[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                     PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS AND
                       PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY:
                          IS VA DOING ITS JOB?

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2019

                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-41

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs
       
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                    Available via http://govinfo.gov
                    
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                     COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

                   MARK TAKANO, California, Chairman

JULIA BROWNLEY, California           DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee, Ranking 
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York               Member
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania, Vice-      GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    Chairman                         AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 
MIKE LEVIN, California                   American Samoa
MAX ROSE, New York                   MIKE BOST, Illinois
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire          NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia            JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
SUSIE LEE, Nevada                    JIM BANKS, Indiana
JOE CUNNINGHAM, South Carolina       ANDY BARR, Kentucky
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, JR.,           DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania
    California                       STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota        CHIP ROY, Texas
GREGORIO KILILI CAMACHO SABLAN,      W. GREGORY STEUBE, Florida
    Northern Mariana Islands
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York

                 Ray Kelley, Democratic Staff Director
                 Jon Towers, Republican Staff Director

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

                 CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire, Chairman

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York           JACK BERGMAN, Michigan, Ranking 
MAX ROSE, New York                       Member
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, JR.,           AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 
    California                           American Samoa
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota        MIKE BOST, Illinois
                                     CHIP ROY, Texas

Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public 
hearing records of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs are also 
published in electronic form. The printed hearing record remains the 
official version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare 
both printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process 
of converting between various electronic formats may introduce 
unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the 
current publication process and should diminish as the process is 
further refined.
                         
                         
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              

                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2019

                                                                   Page

                           OPENING STATEMENTS

Honorable Chris Pappas, Chairman.................................     1
Honorable Jack Bergman, Ranking Member...........................     2

                               WITNESSES

Dr. Tamara Bonzanto, Assistant Secretary for Accountability and 
  Whistleblower Protection, U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs...     4
The Honorable Michael Missal, Inspector General, U.S. Department 
  of Veteran Affairs.............................................     5

                                APPENDIX
                     Prepared Statements of Witness

Dr. Tamara Bonzanto Prepared Statement...........................    25
The Honorable Michael Missal Prepared Statement..................    30

 
        PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS AND PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY:.
                          IS VA DOING ITS JOB?

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2019

              U.S. House of Representatives
        Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation
                             Committee on Veterans' Affairs
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20p.m., in 
room 210, House Visitors Center, Hon. Chris Pappas (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Representatives Pappas, Rice, Rose, Cisneros, 
Bergman, and Bost.
    Also present: Representative Takano.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRIS PAPPAS, CHAIRMAN

    Mr. Pappas. Today's hearing will come to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess at any time.
    I ask unanimous consent for our colleague Representative 
Biggs to participate in today's hearing, should he be able to 
attend, and, without objection, so ordered.
    I would also like to welcome our Full Committee chairman, 
Mark Takano, who is with us here today too.
    Today's Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee hearing is 
entitled ``Protecting Whistleblowers and Promoting 
Accountability: Is VA Doing Its Job?''
    In June, the subcommittee held a hearing to discuss the 
importance of VA whistleblowers. We heard testimony from people 
inside the VA who raised major questions and concerns about 
critical problems that affect the health and well-being of 
veterans. These witnesses were willing to blow the whistle even 
when it risked their livelihood and their careers. However, all 
three of the VA employees that day testified they are still 
experiencing retaliation as whistleblowers and, unfortunately, 
they are not alone. My office hears from other whistleblowers 
describing similar outrageous stories of retaliation and how 
the VA turns a deaf ear to their plight.
    In July, Assistant Secretary Bonzanto, the top official 
from the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection 
(OAWP), appeared before our subcommittee. I was not satisfied 
with her testimony at the time, and I think it is fair to say 
that the subcommittee members expressed the need for VA to 
change its culture and ensure it is listening to and protecting 
whistleblowers, and that has to be the highest priority.
    Last week, the Inspector General (IG) released its report 
that examined the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection. The IG's findings in this report right here are 
stark and damning, describing a failure by VA to perform basic 
missions and investigating allegations and protecting 
whistleblowers.
    The IG report states that the office floundered in its 
mission to protect whistleblowers. Leaders created an office 
that was, quote, ``sometimes alienating to the very individuals 
it was meant to protect.''
    According to press statements, VA is trying to spin the 
report as simply problems of the past; this is a misreading of 
the IG's report.
    Clearly, the early leaders of OAWP made major missteps. 
However--and this must be clearly stated--the IG also describes 
how major failures continue to this day. The IG report lays out 
22 recommendations for VA and the Office of Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection, 22; all of these recommendations 
remain open. Oddly, the VA has stated publicly that a number of 
these recommendations have been resolved and I do not believe 
this is true, and I hope Mr. Missal will clarify that in his 
testimony.
    I would go further to say this, that this inability to 
admit failure is also part of the problem that we face. The VA 
has not recognized how badly it treats whistleblowers and the 
culture of retaliation that exists.
    On September 30th, I joined the Full Committee chair, Mark 
Takano, in sending a letter to VA, pointing out that OAWP is 
not performing its basic missions for protecting 
whistleblowers. The Secretary is not receiving proposals for 
action that would hold VA leaders accountable, nor is the 
office training VA supervisors about the rights and protections 
of whistleblowers, and this is simply unacceptable.
    I have said this before and it needs to be repeated: 
whistleblowers are an important source of information and they 
can not be ignored. Their rights must be protected, so that 
future whistleblowers will have confidence that their stories 
will be heard and assurance that their allegations will be 
investigated without reprisal.
    So far, the office has not achieved this basic mission. We 
need to have a complete explanation as to how Dr. Bonzanto will 
get the job done. Whistleblowers are waiting and empty promises 
will not do.
    With that, I would like to recognize Ranking Member Bergman 
for 5 minutes for any opening remarks he may have.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF JACK BERGMAN, RANKING MEMBER

    Mr. Bergman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to start by thanking Inspector General Missal and 
his staff for their work on this thorough and well-reasoned 
report; I am confident that they have left no stone unturned.
    Accountability at all levels of the Department of Veterans 
Affairs is one of my, and I know the entire staff's, highest 
priorities. When we first examined the Office of Accountability 
and Whistleblower Protection, OAWP, in July 2018, I expressed 
my concern to Mr. O'Rourke about a breakdown in the 
Department's chain of command. Dr. Roe cautioned that, while 
well-intentioned, OAWP may come to constitute another layer of 
bureaucracy and, worse, seek to expand beyond the intent of the 
Accountability Act.
    Given OAWP's lack of any written policies and procedures at 
the time, several different members of the committee questioned 
Mr. O'Rourke about the rationale for and the propriety of the 
office's activities. We now know that the situation was even 
worse than we believed. This OIG report leaves no doubt that 
OAWP misinterpreted its statutory mandate, conducted unsound 
and biased investigations on multiple occasions, and failed to 
establish safeguards to protect whistleblowers from 
retaliation.
    Many of the report's findings seem to be indicative of a 
cynical or self-serving attitude in OAWP under the previous 
leadership. There is no doubt OAWP was badly in need of top-to-
bottom housecleaning to fully turn the page on this disturbing 
era.
    Mr. Chairman, the OIG report makes clear that these 
leadership deficiencies were the root cause of many of OAWP's 
problems. I hope we will now focus on the future of OAWP, whose 
mission you and Chairman Takano described as critical to 
veterans, rather than dwell in the past regarding individuals 
who are no longer with the VA.
    I am encouraged that Dr. Bonzanto is now leading OAWP. I am 
pleased to hear that she has already submitted information 
responsive to ten of the recommendations and I believe--I think 
I heard you say 22, so we are almost at 50-percent response 
already; however, this is only the beginning of the office's 
rehabilitation. This afternoon, I expect to hear what she has 
accomplished since her confirmation on January 7th, 2019, as 
well as what her plan looks like to tackle the challenges that 
remain within her office. I want specifics, including dates, as 
to when additional reforms will be implemented.
    Above all else, OAWP needs to return to focusing on its 
core statutory mission. This organization has to learn to walk 
before it can run. The report details example after example of 
OAWP investigating individuals beyond its authority, while at 
the same time arbitrarily narrowing the scope of alleged 
wrongdoing to be considered. Sometimes the investigations 
appeared to be personally motivated. Many times OAWP would 
simply refer an investigation back to the office where the 
allegations originated. All too often, investigations were 
conducted as disciplinary actions in search of evidence rather 
than as comprehensive and fair-minded inquiries into all the 
available evidence.
    It would be unreasonable for an office of roughly 100 
people to adjudicate misconduct allegations originating from a 
workforce of over 350,000 people. Let me be clear, I am not 
advocating super-sizing OAWP to do all these things; rather, we 
need to see a more effective OAWP with a laser-like focus on 
its statutory mission of receiving, reviewing, and 
investigating executive misconduct, retaliation, and poor 
performance, as well as any sort of whistleblower retaliation 
by senior leaders and managers. Although OAWP's work is 
difficult, I have no doubt that most of the employees believe 
in the mission and work hard to do the right thing, even under 
the previous leadership.
    The OIG report notes that many of the original employees 
were human resources specialists. Human resources and 
administrative investigations are very different disciplines 
and it is possible that these employees were never put in a 
position to succeed. I want to see VA's strategy to recruit and 
place seasoned investigators in these critical positions. The 
current strategic pause on recommending new personnel actions 
makes sense until quality is established, but what comes next?
    Holding senior leaders accountable is a core function of 
this office. I hope that there is some capacity for OAWP to 
perform reviews at this time and I would like to know what the 
plan is.
    Finally, I expect OAWP to treat whistleblowers with care in 
all its activities. The report paints a disturbing picture of 
cavalier culture and careless practices. I think it is not only 
right, but necessary to hold OAWP to the highest standards of 
integrity in order for the VA workforce to have confidence in 
the office's actions. Whistleblowers, to entrust it with their 
futures, OAWP must project the values of fairness, honesty, and 
incorruptibility.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Pappas. Thank you for your comments, Mr. Bergman. We 
will now hear from our witnesses.
    First I would like to introduce Dr. Tamara Bonzanto, she is 
the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection. The subcommittee thanks you for appearing before us 
today and, Dr. Bonzanto, you have 5 minutes.

                  STATEMENT OF TAMARA BONZANTO

    Ms. Bonzanto. Chairman Pappas, Ranking Member Bergman, and 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify today about VA's Office of Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection, OAWP.
    OAWP's establishment is meant to highlight the need for 
accountability in VA. Since my appointment in January, I have 
expeditiously undertaken actions to ensure that a culture of 
accountability exists within OAWP, with a goal of regaining the 
trust of employees, whistleblowers, and veterans.
    My written testimony addresses reforms underway in OAWP; 
however, I want to highlight a few examples.
    OAWP's staff was signing off on recommendations not to take 
disciplinary action without sending those recommendations to me 
for review. When I identified this was happening, I immediately 
put a stop to this practice; I now review all recommendations.
    In reviewing recommendations for disciplinary actions, I 
identified several deficiencies, including investigative 
reports that did not contain witness interviews. To improve 
oversight for investigations, I established smaller 
investigative teams with ten investigators per supervisor. I 
also brought in a new leadership team, which include 
individuals with substantial experience managing whistleblower 
retaliation investigations. I established a quality control 
team to independently review investigative reports for 
thoroughness and accuracy.
    OAWP is working on standard operating procedures for 
investigations and customized investigator training.
    With regard to the timeliness of investigations, OAWP takes 
around 215 days to complete an investigation. This resulted in 
a backlog of 572 cases, some dating back to 2017. My goal is to 
reduce this timeframe to 120 days and eliminate the backlog by 
the end of the next calendar year. Some of the above reforms 
will help us achieve this goal.
    I also realigned staff, so that we have investigators. 
Because of the extensive time that an OAWP investigation takes, 
I mandated that staff regularly update individuals about the 
status of their matters. OAWP is leveraging best practices from 
across the Government to help us ensure that our investigations 
are timely.
    I recognize that individuals have to trust OAWP for them to 
share information with us. Around August 2019, I found out 
about a list of individuals that was sent to prior OAWP 
leadership. This list contained detailed information about the 
allegation raised by individuals and OAWP staff opinions about 
the individuals and their allegations. According to OAWP staff, 
this list was requested by former OAWP leadership and was 
related to a whistleblower mentorship program, which I have now 
canceled.
    Regardless of the intent, it was inappropriate to utilize 
whistleblower information to establish such a list and provide 
opinions about individuals who raised allegations of 
wrongdoing.
    The deficiencies in OAWP have had a substantial impact on 
whistleblowers and VA employees who disclose wrongdoing. The 
organizational changes underway bring OAWP into compliance with 
the law and reflect a fundamental change in the way we do 
business. I will continue to engage with stakeholders, 
including OAWP employees, as we address the deficiencies.
    As a registered nurse, Navy veteran, and former 
investigator on this committee, I am committed to 
accountability in VA. I have the support of the Secretary and 
VA leadership as I continue to address the deficiencies in 
OAWP.
    I ask for your support and I appreciate the input from you 
and your staff as I continue to ensure that OAWP does a better 
job at improving the culture of accountability in VA and 
protecting whistleblowers.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bergman, and members of the 
committee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to 
answer any questions you may have.

    [The Prepared Statement Of Tamara Bonzanto Appears In The 
Appendix]

    Mr. Pappas. Thank you very much.
    I will now recognize our second witness, Mr. Michael 
Missal, the VA Inspector General. Mr. Missal, you have 5 
minutes.

                  STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MISSAL

    Mr. Missal. Thank you. Chairman Pappas, Ranking Member 
Bergman, Chairman Takano, and members of the subcommittee, 
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Office of 
Inspector General's report, ``Failures Implementing the VA 
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017.''
    In June 2018, we received a request from Members of 
Congress raising concerns that VA was not properly implementing 
the Act. In addition, we received complaints directly from VA 
employees and others relating to concerns about OAWP's 
operations. We were also denied access by VA leaders to 
information about the operations of the OAWP.
    In response, we conducted a review focusing on the OAWP's 
operations from June 23rd, 2017 through December 31st, 2018. 
During this review, additional allegations arose as new OAWP 
leaders began making changes, prompting further related work 
through August 2019.
    As detailed in our report, we identified significant 
deficiencies in the operations of the OAWP. We made six overall 
findings: first, that the OAWP misinterpreted its statutory 
mandate, resulting in failures to act within its investigative 
authority; second, that the OAWP did not consistently conduct 
procedurally sound, accurate, thorough, and unbiased 
investigations and related activities; third, they struggled 
with implementing the act's enhanced authority to hold 
executives covered by the act accountable; fourth, the OAWP 
failed to fully protect whistleblowers from retaliation; fifth, 
VA failed to implement various requirements under the act, 
including revising supervisors performance plans and developing 
supervisors training regarding whistleblowers rights; and, 
sixth, the OAWP lacked transparency in its information 
management practices.
    We recognize that organizing the operation of any new 
office is challenging, but OAWP leaders made avoidable mistakes 
early in its development that created an office culture that 
was sometimes alienating to the very individuals it was meant 
to protect. Those leadership failures distracted the OAWP from 
its core mission, and likely diminished the desired confidence 
of whistleblowers and other potential complainants in the 
operations of the office.
    VA employees who identify serious misconduct must feel 
protected when coming forward with complaints. They are 
essential to helping VA spot and address significant problems 
that may otherwise go undetected and persist, which could 
increase veterans' risk of harm.
    Our report highlights significant failings by OAWP's former 
leaders that have had a chilling effect on complainants still 
being felt today.
    To address the issues identified, we made 22 
recommendations. VA concurred with all recommendations and 
provided action plans for implementation. However, some of the 
planned actions lacked sufficient clarity or specific steps to 
ensure corrective actions will adequately address the 
recommendations. All 22 recommendations remain open and we will 
monitor implementation of VA's planned and recently implemented 
actions to ensure that they have been effective and sustained.
    We recognize that there have been changed made by Assistant 
Secretary Bonzanto to attempt to establish the trust of 
whistleblowers and other complainants due to missteps and a 
culture set by former leaders. Recent communications to the OIG 
hotline, however, indicate that some individuals continue to 
harbor a fear of OAWP retaliation or disciplinary action for 
reporting suspected wrongdoing. The OIG wants the goals of the 
act to be accomplished. Whistleblowers play a critical role in 
oversight and they need to have confidence that their concerns 
will be heard and properly considered, and that their 
identities will be protected.
    The OAWP leaders and staff who are committed to improving 
VA programs and operations face considerable challenges in 
overcoming the deficiencies identified in our report.
    Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I am happy 
to answer any questions that you or other members of the 
subcommittee may have.

    [The Prepared Statement Of Michael Missal Appears In The 
Appendix]

    Mr. Pappas. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. 
Missal.
    We will now move to the question portion of the hearing 
today and I would like to start by recognizing myself for 5 
minutes.
    Dr. Bonzanto, thanks for your testimony. One of your main 
responsibilities as Assistant Secretary to provide 
recommendations for disciplinary action to the Secretary. You 
have acknowledged that over your tenure you have sent one 
single recommendation for action so far; is that correct?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Pappas. I would like to be frank. In light of that, is 
that adequate? Are you meeting the responsibilities of your 
job?
    Ms. Bonzanto. At this time, I can say that I am also 
equally frustrated that I have not been able to send additional 
recommendations to the Secretary for disciplinary action, but 
as the IG highlighted and I found in the recommendations I 
reviewed, there was significant deficiencies in the 
investigative report and it needed to be sent back for review.
    Mr. Pappas. Sure. I understand you have those quality 
concerns about the office's investigations and rightfully so, 
given what Mr. Missal has found. No one would suggest that you 
should recommend disciplinary action based on shoddy 
investigations, but the office continues to conduct 
investigations without procedures for how they should be done 
and in fact, despite your stated concerns over quality, you 
increased the number of investigations that each investigator 
is expected to handle.
    Help me understand the logic behind that. Why are you 
directing your staff to continue investigations when you have 
not developed necessary guidance or training to address your 
concerns about quality, and is your office going to have to go 
back and redo some of these investigations?
    Ms. Bonzanto. No. To your address your concern regarding 
the staff training, staff has had training in the past prior to 
my arrival, they also had training when I came on board. The 
staff also, we have a quality team that is going to be 
reviewing the investigations and increasing the number of 
investigations that they are carrying. When I came on board, 
the staff were carrying two investigations per investigator on 
average and that resulted in a significant backlog, there was a 
lack of oversight. To improve that, we also made the teams 
smaller and had smaller teams with at least ten investigators 
per supervisor.
    Before those recommendations come to me, they are getting 
reviewed by a supervisor, getting reviewed by a quality team, 
and then being sent up for review by myself.
    Mr. Pappas. What about the standard operating procedures?
    Ms. Bonzanto. The standard operating procedures is 
currently in development. We most recently in September 
published our directive and we needed the framework for 
investigations, that framework will then be used to develop our 
internal processes, and that is currently in draft and I expect 
that to be completed by the end of this calendar year.
    Mr. Pappas. By the end of 2019?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Pappas. Mr. Missal, could you be clear about one major 
point here. The major failures that you identified in your 
report continue today?
    Mr. Missal. We have not closed out any of the 
recommendations, so the report is our most current information.
    Mr. Pappas. The 22 recommendations have not been closed 
out, all remain open. You did say in your testimony that some 
of the actions lacked specificity and you still have concerns 
about the action plan; is that correct?
    Mr. Missal. That is correct.
    Mr. Pappas. Dr. Bonzanto, we hear from whistleblowers that 
they often experience retaliation in the form of a hostile work 
environment, things like being isolated in a basement office, 
about being assigned to a room without working air conditioning 
or heat, not being given the tools an individual needs to 
complete his or her job.
    In June, we heard from Mr. Jeff Dettbarn, a VA X-ray 
technologist who described the retaliation he has experienced 
after blowing the whistle on concerns about the quality of 
veterans' care. It has been years since Mr. Dettbarn reported 
concerns to OAWP, yet he continues to face a hostile work 
environment and has had his duties reduced to only menial 
tasks.
    Other than placing stays on terminations, how else does 
your office protect whistleblowers like Mr. Dettbarn?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Since I have been on board, I have actually 
mandated that staff reaches out to whistleblowers and 
communicate with them. Communication and transparency is key in 
building trust with the whistleblowers that we are serving and 
the VA employees that are coming forward. This way it is giving 
us the opportunity to identify if they are facing retaliation 
early in the process.
    Also, improving investigations and improving the work 
product of the team will help protect whistleblowers, because 
then we can have thorough and accurate investigations.
    Mr. Pappas. Well, what about the fear that some individuals 
have--and Mr. Missal cited it here today--of the fear that they 
have in reaching out to OAWP, that they are not going to be 
protected or have the advocate in their corner that they need, 
is that of concern to you?
    Ms. Bonzanto. That is of concern. As the IG report 
highlighted, the fear was substantiated in the investigations 
that were done and there were a lot of examples in there where 
whistleblowers themselves were not interviewed. That fear is 
real and I acknowledge that. I have taken--as I said, we have 
taken a totally different direction. I want to be transparent 
with whistleblowers, I want them to trust that they can come 
forward and know that we are here to hear their concerns and 
protect them from retaliation.
    Mr. Pappas. Well, I know we have spoken about this and I 
really want you to be an advocate for whistleblowers across the 
VA system. It is critically important that these individuals 
who are just looking out for veterans have the ability to come 
forward to talk about waste, fraud, and abuse that they see, 
and to be a part of improvements ultimately for veterans in the 
end.
    I think we need to continue to see more work on that front, 
we need to continue to insist that you meet some of the dates 
that you have said here today in your testimony about how you 
are going to introduce, you know, some of these proposals to 
move OAWP forward.
    With that, my time is up. I would like to turn it over to 
Ranking Member Bergman for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Bonzanto, you know and being in the Navy, you join a 
command, you become part of a command, in some cases you are 
the commander, and it is the commander's responsibility to 
establish a command climate and also that command culture. When 
you are a commander coming into a unit that is already 
established, good or bad, you inherit what you inherit. It is 
what it is and it is not necessarily what you want it to be 
yet. That is where you put your fingerprints on it and your 
stamp on it to make it that superior command that you want to 
pass along to the next person.
    Having said that, I know you are doing everything you can 
at this point given what you were given. Your office is 
responsible for actions by senior leaders and executives, as 
well as managers, when whistleblower retaliation is alleged. 
Approximately how many VA employees fall within this 
jurisdiction, how many senior leaders and executives?
    Ms. Bonzanto. I would say around 540 falls in that core 
group----
    Mr. Bergman. Okay.
    Ms. Bonzanto.--of senior executives.
    Mr. Bergman. Basically, that is a relatively small subset 
of the VA total workforce. I understand that you put 
disciplinary recommendations on hold out of concerns for the 
quality of the investigations, but I hope you have some current 
capacity, and we kind of talked about this already, investigate 
properly. What is your plan to lift the hold and resume a full 
level, if you will, of investigative capability?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Currently--so, coming on board, we actually--
what I saw, there was a need for oversight, so these are some 
of the steps I have taken to get to this point right now. We 
have increased the oversight operation by having smaller teams. 
We have also--I am now reviewing all the investigative reports 
for recommendation and for closure. Whistleblowers are 
contacted every 14 days; that improves transparency in the 
process. I have also realigned the organization to basically 
eliminate duplicative efforts that was happening within the 
teams.
    We have issued a directive of hired most recently 
investigative leadership with a background in investigating 
whistleblower retaliation cases and doing administrative 
investigations. We have also implemented a case management 
system, which allows us to track cases and have a platform for 
staff to document, and we have the quality review team that is 
in place.
    Those are the things that are currently done. The 
priorities to continue working on this is to hire additional 
leadership for stability to establish the Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) for the investigators to be able to do their 
job, and to establish performance standards for the 
investigators, so that they can be held accountable for doing 
their jobs.
    Mr. Bergman. Dr. Bonzanto, if I was a whistleblower working 
at VA and suffering retaliation by my supervisor today, should 
I have confidence in OAWP to handle my allegations competently 
and fairly?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
    Mr. Bergman. Is it perfect or have you still got some 
improvements?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Sir, we still have a lot of work to do.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Mr. Missal, do you agree with that?
    Mr. Missal. I think it still remains to be said. Certainly, 
from our review, we found that they were not handling the 
investigations appropriately. I know Dr. Bonzanto is trying to 
make changes, but it is going to take some time for them to go 
through.
    I would just like to add one thing that is somewhat 
disturbing, it is if you look at the organizational chart that 
Dr. Bonzanto included in her testimony, there are a lot of 
empty positions and, as she just pointed out, she needs to fill 
those positions. Until that leadership structure gets filled 
out, it is going to be really hard to make the changes that I 
know she wants to make.
    Mr. Bergman. Dr. Bonzanto, is OAWP still closing and 
declining to investigate matters that fall within your 
statutory authority?
    Ms. Bonzanto. No, sir.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Is OAWP still opting to investigate 
individuals in matters outside of its jurisdiction?
    Ms. Bonzanto. OAWP is investigating matters with an 
authorized scope, sir.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Dr. Bonzanto, is OAWP now cooperating 
with the Office of Inspector General and can give me some 
tangible examples of how this is--you know, it is changed that 
you are cooperating?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir. Mr. Missal and I actually meet 
monthly or as needed, as often as we need to do with the staff. 
We have had great communication between us since I have been on 
board. We have been collaborating on a lot of the improvements 
or I have been actually asking his staff for best practices of 
things they are doing well. Those are the examples I can give 
you and I am sure there is more.
    Mr. Pappas. Mr. Missal, do you agree with that statement?
    Mr. Missal. Yes. There is certainly jurisdiction that 
overlaps, and so what really needs to be done is to ensure that 
the right organization is handling a particular matter. Aside 
from OAWP, there is the Office of Special Counsel, there is the 
Office of Resolution Management, there are a number of 
different avenues a complainant can go to. Unless all of those 
offices coordinate their efforts and communicate together, it 
is going to make it really tough.
    I would agree with Dr. Bonzanto that the lines of 
communication between our office and OAWP has drastically 
improved since she came on board.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Bergman.
    I would now like to recognize Chairman Takano for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Takano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Bonzanto, you have expressed a lot of concerns about 
the quality and consistency of the work that OAWP has done, 
some of which was prior to your confirmation as Assistant 
Secretary. Are all these issues surprising to you given the 
lack of standard operating procedures for investigations?
    Ms. Bonzanto. These issues were not surprising given the 
fact that there are a lot of leadership vacancies in the 
organization, so it goes beyond the standard operating 
procedures. I need to fill those vacancies in order to be able 
to have a team, to build a team out.
    Mr. Takano. Well, but there is a connection to the quality, 
the lack of quality, and the consistency of the work, and the 
lack of standard operating procedures?
    Ms. Bonzanto. I would say I need investigators with a 
background in investigations and the H.R. staff that I 
currently have on board also to ensure that they have the 
training to be able to do the investigations, then establish. 
We recently----
    Mr. Takano. Well, let me ask you, is it correct that it 
took 9 months after your appointment to publish a basic policy 
on investigations?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
    Mr. Takano. Your office still does not have standard 
operating procedures to guide investigations; is that true?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Right. We published in September the 
framework and now we are developing the standard operating 
procedures based on that framework.
    Mr. Takano. They are still yet to be established this many 
months into your tenure.
    Ms. Bonzanto. Basically, it has taken time to get to this 
point. As the IG found, there were substantial issues with the 
office and operations of the office. I identified a lot of 
issues that were deep-rooted and started addressing those 
issues. Then I had vacancies in leadership that also slowed 
progress and I wanted to ensure that the changes----
    Mr. Takano. Well, in claiming my time, I need to get to--I 
am sorry.
    Ms. Bonzanto. Okay.
    Mr. Takano. Mr. Missal, can you speak to how the office's 
lack of standard operating procedures contributes to all of the 
failures that your report has identified?
    Mr. Missal. It is very critical. If you do not have 
standard operating procedures, you are going to have 
inconsistencies, and if one of the goals is to earn and get the 
trust of whistleblowers, it is hard for them to have that trust 
if they recognize that the office to whom that they are going 
to make a complaint does not have standard operating procedures 
to do investigations.
    Mr. Takano. This many months into Dr. Bonzanto's tenure, 
you know, it is critical--I mean, this is a missing piece, a 
critical missing piece of the standard operating procedures and 
it seems to be, as you said, the heart of gaining the 
confidence of potential whistleblowers to come to the office.
    Mr. Missal. It is one of the missing pieces, along with 
filling out the leadership team.
    Mr. Takano. Okay, great.
    Dr. Bonzanto, you have cited the need for training for your 
staff to appropriately conduct investigations and perform 
quality assurance steps, and you noted that your staff has 
received initial training on these topics. The Project on 
Government Oversight recently reported major concerns about the 
quality of this training. In one surprising point, their 
analysis shows that portions of the training materials appear 
to be pulled from Wikipedia. The article even noted that 
participants referred to the training as, quote, ``not even 
remotely useful,'' end quote, and that the instructors had to 
make changes to the material on the fly.
    Dr. Bonzanto, has this training provided you any more 
confidence that your office will be able to produce high-
quality investigations?
    Ms. Bonzanto. I want to take this opportunity to address 
that concern in the article regarding the training. I just want 
to say that the contractor that was identified was a veteran-
owned small business contract. We started working on this 
contract for the training sometime in June. My staff raised 
concerns during the contract about the qualifications of the 
contractor. We were informed by the contracting office that we 
will get the product that we are requesting. We provided edits 
and feedback to the contracting office. We were also again 
assured around August-September timeframe that the product will 
be delivered. The product that we requested from contracting 
was not what we requested, what we were told we were going to 
get, and we are now working with contracting to address those 
issues.
    Mr. Takano. Well, so let me get this straight. You are not 
able to do your job because you are concerned about the quality 
of your office's work; you have many staff that have been 
reassigned to perform investigations that they have no 
experience conducting; you tried to get your staff quickly 
trained, but the contractor you paid simply pulled from 
Wikipedia and other online sources instead of developing 
useful, detailed training materials.
    I am just--this is incredulous to me and to be frank, Dr. 
Bonzanto, I do not have confidence in this office. If I am 
approached by a whistleblower from my district, I cannot in 
good conscience direct them to work with your office, and I, as 
a Member of Congress, have had to do that with VA facilities, 
and that is not going to change until I actually see some real 
progress.
    Thank you for your testimony today. Thank you.
    Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Chairman Takano.
    I would now like to recognize Mr. Bost for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Bonzanto, your testimony states that Secretary Wilkie 
and yourself, and I quote, ``recognize the intent for 
transparency,'' and that is end quote, behind the statutory 
requirements to report to Congress within 60 days when your 
disciplinary recommendations are not implemented. Okay?
    Recognizing that the intent is one thing, but we are 
talking about a law. Okay? Will you commit to provide these 
reports in every instance the law requires?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Bost. Okay, I want to make sure of that.
    Inspector General Missal, do you believe the culture of 
accountability exists right now within the OAWP?
    Mr. Missal. We did not find that when we were conducting 
the investigation. We are obviously going to take another look 
as we assess the implementation of the recommendations.
    Mr. Bost. Dr. Bonzanto, do you agree with that, or does a 
culture of accountability now exist?
    Ms. Bonzanto. A culture of accountability now exists in 
OAWP, sir, and I am working on improving it.
    Mr. Bost. Okay. Mr. Missal, it is my understanding that the 
OAWP submitted information seeking to close ten of the OIG's 
recommendations; when do you think that will be complete and 
that you could actually start seeing some things that you can 
make a decision for these closures?
    Mr. Missal. It is hard to say when we are going to get the 
information. What was produced to us was, as Dr. Bonzanto said, 
the framework of certain guidance that they are going to have. 
They still need to fill all that in.
    The way our process works is 90 days after a report is 
published, we then meet with the responsible parties and start 
talking through what are they doing to close the 
recommendations, and we are very transparent about what we need 
to get them closed, so that will be part of the process. If the 
party wants to try to close them earlier, we are always happy 
to meet with them.
    Mr. Bost. Dr. Bonzanto, let me ask this. I think that 
Ranking Member Bergman brought this up about taking and 
assuming a command when you could inherit some problems. The 
question that is really before this committee is because, as 
the chairman said, you know, we each have our own--when we are 
dealing with those people who are whistleblowers and we want 
them to make sure that they feel comfortable in the fact of the 
reporting to make sure that the VA operates better, see the 
problems that are really existing, but the concern is, is that 
when--you have inherited the problem and I understand you are 
trying to fix it, but we are a long time into it.
    The general public out there, even though they may know 
there is a problem and you inherited a problem, they want it 
fixed correctly, but they also want it fixed quickly. I think 
that the ability for us to go back to our constituents and say, 
yes, we are getting this problem straightened out, we need to 
know that you are doing everything you can as fast as you can. 
Now, we want it right, but we also need it very quickly, and I 
think that is the concern that we are dealing with here.
    It is my hope that when I am sure we are going to continue 
in this committee to monitor this that you can come back with 
some very positive reports very quickly. Working with the 
Inspector General, it is fantastic that you are doing that, but 
I spend way too much time in my life, not only with the VA, but 
everything in government, especially on this Federal Government 
level after being in the State government, which I was in 
Illinois, there are a lot of problems there, but to try to 
explain to people that it takes--when the problems were 
identified, we are going to be over a year getting them 
straightened out. The people that are suffering and the 
employees that are being put in these situations where they are 
not comfortable at work because they actually brought something 
up we have got to try to fix, but thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Bost.
    I would now like to recognize Mr. Cisneros for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Bonzanto, just to kind of follow up on the chairman's 
question, is there an ETA for getting your standard operating 
procedures in place?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir, the end of the calendar year.
    Mr. Cisneros. Is that on track right now, are we going to 
get that done, or will it be delayed?
    Ms. Bonzanto. It is on track right now, sir.
    Mr. Cisneros. All right. You know, there have been a lot of 
situations where there has been retaliation against 
whistleblowers from middle and senior management when they have 
come out and spoken up against them. What is the office of 
OAWP, how are they addressing these issues? What penalties or 
disciplinary action are they taking, is OAWP taking against 
these middle managers and senior executives that are going 
after people that are coming and blowing the whistle on them?
    Ms. Bonzanto. OAWP recommends disciplinary action when 
allegations are substantiated, we do not take the disciplinary 
action. Then there is a notification process in place that if 
the recommendation that is given by myself to the proposing 
official is not taken within 60 days, notification is sent to 
Congress if the action falls out of my recommendation.
    Mr. Cisneros. Do you have data on that?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Currently, I have only submitted one 
recommendation for disciplinary action, sir.
    Mr. Cisneros. Only one?
    Ms. Bonzanto. We are still within the 60-day timeframe, 
correct.
    Mr. Cisneros. Okay. Dr. Bonzanto, recommendation 7 of the 
IG's report speaks to setting up of a quality assurance 
function in the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection to help address the investigative issues the IG 
identified. The agency's response to the recommendation states 
the VA has completed action to address this recommendation, 
although the IG stated here today that all 22 recommendations 
remain open. How does the OAWP stand up to quality assurance 
functions if it has not yet developed standard operating 
procedures to guide the underlying investigations in the first 
place?
    Ms. Bonzanto. We have actually had the quality team set up 
and we have actually when found--we have checklists in place. 
We actually have a draft, we are drafting the SOPs. We have a 
checklist in place of critical things like, for example, a 
simple did you interview a witness, we have the checklist for 
the quality staff to be reviewing the investigative reports.
    Mr. Cisneros. Okay. Just to follow up on the question 
regarding training that the chairman stated was being pulled 
off of the Internet and Wikipedia. Who authorized that contract 
to that vendor, the VA?
    Ms. Bonzanto. The VA contracting office, yes, correct.
    Mr. Cisneros. Okay. Going forward with the training, I 
mean, is there a new contract in development, has one been 
issued now, or what is going on with the new contract for 
training?
    Ms. Bonzanto. We do not have a new contract for training, 
sir. Currently, I have actually most recently brought on new 
leaders with a background in investigation and we are working 
internally to develop customized training for the 
investigators.
    Mr. Cisneros. Is that same vendor still under contract?
    Ms. Bonzanto. No, sir. We are actually working with the 
contracting office to address the concerns that were raised 
regarding the quality of the product we received.
    Mr. Cisneros. All right. I yield back the balance of my 
time.
    Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Cisneros.
    I would now like to recognize Miss Rice for 5 minutes.
    Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Bonzanto, you just said that you have only made one 
recommendation for disciplinary action since January of this 
year; is that correct?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, ma'am.
    Miss Rice. Out of how many cases?
    Ms. Bonzanto. About 16 I reviewed personally myself that I 
was only able to send one recommendation for disciplinary 
action.
    Miss Rice. Well, those are 16 that you reviewed?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
    Miss Rice. Were there more?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, ma'am. There were 42 cases that were 
reviewed by the quality team that was sent back to 
investigations to be reviewed, to be completed.
    Miss Rice. You only looked at 16 of those?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Sixteen of those--I did not look at any of 
the 42. Once the quality team was in place, they started 
reviewing the cases before I got the cases. 16 actually came 
completed with recommendations to me and this is earlier before 
the quality team was established----
    Miss Rice. What happened to the difference between 42 and 
16?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Those 16 were totally separate from the 42 
cases. Those 16, some of them are still being worked out.
    Miss Rice. I guess my question is, so 42 cases and there is 
only one recommendation made, what happened to the other ones? 
What were the findings of the other ones?
    Ms. Bonzanto. The other findings were some of the 
deficiencies I identified in investigative reports where a 
witness is not being interviewed, conclusive statements in the 
case file that was not supported by evidence, and that is two 
good examples I can give you that was consistent in some of the 
deficiencies I found.
    Miss Rice. The whistleblowers were not believed or were not 
found to be credible?
    Ms. Bonzanto. In instances they were not interviewed.
    Miss Rice. They were not interviewed?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
    Miss Rice. Ever?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes. The IG highlighted that occurred in the 
office, correct.
    Miss Rice. Here is my concern. We have a lot of rhetoric 
right now in the public discourse about whistleblowers and 
there is certain terminology being used to describe exactly 
what they are by some people, specifically the President of the 
United States and other people in his administration. How much 
of the President's feeling about whistleblowers specifically, 
how does that affect your job?
    I mean, this administration set up this office, said they 
were going to take care of whistleblowers within the VA, 
because they have actually uncovered some really bad things 
going on within the VA, just speaking about that agency. They 
should be heard and they should be protected, but we have an 
environment right now that is very hostile to whistleblowers. 
How much of the big boss, right, the President's opinion about 
whistleblowers, how does that affect people in your office and 
how they look at whistleblowers?
    Ms. Bonzanto. I can say from coming on this committee and 
also working as an investigator on this committee, I value 
whistleblowers. I took this position because I value the input 
whistleblowers bring to improving VA.
    As a veteran and a nurse, I also know the impact 
whistleblowers have on an organization when they bring 
information forward that can really change the operation of the 
organization. I have informed my staff that it is critical that 
they listen and they understand the view of the whistleblowers, 
they understand that when they do not pay attention lives are 
impacted, and they must listen to the whistleblower and get 
both sides of the story when they conduct an investigation.
    I expect thorough and accurate investigations and nothing 
less. I know, I am equally as frustrated I could not put 
recommendations forward, more than one, but that shows that we 
need to improve and I am going to continue to improve. At this 
time I can say that I am committed to the process and I am here 
for that reason, because I believe in the value whistleblowers 
bring to the organization.
    Miss Rice. I appreciate your position, because if you do 
not feel that way, we are in trouble, No. 1, but I still find 
it very alarming that there has only been one recommendation 
out of all of the cases that have been brought since January.
    I guess, you know, you can only address this problem if you 
train people on how to identify, you know, what to do in an 
instance where you see something, how you report it, whatever 
the training is. I mean, a big criticism that they were not 
even--the trainers did not even know what they were talking 
about, did not know how to train people.
    I mean, how serious do you think whistleblowers take your 
mission when you contract out for God knows how many millions 
of dollars a service that you got really a poor quality work 
product from?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Basically, I want to say that the staff had 
training prior to me coming on board from other Federal 
entities. I started identifying deficiencies in March, they had 
training again from the Office of Special Counsel. In August, 
they had training from the Office of General Counsel. The staff 
has consistently gotten training over time.
    Based on the deficiencies and the number of deficiencies 
that we were identifying, I needed to have a baseline. we went 
back to basic investigation techniques, interviewing 
techniques, and evidence gathering. The contract that we are 
discussing and the issues with the contractor was the September 
training, which was, again, to reset. Let us just start and we 
get basic investigative training because of the deficiencies, I 
still continued to identify deficiencies in the reports.
    Miss Rice. Do you have input as to what contractor is used?
    Ms. Bonzanto. The contracting office normally select the 
most qualified vendor for us.
    Miss Rice. Do you have any input? Do they ask you?
    Ms. Bonzanto. I am not sure if we--I think they select 
based on the--they select the contractor based on the 
qualifications of the contract. I can not say for sure if--the 
VA has input, obviously, but the contracting office does not 
work directly for me, no.
    Miss Rice. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Pappas. Thank you very much.
    I just have a few more and perhaps the other members here 
would like to ask a few more--Okay, I guess we are going to go 
for a second round. Thank you very much for your answers to 
date.
    I just wanted to follow up on a comment that Mr. Missal had 
made about the fact that there are a number of key positions 
that are vacant where you are still recruiting an individual. 
You had submitted as part of your testimony this org chart 
here, which represents a realignment since August. You know, of 
that, seven are filled, five you are still recruiting for, six 
remain vacant, including the Deputy Executive Director 
position.
    You mentioned, for instance, developing standard operating 
procedures, you are going to do that by the end of the year, 
but yet the Chief of Policy position is vacant.
    How are you going to, you know, deal with these 22 
recommendations and make progress if you still have these 
vacancies, and what is the action plan to fill out this 
realigned org chart?
    Ms. Bonzanto. We currently have six positions in 
development for recruitment, five positions on active 
recruitment, we are actually interviewing individuals for those 
positions right now. We are still working.
    The Chief of Policy is actually focused on policy, that is 
not the standard operating procedures. The standard operating 
procedures, I most recently hired a Deputy Director for 
Investigations, and that individual is going to be working on 
the standard operating procedures for investigations. The head 
of the quality team is already in place and they are working on 
the quality SOPs for that team.
    Mr. Pappas. Mr. Missal, you had raised specifically in 
terms of, you know, flagging this in her testimony. How much of 
a concern is this for the IG in terms of the steps that OAWP 
needs to take?
    Mr. Missal. It is a very great concern for us, because you 
obviously need policies and procedures in place, but before you 
can really get started in changing around an organization that 
we identified had so many problems, you really need to have not 
only the people in place, you need to have the right people in 
place, and it sometimes takes time when new people are put 
together into an organization for them to work together as a 
team to communicate well.
    Until these positions are filled, it is going to be very 
hard to make progress on a number of other avenues that they 
need to improve.
    Mr. Pappas. One measure of an organization coming together 
and gelling and focusing on its mission is measuring employee 
morale. You had indicated to me when we spoke that is something 
you intend to measure. How would you characterize morale today 
within OAWP?
    Ms. Bonzanto. As I have told you, sir, morale is--I would 
say it is at this time neutral. I have some parts of my team 
saying we are heading in the right direction and some parts of 
the team they are raising concerns about the direction we are 
heading, because it is fundamentally different from what they 
have done before.
    I am doing my best to engage the staff. We have developed 
teams around some of the work products we need to produce, to 
encourage staff to engage and give us recommendations on what 
the best practices are or they identify as the best practices 
for improving operations.
    We are also working with the VA's National Office of 
Organizational Development to come in and do an assessment, and 
also work with the new leaders as they come on board, so they 
can provide us feedback of where we are as an organization and 
also help coach the leaders as we are going through this 
organizational change.
    Mr. Pappas. Protecting whistleblowers is your mission, but 
I am incredibly concerned to hear that multiple staff in your 
office have actually filed whistleblower complaints themselves, 
including allegations of retaliation with the Office of Special 
Counsel (OSC). Perhaps more concerning is that in the office's 
newly published directive on investigations OAWP employees are 
specifically excluded from the definition of whistleblowers.
    I am wondering if you could address this exclusion and 
describe how whistleblowers in your office should come forward 
and be a part of the change that needs to happen.
    Ms. Bonzanto. Right. I can say that in OAWP I encourage 
staff to come, you know, bring concerns, raise concerns to 
their supervisors. If they are not concerned with the response, 
they can raise concerns to me. I have an open-door policy to me 
with employees. If they are not--you know, if they do not want 
to come forward and bring those concerns to us, they have like 
every other employee can go to the OSC, the IG, Congressional 
Committees; they can exercise their right to raise concerns to 
other entities, if they choose to.
    I think it is a conflict for us to investigate employees 
ourselves. If someone raised concerns to us, it is a conflict 
of interest for us to investigate those employees, and we 
actually had an example of that in the IG report of that 
happening, and that is why the directive addresses that.
    Mr. Pappas. One thing I wanted to ask about as well is 
training of VA employees more generally speaking. This training 
has taken over 2 years to develop and why is that the case? 
This just seems very fundamental in terms of your charge.
    Ms. Bonzanto. It is one of the things we are continuing to 
work on. I know I had a deadline of October 15th for getting 
that training up and we have not met the deadline for, you 
know, completing the training. It was under legal review, legal 
review just came back with edits, but we are expected to meet 
our goal of having the training published on VA's Talent 
Management System (TMS) website by the end of the calendar 
year. That was our goal, the end of the calendar year.
    Mr. Pappas. It is a revised goal, though; correct?
    Ms. Bonzanto. No. The goal was the end of the calendar year 
and October 15th was for us to actually have it uploaded in the 
TMS system. It has not been uploaded yet.
    Mr. Pappas. You have missed that mark----
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
    Mr. Pappas.--but you hope to hit the mark for the end of 
the year?
    Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Pappas. Well, I will turn it over to General Bergman 
for additional questions.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I guess it is 
just you and me as I look around.
    I wish--unfortunately, as you know, our schedules are 
extremely busy around here and I know our members had to go on 
to something else, I hope equally as important. As I kind of 
mentioned in my opening remarks, you inherit the command you 
inherit. You know, George Washington was judged by historians 
as being able to accept the world as it was, not how he wanted 
it to be, so he accepted the reality.
    As I listened to the questions being asked, sometimes we 
just assume we are starting at a zero point and neutral point, 
but in this particular case, if we were to put it on a linear 
graph, we were kind of starting behind the power curve in a 
negative, negative way.
    Even though we are at neutral or slightly on the positive 
side now, it does not look like much, because if you did not 
think about it, we are just kind of assuming the zero starting 
point, so the progress that has been made was just to kind of 
clean up messes and get the ball rolling again in the right 
direction. Usually it is not about the fact that things are 
changed or you are moving forward, it is the rate at which you 
are going.
    Dr. Bonzanto, would you care to comment, do you have a rate 
of change, if you will, that is a positive rate? Are you 
accelerating, decelerating, you know, when it comes to 
everything from your training to your SOPs to your, you know, 
everything in the whole--how would you say it, is it 
acceleration, deceleration, neutral?
    Ms. Bonzanto. I would honestly like to move faster. As you 
know, the H.R. in Federal Government is it takes time. It is 
taking about an average of 90 to 120 days to on-board someone, 
and that is from the job posting through the interview period. 
If we can--that is my concern is I am not moving as fast as I 
would like to and filling these vacancies as fast as I would 
like to, but it is part of the process that I have to go 
through.
    Mr. Bergman. Well, as long as you are not comfortable, I 
think we are comfortable; if you are comfortable, we are 
uncomfortable. I think that is a trend in the right direction.
    Mr. Missal, I firmly believe that all employees doing wrong 
or failing to serve veterans should be held accountable 
regardless of rank, position, or grade. You found in your 
report that disciplinary officials sometimes mitigated OAWP's 
recommended penalties based on their subjective, personal 
judgment. You gave ten examples that run the gamut from a 
removal reduced to a demotion, to suspensions reduced to no 
penalty whatsoever. How commonplace is that?
    Mr. Missal. It certainly was commonplace in what we found 
with OAWP. You have to remember, there are disciplinary actions 
going on throughout VA and they have different standards that 
they apply, that going through OAWP they do not follow those 
same standards.
    For instance, outside of OAWP there is a VA disciplinary 
chart which gives examples and guidance about certain actions 
and where they should be. Making sure you have consistency in 
your discipline is extremely important, again, to give 
confidence in the office and to show those who commit 
wrongdoing that they are going to be held accountable.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Again, Mr. Missal, given the gravity of 
OIG's findings, I believe sustained oversight of OAWP is 
warranted. What sort of follow up work do you intend to perform 
to determine whether these problems have actually been 
corrected?
    Mr. Missal. We have, on the formal side, we will be working 
with OAWP to assess how they are addressing the 22 
recommendations that we have that are still open. Then, on the 
more informal side, we meet regularly with OAWP just to discuss 
current issues that come up, because, as I said, there are a 
number of different places which are looking at potential 
wrongdoing and so those different organizations have to 
coordinate their efforts for it to be as effective as possible.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Pappas. Well, thank you very much. I do not have any 
further questions. I do not know, General Bergman, if you would 
like to give any closing comments before we conclude, but I 
would like to take the privilege of having a few closing 
comments, if you do not mind.
    I want to thank our witnesses today, Dr. Bonzanto and Mr. 
Missal, for joining us. You know, the Inspector General once 
again has produced a very comprehensive report, it is a page-
turner. If you have not looked at it, I urge you all to do so, 
and we will be continuing to look at this report closely.
    You and your staff performed an important service and the 
report identifies a long list of problems, 22 recommendations 
that must be addressed if the office is to succeed.
    Unfortunately, I think this hearing has made clear that 
OAWP is not providing critical protections and, on top of 
retaliation, we often hear from whistleblowers about 
frustration that they feel when working with OAWP. I feel a 
sense of solidarity, because I feel similar frustrations today.
    Dr. Bonzanto, you testified that you have established goals 
for the office, but these are just the beginning steps and we 
need to continue to insist on more progress. While the office 
now has a high-level policy for investigations, this is not the 
same as having a detailed standard operating procedures, nor is 
it actually completing investigations. While it is good to hear 
that OAWP will have training materials by the end of the year, 
this is not the same as actually training the supervisors on 
the rights of whistleblowers.
    Dr. Bonzanto, whistleblowers in the VA are still waiting 
for your office to perform basic mandates. I recognize that you 
want to move OAWP in the right direction, I recognize that you 
inherited a very complicated and difficult situation when you 
assumed your position in January of this year, but your 
testimony in response to questions does not provide a full 
picture of how you are going to get there. We do not have all 
the metrics and time lines for how your mission will be 
achieved, and we need to continue to work with you to insist on 
progress.
    Ultimately, we are all working toward the same goal here. 
We want OAWP and we want you to be successful in your role, and 
that is ensuring that whistleblowers have the opportunity to be 
heard without fear of retaliation. It is pivotal that we come 
together and focus on this mission to improve protections for 
whistleblowers and in turn improve our service to veterans.
    With that, members will have 5 legislative days to revise 
and extend their remarks, and include any extraneous materials.
    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                         A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X

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                    Prepared Statements of Witnesses

                              ----------                              


                 Prepared Statement of Tamara Bonzanto

    Chairman Pappas, Ranking Member Bergman, and members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
                             i. background
    The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) appreciates the opportunity 
to answer questions and report progress about its implementation of the 
VA Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (the Act), 
Public Law 115-41. The Act, which is an unprecedented piece of 
legislation, is an important priority for the Department. The Act is 
another tool to help VA hold employees accountable and protect 
whistleblowers who report wrongdoing. VA's Office of Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) was established by the President of the 
United States on April 27, 2017, under Executive Order 13793. OAWP was 
statutorily established by the Act, and its functions are codified 
under section 323 of title 38 of the United States Code (U.S.C.).
    OAWP receives and investigates allegations of misconduct, poor 
performance, and whistleblower retaliation against VA senior leaders; 
and allegations of whistleblower retaliation against VA supervisors. 
OAWP also receives whistleblower disclosures from VA employees and 
applicants for VA employment and refers those allegations for 
investigation within VA. OAWP is responsible for tracking and 
confirming VA's implementation of recommendations from audits and 
investigations carried out by OIG, VA's Office of the Medical Inspector 
(OMI), the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), and the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). OAWP is also responsible for 
advising the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on accountability and for 
identifying trends based on data received by OAWP, so that VA can 
proactively address systemic issues.
    Trust is an important element for ensuring OAWP's success. 
Individuals who report wrongdoing must trust OAWP with their 
information. Those individuals must also trust OAWP to review and refer 
or investigate their allegations in a thorough and timely manner.
    Since my appointment in January 2019, I have heard from Veterans, 
VA employees, whistleblowers, and Congress about their concerns with 
OAWP operations and concerns about OAWP staff. As I assessed OAWP 
operations, I came to the realization that most of these concerns were 
valid. By April 2019, I identified several deficiencies that are now 
highlighted in an OIG report, which needed to be corrected, including 
staff who were making decisions on my behalf with little to no 
oversight; teams who were duplicating efforts; investigators who were 
conducting investigations without sufficient training; a lack of 
communication with whistleblowers about the status of their matters; a 
lack of written policies and standard operating procedures; and reports 
and recommendations that displayed a lack of training. Fixing these 
deficiencies is the first step toward regaining the trust that 
individuals who report wrongdoing place with OAWP. Ensuring that the 
information provided by those individuals is not used without their 
consent or as otherwise permitted by law, is also essential to 
regaining the trust that OAWP needs to succeed as an organization.
                       ii. overcoming challenges
    Since my appointment, OAWP independently identified many of the 
issues now substantiated by the OIG in its report issued on October 24, 
2019. These issues can be attributed to a lack of oversight, 
communication, and training for staff. Ten of the 22 recommendations 
made by OIG have been addressed. VA is working to resolve the remaining 
six recommendations.
    The Act's establishment of OAWP is to ensure a culture of 
accountability in VA. Unfortunately, as OIG recognized, OAWP lacked its 
own culture of accountability for its first 2 years of operations as 
reflected in the deficiencies I noted above. I am expeditiously 
undertaking actions to ensure that such a culture exists within OAWP. 
Significantly, these deficiencies identified by the OIG have an impact 
on VA employees who report wrongdoing. In many instances, individuals 
who lost their jobs or faced other forms of whistleblower retaliation 
relied on OAWP to conduct a thorough investigation into their 
allegations, only to be disappointed when staff failed to respond back 
to them. This lack of oversight, communication, and training for staff 
contributed to the lack of trust that individuals have in OAWP.
    Once I assessed OAWP's deficiencies, I immediately began working to 
correct them, including the following:
       Reviewing all OAWP recommendations, including 
recommendations for disciplinary action, or no action before a case 
could be closed;
      Implementing an information system to track 
investigations and OAWP's recommendations. This system has an audit 
trail and ensures that only authorized users can access certain case 
files. This system will also help OAWP identify trends, as required by 
the Act;
      Stopping OAWP contractors from performing work unrelated 
to OAWP's statutory functions;
      Mandating that staff update whistleblowers about the 
status of their matters;
      Realigning OAWP's operations to ensure that teams were 
not duplicating efforts and to increase the number of investigators; 
\1\
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    \1\  A pre-and post-realignment organizational chart can be found 
in exhibit 1.
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      Providing OAWP investigators with training on conducting 
investigations. OAWP is currently developing a customized investigative 
training course for its investigators. This training would resolve 
recommendation 8 in OIG's report; and
      Issuing VA Directive 0500, Investigation of Whistleblower 
Disclosures and Allegations Involving Senior Leaders or Whistleblower 
Retaliation. The directive governs how OAWP receives whistleblower 
disclosures; allegations of senior leader misconduct, poor performance, 
and whistleblower retaliation; and allegations of whistleblower 
retaliation against supervisors. The directive covers a number of the 
recommendations made by the OIG.
    I also recognize the need for appropriate oversight within OAWP. 
With that in mind, OAWP is working to fill its supervisory vacancies. 
OAWP recently hired a deputy director for investigations and two 
supervisory investigators. These individuals, who come from the 
Department of Defense and other Federal agencies, have substantial 
experience with managing administrative investigators; conducting 
whistleblower retaliation investigations; and developing whistleblower 
retaliation training.
    I appreciate the concerns raised by OAWP employees to me about the 
organizational changes underway. Many of these changes are significant 
and represent a fundamental adjustment in the direction that OAWP was 
taking during its first 2 years. As we work to improve OAWP, I want to 
ensure that employees are engaged in these organizational changes.
    I have met with several employees about their concerns and have 
discussed the organizational changes underway with staff during town-
hall sessions. By the end of the year, OAWP will also establish 
employee workgroups within OAWP to solicit feedback as OAWP continues 
to improve its operations. The workgroups include a training workgroup, 
which would provide feedback on training that is beneficial for OAWP 
staff; a policy/process workgroup, which would provide feedback on 
internal standard operating procedures and policies; an employee 
engagement workgroup, which would advise on ways to improve employee 
engagement; and a technology workgroup, which would advise on ways to 
better utilize technology in OAWP.
    The above actions, once addressed, will help strengthen OAWP 
workforce engagement and satisfaction as we continue to improve OAWP 
operations.
                   iii. improving oawp investigations
    OAWP has a backlog of investigative cases, which can be defined as 
a disclosure or submission that is open with OAWP for over 120 days. 
Many of these backlogged cases date back to 2017 and 2018. The goal is 
to eliminate the backlog by the end of the next calendar year and, per 
VA Directive 0500, to have OAWP investigations conducted and 
recommendations issued within 120 days from the date that a disclosure 
or submission is received by OAWP. This newly established timeline 
would decrease the average time to conduct an investigation by 44 
percent. To reach these goals, OAWP has undertaken a multi-prong 
approach, outlined below.

    A. Increasing the number of OAWP investigators.

    In August 2019, OAWP realigned resources to avoid a duplication of 
efforts on investigative cases and ensure that we have more 
investigators available. The realignment was based on input provided by 
OAWP managers and a workload analysis of a sampling of OAWP staff.
    With the realignment, OAWP now has 40 investigators rather than 30. 
Investigators are also supervised in smaller teams of approximately 10 
individuals, to ensure appropriate oversight. Since the realignment, 
investigators carry an average of 6 investigations. This increase in 
investigative case load brings them on-par with investigators who 
handle equally complex work in other government investigative bodies.

    B. Issuing policy to clearly define OAWP's investigatory scope.

    VA Directive 0500 was issued. The directive governs how OAWP 
receives whistleblower disclosures; allegations of senior leader 
misconduct, poor performance, and whistleblower retaliation; and 
allegations of whistleblower retaliation against supervisors. The 
directive clearly defines what is within and outside OAWP's 
investigatory scope.

    C. Comprehensive training to improve the quality of investigations.

    OAWP is developing a comprehensive training program for its 
investigators.\2\ The program will cover investigative techniques, 
including report writing. The program will incorporate best practices 
from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the Council of Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), and other governmental and 
non-governmental offices. This program will serve as the foundation for 
continuous professional training and development that will be conducted 
throughout this fiscal year.
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    \2\  OAWP investigators have already been provided with 
standardized investigation training in August and September 2019. This 
supplements training that they received in the past but does not amount 
to a comprehensive training program. In prior years, OAWP investigators 
took different training courses on investigative techniques. This 
resulted in disparate investigative reports and interviews. For 
example, some investigators took a five-day investigative training 
course conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 
However, only two of the days in the course were applicable to OAWP 
investigators. The remaining three days focused on ICE practices and 
policies.

    D. Developing standard operating procedures to ensure clear 
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consistency.

    OAWP is developing standard operating procedures (SOP) and 
templates for investigators and staff, which are expected to be 
completed before the end of the calendar year. This will ensure that 
investigative reports, evidence gathering techniques, and interview 
techniques are standardized across OAWP's 40 investigators.

    E. Utilizing contractors to assist with investigations.

    Given the significant backlog, OAWP also plans to utilize 
contractors to assist in conducting investigations. This is a best-
practice utilized by other investigative entities.

    F. Establishing a team to conduct quality reviews on 
investigations.

    Recognizing that quality control is essential, I have established 
an independent team to ensure investigative reports are thorough and 
accurate. This team received initial training on reviewing 
investigative reports in September 2019. OAWP is developing a 
comprehensive training program for individuals on the team to ensure 
that investigations are done in a fair, unbiased, thorough, and 
objective manner. The program will incorporate best practices from OSC, 
CIGIE, and other governmental and non-governmental offices. The quality 
review team is also developing SOPs, checklists, and a reporting 
template to ensure consistent quality and timeliness with OAWP 
investigations.

    G. Ensuring that disciplinary action recommendations comply with 
the Act.

    Starting in April 2019, all recommendations, whether for 
disciplinary action or no action, are reviewed by me or my designee. 
During my review of these recommendations, I identified several 
deficiencies, including the following:
      Citing investigative reports where witnesses were not 
interviewed;
      Conclusory statements that were not tied into evidence; 
and
      Failing to properly address the elements required for 
whistleblower retaliation.
    In August 2019, OAWP developed checklists to ensure that 
investigative reports and recommendations did not contain these types 
of deficiencies. Quality staff have identified discrepancies in over 45 
cases submitted to them as of September 2019. All cases where 
deficiencies were found were routed back to investigations for further 
review and resolution of the discrepancies.
    The Secretary and I recognize the intent for transparency behind 38 
U.S.C. Sec.  323(f)(2), which requires that VA report to Congress when 
disciplinary recommendations that I make are not implemented. To 
memorialize our commitment to the Act, VA Directive 0500 requires Under 
Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries and other Key Officials, and their 
designees, to respond to OAWP recommended disciplinary actions, 
including providing a copy of the action taken or proposed and, if the 
recommended disciplinary action was not taken or proposed, providing a 
detailed justification why such an action was not taken or proposed 
within 60 calendar days of OAWP's recommendation.
           iv. improving communications and customer service
    OAWP has mandated, through VA Directive 0500, that staff regularly 
communicate with individuals about the status of their cases. OAWP is 
collaborating with VA's Veterans Experience Office (VEO) to provide 
customer service training to all OAWP staff. OAWP is working with VEO 
to develop a customer survey to measure the impact of these customer 
service improvements. Customer service, which is a priority for the 
Secretary and me, will also be a critical element in all performance 
standards for OAWP employees.
          v. oawp's whistleblower mentor and outreach programs
    In 2017, OAWP established the whistleblower mentorship program, 
formerly known as the whistleblower reintegration program. After 
receiving several complaints from VA employees and whistleblowers about 
the program, I asked that it be placed on hold while we evaluated 
whether there was appropriate governance and how applicants were 
identified and interviewed.
    After evaluating the program, I identified several deficiencies, 
including how applicants were identified and interviewed. In light of 
those deficiencies, the OIG's findings, and because the program was 
operating outside of OAWP's authorized scope, I have decided to 
discontinue the program. Instead, OAWP is assessing whether an 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program, similar to OSC, should be 
established with VA's existing ADR resources.
    Prior to my appointment, OAWP also established a whistleblower 
outreach program. The program was meant to provide whistleblowers with 
information about wellness and other resources. However, in view of 
OIG's findings about the whistleblower mentorship program, we have 
decided to discontinue the program. Instead, whistleblowers will be 
informed about services available to them through VA's employee 
assistance program should they need assistance.
            vi. whistleblower rights and protection training
    Under 38 U.S.C. Sec.  733, VA is required to implement training for 
all employees on whistleblower rights and protection. OAWP worked with 
OSC and OIG to develop training required under 38 U.S.C. Sec.  733. 
This training will address, among other things, methods for making a 
whistleblower disclosure, prohibitions against taking an action against 
an employee for making a lawful disclosure, and penalties for 
whistleblower retaliation.
    The training is being finalized and VA anticipates issuance of the 
38 U.S.C. Sec.  733 training, including a specialized module for 
supervisors through VA's Talent Management System, before the end of 
the calendar year.
     vii. implementing oawp's other functions, required by the act
    As I address the deficiencies within OAWP, I am implementing its 
statutory function of tracking and confirming VA's implementation of 
recommendations from audits and investigations carried out by OIG, OMI, 
OSC, and GAO. As required by law, I am also implementing a process to 
identify trends based on data received by the office so that VA can 
proactively address systemic issues.
    OAWP is establishing a new VA compliance and oversight team to 
track and confirm the implementation of recommendations from audits and 
investigations. The target date for staffing the team and finalizing a 
directive on these requirements is the end of the calendar year. OAWP 
also began utilizing an information system in June 2019, to help us 
identify trends based on the data received by the office.
                            viii. conclusion
    I understand the sense of urgency to improve OAWP operations. I 
also recognize the substantial impact that the deficiencies in OAWP 
have had on whistleblowers and VA employees who disclose wrongdoing.
    I have the support of the Secretary and VA leadership as I continue 
to work on fixing those deficiencies. I ask for your support and I 
appreciate the input from you and your staff as I continue to ensure 
that OAWP fulfills its statutory mandate.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bergman, and Members of the Committee, 
this concludes my statement. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 
before the Committee today to discuss VA's implementation of the 
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act. I would be happy to 
respond to any questions you may have.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1246.001

                                ------                                


                Prepared Statement of Michael J. Missal

    Chairman Pappas, Ranking Member Bergman, and members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Office of 
Inspector General's (OIG's) report, Failures Implementing the VA 
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017(the Act).\1\ In 
June 2018, one year after the Act's enactment, the OIG received 
requests from the then ranking member of the House Veterans' Affairs 
Committee and several senators raising concerns that VA was not 
properly implementing the Act. In addition, the OIG received complaints 
from VA employees and others relating to concerns about OAWP 
operations. In response, the OIG conducted a review focusing on the 
OAWP's operations from June 23, 2017, through December 31, 2018. During 
the review, additional allegations arose as new OAWP leaders began 
making changes, prompting further related work through August 2019.\2\
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    \1\  Issued October 24, 2019; the law was signed on June 23, 2017, 
and became Public Law 115-41
    \2\  From June 23, 2017, until January 7, 2019, the OAWP operated 
without an Assistant Secretary--a position called for by the Act. It 
was led by Executive Director Peter O'Rourke from June 23, 2107, to 
February 28, 2018, followed by Executive Director Kirk Nicholas until 
January 7, 2019. The current Assistant Secretary for Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection took office on January 7, 2019, and soon began 
implementing changes, some of which address matters identified 
throughout the review.
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    As detailed in the OIG's report and summarized here, the OIG 
identified significant deficiencies in the operations of the OAWP. The 
OIG recognizes that organizing the operations of any new office is 
challenging, but OAWP leaders made avoidable mistakes early in its 
development that created an office culture that was sometimes 
alienating to the very individuals it was meant to protect. Those 
leadership failures distracted the OAWP from its core mission and 
likely diminished the desired confidence of whistleblowers and other 
potential complainants in the operations of the office.
    VA employees who identify serious misconduct must feel protected 
when coming forward with complaints. They are essential to helping VA 
spot and address significant problems that may otherwise go undetected 
and persist, which could increase veterans' risk of harm. This report 
highlights significant failings by OAWP's former leaders that have had 
a chilling effect on complainants still being felt today. These 
failings include the lack of relevant policies and procedures, 
fundamental misunderstandings of investigative scope, not holding 
individuals accountable, and inadequate protections for whistleblowers. 
As a result, the current Assistant Secretary for Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection faces significant challenges in putting the 
OAWP on a path to meet its statutory mission, mandates, and goals.
                               background
    The VA Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) 
was established in 2017 to improve VA's ability to hold employees 
accountable for specified misconduct; prevent retaliation against 
whistleblowers and initiate action against supervisors who retaliate; 
and address senior executives' poor performance.\3\
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    \3\  See Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, P.L. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862 (June 
23, 2017). The legislation codified the establishment of the OAWP 
following an executive order issued in April 2017 to create an entity 
to ``improve accountability and whistleblower protection'' at VA. 
Improving Accountability and Whistleblower Protection at the Department 
of Veterans Affairs, Exec. Order No. 13793, 82 Fed. Reg. 20539 (Apr. 
27, 2017). See also Dep't of Veterans Affairs, News Release, 
``Secretary David Shulkin Announces Establishment of Office of 
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection and Names Peter O'Rourke as 
its Senior Advisor and Executive Director'' (May 12, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In comments to the OIG on the draft report, VA took issue with what 
it characterized as the OIG's conclusion that the Act was designed to 
target senior executives for discipline. VA noted that the Act included 
expanded disciplinary authorities that apply to all VA employees. That 
is an accurate summary of the statute but it misses the point. The 
report focused on the OAWP's operations and efforts to implement 
relevant sections of the Act. The expanded disciplinary authorities of 
the Secretary over VA employees generally, although part of the same 
legislation, are not directly relevant to OAWP's operations and, thus, 
the OIG report. The Act did expand the Secretary's disciplinary 
authority as to all VA employees, but that authority applies without 
regard to any involvement or action by OAWP. Indeed, the Act provides 
no role for OAWP in the disciplinary process of employees other than 
its authority to recommend discipline based on its investigation of 
allegations of misconduct, poor performance, and retaliation involving 
certain senior executives (i.e., the defined categories of Covered 
Executives \4\) and allegations of retaliation on the part of 
supervisors.\5\ It is this authority of the OAWP with respect to 
disciplinary proceedings that are addressed in this report.
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    \4\  ``Covered Executives'' refers to VA personnel holding 
statutorily enumerated senior-level positions as defined in 38 U.S.C. 
Sec. Sec.  323(c)(1)(H)(i) and (ii).
    \5\  38 U.S.C. Sec.  323(c)(1)(H). The OAWP may also recommend 
appropriate discipline for employees based on investigations carried 
out by other entities such as the OIG, the Office of the Medical 
Inspector, and the Office of Special Counsel. 38 U.S.C. Sec.  
323(c)(1)(I).
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      failures implementing aspects of the va accountability and 
                  whistleblower protection act of 2017
    The OIG's review focused on answering the following questions that 
emerged from complaints and allegations to the OIG from various 
sources:

        1. Whether the OAWP was exercising its authority in accordance 
        with the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and 
        Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 and other applicable laws

        2. Whether the OAWP conducted adequate, thorough, and 
        procedurally fair investigations of matters it investigated

        3. Whether VA employees were held accountable by making 
        appropriate use of the authorities provided in the Act

        4. Whether the OAWP was adequately protecting whistleblowers 
        from retaliation as required by the Act and other applicable 
        laws

        5. Whether VA complied with other requirements of the Act, 
        including making timely and accurate reports to Congress.

    A summary of key findings related to each of the review questions 
follows. The OIG made 22 recommendations related to six key findings.
finding 1: the oawp misinterpreted its statutory mandate, resulting in 
           failures to act within its investigative authority
    The OAWP misconstrued its statutory investigative mandate both by 
accepting matters that it should not have and declining matters the Act 
requires it to investigate. The OAWP also investigated individuals 
outside the OAWP's scope of authority under the Act, which in some 
instances introduced an appearance of bias. This included investigating 
one of its own directors for allegations relating to the director's 
earlier position at another VA office, which was not within the OAWP's 
statutory authority to investigate. At the same time, it was too 
narrowly interpreting the scope of what the office should investigate. 
The OAWP inappropriately excluded investigations of misconduct and poor 
performance of covered individuals if the person making the allegations 
did not meet the statutory definition of whistleblower. The OAWP is not 
limited to investigating allegations made only by whistleblowers--
defined as employees and applicants for employment--but rather can 
investigate allegations from other complainants as well.
    In addition to misinterpreting its statutory investigative mandate, 
the OAWP also failed to refer matters for investigation to other more 
appropriate investigative entities. Pursuant to regulation, VA 
employees must, for example, refer to the OIG matters that may be 
serious violations of criminal law related to VA. The OAWP investigated 
criminal matters involving possible felonies that it was required to 
refer to the OIG. Allegations of discrimination similarly should have 
been referred to VA's designated equal employment opportunity (EEO) 
office, the Office of Resolution Management (ORM), unless they fell 
within the OAWP's authority to investigate. Although the law does not 
require that the OAWP refer such matters to the ORM, filing with the 
ORM is the only way for employees to preserve their EEO rights and it 
has more expertise to handle investigations of discrimination.
    A fundamental flaw identified by the OIG was OAWP's 
misunderstanding of its statutory authority. The lack of clear and 
consistent guidance contributed to many of the other deficiencies 
identified in the report. The OIG made four recommendations related to 
Finding 1. They focus on actions by the Assistant Secretary for 
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection to ensure that the office 
is acting within its statutory authority and develop policies and 
procedures for working with VA's Office of General Counsel (OGC), ORM, 
OIG, and the Office of the Medical Inspector to establish criteria and 
procedures for the referral of matters to these entities. A complete 
listing of all the report's recommendations are in Appendix A of this 
statement.
 finding 2: the oawp did not consistently conduct procedurally sound, 
 accurate, thorough, and unbiased investigations and related activities
    Written policies and procedures are crucial to effective 
operations. During the tenures of former Executive Directors Peter 
O'Rourke and Kurt Nicholas, the OAWP did not adopt comprehensive 
written policies and procedures on any topic. As of July 2019, it still 
lacked OAWP-specific written policies and procedures.\6\ The failure to 
put in place key systems and quality controls has resulted in OAWP 
conducting investigations that were not always thorough, objective, and 
unbiased--undermining OAWP's credibility among some VA employees.
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    \6\  OAWP staff reported during the review that written policies 
and procedures were being drafted.
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    The OIG identified deficiencies in the following areas:

      The OAWP lacks comprehensive policies and procedures 
suitable for its personnel. This is particularly important given that 
individuals' reputations are at stake, whistleblowers' identities must 
be protected, and the issues on which the OAWP is reporting affect 
veterans' lives in tremendously significant ways. Staff were either 
missing guidance or were piecing together direction largely based on 
the mandates of a prior office that was not entirely aligned with 
OAWP's legislative scope. The results were felt across OAWP divisions:

        1. The Triage Division's procedures blurred the scope of OAWP 
        authority and called for acceptances or referrals of cases that 
        were not consistent with the OAWP's statutory authority.

        2. Operational procedures were incomplete and outdated, leaving 
        staff without clear guidance.

        3. The Investigations Division used selective portions of 
        preexisting VA procedures that provided insufficient guidance 
        and led to questionable results.

      The absence of OAWP quality control measures is 
particularly troubling given the hodgepodge of policies and procedures. 
OAWP's Advisory and Assistance (A&A) Division identified issues with 
the thoroughness of investigations. In some cases, investigators failed 
to seek testimonial evidence from key witnesses, including in at least 
one instance from the subject of the investigation. VA's OGC also 
identified deficiencies in the work of the A&A Division and 
Investigations Division. Although some investigatory inadequacies were 
detected by disciplinary officials and VA's OGC, this de facto 
oversight was not an effective or sustainable solution.

      The OAWP has failed to provide the staffing and training 
necessary to ensure it has the expertise, experience, and commitment 
that yield objective and thorough investigations critical to OAWP's 
success. Staff within OAWP that conducted investigations were not given 
the training and access to expertise needed to perform at the level 
expected of that office. While the Investigations Division has 
broadened its staffing strategy to include more than Human Resource 
specialists, it still lacked a coordinated strategy for training 
specific to investigations.

      The OAWP has fallen short of its commitment to conduct 
``timely, thorough, and unbiased investigations'' in all cases within 
its investigative jurisdiction. VA employees and other complainants 
must be assured that OAWP investigations are conducted with the highest 
ethical standards, which does not yet appear to have been achieved. A 
contributing factor to both lack of thoroughness and appearance of bias 
was the OAWP's practice of investigating to the ``substantial 
evidence'' standard. That is, OAWP investigators did not conduct 
investigations designed to ensure that all known or obviously relevant 
evidence was obtained.\7\ Rather, in many instances, they focused only 
on finding evidence sufficient to substantiate the allegations without 
attempting to find potentially exculpatory or contradictory evidence. 
One disciplinary official described OAWP investigations as ``a 
[disciplinary] action in search of evidence.'' This standard and its 
application contributed to limited and unbalanced investigations.

    \7\  For example, the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity 
and Efficiency, Quality Standards for Investigations (November 15, 
2011) provide that all known or obviously relevant evidence should be 
obtained during an investigation. While OAWP is not governed by these 
standards, they provide relevant guidance for conducting thorough and 
objective investigations in a similar context.
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        The OAWP has statutory authority to investigate matters that 
        overlap with the authority granted to several other 
        investigative bodies, which means more than one entity can 
        potentially investigate the same matters. The OIG identified 
        instances in which the OAWP's objectivity was impaired by at 
        least the appearance of bias.\8\ In these instances, the OAWP 
        should have referred the matters elsewhere or implemented 
        measures sufficient to avoid the appearance of impropriety.\9\ 
        Key to this process is having an effective apparatus for 
        triaging which issues should remain within the OAWP. Written 
        guidance and training for employing that judgment would help 
        ensure consistency and enhance the integrity of the office. The 
        report cites two examples related to OAWP investigations of 
        political appointees that had the appearance of bias.\10\

    \8\  As discussed in Finding 1, the OAWP decided to investigate one 
of its directors in a case outside its statutory scope. The appearance 
of bias in that case was exacerbated by the slow progress of the matter 
at the discipline stage. Some OAWP staff familiar with the 
investigation questioned whether OAWP leaders were protecting a senior 
staff member.
    \9\  The OAWP has statutory authority to refer whistleblower 
disclosures to other investigative entities, including the OIG. 38 
U.S.C. Sec.  323(c)(1)(D).
    \10\  See examples 11 and 12 of the report.
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        The OIG received numerous complaints from whistleblowers who 
        felt that their submissions to the OAWP were not being handled 
        in a timely manner, and that they were not even sure that the 
        OAWP had accepted their allegations for investigation. Lengthy 
        processing times can discourage whistleblowers from making 
        further reports.\11\ The OIG recognizes, however, that 
        investigations must be afforded adequate time to ensure 
        accurate results. Still, the OIG evaluated the time taken by 
        the OAWP to resolve matters that were received by the OAWP 
        Triage Division and referred for administrative investigation 
        and found many took a year or more to close.\12\

    \11\  GAO, Office of Special Counsel: Actions Needed to Improve 
Processing of Prohibited Personnel Practice and Whistleblower 
Disclosure Cases, GAO-18-400, (June 2018) 16, 21, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/700/692545.pdf (discussing importance of timeliness in resolving 
whistleblower claims).
    \12\  The data show that from June 23, 2017, through December 31, 
2018, the OAWP opened 628 matters for investigation and inherited 131 
matters that had been pending with the OAR. Of the 628 OAWP matters, 
299 were closed by the end of 2018, but 20 took more than a year to 
resolve. Of the 329 matters still pending at the end of 2018, 52 had 
been open more than a year. According to VA's Administrative 
Investigations: Resource Guidebook (June 2004), ``[a]n administrative 
investigation is an impartial inquiry, authorized by a facility 
director or higher level manager, to be conducted at any time deemed 
necessary, to determine facts and collect evidence in connection with a 
matter in which the VA is or may be a part in interest.'' Directive 
0700 also provides, ``The term `administrative investigation' refers to 
a systematic process for determining facts and documenting evidence 
about matters of significant interest to VA.''
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        Dr. Bonzanto told OIG investigators that she prioritized the 
        need for prompt resolution of matters due in part to impacts on 
        the subjects of investigations. She also stated that she was 
        introducing standardized ``touchpoints'' with whistleblowers to 
        improve communication about case statuses. She told OIG 
        investigators that she instituted new expectations relating to 
        timeliness of investigations. Her stated goal is to reduce to 
        90 days the time it takes from the receipt of a submission to 
        the end of the A&A Division's involvement. Dr. Bonzanto 
        explained that she is instituting check-in points to ensure 
        that the staff of the Investigations Division are keeping up 
        with their workload.

    The OIG made four recommendations related to this finding. Three 
were to the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection related to creating standard operating procedures, creating 
a quality assurance program, and providing training to OAWP staff. The 
other recommendation was to the OGC to review and update as needed VA 
Directive 0700 and VA Handbook 0700 and clarify how they apply to OAWP, 
if at all.
   finding 3: va has struggled with implementing the act's enhanced 
            authority to hold covered executives accountable
    A critical purpose of the Act was to facilitate holding Covered 
Executives accountable for misconduct and poor performance. However, as 
of May 22, 2019, VA had removed only one Covered Executive from Federal 
service pursuant to the authority provided by the Act. The OIG found 
that officials tasked with proposing and deciding disciplinary action 
had insufficient direction for how to determine the appropriate level 
of discipline that would ensure consistency and fairness for specific 
acts of misconduct and poor performance. In many cases, a disciplinary 
official mitigated the discipline recommended by OAWP as too severe or 
based on advice from the OGC. In part, this was because of the absence 
of clear guidance and the OAWP's practice of not always including 
relevant exculpatory evidence, which would emerge later in the process 
at the disciplinary stage.
    The A&A Division adopted a practice of culling OAWP's investigative 
files to prepare an evidence file that it provided to the OGC and the 
proposing official. The A&A Division focused on including material in 
the evidence file that supported the proposed disciplinary action, 
rather than compiling all relevant evidence. According to the A&A 
Director, the content of the evidence file was determined by the A&A 
specialist and contained only the evidence that the specialist believed 
supported the charges.
    The A&A Division would provide additional information from the 
investigative file if requested by the OGC. The OIG determined that 
this practice was problematic because OGC attorneys might not know what 
information to request. As one OGC attorney explained, neither the OGC 
attorney nor the disciplinary officials know what other information is 
in the investigative file until the subject responds, and even the 
subject might not know what is in the investigative file.\13\
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    \13\  This problem is exacerbated by the Act's timelines, which 
provide only seven business days for the subject to respond and an 
additional eight business days for the deciding official to process and 
review new information before rendering a decision. An evidence file 
provided by the proposing official to the deciding official with all 
relevant information would reduce the information the subject must 
collect and the deciding official must review.
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    Under a pilot initiative implemented by Dr. Bonzanto, OGC attorneys 
are now routinely provided access to the entire investigative file. The 
results of that pilot were not yet available.
    For Finding 3, the OIG made 3 recommendations. Two were directed to 
the Secretary related to providing guidance and training on penalties 
for actions taken pursuant to the Act, as well as guidance and training 
for disciplinary officials to maintain compliance with mandatory 
adverse action criteria outlined in the Act. The third recommendation 
under this finding was to the Assistant Secretary for Accountability 
and Whistleblower Protection to make certain that all relevant evidence 
is provided to the VA Secretary or the disciplinary officials 
designated to act on the Secretary's behalf when OAWP recommends a 
disciplinary action.
    finding 4: the oawp failed to fully protect whistleblowers from 
                              retaliation
    From June 2017 to May 2018, the OAWP referred 2,526 submissions to 
other VA program offices, facilities, or other components that were not 
all equipped to undertake such investigations and without adequate 
measures to track the referrals or sufficient safeguards to protect 
whistleblowers' identities.\14\ While referring other submissions to 
entities best positioned to address them is not inherently problematic, 
complainants were not always advised of these referrals. Of those 
referred, at least 51 involved allegations of whistleblower retaliation 
by a supervisor (and so properly fell within the investigative 
authority of the OAWP). The concerns raised by OAWP's referrals are 
primarily threefold:
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    \14\  In April and May 2019, Dr. Bonzanto directed, as part of an 
effort to review all 539 investigations of whistleblower retaliation 
allegations received from June 23, 2017, through April 15, 2019, to 
determine if they were properly developed. A plan has been submitted 
for reviewing 42 disclosures determined to need further review.

        1. The recipient agency must be competent to conduct the 
        investigation of the type of matter being referred in a 
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        comprehensive, accurate, and balanced manner.

        2. The OAWP must have tracking and monitoring processes to 
        determine if the recipient entity has reasonably and 
        appropriately handled the referral.

        3. The OAWP must be transparent with complainants about the 
        referral process and have procedures in place to ensure that 
        complainants' identities will be protected--particularly from 
        individuals in VA who are the subject of the allegations or are 
        positioned to identify the complainant based on the nature of 
        the submission or other released information.

    Other concerns regarding protecting whistleblowers from retaliation 
include the following:

      The OAWP took the position that allegations of 
whistleblower retaliation could not be investigated unless the 
whistleblower was willing to disclose his or her identity. The consent 
to disclose allowed the OAWP to further disclose the whistleblower's 
identity to other VA components. This policy places OAWP's obligation 
to investigate whistleblower retaliation in conflict with its 
obligation to maintain confidentiality of whistleblowers' identities. 
An OAWP Senior Advisor told the OIG that the OAWP adopted this policy 
because of the belief that to ``investigate retaliation, you have 
almost no choice but to disclose the individual's identity.''

      In 2017, the OAWP established a whistleblower 
reintegration program, which was later renamed the Whistleblower 
Mentorship Program. The OIG received complaints that the program was 
being used inappropriately to target whistleblowers. The stated purpose 
of the program was to provide whistleblowers who had made complaints 
with transitional support resources if needed after the whistleblowing 
experience. OIG interviews indicate that the motivation for the program 
was also to break the perceived routine of whistleblowers to continue 
reporting.

        Ultimately, in its approximately 18-month existence, the 
        program served one whistleblower as a test case, which was 
        described by OAWP staff as successful. Dr. Bonzanto placed the 
        program on hold because her assessment revealed that it had not 
        met with identifiable or measurable success sufficient to 
        warrant devotion of the resources that would be required to 
        expand the program to serve more individuals.

      The OAWP also failed to establish safeguards sufficient 
to protect whistleblowers from becoming the subject of retaliatory 
investigations. One troubling instance involved the OAWP initiating an 
investigation that could itself be considered retaliatory. At the 
request of a senior leader who had social ties to the OAWP Executive 
Director, the OAWP investigated a whistleblower who had a complaint 
pending against the senior leader. After a truncated investigation, the 
OAWP substantiated the senior leader's allegations without even 
interviewing the whistleblower.

      Former leaders of OAWP also directed funds for purposes 
unrelated to OAWP's core mission. There were $2.6 million of OAWP's 
Fiscal Year 2018 budget of $17.37 million (15 percent) obligated on two 
separate contracts for process improvement and leadership development 
services. Each contract had two subsequent option years which, if 
exercised, would have brought the potential total obligation to over 
$6.8 million. The first contract related to process improvements. 
According to Dr. Bonzanto, shortly after she became Assistant 
Secretary, she learned about the existence of the process improvement 
contract. She told OIG investigators that the contractor ``was supposed 
to be helping us with our directives and our workload,'' but she 
learned after inquiring further that ``everything that they were doing, 
none of it was related to OAWP.'' She also told the OIG that she 
ordered then Deputy Director Todd Hunter to refocus the contractor to 
``come back and start doing work that's related to OAWP.'' According to 
Dr. Bonzanto, by March 2019 the contractor's work was redirected to 
assisting the OAWP with developing its processes and procedures.

        The services to be acquired under the second contract related 
        to leadership development and coaching, which former Executive 
        Director Nicholas intended for VA generally, not just the OAWP. 
        In response to the OIG's inquiry concerning the contracts, VA 
        suspended performance on the contract for leadership 
        development and coaching, which limited VA's cost to the 
        $88,000 already expended. The OIG did not find any evidence 
        that VA leaders requested that Mr. Nicholas initiate either 
        procurement or redirect OAWP funds to these contracts.

    During its review, the OIG received several allegations from OAWP 
employees pertaining to personnel decisions and other exercises of 
discretion by OAWP management. These related to past practices as well 
as events occurring between January and June 2019. The investigation of 
individualized complaints of prohibited personnel practices was not 
within the scope of this review. Witnesses raising allegations of 
whistleblower retaliation or prohibited personnel practices were 
encouraged to file complaints with the Office of Special Counsel. Some 
of these allegations related to dissatisfaction with current OAWP 
management's decisions. Reviews of these types of allegations were 
declined when they amounted to reasonable policy differences that were 
not appropriate or ripe for OIG oversight. Nonetheless some of these 
allegations raised important issues that OAWP managers needed to 
address. Accordingly, the OIG deidentified the complaints and 
transmitted their general substance to OAWP in September 2019.
    The OIG made three recommendations to the Assistant Secretary for 
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection regarding safeguards to 
maintaining confidentiality of employees making submissions; conducting 
an organizational assessment of OAWP employee concerns and developing 
an appropriate action plan; and developing a process and training for 
OAWP's Triage Division to identify and address potential retaliatory 
investigations.
 finding 5: va did not comply with additional requirements of the act 
                         and other authorities
    The OIG determined that VA failed to implement various requirements 
under the Act, including revising supervisors' performance plans and 
developing supervisors' training regarding whistleblower rights. VA 
also has not provided whistleblower protection training for all other 
employees. On numerous occasions, VA did not submit timely, responsive, 
and/or accurate reports to Congress on whistleblower investigations and 
related disciplinary actions as required by the Act. The causes of 
these lapses included

      OAWP's lack of an adequate data base system to capture 
required information,

      OAWP leaders' failure to understand their 
responsibilities and deadlines under the Act and plan accordingly, and

      OAWP's inadequate procedures or processes to track the 
information requested by Congress.

    In addition, VA has interpreted the requirement that it submit 
reports to Congress when the Secretary ``does not take or initiate the 
recommended disciplinary action'' within 60 days of receipt of a 
recommendation in such a way that VA disciplinary officials' mitigation 
or declination of OAWP's recommended actions are not reported to 
Congress.\15\ By failing to meet these statutory obligations, the OAWP 
has undermined Congress's intent to create greater transparency with 
respect to employee accountability and whistleblower protection within 
VA.
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    \15\  38 U.S.C. Sec.  323(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are six recommendations related to Finding 5. Four 
recommendations are for the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection, of which two relate to training; one deals 
with performance plan requirements; and one addresses improvements to 
systems to be capable of tracking the data required by the Act. Two 
recommendations are for the VA Secretary and deal with ensuring 
supervisor training is implemented and that VA comply with the 60-day 
reporting requirements.
 finding 6: the oawp lacked transparency in its information management 
                               practices
    In the course of the OIG review, staff identified issues outside 
the initial scope regarding OAWP's information management practices. VA 
has obligations under the Privacy Act of 1974 to disclose its uses of 
information collected from individuals, and it has obligations under 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to provide timely and accurate 
responses to requests for information. The OAWP failed to publish 
notices required by the Privacy Act concerning the collection of 
information from individuals and VA's routine uses of that information. 
The OIG also found that the OAWP did not communicate appropriately with 
individuals who made submissions to the office, and that its responses 
to requests for information pursuant to FOIA have not met statutory 
deadlines and lag significantly behind other VA components.
    The two recommendations associated with this finding are directed 
to the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection. The first relates to publishing Systems of Record Notices 
for each OAWP system of records. The OIG also recommended training, 
staffing, and establishing procedures for the OAWP's FOIA Office in 
order to comply with governing requirements.
                     va comments to the oig report
    VA concurred with all recommendations and provided action plans for 
implementation. However, some of the planned actions lacked sufficient 
clarity or specific steps to ensure corrective actions will adequately 
address the recommendations (see Appendix A for a listing of all 
recommendations). In particular, the actions detailed in multiple 
responses (specifically to Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 18, 19, 
and 20) were identified by VA as completed as of October based on the 
issuance of Directive 0500 on September 10, 2019, or other actions 
taken in recent months. The OIG has not received sufficient 
documentation to determine whether recent actions and attempts to 
implement Directive 0500 fully address the recommendations. The OIG 
notes that the planned actions for two recommendations (Recommendation 
2 and 12) do not appear sufficient to address the findings and will 
require updated action plans. The OIG considers all 22 recommendations 
open and will monitor implementation of VA's planned and recently 
implemented actions to ensure that they have been effective and 
sustained. As stated earlier, VA's assertions that OAWP has broader 
statutory authority is a clear misunderstanding of the office's 
statutory scope. Moreover, VA's suggestion that it independently 
identified problems and that the OIG failed to acknowledge progress 
made by the office in the text of the report is refuted by the OIG in 
the report section on responses to VA's comments.
                               conclusion
    The OIG found that VA has failed to properly implement several key 
provisions of the VA Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 
2017, as well as other authorities. In particular, the OAWP's former 
leaders failed to understand the office's statutory mandates and 
investigative authority. They were also ineffective at establishing 
clear policies, procedures, and training sufficient to ensure that the 
OAWP and VA met their obligations to protect whistleblowers' identities 
and hold VA employees accountable. Although the OIG recognizes that 
there have been a series of improvements planned by the Assistant 
Secretary in 2019, there are significant steps that must be taken to 
restore the trust of whistleblowers and other complainants due to 
missteps and a culture set by former leaders who did not appear to 
value whistleblower contributions. The very office established to 
protect whistleblowers and enhance accountability lacked the basic 
structures needed to achieve its core mission. Recent communications to 
the OIG hotline indicate that some individuals continue to harbor a 
fear of OAWP retaliation or disciplinary action for reporting suspected 
wrongdoing. The OAWP leaders and staff who are committed to improving 
VA programs and operations face considerable challenges in overcoming 
the deficiencies identified in the OIG review.
    Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement and I would be happy to 
answer any questions that you or the other members of the Subcommittee 
may have.
   appendix a: listing of recommendations from failures implementing 
 aspects of the va accountability and whistleblower protection act of 
                                  2017

    FINDING 1

    1. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection directs a review of the Office of Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection's compliance with the VA Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 requirements in order to ensure 
proper implementation and eliminate any activities not within its 
authorized scope.
    2. The VA Secretary rescinds the February 2018 Delegation of 
Authority and consults with the Assistant Secretary for Accountability 
and Whistleblower Protection, the VA Office of General Counsel, and 
other appropriate parties to determine whether a revised delegation is 
necessary, and if so, ensures compliance with statutory requirements.
    3. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection, in consultation with the Office of General Counsel, Office 
of Inspector General, Office of the Medical Inspector, and the Office 
of Resolution Management establishes comprehensive processes for 
evaluating and documenting whether allegations, in whole or in part, 
should be handled within the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection or referred to other VA entities for potential action or 
referred to independent offices such as the Office of Inspector 
General.
    4. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection makes certain that policies and processes are developed, in 
consultation with the VA Office of General Counsel and Office of 
Resolution Management, to consistently and promptly advise complainants 
of their right to bring allegations of discrimination through the Equal 
Employment Opportunity process.

    FINDING 2

    5. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection ensures that the divisions of the Office of Accountability 
and Whistleblower Protection adopt standard operating procedures and 
related detailed guidance to make certain they are fair, unbiased, 
thorough, and objective in their work.
    6. The VA General Counsel updates VA Directive 0700 and VA Handbook 
0700 with revisions clarifying the extent to which VA Directive 0700 
and VA Handbook 0700 apply to the Office of Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection, if at all.
    7. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection assigns a quality assurance function to an entity positioned 
to review Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection 
divisions' work for accuracy, thoroughness, timeliness, fairness, and 
other improvement metrics.
    8. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection directs the establishment of a training program for all 
relevant personnel on appropriate investigative techniques, case 
management, and disciplinary actions.

    FINDING 3

    9. The VA Secretary, in consultation with the VA Office of General 
Counsel, provides comprehensive guidance and training reasonably 
designed to instill consistency in penalties for actions taken pursuant 
to 38 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  713 and 714.
    10. The VA Secretary ensures the provision of comprehensive 
guidance and training to relevant disciplinary officials to maintain 
compliance with the mandatory adverse action criteria outlined in 38 
U.S.C. Sec.  731.
    11. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection makes certain that in any disciplinary action recommended by 
the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection, all relevant 
evidence is provided to the VA Secretary (or the disciplinary officials 
designated to act on the Secretary's behalf).

    FINDING 4

    12. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection implements safeguards consistent with statutory mandates to 
maintain the confidentiality of employees that make submissions, 
including guidelines for communications with other VA components.
    13. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection leverages available resources, such as VA's National Center 
for Organizational Development and the Office of Resolution Management, 
to conduct an organizational assessment of Office of Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection employee concerns and develop an appropriate 
action plan to strengthen Office of Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection workforce engagement and satisfaction.
    14. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection develops a process and training for the Triage Division 
staff to identify and address potential retaliatory investigations.

    FINDING 5

    15. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection collaborates with the Assistant Secretary for Human 
Resources and Administration, and the VA Secretary to develop 
performance plan requirements as required by 38 U.S.C. Sec.  732.
    16. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection ensures the implementation of whistleblower disclosure 
training to all VA employees as required under 38 U.S.C. Sec.  733.
    17. The VA Secretary makes certain supervisors' training is 
implemented as required under Sec.  209 of the VA Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017.
    18. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection confers with the VA Office of General Counsel to develop 
processes for collecting and tracking justification information related 
to proposed disciplinary action modifications consistent with 38 U.S.C. 
Sec.  323(f)(2).
    19. The VA Secretary in consultation with the Office of General 
Counsel and the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection ensures compliance with the 60-day reporting 
requirement in 38 U.S.C. Sec.  323(f)(2) consistent with congressional 
intent.
    20. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection develops or enhances data base systems to provide the 
capability to track all data required by the VA Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017.

    FINDING 6

    21. In consultation with the VA Office of General Counsel, the 
Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower Protection 
completes the publication of Systems of Records Notices for all systems 
of records maintained by the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection, and adopts procedures reasonably designed to ensure that 
the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection does not 
create additional systems of records without complying with the 
requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974.
    22. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection consults with the VA Chief Freedom of Information Act 
Officer to ensure adequate training and staffing of the Office of 
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection's Freedom of Information 
Act Office, and establishes procedures to comply with FOIA requirements 
including timeliness.

                                 [all]