Studies to further
expand resilience planning, and in San Diego, the Integrated Natural
Resource Management Plan (INRMP) process became the foundation for a
Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy and the Port of San Diego
to expand joint adaptation planning.\27\
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\27\ Hannah M Teicher.
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Finally, Dr. Teicher points out two main enabling mechanisms in her
dissertation: those of ``recognizing independence and constructing
credibility,'' as key to not only initiating such alliances, but to
reinforcing and expanding them.\28\
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\28\ Hannah M Teicher.
Teicher points out the ``benefits of such collaboration -
[include] expanded regional cooperation across a range of jurisdictions
and sectors, and enhanced technical capacity and increased access to
federal funding.'' \29\
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\29\ Hannah M Teicher.
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And the ``emerging risks [to such collaboration,
including] prioritizing high-value assets over vulnerable populations,
emphasizing adaptation at the expense of mitigation--addressing
immediate impact rather than cumulative human causes--and prioritizing
sensational risks, such as sea level rise rather than more pervasive
risks, like heat stress'' or recurrent flooding.\30\
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\30\ Hannah M Teicher.
Certainly the IPP process in and of itself brought hundreds of
stakeholders together, built lasting and ongoing relationships, and
produced many workable recommendations for the region, accomplished by
a variety of partnerships. The key deliverables--a whole of government
mitigation and adaptation planning process, and a recommended
integrated regional strategy to move forward, can both serve as a
template for other regions.\31\ Some of this work may be specific only
to a unique circumstance or area, but when taken as a whole, it brings
substantive change in the context of local, regional and federal
collaboration. Finally, the IPP built on previous efforts accomplished
by other leaders in the Hampton Roads region, and continues to leverage
those outcomes to accelerate regional adaptation.\32\
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\31\ Steinhilber et al., ``Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise
Preparedness and Resilience Intergovernmental Pilot Project. Phase 2
Report: Recommendations, Accomplishments and Lessons Learned.''
\32\ Commonwealth of Virginia, ``EO 24; Increasing Virginia's
Resilience to Sea Level Rise and Natural Hazards.,'' November 2,2018,
https://www.governor.virginia.gov/executive-actions/.
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Taking Advantage of Existing Federal Programs
As a direct outcome from the IPP, and as recommended by Commander
Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, the Navy's Executive Agent for the IPP, the
Department of Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) undertook a
series of Joint Land Use Studies (JLUS) within the Hampton Roads
Region. The context of these studies, understanding compatible use of
infrastructure by federal and local partners, focused on how
infrastructure external to federal DOD facilities would be impacted by
the encroachment of recurrent flooding, storm surge, sea level rise,
and other coastal hazards, and how those impacts and outcomes would
affect the environmental resilience of the federal facilities in the
region. The first of the studies, completed in June 2018, built upon an
existing JLUS with the City of Hampton in 2010, expanded to include
compatible use aspects, and included the city of Newport News, James
City and York Counties, and Joint Base Langley-Eustis, with a focus on
the FT Eustis facility.\33\
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\33\ ``Joint Base Langley Eustis (Fort Eustis) Joint Land Use
Study'' (City of Newport News, March 2018), https://docs.wixstatic.com/
ugd/3a99a7_58423e7847ce4078af32aceafeb6489f.pdf.
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JLUS Study objectives typically include four focus areas:
Provide meaningful input by the public.
Identify areas where land use conflict occurs.
Identify strategies to reduce encroachment and promote
land use compatibility including considerations for regional roadway
congestion, sea level rise and recurrent flooding, waterway and access
management, and safety and security for the installation.
Create an implementation plan and narrative report with
recommendations and strategies.
Key recommendations from the Newport News/Hampton JLUS study also
support IPP outcomes. In particular, establishing a formal
communications process and developing a series of memoranda of
understanding to ensure standardized processes for future collaboration
between the localities and the federal facilities on a host of topics,
including GIS, land use compatibility, communication, sea level rise
and recurrent flooding, traffic, waterway access, energy and natural
resources.\34\
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\34\ ``Joint Base Langley Eustis (Fort Eustis) Joint Land Use
Study.''
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The IPP led directly to two additional new JLUS study efforts. The
Norfolk/Virginia Beach JLUS, including Naval Station Norfolk, Joint
Expeditionary Base Little Creek/Fort Story and Naval Air Station
Oceana, and the Portsmouth/Chesapeake JLUS, including Norfolk Naval
Shipyard in Portsmouth, outlying Fentress Field in Chesapeake, and the
Portsmouth Naval Medical Center. The Norfolk/Virginia Beach Study has
just been completed and just finished its final public comment--the
Portsmouth/Chesapeake study has just started.\35\ These studies are a
great value to the region and to the Commonwealth of Virginia, as not
only do we now have a better understanding of how shared infrastructure
interdependencies will be negatively impacted by climate change effects
over time, but we also have a prioritized process from which to work
with our federal partners begin to adapt across the region in ways that
provide mutual support.
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\35\ ``Joint Land Use Studies/Hampton Roads Planning District
Commission,'' accessed September 16, 2019, https://www.hrpdcva.gov/
departments/joint-land-use-studies/.
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Through the assistance of the Department of Defense Office of
Economic Adjustment, we have the opportunity to apply for additional
planning grants to allow us to take steps collaboratively with our
federal partners to begin to plan for some of the IPP/JLUS recommended
outcomes. This program provides critical planning funding to
communities adjacent to DOD/Federal facilities that offers direct
assistance to those facilities for resilience work, and should be fully
funded and expanded.
The Commonwealth of Virginia also works closely with the US Army
Corps of Engineers across a number of programs, most specifically the
Feasibility Study 3x3x3 process and Continuing Authorities
programs.\36\ Both processes allow Army Corps districts to work with
local governments to study the needs of communities dealing with rising
waters and storm surge. Related to recommendations from the 2015 North
Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Survey, completed by USACE North Atlantic
Division, the City of Norfolk and USACE Norfolk District completed a
3x3x3 in February of 2019 and have proceeded to the preliminary
engineering design phase.\37\ The second recommended study area,
Potomac River shoreline in Northern Virginia, has just started a
Coastal Storm Risk Management Study (July 15, 2019) under the auspices
of the Baltimore District, USACE, with the Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments as the non-federal sponsor, and the Commonwealth
of Virginia as one of several cost share partners.\38\ The 2018 Water
Resources Development Act authorized a full coastal study for Coastal
Virginia, to include flood risk management, ecosystem restoration and
navigation, which gives the Commonwealth the flexibility to include
more than one city or municipality in the study area, critical to a
region such as Hampton Roads, where multiple cities, localities, and
federal facilities exist in close proximity.\39\
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\36\ ``The Corps Feasibility Study--Finding a Balanced Solution,''
Headquarters, accessed September 16, 2019, https://www.usace.army.mil/
Media/News-Archive/Story-Article-View/Article/643197/the-corps-
feasibility-study-finding-a-balanced-solution/.
\37\ ``North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study: Resilient
Adaptation to Increasing Risk,'' Study (United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 2015), https://www.nad.usace.army.mil/CompStudy/.
\38\ ``Northern Virginia Coastal Study,'' accessed September 16,
2019, https://www.nab.usace.army.mil/DC_Coastal_Study/.
\39\ ``Water Resources Development Act of 2018,'' Pub. L. No. H.R.
8, 201 (9) (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
house-bill/8/text.
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The challenge, though, is that such studies do not include Federal
property, as dictated by restrictions to funding appropriations
sources, and so require additional coordination between USACE, DOD,
State and local participants to align appropriated funding. As an
example, the Norfolk CSRM study only includes the City of Norfolk, and
did not include a similar level of effort or the impacts to or outcomes
of storm surge and flooding for Naval Station Norfolk or Naval Support
Activity Hampton Roads. While USACE can work for DoD, they must be
funded with DOD appropriations for such work, which does not often
happen because of a lack of coordination.
Further, the Naval Facilities and Engineering Command released an
excellent Climate Change Planning Handbook: Installation Adaptation and
Resilience planning guide in January 2017, but with little follow-up on
how and when facilities should use it. This document should be a key
tool in federal facility resilience planning.\40\
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\40\ ``Climate Change Planning Handbook Installation Adaptation and
Resilience,'' Final Report (Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Headquarters, January 2017), https://ww.fedcenter.gov/Documents/
index.cfm?id=31041.
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Finally, language in the draft 2020 NDAA directs DOD to fund US
Army Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC) to undertake a
national study of water related risks and vulnerabilities to military
installation resilience, along with an assessment of ongoing or planned
projects by the Corps of Engineers that may adapt such risks. This will
help mitigate this challenge, but meanwhile, the gap in federal
resilience planning alignment with the USACE 3x3x3 process continues,
placing communities and military facilities at risk.
Virginia is Taking Action
This is our challenge. In Virginia, we have over 10,000 miles of
tidally-influenced shoreline.\41\ Virginia has the eighth longest
tidally-influenced coastline in the country, ranked just behind the
state of Texas.\42\ \43\ We have experienced over 18 inches of sea
level rise in 100 years, as indicated by NOAA Sewell's Point tide gauge
at Pier Six, Naval Station Norfolk. With an average of 4.66 mm of sea
level rise per year, Virginia has one of the highest rates of relative
sea level rise change of any state on the East Coast of the United
States, including the Gulf of Mexico.\44\ We are also experiencing land
subsidence--most evident in areas where there is heavy use of water
from our aquifers. Land subsidence varies across Coastal Virginia, and
can range from as much as 40% to as little as 0% of the observed
relative sea level rise.\45\ Since the late 1990s, the duration,
severity, and impacts of flooding have all increased substantially.\46\
Current scientific projections, as documented by the Virginia Institute
of Marine Science Sea Level Report Card, show that our sea levels will
continue to rise and the rate of rise will accelerate, such that we
expect an additional 18 inches of relative sea level rise by mid-
century.
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\41\ MR Berman et al., ``Virginia--Shoreline Inventory Report:
Methods and Guidelines, SRAMSOE No. 450.'' (Comprehensive Coastal
Inventory Program, Virginia Institute of Marine Science, 2016).
\42\ NOAA Office for Coastal Management, ``Shoreline Mileage of the
United States,'' 1975.
\43\ Berman et al., ``Virginia--Shoreline Inventory Report: Methods
and Guidelines, SRAMSOE No. 450.''
\44\ ``Sea Level Trends--NOAA Tides & Currents. Sewell's Point VA
Station,'' 2019, https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/sltrends/
sltrends_station.shtml?id=8638610.
\45\ D. P. S. Bekaert et al., ``Spaceborne Synthetic Aperture Radar
Survey of Subsidence in Hampton Roads, Virginia (USA),'' Scientific
Reports 7, no. 1 (2017): 14752, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-
15309-5.
\46\ T Ezer and L Atkinson, ``Sea Level Rise in Virginia--Causes,
Effects and Response,'' Virginia Journal of Science 66, no. 3 (2015):
355-59.
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Under Governor Ralph Northam, Virginia is taking bold and
substantive action to identify and fill the gaps. He intends to build
capacity for Virginia as we set standards and define how we as a
coastal state will approach this existential threat. During the 2019
General Assembly Session, Governor Northam proposed legislation to
begin to do just that, the Virginia Coastal Protection Fund Act, which
would have modified and funded the Virginia Shoreline Resilience Fund,
recast as the Virginia Shoreline Protection Fund, and provided a
continuing source of income--estimated to be at least $50 million
annually--generated by the sale of carbon dioxide emissions allowances
received from Virginia joining the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
Funds so generated would support implementing hazard-mitigation
projects to both mitigate and prevent further flood damage. This
legislation failed in Committee. And the General Assembly went further,
preventing Virginia from participating in RGGI under any circumstance
by blocking the use of agency funds for RGGI participation, even though
it has already been approved by the Virginia State Air Pollution
Control Board.\47\
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\47\ Lewis et al., ``A BILL to Amend and Reenact 10.1-603.25 of
the Code of Virginia, Relating to the Virginia Coastal Protection Fund;
Establishment of a Carbon Dioxide Cap and Trade Program; Authorization
to Establish an Auction Allowance Program Consistent with the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum of Understanding; Deposit and
Distribution of Proceeds of Allowance Auctions; Virginia Coastal
Protection Act.,'' Pub. L. No. SB1666 (2019), 10.1-603.25 (2019),
https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?191+ful+SB1666.
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Despite these efforts, Governor Northam remains committed to
coastal resilience. His priorities are to identify critical
infrastructure that is vulnerable to rising waters and recurrent
flooding; to determine the best and most practical, innovative and cost
effective solutions to adapt and protect that infrastructure; to use
creative and less costly green or green-gray infrastructure approaches
to protect more dispersed assets and communities; and to leverage
federal, state and local funds to help make coastal Virginia more
resilient to climate change.
To do this, Governor Northam has established a series of executive
actions, through Executive Order 24, Increasing Virginia's Resilience
to Sea Level Rise and Natural Hazards, signed on November 2, 2018. With
this Order, Virginia is directed to determine the vulnerability of and
set standards for future built infrastructure throughout the
Commonwealth, to make Commonwealth holdings more resilient. We have
established and will implement a series of sea level rise scenario
planning curves, which we will use to ensure the resilience of state-
owned infrastructure and as recommendations for local governments and
regions to use in planning and preparations for the future. We have
also established a series of recommendations for first finished floor
elevation for future constructed state-owned buildings that may be
located in floodplains.
Executive Order 24 also directs development of a Virginia Coastal
Protection Master Plan to adapt and protect our coastal region. This
plan will build on and align those actions, which our localities and
regions have already taken to prepare themselves for their future, and
will lay out a series of recommended actions and strategies for our
state to develop and prioritize how it will adapt and protect our
valuable and vulnerable coastline. In this context we view it as
essential to work with our federal partners as we move forward to
better prepare our state, regions, localities, and communities, to
build trust, and demonstrate value. Finally, Executive Order 24 will
serve to coordinate, collaborate, and communicate across state
entities, across and with federal entities, and across our Coastal
regions, communities, and localities to ensure coordinated objectives,
and the best use of scarce funding dollars.
Virginia has identified four key areas of focus. First, the use of
natural and nature-based features as a way to buy time--as the first
line of defense--as we build our strategy and understanding of what
infrastructure is critical and vulnerable, and what the best plans and
processes will be over time to adapt that infrastructure. Second, we
are focused on collaborative efforts at every level, working with and
across localities to expand the capacity of their dollars, of state
dollars, and where possible, of federal dollars. Third, we are
committed to ensure environmental justice, as underserved communities
often bear the most substantial brunt of flooding challenges, and yet
have the least capacity to plan, apply for grant dollars, determine or
meet federal and state match requirements, and to sort out solutions to
fund and implement actions to keep their communities and their
histories viable into the future. Finally, we will facilitate the
adoption of resilience practices across state agencies and processes.
Executive Order 24 builds on actions already underway across
Coastal Virginia. At the federal level, the Department of Defense,
Office of Economic Adjustment has initiated a series of ``compatible
use'' Joint Land Use Studies (JLUS) in Coastal Virginia. The Joint Base
Langley-Eustis Study with the Cities of Hampton and Newport News was
completed in 2018, and the Norfolk-Virginia Beach JLUS just entered its
public comment period in June, and is nearly complete. The third JLUS
study, including the cities of Chesapeake and Portsmouth, has just
begun and should be complete in FY 2020. These studies help Coastal
Communities understand the impacts of rising waters and flooding on
infrastructure in and around their shared federal facilities, and give
the communities and their federal partners a better understanding of
how to prepare and prioritize project outcomes of benefit to both to
ensure operational and community readiness.
As described earlier, the US Army Corps of Engineers North Atlantic
Coast Comprehensive Survey (2015), a post-Hurricane Sandy report,
recommended seven additional Coastal Storm Risk Management Studies, two
specific in Virginia. The first, the Norfolk Coastal Storm Risk
Management Study conducted by the USACE Norfolk District, received its
signed Chief's Report in February 2019. The second, Northern Virginia/
Potomac River Shoreline, executed by the USACE Baltimore District,
officially started July 15th, 2019.
To give you a sense of the enormous costs of making our coast more
resilient, the City of Norfolk USACE Coastal Storm Risk Management
Study outlines $1.57B in proposed projects to reduce the impact of
storm surge and risk on the city.\48\ Though this is valuable work,
critical to the city's future, it does little to address nearer term
recurrent flooding across the city, and again, such studies do not, by
law, include Department of Defense infrastructure in considering
impacts and design outcomes.
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\48\ ``Final Integrated City of Norfolk Coastal Storm Risk
Management Feasibility Study Report/Environmental Impact Statement,''
Feasibility Study (Norfolk, VA: US Army Corps of Engineers, Norfolk
District, September 2018), https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/
collection/p16021coll7/id/5490/.
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And the City of Virginia Beach is completing a series of studies,
including a full watershed analysis, and a sea level rise and recurrent
flooding study that has estimated $2.4B in anticipated costs to reduce
flooding and surge impacts across the city. Virginia Beach has raised
taxes and storm-water fees, and committed to $1.3B in spending over a
15-year period to begin to prepare for these impacts, and yet realizes
that much of what it must do will require the cooperation of nearby
cities to achieve the full set of desired resilience outcomes.
Many other cities are staring down costs on a similar scale, and
rural localities with more dispersed populations and limited tax bases
have a wholly different set of needs that must be addressed through
more creative solutions.
What Congress Can Do To Help
First, I would like to thank both the House and the Senate for the
addition of climate-related amendments in the 2018, 2019, National
Defense Authorization Act language and the 2020 NDAA mark-up language,
and for the language contained in the 2019 Coast Guard Continuity Act.
These efforts help coastal communities in Virginia with substantial
federal presence improve coordination at the federal, state, and local
level and improve resilience for our federal and defense facilities
along with that of the surrounding communities, without which they
would not be able to ensure our forces are prepared to deploy. I would
also like to thank the House and the Senate for their work on the 2018
Disaster Recovery Reform Act and its many innovative solutions to focus
on pre-disaster hazard mitigation, which will also give options and
opportunities for coastal communities to better prepare themselves in
advance of increased hazardous weather and storm activity. Further, in
February, 2019, Virginia Secretary of Natural Resources, Matthew J.
Strickler, submitted testimony for the record with specific
recommendations as to how Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
could assist Virginia and other states in mitigating and adapting to
the impact of sea level rise and extreme weather events.\49\ Several of
his recommendations are particularly germane to this Subcommittee
testimony, and include:
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\49\ Matthew J Strickler, ``Letter to Submit for the Record of the
February 27, 2019 Transportation & Infrastructure Committee Hearing
Titled `Examining How Federal Infrastructure Policy Could Help Mitigate
and Adapt to Climate Change.,' '' February 22, 2019.
Helping States organize and prioritize flood control
projects with USACE,
Delivering timely USACE studies, and considering third
party analysis and study, and
Delivering strong environmental review
I have included Secretary Strickler's letter of February 22, 2019
as an attachment for the record.\50\
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\50\ Matthew J Strickler.
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As sea levels rise and extreme weather events, like the extreme
rain and flash flooding event of July 8th 2019 here in Washington, DC,
and the events leading up to and post Hurricane DORIAN, become more and
more common, the United States is under stress. Since 1980 there have
been have been 219 disasters costing over $1 billion each, for a
cumulative cost of $1.57 trillion.\51\
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\51\ Adam Smith, ``2017 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate
Disasters: A Historic Year in Context.'' (NOAA Climate.gov, January
2018), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/beyond-data/2017-us-
billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters-historic-year.
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Because of this, since 1980 the federal government has appropriated
over $73 billion for disaster preparedness and recovery. In response to
disasters, Congress has provided an additional $254.6 billion in
supplemental and contingency funds, nearly three times more than had
been provided in the annual budget.\52\ This is a fiscal and budgeting
problem as well as a resilience and disaster preparedness problem. We
know every dollar spent on disaster mitigation saves $6, which should
be full justification for Congress to take action to increase the
amount of money spent on resilience and pre-disaster mitigation. The
funding is needed, whether it is money for the Army Corps of Engineers
to study and construct flood control projects, or for DOD and Coast
Guard to study, understand, and prepare their facilities for current
and future risk, or for FEMA to improve predictive floodplain mapping
and help communities move out of floodplains, or money for USGS or NOAA
to better monitor, analyze and understand flooding and storm surges.
Increased spending now will better protect people, property and the
fiscal strength of the United States for tomorrow, and save precious
dollars over time.
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\52\ William Painter, ``The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and
Issues'' (Congressional Research Service, February 2019).
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Further, this Committee and Subcommittee must recognize climate
resilience and disaster preparedness as one of the country's greatest
and most immediate needs. Without significant funding for and
coordination across the federal agencies that provide resilience and
pre-disaster mitigation, Congress will fail to meet its charge of
protecting the communities of the United States. In addition, Congress
should encourage greater alignment of these programs to eliminate
redundancies and ensure the most expedient and effective use of funds
to protect people and property and reduce repetitive disaster spending.
In addition to resilience, pre-disaster mitigation, and
infrastructure and flood plain actions, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) has a $96 billion backlog of authorized but
unconstructed projects, while annual appropriations for the USACE
Construction account under Energy and Water Development appropriations
bills have averaged $2 billion in recent years. Congress has also
limited the number of new studies and construction projects initiated
with annual discretionary appropriations, with a limit of five new
construction starts using FY2019 appropriations.\53\ Since only a few
construction projects are typically started each fiscal year, numerous
projects that have been authorized by previous Congresses remain
unfunded and backlogged. This problem has worsened in recent decades as
Congress has authorized construction of new projects at a rate that
exceeds USACE's annual construction appropriations. This drives
competition for funds among authorized activities during the budget
development and appropriations process, and only a few projects make it
into the President's budget each year. Non-federal entities involved in
USACE projects are frustrated with the extreme effort it takes to fund
the projects their localities need, and again, those processes do not
include federal bases that are within or adjacent to community
boundaries.
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\53\ ``Army Corps of Engineers Annual and Supplemental
Appropriations: Issues for Congress'' (Congressional Research Service,
October 2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45326.
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Finally, additional topic areas of need include:
Substantive and timely, publically-available scientific
data
Expanded USACE Project Development, and alignment with
DOD/USCG resilience needs
Support for Department of Defense Office of Economic
Adjustment
Aligned and Expanded Federal Block Grant Programs
State resilience incentivized with Federal Matching Funds
Conclusion
In summary, as viewed from the state and community level, there is
an urgent need for a coordinated federal effort, and for codified
Federal/community aligned planning processes to deal with the impacts
of climate and rising waters on Coastal Communities. Rising waters and
recurrent flooding know no political boundaries; they know no
boundaries of wealth or race; they know no boundaries of society.
Coastal communities and their Federal partners across Virginia and
around the country are being impacted today.
This Committee can help by recognizing climate resilience and
disaster preparedness as one of the country's greatest and most
immediate needs.
Virginia is committed to building capacity for our coastal
communities to prepare for and build resilience to this threat, and as
one of many impacted coastal and riverine states, we need the support
of a coordinated nationwide federal response to make this happen.
We have no time to waste because ``Time and Tide wait for no man.''
(The words of Geoffrey Chaucer)
Thank you again for the opportunity to offer this testimony, and I
look forward to your questions.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
Dr. Cox, you may proceed.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Chairman Brown, Ranking Member Gibbs,
and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify
today. My name is Dan Cox. I am a professor in civil
engineering at Oregon State University with experience in
climate engineering and community resilience. I am pleased to
provide testimony on the role that university-based research
can play in providing the Coast Guard with tools to protect,
rehabilitate, and mandate resilience and adaptive port
infrastructure.
I will focus on science-based, risk-informed decision
support tools to further promote resilient port infrastructure,
including adaptive planning, and adaptation of advanced
materials and natural and nature-based features.
Mr. Brown. Can you turn on your microphone, please?
Mr. Cox. Sorry about that. I won't go through the entire
list again, if that is OK, but I would like to add one more
point. I would also like to talk a little bit about the
importance of the graduate education and maintaining a strong
workforce for the Coast Guard, but, first, I will talk a little
bit about the risk-informed decision support tools.
We have already talked today about the importance of the
mission to be able to absorb and recover quickly after these
extreme events. The modern risk-informed decision support tools
that have been developed can be used to predict what the
consequences of extreme coastal events would be and allows
people to focus on optimized solutions, so trying to buy down
the risk where it is the highest. It captures the uncertainties
with the hazard as well as the response of how--you know, what
is going to happen to the infrastructure once these storms come
ashore.
So I will give you a couple of examples. NIST, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, has funded a risk-based
center that is producing these open-source modeling tools that
help with this mitigation strategy.DHS, for example, has funded
a coastal resilience center and is also creating better tools
for hazard prediction and looking at the related damage. Tools
such as HAZUS-MH can be used to look at this type of risk.
Also, the American Society of Civil Engineers are updating
their standards for critical facilities to withstand floods,
hurricanes, surge, and waves. These can all be used in some
capacity to help make port facilities more resilient.
We have already heard testimony today about the U.S. Naval
Station in Virginia that has been using these risk-based tools.
I think the Coast Guard would also benefit from this type of
study, trying to look at where the risk is the highest for
their assets.
In concert with developing these strategies for the extreme
events, the Coast Guard also has to consider the chronic
conditions related to sea-level rise and how you are going to
adapt to these changing conditions in sea level and storminess.
For example, the U.S. ports, Navy ports on the Pacific coast
have already looked at things that would affect operational
days per year in some of their infrastructure and how far into
the future do they have to plan in order to keep from exceeding
these thresholds. So is it a 10-year problem, a 20-year
problem, or a 50-year problem that helps them make better
decisions on how to rehabilitate their infrastructure.
Another big issue with ports is a hostile environment for
infrastructure. Corrosion is a big issue, and one of the big
problems facing existing ports is maintenance, rehabilitation,
and repair, and I think the use of some new technologies,
higher strike concrete composites, these can help be used to
extend the service life of a lot of our infrastructure.
There is also an issue with permitting. So you might have a
great idea, but if you want to get it permitted, you have to
think about these things, and natural and nature-based features
are other ways in which we can think about how to adapt, make
ports adaptive to future climate change.
Finally, the Coast Guard and other areas of Federal
Government need a workforce that is trained in understanding
these issues of port adaptation, resilience. Some of these
training programs are already in place. Oregon State
University, Texas A&M University, and the University of Rhode
Island trains at the graduate level U.S. Coast Guard officers
to be able to implement some of these solutions. These programs
exist. Hope they stay in place, and even if they could be
enhanced, I think that would be great for the U.S. Coast Guard.
So, in closing, I would just like to thank the subcommittee
for all of the efforts, and I would be pleased to answer any
questions.
[Mr. Cox's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel Cox, Ph.D., CH2M-Hill Professor in Civil
Engineering, Oregon State University
Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Maloney, and Ranking Member Gibbs, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today on the importance of port
infrastructure resilience within the United States Coast Guard. I am
pleased to provide testimony today on the role university-based
research can play in providing the Coast Guard with tools to build and
maintain resilient and adaptive port infrastructure to fulfill its
mission.
I am a professor in the College of Engineering at Oregon State
University and have been conducting research in coastal engineering for
more than 30 years, including the impacts of extreme coastal storms and
tsunami on critical infrastructure. Since 2014, I have served as an
associate director of the Center for Risk-Based Community Resilience,
headquartered at Colorado State University and supported through the
National Institute for Standards and Technology. This center has
supported me and other researchers to investigate coastal impacts on
infrastructure, including critical facilities and lifelines such as
electric power networks, water, communication, and transportation
network that are essential for immediate response and recovery. Our
work combines engineering, social science, economics and computer
science to create metrics to assess community resilience and to develop
open-source computation tools for risk-informed decision-making to
enable better strategies for hazard mitigation. I am also a member of
the Center Resilience Center, headquartered at the University of North
Carolina, and funded through the Department of Homeland Security.
Through the National Science Foundation's Natural Hazards Engineering
Research Infrastructure program, I am supported as the principle
investigator of the O.H. Hinsdale Wave Research Laboratory at Oregon
State University, which serves as the Nation's shared-used experimental
facility for coastal engineering research. I am a member of several
committees of the American Society of Civil Engineers, including the
chair of ASCE 7-22 Chapter 5 Flood Load subcommittee. Our subcommittee
provides improvements to building codes to ensures the safe design of
structures subjected to riverine flooding and to coastal surge and
waves.
Overview
This testimony provides perspective on the importance of and
opportunity for the Coast Guard to access and utilize science-based,
risk-informed decision-support tools to further promote resilient port
infrastructure, including adaptive planning for port infrastructure,
advanced materials and health monitoring, natural and nature-based
features (NNBF), as well as the importance of graduate educational
programs for workforce development.
Risk-informed Decision-support Tools for Resilient Port Infrastructure
Resilience is the ability to absorb and recover quickly from a
sudden stress. During extreme threats posed by coastal hurricanes and
tsunami, it is essential that Coast Guard port facilities be able to
absorb and recover quickly because these facilities are essential for
emergency response, search and rescue, and for the early stages of
recovery. Modern, risk-informed decision support tools have been
developed that can be used to predict the consequences of extreme
coastal events on port infrastructure and can be used to develop
optimized solution strategies. Probabilistic tools, rather than
scenario-based planning tools, can capture the uncertainties in both
the hazard and system response, and can be used to identify highest-
risk conditions for developing effective mitigation strategies.
These tools should be considered for resilient port infrastructure
design, maintenance and operation. The US Naval Station at Norfolk VA,
for example, has been studied extensively using risk-based approaches
to determine which types of loading (wind, wave, and surge) were
threats to the various assets; identify the most likely infrastructure
failure modes; and generate the probability of damage based on the
capacity and demand. These studies can also be conducted relevant to
the Coast Guard or other critical port infrastructure to inform
performance-based design of critical port infrastructure and improve
risk communication and urgency for port infrastructure improvements.
Additionally, work by the NIST-funded Center for Risk-Based Community
Resilience is producing open-source modeling tools to enable better
strategies for hazard mitigation. Further, the DHS-funded Coastal
Resilience Center is creating better hazard prediction tools and
related damage functions to predict infrastructure damage due to
hurricane surge and waves, and can be used in conjunction with for
decision-support tool such as HAZUS-MH. Work by the American Society of
Civil Engineers is updating design standards for critical facilities to
withstand floods, hurricane wave and surge, and tsunamis and can be
used to make port facilities more resilient to these extreme events.
These examples underscore the increasing access to and utility of
decision-support tools and building design standards that are available
to planners that can effectively promote enhanced resiliency of our
critical federal and coastal infrastructure.
Adaptive Planning for Port Infrastructure
In concert with developing effective mitigation strategies for
extreme events, the Coast Guard must consider port infrastructure under
the chronic conditions related to sea level rise and changing storm in
patterns. Nuisance flooding and other hazards associate with chronic
coastal conditions can impact the Coast Guard's mission, impacting
readiness and operation. The Coast Guard should consider adaptive
planning to improve port infrastructure and account for future sea
level uncertainties and associated short- and long-term
vulnerabilities. For example, studies conducted on US Naval ports along
the Pacific Coast, quantify the number of days per year when
operational thresholds will be exceeded for critical infrastructure
such as bridges and other lifeline networks due to combinations of
future sea level rise, El Nino events, and changes in weather patterns.
Investing in studies and analyses to make these future projections
would allow port planners to compare elevation, relocation, and other
adaptive mitigation strategies.
Advanced Materials and Health Monitoring for Port Infrastructure
Rehabilitation
Changes in water levels will also affect, and in some cases
accelerate, the deterioration of port infrastructure. This
deterioration can be reduced by improving the corrosion resistance of
steel in reinforced concrete, potentially improving the service life of
the infrastructure, and allowing adaptive strategies to be enacted.
Service life models can be used to better document what remaining life
a facility may have and improve decision-making on infrastructure
rehabilitation. Improved models relating exposure conditions from
extreme surge and waves on long term performance can be used to provide
better service life prediction, and advances in high performance
concrete can be use improve new construction.
Natural and Nature-Based Features (NNBF) for Port Infrastructure
Natural and nature-based features can be used to protect port
infrastructure and to provide ecological benefits to adjacent areas.
Research has demonstrated that NNBF can reduce wave and surge
conditions acting on exposed port infrastructure, and biocementation
can be used to mitigate effects of erosion and scour under extreme
storm conditions. Specifically, research relying on field observations
after major storms combined with laboratory testing and numerical
modeling confirms the role that NNBF can play in reducing the hazards
associated with coastal storms on the built environment. At Oregon
State University, through support of the National Science Foundation
and the Natural Hazards Engineering Research Infrastructure program,
and in collaboration with 5 other universities, we recently conducted
one of the first comprehensive studies of the role of NNBF for coastal
protection against hurricane wave and surge. This new research allows
engineers to quantify the benefits of NNBF in the design of coastal
infrastructure and to use NNBF in conjunction with traditional
structures. This not only lowers the overall cost of infrastructure
projects: it can also improve the permitting process by providing co-
benefits for marine habitat and recreation. The US Army Corp of
Engineers was also a partner on this project and has accelerated
research and practical application of NNBF to mitigate coastal hazards.
Similarly, the Coast Guard should consider the role of natural and
nature-based features in the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure
and future projects, including ways in which NNBF can supplement and
integrate with more traditional infrastructure for better meeting
objectives for adaptation and resilient planning.
Graduate Educational Programs for Workforce Development
The Coast Guard and other areas of the federal government need a
workforce trained in understanding issues of port infrastructure
adaptation and resilience. Some of these training programs are already
in place. At Oregon State University, for example, we are engaging with
Coast Guard and Navy students at the graduate education level. We
provide a rigorous academic program combined with hands-on research
projects tailored to the missions of these agencies. We encourage the
Coast Guard to continue and enhance their workforce training at the
graduate level in the area of coastal engineering to build and maintain
resilient and adaptive port infrastructure.
Summary
In closing, I thank the Subcommittee for your efforts to consider
the role of university-based research and education can play in
providing the Coast Guard with tools to build and maintain resilient
and adaptive port infrastructure to fulfill its mission. I would be
pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Dr. Cox.
Mr. Hecht, you may proceed.
Mr. Hecht. Thank you, Chairman Brown, Ranking Member Gibbs,
and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today, and I am pleased to discuss some of
the challenges facing the Coast Guard, our ports, and other
public agencies as they try to make sure our coastal
infrastructure is resilient to emerging risks relating to
coastal change.
For over 10 years, I have studied the way that coastal
managers and the insurance industry address climate change-
related risks. Managers of coastal properties and
infrastructure have to make strategic choices about where and
how to invest. Federal management investment decisions
influence downstream infrastructure investments in the public
and private sector. With that in mind, the challenges that are
faced by global risk managers, like insurers, hold lessons for
the Federal Government.
We built our infrastructure around an historical range of
conditions, knowing there may be extreme conditions at times,
but it is clear that the past is no longer a reliable indicator
of the future, and the conditions that we view as extreme today
will become more ordinary. Moreover, we don't know the
magnitude or pace of the change precisely since that depends on
complex physical systems and on how much we reduce greenhouse
gas emissions.
Federal agencies have a responsibility to ensure resilience
to coastal change in the management of Federal assets, and
vulnerability assessment and adaptation planning are essential
for agencies to understand and evaluate the risks under a range
of future scenarios and to strategically invest in resilience.
I want to note that coastal adaptation planning is
increasingly common at the State and local level. So, for
example, California's Coastal Commission, which administers the
Coastal Zone Management Act in California, has been very
forward thinking. And the Port of Los Angeles in Representative
Lowenthal's district recently developed a sea-level rise
adaptation plan that evaluates physical assets exposure,
sensitivity to change, and adaptive capacity. Their plan
reviewed multiple scenarios to account for uncertainty from
about 2 feet of sea-level rise all the way up to 6 feet of sea-
level rise, which is within the range of predictions that we
have.
The private sector is focusing on adaptation more and more,
and I want to focus on that for a while. Corporations are
taking steps to assess and address vulnerabilities in their
assets, and significantly, the insurance sector, which holds
the most financial risk across the world economy, is
increasingly concerned with climate-related risks. The type and
level of disruption and uncertainty climate change will cause
makes it challenging to plan for the future and increases the
likelihood of chaotic outcomes.
Climate change increases the uncertainty of risks, and this
is a challenge for insurers. Insurers can't insure where they
can't predict risks over time, so the major insurers are
investing heavily in better understanding climate risk as they
sound the alarm. For example, officials at Lloyd's of London
and Munich Re noted after Hurricane Sandy the likely
connections between climate change and future increases in
storm damage, and we see a lot of investment by especially the
largest global insurers in understanding climate better.
The most recent annual survey of emerging risks by the
professionals whose job it is to evaluate financial risk for
the private sector actuaries named climate change as both the
top emerging risk and the top current risk last year. The most
sobering assessments within the insurance sector focus on the
uncertainty that climate change injects into insurers' business
models and the strategic challenges that uncertainty creates
for risk management.
Within U.S. insurance markets, flood insurance has long
been a special case among weather-related risks, even
independent of and long before we recognized climate change
risk. Private insurers largely pulled out of the flood
insurance market in the middle 20th century as a result of
massive correlated losses from hurricanes that made many
insurers view flood risk as uninsurable.
One might suspect that availability of private coastal
flood insurance will only get worse under emerging conditions,
but recent research instead provides reason for optimism.
Private flood insurance availability is improving as insurers
develop more and better information about coastal risk through
research, modeling, and data analysis and as planners work to
address those risks. Insurers have made clear that more robust
information and analysis about emerging risks and evidence of
community scale risk mitigation planning are crucial to their
ability to manage risks. The value of anticipating the need for
elevation of structures or maintaining a wetland that protects
structures from king tides or storm surges can be quantified
and considered, and this is of value to insurers.
So what does this mean for the Coast Guard and for port
infrastructure? Federal planers can draw lessons. First, more
information and analysis to clarify risk is crucial. Risk is
inevitable, but understanding risks enables us to plan for
them.
Second, planning for resilience will reduce uncertainty and
facilitate better investment and prioritization by Federal
agencies. Just as insurance underwriters are willing to address
even very difficult risks where loss prevention measures are in
place, Federal agencies can decrease their vulnerability
through sound planning.
And the most crucial action is to integrate resilience
planning governance into Federal actions at every step to
consider that climate changes are considered in planning and
decisionmaking about how and where we build and rebuild.
Planning informs asset investment by agencies like the Coast
Guard and also can inform grant making under, for example, the
Port Infrastructure Development Grant and port security grant
programs. Investing early to reduce and protect assets in light
of real science will pay off. Thank you for your consideration,
and I look forward to your questions.
[Mr. Hecht's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sean B. Hecht, Co-Executive Director, Emmett
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, University of
California at Los Angeles School of Law
Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
pleased to be here to discuss some of the challenges facing the Coast
Guard, our ports, and other public agencies as they try to make sure
our coastal infrastructure is resilient to emerging risks relating to
coastal change. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and
not the views of UCLA School of Law.
For over ten years, I have studied the ways private and public
institutions address emerging climate-change related risks to
infrastructure and communities. I have followed closely the ways local,
state, and federal coastal managers address climate change in their
planning. I have also analyzed climate change's interactions with the
insurance sector, which holds much of the world's weather- and climate-
related financial risk.
Managers of coastal properties and infrastructure, including
federal agencies, have to make strategic choices about where and how to
invest. Federal management and investment decisions also influence
downstream infrastructure investments in the public and private sector.
These decisions necessarily involve consideration of all relevant
risks. With that in mind, the challenges faced by global risk managers
like reinsurers hold lessons for the federal government.
Coastlines, by their nature, undergo constant changes as well as
occasional serious disruptions. The stability of our coastal
infrastructure has always required careful attention to the physical
conditions and the risks these conditions pose. But the evidence is
clear: sea-level rise and increased storm-related coastal risk present
new challenges that our infrastructure isn't designed for. Scientists
have measured sea-level rise over the past century at an average of 6-8
inches already, with evidence the rate of rise is accelerating. A
combination of factors, including changes in storm dynamics and the
impact of rising seas on king tides along with increased urbanization
and infrastructure on our coastlines, will result in more rapid coastal
change and more vulnerability than we've seen in the past.
This will affect communities throughout the U.S. The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) found in a 2018 report
that ``While the rate and overall amount of [relative sea-level] rise
over this century (and beyond) is uncertain, as it is linked to future
amounts of emissions and global temperature rise, it is nearly certain
that high tide flooding will become increasingly chronic within coastal
communities over the next several decades simply under current rates of
local [relative sea-level] rise.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ William V. Sweet et al., Patterns and Projections of High Tide
Flooding Along the U.S. Coastline Using a Common Impact Threshold (NOAA
Technical Report NOS CO-OPS 086 2018) (citation omitted), available at
https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/
techrpt86_PaP_of_HTFlooding.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Future chronic high-tide flooding in previously safe communities
illustrates a key point. We built our infrastructure around a
historical range of conditions--knowing that there may be extreme
conditions at times. But it's clear the past is no longer a reliable
indicator of the future, and the conditions we view as extreme today
may become more ordinary, or at least more frequent. Moreover, we do
not know what the magnitude or pace of the change will be, since that
depends on complex physical systems as well as on how much we reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. It is increasingly challenging to plan
effectively for the future in a literal climate of uncertainty.
Federal agencies have a responsibility to ensure resilience to
coastal change in the management of federal assets. In light of the
foreseeable direction and probable magnitude of change, planning and
investment will reduce the economic and social costs of sea-level rise,
storm surge, and other impacts, compared with reacting when the hazard
materializes. Vulnerability assessments and adaptation planning help
agencies to understand and evaluate the risks under a range of future
scenarios, and then to strategically invest in resilience accordingly.
I want to note here that adaptation planning is increasingly common
at the state and local level, in addition to federal efforts.
California's Coastal Commission, which administers California's Coastal
Zone Management Act program, has been particularly forward-thinking in
planning for coastal resilience. Other agencies have also had to
address coastal change in the context of asset management. For example,
the Port of Los Angeles, in Rep. Lowenthal's district, recently
developed a Sea Level Rise Adaptation Plan. That plan evaluates
physical assets' exposure, sensitivity to change, and adaptive
capacity, as well as potential economic, social, and environmental
vulnerabilities. It projects serious consequences if the Port fails to
adapt.
The private sector is also focusing on adaptation more and more.
Corporations are taking steps to assess and address vulnerabilities in
their assets. Significantly, insurance executives, underwriters, and
actuaries, who drive decisionmaking by the companies that hold the most
financial risk across the world economy, are increasingly concerned
with climate-related risks.
The Department of Defense has called climate change a ``threat
multiplier'' to national security, and for good reason. The type and
level of disruption and uncertainty that climate change will cause
makes it challenging to plan, and increases the likelihood of chaotic
outcomes. Similarly, because climate change increases the uncertainty
of risks, it is a threat to risk managers and their clients.\2\
Insurers cannot insure where they can't predict risks over time. The
major international insurers, which hold the most risk, are
particularly concerned, and are investing heavily in better
understanding climate risk--as they sound the alarm within their
industry and more generally. Officials at both Lloyd's of London and
Munich Re noted, after Hurricane Sandy, the likely connections between
climate change and future increases in storm damage.\3\ The projected
rise in sea level will further increase the risk of storm surge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of
Risk: Insurance Matters, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1559 (2008), for a more
comprehensive discussion of the strategic risks climate change poses
for the insurance sector. Available at https://www.uclalawreview.org/
pdf/55-6-3.pdf.
\3\ Munich Re, Natural catastrophe statistics for 2012 dominated by
weather extremes in the USA (January 3, 2013), https://
www.munichre.com/en/media-relations/publications/press-releases/2013/
2013-01-03-press-release/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most recent annual survey of emerging risks by three major
actuarial societies--the professionals whose job it is to evaluate
financial risks for the private sector--named climate change as both
the top emerging risk and the top current risk.\4\ The most sobering
assessments within the sector focus on the uncertainty that climate
change has injected into insurers' business model, and the strategic
challenges it creates for risk management. The International
Association of Insurance Supervisors recently noted ``the potential for
physical climate risks may change in non-linear ways, such as a
coincidence of previous un-correlated events, resulting in unexpectedly
high claims burdens,'' and concluded that ``[a]t the macro-economic
level, uninsured losses from physical risks may affect resource
availability and economic productivity across sectors, the
profitability of firms and individual assets, pose supply chain
disruptions, and ultimately impact insurance market demand.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Max J. Rudolph, 12th Annual Survey of Emerging Risks: Key
Findings (Casualty Actuarial Society et al. 2019), available at https:/
/www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/resources/research-report/2019/
12th-emerging-risk-survey.pdf.
\5\ International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Issues
Paper on Climate Change Risks to the Insurance Sector (July 2018),
available at https://www.insurancejournal.com/research/research/
success/climate-change-risks-to-the-insurance-sector/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within U.S. insurance markets, flood insurance has long been a
special case among weather-related risks, independent of climate change
risk. Private insurers largely pulled out of the flood insurance market
in the mid-20th century. This was the result of massive, correlated
losses from hurricanes that made insurers view flood risk as
uninsurable. Most insurable risks are spread over a large area, and
occur more or less randomly across a large number of insureds. Think
about auto insurance: not every drive will have an accident the same
day. Instead, they are well-dispersed, enabling insurers to price the
risks and to maintain sufficient capital to pay claims. Storm-related
losses, and flood-related losses generally, are different. Insurers
can't spread these risks effectively. The National Flood Insurance
Program fills the gap in private flood insurance. Of course, that
program has its own challenges that are out of the scope of this
hearing.
One might suspect that availability of private coastal flood
insurance will only get worse under emerging conditions. But recent
research instead provides reason for optimism. Private flood insurance
availability is improving as insurers develop more and better
information about coastal risks through research, modeling, and data
analysis, and as planners and infrastructure managers work actively to
address those risks.\6\ Insurers have made clear that more robust
information and analysis about emerging risks, and evidence of
community-scale risk mitigation planning, are crucial. The value of
anticipating the need for elevation of structures across an entire
area, or maintaining a wetland that protects structures from king tides
or storm surges \7\, can be quantified and considered. And over time,
insurers' decisions may also signal practices that make assets so
vulnerable that new investment should be avoided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Carolyn Kousky et al., The Emerging Private Residential Flood
Insurance Market in the United States (Wharton 2018), available at
https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/
Emerging-Flood-Insurance-Market-Report.pdf.
\7\ Lloyd's of London, Coastal Wetlands Save Hundreds of Millions
of Dollars in Flood Damages During US Hurricanes (October 25, 2016),
https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-risk-insight/press-releases/2016/10/
coastal-wetlands-save-hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars-in-flood-damages-
during-us-hurricanes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What does this mean for the Coast Guard, and for Port
infrastructure?
Federal planners can draw lessons from the insurance sector. First,
more information and analysis to clarify and assess site-specific and
programmatic risks is crucial. Risk is inevitable. But where agencies
understand risks, they can plan for them. Developing and using tools to
assess the vulnerability of their infrastructure and personnel can help
federal agencies to reduce risk, and to anticipate practices for
adapting even to catastrophic events by managing risk more effectively.
And agencies don't need to reinvent the wheel. Other agencies, academic
researchers, and insurers have developed tools that can assist with
modeling of physical conditions, assessment of economic and social
vulnerability, and analysis of other parameters.
Second, planning for resilience will reduce uncertainty and
facilitate better investment and prioritization by federal agencies.
Just as insurance underwriters are willing to address even very
difficult risks where loss prevention measures are in place, federal
agencies can decrease vulnerability through sound planning. New
infrastructure should avoid the most vulnerable areas, and agencies
should evaluate the adaptability of what they've already built. A range
of strategies will be necessary, including retrofitting existing
structures, rebuilding smarter after disasters, using natural
infrastructure to mitigate risks, and avoiding building in the most
vulnerable places.
The most crucial action is to integrate resilience planning and
governance into federal actions at every step, to ensure that climate
change's impacts are considered in decisionmaking about how and where
we build and rebuild, and that agencies understand the reasonable range
of possible futures. This process will enable agencies to plan
effectively for a range of scenarios. This type of planning can inform
asset investment by agencies like the Coast Guard, and also may inform
other programs, like grantmaking under the Port Infrastructure
Development Grant and Port Security Grant programs. Investing early to
reduce risk and protect assets will pay off.
Thank you for your consideration and I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Hecht.
We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will
be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by recognizing
myself.
Admiral Phillips, you mentioned the intergovernmental pilot
project down at Hampton Roads. What were some of the resources
that were crucial to that project that any coastal city with
Federal facilities would need to conduct their own integrated
adaptation plan.
Admiral Phillips. Yes, sir. Thank you for your question.
The intergovernmental pilot project was one of four Federal
and three Department of Defense pilot projects. It did not come
with Federal resources or really any resources. It was a total
voluntary effort. It was approved through the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and Navy was designated as lead service,
so it was totally voluntary throughout.
What it did have, though, that facilitated action was Old
Dominion University serving as a convener to provide a neutral
entity upon which to base actions and activities. It had at its
start a completed charter and suggestions for working groups.
There were six working groups and four advisory committees that
were already formed plus a steering committee and
recommendations for who should serve on those committees and
working groups and how the process should move forward. So it
started with a charter in place. It was authorized by the
Department of Defense, and the lead service was designated who
was authorized to participate. And I would also add that we had
considerable participation from the Coast Guard, Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Energy, Department of
Transportation, all facilitated through a letter Senator Kaine
wrote requesting that the National Security Council include all
of the agencies in this pilot project effort specifically in
the State of Virginia.
So, with that kind of written support, we had a foundation
upon which to move forward. Then it was a matter of getting the
cities and localities involved and engaged, and what kept them
there was Federal, State, and local participation, which many
of them said they had not seen before. Thank you.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
Dr. Cox, in your testimony, you discuss the potential
applications of risk-informed decision support tools, and what
do you see are potential barriers to utilizing a tool like
that?
Mr. Cox. I think for the ports in particular, a lot of
these----
Mr. Brown. And is your mic on? I haven't been asking
people.
Mr. Cox. I think so.
But I think the Coast Guard in particular, the barriers, I
think, one, is having the training, people that can operate
these tools that are just not off the shelf, you know. You need
somebody who really knows what they are doing and can interpret
the results.
I think a second thing is a lot of the consequence, like
how much damage could occur, it could be specific to the type
of asset that the Coast Guard has. And if those relations
aren't developed yet, then somebody has to, either through
expert opinion or computer modeling or experiments, come up
with what those damage functions would be.
So, depending on what they are trying to look at, if it is
a building, that is kind of--you could say that is done
already. But if it is a particular port asset, there might have
to be some work behind the scenes to get the right damage
function.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
I will now recognize each Member for an additional 5
minutes of questions, and we will begin with Mrs. Miller.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Chairman Brown and Ranking Member
Gibbs. I appreciate that.
And thank you all for being here today.
Rear Admiral Phillips, how can Congress better collaborate
with our State and local leaders when it comes to disaster
preparedness?
Admiral Phillips. Thank you for your question, ma'am.
The challenge for State and local leaders is that there are
a number of Federal programs that work disaster preparedness
predisaster, FEMA, HUD, NOAA, NFWF, just to name a few. They
are not coordinated amongst themselves, and this is a part of
our challenge.
There are also programs being developed within the
Department of Defense, the Defense Community Infrastructure
Program, which was created under the 2019 National Defense
Authorization Act but not funded, not appropriated, and also
Defense Access Roads Program, which comes out of MILCON
dollars, which are always scarce across the services, are also
options and opportunities for localities and the State perhaps
to collaborate with Federal entities.
But the real challenge and the real need is for a
coordinated effort across Federal agencies that focuses on this
issue, that aligns grants and funding, and that is
understandable and accessible by not only States but also
localities.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you. I have found that same issue in
West Virginia in dealing with things.
Dr. Cox, what are the key factors that lead to Coast Guard
infrastructure resiliency so that the Service can quickly
recover from extreme weather events and transition to emergency
response and search/rescue operations?
Mr. Cox. Could you please repeat just the first part of the
question?
Mrs. Miller. What are the key factors that lead to Coast
Guard infrastructure resiliency?
Mr. Cox. Yeah. I think one of the keys is implementing the
findings of these studies. So, if they are looking at here is
where the greatest risk is, they know what the greatest risk
is, OK, well, there needs to be a way to implement those
findings.
Mrs. Miller. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Hecht, what can commercial and residential areas do to
protect themselves and mitigate damage from flooding such as
the devastation that struck West Virginia earlier this year?
Mr. Hecht. Thank you for the question.
The best thing that local governments can do in communities
is to do the proper kind of planning. And often what we see is
that scenario planning, looking at various different possible
futures because of the uncertainty, is essential to being able
to plan properly.
So we might look at one scenario which has a relatively
small amount of coastal change and another area with a
different set of assumptions. And vulnerability assessment is
the practice of doing that and also looking at the social
vulnerability, not just the physical vulnerability, but the
social and economic vulnerability that go along with that.
So we see many examples of local governments that are doing
that kind of adaptation planning. One of the biggest challenges
that they face in that planning is funding to do the planning
and then, of course, the implementation, which sometimes
creates not only funding challenges but also challenges of
political will because governments have to make hard choices
sometimes that affect residents in challenging ways.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
I yield back my time. Thank you.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
Mr. Lowenthal.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My first question is for Mr. Cox. In your testimony, you
discussed--and this is both the written, especially--you
discussed how natural and nature-based features can be used to
protect port infrastructure. Can you elaborate on how expanded
uses of natural and nature-based features are beneficial to
private industry, and how can they be used on the large scale,
such as at some of our Nation's busiest ports, which I
represent?
Mr. Cox. Yeah. Thank you for the question.
So the role of natural, nature-based features, one thing is
it could be used to mitigate the intensity of the storm. So it
can reduce surge, wave action, the stuff that is going to
impact the structure. The other thing it can help to do is to
change patterns of sedimentation. So one of the big issues with
ports is keeping them open----
Mr. Lowenthal. Open.
Mr. Cox [continuing]. For shipping. And so, if you are
using a natural system to trap the sediments, basically you can
improve the navigability of the ports.
Mr. Lowenthal. What kinds of natural----
Mr. Cox. In Florida, for example, mangroves. So after
Hurricane Irma, Maria, they saw that areas with mangroves
suffered a lot less damage. With climate change there is a
potential there is going to be more mangroves along the Texas
coast and further north. That is just one example.
One of the other ones is called biocementation, so this is
a process where you are accelerating the rate at which
sediments can adhere to each other.
Mr. Lowenthal. Yes.
Mr. Cox. Basically, you could eventually turn it into
sandstone, if you wanted to. But trying to come up with an
engineering way to apply that after a big storm, you know,
instead of using sandbags or geotubes or something like that.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you.
Mr. Hecht, in your testimony, you talked about my part of
the country when you were talking about the Port of Los
Angeles, which is just adjacent to my district. I am the Port
of Long Beach, but they are really one combined port. And its
sea-level rise adaptation plan might be an example for the rest
of the country. Can you elaborate on how the port actually
designed and implemented this plan, and what can we learn from
adaptation projects on this magnitude?
Mr. Hecht. Yes. Thank you for the question, Representative
Lowenthal. And I apologize for mischaracterizing the boundaries
of your district.
Mr. Lowenthal. I will take the port of--I represented the
Port of L.A. and Long Beach, as well, while I was in the State
legislature, so I accept some ownership.
Mr. Hecht. So the port's planning process was detailed in a
paper that they published recently just in the last few months.
I haven't dug into the details of the adaptation plan, and my
understanding is that it came out recently enough that there
hasn't yet been implementation.
Mr. Lowenthal. OK.
Mr. Hecht. But what seems innovative about it to me and
important is the fact that they are doing scenario planning,
that they are looking at different possible futures, some
futures with less sea-level rise, some with more, some with a
certain amount of storm surge, and doing that and basing their
determinations on that modeling.
The other really important feature of any sound adaptation
planning, which appears to be in the port's plan, is that they
are integrating plans for resilience in their planning process.
It is not just a matter of let's build this thing here and
let's remove that thing there. It is a matter of integrating
this type of planning whenever they are making decisions about
their infrastructure so that they understand what the
vulnerabilities are of that infrastructure under different
scenarios.
And so they explicitly have put into their planning and
governance taking into account the latest projections of sea-
level rise and related risks over time as they plan new
infrastructure as they think about what they are doing going
forward. So those seem to me to be the most important features,
and they are the features of any really worthwhile adaptation
planning process.
Mr. Lowenthal. I also kind of am looking at and want, Mr.
Hecht, maybe a greater understanding of how potentially some of
our interventions--the very intervention may cause some
problems. I raise that in terms of as we invest in resilient
shore infrastructure, I think it is important to keep in mind
the environmental impacts of these very upgrades and what they
might have. Not only should we be concerned about adapting to
the impact of climate change, but we have to look at how we can
mitigate the environmental impact of the new infrastructure
itself. And so can you talk about how investing in resilient
shoreside infrastructure can be an important way of reducing
our overall environmental footprint?
Mr. Hecht. I would be happy to.
Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up, but may I respond?
Mr. Brown. Well, since we are on short final, why don't you
go ahead and answer the question, please?
Mr. Hecht. Thank you.
So that is a really important point. And so the California
Coastal Commission is a good example of an agency that is
really taking those----
Mr. Lowenthal. Yes.
Mr. Hecht [continuing]. Considerations into account. So, in
their planning processes, they are looking very closely at
shoreline armoring like seawalls and the spillover impacts that
those might have and encouraging the use of other types of
solutions, some of which include the types of natural
infrastructure solutions that Dr. Cox was talking about.
In some cases, it is going to be difficult or impossible to
do that, to protect particular kinds of assets that are fixed
in place with very long, useful lives. But where possible, that
is a key aspect of planning is to try to take that into
account. It is not just about destroying nature and ecosystems;
it is also about spillover impacts on other users of the
coastline and beach loss and other impacts like that. So that
question was very--it really does get at the heart of an
important point.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you.
And I yield back. And I thank the chair for letting me have
that extra minute.
Mr. Brown. Thank you for that very important question and
rounded out your 5 minutes brilliantly, yes.
Mr. Gibbs.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman.
Of the GAO's 10 recommendations for the Coast Guard
management of shoreside infrastructure, which do you see, if
any, of those recommendations apply to local ports and the
maritime transportation system? Whoever wants to answer it.
Mr. Hecht. So I am not deeply familiar with all the
recommendations in the GAO report. I looked at the report, but
I don't have it in front of me now. I don't know if my
copanelists can, but I am happy to talk about particular ideas.
Mr. Gibbs. That is fine. I will go on. I will move on.
I guess, Mr. Hecht, I guess you got my attention when you
talked about out in California, the California Coastal
Commission figures either the variation of a 2-foot to a 6-foot
rise in sea level, which is, I think, a pretty good variation.
I guess my first thought is, what is the sea-level rise at
the port of L.A., for example? I was out there a few years ago.
I know it was all built in dredge material. I was fascinated by
that port out there. But what are we seeing, if any, rise in
the last 20, 30 years, or what is going on? Just give me an
idea.
Mr. Hecht. So, over the last century, we have seen an
average over the country of 6 to 8 inches. I think that the
rise is slightly less in southern California so far. There is
evidence from research that the rate of rise is accelerating.
And you are correct that that is a highly variable range.
That is based on estimates not just from the Coastal Commission
but also from NOAA, which is really the--you know, NOAA has
done incredible work to really try to define the parameters of
sea-level rise. And its most recent report--I believe it is the
most recent report from 2018--provides a lot of insight into
it. It is hugely challenging to have that type of a range, and,
again, that is part of why----
Mr. Gibbs. That goes--well, you mentioned about the
insurance actuaries.
Mr. Hecht. Yeah.
Mr. Gibbs. But how do you--we are building resilient
infrastructure. How do you figure--you know, when you start
looking at cost-benefit analysis and, you know, try to be
reasonable, practical----
Mr. Hecht. Right. So you look at robustness over a range of
scenarios. You can't look at just one scenario. You look at the
range of scenarios, and you can't always plan for the worst
case, but you can plan for infrastructure to be resilient over
a range of the most probable outcomes.
And you can have different plans for different scenarios
that are adaptable in 10 or 20 or 30 years when we see
different levels of change. You create infrastructure that is
adaptable enough that we can build that resilience in and
change it if we need to. So creating something that might more
easily be elevated, for example, if you are building something
new rather than something that is so fixed in place that it is
immovable would be an example of that.
Mr. Gibbs. Yeah, if you start new construction, it would be
more cost effective probably.
Mr. Hecht. Yes.
Mr. Gibbs. OK. I don't know if this is a pertinent question
to this panel. I think maybe. We will see. The Great Lakes. I
don't know--you are from Oregon, and you are from California,
and you are from Virginia, so maybe----
Mr. Hecht. I went to law school at the University of
Michigan, so----
Mr. Gibbs. OK, well----
Mr. Hecht. I lived in Michigan for a while.
Mr. Gibbs. We are looking at, you know, resilience planning
in the Great Lakes. You know, should the Great Lakes be just as
concerned as our coastal--because we don't have hurricanes. We
kind of do sometimes have nor'easters, but we don't have
tropical storms. You know, what is the risk on the Great Lakes?
Mr. Cox. I think the planning tools are there, and if they
are used, they can basically----
Mr. Gibbs. Microphone, I think.
Mr. Cox. Sorry. Maybe I will talk a little closer. I think
the Great Lakes benefit as well from the resilience planning.
So it is really just about the ability to absorb and recover
quickly, and it is up to the Great Lakes to say this is how
quickly we would need to recover, this is how much we can
absorb. But I think the tools are there and useful for the
Great Lakes as well.
Mr. Gibbs. Of course, with the freeze and the thawing of
the ice, that might be a different consideration that you don't
have in L.A., obviously. Because if you had that problem in
L.A., then we have got a different issue, right?
Mr. Hecht. Yeah. We are not headed that way.
Mr. Gibbs. All right. I yield back. I think I am good.
Thanks.
Mr. Brown. Are there any further questions for members of
the subcommittee?
Seeing none, I would like to thank each of the witnesses
for your testimony today. Your contribution to today's
discussion has been very informative and helpful.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
writing and unanimous consent that the record remain open for
15 days for any additional comments and information submitted
by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's
hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
If no other Members have anything to add, this subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
As a farmer and a Member whose district is bounded by both the
Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, I understand the power of water both
as a necessity and as a sometimes destructive force. In the Midwest we
must be prepared for river flooding, just like coastal areas must
prepare for hurricanes and other large coastal storms. Therefore, I
commend the Chair for holding this hearing on the importance of
building Coast Guard and port facilities in a way that can withstand
the ever-increasing forces of mother nature.
The Coast Guard has a $2.6 billion backlog of construction and
maintenance projects. I share GAO's concern that this only represents a
one-for-one replacement rather than a strategic assessment of the Coast
Guard's long-term operating needs. The Coast Guard needs to undertake
such an assessment.
I am particularly concerned that the Coast Guard does not
understand the shoreside facility needs for its new operational assets.
Recapitalizing Coast Guard aircraft and the fleet which operates more
than 50 miles offshore has taken priority in Coast Guard budgets now
for over 15 years. However, we must make sure that shoreside facilities
keep pace with commissioning these new assets.
For example, a $100 million investment is needed to upgrade the
hangars at Barbers Point in Hawaii to adequately protect the new C-
130Js the Service is procuring. The service life of those aircraft will
be reduced, and taxpayer dollars wasted, unless the appropriate hangar
space is provided. Put simply, salty air and exposed planes don't mix.
While I am glad the Coast Guard is getting the airplanes they need to
do their jobs, I think we need to be smarter about how we protect these
investments.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about how the Coast
Guard can better plan for its future shoreside facility needs, and how
U.S. ports can design more resilient facilities to withstand coastal
storms and flooding.
Letter Referenced in Testimony of Rear Admiral Phillips, Dated February
22, 2019, from Matthew J. Strickler, Secretary of Natural Resources,
Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Anthony G. Brown
February 22, 2019.
Hon. Peter DeFazio,
Chairman,
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Washington, DC.
Hon. Sam Graves,
Ranking Member,
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member Graves,
I am writing today to offer the Commonwealth of Virginia's
perspective on ways the federal government can better assist Virginia
and other states in mitigating and adapting to the impacts of sea level
rise and extreme weather events. Please accept this testimony for the
record of the February 27, 2019 Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee hearing titled ``Examining How Federal Infrastructure Policy
Could Help Mitigate and Adapt to Climate Change.''
Virginia has much at stake as Congress considers legislation to
address our country's aging infrastructure. In addition to help
repairing and modernizing roads, bridges, and railways, the
Commonwealth requires the assistance of the federal government to make
coastal communities and critical assets more resilient to climate
change and natural hazards.
Sea level rise and more frequent and intense weather events have
combined with land subsidence to dramatically increase flooding and
storm damage risk to coastal Virginia. We are not unique among coastal
states in this regard, but with nearly 10,000 miles of tidal shoreline,
the deepest and one of the busiest ports on the east coast, and
numerous military installations including the largest naval base in the
world, we are uniquely vulnerable.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.vims.edu/bayinfo/faqs/shoreline_miles.php
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The recently published, Fourth National Climate Assessment report
summary includes the following findings regarding infrastructure:
Climate change and extreme weather events are expected to
increasingly disrupt our Nation's energy and transportation systems,
threatening more frequent and longer-lasting power outages, fuel
shortages, and service disruptions, with cascading impacts on other
critical sectors. The continued increase in the frequency and extent of
high-tide flooding due to sea level rise threatens America's trillion-
dollar coastal property market and public infrastructure, with
cascading impacts to the larger economy . . . Expected increases in the
severity and frequency of heavy precipitation events will affect inland
infrastructure in every region, including access to roads, the
viability of bridges, and the safety of pipelines. Flooding from heavy
rainfall, storm surge, and rising high tides is expected to compound
existing issues with aging infrastructure in the Northeast.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/
In Virginia, these warnings are already ringing true. According to
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 2017 Sea Level
Trends Map, all eight of the sea level monitoring stations in the
Commonwealth show a relative sea level rise of one to two feet per
century, among the highest rates of sea level rise on the east or west
coasts.\3\ The Hampton Roads Planning District Commission estimates the
negative impacts on private property and public infrastructure from
three feet of sea level rise in Southeastern Virginia, in the tens of
billions of dollars.\4\ As this trend continues, the costs and profound
impacts of natural hazards associated with climate change will only
increase the longer we wait to address them. Public health and safety,
our environment and natural resources, and the economic wellbeing of
the Commonwealth, including our ports, military installations,
transportation infrastructure, tourism assets, farms, forests, and
fisheries are all at risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/sltrends/slrmap.html
\4\ https://www.hrpdcva.gov/uploads/docs/
HRPDC_ClimateChangeReport2012_Full_
Reduced.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We must act now to protect lives and property and reduce taxpayer
exposure through fiscally responsible planning. It is important to
understand that we must not only work to make our existing
infrastructure more resilient to sea level rise and other natural
hazards, but that we will need to build new infrastructure, both green
and grey, for the express purpose of making our coastal communities
more resilient.
Virginia is already doing its part. Last November, Governor Northam
issued Executive Order (EO) 24: Increasing Virginia's Resilience to Sea
Level Rise and Natural Hazards. This sweeping directive establishes a
roadmap for making Virginia more resilient, including the creation of a
Coastal Resilience Master Plan for the Commonwealth. A copy of E0-24 is
attached for your reference.
Given the enormous scope of this problem and the significant cost
required to better protect people and property from extreme weather and
sea level rise, Virginia will require the assistance of the federal
government to address this pressing issue and to implement our Master
Plan. On behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia, we respectfully urge
the Committee and Congress to consider the following recommendations as
you develop infrastructure legislation:
1. Provide robust funding to help states and localities address sea
level rise and extreme weather events
As detailed in this letter, the cost of making the United States
more resilient to extreme weather and sea level rise is enormous.
Without consistent, dedicated funding, coordinated fully across federal
agencies, states like Virginia will not be able to adequately protect
their citizens and the built and natural infrastructure that underpins
their economies. In particular, we urge Congress to make significant
investments in pre-disaster mitigation and resilience funding, and U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) flood protection projects. To meet the
challenge before us, we will need unprecedented investment from the
federal government to better protect America's coasts. We urge the
committee to prioritize flood control projects for those areas most at
risk, and to also prioritize projects that are part of comprehensive
regional or multi-state plans rather than free-standing projects that
may be advanced by a particular locality or interest.
2. Encourage green infrastructure solutions where applicable
Science has shown us that natural defenses against flooding, storm
surge, erosion, and other forces are often our most effective--and most
cost effective--solutions for protecting vulnerable areas. By reducing
storm water runoff and allowing floodplains to function, green
infrastructure can help manage both localized and riverine floods. In
areas impacted by localized flooding, green infrastructure practices
absorb rainfall, preventing water from overwhelming pipe networks and
pooling in streets or basements. In coastal areas, natural or nature-
based buffers and living shorelines can reduce storm surge and absorb
flood waters. In addition, green infrastructure provides an array of
co-benefits including improved water quality and productive fish and
wildlife habitat. To the maximum extent possible, the Corps should look
first toward natural and nature based infrastructure solutions for
coastal protection and flood risk reduction, reserving more costly gray
infrastructure for situations where it is the only feasible option. In
Virginia, we hope to anchor our Coastal Resilience Master Plan with a
limited number of structural flood protection projects, while we fill
in the gaps with an array of softer solutions including coastal barrier
protection, land acquisition, property buyouts, buffers, living
shorelines and more.
3. Help states organize and prioritize flood control proiects
For years, cities and towns have taken the lead on requesting Army
Corps flood control studies and construction projects, which has led
led to a long list of regional studies that either overlap or leave
gaps in coverage along jurisdictional lines. To ensure that studies are
providing the maximum benefit, the Corps should assist states in
prioritizing and aggregating flood control projects. Furthermore, the
Corps should prioritize new studies and new projects according to the
greatest flood risk and the greatest economic needs, as well as giving
priority to projects that are part of a regional comprehensive plan. In
addition, the Corps should provide regional guidance for how to best
address sea level rise and pre-disaster hazard mitigation.
4. Deliver timely Army Corps studies and consider third party analysis
and study
In recent years, appropriations bills have limited the number of
Corps flood control feasibility studies and project starts in any given
year. We simply cannot afford the delay. Congress and the Corps must
devise a way to expand capacity to complete such studies more quickly
and begin detailed planning and project execution to reduce flooding
and extreme weather risk.
In an effort to address the critical need for flood control and
pre-disaster hazard mitigation, some cities or towns have engaged
private engineering companies to undertake studies on how to best
reduce flooding. For example, Virginia Beach has spent more than $4
million studying its vulnerabilities to flooding and sea level rise.
Rather than begin a new feasibility study by the Corps, Congress should
ensure that the Corps will accept and validate viable commercial and
academic study work as the basis for, or in lieu of, a full feasibility
study.
5. Ensure strong environmental review
While both the need and desire for coastal protection projects are
urgent, we must resist the temptation to circumvent or weaken bedrock
environmental laws. This goes for all infrastructure projects. Robust
reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act will help ensure
that projects with negative unintended consequences are not selected,
and that the needs of impacted communities--particularly environmental
justice communities--are taken into account. Similarly, thorough and
effective consultation under the Endangered Species Act is necessary to
protect vulnerable fish, wildlife, and plants that serve as proxies for
the health of entire natural systems.
I understand and appreciate the challenging task that lies ahead of
you in developing this infrastructure package, and I thank you for your
consideration of these requests. Please do not hesitate to contact me
if I can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Matthew J. Strickler.
Statement of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Anthony G. Brown
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) appreciates the
opportunity to submit our position on the importance of long-term,
strategic investment in our nation's ports infrastructure. ASCE also
thanks the U.S. House of Representatives Transportation and
Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
for holding a hearing on this critical issue.
Overview of ASCE's 2017 Infrastructure Report Card
Infrastructure is the foundation that connects the nation's
businesses, communities, and people, serves as the backbone to the U.S.
economy, and is vital to the nation's public health and welfare. Every
four years, ASCE publishes the Infrastructure Report Card, which grades
the nation's 16 major infrastructure categories using a simple A to F
school report card format. The Report Card examines the current
infrastructure needs and conditions, assigning grades and making
recommendations to raise them.
ASCE's 2017 Infrastructure Report Card rated the overall condition
of the nation's infrastructure a cumulative grade of ``D+'' across
sixteen categories, with an investment gap of $2 trillion. The Report
Card gave our nation's ports infrastructure category a grade of ``C+.''
The economic consequences of our nation's infrastructure
deficiencies also extend to families' disposable incomes, with each
household in the U.S. losing $3,400 each year through 2025; if left
unaddressed, the loss will grow to an average of $5,100 annually from
2026 to 2040. It is possible to close the infrastructure investment gap
and avoid the economic consequences caused by this deficit, but it will
require sustained and robust investment.
Ports and the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund
Our nation's 926 ports support over 23.1 million jobs, provide
$321.1 billion in tax revenue to federal state, and local governments,
and are responsible for $4.6 trillion in economic activity, or roughly
26 percent of the nation's economy--making them essential to U.S.
competitiveness. Our ports serve as the gateway through which 99
percent of America's overseas trade passes, and the top 10 U.S. ports
accounted for 78 percent of U.S. foreign waterborne trade in 2015.
However, the investment gap for inland waterways systems and ports is
expected to be $1.5 billion by 2025.
According to ASCE's 2016 economic study, Failure to Act: Closing
the Infrastructure Investment Gap for America's Economic Future, if
America's current level of investment in its inland waterways and
marine ports continues, the losses to the nation's economy will
increase shipping costs, resulting in GDP losses of $95 billion in 2020
to over $255 billion by 2040. The cumulative loss in national GDP
through 2040 will be over $4 trillion, resulting in over 738,000 fewer
jobs in 2020 and growing to over 1.3 million job losses by 2040.
In a 2015 survey \1\ of ports, a third indicated that congestion
over the past ten years resulted in a 25 percent decrease in port
productivity. Few of our nation's ports can accommodate the large ships
that pass through the Panama Canal, so to remain competitive in the
global market and to accommodate these larger vessels, ports have been
investing in their facilities and plan to spend over $154 billion from
2016 to 2020 on expansion, modernization, and repair. Ports, however,
are contending with larger container ships and do not always have
adequate access to the user-fee funded Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund
(HMTF), which would help these facilities prepare for larger vessels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ American Association of Port Authorities, 2015 Port Surface
Freight Infrastructure Survey, April 2015
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enacted in the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, the Harbor
Maintenance Tax (HMT) is a fee (0.125 percent of the value of cargo)
collected from users of our nation's maritime transportation system
that is then used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to dredge
harbors. Despite the significant dredging needs at the majority of U.S.
ports, the fund's revenues have frequently not been appropriated for
its designated purposed, instead being used for federal deficit
offsets. ASCE strongly supported the provision in the Water Resources
Reform and Development Act (WRRDA) of 2014 that created a phased-in
approach to reach full use of HMT revenues by FY2025 and that set
incremental spending targets each year until full use.
The HMTF's balance currently sits at over $9 billion. Once fully
funded, it will take five years of complete HMTF appropriations to
dredge and restore channel depths and widths. ASCE urges the
Subcommittee to continue implementing the WRRDA 2014 agreement by
increasing expenditures accordingly and ensuring that HMT revenues are
used only for its intended purpose, and we support the bipartisan Full
Utilization of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund Act, H.R. 2440.
Ports Resilience
Ports are unique infrastructure systems in that they must
efficiently move goods while also maintaining secure facilities.
However, natural disasters not only create high cost damage to ports
infrastructure, but they can result in the loss of long-term economic
activity.
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), natural disasters cost the country $91 billion in 2018--the
fourth-highest total costs from natural disasters since NOAA started
tracking this data in 1980. It also marked the eighth consecutive year
with eight or more natural disasters that cost at least $1 billion
each. According to the National Institute of Building Sciences,
however, every dollar spent on pre-disaster mitigation and preparedness
saves six dollars in rebuilding costs after a storm. Investment in
disaster mitigation makes the recovery process shorter while saving
taxpayer money.
ASCE believes that a critical component to raising our nation's
infrastructure grade is careful preparation for the needs of the
future. This includes the utilization of new approaches, materials, and
technologies to ensure our infrastructure is both more resilient and
sustainable--that is, the ability to quickly recover from significant
weather and other hazard events while reducing impacts on local
economies, quality of life, and the environment--as well as the need to
support research and development into innovative materials and
processes to modernize and extend the life of infrastructure, reduce
life-cycle costs, expedite repairs or replacement, and promote cost
savings.
The nation's economy relies on resilient ports infrastructure that
can withstand future extreme weather events. As civil engineers, we
think about building infrastructure that will last for 50 to 100 years
or more. It shouldn't take a disaster to spur action. The opportunity
to build strategically is upon us.
Ports Recommendations From ASCE's 2017 Infrastructure Report Card
Increase overall investment into the freight program to
ensure ports can effectively distribute and receive goods as ships
continue to grow in size.
Appropriate funds to the congressionally-authorized
projects to ensure that projects crucial to freight movement are
completed in a timely manner.
Ensure that ports have a seat at the table as states
create and execute freight plans.
Adopt new technologies to reduce wait times at docks,
boost efficiency, and increase security.
Improve freight and landside connections to strengthen
the entire freight system and reduce congestion that is costly to the
economy when moving goods.
Conclusion
ASCE believes Congress must prioritize the investment needs--
including building with a resilient eye to the future--of our ports
infrastructure to protect our nation's economy and millions of jobs,
and to ensure we remain internationally competitive. ASCE thanks the
Subcommittee for holding this hearing and bringing attention to this
critical matter. We look forward to working with you to find investment
solutions to our nation's ports infrastructure.
Appendix
----------
Question from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Rear Admiral Nathan A.
Moore, Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast
Guard
Question 1. In your testimony you describe that your shore
infrastructure vulnerability assessment will not be completed until
2025. By that time, many of the Coast Guard's existing infrastructure
issues will have compounded by increasingly severe natural hazards.
What will it take to have that assessment completed by 2021?
Answer. The Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report
entitled Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Processes for Improving
Resilience Should Fully Align with DHS Risk Management Framework (GAO-
19-675) notes that the Coast Guard's SIVA process is ``not expected to
be completed until at least 2025.'' In our communications with GAO
during the development of this report, the Coast Guard emphasized that
the completion of SIVA Phase II by 2025 is uncertain given funding
limitations and that the actual completion date will depend on funding
availability.
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Rear Admiral Nathan A. Moore,
Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast Guard
Question 1. The first Polar Security Cutters will be homeported in
Seattle, which has been the home of the nation's icebreaking fleet
since 1976. It is also my understanding the Coast Guard is considering
homeporting future vessel acquisitions in Northwest Washington. What
are the berth capacity needs in the Puget Sound region to accommodate
these new vessels?
Answer. The ship's design for the Polar Security Cutter is not
finalized, however, the anticipated berthing requirements are as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polar Security Cutter
Item Requirement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Depth at Mooring.......................... 40 feet.
Mooring Length............................ 480 feet.
Ship's Beam............................... 90 feet.
Fendering, mooring devices, and deck Fendering, mooring devices,
fittings. and deck fittings shall
comply with the Navy's
Unified Facilities
Criteria.
Pier lay down space....................... 4,000 Square Feet area in
addition to pier/wharf
space for pre-staging
supplies and equipment
within \1/2\ mile of the
pier or wharf.
Vertical load............................. 600 pounds per square feet
live load.
Fueling................................... Capable of being fueled at
pier either by truck
(AASHTO HS20 Truck loading)
or by installed fueling
system.
Shore ties................................ Electric, potable water,
sewage, telephone, local
area network.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 1.a. Follow-up: Does the Coast Guard also have the
necessary maintenance and shipyard capacity in the Pacific Northwest
for new acquisitions?
Answer. The Coast Guard is currently in the process of establishing
maintenance requirements for new surface asset acquisitions. The Coast
Guard is forecasting nation-wide commercial and government industrial
base challenges based on proposed U.S. Navy fleet expansion, and we are
looking at all options to best support our new cutters.
Question 1.b. Follow-up: How are homeport sites being designed to a
more resilient standard? What are the benefits?
Answer. All Coast Guard construction projects include resilient
standards based on local building codes, likely risks, and operational
requirements. The physical resilience of the building is usually
addressed through siting considerations, structural criteria, and
elevation controls. Operational resilience is addressed with emergency
utilities capability, logistics chain planning, and use of renewable
energy sources where possible.
Resilient buildings are more likely to support contingency
operations during emergency events and restore normal operations faster
after those events have occurred. They also better protect occupants in
cases where events happen without warning (e.g. earthquakes) and it is
not possible to relocate personnel to a safer location prior to the
event occurring. Where physical reconstitution of resilient buildings
is required after an event, these efforts are less costly due to the
improved building survivability.
Question 2. In my home state of Washington, the impact of climate
change has resulted in rising temperatures, record-breaking wildfires
and an acidifying ocean which harms coastal communities. When the Coast
Guard is considering a new construction project, what are some of the
climate risk considerations incorporated into planning?
Answer. As Coast Guard facilities and assets are planned for
recapitalization, resiliency for natural disasters is factored into
facility plans and designs. The Coast Guard considers 10 natural
hazards based on a project's geographical location. Those hazards
include earthquakes, flooding, tsunamis, sea level rise, coastal
vulnerability, hurricanes, wildfires, volcanoes, tornadoes, and
drought.
Question 2.a. Follow-up: How are carbon dioxide emissions levels
built into these models?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not include carbon dioxide emissions
in its construction considerations beyond efforts to meet the
requirements of the Executive Order Regarding Efficient Federal
Operations (EO 13834).
Question 2.b. Follow-up: To date, Sea Level Change is not
incorporated into FEMA's 100-year floodplain models, which in your
testimony you cite as the SILC's baseline standard for designing new
facilities. What are some other predictive models the Coast Guard could
apply that incorporate sea level change, storm surge, and the 100-year
flood models? What agencies do you collaborate with for these data?
Answer. The Coast Guard primarily uses publicly available products
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the
National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) to inform planning
factors when considering infrastructure project siting. These include
NOAA's Global and Regional Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the United
States and NASA's AVISO Level 4 data sets.
Questions from Hon. Stacey E. Plaskett for Rear Admiral Nathan A.
Moore, Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast
Guard
Question 1. As a result of the Hurricanes, Sector San Juan (to
include Rio Bayamon Housing) suffered an estimated $156 million in
infrastructure damages. The entire PC&I portion of the FY18 hurricane
supplemental appropriation was $719 million. How has disaster funding
been applied by the coast guard to rebuild island facilities to date?
What are the rebuilding standards used for these facilities, and how
does the CG account for the specific vulnerabilities of island
property?
Answer. Upon receipt of the Fiscal Year 2018 hurricane supplemental
appropriation, the Coast Guard commenced repairs to damaged
infrastructure and concurrently began planning and design efforts to
rebuild affected facilities in Puerto Rico and St. Thomas to resilient
standards. To date, the Coast Guard has obligated $42 million for
repair and rebuild work in Puerto Rico and St. Thomas. Nearly all of
the repairs will be completed by April 2020, and we anticipate awarding
the first rebuild contract in October 2020.
The Coast Guard rebuilds facilities in accordance with applicable
building codes. When more stringent design criteria are required, the
Coast Guard exceeds building codes to ensure structures can survive
likely natural events. The Coast Guard considers historical climate
data and forecasts to influence design criteria for new construction
projects and major renovations on the islands. Locations specifically
affected by flooding and coastal vulnerabilities normally receive
siting and elevation considerations based on Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) flood maps and design criteria recommended by
the American Society of Civil Engineers. For example, the Coast Guard
implements a minimum finished floor elevation of the 100-year flood
level + 3 feet, or the 500-year flood elevation + 1 foot, whichever is
greater.
Questions from Hon. Bob Gibbs for Rear Admiral Nathan A. Moore,
Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast Guard
Question 1. After Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard undertook an
internal restructuring called Modernization. Among other things, it
used the Aviation Logistics Center as a model for new surface assets,
IT, and shoreside infrastructure logistics center. The Aviation
Logistics model imposed national standards for all Coast Guard aviation
operations proved successful when the Coast Guard mounted its
monumental response to the massive hurricane. Unfortunately, it appears
the Shoreside Infrastructure Logistics Center (SILC) exists largely as
a paper exercise, and that the six regional civil engineering units
continue to make decisions without the benefit of national processes
and standards. The one-for-one replacement of existing Coast Guard
shoreside facilities is not the best way to assure the Coast Guard can
carry out its missions in the future.
Question 1.a. When does the Coast Guard intend to implement a
national process for reviewing and rating individual projects?
Answer. Review and prioritization of the Coast Guard's major repair
and recapitalization projects have been part of a national process
overseen by the Shore Infrastructure Logistics Command (SILC) since
2012. The Coast Guard is in the process of updating formal guidance to
its national and regional shore infrastructure planning boards.
Question 1.b. When does the Coast Guard intend to review its assets
nationwide and match those assets to its mission needs?
Answer. The Coast Guard provides a comprehensive Coast Guard
Mission Needs Statement to Congress at least every four years with the
first delivered in 2016. The latest version was delivered in 2018
(attached).\\ The Coast Guard Mission Needs Statement reviews
the Coast Guard's statutory missions, threats, and opportunities and
compares them to the service's ability to conduct effective operations
resulting in the required mission needs of the service.
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\\ Editor's note: The 126-page report entitled ``Coast
Guard Mission Needs Statement: Report to Congress--November 21, 2018,''
is retained in committee files.
Question 1.c. Of the ten recommendations in the last three GAO
shoreside infrastructure reports, how many have been fully implemented?
Partially implemented? Received no action?
Answer. The Coast Guard is tracking seven recommendations from two
recently completed GAO audits on Coast Guard shore infrastructure: six
from GAO-19-82, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading
Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of At Least $2.6
Billion, and one from GAO-19-675, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure:
Processes for Improving Resilience Should Fully Align with DHS Risk
Management Framework. Of these seven recommendations, one has been
fully implemented and six have been partially implemented. In addition
to these recommendations, the Coast Guard is tracking three
recommendations from GAO-18-9, Coast Guard Actions Needed to Close
Stations Identified as Overlapping and Unnecessarily Duplicative. These
three recommendations have been partially implemented.
Question 1.d. Does the Coast Guard plan to impose a national
standard for resilient construction and maintenance in areas subject
coastal storms and flooding? What would be the costs of implementing
such a policy? The savings?
Answer. Coast Guard operational resilience standards are applied
based on the mission criticality of the specific building. Physical
resilience standards are defined by applicable building codes.
Locations specifically affected by flooding and coastal vulnerabilities
normally receive siting and elevation considerations based on FEMA
Flood Maps and design criteria recommended by the American Society of
Civil Engineers. Where appropriate, the Coast Guard exceeds building
codes to ensure structures can survive likely natural events.
The cost of building to resilient standards increases where we
exceed building codes because baseline costs are based on building code
requirements. Examples of design considerations that may exceed
building codes include a sacrificial first floor, thicker walls,
emergency power generation, and additional potable water storage and
purification.
Following disasters, the Coast Guard's infrastructure
reconstitution costs have been relatively low for facilities built to
resilient standards. Recent examples include Coast Guard infrastructure
at Sabine Pass, Texas, and Great Inagua, the Bahamas, which was rebuilt
after Hurricane Ike and sustained no damage during more recent
hurricanes.
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Nathan Anderson, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Question 1. The Coast Guard began assessing certain buildings for
vulnerabilities to natural disasters in 2015 and aim to complete that
process in 2025, but are only 15 percent finished. Taking into account
the projects that the GAO does not consider necessary to cost, what
resources would it take to complete that process by 2021?
Answer. It is unclear what resources it would take to complete the
Coast Guard's vulnerability assessment process by 2021 because the
Coast Guard's phase I analysis did not identify all shore
infrastructure assets that are critical to its missions. Additionally,
its ongoing phase II assessment, which involves more detailed
structural analyses of 1,500 buildings, is limited in scope to
earthquakes or tornado and hurricane winds, depending on the building.
Moreover, the phase II assessment, which began in September 2018,
included just one contract for about $700,000 to determine if 15
buildings at multiple Coast Guard sites are vulnerable to earthquakes.
According to the contract, these 15 assessments are to be completed in
October 2021. However, the Coast Guard did not have a charter that
outlined a methodology for the broader development of phase II. A Coast
Guard memo from March 2019 recommended that phase II assessment work be
prioritized based on how critical a building is to Coast Guard
operations, its occupant density, and its overall age and condition,
and the Coast Guard has data it could use to accomplish this
assessment. As a result, we recommended in September 2019 that the
Coast Guard implement a risk-informed approach to better guide its
shore infrastructure investment decisions.
Further, even if the assessment process could be completed by 2021,
we cannot estimate the resources it would take because the Coast Guard
would then have to identify projects needed to address assessment
results. But, as we reported in February 2019, (1) the Coast Guard was
unable to provide us with documentation showing whether and to what
extent risk reduction methods were considered in its funding
prioritization processes for shore infrastructure projects, and (2) it
was unclear whether future Coast Guard prioritization decisions would
focus on the most critical risks and consider resilience as a factor
when choosing which projects to fund. As a result, we are unable to
estimate resources needed to address the Coast Guard's shore
infrastructure vulnerabilities.
Question 2. Should the Coast Guard conduct comprehensive adaptation
planning for its facilities? To what extent does the Coast Guard
coordinate with local planning bodies when identifying critical assets
and planning shoreside infrastructure improvements?
Answer. GAO's High Risk work on Limiting the Federal Government's
Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks [https://
www.gao.gov/highrisk/limiting_federal_government_fiscal_exposure/
why_did_study#t=2], states that the federal government needs a
comprehensive approach to improve the resilience of the facilities it
owns and operates and the land it manages.\1\ This involves
incorporating climate change resilience into agencies' infrastructure
and facility planning processes.\2\ It also involves accounting for
climate change in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analyses and
working with relevant professional associations to incorporate climate
change information into structural design standards. Specifically, in
November 2016 we reported that standards-developing organizations--such
as professional engineering societies--are the primary source of the
standards, codes, and certifications that federal, state, local, and
private-sector infrastructure planners follow.\3\ In this report, we
found that standards-developing organizations generally have not used
forward-looking climate information in design standards, building
codes, and voluntary certifications, but instead have relied on
historical observations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See GAO, https://www.gao.gov/highrisk/
limiting_federal_government_fiscal_exposure/why_did_study#t=2.
\2\ See GAO, Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve
Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential
Impacts, GAO-14-446 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-446]
(Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2014); Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Needs
to Better Incorporate Adaptation into Planning and Collaboration at
Overseas Installations, GAO-18-206 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
18-206] (Washington, D.C.: Nov 13, 2017); Climate Resilience: DOD Needs
to Assess Risk and Provide Guidance on Use of Climate Projections in
Installation Master Plans and Facilities Designs GAO-19-453 [https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-453]: (Washington, D.C.: Jun 12, 2019).
\3\ See GAO, Climate Change: Improved Federal Coordination Could
Facilitate the Use of Forward-Looking Climate Information in Design
Standards, Building Codes, and Certifications, GAO-17-3 [https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-3] (Washington, D.C.: Nov 30, 2016).
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Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Nathan Anderson, Director, Homeland
Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Question 1. What research has the GAO done into the use of nature-
based infrastructure in climate mitigation projects beyond the more
conventional mitigation approaches (e.g. structure elevation, flood-
proofing, relocation, etc.)?
Question 1.a. Follow-up: Are there potential returns on investment
with nature-based infrastructure?
Question 1.b. Follow-up: Should the Coast Guard consider other
types of adaptation techniques?
Answer (1.a.-1.b.). In March 2019, we reported on how the Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) determines when to use natural
infrastructure (e.g. wetlands and beaches), or hard infrastructure
(e.g., seawalls) for coastal management projects.\4\ For coastal storm
and flood risk management projects, the Corps is supposed to choose the
infrastructure type with the greatest net benefits. Reducing damages to
existing structures, including homes and commercial buildings, is the
primary benefit the Corps considers when identifying benefits for
coastal storm risk management project alternatives, according to its
planning guidance. Specifically, the guidance outlines general steps
for estimating damage reduction benefits, which are to be calculated
and included in each coastal storm and flood risk management
alternative's economic analysis. We also found that the Corps is
beginning to pursue the use of natural infrastructure in its planning,
but that it can be difficult to calculate the net benefits of natural
infrastructure. For example, it can be hard to put a dollar value on
environmental benefits, such as providing habitat for fish and birds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See GAO, Army Corps of Engineers: Consideration of Project
Costs and Benefits in Using Natural Coastal Infrastructure and
Associated Challenges, GAO-19-319 [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-
319] (Washington, D.C.: Mar 28, 2019).
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Further, our October 2019 Disaster Resilience Framework: Principles
for Analyzing Federal Efforts to Facilitate and Promote Resilience to
Natural Disasters states that, in addition to built-infrastructure
assets, information about how natural ecosystems contribute to disaster
resilience and overlap with the built environment can help provide
additional insight into how to design better solutions that account for
the condition and benefits of the whole system.\5\ For example, as we
have previously reported, coastal ecosystems--including wetlands,
marshes, and mangroves--may shield communities from some of the impacts
of climate change.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See GAO, Disaster Resilience Framework: Principles for
Analyzing Federal Efforts to Facilitate and Promote Resilience to
Natural Disasters, GAO-20-100SP [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-
100SP] (Washington, D.C: Oct 23, 2019).
\6\ See GAO, Climate Change: Information on NOAA's Support for
States' Marine Coastal Ecosystem Resilience Efforts, GAO-16-834
[https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-834] (Washington, D.C.: Sep 28,
2016).
According to the Fourth National Climate Assessment,
information on benefits of resilience efforts is lacking in many
sectors, though some information exists on the benefits and costs of
such efforts in certain sectors, such as resilience efforts in coastal
areas, resilience efforts designed to protect against riverine flooding
(i.e., flooding that occurs when river flows exceed the capacity of the
river channel), and resilience efforts related to agriculture at the
farm level.\7\ According to this assessment, some of the actions in
these sectors, at least in some locations, appear to have large
benefit-cost ratios--both in addressing current variability and in
preparing for future change. According to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Office for Coastal Management,
wetlands can protect coastal communities from powerful storm surge by
buffering waves and absorbing additional water. NOAA estimates that
coastal wetlands in the United States provide about $23 billion in
storm protection services each year.\8\
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\7\ Jay, A.,D.R. Reidmiller, C.W. Avery, D. Barrie, B.J. DeAngelo,
A. Dave, M. Dzaugis, M. Kolian, K.L.M. Lewis, K. Reeves, and D. Winner,
2018: Overview. In Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States:
Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W.
Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, T.K. Maycock, and
B.C. Stewart (eds.)]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington,
D.C.
\8\ See https://coast.noaa.gov/data/nationalfacts/pdf/hand-out-
natural-infrastructure.pdf and National Research Council of the
National Academies, America's Climate Choices: Panel on Adapting to the
Impacts of Climate Change, Adapting to Impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a federal agency, the Coast Guard should pursue every
feasible opportunity to limit federal fiscal exposure to climate change
risks within its planning and construction processes. As GAO stated in
its High Risk area Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by
Better Managing Climate Change Risks [https://www.gao.gov/highrisk/
limiting_federal_government_fiscal_exposure/why_did_study#t=2], the
federal government needs a comprehensive approach to improve the
resilience of the facilities it owns and operates, and land it manages.
This involves incorporating climate change resilience into agencies'
infrastructure and facility planning processes, such as agency efforts
to implement our prior recommendations.\9\ It also involves accounting
for climate change in NEPA analyses and working with relevant
professional associations to incorporate climate change information
into structural design standards.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to
Achieve Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas GAO-19-157SP [https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-157SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar 6, 2019).
\10\ GAO-19-157SP [https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-157SP].
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Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Rear Admiral Ann C.
Phillips, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Special Assistant to the Governor for
Coastal Adaptation and Protection, Office of the Governor, Commonwealth
of Virginia
Question 1. Is there a comprehensive national report on port
vulnerability available? What variables and concerns should such a
report take in to account?
Answer. Congressman Maloney, Thank you for the opportunity to
testify and to answer Questions for the Record. As related to a
comprehensive national report on Port Security, the Department of
Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,
(DHS/CISA) is currently working in partnership with the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (USACE) to develop a uniform set of guidance for assessing
port resilience with three scope levels: single port, a regional system
of ports, and an inland marine transportation system. This project
draws from the Regional Resilience Assessment Program (RRAP)
Methodology that DHS/CISA has developed and used for the past 10 years
to conduct a large number of assessments of infrastructure
resilience.\1\ Many of these assessments have involved ports, but they
have not been specific to the port of interest and focused on
particular regions, and the resulting reports have generally been
designated FOUO, which impacts public access. Working with USACE, DHS
plans to augment this assessment methodology with quantitative and
qualitative tools developed by USACE in addition to analytical
approaches developed by National Laboratory partners supporting the
Regional Resilience Assessment Program. DHS is in the process of
drafting the guidance and conducting case studies using some of these
analytical techniques. They intend to produce a general methodology
supported by a suite of analytical tools that can be selected based on
the resilience question being considered, and to ensure the results are
released publicly when complete--they estimate at least a year to
completion.
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\1\ ``Regional Resiliency Assessment Program,'' U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, February 5, 2010, https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/regional-
resiliency-assessment-program.
Question 2. While Congress provided for $292.7 million in
discretionary grant funding through the Port Infrastructure Development
Program as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, it is
my understanding that the Department of Transportation has not issued a
single grant nor did the President request further funding in his 2020
Budget Request. If the Port of Virginia were to be awarded a grant from
that program, what sort of resilient infrastructure investments would
you be able to make?
Answer. The Port of Virginia maintains a proactive stance on
preparing for its future infrastructure needs across a range of
circumstances, and over the past year, has been creating a
comprehensive document that details the port's Design and Construction
Standards and Preferences. This document (in draft form) borrows from
established industry practices that take into account the latest
technology and engineering solutions. The Port of Virginia's
construction is governed by those standards and preferences--whether
grant funded or not.
The Port of Virginia has applied for a Port Infrastructure
Development grant for additional capacity and corresponding upgrades to
rail operations at the Norfolk International Terminals. The following
paragraph is excerpted from their grant application:
``It is important to address project resiliency at the onset of
design for all projects. The NIT CRY Optimization project has a
projected service life of 30 years which necessitates adopting
a Basis of Design that reflects industry accepted resilient
design criteria. The Port of Virginia continues to lead
regional discussions and sustainability action and is proud to
have created a set of Resilient Design Criteria as part of its
Design and Construction Standards and Preferences. These design
criteria encourage all engineered projects to adopt future
intensity-duration charts for rainfall projections, baseline
flood elevations, and best practices for resilient design. The
port views this project as an opportunity to further the
resiliency of both terminal infrastructure and regional/
national freight infrastructure.''
The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) administers the
Port Infrastructure Development Grant process.\2\ As stated in your
question, to date, no awards have been made, but the Port of Virginia
expects announcements around the start of the calendar year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ US Maritime Administration, ``About Port Infrastructure
Development Grants: MARAD,'' accessed November 6, 2019, https://
www.maritime.dot.gov/PIDPgrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Port of Virginia's annual Sustainability Report
details those activities that illustrate its commitment to
environmental stewardship, fiscal responsibility, the health and well-
being of its colleagues, port partners and neighbors, and to building
strong community relationships.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Port of Virginia--Sustainability Report 2018,'' accessed
November 6, 2019, http://www.portofvirginia.com/fy18-sustainability-
report/.
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Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Rear Admiral Ann C. Phillips,
U.S. Navy (Ret.), Special Assistant to the Governor for Coastal
Adaptation and Protection, Office of the Governor, Commonwealth of
Virginia
Question 1. In the EPA's draft report, ``Environmental Justice
Primer for Ports'' from 2016, the agency identified that near-port
communities and tribes can face unique challenges due to sustained
exposure to pollutants and toxins from ports, and that the
disproportionate impacts experienced by these communities are often
compounded when they do not receive the same level of benefits from
port activities--such as jobs and economic growth--that are enjoyed
regionally.
Question 1.a. As ports work to become more resilient and develop
their infrastructure, how can they best do so in a way that encompasses
principles of environmental justice?
Answer. Congressman Brown, Thank you for the opportunity to testify
and to answer Questions for the Record. The Port of Virginia has a
particular focus on sustainability to meet present needs without
compromising future generations, communities, or the environment. With
facilities in Norfolk, Portsmouth, Newport News, barge service to
Richmond, and an Inland Port Intermodal transfer facility in Front
Royal, Virginia--all localities with under-served populations--the Port
of Virginia works to build resilience, as recommended in the EPA Draft
Environmental Justice Primer for Ports, through a focus on community
engagement, through building long-term relationships with near-port
communities, working to ensure environmental regulatory compliance,
responsible land use, and through integrating port needs and community
goals.\4\ In addition, they have focused on increasing capacity while
reducing emissions, and have been awarded their 16th consecutive River
Star Business Award for environmental excellence by the Elizabeth River
Project. Much like the regions' federal facilities, the Port of
Virginia understands its future resilience is inextricably linked to
that of the surrounding cities and other localities that support and
provide its critical utilities, transportation, logistics, and supply
chain infrastructure. The Port of Virginia's annual Sustainability
Report details those activities that illustrate its commitment to
environmental stewardship, fiscal responsibility, the health and well-
being of its colleagues, port partners and neighbors, and to building
strong community relationships. Key to the success of their efforts is
their focal point of community stewardship, partnership, and
engagement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Office of Transportation and Air Quality, ``Environmental
Justice Primer for Ports: The Good Neighbor Guide to Building
Partnerships and Social Equity with Communities'' (United States
Environmental Protection Agency, July 2016), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/
ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100OYGB.pdf.
Question 1.b. Were there any lessons learned from the Hampton Roads
pilot project regarding the intersection of climate adaptation planning
and environmental justice issues?
Answer. The Hampton Roads Pilot Project focused on whole of
government and community solutions to prepare the Hampton Roads Region
to adapt to sea level rise and recurrent flooding. Its particular focus
was in the coordination among and between communities, localities, and
Federal, State and local stakeholders. It did not specifically address
environmental justice, and did not focus on environmental regulatory
compliance, rather it worked to determine a series of regional
priorities, to inform future actions, and to understand the need for
and in some contexts to develop institutionalized processes that would
facilitate continued formal stakeholder collaboration. Key deliverables
included whole of government mitigation and adaptation planning
processes and integrated regional recommendations, with the intent that
both could be adapted for use by other regions--a particular interest
area of the National Security Council and Department of Defense.\5\ \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ John Conger, Acting Under Secretary of Defense, ``Memoradum for
Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force: DoD Climate
Preparedness and Resilience Planning Pilots,'' October 29, 2014.
\6\ Emily E. Steinhilber et al., ``Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise
Preparedness and Resilience Intergovernmental Pilot Project. Phase 2
Report: Recommendations, Accomplishments and Lessons Learned'' (Old
Dominion University, October 2016), https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/
hripp_reports/2/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, the Whole of Government and Community effort would
not have been successful without the hundreds of stakeholders and
volunteer leaders from across the full spectrum of government,
academia, and the community, many of whom participated out of a sense
of duty to their community and shared commitment to collaboration.\7\
This in and of itself drives to the heart of ensuring environmental
justice, cross community collaboration and inclusion, supported by
``recognized interdependence and constructed credibility'' between
stakeholders.\8\ This outcome is also reflected at the State level with
Governor Northam's Executive Order 24, Increasing Virginia's Resilience
to Sea Level Rise and Natural Hazards, and Executive Order 29,
Establishment of the Virginia Council on Environmental Justice. Again,
institutionalized processes, built on continued and ongoing
relationships and partnerships between stakeholders were and continue
to be the key to a successful effort, and to adaptive planning, across
the full spectrum of community, the ``whole of society.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``June 27, 2016 IPP SC Consensus Resolution'' (The Steering
Committee of the Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise Preparedness and
Resilience Intergovernmental Planning Pilot Project, June 27, 2016),
https://www.floodingresiliency.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IPP-
Consensus-Resolution-All-Signatures.pdf.
\8\ Hannah M Teicher, ``Climate Allies: How Urban/Military
Interdependence Enables Adaptation'' (Doctoral Dissertation,
Massachussets Institute of Technology; Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, 2019), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/122193.
Question 2. You recommended that we establish a coordinated
Interagency Task Force for help agencies like FEMA, HUD, NOAA, NFWF,
and others to coordinate amongst themselves. What are some lessons from
the Hampton Roads pilot project that would be well applied to such a
task force?
Answer. The Hampton Roads Pilot Project was fortunate to have the
participation of and collaboration with a number of Federal partners.
This was in large part facilitated at the request of Senator Kaine, who
wrote letters requesting such participation to stakeholder Cabinet
Secretaries at the Federal and State level, as well as other Deputy and
Assistant Secretaries, Mayors, and Planning District Directors within
the Hampton Roads Region--requesting their agencies' support and
participation.\9\ Ultimately, their participation was critical to the
overall success of the effort, and many participants stated they stayed
with the two-year process because it was the first time Federal, State
and local participants sat at the table together to develop processes
to determine solutions for the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Emily E. Steinhilber et al., ``Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise
Preparedness and Resilience Intergovernmental Pilot Project Phase 1
Report: Accomplishments and Lessons Learned'' (Old Dominion University,
November 2015), 1, http://www.mari-odu.org/news/IPP-Phase-1-Report-
with-Appendices.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the key recommendations of the Pilot Project was that such
interoperability should be institutionalized, in particular at the
regional level, such that the regional presence of federal agencies had
an agreed-upon means to remain involved in the ongoing planning and
needs to prepare the Region for sea level rise and recurrent flooding,
as well as other efforts that would benefit from such a regional
collaborative effort. This concept could mirror a similar approach with
the establishment of an Interagency Task Force at the Federal level,
which could coordinate across agencies, and develop and implement a
national policy, standards and processes to address and prepare for
climate impacts.
A similar construct was directed by President Obama's Presidential
Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security, of September 21st,
2016. The Memorandum specifically focused on ``establishing a framework
to direct Federal Departments and Agencies to ensure climate-related
impacts were fully considered in national security doctrine, policies
and plans.'' \10\ It built on existing Presidential directives and
policies, including the Climate Action Plan of June 2013, and Executive
Orders 13653 (Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate
Change) of November 1, 2013 (revoked in 2017), 13677 (Climate-Resilient
International Development) of September 23, 2014, and 13693 ( Planning
for Federal Sustainability for the Next Decade) of March 19, 2015.\11\
\12\ \13\ \14\ It further directed the establishment of a Climate and
Security Working Group, chaired by members of the National Security
Council, and including representation from stakeholder Federal
departments and agencies. Unfortunately, this group never convened, but
the need for an institutionalized national-level focus, process and
strategy, one that could be replicated at the State and regional level
to coordinate on Pre-disaster preparedness, planning and adaptation
development was shown by the IPP to be of value.
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\10\ Barack Obama, ``Presidential Memorandum--Climate Change and
National Security'' (The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
September 21, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/09/21/presidential-memorandum-climate-change-and-national-
security.
\11\ Executive Office of the President, ``The President's Climate
Action Plan'' (The White House, June 2013), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/
president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
\12\ Barack Obama, ``Executive Order 13653: Preparing the United
States for the Impacts of Climate Change,'' November 6, 2013, https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/11/06/2013-26785/preparing-the-
united-states-for-the-impacts-of-climate-change.
\13\ Barack Obama, ``Executive Order 13677: Climate-Resilient
International Development'' (The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, September 26, 2014), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2014/09/26/2014-23228/climate-resilient-international-
development.
\14\ Barack Obama, ``Executive Order 13693: Planning for Federal
Sustainability in the Next Decade'' (The White House Office of the
Press Secretary, March 25, 2015), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2015/03/25/2015-07016/planning-for-federal-sustainability-in-
the-next-decade.
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In addition, the 2016 Water Resources Development Act directed the
US Army Corps of Engineers to establish an Interagency Coordination
process, to participate in any State level activities related to
Federal property that would be impacted by local, regional, or State
adaptation and protection efforts to prepare for coastal resilience.
The 2016 WRDA/WIN Act Sec. 1183(b) \15\ language, (shown below) could
also be a template for an interagency coordination effort, though it is
not clear how USACE has implemented this legislation.
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\15\ ``Water Infrastructure Improvements For The Nation Act,'' Pub.
L. No. 114-322, Sec. 1183(b) (2016), https://www.congress.gov/114/
plaws/publ322/PLAW-114publ322.pdf.
(b) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON COASTAL RESILIENCE.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall convene an inter-
agency working group on resilience to extreme weather,
which will coordinate research, data, and Federal
investments related to sea level rise, resiliency, and
vulnerability to extreme weather, including coastal
resilience.
(2) CONSULTATION.--The interagency working group
convened under paragraph (1) shall participate in any
activity carried out by an organization authorized by a
State to study and issue recommendations on how to
address the impacts on Federal assets of recurrent
flooding and sea level rise, including providing
consultation regarding policies, programs, studies,
plans, and best practices relating to recurrent
flooding and sea level rise in areas with significant
Federal assets.
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Daniel Cox, Ph.D., CH2M-
Hill Professor in Civil Engineering, Oregon State University
Question 1. In your testimony, you cite the importance of modern
technology and data that should be considered for resilient port
infrastructure design, maintenance, and operation. How should the Coast
Guard best adopt those technologies given that they maintain 20,000
shore facilities?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. In your testimony you discuss how natural and nature-
based features can be used to protect port infrastructure. Can you
elaborate on how expanded use of natural and nature-based features are
beneficial to private industry and how they can be used on a larger
scale at some of our nation's busiest ports?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Is there a comprehensive national report on port
vulnerability available? What variables and concerns should such a
report take in to account?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. In your written testimony, you mentioned the potential
for integrating advanced materials into infrastructure reinforcement
projects for expanding service life, can you speak to what this entails
and how the economics works for building with more advanced materials
to extend service life may also reduce costs?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Daniel Cox, Ph.D., CH2M-Hill
Professor in Civil Engineering, Oregon State University
Question 1. States like Washington are working to address growing
infrastructure needs and a transition to sustainable, energy-efficient
efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change. How can we ensure
that technologies like port electrification, are designed to withstand
sea level rise and other climate impacts?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. In your testimony, you mentioned the potential for
integrating natural and nature-based features into port infrastructure
projects. Can you talk more about what that entails and whether there
are cost benefits for reinforcing exposed port infrastructure?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Mr. Cox, in your experience with the National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST), what further investments are
needed to enhance infrastructure adaptation and mitigation?
Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Sean B. Hecht, Co-
Executive Director, Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law
Question 1. The Port Authority of New York New Jersey pays $200
million annually to insure $9 billion in assets. Are there other models
for insuring coastal property or reducing perceived risk that we should
consider? When and how should the government intervene in such an
increasingly risky market?
Answer. Insurers will cover risks only under certain conditions.
Risks that do not meet these conditions may be considered uninsurable,
because the basic model of collecting premiums to pay for losses
wouldn't work without them. Disaster risks, including many that relate
to climate change, have many of the markers of uninsurability, as does
incremental sea-level rise.
Here are factors that determine whether a risk is insurable:
The largest possible loss should not affect the insurer's
solvency (ability to have the capital to pay all claims).
The average loss should be determinable and quantifiable
(to allow insurers to plan for risk and set premiums rationally).
Risks should be independent and well-distributed in time
and space rather than correlated (so that the insurer can diversify
risks effectively and avoid insolvency or other failures).
The pool of insureds should not be skewed toward those
with high risk, and the insurance contract should not motivate
policyholders to fail to take self-protective measures (moral hazard).
There must actually be a market in which supply and
demand yield a price point for any given level of insurance against any
given risk.
Insurers can take actions to try to make risks more insurable,
especially engaging in research to understand risks as well as
possible. But the financial dynamics of disasters are particularly
challenging for risk management: not only are basic parameters of
disasters themselves unpredictable (for example, how many hurricanes of
what magnitude in what location make landfall), but a single year of
extremely large covered losses may be high enough to render an insurer
insolvent. Unlike, for example, automobile insurance, insurers can't
spread disaster risks effectively. The widespread disruption in
insurance markets after Hurricane Andrew's wind-related destruction in
Florida illustrates this well.
The example of Hurricane Andrew demonstrates how some types of
climate-related risk challenge core principles of insurability. A given
level of overall risk from a particular kind of insured loss may be
perfectly acceptable if losses are likely to be well-distributed and
independent. But concentration or correlation of losses--as occurs in
hurricanes, wildfires, and other major disasters--makes it more likely
that an insurer may will suffer unsustainable losses within a single
year. Uncertainty, or ambiguity of risk--the inability to assess and
quantify probabilities of predicted losses with sufficient precision--
makes insurers reluctant to insure risks, except at high cost. In
extreme cases, uncertainty will render a risk uninsurable by rendering
risks unquantifiable, concentrated, and unable to be priced at a level
consumers or regulators will tolerate.
This recognition of uninsurability happened long ago with flood
insurance in the United States. Private insurers largely pulled out of
the flood insurance market in the mid-20th century. This was the result
of massive, correlated flood-related losses that made insurers view
flood risk as uninsurable--or at least insurable only at very high cost
through specialty insurance products. The federal government stepped in
to insure homes at risk of flood damage through the National Flood
Insurance Program, but that program relies, when there are significant
correlated losses from events like hurricanes, on subsidies from
general federal funds.
As climate change affects weather patterns, changing sea levels and
storm surge as well as changing tropical storm and precipitation
dynamics, it will become even harder for insurers to manage these
already-difficult types of risks. Many of these risks may end up being
insured through government-run risk pools--as is already the case with
earthquake insurance in California, flood insurance nationally, and a
significant amount of weather risk on the gulf coast. Insurers have
been working in recent years to develop new financial instruments to
try to address those risks by providing incentives for capital
investment that can provide funding to address the risks when they
materialize. These include catastrophe bonds and other types of
insurance-linked securities, as well as other parametric products that
provide capital when a triggering physical condition is reached.
For essential infrastructure, government agencies at all levels
will have to make difficult choices about investment and risk
management. Competent port managers are projecting future risks and
making decisions that reflect those risks. Ultimately, while insurance
and other financial risk-management tools will continue to play a role,
I believe the federal government will have to view investment in
resilience and rebuilding of infrastructure as a cost that must be
borne by some combination of private actors (such as shipping
companies) and the public, and will have to make choices with that in
mind. I note, also, that hardening coastal infrastructure has its own
environmental costs, including spillover effects, or externalities,
that negatively impact other coastal resources; this should be
considered, and the use of natural infrastructural features should be
encouraged where possible.
Question 2. In your experience, what percent of ports are using
risk-based approaches to determine resilient infrastructure designs?
Answer. I do not have data to answer this question. A survey of the
ways that ports nationally or internationally are responding to sea-
level rise is outside my experience or expertise. Anecdotally, I can
say that over the past decade, port managers everywhere are beginning
to look at design in light of sea-level rise risk. This article by
researchers at RAND provides one model for this type of risk
management, Robust Decision Making (RDM), with a case study focus on
the Port of Los Angeles: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC5802450/
Question 3. Is there a comprehensive national report on port
vulnerability available? What variables and concerns should such a
report take in to account if it does not yet exist?
Answer. I am not aware of a comprehensive national report on port
vulnerability. One very recent publication, Climate Change Adaptation
Planning for Ports and Inland Waterways, was published by PIANC, the
World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure. This
guidance document provides detailed technical climate adaptation
guidance for ports: https://navclimate.pianc.org/about/navclimate-news/
climate-change-adaptation-planning-guidance-launched-by-pianc
Other resources are available, such as this book: https://
www.researchgate.net/publication/
281119163_Climate_Change_and_Adaptation_Planning_for_
Ports.
There is also a literature on why adaptation planning in the
context of ports and other infrastructure has lagged. For example, this
article explores the concept of a ``leadership void'' with a port case
study: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/feart.2019.00029/
full
More generally, the federal government, local and state
governments, and academic researchers have developed widely-used
frameworks for climate adaptation. The federal toolkit is available
here: https://toolkit.climate.gov/#steps
Question 4. As ports work to become more resilient and develop
their infrastructure, how can they best do so in a way that encompasses
principles of environmental justice?
Answer. Environmental injustice--the disproportionate impact of
environmental and public health harms on low-income communities and
communities of color--is a serious and well-documented problem in the
United States and globally. Ports, while necessary for our economy,
contribute to environmental injustice through emissions from freight
movement. Ships, trucks, and short-haul equipment contribute
significantly to pollution that disproportionately affects those who
live near ports and freight corridors. Port-related infrastructure and
industrial land uses also dominate the landscape of nearby communities
in other ways. The report available here, developed by the nonprofit
Harbor Community Benefit Foundation when I was the board chair of that
organization, documents some of those impacts relating to the Port of
Los Angeles: https://hcbf.org/blog/hcbf-proudly-releases-harbor-
community-off-port-land-use-study/
Addressing the impacts of port-related land use changes, air
emissions, toxic substances, and flood and other infrastructure risk on
local communities should be an essential component of any port's
planning processes. Ensuring community participation and input into
planning processes is, in turn, an essential piece of addressing those
impacts.
Question 5. At what point do we disinvest from coastal property?
Are there better ways to get a picture of what industrial or federal
properties we should let fall into the water?
Answer. The process of climate change adaptation planning,
including the tools of social, economic, and physical vulnerability
assessment and the planning processes that follow that assessment,
should inform all management of coastal infrastructure. There is no
fixed answer to the question of under what conditions we need to
disinvest, or ``retreat''; ultimately, government agencies will have to
make decisions based on weighing the probable social, economic, and
physical consequences of different options. Unfortunately, this
decisionmaking will inevitably have to happen under conditions of deep
uncertainty.
Question from Hon. Rick Larsen for Sean B. Hecht, Co-Executive
Director, Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment,
University of California at Los Angeles School of Law
Question 1. Your testimony describes how more robust information
and analysis about emerging risks and community-scale risk mitigation
planning, can reduce port insurance costs in the near and long term.
Yet, a recent study by the International Association of Ports and
Harbors and the American Association of Port Authorities found that
most ports are concerned about the impacts of sea-level rise, but not
implementing adaptation strategies. What are some incentives to
encourage ports to implement these strategies and remain competitive
nationally and internationally?
Answer. I believe that competent managers who are looking at long-
term consequences, and who have the resources to assess and implement
adaptation strategies, will be motivated to take into account sea-level
rise in their planning. The key is to make sure that managers and
planners are incentivized to look at long-term rather than short-term
planning. Providing funding, and stressing the dire necessity of a
national mandate to understand and adapt to changing coastal
conditions, are minimal conditions. Unfortunately, currently, many
local and state governments and federal agencies are not providing
adequate resources to address the problem, and the political mandate is
not there in many jurisdictions or under the current federal
administration. Government needs to acknowledge the scientific basis
for concern, to foreground the research demonstrating the economic,
social, and physical need for adaptation, and to provide funding
mechanisms for both basic research and specific adaptation planning and
implementation.
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