[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONFRONTING THE RISE IN ANTI-SEMITIC DOMESTIC TERRORISM, PART II
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 26, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-61
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-451 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey John Katko, New York
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Mark Walker, North Carolina
J. Luis Correa, California Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Max Rose, New York Mark Green, Tennessee
Lauren Underwood, Illinois John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Michael Guest, Mississippi
Al Green, Texas Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Val Butler Demings, Florida
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Max Rose, New York, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mark Walker, North Carolina,
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Ranking Member
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Peter T. King, New York
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Mark Green, Tennessee
officio) Mike Rogers, Alabama (ex officio)
Sandeep Prasanna, Subcommittee Staff Director
Mandy Bowers, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Max Rose, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Mark Walker, a Representative in Congress From the
State of North Carolina, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Ms. Jill Sanborn, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Ms. Elizabeth Neumann, Assistant Secretary, Threat Prevention and
Security Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 12
Mr. Brian Harrell, Assistant Director, Infrastructure Security,
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 12
For the Record
The Honorable Max Rose, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism:
Letter From the Jewish Federations of America.................. 35
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Max Rose for Jill Sanborn................ 39
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Jill Sanborn....... 39
Questions From Honorable Elissa Slotkin for Jill Sanborn......... 39
Questions From Ranking Member Mark Walker for Jill Sanborn....... 40
Questions From Chairman Max Rose for Elizabeth Neumann........... 40
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Elizabeth Neumann.. 40
Questions From Ranking Member Mark Walker for Elizabeth Neumann.. 41
CONFRONTING THE RISE IN ANTI-SEMITIC DOMESTIC TERRORISM, PART II
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Wednesday, February 26, 2020
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Max Rose (Chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Rose, Slotkin, and Walker.
Also present: Representative Malinowski.
Mr. Rose. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism will come to order. The subcommittee is
meeting today to receive testimony on ``Confronting the Rise in
Anti-Semitic Domestic Terrorism, Part II.''
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
subcommittee in recess at any point.
Without objection, Members not on the subcommittee shall be
permitted to sit and question the witnesses.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Of course, thank you so much to our extraordinary slate of
witnesses from the FBI and Department of Homeland Security for
coming here today to testify on the Federal Government's
response to the rise in anti-Semitic domestic terrorism.
I am sure in the process we will also be focusing on
generally the issue of domestic terrorism. This is not a
question of either/or, and we are not losing sight of jihadi
terrorism and the threat that it continues to pose. But there
is no doubt the statistics do not lie. The rise of domestic
terrorism and the anti-Semitic threads running through it are
an incredibly real problem.
I have got people in my community, people in communities
throughout this country, that are afraid to go outside wearing
their kippah, afraid to congregate, afraid to observe the High
Holy Days, and people generally are now afraid to do things
that they were not afraid to do just a few years ago.
We have certainly seen the rise of a global neo-Nazi, White
nationalist movement that is deserving of our attention. Many
people, experts, have said that this looks like what al-Qaeda
looked like in the 1980's and the 1990's. Let's not find
ourselves asleep at the wheel, as we did in the run-up to 9/11.
For so many people in my community, it feels like 9/11 was
yesterday. These organizations, it is my opinion and I am not
the only one, need to be identified as foreign terrorist
organizations, and if they are not identified as foreign
terrorist organizations, you need to tell us that we are still
protected.
We need to know that when people in America go to train
overseas, when people in America are recruited, when people try
to come to America who have trained with these organizations,
that you have the same tools at your disposal that you do and
have had in the fight against jihadi terrorism. That is not too
much to ask on behalf of the American people.
So, with that, I will move on to your testimonies. I have
no more highlighted things.
[The statement of Chairman Rose follows:]
Statement of Chairman Max Rose
February 26, 2020
Anti-Semitic domestic terrorism is an issue that has deeply
affected my district, my community, and the whole New York City area.
As we all know, in recent months, anti-Semitic violence has terrorized
Jewish communities across the country. In the past few months, Jews in
New York and New Jersey have been subjected to dozens of anti-Semitic
incidents and attacks.
We saw the brutal stabbing attack at a rabbi's home in Monsey, New
York, on December 28, and the mass shooting in Jersey City on December
10. Just in the past few months, we've seen over 40 anti-Semitic
incidents in the New York area. And it hasn't stopped. Earlier this
week, bomb threats were sent to 18 Jewish community centers across New
York State.
The simple truth is that we are under assault by extremists, many
of whom are emboldened to act and often encouraged by content on social
media platforms. The time for thoughts and prayers has passed--the time
now is for action. Let me be clear: I will not lose sight or focus on
this issue which has hit far too close to home.
Last month, this subcommittee heard from experts on anti-Semitic
violence and homeland security. Thanks to their expert testimony, we
heard a description of the problem--the violence gripping the Jewish
community across the country--and we heard their recommendations for
Congress and the Executive branch.
Today, we have representatives from the FBI and DHS to discuss the
Federal Government's response to the rise in anti-Semitic domestic
terrorism. I'm glad to see two representatives from DHS who briefed
this committee earlier this month on the Department's approach to
targeted violence and terrorism.
I'm also glad to have FBI at the table. Their work countering all
forms of terrorism is crucial--and I am looking forward to hearing how
they are approaching the issue of anti-Semitic domestic terrorism.
For the past year, Democrats on this committee have led on this
issue. Last month, the President signed H.R. 2479, a bill led by
Chairman Thompson that I co-sponsored, which authorizes and funds the
Nonprofit Security Grant Program to help secure synagogues and other
houses of worship. I fought for funding for this program to be
increased to $90 million. It was increased, thanks to strong bipartisan
support.
But we also need to consider what measures lawmakers and law
enforcement can implement to make sure that anti-Semites and racists
can't carry out acts of violence, and that domestic terrorism is seen
as the crime that it is. Government officials, at all levels, have a
duty to protect Jewish individuals, communities, and institutions from
anti-Semitic violence, and must put forth comprehensive strategies to
address it. That includes meaningful and respectful outreach and
partnerships with Jewish community institutions. In doing so, these
strategies should protect and uplift the civil rights and civil
liberties of all Americans.
We cannot forget that Anti-Semitic violence in the United States is
often linked to transnational networks of terror and hate, including
global networks of white supremacist extremists in Europe and
elsewhere. The Government must prioritize understanding and combating
these networks in order to prevent anti-Semitic and racist violence.
When these foreign white supremacist groups meet the definition of a
Foreign Terrorist Organization, they should be designated as such.
I look forward to hearing testimony from our witnesses today on the
work that is being done to combat anti-Semitic domestic terrorism. More
importantly, I want to hear about the work that we still need to do to
address this rising threat--and how Congress can help. We can all see
that this problem isn't going away. And I will not lose focus on this
issue.
Mr. Rose. So the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Walker, for an opening statement.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
passion in this area and the fine job that you are doing in
this area. I appreciate you scheduling today's hearing to
follow up on the Federal efforts to address anti-Semitism and
domestic terrorism.
It was just last month we had the opportunity to hear
directly from faith-based organizations, think tanks, and
others on the growing threat of anti-Semitic rhetoric and
violence basically around the world. Witnesses testified about
growing threats to their communities from a wide variety of
hateful ideologies and the need for more Federal coordination
and support.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel
about on-going Federal efforts to combat domestic extremism and
terrorism.
Earlier this month, FBI Director Wray testified that the
Bureau had elevated racially-motivated violent extremism to a
threat level on par, and of what Chairman Rose was talking
about it, with Islamist terrorism.
In response, the FBI has established a new Fusion Cell to
better coordinate the response to domestic terrorism and hate
crimes, and joint terrorism task forces across the United
States have been instructed to increase their focus on domestic
terrorism.
I want to welcome the new FBI Assistant Director of the
Counterterrorism Division Jill Sanborn, for, I believe, her
first appearance before the Homeland Security Committee.
Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security has taken a
number of actions to expand efforts to address domestic
terrorism. In April 2019, I believe, DHS launched the new
Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, or TVTP,
to coordinate efforts across the Department and focus on
building prevention capabilities. This office is also working
with FEMA to administer the new TVTP grant program.
DHS also released the first Strategic Framework for
Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, which is a holistic
review of DHS's counterterrorism capabilities and how they can
be utilized to address targeted violence and domestic
extremism.
I look forward to hearing more about the implementation
plans today for all of these efforts and how DHS will expand
the information-sharing and outreach efforts with, very
important, faith-based communities.
I applaud the great work that is being done by this
administration. It is clear that it is taking the increased
domestic extremism threats seriously. I remain steadfast in my
commitment to an open and bipartisan discussion about domestic
terrorism and hateful ideologies in my quest or my search for
meaningful recommendations for addressing these very real
threats to our homeland.
We have and we must continue to work in a bipartisan
fashion to help provide the necessary tools to our communities
that address these complex problems.
I thank the witnesses for appearing here today.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Ranking Member Walker follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Mark Walker
Feb. 26, 2020
I would like to thank Chairman Rose for scheduling today's hearing
to follow up on Federal efforts to address anti-Semitism and domestic
terrorism.
Last month, we had the opportunity to hear directly from faith-
based organizations, think tanks, and others on the growing threat of
anti-Semitic rhetoric and violence around the world. Witnesses
testified about growing threats to their communities from a wide
variety of hateful ideologies and the need for more Federal
coordination and support.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel about on-
going Federal efforts to combat domestic extremism and terrorism.
Earlier this month, FBI Director Wray testified that the Bureau had
elevated racially-motivated violent extremism to a threat level on par
with Islamist terrorism. In response, the FBI has established a new
fusion cell to better coordinate the response to domestic terrorism and
hate crimes, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the United States
have been instructed to increase their focus on domestic terrorism. I
want to welcome the new FBI assistant director of the counterterrorism
division, Jill Sanborn, for her first appearance before the Homeland
Security Committee.
Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security has taken a number
of actions to expand efforts to address domestic terrorism. In April
2019, DHS launched the new Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention, or TVTP, to coordinate efforts across the Department and
focus on building prevention capabilities. This office is also working
with FEMA to administer the new TVTP grant program. DHS also released
the first Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted
Violence, which is a holistic review of DHS counterterrorism
capabilities and how they can be utilized to address targeted violence
and domestic extremism. I look forward to hearing more about the
implementation plans for all of these efforts and how DHS will expand
information sharing and outreach efforts with the faith-based
community.
I applaud the great work that is being done by this
administration--it is clear that it is taking the increased domestic
extremism threats seriously. I remain steadfast in my commitment to an
open, bipartisan discussion about domestic terrorism and hateful
ideologies, and my search for meaningful recommendations for addressing
these very real threats to our homeland. We have and we must continue
to work in a bipartisan fashion to help provide the necessary tools to
our communities that address these complex problems.
I thank the witnesses for appearing here today and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Rose. Thank you, Ranking Member, and thank you for your
extraordinary partnership in dealing with this issue. Other
Members are reminded that statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
February 26, 2020
Today's hearing, the subcommittee's second hearing on the issue of
anti-Semitic domestic terrorism, presents one more opportunity for all
Members of Congress to come together and condemn acts of domestic
terrorism and targeted violence motivated by anti-Semitism.
This issue continues to be a top priority for this committee. Since
this Congress began, our oversight efforts have uncovered the dramatic
and disturbing rise in acts of right-wing domestic terrorism, including
anti-Semitic violence.
Sadly, recent acts of anti-Semitic violence in the New York and New
Jersey areas have highlighted the urgent need to ensure the Federal
Government is working with its State and local partners to combat anti-
Semitic domestic terrorism. Some of these attacks targeted houses of
worship and other religious institutions, a trend we have increasingly
seen Nation-wide.
That is why I introduced H.R. 2476, the American Nonprofit
Organizations Against Terrorism Act of 2019, which authorizes the
Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) for years to come. The program
provides grants to nonprofits and faith-based organizations in both
urban and rural areas to help secure their facilities against a
potential terrorist attack. While I am pleased that the bill was signed
into law on January 24, 2020, Congress must continue its work to make
sure that all precautions are taken to protect communities targeted by
hate and violence.
This includes reevaluating the Grant Program's funding levels and
working with community groups and leaders to establish meaningful
partnerships to tackle this issue.
On this issue, I would be remiss not to express my disappointment
in the Trump administration's continued efforts to make drastic cuts to
DHS preparedness grant programs. In fact, the President's proposed
fiscal year 2021 budget requested nearly $700 million in cuts to these
important grant programs that are necessary to support State, local,
Tribal, and territorial governments in improving their homeland
security posture.
However, I am also encouraged by the DHS's first-ever Strategic
Framework for Combating Terrorism and Targeted Violence. Earlier this
month, the committee held a productive briefing to discuss this
strategy. Two of the witnesses today, Assistant Secretary Neumann and
Assistant Director Harrell, were among the briefers.
I look forward to speaking further with the Department
representatives today to identify issue areas we can work together.
Hearing-specific goals and time lines from the Department today will be
integral to ensuring that implementation of the strategy is a priority.
Moreover, I look forward to hearing from Assistant Director Sanborn
of the FBI, on how the FBI is working with DHS to combat domestic
terrorism--especially anti-Semitic domestic terrorism. Additionally,
Ms. Sanborn, it is my understanding that you are the first woman to
hold the position of assistant director of the Counterterrorism
Division at the FBI. I would like to extend my congratulations to you
on this significant achievement.
It goes without saying that Congress must continue to advocate for
policies that protect the Jewish community and all communities impacted
by acts of domestic terror. I look forward to hearing testimony from
the witnesses on how we can work together to curb domestic terrorism
while respecting and protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of
all Americans.
Mr. Rose. I now welcome our panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Ms. Jill Sanborn, assistant director
of the counterterrorism division of the FBI.
Ms. Sanborn, I understand that you are the first woman to
hold this position, and we congratulate you on this tremendous,
tremendous achievement.
Our second witness is Ms. Elizabeth Neumann, assistant
secretary for threat prevention and security policy in the
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans at DHS.
Our third and final witness is Mr. Brian Harrell, assistant
director for infrastructure security at the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, at DHS.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement
for 5 minutes, beginning with Assistant Director Sanborn.
STATEMENT OF JILL SANBORN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM
DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Ms. Sanborn. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
and Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
My name is Jill Sanborn. It is always an honor to be on the
Hill, where I started my public service as a Senate page back
in 1987.
As of last week, I am now the assistant director of the
FBI's counterterrorism division. I spent the last couple years
as the special agent in charge of the Bureau's Minneapolis
division, where I had the honor of overseeing FBI operations in
Minnesota and the Dakotas.
While I was sad to leave the great folks working the upper
Midwest, I am equally happy to be here focusing on the
counterterrorism fight once again.
As the Members of this committee are well aware, preventing
acts of terrorism, domestic or international, continues to be
the FBI's No. 1 priority. The FBI takes very seriously all acts
of terrorism, from any place, by any actor, against any person.
Multiple fatal attacks, from a church in Charleston in
2015, to a synagogue in Poway just last year, underscore the
continuing threat currently facing faith-based communities in
the United States.
The threat itself is diverse. In the last 18 months, Jewish
communities have been targeted and threatened by violent
extremists across the terrorism spectrum.
It is widely known that there are groups that want to do
harm to Americans, but the greatest threat we face today is the
one posed by lone actors of any ideology, who are typically
radicalized on-line and look to attack soft targets with easily
accessible weapons. The solitary nature of their radicalization
and mobilization makes them particularly difficult to identify
and disrupt before they take their opportunity to act.
More often than not we are seeing that these people are
motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, social,
political, and personal grievances against their targets.
While identifying the ideology of the person helps us
understand their motivation, our ability to prevent an attack
seems to rely heavily on recognizing warning signs or
indicators that someone is actually mobilizing toward an act of
terrorism.
In a recent FBI study of successful attackers, in each case
at least one person saw a change in the attacker's behavior
before the attack unfolded.
Unfortunately, people in the United States are often
inspired by attacks abroad. Attacks like the one in
Christchurch, New Zealand, last year could and have incited
others to conduct a similar attack here in the United States.
In fact, we have seen some domestic terror subjects reference
foreign individuals over the course of their own radicalization
process, as well as attempt to livestream their attacks,
mirroring what they have seen overseas attackers do.
The internet transcends borders; so, too, do the ideas that
are propagated on it. To that end, we have seen some domestic
terrorism subjects travel overseas, some to conflict zones, for
combat training.
It is for these reasons, and many more, that the FBI
commits significant resources to the fight against terrorism
both here and abroad. Regardless of where it happens, how it
happens, or who does it, terrorism is terrorism.
I would like to thank all of our partners, including the
Members of this committee, who work with us to keep the
American people safe. We do not and cannot fight this battle
alone.
Our people are collaborating and communicating at a high
level in joint terrorism task forces across the country, and
also within the numerous fusion centers throughout the Nation.
In my career, I have worked with many fusion centers, to
include some in your districts, and the work we are doing
together there is simply amazing. In fact, information provided
by the fusion center in Orange County, California, led us to
predicate cases that recently resulted in 7 arrests of members
of The Base across 4 different States.
Collectively, we are working around the clock to push out
real-time intelligence to Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
territorial agencies. This collaboration will continue to be
vital as we face new trends in the threat.
Our partnerships include non-law enforcement agencies, from
tech companies to faith-based organizations like the Anti-
Defamation League. I can tell you from my time in the upper
Midwest, one of our best partners was, and still is, the Jewish
Community Relations Council of Minnesota and the Dakotas.
These relationships are working. In just the first quarter
of this fiscal year, these types of partnerships have assisted
JTTFs across the country in disrupting and arresting 38
terrorism subjects right here in the United States.
In closing, I want to thank you for your continued support
of the men and women of the FBI. I am honored to be here with
you today to discuss the issues facing our communities, and I
look forward to answering any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanborn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jill Sanborn
February 26, 2020
Good afternoon, Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I welcome the opportunity to discuss the FBI's efforts to combat
the terrorism threat to the homeland, specifically the increasingly
lethal threat posed by violent extremism to the Jewish community.
threat assessment
While the threat posed by terrorism has evolved significantly since
9/11, preventing terrorist attacks from foreign and domestic actors
remains the FBI's top priority. We face persistent threats to the
homeland and to U.S. interests abroad from foreign terrorist
organizations (``FTO''), home-grown violent extremists (``HVE''), and
domestic violent extremists (``DVE''). The threat posed to the United
States has expanded from sophisticated, externally-directed plots to
attacks conducted by radicalized lone actors who mobilize to violence
based on international and domestic violent ideologies.
In this vein, the greatest threat we face in the homeland today is
that posed by lone actors radicalized on-line who look to attack soft
targets with easily accessible weapons. This threat includes both HVEs
and DVEs, two distinct sets of individuals who generally radicalize and
mobilize to violence on their own. Many of these insular violent
extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-
political, and personal grievances against their targets, which
recently have increasingly included large public gatherings, houses of
worship, and retail locations. Lone actors, who by definition are not
likely to conspire with others regarding their plans, are increasingly
choosing these soft, familiar targets for their attacks, further
limiting law enforcement opportunities for detection and disruption
ahead of their action.
These lone actors have targeted and will likely continue to pose a
threat to the Jewish community. Multiple recent attacks against the
Jewish community perpetrated by Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violent
Extremists highlight the diverse nature of this threat. In just the
last 18 months, anti-Semitic terrorism has devastated Jewish
communities from Pueblo to Poway to Pittsburgh to Jersey City. These
attacks were planned by individuals with a variety of ideological
motivations that justify violence toward others, to include those who
advocate for a perceived superiority of the white race, as well as
individuals with an ideology that believes Western hemisphere-based
minorities are the true Jewish race and are empowered to eradicate
those not in their belief system. In fact, the top threat we face from
DVEs stems from those we identify as Racially/Ethnically Motivated
Violent Extremists. Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists
were the primary source of all ideologically-motivated lethal incidents
and violence in 2018 and 2019 and have been considered the most lethal
of all domestic violent extremists since 2001. We assess the threat
posed by Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in the
homeland and will remain persistent going forward.
Domestic violent extremists pose a steady and evolving threat of
violence and economic harm to the United States. Trends may shift, but
the underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism--which includes
socio-political conditions, racism, and anti-Semitism, just to name a
few--remain constant. As stated above, the FBI is most concerned about
lone offender attacks; primarily shootings, as they have served as the
dominant lethal mode for domestic violent extremist attacks. More
deaths were caused by domestic violent extremists than international
terrorists in recent years. In fact, 2019 was the deadliest year for
domestic violent extremism since the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995; a
tragic note on the state of domestic terrorism as we look back and
remember the victims and their families approaching the 25th
anniversary of that horrific attack.
HVEs, who are global jihad-inspired; FTOs; and state sponsors of
terrorism have also demonstrated and acted upon a desire to target
Jewish houses of worship and the Jewish community in the United States.
Groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (``ISIS''), the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (``IRGC''), and Hizballah have
established anti-Semitic intent and encouraged their followers to
target Jewish persons and interests both in the homeland and around the
world. In April 2016, an individual in southern Florida was arrested by
the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (``JTTF'') based on his plot to
attack a Florida Jewish Center with an improvised explosive device
(``IED'') in support of a FTO. In August 2018, two individuals were
arrested for working on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
conduct surveillance of Jewish facilities in the United States. In
December 2018, a JTTF in Ohio arrested a subject who identified two
different synagogues in Toledo he wanted to attack in support of ISIS.
These arrests reflect just a few examples of international terrorism
actors who have targeted the Jewish community.
It is important to note again that the FBI is concerned about any
and all acts of terrorism. Multiple lethal attacks in the last 5 years
have underscored the threat posed by violent extremist actors to all
faith-based communities in the United States. From the attack on the
Emanuel AME Church in Charleston in 2015 to the attack on a Hanukkah
celebration in Monsey just 2 months ago, our faith-based communities
have been targeted during services, in their places of worship, which
have included temples, synagogues, churches, mosques, and private
homes; and in their grocery stores and community centers. Each attack
represents unacceptable violence against a group of Americans gathered
together to exercise their Constitutional right to practice their
religious beliefs freely. The FBI takes these attacks very seriously,
and is committed to working with our partners to prevent these acts of
terrorism.
The attacks and disrupted plots we saw in 2019 underscore the
continued threat posed by violent extremists. Such crimes are not
limited to the United States, however, and with the aid of the
internet, like-minded violent extremists can reach across borders.
Violent extremists are increasingly using social media for the
distribution of propaganda, recruitment, target selection, and
incitement to violence. Through the internet, violent extremists around
the world have access to our local communities to target, recruit, and
radicalize like-minded individuals and on a global scale. Attackers
both in the United States and overseas, for example, have posted
manifestos dedicated to their ideology prior to their attacks.
Last year's attack in Poway not only highlights the enduring threat
of violence posed by domestic violent extremists, but also demonstrates
the danger presented by the propagation of these violent acts on the
internet. The attacker in Poway referenced the mosque attacks in
Christchurch, New Zealand, and we remain concerned that on-line sharing
of live-streamed attack footage could amplify viewer reaction to
attacks and provide ideological and tactical inspiration to other
violent extremists in the homeland. Less than 2 months after the
attacks in Christchurch, FBI JTTFs in multiple states disrupted plots
both to replicate and to retaliate for those attacks in New Zealand. We
continue to see subjects reference foreign attackers in the course of
their radicalization process. In recent years we have also increasingly
seen domestic violent extremists both communicating and traveling to
meet with like-minded individuals overseas. Some of these individuals
have traveled to conflict zones for combat training and established
contacts with foreign military and paramilitary organizations, which
could increase their capacity for violence here in the homeland.
fbi and partnership action to combat the threat
As the threat to harm the United States and U.S. interests evolves,
we are adapting and confronting these challenges, relying heavily on
the strength of our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international
partnerships. In that vein, it is important to highlight the men and
women across this country that work to fight terrorism every day. That
includes the men and women of the FBI, who have dedicated their lives
to our mission to protect the American people from its enemies and to
uphold the Constitution of the United States. It also includes the men
and women across the United States who serve on our Joint Terrorism
Task Forces and in our fusion centers, who work with the FBI to
identify, assess, and disrupt terrorism threats in the homeland. These
force-multipliers in the counterterrorism fight serve as the front line
in the homeland and bring invaluable experience and familiarity with
the local community to our investigations. Just in January 2020, JTTFs
across the 50 States disrupted 22 terrorism subjects by arrest.
In this vein, I would be remiss if I did not mention the great work
being done to fight the scourge of hate crimes by my colleagues in our
Criminal Investigative Division. Through our Domestic Terrorism-Hate
Crimes Fusion Cell we at the FBI apply the expertise, dedication, and
resources of both the Counterterrorism and Criminal Investigative
Divisions to these overlapping threats, working to prevent the threats
on the horizon and provide justice to the victims of hate crimes.
Because individual incidents may be investigated as both domestic
terrorism and as a hate crime, we bring the force of the FBI to bear
against any event that may fall into these categories, investigating
crimes through the lenses of both Divisions unless or until one avenue
is foreclosed or eliminated. This Fusion Cell helps ensure seamless
information sharing across Divisions and augments investigative
resources to combat the domestic terrorism threat, ensuring we are not
solely focusing on the current threat or most recent attack, but also
looking to the future to prevent the next one.
In the last year, the FBI investigated countless threats to
religious institutions. Our most valuable tool in this counterterrorism
fight exists in our relationships with local communities and the
public, who are best positioned to notice a change in an individual's
behavior and alert the FBI to threats that endanger members and
congregants. In line with this effort, the FBI's partnerships with
leaders in the faith-based communities are paramount to our success.
Just a few months ago the FBI held a Roundtable with leaders from the
faith-based community across the country to discuss the threats posed
to their members and the importance of vigilance in their places of
worship. Perhaps more importantly, our Field Offices conduct outreach
with faith-based leaders in their areas of responsibility to host
interfaith working groups and training in an effort to ensure
communities are kept abreast of the current threat picture and are in
the best position to prevent and mitigate acts of terrorism when they
arise.
It is also important to highlight our outreach to social media and
technology companies. FBI interactions with social media companies
center on education and capacity building, in line with our goal to
assist companies in developing or enhancing their terms of service to
address violent extremist exploitation of their platforms. I want to
emphasize that no FBI investigation can be opened solely on the basis
of First Amendment-protected activity. Thus, the FBI does not
investigate mere hateful rhetoric or association with groups that are
not engaged in criminal activity, or with movements without any element
of violence or criminal activity. In order to predicate a domestic
terrorism investigation of an individual, the FBI must have information
that there is the potential for a Federal or criminal violation and
that the individual is threatening or planning violent actions in
furtherance of an ideology. In this vein, we remain sensitive to First
Amendment-protected activities during investigative and intelligence
efforts so as to ensure our investigative actions remain aligned to and
do not exceed the scope of our authorities and are conducted with the
appropriate protections in place for privacy and civil liberties.
In a recent FBI study of HVEs who were successful in conducting
their attacks, the FBI found that in every instance, at least one
person saw a change in the attacker's behavior before the individual
mobilized to violence. This was not surprising given the frequency with
which the FBI receives terrorism-related tips from the community, law
enforcement, or other Government agencies. In this vein, increased
community awareness of concerning behaviors and encouraging reporting
of those behaviors are critical in our fight against terrorism in the
homeland. Friends and family are always in the best position to notice
a change in the behavior of their loved ones. Their willingness to
reach out to law enforcement and others in the community to get help
for individuals they are concerned about make them critical to
protecting others in their communities and neighborhoods. We need the
public to maintain this awareness, and help us to expand the
understanding that ``See Something, Say Something'' is not a plea for
vigilance limited to unattended baggage--it also includes our
responsibility to speak up when we believe an individual in our midst
could be radicalizing to violence.
conclusion
The FBI would not be as successful as we are in identifying and
detecting violent extremists before they act if it were not for our
close relationships with all of our partners across the country,
including law enforcement at the Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
territorial levels, as well as our partners in the faith-based
communities and the private sector. In conjunction with these partners
we constantly collect and analyze information concerning the on-going
threats posed by violent extremists and work to share that information
with these partners around the country, and with our international
partners around the world. The American lives saved in communities
across this country are a testament to their hard work and dedication
to disrupting terrorism from any place, by any actor.
Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify concerning the
evolving terrorism threat to the homeland. As I hope I will make clear
to you today, the FBI takes very seriously the threat of terrorism in
any place, by any actor, against any individual or group. Regardless of
a case classification or indictment category, we work daily to carry
out the FBI mission to protect the American people and uphold the
Constitution of the United States. We are grateful for the support that
you and this subcommittee have provided to the FBI, and we look forward
to answering any questions you might have.
Mr. Rose. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Assistant Secretary Neumann to summarize
her statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH NEUMANN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, THREAT
PREVENTION AND SECURITY POLICY, OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND
PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Neumann. Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker,
Congresswoman Slotkin, and Congressman Malinowski, I have
appreciated each of your attention, your leadership, to this
issue, and I appreciate you holding this hearing today.
Last summer, I toured Auschwitz-Birkenau death camps. To
prepare I read multiple survivors' memoirs, but really nothing
can prepare you for the size and the scale of those camps.
The more harrowing thing I found was that there was a
methodical approach to annihilating groups of people that were
deemed ``less than.'' I was struggling with how do people
devolve into such depravity, how quickly pride, which is that
part of ourselves that says, ``I am better than,'' which we all
struggle with, it is the original sin, but how quickly pride
leads to anger, then hate, and then to violence, if properly
stoked and unchecked.
How quickly a small group of empowered people, take just
the prison guards at one camp, they had to buy into the
justification, a sick rationale, to bring themselves to kill
millions of people in a systematic fashion.
You see, they didn't see fellow men and women. They didn't
see the children reminding them of their own sons and daughters
and nieces and nephews. Those coming off sealed cattle car
trains were ``the other,'' a manifestation of a profound
breakdown of societal bonds into two camps--us and them.
While many scholars and philosophers have expanded on this
idea far better than I can, experiencing Auschwitz left me with
renewed purpose to root out such division within our country.
Anti-Semitism and similar ideologies of hatred and the
violence perpetrated in their name have a chilling effect on
Americans' ability and willingness to openly exercise their
Constitution's guaranteed rights. These individuals support
ideologies that seek to create ``the other'' here in the United
States, and we cannot let that happen.
Last June, I had the privilege of testifying before another
subcommittee, and I made a commitment that DHS would develop a
strategy to counter the threat of domestic terrorism. In
September, DHS released that strategy, the Strategic Framework
for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, which describes
the threat from domestic terrorism, particularly racially- or
ethnically-motivated violent extremism as growing, and needing
to be addressed in the same way we have addressed the foreign
terrorist challenge.
It calls for us to update the tools and expertise that have
protected and strengthened our country the past 17 years from
foreign terrorists, to address the threat from domestic
terrorism and targeted violence.
As testified in one of your earlier panels, increasingly
this threat is transnational. Thus, we are exploring how to
leverage our existing CT authorities to combat terrorist travel
against any foreign threat actor seeking to conduct violence.
At DHS we work closely with the State Department, who has
the statutory authority for designating groups as foreign
terrorist organizations. For any groups that are designated,
DHS then implements relevant screening and vetting measures.
While designations of certain overseas groups may help us
address some of these challenges, the lack of a designation
does not prevent the Department from applying its authorities
under the INA to disrupt travel of violent extremists. We have
several examples of skilled CBP officers preventing foreign
nationals with ties to neo-Nazi groups overseas from entering
the country due to being deemed inadmissible under the INA.
Finally, we are seeing foreign-based groups attempting to
influence and motivate U.S.-based individuals through a variety
of extremist ideologies in an effort to sow discord in the
United States as well as incite violence. It is critical that
we educate the American public and build resilience to these
malign influence campaigns.
We are still early in this process, and it is a process
which needs to be done carefully to ensure we operate within
the bounds of existing authorities. But please know that our
operators are actively working to prevent individuals seeking
to harm our citizens from entering the country.
The Strategic Framework also called for DHS to create new
tools, new capabilities to address the threat of terrorism and
targeted violence. It redefines what we mean by prevention and
calls for scaling the prevention mission across the United
States.
Prevention efforts, in short, are locally-based solutions,
centered on accepted threat assessment and management
approaches. We are assisting law enforcement and communities to
offer voluntary counsel and help to susceptible individuals
before they commit a crime or violent act.
The strategy also highlights that we need to do a better
job countering the on-line influence of violent extremists, as
witnesses on previous panels discussed in depth. Thanks to
funding provided by you in fiscal year 2020, we are already
beginning to scale the prevention mission this year. That
effort is under way and described in more detail in our written
statement for the record. Further, the President's budget for
fiscal year 2021 requests additional increases for prevention.
We are headed in the right direction, and I am hopeful that
these efforts in time will lead to a reduction in violence in
our communities.
But let me end with this. While I am passionate about DHS's
approach to preventing violence, I am also realistic about how
much Government can do. At its core, hate is a heart problem,
and Government can only do so much about heart problems. We
need engaged citizens, communities of faith, and leaders in
communities, nonprofits, corporations, academia, technology,
and Government to stand up against this evil.
In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in 1986, Eli
Wiesel, a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau's death camps, said:
We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor,
never the victim. Sometimes we must interfere. When human lives
are endangered, when human dignity is in jeopardy, national
borders and sensitivities become irrelevant.
Thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Neumann and Mr.
Harrell follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Elizabeth Neumann and Brian Harrell
February 26, 2020
introduction
Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for holding today's hearing on domestic
terrorism and, in particular, the rise in anti-Semitic domestic
terrorism.
Terrorists and perpetrators of targeted violence aim to weaken the
very fabric of our democracy. The Constitution's guaranteed rights and
privileges, including free exercise of religion, are integral to the
American way of life. Anti-Semitism and similar ideologies of hatred
for religious groups, and the violence perpetrated in its name, have a
chilling effect on Americans' ability and willingness to openly
exercise their most fundamental rights.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to
preventing and mitigating the impact of all forms of terrorism and
targeted violence. DHS addresses the threat of domestic terrorism with
the same gravity and seriousness that it gives to foreign terrorist
organizations. To be clear, whether its origins are anti-Semitism,
white supremacism, or something else, domestic terrorism of any form
cannot and will not be tolerated in the homeland. The Department stands
committed to working with faith-based organizations (FBO) and other
stakeholders to enhance our collective ability to prevent, protect
against, and respond to attacks in our communities.
Over the past decade, DHS, the Department of Justice, and our
State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partners
have tried a variety of approaches to tackle the problem of targeted
violence and terrorism originating from within the homeland. We have
learned that traditional law enforcement tools--such as investigations
and prosecutions--are critical, but they alone cannot solve the
problem.
We need to make it harder to carry out an attack and reduce the
potential loss of life, as well as prevent individuals from mobilizing
to violence in the first place. Achieving those objectives is beyond
the Federal Government's capability and role alone; we need a whole-of-
society approach. DHS's role in this effort is to inform, equip, and
empower the homeland security enterprise to enhance its capabilities.
This means building meaningful partnerships and trust among many
different actors in our local communities, including houses of worship,
civic organizations, Government agencies, law enforcement, and others,
and providing resources, training, and other assistance that bolsters
their ability to protect themselves and prevent these attacks before
they happen.
a new approach
Since its creation in 2003, DHS has initiated numerous programs and
activities to provide support to our SLTT and private-sector partners
across the National Preparedness System. The National Preparedness Goal
is comprised of 5 Mission Areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation,
Response, and Recovery. Across 4 of these missions, DHS has supported
our partners in steadily building core capabilities for decades. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--as the primary lead for the
mitigation, response, and recovery missions--has worked to hone the
doctrine, policy, concept of operations, and training since the 1980's,
while the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
which leads the protection mission, has been at it for 15 years. DHS is
now bringing to scale the fifth mission--the prevention mission--to
ensure that there is both a well-regarded set of baseline capabilities
and the capacity to help State and local partners build these programs.
In September of last year, DHS released its Strategic Framework for
Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence (referred to here as the
``Strategic Framework''), which seeks to use all the Department's
resources to address these threats holistically. It also makes clear
that the threat landscape is no longer dominated solely by foreign
terrorist organizations; significant attention and effort are required
to address domestic terrorism and the mass attacks associated with
targeted violence.
The Strategic Framework contains 4 goals to counter terrorism and
targeted violence:
1. Goal 1.--Understand the evolving terrorism and targeted violence
threat environment, and support partners in the homeland security
enterprise through this specialized knowledge.
2. Goal 2.--Prevent terrorists and other hostile actors from
entering the United States and deny them the opportunity to exploit the
Nation's trade, immigration, and domestic and international travel
systems.
3. Goal 3.--Prevent terrorism and targeted violence.
4. Goal 4.--Enhance U.S. infrastructure protections and community
preparedness.
While these goals focus on some very traditional roles for the
Department--information sharing, border security, and infrastructure
protection--the Strategic Framework is novel in several respects.
First, it addresses not only international and domestic terrorism,
but also targeted violence--explicitly stating for the first time in
National-level strategy that these threats overlap and intersect,
necessitating a shared set of solutions.
Second, the Strategic Framework lays a significant marker for DHS
to step up its activities in the prevention space. The Department views
prevention as key to addressing terrorism and targeted violence in the
United States. Consequently, the Strategic Framework's third goal--
simply titled ``Prevent terrorism and targeted violence''--calls for
DHS to further the development of societal resistance to radicalization
and ensure broad awareness of the threat of mobilization to violence.
It also emphasizes locally-based solutions. DHS will continue to
support local efforts to develop and sustain prevention frameworks that
ensure threat assessment and management approaches that assist law
enforcement and the communities they serve to ``off-ramp'' susceptible
individuals before they commit a crime or violent act.
Third, the Strategic Framework highlights the need to counter
terrorists' and violent extremists' influence on-line. Witnesses on
previous hearing panels discussed the role of on-line platforms in
addressing the spread of violent extremist and other hate-filled
content. The Department will continue to engage with our partners in
the private sector, including internet service providers and social
media platforms, both directly and through broader initiatives such as
the Global Internet Forum for Counterterrorism and the evolving
framework found in the Christchurch Call to Action. We will also
continue to support efforts by individual technology companies, non-
governmental organizations, and civic partners through mechanisms like
the digital forum for terrorism prevention and by supporting digital
challenges that turn the tools terrorists and others use for malicious
intent back on them.
implementing the framework for countering terrorism and targeted
violence
The Department is working aggressively to meet the goals it has set
for itself, including working diligently to finalize an implementation
plan for the Strategic Framework. The implementation plan will outline
DHS's role in this space, which again is to ensure that our SLTT
partners have the knowledge, tools, and resources required to address
all of the missions contained in the Strategic Framework. Nowhere is
this more critical than the need to bolster the protection and
prevention missions within the United States to reduce the harms
associated with terrorism and targeted violence fueled by anti-
Semitism.
Protection
The Department's protection mission is integral to the Nation's
counterterrorism efforts. The protection of infrastructure and people
are therefore a vital component of the Department's Strategic
Framework.
CISA is at the forefront of this work and is continuing long-
standing efforts to partner with communities to enhance their safety
and security. For example, CISA's Hometown Security Initiative provides
direct, tangible support to harden public gathering locations.
Leveraging its field personnel and program offices, CISA also shares
threat information, including prominent and emerging tactics; conducts
security and vulnerability assessments; and provides a wide range of
training and exercises. In the last 3 fiscal years, CISA conducted
1,534 engagements with FBOs, primarily through its Protective Security
Advisors (PSA). In fiscal year 2019 alone, CISA conducted 800
engagements with places of worship, progressively increasing its
outreach annually since fiscal year 2017.
CISA also provides a suite of resources that helps inform local
decision making. For example, CISA shares information aimed at reducing
the impacts of an active-shooter incident. This information focuses on
suspicious behavioral indicators, potential attack methods, how to
develop an emergency action plan, actions that may be taken during an
incident to reduce its impact, and how to quickly and effectively
recover from an incident. Since 2011, CISA has conducted more than 300
in-person Active Shooter Preparedness Workshops with 41,000
participants, nearly 975,000 people successfully completed the on-line
training course, the publicly-available website has been viewed almost
4.5 million times, and PSAs conducted more than 5,000 active-shooter
activities (e.g., briefings, presentations, security walk throughs, and
emergency planning sessions) directly with facilities. Many of these
resources have been provided to FBOs. Following the tragic attack at
the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, members of the synagogue
credited the training coordinated by CISA's PSA with saving lives.
CISA also maintains an exercise program that provides effective and
practical mechanisms to identify areas for improvement, implement, and
evaluate corrective actions, and share best practices through
discussion- and operations-based exercises. Scenarios are driven by the
public and private sectors, and often focus on active shooters. As just
one example, in April 2019, CISA partnered with the Secure Community
Network to conduct a tabletop exercise with Jewish Community leaders
from across the United States, law enforcement personnel, and
interagency officials to work through how the community will share
information and what actions they would take in the event of a threat.
Additionally, FEMA manages the Nonprofit Security Grant Program,
which provides more than $70 million in grants annually to non-profit
and faith-based institutions to protect infrastructure and houses of
worship.
Prevention
The paths of terrorists and other violent actors are not linear. As
witnesses on previous hearing panels have attested, anti-Semitic
attacks in the United States demonstrate a variety of ideological
drivers. As such, there is not a one-size-fits-all solution to these
attacks on FBOs. However, the factors that drive these individuals to
violence are almost consistently observed by those who know them best.
Families, friends, bystanders, and others who are concerned for the
well-being of these individuals are critical to prevention, as they are
often the ones who will recognize behavioral changes over time that may
be indicative of radicalization and mobilization to violence.
Building local prevention frameworks that these bystanders can
consult when they have concerns--especially before an individual has
committed a criminal act--is the lynchpin of our prevention efforts.
DHS is focused on ensuring that SLTT partners, social services, civil
society groups, the private sector, and other elements of the local
homeland security enterprise are aware, informed, and capable of
creating and maintaining local prevention frameworks. Baseline
capabilities published by DHS will help States and municipalities
understand what ingredients are needed in a framework and may help them
identify existing resources that can be leveraged for prevention of
terrorism and targeted violence. For instance, a suicide hotline, a
case management system for school resource officers or existing
protocols for community engagement on other issues can be a good start
for a prevention framework and baseline capabilities will determine
whether and how they fit. When consulted, these local prevention
frameworks can work with individuals of concern and their support
network of family and friends to prevent further progression toward
violence and improve the odds of a more positive outcome for all
involved.
The Department is already actively engaged in prevention
activities. DHS currently provides information products to State and
local partners that provide the latest understanding of the threat and
how to prevent it. For 20 years, the United States Secret Service
National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) has been conducting research
and training on the prevention of various forms of targeted violence.
NTAC has traveled to all 50 States, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and 16 countries providing 1,188 training/briefings to
approximately 160,000 members of Federal, State, and local law
enforcement, mental health professionals, teachers and school
administrators, private industry, and other community stakeholders.
NTAC's most recent publications included an operational guide for
preventing targeted school violence, Mass Attacks in Public Spaces--
2018, which was released in July 2019, and the most comprehensive
behavioral analysis of incidents of targeted violence at K-12 schools
released in November 2019. Since 2011, NTAC has also provided 100 case
or program consultations for community partners. The goal of NTAC's
work is to help standardize the principles of threat assessment so our
communities are better equipped to identify persons of concern, assess
their potential for carrying out an act of targeted violence, and
intervene before an act of violence takes place.
In recent years, DHS has also worked diligently to identify what
works best to prevent terrorism and targeted violence. We have
administered a grant program since 2016 to identify innovative programs
and promising practices, delivered awareness trainings to audiences
seeking knowledge of the threat, engendered effective partnerships with
the whole of society, and assisted practitioners across the country in
building meaningful and effective prevention programs.
All of this preparatory work culminated in the April 2019 creation
of the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP), the
primary entity responsible for driving the prevention mission within
DHS. From that starting point, we worked with Congress to share the
Department's vision for prevention. Over the course of many hours of
briefings across the Hill, we had several productive conversations on
the best approach to this problem. We also pledged to develop a
prevention strategy. In September 2019, we delivered on that promise
with the publication of DHS's Strategic Framework, wherein Goal 3
outlines the DHS approach to prevention.
In December 2019, Congress provided funds to implement that mission
through TVTP. We thank you for that investment. Because of this
additional funding, DHS is well-positioned to begin achieving the goals
laid out in the Strategic Framework. For example, with $10 million in
fiscal year 2020 grant funding dedicated to the creation and expansion
of local prevention programs, DHS will build on the promising practices
and lessons learned from DHS's past and on-going activities, with an
emphasis on projects that will help our partners to build local
capacity to prevent targeted violence and all forms of terrorism.
The Department is also expanding its ability to coordinate and
deliver technical assistance. For example, TVTP's awareness briefing
team is coordinating, updating, and expanding DHS's training
offerings--including the Community Awareness Briefing, Community
Resilience Exercise, and Law Enforcement Awareness Briefing (in
partnership with the DHS Office for Civil Right and Civil Liberties and
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers)--to meet the needs of our
State and local partners, as well as the technology sector. A strategic
engagement team is working with key stakeholders, including houses of
worship; civic organizations; behavioral practitioners; law enforcement
and other Government officials; and others, to ensure the proper
operation of prevention frameworks at the local level. Broader
engagement seeks to amplify and support local prevention efforts.
Over the next year, the Department's top priority will be working
with our State and local partners to issue baseline capabilities and
build locally-based prevention capabilities. To do that, we will
leverage both the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant
Program and a soon-to-be-launched Nation-wide field staff presence to
provide technical assistance to those partners who have volunteered to
work with us to develop these capabilities. With fiscal year 2020
appropriations, DHS's field staff program can now expand over the next
year to 12 regions across the country with the ability to deliver
awareness briefings, convene key stakeholders required to collaborate
on prevention frameworks, and identify existing resources that can
bolster prevention efforts.
The Homeland Security Advisory Council Subcommittee Report on
Preventing Targeted Violence Against Faith-Based Communities
Recognizing the impact that the threat of targeted violence and
terrorism has on FBOs, at the suggestion of Chairman Thompson and
Ranking Member Rogers, then-Acting Secretary McAleenan directed the
Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to stand up a subcommittee
that would focus on how the Department can support FBOs to keep them
safe, secure, and resilient. The HSAC subcommittee transmitted its
findings and recommendations on preventing targeted violence against
FBOs to Acting Secretary Wolf on December 17, 2019. We are grateful for
the leadership of the subcommittee co-chairs, General John R. Allen,
USMC (Ret.), and Paul Goldenberg, and for the valuable recommendations
they provided. DHS leadership acted quickly to assess the Report's
findings and identify areas where we could take action.
The encouraging news is that many of the subcommittee's
recommendations will be addressed in the implementation plan for the
Strategic Framework, which is now being finalized. The Implementation
Plan is one of the Department's top priorities.
The Department continues to explore options to implement several of
the top-tier recommendations in the Report. We concur with the Report's
findings on the importance of having a designated lead within DHS who
is responsible for coordinating security-related information, training,
and engagement with FBOs. The Department is in the process of
identifying the appropriate office and resources to support this
requirement. The Department also concurs with the recommendation to
establish a standing inter-faith advisory council to support the work
of this newly-established director for FBOs. Such a council would
enhance the Department's understanding of FBO security needs,
streamline and increase our engagement with FBOs, and inform our
responsiveness to threats of targeted violence. We look forward to
sharing more details about the new director for FBOs and inter-faith
advisory council as they are formalized.
Last, we should note that several of the Report's findings focus on
enhancing outreach efforts by State and local fusion centers, and on
increasing awareness, training, and information sharing at the local
level. In order to best address these recommendations, DHS must employ
a multi-pronged approach that includes all State, local, Federal, and
non-Federal partners, including State Homeland Security Advisors and
State and local law enforcement. This approach should build upon DHS's
mission to facilitate and enhance information sharing and analysis
across the DHS intelligence enterprise, and with our SLTT homeland
security partners. Furthermore, our approach should leverage DHS's
field-deployed experts, such as the CISA's PSAs, TVTP's Prevention
Coordinators, and DHS Intelligence and Analysis Field Intelligence
Officers who engage with communities and provide vetted information,
security assessments, and links to key resources and training. We look
forward to engaging with Members of Congress to outline opportunities
where we believe additional resources could help advance this important
goal.
conclusion
The Department recognizes there is a lot of work to do, and that
the threat continues. It is unacceptable that anyone in the United
States be made to feel afraid because of religion, race, or ethnicity,
nor should anyone be fearful of attending a house of worship or school,
or of visiting a public space. We are working expeditiously to ensure
that DHS is postured to better prevent and protect against all forms of
targeted violence regardless of the ideological motivation.
The Department is also seeking to build our prevention and
protection programs to scale in the coming years. The President's
fiscal year 2021 budget request reflects this requirement, adding $80
million to the prevention and protection missions. In addition to
allowing expansion of hard infrastructure assessments and cybersecurity
engagements, among others, this budget will permit CISA to expand its
field forces to significantly improve its ability to meet regional
stakeholders' service demands, such as vulnerability assessments and
recommendations for action; guidance and best practices for security
and resilience; situational awareness products and briefings; active
shooter and counter-IED products, training and tools; and workshops,
exercises, and consultancy to affect a comprehensive approach to
address the threat of targeted violence and terrorism. With the
additional funds provided in the President's budget, TVTP will enhance
coordination of the overall prevention approach for the Department and
expand provision of technical and financial assistance to SLTT partners
establishing and expanding local prevention frameworks. Specifically,
the President's budget will expand TVTP's regional coordinator program,
enhance our efforts to engage with the technology sector to combat
terrorist use of the internet, and double the size of the Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee to discuss the Department's efforts to combat domestic
terrorism, in particular, by maturing the prevention and protection
work of DHS. We look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Rose. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Assistant Director Harrell to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN HARRELL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Harrell. Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and
Members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for having me
today.
The cornerstone of America's democracy is a free and open
society where people can live without fear of harm. Americans
expect to be safe and secure as they conduct their daily lives.
Most importantly, there are certain foundational rights within
the Constitution that must be protected.
These freedoms, including the right to practice a religion
of choice, are integral to the American way of life.
Unfortunately, the persistent pressures from domestic and
international terrorists and other violent extremist actors aim
to threaten the fabric of America's democracy.
Differences in ideology materialize in targeted violent
attacks, as demonstrated by recent events against faith-based
communities. Throughout the past few years, we have seen
significant security incidents involving houses of worship,
schools, and other soft targets and crowded places.
We have seen the face of evil, but we have also seen the
face of courage. Courage has materialized in the response of
our law enforcement, our community business partners, our
fellow worshippers, and our faith leaders.
The Department is committed to mitigating the risk of
attacks on our homeland, and our mission is critical to the
Nation's counterterrorism efforts. The protection of our people
and our infrastructure is a vital component of the Department's
Strategic Framework.
Through the resources provided by CISA, DHS continues our
long-standing efforts with communities to share threat
information, harden public gathering locations, train law
enforcement and first responders, and conduct a wide range of
training and exercises.
We do not magically get better in a time of crisis. We
always default to the things that we know, to training, to the
lessons learned from exercises. These are proven initiatives
that have enhanced the safety and security of the American
people. Through the Strategic Framework, DHS is augmenting its
capabilities to address this increased targeted violence
against our communities.
To ensure the safety and security of our worshippers, we
must be innovative, provide timely and useful resources, and
increase information sharing. CISA is at the forefront of this
work. Our Hometown Security Initiative provides direct,
tangible support to harden public gathering locations.
Leveraging its field personnel and program offices, CISA shares
information on the evolving threat, including prominent and
emerging tactics, we conduct security and threat vulnerability
assessments, and we offer resources to how to mitigate and
drive down the risk of violent attacks.
In the last 3 fiscal years, CISA has conducted 1,534
engagements with faith-based organizations, primarily through
its Protective Security Advisor Program. In 2019 alone, CISA
conducted over 800 engagements with houses of worship,
progressively increasing our outreach since 2017.
Just last week, DHS, in partnership with DOJ, HHS, and the
Department of Education, released to the public the
SchoolSafety.gov website, further demonstrating the
Department's commitment to giving the appropriate security
resources to those that can have an impact.
CISA's resources help inform local decision making. The
Agency shares information aimed at reducing the impacts of an
active-shooter incident. This information focuses on suspicious
behavioral indicators, potential attack methods, how to develop
an emergency action plan, actions that may be taken during an
incident, and how to quickly and effectively recover from an
incident.
Since 2011, CISA has conducted more than 300 in-person
active-shooter workshops throughout this country, teaching over
41,000 participants. Nearly 975,000 people have successfully
completed our on-line active-shooter training, and our active-
shooter website on DHS.gov has been seen and viewed over 4.5
million times. Our PSA has conducted more than 5,000 active-
shooter activities throughout this country, and many of them
revolve around the faith-based organizations.
Following the strategic attack at the Tree of Life
Synagogue in Pittsburgh, members of the synagogue credited the
training provided by our PSAs with saving lives.
CISA maintains an exercise program that provides effective
and practical mechanisms to identify areas for improvement,
evaluate and implement corrective actions, and share best
practices through discussion-based and full-scale exercises.
These scenarios are driven by the public and private sector and
often focus on active shooter, vehicle ramming, chemical
security, and bombing prevention.
In view of the attacks against faith-based communities in
April 2019, CISA partnered with the Secure Community Network,
SCN, to conduct a tabletop exercise with the Jewish community
leaders from across the United States, law enforcement
personnel, and interagency officials to work through how a
community will share information and what actions they should
take during a security event.
Throughout the history of our Nation, the United States has
epitomized the truest definition of a great democracy and has
demonstrated to the world the value of freedom, and this is
clearly seen in the right to practice a religion of choice.
However, those freedoms that have made this country a
shining city upon a hill do not come without a price. As I
wrote to the faith-based community a little over a year ago, in
this dynamic threat environment we face the reality that
differences in ideology can result in attacks even in the most
holy of places.
While this unfortunate truth may be a reality, it does not
have to be inevitable. The threat is not going away, but
neither is our determination to reduce the probability of a
successful attack.
The Department is committed to maintaining a strong
relationship with the faith-based community to reduce risk
where we can, mitigate impacts where we must, and always defend
today to secure tomorrow.
Thank you, and I welcome your questions.
Mr. Rose. I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
I will remind the subcommittee that we will each have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I will now recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Neumann, I would like to
start with you.
Anti-Semitism is rising around the world. I think you even
addressed that a little bit. We need to figure out how to stop
this hateful trend. I asked our last panel of witnesses that
are referred to a little earlier in my statement about a month
ago this question, and I am interested to see your assessment.
What are you seeing in Europe and elsewhere in terms of
anti-Semitic rhetoric and violence, and how has this
contributed to the rise of anti-Semitism here in the United
States?
Ms. Neumann. Sir, I will invite also AD Sanborn to join me
in this because the FBI does a lot more of the intelligence
investigations than I do in my role. But I can tell you from
the work that my team does and talking to our partners overseas
that our European allies are very concerned about what they are
seeing. There are a number of summits that are planned for next
month to discuss how to wrestle with the same issues that we
are wrestling with here.
It is transnational, it is rising in Europe, and
increasingly everybody is talking to one another and sharing
ideas, and how to get around our law enforcement and terrorism
tools.
Mr. Walker. I was going to the assistant director.
Would you mind answering the same question?
Ms. Sanborn. Just to add to what Ms. Neumann said, the
Jewish community across the world is definitely vulnerable, not
just in regard, though, I would highlight, to domestic
terrorism, but also international terrorism.
If you remember back--and I think I mentioned this in my
statement for the record--in 2016, we actually arrested, JTTF
did, an individual who was planning to attack a Jewish center
in Florida on behalf of ISIS.
In 2018, we had two individuals who were surveilling Jewish
facilities to do attacks potentially on behalf of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
Then later on in December 2018, the JTTF in Ohio arrested
an individual for identifying two different synagogues that he
wanted to attack.
So the vulnerability, obviously, of the Jewish community is
concerning, and it is across both spectrums of----
Mr. Walker. Well, let's stay there, let's unpack that a
little bit then. Anti-Semitic attacks and incidents in New York
and New Jersey, we have seen them increase, but we have also
seen that it comes from a wide variety of ideologies. Is that
fair to say?
Ms. Sanborn. Totally fair to say. I think----
Mr. Walker. Well, what do you--let me ask the question
here. This is what I would like you to address. What do you
attribute the spread of anti-Semitism from so many of these
ideological drivers?
Ms. Sanborn. That is a great question, and I think you
heard from the earlier panel, in Session I. What is behind each
individual's ideology and motivation and eventual decision to
attack is complex, and incredibly complex. We are seeing a
mixture of ideologies. So peeling back exactly what that is and
what drove them to that is incredibly difficult.
I think both Ms. Neumann and I commented in our opening
statements about the behavior and focusing on the indicators
and warning signs that somebody might mobilize is where we see
our most productive, successful effort.
Mr. Walker. OK. Earlier this month, as I mentioned, FBI
Director Wray testified that the Bureau has elevated racially-
motivated violent extremism to an equal priority with home-
grown violent extremism and Islamist terrorism.
Assistant director, have new directives been issued to the
JTTFs and the FBI field offices? What type of resources are
dedicated to all these new priorities?
Ms. Sanborn. Another great question.
So every year we go through a threat prioritization process
at headquarters and out in the field, and by the director doing
that, that sets the stage for how the field should respond to
that.
So that definitely is something that every field office
reacts to. I can tell you in Minnesota, I mimicked exactly what
you heard the director say. I have a hate crimes DT Fusion Cell
in Minnesota. I created that to mimic that.
I think to highlight the resources, I would like to bring
up a significant arrest that we had today.
Mr. Walker. Sure.
Ms. Sanborn. Sort-of mention to you, this is how we respond
to those things.
So today we arrested 5 members of the Atomwaffen Division
across 4 different States. Why I bring that up is I think it is
important for you to understand every single person in the FBI
is going to work a threat when we have a threat.
We had individuals who were involved in an intimidation
campaign to put personalized messages on journalists and
members of our Jewish community to intimidate them and
potentially act out in violence. When that happens, in those 4
States every single person in these field office is working
that arrest today. Whether they are a fugitive agent or a
counterterrorism agent, they are working that arrest today.
Mr. Walker. Just a quick yes or no as my time expires here.
Thank you for that information. I can even see your passion
behind this a little bit. It sparks up a little bit there. Just
a quick yes-or-no question. Do you feel like the directives
that are getting are more than just what is on white paper, but
these are actually being implemented along the way?
Ms. Sanborn. Yes.
Mr. Walker. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rose. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
We will now move on to the esteemed gentleman from New
Jersey, Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for allowing me to take part in this hearing.
Ms. Neumann, it has been a pleasure to work with you over
the last several months. I want to thank you again personally
for coming to my district and helping us spread the word among
our faith community about the resources that are available to
them.
I want to start with you because, as you know, one success
that we have had recently is that we have worked together here
to restore a significant amount of funding that was previously
cut from a variety of DHS Office of Targeted Violence and
Terrorism Prevention programs.
I wanted you to tell us in as concrete and straightforward
terms as possible what you are now able to do, now that you
have this new funding, that you were not able to do before, how
that will help, and what lessons has DHS learned from previous
iterations of this program to make sure that we are effectively
honing our efforts on where the threat is coming from right
now, in accordance with the strategy you all put out.
Ms. Neumann. Thank you, Congressman. I, too, have enjoyed
the partnership and everyone on this committee's support for
our efforts.
I am going to start with your last question because I think
it helps frame where we are today, the lessons learned.
A couple of years ago, as you alluded to, the funding for
this effort was reduced, in large part because we were going
through administration transitions, and the work that had been
initiated was toward the end of an administration and not
properly codified in a variety of mechanisms, getting things
into budgets and making sure that there was appropriate policy
documentation to say what we were trying to achieve, the
expected outcomes, et cetera.
One of the things that we looked to do when we were
studying where does the prevention mission need to go, we first
started with RAND, our FFRDC, and asked them to go look at the
problem set because there were criticisms from multiple angles:
``You are targeting communities,'' to, ``This is pseudo-
science, it doesn't actually work.''
RAND went out and studied. They came back, they said
prevention does work, it is underfunded, here is where you need
more money, and it needs to be locally-based, you need to focus
your efforts on equipping, empowering, informing the local
communities, the local government, to be able to conduct
prevention efforts.
So that gave us a framing, and from that we started talking
to you all, and we started articulating a vision for where we
wanted to go with prevention, acknowledging the mistakes of the
past few years and looking forward to trying to build a better
path forward.
I am very pleased that because of those conversations with
you, with your staff, that what is represented in this document
here, Goal 3, that it is all about prevention. It redefines
what prevention means. As many of you know, post-9/11
prevention was the imminent threat--stop the bomb from going
off.
Now prevention is much farther left of boom, working with
individuals well before they contemplate an act of violence,
trying to build resilience into society, and then, as somebody
is on that pathway to violence, trying to intervene before they
have crossed that criminal threshold.
Because of the funding that you have given us, the concrete
answers, we are able to put 12 field staff in the field this
year. We are going to be developing baseline capabilities for
how you do prevention correctly, to make sure we have proper
protections in place for civil liberties, as well as privacy,
and as well as having the right handshake with law enforcement,
with the FBI, so that if somebody does not successfully work
through an intervention and an off-ramp, that law enforcement
is called in appropriately to disrupt.
We are going to be able to engage with more stakeholders,
especially the technology community. I think this is a space,
as your earlier panels alluded to, that we need to have more
conversations and see if we can be doing more to combat
terrorist use of the internet.
So that is just a snapshot of what we are currently working
on, but there is much more to be done.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
Very, very quickly, I don't have much time left. Ms.
Sanborn, you mentioned the arrest of the Atomwaffen Division
members. What are they being charged with, if it is a campaign
of intimidation? Because we are thinking about legal
authorities and whether you have sufficient authorities.
Ms. Sanborn. Absolutely. I don't have the specific charges
in front of me. I do remember that some of them involve the
transmission of threats across interstate lines, wire
communication, and whatnot, so typical tools we use in our
toolbox.
Mr. Malinowski. Right. But we still can't charge someone
with material support----
Ms. Sanborn. Correct.
Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. For the Atomwaffen Division.
Right, got it.
Thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Rose. Thank you.
We will move on to someone who has spent her entire career
fighting this fight, Ms. Slotkin, from the great State of
Michigan.
Ms. Slotkin. He is just trying to make up for the fact that
he let Mr. Malinowski go first.
Thank you for being here.
The context for my questions is that I am from Michigan,
and in my district specifically we have seen in the very recent
past a real uptick in anti-Semitic incidents. We have had our
Michigan State University Hillel defaced this fall. We had a
swastika painted in front of a fraternity house in the past
month. We had a mezuzah pulled off one of our dorm--or one of
our student's locations.
Then in one of my counties, across basically an entire
town, we woke up one morning and had anti-Semitic graffiti in
front of multiple businesses saying, Jews are responsible for
9/11.
So in response to this uptick, not just in my district but
across the State, we have had synagogues defaced, including in
Hancock, Michigan, where a man from New Jersey put out a call
and said, you know, kind-of, you should move against
synagogues. In Michigan and in Wisconsin, people responded and
defaced synagogues.
I held a meeting this past Sunday on anti-Semitism in my
community, in East Lansing, Michigan. My attorney general was
there. We spent a lot of time answering questions, concerns,
from community members on what to do about this.
So my experience in my life is in countering foreign
terrorism and the foreign threats. I know that after 9/11,
especially in the FBI, it took a minute to adjust to these
different threats. I remember when we turned a lot of support
staff at the FBI into analysts on terrorism overnight. I
remember how we weren't resourced because the threat had
fundamentally changed.
So if I can just ask, Ms. Sanborn, can you tell me in
specific terms what you have changed on number of analysts,
number of dollars, number of agents, number of task force?
Like, I get that you guys are focused on it and I am thrilled,
but I know after 15 years in the Government, it is dollars and
people. Convince me, as Mr. Rose said, that we are taking the
threat seriously.
Ms. Sanborn. What I can tell you is the number of resources
that we throw at that is commensurate with what we are seeing
with the problem. So, for example, one-fifth of my CT cases are
either racially or ethnically motivated. So one-fifth of my
resources are applied to that. So it is commensurate with what
we are seeing as far as the cases and the threat and the amount
of resources that we put forth to it.
I believe that the creation of things like the Hate Crimes
Fusion Center, the other thing that we have done is we have
cross-pollinated some of those people that you reflect in your
career, the long-time, good, international terrorism analysts
and/or agents are cross-pollinating into the domestic terrorism
space to sort-of make sure we are passing on best practices and
lessons learned.
Interestingly enough, the JTTF, which is one of our best
tools in our toolbox, was actually created in 1980 in response
to domestic terrorism in New York with the increase of attacks
there.
Ms. Slotkin. So what I would ask, because I think there are
a lot of folks who might be interested in this, is that you
take that question for the record, and provide kind-of in
concrete dollars and bodies what we are talking about. It is
great that one area is commensurate with the threat, but I
think a lot of us would be able to speak to our constituents
with real authority if we said, look, here is what the FBI had
their resources--here is how they had them allocated in 2016,
and here is what they are today. A comparative to show us the
delta would be great.
If I can just move on to Assistant Secretary Neumann.
So I guess the question I have is, in your experience, once
we identify that these networks are out there, that there are
communities, particularly on-line, that may be mobilizing or
dealing in conspiracy theories, recruiting, those kinds of
things, tell me about rehabilitation. Tell me about how you
deal with this.
I understand prevention, and obviously that is the goal.
But just like with foreign terrorists, right, with people who
have been radicalized, what is the rehab process once we
identify a community? What can you recommend to people who are
concerned about the growing spike in anti-Semitic attacks?
Ms. Neumann. I will start with the honest answer, which is
I think we are still learning. From your experience overseas,
you know that there are a number of other governments that have
been struggling with this for a long time. They don't have some
of the restrictions we do, they try a variety of things, and
the jury is still out whether it really works.
It is very hard to say that once somebody is fully
radicalized, mobilized to violence, committed that act, that
you are going to have much success off-ramping them, if you
will. So the recidivism problem is one that we are really
concerned about.
I don't think that means we are without hope, and I am sure
AD Sanborn has some interesting experience on this, too. But I
do think we need more research, and we need to study.
So one of the things that we are doing with the grant funds
that you all have provided us is we are ensuring that there is
room for innovation, for NGO's, nonprofits, things that maybe
Government is not best equipped to do, to try new things, try
something new in this space, since we are all still kind-of
learning what works and what doesn't.
We are also bringing our Science and Technology Directorate
alongside those grantees to study the effectiveness, the
outcome. I am OK if we give money to a grantee, they try
something, and it fails. I just want to know that it failed, so
we don't re-fund it or other people don't try to pass on that
practice.
So I think we need more research in that space. I think we
need to invite more of the technology sector and academia to
the table. Things that we thought were working, for example, in
countermessaging, we are now seeing some evidence that maybe it
doesn't work as well as we thought a couple of years ago.
So data here is really important to make sure that as we
are trying new things, that we genuinely understand if it is
having that long-term impact.
I feel much more confident in what the science is telling
us or the research is telling us on that far left of boom,
being able to intervene before somebody really has idealized
and come up with a plan.
Once somebody has carried out an attack, that space--and
DOJ does a lot of studies in this space, more so than DHS--but
that space we know is a tougher--to crack.
It is in our strategy. It is one, as we are building our
implementation plan, I see us taking on in probably another
fiscal year or two because we want to build the local
prevention framework capability first, so that as somebody is
coming out of prison they might be able to leverage that
capability more effectively, and recognizing DOJ also has
strong responsibilities in this space.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you. I think my time has expired.
Mr. Rose. We will do another round of questions after this.
Ms. Sanborn, I want to lean in on this arrest that was made
earlier today. Based off your understanding, specifically
looking at R.A.M., Atomwaffen, and The Base, 3 leading domestic
neo-Nazi organizations, what are their global connections? Who
are they going to work with, communicating with, exchanging
money with? Paint the picture of this global movement, please.
Ms. Sanborn. I can't get into the specifics on this
specific case because the investigation is obviously on-going,
but I will tell you that that is one of the things that we are
doing all the time. For example, you probably saw the attacks
in Germany this week. So we are trying to take those attacks
overseas, or disruptions here, and build out global networks,
working with our foreign partners.
Mr. Rose. OK. So you look at Atomwaffen, for instance.
Sonnenkrieg in Britain is technically an offshoot of
Atomwaffen. Sonnenkrieg, just several weeks ago, was labeled a
terrorist organization by the United Kingdom, so this is
something that is clear. It is almost obvious at this point.
If Atomwaffen were ISIS or al-Qaeda and those 4 individuals
had sent these menacing messages, anti-Semitic in nature and
otherwise, what would you be charging them with?
Ms. Sanborn. Not speaking for the United States Attorney,
but if they were supporting a foreign terrorist organization,
and they were designated, we would have the potential for the
2339, the foreign--material support to a foreign----
Mr. Rose. Providing them material support. What additional
powers would you have in terms of surveillance and generally in
terms of your law enforcement capabilities, again if Atomwaffen
were ISIS or al-Qaeda and they had chapters here in America?
Ms. Sanborn. That is a complicated, I think, two-part
process, right? So the charge is separate from our authorities,
and what we would need to predicate a case.
So while the charge is definitely a great tool in the
toolbox to add charges on, we, according to our policies and
procedures, to predicate a case in the domestic terrorism space
you would still need those things that we have right now, which
is somebody who is looking to commit a criminal act, conduct
violence in furtherance of their ideology to coerce.
So it wouldn't help us predicate a case just because we had
a statute.
Mr. Rose. Sure. But again, with that providing material
support, based off your experience, looking at the charges that
these 4 Atomwaffen members will likely face, versus providing
material support, in terms of the severity, how different are
they, in terms of the average amount of time that they will
spend behind prison, behind bars, so on and so forth?
Ms. Sanborn. Material support exposure is definitely
greater than what these 3----
Mr. Rose. How--and I understand you are speaking in
generalities--but how much greater?
Ms. Sanborn. I don't remember specifically what the
exposure is on 2339, but I, in the press conference with the
United States Attorney and the SAC out in Seattle, these guys
are looking at about 5 years.
Mr. Rose. Atomwaffen?
Ms. Sanborn. The ones we disrupted today, correct.
Mr. Rose. They are looking at about 5 years. Now, if they
were ISIS, al-Qaeda providing material support to a foreign
terrorist organization, correct me if I am wrong, they are
looking at closer to life?
Ms. Sanborn. Correct. You would have an extra charge.
I will say that one of the things that they are doing in
this case, and you will find this in many cases, is they start
off with a one charge, and then as the case progresses they
will add further charges on. So I would not be surprised if in
the coming days you don't see the Western District of
Washington add charges on to these individuals, so their
exposure could get----
Mr. Rose. Sure. But the charge that is not available to
them right now is exactly the one you just laid out, providing
material support to a foreign terrorist organization, because
our State Department has been unwilling to label global neo-
Nazi organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, despite
the fact that countries like Canada and the United Kingdom have
already done so, despite the fact that if you look at the
conflict in Crimea, 20,000 foreign fighters have gone to
already fight in that conflict in just the last 5 years, double
the number that went to go fight in Afghanistan during the
entirety of that conflict in the 1980's.
Ms. Neumann, you mentioned tracking foreign fighters, both
foreign fighters coming into America, as well as American
citizens or legal residents going to fight and then coming
back. Are you telling us here that you have enough powers, that
the Federal Government has enough power right now and authority
to identify every legal resident, American citizen, as well as
person attempting to come into America who has participated in
the conflict in Crimea or been a part of a global neo-Nazi
organization?
Ms. Neumann. What I can say is that we are working on it.
But, no, I don't have confidence that we would be able to track
everyone.
Mr. Rose. Do you have confidence that we are able to track
those participating with jihadist organizations?
Ms. Neumann. I have better confidence, yes.
Mr. Rose. Why do you have better confidence?
Ms. Neumann. We have been working on it longer. As
Congresswoman Slotkin pointed out, it does take a while for us
to figure, when we are doing something new and the authorities
are different, what we are allowed to do, what are the
parameters----
Mr. Rose. Why are the authorities different?
Ms. Neumann. When you have a designated terrorist
organization, like ISIS, we are able to do certain things with
our screening and vetting tools that in a context of not having
a designated organization we have to be careful to make sure
that when we are tracking somebody or denying somebody
admissibility that it adheres to the law.
If you are a member of a foreign terrorist organization,
period, hard stop, you don't get to come in.
If you are not, but you are associated with a violent
extremist group but they are not designated, we have to do more
work to justify that inadmissibility.
Mr. Rose. So what I am hearing from you is because, again,
we are unwilling to label these organizations as FTOs, we do
not--we cannot say with certainty, the same level of certainty
that we can say for jihadist organizations, that we can track
those coming in, as well as legal residents and American
citizens who go and then come back. Is that correct?
Ms. Neumann. Yes.
Mr. Rose. OK.
I want to look at social media. How has your partnership
been with social media companies thus far in addressing the
issue of counterterrorism? Well, let's actually do all three,
because I think all three of you are affected by this.
Ms. Sanborn. Want to go first?
Mr. Harrell. Yes, sure. Mr. Chairman, I don't mind going
first.
You know, CISA works with our social media companies quite
often. Mostly it is centered around disinformation and foreign
influence.
But as the Strategic Framework, I started to point out, we
are starting to gravitate resources and ask the right questions
of our social media companies now as it relates to really the
connection between foreign influence and the radicalization
that is highlighted in the DHS framework.
I think from a resource perspective I would like to circle
back on Congresswoman Slotkin's question from earlier.
The resources are really driven from the demand signal from
industry. So right now faith-based organizations, particularly
the Jewish organizations that reside throughout this country,
are asking these very key questions of, DHS, you have done
these really great things over the last 15 years, they are very
high-level, they are at 45,000 feet, we need some very specific
things surrounding what to do when an intruder comes into our
church, synagogue, mosque, temple. Can you get more specific?
So what we have done over the last number of years is to
try and drill down to what does ``run, hide, fight'' really
mean, what are some of the basic protective measures that a
church or synagogue should actually implement that are low cost
or no cost that people can do today.
So a lot of our products and services that we are pushing
out today have a lot of that flavor. I think today we are in a
better position to provide subject-matter expertise in the
field where the constituents reside to make them a more secure
campus, or in this case a more secure church, synagogue,
mosque, or temple.
We do this through the PSA Program. I mentioned that
earlier in my opening statement. We have 119 PSAs, and quite
frankly, we probably need 119 more. The demand signal again is
just off the charts. These are GS-14s and 15s that are out in
the field, kind-of the tip of the spear, that are able to walk
the property, understand what that enemy avenue of approach is,
understand what the gaps in security might be, and where to
make those investments.
So this is really from an investment and resource
perspective where I think DHS and CISA are trying to gravitate
toward now.
Ms. Neumann. On social media, we, as I mentioned in my
testimony, we do work with the big companies primarily through
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism.
Mr. Rose. Who do you work with at the Global Internet Forum
to Counter Terrorism?
Ms. Neumann. So the founding partners were Facebook,
Twitter, Google, and Microsoft.
Mr. Rose. Who is your point of contact?
Ms. Neumann. So GIFCT as an entity is in the process of
turning itself into a nonprofit.
Mr. Rose. Right.
Ms. Neumann. So as they are standing that up----
Mr. Rose. Because we yelled at them, because it was a shell
of an organization with no points of contact.
Ms. Neumann. It was a rotating chair.
Mr. Rose. They had no points of contact, they had no
budget, they had no SOP, they had nothing.
So my question is, is that when you work with social media
companies to address the issue of counterterrorism, who do you
call?
Ms. Neumann. All right. So if it is law enforcement, that
would be in the Bureau's lane, so I will let AD Sanborn
describe that.
On the nature of how do you take down terrorist content,
voluntary approach that the U.S. Government uses, best
practices for countermessaging, we are using the points of
contact at the GIFCT. I personally don't know the names of
those, but my staff----
Mr. Rose. So you send an email to 5 people?
Ms. Neumann. No. They are in the process of hiring an
executive director, is my understanding.
Mr. Rose. Yes, I know.
Ms. Neumann. I am happy to take that as a get-back with the
precise ``here is how often that we are talking to them.'' But
I know that we are----
Mr. Rose. Yes. We are very interested to know how this
actually happens.
Ms. Neumann. Sure.
Mr. Rose. Because I have been hearing people brag about the
GIFCT now for more than a year, and right now the thing does
not exist. It is not real. All it is, is a share drive of
hashtags. That is all it is. It doesn't exist. So we really
want to understand how this works.
Ms. Neumann. Sure.
Mr. Rose. We have yet to get a real answer.
Terrorism is terrorism. Take it all down. But this is big
business here.
GIFCT does not exist yet. So that is not a suitable answer
yet as to what your operational procedures are to address
social media companies.
Ms. Sanborn.
Ms. Sanborn. We spend a good chunk of our energy and
resources in my division and across the Bureau, I have a
Strategic Partnership Engagement Section that tries to focus on
strategic partners in general, which include social media and
education and capacity building, trying to really make them
aware of what the threat is so that they can be very mindful
when they develop and enforce their terms of use, for example.
Also very encouraged by their response when we serve them
lawful process.
So both in an education and capacity-building, the better
aware they are of the threat, the more----
Mr. Rose. You are confident that they treat neo-Nazi
organizations in the same manner that they treat jihadist
terrorist organizations?
Ms. Sanborn. I am encouraged by their interest to learn
that from us.
Mr. Rose. OK. All right. For our next round, we will move
back to the Ranking Member.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Neumann, the Homeland Security Advisory Council
Subcommittee on Faith-Based Security released a report in mid-
December with a number of recommendations. One that stood out
to me was that there is an information gap between faith-based
groups and State and locally-owned fusion centers.
The reason why, I was a pastor for 16 years, during the
time that we began to build our own security teams, trying to
even go as far as process information to see if there were any
potential threats out there.
My question is: Does DHS have any initiatives to expand
information sharing and as well training available to fusion
centers and DHS personnel deployed around the United States to
fill this gap?
Ms. Neumann. Thank you for the question, Chairman. I am
actually going to answer part of this and pass it over to Mr.
Harrell.
We are in the process of finalizing our implementing
recommendations coming out of that HSAC report. We took their
commentary about fusion centers and connecting with churches,
we kind-of examined that and had some conversations with the
HSAC chairs, Mr. Goldenberg, Mr. Allen, and we are trying to
understand the problem that they were describing.
I think one of the challenges is that fusion centers are
different in each State. Their original purpose was information
sharing between and among local government and up to the
Federal Government. They were not necessarily designed to be
outreach mechanisms to their community.
Now, some fusion centers have taken on that mandate, and
that is great--New Jersey is a great example of this--where
they physically go out and do trainings and conduct exercises
and educate their communities about the threat. I think that is
wonderful.
But I don't think all fusion centers are designed that way.
They really are about intelligence analysis and information
sharing.
So this leads me to, as we were assessing, there is a
problem here--we like to call it the last-mile problem--the
Federal Government's apparatuses are not designed to get to
all, you know, tens of thousands of houses of worship in this
country----
Mr. Walker. Let me--and pause for just a second.
Ms. Neumann. Sure.
Mr. Walker. I appreciate the eloquent response there. But
if there is a concern, even remotely, for a synagogue or a
church in a specific area, does not these fusion centers of the
Federal Government have some responsibility to bring these
folks in to say, ``Hey, it is just small on the radar, I just
wanted you to know,'' as opposed to putting the burden on the
church or synagogue, the rabbi, the pastor, the clerk, whatever
it might be, to pursue this information?
Ms. Neumann. Yes. What I was trying to get to is that we
haven't had to do that before. So we are trying to figure out
the best way to do it.
Mr. Walker. OK.
Ms. Neumann. So I think there is a role for fusion centers.
There is a huge role for State and local law enforcement. Our
Protective Security Advisors are in some ways much better-
equipped than perhaps a fusion center might be to make sure
that they are getting that information out.
But it is tens of thousands of houses of worship that need
to be trained and educated, that there is not enough manpower
in a fusion center or a PSA apparatus to do that. So we are
going to have to come up with a slightly different model than
what we have used heretofore.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Harrell, do you want to add something to
that?
Mr. Harrell. Please, and thank you, sir.
You know, with the 80-plus fusion centers that we have in
this country, that is one bellybutton. The additional
bellybutton would be the information sharing and analysis
center, or the ISACs, and these are the major channels of
communication back and forth between the Federal Government,
State and local partners, and then ultimately industry,
churches, synagogues, mosques, et cetera.
But you don't know what you don't know, and I think at some
point there needs to be a better information-sharing campaign
to say these resources exist, this information is being shared
on a daily, weekly, monthly basis in terms of threats, in near-
real time.
It is difficult, as Assistant Secretary Neumann just
mentioned, it is difficult to get to every church. But we need
to ensure that through this mechanism people are landing on
distribution lists across this country to get this information
into the hands to people that can actually do something about
it.
I think through the PSA program, we have tried to bridge
some of those gaps, but it is difficult to get to some of the
rural communities. It is difficult to get to some of the
lesser-served populations. But that is our goal. That is what
we are trying to do. That is what we are gravitating toward.
Mr. Walker. Let me switch gears just for a second and stay
with you, Mr. Harrell.
The CISA Protective Security Advisor program has been
getting a lot of attention recently and additional
responsibilities related to community outreach. How many PSAs
are there, and what are their primary responsibilities? What
new responsibilities will they have under the new TVTP
initiative? I will throw this in there since I have just got a
few seconds. Touch on it what you can. Does this strain your
resources for other missions under CISA?
Mr. Harrell. We have 119 PSAs, Congressman, and as I
mentioned earlier, we need a whole lot more. This is one of the
things that we have asked for in future budgets, and I am
confident that is where we will end up going as an
organization.
The demand signal ultimately comes through these PSAs. They
are the field resources. They are the ones that eat, breathe,
sleep, and reside in these communities. They have the
relationships with the local community, the churches, the
schools, the big communities that are out there, critical
infrastructure owners and operators.
Their whole goal really, at the end of the day, is capacity
building and bringing relationships to bear, having the right
people sit at the table to understand what the risk is, how to
drive down risk, and ultimately what resources does the Federal
Government have that we could put into the community today to
drive down risk and make people a harder target.
Many of these resources are low-cost, no-cost. I would say
the majority of them are absolutely free. But, again, people
don't know what they don't know, and so it is our opportunity,
it is our challenge to get this information out.
I can point to a website all day, but at the end of the day
we need to help people along to get them the right information.
Mr. Walker. It is your challenge, your opportunity, and I
would even add, hopefully, responsibility as well.
Mr. Harrell. Thanks.
Mr. Rose. Thank you.
Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
I want to start with a social media question, and I want
you all to imagine the following hypothetical scenario.
An American company reaches out to leaders of The Base or
the Atomwaffen Division or another terrorist group and says,
``Have we got a great service for you. We will scour the entire
internet looking, using big data, for anybody in the world who
might be susceptible to your message. So long as you don't post
things that are overtly threatening violence, we are willing to
deliver your message directly into the social media of those
people wherever they may be to help you recruit more members
and to spread your message more effectively.''
Would you be concerned about that?
Ms. Neumann. Very.
Mr. Malinowski. Isn't that exactly what Facebook and
Twitter and YouTube and the big social media companies, in
fact, do via their social media algorithms?
Now, they may not physically pick up the phone and call the
Atomwaffen Division and say, you know, ``This is a great
service for you.'' But isn't that effectively what the social
media algorithms do? They scour the internet for anybody who,
based on their previous internet usage, seems like the sort of
person who would like to buy a pair of shoes, watch a cute
kitten video, or perhaps be interested in anti-Semitic or neo-
Nazi content, and make that connection?
Ms. Neumann. Yes. I am not going to sit here and defend
companies. That is not my job. Your point, Mr. Chairman, was
well-taken.
That said, I do think that the briefings I have received,
they are trying. Are they trying hard enough? I think that is
for you all to examine.
Mr. Malinowski. Have you ever in your engagement with them,
though, directly addressed this issue of how their algorithms
help to spread this kind of content?
Ms. Neumann. Yes. I can tell you that there are any number
of former counterterrorism professionals that work for these
companies that are actively trying to figure out how to stop
this.
If they are moving fast enough, if there is enough money
toward that, that is a separate question. I have not examined
that. But I do know that the people that I have met with that
brief me on their innovative tools to try to promote civil
discourse, to try to appropriately remove content that violates
their terms of service, that tries to identify that content,
which is spreading hate, they are looking for ways to do that
within the context of their----
Mr. Malinowski. So clearly, if they see something bad they
take it down, but the engine that causes that stuff to spread
is something I think they are more reluctant to acknowledge and
address.
Different question for you, Ms. Sanborn. We were talking
about various legal authorities. We had a case in New Jersey
recently, a man in Camden County, New Jersey, who had a long
history of posting anti-Semitic rants on the internet,
including celebrating acts of violence against Jews.
Allegedly, he was in personal contact with the shooter in
the Tree of Life Synagogue. Because we have in New Jersey
recently passed a so-called red flag law, law enforcement in
New Jersey was able to confiscate this individual's firearms,
of which he had quite a few.
In your experience as a law enforcement officer, do you
think this is an authority that is useful in these
circumstances, where somebody has not yet committed an act of
violence but there is this body of evidence that they may be
celebrating, contemplating engaging with people who have
committed such acts? Is that a useful tool for law enforcement
to have in your view?
Ms. Sanborn. I think what would concern me about sort-of
thinking that solves the problem is, in my experience as a law
enforcement officer, if an individual is intent on doing some
harm, they are going to find a weapon. Unfortunately, all of
our terrorism, international and domestic, is encouraging
individuals to make a weapon.
I mean, the threat we have seen in Europe of vehicular
attacks is equally as scary as the threat that we can imagine
when you talk about firearms. They are telling them, go get a
knife, go get a vehicle. So I am not sure that that
necessarily--it could falsely give us the sense of security----
Mr. Malinowski. But can it help? I am not suggesting it
solves the problem.
Ms. Sanborn. Any time a bad guy doesn't have a weapon in
their hands it is a positive sign.
Mr. Malinowski. Good. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Rose. So I want to close out just by again looking at
this issue of social media.
Ms. Sanborn, would you agree that one of the most
significant threats we face today when it comes to terrorism is
that of a self-radicalized lone gunman, lone gunwoman, or lone
perpetrator, who hasn't traveled to a terrorist camp, hasn't
necessarily even moved overseas?
Ms. Sanborn. Correct, the lone offender is our greatest
threat.
Mr. Rose. They are often radicalized on-line, correct?
Ms. Sanborn. Correct.
Mr. Rose. So we have that--we all agree that that is a
threat.
Now, Ms. Neumann, you just said something that I found
interesting. We don't yet know, correct, whether social media
companies are fulfilling their responsibilities to adhere fully
to their own codes of conduct. Right now it doesn't seem like
we have a metric or a system in place to say they have done it
90 percent of the time or 95 percent of the time. Is that
correct?
Ms. Neumann. I think so. I will also take that as a get-
back to confirm that we don't have metrics in place. I have
been in conversations where they have been discussing how to
measure. They measure right now in terms of the amount of
content taken down.
Mr. Rose. Sure.
Ms. Neumann. How quickly they intervene in content before
it even uploads. But I think you are getting into a slightly
different type of metric, and I would like to look at that.
Mr. Rose. Yes. What I am trying to get at is that we don't
have--the public sector right now, we have no system in place
to measure how well they are doing something which we all
collectively agree is one of, if not our greatest or most
likely, terrorist threats. We are in essence relying on them to
take--we have to take them at their word.
Now, we don't do that for airbag deployability. We don't do
that for all of these other public health, public safety
concerns that we as society have agreed upon. Do you agree with
that?
Ms. Neumann. Yes.
Mr. Rose. So what I would urge you all, and we are going to
have continued discussions about this, we are proposing
something called Raise the Bar Act, which would be an
innovative public-private partnership between DHS and the
social media companies, particularly those engaged in GIFCT
when they stand it up and make it a real organization, to on a
quarterly basis issue a report, engage in a partnership with a
university and trusted flaggers, to see how well they do at
taking terrorist content off of their platforms.
But the last point here is we have to get them to agree
that Atomwaffen and The Base and Sonnenkrieg and Blood & Honour
and National Action and so many others are actually terrorists.
In order to do that we need you all to call them that. We need
the State Department to label at least some of them FTOs.
So I will leave it to you, if you all have any reaction to
what I just said, and then we can close it out.
We will start with you, Ms. Sanborn.
Ms. Sanborn. I think we would welcome the participation
about the conversation with the State Department. We would be
happy to feed our intelligence into them and allow them to
evaluate what we have to see if it helps them make a decision.
Mr. Rose. Thank you.
Ms. Neumann. I have really struggled with this, several of
the questions you have been raising, Mr. Chairman, especially
since we talked a couple weeks ago. I have, in truth, been
struggling with this for the 2 years that I have been in my
position.
I think that what you are raising deserves robust debate,
and I think it deserves probably more due diligence than
somebody in my role with multiple responsibilities in, quite
frankly, one hearing can do.
I think there are two particular issues you have drawn out.
The first is the way in which on-line platforms catalyze hate.
I think Mr. Goldenberg, in his past panel with you, gave you a
great example of situations that are just absolutely abhorrent
of a rabbi whose children were targeted on-line. I am very
encouraged by AD Sanborn to see that they are looking to try to
use all the tools that they currently have to try to go after
such horrible, horrible things.
But the fact is that our law enforcement community feels
hamstrung in how do you go after and balance First Amendment
rights to free speech, while at the same time how do you not
acknowledge that innocent children being projected with images
on-line that will forever be on-line, what about their rights?
So there is that tension there.
Then we also know that we have these organizations or
movements or individuals, that some of them are very
sophisticated. They know exactly how far they can go. They are
training their people to say you can go this far but not any
farther. They are being sophisticated in both their
communications and in their messaging.
So they are playing a game, and we are not equipped to go
after that game effectively because of the rules that we are
using that were, quite frankly, designed 50 years ago.
So I think it is probably time to take a fresh look. We do
regulate other parts of speech over airwaves. It is hard for me
to understand why on the on-line side we are not willing to
look at that.
Then the second thing you raised, about some domestic
terrorist groups and movements being designated, I think it is
definitely worth looking at whether we need a new DTO
designation or movement designation or maybe just relook at the
whole, entire framework.
The National security apparatus is designed for a threat
from 20, 30 years ago, and the world is changing. Every
counterterrorism professional I speak to in the Federal
Government and overseas feels like we are at the doorstep of
another 9/11, maybe not something that catastrophic in terms of
the visual or the numbers, but that we can see it building and
we don't quite know how to stop it.
So this feels like one of those moments where having smart
people, academics, lawyers, people that can appreciate that we,
as a country, have abused authority in the past, McCarthyism,
internment of Japanese during World War II, we don't have a
great track record here. We need to do this wisely. It probably
is not in our normal course of business. It feels like this is
a time for some sort of bipartisan commission to go off and
study this problem and come back with a holistic view of this.
So I applaud your championing. Happy to work with you on
your legislation, because I will take whatever we can get to go
after this problem. But I also think we need a bigger
conversation on this.
Mr. Harrell. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for having us.
You know, based off of current events and the frequency of
events, I am convinced that this country is becoming more and
more violent every single day.
I am unique up here in that I sit in a position where we
are focused within CISA on preparedness and protection. I live
my life as if the worst day is right around the corner. I think
I mentioned this to you in the past.
So we need to ensure that we have the resources in our
fingertips. They can't reside in our fingertips. They have to
go out into the field where they can be used to reduce risk and
ultimately save lives.
So in terms of marshalling resources, budgets, the things
that we have within the Department, we need to ensure that they
are well-known, there is an education campaign that DHS has
these things, and I think we are moving in this direction now.
Mr. Rose. Thank you all so much again, and thank you for
all your service to this country. I know you live with an
incredible amount of stress and pressure, and people are often
only focusing on you when something doesn't go well. So thank
you for everything that you are doing for this great country.
I would also ask unanimous consent for a statement from the
Jewish Federations of North America to be entered into the
record. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter From the Jewish Federations of America
February 26, 2020.
The Honorable Max Rose,
Chairman, Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee, Homeland
Security Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,
DC 20515.
The Honorable Mark Walker,
Ranking Member, Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee,
Homeland Security Committee, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Rose and Ranking Member Walker: The Jewish
Federations of North America (JFNA) applauds your continued focus on
confronting the rise of anti-Semitic domestic terrorism. The
existential threats to the Jewish community have been growing and
becoming more complex over the past two decades and Federal resources
to counter these threats are in increasing demand.
Three months after the horrific September 11 attacks on our
country, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on
confronting international terrorism. At that the hearing, JFNA (then
United Jewish Communities) submitted the lone statement expressing the
needs and concerns of the nonprofit sector, as follows in pertinent
part:
``The events of September 11th have also affected our institutions in a
profound and unanticipated way. Our Federations, day schools and
seminaries, synagogues, community centers, seniors programs, and
agencies serving the public became aware that our own institutions and
the people they serve could be the targets of future terrorist attacks.
There is no secret that both the rhetoric of those responsible for
September's attacks and past experiences support this view.
``While State and local law enforcement and other emergency response
agencies play a necessary and indispensable role in protecting our
communities, it is not their responsibility to secure our daily
operations or infrastructure.
``Creating and employing a mitigation plan; maintaining and
coordinating full-time security staff; installing bulletproof glass,
gates and fencing, outdoor cameras, reinforced doors and locks,
intercoms and panic buttons; redesigning the ingress and egress of
facilities and retraining staff are examples of the types of enhanced
human and hardware assets our communities will require to meet their
security needs.
``[S]ecurity enhancements across the Jewish Federated system will cost
hundreds of millions of dollars. Our greatest concern is that without
some modest government assistance, our costs for providing security
will come at the expense of program dollars and upon our ability to
provide for the health and social wellbeing of the millions of people
living in the hundreds of communities we serve.''
This statement was the precursor to JFNA's efforts with Congress to
establish the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Nonprofit
Security Grant Program (NSGP) in 2004. The concerns we relayed then are
equally germane today, and the escalating threats against Jewish and
other faith-based and nonprofit communal organizations posed by
Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs) and Racially/Ethnically Motivated
Violent Extremists (RMVEs), further crystalize the importance of the
NSGP as the central Federal program to counter these threats.
Last month, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
issued a joint intelligence bulletin, which assessed the threat from
DVEs and RMVEs as follows:
``They will continue to pose a lethal threat to faith-based
communities, particularly the Jewish community, in the homeland and
remain concerned about the difficulty of detecting lone offenders due
to the individualized nature of the radicalization process. At least
four incidents since October 2018 against Jewish communities underscore
the increasingly lethal threat RMVEs and perpetrators of hate crimes
pose to faith-based communities in the United States, particularly
against soft targets such as religious and cultural facilities. In
addition to violent attacks and plots, the FBI and law enforcement
partners have investigated and arrested individuals who have vandalized
or committed arson on property associated with Jewish institutions. In
addition to the previous attacks, the FBI has arrested several
individuals at various stages of plotting future attacks on Jewish
communities. These events underscore the persistent threat of lethal
violence and hate crimes against the Jewish community in the United
States.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ JIB: Continued Interest in Targeting Jewish Communities in the
Homeland by Domestic Violent Extremists, 3 January 2020 (IA-41058-20).
This assessment was based on multiple lethal incidents, violent
attacks, and disrupted plots, including the mass casualty attacks
against Jewish institutions in Pittsburgh (October 2018), Poway (April
2019), Jersey City (December 2019), and Monsey (December 2019).
The FBI, DHS and NCTC issued a second bulletin last month that
underscored that international terrorists also continue to pose a
threat to the Jewish community, as follows:
``If the Government of Iran were to perceive actions of the U.S.
Government as acts of war or existential threats to the Iranian regime,
Iran could act directly or enlist the cooperation of proxies and
partners, such as Lebanese Hizballah. Based on previously observed
covert surveillance and possible pre-operational activity, Iran or its
violent extremist supporters could commit attacks in retribution, with
little to no warning, against U.S.-based Jewish individuals and
interests among likely targets.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ JIB: Escalating Tensions Between the United States and Iran
Pose Potential Threats to the Homeland, 8 January 2020 (IA-41117-20).
According to this assessment, in recent years, agents of Iran or
Lebanese Hizballah have been prosecuted for conducting surveillance
indicative of contingency planning for lethal attacks in the United
States. This included the convictions of a dual U.S.-Iranian citizen
and a U.S.-based Iranian citizen convicted in November and October
2019, respectively, for working on behalf of Iran to collect
information on and identify multiple Jewish institutions, including a
Hillel Center and the Rohr Chabad Center in Chicago.
Encapsulating these concerns, FBI Director Christopher Wray
testified before the House Judiciary Committee on February 5, 2020,
that threats from ISIS, Al Qaeda, Iran and its proxy Hizballah are of
top concern and that violent extremists motivated by race were now
considered a ``national threat priority'' equivalent to foreign
terrorist organizations. Director Wray also testified before the Senate
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee on November 5, 2019,
that the underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism, including
racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, remain constant. What we know is
that both domestic and international terrorists are targeting the
faith-based and communal organizations and that a common thread between
them is anti-Semitism and violence directed at the Jewish community, in
particular.
Every week, there are multiple incidents reported. This week, more
than 50 Jewish community centers in 23 States received emailed bomb
threats. In this environment of perpetual threats, demand for NSGP
resources is growing. As you know, the program supports the acquisition
and installation of physical target hardening measures (i.e., access
controls, barriers, blast-proofing, monitoring and surveillance
capability, and cybersecurity enhancements), activities to advance
preparedness and prevention planning, training, exercises, and
contracted security personnel, and collaboration and engagement with
Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies.
Since its inception, the program has maintained bi-partisan support
in both the House and Senate and is thought of as an efficient and
effective means to accomplish a great deal of security enhancement and
preparedness through modest resources. As such, we are tremendously
pleased that Representatives Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ) and Peter King
(R-NY) are spearheading a House funding request letter this week to
increase the fiscal year 2021 appropriations for NSGP to $360 million.
This request, if funded, will significantly close the gap in unmet
need. Between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2019, there were more
than 11 thousand NSGP funding requests, nationally, seeking
approximately $900 million in security investments, but less than 4
thousand awards were funded in support of just over $300 million in
security investments.
In this environment, we are grateful for the bipartisan leadership
of the House Homeland Security Committee, and the subcommittees on
Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery, and Intelligence and
Counterterrorism, for holding hearings and advancing legislation to
counter the complex threats against the Jewish community and other
faith-based and communal organizations. In continuing to elevate these
concerns and prioritizing limited resources to counter these threats,
we urge you to maintain strong support for FEMA's Nonprofit Security
Grant Program.
Sincerely,
Robert B. Goldberg,
Senior Director, Legislative Affairs.
Mr. Rose. Thank you for their extraordinary, extraordinary
contribution.
With that, I thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions.
The Members of the committee may have additional questions
for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Max Rose for Jill Sanborn
Question 1. In your testimony, you stated, ``FBI interactions with
social media companies center on education and capacity building, in
line with our goal to assist companies in developing or enhancing their
terms of service to address violent extremist exploitation of their
platforms.'' Specifically, how does the FBI help ``in developing or
enhancing their terms of service to address violent extremist
exploitation of their platforms''? What criteria does the FBI use to
determine these best practices?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. In general terms, please describe the collaboration and
coordination of DHS and FBI with the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) with regard to domestic terrorism issues.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. To what extent do DHS and FBI place emphasis on open-
source intelligence when dealing with domestic terrorism? How can
focusing on these unclassified sources help to improve information
sharing with State and local law enforcement partners?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Jill Sanborn
Question. We recently heard from DHS in a briefing about the
challenges they face in distributing information to law enforcement
partners in rural communities. Please describe how the FBI is
approaching this challenge, alone and in coordination with other
Federal entities.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Elissa Slotkin for Jill Sanborn
Question 1. The number of domestic terrorist attacks in the United
States has been trending upward for several years now. In my
experience, the best way to tell whether or not Government agencies are
adapting to a changing environment is to look at the specifics of
resource allocation, and especially dollars and people. With that
context in mind, please provide annual figures for 2016-present, and
estimated for fiscal year 2021 based on the President's budget request
for the following items:
The number of employees dedicated to the problem of domestic
terrorism and white supremacist extremism compared to
international terrorism.
The number of analysts dedicated to identifying and
monitoring the on-line activities of domestic terrorists and
white supremacist extremists compared to international
terrorists.
The budget as proposed, appropriated, and expended for the
Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell and other FBI
programs designed to identify and combat domestic terrorism and
white supremacist extremism compared to programs designed to
identify and combat international terrorism.
How much agent and staff time the FBI spent on domestic
terrorism and white supremacist extremism across both the
Counterterrorism and Criminal Investigative Divisions compared
to foreign terrorism.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. The FBI has previously identified community
relationships as the most important factor in preventing domestic
terrorism.
Please provide annual figures for 2016-present for the
number of communities the FBI has contacted regarding domestic
terrorism and white supremacist extremism.
Please provide annual figures for 2016-present for the
number of communities that have reached out to the FBI
regarding domestic terrorism and white supremacist extremism.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Mark Walker for Jill Sanborn
Question 1. Understanding that case data is fluid, please clarify
the current breakdown of resources within the Counterterrorism Division
focused on international terrorism and domestic terrorism to include
the total number of cases in each category and a breakdown within each
category to the extent possible.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. There is an urgent need for reliable, public data from
the FBI and DOJ on hate crimes and terrorism arrests so that we can
better understand the threats across the U.S. homeland. What is the
status of FBI efforts to improve reporting to the Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) Program related to hate crime data collection? What
other efforts are under way to improve and encourage participating law
enforcement agency's public reporting of domestic and international
terrorism arrests and prosecutions?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Outside advocacy groups and experts have stressed the
need for more training for law enforcement and prosecutors at all
levels regarding the successful investigation and subsequent
prosecution of those who commit anti-Semitic and other domestic
extremist attacks. What efforts are under way within the FBI to ensure
that those on the front lines are provided with comprehensive training
to identify and investigate these crimes?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Max Rose for Elizabeth Neumann
Question 1. In general terms, please describe the collaboration and
coordination of DHS and FBI with the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) with regard to domestic terrorism issues.
Answer. Response is For Official Use Only.
Question 2. To what extent do DHS and FBI place emphasis on open-
source intelligence when dealing with domestic terrorism? How can
focusing on these unclassified sources help to improve information
sharing with State and local law enforcement partners?
Answer. Response is For Official Use Only.
Question 3. What lessons has DHS gleaned from tracking ISIS-related
foreign fighters that it can apply to the international travel of
foreign citizen white supremacist extremists?
Answer. Response is For Official Use Only.
Question 4. Is DHS's international engagement and component
international footprint appropriately calibrated and resourced to react
to the changing nature of the threat posed by transnational white
supremacist groups?
Answer. Response is For Official Use Only.
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Elizabeth Neumann
Question. What criteria will OTVTP use to determine which entities
will receive grant funding from the newly set-aside $10 million for
targeted violence and terrorism prevention?
What efforts are being made to include more non-governmental
organizations and academic entities, as compared to the Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) grants awarded in fiscal year 2016?
Answer. The Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) grant
program Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) was posted on March 30 and
can be found at https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-
opportunity.html?oppId=325876. We were pleased members of your
committee staff were able to join us for a teleconference briefing on
the NOFO. Relevant to the topic of this hearing, we want to note that 1
of the 3 priorities for this year's grant are projects which address
domestic terrorism.
Speaking generally, the solicitation sets up a process to fund
applicants with strong program design based on a rigorous analysis of
local resources and plans for permanently sustaining capabilities.
Specifically, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to use
the grants to fill significant prevention gaps at the local level. Such
efforts can take multiple forms. An applicant might establish a
comprehensive approach to prevention. Applicants could also use the
funds to stand up specific prevention programs to close a gap that
hinders prevention of terrorism and targeted violence. Or applicants
can seek to prevent forms of terrorism and targeted violence, such as
the Racially and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVEs) we
discussed in the hearing.
Questions From Ranking Member Mark Walker for Elizabeth Neumann
Question 1. DHS has a significant number of employees deployed
across the United States, including Protective Security Advisors,
intelligence analysists at fusion centers, and brand new TVTP
employees. How will all of these individuals be coordinated when it
comes to TVTP outreach and training?
Answer. PLCY is working in coordination with the TVTP Executive
Steering Committee (ESC) to develop a DHS Prevention Field Concept of
Operations (CONOPS) for supporting locally-based prevention frameworks.
PLCY leads the ESC to coordinate the efforts of 21 DHS offices and
components that have a role in the implementation of Goal 3 of the
Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence. The
CONOPS will:
Finalize roles and responsibilities of the OTVTP Regional
Prevention Coordinators vis-a-vis other DHS field personnel
(e.g., Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Protective Service Advisors) in carrying out prevention
activities with State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT)
partners.
Coordinate with other Federal partners with field presence
that DHS can leverage to assist in prevention; and
Ensure mechanisms are in place to harmonize and deconflict
the delivery of trainings, briefings, and information being
shared with local stakeholders.
The TVTP ESC members will encourage appropriate field personnel to
meet with Regional Prevention Coordinators to discuss implementation of
the CONOPS.
Question 2. DHS is reinvigorating the community grant program for
countering violent extremism as the Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention grant program. How will this program be different and when
do you expect to release the Notice of Proposed Funding Opportunity?
Given that programs focused on prevention are relatively new, how will
DHS build in evaluation metrics into the proposals?
Answer. DHS released the NOFO on March 30, 2020. The NOFO outlines
the new program elements, which are in part an evolution and in part a
new direction for grants supporting targeted violence and terrorism
prevention at the local level. The program is an evolution from the
fiscal year 2016 Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program in that it
makes modifications and improvements based on the promising practices
and lessons learned that OTVTP documented in its quarterly and other
reports (see https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants for these reports). The
grant program is a new direction in that it expands covered activities
to include projects that mitigate the threat of targeted violence,
therefore aligning the grant program to the objectives in Goal 3 of the
Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence.
The TVTP Grant Program is designed around a dozen project types,
each of which has required performance metrics that grantees will
collect and report as a term of their award. In designing these
required metrics, OTVTP drew upon lessons learned from the fiscal year
2016 grant program and engaged experts in the field of evaluation
science, an example of which is found in the RAND Program Evaluation
Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism (see https://www.rand.org/
pubs/tools/TL243.html). Currently, OTVTP is working with the DHS Office
of Science and Technology and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
produce a robust evaluation plan that will include independent
evaluations of a cross-section of the grantees. These steps ensure that
the fiscal year 2020 grant program will be able to provide evidence-
based answers to questions that the fiscal year 2016 program received
(and continues to receive) from OMB, Government Accountability Office,
U.S. Congress, the media, and SLTT partners about what works in
prevention.