[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WITH AMERICAN LIVES ON THE LINE,
LESSONS FOR MANAGING THE RUSSIA THREAT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
July 10, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-126
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
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______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-241 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and The Environment
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois, Ranking
GREGORY MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
DAVID TRONE, Maryland RON WRIGHT, Texas
JIM COSTA, California MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
Gabrielle Gould, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Panetta, The Honorable Leon, Chairman, The Panetta Institute for
Public Policy (Former United States Secretary of Defense,
Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Former
White House Chief of Staff).................................... 9
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 38
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 39
Hearing Attendance............................................... 40
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Gonzalez........................................ 41
WITH AMERICAN LIVES ON THE LINE, LESSONS FOR MANAGING THE RUSSIA THREAT
Friday, July 10, 2020
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
Energy, and the Environment,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC,.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m., in
via Webex, Hon. William R. Keating (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Keating. The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee will
come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any point. All members will have 5
days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions
for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
To insert something in the record, please have your staff email
the previously mentioned address or contact full committee
staff.
Please keep your video function on at all times, even when
you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible
for muting and unmuting themselves. Please remember to mute
yourself after you have finished.
Consistent with House Resolution 965 and accompanying
regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as
appropriate, when they are not under recognition, to eliminate
background noise.
I see that we have a quorum present. I really want to thank
everyone on a Friday for doing this. It is an important issue.
I will now recognize myself for opening remarks.
Pursuant to the notice, we are holding a hearing to discuss
``With American Lives on the Line, Lessons for Managing the
Russia Threat.''
Two weeks ago, the startling revelations broke that Russia
put bounties on American troops serving in Afghanistan. This
week, in the Foreign Affairs Committee, we have been examining
this egregious attack on Americans and the Trump
administration's failure to handle it appropriately.
I think it is important for the public to know this. I have
personally been involved in four hearings this week alone that
have dealt with this issue, and that does not include the
actions of other committees working on their own.
So I just want to underscore to the people listening that
they should know that we in Congress are taking oversight of
this matter very seriously.
Party politics and everything aside, the one thing, if we
do nothing else, one of the most basic and most fundamental
duties is to do everything in our power to keep Americans safe.
We owe it to the servicemembers whose lives were lost in
Afghanistan. We owe it to their families. We owe it to every
member of our military and every American serving abroad who
puts their life on the line every day in service of our
country.
On Tuesday the subcommittee heard from former U.S.
officials and experts on the Kremlin's network for malign
actors and systems of corruption that oppress the Russian
people and sustain its criminal actions, and hybrid warfare.
That, in your submitted testimony, Secretary Panetta, you note,
may be even more dangerous than the threats we faced during the
cold war.
While invited, it is regrettable that Secretary Pompeo
declined to participate yesterday in our full committee
hearing. This is part of a pattern of failure to recognize the
importance of a unitedand unambiguous U.S. response to the
escalating threats we face from the Kremlin.
The members of our committee have many questions about what
happened, and with the questions of murdered servicemembers at
hand, it would have been helpful, to say the least, to hear
from the Secretary himself as we reckon with the gravity of
this issue.
To his credit, Secretary of Defense Esper appeared before
the House Armed Services Committee yesterday, and in response
to my questioning he acknowledged that he had seen reports of
payments in response to attacks on our troops.
Today we are honored to be joined by Secretary Leon
Panetta, a dedicated public servant who shaped U.S. national
security policy for decades and whose perspective and range of
experience on these issues is, frankly, unparalleled.
Having himself served in the U.S. House of Representatives,
Secretary Panetta is familiar with the important role the
legislative branch plays in shaping our national security
trajectory. Secretary Panetta later served in multiple
executive functions under two Presidential administrations,
including as Secretary of Defense, Director of the CIA, and
White House Chief of Staff.
We are fortunate to have you joining us today because as we
try to understand what transpired in the Kremlin's bounty
scheme, and how much of the Trump administration knew about it
or not, your experience is uniquely instructive. You are
someone who has been responsible for American troops abroad,
for managing a primary element of our intelligence apparatus,
and for ensuring the President has access to the intelligence
and resources he needs to carry out the duties of that office.
Furthermore, Secretary Panetta has overseen and shaped U.S.
policy toward Russia throughout the course of his career.
Beyond the specific instance of Kremlin aggression against
Americans abroad, the resounding takeaway from this week in all
the hearings so far is we have no Russia policy.
In its place, we have a misguided, ill-defined, impulsive,
and, frankly, dangerous series of actions prioritizing the
interests of the Kremlin over the dedicated efforts of our
intelligence community, diplomats, and career civil servants.
The sacrifices of our military and the American national
security interests should, as always, remain paramount.
There has been no shortage of information available to
President Trump about Russia's malign activities, and yet it
has been one gift to Putin after another, whether it is pulling
out of the European-supported INF and Open Skies treaties;
withdrawing our forces from Syria without notice to our allies
who had troops on the ground; Helsinki; his intent to reduce a
quarter of our troops in Germany; inviting Russia back to a
reconstituted G8; pulling funds from the European Deterrence
Initiative, which was meant to deter Russian aggression; or
casting blame toward Ukraine when our intelligence community
had proved Russia was responsible for the attack on our 2016
election.
We have been hearing all week that Putin pays attention and
responds to the actions taken by the United States in concert
with our allies. Yet the message I hear loud and clear from
President Trump is: You can do whatever you want because we
will not hold you accountable.
That is unacceptable. How long do we have to wait for a
policy toward Russia that prioritizes, above all else, keeping
Americans safe?
That is why these hearings this week are so important, and
why I was so pleased to have you joining us today, Secretary
Panetta. We are looking forward to hearing from you about your
perspective on where we must go here, as a country, in our
policy and posture toward Russia.
You have seen successes and failures, and we are running
out of time to get this right.
I now yield to Ranking Member Representative Kinzinger for
his opening statement.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Chairman Keating, for
calling this hearing.
And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for joining us today.
Since the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Russia has shown not
only a willingness but an eagerness to develop, test, and
deploy an advanced set of tools to undermine democracy and
Western institutions around the world.
While Russia and its Soviet predecessors have used foreign
forces to carry out proxy wars against the West, the reports
that Russian military intelligence, often referred to as the
GRU, set up a bounty program for American soldiers in
Afghanistan shows an emboldened Vladimir Putin.
Let's remember that this is the same unit that is
responsible for interfering in our elections, using chemical
weapons against Russian defectors living under NATO protection,
and invaded Ukraine, a NATO aspirational nation and an EU
priority partner.
More recently we have seen the Russian mercenaries
supporting genocide in Syria, fueling conflict in Libya, and
propping up the corrupt Maduro regime.
The fact that Putin is trying to harass the United States
and Afghanistan should not come as a big surprise. The question
remains, though, what does Putin gain from this bounty program
and why does he feel emboldened to carry it out? I believe that
Putin wants United States to fail in Afghanistan just like his
country did nearly four decades ago.
While some of my colleagues will likely try to paint this
administration as weak on Russia, I do not believe that is what
is driving Putin's agenda. Lenin once said: You probe with
bayonets. If you find mush, you proceed. If you find steel, you
withdraw.
Over the past decade, Putin has found mostly mush when
probing the United States. As Congress, we must come together
and be the steel that forces Putin to think again.
The first step is recognizing the nature of warfare has
changed. Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, many in the
West believed that we would usher in an era of perpetual peace.
Countries around the world, the U.S. included, gave up on cold
war policies that made Western institutions the standard bearer
in a post-Soviet world.
However, the Russians adapted, learned from their mistakes,
and reinvigorated their tactics to fit the 21st century. They
have been operating within a gray space that is neither war nor
peace, and we must now change how we respond to these clear
provocations.
Contrary to popular belief, this administration has pushed
back against Putin. Take the incident in 2018, when Wagner
mercenaries and forces loyal to Assad attacked U.S. troops in
Syria. Within 4 hours, hundreds of Russians and Syrians were
neutralized. The Wagner Group did not provokaye U.S. forces
ever again.
Not every provocation from Russia can be met with kinetic
action. In fact, on the contrary, our greatest weapon is the
alliance of like-minded nations that have defended freedom
since 1949.
It is in our best interest to work with our allies, much
like we did throughout the cold war, to develop and implement a
strategy to counter Putin's malign activity. Much like Putin
did over the past decade, we need to dust off the old cold war
playbook to confront the Russian threat.
The good news is that despite all of Putin's foreign
operations, he has not benefited domestically. Nearly 50
percent of Russians opposed waiving Presidential term limits
for Putin, nearly 60 percent believe the President should not
be as old as Putin is, and only 25 percent of the Russian
people trust Putin's plan for their country. If this does not
demonstrate that Putin's strategy failed, I do not know what
does.
Again, I want to thank Secretary Panetta for joining us
today. We will have plenty to talk about.
And with that, I will yield back to you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative Kinzinger.
I will now introduce our witness.
And, again, thank you for being here today again.
Secretary Leon E. Panetta is chairman of the Panetta
Institute for Public Policy. His distinguished career in public
service, as I mentioned before, includes serving as the 23rd
United States Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, White House Chief of Staff to President
Bill Clinton, Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
and most importantly, as a Member of the U.S. House of
Representatives from California.
I will now recognize the witness for 5 minutes.
And without objection, your prepared written statement will
be made part of the record.
You are now recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LEON PANETTA, CHAIRMAN, THE PANETTA
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (FORMER UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
AND FORMER WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF)
Mr. Panetta. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would like to
submit my testimony for the record, and if I could, try to
summarize it for your benefit.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be able to
testify about the significant threat that all of you recognize
from Russia and the threat that Russia poses to our troops and
our democracy and our Nation.
I had the honor to serve in the House for 16 years, from
1977 through 1993. It was the height of the cold war between
the United States and the Soviet Union, through the end of the
Vietnam era, the Reagan buildup, the fall of the Berlin Wall.
And I have to tell you, during that time Congress played an
enormously important role in conducting oversight, whether it
was a Republican administration or Democratic administration,
to ensure that our national security interests were protected
during that cold war.
I want to commend all of you, Mr. Chairman, and all of your
members, for your continuing critical oversight to make sure
that we protect our country.
Let me begin by making clear that there is little question
that we are in a new chapter of the cold war with Russia. But
this new chapter, with Vladimir Putin's Russian Federation, is
in some ways more dangerous than what we faced with the old
Soviet Union.
With the Soviet Union, we were in rough parity with our
nuclear capabilities. They knew our strength, we knew their
strength, and in some ways that gave us leverage to be able to
deal with them from a position of strength.
To deal with Vladimir Putin, you have to deal with him from
a position of strength. If he senses weakness on the part of
the United States then, make no mistake, he will take advantage
of it, because he knows he does not have to pay a price. And
thus we have seen him take advantage of it through his
aggression in Crimea, in the Ukraine, in Syria, in the U.S.
election process, in Libya, in Afghanistan, and other places.
The point is very clear, and I think it is clear to all of
you, that if we fail to draw lines on Putin, if we do not make
clear where those lines are and make clear that he will not be
allowed to cross those lines, then he will continue to be
encouraged to be aggressive.
The principal point is this. In this new cold war chapter
what is required is a resolute, clear-eyed, strong, unambiguous
leadership from the President and the rest of our government
that is informed by our diplomatic, military, and intelligence
professionals and guided by the need to protect our national
security interests. That has got to be the message that Putin
hears.
Some of you may remember President Bush once said that he
looked into Putin's eyes and saw somebody that he thought he
would be able to deal with. My friend and former colleague, Bob
Gates, said that he too looked into Putin's eyes and saw KGB,
KGB, KGB.
Putin believes that the glory of the former Soviet State
must be restored. He believes the fall of the Iron Curtain
brought with it an era of weakness in Russia, and he is
determined to return Russia to the status of a global
superpower. And the key to that strategy is to undermine the
United States and to weaken our country and weaken our foreign
policy.
But Putin has his own problems. The Russian population is
aging, it is shrinking. By the economy, Russia is struggling.
There is a mix of an overburdened socialist State with a very
corrupt core of oligarchs who have literally stolen billions of
dollars from the Russian people. They have serious social and
economic issues.
No democracy would tolerate the kind of mismanagement and
corruption that we have seen there, and that is why Putin has
done away with any semblance of democracy. He has pushed
through constitutional referendums, as we know, just recently,
that allows him to be a virtual dictator through 2036.
Russia's strategy to restoring its superpower status is
dependent on the following elements.
First, they clearly want to undermine NATO and its key
missions. NATO has been a barrier to the ability of Russia to
expand back to the Soviet State.
Second, they want to undermine U.S. military presence in
Europe. By that presence, our forces in Europe have been a
check on Russian ambitions.
Third, he wants to reinsert the Russian regime back into
the G7 to be able to regain the status that they lost when they
were kicked out because of their invasion of the Crimea.
Fourth, they believe that interfering in United States and
other Western elections has sown chaos and discord, and they
are seeking an election result in all areas that are favorable
to Russia.
And last, they have developed and in some ways perfected
hybrid warfare. Russia cannot match the U.S. in a force-on-
force conflict, but they have developed asymmetric power,
hybrid power. They have used a mix of civilian-military
capabilities to undertake deniable, lethal, covert operations,
they have engaged, obviously, in election interference, the
recruitment of spies and agents, the theft of technology, they
have taken prisoners, all to gain geostrategic leverage without
triggering conventional conflict with the West.
What we saw with the latest intelligence of the possibility
that Russians were using bounties in many ways comes right out
of Putin's playbook. I have not read the intelligence
assessment, but I think we all need to take these reports very
seriously, because, as I said, it fits Putin's playbook, the
playbook that he has used as a result of his concerns in
Afghanistan and other areas.
He still resents what the United States did in Charlie
Wilson's War, when we kicked the Soviet Union out of
Afghanistan in the 1980's. He believes we have used the Afghan
war as a pretext to position U.S. military and intelligence
assets on the doorstep of Russia.
And he resents the fact that the Afghan war has been a NATO
mission. His goal is to fracture NATO, and their sense is, the
best way to fracture NATO is to bring them down in Afghanistan,
which is the graveyard of empire.
He pays mercenary forces to come after us, and that is very
consistent with Putin's methods. They developed the Wagner
Group to attack our forces in Syria, take over oil facilities
in Libya. They have conducted assassination attempts in the
U.K. against former spies. And, obviously, they have conducted
this bold attack in our own democracy in the 2016 election.
The assessment is very clear: There is no question here
that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence
campaign in the 2016 election aimed at trying to influence what
happened in the U.S. Presidential election.
And they further assessed--and this is something we have
just got to continue to remind ourselves--that Putin is going
to apply the same lessons in the current election in this
country, as well as in elections that are taking place with our
U.S. allies.
This is not a hoax, it is a real threat, it works, and you
can look at the consequences. It has strained relations between
the United States and NATO allies. There was even the
possibility at one point that we might pull out of NATO. And,
very frankly, the entire military structure we have used to
contain Russia could fall apart if we did that.
They have paid no price for annexing Crimea, and,
obviously, they believe that the President has, in many ways,
given Russia and Putin a pass on Crimea and the Ukraine. They
have seen a United States that is slow to enforce sanctions--
sanctions passed by the Congress, by you.
And although the President invited Russia back into the G7,
the reality is that that invitation contained no concession on
the part of the Russians.
The U.S. also is set to redeploy 9,500 U.S. forces from
Germany, forces that are critical to signaling U.S. resolve
with our allies.
What are the steps required to counter this Russian threat?
Let me end by summarizing them.
One, I do believe we have to make clear where the lines are
that cannot be crossed, make very clear that he will not get
away with attacks on our forces, and that we will respond,
through diplomatic isolation, through sanctions, and through
military force if necessary.
We have to recommit to the NATO alliance. Look, Russia and
China are our primary adversaries at this point in time, and
what is the one thing that they cannot do? They cannot form
alliances. They fear alliances. And so our ability to develop
and maintain alliances is one of our best weapons against those
adversaries.
Third, we have to make sure that we do protect free and
fair elections in this country, free from Russian interference.
And fourth, we do have to read and listen to intelligence
assessments about Russia. This is information that is gathered
at great risk. Our intelligence professionals--and you have
heard from many of them--have spent their careers analyzing the
Russian Federation and Putin. They understand what Putin is up
to, and they can be very helpful in providing a heads-up to the
President and to this country about what Putin is trying to do.
Look, no leader--no leader--can act responsibly for this
country without good intelligence. That is the bottom line.
Fifth, I think it is important to suspend the actions to
redeploy forces from Europe. This is the wrong time to be
moving forces out of Europe. And again, it sends, I believe, a
message of weakness to Russia.
We have to finally rededicate ourselves to the values that
make America strong and free. At the end of the day, what Putin
fears the most, very frankly, is our values. They threaten the
power he is trying to consolidate. Freedom of the press,
freedom of speech, equality of all citizens, all of that
undermines the strength that he is trying to assert in Russia.
The greatest threat to Putin is the values that are our
greatest strength in this country.
So let me conclude by saying, the United States has to be
clear with Putin. We cannot afford to send mixed messages to an
adversary. We must make clear that there are lines that we will
not allow Russia to cross.
One of those lines has to be that we will not tolerate any
involvement by Russia in killing U.S. men and women who are
putting their lives on the line for this country.
Look, as Secretary of Defense and CIA Director, I was
involved in deploying our young men and women into harm's way.
I had to go to Dover to receive our fallen heroes and give
condolences to their families on behalf of a grateful Nation.
This is about life and death. Life and death.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I think all
of us owe it to our troops and to their families to answer a
very simple question: What did our government do to protect our
troops? And if Russia did put a price on the heads of our men
and women in combat, what price will Russia pay for doing this?
Americans are entitled to know that we did everything necessary
to protect our troops, our national security, and our
democracy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Panetta follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony,
the comprehensive breadth that you gave to that.
I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each, pursuant
to the House rules. All time yielded is for the purposes of
questioning our witness.
Because of the virtual format of the hearing, I will be
recognizing members by committee seniority, alternating between
Democrats and Republicans. And if any of you miss your turn,
please let your staff know, and we will circle back to you. If
you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone and
address the chair verbally. And I will start this by
recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Secretary, I would like to start where you ended your
opening remarks. In my life, in my younger years, the most
sensitive conversations I had with my father and my grandmother
were when they were talking about the circumstances around
which my uncle was killed in action. It left an indelible
imprint in my mind and my values.
So I agree with you, this is about being responsible and
respecting our servicemen and--women and families who lost
loved ones.
And so I just want to underscore your point, honoring our
fallen heroes and their loved ones would mean taking action--
taking action--creating consequences, to hold Putin and the
Kremlin accountable, correct.
Also, I just want to start with your background in terms of
your intelligence background. I would like to turn next to the
intelligence aspect of this.
Would it have been plausible in the administrations that
you served in for this type of intelligence not to have been
briefed to the President? Not just the initial briefing, but
briefings before there were six calls, six personal calls from
March thereafter between the President and Putin; before
slashing funds for the European Deterrence Initiative, which
was set up to curb Russian aggression; before inviting Russia
and Putin to the newly constructed G8, after they were thrown
out for their aggressive actions in Ukraine that resulted in
13,000-plus Ukraine deaths; and before ordering a quarter of
our troops out of Germany. Is it plausible that there would not
be a briefing in the administrations you served with in any of
those instances?
Mr. Panetta. The role of Commander in Chief is to be able
to support and defend our men and women in uniform who do put
their lives on the line in order to protect our country. And if
we received intelligence--frankly, as you have heard,
intelligence that is presented as part of the PDB varies in
terms of its credibility. And it can be low credibility, it can
be moderate, it can be high credibility.
But if there is intelligence that indicates that there is a
possibility that the Russians were putting a bounty or putting
a price on the heads of men and women in uniform, that
intelligence would be brought to the attention of the President
immediately, because that does involve the lives of our men and
women in uniform, that does involve the responsibility that the
President and our military leaders have to be able to protect
those that are out there in combat.
So I find it very surprising that that kind of information
was not brought directly to the President of the United States.
I think that the National Security Advisor, I think those who
provide the intelligence briefings to the President, have an
obligation--an obligation--to bring that kind of sensitive
intelligence to the attention of the President of the United
States.
Mr. Keating. Well, quickly, Mr. Secretary, if I could,
there has been a lot of discussion about the levels of
certainty. And again, given your background, would it be
something--maybe you can give us some--shed some light on these
things.
It would not be random or noncorroborated at all, in your
experience, if something was brought to the Presidential Daily
Briefing, if it was information, it was shared--very high
intelligence information--shared with an ally like the U.K.,
and that has been reported in this instance, so they could
protect their troops? Or maybe you could tell us about the CIA
WIR, the World Intelligence Review, and these are significant
benchmarks of intelligence.
I am almost out of time, but if you can just shed some
light, because this seems to be the discussion of the week.
Mr. Panetta. Well, again, there is no question that,
certainly when I was Director of the CIA, if we had information
that that was taking place and it involved our NATO allies,
that we would immediately share that with our allies so that
they would be aware of it as well, because it involves their
lives.
And so, first of all, it would be shared with our allies.
But most importantly, it is the kind of intelligence that I
think it is the duty of those in the White House and in the
intelligence community to bring that information to the
President. Even though they may think it is not fully
corroborated, even though they may think it is not fully backed
up, that does not make any difference. That is very sensitive
intelligence information that the President of the United
States should know and should act upon.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. That is right on point, and thank
you for answering it so directly.
I now call on Representative Kinzinger, who can have the
additional time that I took if he so desires, to go over the 5
minutes.
Representative Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
I think the question of was the President briefed, I mean,
I believe he was not. I believe that we can debate, and I think
it is probably a good debate within the administration, of
whether he should have been, because as the Secretary
mentioned, it is a pretty serious accusation. I am not sure if
the intel was to the point yet of actionable, and so I think a
decision was made there.
You know, one of my concerns about this is Russia and,
quite honestly, foreign policy should be a bipartisan issue.
And I think--and it is nobody on this committee, and I mean
that--but some people quickly jump to accusations of ``the
President loves Russia'' and this kind of stuff, and I think
what that does is it makes it more likely that this becomes
partisan and that both sides get defensive.
But that said, I think we need to get to the bottom of it,
and I think it is a very, very serious accusation that we
should find out if true.
Mr. Secretary, do the Russians want to accelerate the U.S.
withdrawal in Afghanistan? Do they want to bog us down in the
country for the next decade? Or does the outcome not matter for
them?
Mr. Panetta. I think the answer is ``yes'' to all of the
above, because I think their interest is to try to undermine
the position of the United States there. And they are going to
take advantage of every opportunity.
I mean, if they think--and I think this is probably the
more likely scenario--if they think that the President is going
to be trying to remove our forces from Afghanistan, they are
going to try to do everything possible to try to encourage that
result.
And I think part of what was involved in this possible
intelligence was that they were trying to, obviously, get
Americans killed, have those bodies returned to Dover, and have
those families basically say that enough is enough, and urge
the President to bring those troops home. I think that was part
of the game here.
But in my experience the Russians were involved in a number
of ways with the Taliban and with our enemies, either providing
support or providing weapons, to try to assist those that were
going after American men and women.
Mr. Kinzinger. So let me ask you two questions then--and I
think the point you make is extremely important--two specific
questions.
If this intel is proven correct and we get whatever, high
confidence, we find out it is correct, what do you think we
should do in response?
And then also, if you could piggyback on that, what do you
think we should do with regards to the, quote/unquote, peace
deal?
I disagree with a lot of what the administration is doing
on Afghanistan, to be very clear. I think it is a relatively
minor investment for what the alternative would be if we left.
But if you could answer those, that would be great.
Mr. Panetta. Look, I think it is very important that if
this information is further corroborated, that the President of
the United States has to make very clear--and the President has
to do this--the President has to make very clear to Russia and
to Putin that we will not tolerate this kind of behavior and
that we are going to take all necessary action to protect and
defend our forces.
He needs to get that message. We do not have to go into
particulars. But I think that larger message needs to be sent,
that this is not to be tolerated.
With regards to the situation in Afghanistan, I think we
have got to be very careful not to make the same mistake we
made in Iraq.
And I was concerned about that because I thought if we
withdrew all of our forces there and did not continue to have a
presence in Iraq, in trying to work with their security forces,
with their intelligence forces, to be able to deal with al-
Qaeda and try to make sure that they did not restore any kind
of power in Iraq, that what would happen is exactly what did
happen, which is the creation of ISIS, and then the invasion,
and then the necessity for the United States to go back in and
try to defend that.
Now, if we just suddenly pull out all of our forces out of
Afghanistan and do not have some kind of rational basis on
which to maintain a presence, to make sure that the Taliban
does not take control of that country and that al-Qaeda and
ISIS do not take control of that country, then I think we are
making a big mistake.
So it is not so much whether or not we ought to look at the
possibility of withdrawing some of our forces there. The bigger
question for me is, are you taking steps to make sure that you
are not handing Afghanistan back to those who attacked us on 9/
11?
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. And, Mr. Secretary, a great deal
of respect for you. Thank you for being here.
The last thing I will say is, in Afghanistan the difference
between the Russians and us is the Afghan people want us there.
It is 80 or 90 percent agreement.
So with that, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary. I
yield back.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. [Inaudible] Is Mr. Meeks of New York.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. Thank you for
being here. And thank you for being the great patriot that you
are and all that you have done.
You have talked, and listening to your testimony today, you
observed that the administration has been slow to enforce the
sanctions against Russia.
So now, in light of the credible allegations that the
Russian Government put bounties on our U.S. armed services in
Afghanistan, my question is, can you talk to the effectiveness
of the United States' current sanctions regime?
And are the sanctions that we have in place now an
effective instrument to counter what I call Putinism? That is
President Putin's brand of authoritarianism and economic
kleptocracy.
And how would you counter those who say, because some say
Putin's approval ratings may be on the decline, but sanctions
have done little to deter Russian aggression worldwide.
So what would you say about that and about what we need to
do and what kind of sanctions we should put in place?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, thank you for that question.
Look, I would urge the administration to look at their
approach to sanctions against Iran and apply those same
sanctions, same processes, that they have applied there. And
they have applied very strong sanctions against Iran in every
area. We have gone after their banking capability. We have gone
after their ability to sell oil. We have gone after the very
heart of their economic ability to stay alive. We have done
that.
And the argument by the administration is that continuing
to press on those sanctions is, in their minds, what will bring
Iran ultimately to the table to negotiate.
Now, I am not sure that is going to be the ultimate
approach here. But what I am saying to the administration, I
think what should be said to the administration, take the same
approach that you are using against one adversary, Iran, and
apply exactly the same kind of pressures with regards to
Russia. Because if we did, mark my words, it would send a clear
signal to Putin that we are serious about making sure that they
stop the aggression that they have been involved with.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you for that. I think that that gives us
more work that we could do in Congress as far as passing those
similar-type sanctions that you just indicated that we have on
Iran, on Russia, and see what the President does with that.
Because as I said in yesterday's hearing, for his silence,
not even saying that he is going to go after and check out
everything, and if there is anything that is possible to be
found he is going to go after them, we have not heard that. We
have not heard anything from the administration. And silence,
in my viewpoint, is complicit to a large degree.
And when it comes to our men and women who are putting
their lives on the line, we have got to stand up for them in
that regard.
And in my last few minutes, you also testified about the
strong support and the need for us to make sure that NATO--in
our Transatlantic Economic Relations Subcommittee, of which I
am the co-chair, of the NATO PA, we have had this conversation
going back and forth, and I make the case that a strong NATO is
beneficial to the United States and our transatlantic
relations, just as you have.
So you have explained to a large degree why the U.S.
support for the Euro-Atlantic security institutions, like NATO,
serve as the bulkhead against Russian aggression and that we do
not need to withdraw our troops from Germany. So can you better
say how we should send that message to the American people, so
that they know that we need to make this stronger case about
how important NATO is to us and our national security
interests?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I am a strong believer in the importance
of our NATO relationship. As both Director of the CIA and also
as Secretary of Defense, I cannot tell you how important it was
to be able to work with our allies, not only in sharing
intelligence, but in doing security work together and in taking
steps to be able to protect the security of Europe and of the
United States.
I mean, we could not have done that without NATO. This goes
back to what Harry Truman did, for God's sakes, in establishing
not only NATO, but the Marshall Plan and the other steps that
were taken, in order to contain Russia. And they have been
successful, I think in some measure were responsible for
bringing down the Berlin Wall.
So I am a big believer that we need to maintain our NATO
alliance and to maintain our presence there.
I think the President ought to do two things.
No. 1, make clear to Russia that we will not tolerate the
Russians doing anything to target our men and women in uniform.
Two, that we are going to maintain our force strength in
Germany and elsewhere as part of our NATO commitment to ensure
that Russia will not take any steps of aggression against other
former Soviet States.
And third, I think, diplomatically, strengthening those
sanctions you talked about should be part of the package, so
that Putin gets a clear message that we are not going to
tolerate his behavior. That message of strength will take us a
long way toward making clear that Putin is going to pay a price
for behaving the way he does. And right now, that message is
not there.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Representative Brian Fitzpatrick from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
calling such an amazing and highly respected witness.
And, Mr. Secretary, I always say this when I talk to you,
the apple does not fall far from the tree with your son, the
finest man I know.
And thank you for being you, thank you for always putting
your country ahead of your party. Because of that, you have
more respect than you realize across the political spectrum,
including from every Republican that I know. And I wish we
could clone and replicate you, sir.
So I just wanted to say that at the outset.
Two things. And I had to jump off, so I do not know if this
question was asked before. No. 1, with regard to--because in
your role as Director of the CIA--if you could just help me and
the panel and my colleagues understand how the Presidential
Daily Briefing works, as far as inclusion, exclusion, what gets
orally briefed versus what does not, and to what extent
different people should be held responsible regarding
omissions.
And my second question is, with regard to Vladimir Putin,
who you probably understand better than any of us, what do you
believe his ultimate goals are, and what do you believe his
greatest fear is? Because it is always helpful to know what
these people fear. What do you think he fears?
Mr. Panetta. Okay. Thank you for that question.
You have had some testimony to this respect, but basically
what we do with the Presidential Daily Brief is to summarize
all of the intelligence that has come in during that evening
that involves threats to the United States. I mean, it can
contain other information, but it is largely dealing with
threats that are out there.
And there is a lot of work done to scrub the information
that comes in. There is a great deal of information that comes
in from all of our sources around the world, and so there is a
process of trying to scrub down what is the key intelligence
that we are receiving and that the President should be informed
of. That is contained then in the PDB.
For those of you that have not seen a PDB, it can be a
number of pages, depending on the intelligence that has come
across, but it is not--you know, I understand the President's
reluctance to look at some of that stuff. I have to tell you,
it is not a very comforting read when you look at the PDB,
because you are reading about all the threats that are possible
against the United States, and it can start your day off on the
wrong foot by virtue of that.
But nevertheless, it is important information that the
President needs to have and that other policymakers need to
have.
And so when it is presented to the President in the
briefings, I mean, do not forget, this PDB is circulated not
just to the President, it is circulated to other key
individuals in the administration--the National Security
Advisor, to the Chief of Staff, to the Cabinet, key Cabinet
members, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State--so that all
of them are briefed.
I mean, normally a briefer is assigned to all of those key
people. And the briefer will go through the PDB. I mean, your
first responsibility is to read the PDB, and it is, as I said,
it is a lengthy read. So it is important to have a good
briefer.
The briefer will sit down and go through the key elements
of the briefing and highlight key information and respond to
your questions. That is usually what is done, and I am sure it
is done with the President and with these other individuals.
So in some ways, even though the briefer may not have
touched on everything, it is the responsibility of the person
who gets the PDB to read the damn thing. And as I said, I know
it is tough. I know it can be time consuming. But there is a
lot of important information there.
So I am a little concerned that other people who, if this
was, in fact, contained in the PDB, why others did not raise
this as well as a result of it. It is not just up to the
briefer. It is also up to the individual who has to read the
PDB.
With regards to Putin, I do not think there is any
question, as I mentioned--and I think Bob Gates got it right--
this guy is a KGB officer. He thinks like a KGB officer. He is
immersed in all of the tactics and the methods of spies. That
is what he cares about.
I will tell you just quickly one incidence. When we were
dealing with ten Russian agents who had been planted here in
the United States, and we were able to discover that they were
there, we arrested them and we tried to work out--and we did--
work out a trade with Russia.
At the time I talked to my Russian counterpart, with the
intelligence there, and I said: Will you agree to this trade?
And he said at that time--and Putin was not even President--he
said: We have to talk to Putin about whether or not we can make
this trade. So Putin had his hands on all of that, the
intelligence, in trade, that goes on.
His goals are to really restore the former Soviet Union. He
thinks that that was a great tragedy, that they were weakened.
And I think his goal is to gradually do what he did in Crimea
with regards to others, other countries that were former
members of the Soviet State.
His greatest fear--his greatest fear--is that if the United
States remains strong and remains true to our values, that
ultimately, if we can work with our allies, that we can weaken
Russia and bring them down the same way that the former Soviet
Union went down. That is what he fears. And that is why his
primary goal is to undermine our strength and undermine our
values.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Very helpful for that perspective, Mr.
Secretary. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Mr. David Cicilline from Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
convening this hearing.
Mr. Panetta, Mr. Secretary, just to let you know, the
admiration of your son is bipartisan. So we all feel a
tremendous honor to serve with him.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you for your extraordinary service to
our country.
As you said, we have no more sacred responsibility than to
honor the lives lost in defense of our country. And sharing
words of appreciation is not sufficient. We must act consistent
with that obligation, and our most basic response has to be to
condemn this action, punish it, and deter it from ever
happening again.
And, of course, the President has to understand that his
responsibility as Commander in Chief to support and defend our
men and women in uniform goes beyond trying to plan a military
parade, but actually is fundamentally his most important
responsibility.
And when the briefing was provided to the senior members of
our caucus at the White House, Mr. Hoyer came out of that
briefing and said, ``Nothing in this briefing that we have just
received led me to believe it is a hoax,'' which is what the
President claimed. And Mr. Engel, the chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, said the American people deserve to know why
the President did not condemn Vladimir Putin: ``For God's sake,
these are our soldiers, and if we are not going to protect
them, what are we going to do?''
And so my question is, the National Security Advisor, Mr.
O'Brien, began to prepare options for the President to consider
in response to this intelligence. And so my first question is,
is it the normal case that there has to be some level of
intelligence before the difficult process of developing a set
of options to respond occurs?
And second, in order to be included in the Presidential
Daily Brief there has to be some intelligence to support it,
whether it is moderate, high, or low confidence. But the
Presidential Daily Brief does include rumors or innuendos or
unsupportedallegations, is that fair to say?
Mr. Panetta. Absolutely. The intelligence that is there
ranges across a vast spectrum of credibility. But let me just
give you an example.
If there were intelligence there that a nuclear weapon had
been planted someplace in Washington, DC, and let's assume that
there just was not a lot of credibility assigned to it, but
just the mere fact that there may be a nuclear weapon in
Washington, DC, is significant enough that you better damn well
alert the President of the United States to that possibility.
Mr. Cicilline. Yes. And I think the challenge and the
question that I had, Mr. Secretary, is sort of the elephant in
the room, and that is, you have spokayen a lot about strong
condemnations, about not moving troops out of Europe, a number
of steps, working more closely with our allies.
But these are suggestions you made in the context of a
President who from the day he took office has expressed
admiration for Vladimir Putin, has described Russian
interference in our Presidential campaign as a hoax, stood at
Helsinki and sided with Vladimir Putin against the U.S.
intelligence community.
And so my question is two-part, is, what can we do in that
context where the President of the United States refuses to do
all the things you described? Can Congress substitute in a
meaningful way?
And the second part of that question is, what damage does
it do and what does Vladimir Putin think when he hears the
President say those things and behave that way in terms of
future aggression?
Mr. Panetta. Well, as all of you know, you know, the
Members of Congress, obviously, you can play a very important
role in terms of oversight. You can play a very important role
in terms of trying to move legislation that will send a
message. You can play a very important role in terms of what
you do to educate your constituencies about these issues. But,
in the end, it is the President of the United States who is
Commander in Chief and who has the power to be able to speak on
behalf of the United States to our foreign adversaries.
I find it really difficult--and, you know, as a former
Chief of Staff, having worked with the National Security
Advisor--that they would not, when this issue came up, make
very clear that the President needs to speak to this issue to
Putin and to the country about this possibility. And, you know,
they could have made references to the questions they have
about the credibility of the intelligence, but the fact is that
that intelligence is so critical because it does involve the
lives of our men and women in uniform.
I mean, look, you know, as Secretary of Defense and, I am
sure, as many of you have gone abroad, and you look into the
eyes of our men and women in uniform, and these are brave young
people who are willing to fight and die for this country. I
mean, talk about getting a sense of confidence about what the
strength of America is. Look into the eyes of our men and women
in uniform and what they are willing to do. And, if you do
that, then we owe them every step necessary to help protect
their lives.
And so, when you get this kind of information, I think the
National Security Advisor, I think the Chief of Staff, I think
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State should have
gone immediately to the President of the United States and
said, you need to issue a statement that makes clear to Russia
that this should not happen.
I mean, rather than having the President say, ``Well, I
never saw it,'' or, ``Nobody ever told me,'' and having the
National Security Advisor say, ``Well, you know, it just was
not the right kind of intelligence to present to the
President,'' I mean, push all of that aside. The fundamental
issue is, are you going to protect our forces? Are you going to
protect our men and women in uniform? That is what they should
have focused on, and that should have been the main message
coming out of the White House.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, very much.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Mr. Tim Burchett from Tennessee.
Mr. Burchett. Right on. Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Keating. Loud and clear.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
putting together this important meeting.
Mr. Secretary, I could lay on all the accolades, but I
think the best thing that you ever did is make a really cool
son. I dig him. He is a good dude, man, and he is a good
friend, as I told you earlier.
But, anyway, that is what we do here in the South; we say
something nice for you and then we go for the jugular.
Mr. Panetta. ``With all due respect.''
Mr. Burchett. Yes, ``with all due respect,'' or, ``I am
putting you on my prayer list,'' you know. That is the way we
gossip too, you know, in church. We say, ``Oh, we need pray for
old so-and-so. I think he is hitting the bottle a little bit
much,'' you know, or whatever.
But, anyway, hey, all kidding aside, I had a question, and
it is changing lanes just a little bit. It is well-documented,
though, that the Russians--and for the record, I do not like
Putin. I think he is a thug. You know, we try to be diplomats.
And I know that is probably--here is Tim Burchett, thinks he is
a thug. I know he probably quakes in his Gucci loafers because
the 435th most powerful man in Congress is calling him out. But
I do not like the guy, I do not care.
But I know it is well-documented that the Russians operated
a spy ship called the Yantar. And the ship carries submersibles
that can tap into and even sever our undersea fiberoptic
cables, which would slow our communication with our allies
considerably. Additionally, the Russian subs are known to
operate close to these cables.
I was wondering if you could discuss the Russian submarine
fleet and specifically the threat that it poses to our undersea
cable network and what we can do to protect the flow of data.
Mr. Panetta. Well, it is a very good point for you to look
at, because, make no mistake about it, the Russians are engaged
in whatever efforts they can engage in in order to try to
either take our technology or interfere with our communication
or, obviously, interfere with our election process. You know,
that is what the Russians are all about.
Mr. Burchett. Right.
Mr. Panetta. And they do it, obviously, through their
intelligence forces and their spies, but they also use their
military for that purpose as well.
A lot of what you are asking, you know, wanders into
classified territory, so I am a little hesitant----
Mr. Burchett. I understand that.
Mr. Panetta [continuing]. To go into the specific
operations.
Mr. Burchett. I understand that.
Mr. Panetta. But make no mistake about it, the Russians are
trying to conduct efforts that interfere with the
communications that go on between the United States and the
rest of the world, and they have very sophisticated equipment
to be able to accomplish that. That, I think, should be of
concern not just to you but to all Americans.
Mr. Burchett. Do you think they would rather sever those
cables or would they just tap into them and find out all of our
secrets, I guess?
Mr. Panetta. I think the more important effort for them is
to tap in and get that information.
Mr. Burchett. Okay.
Well, why do you think they rely so much on techniques like
information warfare and the covert special operations in cyber
to confront the West? Because they are so effective, or is it
just all they have?
Mr. Panetta. No, you know, it is something we better get
smart about, because that could very well be the kind of
conflict we are going to have to face in the future.
I mean, I know we focus on conventional wars, I know we
focus on potential nuclear wars, but the Russians have
developed a hybrid capability that I think is going to become
the weapon of the future. It combines cyber with the ability to
conduct covert operations, with the ability to have even the
military involved to assist others. But it is all done on a
covert basis.
And it works very effectively. They have used in it in the
Ukraine. They have used it in Syria. They have used it
elsewhere.
We need to develop that kind of hybrid capability. That is
not to say that we do not have some of those same elements.
Obviously, we have special forces; we have other technologies
that are able to give us some capability. But I think the
ability to put together an entire strategy, as they have done,
using hybrid methods of warfare has proven very effective in
their ability to produce chaos, to undermine stability, and to
create the kind of situation that they can then take an
advantage of.
So, in many ways, hybrid warfare for the Russians is an arm
of their diplomacy so that they can then go in and undermine
the strength of whatever country they are dealing with. That is
how they operate.
Mr. Burchett. All right.
Hey, thank you. I am out of time, but I just want to tell
you what an honor it is. And I wish my folks were alive. They
probably would not agree much on your politics, but they would
dig the results that you get. So I wish they were alive to see
this. This is really cool.
Thank you, brother. And say ``hey'' to Jimmy tonight.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you very much. I will say ``hi'' for
you.
Mr. Burchett. Yes, sir, brother. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Mr. Burchett. Well, the South is the one place in the
country where people do not speak with an accent. You know
that, do not you?
Mr. Keating. I am told we have some here in Massachusetts
too.
Mr. Burchett. If you get pulled over in Tennessee, just say
``y'all'' and say, ``Where can I get a moon pie?'' and then--
they will probably still throw you in the back of the squad
car, so--anyway.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Or a key lime pie.
Let's get serious here and recognize Mr. Costa from
California.
Mr. Costa. I want to thank the chairman of the subcommittee
for this important hearing.
And I think we are all honored, on a bipartisan basis, to
have Secretary Panetta testify before us. His wealth of
knowledge, experience, and expertise has obviously been well-
stated and--documented.
And, Leon, it is an honor to have been your friend and have
worked with you for over 30 years.
And for all my other colleagues who are giving you all the
credit for Jimmy, I will not tell them that in the Panetta
household there has always been a partnership with Sylvia and
it has been a team sport, in terms of service to our Nation and
public policy. And so we know that Jimmy not only derives that
from you but from his mom as well.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Mr. Costa. Yes. Give her my regards.
I want to take off on the--first of all, in your summary,
you really talked about what constituted a plan that we used
during the cold war, on a bipartisan basis, to confront the
Soviet Union. And that plan, regardless from administration to
administration, in terms of the foundations of that plan, was
very successful, because it had continuity and it had
bipartisan support, from administration to administration as
well as in Congress, where politics, in those days when you
served, tended to stop at the water's edge. Not so much these
days, unfortunately.
So I guess my question to you is, how would you suggest
that we put, reinstitute, a bipartisan plan in place?
I think you talked about what the tenets of that plan could
constitute. I think, in doing so, we also--you just noted by my
last colleague, who talked about the hybrid implementation that
Putin has implemented to undermine the West, us and our allies
in Europe--and you have to give him credit. He has taken a
limited hand, and he has played it very well.
So I am wondering--because I agree with you. I think the
conventional weapons, for a lot of reasons, as we go forward
are going to have less of an impact as our ability to deal with
these hybrids efforts that involve high-tech and a lot of other
things.
I think we have repair work that we need to do on NATO. And
I think that
[inaudible] We both are active in the Transatlantic
Legislative Dialogue. I would like to get your sense on how
much repair work you think we need to do.
You know, people forget that the 71 years of NATO is the
longest--longest peacetime period in Europe in over 1,000
years. And we helped that happen, with President Truman, as you
noted, not just because we are good people, but that was in our
own interest. And it still is in our own interest. And it is
critical that we educate.
And, finally, when we talk about an overall strategy, I
sometimes--and this is no reference to any sort of ethnic
community in the country, but I think Putin and company are
kind of the Russian version of the Sopranos. And, in fact, I
mean, you know, when you look at the 50 top pals of his and how
they have taken so much of Russia's wealth and how much of that
is in European banks and other places--and I have seen their
yachts in the Caribbean and in the Mediterranean and the
lifestyle they live.
We know where a lot of those bank accounts are, and I am
wondering if that could be a part of a hybrid strategy, to grab
them where it hurts.
Mr. Panetta. Good question, Jim. Let me try to do my best
to try to mention what I think are the important areas that we
need to stress.
Look, first and foremost, obviously, we do have to maintain
our military power. We have to be the strongest military power
on the face of the Earth. That is critical. And it sends a very
important message that the United States has the ability to
respond to any threat, not only diplomatically but militarily
if necessary. So maintaining a strong military. Developing,
obviously, a hybrid capability I think is important as well.
Second, I am a believer, as I stated, in alliances, in the
importance of alliances. I think developing alliances is the
key to our ability to respond to a number of flashpoints in the
world.
I think we are dealing with a lot of flashpoints right now,
not just Russia. We are dealing with failed States in the
Middle East, we are dealing with Syria, we are dealing with
Iran, we are dealing with North Korea, we are dealing with
Russia, we are dealing with China, we are dealing with cyber
attacks, all of which are threatening our national security.
I think one of the keys to be able to respond to that many
threats, first of all, is to have the United States be a world
leader. I do not think we should withdraw from leadership in
the world. I think we have to be a world leader.
And, as a world leader, I think we ought to be not only
strengthening the NATO alliance, which is our primary alliance
in dealing with Russia, but I also think we ought to be
building new alliances. In Southeast Asia, we ought to be
building an alliance with those countries to try to check
China.
And I think there is that possibility, if we work with
those countries--when I was Secretary of Defense, I was trying
to build that kind of relationship on a security basis so that
we were working together on security areas. I think we could
build an alliance in the Middle East, made up of moderate Arab
countries, made up of Israel, to try to deal with the threat
from Iran, to try to deal with the threat from terrorism. I
think we can build an alliance in South America, in Africa.
I mean, alliances are going to be the key to our ability to
preserve peace and prosperity in the future. So I would stress
that.
Third, diplomacy. I think it is really critical that we
have a strong diplomatic arm available and that we have good
diplomats in these areas who represent the United States and
who keep their ear to the ground and can tell us what kind of
threats are out there.
And I also believe very deeply in a strong intelligence
capability. We just cannot do this unless we have information
about what the hell our adversaries are up to. We cannot
operate in the dark. No leader can operate in the dark. So
getting that kind of intelligence is a good thing. It is not a
bad thing, it is a good thing, to be able to have our spies and
our sources and our capabilities out there trying to gather
information on where these threats are and providing that to
our opinion-makers.
But, last, something that you mentioned that I think is
really important is, somehow we have got to restore a sense of
bipartisanship when it comes to our national security
interests. During most of my career in the Congress, even when
I was Secretary of Defense, I really worked to get bipartisan
support with regards to what I was doing. And I did get
bipartisan support, and it was very important.
I think somehow we have to get back to that spirit of
bipartisanship. I mean, I know the politics of today, and I
know what all of you are putting up with, one way or the other.
But, at some point, we really have to be concerned about this
country. And, right now, I think Putin looks at the United
States and looks at the polarization and the partisanship and
the divide that has taken place in our country and sees that as
weakness on the part of the United States.
When we are together, when we are working together, there
is no country stronger than the United States of America. So I
hope at some point we can get back to a spirit of true
bipartisanship when it comes to national security issues.
Mr. Costa. Well, thank you. My time has expired, but I
think your point is well-taken. I mean, he has exploited
Western elections--been doing it in Europe for longer than he
has been doing it in the United States--all with the intention
to take our divisions and to undermine our strength of
governing. And that is the limited hand that I think he has
played pretty well so far.
But I know, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but on those
three categories, diplomacy, our NATO alliance, are we stronger
or weaker than we were 3 years ago or 4 years ago?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I worry, you know, that we have sent a
signal. I mean, when I have gone abroad, our NATO allies are
very concerned about the commitment of the United States toward
the NATO alliance. And that is not a good--that is not a good
thing. So it really is important.
And I commend the Congress, because I think the Congress
has spokayen pretty clearly about the importance of protecting
NATO. I think it is important for the President of the United
States to speak to that importance as much as possible so that
our NATO allies know that the United States is going to be a
partner and will be there if something should happen.
Mr. Costa. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
You know, I want to thank all of our members for being so
patient. And if you had to be patient and you had to be
somewhere in the country to be patient, I would probably rather
be in San Diego than many other places.
The chair would like to recognize Representative Juan
Vargas from San Diego.
Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Can you hear
me, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Keating. Loud and clear.
Mr. Vargas. I want to thank you for holding this hearing,
and the ranking member. I appreciate it very much.
And, especially, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I
do think that I would be remiss, as my colleagues have already
said, if I did not tell you about my affection toward your son,
Jimmy. We all like him very much.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Mr. Vargas. He is a wonderful Member and a good friend to
all of us.
You do have a unique perspective--and, obviously, it has
come out in this hearing--because you were the Secretary of
Defense, you were the Director of the CIA, and you were the
White House Chief of Staff. So I thank you for your words and
your perspective.
And, unfortunately, I think you are correct that we are in
a new cold war, which I think is sad and too bad. I think a lot
of us believed, or wanted to believe, that when the Iron
Curtain came down that we were going to be able to work with
Russia. You know, Russia does have a lot of Western thought in
it. You know, a lot of the bookays that we love, that we read
in college, you know, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, they are written by
Russians. So a lot of us were hopeful, and, unfortunately, that
hope turned to despair, I think, when they went hard-line,
especially with Putin.
Now, I have to say that I agree with everything that you
have said about the asymmetric deals that this Putin has put
on, but this feels different. Putting a bounty on U.S. soldiers
to kill them, to me, feels different. When I read about this,
when I heard about it, it was, I think, different, almost a
red-on-blue attack.
Could you comment about that? Because this, to me, does not
feel the same as what he had been doing previously.
Mr. Panetta. You know, in some ways, it is difficult to
believe that an adversary would put bounties out there in order
to kill U.S. men and women in combat. And it strikes me as
Putin taking a very careless step. I mean, I think it is
careless to think that--I mean, assuming that this is true.
And, as I said, it sounds like something that might come out of
his playbook. But I think it is an indication that Putin feels
empowered to do things that he would not otherwise do.
And because he does not pay a price, because, you know, we
are not taking steps to make clear to him that this will not be
tolerated, I think what it does is it gives him a sense that,
yes, you know, we can try to do something that, you know, we
may not have done before, but if it is successful and if U.S.
men and women are killed as a result of this and if the United
States is so depressed by our presence in Afghanistan that we
remove our forces from Afghanistan, then it could play to his
benefit.
And I think that is the way he thinks. He does not think as
a world leader; he really thinks as a former spy.
Mr. Vargas. Yes.
Mr. Panetta. And that is, I think, what led to this.
Mr. Vargas. And, in many senses, it does not only seem
careless but reckless too, I mean, incredibly reckless.
Now, assuming for a second that it is true, that, you know,
the intelligence comes back and says that this is what they
were attempting to do, and, in fact, let's even say that they
were even successful, God forbid they were, but let's say that
they were--I know one of the things that we have looked at
previously and we have not done is kicked Russia out of SWIFT,
out of the banking system that we have that secures these
transactions. We have always thought that he would act
recklessly, and Medvedev and others have said, you know, you
better not do that.
What do you think would happen if we did take a pretty
dramatic step to kick them out? I mean, you took a look at
Iran. That is what we did to Iran, obviously. What would
happen? How would he react?
Mr. Panetta. Well, you know, it is that old story about,
you know, the jackass that would not move, and the guy finally
hit the jackass across the head with a stick, and somebody
said, ``What the hell are you doing?'' He says, ``Well, I am
trying to get its attention.''
I think we may have to do something bold in order to get
Putin's attention right now. Because I think, right now, Putin
does not really believe that the United States is going to
respond in a way that is going to really undermine, you know,
Russia and undermine him.
So I think it may be necessary to send a bold signal to
Russia that he has crossed the line. I think when you take
steps to put a price on the heads of our men and women in
uniform, that is crossing a line that is unacceptable.
Mr. Vargas. Yes.
Mr. Panetta. And I think we do need to send Russia a very
clear signal that that is not to be tolerated.
Mr. Vargas. Well, thank you again. My time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, maybe we need that 2-by-4 then to teach
Russia what to do. Thank you again.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Keating. The chair recognizes Mr. Sherman from
California.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Secretary, thanks for your service, and
thanks for donating your son to our institution.
The loudest testimony on this we heard yesterday from
Secretary Pompeo, whose decision not to come before the full
committee speaks volumes about how the policymaking process in
the White House and the policies they actually derive there are
simply indefensible, cannot be defended.
Russia and the United States have a long history of arming
each other's enemies. Thousands of our troops died in Vietnam
at the hands of Soviet weapons. Thousands of Russians died in
Afghanistan in part because we
[inaudible] The Mujahedeen. But that was at a time when the
Soviet Union and the United States were enemies and treated
each other as enemies.
For several years, Russia is known to have been providing
weapons to the Taliban, and, while occasionally the Taliban
strike against ISIS, for the most part those weapons are used
to kill Americans. But now they have added this additional
obscenity of putting a bounty on the head of American soldiers.
And so they are acting like an enemy. And they have learned
that they can act like an enemy and we treat them like a
friend. The President bestows great honor and friendship; then
he brings up the G8. We still allow our financial institutions
to lend money to the Russian State. And we had a law requiring
that sanctions be imposed on the sovereign debt issue, and the
Treasury imposed the lightest possible version of these that
still allow for Americans to invest in Russian sovereign debt
and American banks to lend
[inaudible] To a Russian State enterprise.
Of course, those sanctions were
[inaudible] Weapons. Indeed, one of those
[inaudible] May have killed one of their dissidents in
Britain using chemical weapons. And, of course, there is a
pipeline being built that will make Germany dependent upon
Russian natural gas.
We have limited sources and many flashpoints in the world;
I do not think Russia is our only problem. We can have primary
sanctions, where we take action ourselves, and secondary
sanctions, where we try to convince our allies to do something
that is
[inaudible]. We can have economic action. We can sell
weapons or provide weapons to Russia's enemies. We can do troop
deployments
[inaudible] Whole panoply
[inaudible].
We should at least make it clear that they should not be
allowed in the G8 and that American financial institutions
should not be lending money to the Russian State or its State-
owned enterprises. Would that be a starting place?
Mr. Panetta. You know, you have outlined the options that
are available very well. And I do not think there is any
question that any one of those options, whether it was to take
away that invitation to the G7, G8, or whether it is to tighten
up the sanctions in a way that really would have an impact in
terms of Russia, I think doing that would send a message that
the United States is not going to simply look in the other
direction while the Russians do what they are doing. That
signal needs to be sent.
Mr. Sherman. I will point out that the tough sanctions on
Russian sovereign debt are thought to increase their borrowing
costs by about half a percentage point, which in the financial
world is very solid, and that we in the House passed my
amendment that would accomplish that. It was taken out in the
Senate. We will have a chance to do that again with the NDAA
bill.
Mr. Secretary, would we also
[inaudible] Providing more weapons than we have to Ukraine
and to Georgia?
Mr. Panetta. Obviously, I think our ability to provide
military aid to the Ukraine is extremely important in sending
that signal to Russia that we are not going to allow the
Ukraine to be taken over by Russia. And I do not think there is
any question that we ought to be looking at what additional
military aid could we provide that would assist the Ukrainian
forces in their efforts to try to maintain their independence.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
And I thank the chair for letting me participate even
though I am
[inaudible].
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
I will ask the ranking member if he has any closing
statements. Otherwise, I will have a few closing remarks
thanking the members that participated and you, Mr. Secretary.
You know, there was talk about bipartisanship. You can see
through this committee this collegiality, civility. We do not
agree on everything, but you can see, I think, and the American
public can see Members of Congress do work together and we do
understand the importance of that.
I do want to just have a couple of closing remarks. Despite
that collegiality, this is as serious as it gets as an issue.
This has been, to me and I think most Members, just a
heartbreaking and anxious time, with the information that
bounties could have actually been placed on our military's
head. But what we are suffering through is nothing compared to
what our troops that are serving and the family members of the
troops who are lost have been going through. And I just want to
emphasize our hearts and our conviction. We are with them.
And this is not going to go away. So many issues go away.
This issue is going to be like the coronavirus. This is not
going away, I will tell you that. As Members of Congress, this
will not be the news of the day until we get answers, and we
will continue to do that.
There is one thing they should know too. At least in my
view, the perception that somehow something came across the
President's desk and he missed it just does not cut it with me.
I mean, just in the period between that briefing at the end
of February that was on his desk and what transpired the same,
that is one swing and miss. There were six calls in
preparation, person to person, between our President and
Putin--six.
Seventh thing, you know, before the G7 discussions and the
invitation, there was another period where you had to sit down
and say, ``Hey, this is going on'' before you give that
invitation; before you do something like cut the European
deterrence funding, which is one of those popular programs that
deters Russia and brings our allies together; before we went to
informing the British that this was a threat to them. Are we to
believe that our intelligence reached out to the British and
said, ``By the way, this is a serious threat, we want you to
know,'' and they never did it that to the President?
They had to have done it before they pulled out a quarter
of our troops--before he wanted to pull out a quarter of our
troops in Germany. He knew the impact of that and what it
meant.
And it had to have occurred before or after his top
security officials all gathered together, which we know now in
a meeting in March, and planned options to react to this.
Those are 11 things off the top of my head. That is not one
swing and miss. Those were 11 things. And that is just, I am
sure, a partial list.
The other thing that has become clear from this hearing and
the ones that preceded it that we should have great confidence
in: We absolutely--and there is no doubt in my mind--have the
ability to do things to counter this and counter it
effectively. It is not a question of being able to do it; it is
a question of doing it.
And I am quite optimistic that a whole array of options,
many of them, Mr. Secretary, that you brought up today that are
so important, can be done, and they will be effective.
And the last point is, we have to do it. We have to act
now. Because, as we are discussing this, even with the best of
our oversight, the Russians are still, as we speak, attacking
and preparing to attack further our electoral process in this
next election. That is a given. Our own intelligence is clear
and consistent with that. And we have to understand that they
will be emboldened by this and further endanger our safety and
the safety of our allies and the safety of our troops. We
cannot wait. So there is an urgency.
We will continue to do our best. Your presence here today
with us helps a great deal. We hope to continue to work with
you and get your advice, your counsel, because it is so
important, and to move ahead. The people of the United States,
the people that serve us, their families deserve nothing less.
So, with that, I adjourn and thank everyone for being here.
By the way, if I could, as I mentioned at the beginning,
there will be 5 days to submit statements, extraneous
materials, and questions subject to the rules of this
committee. So I repeat that as well. They just have to be done
by email.
Mr. Keating. With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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