[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NORTHERN NORTHERN BORDER: HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITIES IN THE
ARCTIC, PART II
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 5, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-59
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-304 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey John Katko, New York
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Mark Walker, North Carolina
J. Luis Correa, California Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Max Rose, New York Mark Green, Tennessee
Lauren Underwood, Illinois John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Michael Guest, Mississippi
Al Green, Texas Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Val Butler Demings, Florida
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
J. Luis Correa, California, Chairman
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Debbie Lesko, Arizona, Ranking
Dina Titus, Nevada Member
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey John Katko, New York
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Val Butler Deming, Florida Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Mike Rogers, Alabama (ex officio)
officio)
Alex Marston, Subcomittee Staff Director
Kyle Klein, Minority Subcomittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Debbie Lesko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Michael J. Murphy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European
and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Ms. Marie A. Mak, Director for Contracting & National Security
Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
THE NORTHERN NORTHERN BORDER: HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITIES IN THE
ARCTIC, PART II
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Wednesday, February 5, 2020
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation
and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. J. Correa
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Correa, Cleaver, Lesko, Katko,
Bishop, and Drew.
Mr. Correa. This committee will now come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the Northern Northern Border: Homeland Security Priorities in
the Arctic, Part II. Without objection, the Chair is authorized
to declare the subcommittee in recess at any point.
I want to thank the Ranking Member Lesko and our panel of
witnesses for joining us today, and I am going to take the
credit, but I am going to give credit where credit is due. The
Coast Guard had asked us to do this set of hearings on this
issue months ago, and I think it is a good call. So thank you
for bringing this issue to our attention.
Today, we will discuss the U.S. Homeland Security
priorities in the Arctic following a productive hearing with
non-Government issues on this witness in September. We have
seen the Arctic climate changing with diminishing ice openings
and with maritime activity increasing in parts of the world
that were essentially unnavigable and untouched in years
before. It seems that we are ill-prepared for the changes
brought about by a warmer climate in the Arctic.
I am very concerned about the number of aggressive actions
of other nations in the region, especially China and Russia. We
in the United States, we have had a long history of supporting
an internal rules-based order in order to foster a spirit of
cooperation in the Arctic states. But in recent years, we have
seen Russia expand its military installation in the area and
expand its activities in the Arctic. They have invested heavily
in assets to increase their maritime operations.
Russia has the largest, or I should say a large fleet of
icebreakers that numbers more than 50 and more on the way.
China, that is more than 1,000 miles away from the area, has
declared itself a near-Arctic state and is investing
strategically in other Arctic nations to increase its presence
and influence in the area.
Russia and China seek economic interest in the region, rely
heavily on opening up potential trade routes in the area as ice
shelves continue to diminish. A new northern sea route would
shorten the trip from east Asia to the western Europe area by
more than 13,000 miles. Such a route would allow China to ship
goods to Europe 2 weeks faster, I should say, than they can do
it today. Russia has begun to demand a fee from ships to travel
through international waters along the Northern Sea route over
which it claims ownership.
Along with new and additional maritime activities, melted
ice in the Arctic will increase economic activities such as
tourism, fisheries, energy exploration, infrastructure
development, as well as other areas presenting major challenges
to the United States. We must ensure development is sustainable
with minimal environmental impacts and that it supports local
communities, including the indigenous people.
The presence of the Coast Guard, your presence in the
Arctic and the State Department's diplomatic efforts to protect
international cooperation will be critical to protecting our
interests in the region. The Coast Guard's mission in the
Arctic include regulation of shipping, fishing law, and ports
of security, search and rescue, and support of scientific
research. The Coast Guard is responsible for maintaining a U.S.
presence in our territorial waters and defending our security
and economic interests in the region.
Right now, the Coast Guard is hampered by its Arctic
mission because it only has 2 polar icebreakers and only one of
which is a heavy-duty icebreaker.
Congress has provided funding in 2019 for the Coast Guard
to begin construction of its first new polar security cutter, a
good initial investment in improving the Coast Guard's
capabilities. But the Coast Guard has stated that 6 polar
security cutters will be necessary to successfully execute its
mission in the Arctic.
Congress must continue to emphasize its supporting efforts
with the Coast Guard and your needs as we will continue to
value the Government Accountability's Office assistance in
ensuring appropriate oversight of these acquisition programs.
In the mean time, the Coast Guard will need to use other
resources and capabilities to meet its mission in the Arctic.
The lack of adequate Coast Guard resources will make the State
Department's diplomatic work all that more important.
Unfortunately, just when American leadership and
cooperation in the Arctic is needed on the international stage,
we have chosen to eliminate the State Department's position of
the Special Representative for the Arctic.
I look forward to hearing from the State Department and how
it is ensuring appropriate leadership in the Arctic issues
despite the loss of that position.
My opinion, we need to invest more in our capabilities in
the Arctic, not less, in order to ensure that the Coast Guard,
the State Department, and its Government partners can secure
the homeland at our northernmost border.
I look forward to our discussion today, and I will now
recognize the Ranking Member Lesko, of this subcommittee, for
an opening statement.
[The statement of Chairman Correa follows:]
Statement of Chairman Lou Correa
February 5, 2020
Today's hearing will discuss U.S. homeland security priorities in
the Arctic, following a productive hearing with non-Government
witnesses on this topic last September. Already we have seen the
Arctic's climate changing--with diminishing ice opening up maritime
activity in a part of the world that was largely unnavigable and
untouched. It seems the Federal Government is ill-prepared for the
changes brought about a warmer climate in the Arctic. I am very
concerned about the number of aggressive actions of other nations in
this region, primarily those of Russia and China. The United States has
a long history of supporting an international rules-based order in the
spirit of cooperation by all Arctic states. In recent years we have
seen Russia expand its military installations and activities in the
Arctic, investing heavily in assets to increase its maritime
operations. Russia has a large icebreaker fleet of more than 50
icebreakers, with more on the way.
China, located 1,000 miles away from the Arctic, has declared
itself a ``near-Arctic state'' and is investing strategically in other
Arctic nations to increase its presence and influence in the region.
Russia and China's economic interests in the region rely on opening
potential trade routes in the Arctic as ice shelves continue to
diminish. A new Northern Sea Route would shorten the trip from East
Asia and Western Europe from 13,000 miles to 8,000 miles. Such a route
would allow China to ship goods to Europe 2 weeks faster than it can
now. Furthermore, Russia has begun to demand a fee from ships to travel
through international waters along the Northern Sea Route over which it
claims ownership.
Along with new and additional maritime activities, melted ice in
the Arctic will increase economic activities such as tourism,
fisheries, energy exploration, and infrastructure development,
presenting major challenges. We must ensure development is sustainable,
with minimal environmental impact, that it supports local communities,
including indigenous people. The Coast Guard's presence in the Arctic
and the State Department's diplomatic efforts to protect international
cooperation will both be critical to protecting U.S. interests in the
region. The Coast Guard's missions in the Arctic include regulation of
shipping and fishing, law enforcement, port security, search and
rescue, and support of scientific research. The Coast Guard is
responsible for maintaining a U.S. presence in our territorial waters
and defending our security and economic interests in the region. Right
now, the Coast Guard is hampered in its Arctic mission because it has
only 2 polar icebreakers--only 1 of which is a heavy-duty icebreaker.
Congress provided funding in 2019 for the Coast Guard to begin
construction of its first new Polar Security Cutter--a good initial
investment in improving the Coast Guard's capabilities. But the Coast
Guard has stated that 6 Polar Security Cutters will be necessary to
successfully execute its missions in the Arctic. Congress must continue
to prioritize supporting the Coast Guard's urgent needs, and we will
continue to value the Government Accountability Office's assistance in
ensuring appropriate oversight of these acquisition programs. In the
mean time, the Coast Guard will need to use other resources and
capabilities to meet its Arctic mission to the best of its ability.
Additionally, the lack of adequate Coast Guard resources will make the
State Department's diplomatic work all the more important.
Unfortunately, just when American leadership and cooperation on the
Arctic is needed on the international stage, the administration has
chosen to eliminate the State Department position of the Special
Representative for the Arctic.
I look forward to hearing from the State Department how it is
ensuring appropriate leadership on Arctic issues despite the loss of
that position. We need to invest more in our capabilities in the
Arctic--not less--in order to ensure that the Coast Guard, the State
Department, and its Government partners can secure the homeland at our
northernmost border.
Mr. Correa. Mrs. Lesko.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have to say I
thought your opening statement was spot-on, and we have
bipartisan agreement. In this whole partisan culture that is
going on, I welcome bipartisan agreement on an issue. I also
want to welcome a new Member to our subcommittee,
Representative Van Drew. Welcome.
Mr. Correa. Welcome, Mr. Van Drew. We do need another
dentist on this committee.
Mr. Van Drew. No such thing as too many dentists.
Mrs. Lesko. There you go.
Well, I am pleased to see the subcommittee meeting today to
gain additional perspectives on this important topic facing the
United States' National security. Our previous hearing on the
Arctic gave the subcommittee valuable stakeholder perspectives
on the Homeland Security implications of a changing strategic
dynamic in the region, and I look forward to hearing today how
the U.S. Coast Guard and State Department are responding.
The many international, legal, economic, scientific, and
security challenges facing the Arctic present a complex set of
issues that require close interagency collaboration and a
united effort to work with our partners and present strength to
our adversaries. I hope to hear today how the Coast Guard and
State Department are working together to advance U.S. interests
and what work is being done with our allies and partners.
As we heard from our witnesses at the first hearing on this
topic, the Arctic is quickly becoming a region in which
commerce comes face-to-face with great power competition. The
United States must work to protect its interests in
international norms surrounding freedom of navigation. For this
reason, I am eager to hear from our panel today about what
resources are needed to accomplish a diverse and critical
mission set and what additional implications for Homeland
Security we can examine.
The Coast Guard is the sole operator of America's polar
capable fleet, thus placing the service at a critical center of
maintaining U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic.
However, this reality also requires us to understand the
Coast Guard's limitations related to an aging fleet consisting
of a single heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star, which as we all
know, suffers from age-related mechanical issues. I am pleased
that Congress has finally funded a new polar security cutter
and has begun funding for preparation of another.
However, it is incumbent upon us to continue advocating for
the resources and infrastructure needed by our men and women in
uniform. As we ask more and more of the Coast Guard in the
Arctic, we should be steadfast in our commitment to the service
and its needs, and so I am glad that we are in agreement on
this issue, Mr. Chairman.
The Homeland Security implications of a changing Arctic
dynamic present both challenges and opportunities for the
United States, and I am glad that the subcommittee is ensuring
that we are part of the conversation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to our witnesses today.
I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Lesko follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Debbie Lesko
Feb. 5, 2020
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to see the subcommittee
meeting today to gain additional perspectives on this important topic
facing U.S. National security. Our previous hearing on the Arctic gave
the subcommittee valuable stakeholder perspectives on the homeland
security implications of a changing strategic dynamic in the region,
and I look forward to hearing today how the U.S. Coast Guard and State
Department are responding.
The many international legal, economic, scientific, and security
challenges facing the Arctic present a complex set of issues that
require close interagency collaboration and a united effort to work
with our partners and present strength to our adversaries. I hope to
hear today how the Coast Guard and State Department are working
together to advance U.S. interests and what work is being done with our
allies and partners.
As we heard from our witnesses at the first hearing on this topic,
the Arctic is quickly becoming a region in which commerce comes face-
to-face with great power competition. The United States must work to
protect its interest and international norms surrounding freedom of
navigation. For this reason, I am eager to hear from our panel today
about what resources are needed to accomplish a diverse and critical
mission set and what additional implications for homeland security we
can examine.
The Coast Guard is the sole operator of America's polar-capable
fleet, thus placing the service at the critical center of maintaining
U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic. However, this reality also requires us
to understand the Coast Guard's limitations related to an aging fleet
consisting of a single heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star, which suffers
from age-related mechanical issues. I am pleased that Congress has
finally funded a new Polar Security Cutter and has begun funding for
preparation of another; however, it is incumbent upon us to continue
advocating for the resources and infrastructure needed by our men and
women in uniform. As we ask more and more of the Coast Guard in the
Arctic, we should be steadfast in our commitment to the service and its
needs.
The homeland security implications of a changing Arctic dynamic
present both challenges and opportunities for the United States, and I
am glad that the subcommittee is ensuring that we are part of the
conversation. Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mrs. Lesko. Members are reminded
that statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
February 5, 2020
I would like to thank Chairman Correa and Ranking Member Lesko for
holding today's hearing on homeland security priorities in the Arctic--
our Nation's northernmost border. I also would like to thank today's
witnesses for sharing their valuable expertise. Under the current
administration, a great deal of attention has been focused on our
Southern Border. One thing that I appreciate about this committee,
however, is our ability to simultaneously examine the vast range of
security matters facing the homeland.
Among these matters is the U.S. Coast Guard's mission to secure and
protect the maritime domain--which includes U.S. Arctic waters. Many
forget that the United States is, after all, an Arctic nation, given
the geography of Alaska. The vastness of U.S. Arctic waters and a
changing environment place increasing demands on the Coast Guard. The
Coast Guard has identified its responsibilities in the Arctic as
ensuring ``the homeland security, safety, and environmental stewardship
of U.S. waters.'' Executing this mission in the region is becoming more
difficult, as the Arctic's strategic importance is growing, and
maritime activity is increasing.
Studies show this increase in maritime activity is linked directly
to climate change, as global warming has caused an overall decrease in
the duration and thickness of sea ice coverage. Warmer temperatures are
also inviting a rise in recreational activity and offshore exploration
of natural resources. In addition to climate change, the Coast Guard
has had to contend with the increased presence and aggression of
geopolitical actors, like Russia and China, in the region. Both nations
have identified increased presence in the Arctic as a strategic
priority, motivated in part by the potential economic benefits that
Arctic shipping routes could bring. Russia is increasing its military
presence in the Arctic, building on what is already the world's largest
number of icebreakers. With almost 50 icebreakers, Russia has the
capabilities, personnel, and infrastructure needed to operate in the
Arctic year-round.
China has likewise shown its Arctic ambitions, directing Chinese
companies and Government agencies to maintain an increased presence in
the region to help create what it calls a ``Polar Silk Road.'' China
has also announced its first domestically-built icebreaker and plans
for a nuclear-powered icebreaker. As we learn about the emerging
capabilities of other geopolitical actors in the region, I am concerned
about the Coast Guard's capability gaps in the Arctic--including a need
for additional icebreakers and long-range patrol vessels. The Coast
Guard currently has just one heavy polar icebreaker, the Polar Star,
and one medium icebreaker, the Healy. The Polar Star is well past its
service life and conducts missions in Antarctica--not the Arctic.
Thankfully, Congress has made significant investments in building
new Coast Guard assets, including funds to begin construction on a new
Polar Security Cutter. This first Polar Security Cutter will replace
the Polar Star and its responsibilities in the Antarctic; only a second
Polar Security Cutter to be delivered in 2025 or later would finally
provide the Coast Guard with icebreaking capabilities in the Arctic. It
is evident that the Coast Guard, and the U.S. Government as a whole,
has some catching up to do to be able to protect U.S. interests in the
Arctic. Without increased attention and investment in the strategies,
resources, and personnel needed to operate at our northernmost border,
the Coast Guard will risk falling further behind. I look forward to
hearing from today's witnesses about homeland security priorities in
the Arctic and how Congress can best support the Government's critical
missions in the region.
Mr. Correa. I will welcome our panel of witnesses.
Our first witness, Admiral Charles Ray, is the vice
commandant of the United States Coast Guard. I welcome you,
sir, and I recognize you for 5 minutes of comments. You may
begin.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY, VICE COMMANDANT, U.S.
COAST GUARD
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Good morning, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko,
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. On behalf of Admiral
Shields and all the women and men of the United States Coast
Guard, I want to thank you for your unwavering support of our
service.
Arctic is growing increasingly important, and I appreciate
the opportunity to appear today and discuss the Coast Guard's
proactive strategy to advance U.S. National security interests
in the region. I ask that my previous written testimony be
entered into the record.
Mr. Correa. Without objection, sir.
Admiral Ray. Thank you, sir.
For over 150 years, your Coast Guard has been America's
primary maritime presence in the Arctic, and the demand for our
services is intensifying. As a result, the opening waters in
America's northern coast commercial opportunities range from
fishing to energy production, rare mineral extraction, cruise
operations, ecotourism abound. There is an overall increase in
human activity in this region, and it indicates the need for
increasing Coast Guard presence. Also, this combination of
events has led to the opportunity for nations, other nations,
to seek to shape the security environment, expand their
influence, and advance their own interests.
As was stated by the Chairman, Russia's got the world's
largest icebreaker fleet by large. Its ability to visibly
project force, coupled with the renewed interest in their
infrastructure in the Arctic region and increase in military
activities, are indicative of the strategic significance they
place on the region.
As was also stated, China, a non-Arctic state, not even
within 900 miles, is also investing heavily in the Arctic. They
are emblematic of their global influence campaign. Whether from
Africa to South America, anywhere on the planet you put it,
they are working from the same playbook.
This year, China took delivery of its first domestically-
built icebreaker, Xuelong 2. They had the Xuelong 1 which they
obtained from Ukraine and refitted, and so within about 2
years, they are going to surpass the United States in their
icebreaker capability. If left unchecked, China and Russia's
behavior risks fracturing the tenuous stability and rules-based
governance in the Arctic.
To address the Nation's expanding National security needs
and built on our 150 years of experience, the Coast Guard
published an updated Arctic strategic outlook in April 2019
which reaffirms our commitment to promoting U.S. leadership in
the region and preserving a peaceful, cooperative, rules-based
region.
As you all have stated, leadership begins with presence,
and that is a challenge. Our Nation's icebreaking fleet is
aging, and we do not have the capacity to cover where we think
we should be at the present time. But thanks to this
subcommittee, the Congress, and the administration, we have
turned the corner on that, and I am really pleased that we have
started to rebuild our polar security cutter fleet.
Leadership in this region also requires operations in
communities, ports, and waters, and we demonstrate this yearly
through an operation called Arctic Shield. It is mobile, it is
scalable, and we connect with the indigenous people of the
region and participate in all of our other missions.
As many nations aspire to expand their roles, the Coast
Guard, we work collaboratively with these multi-lateral
international organizations and work with the State Department
and particularly with the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and we
participate in things that we can agree on, fisheries and
pollution response and things like that, so that is a look in
the right direction.
However, to continue to protect our region, we need other
assets up there to improve communication, maritime domain
awareness, navigation. I was up on the cutter Healy north of
the North Slope about 60 miles. For almost a month this past
summer, and there were 7 up there, they were without any
communications other than HF radio. I mean, they were literally
off the grid. That takes a whole-of-Government approach, and I
am sure we will be able to do that.
In summary, a strong United States Coast Guard empowers the
Nation to lead in the Arctic and shape the region as a safe,
cooperative, and prosperous domain. I thank you for your
support and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ray follows:]
Statement of Admiral Charles W. Ray
February 5, 2020
introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here to discuss the U.S. Coast
Guard's strategy and operations to safeguard National security
interests and advance safe, secure, and environmentally responsible
maritime activity in the Arctic Region.
The Coast Guard has been operating in the Arctic Ocean since 1867,
when the United States purchased Alaska from Russia. Since that time,
the state of affairs in the Arctic has evolved significantly. The ice
is receding; storms are increasing in frequency and magnitude; the
coast is eroding; and permafrost is thawing. Alaskan residents are
striving to evolve their resiliency and to sustain their culture and
way of life while residents and non-residents alike are pursuing
emerging opportunities. For the Coast Guard, the demand signal for our
services is expanding along with the operational environment,
exacerbating the tyranny of distance of the region. The types of
commercial activity are morphing, from oil and gas exploration a few
years ago to the recent surge in cruise ship activity and expanding
environmental tourism. These rapid changes in types and location of
activity, along with the changes in the physical environment, magnify
the challenges in executing the Service's mission to advance safety,
security, sovereign rights, and stewardship across the Arctic.
Simultaneously, the geopolitical environment is rapidly changing as
state and non-state actors seek to advance their own interests in the
Arctic. Allies, partners, and competitors alike increasingly compete
for diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage. The National Defense
Strategy describes a world no longer at either peace or war but rather
one of enduring great power competition.
Shaping and influencing this competition continuum requires a
mixture of diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial,
intelligence, and law enforcement efforts to achieve and sustain
National strategic objectives. As the only U.S. Armed Force with both
military and law enforcement authorities, combined with membership in
the intelligence community, the Coast Guard seamlessly bridges the
layers across this continuum. Specifically, the Coast Guard's
constabulary function and broad authorities serve as a critical bridge
between the hard-power lethality of the Defense Department and soft-
power diplomacy of the State Department. This strategic versatility is
well-suited for operating in ambiguous environments. This makes the
Coast Guard a unique agency to cultivate strong international
relationships and build a coalition of Arctic partners based on mutual
interests and values that strengthen regional stability and enhance
prosperity across the region.
Our recently published 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms the
Service's commitment to advancing and protecting National security
interests in the region through American leadership, partnership, unity
of effort, and continuous innovation. The Outlook establishes 3 lines
of effort to achieve long-term success. First, we will enhance
capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic domain; second,
we will strengthen the rules-based order; and third, we will innovate
and adapt to promote resilience and foster prosperity. Meeting the
Nation's needs and interests to secure the Arctic requires significant
investment and a whole-of-Government approach across multiple
Departments, agencies, and services. The Coast Guard's value in this
whole-of-Government approach is our experience, leadership, model
behavior, and ability to compete below the level of armed conflict.
Therefore, strengthening the Coast Guard empowers the Nation to secure
the Arctic against threats and shape the region as a safe, cooperative,
and prosperous domain.
national security interests in the arctic region
The United States is an Arctic nation with extensive sovereign
rights and responsibilities, and our National security interests in the
Arctic are significant, in part due to the reemergence of great power
competition in the region. As access to the region evolves, many Arctic
and non-Arctic nations aspire to assert or expand their role in
governing the region; the dynamic operational environment continues to
present risks and opportunities for a broad spectrum of stakeholders.
To safeguard our National interests, the United States must plan for a
robust, year-round maritime presence commensurate with the expanding
interest in the Arctic's strategic value, in its natural resources, and
in its potential as a transportation corridor between Asia, Europe, and
North America. If we are not vigilant and proactive, other Arctic and
non-Arctic nations will outpace us in assuring their strategic
interests in the region in ways that may adversely affect the United
States' interests.
Actions and intentions of Arctic and non-Arctic nations shape the
security environment and geopolitical stability of the region. In
particular, our 2 near-peer competitors, Russia and China, are
demonstrably intent on exploiting the maritime domain to advance their
interests. Twenty percent of Russia's landmass is north of the Arctic
Circle, and both onshore and offshore resource (minerals, oil, and gas)
development is crucial to the Russian economy. Russia is also advancing
the growth of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for trans-Arctic shipping
and other commercial opportunities.
The NSR continues to set new shipping records, last year reaching
29 million tons of goods transported along the route. Natural resource
extraction is the main contributor to these increases, predominantly
oil and gas shipments from their Yamal facilities. If their energy
projections come to fruition, then transport volumes on the NSR could
reach 100 million tons per year by 2030.
From a military perspective, Russia's long Arctic coastline, once
stripped of sea ice in the future, will be both vulnerable, and able to
support naval fleets readily deployable between the Atlantic and
Pacific. The Russian government is currently rebuilding and expanding
military bases that had previously fallen into disuse. These renewed
capabilities include air bases, ports, weapons systems, troop
deployments, domain awareness tools, and search-and-rescue response.
Additionally, Russia has the world's largest number of icebreakers.
With over 50 icebreakers that include 4 operational, nuclear-powered
heavy icebreakers, and plans to build an additional 7 nuclear-powered
icebreakers, Russia maintains the capabilities, capacities, experienced
crews, and infrastructure necessary to operate and surge into the
Arctic year-round.
China, a non-Arctic nation, has recently taken an active role in
Arctic development, pursuing economic investments with every Arctic
nation in key strategic areas, such as oil and gas development, ports,
railways, and infrastructure. It has purchased numerous resource
deposits throughout the region, including uranium, energy, and rare-
earth elements. With the release of their Arctic Policy paper in
January 2018, China declared itself a nation intrinsically tied to the
Arctic, and signaled their intention to play a security and governance
role in the region. China has directed Chinese companies and government
agencies to become more involved in Arctic affairs, and is rapidly
developing its ability to operate in the region. This year, China
launched its first home-built icebreaker and has begun designing an
even more powerful and potentially nuclear-powered Polar icebreaker
expected to have twice the icebreaking capability of its newest vessel.
With 3 icebreakers China will have greater access than the United
States currently has to the Arctic, its ports, and its resources. The
concern with Chinese activities in the Arctic is the potential to
disrupt the cooperation and stability in the region. Around the globe,
China uses coercion, influence operations, debt-trap diplomacy, and
implied military threats to persuade other states to heed China's
strategic agenda. China views the Arctic as a component of its One
Belt, One Road initiative, recently dubbed the Polar Silk Road. China's
ambitions and outreach are fraught with risk, often times diminishing
the sovereignty of states and fracturing the rules-based governance
currently employed in the region.
National security interests extend to the local level as well. For
example, economic, environmental, and human security and stewardship
are also linked to the changes and expanding activity in the Arctic.
Significant increases in natural resource extraction in the U.S. Arctic
have not yet materialized, but industries continue to explore
opportunities so that they are positioned to leverage economic
prospects as they emerge. Current industry growth in the Arctic
includes a significant increase in cruise tourism and transpolar
flights, which could potentially increase search-and-rescue missions
and risk to the pristine environment. Additionally, we have observed
steady but measured growth of shipping through the Bering Strait over
the past 10 years, across all sectors of industry. As the Arctic
continues to experience longer and larger periods of reduced or ice-
free conditions, commercial interest and exploitation will grow. A
recent U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System report
projects that by 2030, vessel traffic through the Bering Strait could
increase to more than 370 transits, which is roughly 3 times the 2008
traffic levels. This potential rise will increase the demand for the
Coast Guard to monitor, protect, and regulate increased maritime
activity, such as de-conflicting shipping corridors in U.S. waters with
subsistence hunting and fishing communities.
Food security is another significant issue for Arctic residents and
our Nation as a whole. The Bering Sea provides more than half of the
wild-caught fish and shellfish in the United States, and the wildlife
for subsistence harvesting. Alaska is ranked seventh in the world in
global fish exporters, and their seafood industry accounts for almost
$6 billion a year in total economic activity. Additionally,
approximately 70 percent of the U.S. Arctic population relies on
subsistence hunting and fishing for survival, the vast majority of
which comes from the sea. Thus, changes occurring in the Arctic Ocean
are increasing the risk to food security for the globe, from shipping
that disrupts migration patterns, to increased risk of pollution
incidents, to growth in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing as
fish stocks migrate.
As human activity continues to increase in the Arctic region,
challenges associated with legal and illicit activity plus state and
non-state actors are likely to increase. In the face of this
competition continuum, the Coast Guard's value proposition is even more
critical in the Arctic and around the globe. The Service upholds
freedom of the seas and the rules-based order by setting and enforcing
standards of behavior in the maritime domain.
balancing national security interests across the globe
The Coast Guard possesses a broad suite of authorities and
capabilities unique from the other armed services and traditional
instruments of National power. As previously noted, the Coast Guard's
authorities expand beyond traditional military and intelligence roles,
to include law enforcement and regulatory roles. This combination,
along with a multitude of steady-state international bilateral
agreements, offers a distinct compliment to conventional defense forces
in the on-going struggle to compete below the level of armed conflict.
Coast Guard international engagements complement more traditional
U.S. military posturing. Regular and persistent Coast Guard presence
and peaceful engagements support regional stability while positioning
the United States as the global maritime security partner of choice.
The Coast Guard operates around the world in accordance with over 60
international bilateral agreements, to include 11 with Oceania nations.
Furthermore, the Service is also party to and, in many cases,
serves in a leading capacity within a variety of multilateral forums
including the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, Arctic Coast Guard
Forum, South East Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Cooperation, and the
Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. This combination of
access, authorities, and international acceptance, offers an
indispensable opportunity of regional support and stability in this new
era of competing influence.
As the world's preeminent coast guard, the U.S. Coast Guard is
logically the most suited to build partner capacity in maritime law
enforcement, search and rescue, marine safety, fisheries management,
and conservation--all of which are traditional Coast Guard missions.
These missions, incidentally, are in growing demand across the globe.
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, in particular, is a
priority issue impacting global stability, in the Atlantic, across the
Pacific, and even in Antarctica, where many economies heavily depend on
local fish stocks as a primary source of protein and personal income.
The Service, through its internationally-recognized maritime law
enforcement expertise and a multitude of bilateral and related ship
rider agreements, offers viable options to augment partner nation law
enforcement capacity to patrol their respective exclusive economic
zones. These efforts are essential to preserving, protecting, and
defending critical regional and migratory fish stock sustainability and
economic vitality while simultaneously countering the malign influence
and predatory practices of globally-spread powers such as China.
the coast guard in alaska and the arctic region
As stated, our 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms our
commitment to American leadership in the region and articulates the
ends, ways, and means to promote and safeguard National security in the
Arctic. This includes waging a campaign for safety, all sovereign
rights, and stewardship through cooperation; addressing competition
below the level of conflict; and preparing for conflict should it
arise. The following highlights some of the initiatives that have
particular impacts on our National and international security, but
these activities must be part of an integrated, whole-of-Government
approach to security in the Arctic.
strategic leadership
As many nations and other stakeholders across the world aspire to
expand their roles and activities in the Arctic, the Coast Guard is
working collaboratively through international bodies to address the
emerging challenges and opportunities in the region. One example is our
support to the Arctic Council, which is a high-level international
forum focused primarily on environmental protection and sustainable
development issues in the Arctic region. The Council is composed of the
8 Arctic nations, 6 Arctic indigenous groups, observer nations
(including China), and non-governmental organizations that have
observer status. The Coast Guard plays a significant role in supporting
our Nation's existing engagement in Arctic Council activities through
representation on 2 standing working groups--Emergency Prevention,
Preparedness & Response (EPPR), and Protection of the Arctic Marine
Environment (PAME).
Under the EPPR working group, the Coast Guard leads the U.S.
Government delegation and serves as Chair of the Marine Environmental
Response Experts Group. Within PAME, the Coast Guard participates in
the Shipping Experts Group where we support projects such as mitigation
of risks associated with the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil by
vessels in the Arctic. The Coast Guard also served on the Council's
Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation and has been active in other
task forces that established the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue
Agreement, the 2013 Oil Spill Prevention and Response Agreement, and
the 2015 Framework for Oil Pollution Prevention.
The Coast Guard has also supported Arctic safety through other
international bodies such as the International Maritime Organization
(IMO). The Coast Guard was instrumental in the IMO's development and
adoption of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters
(Polar Code) to cover the design, construction, equipment, operational,
training, and environmental protection matters relevant to ships
operating in the Polar regions. In 2017, the Coast Guard completed a
rulemaking process to issue Polar Ship Certificates to U.S. vessels. We
also developed and promulgated guidance to industry and our Captains-
of-the-Port on how to ensure compliance with the Polar Code.
Additionally, in November 2017, the Coast Guard collaborated with
the Russian Federation to jointly develop and submit a proposal to the
IMO to establish a system of two-way routes in the Bering Strait and
Bering Sea. The Coast Guard also submitted an associated proposal to
establish ``Areas to be Avoided'' in 3 environmentally-sensitive areas.
The objective was to advance the maritime transportation system in the
region; promote the safe, responsible flow of commerce; and de-conflict
the commercial uses of the waterways with subsistence activities. The
IMO adopted these measures at the 99th session of its Maritime Safety
Committee, and the provisions entered into force in December 2018.
These are but two examples of the Coast Guard being proactive in
addressing emerging international and domestic maritime concerns in the
Arctic.
Last, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) is a bridge between
diplomacy and operations. Formally established in October 2015, the
ACGF operationalizes all of the elements of our Arctic strategy as well
as the objectives of the Arctic Council. It is a unique, action-
oriented maritime governance forum where the Coast Guard and our peer
agencies from the other 7 Arctic nations strengthen relationships,
identify lessons learned, share best practices, carry out exercises,
conduct combined operations, and coordinate emergency response
missions.
In April 2019, the ACGF conducted its second live exercise,
POLARIS, which incorporated 6 ships and 5 aircraft from the ACGF member
nations to respond to a simulated cruise ship in distress near Finland.
The exercise was a successful demonstration of combined operations with
the 8 ACGF nations and highlights the criticality of coordination in
maritime environmental response and the responsibility to ensure
search-and-rescue resources are prepared to respond.
coast guard operations in the american arctic
Operation ARCTIC SHIELD is the Coast Guard's year-round planning
and operational endeavor that provides a flexible, mobile, and scalable
presence in the Arctic domain. In 2019, ARCTIC SHIELD (AS19) operations
advanced National and Coast Guard strategic goals by aligning
operations to mitigate real-world threats and leverage opportunities of
strategic interest.
To promote regional resilience and strengthen the maritime
transportation system, the Coast Guard spearheaded a Marine Safety Task
Force (MSTF) to conduct missions in the remote regions of their Area of
Responsibility (AOR). Employing active and reserve surge personnel, the
MSTF deployed to and engaged with 102 local communities to perform
marine safety and marine environmental protection missions in villages
not on the road system in the Arctic and Western Alaska. In addition to
the summer surge support, a major contributor to the MSTF success has
been its partnerships: The Civil Air Patrol transportation saved
valuable resources and allowed personnel to transit more seamlessly
between remote villages.
The MSTF teams inspected over 60 percent of the region's 380
regulated bulk oil facilities--a massive improvement over the prior
annual average of 12 percent. Frequent inspections and proactive
communications between the Coast Guard and facility operators will
reduce the environmental risk to remote communities, help remote
villages build capacity to respond, and set baselines for resilience
and awareness as their environment rapidly changes.
From July to October, MH-60 helicopters and crews deployed to
Forward Operating Location Kotzebue and to Utqiagvik to conduct Coast
Guard missions. This year, those helicopters completed 25 SAR cases,
saved 13 lives, and assisted 28 others in an environment harsher than
anywhere else the Coast Guard operates. Additionally these assets
improved the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness in the Arctic and
provided critical support to Federal and State personnel studying
marine mammals. The Coast Guard partnered with DoD to leverage their
strategic lift capabilities to deploy the assets to Kotzebue and the
North Slope. Additionally, when the helicopters made the unplanned
shift to Utqiagvik in September, the Coast Guard leveraged a long-
standing positive partnership with the North Slope Borough to gain
critical hanger space and logistical support on short notice. The Coast
Guard would not have been able to complete its scheduled deployment to
the Arctic and provide SAR coverage to North Slope mariners without the
efforts and support from both. The Coast Guard departed Utqiagvik on
October 31, 2019, but subsistence whale hunting extended beyond the
traditional season. This highlights the changing operational
environment not only for the Coast Guard but also for Arctic residents.
The lengthened ``shoulder'' seasons of open water are beyond the period
in which the Coast Guard has the resources to be present. Without the
Coast Guard's highly mobile expeditionary forces, risk to mariners and
coastal residents will escalate as maritime activity and traffic
expands throughout the vast Arctic.
AS19 exercised the Coast Guard's expeditionary capability by
deploying a team from our Deployable Specialized Forces in California
to conduct shore-based law enforcement operations for the Kotzebue
salmon state fishery that consists of nearly 100 small open skiffs. The
enforcement operation reinforced several years of extensive marine
prevention outreach, education, and training with these fishers.
Planning and executing this mission highlighted the logistical and
administrative challenges involved in supporting mission execution in
the Arctic. This deployed law enforcement team provided 3 weeks of on-
water presence and contacted 59 commercial fishing vessels and
conducted 27 boardings with 5 voyage terminations. The operation
bolstered community support from the mayor and local fishermen and
rallied the community to improve their own safety and survivability at
sea.
In the absence of a consistent law enforcement presence in the
region, the Coast Guard must develop and exercise expeditionary
capability to project surface forces into the Arctic as the weather
patterns are less predictable and maritime activity continues to
evolve. This team's employment points to the urgent need to modernize
assets, infrastructure, and platforms to effectively operate and
provide presence in the Arctic.
In 2020, operations will be supported with cutter, aircraft, and
shoreside presence across Western and Northern Alaska. Specific
activities include establishing a regional SAR response capability,
conducting boardings to promote fishing vessel safety, facility and
vessel inspections, gold dredge fleet inspections, maritime safety
compliance enforcement, and ice rescue training.
Planned activities also include testing and improving oil spill
preparedness and response capabilities, conducting a commercial
aircraft crash-related mass rescue exercise, and completing a joint
maritime pollution contingency exercise with international partners.
Year-round outreach efforts will continue to deliver education and
awareness services to Arctic communities and outlying native villages.
As presence equals influence, the Coast Guard must continue to
evaluate options to advance our 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook as well
as National interests in the region. The resurgence of nation-state
competition over the past 5-10 years has coincided with the dramatic
changes in the physical environment of the Arctic. This reality has
elevated the Arctic's prominence as a strategically competitive space.
The Coast Guard, and the Nation, have limited means to respond to,
intercept, or collect information on vessels operating in the Arctic
region.
icebreaking capacity and acquisition status
The ability for the United States to lead in the Arctic, both
strategically and operationally, hinges on having the capabilities and
capacity (presence) to protect our National sovereignty and safeguard
our homeland security interests. The foundation of the Coast Guard's
operational presence and influence is U.S. icebreakers, whose purpose
is to provide assured, year-round access to the polar regions for
executing National security missions within existing Coast Guard
authorities.
Our heavy icebreakers must be fully interoperable with DoD,
international allies, and partners to optimally carry out National
maritime homeland defense and homeland security missions. Thus, they
will include sufficient space, weight, and power to conduct the full
complement of multi-mission activities that support our Nation's
current and future National security interests in the Arctic.
The 2010 High Latitude Mission Analysis Report (HL MAR) identified
the need for 6 new polar icebreakers (at least 3 of which must be
heavy) under the assumption that, in the future, the Coast Guard would
be required to perform 9 of its 11 statutory missions year-round in the
Arctic, and meet all icebreaking needs in support of the United States
Antarctic Program.
In 2017, the Coast Guard's Center for Arctic Study and Policy
completed an addendum to the HL MAR. The objectives were to provide a
broad overview of changes in the polar regions over the last 7 years
and to provide specific information for use in determining potential
impacts on mission areas in the polar regions. This addendum provides
confidence in the original findings and encourages the sustained
reliance on its initial recommendations on the Nation's need for 6
icebreakers, 3 of which must be heavy icebreakers.
The current Coast Guard icebreaker capacity is 1 heavy polar
icebreaker, CGC POLAR STAR--commissioned in 1976, and 1 medium
icebreaker, CGC HEALY--commissioned in 2000. The primary differences
between heavy and medium icebreakers are endurance and power. The Coast
Guard considers a heavy icebreaker to be one that can break at least 6
feet of ice at a continuous speed of 3 knots and operate year-round in
the Arctic, with the necessary systems and endurance to protect its
crew in the event it has to ``winter-over'' in substantial ice
conditions. Conversely, medium icebreakers are designed to operate
seasonally in the Arctic.
Due to the strong support of the administration and Congress, the
fiscal year 2019 appropriation included full funding for the
acquisition of our first Polar Security Cutter (PSC), and some long
lead time materials for the second. This investment sends a strong
message that the Nation is serious about our interests in the Arctic.
In April of last year, the joint Coast Guard and Navy Integrated
Program Office (IPO) awarded VT Halter Marine Inc., of Pascagoula,
Mississippi, a fixed price incentive (firm) contract for the detail
design and construction of the lead PSC. We are as close as we have
been in over 40 years to recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet, and
continued investment will ensure we meet our Nation's growing needs in
the rapidly evolving and dynamic polar regions.
The Coast Guard also understands that we must maintain our existing
heavy and medium icebreaking capability while proceeding with
recapitalization. Construction on the first PSC is planned to begin in
2021 with delivery planned for 2024; however, the contract includes
financial incentives for earlier delivery. Maintenance of POLAR STAR
will be critical to sustaining this capability until the new PSCs are
delivered. Robust planning efforts for a service life extension project
on POLAR STAR are already under way and initial work for this project
will begin in 2020, with phased industrial work occurring annually from
2021 through 2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the
vessel's service life until delivery of at least the second new PSC.
shore infrastructure
In addition to having the necessary platforms to maintain our
presence in the Arctic, the Coast Guard maintains a robust shore
infrastructure laydown in Alaska. Shore facilities support all Coast
Guard operations and personnel, as well as provide required
infrastructure to support the needs of the Service's operational
communities. Investments in shore infrastructure are critical to
modernizing the Coast Guard and equipping our workforce with the
facilities required to meet mission.
With approximately 10 percent of the Coast Guard's real property
inventory located in Alaska, the need for proper capital investments is
all the more critical given the vast distances between shore facilities
in that region. We are currently building waterfront facilities and
shore infrastructure to support the delivery of 6 new Fast Response
Cutters (FRC) and 2 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) to Alaska, as well as
the critical housing and family support facilities to accommodate the
additional personnel and their families to operate and maintain these
new assets. Additionally, over the last few years, we have built a new
hangar to support forward-deployed helicopters in Cold Bay, 20 new
housing units in Kodiak, as well as new facilities in Kodiak to enable
our transition from C-130H to C-130J aircraft.
conclusion
These efforts reaffirm our commitment to the region and the
Nation's need for capabilities, capacities, and infrastructure to
protect our National security interests in the region. Arctic
operations must be balanced with competing demands for Coast Guard
capabilities both at home and abroad. However, the Coast Guard must
remain flexible and scalable to adapt to the rapidly-evolving
geopolitical and operational Arctic environments.
Regardless, the Coast Guard will continue to lead across the
National and international landscape to build a coalition of like-
minded partners in order to shape the Arctic domain as an area of low
tension, high attention, and great cooperation while preserving our
National interests and rights. This leadership and collaboration across
the National and international spectrum will enable us to reinforce
positive opportunities and mitigate negative consequences in the Arctic
region. Failing to increase and focus our Nation's leadership in the
Arctic will result in other powerful nations taking the lead in a
region with critical geostrategic value.
We understand the significant investment required to secure the
Arctic, and we appreciate and embrace the trust the Nation has placed
in the Service. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today and for all you do for the men and women of the Coast Guard. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Ray. Without objection, your
full statement will be inserted into the record.
I now recognize Mr. Michael Murphy, the deputy assistant
secretary for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs,
Department of State. Please summarize your comments in 5
minutes. Thank you. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. MURPHY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lesko, Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for you inviting me to appear
before you today to discuss the security situation in the
Arctic. We are happy to work alongside our Coast Guard
colleagues to deepen strategic partnerships in the region. Our
goal is a secure and stable Arctic where U.S. interests are
safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and Arctic states
work cooperatively to address shared challenges.
For more than 20 years, our principal focus in the Arctic
has been on promoting cooperation, coordination, and
interaction among Arctic states and communities on issues such
as sustainable development and environmental protection. Much
of this work has occurred through the Arctic Council. As
Secretary Pompeo has underscored, the Arctic Council's work is
an important part of our agenda.
At the same time, we must adjust our Arctic policy to
today's new strategic reality which is characterized by the
return of great power competition, a change driven by the
desire of Russia and the People's Republic of China to
challenge the United States and the west. The Arctic is not
immune from these implications. In fact, we should expect the
rapidly-changing Arctic system to create greater incentives for
Russia and the PRC to pursue Arctic agendas that clash with our
interests.
Russia views the development of the Arctic region as
critical to its economic future, and Russia has legitimate
Arctic interests. Within the Arctic Council, Russia has
cooperated with the United States on issues including oil spill
response and search and rescue. However, Russia's restrictions
on the freedom of navigation in the Northern Sea route are
inconsistent with international law.
At the same time, Russia's military presence in the Arctic
is growing. In recent years, Russia has established a new
Arctic command, created 4 new Arctic brigades, refurbished old
airfields and other infrastructure in the Arctic, and
established new military bases along its Arctic coastline. It
has also made a concerted effort to establish a network of air
defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars,
rescue centers, and a variety of centers in the Arctic.
The Russian military build-up in the Arctic has
implications beyond its waters. From a geostrategic
perspective, the Arctic and the North Atlantic are inextricably
linked. The Arctic provides Russian ships and submarines with
access to a critical Naval choke point, the GIUK gap, that
plays an outsized role in NATO's defense and deterrent
strategy. Underwater transatlantic cables also run through the
area. In short, NATO's northern flank must once again command
the attention of the United States and its allies.
The PRC presents a different challenge. Its stated interest
in the Arctic are primarily focused on access to natural
resources and the opportunities offered by Arctic shipping
routes. In 2018, the PRC outlined its plans to develop a Polar
Silk Road as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. It declared
itself a near-Arctic state and signaled an intention to play a
role in Arctic governance. This is disconcerting given PRC
behavior outside the Arctic where it often disregards
international norms.
The PRC is seeking greater influence in the Arctic by
trying to grow its economic, diplomatic, and scientific
presence. Over the past several years, the PRC has secured
mining licenses for mineral deposits throughout the region,
including uranium and other rare earth minerals. In 2019, it
launched its first home-built icebreaker. The PRC is
maintaining research stations in Iceland and Norway, and it
operates 23 Confucius institutes in Arctic countries outside of
Russia and the United States.
But as we have seen across the globe, soft power tools have
a sharp edge when deployed by the PRC. The PRC has weaponized
state capitalism in an effort to secure control of critical
dual-use infrastructure. The PRC has demonstrated willingness
to use coercion, influence operations, and other methods to get
what it wants. This pattern of behavior, particularly the way
the PRC has used development of critical infrastructure to
establish a permanent security presence, must inform our
approach on the PRC's interests and activities in the Arctic.
Security challenges exist in the Arctic, but the region is
also full of opportunity. It is home to fish stocks critical to
global food supply and deposits of minerals essential to the
production of advanced technology. As navigation seasons open
in the Arctic Ocean, new faster, cheaper, circumpolar
navigation and shipping routes may emerge. The Department of
State will work to ensure that this region remains open to
shared economic and scientific interests and our security
interests are protected.
More broadly, we want the United States to be a partner of
choice in the Arctic. We plan to increase our engagement with
and investment in the region. We are working to establish a
diplomatic presence in Greenland this summer. We have proposed
a new $12.1 million funding package to jump-start our
engagement in Greenland. We are also exploring the possibility
of increasing the footprint of U.S. Embassy Reykjavik.
As a department, we continue to support programs designed
to increase the resilience of Arctic communities to malign
actors, and we are continuing the good work and strong
cooperation of the Arctic Council. Its work on non-security
issues makes a vital contribution to Arctic security.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lesko, distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to
meet with you today and to discuss the challenges and
opportunities we face in the Arctic.
I look forward to your continued cooperation and your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Murphy
February 5, 2020
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lesko, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to
discuss the security situation in the Arctic. We are happy to work
alongside our Coast Guard colleagues to deepen strategic partnerships
and advance U.S. interests in the region. Our goal is a secure and
stable Arctic where U.S. interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland
is protected, and Arctic states work cooperatively to address shared
challenges.
The Department of State has fostered strong diplomatic ties with
Arctic countries--even before the United States officially became an
Arctic state in 1867 with the acquisition of Alaska. Our relationships
with our Nordic partners are some of our most important and enduring in
Europe, dating back to the earliest days of our Nation's history.
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Canada are NATO Allies whose troops
deploy alongside our own in war zones like Iraq and Afghanistan, while
Finland and Sweden are important NATO partners with whom we work
closely. Our Northern neighbors are essential to Transatlantic security
both in the Arctic and beyond.
During World War II, the United States worked with its Arctic
Allies--particularly Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark--to establish
bases that were critical to the war effort. During the Cold War, the
United States and our Allies maintained a robust presence in the High
North and the Arctic, which reflected the region's importance to our
collective security in an era of strategic competition. With the fall
of the Soviet Union, our attention turned to other security challenges,
and our approach to the Arctic shifted. For more than 20 years, our
principal focus in the Arctic has been on promoting cooperation,
coordination, and interaction among Arctic States--with the involvement
of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants--on
issues, such as sustainable development and environmental protection.
This approach manifested itself in 1996 when the 8 countries with
territory above the Arctic Circle--Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden, Russia, and the United States--formed the Arctic Council. This
body serves as the premiere multilateral forum for matters of regional
governance. The Council operates based on consensus and addresses
issues ranging from Search and Rescue, to maritime pollution, to the
health of indigenous communities. Iceland currently serves as the
Council's chair, but the chairmanship will transition to Russia in May
2021. The Department of State serves as the lead agency coordinating
U.S. efforts in the Arctic Council and in multilateral fora focused on
Arctic governance as well as maritime safety and security.
As Secretary Pompeo has underscored, the good work that the Arctic
Council is engaged in must continue; it is an important part of our
Arctic agenda. The United States has no interest in seeing these
cooperative activities end. At the same time, we must adjust our Arctic
policy to today's new strategic reality, which is characterized by the
return of great power competition--a strategic change driven by the
desire of Russia and the People's Republic of China to rearrange the
global security order by challenging the United States and the West.
The Arctic is not immune from the implications of this change. In fact,
we should expect the rapidly-changing Arctic system--diminishing sea
ice coverage, declining snow cover, melting ice sheets, and thawing
permafrost--to create greater incentives for Russia and the PRC to
pursue Arctic agendas that clash with United States and Western
interests. This could put at risk our collective efforts to ensure the
Arctic remains a region of rules-based governance and low tension.
Russia is the largest Arctic state in terms of population residing
above the Arctic Circle and by geographic area, with over 53 percent of
Arctic Ocean coastline. Russia views the development of its Arctic
region as critical to the country's economic future, and it has
legitimate Arctic interests. Within the Arctic Council, Russia has
cooperated with the United States on a number of issues, including
education, oil spill response, and search and rescue. However, Russia's
restrictions on the freedom of the navigation in the Northern Sea Route
(NSR) are inconsistent with international law as reflected in the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention. Since 1983, the United States has viewed the
Convention as reflecting customary international law with regard to
traditional uses of the ocean and, as such, binding on all States
including the United States. The Russian government's threat to use
military force to enforce its unilateral assertions about the NSR only
further highlights its concerning behavior.
Russia's military presence in the Arctic is also growing. In recent
years, Russia has established a new Arctic command, created 4 new
Arctic brigades, refurbished old airfields and other infrastructure in
the Arctic, including deep water ports, and established new military
bases along its Arctic coastline. Russia has also made a concerted
effort to establish a network of air defense and coastal missile
systems, early warning radars, rescue centers, and a variety of censors
in the Arctic. In October 2019, we witnessed the largest Russian
military exercise in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War. Last
fall, Vice-Admiral Alexander Moiseyev of the Northern Fleet announced
Russia's intention to deploy S-400's to create ``an air defense dome
over the Russian Arctic.'' Russia also maintains the largest icebreaker
fleet in the world with over 40 existing icebreakers and more in
development. In fact, on January 15, 2020, Russia announced it will
invest $2 billion for construction of the world's most powerful nuclear
icebreaker.
The Russian military build-up in the Arctic has implications well
beyond its waters. From a geostrategic perspective, the Arctic and the
North Atlantic are inextricably linked. The Arctic provides Russian
ships and submarines with access to a critical naval choke point, the
Greenland, Iceland, UK Gap (the GIUK Gap), that plays an outsized role
in NATO's defense and deterrence strategy. Underwater transatlantic
communication cables--the foundation of our communication system with
Europe--cross the same waters. In short, NATO's Northern Flank must
once again command the attention of the United States and its Allies.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) presents a different
challenge. Its stated interests in the Arctic are primarily focused on
access to natural resources and the opportunities offered by the Arctic
sea routes for shipping. As Admiral Ray highlighted, in 2018, the PRC
launched its first Arctic Strategy, outlining plans to develop a
``Polar Silk Road'' as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In that
document, the PRC declared itself a ``near-Arctic'' state and signaled
its intention to play a role in Arctic governance. This is
disconcerting given the PRC's behavior outside the Arctic where it
often disregards international norms, as it has in the South China Sea,
for example. As Secretary Pompeo noted in a May 2019 speech, ``Beijing
claims to be a `Near-Arctic state,' yet the shortest distance between
China and the Arctic is 900 miles. There are only Arctic states and
Non-Arctic states. No third category exists and claiming otherwise
entitles China to exactly nothing.''
The PRC is pursuing greater influence in the Arctic by seeking to
grow its economic, diplomatic, and scientific presence. The Department
of State fully supports the conclusion of the fiscal year 2020 NDAA
that ``China is projecting a physical presence in the Arctic through
upgrading to advanced icebreakers, utilizing the Arctic Ocean more
regularly through subsidizing arctic shipping, deploying unmanned ice
stations, and engaging in large and sophisticated data collection
efforts in countries of the Arctic region, including Iceland,
Greenland, and Canada.'' Over the past several years, the PRC has
secured mining licenses for several mineral deposits throughout the
region, including uranium and other rare-earth minerals. In 2019, the
PRC launched its first home-built icebreaker and has begun work on a
new (potentially nuclear powered) icebreaker. The PRC maintains
research stations in Iceland and Norway (on the island of Svalbard). It
operates 23 Confucius Institutes in Arctic countries outside of the
United States and Russia.
As we have seen across the globe, ``soft power'' tools often have a
sharp edge when deployed by the PRC. The PRC has weaponized its state
capitalism in an effort to secure control of critical, dual-use
infrastructure, such as ports, airports, and telecommunication
networks. The PRC has demonstrated a willingness to use coercion,
influence operations, and other methods to get what it wants, and we
have seen this in the Arctic. The recent experience of the Faroe
Islands, in which a PRC Ambassador threatened to drop a trade agreement
if the Faroese government did not sign a 5G contract with Huawei, is
one example. The PRC's objections to Norway's efforts to protect the
integrity of the Svalbard Treaty and ensure the island remains a base
for only legitimate scientific research is another.
The PRC's patterns of aggressive behavior elsewhere in the world,
the way the PRC has used Chinese money, Chinese companies, and Chinese
workers to develop critical infrastructure in other parts of the globe
to establish a permanent security presence must inform our approach to
the PRC's interests and activities in the Arctic. The United States is
not arguing that Chinese economic investment or scientific research in
the Arctic is unwelcome. We welcome transparent, rules-based engagement
by the PRC, but the United States and its Arctic Allies and partners
must examine the PRC's activities much more closely than we have in the
past. The PRC's behavior over the last decade underscores that we
cannot and should not assume its good intentions.
Security challenges exist in the Arctic, but the region is also
full of opportunity. It is home to fish stocks critical to global food
supply, oil reserves, and deposits of critical minerals essential to
the production of advanced technology. As the navigation seasons in the
Arctic Ocean increase, new, faster, and cheaper circumpolar shipping
routes between Europe and the United States may emerge. The Department
of State will work to ensure the region remains open to shared economic
and scientific, and our security interests are protected.
Our goal is for the United States to be the partner of choice in
the Arctic. We hope to accomplish this by increasing our engagement
with and investment in the region. We are actively working to establish
a diplomatic presence in Greenland this summer--reopening a U.S.
Consulate in Nuuk, which closed in 1953. We have proposed a $12.1
million funding package to jumpstart our engagement with Greenland. We
are also exploring the possibility of increasing the footprint of U.S.
Embassy in Reykjavik. As a Department, we support people-to-people
exchanges to increase English language skills and programs focused on
sustainable economic development--all to increase the resilience of
Arctic communities to malign actors. We are continuing the good work
and strong cooperation through the Arctic Council--a body that has
directly contributed to the region's long history of peace and
stability. Its work on non-security issues makes a vital contribution
to Arctic security.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lesko, and distinguished Members of
this subcommittee, thank you, again, for the opportunity to meet with
you today to discuss the challenges and opportunities we face in the
Arctic. I look forward to our continued cooperation as we work to
increase Arctic security.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Murphy, thank you very much. Without
objection, your statement will also be inserted into the
record.
Ms. Marie Mak, our next witness, is director for
Contracting & National Security Acquisitions with the GAO.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MARIE A. MAK, DIRECTOR FOR CONTRACTING & NATIONAL
SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Mak. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Correa, Ranking
Member Lesko, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
inviting me here today to discuss the Coast Guard's role in the
Arctic and some key challenges it faces in the region.
As in all U.S. waters, the Coast Guard is responsible for
maritime safety, security, environmental protection, and
National defense among other missions in the Arctic. As the ice
continues to recede and human activity increases, the Coast
Guard has faced and will continue to face expanding
responsibilities in the region.
Although ensuring the safety and security of this dynamic
region requires a whole-of-Government approach, the Coast
Guard's capabilities and capacities are also vital to ensure
National security. It is with the icebreakers that the United
States can have the assured access to the polar regions as well
as to safeguard our National interests.
With that said, the 3 areas that I would like to highlight
today are first, the capability gaps the Coast Guard identified
in the region; second, the current Coast Guard icebreaker
capacity in the polar regions; and third, the key risks facing
the Coast Guard's acquisition of the new polar security
cutters.
Specifically, with respect to capability, we found back in
2016 that the Coast Guard identified various gaps in the region
which are still valid today. These include but they are not
limited to communications, infrastructure, and icebreaking. The
Coast Guard has worked to mitigate these gaps with its Arctic
partners. But we found during our review that the Coast Guard
does not systematically assess how the actions it takes in that
area will affect those capability gaps. We made a
recommendation to do so, the Coast Guard agreed, and since then
has been developing an implementation plan which will provide
the foundation for assessments of those capability gaps.
Second. When it comes to polar icebreaking capacity, the
Coast Guard currently only has 2 operational polar icebreakers,
1 medium, the Healy, and 1 heavy, the Polar Star. The Healy,
commissioned in 2000, primarily supports Arctic research, but
it cannot ensure timely access year round. The Polar Star,
commissioned in 1976 and the only U.S. heavy icebreaker that
can break at least 6 feet of ice continuously, is in dire
condition and is limited to conducting an annual mission to
resupply the McMurdo Station in Antarctica. The last 2
missions, the crew have admirably dealt with flooding and fires
in creative ways to replace broken parts.
Third. As the Coast Guard continues its effort to address
the icebreaking capability and capacity gaps, through the
acquisition of the polar security cutter, it is important to
recognize that the United States has not built an icebreaker of
this kind in over 40 years. As we have found time and time
again in our shipbuilding and major defense acquisition work,
programs, though well-intentioned, are incentivized and
pressured to move forward before they have gained sufficient
knowledge at various points throughout the acquisition process.
In other words, not having a solid business case. As we
found in 2018, the polar security cutter program did not start
off with a sound business case either. However, in response to
our recommendations, the Coast Guard has signaled a commitment
to gaining key knowledge before proceeding. For example, the
program assessed its key technologies and is planning to revise
the schedule to be more realistic. This program is still early
in its life cycle. A key milestone and test of the Coast
Guard's commitment to a sound business case will be the start
of construction on the lead ship which is slated to begin next
year.
In conclusion, the Arctic region has increased in strategic
importance in recent years. As more nations look to the Arctic
for both economic and geopolitical advantages, the demand for
the Coast Guard presence will continue to grow. Both the Coast
Guard and Congress should remain vigilant in ensuring that the
program obtains key knowledge on the ship's design before
authorizing construction on the lead ship.
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may
have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Mak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marie A. Mak
Wednesday, February 5, 2020
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-20-374T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard--a component of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)--is a multi-mission, maritime military service that is
responsible for maritime safety and National security, among other
missions. Given the Arctic region's expansive maritime domain, the
Coast Guard plays a significant role in Arctic policy implementation
and enforcement. The Coast Guard is also the sole provider and operator
of the U.S. polar icebreaking fleet--a critical component in ensuring
year-round access to the Arctic. The Coast Guard is developing the
first of 3 heavy polar icebreakers--the Polar Security Cutter--it has
acquired in over 40 years.
This statement addresses: (1) The Coast Guard's assessment of
capability gaps in the region, and (2) key risks facing the Polar
Security Cutter acquisition. This statement is primarily based on GAO's
June 2016 report examining capability gaps in the Arctic and its
September 2018 report examining the Coast Guard's polar icebreaker
acquisition.
What GAO Recommends
In June 2016, GAO recommended, among other things, that Coast Guard
develop measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate
Arctic capability gaps. In September 2018, GAO recommended that the
Polar Security Cutter program develop a program schedule according to
best practices. DHS concurred with all of the recommendations, and the
Coast Guard is in the process of addressing them.
arctic capabilities.--coast guard is taking steps to address key
challenges, but additional work remains
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard--the primary Federal maritime
agency in the Arctic--assessed its capability to perform its missions
in the region and identified a number of capability gaps. These gaps,
which still exist today, include communications, infrastructure,
maritime domain awareness, and icebreaking. The Coast Guard has worked
to mitigate these gaps with its Arctic partners, such as other Federal
agencies. For example, during a 2015 annual operation in the Arctic,
the Coast Guard took steps to enhance maritime domain awareness by
testing the Department of Defense's communications equipment, extending
communications capabilities further north than previously possible.
However, in June 2016, GAO found that the Coast Guard did not
systematically assess the extent to which its actions helped to
mitigate these gaps. In response to GAO's recommendation, the Coast
Guard is currently developing an implementation plan and corresponding
metrics for its April 2019 Arctic Strategy.
In September 2018, GAO found that the Coast Guard faced 4 key risks
when it established the Polar Security Cutter program in March 2018:
Technology, design, cost, and schedule. For example, the Coast Guard's
initial planned delivery dates of 2023, 2025, and 2026 for the 3 ships
were not informed by a realistic assessment of shipbuilding activities.
The schedule was driven, instead, by the potential gap in icebreaking
capabilities once the Coast Guard's only operating heavy polar
icebreaker--the Polar Star--reaches the end of its service life (see
figure).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
GAO recommended in September 2018 that the program develop a
realistic schedule and determine schedule risks for the program. In
response, the Coast Guard is now tracking additional schedule risks for
the program and is in the process of updating its program schedule. GAO
will continue to monitor the Coast Guard's progress in addressing this
recommendation and other recommendations GAO made to address key risks,
such as design and cost, facing the Polar Security Cutter program.
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss key challenges
that the Coast Guard faces in the Arctic, including its capability gaps
in the region and efforts to recapitalize the Nation's polar icebreaker
fleet--a key step in addressing these gaps.
The Coast Guard, a component within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), is the primary Federal maritime agency in the Arctic
and is currently developing the first heavy polar icebreaker it has
acquired in over 40 years. As we reported in September 2018, the Coast
Guard, in collaboration with the Navy, plans to invest up to $9.827
billion for the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of 3 heavy
polar icebreakers--also known as the Polar Security Cutters--over their
entire 30-year life cycle.\1\ In April 2019, the Navy awarded an
approximately $750 million detail design and construction contract to a
shipbuilder for the first icebreaker. As the Coast Guard's only
operating heavy polar icebreaker--the Polar Star--nears the end of its
service life, the Polar Security Cutters will play a critical role in
the Coast Guard's ability to ensure year-round access to the Arctic.
Such access affects U.S. economic, maritime, and National security
interests in this region.
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\1\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program Needs
to Address Risks Before Committing Resources, GAO-18-600 (Washington,
DC: Sept. 4, 2018).
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My statement today will address: (1) The Coast Guard's role in the
Arctic, including its assessment of capability gaps in the region, and
(2) key risks facing the Coast Guard's acquisition of the Polar
Security Cutters.
This statement is based primarily on our June 2016 report examining
capability gaps in the Arctic and our September 2018 report examining
the Coast Guard's polar icebreaker acquisition.\2\ For the reports
cited in this statement, among other methodologies, we analyzed Coast
Guard and Navy guidance, data, and documentation, and interviewed Coast
Guard and Navy officials. Detailed information on our scope and
methodology can be found in the reports cited in this statement. Since
the issuance of these reports, we received and reviewed information
from the Coast Guard on the actions it has taken in response to our
recommendations. In addition to our prior work, for this statement we
reviewed the Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic strategic outlook.\3\
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\2\ GAO-18-600 and GAO, Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway,
but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic
Capability Gaps, GAO-16-453 (Washington, DC: June 15, 2016).
\3\ U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategic
Outlook (Washington, DC: April 2019).
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We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
the coast guard has taken actions to help mitigate arctic capability
gaps but has not yet systematically assessed its progress in this
effort
The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, maritime military service that
is responsible for maritime safety and security, environmental
protection, and National security, among other missions. Given the
Arctic region's expansive maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a
significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement.
Therefore, as we have reported, as more navigable ocean water has
emerged in the Arctic and human activity increases, the Coast Guard has
faced, and will continue to face, expanding responsibilities in the
region.\4\
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\4\ Other DHS components and Federal agencies--such as the
Departments of Defense (DOD), Interior, and Commerce, and the National
Science Foundation--as well as interagency groups also have
responsibilities in the Arctic. We found in June 2015 that DOD's
strategic guidance on the Arctic establishes a supporting role for DOD
relative to other Federal agencies, based on a low level of military
threat expected in the region. See GAO, Arctic Planning: DOD Expects to
Play a Supporting Role to Other Federal Agencies and Has Efforts Under
Way to Address Capability Needs and Update Plans, GAO-15-566
(Washington, DC: June 19, 2015). See also Arctic Planning: Navy Report
to Congress Aligns with Current Assessments of Arctic Threat Levels and
Capabilities Required to Execute DOD's Strategy, GAO-19-42 (Washington,
DC: Nov. 8, 2018).
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In June 2016, we found that the Coast Guard assessed its capability
to perform its missions in the Arctic in fiscal year 2012 and
identified various capability gaps, including the following:
Communications.--Including the lack of communications
architecture. Harsh weather conditions, high latitude
disturbances, and geomagnetic storms combine to make
communications in the Arctic difficult.
Arctic maritime domain awareness.--Including limited
nautical charting, inadequate navigation systems, and
insufficient surveillance. Extremely limited operational assets
and support infrastructure in the Arctic, as well as the harsh
operating environment, make achieving maritime domain awareness
a challenge.
Infrastructure.--Including limited aircraft infrastructure
on the North Slope in northern Alaska and limited logistical
support. Facilities located below the Arctic Circle, and even
those within Alaska, provide limited capability to support
Arctic missions due to the long transits to the Arctic region.
No deepwater ports currently exist on the North Slope or near
the Bering Strait that are capable of refueling and re-
provisioning polar-capable cutters. This forces the Coast
Guard's polar-capable cutters to expend significant time
transiting long distances to and from replenishment ports.
Development of infrastructure to support operations is
challenging, in part, due to the high cost of transporting
materials to the Arctic and short construction seasons.\5\
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\5\ We previously reported on the efforts of the committee on the
Marine Transportation System to prioritize Arctic infrastructure, and
on the actions taken by Government entities in support of planning and
developing U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure; see GAO, Maritime
Infrastructure: Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity in the U.S.
Arctic Over the Next Decade, GAO-14-299 (Washington, DC: Mar. 19,
2014). We currently have on-going work examining maritime
infrastructure gaps in the U.S. Arctic and expect to issue a report in
2020.
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Training and exercise opportunities.--Including a limited
pool of Arctic-trained and experienced Coast Guard personnel,
and limited training, exercise, and educational opportunities
to enhance Arctic skills among staff. According to Coast Guard
officials, few opportunities exist to train in the Arctic, in
part, because of limited Coast Guard icebreaking capacity.
Icebreaking.--Including limited icebreaking capacity given
the Coast Guard's existing active inventory of 1 medium and 1
heavy polar icebreaker, as discussed later in this
testimony.\6\
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\6\ GAO-16-453.
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At the time of our June 2016 review, Coast Guard officials stated
that the capability gaps were not the sole responsibility of the Coast
Guard to mitigate and did not completely impair or eliminate their
ability to perform operations. For example, while communications can be
a challenge in remote regions, the risk of lost communications can be
mitigated by using multiple assets working together to mitigate risk if
lost communications is anticipated. Coast Guard officials also stated
that given its activity levels at the time, the mobile and seasonal
nature of its Arctic presence, and its ability to leverage partners'
resources, the Coast Guard has had sufficient resources to fulfill its
Arctic responsibilities. However, Coast Guard officials stated they
would reassess their approach as Arctic activity and resulting mission
requirements change over time. As we reported in June 2016, if Arctic
activity continues to increase, as anticipated, the Coast Guard may
have insufficient resources to meet expanded Arctic requirements.
In June 2016, we also found that the Coast Guard worked with its
Arctic partners--such as other Federal agencies--to carry out actions
to help mitigate Arctic capability gaps. For example, the Coast Guard
took steps to enhance Arctic maritime domain awareness by testing
communications equipment belonging to DOD during a 2015 annual
operation in the Arctic, extending communications capabilities further
north than previously possible.\7\ However, we found that the Coast
Guard did not systematically assess how its actions helped to mitigate
these gaps. Such an assessment--which includes developing measures for
gauging its progress, when feasible--is critical to the Coast Guard's
understanding of its progress toward addressing these gaps. By
systematically assessing and measuring how its actions have helped to
mitigate capability gaps, the Coast Guard will be better positioned to
effectively plan its Arctic operations, including its allocation of
resources and prioritization of activities to target the gaps.
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\7\ The annual operation--also known as Operation ``Arctic
Shield''--is a seasonal surge operation designed to help the Coast
Guard learn how to operate in this increasingly active area of
responsibility. Arctic Shield is intended to provide the Coast Guard
with the opportunity to: (a) Perform Coast Guard missions and
activities, (b) advance maritime domain awareness, (c) broaden
partnerships in support of Coast Guard Arctic operations, and (d)
enhance and improve preparedness, prevention, and response capabilities
in the Arctic. It is also the primary operation through which the Coast
Guard carries out activities in the Arctic region and includes the
deployment of aircraft, cutters, and personnel to the Arctic region.
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As a result, we recommended in June 2016 that the Coast Guard: (1)
Develop measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate
Arctic capability gaps and (2) design and implement a process to
systematically assess its progress on this.\8\ DHS concurred with our
recommendations. As of January 2020, the Coast Guard had not yet taken
action to implement these 2 recommendations, in part because the Coast
Guard issued its Arctic strategic outlook in April 2019 and is
currently updating its corresponding implementation plan for this
strategy.\9\ The plan is expected to provide the foundation for
systematically assessing efforts to address Arctic capability gaps.
Coast Guard officials stated that they are also developing a strategic
metrics framework for measuring progress in addressing the capability
gaps. Coast Guard officials did not identify when they plan to complete
the plan and framework, stating that these are longer-term efforts.
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\8\ GAO-16-453.
\9\ U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategic
Outlook (Washington, DC: April 2019).
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The Coast Guard highlighted the Arctic capability gaps in its 2013
Arctic Strategy and again in its 2019 Arctic strategic outlook.\10\ The
2019 strategy highlighted the need to elevate the Arctic region's
prominence as a strategically competitive space due to: (1) The
resurgence of nation-state competition from the United States' 2
nearest-peer powers, Russia and China, and (2) reduced ice conditions
in the Arctic which have led to increased human and economic activity
in the region.
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\10\ U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy
(Washington, DC: May 2013); and United States Coast Guard Arctic
Strategic Outlook (Washington, DC: April 2019).
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In addition, the 2019 Arctic strategy highlighted 3 overarching
goals:
enhance capability to operate effectively in a dynamic
Arctic domain,
strengthen the rules-based order, and
innovate and adapt to promote resilience and prosperity.
Further, the 2019 Arctic strategy noted that the Coast Guard is the
sole provider and operator of the U.S. polar icebreaking fleet--a
critical component in achieving the Coast Guard's overarching goals in
the strategy--but currently does not have the capability or capacity to
ensure access in the Arctic region.\11\ The Coast Guard's polar
icebreaking fleet comprises 2 operational polar icebreakers--the Polar
Star and Healy of which only the Healy is currently active and
operating in the Arctic.\12\ The Healy is a medium icebreaker that
primarily supports Arctic research, and while it is capable of carrying
out a wide range of activities, it cannot ensure timely access to some
Arctic areas in the winter given that it does not have the icebreaking
capabilities of a heavy polar icebreaker. See figure 1 for photographs
of the Coast Guard's active icebreakers.
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\11\ Under Federal law, the Coast Guard has been responsible for
carrying out the Nation's polar icebreaking needs since 1965--when it
assumed primary responsibility for the Nation's polar icebreaking
fleet. 14 U.S.C. 2 establishes that one of the Coast Guard's required
primary functions is to maintain icebreaking facilities for use on the
high seas and on waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction, as well as,
pursuant to international agreements, to maintain icebreaking
facilities on waters other than the high seas and on waters not subject
to U.S. jurisdiction--specifically, the Antarctic region. Title 14
authorities do not prevent other agencies from owning or operating
icebreakers or ice-capable vessels. For example, the ice-strengthened
Research Vessel Sikuliaq, which was commissioned in March 2015 and
operates in the Arctic Region, is owned by the National Science
Foundation and operated by the University of Alaska Fairbanks. The
Sikuliaq, however, is unsuitable for extended operation in the Arctic
and can only operate in ice up to 2.5-feet thick.
\12\ The Polar Sea has been inactive since 2010 when it experienced
a catastrophic engine failure.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In November 2018, the Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for
Acquisition testified that the Coast Guard's current polar icebreaking
fleet provides minimal capacity to carry out current icebreaking
missions and that the Nation must take swift action to rebuild and
enhance this critical National capability.\13\ To this end, DHS
approved the Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter acquisition program's
cost, schedule, and performance baselines in February 2018.\14\
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\13\ U.S. Coast Guard, Testimony of Rear Admiral Michael J.
Haycock, Assistant Commandant for Acquisition and Chief Acquisition
Officer, on Polar Icebreaker Acquisition before the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation (Washington, DC: Nov. 29, 2018).
\14\ The corresponding acquisition decision memorandum was signed
in March 2018.
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the coast guard has taken steps to address technology, design, cost,
and schedule risks for the polar security cutters
In September 2018, we found that the Coast Guard did not have a
sound business case when it established the acquisition baselines for
the Polar Security Cutter program in March 2018 due to risks in 4 key
areas: Technology, design, cost, and schedule.\15\ Our prior work has
found that successful acquisition programs start with solid, executable
business cases before setting program baselines and committing
resources.\16\ A sound business case requires balance between the
concept selected to satisfy operator requirements and the resources--
design knowledge, technologies, funding, and time--needed to transform
the concept into a product, which in this case is a ship with polar
icebreaking capabilities. Without a sound business case, acquisition
programs are at risk of breaching the cost, schedule, and performance
baselines set when the program was initiated--in other words,
experiencing cost growth, schedule delays, and reduced capabilities.
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\15\ GAO-18-600.
\16\ GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Past Performance Provides Valuable
Lessons for Future Investments, GAO-18-238SP (Washington, DC: June 6,
2018); Weapon System Requirements: Detailed Systems Engineering Prior
to Product Development Positions Programs for Success, GAO-17-77
(Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2016); Best Practices: High Levels of
Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy
Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322 (Washington, DC: May 13, 2009); and Defense
Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy
Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-07-943T (Washington, DC: July 24, 2007).
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To address the key risks we identified and help establish a sound
business case for the Polar Security Cutter program, we made 6
recommendations to DHS, Coast Guard, and the Navy in our September 2018
report.\17\ The agencies concurred with all 6 recommendations and have
taken steps to address some of the risks, as noted below.
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\17\ GAO-18-600.
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Technology.--The Coast Guard planned to use proven
technologies for the program, but did not conduct a technology
readiness assessment to determine the maturity of key
technologies prior to setting baselines.\18\ As a result, the
Coast Guard did not have full insight into whether these
technologies were mature and was potentially underrepresenting
the technical risk of the program. We recommended that the
program conduct a technology readiness assessment, which DHS
completed in June 2019. DHS determined that 2 of the 3 key
technologies were mature and the remaining technology was
approaching maturity. The Coast Guard now has plans in place to
use testing results to increase the maturity and reduce risks
for the remaining technology--the hull form.
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\18\ A technology readiness assessment is a systematic, evidence-
based process that evaluates the maturity of critical technologies--
hardware and software technologies critical to the fulfillment of the
key objectives of an acquisition program. According to our best
practices, a technology readiness assessment should be conducted prior
to program initiation. For more information, see GAO Technology
Readiness Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Evaluating the Readiness
of Technology for Use in Acquisition Programs and Projects, GAO-20-48G
(Washington, DC: Jan. 7, 2020).
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Design.--The Coast Guard set program baselines before
conducting a preliminary design review. This review is a
systems engineering event intended to verify that the
contractor's design meets the requirement of the ship
specifications and is producible. By not conducting this review
before establishing program baselines, the program is at risk
of having an unstable design, thereby increasing the program's
cost and schedule risks. We recommended that the program update
its baselines prior to authorizing lead ship construction and
after completion of the preliminary design review. DHS and the
Coast Guard agreed and plan to take these steps by fiscal year
2022.
Cost.--The cost estimate that informed the program's $9.8
billion cost baseline--which includes life-cycle costs for the
acquisition, operations, and maintenance of 3 polar
icebreakers--substantially met our best practices for being
comprehensive, well-documented, and accurate.\19\ But the
estimate only partially met best practices for being credible.
The cost estimate did not quantify the range of possible costs
over the entire life of the program, such as the period of
operations and support. As a result, the cost estimate was not
fully reliable and may underestimate the total funding needed
for the program. We recommended that the program update its
cost estimate to include risk and uncertainty analysis on all
phases of the program life cycle, among other things.
Subsequently, in December 2019, we found that while the Coast
Guard updated the cost estimate in June 2019 to inform the
budget process, the estimate did not reflect cost changes
resulting from the contract award 2 months prior.\20\ Coast
Guard officials acknowledged these cost risks and plan to
address them as part of the next update to the program's cost
estimate. Coast Guard officials told us that they plan to
update the cost estimate by the end of February 2020.
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\19\ The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide was used as
criteria in this analysis. A cost estimate is considered reliable if
the overall assessment ratings for each of the 4 characteristics--
comprehensive, accurate, well-documented, and credible--are
substantially or fully met. For more information, see GAO Cost
Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and
Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 2,
2009).
\20\ GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: Outcomes Have Improved
but Actions Needed to Enhance Oversight of Schedule Goals, GAO-20-170SP
(Washington, DC: Dec. 19, 2019).
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Schedule.--The Coast Guard's initial planned delivery dates
of 2023, 2025, and 2026 for the 3 ships were not informed by a
realistic assessment of shipbuilding activities. Rather, these
dates were primarily driven by the potential gap in icebreaking
capabilities once the Coast Guard's only operating heavy polar
icebreaker--the Polar Star--reaches the end of its service
life. In addition, our analysis of selected lead ships for
other Coast Guard and Navy shipbuilding programs found the
icebreaker program's estimated construction time of 3 years to
be optimistic. An unrealistic schedule puts the Coast Guard at
risk of not delivering the icebreakers when promised. As a
result, the potential gap in icebreaking capabilities could
widen. We recommended that the program develop a realistic
schedule, including delivery dates, and determine schedule
risks during the construction phase of the program. In
response, the Coast Guard is now tracking additional schedule
risks for the program and is in the process of updating its
program schedule. Further, in December 2019, we found that the
contract delivery date for the lead ship, May 2024, is 2 months
after the delivery date in the program's schedule baseline.\21\
Coast Guard officials said they plan to address this risk when
they update the program's schedule by the end of March 2020.
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\21\ GAO-20-170SP.
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In summary, the Arctic region has increased in strategic importance
in recent years, and with the increase comes more responsibility for
the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has emphasized that as the Arctic
continues to open and strategic competition drives more actors to look
to the Arctic for economic and geopolitical advantages, the demand for
Coast Guard leadership and presence will continue to grow. As the Coast
Guard embarks on the acquisition of its new polar icebreakers, it faces
a number of key acquisition risks. The Coast Guard has begun to take
steps to address these risks and must remain committed to executing a
sound business case for the program to mitigate capability gaps in the
Arctic. To this end, we will continue to monitor the Coast Guard's
progress in addressing our recommendations.
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this
time.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Ms. Mak, and I thank all the
witnesses for their testimony. Now I will remind each Member
that she or she will have 5 minutes to question the panel, and
I will recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
The first question to all of you. Listening to your
testimony, I am trying to figure out where we start. It is such
a huge issue with so many parts. So for each witness, I would
ask what do you see as the single biggest challenge facing the
United States, and in particular, the Coast Guard in your role
in the Arctic?
Admiral Ray.
Admiral Ray. Sir, Mr. Chairman, I think as was stated by
Ms. Mak, we have been a long time in coming, over 40 years, in
building a polar security cutter or heavy icebreaker. So now
that we have gotten started, we have got to get it right. In
the meanwhile, Polar Star, as was stated, our current
icebreaker, she right now is at McMurdo Station in the South
Pole as we sit here today, and she successfully broke it out.
By break it out, I mean they opened up the channel where they
could get the resupply vessels in, and so she is doing her job.
We have got a plan to extend her service life. We will
start work on that so when she comes home in our summertime,
their wintertime down at the South Pole, we will spend extra
time in the yard, extra funds to extend her service life. So we
have got to keep her in service until this new polar security
cutter that Ms. Mak was talking about comes out of the yards
which is projected in 2024.
So that overlap time between now and then is critical time.
We have got to maintain this aging ship and get the new ship
going while being mindful of all the challenges of the first
ship of a class coming off the way.
Mr. Correa. Thank you.
Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I would just echo what the Admiral said about
presence equaling influence and leadership. Certainly the State
Department shares the view that a greater Coast Guard presence
in the Arctic would be a positive thing in terms of shaping the
strategic environment in the United States' favor.
With regards to the State Department itself, there is a
change going on in the Bureau of European Affairs where seven
of the Arctic states or 6 of the 7 Arctic states in the Arctic
Council are located, we have have a new strategic environment
with regard to the challenges we are seeing from China and
Russia.
In the past before the acknowledgment of the great power
competition paradigm which we now find ourselves in, we saw
Europe primarily as a platform for partnerships outside the
region. We are now in a theater of operations ourselves much
the same way that other parts of world have been, you know,
prior to this.
So the United States State Department, the Bureau of
European Affairs, needs to make that transition from a platform
for operations outside the continent, whether in the Arctic or
elsewhere, to what I will call a war-fighting command in much
the same way that UCOMM is doing in response to the challenges
we are seeing from Russia and China. That is one of the reasons
we are working on presence in the Arctic region itself.
Mr. Correa. Ms. Mak.
Ms. Mak. Both the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard
Arctic strategies have highlighted some of the same capability
gaps that I mentioned earlier like communications, maritime
domain awareness, infrastructure, icebreaking, and training
opportunities.
So in order to really figure out what the top priorities
for the United States should be, there needs to be a whole-of-
Government approach to determine which priorities in these gaps
are the most urgent and how to proactively address all these
gaps, which one is most important to address first. But it is
important that--we tend to be more reactive. It is really
important as a Government that we be proactive. By the time the
threats are imminent in the region, it will be too late.
Mr. Correa. So we are kind-of chasing the issues as opposed
to planning long-term anticipation of developments, yes?
Ms. Mak. Yes. Correct.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much.
I am going to yield the remainder of my time and ask Mrs.
Lesko to engage her 5 minutes of questions.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is to both Admiral Ray and Mr. Murphy,
and it has just kind-of a basic question. There are so many
needs throughout the world and to protect us. Do you think this
concern about the Arctic and competition in the Arctic, and
making that sure we have a presence in the Arctic has risen
high enough to the level to get the attention of top people as
a priority?
Mr. Ray. Well, I think it is certainly--it has not been but
recently that we received the attention of subcommittees such
as this one and the Congress and the people who have the
opportunity to provide the resources to do what we need to do
to have that presence that Mr. Murphy is talking about.
I think likewise within the administration, we have got
great support for the polar security cutter program, incredible
support, and so right now, I think this has reached the highest
levels of Government.
In the Coast Guard, we have been talking about this for, I
don't know, a decade, at least, and it was seen before as kind-
of an Alaska problem. I don't see that as the situation any
more. I see this as everybody understands it is a National
priority, and both from the Congress and from the
administration, we have got the support we need.
It is just we have got to--there is additional things
besides polar security cutters that we need to get after. As
Ms. Mak talked about, there is communication and other
capabilities, and we can discuss those as you see, but I think
generally speaking, this has gotten the attention now that we
need it to have.
Mr. Murphy. I would agree. When I started my job about 2
years ago, security in the Arctic really wasn't on my agenda at
all. It was a traditional Nordic Baltic European security
portfolio. That change has come about directly as a result of
the secretary putting it on our agenda and making clear that we
in the Bureau of European Affairs need to focus on the Arctic
security piece of what is happening, you know, not just the
Arctic Council-type issues that we focused on in the past,
important as though they are.
The work that we are doing now to put a permanent presence
in Greenland, a new consulate there, and we are looking at, as
I said in my remarks, expanding our presence in U.S. Embassy
Reykjavik. I am working directly with the counselor who has
been directed by the Secretary of State to make sure this
happens.
So I have seen a big change in both support at the top and
in the energy behind these issues in my 18 months in the State
Department in my current job.
Mrs. Lesko. That is good to hear. It is good to hear.
Another question for Admiral Ray is, Ms. Mak talked about
in her testimony how, you know, the Coast Guard had problems
tracking and measuring progress in the Arctic region, and she
said that the Coast Guard has agreed to the recommendations.
So can you expand upon that? Like, what has the Coast Guard
been doing not only on that, but she also said like a business
plan to purchase and acquire the Coast Guard cutters?
Mr. Ray. Yes, ma'am. Well, I think there has been a
combination of events that have allowed us to put forth the
persuasive argument that the Nation--this is a National
problem, that we need to operate there and that we are not--the
resources that we had appropriated to this mission were
insufficient for what the Nation needed to do.
So I have worked with Ms. Mak over the last few years. What
they do is kind of help us look at our plans moving forward,
whether it is the acquisition of a National security cutter,
and that is a tough thing to do. It is a specialized
construction.
So what we did, largely according to their advice, A, we
partnered with the Navy in order to have an integrated program
office. So the specialized ship work construction is really not
that different than building a submarine which is a specialized
construction. So we had Navy leadership that has experience in
that working with us throughout the way.
She also talked about our, you know, not really
understanding the state-of-the-art with regards to technology.
So we did industry studies which we paid for industry to
analyze this problem before we put out the request for
proposal, and that really made a big difference. It really
narrowed us down with regard to technology that we would use
different than what Polar Star has now with regards to what is
available on the market, kind-of the state of the market. So I
think we have been specifically following their guidance on
this, and then the whole process of the acquisition. That
requires attention.
With regards to the other capabilities, Ms. Mak's exactly
right. I mean, it is difficult to communicate. When you get
north of the North Slope up in Alaska or north of that same
latitude in Greenland or anywhere, it is difficult. It is
difficult to navigate. It is difficult to do everything that
you do down here. That is why this presence and being there in
the interim--you don't just show up in the Arctic and decide to
operate there. You need to be working on it every day. We have
been about that through an operation called Arctic Shield that
we have been doing for the last several years.
So I think we have been not 100 percent with what GAO would
have us to do, but we have been working down that path.
Mrs. Lesko. Well, that is wonderful, and I want to thank
all of you for working on this important issue, and I agree
with Chairman Correa. We need to continue to support our
efforts up there, and I yield back my time. Thank you.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mrs. Lesko.
Now I recognize Ms. Barragan for 5 minutes of questions.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you. I want to thank the panel for
being here today. Thank you, Admiral, for your work and that of
the Coast Guard. I represent the Port of Los Angeles, and you
are very--the work that you all do there, the men and the
women, is remarkable, so I want to thank the Coast Guard for
its work.
We were handed out this little chart here that shows the
icebreakers of the world, and it is pretty remarkable to see
Russia at 53 plus 6 under construction and 12 planned and the
United States only at 5. It is more than 10 times as many. That
is quite remarkable. I am hoping we can talk a little bit about
what that means.
But before I get to that, Admiral, does the Coast Guard
believe in climate change? Do they take a position on it?
Mr. Ray. Ma'am, what we have stated pretty consistently
over the years is we remain pretty agnostic about it. What we
know is there is water where there used to be ice, and we have
a job to do there. That is how we go about that.
Ms. Barragan. So the Coast Guard's 2013 Arctic strategy
attributed decreases in sea ice coverage explicitly to climate
change. However, the 2019 Arctic strategy avoided such an
attribution and merely acknowledged a changing climate. As the
Coast Guard plans for its future needs over the coming years
and decades, it must use the best scientific estimates for what
the climate and sea levels will look like.
How does the Coast Guard incorporate the scientific models
and projections into its planning activities? Are the Coast
Guard's projections for future needs driven by scientific
consensus or politics?
Mr. Ray. Well, we base it on science, and thanks to the
support from this committee and others. In fact, what we have
seen, as I know you're aware, the hurricane supplemental money
we have received from the 3 years of storms we had down south,
along the gulf and in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
So what we are doing is we are building our stations back
with an acknowledgment that in the future, the ocean conditions
and the coastal conditions are going to be different than they
are now. So we have got to build back in a more resilient type
infrastructure. So we are, I think, clearly acknowledging that
it is a changing environment, and we need to be able to operate
in it, and we don't have the luxury of not being close to the
coast because that is where our business is. So we are building
back more resilient facilities.
Ms. Barragan. So you mentioned that the ice is melting. Is
there any other environmental changes that occurred in the
Arctic? What type of changes do you project for the future in
the Arctic?
Mr. Ray. Yes, ma'am. There are multiple things that are
changing. One of the things that I talked to the Chairman about
the other day is the fish stocks are--we have got indications
from working with NOAA that fish stocks are migrating further
north as there is a slight warming in the Bering Sea. The fish
stocks are moving north.
So the Bering Sea is a really important fishery to the
Nation. Probably better than 50 percent of the Nation's, you
know, seafood products that we consume come from the Bering
Sea. So those fish stocks migrating north that is a----
Mr. Correa. Can you repeat that again, that statement you
just mentioned?
Mr. Ray. Yes, sir. About 52 percent of the seafood products
that American consumes, you know, sells that we harvest from
the ocean come from the Bering Sea which is just south of the
Arctic Circle, the biggest part of it is. I have been up there,
you know, quite a bit, operated up there, and that is a well-
managed fishery.
There is a lot of cooperation where there is a rarely-
defined border between us and the Russians, so it is a well-
managed fishery. Then as those fish stocks migrate north, those
that would take advantage of a less well-defined structure,
they will do that, and so we have to be mindful of that. So
fish stock is moving north.
There are changes, if you talk to the indigenous people
which I have many times, there are changes to the migration
patterns of marine mammals that they depend on for subsistence
living. They go further offshore to look for whales. I could go
on and on, but suffice it to say there is changes.
Then equally with regards to the environment, there are
changes to the permafrost that they depend on, they built on,
and that has been frozen for eons. As that has, you know, it
has changed, then you have got to watch some of the
infrastructure that they have got in those native villages out
there.
So that is the summary of the changes I am aware of, ma'am.
Ms. Barragan. Great. Well, thank you. I am definitely
concerned with climate change and what it is doing to the
region and the impact it is going to have on National security.
With the time remaining left, you know, if you take a look
at the chart, as I mentioned, there is a pretty remarkable
difference between the icebreakers that Russia has and China
has. Should the United States be concerned that it is lagging
so far behind Russia and China?
Maybe one of the other panelists want to start.
Mr. Murphy. I won't speak to Coast Guard-specific points,
but yes is the short answer to the question. One of the reasons
the State Department is working to enhance its presence in the
region and diplomatic engagement is precisely because we see
our adversaries doing the same.
We have to move beyond a point where we are focused solely
on the one element of Arctic policy that we have been focused
on over the past 20 years, as important as it is, the work of
the Arctic Council, to ensuring we inject respect for and
concern about Arctic security into what we do every day.
That is precisely what the Secretary has asked us to do,
and that is what lay behind, for example, our decision to open
a new consulate in Greenland.
Ms. Barragan. Admiral, do you want to chime in before I
yield back?
Mr. Ray. Well, I think what we propose in the Coast Guard
is 6-3-1, so I think trying to catch the 53 is not something
that we think that is aspirational for us.
We talked about 6 icebreakers total we need to do the job.
We need to do both poles. Three of them need to be heavy
icebreakers, and we need the first one right now as we have
talked about. We will reassess that as we move forward, but the
critical thing is to get that first one off the ways at the
shipyard.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Ms. Barragan.
Now I recognize Mr. Katko for 5 minutes of questions, sir.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I never want to miss an opportunity to tip my
hat to the Coast Guard. I have worked with you for 20 years
when I was in Puerto Rico and back in upstate New York and
around the world, and you do a remarkable job, and you have to
wear many hats. From a law enforcement and organized crime
standpoint, you do an awesome job. I just want to thank you to
you and all the men and women who work under you for the great
job that they do, so thank you for that.
I am absolutely convinced that we obviously need to plus up
the forces up and the icebreakers and the ships. I agree with
you, Admiral. We can't get to where Russia is, nor do I think
we need to, to be effective. I think my colleagues have pointed
that out pretty well as well. But I want to take a step back
and understand from a bigger picture standpoint, maybe we can
start with Mr. Murphy on this issue, and that is I want to
understand the interplay with Russia better, and China, and the
United States as I understand it, Russia does have somewhat of
a decent working relationship to some extent with the United
States on this issue. China seems to be trying to elbow their
way in.
So what do you see are the issues going forward if you can
summarize them for us the best you can and the interplay
between all 3? What are the real threats?
Mr. Murphy. Sure. You are right. Russia does have a good
working relationship with the United States and the other
Arctic States within the Arctic Council, and we have done some
great work on search and rescue, good scientific collaboration,
responses to oil spills, things of that nature. That has been
positive, and we want to make sure we don't lose that. There is
no reason to want to lose that.
The Russian challenge is, of course, the military build-up
that is not just occurring, of course, in the Arctic. This is
all related. It is occurring in the east and sort of the you
know, the Russian behavior in Europe more broadly in terms of,
you know, violating international rules and norms and the
actions it has taken in the Donbass and Crimea and Georgia.
I mean, we have seen that Russia can flip a switch and go
from--you know, to a military--take a military approach to
pursuing its interests if it wishes to, and we need to respond
as allies and in the United States within, you know, NATO to
the challenges that the Russians are now posing to us in the
Arctic and North Atlantic militarily.
With regards to China, it is a bit different, of course.
They have not established a military presence in the Arctic.
But they are very aggressively pursuing economic and other
interests in the Arctic in ways that are disconcerning given
some of the claims that they are making about where they want
to be involved in Arctic governance as a near Arctic state.
Mr. Katko. A near-Arctic state. Yes, yes.
Mr. Murphy. Which is malarkey. There is no such thing as a
near-Arctic state. There are Arctic states and non-Arctic
states. China is the latter, not the former. The Arctic Council
works fine, thank you very much, without China.
But we have to be cognizant of the fact that what looks
relatively benign on the surface, an economic investment, here
a piece of scientific cooperation there, may have long-term
military purposes. We know from reading some of the journals,
the scholarly journals, the Chinese have been quite clear about
their intentions there, and we need to begin countering that
influence now. We don't want to wait and wake up and find some
day that we have lost control of a port somewhere or an
airfield somewhere that we need for our own security and
defense or that we need to protect and defend our allies. Those
are the challenges.
Mr. Katko. So--thank you. That is a great summary. It is
very helpful. Just a couple follow-up questions and one
observation and one question.
The observation is China has got the money to do the build-
up. I question whether Russia has the ability to sustain itself
given the fact that oil is remaining at a low price on the
international market, and their economy is not as strong as it
once was and maybe never was. Just how much money can they
dedicate to this constant build-up that they are contemplating?
Mr. Murphy. The challenge is one of near-term and long-
term.
Mr. Katko. Right.
Mr. Murphy. They are really short-handed. As we have seen
from Russian behavior not just in Europe or in the Arctic but
in the Middle East and in South America and in Africa, they
have the resources to be very aggressive and to challenge our
interests where they want to when they want to despite the
challenges you allude to facing their economy and their long-
term prognosis of their economy.
So we need to--we can't wait and hope that history is going
to bend into a particular direction. We have to help shape our
forces in our own favor, and that is one of the reasons I think
we still need to continue to pay attention to Russia and push
back where it is necessary.
Mr. Katko. This is very helpful. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much, Mr. Katko.
I recognize Mr. Bishop for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, being very new in Congress and listening to this,
even if you didn't have anything about the climate change and
new routes in the Arctic and increased global great power
competition as you put it, Mr. Murphy, it would be easy for me
to see that the need for a heavy icebreaker, if you have got
one and it is flooding and burning as it is exercising its
mission, it has got to be replaced. I get that. That seems to
be largely what we are talking about, at least in the immediate
future. I understand there is a plan that goes farther out.
I understand, Mr. Murphy, that you are talking about
responding to the challenges by having a new consulate in
Greenland. But when you describe the phenomenon and
characterize it as a great power competition, the same sort of
phenomenon we are seeing in the South China Sea and so forth,
those responses sound to me, just as a matter of common-sense,
a little inadequate.
Now, that doesn't mean that I believe that I think we have
the means to project American power in a much bigger way
because that consumes a tremendous amount of resources. But I
do wonder about that. Could you, Mr. Murphy, maybe first and
then, Admiral Ray, if you would address that apparent mismatch
between what is being suggested as the response and the nature
of the dynamic that you are describing?
Mr. Murphy. I think, you know, we have to look at this as
something that doesn't happen in a week or a month. It takes
time. We went through pivot points in our strategic in the past
and strategy when in 1945, 1989, and, you know, 2001, and it
took time to get from where we wanted to be--from where we were
to where we wanted to be. I mean, Germany didn't join NATO
until 1953. It didn't come out of whole cloth in 1945 at the
end of the war.
I think what you are seeing is the U.S. Government and the
Legislative and the Executive branch making adjustments to this
new strategic reality. So I would argue that the consulate in
Greenland is an example of that, but it is not all that we are
doing. The Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs in my
department and the Bureau of Energy Affairs are vigorously
involved in dealing with the threats posed by 5G networks
coming from China, for example. We have been very forceful in
pushing back against unfair Chinese trade practices, for
example.
It is not just--you know, when you talk about it in the
context of the Arctic, it is in part about presence now because
we haven't been as present as we need to be. So it is just one
piece of the puzzle. I wouldn't characterize it as the whole.
Mr. Bishop. That is helpful. Admiral Ray maybe, I think
what maybe we are seeing here is a glimpse of a piece given
this committee's jurisdiction of the response to that new
dynamic. Can you characterize how it is that, you know, for the
immediate near future, 1 new heavy cutter in relationship, you
know, to Russia's assets that have been described, how that
materially changes the way America has a presence in the
region.
Mr. Ray. Yes, sir. It is really pretty--what our strategy
and the number that sticks that I talked about earlier, the
first one being important, is it allows us to be present there.
So we have got--the Department of Defense has great assets, and
they protect us under the ocean and in the skies, the greatest
in the world, but you have got to have an on-surface presence
to contest these folks.
We can talk about in a different setting, you know, exactly
what has happened in the past where they just kind-of push the
envelope, push the envelope. If you are not there to stand up
to them and say, ``Hey, what are you doing?'', that becomes a
challenge.
So really, what happens when you build a heavy icebreaker,
that allows you to be up there anywhere you want to be in the
Arctic pretty much year round. There are certain times that
would be a little too bad, but you can be there any time. Do we
need to be there this winter? Probably not. But if you look at
the way it is trending, we need to have the capability to
operate up there all year round. That is what these will do for
us.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Murphy, one other question, I think. Can you
characterize, maybe, what does the interagency partnership look
like across the Government to respond to the Arctic, the
situation in the Arctic, and which agency spearheads it? Is it
State?
Mr. Murphy. It depends on the issue, of course, but in
general, the Department of State leads in preparing and
managing the relationships that occur within the Arctic Council
which brings together a whole slew of agencies, including the
Coast Guard, with whom we partner greatly and coordinate
greatly in the work that they are doing in the Arctic Council
working groups on things like search-and-rescue and oil spills
and whatnot.
We work very closely with the National Science Foundation
and NOAA which are also involved in the Arctic Council work. My
team, in my office, work very closely with the Pentagon, the
civilian side and the military side, to deal with the
challenges in the Arctic as they look through the lens of NATO
which is one of my areas of responsibility.
The interagency has been pulled together several times,
many times, by the National Security Council to discuss how we
respond to and what we do in the context of the new challenge
in terms of Arctic security, so it is myriad and multi-faceted.
What is interesting, and I say this as someone who has been
learning about this myself over the last 8, 9 months, is there
are a lot of strands here. But what I am consistently impressed
with is the dedication and the commitment of the people with
whom I work right across the interagency process to getting
this right for the United States which is what I think they get
up every morning and try to do.
Mr. Bishop. No doubt. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Correa. Thank you Mr. Bishop. I recognize Mr. Van Drew
for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank all of
you for the work that you do. Particularly, I have had a
relationship with the Coast Guard as well and wanted to echo
Congressman Katko's words. As you know, we have the training
center for the entire United States in Cape May in my district,
actually, only a few minutes from my house. So we really do
appreciate the work that you do.
I am going to ask an elemental question, a basic question.
You know, they say there is no such thing as a stupid question,
so here we go. How is this governed? In other words, how does
this operate? Like, what gives China the right to just be up
there or Russia or us? How does this whole system work?
Mr. Murphy, I guess I would start with you on that.
Mr. Murphy. That is fair enough. Well, obviously within the
context of the Arctic Council which is the principal form for
the Arctic states to----
Mr. Van Drew. Which is made up of those states----
Mr. Murphy. The Arctic states. That is exactly right. There
are 8 of them. Canada, the United States, of course Denmark,
Norway, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, and Russia. That, by
design, the remit of the council is not on security issues. It
is focused on things like environmental protection, search and
rescue, scientific research. It was deliberately designed that
way when it was inaugurated in 1996.
They have been engaged in partnerships across the board on
those types of issues, and they sort-of set the rules, if I can
put it that way. The lawyers probably will probably tell me
that is too strong a word, but they more or less set the rules
for Arctic governance. Now, they don't have the ability to
enforce those rules. It is up to the individual member states
of Arctic Council themselves which has happened. That
partnership occurs also with indigenous peoples and indigenous
groups across the Arctic states and non-indigenous Arctic
communities that are living in the Arctic.
Mr. Van Drew. So it is a little complicated.
Mr. Murphy. It is a little complicated, but it works. The
most important thing to remember is it works. For 20 years, it
has produced results.
Mr. Van Drew. So let me ask this question, exactly how it
happens. So China, of late, has been more involved, correct?
Mr. Murphy. They have been more assertive in pushing their
presence into the Arctic.
Mr. Van Drew. To whom did they have to go to get permission
to do that?
Mr. Murphy. They don't have to ask, for example, to seek
investments in critical infrastructure in Finland or Norway
or----
Mr. Van Drew. But the group that is there, that council
agreed that they could be there.
Mr. Murphy. Every nation has the right to seek investments
in foreign countries. What we need to do as the governments of
the Arctic states ourselves is make sure that we are looking at
those and asking ourselves are we screening them? Should we
allow control of a port or an airport to fall to the Chinese?
Should we allow them to obtain controlling stakes in sensitive
minerals and mining areas? That is on us.
One of the things the Department of State has been doing
with others in the interagency is pressing not just these
states but countries world-wide to put in place exactly these
kinds of investment screening mechanisms, for example. Do we
want them to control information technology, and you know, 5G
networks where they might use for nefarious purposes, and we
are pressing in those areas.
Mr. Van Drew. Each person has 1 vote?
Mr. Murphy. In the council, yes, and it is a consensus-
based organization. So we have to distinguish between the
individual projects the member states agree to take up in the
working groups that they are engaged in and then the broader
set of challenges, you know. China can sail in international
waters, and I am really going to defer to the Coast Guard on
this, just as we can.
What we wanted to do is to respect the rules-based order
and be transparent in the way that it goes about, you know,
asserting its--being present or engaging in economic----
Mr. Van Drew. A little bit more than most modern
governments interactions in cities, it seems a little bit more
of a little--I am exaggerating a little bit here, but Wild West
type of atmosphere compared to what you see in most of the
world or at least a good part of the world. It seems like an
open territory where people can kind of go in and, to some
degree, do what they want.
Mr. Murphy. I think because the Arctic is changing, there
are opportunities opening up that weren't there before in terms
of shipping and other places that create these potential
challenges you are alluding to, yes.
Mr. Van Drew. In the future because of that, and then I
will just wrap up, but two things. No. 1. I agree with you,
absolutely it is unbelievable. We need these Coast Guard
cutters for sure, you know. We need to make sure that we have
this equipment.
Second, I think it is important probably as we go forward
that the scrutiny might be greater because of what is going on
and the changes that are occurring on our earth.
Third, I do think that there are changes, climate changes
that are occurring, but regardless of the climate changes, we
have a responsibility as far as the resources that are up
there, and we have a responsibility as far as safety and
governance to ensure that we have our rightful role of having
some control over what is going on in the future because, you
know, the one thing we can talk about climate change all we
want. Whatever you believe and whatever is going to happen, it
is not going to be cured like that.
So this process, to some degree, is going to go on, and we
have to be able to control it. I think that is what you are
trying to say, and I think you are absolutely right.
Mr. Murphy. I think a secure and stable Arctic where U.S.
interests are safeguarded, where our homeland is protected, and
where Arctic states work cooperatively on some of these
challenges is exactly what we are aiming for. It is
irrespective of any other sort-of issue going on, you know.
Mr. Van Drew. Last question on this. What is the time
frame--I know Russia has been involved a long time, but for
China. What is the time frame where they have really gotten
active there?
Mr. Murphy. It goes back----
Mr. Van Drew. Just a ballpark.
Mr. Murphy [continuing]. Several years, 3 or 4 years, at
least.
Mr. Van Drew. So yes. This is a relatively new activity on
their part.
Mr. Murphy. You know, I think the administration's National
security strategy does an outstanding job highlighting this
geostrategic shift that has occurred in the world. I think it
was happening before 2014 with regards to Russia, for example,
before a 2016 attempt by the Chinese to make a purchase in
Greenland of what was a formal Naval base of the United States.
But it crystallized everyone's thinking. It is a new frame.
I see, you know, strong bipartisan support in my job from
this body but also outside in think tanks and the NGO community
moving forward to put in place the tools that we need to
succeed in that frame and protect our interest and our security
and ensure the prosperity for the American people as we did for
the last 75 years.
Mr. Van Drew. Absolutely. I think we have to keep an eye on
them. Thank you.
Mr. Correa. Thank you Mr. Van Drew.
I would like to move into a second round of questions, if
we can, and I wanted to start out by asking, Admiral Ray
without getting into political issues of global warming, I
would ask specifically. I presume the Coast Guard has a plan,
has some projections in terms of what assets will be needed in
that area of the world based on less ice the next 5, 10, 15,
20, 50 years. Am I correct in that assessment?
Mr. Ray. Yes, sir. We have talked a lot about the polar
security cutters, but there are other assets that we will need
to operate up there as well.
Mr. Correa. So coming back to that chart Ms. Barragan put
up and that shows that we are way behind when it comes to
icebreakers when you compare us to the Russians and some of the
others, but there is other ways to multiply, so to speak, our
assets to make sure that we have other non-icebreaker
capabilities to assure that we have some kind of a semblance of
control and enforcing rule of law in that area?
Mr. Ray. Yes, sir. As was stated previously, the ability to
communicate up there requires use of new technology. We did an
experiment--not an experiment. We did a test starting 2 years
ago with small satellites that were launched with SpaceX to a
lower polar orbit to allow us to communicate, and this was, you
know, pretty--it was funded by DHSST, and it was--we learned a
lot during that. It wasn't intended to become operational. We
learned a lot. So that is an example of things that we need to
do to get into that line of business.
There are things we need to do with our aviation assets
that we need to operate up there. I think the most important
thing that we kind-of believe is the secret to the Coast
Guard's ability to be agile is you can't cover the whole thing
from fixed bases is to have these movable resources that you
can----
Because in 2015, it was all about Shell drilling for oil,
and we were all stationed over in what I will call northwest of
Utqiagvik. More recently, the ecotourist traffic is further to
the east, you know. When I say further east, several hundred
miles. So we have got to be agile and able to move around.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Murphy, you made a statement that the
administration now understands the importance strategically of
this area to our Nation. But I would say--just from a gut
reaction here, I would say that we as a Nation do not
appreciate the importance of this region to our country. Unless
you are on the front page of the newspapers every day, unless
you begin--you know, really push this in front of the public,
our policy makers are probably not going to look at this.
This committee, this is the second hearing we have had on
this issue, and we are trying to push this information out to
the rest of our colleagues. It is important because long-term,
pennies invested today will save us a lot of headaches and a
lot of dollars in the future.
We talked earlier, Admiral, about the fish stock and the
Bering Sea, 52 percent of our fish and a huge percentage of our
protein coming from that area. You talked about the fish
migrating north, so my question is are they migrating north, or
are they expanding north?
Mr. Ray. Probably the--I think it is more toward--I will
call it relocating, at least from the signs we have seen thus
far. So the fish stocks are----
Mr. Correa. That would concern me a little bit because we
are talking about food stock. Twenty, 30 years' worth of food
will be a strategic weapon in the world. We want to make sure
that the United States has its food supply secure.
Finally, I would just say planning for the future, what can
we do as a committee to make sure that we inform our public,
our constituents, our colleagues of your important--and not
only in the region but of the Coast Guard. I just got back from
New Zealand. Those folks were talking raving reviews about the
Coast Guard and how they work on these vast swaths of water to
protect, to rescue folks.
We look at North Korea, how you are involved in the
blockade, OK, of North Korea to make sure that we are enforcing
international law. You are working everywhere; South America,
Central America, the Caribbean. Yet your resources are very
limited. How can we get that message out to our colleagues that
we need to take care that you do have the resources and the
assets to do your job?
Mr. Ray. Well, thank you for your observations, Mr.
Chairman. I think, you know, as we look over the support that
we have received, the resources recently, the thing that we
come back to is talking about our readiness. Our readiness
allows us to take resources from New England and surge them
down to the Gulf Coast to respond to a hurricane. It is what
allows us to do this Arctic work.
So when we talk about readiness, that is the kind-of the
day-to-day operational and maintenance funding that the
Congress provides us. While the Department of Defense got a
plus-up of about 12 percent as they plussed-up their readiness,
we were not much above flatline. So if I was going to, you
know, focus on one thing and a general subject, it is
operational and maintenance funding to go toward improving our
day-to-day readiness.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much.
Now Ranking Member Lesko.
Mrs. Lesko. No further questions Mr. Chair.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just very briefly.
Mr. Murphy, you offered some helpful comments about sort-of
the overall picture and it being a gradual and intentional
process to expand resources, consulates, icebreakers, but many
other things. I am curious how--you know, whether there is a
similar process going on vis-a-vis allies.
So you have on this sheet of the icebreakers that was made
reference to earlier Canada, the Nordic states, Finland,
Sweden, Denmark. They are all making investments. They seem
rather modest. Can you character--and of course, we are looking
at icebreakers here and all of that. But can you characterize
that picture too? How about--you mentioned the Arctic Council,
and I assume we do work--all those Nations do work there.
But do our allies engage and are they prepared to expend
the resources that the United States is expected to expend to
respond to this problem?
Mr. Murphy. That is a good question, and I think the answer
to that question is yes. I mean, there has been a tremendous
bump in investment in shared burden sharing challenges by the
allies over the last several years, and that is a real
positive.
This administration deserves a lot of credit for affecting
that change. But I also see, to use a specific example in the
context of dealing with some of the emerging military
challenges that the Russians are posing in the Arctic and in
the North Atlantic. You see the Icelanders, for example, making
investments in the Keflavik platform which we are using with
our allies to conduct P8 missions.
You have seen the Norwegians making investments in sensor
technology and other areas so we know what is going on,
situational and domain awareness. The United Kingdom is going
to get back into the P8 antisubmarine warfare mission,
something they had gotten out of at the end of the Cold War, so
there are changes taking place. They take longer to come on-
line than we would all like, but they are happening.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Van Drew.
Mr. Van Drew. Just one quick question and one remark.
Ms. Mak, you said, you know, obviously we have to get these
things accomplished and done before it is too late. I agree
with you, by the way. What would you characterize as too late,
just complete control of the area by all these other nations,
or how would you characterize that?
Ms. Mak. My perspective is really from an acquisition
perspective and really meaning that as the Coast Guard is
pursing the polar security cutter, it needs to do things the
right way and have the right appropriate knowledge before it
moves forward to construction because we have seen a lot of
other--a lot of work in our shipbuilding reviews where there is
pressure to move forward and award construction.
They start building the ship before the design is complete
numerous times on Navy ships and Coast Guard ships. It ends up
costing more and taking longer in the long run because they
have to rework it, or the contractor has to pull a part out
because the design got changed later on, and all that ends up--
there is a lot of back and forth, and it ends up taking a lot
longer and costing longer.
As a Nation, as a country that needs to project in the
Arctic, I think we can't afford to have those kind of delays,
so we are asking the Coast Guard to be committed, and they have
shown indications of that, to do it right the first time
around.
Mr. Van Drew. OK. Thank you. The Chairman had made note of
how much the Coast Guard is doing all over the world and with
limited resources and how amazing it is. I would just remind
him that their initial training is in Cape May, New Jersey, so
that might explain part of it.
Mr. Correa. Are you arguing for more training or less?
Mr. Van Drew. I am arguing for anything I can get down
there.
Mr. Correa. Good answer.
I want to thank our Members of the committee, our witnesses
for their valuable testimony. Members of the committee may have
additional questions for the witnesses, and I would ask that
you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions when
they do present them.
Without objection, the committee record will be kept open
for 10 days.
Seeing no further business for this committee, this
committee stands adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]