[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-66]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
THE FISCAL YEAR 2021 NATIONAL
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET
REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 27, 2020
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-283 WASHINGTON : 2020
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Emma Morrison, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 2
WITNESSES
Berger, Gen David H., USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps........ 5
Gilday, ADM Michael M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy 4
Modly, Hon. Thomas B., Acting Secretary of the Navy.............. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Modly, Hon. Thomas B., joint with ADM Michael M. Gilday and
Gen David H. Berger........................................ 59
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Banks.................................................... 111
Mr. Bergman.................................................. 111
Mr. Brown.................................................... 109
Mr. Cook..................................................... 109
Mr. Courtney................................................. 107
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 107
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 110
Mr. Larsen................................................... 107
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 108
Ms. Speier................................................... 107
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 112
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bergman.................................................. 127
Mr. Bishop................................................... 130
Mr. Brindisi................................................. 129
Mr. Brooks................................................... 121
Mr. Byrne.................................................... 121
Mr. Cisneros................................................. 124
Mr. Gallagher................................................ 123
Mr. Golden................................................... 128
Mr. Graves................................................... 129
Mr. Scott.................................................... 117
Ms. Sherrill................................................. 126
Ms. Speier................................................... 116
Ms. Trahan................................................... 128
Mr. Turner................................................... 115
Mr. Vela..................................................... 122
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 127
THE FISCAL YEAR 2021 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, February 27, 2020.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. We are going to go ahead and get started. We
have a full committee hearing this morning to discuss the
fiscal year 2021 national defense authorizing budget request
for the Department of the Navy.
And we are joined by three witnesses this morning: the
Honorable Thomas Modly, Acting Secretary of the Navy; Admiral
Michael Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations; and General David
Berger, the Commandant for the U.S. Marine Corps.
Gentlemen, thank you all for being here. Appreciate your
willingness to testify, and also your service to our country,
all the work that you do to help make sure that we have the
strongest military we possibly can and meet our national
security objectives.
We kicked off our posture hearing season yesterday with the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and I think got a pretty good overview of the overall
budget, and now we are going to work our way through piece by
piece.
And I think the most interesting thing is what the
Department of Defense has undertaken--that I know you all are
participating in as well--that has come to be called the blank-
slate review; basically, an effort to look at everything that
we are doing within the military and reassess, figure out where
we could potentially save money, where we should spend more,
and how we need to realign our priorities to make sure that
they match up with the National Security Strategy that was put
in place over a year ago now, I believe.
The overarching theme of that is the notion of great power
competition and the re-emergence of that, which re-emerged a
while ago, but dealing with Russia and China and how that
enabled--how we should realign our forces and realign our
defense priorities to meet that challenge. And I think that is
the most difficult question and one that we definitely want to
hear from all of you today in terms of how it specifically
impacts the Navy and the Marine Corps.
What do you need to do differently? Where are you short
assets? Where can assets be transferred from? And how do we
balance all of those complex needs? And the great challenge
here of course is we do not have infinite resources. The budget
is what the budget is. So if we come to you and say, ``We want
you to do more here,'' logically, you are going to have to do
less somewhere else.
I do realize that efficiencies are part of that. We
discussed a little bit yesterday the move towards an audit,
trying to make sure that we create greater efficiency in the
acquisition and procurement process.
I know Ranking Member Thornberry has done an enormous
amount of work on that. All of that done, we still have to make
choices within the budget. And you gentlemen are in the
position to best understand those choices and why you have made
the ones you have. So hearing from you how you prioritize where
you want the money spent is going to be enormously important.
We are specifically concerned--and I know Congressman
Courtney will express these concerns better than I can--about
some of the reductions in the shipbuilding accounts and money
that apparently was transferred around in the President's
budget at the last minute that, among other things, required
the reduction of one attack submarine and how we are going to
meet those needs.
And overall, in that area, I am interested in--we have been
talking about a 355-ship Navy I think for the entire time that
I have been in Congress. I think they had a different number
when I started, but I forget what that number was.
It is almost meaningless at this point. Since it is like
20, 30 years out, we are going to try to get to that number.
What I am more interested in is, what do we have now? What are
we likely to have in the next 5 years? How does it meet our
needs, and how do we plan for the future? It is great to have
goals, I suppose, and we can aspire towards that number.
But at the point--at this point, it seems like just that:
an aspiration. It doesn't translate necessarily into a
strategy, so we are more interested in how the short-term
strategy works on that front. So we look forward to your
testimony, and we have many questions, and it will help inform
us as we get ready to produce the National Defense Authorizing
Act this year.
And with that, I turn it over to the ranking member, Mr.
Thornberry, for any opening comments he has.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
FORCES
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I join you in
welcoming our witnesses today, and also thanking each of them
for their service and their many contributions to the country's
defense.
As chairman referenced, there was considerable conversation
yesterday with the Secretary and the Chairman about Navy
shipbuilding. It was interesting to me, one of the benefits the
chairman and I have is we get to be here from the front until--
the beginning until the end of these hearings. And while there
was a lot of concern about this year's budget, as the
conversation evolved, there seemed to be more questions about,
okay, where is the Navy headed in a longer term sense? Not just
numbers of ships, but characteristics of ships and
capabilities, and so forth.
And so I do think members are interested to get that sort
of where we are headed, and that will enable us to do a better
job not only this year but in the future. And, similarly, a
reference was made to potential changes coming to the Marine
Corps.
And so I think while we will focus, of course, on this
year's budget, as the chairman referenced, changes in warfare,
moving from as much emphasis on counterterrorism toward great
power competition, means that all of the services will have to
make some changes, maybe your two as much as any.
So we look forward to hearing from you, and, again, thanks
for being here.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Modly.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS B. MODLY, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Mr. Modly. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your
bipartisan efforts on behalf of our sailors, Marines, and
civilians in the Department of the Navy. It is a true honor for
me to be here today with Admiral Gilday and General Berger,
both of whom have demonstrated great commitment to each other
and to each other's respective naval service as they have
worked collaboratively to lead our integrated American naval
force.
Consistent with that spirit, we have taken a different
approach to the written testimony this year, as you have
received--we have submitted one unified document instead of
three separate statements. And staying ahead in today's rapidly
changing global strategic environment demands that our naval
forces commit to unified planning, clear-eyed assessments, and
sometimes some very, very hard choices.
In this process, we must harmonize competing priorities,
sustain our critical industrial base, and not allow our
maritime competitive advantage to erode relative to global
competitors and, more accurately stated, aggressive adversaries
who wish to hasten our decline as a global force for liberty
and decency around the world.
In the end, this budget submission is a manifestation of
the hard choices we had to make this year. But it is centrally
about our sailors and Marines, their safety and their security
and their well-being and their families.
Ultimately, I ask that you recognize that in this
submission we could not make trades that put our sailors and
Marines on platforms and with equipment that are not ready for
a fight if that fight is what is required of them. While this
budget does slow our trajectory to a force of 355 ships or
more, it does not arrest it.
You have my personal assurance that we are still deeply
committed to building that larger, more capable, more
distributed, naval force within what I consider a strategically
relevant timeframe of no more than 10 years. I look forward to
working with this committee and the entire Congress in the
coming months as we develop realistic plans to do so.
Our budget also demonstrates a clear commitment to the
education of our people as we implement the recommendations of
the Education for Seapower study that I led while serving as
the Under Secretary of the Navy for the last 2 years. We are
establishing a naval community college for our enlisted
personnel as part of a bold and unified naval education
strategy that recognizes that the intellectual and ethical
development of our people is going to be the most critical
element of our success as a naval force.
We are also stepping up our efforts to meet our solemn
commitment to our military families through significantly more
engaged oversight and accountability of our public-private
venture housing program.
Finally, I would like this committee to understand that as
leaders of the Department of the Navy, we are both vocal and
united in our determination to prevent sexual assault and
sexual harassment throughout our force. Every sailor, every
Marine, and every Navy civilian deserves individual dignity,
respect, and protection from this great naval institution that
we have the honor to lead.
We have a lot of work to do in this regard, but you have my
personal commitment that we take it very, very seriously, and
we are going after it every day. We are grateful to the
committee for passing this year's NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], which enables many of the priorities
identified within this document. In passing this legislation,
you sent a strong signal of support to our people and a stern
warning to our adversaries around the world.
We also appreciate the funding stability and predictability
of the last several years. This has saved a lot of money for
the American taxpayers and given our force the agility and
flexibility to address emerging threats while investing in our
integrated force.
We urge this committee to do what it can to continue this
stability in the future, so that we can implement the reforms
and investments required to meet the great power challenges we
face, protect the maritime commons, and defend the United
States of America.
Thank you for your time, and we look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Modly, Admiral Gilday,
and General Berger can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday, are you going to make a statement? We are--
--
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I can.
The Chairman. Okay. Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Gilday. Chairman Smith----
The Chairman. If you could be sure and pull the microphone
down in front of you there.
Admiral Gilday. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank
you for the opportunity to appear today with Secretary Modly
and General Berger, and for your enduring support of the Navy-
Marine Corps team.
I would also like to point out that my wife Linda joins me
this morning.
I will be brief, sir. I would like to address some of the
points that both of you made in your opening statements, and
this really gets down to priorities. So in our budget
submission for this year, the Navy has four priorities. The
first is to fully fund the Columbia-class submarine. So that
nuclear seaborne deterrent that this Nation depends upon is
aging out. By the time we replace the Ohio hull, it will have
42 years in the water, and so we need to deliver Columbia on
time for its first patrol in 2031.
Numbers two and three are readiness and lethality. We are
catching up and closing gaps that we have created over the past
15 to 20 years. And so in order to come to this committee and
ask for more money for a larger fleet, we need to make sure
that we can maintain and sustain the fleet that we have. And so
those are two priorities for us, and our budget reflects that.
In terms of lethality, we are closing gaps against near-
peer competitors by investing in capabilities that have range
and that have speed. Twenty-one percent of our budget is
invested in closing those gaps against our near-peer
competitor. While we are doing those top three priorities, we
are still investing in capacity. The size of the fleet is
growing; it is just not growing at the pace that some would
prefer.
And to meet those priorities, we have had to make some hard
choices inside the Navy, and that includes decommissioning some
legacy platforms that don't bring lethality to the fight.
So with those comments, sir, I thank you again for your
time this morning.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Berger.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE
CORPS
General Berger. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
distinguished members of this committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify on the posture of your Marine Corps and
the priorities for our future.
And I will start by echoing Secretary Modly and Admiral
Gilday's thanks for timely funding, as well as your enduring
commitment to Marines, sailors, and their families through
efforts like the hurricane recovery effort and funding that you
provided last year, and the revision to the public-private
venture housing program. Your bipartisan support is critical to
ensure that we continue to prioritize people as our greatest
resource.
Thanks to predictable funding over the past few years, the
Marine Corps has made significant progress in restoring both
availability and readiness. We are now at an inflection point.
We have to pivot now toward modernization, while sustaining the
readiness that this committee has resourced.
This pivot, in my opinion, cannot wait until next year or
the following. We must move now or risk overmatch in the future
by an adversary, and that is a risk we will not take.
As the National Defense Strategy directs, and as Secretary
Modly recently emphasized in his first Vector to all hands, we
must pursue urgent change at a significant scale. Marines have
always sensed when it is time to move out smartly. We don't
hesitate. This is that time.
Realizing the bold direction of our strategic guidance
requires acknowledging fundamental changes in the operating
environment, and that means how we must train, organize, and
equip the force. I believe most leaders recognize that
significant changes are required, yet the scope and pace of
necessary change is seemingly at odds with some historical
resource allocations and major acquisition programs which
predate the National Defense Strategy.
This budget submission marks the beginning for the Marine
Corps of a focused effort to better align resources with
strategic objectives. Our future budget submissions will build
on these investment decisions with informed recommendations for
force design modifications and adjustment to our programs of
record.
Together, in partnership with Admiral Gilday and under the
direction of Secretary Modly, we are committed to delivering
the integrated naval and Marine forces that our Nation
requires.
As always, I welcome the opportunity to discuss our
findings along the way, and keep each of you and your staffs
informed as we progress. We will be frugal with the resources
we are given. We will ask for no more than we need. With
Congress' commitment and support, we will ensure your Marines
continue to have every advantage when we send them into harm's
way.
And I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, General. Could you, as a starting
point, quantify for us the readiness gains, where we were at,
where we've come to, how much further we need to go, taking
your point on the procurement needs now that are paramount.
Explain to us where you are at on readiness, where you were,
where you are at, where you think you need to be.
General Berger. Chairman, I will probably just use a couple
of examples. First of all, TACAIR [tactical air], fixed-wing
aviation. Three years ago, if memory serves me right, we were
in the mid to upper 50s across the F-18 and Harrier community,
and we were just introducing the F-35. And 50 percent is not
the readiness that you all expect.
Last year, the goal that the Secretary outlined, and we
both strove towards, was 80 percent, and we in fact achieved
that. We would never have made that without the resources that
Congress provided.
Ground side, similar picture. Because of Iraq and
Afghanistan, we had rode our forces, our equipment, pretty
hard, and we had postponed maintenance. The last 2 or 3 years
we have recovered that.
The Chairman. Terrific. Thank you.
Admiral, could you help me out with the 355-ship thing? I
think it is really important, as the ranking member pointed
out, what are the capabilities we need? What are the types of
ships? How do you sort of balance that focus in terms of what
types of ship you are building, what capabilities you need,
with the oft-stated goal of having 355 ships? And when is it--I
forget the date when we are supposed to achieve that number.
How do those two things mesh in terms of your plans?
Admiral Gilday. To your point, it is about capabilities.
And so when we take a look at what we need--what we need in the
Navy as part of the joint force, we are taking a look at what
unique capabilities the Navy can bring to the fight that other
services can't.
And so it is an analytical approach within the Pentagon to
try and make the best investments now to close capability gaps
against both the Chinese and the Russians.
So a couple of examples of the Navy in terms of the air
wings that are embarked on aircraft carriers. So no other place
in the military do we have an airfield that I can move 700
miles a day, and at the same time provide the integrated
capability of early warning, electronic attack, anti-submarine
warfare, air-to-ground, air-to-air, and logistics; all the
while you have a self-sustaining platform that, again, is
mobile.
At the same time, we bring unique capabilities with respect
to ballistic missile defense and anti-submarine warfare on the
destroyers, and with our submarines as well. And so those fold
into that joint mix in terms of what the Navy can contribute to
the joint fight, and that translates into platforms.
And so, simply, that is kind of the quadratic equation that
yields the number of ships, but it also takes into account
attrition models in a fight. It also takes into account what
other missions we need to conduct around the globe in
accordance with the National Defense Strategy. So that would
include deterring another near-peer competitor conventionally,
strategically, being able to respond to additional threats,
assuring allies and partners.
Those also fold into the equation, as well as a strategic
reserve bench in case we do get into----
The Chairman. What is the point of the 355 goal? Mr. Modly,
if you want to take----
Mr. Modly. Mr. Chairman, do you mind if I address this
question? So it is not a random number. It is a number that was
basically benchmarked off of a study that was done in 2016, the
force structure assessment.
The Chairman. But when is it that we are saying that we are
going to need the 355 ships?
Mr. Modly. I am sorry, sir? I didn't----
The Chairman. When? When are we planning on----
Mr. Modly. Well, it is my objective to try to get us there
within 10 years. That is the strategy I am trying to drive
through, and it is not just a random number. It is driven by
strategy. It is driven by the capabilities we think we need.
I will also say it is improper for us to be benchmarking
against a static number. What we are trying to develop in the
Department of the Navy is more of an iterative process to look
at that number, so that we can understand how we might adjust
certain ship categories based on how we perceive the security
environment evolving.
The security environment is not static. We have to develop
a force that is agile, that we can quickly adjust certain ship
categories as we see that we need them.
We just completed an integrated force structure assessment
that was led by the Commandant and the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] for the first time together, trying to determine as
we look at that future security environment and the 10-year
horizon--and we have to take it with some reality here because
it takes a long time to get ships designed and built and into
an industrial base that can support it. But in the 10-year
horizon, as we looked at those numbers again, they actually
ended up increasing, but the mix is different.
So what I am trying to emphasize is that it is--the 355 was
pegged to a force structure assessment that was done 4 years
ago. We are trying to develop a process in the Navy where we
constantly look at this, constantly iterate this, give good
signals to industry so they can adjust with it.
The Chairman. Understood. One last question on that. So
looking at that 10-year goal, how does the money that was taken
out of shipbuilding that cost us that submarine, number one, in
this budget--which was not in the original President's budget
that was taken out, as I understand it, to fund the NNSA
[National Nuclear Security Administration] at a higher level--
how does that, plus the cuts that you are now facing from the
money being reprogrammed for the wall and the programs that are
cut, how do those things impact your ability to meet those
goals?
Mr. Modly. Well, to be frank, it is not helpful, because it
takes a ship out of a plan that we are driving towards. It
particularly is harmful in the sense that it takes a ship out
of a category of ship for which we are going to have a hard
time getting to anyway. We feel like we need to have at least
66 attack submarines.
Even on a 10-year trajectory, based on industrial base
capacity, we think we can get to about 49 or 50. So it takes
out one. If we can get to 48 instead of 49, that impacts that
number. But that is--so, of course, any ship that comes out of
the process of--in any given year is going to impact our
ability to get there as quickly as I would like to.
The Chairman. Understood. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. As I look at the numbers, the shipbuilding
account is down, what, about $4 billion from last year? And the
readiness--O&M [operations and maintenance] account for the
Navy is up about $3.6 billion from last year. Basically, the
same, the cuts and the increases.
So could either of you, Mr. Secretary or Admiral, give me a
little deeper explanation for why the emphasis needs to be, in
your view, on the O&M part this year?
Mr. Modly. I will take it initially, and then I will turn
it over to the CNO. But I think what I tried to basically say
in my opening statement was we did make that trade.
It was an intentional trade because our decision was that
at this particular time, because of the readiness hole that we
had fallen into over many, many years, we needed to address
that first and foremost, because that immediately impacts the
safety and security of the sailors and Marines that we put out
on these platforms.
We could not, in good conscience, trade that money for more
ships that could not operate properly with the right equipment
and with the right readiness. And so that is the trade we made.
We have to look now, as we look from 2022 forward, how do
we afford this larger Navy and maintain the readiness? And
those are the challenges, and that is being pressurized by a
lot of things, such as the Columbia recapitalization, which is
a necessary part of our national security. But we are looking
internally to see what we can do, to look at our own budget
first to see what we can do to find additional funds to drive
that.
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral, as you describe this, can you give
us--you have got, what, ships that are not deployable? Kind of,
what is this readiness priority in a practical, concrete way?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So big picture, I believe that we
need a Navy that is ready, that is capable, and lethal, more
than we need a bigger Navy that is less ready, less capable,
less lethal. And so the money that we are putting into the
readiness accounts, right, specifically, if we talk about
manpower--so when I commanded a destroyer, we had over 300
sailors on the destroyer. We went down to 245. We had
collisions in the Pacific. We learned a lot, lessons learned in
blood.
We are now buying that manpower back. We will be at 265
this year. We will come out to 285 in those destroyers in 2023,
as an example.
We have gaps at sea. Those gaps need to be filled so our
ships are fully manned for all the reasons that you well know.
So we are buying back those people. There are years when the
Navy has shedded people faster than we have shedded ships, and
the size of the Navy has declined since I have been in uniform
in 1985.
But the people piece is where you can get money fast, and
it is a really attractive place to go after money, and we are
saying we are not going to do that. We are going to buy back
that manpower that we know that we need on our ships.
In terms of training for that manpower, what we also
learned from those collisions, we need to do a much better job
at training our sailors at sea. We have put significant
investments in live virtual training as an example--simulators
that are world-class--and we have those at all of our fleet
concentration areas.
In terms of modernization, so we are modernizing our ships.
We have taken a holiday for a while, and keeping up with--70
percent of the fleet that we have today we are going to have in
2030. And so we have to take care of that fleet.
So in terms of modernization, we are putting new systems on
there to make our ships more lethal, and we are filling the
magazines with weapons. And the investments we are making in
weapons are those that have range and speed. So for years, we
have invested in defensive systems because we haven't had a hot
breath down the back of our neck. Now that hot breath is China,
so we are closing those gaps.
That essentially, sir, I hope answered your question on why
that is where the focus is at the expense of growing a Navy at
a precipitous pace. And so----
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Let me just ask one other question.
Lots of flack yesterday about not having a 30-year shipbuilding
plan come with a budget. Any idea when we might see such a
thing?
Mr. Modly. Representative Thornberry, the issue with a 30-
year shipbuilding plan is that we developed this integrated
force structure assessment, and we presented it to the
Secretary of Defense. He wanted some time and some space to
look at that, analyze it, and understand how that would impact
a 30-year shipbuilding plan.
So, unfortunately, it was a confluence of events this year
that we did not--we submitted our budget, the force structure
assessment was delivered, and we didn't have time to really
iterate that, talk to him about it, test it, before we
submitted a 30-year shipbuilding plan. But we will work with
them. Hopefully by--in a couple of months we will be able to
submit that.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Thank you.
The Chairman. So two quick things before we go to the rest
of the questioning. First of all, we have a 5-minute clock for
everyone, and the witnesses need to be helpful to me. Once you
get down close to that 5 minutes, if you could try to wrap up,
so that I don't have to interrupt you, that would be great.
Second, Mr. Garamendi has an introduction he wants to do
quickly.
Mr. Garamendi. If I might--thank you, Mr. Chairman--very
quickly. The 75th anniversary of Iwo Jima is upon us. Wandering
into my office today is a 98-year-old veteran of Iwo Jima, a
Purple Heart. Clinton Trefethen is down here in the front row.
His unit was the first on the beach, an engineering unit. He
was wounded in that battle, and I would like to welcome him.
General, Commandant, he has got a few things he can tell
you about how to do it right.
[Applause.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Thank you, John.
Mr. Garamendi. He was just recently given his new license
from the California Department of Vehicles. Highway Patrol
caught him a couple of days after that traveling at over 100
miles an hour. And when the Highway Patrolman said, ``Do you
know how fast you were going?'' he said, ``Yes, 2 miles an hour
over my age.''
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Thank you. On that note, Ms. Davis is
recognized.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of
you for your service to our country and certainly for being
with us today.
I wanted to go back to the issue that we began talking
about yesterday. And as you may know, I had asked General
Milley about the cut to the Virginia-class submarine--we have
referenced that already today--to increase nuclear weapons
programs. And he said that while he supported fully funding the
nuclear arsenal, the last-minute change was not supported by
his best military advice, and I know that has been mentioned
again.
Could you share your thoughts about that, so we have a
better understanding about how that occurred? I was addressing
that to the Admiral, but, Mr. Secretary, do you want to----
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I was not directly involved in those
discussions. It happened at budget end-game very quickly, and
we were informed after the decision was made.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. And, Mr. Secretary, I think you addressed
it already.
Mr. Modly. That is exactly the way I would--thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. That is
helpful, and maybe further discussions about how, again,
Congress can play a stronger role in that as well.
In this budget, shipbuilding has also seen cuts in
logistics and support vessels like oilers. And I wonder if you
could talk about the way forward with those programs as well.
Where are we? Where should we be going?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. Thanks. As you probably know,
we have a new class of oiler that we are building and will
reach its initial operating capability in just a couple of
years, so replacing an aging fleet of oilers. We are also
beginning to make investments in strategic sealift. And so that
is another area of the budget, just like the Columbia-class
submarine, just like our infrastructure ashore, where we
haven't made significant investments in a while.
So the Congress has given us the authorities to buy used
vessels, and so we are buying two used vessels in 2021, and the
authority is to buy up to seven of those. At the same time, we
are doing R&D [research and development] in a new class of
affordable sealift platform.
At the same time, we did service life extension on six of
our older ships last year. We are going to double that this
year, and we are going to triple that next year in 2021 with
this request.
I hope that answers your question, ma'am, in terms of----
Mrs. Davis. Sure. And you feel that that is going to get us
where we need to be.
Admiral Gilday. No, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. Oh, okay.
Admiral Gilday. And so----
Mrs. Davis. Where do we need to be?
Admiral Gilday [continuing]. We take a look at pressure
points within our top line, and that is among them. We are
giving it attention, but it is just a long time to catch up
with that aging fleet, given its size.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. The Navy, as you know, has been
offering unmanned systems and has developed multiple programs
of record on systems that were never fielded. In fiscal year
2021, the Navy proposed a serial production of the large
unmanned surface vessel before prototyping and testing are
complete.
Considering the history, is it prudent to continue serial
production of large unmanned surface vessels before the
prototyping and testing are complete? Mr. Secretary, you want
to answer?
Mr. Modly. Yes, absolutely. Well, we have to really
accelerate our investment in unmanned platforms. And that is
what we are trying to do, and we are trying to do it at a
reasonable pace, so that we can understand how these
technologies might work, and, more importantly, how they might
operate together.
So without having the platforms, it is very difficult for
us to do that type of testing, that type of integrated testing
that we would need to do.
So we are proceeding, we think, in a somewhat cautious pace
to do this. But it is absolutely going to be part of whatever
future force structure we have, and so we need to start
experimenting with concepts, understanding how the technology
will work.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. You know that the Navy struggles to
forecast ship depot maintenance--that is a big, tough issue for
everybody--and has recently requested congressional approval to
cover approximately $1 billion of shortfalls in this account.
This creates unpredictability, of course, for industry and
diminishes Congress' confidence that the Navy is effectively
managing this huge and critical enterprise.
What are you doing to better predict the schedule and costs
of ships and submarine maintenance availabilities?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am--I am mindful of the time, Mr.
Chairman--but so as you point out, we have had challenges with
depot-level maintenance on our ships. Most recently, we have
only been able to get about 30 to 35 percent of our ships out
of the shipyards on time. That has been a priority of the Navy,
to turn that around.
We want to reduce 80 percent of our delay days this year.
Right now, 63 percent of our ships are coming out of
maintenance on time through 2020, and we want to eliminate all
of those delays by the end of 2021. So it is very aggressively.
We have done a lot of analytical work. We found out, as an
example, that most of the--many of the delays, about 25
percent, could be attributed to poor forecasting and planning
up front. That is our fault in the Navy, and so we took a round
turn on that.
Additionally, we are taking a look at bundling contracts
for private----
The Chairman. And we will have to leave it at that.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you
for being here, and I particularly appreciate you being here. I
am a grateful Navy dad, and I have a son who has been an
orthopedic surgeon and serving today, has previously served in
Iraq with the SEALs [Sea, Air, and Land teams] and the Rangers.
So we just so appreciate our family being part of the Navy
family.
Additionally, Secretary Modly, the National Defense
Strategy lays out the rebuilding military readiness as we face
a more lethal joint force as a distinct line of effort. The
Navy's fiscal year 2021 request for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters
include five less than last year, and six less than fiscal year
2019.
Topping the Navy's unfunded priorities list, however, is
$525.5 million for five F-35C carrier variants. How is the
naval readiness, and ultimately military readiness, impacted by
these aircraft not being funded? And what is the Navy's plan to
compensate for the shortfall?
Mr. Modly. Well, as you know, sir, we did put that in. It
is the number two item on our unfunded priorities list. We
would, obviously, love to have those aircraft. But, again, if
the--when we got into the final budget deliberations, we felt
that we could trade that without severely impacting our
readiness over the long term and try to pick it up in future
years.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
And, General Berger, I previously represented Marine Corps
Air Station Beaufort. And one of the great achievements was for
that community that just really loves the Marine Corps Air
Station, they love the sound of freedom, all right, when it
flies over. They do not complain. And so that is why they help
recruit and support F-35s to be located there.
By replacing the fourth-generation planes at Beaufort with
fifth-generation aircraft, what is the current process, and
what challenges do you foresee?
General Berger. Well, sir, 2\1/2\ years ago we sent the
first squadron to Iwakuni. Last year they went on ship. A year
and a half ago, they went on ship. We are moving fast.
In our view, comparing the Harrier against the F-35, it is
pretty striking. And all you need to do is listen to the media
in Indo-Pacific on the other side to find out what the impact
of the squadron of F-35s on board an amphibious ship floating
around out there is no difference or no--there is no
comparison.
In Beaufort, on the east and west coasts, moving as fast as
we can to get out of F-18s and Harriers and into F-35s. That is
our goal.
Mr. Wilson. Well, we appreciate it. And they are--if ever
there is a community that will welcome it, it is Beaufort,
South Carolina, and the State of South Carolina.
And, Admiral Gilday, I am grateful that the Navy is
fielding W76-2 low-yield warheads earlier this month. The
nuclear posture review identifies a requirement to modify a
small number of submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads
to combat potential adversaries with low-yield nuclear weapons
for peace through strength.
However, the W76-2 is one of two variants of the W76 which
just completed its service life extension program. These
systems will require modernization in the coming years as their
cores are increasingly older. Which steps is the Navy taking to
ensure the seamless modernization of these systems and to
ensure that the naval readiness is not impacting by giving--by
the growing nuclear threat?
Mr. Modly. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question about low-
yield nuclear weapons. We are making investments right now in
modernizing our nuclear weapons inventory, and so that is
included in that plan. It will take a number of years in order
to close, but it is included.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I particularly appreciate it, because I
know the Savannah River nuclear laboratory is very vital and
very, again, enthusiastic to work with you.
Sadly, in 2017, I visited the Fitzgerald in Japan, which so
many American sailors were tragically, and to me just
shockingly, killed. What lessons have we learned? What steps
have we taken to avoid any further accidents such as the
Fitzgerald and the McCain?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I know you are aware of the
comprehensive review we have done and the phases we have gone
through in order to institutionalize what we learned from both
of those collisions. I will actually be traveling to
Pascagoula, Mississippi, tomorrow, and I will be aboard the
Fitzgerald and we are going to talk about many of those issues.
Mr. Wilson. And I hope every effort is made for an early
warning advance system for the best for our sailors. And I am
grateful to be here and yield the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, and General Berger for being
here today, for your testimony, and all that you do on behalf
of our Nation.
I want to begin by applauding your efforts with the recent
Education for Seapower study to enhance professional military
education and increase opportunities for our enlisted sailors
and Marines to earn accredited technical degrees. I think it is
absolutely essential that we continue to educate all of our
service members wherever possible and provide them these
opportunities.
It was a big priority for a former chairman of this
committee, Ike Skelton, who believed greatly in professional
military education and something that has stuck with me during
my time here on the committee.
On another topic, I appreciate both the chairman and my
colleague, Ms. Davis, for raising the concern about the cut to
the Virginia-class submarine in this year's Presidential
budget. I don't think this is a time that we should be cutting
it, and it does concern me, Admiral, that that decision was
made after the fact and not, it seems, with your input. That
does not inspire confidence here that we are making decisions
based on our military needs versus what someone may be doing
with playing around with budget numbers.
But that being said, Secretary Modly, in your recent Vector
12, you emphasized the importance of continued increased
undersea dominance for the long run. The most, obviously,
survivable leg of nuclear triad, the Columbia-class submarine,
is essential to that mission.
My question, Secretary Modly, or Admiral Gilday, is the
Columbia-class submarine vital for our success in great power
competition? And would you agree that the Columbia-class
submarine is a strategic asset that will benefit more than just
the Navy?
Mr. Modly. Sir, I absolutely agree that it is probably the
most vital part of our strategic nuclear deterrent. The current
force is aging and has to be modernized, so that is why it is
number one on our priority in terms of as we looked at this
budget and how we intended to roll it out.
It is going to be even more relevant in a more complicated
world with powers who have greater ability to project power
both under the sea and in other areas. And so it is absolutely
vital to our future, and that is why it is such a priority for
us in our budget.
Mr. Langevin. So this asset will carry 70 percent of the
nuclear arsenal, and yet the Navy seems to be the only one
covering the bill. Secretary Modly, or Admiral Gilday, do you
believe that the Navy is shouldering a disproportionate share
for this asset?
Mr. Modly. Well, we work under the top line that we are
given to work under, sir. And so that is how we are managing
it. We prioritize it. I think there are a lot of discussions
being held both in the halls here and other places about how we
might come up with more creative ways to fund that program,
because, frankly, it is putting a huge pressure on our
shipbuilding budget. It is 25 percent now. It is going to
escalate to 31 percent. And if we also have this goal of
growing a fleet to 355, or I like to say 355-plus, we are not
going to be able to do all of those things.
So we are looking, we are digging hard inside our own
budget to see where we can free up dollars for this. There may
be some creative ways to look at unexpired or unused or
unobligated funds to try and fund that. But we are looking at
every possible way to do that, but we can't abandon it, so----
Mr. Langevin. I would agree. I think you would find support
here on the committee. We need to get creative because this is
a national strategic asset. I don't think we should be taking
it just out of the shipbuilding budget.
But to this point, what steps are you and OSD [Office of
the Secretary of Defense] taking to ensure the Columbia-class
submarines procurement timeline remains less volatile than our
current experience with Virginia class.
Admiral Gilday, I am glad to hear you talk about how we are
committed to fully funding Columbia, but what are the steps we
are taking to make sure that procurement timeline----
Admiral Gilday. Probably the best example I can give you,
Congressman, is the fact that when we begin building that
submarine later this year, 83 percent of that submarine will be
designed. If I compare that against Ohio, 2 percent of that
submarine was designed when we started building it. Virginia
class, less than half of that submarine was completed design by
the time we started building it.
So it is vitally important, for the reasons stated
previously, to stay in the timeline to begin its first patrol
in 2031, that we absolutely remain focused on it. And the
teamwork with the shipyards is absolutely critical here in
order to stay in that timeline as well.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
your service and for your availability today.
Admiral Gilday, to address a gap in the homeland defense
due to program cancellations, Missile Defense Agency is looking
at a regional defense system to serve as an underlayer to the
GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] system. Specifically, they
are looking at the Aegis destroyer using the SM-3 Block IIA
missiles. How would that impact your BMD [ballistic missile
defense] mission?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, it would allow us to use BMD-capable
ships for other missions besides defending the homeland. And so
it would give--I think it would give more flexibility to senior
decision-makers in terms of how they would use those assets if
that gap were covered with a land-based Aegis system, with
essentially the same capability as the ships.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I am glad you mentioned the land-based
system. Has there been discussion about moving the Aegis Ashore
from the Navy to the Army, given that there is talk about
expanding that capability?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, not that I am aware of.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Over the last decade, we have seen
significant growth in the Chinese battle fleet, and they have
surpassed the United States now as the largest navy. We are
seeing significant investments by both Russia and North Korea
in their submarine technologies and capacity. How do you
compete with that?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, so I go back to the priorities, right?
In terms of making sure that the fleet we have today, 70
percent of which we are going to have in 2030, is ready and
capable of flight, that 21 percent of our budget is focused on
lethality and modernization, so that we have weapons that can
actually outstick our adversaries with great speed.
And that includes doubling our investment in hypersonics,
and so we are working very closely with the Army and the Air
Force as we develop not only the airframe that we should begin
doing testing here together very soon, but also the warheads.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
General Berger, you talked in your opening statement about
this being an inflection point, and that we can't waste time.
We have to start acting now. But when I look at your PB21
[Presidential budget for fiscal year 2021] numbers, I don't see
much difference between PB20. What am I missing? If we have
really got to do something now, why is it not reflected in
larger numbers in the PB21?
General Berger. This year is the pivot. This budget was
largely built in July and August based on our annual fiscal
cycle. So I could fit some things, I could change some things,
but not the significant ones that we need to make.
In 2022 and 2023, it will be significantly more. But even
in this one--even in this one--there is investments in things
like ground-based anti-ship missiles that you wouldn't have
seen a couple years ago at all. But this is the direction the
integrated force must go.
Mr. Rogers. Great. In your written testimony, you also
talked about an acquisition review of legacy programs. You
talked about F-35, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the
Amphibious Combat Vehicle, and others. And like you said, we
may have to turn loose of some legacy programs. When do you
think that review is going to be complete and ready for you to
take action?
General Berger. I think much like the integrated force
structure assessment in terms of ships, it is not going to be
ever over, because we have an adversary that is moving. So we
have completed the first round of it. We know the size of the
Marine Corps that we are going to need, we think, in 10 years
from now, and much of the capabilities and capacities are
driven by the size of your force.
We will need to make adjustments to the programs of record
based on a couple of things. First, the size of the Marine
Corps. We don't--we are not going to waste the resources you
give us. Second, the threat. We have to match--we have to
maintain an overmatch all along.
So as long as we are in great power competition, we are
going to gauge off of a pacing threat, which means we are going
to increase/decrease.
Mr. Rogers. From our previous conversations, I very much
like the aggressive approach that you are taking. I am just
wondering when we are going to start seeing you take the knife
out and start taking some action. Will that be in the 2022
budget, or what?
General Berger. This year, in this budget, we reduced the
manpower equivalent of a couple thousand Marines. That probably
won't be the largest one or the last. Why? I think every
service chief would love to have a bigger force, but you need
us to be lethal, you need us to be mobile, you need us to be
integrated with the Navy.
So we are going to reduce the size of the Marine Corps some
this year, more next year. You will see the impacts to programs
I think later this summer and into the spring of next year.
But, again, it will be--it is not a snapshot in time where we
freeze, or else an evolving threat, we will stare at a signpost
and it will be moving.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I like your leadership on this. Thank
you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday,
the fiscal year 2020 NDAA included a provision that required
the SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] to conduct real-time sound
monitoring at no fewer than two Navy installations, and their
associated outlying landing fields [OLFs]. And so we have a
very peripheral interest. They are trying to deal with some
issues around NAS [Naval Air Station] Whidbey Island and OLF.
But I think this is a good compromise step moving away from
the traditional model that we have used and move to real-time
noise monitoring. The plan, though, for additional monitoring
is due to Congress by March 20 according to the language in the
law. So is the Navy planning to submit that plan to Congress on
time?
Mr. Modly. Sir, my understanding, that they are wrapping up
that study, and that it is on track to be delivered on time.
Mr. Larsen. So the plan for the study is due on March 20,
and then the implementation then would----
Mr. Modly. That is right.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. Occur. So you are saying by March
20 we will see--we will have the plan?
Mr. Modly. I have not heard anything otherwise in terms of
our ability. I will check into that for sure and get back to
you, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Earlier is better, certainly. So, then, with
that plan, I then assume the Navy is prepared to begin
implementing the real-time monitoring soon after.
Mr. Modly. Sir, I will get back to you on that one, sir. I
was just reading about that this morning, that they were
preparing this plan--preparing to deliver this plan, but I have
not seen it yet. So once I know more of the details, I will get
back to you on that, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
Mr. Larsen. Great. Thank you very much. We will be in
touch. Appreciate that.
And then, second, for the Secretary or Admiral--you can
choose, really--the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]
signed interim guidance in December providing recommendations
to address groundwater contaminated with PFAS [per- and
polyfluoroalkyl substances] and PFOS [perfluorooctane
sulfonate], and we have had this debate here. And, of course,
again we have an issue on Whidbey Island.
And I will note the Navy's commitment to Whidbey Island has
been great in helping the city of Coupeville deal with their
well situation, but we still have groundwater issues there. Is
the Navy following the EPA guidance, continuing to follow the
EPA guidance?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, so we finished our investigations. And
in areas like Coupeville, where we found contamination, we have
taken steps, for example, to provide suitable drinking water
from other sources. We have money in the budget this year--
about $60 million--to address cleanup. And so we are moving
through cleanup in 2020 and 2021.
So, in both 2020 and 2021, we have money towards cleanup.
In the last report that I saw, we were on track to conduct that
cleanup on time.
Mr. Larsen. Excellent. We will follow up with you on that,
too. There may be some--I think every community is unique, and
we have some unique issues there at NAS Whidbey Island and
Coupeville as well, so we will follow up with you on that.
Appreciate that.
Third question I have has to do with the readiness
question, especially as it applies to the F-18s; specifically,
the Gs, the Growlers, at NAS Whidbey Island, and it is a
Growler question. But what is the--given the percentages you
have outlined with the Es and Fs, do you know the readiness
level of the Gs?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. It is over 60 percent right now.
We have learned a lot from what we have done with the Super
Hornets, right, the Es and the Fs. And so we were at 50--we
could not break 55 percent mission-capable aircraft for a
decade. And so we took a deep look at our processes, and we are
applying those same to our ships maintenance.
So we have now been sustaining above 80 percent for 4 or 5
months. So we are applying those same processes to every type,
model, series aircraft in the inventory. So I expect that the
Growler numbers will come up. They are headed in the right
direction.
Mr. Larsen. Excellent. So if--I apologize, this is kind of
a leading question, because if we can get to 80 percent-plus on
the Gs, does that change the number of Growlers that the Navy
will need?
Admiral Gilday. No, sir. It won't change the requirement.
We just have a more ready fleet.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. I think that is it. I yield back. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, all, for your service, for your contribution,
and, Admiral, for your wife as well and what she contributes.
I would like to ask you about conventional prompt-strike,
presumably with a hypersonic glide vehicle. What is the need
for such a submarine-launched capability? Admiral or Acting
Secretary?
Mr. Modly. Well, one of the great challenges we have right
now is that our adversaries have developed long-range
hypersonic missiles that hold our forces at bay, make us have
to operate farther and farther away from the first and second
island chains. And so we have to develop some type of
capability to be able to meet that.
And so that is why we are developing this conventional
prompt-strike weapon, and we are working with the Army and the
Air Force on this collaboratively. We are looking at all kinds
of different options for how we might base that, some of which
I can't discuss in an open forum, but would be happy to come in
in a closed forum and talk to you about that.
Mr. Lamborn. And we are talking about a conventional
capability, not strategic or nuclear but conventional. Would
that affect strategic stability? Would it make the environment
more unstable with our near peers?
Mr. Modly. Well, sir, I think the goal of everything that
we are doing is to try and increase strategic stability, to
maintain strong enough deterrent force to keep our adversaries
guessing and uncertain about their capabilities.
So everything that we do is with that objective in mind. We
have--there is nothing that we do to try to create a more
unstable security environment.
Mr. Lamborn. And does having such a submarine-based
capability put our submarines under an unacceptable risk of
detection, and so forth?
Mr. Modly. I will yield over to Admiral Gilday on that in
terms of the actual operational elements of the attack
submarine force.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think any time you fire a weapon you
face that kind of risk in terms of--particularly if you are
firing from a concealed position like a submarine. But it is
not just what you are firing; it is how you are going to
actually maneuver to conduct the fight, right?
So it is how we are going to fight, our concepts of
operations, and so that will be taken into account, and each
situation where we would employ those weapons will be a little
bit different. So it will be based on the fighting environment
as well.
Mr. Lamborn. So are you confident that even if there is a
risk it would be an acceptable risk?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, we would maneuver to make that risk
accessible. I want to create--we want to create a dilemma for
the Chinese fleet commanders, so that they don't know what
vectors they have to protect themselves from.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And how would not having this
capability affect your ability to operate in a contested
environment with a near-peer competitor?
Admiral Gilday. So I think the ability to have a long-range
weapon at speed like hypersonics, it allows you to get in
closer sooner. So it allows you to create a dilemma for the
enemy where you actually outstick them with mass volumes of
fire to put yourself in a position of advantage early.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate those answers.
Changing gears, I would like to ask you about the four
public shipyards. And I know that the current budget includes
funding to continue the virtual mapping of the public shipyards
and some military construction funding for dry docks. When do
you expect that the Navy will complete this mapping and begin
increasing annual investments in the shipyard infrastructure
optimization plan, SIOP, in line with about $1 billion annually
that it is going to need?
Mr. Modly. Just at a high level, sir, this is about a 20-
year program that we have that we absolutely must do with these
public shipyards to modernize them, not just modernize the
facilities but modernize the way in which work flows through
them more efficiently and more effectively.
So we are starting already on this process of investing in
this long-term plan. I don't know if the CNO has any more to
say about that.
Admiral Gilday. Yes. So the mapping should take a couple of
years in terms of doing the virtual mapping of all of the
shipyards, and really taking a look at processes and how they
can become more efficient. But at the same time, we are
investing in infrastructure like dry docks. We just began work
less than a month ago down in Norfolk on a dry dock that is 101
years old. We just did a ribbon-cutting up at Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, on a deep basin up there.
And so at the same time, sir, we are taking a look at where
we want to make deliberate investments. We know some things now
that we have to fix. We have to replace cranes, we have to
rebuild dry docks, as examples.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you so much.
I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the
witnesses for being here today.
I have had a chance to meet with you all over the last few
months or so, and, again, just really impressive, serious
people, and appreciate your testimony here today.
Just real quick, on the 30-year shipbuilding plan issue and
the integrated force structure assessment, you know, the reason
why that is in statute on the 30-year, it is just that
shipbuilding takes a long time. You know, I mean, a sub is
about 65 months for Virginia class. Columbia will be longer.
Carriers, I think it is year 12 for the Ford carrier.
So we need to have that longer sort of perspective because
these investment decisions, again, just have--they have just
years-long impact in terms of how Congress operates.
The integrated force structure assessment--again, we look
forward to seeing it. But, I mean, without trying to quibble
here, these are two separate endeavors. I mean, the 30-year
shipbuilding plan is a budget requirement in law. And the
integrated force structure assessment, just like the last one
in 2016, I mean, that was a separate process, a good process.
And the reason isn't necessarily to find out what is the
top line, what is the--how many do we need. It is also about
the fleet architecture. What is the composition of the fleet?
Because when we talk about lethality, it matters, you know, in
terms of being able to see, you know, where we are going over
just a 1-year budget period.
So, for example, in this year's submission, you have got
two salvage ships. We need them. They are important. But let's
face it, you know, the OPLANs [operations plans] for our near-
peer competitors--China and Russia--you know, attack submarines
are really the tip of the sphere in terms of, you know, what we
need out there.
And cutting, you know, that Virginia-class sub, I mean,
again, I just think is at odds with the National Defense
Strategy when you sort of drill down in terms of what real
lethality is.
So last year, Admiral Richardson, Admiral Gilday's
predecessor, when he was testifying about boosting attack sub
production to above the program of record of two a year, stated
that with respect to our greatest gap between the warfighting
requirement and current inventory, there is no greater need
than the attack submarine fleet. It is a wide gap, and it is
getting wider.
So every single submarine counts against closing that gap.
Again, at that point, we were talking about going above the
program of record. Now we are in a situation where we are below
the program of record of two a year.
Again, I want to just salute the fact that in your unfunded
priorities you put at the top of the list restoring that
submarine. Again, Admiral Gilday, we were up in Groton on
Monday, and a couple of months ago up in Quonset. You got a
real first-hand look in terms of the workforce, the design
completion, which you mentioned for both the VPM [Virginia
Payload Module] and Columbia.
What is the Navy's position about execution in terms of
adhering to the two-a-year program? In terms of just, is that a
factor in the decision, or was it resources?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, it was definitely affordability in
terms of that submarine being cut. If I could make a point
about the force structure assessment. And so that work is done,
and I think the reason you would benefit from having that
inform the 30-year shipbuilding plan is because if we didn't
use it to inform this plan, you would go back to the 2016
assessment.
And as you said yesterday, that 30-year shipbuilding plan
is the headlights that we provide, so that you know where we
need to go. So I think if we can have those discussions with
the Secretary of Defense, and once he is comfortable with that,
I think that that is all packaged and ready to come up to the
Hill.
Mr. Modly. And, Mr. Courtney, if you don't mind me
commenting on this as well.
Mr. Courtney. I have one more question.
Mr. Modly. Yes. Just quickly about 30-year shipbuilding
plan. We agree with you. We understand the congressional
requirements, a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to
deliver. He wants a little bit more time to understand it, and
we are going to help him with that. And it is not going to be a
long delay. It will--as you think about 2021 budget, you will
have plenty of information and enough time to be able to do
that. You have my commitment on that.
Mr. Courtney. Okay. The chairman's plan is to get this to
the floor, as you know, on a very aggressive schedule this
year.
Mr. Modly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Which I support. Regarding Columbia, we
talked, again, up in Groton about the fact that the NSBDF
[National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund], which at least created
authorities for incremental funding and multiyear, is a way of
reducing costs. And just if there is--maybe you could just
comment in terms of whether the Navy is coming to us with more
requests in that regard.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So to your previous question, you
asked about, you know, numbers per year. Yes, in terms of two a
year, to close the gap of where we need to be, that is how we
need to build. And if you ask me, you know, if I could give you
another ship today, what would it be, it would be a Virginia-
class submarine.
And your question was about the----
Mr. Courtney. Incremental authorities?
Admiral Gilday. Yeah. It----
Mr. Courtney. And maybe you want to take that for the
record because I don't want to----
Admiral Gilday. It is not the fund. It is the funding. That
is--the issue is the funding that needs to go in that bin. I
personally don't care what bin it is in as long as we can use
it to build more submarines, but that is the issue is fencing
that money off. The authorities are terrific and help us
tremendously.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
the witnesses for joining us.
Secretary Modly, I want to begin with you. You have heard
my colleagues talk at length about the underinvestment the Navy
is making in shipbuilding. When you put that in contrast to our
adversaries and the increased investments that they are making,
the pace that they are building their navies, it is pretty
concerning; 355 ships is the law.
And we look today, as the Navy's budget--only about 10
percent of the Navy's budget is devoted towards building ships.
And if you look at the current path that you are on, we are
only going to have a net increase of eight ships in the next 5
years.
You talked about getting to 355 by 2030. That is an
impossible task based on the current pace.
You heard my colleague, Mr. Courtney, talk about the
incredible importance of our attack submarines. We are going to
be down to 42 submarines, attack submarines, by 2028.
All of those things lead me to this question. What is the
Navy going to do in looking at reallocating resources to the
shipbuilding account over the period in the near future through
the 5-year defense plan, better known as the FYDP [Future Years
Defense Program]. Give me your perspective on how we do that,
because you talked about 2030 being the focus on getting to
355. Tell me what you are going to do immediately to get us on
that path.
Mr. Modly. Well, sir, thanks very much for that question.
As you know, I have been a pretty vocal supporter of the 355-
ship Navy since I have been back in the Department of the Navy,
and I would just take issue with your point about it being
impossible.
I don't think it is impossible. I think there are two
things that have to happen for it to be possible. One is a
reasonable plan that demonstrates how we can get there on an
accelerated path, and political will. That is it. If those two
things come together, then I think we can do it.
My job is to develop that plan in a reasonable way, and
also demonstrate that the answer isn't, ``Oh, we need more top
line to do this.'' Because I know that in our $207 billion a
year budget there is a lot of money in there that we could
probably use a lot more efficiently.
So I chartered about 2 weeks ago something called a stem-
to-stern review, and we are looking internally to see what we
can stop doing that doesn't make sense for this future force.
And that is what we are doing. So we are going to go through
this process.
I gave them--I was very aggressive on the timeline. I said
45 days we need some answers on this. What we need to get on
this path from preliminary analysis that we have done is about
$5-$8 billion more a year. Relative to the overall DOD
[Department of Defense] budget, it is a very, very small
amount. But I am not in the business of making trades on the
overall DOD budget. I am just in the business of trying to
present a plan, advocate for the Navy, for the reasons that are
important for the Nation, and sell that plan as something that
is reasonable and that can be done, and then the political will
has to align around it and then we can go do it.
Mr. Wittman. Got you. Well, listen, thank you so much for
being focused on getting us to 355. Thanks for saying it is not
impossible. I put that out there just to get your thoughts on
what the path may be going forward. I am glad to hear from you
that it is possible and that we are going to get on the path to
do that.
Admiral Gilday, I want to go to some of the comments that
you have made. You talked about not just the ship component of
the Navy, but the manning component of the Navy, and we see
some of the things that have happened because of manning
issues, the risk that the Navy has taken on; in many instances,
unacceptable risk.
You know, you talked about the shortfall of sailors being
at about 6,000. It now looks like some of the new projections
are closer to maybe 9,000 sailors. Can you give me your
perspective on what the Navy can do to reverse this alarming
trend? And what are we going to do to make sure as ships go to
sea we have both proper manning and training to make sure that
our sailors have exactly what they need to do the difficult job
we ask of them?
Admiral Gilday. So, sir, thanks. So the answer is retaining
them, right? Retaining that talent. And so that begins with
their families, and all of those programs that we have,
including child care, including housing, and the focus--and the
budget reflects it--that we are putting on that.
Right now, our retention numbers over the past year are at
75 percent. So we have exceeded at every paygrade our
expectations in terms of the numbers we retain. A lot of that
has to do with the good work that the Navy has done over the
past few years to digitize many of the applications that we use
for sailors.
So to give you an example, we have a detailing marketplace
now where, on an app, they can compete for jobs, and they can
do this a year out, so that their family has the understanding
of where they are going to move next. It allows the family to
actually, through these apps, take care of child care and
housing reservations months out before they even report to the
duty station.
They seem like small things, but we are taking, you know,
systems that are maybe 75 different websites and we are
collapsing it down to a single entry point through a
microprocessing app like on your phone. That just makes a world
of difference for people.
So it is really--sir, a long answer to your question, it is
really putting a focus on people and families.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we need to really deal with the fundamental thing
that is going on here. It is a sea change. The 355-ship Navy is
yesterday's plan. If I am at all perceptive of what is going on
here, it is that the Navy is rethinking the way it will
operate, and the equipment, ships, and other things that they
need to operate, and that that is underway. The Marine Corps,
you are very clear that you are in the process of doing that.
I sense myself that this is happening, and, therefore, a
frustration about let's share about what you are thinking. This
may not be the forum in which that takes place, but underlying
all of the questions that have come thus far and my own is,
wait a minute, everything that we have been building and
planning for, and suddenly, wait a minute, a sea change is
occurring, and you are rethinking this. Good.
To the extent that you can, share with us soon the general
outline of that rethinking. Commandant Berger, you said that
you are not able, given today's budget, to make that shift
today. I understand that. Nevertheless, we need to change our
thinking, and we need to put in place in this NDAA and the
appropriations the elements that allow you to continue that
process.
Right now, we are very much in the dark. We really don't
have that. And, therefore, we are kind of--not kind of. We are
clearly--I am frustrated. I think my colleagues are also. The
information we are hearing doesn't line up, or the information
we are giving doesn't line up to what you are saying, or at
least indicating.
So having said that in 2\1/2\ minutes, let me get to one of
my favorite subjects, which I think all of you are aware of,
and it is sealift capacity, my new flag that I keep waving in
front of you folks. Whatever that future holds, the current
sealift capacity, which is inadequate for at least the next
decade, we need to think about how to bring into reality a
sealift capacity for whatever you plan out there. Big power
competition, the Pacific is a long, big ocean, and we simply
are not capable of sustaining the fight. I mean, it is very
clear.
I want to work with you on developing a national fleet. The
bow wave of the Columbia and rockets and nuclear, and other
things, is going to make it very, very difficult to provide the
logistical sealift support from the Navy budget. You were just
talking about that.
Is there another way to do it? I think there is. I think if
we are to rebuild our merchant marine capacity in a way that
builds that capacity in a militarily useful, Navy useful
manner, for both the transport of weapons, material, men,
equipment, as well as fuel, I think we can do it without
significant impact on the Navy budget. And the Navy budget,
insofar as non-combat ships, would be for the specialty ships
that are not now available but would absolutely be necessary.
So the Navy does that, and then the merchant marines over
here. We have available to us programs that have not been used
for a couple of decades.
So I want to just put that on the table, pursue that with
you, and, obviously, we don't have 38 seconds to answer all the
questions here. But be aware, we are going to have this with
MARAD [United States Maritime Administration], Admiral Buzby,
and the like. And so I will let it go at that.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for your support, and thank you as well for your support as
well, Mrs. Gilday.
You have mentioned several times about the improvements
with the F-18s and their readiness levels, and we, too,
celebrate that. This has been a focus of this committee for
several years, to get that up, and so we celebrate the 80
percent readiness milestone.
I really think that we continue to build on that with this
year's budget that you put forth, an additional 24 new mission-
capable aircraft. And as you know, the new aircraft have the
most immediate and profound impact on the tactical aviation
inventory and fleet readiness, which is why I am concerned that
the budget request proposes to eliminate 36 Super Hornets for
future year defense budget.
So would you please speak to how this will impact the
tactical aviation inventory, since that is three squadrons'
worth of aircraft that the Navy is no longer investing in?
And it is my understanding the Navy has an existing strike
fighter shortfall of approximately 48 aircraft. So could you
please speak to the impact and the potential operational risk
that this will bring to our readiness?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, thanks for the question. The cuts
this year were due to affordability. And so we made what we
thought were balanced risk discussions based on what we could
afford given the current top line.
The mission-capable jets, the path that we are on right now
to get the most we can out of the fleet that we have, including
modernizing our existing Super Hornets to Block IIIs, puts us
on a good path. As you know, the numbers of our F-18 Super
Hornets are above 650. The fleet that we really need when we
have our fourth- or fifth-gen mix is around 785. And so we are
trying to maintain that path through the FYDP and beyond.
Mrs. Hartzler. Will you be able to maintain the 80 percent
target for mission-capable aircraft by cutting these aircraft
out?
Admiral Gilday. We think we will. So that--so the fact that
we have reduced the buy doesn't necessarily affect our ability
to reach 80 percent mission capability.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay.
Admiral Gilday. Mission-capable aircraft, excuse me.
Mrs. Hartzler. I am still concerned about this decision and
the cost that it could bring to the aircraft, because you have
current production lines that help bring the parts and the
service to the modernization effort. And if you cut out that
new line, then that could jeopardize the ability to get your
parts and for the modernization.
So could you please elaborate on whether the Navy has
assessed what additional cost will be incurred should the Super
Hornet production line be shuttered? And can you provide this
cost analysis to the committee?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, if we could, I would like to get
back to you with some more detailed information on that, so
that we can lay it all out for you in a way that makes sense
and gets to the details that you are asking for.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
Mrs. Hartzler. And you said that the cuts were due to the
lower top line. Are you saying that if we were to add
additional funds you would support reinstating those new
aircraft and pushing that out?
Admiral Gilday. I think it would go into the prioritization
mix as we took a look at what we really need, you know, based
on the timeframe that we are given.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Very good. Switching gears, talking
about munitions, certainly we have a lot of challenges with
that. Our stockpiles of high-demand preferred or precision-
guided munitions have been significantly reduced, as we all
know, over the last 15 years.
So in order to meet the objectives of the National Defense
Strategy to support globally and integrated defense planning
for contingencies, we need to procure sufficient inventories of
munitions by a healthy industrial base.
So what is your assessment of risk in the Navy's precision-
guided and preferred munitions request? And what specific
actions are you taking to manage stability, capability, and
capacity risk in the U.S. munitions industrial base, to include
reducing critical supply chain dependency sourced from outside
the United States?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, in terms of--in terms of our budget
this year--and I talked about a focus on both readiness and
lethality, and 21 percent of our budget is dedicated to that.
So a large portion of that is dedicated not only to modernizing
our ships and aircraft, but filling our magazines with weapons.
So that is not only our ships, but also our air wings.
And to get to your last point in the supply chain, ma'am, I
would have to get back to you on that with more details.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
Mrs. Hartzler. All right. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral Gilday, I understand the P-8A Poseidon maritime
patrol aircrafts are the best submarine-hunting aircraft in the
world. Would you agree with that assessment?
Admiral Gilday. Yes.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. Can you just--can you please
describe to us and me, in an unclassified way, how we use our
Poseidon aircraft specifically with respect to Russia and
China?
Admiral Gilday. So it is the most effective platform that
we have for not only wide area search but also localization,
and so that we can actually find, fix, and if we are in a
position to, finish a Russian submarine. And so the
capabilities of those P-8s, I think the best testimony is the
fact that all of our allies and partners are lining up to buy
the P-8. Tremendous capability.
Mr. Gallego. Sir, knowing that, were you surprised to see
the Department--see in one of the cuts a P-8 cut from last
year's budget to help afford this border wall?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Before my time. I can't speak to
the decisions that were made in the last budget.
Mr. Gallego. Okay. I think, Secretary Modly, the recent
reprogramming notice says that the items above last year's
budget request were what was stolen from, but the Navy says
that we need 138 P-8As, and we only have funding for 120. How
is this--how is the reprogramming anything other than arbitrary
and capricious if the Navy is disagreeing with the Department's
rationale for completing this theft of its budget?
Mr. Modly. Well, sir, those decisions are made by the
Secretary of Defense. We support them as he makes them, but he
has lots of tradeoffs that he has to make for other competing
priorities. We would, obviously, love to have more P-8s,
clearly. It is an incredible weapons platform. We want a lot of
our allies to have them, too, so we are looking for ways to
work with our allies to get them involved in the program, so
that Boeing can continue to produce them out in Washington.
Mr. Gallego. Were any of you consulted before being
informed that your budget was being cut by Secretary Esper and
others in the administration? Did they talk to you? Did they
ask your preferences, if this was, you know, necessary or not
necessary?
Mr. Modly. Well, sir, we go through a continual process on
budget negotiations and deliberations. So we are consulted all
along the way. Ultimately, we don't have a veto.
Mr. Gallego. Well, no, no. And I understand that.
Definitely understand you guys don't have a veto. But more
along the lines of, did Secretary Esper or other aspects of the
administration at least talk to you all before they went and
did this cut? Because it is--this is not just unfunded money
like it was last year. This is actual equipment, very necessary
equipment.
Mr. Modly. We knew that they were looking at a variety of
different options, and then at the end those options were
presented to us.
Mr. Gallego. Right. Admiral Gilday, again, I understand
that you didn't have a veto over any of this.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I was not consulted before that final
decision was made and the $3.8 million under the provision 284.
Mr. Gallego. Okay. So the same thing, General Berger?
General Berger. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gallego. Okay. Moving on, our national posture in Asia
is mostly naval and highly concentrated in very small and
specific parts of Japan and Korea. This committee recently
heard testimony from former East Asia DASD [Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense] Abraham Denmark that the relatively small
number of large bases that we have in Asia should be
diversified to a new approach that prioritizes new airfields,
new prepositioning, and new posture.
What is your take on the survivability of our naval assets
in Asia and the supply lines across the Pacific should the
balloon go up? We will start with you, Admiral Gilday.
Admiral Gilday. So I think based on the fact that where we
are located, we have concerns, which is why we are making
investments in better weapons systems. And it is not just--it
is not just on the kinetic side; it is the investments that the
Department is making in space and in cyberspace to put us in a
much better position against those types of threats.
Mr. Gallego. And just because I had a little--wanted to get
one more question in. How does this budget take the necessary
steps to increase the survivability of our INDOPACOM [U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command] assets against Chinese threats or
aggression? Mr. Modly.
Mr. Modly. Well, as I mentioned before, everything that we
did was to increase the readiness and lethality of our forces
that are--particularly the ones that are deployed.
And so that is really what our primary concern is right
now. So as we look to the future, we are looking at some of
these other bigger issues in terms of, how do we distribute our
force, how do we do more distributed maritime operations, what
types of ships will we need to do that, to support that, et
cetera.
And those are the types of changes and things that you will
see that will be different in this force structure assessment
than the one that was done 4 years ago.
Mr. Gallego. Great. I yield back my time. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly. Mr. Kelly? Hello? Mr. Kelly?
Mr. Kelly. Thank you. Sorry. Thanks, Mr. Mitchell.
I first want to talk about--I want to be real clear. I
support our border, and particularly our southern border and
building the wall. However, during the recent reprogram, $650
million was diverted from an LHA [landing helicopter assault]
America class of amphibious ship, which is built by Huntington
Ingalls, a massive shipbuilder in Mississippi.
The impact that will be felt will be loss of jobs, and it
will hurt the industrial shipbuilding base. I think
consistency, long-term maintained plans, are key to maintaining
our industrial base. And they, much like an aircraft carrier,
can't turn on a dime. And so when we destroy that industrial
base, we don't just get it back when we decide we want to build
a different ship.
So what is the plan to get this ship back on track? Either
Mr. Secretary or Admiral Gilday.
Mr. Modly. Sir, I can speak to a high level on that. We did
end up--funding was moved from this year for that. However, it
did not change the delivery time for that ship. We actually
pulled that ship forward and plan on starting that in fiscal
year 2023. In previous plans, it was either 2024 or 2025, so it
has actually--over the course of the last couple of years, we
have actually accelerated the delivery of that ship.
And we understand and we are very sympathetic to the impact
it might have on employment down there in Mississippi. That is
a critical shipyard for us. They do fantastic work, and we want
to make sure that we maintain a healthy shipbuilding capacity
down there. But this is just a decision that was made here at
the end game.
Mr. Kelly. I understand. But what we do is lose long-term
effects for short-term gains, and you can't buy that back. We
see that when we make cuts in personnel to the Marine Corps or
the Navy or the Army. When we make those cuts, and then the
next year we go, ``Well, that number was a little too low, so
we will just build it back,'' you can't replace that E-6 with a
trainee. That is 12 years of experience to get there that we
can't replace.
It is the same way with the industrial base. If they are
geared up and tooled up to build a ship, and we change the
plans, they can't just next year when we change them back get
back to the same spot because they have lost that. Those guys
are working somewhere else. Those guys and girls are doing a
different job somewhere else, and we can't rebuild it. We just
have to be real careful about doing that.
And I am a firm believer in all of our services owe us--
every year we ask you, what are your personnel numbers? What
are your requirements? And when you give those to us, and then
we change them the next year, it makes it very difficult for us
to plan and our industrial base to plan, and we have got to
adhere to that, because I am kind of a Patton guy. An 80
percent plan violently executed is better than a 100 percent
plan 2 days after it mattered. And so I just ask that we keep
that in mind when we are dealing with the industrial base.
General Berger, in your planning guidance, you talk about
the need for a smaller, more maneuverable Marine Corps that
gets back to its expeditionary roots. I suggest we may need
different platforms or amphibious ships to do this. Can you
tell me what you envision in this, General Berger?
General Berger. Sir, for the last two decades, we did what
the Nation needed us to do in the Middle East. But that is not
what you need us to do in the future. You need us as part of an
integrated naval force, because our view, that is an asymmetric
advantage that we have, by a wide margin. We need to sustain
that margin.
So, in simple terms, we need--instead of a land force that
could sometimes, if we really tried, and it would be really
painful--get aboard ship, we need to be a naval force that you
can send where you need to, the commander can send where they
need to, can go ashore when they choose to, back aboard ship,
very dispersed, very distributed. In other words, pose an
adversary a real challenge, that it makes his day really hard.
That is what we have got to do.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, and I agree. And I think that 98-
year-old Marine would agree also. He is not here anymore,
Commandant, but I think he would definitely agree.
And, Secretary Modly, I want to talk a little bit. I just
visited a DDG [guided-missile destroyer] when I was in Rota and
visited our great sailors out there. And we had a discussion
yesterday. But I just want you to talk about your Optimized
Fleet Response Plan [OFRP] and how personnel figures into that.
Mr. Modly. Well, one of the things that we are trying to
do, particularly in this budget, is adjust some of the problems
we had in previous years with respect to the manning that we
had on our ships. And I think that the CNO mentioned this
earlier in terms of what he experienced back when he was on a
DDG and what that had declined to over the years.
And we started seeing the results of that in these horrible
accidents that we had in the Pacific a couple of years ago. So
we are trying to adjust that to make that better.
With respect to specifically about OFRP, we are doing a
deep dive look on that. The Secretary of Defense actually hired
an outside company, FFRDC [federally funded research and
development center], to help us look at that and look at better
options for that. I would----
The Chairman. I apologize. The gentleman's time has
expired.
Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you to all of
you for being here today.
Secretary Modly, in your opening statement, you indicated
that you are committed to stamping out sexual harassment in the
Navy. And yet last February you promoted a man named Ronnie
Booth to head the Navy's audit agency, even though there had
been multiple whistleblowers and complainants that had come
forward documenting his workplace sexual harassment retaliation
dating back to 2007.
Alarmingly, many people reported him wanting to offer to
mentor female subordinates, suggested they meet outside of
work, arranged travel with them. This man is the person you
chose to lead a major naval agency. I wrote your office asking
about these concerns, and then-Secretary Spencer responded by
saying there was no documented, substantiated evidence of Mr.
Booth's behavior, yet, following my letter, Mr. Booth was
reassigned to work as a special assistant and retired shortly
thereafter.
Would you please indicate to us how that squares?
Mr. Modly. Yes, ma'am. I appreciate the question, and I
remember your letter very clearly. Let me say that that
situation was part of a broader cultural and climate problem
that I had at the Naval Audit Service. I had to take action to
remove somebody and move somebody into a position of authority
in that organization. I did it very methodically and very
carefully.
If I may, I was not aware--when we made that decision, we
went back and followed all of the rules in terms of what can
restrict you from putting somebody in a position of that place.
There was no documented evidence, no IG [inspector general]
investigations, nothing, about----
Ms. Speier. There were complaints that had been filed. How
can you say there was no documented evidence?
Mr. Modly. There was no documented evidence in his
individual record that prohibited me from doing that. When I
found out about this, thanks to your letter and to some emails
that came to me, we immediately started an internal
investigation, the DOD started an internal broader
investigation, and we were told to shut down our investigation
on that. Okay?
Ms. Speier. Who told you to shut it down?
Mr. Modly. The DOD IG, because once they start an
investigation, we can't have a parallel investigation.
Ms. Speier. I see. Because they were now investigating.
Mr. Modly. That is correct.
Ms. Speier. I guess the real question is, why did it take a
letter from me that then triggered an inspector general
evaluation----
Mr. Modly. Because there was no--there was no evidence
before I found that----
Ms. Speier. Well, I find it hard to believe if there are
complaints that are filed that that is not considered evidence.
Let me ask you another question.
Mr. Modly. Ma'am, may I say something?
Ms. Speier. In your budget proposal----
Mr. Modly. May I say something else about this?
Ms. Speier. Well, maybe for the record.
Mr. Modly. If the suggestion is that I would ever----
Ms. Speier. For the record.
Mr. Modly [continuing]. That I would ever----
Ms. Speier. For the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
The Chairman. Mr. Modly, she controls the time. I am
sympathetic, but she has the right to ask the questions she
wants to ask. So let her ask.
Ms. Speier. In the budget proposal, the Navy has cut the
SAPRO [Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office] budget.
How can you cut that budget when we have an epidemic on our
hands?
Mr. Modly. Ma'am, I don't know the specifics in terms of
how much we cut that budget. But I have been extremely
committed to fighting sexual assault and harassment in the
service.
Ms. Speier. Then why do you cut the budget?
Mr. Modly. I don't know the----
Ms. Speier. The numbers are up.
Mr. Modly. The numbers are up. We take it very seriously.
The Navy, the Department of the Navy, actually initiated
actions with other universities around the country to get after
this problem, to share information and to share data.
And I will just say, if the suggestion is that I would ever
put a person in a position of authority knowing full well, with
documented evidence, that that person was a sexual harasser,
that would never happen.
Ms. Speier. Well----
Mr. Modly. I would never do that, and the suggestion I
think is----
Ms. Speier. All right. This is my time. I would like to ask
another question.
The LCS [littoral combat ship] turned out to be a debacle.
Part of the problem was the cost estimates were way
undervalued. They were first supposed to be $220 million
apiece. They ended up costing two and a half times that much.
The GAO [Government Accountability Office] said you should do
independent cost estimates. As of August of 2019, there has
never been an independent estimate of the frigate.
CBO [Congressional Budget Office] thinks that the actual
costs will probably exceed your estimates by about $300 million
per ship. Seems like we need the benefit of an independent
estimate. Are you intending to do that?
Mr. Modly. We intend to do--the LCS program predates me by
many, many years. We intend to do independent cost estimates on
every new platform that we are doing.
Ms. Speier. So the frigate will be subject to an
independent cost estimate.
Mr. Modly. Yes.
Ms. Speier. All right. I will yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to go off in a
different direction. We had the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] Parliamentary meeting this last week, and there
were kind of some things that were said there that were kind of
scary to me, because some of the concerns in this committee
were our ability, the number of ships to--if the balloon went
up in Europe, our air refueling capability, which was a very
contentious hearing here. Boeing did not have a good day, and I
won't go into that.
But the point that was made at this meeting here--and I am
a big NATO supporter and everything like that--but it broke out
that the EU [European Union] was invited to speak. And they
were talking, quite frankly, about taking over some of the
aspects, the way I understood it, of the strategic forces under
their cognizance.
Now, we have had problems with the EU going from some of
the different exercises. And the RAND study that a few years
ago we--you know, the Javelin missile and some of the other
systems, were based on some of these things.
Now, if this is true, and it might be partly a reaction to
Brexit, but there were a lot of countries that were alarmed at
the fact that now the EU is going to make it very, very
difficult if there--many of these countries, which are NATO
members but also EU members, are not totally committed to NATO.
Do you have any reactions, Mr. Secretary, at all? Or have you
heard any of the repercussions of that conference?
Mr. Modly. I have not been briefed on any of the
repercussions of that conference, and on these discussions, so
I don't have a comment right now. I can find out more
information on it and get back to you, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
Mr. Cook. Yeah. And the reason I raise this issue here,
because we are talking about some of these funding issues. In
the past, you know, it was the situation in Korea, and it
changes from day to day where the threat is. And, by the way, I
want to thank you for coming here. We learn a lot I think. We
make changes.
I remember when General Scaparrotti talked about the Air
Force wanted to get rid of the U-2s. This was in Korea, and he
said, ``No. The U-2s have more reliability.'' Next thing you
know they are back in the budget. So some of the things that
you say here have tremendous repercussions, at least in my
decision-making, and I think everyone here.
All I am saying is that some of these other questions, in
terms of preparing, prepositioning equipment, and everything
else, if this NATO situation is going to be revisited in terms
of perhaps conflicts with the EU, I think it might affect some
of the things--our budget decisions in this committee.
Admiral or General, do you have any comments on that? I
think you are familiar with those.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would just say I take your point.
There are two different political bodies that make different
decisions that are not always synchronized, and there is a
potential risk--I think your point is--to NATO.
I just am not familiar with the context of last week's
discussions in Brussels.
Mr. Cook. Yeah. It was UNCLASS [unclassified], and you can
probably see everything.
General Berger, I never thought I would be happy about the
day that, you know, we are not getting new weapons systems or
anything else. But right now in the President's budget we have
the sewer plant for Twentynine Palms. This combat Marine, that
is his greatest accomplishment was to get the sewer plant for
Twentynine Palms.
But it really, really is a big deal because of the
environmental concerns in California. And something like that
can--I think it is one of the greatest training bases in the
world. And it is an admin thing, so I am going to try and bring
that all the way to fruition.
So thank you very much for being here, and I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
testimony here today. You know, I am really proud of the
efforts in the Department of Defense, our uniformed services,
in integrating our force and leading this Nation by example,
started in the 1940s, executive orders that removed racial
barriers to service, and work that has happened over the years
in terms--for inclusion of women in now every aspect of the
military.
It is hard to believe that it took an act of Congress just
last year to finally get the Marine Corps to include women in
basic training platoons. But, you know, sometimes it has come
easy and sometimes it has been a little bit more of a
challenge, but I think we can all take pride in the progress
that we have made.
Mr. Secretary, I really, really want to thank you for the
historic decision that you made in naming an aircraft carrier
after an enlisted soldier, recognizing the important
contributions that enlisted men and women make to the force,
and to naming that aircraft carrier after Cook First Class
Doris Miller. So thank you very much for that.
Having said what I just said, we have got a problem. We
have got a problem in both the civilian staffing and in uniform
staffing in both the Navy and the Marines, and particularly in
what I call the elite sectors, such as your fighter squadrons.
Looking at your civilian staffing, you stated in your
statement on page 17 regarding recruiting, curating, and
retaining the best talent, that you are leveraging leading
private sector business practices. But in your human capital
strategy for 2019 to 2030, there is only one mention of
diversity in that strategy. Mr. Secretary, what are you doing
to ensure that you are diversifying the civilian workforce at
the Department of Navy?
Mr. Modly. Mr. Brown, first of all, thank you for the
compliment on the Doris Miller. I really appreciate that, and I
agree with you in terms of the historical significance of it.
And I will tell you that as great a day as it was for the
family of Doris Miller, it was an even greater day for the
Navy. So just a wonderful moment for us as a country.
We have challenges with this, sir, and we have talked about
this in your office before about the challenges that we have,
particularly on the uniform side. As people progress through
the service, we don't have a lot of diversity in senior ranks.
We have pretty good diversity in the civilian ranks. It is
interesting that you note that. I did not note that when I read
through the human capital strategy. I will have to look through
that again.
But the whole concept of our human capital strategy is to
try to attract people from a variety of different areas, new
types of people, new thinking, more diverse thinking, give them
ways to come in and serve in the government, perhaps go back
out. So I will look in specific----
Mr. Brown. Yeah. So let me just suggest, then, if in--as in
your statement you suggest that you are taking leading private
sector business practices, I think in this regard the private
sector is well out in front of your strategy. So I would ask
you to go back and look.
Let's turn to the uniform service. Both the Marine Corps
and the Navy, you have a serious problem in your fighter units,
your fighter pilots. You have in the Navy 710 Navy fighter
pilots; 17 or less than 3 percent are African American, and not
a single woman.
You have 735 Marine Corps fighter pilots. Less than 1
percent or 5 are African American; one woman.
You have got claims of equal opportunity violations,
inspector general reports. You have flag officers who are
making inappropriate public comments undermining the integrity
of the EEO [Equal Employment Opportunity] process and the
inspector general process, and I have sent a letter to the
Secretary to that regard.
You have pilots--an African American pilot who has left the
service, another whose record is still tarnished and will
inhibit his promotion, a whistleblower who is still on the edge
awaiting an outcome of a report, and the concern is that the
initial EEO complaints substantiated that there were racial
discrimination against these pilots.
And then for some unexplained reason it was reversed, and
now you have three people sitting on pins and needles wondering
the fate of their future, because you have these outstanding
complaints. So you take the numbers alone, the lack of
diversity and conclusion by race and gender, you have got these
terrible cases in front of you, and you have a pilot shortage
to boot, you have got a lot of work to do.
So I will take it for the record what your response will be
because I did submit a letter to you back in January, and I am
waiting for the response.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
Secretary Modly, so in the last 24 hours, we have learned
that you have delivered the integrated naval force structure
assessment to the Secretary of Defense. He wants some time to
evaluate that, potentially compare it against some alternative
assessments that are out there, whether they are in CAPE [Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation], or he alluded to outside
assessments, and that is why we don't have a 30-year
shipbuilding plan because it would be informed by the
integrated naval force structure assessment.
But over the last 4 years, we have done a lot of outside
studies. A lot of us have committed to not only rhetorically
but put it into law that we need a 355-ship fleet. We believe
that to be a floor, not a ceiling. So could you help us put
into perspective what the total ownership costs of a 355-ship
Navy would be in constant dollars over the current fleet of
about 293 ships?
Mr. Modly. So as we have looked at this in terms of, as we
used the integrated naval force structure assessment as our
benchmark, as sort of our North Star in terms of where we think
we should go as the Department of the Navy, and understand that
the Secretary of Defense has not signed off on that or has not
bought into it yet, in order to get there on an accelerated
path, which would approximate getting to that ideal force
structure in 10 years, it is probably--if you assume a flatline
budget for us, it is probably going to take between 120- and
$130 billion more total over that 10 years.
Those are the initial cuts we are looking at, the initial
numbers that we are looking at. So that is basically what it
comes down to.
Mr. Gallagher. So per year, would it be fair to say that
would be well north of $8 billion?
Mr. Modly. Yeah. We are looking--and that is the reason why
I put this benchmark out for our teams to look at, how do we
get $8 billion out of the top line that we have right now? So
at least we can start moving down that path.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday, I couldn't help but notice that the budget
for the new frigate now reflects one ship per year over the
first 3 years of production. Can you assure me that the Navy
remains fully committed to executing this program to achieve
the 20 ships briefed to this committee previously?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We are committed to that number.
I think that one frigate in the first year is prudent. We need
to get this right. There have been comments made about LCS and
other programs. And so we are focused on making sure that that
first ship puts us in a very good direction for the remainder
of the class.
Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Modly, should the Columbia be a
Navy bill?
Mr. Modly. Well, Rep. Gallagher, it is a Navy bill, and so
we are assuming that it is a Navy bill. Obviously, it has
strategic implications for the whole country, for the whole
force, but right now it is a Navy bill.
Mr. Gallagher. Commandant Berger, in your planning
guidance, you write about the importance of ground-based, long-
range precision fires with no less than 350 nautical mile
ranges, and you call for potentially even more than that.
Can you talk a bit about how central these long-range
precision fires are to your planning guidance and executing the
overall strategy and what any restrictions on the ranges of
missiles your Marines could employ would impact your ability to
execute your vision?
General Berger. The distributed maritime operations concept
that we fit within means we do two things in support of the
fleet commander: sea control and sea denial. The fires that you
are speaking of, that capability allows us to do that, either
embarked or ashore.
What is the value? The value to the fleet commander is he
is not just hauling around Marines as passengers anymore. They
are part of his--part of his fighting capability. We need the
ability to reach out and hold at risk an adversary's naval
fleet from wherever we are, embarked or ashore.
Range limitations, you definitely want longer rather than
shorter if you are going to outstick an opponent. Though any
restrictions on ranges of weapons systems from our perspective,
from a warfighting perspective, we are going to push back on
that. Then it becomes just a function of technology and weight,
you know, size. We have to be mobile. We have to be
expeditionary.
Mr. Gallagher. Let me just follow on your planning--well,
this is just a comment. Your planning guidance has sparked a
lot of very useful discussion in forums like War on the Rocks
among company-grade officers, field-grade officers. I just--I
know you are bought into this, but I just would continue--
please continue to encourage that. Make sure that those Marines
who are challenging long-held assumptions aren't being punished
when it comes time for them to be up for promotion, because I
think there is a really healthy discussion going on in the Navy
and the Marine Corps right now among all levels of officers and
enlisted, and I am really pleased to see that.
Finally, just to end where we started, you know, we have,
really, at times a contentious debate about waiting for the
shipbuilding plan. And, you know, there is a lot of frustration
here. You know, in 2017, we had three outside studies about the
force structure and where we needed to go with the fleet. The
next year the NDS [National Defense Strategy] came out. Two
months later, in March 2018, the Navy came to this committee
and testified that a new FSA [force structure assessment] was
on its way.
Then, in September, the Navy said, ``Wait. It is not coming
until 2019.'' N9 said we would have it by now last year, so,
please, just as soon as you can tell us your vision for the
future of the Navy and the Marine Corps, in geopolitical terms,
I think you will find a very receptive audience here, because
it is hard for us to give you money until we know that vision.
General Berger. Duly noted.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to start
by echoing my colleague and fellow Marine Mike Gallagher's
comments about how important it is to encourage this
discussion. And I would say not only should we make sure that
these Marines aren't punished for being willing to question the
assumptions, they are exactly the people that we should be
promoting, and promoting quickly.
What you are doing is setting an important tone for the
entire Department of Defense, Commandant. And we need the other
services to do it, too. We need to do it more. I am the co-
chairman with Representative Jim Banks, a Navy veteran, of the
Future of Defense Task Force. We are trying to do that here on
the Armed Services Committee, to really question our
assumptions, because we are losing the game to Russia and China
right now. That is the harsh reality. They are outpacing us,
and that is why they are closing the gap.
So we have got to keep doing this, and it is incredibly
important. Of course, one of the challenges is literally
staring at you on this committee, because about half the
questions this morning, if my tally is correct, were
essentially parochial questions about district priorities, not
strategic questions about what we need for our Navy or Marine
Corps.
In other words, are my airplanes going to be okay at my
local base or my missile capability, is that going to be
developed? How do you propose that we get around that challenge
to your changes, and that we support your courageous
willingness to slay sacred cows in order to make room for new
and innovative weapons systems?
General Berger. I think we owe you a couple of things, sir.
First of all, our assumptions about where the threat is, where
the adversary will be in the future, which could change because
it is--there is a series of assumptions that go into that.
Second is a clear picture at the UNCLASS--more valuable,
the classified level of how we expect we will fight the joint
force. Then a subset of that is how we will fight the naval
force. Armed with that, you should be able to ask us, okay, now
armed with that, the threat picture is this. I understand now
how you think you are going to fight. Tell me how these
capabilities that you are asking for, that are on your shopping
list, how do they fit into that mix?
Mr. Moulton. So let me ask you, Commandant, about one
specific capability, the CH-53. As you are aware, the Marine
Corps has a proud tradition of generating overwhelming combat
power with less manpower and less cost. But right now, the per
aircraft cost is set to exceed $120 million, which is $20
million more than a fifth-generation fighter, and many more
orders--and many orders of magnitude, rather, more expensive
than proven alternatives such as the CH-47F.
That is a very expensive toilet, for a joke that only the
Marines will get. What is going on here, and what do we need to
do to fix it?
General Berger. The lift requirement to move Marines and
equipment and the naval force around remains valid. As
distributed as we are going to be, we are going to need the
ability to move that force and the sustainment around. So the
requirement is valid, and it is 200 aircraft.
The cost--to your point, the cost is the big factor. APUC
[average procurement unit cost] right now, $107 million. Total
flyaway cost, we are still a margin away from where it is an
affordable aircraft, even to buy off the shelf, much less
sustain over the long term. So we have a valid warfighting
requirement. We have an affordability challenge.
Now it is up to us negotiating with Sikorsky and Lockheed
Martin to try to drive the costs down to where it is affordable
by the Department, affordable by the Marine Corps.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. Well, we will certainly support that.
Mr. Secretary, I want to come back to a question that
Representative Lamborn asked about whether hypersonics increase
or decrease strategic stability. And you replied that we always
want to increase strategic stability, which I heartily agree
with, but it is sort of like acknowledging that the ocean has
water in it, which you don't need to be the Secretary of the
Navy to know.
Explain to me how having a weapon--and, understand, I am
supportive of innovative future-focused capabilities. But how
is having a weapon, especially one that is submarine-launched,
that you know is launched but you don't know where it is going
and you don't know if it has a conventional or nuclear weapon
on it--so, in other words, you have to make a decision on how
to respond to it, and a timeline similar to with an ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile], except it is more
compressed, so you don't know where it is going. How does that
increase strategic stability?
The Chairman. You need to explain that in 20 seconds, so
go.
Mr. Modly. Well, I am sorry you didn't like my previous
answer. But I think what it does is it does create some--it
creates more unpredictability, that is true. It does--and that
is really what we are trying to do. We are trying to create a
more unpredictable nature of our forces, so that our----
Mr. Moulton. My time is up. But if we could take this for
the record, I think that would be valuable, because I agree it
increases unpredictability. My concern is that it also
increases strategic instability, and we need to understand that
more fully before we commit the kinds of funds we are talking
about.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 108.]
The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will take note of
my colleague's admonition about parochial questions, and so I
will ask my parochial question in as strategic a way as I
possibly can. We are incredibly proud of the cyber warriors
that we train up at Corry Station that go to serve the Navy.
And so I was just wanting to give you the opportunity to
reflect on the nature of the cyber mission and how it fits into
the strategic paradigm that we are working on building.
Admiral Gilday. Yeah. So, sir, thanks for the question, and
thanks for the comments about those cyber warriors down in
Corry. We think they are the best in the world, or among the
best in the world.
So we are not going to fight in one domain, and so we are
leveraging those cyber warriors in terms of our concept of how
we are going to fight in the future. We are about to do our
largest exercise in a generation this summer. And as part of
that exercise, we are going to include a cyber electronic
warfare and space cell inside of our fleet commander's
headquarters, and we are going to assign tactical offensive
cyber teams to the fight. We haven't done that before.
And so just two examples of how we are going to try to
better integrate those capabilities into what we want to do in
the future.
Mr. Gaetz. I also wanted to commend the Navy. We have got a
lot of naval aviation going on in my community, and the TH-57
is a platform that needs to be retired. Every other day we are
having one of those helicopters come back on a truck because
they are having to land them out in a peanut field or soybean
field somewhere as a result of an alert.
Folks should not have to train on analog and then go to
digital. But the Navy has been very innovative in embracing
off-the-shelf options, and I think that particularly at Whiting
Field we are going to see a replacement for the TH-57 that will
be at lower cost and with greater utility for our naval
aviators.
My colleague, Mr. Gallagher, had some follow-up questions,
so I will yield to him the remainder of my time.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Gaetz. Very generous.
Just a quick follow-up for Secretary Modly. So you said
that it is going to cost about 120- to $130 billion more over
the next 10 years to get to 355 ships. Was that correct? Is
that just acquisition costs, or is that the total----
Mr. Modly. No, that is everything. That is----
Mr. Gallagher. That is everything. That is total----
Mr. Modly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gallagher [continuing]. Ownership costs. So that is----
Mr. Modly. Above our--if you assume a current flatline
budget, this would be the incremental cost of getting to there.
As you know, sir, we are kind of tapping out at about 305
ships. That sort of will be----
Mr. Gallagher. Yeah.
Mr. Modly. That flatline can sustain that 305 ships. If we
want to accelerate to 355 within 10 years, based on the
analysis that we have done, that is the incremental additional
cost to not only acquire but also to sustain those platforms.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So in order--I mean, in order to build
a fleet that is about 20 percent bigger than the one we have
now, it is going to be about--and this is just back of the
envelope--7.5 percent more each year. But you are saying that
is----
Mr. Modly. That is right.
Mr. Gallagher [continuing]. That is your analysis of the
total----
Mr. Modly. Yes, sir. That is----
Mr. Gallagher [continuing]. Man, train, build, equip,
maintain, modernize.
Mr. Modly. Right. And that has a lot to do with the mix,
because we are not filling it up with--we are not filling that
gap with 50 aircraft carriers, right? We are looking at some
smaller, more distributed types of ships that are less
expensive, and that will help fill the gap over that time.
Mr. Gallagher. Great. Thank you. And we all look forward to
the integrated naval force structure assessment when it
arrives.
Mr. Gaetz. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Horn.
Ms. Horn. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you so much
for being with us today. I want to--General Berger, I want to
address my questions to you talking--when we are speaking about
the needs and choices that we are going to have to make in
terms of cost, especially looking forward in our needs for the
next-generation aircraft and fighters, you have spoken
repeatedly about the need for a balanced mix of manned and
unmanned systems that includes manned--excuse me, unmanned
aerial combat vehicles and low-cost attribal--attritable--I am
having--aircraft that are disposable, that can be used as
targets. Let's just--I can't get that word out today--aircraft
technologies.
And when you talked about the stated requirements for the
manned F-35s, while that is well known and is a matter of
record, we haven't heard articulated requirements for the
unmanned systems to be paired with the more technologically
advanced aircraft because we are clearly not going to use the
F-35s for target practice.
So do you--my question is, do you intend to pursue a large
number of lethal unmanned aerial systems per your comments in
the command's planning guidance and other statements? Or do you
have another plan? Can you speak to that first?
General Berger. I don't know today. We don't know today the
number or the ratio. What we know is we have got to move faster
than we have in the past 3 or 4 years. Some use a metaphor or
example of like a quarterback, where the manned platform, a
ship or a plane, is sort of the quarterback with a whole bunch
of unmanned--and the Air Force uses the term ``unmanned
wingmen.''
We need to move fast. Why? We can cover a lot more ground
if it is a mix of manned and unmanned. It is also more
survivable. We have got to complicate the adversary's
collection and targeting problem. We are making it too simple
when they are all manned.
It is not in a trying to reduce casualties mode as much as
it is try to gain an advantage and maintain that. But our
processes don't reward going out on the edge and replacing
something with something you have today, but we have got to
press the accelerator down now. We have got to move now.
Initially, some hybrid of manned and unmanned, lightly manned,
but in the end, it is going to be a hybrid of all of that. And
if you are sitting on the other side at an adversary's radar
screen, you can't tell the difference.
Ms. Horn. Thank you. And to follow up on that, I think we
are--in terms of strategic capabilities and costs and the
balance, do you expect to include those needs in the next
version of the aviation plan? When can we expect the
requirements for that? Because, as you said, we have got to
move fast, but what does that look like in terms of needs
assessment?
General Berger. You will see it in both 2022 and 2023
budget. We are in the latter phases now of necking down what we
are going to procure to put on board a ship, provide the ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], and maybe
multiple payloads off of a ship.
The other construct is an unmanned series of vessels that
launches an unmanned swarm of aerial vehicles. Why would we not
try to do that? We should never put--if we are going to cross a
beach, go somewhere, we should send a machine where we can to
do the reconnaissance, to take a look before we ever send the
first human.
Ms. Horn. Cost effective and strategically increasing
capabilities.
I yield back the balance of my time. That is all my
questions. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
gentlemen here today for your leadership and taking care of the
world's greatest sailors and Marines.
Admiral Gilday, my first question is for you. You know, 3
years ago, we had a serious readiness problem, and the numbers
we were using is like 50 percent of the aircraft in the Navy
could fly on any given day. Now, after 3 years where we
restored roughly 60 percent of the budget from what we had from
2010 cuts, could you just give us some feedback? How are we
doing with the aircraft readiness? Are we--do we have a very
noticeable improvement with the last 3 years' budgets?
Admiral Gilday. Very noticeable improvement. So we are at
over 80 percent right now sustained with Super Hornets in terms
of mission-capable aircraft. And I was just down in Norfolk
recently at the operations center where they actually bring
together all of the maintenance officers from the wings, and
they bring them together to get after constraints or getting
ready aircraft back on the flight line.
And so it includes bringing together the folks from DLA
[Defense Logistics Agency], the folks from the Navy Supply
System, engineers from NAVAIR [Naval Air Systems Command], and
so we have really brought the team together, ironed out some
process issues that we have had, and significantly increased
readiness.
Mr. Bacon. Is there a way that we could quantify it? That
was the F-18s when you say 80 percent. I would like to be able
to go back to our constituents and say 3 years ago, 50 percent
across the board; today we are 75 percent, or whatever it may
be, you know, broader than, say, just the F-18, because I think
that was important. Readiness is vital.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, if I hear you, are you talking about
each type, model, series?
Mr. Bacon. What was the composite number, the 50 percent or
a cumulative number of all of the Navy aircraft?
Admiral Gilday. So I was really talking about the focus
initially has been Super Hornets. And so we have been at 50, 55
percent for a decade. Now we are at 80 percent, above 80
percent sustained. We are bringing those same processes into
the other type, model, series aircraft to bring them back--to
bring them over 80 percent sustained as well.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. Thank you. I want to go to electronic
warfare [EW], something I have been involved with for about
three decades. And we have fallen significantly behind as a
department, and each of our services, so I appreciate the
Navy's focus on it. Even while I was in the service, I think
you had your sights on it all along.
The joint staff has appointed a two-star now to lead their
EW program. The Air Force has a one-star. They created a panel
for funding, so it is a separate funding process. What is the
Navy and the Marines or the Department doing to raise the bar
here for electronic warfare? Because, to me, it is a physical
domain that we have to control. We can control the ground, the
sea, the air. But if we can't talk, can't use the radars, we
are in trouble. So I appreciate your feedback.
General Berger. Sir, 2 years ago I think it was, General
Miller talked with us about the need to move into the
information environment, electronic warfare, MISO [military
information support operations], cyber, and military deception
faster. He traded--intentionally deliberately traded a three-
star billet from a command and created a three-star general,
Lori Reynolds, who oversees that for us.
Now, you wish you could go back 2 years and thank him for
that, because right now she is incredibly far out in front of
the rest of us, telling us where we need to go, and not just in
one area, EW, but how do you integrate those domains and make
it a warfighting capability.
So on our staff, on our headquarters Marine Corps smaller
staff, a lieutenant general, Lori.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
Admiral, or Secretary? However you want to do it.
Mr. Modly. I will ask the CNO to talk about this as well,
sir, but I think one of the things that we are emphasizing at
the department level is to ensure that the Navy and Marine
Corps are more integrated in this process going forward, as
well as how we integrate with the overall joint force. And
there is a lot of emphasis being placed on that at the OSD
level as well.
Admiral Gilday. So we stood up the Information Warfare
Development Command down in Norfolk, and so it brings together
cyber, electronic maneuver warfare, and space, into a single
warfare development center. And it actually creates tactics and
operating procedures for the fleet.
We are testing that in a big--we are testing a lot of that
in a big exercise this summer and throughout the deployments
that we make.
We have put together an IW [information warfare] commander
on board our carrier strike groups and our amphibious readiness
groups, so that, again, brings together space, cyber, and EW.
We are doing it at the fleet command level based on what we
learned there, and the Commandant is integrating with his
expeditionary advanced basing concept, non-kinetic, into the
fight from the shore.
Mr. Bacon. Do you have a single bellybutton, if you will,
in the Navy that does all things EW?
Admiral Gilday. So we have a three-star in charge of
programs on my staff. We have the one-star down in Norfolk that
at the tactical level is bringing those concepts together.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
And thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And I would like to yield for just a moment to the ranking
member, Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you
often, rightfully, acknowledge the key contributions to not
only our committee but to the country's national security by
the members of the staff of this committee.
In my experience, working on 26 years, there is no staff
member who has exhibited greater professionalism, dedication to
the mission, tolerance and patience with members, and our
inadequacies, than Pete Villano. He is about to leave the
committee imminently, and so I think it is appropriate to just
take a moment to specifically thank and acknowledge his many
contributions to this committee and our work over the years,
but also to hold him up as a shining example of the tremendous
staff that enable us to do what we do.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. And I want to echo those remarks.
In particular, I think it is noteworthy that Pete has--he has
worked for both of us. And that is a key part of this
committee, which by the way is unlike any other committee in
Congress. We are bipartisan, and the staff is more responsible
for keeping that in place than anyone, and Pete exemplifies
that.
So 26--how many is it? Twenty-four years? I forget. Twenty-
six total years of service. So we want to recognize that
service and thank you very much.
[Applause.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Resuming the questioning, we will go to Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will also take
my turn to ask my parochial and provincial question. My
community is home to the Sikorsky facility that manufactures
the VH-92, known as Marine One. And you all know that last year
Sikorsky announced its intention to close that facility and to
consolidate operations in other locations.
And I, at that time, was a very vocal opponent, joining
with other members of our Pennsylvania delegation asking
Sikorsky to reverse that decision and to have an enduring
commitment to the city of Coatesville, which is where that
factory is. And, thankfully, the President also shared this
view, and Lockheed announced very soon after, in July in 2019,
that it would keep the plant open, and at least as long as it
had work on the VH-92 program, it would remain so.
So I have two questions. I think probably the admiral would
be most likely the appropriate person to ask the first one.
Last year, I placed into section 133 of the NDAA a requirement
for the Navy to report to Congress on its assessment of what
the facility's closure would mean for the program, and we
received this response in January. And this much of it is the
assignment, and this is the answer.
And I was a program manager in the Air Force, and I was
also a chemistry teacher in 11th grade, and on both counts I
think this would merit an F in terms of effort. And I was
wondering if you could maybe provide a little bit more insight
onto what the implications would be, because in all likelihood
the factory at some point will be closed and moved, and was
hoping you might be able to provide me some more insight than
this report does.
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I don't think that I signed that
report. I don't think that I have seen it. And so if I could
take that for the record, or set up a meeting to come back and,
a) get schooled in it myself, and then--so I can adequately
answer your questions.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 110.]
Ms. Houlahan. I would really appreciate that, because I
really would love to have a more robust answer to a really
important question.
And my second question is for General Berger. I understand
that the Marine Corps aviation plan had originally called for
two additional CH-92A, which are the trainer aircraft. Having
dedicated training aircraft obviously helps to relieve the
burden on the regular fleet, and I noticed that funding for
this was struck in this budgetary process.
And I was wondering if there was a plan for that to
eventually be added, why that was decided to be struck? If you
could provide some insight into that as well.
General Berger. The requirement remains, too, ma'am. You
are accurate. One we have right now down at Quantico, one
simulator. The requirement is a second one. So that part
remains valid. We will need to find the funding for it, because
as we field the 92, we are going to need two simulators, not
one.
Ms. Houlahan. And I guess I would just--I appreciate that--
elevate my concern that if this particular facility which is
charged currently with this manufacturing is in fact at some
point to be shuttered because of lack of demand, we really need
to make sure we understand that demand shortly, so that we
don't end up with a difficult problem.
That is the bulk of my questions, and I yield back the
balance of my time. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am concerned about
reports about the Chinese and Russian militaries investing
heavily in their submarine fleets, with subs that can deploy
longer and have more lethal weapons systems. They are
increasing their activity in the North Atlantic region. And at
the rate China is building and currently commissioning ships,
its Navy could have 100 submarines within the next 15 years.
The Navy has validated warfighting requirements of 138 P-8
Poseidons, the only long-range aircraft that can detect and
track deepwater submarines, as previously attested to by the
Secretary and the admiral this morning.
My question is, has the Navy performed any risk assessment
of not reaching the warfighting requirement for P-8s?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would have to get back to you on
specifically with respect to P-8s. But I think P-8s would be
part of a broader set of capabilities that we would use against
that submarine buildup. But I will have to get back to you with
more specifics.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 111.]
Mr. Banks. Okay. I appreciate that. Furthermore, what does
the shortfall of P-8 mean for the stockpile of associated
capabilities that are necessary for anti-submarine warfare
missions, such as sonobuoys?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I lost the connection there between
sonobuoys and the----
Mr. Banks. What does the shortfall of P-8s mean for
sonobuoys?
Admiral Gilday. So I am concerned about numbers of
sonobuoys and have added that to my unfunded list. In terms of
P-8s and the risk there, I think there is a direct risk to
warfighting capability and capacity based on numbers. And so I
think I can get back to you as part of that previous question
and tie it together.
Mr. Banks. All right. Appreciate that very much.
You already heard from Representative Moulton a little bit
about the Future of Defense Task Force that he and I co-chair.
We are working closely with DOD and members of the national
security innovation base to identify opportunities to invest in
our future force structure.
Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you state, quote, ``There
is clear agreement that certain new classes of ships that
currently do not exist today must be designed and built rapidly
in the next 10 years.'' What role do you see unmanned undersea
vehicle systems playing in a conflict in Russia and China?
Mr. Modly. Sir, I think they are going to play a role, and
I think what we need to do, the work that we need to do now--
and this is largely where there are some disagreements between
the analysis that we have done, the analysis that CAPE has
done, the analysis that think tanks like CSBA [Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments] has done, is how do you
scale--what is the scale of that unmanned piece of the mission?
And the numbers vary. From my perspective, right now in
this point in time, I don't think that that difference in
numbers is that significant, because we have to get after it
now anyway, and it is going to take time to get to that size of
force. But I think we all agree that unmanned platforms are
going to have a role to play, whether they are undersea
unmanned platforms, large ones, medium-sized ones, small ones.
They are going to be part of the future force mix that we are
going to design.
Mr. Banks. Can you comment a little bit further on the
readiness of U.S. citizens studying STEM [science, technology,
engineering, mathematics] professions and how that impacts your
ability to prepare the Navy for the future?
Mr. Modly. I think it is a huge strategic problem for us
that we don't have enough students, and we are not generating
enough students out of secondary education to meet those needs.
I haven't studied it, but I have seen some statistics on it.
And when you look at what particularly our biggest long-term
competitor is doing, we have significant challenges there. And
it limits our--it limits the types of input that we have into
our force.
Mr. Banks. Okay. I appreciate that.
Mr. Secretary, in reference to a subject that Congressman
Lamborn brought up earlier, what is the Navy's plan to
proliferate conventional prompt-strike and hypersonic weapons
across the force in order to prevent them from being solely
held within our submarine force?
Mr. Modly. Sir, we have to come back and give you a
classified briefing on that in terms of how we plan on
deploying these. There are lots of different options that we
are looking at, but I really can't discuss that in an open
forum. But we would be more than happy to come and do that in a
classified forum.
Mr. Banks. We look forward to that. With that, I yield
back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Golden.
Mr. Golden. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
A couple of questions, Admiral Gilday. I have sat here
throughout this whole hearing just to get to this. Earlier
today you mentioned that Portsmouth is in New Hampshire. I just
had to point out that the entrance to Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
is in Kittery, Maine. And most of that shipyard--you know I
wouldn't let you get away with that. Most of that shipyard is
in Maine, and we are proud of it and proud to share it with New
Hampshire.
But more seriously, you have sat in front of the Seapower
Subcommittee in the last year. We have had conversations about
your excitement about the DDG Flight III and how important
getting that platform out into the Navy is.
I also noticed that in a fiscal year 2021 budget request
there is $46 million for industry studies regarding the next
large surface combatant, but that is a ways out there. You have
testified today about how a lot of the platforms we have right
now are going to be with us for a while. And as a result, you
are going to be investing in upgrading the systems that you
have.
And with that in mind, I wanted to remind you that the
current multiyear procurement for DDG-51s runs out in fiscal
year 2022. And, therefore, I wanted to ask both the Secretary
and yourself what your plans are regarding a fiscal year 2023
multiyear procurement contract for DDG-51 Flight IIIs.
Admiral Gilday. Right now, sir, I can't speak to a detailed
plan for a multiyear procurement of DDG-51 Flight IIIs in 2023.
I think that would really be dependent upon the integrated
force structure assessment that we have done, and then
prioritizing within that in terms of what we need to move
forward on quickly, given the top line that we have.
And I don't mean to be evasive. It is just I don't have a
firm answer to that yet.
Mr. Modly. If I may just add to that. The multiyear
procurements give us tremendous flexibility to purchase these
ships, these long lead time ships, and reduce the cost of them
over time. And so we are very much in favor of using that
authority whenever we possibly can. So----
Mr. Golden. Well, I appreciate that and, you know, would
love to work with you on that as we plan for the future,
because I think you have made the point, Mr. Secretary, it
drives down the cost of the ships. I would be surprised--
obviously, I don't know what the force assessment is going to
look like, but I have heard an awful lot of good testimony
about the importance of the DDG destroyer as the Cadillac of
the Navy, the backbone of the force.
I would be shocked to see a dramatic shift. Maybe I will be
proven wrong. But I think that would be an interesting
conversation.
General Berger, I want to just ask you, in your planning
guidance, you made this quote, ``Marines cannot be passive
passengers en route to the amphibious objective area. As the
long-range precision standoff weapons improve, and diffuse
along the world's littorals, Marines must contribute to the
fight alongside our Navy shipmates from the moment we embark.''
I also have heard you talk about having a distributed
force. You have talked about land-based anti-ship weapons and
being able to reach out and touch the enemy. I also can't
imagine you envisioning a Marine Corps infantry that is not
able to go ashore and tangle with the best of them.
So this is not a got-you question, but during your
nomination you testified that you would continue the Marine
Corps support for the Close Combat Lethality Task Force. I also
wanted to point out that Secretary Esper basically committed
the same, saying that the cross-functional nature of the CCLTF
increases coordination of effort department-wide.
For those people listening that don't know, this is an
effort to strengthen the lethality, survivability, resiliency,
and readiness of U.S. squad-level infantry units to ensure
close combat overmatch against pacing threats, yet there is a
proposal to just move this into the Army and not keep it--a
shared joint services effort.
I can't imagine that much has changed, but I did want to
ask because it seems like a pretty rapid shift away from where
we were just 6 months ago.
General Berger. Sir, we have benefitted from the work they
have done so far, because we were part of it. And inside this
budget, plus a very small unfunded priority list for the Marine
Corps, 44 percent of that unfunded stuff is individual Marine
stuff, from the individual combat equipment for reservists to
suppressors and night optics.
We have been the beneficiary of that. We have to continue
that. We cannot let that flounder again, not because we are
going to put 10,000 Marines across a beach, we are not going to
relive 1944 or 1945, but because the way you describe it, we
have to first deter, but if that doesn't work, be prepared to
distribute a force ashore or afloat, either one. And then it is
going to always boil down to a small unit leader, and we have
to outfit that small unit leader and his team with the very
best we can.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Golden. I am out of time. Thank you. I appreciate it.
The Chairman. Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Modly, before I get into my broader strategic and
parochial questions, I just wanted to note that several members
of the Florida delegation wrote you regarding the awarding of
Purple Hearts to those wounded during the December terrorist
attack on Pensacola NAS, and asking you to review whether any
of those personnel merit valor awards.
As a combat veteran, I certainly saw valor in the actions
of many to protect their fellow sailors and civilians. So I
understand the valor awards are still under review, but I
wanted to thank you for awarding several Purple Hearts to the
victims of that horrific attack.
I just want to echo quickly my colleagues, Representative
Gallego, Representative Banks, the concerns of the burgeoning
qualitative and quantitative Chinese and Russian fleets. Lots
of discussion of the Virginia; lots of discussion of the
Columbia. Obviously, that is a key part of our deterrent.
Moscow and Beijing I think feel the same way, so taking a
look at the P-8s and just following up on Representative Banks,
we have a Reserve squadron, the P-3s are so old that I guess we
are retiring those, even without replacements. But what is the
bottom line on where you need to go on the total numbers of P-
8s? And how and when are we going to get there? And I know that
is a piece of the ASW [anti-submarine warfare] fight, but I
think it is a pretty critical one.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, we are not abandoning P-3s without a
replacement. So P-8s are coming online and replacing those P-
3s. In the late 2020s, that inventory will be closed, fully
closed.
Mr. Waltz. Admiral, my understanding is that this--the
Reserve squadron in Jacksonville, Florida, is going to
decommission before they get P-8s, if we could--I would be
happy to be wrong on that, if you could just follow up for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 112.]
Admiral Gilday. I will come back to you on that, sir. But I
also take a look at whether or not that is being replaced in a
different area with a different squadron.
Mr. Waltz. Fair enough.
Admiral Gilday. But I will get back to you with some----
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Thank you. And then, on the sonobuoy
piece--and, again, you can take this for the record as well if
you don't have the detail. As we looked at it, you request $49
million to recapitalize the newest version, the SSQ-125A. Our
understanding--my understanding, that is not in production yet.
So we are confused on where, you know, basically, if you could
come back to us and explain why we are recapping a sonobuoy
that is not in production versus replenishing the stocks and
continuing to replenish the stocks, which I think this
committee has supported you in doing in the last few years, but
that seems to us to be a disconnect for replenishing something
that is not in production yet. If you could come back to us on
that, I would appreciate it, Admiral.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I will.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 112.]
Mr. Waltz. And then, you know, I just have a broader
strategic topline question that I am asking of all of the
services. I mean, and the Secretary and Chairman. We are
looking at a flat topline budget. We are looking at increasing
personnel costs. I still am not clear--and I think this is the
broader strategic question we are all asking--how are we going
to modernize? How are we going to recap?
And how are we going to procure when our personnel costs
continue in the outyear and the FYDP to eat up more and more of
a flat top line? It just--I am having trouble kind of circling
that square. If you could--if you could speak to that, and then
in the time remaining I have--I completely agree there is a
quality and quantity. Are you looking at any types--of pulling
anything out of mothball or modernizing any from the Hazard
[Oliver Hazard Perry-class] frigates or anything along those
lines of kind of really getting out of the box to keep up with
the pace that the Chinese are cranking out ships?
Mr. Modly. So I think, sir, that the best way to answer
that first question from my perspective is we have to look
internally at our own organization. And there are many things
that we do, the way we operate, the way our business processes
are set up, the business system structures that we have, that
inhibit our organization to be as agile as it needs to be. And
there is cost associated with that.
There are overhead structures that are associated with that
that we don't need to have, and we need to funnel that into
modernization. I think ultimately we can dig very deep to find
some of that, but at some point there is going to have to be a
broader discussion about a higher top line for the Navy. And
that is something that I am trying to queue up, but I can't----
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Just in the time--thank you for that
candor. And the other piece--again, I am on the Future of
Defense Task Force as well. In my remaining 10 seconds, if we
are moving long term to more and more lightly manned and
unmanned systems, but we have the long-term personnel costs
that are eating up that budget, how--you know, again, if you
could come back for the record of how--you know, where those
intersections come, is it 5 years, 10 years, and how we
accelerate it.
Mr. Modly. Happy to do so.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 112.]
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. A number of members have hit upon this point,
but I think that is a crucial question is making the budget
work for what we want to do, make sure we don't overextend
ourselves, so we wind up not doing anything well.
You know, if we have the money, we have the money. If we
don't, we have to figure out how to make it work. And I think a
lot of us--and you as well--are struggling to get the right
answers on that. And that will inform a lot of what we do in
this year's defense bill.
Ms. Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Secretary Modly, I wanted to start with a
comment that you made recently, and this is a quote. You said,
``The service needs to settle on a North Star and begin the
research and development and construction to get the hulls in
the water, and then it could refine its vision as needed once
fleet leaders understand how the new and old ships work
together to bring naval power to a distributed fight.''
So, you know, I read this and what do you think it sounds
like to me? It sounds like the LCS program, the DDG-1000. It
sounds like the Ford. It sounds like the conversations we are
having about unmanned surface vessels. So, you know, I just
wanted to point out the fact that, you know, we have had class
after class after class of ship procurement and construction
that has essentially failed, and it has failed us in providing
national defense, presence, deterrence overseas.
And it has failed the sailors who are working on those
ships. They are the ones who are doing the right thing, but we
are giving them platforms that can't do the job, that are not
fully developed, that are not mature in design before we start
building them.
And so in that discussion I want to discuss the LCS. So, in
2018, Vice Admiral Brown, Commander, Naval Surface Forces,
said, ``These ships bring unmatched capability to our surface
Navy and provide flexibility to our fleet commanders.''
So in your assessment, do you agree with Vice Admiral Brown
that these have brought us unmatched flexibility? And would you
say the LCS is a success or a failure?
Mr. Modly. Well, ma'am, I think it is too early to say
whether or not they are a success or a failure. I think right
now----
Mrs. Luria. Well, no. It is too early to tell? You want to
decommission the first four ships in the class, and it is too
early to tell? We are going to go through, and we are going to
start decommissioning them when the oldest one is 12 years old.
And I will quote--Admiral Gilday gave I think a good assessment
of what they turned out to be at the Shipbuilding Caucus
breakfast a couple of weeks ago, that they were just
prototypes, because we built them and then we figured out that
they didn't work.
So is this like a ``we will build it and then they will
come'' mentality that they Navy has? Is this your plan for the
FFG, the large surface combatant? You know, what is the plan of
the Navy to develop platforms and ships that actually do the
mission?
And I am going to stop there because it is a somewhat
rhetorical question and could never be possibly answered in 5
minutes.
But what I am going to move on to is this entire discussion
about 355 ships. So since I have been here, what I have been
talking about is, how did we get to the 355 number? We got to
it through the OFRP, and the OFRP moved us from deploying 6 out
of every 24 months, so 25 percent of the time, to 6 out of
every 36 months, 17 percent of the time.
I am not that smart with math, but I am a Navy nuke, and I
can do the math backwards. And 355, if you do the math
backwards, at 25 percent of the time, it works out you only
needed 282 ships to do the same thing presence-wise before you
went down in the amount of time they are deployed.
So, honestly, a force structure assessment and a 30-year
shipbuilding plan that are based off of an assumption that we
are only going to deploy approximately 17 percent of the time,
or 6 or 7 out of 36 months, you know, it doesn't work. It gets
us to 355.
And, you know, I have been struggling to do your math
because you said we could get to 355 ships by the end of this
decade. I mean, do you have proof that our industrial base
could even do that if we threw all of the money that the
taxpayers had at it? Would it even be physically possible?
Mr. Modly. I think it is possible, and I mentioned before,
ma'am, what I think it would take.
Mrs. Luria. So it is possible in the plan that we haven't
seen yet. It tells us how to get to 355 in a decade.
Mr. Modly. I will be able to tell you how we think--how I
think we can get there. Yes, ma'am. But, you know, many of your
points are valid, but some aren't. The LCS--the first two LCS
ships were not designed to be operational ships. They were test
ships.
Mrs. Luria. Is that what was testified to Congress? When
you came and asked us to pay a bill, and the American taxpayer
to pay for ships, you told us you wanted to build two ships
that weren't going to be operational, that were never going to
deploy, and then you send sailors there and expect them to
operate these and put all of their blood, sweat, and tears into
operating the ships that are never going to deploy?
Mr. Modly. The first two were purchased with R&D dollars,
which meant they were research and development ships. So I
think--I was not here, but that sounds to me like----
Mrs. Luria. Okay. So then are they being counted? If they
are R&D ships and they are just prototype test platforms, are
you counting them in the 293 of 355 that we have right now?
Mr. Modly. They are part of the----
Mrs. Luria. Are they operational fleet ships?
Mr. Modly. Yes.
Mrs. Luria. Well, then, I don't buy that answer. If they
are operational fleet ships, they can't deploy. We were going
to have warfare modules for them. They were going to bring us a
whole bunch of capability, but guess what? We didn't even
develop those, and we are still not operational at this point.
Is that correct?
Mr. Modly. Some of them are. Some of them are operating
right now. Some of them are doing operations out in the South
China Sea right now. So they are out there, and they are doing
things.
Mrs. Luria. So they are out there, and they are doing
things. So was it the agile, flexible platform that was going
to solve all of the Navy's problems? When I see this mystery
30-year shipbuilding plan, is it all LCSs?
Mr. Modly. No, ma'am. And I don't think anyone ever said
that it was going to solve all of the Navy's problems. I think
it was a new capability that would address certain problems in
certain areas that other more expensive ships--that it was too
expensive to do with those other ships. That is what it was
designed to do.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
It is an incredibly important point, and a much more
forceful and articulate way of getting at what I was trying to
get at in my opening statement is the 355 number kind of
offends me because it doesn't get into this. And this is what
matters.
You know, you could have 355 rowboats, theoretically, and
you would have 355 ships. So I don't even know why we put that
number out there. I would much rather see, here are the
capabilities that we need to have.
And, you know, yes, I take your point about R&D ships, but
you can't really count an R&D ship as part of the 355-ship
fleet if you are being honest about it, if you are not just
trying to hit an artificial number. It is about the
capabilities.
And also, I think what--and you gentlemen have worked very
hard on this and made it better. It is about, okay, we have it.
Can we use it? And that is really important, and I know you
focused on that. You focused on the maintenance. You focused on
those issues.
That just seems to me like a lot more important than
spending all of your time, you know, trying to come up with
some chart that shows we can get to 355 ships. You know, the
point is much more the capabilities and the deployability. Just
my two cents' worth.
Mr. Bergman.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Am I ``Tail End
Charlie'' here?
The Chairman. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Bergman. Am I the last man standing?
The Chairman. At the moment. But you never know who is
going to show up.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Well, potentially, then, the only thing
standing between you all and what you are going to get onto
next today, I will try to be short, sweet, and to the point,
but it will take 5 minutes.
So the point is, historically, we have heard the phrase
used ``There is no one more adaptable and creative than a
Marine in a firefight.'' Conversely, personal experience tells
me there is no one less adaptable than that same Marine within
a change-resistant bureaucracy.
As I look at today's DOD and service bureaucracies, I see
experienced, motivated, digitally savvy, young service members
held back by analog bureaucrats who are change-resistant. That
is just a perspective of 40 years in uniform, whether it be
Active Duty or Reserve.
There is good news, because we have these service members,
these young men and women, who they are there to fight. They
are there to defend our country's interest at all cost. It is
up to us to do the right thing, to enable them, and not stifle
them after they have gotten the experience, that they can be
productive in a changing environment that is always going to be
changing.
So, General Berger, I know it was mentioned before I got
here, you know, you are going to propose some--the Marine Corps
is proposing cuts of about 2,000 personnel in the fiscal year
2021 budget request. You have indicated what your goal is.
I guess my question is, with the proposed cuts to manning,
is the Marine Corps considering increased use of shared
services, whether it be on the admin side, the fiscal side,
where you don't need commands at all levels to have that
completely filled-out shop; that you can actually streamline
your outputs for, again, HR [human resources] stuff and fiscal
stuff by utilizing the shared services.
And can you--do you want to make a comment? Are you ready
to--and if you are not, I mean, we can talk about it, take it
for the record, because I would like to hear what you are
thinking.
General Berger. The force design efforts started with the
warfighting end. So most of the adjustments to how we are built
had to do with warfighting. And part of that, to your point,
sir, was where we would best--where we ought to integrate with
the Navy in a personnel manner.
In other words, at the numbered fleet, do we have it right?
Because right now, today, a numbered fleet has one Marine
colonel. We have got to do a lot different than that going
forward.
So it is not for the sake of efficiencies. It is for the
sake of warfighting. After that, where do we go inside the
title 10 headquarters, all of the headquarters between us and a
battalion squadron? We have to look at all of that, yes. Have
we looked at it through the lens of where we could deliberately
look for services elsewhere? We have not yet, no.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you. And also, for both--and,
again, not necessarily to be answered right now, but for both
Admiral Gilday and General Berger, we now use the term
``operational reserve,'' because since we can go back in the
history since after Korea, where we didn't--we didn't populate
the Guard and Reserve with equipment or resources necessary to
keep them ready to the point where if we needed to use them,
they were ready to go when we needed them.
Well, the last 20-plus years, we have seen the value of an
operational reserve. So having said that, when we think about
HD/LD assets, high demand, low density, quick turn on the
deployments, things--now we are talking Active Component
assets--intel, cyber, IT [information technology], for
example--we know we are not going to keep those corporals and
sergeants because the pay is too good and the opportunities too
great in the outside world. So we train them up; they serve
their time honorably; they do the job well.
So I would just encourage you to be looking at, how do you
take those highly trained, capable assets, and keep their
viability? It is different in an infantry battalion, but those
kind of assets we need to keep for as long as possible.
And there is only one place to keep them, if they leave
Active Duty, and that is a Reserve capability appropriately led
by people who understand what it takes to be a reservist who is
committed to a career after their service.
And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 111.]
The Chairman. Thank you. I believe we are done, but thank
you, gentlemen, very much. Appreciate your service, appreciate
your testimony, and we will continue to work on this as we
prepare the bill for this year.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
FEBRUARY 27, 2020
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 27, 2020
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Modly. We are submitting the report to Congress on 19 March and
will then award the contract. It will take a few weeks to mobilize, but
anticipate a kick off and logistics coordination meeting in April/May
with follow on data collection starting this summer. [See page 17.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
Admiral Gilday. The Navy requested the authority to award an
incrementally funded contract for SSBNs 826 and 827 (Legislative
Proposal 017). In December 2019, the Navy and Electric Boat reached a
signed agreement for the Columbia ``Build I'' as an option to the
existing IPPD contract which will include construction of the first two
hulls (SSBN 826 and SSBN 827) and associated design and support
efforts. This will enable the Columbia program to begin construction in
October 2020, and provide industrial base stability, production
efficiencies, and cost savings when compared to individual
procurements. In order to exercise the Build I option on schedule, the
authority to award the incrementally funded contract is required by
October 2020. Incremental full funding will allow the Navy to program
the costs for the first two ships over a five-year period, reducing
pressure on the Navy's shipbuilding account and risk to other
shipbuilding programs. The program's approved acquisition strategy and
budget requests assume incremental full funding in fiscal years 2021
through 2023 for SSBN 826 and fiscal years 2024 and 2025 for SSBN 827.
Beginning in FY 2026, the program's budget requests will include full
funding in the year of authorization for SSBN 828 and follow ships. If
disapproved, the Navy would be unable to award the option for
construction of SSBNs 826 and 827; delaying the start of lead ship
construction and delivery schedules, increasing construction costs due
to schedule delays and build disruptions, and compromising the ability
to meet U.S. Strategic Command requirements. Additionally, in the event
of a FY21 Continuing Resolution, a anomalies will be required,
including new start language and incremental full funding authority.
[See page 22.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Mr. Modly. In a letter dated July 26, 2019, DOD OIG advised that it
had opened an investigation into allegations involving Mr. Booth. The
investigation concerned, in part, allegations that were filed with DOD
OIG on or before March 1, 2019, allegations that had been undergoing
review. DON stopped any DON inquiries in order to prevent conflict with
the DOD OIG investigation. DON had no role in the DOD OIG decision to
open an investigation nor in the timing of the opening of the
investigation. [See page 31.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Admiral Gilday. The F/A-18 production line shutdown comprises a
number of elements including line tear down for the F/A-18 and EA-18G
Airborne Electronic Attack Suite, disposition of government furnished
equipment (GFE) and the transition of data into a single government
repository. As programmed in the PB21request, these costs total $319.3M
across FY22-24. Line tear down includes the inspection, identification
and classification of inventory, followed by preservation, packing,
marking and where required disposal. Additional funding is required for
shutdown management, supplier close out, engineering and management
planning and analysis as well as contractor liaison. The PB21 request
programs $89.218M for line tear down in FY22 and $230.165 across FY22-
24 for disposition of GFE and data transition. If the production line
remains open through domestic or foreign military sales these costs
would be deferred. [See page 26.]
Admiral Gilday. We assess the risk of Navy's precision-guided and
preferred munitions request as moderate. While we have reprioritized
weapon/munitions investments priorities based on evolving Red Force
threats, the Department of the Navy's overall request for weapons/
munitions procurement funding has increased over the last three-years.
Additionally, the Navy is taking deliberate actions to identify and
reduce industrial base vulnerabilities to assure maritime and national
security. The Navy also continues to maintain limited organic
manufacturing capabilities for ordnance and energetics that will assure
surge capability and capacity for munitions and ordnance components.
The Department's FY 2021 weapons/munitions budget request continues to
improve our capability and capacity position to meet all Defense
Planning Guidance requirements. Specific efforts to manage stability,
capability, and capacity risk in the U.S. munitions industrial base
include: procurement of new capabilities; increasing legacy weapon
capabilities via major modification programs; increasing capacity by
making investments to increase repair throughput and reduce turnaround
times for weapons Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul; and working with
the U.S. Defense Industrial Base to address specific industrial base
issues and concerns such as reliance on offshore suppliers.
U.S. Defense Industrial Base Initiatives include:
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control (LMMFC): Working with the
U.S. Air Force and Lockheed-Martin, LMMFC is in the process of
expanding production capacity for Air Force JASSM-ER and Navy LRASM at
its Troy, Alabama facility.
Boeing Company (LJDAM): Navy has developed contingency plans with
Boeing to allow for U.S. production of Laser Joint Direct Attack
Munition (LJDAM)/Precision Laser Guidance Set (PLGS) detectors in the
event production operations in allied countries were degraded or
destroyed.
Raytheon Missile Systems (RMS): Based on policies to use domestic
suppliers over foreign entities for critical missile components, Navy
coordinated with RMS to ensure the program leveraged U.S. based BASF
Inc. over a foreign manufacturer for the use of Dimeryl-Di-Isocyanate
(DDI) as a curing agent in the propellant and bond liner in the Rocket
Motor.
Department of the Navy Management Initiatives include:
Weapons/Munitions Production Forecasting: To maintain weapons/
munition production/industrial base stability, Navy program offices are
sharing 2-5 year forecasts with industry (Congressional Service budget
support dependent). This forecast sharing facilitates Defense
Industrial Base production planning and enables an orderly transition
and adjustment of personnel and resources.
Counterfeit Parts Mitigation Programs: Use of Trusted Foundries and
Life-of-Type buy procurements.
Presidential Determinations (PD): PDs are being used to allow the
use of funds to build or increase capacity and capability to produce
chemicals used in munitions, and for rare earth magnets, many of which
are used in weapons/munitions.
Other: OSD(MIBP) also funded other weapons/munition production
risks mitigation efforts benefitting the DON, such as a project to
establish a U.S. source for chemicals previously procured from China.
Maintain the DON's organic government owned and government operated R&D
and limited manufacturing capabilities to aid and augment industrial
base capability and capacity for munitions and ordnance.
Procurement: Increases in procurement quantities to include LRASM,
Tomahawk, and APKWS, including use of multiyear procurement authority
to buy SM-6 Block I/IA AUR missiles. Increased investment in weapons
sustainment and repair to increase readiness and reduce Maintenance,
Repair, and Overhaul turnaround times.
Risks: Despite the many proactive efforts to fill our weapons
magazines, risks continue. These risks include: concerns over key
weapon/munition components/materials (e.g. batteries); single-source
and/or fragile suppliers; fragile defense markets driven many times by
the uncertainty of U.S. government spending; gaps in U.S.-based human
capital (i.e. STEM personnel resources); general declines in U.S.
manufacturing capabilities and capacity; and industrial policies of
competitor nations. [See page 26.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Modly. Strategic stability is a two-way street, so the
capabilities of other states are an important consideration. Russia has
a large stockpile of non-treaty accountable nuclear weapons, high-end
conventional weapons and dual use delivery platforms, all in an effort
to establish an asymmetric advantage. Russian doctrine also suggests a
limited first use policy, where they may attempt to end a conflict
through the use, or threatened use, of these systems. To address the
question of a rapid response, the imperative to launch under attack
arises if one fears the incoming strike will prevent a retaliatory
response (e.g., an attack against the nuclear command, control, and
communications system, or a massive first strike against nuclear
forces). A single submarine-launched missile, regardless of its payload
and warhead yield, would not present Russia with an existential threat
and could not destroy Russia's nuclear retaliatory forces nor its
redundant command and control networks. To maintain strategic stability
and reassure allies that depend on our capabilities, the United States
must challenge the adversary's perception of capability gaps they could
exploit to achieve a strategic advantage. The current threat
environment requires credible, flexible, and graduated deterrence
options, and the United States is pursuing improvements to a range of
forces to improve our deterrence posture. These improvements will
continue to deter potential adversaries by credibly holding at risk
that which their leaders value and therefore increase strategic
stability. We are not creating asymmetry; both China and Russia have
fielded hypersonic weapons. We are restoring strategic stability by
restoring symmetry. [See page 38.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOK
Mr. Modly. The U.S. and other Allies continue to advocate for
greater NATO-EU cooperation on defense and security matters. NATO
Allies and EU Member States have made two major commitments on greater
cooperation at NATO Summits in 2016 and 2018. At the 2018 Brussels
Summit, Allies and EU member states highlighted specific areas where
defense cooperation is critical such as military mobility and
resilience. To implement the commitment in 2016, Allies and EU member
states also agreed to pursue 74 specific common proposals across both
organizations. These proposals also cover areas such as military
mobility, as well as hybrid threats, cybersecurity, and the EU's better
aligning its defense planning processes with those of NATO. There has
been varied success across all these lines of effort, but more work
needs to be done to better share the burden of our transatlantic
security. Secretary Esper and DOD continue to advocate that EU efforts
not duplicate those of NATO and that all activities undertaken by
Allies, either independently or under multilateral frameworks such as
the EU, complement those they've committed to through NATO. The 2018
Joint Declaration between the EU and NATO also focused on better burden
sharing. All Allies, including those 22 who are also EU Member States,
have reiterated their commitment to the Wales Defense Investment Pledge
to spend 2% of GDP on defense and 20% of defense spending on
modernization by 2024. However, the EU has continued to pursue certain
defense policies that exclude non-members such as the U.S, which
needlessly weakens transatlantic security and defense industry and
innovation as a whole. This is most notable in the European Defense
Fund and in the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation. These lines of
effort each effectively exclude non-EU member states such as the U.S.
from participating, which not only potentially handicaps all such
projects by eliminating capable Allies and partner nations from
contributing their resources or technologies, but also runs counter to
the NATO-EU joint declarations to work better together toward the
common end of transatlantic security. DOD and other elements of U.S.
government continue to make this case to the EU and to Allies who are
also EU members. When adding up all defense spending from the 30 NATO
Allies, more than 80% of that funding comes from those who are not EU
members such as the U.S. and UK. That reality reinforces the need for
the EU to better cooperate with NATO, including those countries which
are not members of the Union on Transatlantic security. [See page
32.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
Mr. Modly. Navy continues to build a more inclusive culture and
diverse workforce across the Fleet and recognizes the importance of
inclusion and diversity across all platforms. The Commander Naval Air
Forces (CNAF) outreach program supports multiple demographic affinity
groups to address underrepresented groups and has partnerships with the
Organization of Black Aerospace Professionals, and many others across
the country to inspire our youth to FLY NAVY. CNAF initiatives, include
implicit bias training into every major symposium and commander
training event. We believe change starts from within and are actively
pursuing cultural progress through the CNO's Culture of Excellence
initiative, a Navy-wide campaign dedicated to strengthening our mission
effectiveness by instilling toughness, trust, and connectedness in
Sailors to achieve warfighting excellence. Our focus encompasses a much
broader definition of diversity beyond the traditional demographic
measures of race, gender, and ethnicity. Sailors bring their own
experiences and personalities to the Fleet and we seek out these future
Sailors with diverse backgrounds, critical thinking skills, and mental
agility. By showing young men and women from across the country what
Navy has to offer, the Navy attracts Sailors with diverse experiences,
thoughts and perspectives. A few examples are:
Faces of the Fleet: Documentary series highlighting
Sailors' stories of their service, family, and life. Of the 15 episodes
currently live, there are 11 that highlight diverse Sailors.
Navy Promotional Days: Promote awareness/active
recruitment efforts at Minority Serving Institutions (Historically
Black Colleges, Hispanic-serving institutions, Tribal Colleges, Women
Colleges) to build strategic networks within diverse and under-
represented communities.
Senior Minority Assistance to Recruiting Program
(SEMINAR): Navy uses volunteers from the officer and enlisted community
to participate in SEMINAR--targeted towards African American, Hispanic,
and Asian/Pacific Islander, but participation is open to other
minorities who volunteer in pay grades E-6 through O-6.
Additionally, we partner with influencers in African American
communities, work with affinity groups who prioritize mentoring,
coaching and sponsorship and publicize the accomplishments of African
American exemplars both within and outside the Navy. This provides Navy
direct access to high-achieving prospects and key influencers with
multiple touchpoints year-round. Today, Navy's inclusive culture allows
our leaders to capitalize on Sailors' diversity, leveraging different
perspectives and ideas to achieve maximum possible performance. By
including all Sailors' voices and ideas Navy can increase its
lethality, readiness and ability to solve problems in innovative and
unique ways, harnessing the exponential creative power of diversity.
[See page 35.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
Admiral Gilday. In June 2019, Lockheed Martin announced the pending
closure of its helicopter manufacturing plant in Coatesville,
Pennsylvania. In July 2019, Lockheed Martin reversed their decision and
announced that the Coatesville manufacturing plant would remain open.
Language in the FY 2020 NDAA requested an assessment of the impact of
this decision to the VH-92A program. Based on Lockheed Martin's
decision to keep the Coatesville facility open, there is no effect on
the VH-92A program.
However, on the hypothetical that Lockheed Martin decides to close
the Coatesville plant and move the S-92 production facility, the
responses are as follows:
(1) Estimated effects on the manufacturing readiness level of the
VH-92 program due to potential changes to the program manufacturing
base; Response: If Lockheed Martin decides to move its current S-92A
production facility, the estimated effects would be negligible based
upon Lockheed Martin's past history and capability of producing S-92As
in a different location (Stratford, Ct). The current VH-92 contract
arrangement is Firm Fixed Price (FFP) with set delivery dates.
(2) The estimated assessment of cost risk to the program due to
potential changes to the program manufacturing base; Response: If
Lockheed Martin decides to move its current S-92A production facility,
the estimated costs and assessment of cost risk to the program would be
zero. The program has already exercised the FFP options for six Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot I aircraft and six LRIP Lot II
aircraft.
(3) Any estimated schedule impacts, including impacts on delivery
dates for the remaining low-rate initial production lots and full rate
production, resulting from any changes to the manufacturing base;
Response: If Lockheed Martin decides to move its current S-92A
production facility, the estimated schedule impacts to the program
would be zero. The program has a FFP contract in place for all
production aircraft that includes set delivery dates.
(4) An assessment of the effect of changes to the manufacturing
base on VH-92A sustainment; Response: The VH-92A sustainment strategy
is not dependent on the Coatesville, Pennsylvania manufacturing and
production facility, therefore, no impact.
(5) The impact of such changes on production and sustainment
capacity for the MH-60 and CH-53K helicopters of the Navy. Response:
CH-53K and MH-60 helicopter programs do not utilize the Coatesville
facility, therefore, no impact. [See page 44.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
Admiral Gilday. Due to higher budgetary priorities, the Navy was
unable to fund P-8As in the President's FY 2021 budget request. The
validated 138 P-8A aircraft warfighting requirement meets persistent
deployed presence and surge support requirements for major combat
operations. The existing program of record of 119 P-8A aircraft is in
alignment with the National Defense Strategy; however, risk is accepted
with regard to defense and deterrence capacity. [See page 45.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
Admiral Gilday. As part of the Navy Total Force, Reserve Sailors
provide operational capabilities, strategic depth, and increased
lethality. Critical to maintaining a ready Reserve Component (RC), it
is imperative to maximize the recruitment of trained capable personnel
who decide to leave active duty, especially in highly valued critical
skillsets. Navy established a Career Transition Office (CTO) that
directly supports a rapid and seamless transition for Active Component
(AC) Sailors to continued service in the RC. Navy Recruiting Command
partnered with the CTO and launched a Prior Service Directorate that
assists the CTO, particularly in critical and high demand skillsets.
Prior Service Detachments assist in increasing AC to RC transitions in
Norfolk, VA, Jacksonville, FL, San Diego, CA, Seattle, WA, Hawaii, and
Japan and are staffed with Reserve Benefits Advisors who act as an
extension of the CTO. These advisors educate separating AC Sailors on
the benefits of the joining the RC, ensuring they have an opportunity
to smoothly affiliate with the Reserves without a break in service.
Additionally, these advisors work directly with AC Command Career
Counselors and Sailors to expedite the affiliation and transition
process into the RC. Finally, the Targeted Re-Entry Program (TRP) is a
talent retention initiative that empowers commanding officers to
identify and nominate their Sailors, both officer and enlisted who are
separating from the Navy, for an accelerated return to active duty if
they choose to do so. The program is designed to benefit both the Navy
and the Sailor through continued service of sustained superior
performers in critical designators and ratings who earned specific
qualifications and possess valuable skill-sets needed in the Navy.
Through the nomination process, the Sailor is considered for a Golden
Ticket or a Silver Ticket. Golden ticket recipients are guaranteed a
return to active duty within one year of release, as long as they
remain fully qualified. Silver Ticket recipients are provided the
opportunity to return to active duty within two years of release,
subject to the needs of the Navy and as long as they remain fully
qualified. [See page 53.]
General Berger. Yes, the Marine Corps' unfunded request for 36
Naval Strike Missiles will allow the Marine Corps to build required
capacity for the Ground-Based Anti-Ship Missile (GBASM) capability one
year earlier than planned, moving this capability from FY23 to FY22.
The Marine Corps' highest ground modernization priority, the GBASM
capability, will provide anti-ship fires from land as part of an
integrated Naval Anti-Surface Warfare campaign. This forward-deployed
and survivable capability will enhance the lethality of our naval
forces and will help to deny our adversaries the use of key maritime
terrain. The Marine Corps' GBASM solution is the Navy Marine
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), consisting of an
unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle-based mobile launch platform,
called the Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires, and
Naval Strike Missiles. The Naval Strike Missile is identical to the
Navy's Over the Horizon Weapon System deployed on the Littoral Combat
Ship and will provide the Marine Corps with a missile capable of sea-
skimming, high-g maneuverability, and the ability to engage targets
from the side, rather than top-down. This maximizes lethality and
missile survivability. The first test of NMESIS took place in December
2019 and successfully fired an inert round. A second live-fire
demonstration with a guided Naval Strike Missile is planned for June
2020. RC in FY19 through lateral move only with (2) Marines currently
on hand. The Marine Corps began building this MOS (1721) into the Non-
Prior Service pipeline in FY20, and the structure continues to grow in
FY21. There are two programs available to Prior Service Recruiting and
career planners to retain/attract Marines to the SMCR. The SMCR
Enlisted Affiliation Bonus for corporals and sergeants permits Marines
in the 1721 MOS eligible for a $20k in exchange for a 3 year obligation
in the SMCR. The SMCR Retention Bonus (SRB-R) for SSgt through MSgt
permits these Marines to be eligible for the $10K or $15K in exchange
for a 4 year reenlistment with a 3 year obligation in the SMCR. [See
page 53.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Modly. The Navy adjusts our end strength based on force
structure changes, so as ships and aircraft are added or retired each
year, we adjust end strength accordingly. Currently, Navy plans to use
unmanned and lightly manned systems to supplement and increase the
total capacity and lethality of our force in addition to manned Battle
Force ships and aircraft. Adding unmanned and lightly manned systems
would not necessarily cause a direct decrease in end strength or
personnel costs. Growing to a 355+ ship Navy over the next 10 years
will require commensurate increases in end strength. [See page 49.]
Admiral Gilday. The Navy Reserve squadrons, VP-62 in Jacksonville,
FL and VP-69 in Whidbey Island, WA, currently operate the P-3C,
providing strategic depth to the Active Component Maritime Patrol
forces, while providing P-3C Littoral Surveillance Reconnaissance
System (LSRS) mission support through the end of FY 2022. In FY20, Navy
requested 6 P-8As for the Active Component in the budget request and
also prioritized 2 P-8As on the Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) to
support recapitalization of the Reserve P-3Cs. In the FY20 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (Public Law 116-93), Congress funded a total of 9 P-
8As and specified that the funding for the three additional P-8As be
used to recapitalize the Navy Reserve squadrons. In February, funding
for one of those three P-8As was reprogrammed into the Drug
Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities appropriation to support the
Department of Homeland Security. The two Congressional additions will
allow for us to start the transition from the P-3C to P-8A for VP-62
personnel in FY 2023. To reach the full Reserve requirement for the 2
squadrons, ten additional P-8A aircraft are needed to fully transition
VP-62 in FY23 and begin VP-69 in FY24. Exact Reserve composition and
Primary Assigned Aircraft will be determined based on final P-8A
deliveries and competing Naval Aviation Force Structure requirements.
The warfighting requirement for P-8A is 138 aircraft. Additive P-8A
procurement will continue to compete for prioritization in the Navy
budget and on future unfunded priorities list. Navy will release a
report to Congress in the coming weeks, which will provide the updated
plan for recapitalization. [See page 48.]
Admiral Gilday. The SSQ-125A sonobuoy IS currently in production.
Navy awarded a five-year production contract for the procurement of
SSQ-125A sonobuoy in July 2019. The Navy continues to use all types of
sonobuoys in dealing with Out-of-Area deployers. PMA-264 annually
optimizes the required inventory of sonobuoys across all types, driven
by Fleet utilization and cost per unit to drive best value to the
Government. The PB21 UPL requests funding to build inventory of the
SSQ-125A and to give more flexibility to how we apply the remaining
base budget to procure the other sonobuoy types. Additionally, the
program office closely manages the inventory of SSQ-125 sonobuoys to
ensure no break in capability to the Fleet until the SSQ-125A inventory
and associated platform operational software update is in place. [See
page 49.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 27, 2020
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. General Berger, you recently published statements about
how increasing gender integration is one of your top priorities for
immediate action. You've also made public comments about longer term
plans of potentially building a new gender integrated recruit training
facility. Can you tell the committee more about your short-term and
long-term plans for increasing gender integration and whether or not
there is anything Congress can do to support these efforts?
General Berger. Recruiting: As we consider the skills, education,
and capabilities required of the next generation of Marines, we must be
able to recruit and sustain a force that draws from 100% of our
Nation's collective reservoir of talent, innovation, creativity, and
patriotism. I take it as a personal responsibility to do everything
within my authority to ensure that the Marine Corps does not create any
artificial barriers to service or advancement. In FY18 and FY19, more
than 10% of accessions were females (both officer and enlisted). In
FY19, 12.7% of officer accessions were female, the highest number since
beginning of the all-volunteer force, while 10.4% of enlisted
accessions were female. As of October 2019, our Marine Corps is 8.9%
female (active component), up from 6.7 percent in 2010. In addition to
employing more female inclusive messaging, we are better employing data
analytics to help understand--and eventually predict--why individuals
decide to join the Marine Corps as well as remain a Marine. These
efforts include improving current data collection and management;
longitudinal accession, retention, and exit surveys; and cognitive and
non-cognitive testing with the objective of identifying and fitting the
right person, with the right skills, into the right jobs. While I am
optimistic about our efforts to expand recruitment and retention of
female Marines, there remains considerable work to be done, and I look
forward to the continued support of Congress to help us achieve our
goals.
Recruit Training: The Marine Corps has taken a proactive approach
to comply with all relevant laws regarding gender integration at entry-
level training, without compromising our proven standards-based model.
Our current infrastructure at both San Diego and Parris Island is a
major limiting factor to further gender integration at recruit
training. As such, I directed the initiation of a conceptual planning
effort to better understand the merits of a consolidated recruit
training facility. As these long-term planning efforts mature, I will
provide you and Congress with routine updates. In addition to those
long-term planning efforts, I am pleased to report that the Marine
Corps trained its first integrated company of entry-level recruits in
2019, comprised of five male platoons and one female platoon, at Marine
Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) Parris Island. This year, MCRD Parris Island
has already graduated four integrated companies, with four more
currently in training and set to graduate by end of May 2020. Moving
forward in the short-term, the Marine Corps is exploring the
feasibility of making this a standard training model for integrated
recruit training, and will provide you and the committee with our final
conclusions and recommendations. The Marine Corps employs female drill
instructors and officers at the company and battalion level to train
and supervise both male and female recruits. This female leadership, at
both MCRD Parris Island and MCRD San Diego, participates in the
majority of training, to include physical fitness, martial arts, water
survival, and academics. This provides recruits an important and early
opportunity to observe Marine leaders of both genders throughout entry
level training. Graduation requirements are exactly the same for all
recruits. Platoons train together, conducting the same scheduled events
on the same training day and in the same location when logistically
supportable. This includes ``the Crucible'' as the culminating event to
earn the title `Marine'. Additionally, in November 2017, the Marine
Corps implemented a fully integrated fourth phase of instruction in
recruit training at both MCRDs. This training focuses on the ``6 Fs''
of the Marine Corps Leadership Development Model: Fidelity, Fighter,
Fitness, Family, Finances, and Future. The goal is to develop maturity
and self-discipline in each recruit so that they are better prepared
for the challenges in follow-on training and the Marine Corps. This
added phase of integrated training provides both male and female
instructors additional time to mentor recruits.
Integration: The integration of female Marines into previously-
restricted jobs and units is progressing without significant issues.
The number of female Marines in previously-restricted Military
Occupational Specialties (MOSs) is on the rise, and women are now
represented in all occupational fields. In 2019, there were 203 women
serving in previously restricted MOSs. Today that number is 283,
including our first female F-35 pilot and first female Reconnaissance
Marine. In 2019, 507 women were in previously restricted active
component units; that number is now 737. To further expand the
representation of female Marines in previously restricted MOSs and
units, we are also: (1) Exploring the feasibility of offering
incentives to female Marines in our reserve component who may be
interested in returning to active duty for service in a previously
restricted MOS or unit; (2) Seeking active-duty female company grade
officers to volunteer to attend the Infantry Officers Course, with a
follow-on assignment to an infantry battalion upon successful
completion; and (3) Creating additional opportunities for qualified
female Marines to execute a `lateral move' into previously restricted
MOSs.
Mr. Turner. The Marine Corps has a well-documented F-35 and MV-22
pilot shortfall. This is also a well-documented problem within the Air
Force, which was the subject of a prior hearing and is part of the
congressional record. The Marine Corps' current program-of-record and
overall aviation modernization plan include the procurement of over 400
F-35s. What is the Marine Corps doing to ensure that it will have
enough pilots to fly all of the F-35s it is procuring?
General Berger. I am familiar with the hearing in question, during
which the Air Force identified challenges related to sustaining its 5th
GEN pilot and UAS operator force, and its statements for the
congressional record of having a pilot shortfall of approximately 2000,
despite offering ever larger bonuses. There are lessons to be learned
from the Air Force, and I welcome your continued oversight and
assistance with this issue. As you noted, Marine Corps pilot shortfalls
with the F-35 and MV-22 are well documented, and I have commented on
these for the record. For FY19, we had a F-35 pilot shortfall of 167
and a MV-22 pilot shortfall of 274. Based on our FY20 Aviation Bonus,
we anticipate shortfalls of 177 F-35 pilots and 191 MV-22 pilots;
however, the increased deficit in F-35 pilots is due to the increase in
squadrons transitioning to F-35 thus increasing the F-35 pilot
requirement. Based on that preliminary data, it appears that our
remedial plans are working. Aviation bonuses totaled $5.1 million in
FY18, $16.3 million in FY19, and are projected to total $16.5 million
in FY20. We anticipate funds approximating FY20 totals being necessary
in support of our pilot retention efforts for the foreseeable future.
Based on the new bonuses, we have had 209 F-35 and MV-22 pilots take
the bonus since FY18. To meet our future pilot inventory requirements
we will need to increase new pilot production; increase transition of
current pilots; and retain adequate numbers of pilots who will clearly
see competing opportunities outside the Marine Corps.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. General Berger, the FY20 NDAA included a provision I
authored that prohibits gender-segregated training at Marine Corps
Recruit Depots within the next eight years. The text explicitly bans
gender-separate training, which means the Marines would have to revise
the current model, which involves limited co-training among single-
gender male and female platoons. Despite being asked by the press and
in a letter from my office whether you would gender-integrate at the
platoon level, your service has only stated that they would quote
``comply with the law.'' General Berger, can you please remove the
ambiguity and tell us whether you agree that the current law requires
Marine basic training integrated at the platoon level, in ways that
mirror the other services' training, and what your plans are to
implement these changes?
General Berger. The Marine Corps fully understands the language and
intent of the current law, established in the FY20 NDAA provision,
stating that Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) Parris Island and MCRD
San Diego shall not be segregated within five and eight years
respectively. We are taking a proactive approach to comply with the
FY20 NDAA provision and all relevant laws regarding gender integration
at entry-level training, without compromising our proven standards-
based model. Our current infrastructure at both San Diego and Parris
Island is a major limiting factor to further gender integration at
recruit training. As such, I directed the initiation of a conceptual
planning effort to better understand the merits of a consolidated
recruit training facility. As these long-term planning efforts mature,
I will provide you and Congress with routine updates. Beyond these
long-term planning efforts, I am pleased to report that the Marine
Corps trained its first integrated company of entry-level recruits in
2019, comprised of five male platoons and one female platoon, at Marine
Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) Parris Island. This year, MCRD Parris Island
has already graduated four integrated companies, with four more
currently in training and set to graduate by end of May 2020. Moving
forward in the short-term, the Marine Corps is exploring the
feasibility of making this a standard training model for integrated
recruit training, and will provide you and the committee with our final
conclusions and recommendations. The Marine Corps also employs female
drill instructors and officers at the company and battalion level to
train and supervise both male and female recruits. This female
leadership, at both MCRD Parris Island and MCRD San Diego, participates
in the majority of training, to include physical fitness, martial arts,
water survival, and academics. This provides recruits an important and
early opportunity to observe Marine leaders of both genders throughout
entry level training. Graduation requirements are exactly the same for
all recruits. Platoons train together, conducting the same scheduled
events on the same training day and in the same location when
logistically supportable. This includes ``the Crucible'' as the
culminating event to earn the title `Marine'. Additionally, in November
2017, the Marine Corps implemented a fully integrated fourth phase of
instruction in recruit training at both MCRDs. This training focuses on
the ``6 Fs'' of the Marine Corps Leadership Development Model:
Fidelity, Fighter, Fitness, Family, Finances, and Future. The goal is
to develop maturity and self-discipline in each recruit so that they
are better prepared for the challenges in follow-on training and the
Marine Corps. This added phase of integrated training provides both
male and female instructors additional time to mentor recruits.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Would you support or oppose legislation that would amend
10 USC 5062(e) to include the U.S. Coast Guard as a matter of joint
concern to the Navy when developing aircraft, weapons, tactics,
technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service
elements?
Mr. Modly and Admiral Gilday. The Navy would support legislation
that would amend 10 USC 5062(d) to include the U.S. Coast Guard
Mr. Scott. In the Navy's Stem-to-Stern Capability-Based Strategic
Review, will you be looking for savings that could be achieved by
greater partnership with both the U.S. Coast Guard and the Air and
Marine Operations of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to achieve
economy of scale in the purchases of small boats, helicopters, and
unmanned systems?
Mr. Modly. The Department of the Navy's (DON) Stem-to-Stern review
will build on the budget optimization work already done by the Navy and
Marine Corps, integrating those efforts across the entire Department
and taking on the more strategic task of structural change in order to
increase naval capabilities. Nothing is off the table. The Department
is reviewing policy, structure, and legislation to identify low
priority, redundant, or legacy capabilities, programs, processes, or
headquarters functions that can be realigned, eliminated, or reduced to
meet the DON's resource needs.
Mr. Scott. What is the timeline for building a new National Museum
of the U.S. Navy on Tingey Street SE between the Washington Navy Yard
and Nationals Park and when do you intend to announce it?
Mr. Modly and Admiral Gilday. The Navy is seeking to acquire land
on Tingey Street adjacent to the Washington Navy Yard to protect
critical assets within security requirements. It may take three years
or more for the Navy to acquire this property due to the land exchange,
environmental review, zoning, and entitlement processes. The Navy's
preferred compatible use for the land is to serve as a site for a new
National Museum of the United States Navy, and the Naval Historical
Foundation, the 501 C(3) that supports the National Museum of the
United States Navy, has agreed to lead the fundraising effort. Navy
leadership is closely monitoring the progress of these efforts and will
make a formal announcement at the appropriate time.
Mr. Scott. Is naval aviation's adversary training at risk of
irrelevance from equipment obsolescence and lack of long-term
recapitalization? What are the advantages of using third generation and
fourth generation aircraft in an adversary role to prepare for possible
combat against Communist China or Russia?
Mr. Modly and Admiral Gilday. A Western fourth generation aircraft
with highly targeted upgrades can accurately emulate Chinese and/or
Russian fifth generation threats in most scenarios and at a lower cost.
The Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 budget request provides naval aviation with a
bridge solution for keeping our adversary fleet relevant while we begin
the process of long-term recapitalization. The FY 2021 budget requests
funding for upgrades and to extend the service life of our adversary
fleet of F-16s, and upgrades the Swiss F-5s procured in FY 2020.
Furthermore, in 2020, the Navy is conducting an Analysis of
Alternatives for long-term recapitalization to help determine the right
mix of adversary training capability and capacity to continue to
prepare our warfighters for combat with a near-peer competitor.
Mr. Scott. When can we expect you to issue an update of the CNO's
Professional Reading Program?
Admiral Gilday. Target release of CNO Professional Reading Program
5.0 is 4 July 2020. The Naval War College (NWC) developed a matrix of
book titles aligned with CNO's primary lines of effort and stratified
by the experience level of the readers. This document is under review
by key stakeholders within the Naval University System. Accounting for
COVID-19's impact on normal operations, the projected date for CNO/
MCPON review of the final list is 15 May 2020. Assuming approval, NWC
will work through June to prepare the website and purchase the e-books
for delivery to the fleet on 4 July.
Mr. Scott. The Navy's two hospital ships, Mercy and Comfort, are
floating goodwill ambassadors with some of the best medical equipment
in the world. Are there additional ways to partner with the private
sector and the inter-agency to increase the availability and share the
costs of operating both of the hospital ships?
Admiral Gilday. While DOD cannot receive funds to share operating
costs, it does partner with external stakeholders to leverage talent
and accept donations of medical equipment. When hospital ships are
tasked to provide humanitarian or Theater Security Cooperation mission
support, DOD collaborates with partners from the interagency and
private sector to provide solutions. To enable these efforts, USAID
provides a full time liaison officer (LNO) to Military Sealift Command
(MSC) and the combatant commander (CCDR) headquarters to support
civilian military coordination. Navy Medicine also provides a military
medical officer to USAID as an LNO to facilitate discussions that
include hospital ships. As a result, various non-governmental
organizations (such as PROJECT HOPE) are able to offer invaluable
volunteer medical care support that delivers medical diplomacy from
``pediatrics to geriatrics.'' Further, CCDRs, in coordination with MSC,
reach out to other non-federal entities to seek volunteers and
donations, such as wheelchairs for medical missions. DOD appropriated
funding covers operational costs and medical supplies for combat
missions.
Mr. Scott. Marine environmental response is one of the Coast
Guard's 11 statutory missions. Should the Coast Guard should take over
all Federal On-Scene Coordinator Representative (FOSCR) requirements
for the Navy?
Admiral Gilday. No. Under the National Contingency Plan, the Navy
is predesignated as the On-Scene Coordinator for response to the
release of hazardous substances, or oil spill/releases from any
facility or vessel, under its jurisdiction, custody, or control. In the
event the Navy cannot appropriately manage a spill event, the Coast
Guard can provide additional assistance and resources. This current
construct has proved both very effective and efficient in managing
spill response incidents for the Navy for the following reasons: The
Navy has the resources (ships, equipment, personnel, contractors,
etc.), to commit funds or conduct actions to ensure a timely and
effective response capability in managing spill events on Navy property
(both on installations and in port). The Coast Guard does not have the
authority to directly commit Navy funds and assets. The Coast Guard
does not have the personnel or sufficient amount of spill response
equipment to respond to spill incidents outside U.S. jurisdictional
waters, where the Navy has facilities and vessels. The current
construct for spill response is a tested and proven response leadership
structure that has been highly successful for decades. It is strongly
recommended that it not be changed or altered.
Mr. Scott. Are you satisfied with the training received by
intelligence officers on U.S. naval combat capabilities? Can Navy
intelligence officers give commanders sophisticated threat assessments
without a strong foundational knowledge of U.S. military capabilities,
particularly naval ones? Should a robust section on U.S. naval combat
platforms and weapons be included in an information warfare officer's
personnel qualification standard? Should more intelligence officers be
rotated to independent deployments of destroyers and cruisers? Should a
longer mid-career intelligence milestone course (weeks if not months)
be created with rigorous testing, student ranking, and a discussion of
U.S. Navy combat capabilities coupled with Chinese, Russian, North
Korean, and Iranian threats?
Admiral Gilday. Are you satisfied with the training received by
intelligence officers on U.S. naval combat capabilities? Training is
consistently evolving with our capabilities and technology, and is
frequently evaluated for mission relevance and progress. We are fully
committed to recruiting, training, educating and being optimized for
maximum effectiveness. A Training Requirements Review (TRR) for Naval
Intelligence Officers Basic Course is scheduled in May 2020.
Can Navy intelligence officers give commanders sophisticated threat
assessments without a strong foundational knowledge of U.S. military
capabilities, particularly naval ones? Intelligence officers should
strive to be proficient in all aspects of the threat presented and are
consistently expanding their knowledge of Great Power Adversaries. This
should include not only the adversaries' disposition, but also the
expertise brought into the environment by those professionals, both
U.S. and our Coalition counterparts, who hold the foundational
knowledge of naval combat capabilities. This team-of-teams approach
ensures the commander receives the most educated, timely assessment as
possible. The combination of a naval intelligence officer, coupled with
a career surface warfare officer is crucial to information dominance.
Should a robust section on U.S. naval combat platforms and weapons
be included in an information warfare officer's personnel qualification
standard? A PQS review is scheduled for May 2020. This has been
submitted for discussion by fleet subject matter experts.
Should more intelligence officers be rotated to independent
deployments of destroyers and cruisers? A Zero Based Billet review has
been requested for all Officer and Enlisted intelligence billets across
the Fleet. This review will identify if there are any requirements
currently not being met and to ensure distribution of intelligence
cadre to succeed in the GPC. The current rotation of intelligence
officers to Destroyer Squadrons (DESRON) has proven professionally
beneficial, increasing the knowledge and experience of the junior
officers assigned to those units. Historically, these units have been
assigned an enlisted Independent Duty Intelligence Specialist (IDIS).
Should a longer mid-career intelligence milestone course (weeks if
not months) be created with rigorous testing, student ranking, and a
discussion of U.S. Navy combat capabilities coupled with Chinese,
Russian, North Korean, and Iranian threats? Training Requirements
Review (TRR) for Naval Intelligence Afloat Senior Milestone Course
(NIASMC) is scheduled in July 2020. Training is consistently evolving
with our capabilities and technology, and is frequently evaluated for
mission relevance and progress. We are fully committed to recruiting,
training, educating and being optimized for maximum effectiveness.
Mr. Scott. Should the Navy implement more stringent damage control
training and make available more tools and programs to reduce
casualties and improving their damage control skills? Are a couple of
basic firefighting schools enough experience for sailors to save a
ship? One light-off assessment or a ten-minute drill a duty day?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy has implemented stringent damage control
training processes, tools, and programs to reduce casualties and
improve their damage control skills. The Surface Ship Readiness
Strategy, codified in the Surface Forces Training and Readiness Manual,
follows a process that educates, trains, assesses, and certifies a
ship's crew to conduct either integrated or independent operations.
This approach to readiness supports standardization of training and
ensures ships are prepared to accomplish their assigned mission by
building proficiency through repetition of fundamentals, exercised in a
variety of training scenarios that build in complexity. Once watch
teams demonstrate sufficient proficiency, they proceed to the mission
area certification event. Damage Control (DC) mission area
certification requires the completion of not less than 11 discrete
events, both knowledge and tasked based. Post-Basic Phase training,
Sailors are required to conduct 14 DC training events with various
degrees of frequency to ensure skills do not atrophy. These
Certification Exercises (CE) and Recurring Exercises (RE) are contained
in the Surface Force Training and Readiness Exercise Manual. Damage
control mission certification includes an assessment of the ship's
ability to self-train. Commanding officers are responsible and
accountable with ensuring their units remain fully ready and may
institute additional proficiency training including duty day drills as
required. It is common practice for commanding officers to conduct
damage control drills daily, whether in port with the duty section or
underway, which may include full ship participation, i.e. General
Quarters.
Mr. Scott. Dr. Milan Vego defined operational art as the ``theory
and practice of planning, preparing, and executing major naval
operations aimed at accomplishing operational objectives.'' Are Navy
officers introduced to operational art too late in their careers?
Admiral Gilday. Officers are exposed to Operational Art at the
appropriate point in their career progression, after leveraging
cumulative experiential and training opportunities to mature
foundational concepts. An officer's ability to embrace, understand, and
effectively employ Operational Art is underpinned by a well formed
understanding of their primary warfare specialty and associated
tactical operations. This is the main focus of the early part of an
officer's career and is the product of both experiential learning and
the primary level of Professional Military Education (PME) as outlined
in the Officer PME Policy (CJCSI 1800.01). Once firmly grounded in
their Service role at the tactical level (skill, knowledge,
experience), officers transition to the operational level of warfare
and embrace Operational Art in increasing depth. Intermediate PME/JPME,
which occurs at the O-4 (or senior O-3 level in rare cases), builds on
officers' cumulative experiential and training opportunities to provide
them the foundational understanding of Operational Art necessary to
successfully serve on warfighting staffs and progress onto the
strategic level of warfare.
Mr. Scott. What steps are being undertaken to enhance the career
path development and management, mentoring, and education of strategic
sealift officers?
Admiral Gilday. DOD is taking deliberate steps to review and update
the training and development path for Strategic Sealift Officers (SSO),
including designating a Captain (O-6) as the SSO Commodore in October
2019 at Military Sealift Command HQ to lead this effort. For more
effective management, the SSO community is implementing a new Command
and Control (C2) structure that provides more-defined career
opportunities. A robust mentoring program is in place and aligned with
the C2 structure to ensure all members have access to a senior mentor
for career development and guidance. Current training for SSOs includes
a two-week Post Commission Indoctrination (PCI) course for Ensigns (O-
1) and a two-week Middle Level Officer Course (MLOC) for Lieutenants
(O-3) is scheduled to start in June 2020. A two-week Commander's Senior
Level Course is also planned to begin in 2021. These courses are
designed as career milestone check-points, augmented by job-specific
training courses, and include the necessary building blocks for SSO
career development. Further recommendations from the SSO Commodore will
be reviewed and implemented, where appropriate.
Mr. Scott. Prompt pre-hospital intervention is the most important
element in wounded combatant survival. Are you satisfied with the
critical care received by injured/wounded sailors and Marines in far-
forward environments? Does the Navy need a Resuscitation Transportation
Team (RTT) to bring together critical-care doctors and national
registry paramedics?
Admiral Gilday. My priority is to ensure that our warfighters have
access to lifesaving combat casualty care wherever the fight takes us--
at sea or ashore--and we remain committed to enhancing our capabilities
and skills in this vital area. Throughout the past 19 years of war in
Iraq and Afghanistan, Navy and Marine combat casualties had rapid
access to forward resuscitative care resulting in unprecedented combat
survivability. Due to time and distance challenges of Distributed
Maritime Operations (DMO) and Littoral Operations in the Contested
Environment (LOCE) expected in the next fight, the ``Golden Hour'' will
not be guaranteed. Therefore, the Navy is actively studying how all
Roles of Care need to be optimized for maximal survivability in DMO/
LOCE. Currently, the Navy does not have a requirement for a
Resuscitation Transportation Teams (RTT) capability. We are however,
constantly working to decrease combat casualty mortality and morbidity
by implementing advanced trauma capabilities leveraged from both
battlefield lessons learned and our civilian counterparts. Navy
conducted a Requirements Evaluation Team analysis of Navy Expeditionary
Health Services in support of Distributed Maritime Operations. As a
result, Navy Medicine is creating Role 2 Enhanced (R2E) Containerized
and Role 2 Light Maneuver systems that provide modular, scalable, and
mobile forward resuscitation in DMO and LOCE. Navy Medicine is also
creating Enroute Care Systems that mirror the Marine Corps ERC
capability for enhanced movement of patients through the roles of care.
Combinations of these new capabilities are designed to stabilize
patients at or near the point of injury and optimize patient
survivability during transport. Lastly, the Navy is developing a R2E
system payload that converts Expeditionary Fast Transport vessels into
``ambulances'' to transport larger numbers of patients around the
battle space. This platform will act as a connector between Roles of
Care while simultaneously providing damage control resuscitation,
damage control surgery, critical care, and patient holding for extended
periods of time.
Mr. Scott. Should the Navy decommission Fleet Forces Command and
recommission the U.S. Atlantic Fleet?
Admiral Gilday. While disestablishing United States Fleet Forces
Command and establishing an Atlantic Fleet could yield some benefits,
ultimately the effort to do so would be costly and would create
inefficiencies that would not justify the effort. Establishing an
Atlantic Fleet that is aligned in a manner which is similar to the
missions and tasks carried out by United States Pacific Fleet could
simplify the lexicon across the world. However, a reorganization of
this scope ignores the functions that Fleet Forces carries out as a
force generator and provider for the entire U.S. Navy, such as Global
Force Management. If this was not executed by USFF, it would require it
to be performed either by an entirely new staff, or growth in several
staffs at both Pacific and Atlantic fleets to carry out, which is
inefficient and would result in increases in the Navy's top line budget
during a fiscally constrained environment.
Mr. Scott. Prompt pre-hospital intervention is the most important
element in wounded combatant survival. Are you satisfied with the
critical care received by injured/wounded sailors and Marines in far-
forward environments? Does the Navy need a Resuscitation Transportation
Team (RTT) to bring together critical-care doctors and national
registry paramedics?
General Berger. We provide our wounded and injured Marines and
Sailors with excellent critical care in forward deployed environments.
At the same time, we recognize that future operating environments will
be less forgiving, and as a consequence, are seeking ways to enhance
our critical care capabilities. Two decades of joint symposia and
research conclude that Field Medical Service Technicians (FMT) and
flight surgeons assigned to casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) platforms
lack the training required to manage critically injured, wounded or ill
service members in the aviation environment. Analysis of CASEVAC
operations from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom
indicate that 83.3% of combat deaths occurred prior to arrival at a
military treatment facility, with 24.3% of those fatalities considered
``preventable''. These challenges will be even more acute on future
battlefields, which will be characterized by greater dispersion of
forces and longer flight times to military treatment facilities. In
close partnership with Navy, we are working to ensure that appropriate
Marine Corps units are staffed with medical personnel in the right
number, and with the right training, to provide a Resuscitation
Transportation Team (RTT)-like capability. Getting this right will be
essential to providing forward-deployed Marines and Sailors with
critical care capabilities, especially as we prepare for operations
that are more distributed than in past conflicts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. During a full scale mobilization, over 90% of the Army
surge will be carried on Navy surge sealift vessels. Unfortunately, the
average age of these vessels is 45 years. In March 2018, Army indicated
``Without proactive recapitalization of the Organic Surge Sealift
Fleet, the Army will face unacceptable risk in force projection
capability beginning in 2024.'' TRANSCOM recently completed a test of
these vessels and the fleet responded with a 40% mission capable rate
when the requirement is 85%. Is Navy responsible for the surge sealift
fleet? Is a 40% mission capable rate sufficient to meet combatant
commander requirements? What is the impact if Navy does not change the
trajectory of surge sealift accelerating decline? Does Navy have a
comprehensive plan to recapitalize the surge sealift vessels?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, Navy is responsible for the resource
sponsorship of the surge sealift fleet and values the importance of a
credible and ready inter-theater sealift fleet capable of delivering
U.S. fighting forces and equipment in support of COCOM requirements.
Recognizing the current mission capability rate was below the required
85% when tested during the recent Turbo Activation exercise, Navy
included deliberate funding in the President's FY21 Budget submission
for which includes an additional $130.6M for sealift readiness, funding
to purchase two used-ships and the research and development money
necessary to start building a new sealift ship in 2023. Navy's
comprehensive plan to recapitalize the surge sealift fleet is reflected
in the March 2018 Sealift that the Nation Needs report to Congress, to
which we are committed. This report describes Navy's plan to address
low mission-capable rates and reverse the readiness decline.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BYRNE
Mr. Byrne. The President's FY2021 budget request represents a
significant step back from the President's pledge to build a strong
Navy to counter the growing threat from China and Russia. This request
for only seven ships represents a significant blow to the already
fragile defense maritime industrial base. To make the matter more
urgent, the recent reprogramming of ships appropriated in FY2020 puts
even greater stress on the Nation's industrial base and puts at risk
the jobs of thousands of skilled tradesman and thousands of suppliers,
many of them small businesses, located throughout the country. What
consideration of the defense industrial base entered into the
development of the FY2021 shipbuilding budget? What are the likely
impacts of this budget on the shipbuilding industry, particularly the
mid-tier yards and their supplier base?
Mr. Modly. Given the budget topline constraints, the FY 2021 budget
prioritizes a more capable and lethal force over a larger force that
would be less capable, less ready, and less lethal. The FY 2021
submission remains mindful of the need to keep the shipbuilding
industrial base loaded at an effective level that encourages industry
investment in capital improvements and expansion and a properly sized
world-class workforce. The Department is committed to at least 355
ships. To get there, the composition of the fleet needs to change so
that we have fewer large platforms and more small platforms that are
lightly-manned, eventually moving to optionally-manned. The fleet needs
to have certain compositional characteristics, including distributed
awareness, lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and we need to
be much more aggressive in terms of experimenting and prototyping and
then quickly moving to production once we feel confident. A healthy
industrial base, including shipyards and the associated workforce, is
absolutely critical to this effort. With adequate resources, and with
budget predictability and stability, the industrial base has the
capacity and capability to support getting to 355 ships in 10 years.
Mr. Byrne. EPFs are an important component of the Navy's Combat
Logistics Force. These versatile platforms are traditionally used for
troop transport, but their variety of missions are ever increasing. In
the FY20 NDAA, Congress authorized and appropriated money for the Navy
to outfit EPF-14 as a medical variant to supplement our two aging
hospital ships. It is my understanding that the Navy and Marine Corps
are considering other missions for these ships. What other
opportunities are potentially available for EPFs?
Admiral Gilday. Mission requests received from the Navy's numbered
fleet commanders fall into six specific areas: SOF support, SPMAGTF
support, maritime security operations, personnel recovery, theater
security cooperation, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response. No
final configuration decisions have been made.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VELA
Mr. Vela. The capability of the Navy is in high demand around the
world. With threats like China, Russia, and Iran, the Navy's forward
presence is vital to our National Security. In your Stem to Stern memo,
one of the areas you are looking at cutting is the Navy's ``Global
Force Management offerings.'' Does that mean you're going to have the
Navy do less is a world where our ships are critically needed? Do you
have certain capabilities you are looking to cut back on?
Mr. Modly. Reductions to Global Force Management offerings is one
of several areas that the Stem-to-Stern (S2S) review will take a hard
look at, but that work is ongoing and the conclusions are pending
Acting Secretary of the Navy review. The S2S review will also look at
enabling capabilities that can be outsourced and enabling capabilities
that can be consolidated to support an integrated naval force. The
ultimate goal of the S2S is to identify low priority, redundant, or
legacy capabilities, programs, processes, or headquarters functions
that can be realigned, eliminated, or reduced to free up resources for
other strategic and political imperatives, including building a bigger
Navy. This ongoing review is looking across FY 2022-2026 and the
results will be included in the FY 2022 President's Budget.
Mr. Vela. The DOD reprogrammed nearly $1 billion from Ship
Construction to build additional miles of border wall. Last year,
Assistant Secretary Geurts testified to the Senate that these funds
were needed in FY20 to maintain a stable workforce in our industrial
base. What impact will this reprogramming have to our shipbuilding
industry, to include the small businesses that are critical to it?
Mr. Modly. A healthy industrial base, including shipyards and the
associated workforce, is absolutely critical to achieving our goal of a
355-plus ship Navy. With adequate resources, and with budget
predictability and stability, the industrial base has the capacity and
capability to support getting to 355 ships in 10 years. The Navy will
continue our efforts to best support workload stability and the
shipyard's workforce, within our overall budget constraints. In
determining the sources for the reprogramming, the Department of
Defense used a deliberate and objective approach to select sources for
the reprogramming. The funds were sourced from FY 2020 dollars that
were considered to be either early or excess to need, particularly if
not requested in the FY 2020 President's Budget.
Mr. Vela. The T-45 Goshawk has been in service since the early
1990s as a trainer for future jet pilots. It has been brought to my
attention that the Rolls Royce engines have a risk of catastrophic
failure and have been limited in their operating hours. With a new
training jet years away, what is the Navy's plan to address this
problem, and what can Congress do to help you?
Admiral Gilday. In response to the T-45 Rolls-Royce Low Pressure
Turbine (LPT) engine blade failures in October and November 2019, the
Navy has limited the operating hours on the blades to 800 flight hours.
The Navy and Rolls-Royce are aggressively increasing depot capacity to
provide and sustain at least 100 engines by the end of April 2020,
which will meet training needs. The Navy and Rolls-Royce are conducting
an investigation, scheduled to complete this spring, to determine the
root cause of the LPT engine blade failures. The Navy is assessing
alternatives if the investigation determines the LPT blade operating
life must remain at 800 flight hours.
Mr. Vela. You have said that LCS 1-4 can no longer have a purpose
in our Navy. Why decommission LCS 3 and 4, when they were not R&D
ships? A month ago Admiral Faller testified to the Senate about the
enormous value that LCS platforms played in Southern Command. Couldn't
these four ships, while not having the anti-submarine or air defense
capabilities still play a vital role in maritime security operations in
the region?
Admiral Gilday. While LCS 3 and 4 are not R&D ships, they were
transition to production ships that still differ significantly from the
Block Buy configured ships (LCS 5/6 and follow) that are the true
beginning of the class. Decommissioning them makes resources available
for prioritized Navy investments in a Great Power Competition
environment. LCS that deployed to the Southern Command area of
operations in 2019 were Block Buy, deployment-configured ships, and
future LCS deployments to the region by similarly-configured ships are
already being planned. Even without a mission package assigned, LCS 1-4
would still require significant modernization and modifications to
deploy to that region.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Modly, you recently argued that future
ships should include quality of life improvements for our sailors. I
completely agree. What actions are you taking to ensure we improve our
habitability requirements for all future ships?
Mr. Modly. CNIC Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Deployed
Fitness System (DFS) relies heavily on the guidance provided in each
class of ship's ``Habitability Manual.'' These manuals drive the amount
of space each ship/submarine has for fitness equipment, recreation
equipment, and storage for shipboard MWR Afloat Recreation Programs.
There are currently 14 classes of fitness and recreation ``Afloat
Standards'' that CNIC MWR DFS uses to fund and outfit ships/submarines
with equipment. CNIC HQ centrally funds this equipment with
distribution occurring at the ship's/submarine's homeport. In addition,
CNIC instructs shipboard active duty recreation services officers,
recreation fund custodians, and the HQ civilian employees, CNIC Afloat
Specialists, who are assigned to 20 ships as a Fun Boss or Fit Boss, in
the proper administration of their afloat recreation programs and
funds. Some vessels have ship's stores whose earnings support crew
recreation. For ships/submarines without ship's stores or whose stores
are closed because the vessel is in the yard, CNIC MWR DFS issues
nonappropriated fund grants to support crew recreation. Actions being
taken include continual review of the latest in fitness equipment
trends and expanded training in Navy Fitness courses to Fit Bosses and
shipboard Command Fitness Leaders, primarily through the Navy
Operational Fitness and Fueling System program. Fitness equipment
includes cardio-bikes, treadmills, rowers, versa climbers, elliptical
trainers, and most recently a new fast attack submarine treadmill under
contract. Strength equipment includes adjustable weight stack machines,
plate loaded machines, free weights, dumbbells, kettle bells, and more.
In addition, CNIC MWR DFS continues to recruit the best possible
candidates to become a Fun/Fit Boss.
Mr. Gallagher. Admiral Gilday, over the past few years, the Navy
has dedicated considerable resources to improving the operational
availability of the fleet. Yet despite these efforts, we still face
considerable readiness challenges, especially when it comes to day in,
day out readiness.
I believe we must start to do things differently. We need to ensure
that new ships are designed to improve maintainability, including
through their equipment layout, density of equipment, removal routes,
and more. At the same time, we must provide sailors the tools they need
to effectively accomplish needed maintenance when it is required.
How is the Navy ensuring these desired capabilities are receiving
due consideration in its evaluation of future ships, starting with
FFG(X)?
Admiral Gilday. In a direct effort to increase operational
availability, the FFG(X) program directed the use of mature and proven
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) elements in the combat and C4I
systems as well as in key Hull, Mechanical, & Electrical equipment
(HM&E) components. The use of GFE equipment incorporates proven designs
with reliability and performance improvements, existing logistics and
maintenance infrastructure and current fleet knowledge and training
support--this directly contributes to increasing readiness and reducing
fleet maintenance burden. The FFG(X) Program has also ensured that
equipment reliability and maintainability are considered during source
selection evaluation of the FFG(X) design. In accordance with the
FFG(X) solicitation, Offerors are required to describe how reliability
was considered in the design of major systems and component selection
which could lead to lower maintenance burden on sailors. In addition,
the Offerors are required to describe optimization and balancing of
design elements such as maintenance considerations and incorporation of
Integrated Logistics Support. The FFG(X) program specified Reliability
and Maintainability values for critical systems within the technical
requirements, which are then verified during source selection
evaluation. Moreover, as a means to assess total platform readiness,
the FFG(X) program has undertaken a robust modeling and simulation
program. This program creates a ship-level reliability,
maintainability, availability, and life cycle cost model that includes
combat systems, C4I systems, aviation, HM&E systems, and navigation
systems to enable total platform performance assessments. Future uses
for such a model would be to increase readiness through targeted
investments, such as different equipment, additional spares, design
modifications, better training, higher manning, or increased
infrastructure.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CISNEROS
Mr. Cisneros. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what is current
trend of the suicide rate in your respective services and how are you
addressing them?
Admiral Gilday. To address suicide and other destructive behaviors,
the Chief of Naval Operations established the Culture of Excellence, a
Navy-wide framework designed to promote signature healthy behaviors and
enhance warfighting excellence by instilling toughness, trust, and
connectedness in Sailors. Navy is using evidence-based primary
prevention strategies to reduce destructive behaviors through decreased
risk factors, and to promote signature healthy behavior by increasing
protective factors. Preliminary counts of 2019 suicide deaths do not
show an increase from 2018, but in-depth analysis is underway to
determine the rate as compared to previous years in order to track the
Navy's trend across time. Rates are important since counts do not take
into consideration changes in the overall population. Our adjudicated
counts and rates will be published as part of the Department of Defense
Annual Suicide Report in September 2020. Relationships, legal
complications, financial problems, transition periods, and mental
health issues continue to be common stressors in most suicides. As part
of the Culture of Excellence, suicide prevention measures include
increasing embedded mental health providers who deliver direct support
to our warfighters as far forward as possible for early intervention.
We have also placed deployed resiliency counselors, who are civilian
social workers, onboard aircraft carriers and large amphibious ships.
An Expanded Operational Stress Control program was developed in
conjunction with Command Resilience Teams to assist leaders in the use
of chaplains, medical personnel, counselors, and community resources to
build a culture that is supportive of help-seeking behaviors. The
program's goal is to assist Navy leaders to build resilience within
commands and individual Sailors by increasing awareness and
understanding of stress and providing strategies to mitigate
detrimental effects. Navy's vision is to develop an environment in
which all Sailors are trained and motivated to navigate stress, to
assist their shipmates, and, most importantly, to seek help early from
available resources.
Mr. Cisneros. As we've heard from the questions posed by my
colleagues on this committee and your own testimony, now more than
ever, every warship in the inventory counts. We can not afford the cost
in terms of service members' lives, capability and monetary value.
Therefore we must minimize the likelihood of preventable mistakes. A
few weeks ago, the Seapower and Projection Forces and Readiness
Subcommittee heard testimony from VADM Brown regarding the 2017 surface
ship mishaps in the Pacific. As a Navy veteran, I'm concerned about the
Surface Warfare community's status as professional mariners and the
steps the Navy is taking to include Navigation, Seamanship and
Shiphandling (NSS) assessments at all milestone levels to ensure
proficiency.
Admiral Gilday, how exactly are these assessments performed? Are
they completed virtually on simulators or are any performed at sea? Who
are the assessors and how can we assure their impartiality?
Admiral Gilday. As codified within the Surface Warfare Career
Manual (COMNAVSURFORINST 1412.7, 16DEC19), the Surface Warfare Officer
(SWO) training and assessment continuum involves a series of 10
Navigation, Seamanship, and Shiphandling (NSS) assessments spanning all
milestones across the SWO career path. Such ensures the development,
assessment, and sustainment of NSS proficiency. These assessments span
Ensign to Captain ranks and Division to Major Command career
milestones, and ensure SWOs bear the requisite skills to safely and
effectively handle their ships and manage watch teams in a variety of
environments. The 10 assessments involve 3 Competency Checks conducted
by the Surface Warfare Schools Command (SWSC), 3 evaluations conducted
by Commanding Officers and ISICs, and 4 x Go/No Go Assessments
conducted by the SWSC. Both the Assessments and Competency Checks
conducted by SWSC are executed by senior post-command assessors
(military Captains/Commanders and licensed civilian Master Mariners) in
high fidelity ship-handling simulators. Evaluations conducted by
Commanding Officers and ISICs are executed at sea and in high-fidelity
ship handling simulators across the Fleet Concentration Areas. SWSC has
a formal process for training and qualifying assessors. SWSC personnel
use standardized checklists in the execution of Competency Checks and/
or assessments at all milestone levels. In the case of Go/No Go
Assessments for Prospective Commanding Officers and Prospective Major
Commanders, at least two assessments are conducted, and two different
assessors are utilized.
Mr. Cisneros. Admiral Gilday, can you provide an update on the
sailors that were aboard the Fitzgerald and the McCain? How are they
being monitored?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy is committed to ensuring that all Sailors
have access to local mental health facilities and frequent
opportunities to request additional support, as desired. The Navy
Personnel Command has a formal process to monitor the status and career
progression, for the USS FITZGERALD (FTZ) & JOHN S. McCAIN (JSM)
Service Members (SVM), who were onboard during the 2017 incidents. This
process is overseen by the Personnel Management Department (Pers-4),
and for enlisted personnel, utilizes a unique Navy Enlisted Code (NEC)
to identify and track these sailors. FTZ/JSM officers comprise a much
smaller cohort, and bear individual tracking by the Surface Warfare
Officer Assignments Branch (Pers-41). The Bureau of Medicine (BUMED)
uses the enlisted NEC and PERS-41 officer data to ensure mental health
services are available to these Sailors. The Organizational Incident
Operational Nexus Trauma Tracker (ORION) program, Periodic Health
Assessment (PHA) Survey, and Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA)
are independent mechanisms, that each allow for intrusive engagement
from mental health providers to assess, monitor and facilitate their
mental health status and care. Created after the 2017 incidents, ORION
provides targeted mental health outreach and caring contacts to
affected SVMs. Sailors were initially contacted via phone and email
regarding their need for care and the accessibility thereof. 100% were
contacted and 62% responded. Of that percentage, 20% sought mental
health care. The PHA includes a Mental Health Assessment. Such provides
an annual inquiry regarding mental health symptoms and the need for
care. If the SVM answers affirmatively to having difficulty, care is
coordinated immediately. SVMs returning from deployment, are required
to complete a PDHA within 30 days of returning from deployment, and
Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) within 90-180 days from
deployment. Both assess mental health or any psychological issues. In
addition to PHA/PDHA, all SVMs who self-refer receive immediate mental
health specialty services. Options include: Primary Care Mental Health
provider (Integrated Behavioral Health Consultant), the Mental Health
Department, the Fleet and Family Support Center, Military One Source
and Military Family Life Counselors. In summary, 100% of the affected
FTZ/JSM SVMs were evaluated by a psychologist and provided the
necessary mental health services. Significant oversight of the SVMs'
mental and physical health, was conducted immediately following and
throughout the first year following the collisions. The annual PHA and
the PDHA processes are enduring tools by which Navy can monitor these
SVMs, and ensure their access to all required/desired mental health
services.
Mr. Cisneros. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, what is current
trend of the suicide rate in your respective services and how are you
addressing them?
General Berger. The number of Marines that have died by suicide in
Calendar Year (CY) 2020 year-to-date is 8 for the Active component and
2 for the Reserve Component. The Marine Corps saw the highest rates of
suicide in CY2018. Although the suicide rate for CY2019 has not been
released by the Defense Suicide Prevention Office, we anticipate the
rate for CY2019 will be notably lower than in CY2018. While no one
intervention can be credited with a reduction in deaths by suicide, the
Marine Corps approaches suicide prevention by using every resource
available to promote and apply the leadership functions of Strengthen,
Mitigate, Identify, Treat, and Reintegrate, which allow Commanders to
increase individual and unit readiness.
Strengthen: No matter the level of resilience a young man or woman
has when he or she becomes a Marine, it is our intent to enhance
individual resilience by strengthening the ability to respond to stress
in a healthy manner.
Mitigate: While being a Marine is inherently dangerous, our
commanders are trained to mitigate unnecessary stressors by enhancing
the tools a Marine has to deal with the stressors of life.
Identify and Treat: All Marines are trained annually to identify
fellow Marines who might be having difficulties handling stress.
Marines learn to ask the tough questions and, if needed, refer one
another to higher levels of support. This support may be in the form of
mental health treatment or other resources provided to our commanders
at the unit and installation levels.
Reintegrate: Commanders have the tools and training to care for a
Marine throughout the spectrum of mental health response to include
reintegration. As is the case with medical or physical injury, care is
taken to get each Marine back in the fight as soon as appropriate,
thereby increasing the readiness of our Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps' current suicide prevention initiatives include:
Unit Marine Awareness and Prevention Integrated Training (UMAPIT):
updated for CY20, UMAPIT (pronounced YOU-MAP-IT) teaches every Marine
the basics of suicide prevention, normalizes life changes, and
emphasizes seeking help early in hopes of decreasing stigma. Research
on social media and suicide is also included, as well as suicide
safeguards. Survey results indicate this training is effective at
increasing overall behavioral health knowledge, knowledge of where to
refer Marines, likelihood of making Behavioral Health referrals, belief
that it is socially acceptable to discuss suicide, and belief that
suicide can be prevented.
Combat And Operational Stress Control (COSC): COSC initiatives
promote prevention, intervention, protection and crisis response for
stress reactions at the unit level. Operational Stress Control and
Readiness (OSCAR) team training is one such COSC initiative and was
updated for CY20. This training builds teams of selected Marines and
unit leaders as well as medical and religious personnel who work
together to act as sensors for the commanders by noticing small changes
in behavior and taking action early. OSCAR teams support the commander
in building unit strength, resilience, and readiness. The Marine-led
training teaches team members to help Marines face everyday stressors
before they become overwhelming. OSCAR team members use their
leadership skills and knowledge of the full spectrum of stress
reactions to break stigma and intervene when Marines show signs of
stress, including suicidal ideations.
Behavioral Health Non-Medical Counseling: Non-medical counseling
services are available to Marines to augment a Commander's efforts to
teach and strengthen coping skills, mitigate stressors, and identify
Marines in crisis, and/or at risk for suicide.
Marine Intercept Program (MIP): MIP is a targeted intervention that
expands follow-on care for Marines who have attempted suicide or have
had a suicide ideation. MIP provides follow-up contacts by telephone or
in person, safety planning, and suicide risk assessment as well as
coordination with the Marine's commander.
Death by Suicide Review Board (DSRB): DSRB analyzes all deaths by
suicide to provide strategic and operational recommendations that
address multiple Marine Corps suicide prevention goals. Recommendations
from DSRB help commanders at all levels to understand the risks of
suicide and improve prevention initiatives.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL
Ms. Sherrill. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, I'd like to echo
my colleague Ranking Member Thornberry's concerns about the
Department's recent reprogramming action. I agree with you that
reprogramming is ``unhelpful,'' especially in contrast to the
Department's stated priorities of modernization and readiness.
I'd like to focus in on the P-8 program. The validated warfighter
requirement is 138 P-8s. In Fiscal Year 2020, the Navy requested only
six aircraft, which would have brought the total to 117. Congress, in
response to the Navy's unfunded priority list, allocated nine P-8s,
which would have brought the total number of aircraft to 120, still far
below the warfighter's requirement.
This year, the Navy requested zero new P-8s after the Department
reprogrammed one aircraft, leaving the Navy with a P-8 fleet of only
119 aircraft.
How does this request and reprogramming action reflect the
validated warfighter requirement of 138 aircraft? Why did the Navy
decline to request enough aircraft to meet the warfighter's need?
I have particular concerns about this program because of a
projected ``drop-dead'' date for the production line of December 1,
2020. Are you aware that the P-8 is produced on an older 737 production
line that will not be restarted once it shuts down? Has the risk of a
production line shutdown factored into your budgeting decisions for
this fiscal year?
Admiral Gilday, Secretary Modly, as you know, the P-8 is a premier
anti-submarine aircraft. We are seeing the highest levels of Russian
submarine activity since the Cold War and indications that China is
investing heavily in its submarine force. How does requesting P-8
procurement below the level required by the warfighter and
reprogramming further aircraft support the great power competition
priorities of the National Defense Strategy?
Mr. Modly and Admiral Gilday. With the additional P-8As added by
the Congress in the FY 2020 appropriations law, the Navy plans to begin
transition of reserve personnel, located at Naval Air Station (NAS)
Jacksonville, FL, into the P-8A starting in FY 2023. VP-62 will retire
their legacy P-3C aircraft and begin training at the Fleet Replacement
Squadron collocated at NAS Jacksonville. The co-location of the FRS
(VP-30) with its simulators, operational flight trainers/labs, support
equipment, embedded logistics, supply chains, and adequate ramp space,
makes VP-62 the ideal choice to transition to the P-8A first. This
transition would occur via the same classroom and simulator-training
syllabi completed by the active duty squadrons. Due to higher budgetary
priorities, the Navy was unable to fund P-8As in the President's FY
2021 request. A full Reserve squadron transition of both VP-62 and VP-
69 from the P-3C to the P-8A would require additional aircraft. The two
reserve P-8A aircraft currently apportioned are insufficient to
transition a single squadron. With ten additional P-8A aircraft, the
Navy Reserve could fully transition VP-62 in FY 2023 and VP-69 in FY
2024.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
Mr. Bergman. Naval and Marine Corps rotary aircraft must be
sufficiently manned and adequately equipped to defeat enemy threats.
How confident are you in the safety of the rotary fleet? Are these
aircraft adequately equipped with infrared countermeasure capability to
detect and defeat heat seeking missiles? Is further investment needed
to ensure the readiness of the rotary fleet?
General Berger. Protection against today's infrared heat seeking
missiles requires continuous upgrades within our aircraft survivability
equipment (ASE) programs, coupled with an aggressive fielding approach.
The AAQ-24 DON LAIRCM (Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure) is
installed on 82 CH-53Es, 48 MV-22s and 10 KC-130J. The AAQ-45 DAIRCM
(Distributed Aperture Infrared Countermeasure) will be installed on 16
UH-1Ys and 20 AH-1Zs. Such systems are significantly better at
detecting all threat types in complex environments and at longer
ranges. . The majority of information about ASE and the threats it
defeats is classified. We will be happy to provide a classified
briefing at your convenience.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. One of the only U.S. Navy aircraft dedicated to anti-
submarine warfare is the P-8A Poseidon. In Florida, one of our Reserve
squadrons at Naval Air Station Jacksonville is dedicated to the anti-
submarine warfare mission, but its legacy P-3 aircraft are so old that
the Chief of Navy Reserve has testified that it will decommission
without new P-8 Poseidon aircraft.
How can Congress help you recapitalize the Reserve squadrons with
P-8s--particularly the one at NAS Jacksonville, FL--so that we don't
lose that critical mission?
Mr. Modly and Admiral Gilday. With the additional P-8As added by
the Congress in the FY 2020 appropriations law, the Navy plans to begin
transition of reserve personnel, located at Naval Air Station (NAS)
Jacksonville, FL, into the P-8A starting in FY 2023. VP-62 will retire
their legacy P-3C aircraft and begin training at the Fleet Replacement
Squadron collocated at NAS Jacksonville. The co-location of the FRS
(VP-30) with its simulators, operational flight trainers/labs, support
equipment, embedded logistics, supply chains, and adequate ramp space,
makes VP-62 the ideal choice to transition to the P-8A first. This
transition would occur via the same classroom and simulator-training
syllabi completed by the active duty squadrons. Due to higher budgetary
priorities, the Navy was unable to fund P-8As in the President's FY
2021 request. A full Reserve squadron transition of both VP-62 and VP-
69 from the P-3C to the P-8A would require additional aircraft. The two
reserve P-8A aircraft currently apportioned are insufficient to
transition a single squadron. With ten additional P-8A aircraft, the
Navy Reserve could fully transition VP-62 in FY 2023 and VP-69 in FY
2024.
Mr. Waltz. I support the Navy's need for sonobuoys and want to
assure we authorize exactly what's needed. It's my understanding that
the Navy is using large numbers of all types of sonobuoys in dealing
with the out of area deployers.
In the Navy's unfunded priorities list, you request $49.1 million
to recapitalize the SSQ-125A sonobuoys. Can you explain why you are
seeking to recapitalize a sonobuoy that is not in production versus
replenishing?
Admiral Gilday. The SSQ-125A sonobuoy is currently in production.
Navy awarded a five-year production contract for the procurement of
SSQ-125A sonobuoy in July 2019. The Navy continues to use all types of
sonobuoys in dealing with Out-of-Area deployers. PMA-264 annually
optimizes the required inventory of sonobuoys across all types, driven
by Fleet utilization and cost per unit to drive best value to the
Government. The PB21 UPL requests funding to build inventory of the
SSQ-125A and to give more flexibility to how we apply the remaining
base budget to procure the other sonobuoy types. Additionally, the
program office closely manages the inventory of SSQ-125 sonobuoys to
ensure no break in capability to the Fleet until the SSQ-125A inventory
and associated platform operational software update is in place.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
Mr. Golden. In written testimony as part of his Senate confirmation
hearing, General Berger stated:
Question: In February 2018, the Secretary of Defense established
the Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF)--a cross-functional task
force charged to ``strengthen the . . . lethality, survivability,
resiliency, and readiness'' of U.S. squad-level infantry formations to
``ensure close combat overmatch against pacing threats.'' Will you
commit that, if you are confirmed, the Marine Corps will continue to
support the CCLTF, ensuring that it is properly resourced for mission
accomplishment?
If confirmed, I would continue the Corps' support for the CCLTF.
The Marine Corps remains fully committed to increasing the lethality
and readiness of our close combat formations. I will ensure the Marine
Corps continues to work closely with the CCLTF as they implement the
Secretary of Defense's intent. The increased resources provided over
the last two years helped us improve readiness at the squad level.
Recently, the Secretary of Defense remarked, ``What we're going to
do, probably, is transition it [CCLTF] to the Army because something
like that needs a strong foundation of backbone upon which its ideas
can then filter out.''
Does the Marine Corps need to continue to work closely with the
CCLTF and should the Marine Corps continue to be a part of the CCLTF?
General Berger. The Marine Corps does need to continue to work
closely with the CCLTF and will continue to do so. The Marine Corps
continues to support CCLTF and Army planners as they mature plans to
transition the task force to the Department of the Army. The Marine
Corps' exact role and relationship with the CCLTF, once it is fully
incorporated into the Department of the Army, will be determined as
details of the transition are solidified. The Marine Corps fully
intends to support the efforts of this critical task force and will
continue to evaluate the best means to do so. The readiness and
lethality of Marine close combat units remains an institutional
priority.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TRAHAN
Ms. Trahan. Hearing loss is a major concern for the Navy and the
Marine Corps. Sailors often work on vessels or in shipyards with
constant high-level noise and marines operate loud artillery. According
to the 2018-2019 disability claims data, the top two most common VA
disability claims are tinnitus and hearing loss, respectively.
What kind of hearing protection measures is the Navy adopting to
protect sailors during combat and training?
Admiral Gilday. The preferred methodology for mitigating hazardous
occupational noise in combat and training environments is to eliminate
the need for hearing protection by reducing the magnitude of the noise
source. The Navy is currently conducting pilot programs with the goal
of reducing source noise in certain generational systems of record by 3
decibels. This target is significant in that achieving such a goal
would double the amount of time a service member could safely work in a
specific environment. Hearing protection devices are the second option
to reduce hazardous noise exposure. A robust inventory, with new
products routinely introduced, of passive, active, and noise mitigating
devices are routinely used in the Department of Navy. Studies are
underway for test protocols for fit-testing and effectiveness, which
will be used at basic training for all recruits and for personnel with
a decrease in hearing identified during annual testing. This effort
will ensure our Sailors are adequately fit with proper hearing
protection and fully trained on how to use the devices effectively.
Ms. Trahan. Hearing loss is a major concern for the Navy and the
Marine Corps. Sailors often work on vessels or in shipyards with
constant high-level noise and marines operate loud artillery. According
to the 2018-2019 disability claims data, the top two most common VA
disability claims are tinnitus and hearing loss, respectively.
What kind of hearing protection measures is the Marine Corps
adopting to protect marines during combat and training?
General Berger. For the majority of Marines, local commanders
across the Marine Corps use operation and maintenance funds to procure
various types of hearing safety devices for both combat and training.
For those Marines that require additional equipment, the Marine Corps
Systems Command, which is the acquisition command of the Marine Corps,
procures additional hearing devices for protection and increased
lethality. Following a congressional increase of $5 million for fiscal
year (FY) 2019, Marine Corps Systems Command procured approximately
5,500 Hearing Enhancement Devices in the fourth quarter of FY 2019. The
devices were fielded to artillery and reconnaissance Marines in the
first quarter of FY 2020. Hearing Enhancement Devices offer a
combination of enhanced hearing capability to increase detectability of
soft sounds through the use of volume control, as well as hearing
protection from excessive noise through electronic compression of sound
to a non-hazardous level. For FY 2020, Marine Corps Systems Command
received a $10 million congressional increase for hearing devices.
Marine Corps Systems Command intends to conduct a full and open
competition and award a contract in the fourth quarter of FY 2020 for
approximately 11,000 Hearing Enhancement Devices. The challenge for
operational Marine Corps units remain that we must balance noise
cancellation with the need for Marines to hear commands. An artillery
Marine, for example, must hear commands from their team chief in order
to be effective and safe. We will continue to seek solutions, which
bridge this difficult challenge.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRINDISI
Mr. Brindisi. Admiral Gilday, I note with disappointment that the
Navy did not include any funding in the FY21 budget for another HELIOS-
Integrated High Energy Laser weapons system shipset. However, I am
pleased that you did include funding for it in your unfunded priorities
list. Can you tell me, where does directed energy stand in your overall
priorities and if it is high on that list, why was there no funding in
the budget or in the FYDP?
Admiral Gilday. Navy is all in on Directed Energy. We must have
directed energy as part of our layered defenses for surface platforms.
All of our investments are focused on delivering area and self-defense
against anti-ship cruise missiles and lesser threats as part of the
Surface Navy Laser Weapon System Increment 2 (SNLWS Inc 2) in the mid-
2020s. SNLWS Inc 1 (also known as HELIOS) is the first high energy
laser installed on a DDG and integrated into the Aegis Combat System.
It will inform development of future SNLWS requirements and grow Navy
laser operational concepts and tactics. However, SNLWS Inc 1 is not the
desired end state. Navy made the decision to field a limited number of
operational lasers to learn what we can at that power level, while
simultaneously investing in the development of underlying technologies
that are required for Increment 2, namely OSD's High Energy Laser
Scaling Initiative (HELSI) and ONR's High Energy Laser C-ASCM Project
(HELCAP). Those two high-leverage projects are funded in PB21 and will
develop technologies and the industrial base required to build a 300-
500kW laser in the mid-2020s.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRAVES
Mr. Graves. With the ``group of systems'' approach for the MUX/
Advanced Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System, is the 22.5M$ budget
request actually sufficient to provide for the testing and development
required, particularly as it relates to MQ-9 and near-term
capabilities? Would it be beneficial to increase funding beyond the
unfunded request for $6 million in order to fully test and develop the
new MQ-9B as a prototype for the MUX family of systems?
Mr. Modly. The Marine Corps will focus on a medium-altitude, long-
endurance solution as the first capability for the Marine Air/Ground
Task Force, Expeditionary (MUX) family of unmanned airborne systems.
Development of a competitive acquisition is being pursued to allow
industry to provide the best value at an acceptable cost to the
taxpayer. Additional funding above the budgeted $22.5 million would
allow for acceleration of the system's development once a capability
has been selected. The $6 million unfunded request mentioned is a
separate request for a training system to complement the ongoing Marine
Corps MQ-9A procurement.
Mr. Graves. With the ``group of systems'' approach for the MUX/
Advanced Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System, is the 22.5M$ budget
request actually sufficient to provide for the testing and development
required, particularly as it relates to MQ-9 and near-term
capabilities? Would it be beneficial to increase funding beyond the
unfunded request for $6 million in order to fully test and develop the
new MQ-9B as a prototype for the MUX family of systems?
General Berger. The Marine Corps will focus on a medium altitude,
long endurance (MALE) solution as the first capability for the Marine
Air/Ground Task Force, Expeditionary (MUX) family of unmanned airborne
systems (FoUAS). Development of a competition will allow industry to
provide the best value at an acceptable cost to the tax payer.
Additional funding above the budgeted $22.5M would allow for
acceleration of the system's development once a capability has been
selected this summer. The USMC desires to field a capability in CY23/
FY24. The referenced $6M request is a separate unfunded request for a
simulator training system to complement the ongoing procurement of 2 x
MQ-9A aircraft currently deployed.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Mr. Bishop. Admiral Gilday and General Berger--shortfalls
associated with procurement of the Naval Strike Missile were prominent
on the FY21 Unfunded Priorities Lists released last week. Do you agree
that these unfunded requests would significantly enhance the lethality
of the fleet, and support the deployment of the first Marine Corps
Ground-based Anti-Ship battery?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, additional Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) would
enhance the lethality of the fleet. The NSM funding on the Navy's FY21
Unfunded Priorities List supports shipfill requirements for seven
Littoral Combat Ships equipped with NSM systems. Additional missiles
prevent the need for in-theater ordnance offload and transfers.
Mr. Bishop. Admiral Gilday, I welcome the significant investment in
the Tomahawk program in this year's budget request. However, I am
concerned about the lack of certainty beyond this year for continued
procurement, even as Congress has supported investments to modernize
the production lines for the program. Understanding that the Navy is
now completing analysis to determine what the future-year production
profile looks like, can you please advise the committee on what factors
are being considered and when the service will be able to advise on
recommendations for future production?
Admiral Gilday. Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (OSD(CAPE)) are conducting a
weapon inventory analysis, to include the evaluation of potential
future Tomahawk procurements. This analysis will help inform, among
other things, the proper mix of defensive and offensive weapons from
both surface and sub-surface platforms. Initial study findings are
estimated to be complete in the mid-summer 2020 timeframe. This study
schedule will enable Navy to inform the pending POM-22 budget submit.
Study results will also inform the annual update to the Naval Munitions
Requirements Process (NMRP) which determines Navy's overall Total
Munitions Requirements (TMR). NMRP takes into account Department-wide
priorities and fiscal constraints that enables Navy to prioritize and
balance the overarching weapons procurement plan to minimize TMR
shortfalls across the Navy's entire weapons portfolio. The key TMR
factors we take into account include: Fleet OPLAN munitions
requirements, peacetime ship fill requirements, training requirements
and post-engagement reload requirements. When making these decisions,
Navy is also informed by defense industrial base production
capabilities, capacity and sustainability.
Mr. Bishop. Admiral Gilday and General Berger--shortfalls
associated with procurement of the Naval Strike Missile were prominent
on the FY21 Unfunded Priorities Lists released last week. Do you agree
that these unfunded requests would significantly enhance the lethality
of the fleet, and support the deployment of the first Marine Corps
Ground-based Anti-Ship battery?
General Berger. Yes, the Marine Corps' unfunded request for 36
Naval Strike Missiles will allow the Marine Corps to build required
capacity for the Ground-Based Anti-Ship Missile (GBASM) capability one
year earlier than planned, moving this capability from FY23 to FY22.
The Marine Corps' highest ground modernization priority, the GBASM
capability, will provide anti-ship fires from land as part of an
integrated Naval Anti-Surface Warfare campaign. This forward-deployed
and survivable capability will enhance the lethality of our naval
forces and will help to deny our adversaries the use of key maritime
terrain. The Marine Corps' GBASM solution is the Navy Marine
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), consisting of an
unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle-based mobile launch platform,
called the Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires, and
Naval Strike Missiles. The Naval Strike Missile is identical to the
Navy's Over the Horizon Weapon System deployed on the Littoral Combat
Ship and will provide the Marine Corps with a missile capable of sea-
skimming, high-g maneuverability, and the ability to engage targets
from the side, rather than top-down. This maximizes lethality and
missile survivability. The first test of NMESIS took place in December
2019 and successfully fired an inert round. A second live-fire
demonstration with a guided Naval Strike Missile is planned for June
2020.
Mr. Bishop. General Berger--In the House Report accompanying of the
FY20 NDAA the committee designated the rifle accessory control unit
(RACU) as an item of special interest. The committee stated that it
expects the Marine Corps to complete the phase 2 evaluation and,
subject to a successful evaluation, expects the capability to result in
a validated requirement. The Marines began testing and evaluation of
this technology in FY2016. Because of the funding lags that threaten
the viability of small technology companies, I am concerned about the
inordinate amount of time it has taken to get to this point and equally
concerned about the potential for continued delay. What is the USMC
doing to assure that this item of special interest moves forward onto a
rapid acquisition strategy?
General Berger. The Marine Corps is not pursuing a rapid
acquisition strategy for the Rifle Accessory Control Unit (RACU), as
the Marine Corps does not have a requirement for the RACU. The majority
of close-combat Marines are not equipped with a radio and have only one
weapon accessory to be controlled; an additional accessory adds
unnecessary weight and does not increase lethality. There are no
current plans to create a new requirement specific to this item.
Moreover, the environmental testing and report for the RACU is
complete. Twelve environmental tests were conducted on three RACU
variants. All three RACU variants failed Immersion testing and either
failed or sustained damage in the Operational Drop test. A copy of the
environmental test plan and final report are being provided to KORD
Defense.
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