[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIAN BOUNTIES ON U.S. TROOPS: WHY HASN'T THE ADMINISTRATION
RESPONDED?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 9, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-119
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-240 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Morell, Michael, Former Acting Director and Deputy Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.................................... 5, 7
Wallander, Dr. Celeste, Former Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for Russia/Central Asia, National Security
Council........................................................ 9, 11
Nicholson, General John W., (Retired), Former Commander of U.S.
Forces--Afghanistan and NATO's Resolute Support Mission........23, 25
Brzezinski, Ian, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Europe and NATO, U.S. Department of Defense....................28, 30
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 74
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 75
Hearing Attendance............................................... 76
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
Statement for the record submitted from Representative Connelly.. 77
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record from Chairman
Engel.......................................................... 79
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Wagner.......................................... 81
RUSSIAN BOUNTIES ON U.S. TROOPS: WHY HASN'T THE ADMINISTRATION
RESPONDED?
Thursday, July 9, 2020
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:03 p.m., via
WebEx, Hon. Joaquin Castro [acting chairman of the committee],
presiding.
Mr. Castro [presiding]. The Committee on Foreign Affairs
will come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have
5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions
for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
To insert something into the record, please have your staff
email the previously mentioned address or contact full
committee staff.
Please keep your video function on at all times, even when
you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible
for muting and unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute
yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with House
Resolution 965 and the accompanying regulations, staff will
only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when they are
not under recognition to eliminate background noise.
I see that we have a quorum.
And I will now recognize myself for opening remarks.
We meet today to discuss reporting that Russia put bounties
on the heads of American and allied troops, Russian cash
pouring into the Taliban's coffers in exchange for American
lives. While we are going to steer clear of discussing any
classified information in this hearing, I think I am on safe
ground to say that these allegations and claims were never
denied by the White House. Russia's actions, if true, are
unacceptable. The American people are demanding answers and
they are demanding accountability.
This hearing is also a reminder that America's longest war,
now approaching nearly two decades of continued conflict, still
wages on in Afghanistan. Bringing the 9/11 terrorists to
justice was an imperative, but few would argue today that U.S.
national security interests are being served by this endless
war.
Just this past week, a young soldier from my hometown of
San Antonio died in a vehicle rollover accident, Vincent
Sebastian Ibarria. He was 21 years old and dreamed of becoming
a nurse after serving in the Army. I express my condolences to
his family and to the more than 2,000 American families who
lost a loved one during this conflict. We need to bring this
endless war to a close.
Today, this committee looks to answer an important foreign
policy question: why has Russia faced no consequences, not even
a public rebuke, from the Trump administration? We invited
Secretary Pompeo to testify today. He refused, which is what we
have come to expect from this Secretary of State. While he
makes plenty of time for interviews on Fox News and seems to
relish bullying fact-based journalists from the State
Department press room, he rarely, if ever, summons the courage
to answer questions from his former colleagues in the House of
Representatives, as every other Secretary of State before him
has done.
Russia is not our friend. Vladimir Putin is not a partner
of the United States. He is a dictator who just last week
extended his tenure to 2036. He has robbed his people of their
rights. He has trampled on the sovereignty of his neighbors. He
has used the resources of the Russian government to undermine
democracy, splinter NATO and the EU, and bolster other despots
like Assad. His tools are disinformation, violent suppression,
and assassination. All of that is contemptible enough, but
putting a price on American heads is a serious escalation.
Exactly how the intelligence on this matter was presented
to the President is still unclear. The Trump administration's
excuses keep changing. Perhaps it was within his briefing, but
that does not necessarily mean the briefers briefed him on it,
because it is widely known that President Trump does not read
the Presidential Daily Briefing. Or maybe they did not brief
him because the intelligence was, quote-unquote, ``disputed,''
even though only intelligence that is of major significance
makes it into the Presidential Daily Briefing. Per usual with
President Trump, we are a long, long way from the buck stops
here.
Even if the administration's explanations are true, it
paints a picture of incompetence at the highest levels of our
national security apparatus. But what troubles me the most from
a foreign policy perspective is what this White House did and
did not do once it received this information. Was there a
public condemnation of Russia and Vladimir Putin from the Trump
administration? Did the State and Treasury Departments slap
sanctions on Russian officials involved in the plot? Did the
Taliban, with whom we have been at war for nearly two decades,
pay a price? What are the State and Defense Departments doing
to protect our service members and how are they working with
our NATO allies who are contributing to the Resolute Support
Mission in Afghanistan with us to address this threat? None of
that. As a matter of fact, this President kept doing what he
has been doing since even before he was elected, cozying up to
Vladimir Putin.
Since the United States reportedly obtained this
intelligence, President Trump has released a joint statement
with Vladimir Putin, directed the purchase of faulty Russian
ventilators, and withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty, a
critical part of monitoring Russian military activity. He also
ordered the reduction of America's troop presence in Germany,
an act that was met with bipartisan rebuke and criticism from
our allies, but with praise from the Russians. He even wanted
to expand the G-7 to include Russia again, which was expelled
from the group in 2014 following Putin's illegal annexation of
Crimea. It is almost as if President Trump is on a mission to
make Russia great again.
This issue is also not without precedent. In 2011, the
Obama Administration discovered that Pakistani intelligence
officers urged Taliban-affiliated militants to attack the U.S.
embassy and a NATO headquarters in Kabul. How did the Obama
Administration respond? Secretary Clinton and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, Mike Mullen, confronted Pakistani officials
and publicly shamed them for these actions, even though we were
relying on Pakistan for certain access into Afghanistan.
Admiral Mullen called the Haqqani Network a ``veritable arm of
Pakistani's intelligence agency.'' White House officials stood
up for Americans and the troops who were in harm's way.
The way this administration tries to distort reality and
gaslight the American people is, frankly, a page right out of
Vladimir Putin's playbook. But the facts are clear. The Trump
administration failed in its most sacred duty, to keep
Americans safe.
I hope that our witnesses can help us navigate all of this
today and provide some ideas and insight about what our policy
should look like under these circumstances. But, before I turn
to the witnesses, I want to recognize Ranking Member Mike
McCaul of Texas for his opening remarks.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope everybody can
hear me okay. Thank you for calling this important hearing.
As I have said time and time again--and I agree with the
chairman that Vladimir Putin is not our friend, not a friend to
the United States or our allies. In the past few years, we have
witnessed his regime invade and occupy parts of Ukraine and
Georgia, unleash devastating cyber attacks against our allies,
use a banned nerve agent to try to kill a former Russian spy in
the UK, prop up corrupt regimes in Syria and Venezuela. They
meddled in our elections. They undermine American interests
around the world. He has proven he just cannot be trusted and
he certainly is not our friend.
And now, we are faced with widely reported allegations that
a Russian military intelligence unit, the GRU, has paid
Taliban-linked militants to kill Americans and coalition forces
in Afghanistan. While it is not news that Moscow has provided
the Taliban with weapons and other support--and they have been
there since 1979--now Russia paying bounties for the murder of
American service members would be an unacceptable escalation.
If true, the administration, in my judgment, must take swift
and serious action to hold the Putin regime accountable, and
that should include not inviting Russia to rejoin the G-7.
We have passed, Mr. Chairman, as you know, sanctions that
the administration can enact today on these Russian entities.
Ultimately, there is nothing more important than protecting our
American troops serving overseas. I think we can all agree we
must take any threat to their safety seriously, especially from
someone with a track record like Putin.
I hope we use our time today to discuss how to more
effectively deal with the dangerous autocrat in the Kremlin
rather than descending into a partisan blame game. The only
person who benefits from American infighting over this issue is
Vladimir Putin. He loves chaos. And after last week's sham
nationwide vote in Russia that allows Putin to remain in power
through 2036, essentially, making him the emperor of Russia, it
is even more critical for Americans to work together with our
allies, especially through NATO, to counter Putin's nefarious
activities around the world.
While the topic of this hearing will certainly center
around Russia and Vladimir Putin, the backdrop is Afghanistan.
I urge my colleagues to continue supporting our partners in
Afghanistan to help bring peace and stability to their country.
My friend, Ambassador Rahmani, has devoted herself to
helping secure that future for Afghanistan, and I want to take
this opportunity to thank her for her unwavering dedication to
that mission. And I think it is very commendable that
Afghanistan appoint a female Ambassador to the United States,
and I hope that she will be made a part of the negotiating team
when they meet with the Taliban.
I would also like to note that I appreciate the White House
quickly providing briefings on today's topic on both sides of
the aisle, including myself, the chairman, and other members of
the committee. And further, I know my colleagues want to get
the full story. So, I would encourage them to read all the
classified materials provided on this important matter to get
the entire picture.
And so, finally, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and our witnesses for their testimony. And with that, I yield
back.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Ranking Member McCaul.
I am now going to introduce the witnesses who will testify
to us.
Our first witness is Mr. Michael Morell, former Acting
Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. He is one of our Nation's leading national security
professionals and has been at the center of the Nation's fight
against terrorism. He has worked to prevent the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and efforts to counter U.S.
adversaries like Russia and China. He also was previously in
charge of organizing the President's Daily Briefing under
President George W. Bush.
Our next witness is Dr. Celeste Wallander, former Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia/
Central Asia on the National Security Council. She is a leading
expert on Russian foreign policy, security, defense, and
military affairs, and is the current president and CEO of the
U.S. Russia Foundation. Previously, Dr. Wallander also served
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine,
and Eurasia at the Department of Defense, and was a professor
at American University.
After her will be our witness General John Nicholson, a
retired U.S. Army general and the former commander of the
Afghan war effort, having led the 41-nation, NATO-led Resolute
Support Mission and the United States Forces Afghanistan for
more than two and a half years. His total U.S. Army career
spanned over 36 years, with more than 12 of those years being
spent at various NATO commands. He also serves as an adjunct
faculty member on leadership with Harvard University's John F.
Kennedy School of Government, and is a member of Harvard's
Belfer Center Elbe Group, which sustains Track 2 dialog between
retired American and Russian senior officials for military and
intelligence background.
And last, but not least, we have Mr. Ian Brzezinski, former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO and
national security affairs staffer in the Senate. Mr. Brzezinski
is a leading expert on Europe and NATO with more than three
decades of experience and government service. He is a senior
fellow at the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on
Strategy and Security and the Council's Future Europe
Initiative.
Thank you all for being here. I will now recognize each
witness for 5 minutes. And without objection, your prepared
written statements will be made part of the record.
Mr. Morell.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MORELL, FORMER ACTING DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Morell. Chairman Castro, Ranking Member McCaul, and
members of this distinguished committee, good afternoon. It is
an honor for me to be here with you today, and it is also an
honor for me to testify alongside my distinguished panelists.
Chairman, for the sake of time, I am going to summarize the
written testimony that I submitted to the committee. What I
want to focus on is what I know, which is how the collection,
dissemination, and analytic processes of the intelligence
community work; how the PDB process works; how the policy
process on something like this would have worked at senior
levels of the Bush and the Obama Administrations in which I
spent much time in the Situation Room. So, with that in mind, I
want to make eight points.
One, there is a misperception about who receives raw
intelligence. Many assume that it only goes to intelligence
community analysts who decide what to share, and in what
context, with intelligence consumers. That perception is not
accurate. Raw intelligence gets disseminated widely--to
intelligence analysts, yes, but also to warfighters in the
field and at the Pentagon, the policymakers at the State
Department and the Defense Department, as well as to senior
White House officials via the White House Situation Room. The
important point here is that many people would have already
seen the raw intelligence as the analysts were just beginning
their work on it.
Two, a key question with regard to the raw intelligence is
whether it was clear to a reader what might be happening--that
is, what the Russians might be doing with these bounties--or if
it was possible to only see that by connecting a number of
dots. I do not know what the case was here. But, even if it was
only vaguely clear from the raw intelligence that the Russians
might be paying bounties for the killing of American soldiers,
that information would have made its way to the highest levels
of the U.S. Government, including the President, before the
analysts concluded their work.
Three, the lead IC agencies in assessing the information
would have been the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the National Counterterrorism Center,
for reasons that I outlined in my written testimony. The
analysts would assess the information and they would come to
two separate judgments. One, whether or not they believed
Moscow was offering the bounties, and if they believed that,
No. 2, their level of confidence in that judgment--low, medium,
or high.
Four, if the analysts believed at any level of confidence
that the Russians were providing the bounties, that judgment
would be presented in the PDB. If the President does not read
the PDB--and not all Presidents have--then it would have been
briefed to him, if not by the President's briefer, then by the
Director of National Intelligence or the Director of CIA, or
even those senior administration officials who were aware of
it, such as the National Security Advisor, the White House
Chief of Staff, or the Vice President.
Five, contrary to what has been said by some, a dissent
within the intelligence community on either the judgment itself
or on the confidence level would not keep the piece out of the
PDB. Rather, the dissent would be noted in the PDB piece.
Six, once the piece was in the PDB, the IC leadership on
something of this significance would brief Congress as early as
the same day as the piece ran in the PDB and certainly no later
than the next day.
Seven, if the intelligence community assessed that the
Russians were providing the bounties at any level of
confidence, that would kick off a policy process inside the NSC
staff on how the U.S. should respond. The analysts' level of
confidence would make a difference to that process. A medium to
high level of confidence would lead to a policy decision, I
believe, on how to respond, while a low level of confidence
would result in a decision that more intelligence was necessary
before a policy decision could be made. I will leave it to
General Nicholson to explain how the warfighters in Afghanistan
would have reacted to the information and to the analysis at
any level of confidence.
Eight, and finally, a medium-to-high-level confidence
judgment that the Russians were offering the bounties would in
every administration that I worked in--and I worked in six--
have resulted in some sort of policy action designed to deter
the Russians going forward. The safety of our troops would have
required it.
Mr. Chairman, let me stop there, and I look forward to
answering the committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Morell follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Mr. Morell.
I will now go to Dr. Wallander.
STATEMENT OF CELESTE WALLANDER FORMER SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR RUSSIA/CENTRAL ASIA, NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL
Dr. Wallander. Thank you. I thank the committee members for
the invitation to contribute to your work. Today, I will
summarize my written testimony, and for purposes of today's
discussion, I will assume that the publicly reported details of
the intelligence assessment are accurate.
These operations are embedded in a nearly decade-long
Russian campaign of strategic competition that aims to weaken
the United States and advance Russian power and influence. The
Russian leadership recognizes that, while it is a peer to the
United States in strategic nuclear capabilities, it does not
match the United States in global power projection and in
conventional military capabilities.
Russia seeks to compete where it has advantages in the
asymmetric terrain and to avoid competition that could lead to
its failure. Russia has invested in tools and methods to
asymmetrically counter American advantages, whether those lie
in extremist lies and social media, limited military
interventions in Ukraine and Syria, cyber intrusions in
networks and infrastructure abroad, or interfering in American
and European politics.
Russia also deploys asymmetric tools to deny
responsibility, however implausible that deniability has
proven, in order to be able to operate with impunity and
exploit ambiguities. This takes place in the phase zero end of
the conflict spectrum, the sub-military conflict strategic
environment in which diplomatic, informational, political, and
economic conditions shape a country's capacity to secure its
interests, short of active military confrontation.
The concept is not unique to Russian security doctrine, but
its centrality and asymmetric nature is distinctive in Russian
doctrine and operations. Russian asymmetric phase zero
operations are conducted not only by political, but also
Russian military actors, primarily Russian military
intelligence, the GRU, and quasi-private actors such as the
Wagner Group.
The earliest stages of operations in Ukraine in March 2014,
political protests, were managed by GRU agents. The Russian
operation to influence the U.S. 2016 Presidential election was
a classic phase zero shaping operation, a mix of friendly
foreign (WikiLeaks); quasi-private (Internet Research Agency);
non-military; (the FSB), and Russian military actors.
The asymmetric phase zero framework helps to explain why
the GRU has surfaced in a number of operations in Europe, the
U.S., and now in Afghanistan. Across all of these cases, GRU
operations are ambitious and sloppy. It is unlikely that
President Putin personally approves every GRU operation. Yet,
the GRU continues to operate, despite being exposed. This means
that there is no question that it operates with political cover
and approval at the highest levels of the Russian leadership,
which is, therefore, responsible for these operations.
Why would the Russian leadership allow the GRU to play such
a dangerous game? Because Russia has for years successfully
managed asymmetric operations to keep the competition in
spheres where it has operational advantages. It has exploited
implausible deniability to operate in the asymmetric phase zero
spectrum with impunity. Russia is succeeding.
In this specific case, it may be that Russia assessed that
the Taliban was insufficiently active in striking coalition
forces and needed incentives in order to hasten U.S. failure
and withdrawal. It might be that Russia sought to complicate
the U.S.-Taliban relationship. Whatever the strange reasoning
may have been, this crosses a threshold. Russia is seeking to
exploit implausibly deniable asymmetric operations now directly
against U.S. military forces.
The Russian government has gotten away with its phase zero
operations because we are not well equipped to compete in the
asymmetric space, because we tend to view these operations as
political, not security competition, and because we have all
allowed the implausibly deniable to be denied and explained
away.
The result has been a creeping escalation and exploitation
of asymmetric operations that thwart effective U.S. response.
Caution is warranted. The other end of the conflict spectrum is
mutually assured destruction. But caution does not require
paralysis. The United States should build defenses against
these operations, it should disrupt these operations, and it
should directly hold the Russian leadership accountable at the
military, political, and top level of leadership. If we do not
defend ourselves, if we do not disrupt these Russian
operations, and we do not hold the Russian leadership
accountable, it will continue and they may continue to
escalate.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Dr. Wallander.
We will next go to General Nicholson. General.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN W. NICHOLSON (RETIRED), FORMER
COMMANDER OF U.S. FORCES--AFGHANISTAN AND NATO'S RESOLUTE
SUPPORT MISSION
General Nicholson. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you,
Ranking Member, for the honor to appear before this committee.
And it is also a pleasure to be alongside such distinguished
colleagues. I will summarize some of the major points from my
written submission.
History tells us that miscalculations and mistakes are what
leads to war. And, of course, they are especially dangerous
with respect to the United States and Russia because of our
substantial nuclear arsenals. And if, indeed, they did this,
this will be a serious miscalculation and a serious mistake.
As we know, there were periods of shared interest and some
cooperation in Afghanistan. Up through 2012, logistical
cooperation through the Northern Distribution Network was a
positive aspect of our relationship with Russia. But, after
2014, that changed with the annexation of Crimea, the invasion
of Ukraine, the threats to the eastern States of the NATO
alliance. Within NATO where I was the Allied Land Commander at
the time, we began drawing up defensive plans for the first
time in the 25 years since the end of the cold war. When I
moved from Turkey to Afghanistan in 2016, by that time, the
Russians had intervened in Syria and, of course, we saw a major
focus by the United States on ISIS and Syria.
But, at that time also, we saw a modest increase in
capabilities by the Russians in Central Asia. And, of course,
we discussed this up our chain of command and through
intelligence and military channels. Myself, General Votel,
General Scaparrotti, Secretary Mattis, all addressed this
publicly. And let me go a little bit into that because it ties
into what the other witnesses are referring to.
What we saw was a pattern that they had used in Crimea,
Ukraine, the Baltics, and Syria of using military exercises as
a way to move capabilities and people into an area and, then,
leave some behind. This would desensitize us to their presence.
It would generate options for them. And obviously, it would
reduce our warning times, should they choose to use these
capabilities. This slow, gradual buildup, while we were focused
primarily on Syria, was of concern enough to me as commander
that we highlighted this and, eventually, called them out.
At this same time, they were arming and equipping and
giving money to the Taliban. Now it was in modest quantities.
It was not designed to be a game changer on the battlefield.
For example, the Taliban wanted surface-to-air missiles; the
Russians did not give them to them. So, I always concluded that
their support to the Taliban was calibrated in some sense. But
just because it was calibrated does not mean that it was not
important and it did not cause us difficulties. In the northern
part of Afghanistan, in particular, in Kunduz, this Russian
assistance did help the Taliban to inflict higher casualties on
the Afghan Security Forces and more hardship on the Afghan
people.
Despite all of this, I was somewhat surprised to read the
reports of Russian involvement in bounties because this is so
risky and irresponsible that it would mark a departure from
this previously calibrated approach. And, of course, the layers
of complexity inside the Russian decisionmaking process and
inside Afghanistan are baffling even to those who know these
areas deeply. But, if this is validated, regardless of who made
this decision and whether it was made in Moscow or made in the
field, regardless of whether Russian leaders were complicit
directly or they were merely incompetent in their failure to
control operations, they are still responsible. It is also
important to note that there were two sides of this
transaction: the Russians offered and the Taliban accepted. And
this is in direct contradiction to the spirit and the letter of
the Afghan peace agreement.
So, if we assess that Russia put bounties on Americans and
coalition members, then what should we do about it?
No. 1, we need to condemn this action from the highest
levels of the U.S. Government and NATO, so that the Russians
understand it is unacceptable.
Two, with respect to Russia, we should suspend any troop
withdrawals from Germany. These troop withdrawals play into
Russian desires to undermine and weaken NATO. If carried out
despite these bounties, this will be viewed as a sign of
American weakness in the face of Russian threats.
Three, with respect to the Taliban, we should hold on our
troop drawdown in Afghanistan at the present level until the
Taliban have met the conditions that they agreed to in the
peace agreement. We have delivered on our part by drawing down
to 8600 ahead of schedule. The Taliban needs to deliver on
theirs. And this includes severing ties with Al Qaeda,
reentering Afghan peace negotiations, and a sustained reduction
in violence.
Our long war in Afghanistan is only going to end at the
peace table, and as leaders, we all have a moral responsibility
to do everything in our power to protect our service members
who are fighting for an enduring peace in Afghanistan and to
deliver on the sacrifice of the Americans, the coalition
members, and the Afghans who came before them.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Nicholson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Castro. Thank you, General.
Mr. Brzezinski.
I think you may be on mute. There you go.
STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPE AND NATO, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman, can you hear me now?
Mr. Castro. Yes.
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you.
Chairman Castro, Ranking Member McCaul, distinguished
members of the committee, Americans are rightly outraged by
reports of Russia placing bounties on U.S. military personnel
in Afghanistan. These reports, as heinous as they are,
underscore a broader challenge confronting the West: Russia's
pattern of escalating aggressive international conduct.
Over the last decade and a half, Moscow has applied the
full suite of Russian power to dominate its neighbors, create
division in the West, and position Russia as a global power.
The suite of tools has included military and paramilitary
forces, economic and energy embargoes, assassination and
political subterfuge, information and cyber warfare, separatist
groups, and frozen conflicts. That campaign history includes a
2007 cyber attack on Estonia, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the
2014 invasion of Ukraine, the 2016 coup attempt in Montenegro,
assassinations in the United Kingdom, Germany, just last week
in Austria, and elsewhere.
As the committee has documented, Russia has meddled not
only in the elections of our allies, but even in our own
elections. This willingness to directly attack the United
States took a kinetic dimension in Syria in 2018. There,
Russian paramilitary units attacked outposts known to be manned
by U.S. Special Operations Forces. In light of all this, recent
reports of Russia's bounties on American soldiers are
disturbingly consistent with what has been a steady escalation
of Russian international interference and aggression.
Now, over the past decade and a half of this, the West's
response, including that of the United States, to Russia's
assertiveness has consisted of limited incremental escalations
of economic sanctions and military deployments, complemented by
half-hearted and short-lived diplomatic isolation. This
incrementalism conveys hesitancy and a lack of unity and
determination on behalf of the United States and the Western
alliance. It has failed to convince Putin to reverse course and
it may have actually emboldened him. Continued incrementalism
not only promises continued confrontation with Russia, it
increases the risk of conflict, both intentional and
unintentional.
U.S. strategy regarding Putin's Russia needs to be
calibrated to this reality. Properly calibrated engagement
entails exploring avenues through which to modulate tension and
foster collaboration. But it also requires more immediate and
stronger measures to deter and counter Russian aggression and
provocation. Toward those ends, U.S. strategy should include
the following priorities:
First, we need to increase NATO's readiness for high-
intensity conflict. Russia's military modernization efforts and
its concentration of forces on its western frontier have
increased the risk of conflict in Europe. This reality, of
course, underscores the need for our NATO allies to continue
increasing their military capability and readiness. But there
is more the U.S. can and should do. We should transition the
U.S. Armored Brigade Combat Team in Poland and related elements
to a permanent presence. The U.S. should also permanently
station in the Baltics a Special Forces contingent. President
Trump should reconsider his decision to withdraw U.S. forces in
Germany. Removing forces from Europe weakens our deterrent
posture in. Europe at a time when the threat from Russia is
increasing. It signals a lack of commitment to European
security that President Putin will surely relish.
Second, we need to more robustly support the transatlantic
aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine. NATO enlargement expanded
the zone of peace and security in Europe and strengthened the
alliance's military capability. Both Ukraine and Georgia should
be provided a clear path to NATO membership. Perpetuating their
position in a zone of geopolitical ambiguity only animates
Putin's appetite and sense of opportunity to reassert dominion
over these two democracies.
Third, we need to more effectively counter Russia's
dissemination of false information. In this realm, the United
States essentially disarmed itself when it closed the doors in
1999 of the United States Information Agency. This multibillion
agency was our frontline force on the information front.
Congress should reestablish or establish a modernized version
of USIA, so that the United States can return to the offense in
this dynamic and fast-paced dimension of international affairs.
Fourth, we should increase economic sanctions on Russia.
Today's sanctions may impair the Russian economy, but if their
intended outcome has been to deter Russian aggression, they
have failed by that measure. Sanctions should be escalated from
measures primarily aimed against specific Russian individuals
and firms to more comprehensive sectoral sanctions against
Russian financial and energy sectors.
Finally, we need to strengthen Western cohesion and unity.
These aforementioned actions will only be fully effective if
they are complemented by unity and purpose in action within the
transatlantic community.
So, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, as you and the
committee address the intelligence regarding Russian bounties,
I urge you to also assess the effectiveness of U.S. policy in
terms of deterring, countering, and containing the full
spectrum of Moscow's malign ambitions and actions. When it
comes to Russia, time is long overdue for an unequivocal U.S.
policy.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski, and thank you to all
the witnesses for your testimoneys.
I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. And
pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes
of questioning our witnesses. Because of the virtual format of
this hearing, I will recognize members by committee seniority,
alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your
turn, please let our staff know and we will come back to you.
If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone and
address the chair verbally. And as we start questioning, I will
start by recognizing myself.
I want to ask a question of Mr. Morell first. In instances
where the Russians paid to have American service members
killed, and it appears from press accounts, at least some press
accounts, that the Russian plot results in American deaths, in
your experience as somebody who carried out the Presidential
Daily Briefing, is this something that intelligent briefers
would make the President aware of?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir, without a doubt.
Mr. Castro. Is there anyone on the panel, based on your own
expertise, who believes that the President would not have been
made aware of this information? Anyone?
[No response.]
No one? Thank you.
In the event that the President's advisors really withheld
such alarming intelligence from him, even as he made continuous
concessions to Russia, who would ultimately be responsible for
such process failures, mid-level career civil servants or
administration leadership? And I ask that of anyone on the
panel. If, for example, the intelligence was somehow not
provided to him, then where does the failure lie?
Mr. Morell. Congressman, maybe I can jump in here, having
been in the Oval Office every morning with President Bush for a
year and, then, many times with President Obama. If the
President's briefer did not raise something of such importance,
then I believe it falls on whoever else is there from the
intelligence community, the DNI or the Director of CIA. And
barring their failure to raise such information, I think it
falls on the responsibility of the National Security Advisor to
make absolutely certain the President knows.
Mr. Castro. Okay.
Dr. Wallander. Could I add to Mike's point?
Mr. Castro. Sure.
Dr. Wallander. Which is that every morning in the Obama
White House, among the duties of the senior directors was to
read the PDBs in advance of the presentation of the PDB to the
President by the briefers, and to provide for the National
Security Advisor--in our case, Susan Rice--advice and context,
because she would go in and be part of that briefing and be
ready to make sure that, as Mike pointed out, the briefing had
been received and correctly understood by the White House
leadership.
Mr. Castro. Okay. And we have about 2 minutes left on my
questioning.
Some of you in your remarks, your testimony, suggested
different courses of action, different responses that the
United States could take. I want to ask you this question: so
far, as I mentioned in my remarks, there has been not even a
public condemnation by the President or the White House against
Russia for these reported actions. Let me ask you this--and we
only have about a minute and 45 seconds--what is the cost of
the United States not even saying a word to Russia about these
reported actions?
Mr. Morell. Congressman, let me jump in here again. I did
not make any recommendations about what steps the U.S. should
take, but I think it is really important that we all recognize
something about Vladimir Putin's personality. He is a risk-
taker. And when he takes a risk and he succeeds in his mind, he
is often willing to take even larger risks in the future. So,
the failure for him to face any cost here I think significantly
increases the chances of him doing something else to undermine
the United States, possibly even larger than what we have seen
in this case.
Mr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Castro. Yes, Mr. Brzezinski?
Mr. Brzezinski. Allow me to complement Director Morell's
point. When we do push back on Putin and push back firmly, he
does respond. He is ultimately a pragmatist. And as Dr.
Wallander pointed out, he picks his battles carefully.
When looking back to Russia's invasion on Georgia in 2008,
the turning point of that conflict occurred when the United
States demonstrated some military muscle. The United States
flew back Georgian soldiers to their capital, Tbilisi via a
military cargo plane right in the middle of that conflict,
demonstrating, readiness to take sacrifices, basically Putin
with the risk of a direct military confrontation with the
United States. And that was basically the turning point of that
invasion. That action convinced Putin to end that invasion.
So, if we are more forceful, if we are more firm, we do
have very good prospects of actually restraining Putin's
actions and ambitions.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski.
And I am going to keep myself on time on the questioning.
So, I will go over to Ranking Member Mike McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just, without commenting on the specifics of the
intelligence, there was a very strong dissent. The briefer was
a career intelligence officer that made this decision not to
brief. And I guess the question is whether it is actionable
intelligence.
Having said that, I think the nature of this intelligence
being targeted at U.S. troops would be a significant departure
for Russia in its dealings with the Taliban. Now I personally
think that the President deserved to at least know about this.
I think, if true--and I know that the intelligence community is
going back and doing a deep dive--I do think Russia should be
condemned and the GRU should be sanctioned, as we have
authorized by Congress.
My first question is to General Nicholson. You have been in
Afghanistan for quite some time. And let me say, all the
panelists are very, very impressive with your testimony. I
think this calls into question the good faith of the Taliban. I
do think, though, since the peace plan has been entered into,
there have been no Americans targeted, although they are
targeting Afghan nationals.
Can you tell me, No. 1, how significant of a departure this
would be? Because we know they are arming and giving cash to
the Taliban to kill ISIS, but this would be a different policy
change to target American troops. And second, does it call into
question the good-faith negotiating of the Taliban?
General Nicholson. Thank you, Ranking Member McCaul.
I do think it calls into question the good faith of the
Taliban. There are two parts to this transaction, again, if
validated. But we do know that the Russians have provided small
arms, ammunition, money to the Taliban, and have been doing it
for some time. And frankly, the ability to direct that and
control it, and where it is used and where it is not used, is
extremely limited. Once it is turned over to them, they will
use it as they see fit.
And I have no doubt that some of that was used in the
northern part of Afghanistan against Afghan units with American
advisors, especially in the Kunduz area. And so, I think that,
in this sense, now specifically offering bounties is a small
step from what they were already doing. Their justification for
this action was the fight against ISIS, but part of this was,
as the other witnesses have mentioned, a false narrative and
misinformation on the part of Russia that the United States was
supporting ISIS.
So, I think that this does call into question the Taliban's
commitment to the agreement. As I mentioned in my statement,
they need to sever ties with Al Qaeda; there should be a
sustained reduction in violence, and they need to begin the
peace talks that they are committed to do on----
Mr. McCaul. If I could reclaim my limited time, I note that
Ambassador Rahmani, Afghanistan, our Special Envoy, they are
having discussions this week about a humanitarian cease-fire.
My concern is all the good work that you have done over there,
if the Taliban overruns Afghanistan and takes over, then we
have a safe haven for many years to come.
How do you view the peace plan moving forward? I always
believe, whether it is Syria or Iraq, we need a residual force,
if anything, to protect the homeland. What are your thoughts on
force reduction?
General Nicholson. I think that this level of 8600, we
should hold there until the Taliban delivers on their portion
of the peace agreement and we move to the next stage. So, I do
think that is important. I do think there is a threat from the
region in terms of the multitude of terrorist groups that are
over there. We have over 20 designated groups, U.S.-designated
groups, in the region. And I think that, with the government in
Afghanistan, we should consider, if they ask us to stay and
request our help to keep pressure on these groups, it is
definitely something we should consider.
Mr. McCaul. I can tell you from the Ambassador they do.
Let me ask real quickly, Secretary Brzezinski, the
President's decision in Germany, I sent a letter with Adam
Kinzinger saying this sends a bad message to NATO forces, to
Putin, CENTCOM, AFRICOM. However, if they move some of these
forces as they talked about, the National Security Advisor, to
Poland and the Baltic nations, describe to me how that would
work, and would that be an even better strategy?
Mr. Brzezinski. It would be better than pulling the forces
back from Germany to the United States. But I do not think we
ought to be punishing Germany to the benefit of Poland. We need
a robust presence in Poland and we have one now, which I think
is an appropriate level. I would make it more permanent. But
that is a frontline presence. You want your rearguard, your
rear echelons, to also be robust. We need a robust presence in
Germany, so not only we can reinforce the Baltics, we can also
reinforce southern Europe. And then, of course, we need a
robust presence in Germany if we want to have a robust military
relationship with the Germans and other militaries of the NATO
alliance.
So, this decision by the President is undercutting not only
our relationship with Germany, it is undercutting our
operational efficiency to reinforce our frontline forces in
Poland and frontline operations in the Baltics. So, this is a
potential, if it gets executed, a real setback, a weakening of
our deterrent posture in Europe.
Mr. McCaul. I have talked to the Ambassadors in the Baltic
States and Poland, and they would, obviously, very much welcome
our presence there.
And I know, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. You have
been very generous.
I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Ranking Member McCaul.
We will go to Congressman Brad Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
I want to thank our witnesses for coming before us, but the
loudest testimony is being given by the witness who did not
show up. Secretary Pompeo was invited and strongly urged to
come before us, and his refusal to do so shouts loudly that the
process for decisionmaking on foreign policy and the outcome of
the decisionmaking in this White House is indefensible.
We have a situation where Russia attacks Georgia, the
Ukraine, interferes in Syria, interferes in elections in the
United States, interferes in Montenegro, occupies eastern
Ukraine and the Crimea, and according to Secretary Pompeo, when
he speaks, but, of course, not to our committee, has been
arming the Taliban for years. So, we have all those facts;
plus, good reason to believe that they are providing bounty on
our soldiers. And the response from the White House is, let's
invite them to the G-8.
There has been another response, recently a Department of
Treasury decision, basically--and I will get to this later--
that they should have prevented Americans from buying Russian
sovereign debt, and they went as light on that as they possibly
could under the law.
General Nicholson, in March 2018, you said that you have
had weapons brought into your headquarters that you know were
given to the Taliban by the Russians. As recently as last week,
Russia claims it only supplies weapons to, quote, ``legitimate
government of Afghanistan.'' For how long, and in what
quantity, or what estimated quantity, have the Russians
provided weapons to the Taliban?
General Nicholson. Thank you for the question, sir.
We believe there was a modest amount of support. It was
designed to gain influence with the Taliban. And to be fair,
our intentions were uncertain at that point. When would the
U.S. withdraw? When would NATO withdraw? What would be left
behind? There would be instability in the region. So, we saw
this as an attempt by the Russians to gain influence with the
Taliban as part of potentially a post-withdrawal scenario.
However, that should not be misconstrued. These weapons
made a difference on the battlefield. They weren't game-
changing in a sense, but they did make a difference and they
did help inflict higher casualties, and against units that had
U.S. advisors.
Mr. Sherman. So, we know that Americans have died as a
result of Russia providing those weapons. They have just now,
apparently, added the additional obscenity of not just giving
the weapons to people who want to kill us, but giving them
extra money if they actually do.
I would like to focus on Russian sovereign debt and other
targeted sanctions. Under existing statute, the Secretary of
the Treasury was supposed to choose from a menu of sanctions
for other Russian wrongdoing dealing with their sovereign debt.
If we completely shut off American involvement in their
sovereign debt, we could probably drive up their borrowing cost
by half a percentage point. But the Secretary of the Treasury,
in the midst of all this, decided to say, well, it is fine for
Americans to buy this debt in the secondary market and to buy
the debt directly from State-owned enterprises.
Would a ban on any American involvement in Russian
sovereign debt be the kind of pain that Putin would feel, and
what other economic sanctions do you think are appropriate? I
will ask whichever witness wants to respond.
Dr. Wallander. I can take that one, sir. One of the most
important targets to impose costs on political decisionmakers
in Russia is, indeed, the financial sector in general, and
sovereign debt is certainly part of the menu where you could
increase those costs.
I think that, as an instrument of overall U.S. policy, or
U.S. policy up to this instance, that is constructive and
smart. I would say, in this instance, though, I would target
sanctions in two areas. One, more on the security services, on
defense sales, on the kinds of money that Russia makes from
sales of defense capabilities abroad, and on financing that
supports many of these asymmetric operations; that would target
it more directly on those who are responsible for these
decisions.
Mr. Sherman. If I could interrupt you, obviously, we would
like to prevent Russia from selling weapons to India, Turkey,
and others, but that is not something we have the sovereign
right to do. And as long as the Russian government can borrow
money, the fact that particular military complexes cannot
borrow the money is fairly irrelevant, in that the money is
fungible. Once you lend it to the Russian sovereign, they can
certainly lend it or invest it in military operations.
I will point out that we had an amendment in last year's
NDAA, which I wrote, to prohibit U.S. purchase of sovereign
debt of Russia and its enterprises until they could go a full
election cycle without interfering in our elections. That
passed the House, but, of course, was stripped out by the
Senate. I am hoping that Senators realize that now is the time
to impose some real sanctions on Russia for all of its
behaviors, and beginning with this bounty.
And I yield back.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
All right. Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
First of all, there ought to be no question in anybody's
mind that Russia and Putin, in particular, are no friend of the
United States, and anybody who thinks otherwise is on the wrong
path and does not know what they are thinking about or talking
about, or anything else. They are not our friend.
General Nicholson, let me go to you with the first
question. The reason we went to Afghanistan in the first place
was to root out terrorists there and to ensure that they could
never use that country to stage attacks against the United
States again. Could you give us your current assessment of the
strength of the Taliban-Al Qaeda ties, the relationship
currently? And then, is there any reason to believe that the
Taliban would ever, or will ever, live up to any commitments
that they might make?
General Nicholson. Thank you for the question, sir.
And I have to caveat this by saying I do not have access to
the classified intelligence that I did when I was commander in
the time since I have left. However, you have hit the nail on
the head. This is why we went there, the idea that it would
never be used as a launching pad for attacks against the U.S.
That has not happened. So, we have been successful in that
sense.
But I am concerned that they have not renounced their ties
to Al Qaeda. This is one of the conditions in the agreement.
And not only a public renunciation, but a real severing of ties
with Al Qaeda. And this was the original reason that brought us
there, and, of course, this condition has to be met to have an
enduring peace that secures our interests.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Mr. Brzezinski, I will go to you next, if I can. What does
Russia hope to achieve in Afghanistan, especially with respect
to us? It would seem that, if they want us to leave, that they
should be working to stabilize the country and decrease, not
increase, U.S. deaths. Could you talk about Russia's goals,
their security interests in Afghanistan currently?
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you, sir. Can you hear me?
Mr. Chabot. Yes, I can hear you fine.
Mr. Brzezinski. Great.
I think Russian objectives in Afghanistan are the
following:
One, there is a bit of a revenge component because,
particularly when it comes to the team led by President Putin
in Moscow, they are bitter over the Soviet loss in that country
that they see was catalyzed by U.S. support to the mujahideen
at that time.
Second, I think they want to impose pain to help tie us
down, to impose cost, to psychologically break our mental
fortitude as an international actor.
And then, three, ultimately, they would like to see us
leave, and leave in a way that enables them to develop a
relationship with whatever regime or government that would
succeed in Afghanistan, so they can establish a relationship to
further their influence in that region.
So, three things: revenge, imposing pain; and tying us
down, and, ultimately, getting us out, so that they can enhance
their influence over the region.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Brzezinski, I will stick with you, if I can. It seems
like we have been playing defense vis-a-vis the Russians, and
the Chinese, for that matter, relative to disinformation and
propaganda for way too long, for some time. What would you
suggest in terms of a more proactive U.S. policy in this area?
And, of course, we are not interested in propaganda. We are
interested in getting the truth out there. But how can the U.S.
do a better job vis-a-vis both Russia and the Chinese in that
sphere?
Mr. Brzezinski. Information operations have been long a
part of U.S. policy. It was our effective management of
information operations and engagement, so to speak, public
diplomacy, in the cold war that was probably one of the keys to
our success . We won economically, we won militarily, but we
also won in the information engagement sphere, the public
diplomacy sphere.
The cornerstone, the driver of that dimension of our
strategy was the United States Information Agency, an agency
that we shut down in 1999, at the time when it had, roughly, a
$2 to $3 billion budget. And at the high point, the USIA I
think had over 10,000 people working to get the U.S.
perspective out, working to deepen ties, working to support
dissidents around the world.
When we shut down the USIA in 1999, we basically disarmed
ourselves in the information space and have never really kind
of been able to recover from that. So, that is why I believe we
ought to reanimate this institution, give it Cabinet-level
rank, bring back its bureaucracy, to use that terrible word,
and enable us to get back into the game of information
operations on the offensive. That is going to be critical
because right now we have handicapped ourselves.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Gregory Meeks of New York.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Former Secretary of State George Schultz, I am told, would
ask outgoing Ambassadors, he would take them to the side and
point to the map and ask them, ``Where is your country?'' And
naturally, these outgoing Ambassadors would point to their new
host countries. And here, Secretary Schultz would correct them
and tell them their country is the United States of America.
So, I am often confounded by the President's actions that
directly undermine the interest and security of the American
people. This latest intelligence revelation is an alarming
pattern by this President. The fact that the Secretary of State
Pompeo is not testifying today is yet another alarming pattern
of this administration. Congress has an oversight
responsibility and duty, and the Secretary of State should be
here to answer our questions. And I am glad that our esteemed
witnesses are here today.
But it is unfathomable to me that the Russian government
continues to be unchecked as it engages in a systemic and
aggressive policy to undermine, dismantle, and disrupt American
alliances, threaten our democracy, and allegedly go after our
troops. Time and time again, this committee asks, where is the
President's loyalty and why does he fail to act? It is
outrageous to me that we ask our service men and women to put
their lives in danger for our peace and security, and yet, the
administration won't believe a credible piece of intelligence
putting bounties on their heads.
How was Congress never briefed until the claim was relayed
to the press, at great risk to whistleblowers? This failure to
act, this unwillingness to brief this committee and others,
reflects a continued antagonism and disdain for this body as a
coequal branch of government.
The Russian government continues to operate adversarially,
and the President continues to show deference to Putin. By the
administration's actions and inactions, it is unclear to me how
President Trump would answer Secretary Schultz' question today,
``Where is your country?''
Let me ask, and I think that I want to ask General
Nicholson, Mr. Morell referenced that warfighters often also
have access to raw intelligence. Can you describe in your
experience how you and warfighters at the tactical level would
have handled and acted upon raw intelligence that suggested
Russia had put bounties on American troops?
General Nicholson. Thank you, sir.
Yes, we do have access to that intelligence, and there is a
vigorous dialog that goes on at all levels, between commanders,
intel officers at different agencies. Multiple times, if I had
a question, I would call back to Washington, talk to the heads
of the various agencies, and we would compare our perceptions
and fill in the blanks. And so, this dialog, very active, is
extremely important, and it helped inform me as a commander in
the field, so that I could make the best decisions to
accomplish the mission and protect my troops.
For example, if there were a threat out there that was
identified, even if it was raw intelligence, then you would see
commanders in the field, warfighters, take immediate steps to
protect their service members, regardless of kind of the
validation. Typically, the default would be to act on that
intelligence, especially with protective measures. Now, before
you might go offensively, you would want more precise,
actionable intelligence.
The other thing we would do is immediately elevate it and
let people know. So, in the case of the Russian army and
funding that went to the Taliban in 2018, one of the ways that
we acted on this was to go public. And I did an interview with
the British Broadcasting Company in which we talked about what
the Russians were doing, the fact that Governors of northern
provinces had brought me weapons and said, ``These came from
Russia,'' were given by the Russians to the Taliban.
Getting it into the public domain elicits a response. It
may just be a denial, but you have got it on the radar screen.
They know they are being watched and they know you are pushing
back. And so, these kinds of actions are extremely important.
Now, of course, the higher up you go, the more powerful the
response is. And so, this is why in my opening comments I said
pushing back on this kind of behavior at the highest levels is
extremely important.
And so, thank you for holding this hearing, because this is
one of the ways we make the Russians aware that we are
watching.
Mr. Meeks. I couldn't agree with you more. I see I have
only got a few seconds. I wish at the highest level our
President of the United States would push back on this Russian
aggression, and particularly in regards to the bounties that
may have been put on the heads of our men and women in the
service.
And I see I am out of time. So, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
We will go to Mr. Perry of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
witnesses.
I will start out with Mr. Morell. Mr. Morell, have you seen
the intelligence regarding the bounty story?
Mr. Morell. No, sir.
Mr. Perry. Okay. How about Mr. Nicholson? Have you seen the
intelligence?
General Nicholson. No, sir, I have not.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Thank you.
How about Dr. Wallander? Have you seen the intelligence
regarding the statements?
Dr. Wallander. No, sir, I have not.
Mr. Perry. Dr. Wallander, in particular, as I read here
from your notes, you have assumed that the published stories
are true, is that--I do not want to put words in your mouth,
but that is what my notes show me. Is that correct or
incorrect?
Dr. Wallander. I said that, for the purposes of this
hearing, to be able to address and explain what Russia is up to
in general, that I would assume that they were true. I would
not address the falsity or truths of the public reports.
Mr. Perry. I mean, I understand for the purposes of the
hearing, but you understand there is a bigger story here, and
just making the presumption or assumption that they are true
(a) not having seen any of the intelligence personally, and (b)
understanding that the GRU is, as I am sure you all know, is
daily engaged in misinformation; and finally, as you probably
know, this is based on very specious reports of human
intelligence by individuals that have a motive to provide
misinformation to the United States. I just think that that is
breathtakingly irresponsible.
But, that having been said, do you think it is appropriate,
based on this conjecture, based on just reports from The New
York Times that are based on yet even more specious human
intelligence by people that aren't very friendly to the United
States of America, that this President take action against a
strategic adversary? Do any of you think that that would be
appropriate?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, sir, for your question. To answer
it, I would say that, if this were reported in a PDB, that it
is certainly appropriate for the leadership of the U.S.
Government to decide on a messaging strategy, which is short of
what you asked about a broader action strategy. Certainly, a
messaging strategy. I would personally start with the Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
speaking to their counterparts. Because if the reports are
true, the GRU reports to the Russian Minister of Defense. So, I
hope that addresses your question. I think that would be the
first step. You are absolutely right, actual action would not
be warranted based on this sort of report.
Mr. Perry. Right. I mean, where does, in your mind--and,
ladies and gentlemen, the three that I have asked the questions
of--where does verification of the intelligence lie in relation
to the timeline of when you either take actions or make
statements? Where does verification of intelligence lie? Is it
as soon as you hear the report, the rumor, the supposition, the
claim? Is action required then? Or does verification fall
anywhere inside, in between, the time you hear it and the time
you take action or make statements?
Mr. Morell. Congressman, maybe I can answer that question.
I think that an administration is required to take action--
whatever that action is is obviously part of the policy
process--but is required to take action when the intelligence
community judges with medium to high confidence that something
has happened. And that is why, for me, knowing what that level
of confidence is on this judgment is so very important. Because
I think if it is low----
Mr. Perry. Are you saying, Mr. Morell, are you saying that
you have information that you can verify or justify that we had
medium to high confidence that this is true, this story is
true?
Mr. Morell. No, sir. No, sir. The point I am trying to make
is, I do not know what the level of confidence was. But if it
was low, then I would be perfectly comfortable with senior
policymakers going back to the intelligence community and
saying, ``We need more information. We need to take a harder
look at this. You have got to collect more and figure out
whether this is right or not.''
Mr. Perry. Well, I would agree with you. I would agree with
you, Mr. Morell. And before the President or anyone takes
actions, I think it is important to verify that. I am just
going to quote the chairman of the committee on the death of
Soleimani where he said, ``The decision to kill Soleimani
escalated tensions with Iran and risked plunging us into war.''
And I remind everybody on the panel that Soleimani is a target
that we had complete and verified intelligence on for many,
many years of the deaths of thousands of American service
members and maiming of thousands of others of my friends who
served in uniform. And the criticism was robust for the
President regarding that decision where there was verified,
actionable intelligence over a long period of time, and there
is none----
Mr. Castro. The gentleman's time is up.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. There is none with this.
And with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Morell. Mr. Chairman, may I just add one point?
Mr. Castro. Sure, please.
Mr. Morell. So, I do not want to leave anyone with the
impression that I know that the confidence level was low or the
confidence level was medium or the confidence level was high.
So, I think that is just very important. If it was medium to
high, then I think that required action on the part of the
President.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
We will now go to Albio Sires of New Jersey. I think you
are on mute there. There you go.
Mr. Sires. Yes, I do not have any questions at this moment.
I am just listening. Thank you.
Mr. Castro. Okay. We will go to Mr. Kinzinger of Illinois.
Mr. Kinzinger. All right. Thank you. Let me get on the
video here. There we go.
First off, thank you all for being here. I very much
appreciate it, all your good work, everything you are doing for
the country. This is a really important issue.
I need to say a couple of things upfront. First off, I
think it is too much to call this a hoax. Second, though, I
think it is too much to say that we absolutely know this
happened, and therefore, here should be the penalties. I have
read every piece of intelligence, at least offered to me, and
in terms of what level of confidence, that is not my expertise;
that is up to the intelligence agencies.
And I think the question of whether the President should or
shouldn't be briefed, it is really, in my mind, an art and not
a science. It is a matter, when do you feel, whether it is the
brief or the intelligence experts, that you should brief a
President on this? If it is not actionable, is it worth going
to him? Well, if I was President, I would want to know, but not
every President would or should.
So, I think a lot of the so-called scandal that we have
been seeing here is not a scandal at all. I think it is just an
art form. And unfortunately, look, this goes to--the prior
questioner, Mr. Perry, mentioned about Soleimani. That was a
confirmed bad guy that took confirmed action that killed
Americans. I operated against him in Iraq, or against his
people at least. And there was opposition to that.
And I think with something like this it comes down to
political stripes, unfortunately. If you are a Republican, you
are going to say this was nothing. If you are a Democrat, you
are going to say this is everything. And I just want to get to
the bottom of this, because when we jump to conclusions, I do
not think we are doing any good for our folks in the field.
But it seems to me that the only thing that Putin responds
to is strength. Whenever Putin attempts a new maneuver, he
waits to see the international community's response, and
particularly the United States. And when nothing happens, he
escalates. We have seen it time and again. We have seen it, for
instance, in Syria multiple times and everywhere else.
As I have said before, if the intelligence proved that the
Russian officials approved of this bounty scheme, the United
States and our international partners would need to respond
forcefully. But had the administration responded back in
February when the intelligence was even less certain, I fully
believe my colleagues on the other side of the aisle would be
holding a hearing bashing the administration on this.
Mr. Morell, let me just ask you, during your time as CIA
Director, would you have recommended--you touched on it--but
would you have recommended retaliatory actions against Russia
with anything other than high probability? You talked using
maybe medium probability. But, when you are discussing the fact
that this is Russia, would you on a medium or anything short of
high probability?
Mr. Morell. Yes, I would--so high probability, high
confidence to an intelligence analyst is not certainty that
something has happened, but you are getting pretty close.
Medium to high confidence is pretty good as well.
So, CIA Directors do not make recommendations to Presidents
about what they should do. They characterize the intelligence
and our confidence in it. So, if it was medium to high, I would
tell the President that there is a very good chance that this
happened and it is up to you on how you want to respond.
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes, I think this is the key to this. We
know that Russia has been meddling in Afghanistan. That is not
a question. And I actually would have advocated for action,
whatever that looks like, back in 2013 or 2014. It is a
bipartisan issue, right? I mean it really is. The issue we are
discussing is, was there particularly a bounty, not is Russia
involved, not is Russia doing things that could kill Americans,
because they have been. And I have been advocating to push back
against that for a long time.
Mr. Brzezinski, let me ask you, what other States are
supportive of the Taliban and have any of them placed bounties
on the U.S. or coalition soldiers?
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, let me just add one point on the
bounty issue. The fact that it is plausible that these bounties
were placed on American soldiers in Afghanistan by Russia is
testimony in itself that our policy toward Russia is inadequate
in terms of deterring aggression. And so, I want to make that
important point. The fact that we are even saying this----
Mr. Kinzinger. Fully agree.
Mr. Brzezinski [continuing]. Underscores the point that we
need to recalibrate our posture toward Russia across the whole
spectrum.
Mr. Kinzinger. Let me just say I fully agree with you 100
percent and I would echo those comments. But, then,
specifically, are there any other States that are doing things
like this that we know about?
Mr. Brzezinski. I do not have statistics on that, sir.
Mr. Kinzinger. Okay. So, you do not know if Iran or
anything is involved in the same kind of situation? Okay.
Let me ask just another question of General Nicholson.
During your time commanding U.S.----
Mr. Castro. Your time has expired.
Mr. Kinzinger. I'm sorry?
Mr. Castro. Your time has expired. Do you have a quick
question?
Mr. Kinzinger. Oh, I'm sorry, I did not see a clock up
there. I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Castro. Okay. Thank you.
We will go to Mr. Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Castro. Yes, I can hear you.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
And thank you to the panel.
Mr. Morell, on June 30th, the National Security Advisor,
Mr. O'Brien, and the White House Press Secretary, Ms. McEnany,
said the President had not been briefed on this intelligence
due to disagreements among the intelligence community. Is that
how intelligence shifts up to the President, that it has got to
be in agreement or he does not hear about it?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir, there are often pieces in the
President's Daily Brief where one or two or three agencies
believe something and another agency has questions about it.
And those dissents are expressed in the piece. The reason for
the dissents are expressed in the piece, and the reason why
those dissents are important to the President are often
expressed in the piece. So, they do not need a unanimous view
to move forward.
Mr. Connolly. So, the explanation they gave does not really
pass any kind of real test, based on your own experience?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. That is not how it works?
Mr. Morell. That is not how it works, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Right. So, there is reason to question the
credibility coming out of the White House as to whether the
President, in fact, got briefed. We know that the President
does not like to read things, but that does not mean that it
was not available to him. And it is not clear, from my
understanding, that he was not briefed. Certainly, the
rationale given for why he was not briefed, as you just pointed
out, Mr. Morell, does not have credibility. It is just not how
the process works.
But I would just say, even from a common-sense point of
view, if I were an intelligence person and I saw any kind of
intelligence that seemed halfway credible that the Russians had
ramped up what they were doing in Afghanistan and were now
paying a bounty on American lives to kill them, I am sure as
hell I would want to make sure the Commander in Chief knew
about that. I would take the risk that he know about that,
whether it was small, medium, or high credible, actionable
intelligence.
Mr. Brzezinski, I really appreciate what you had to say
about Russia. The word that comes to my mind, because Dr.
Wallander just said we have to ask the question why would
Russia do this, I think that is the pertinent question. And for
me--and I want you to react--you said Putin is a risk-taker. I
would also say he loves to push, probe, and expand boundaries.
He is always checking what the boundaries are.
And when you have a President who says, ``I believe Putin
over my own intelligence community about Russian interference
in the 2016 election,'' ``I am willing to pull out 8,000 troops
from Germany because I am angry at Merkel for not coming to the
G7 meeting,'' ``In fact, I want to invite Putin to that G7
meeting,'' and, of course, having withdrawn from critical arms
control agreements, and the like, and now calling this
intelligence a hoax, it seems to me that, if I were Putin, I
would tally all that up and say, ``I can operate with impunity
with this administration. There are going to be very few
consequences for pushing that envelope as far as I can push
it.'' Do you think that is a fair appraisal of where we are in
the current relationship with Vladimir Putin's Russia?
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I am on track with you on this. I
would just characterize Putin not so much as a risk-taker, but
someone who has got very clear objectives, is willing to
assertively pursue those objectives, but who is also a
pragmatist. As Celeste pointed out, as Dr. Wallander pointed
out, he picks his battles carefully. And as you pointed out, he
will probe, and if he does not see pushback, he will push
further. If he sees forcibly pushback, he will back off.
And that is what is a concern about this immediate issue at
hand, which is the bounties issues. Now that it is out in the
public domain, now that it is an issue that has gotten the
attention it has, it is now incumbent upon the administration
to clearly articulate to the Russians this is completely
unacceptable.
Mr. Connolly. Yes, and I would----
Mr. Brzezinski. We need a forceful response, at least
rhetorically. And as for more specific elements of a more
aggressive or substantive response, that has to be determined
based on the intelligence.
Mr. Connolly. And I would add to what you just said, Mr.
Brzezinski, conversely, there are consequences for not doing
what you just said. When Putin hears equivocation and, well, we
did not know and it is not clear, and we did not have
actionable intelligence such that we could react at all, I
think that gives him a flashing green light to do more of it
and to look at other areas where he can do damage to the United
States. And I think that is a very dangerous situation our
President and this administration have put themselves in.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
We will go to Mr. Zeldin of New York. We cannot hear your
audio there, Mr. Zeldin. For some reason, I am not hearing you.
Can we come back to you? Okay.
What I am going to do is go to the next Republican, and
then, go to a Democrat. All right? So, Mr. Mast of Florida. Mr.
Mast, are you there?
[No response.]
Okay. Will the administrator tell me who the next
Republican is that we can call on?
Ms. Stiles. Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Castro. Mr. Fitzpatrick? Okay.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Can you hear me?
Mr. Castro. Yes, Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Mr. Ranking Member.
Thank you to the panelists.
And just to echo what my friend Adam Kinzinger had said, I
hope that our focus can be on, No. 1, fixing the problem,
getting our arms around this intelligence and fixing it. And we
always can have time to go back and do an after-action report
on what did or did not happen after the fact, after we fix the
problem.
So, for the panelists, thank you for being here.
And I just wanted to get your updated sense. I served in
Ukraine as an FBI agent. That was my last international
assignment. And we were, obviously, very well aware of Mr.
Putin's sinister motives when it comes to that region. We all
knew that Mr. Putin has geographic dominance aspirations to
reconstitute the USSR. Iran has religious dominance
aspirations. China has economic dominance aspirations. And in
many ways, they were operating--in some ways, I should say--in
collaboration with one another.
So, if the panelists could just shed light and maybe
provide us with an update on your assessment or your sense for
the collaboration going on between Vladimir Putin and Syria,
Iran, China, North Korea, and any other actors in the region?
Dr. Wallander. I can speak to that, sir. Russia and Iran
collaborate militarily in Syria and have for years. The Russian
military is not a ground presence in Syria and it relies on, as
I suggested earlier, quasi-private military mercenary groups
and, also, coordination with other actors, including Iran, in
Syria.
Russia strategically coordinates with China in areas where
they have common interests in challenging American leadership,
whether that is in the U.N. Security Council in trying to
prevent U.N. Security Council resolutions, for example,
condemning the Assad regime in Syria or many others. They share
an interest in trying to revise the global liberal order in
order to undermine American leadership.
So, you can find instances in which Russia cooperates with
countries in areas that really affect in a negative way
American leadership and American allies and our interests.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Do any of the other panelists have
anything to add to that?
[No response.]
Okay. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking
member. Thanks for holding this hearing.
And thanks to the extraordinary testimony of our witnesses.
Mr. Morell, I am going to ask you about the reports that
there was information in the President's Daily Briefing that
the Russians were putting a bounty on the heads of American
troops. And we have heard lots of reasons why there was no
reason the President should have been concerned about this,
should have wanted to be concerned about this. But I just want
to ask you, I want to take a step back and have you explain how
the President's Daily Brief is assembled. Can you do that for
us?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir. So, there is a meeting every morning
with the briefers there who just briefed that morning and they
provide their feedback on what happened. The most important
part of that feedback, are there any additional questions that
customers need answers to that would result in a piece the next
day? And then, the various parts of the intelligence community
propose pieces for the next day and the out days and decisions
are made about what is going to be in the book the next day and
what is going to be in the book the day after that.
Once those pieces are drafted and approved within the
agency that writes them, they are coordinated across the
intelligence community. And that is where you can get
agreement. So, you can get all agencies agreeing or you can get
dissents. You can get DIA and CIA think one thing and NSA
thinks something else.
So, that is pretty much how the process works. I would add
that within each agency the process for getting a piece
approved to be even sent out for coordination is
extraordinarily rigorous, because at the end of the day these
views are not views of a Michael Morell; they are the views of
the Central Intelligence Agency and the views of the United
States intelligence community.
Mr. Deutch. How do you react, Mr. Morell, to some of my
colleagues coming back now to assert that this information
shouldn't have been in there? One of my colleagues said it was
not verifiable. One of them said it was biased human
intelligence and that, as a result, it should have been clear
back in February that this is nothing to be concerned about.
Mr. Morell. So, if it was in the PDB--and I do not know
that it was--but if it was in the PDB, it means at least one
agency--one important agency, right?--believed the information
to be true at some level of confidence. So, that is the
response, right, is that someone in the intelligence community
believed that information to be true. And that is why it was in
the PDB. It would not be there otherwise.
Mr. Deutch. And so, before we even get to the question of
low, medium, or high, which we discussed earlier, let's talk
about the kind of information that it is. If there were
information in the PDB that said that there was a threat
against one of our Ambassadors in Europe, and it did not come
up in the Daily Brief, at the morning meeting with the
President, what would happen then? Would someone raise it with
the President?
Mr. Morell. So, sure. If it is not in the PDB, but the
President needs to know it, then the briefer can raise it on
their own, right? ``This is something else you need to know,
Mr. President.'' Or the DNI, who is sitting there as well, the
Director of National Intelligence can raise it and say, ``Mr.
President, there is something else you need to know.'' Or the
Director of CIA, or anybody else in the room.
I mean, one of the things that people forget here is that
the President's briefer is the most junior person in the room.
I was once that person. I was the most junior person in the
room. Right? So, the National Security Advisor, the White House
Chief of Staff, the Vice President, the Director of National
Intelligence, Director of CIA are all in the room. Any one of
them are capable of saying, ``Mr. President, in addition to
what is in your book, you also need to know this,'' or that.
Mr. Deutch. Who decides? Does the junior briefer decide
what to report to the President?
Mr. Morell. So, in general, yes. In my case, I went in
there every morning with the Director of Central Intelligence,
George Tenet. So, he wanted to know what additional materials I
was going to give to the President or share with the President.
So, he said yes or no to that. But, in general, the briefers
decide.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Morell, I would just close by pointing out
that, when one of the agencies says that the Russians are
putting a bounty on the heads of American soldiers, that
someone in that room, one would think, would care to share that
information with the President of the United States. And when
this information comes out months later, the response from the
President of the United States, out of respect for the families
who lost loved ones in Afghanistan, should not immediately come
to his own defense, but should try to get to the bottom of what
happened. Fixing the problem is not about the PDB; fixing the
problem is making sure that the President is looking out for
the protection of our troops and potential Russian efforts,
first and foremost. That is what I think needs to be about.
And I yield back.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
We are going to go to Mrs. Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman, for
hosting this very important hearing on the absolutely shocking
allegations that Russia is paying Taliban-linked militants to
attack our service men and women. If these reports are, indeed,
true, we must take strong and swift action to show Russia that
attacking Americans is never acceptable and will be met with a
swift and strong response by the United States of America.
Russia has proven that it will exploit any opportunity to
undermine and roll back American influence, even at the cost of
destabilizing regions and prolonging bloody conflict. This is
evident in its malign involvement in civil wars, unrest, and
conflicts in places like Ukraine, Syria, and Venezuela.
Russia's actions are reprehensible, and I am proud to have
supported robust sanctions against the Putin regime.
Dr. Wallander, you noted that reports of an alleged Russian
bounty program with the Taliban indicate an escalation in
Russia's long-running asymmetric competition with the United
States. Does this illuminate any vulnerabilities in our
deterrence against Russian asymmetric operations and how can we
restore the credibility of our deterrence?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you very much for your question.
I think that the vulnerability lays in our failure to track
Russian activities closely enough and with enough confidence to
be able to take counteractions. What do I mean by that? It is
exactly by operating in this gray zone that Russia hopes to
have the advantages of these operations without suffering the
kinds of consequences we have talked about--their exposure,
American military commanders taking countermeasures, being
called to account by political leadership, potential financial
sanctions. I would look at disruptive activities that the
United States could undertake to complicate these kinds of
operations.
So, we have to get serious about this, not only because of
this incident, which I do think, if it is true, is an
escalation because it exhibits a willingness to take risk for a
direct connection between Russian action and American military
fatalities. And it suggests that the constraints of risk
aversion that we have referred to earlier might be being lost.
Mrs. Wagner. Russian military intelligence, or GRU, is
behind a string of attempted assassination and coups, frankly,
across Europe, including in the Balkans where Russia is seeking
to exploit existing divisions to slow or prevent regional
countries from integrating into the European Union or NATO. I
am deeply concerned that Russia is fueling ethnic divides in
the interest of weakening Balkan States. Mr. Brzezinski, how
can we work with our NATO partners to prevent the GRU from
undermining progress in the Balkans?
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you, ma'am.
I would just add on Celeste's point that, if you look back
at 2008, how quickly President Putin backed off when he was
confronted with the possibility of a direct red-on-blue
engagement--that is, when he was confronted with the
possibility he might have to shoot at American soldiers--
compared to 2018 in Syria and today with the allegations of
putting bounties on American soldiers, and in 2018 where
Russian paramilitaries actually attacked a U.S. outpost, this
shows how Russian aggression, assertiveness, and provocations
have escalated. And if we are really going to curb, deter,
contain, push back Russia's actions in this area, I think we
have to have a much firmer posture across the board. We cannot
be willing to invite him or initiating invitations to the G7s.
The political isolation has got to be real and sustained. Our
economic pressure has to be much harder.
In addition to some of the sanctions that Celeste was
talking about, I would seriously consider pulling Russia from
SWIFT. Really hammer its financial sector. Yes, this will cause
pain and a lot of collateral economic damage on people who
shouldn't be held responsible for Putin's actions in Russia,
but that is a geopolitical reality. If we really want to shake
up Putin, we have to shake his political base, his political
stability.
And militarily, we need to be more prepared to push back
against Russia. And I am very concerned about our posture in
Europe. Although we have made progress in recent years, it is
still an inadequate posture to competently deter Russian
aggression, particularly in North Central and Eastern Europe.
Mr. Castro. Time is up----
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski. I believe my time
has expired and I will yield back.
I have several other questions, Mr. Chairman, and I will
put them into the record.
Mr. Castro. Sure. Yes.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Mrs. Wagner.
And just for everybody, please, so that we can get to all
the members on the committee, as you are asking questions, if
you can glance on the grid at the time as it is coming down.
For the witnesses, I know that you all have a lot to say,
and we appreciate your expertise, but if you all can also be
mindful of the time, so that we can get to everybody and help
everybody ask all questions. All right?
We are going to go to David Cicilline, and then, I am going
to try to go back to Mr. Zeldin of New York right after that.
David?
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ranking Member McCaul, for calling this really important
hearing.
I want to begin by saying I disagree with my friend, Mr.
Kinzinger, who said, if you are a Republican, this is nothing;
if you are a Democrat, this is serious. If you are an American,
the idea that there is intelligence that the Russians may have,
in fact, been paying a bounty on the heads of our American
soldiers is outrageous and demands a whole-of-government
response.
But I want to get, first, to this Presidential Daily Brief
because some people have suggested that, oh, you know, it can
be an innuendo; it could be a rumor. And so, Mr. Morell, I want
to ask you, in order to get into the President's Daily Brief,
isn't it a fact that there has to be a sufficient amount of
evidence that it is a credible statement of fact? It is sort of
the gold standard among the intelligence community? Rumors and
innuendos do not make it into the President's Daily Briefing?
Mr. Morell. So, I would agree with you. I would just change
one word. I would change ``fact'' to ``assessment,'' right? It
is an assessment that Putin is providing these bounties, and it
may not be a fact, but it has to be credible in order to get in
there, yes, sir.
Mr. Cicilline. Right. So, this idea of just rumors,
unsubstantiated rumors do not make it into the Presidential
Daily Brief. And I think the President has acknowledged that it
was in the President's Daily Brief, or at least he said he did
not read, he was not briefed on it, and he did not read it,
which presents its own problem. Kind of the consequences of a
President who does not read the Daily Brief is, in and of
itself, alarming.
But, in addition to that, the National Security Advisor,
Mr. O'Brien, acknowledged publicly that he had begun to
develop, along with the other appropriate officials, a set of
responses to this activity by the Russians, a set of options to
present to the President. And is it fair to say that you do not
go through the arduous process of developing a set of responses
without having some confidence that the intelligence that you
have collected is accurate, credible, and worthy of action?
Mr. Morell. In my experience, yes, sir.
Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Morell?
Mr. Morell. I was just going to say, in my experience, sir,
yes, you would need credible intelligence in order to start
that process.
Mr. Cicilline. And so, in this context, we have President
Trump who has fawned over President Putin. On the campaign
trail, he repeatedly complimented Vladimir Putin. He denied
that Russia interfered with U.S. elections. In 2017, in an
interview with Bill O'Reilly, when he was asked about Putin
being a killer, he said, you know, there are a lot of killers;
do you think this country is so innocent? And then, in 2018, at
the Helsinki Summit, Trump incredibly sided with Putin over our
own intelligence community about Russia interfering with our
elections. He has withdrawn from the Open Skies Treaty, which
benefits Russia. He has proposed reducing U.S. forces in
Europe. So, it is in all of that context. Putin has annexed
Crimea, remains steadfastly hostile to Ukrainian democracy in
violation of international law, and just last week we saw him
again, as a dictator, extend his term in office until 2036. So,
it is in this context that reporting that the President failed
to act or even condemn this action by the Russians is so
outrageous.
And so, my first question is to you, Mr. Brzezinski. This,
it seems to me, suggests the absence of
[audio malfunction]. The President is not really interested
in doing it. But would it, in fact, be helpful if we actually
had a strategy to contain Russia when we needed to and to
engage with them when we needed to, and what should that look
like?
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I missed part of your question, but I
understood it is, basically, do we have a strategy for dealing
with Russian assertiveness?
Mr. Cicilline. And should we? Do we have one, should we,
and what should it look like?
Mr. Brzezinski. I think right now, and unfortunately, I
think this is true across the last several Republican and
Democratic administrations, we have really had kind of an ad
hoc strategy. It has been reactive and it has been incremental.
What we really need to be doing is leveraging the full spectrum
of power that we have to deal with Russia. And that power
includes our economic might. I think we ought to be leveraging
more economic sanctions. And think about it, we are a $17
trillion economy; Russia is somewhere between 1 and 2. We have,
with the Europeans, a 34-to-1 advantage in GDP comparison. We
ought to be hammering the Russian economy on this if we really
want to be serious about convincing Russia to take a different
course of action.
On the political side, we can impose more aggressive
political sanctions on Russia. And then, also, as I have
pointed out, we need to adjust our military posture.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
And, General Nicholson, my last question, if the
allegations that are reported in The New York Times are true
and Russians placed bounties on the heads of American soldiers,
what should the President of the United States do to ensure
that service members' families and the American people gain
some comfort in knowing that we are doing everything we can to
protect the men and women in uniform and to ensure that the
Russians know that we will not tolerate this and we take this
action very seriously?
General Nicholson. Yes, what you just said, sir. We should
let the American people know that we will do it, and then, that
would be visible by, as I mention in my recommendations, very
highest levels of our government, drawing a clear line that
this is unacceptable.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
Mr. Castro. All right.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Zeldin, hopefully, we have got you now. I still cannot
hear you. Yes, now it says you are on mute there. Yes, it is
not coming through. Yes, sorry about that.
I will go to the next Republican, Mr. Curtis. Mr. Curtis?
[No response.]
How about Burchett? Okay.
Mr. Burchett. Can you now hear me?
Mr. Castro. Yes. Oh, yes, we can hear you.
Mr. Burchett. I hate cutting in front of everybody,
especially my colleague Lee Zeldin, who I make him look good on
the baseball diamond. I am a consensus fourth stringer on our
baseball team, in case you all did not know that.
And it is a pleasure being here with you all, and thank you
all. I am very interested in this topic. I have talked about it
on the news. I have gotten busted from both sides on it.
And I think it is pretty much known that Putin is a thug. I
mean, I am sure he quakes in his Gucci loafers when he hears
that the 435th most powerful person in Congress isn't a fan of
his, but I think he is a thug. I do not know why there is any
fascination with either side on him.
We know that Russia has been helping the Taliban through
political, maybe even material means since 2016. The Russians
justify this because of the rise of the Islamic State.
Now the--I am not sure if I say it right--but the Khorasan
Province and the ISKP and their view that the Taliban is less
of a threat to their security, and my question is this: what do
the Russians gain by paying the Taliban to kill our troops if
we have a shared enemy in the ISKP? And you all just jump in.
Ma'am, why do not you go? Ladies first. I am in the South, so
that is--go ahead.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, sir. I am happy to address that.
I think the goal of Russian policy now--and General
Nicholson pointed to this as well--is to get the United States
out. There was a shift about half a decade ago where Russia was
ambivalent. It saw some common interests in fighting
fundamentalists and extremists, but, after it invaded Ukraine,
and the United States took firm action to lead especially
Europe in sanctions and isolation, the Russian leadership
evaluated that the threat of the United States being nearby
militarily, not just NATO in Europe, but in the Middle East and
in Central Asia--remember, Russia worked to kick the U.S. out
of the air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan as well. That was the
goal, to get us out and to benefit from our departure, plain
and simple, I think by the period of this incident.
Mr. Burchett. For the rest of you all, I would be curious
what you have to say.
General Nicholson. Yes, I will jump in, sir. General
Nicholson here.
I agree with Dr. Wallander. There was a lot of hedging
activity, we would call it, I would say, as it was unclear what
the United States' intentions were near the end of the Obama
Administration. And we had a Stated intention to leave. We did
see Pakistanis, Iranians, as well as Russians, all getting
involved, I think to gain some influence in what was going to
be the environment after we left, after the U.S. and NATO left.
So, I think a part of it was motivated by a desire to gain
leverage, and then, another part is their legitimate concern
about the spillover of terrorism into Central Asia and Russia.
However, this was overStated and this was called their
misinformation campaign, suggesting that the United States was
supporting ISIS, and, in fact, it was deliberately promoting
it.
So, I think there is a combination lens, as with many
things, with truth and fiction, as they pursued their overall
goal, which is to undermine us, to undermine NATO. They did not
want to see us be successful there and they wanted us out of
the region.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you.
Mr. Morell. Congressman, if I could add just one thing, I
agree with everything that Dr. Wallander and General Nicholson
said. I would just add that this is about Afghanistan, but it
is also about outside of Afghanistan. This is about reminding
Americans that, wherever you go in the world, it might not be
safe. And they want us to think twice about sending troops
anywhere. So, this is a pretty broad policy as well as
Afghanistan-specific.
Mr. Burchett. All right. Real quick, I am running out of
time, but what can we do to make sure this does not happen
again? We can talk all these broad statements, but bottom-line
me. I am in east Tennessee; we need to cut to the chase. Ma'am,
what do you think bottom line? I have got 40 seconds, so 10
seconds apiece.
Dr. Wallander. A political message, but also disruption
operations. The GRU can operate like this because it can travel
to Europe. It can use international financial institutions. And
if it did not have access to those resources, it would not be
able to engage in these operations.
Mr. Burchett. General?
General Nicholson. Sir, I would say, No. 1, strongly and
clearly and unequivocally State this is unacceptable. And then,
second, the other things that they are interested in, and this
is why I suggest suspending any talk of withdrawing troops from
Germany.
Mr. Burchett. Mr. Morell, I have got 1 second.
Mr. Morell. Sir, I would say you have to play to Putin's
fears. And what he fears is his middle class coming out into
the streets of Moscow and saying they want change and they want
him to go away. And that is why I agree fully with Mr.
Brzezinski that the sanctions need to be broad-based and should
not be targeted. They should be broad-based.
Mr. Burchett. Great. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate all you all.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
Mr. Burchett. And I actually miss you guys in person. I
know it is not the same without me being there live. So, thank
you, Mr. Chairman. And, Ranking Member, as always, it is good
seeing you, Brother.
Mr. Castro. Ms. Titus?
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank my colleagues and the panel for giving us
very detailed discussion about the issue of bounties. But I
want to look at this from a bigger picture, as we have started
to do. I think Mr. Brzezinski said that our policy over several
administrations has been ad hoc and reactive, and we know that.
You just go back to Obama. We had the reset with the red
button. That was pretty optimistic. People thought we were
going to accomplish a lot, but it fizzled pretty fast, and
then, ended up with Crimea and sanctions and adoptions being
denied and interference in elections.
So now, we have got a new President and a new policy, if
you can call it a policy. Nobody has come up with a name for it
because it is so confusing. The President talked about Putin in
his campaign and praised him, but, then, on the other hand, he
said, ``I've been more aggressive against Russia than any other
President.'' And then, I think you, Mr. Chairman, laid out all
the things that have happened in recent days that show how the
President feels about Mr. Putin.
We have heard some grand strategies now for what our policy
should be, but I do not see any of those being put into effect
by this administration, judging from his recent behavior. But I
am optimistic. I think we are going to have a new President
here in a few months. So, I would like to talk about what
difference that will make. Will that cause Putin to change his
policy, as he deals with the new President? The fact that he is
going to be there until 2036, he thinks, will that affect his
behavior? How can we now get back into multilateral
relationships to change the new reset or a new policy? And how
can we more effectively deal with his plausible deniability,
like the Wagner Group that he often hides behind? So, given
those major changes that I anticipate will come in November,
could you kind of address how you think that will affect what
our policy toward Russia will be?
Mr. Brzezinski. If I could, I will take a stab.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Mr. Brzezinski. Whether it is a Trump administration or a
Biden administration, there are four kind of elements I would
have for effecting Russia's strategy.
One is to ratchet up political isolation of the Putin
regime, so he does not get legitimacy, political legitimacy,
and stature through fora like the G7.
Second, I would enhance our military readiness in key
frontiers. I focus most on Central Europe, but that is one area
we ought to be continuing to enhance our military readiness,
particularly for high-intensity conflict.
Third, as I mentioned several times, we ought to enhance
our economic pressure, really impose economic pain on Russia.
And then, fourth, kind of following the point that was
inferred by Director Morell and Dr. Wallander, we ought to
really think about our own strategy disruption against Russia.
In the same way that Putin has been mucking around in our
politics and the politics of our allies and partners, we ought
to be leveraging his own political weaknesses by leveraging our
asymmetric advantages and asymmetric tools like cyber warfare
and information operations.
His political stature isn't as strong as he would like it
to be. And the more we could create a certain amount of
uncertainty within Russia about his own political well-being,
the more likely he is going to be focused inward.
So, the combination of this external pressure and a
strategy of disruption that affects his internal stability I
think is in order for more effective Russia policy.
Ms. Titus. Dr. Wallander?
Dr. Wallander. I would agree with what Mr. Brzezinski said
in terms of the focus of the strategy. And I would just
observe, also, that if you are going to focus on isolation,
greater defense spending, and better planning, especially in
Europe, and not only in Europe, and economic pressure, the
United States needs to do it in coordination with allies and
partners, because, otherwise, it is not effective.
Sanctions escape, it is easier for Russia to do if the
United States isn't coordinated with Japan, the other members
of the G7, and certainly with Europe, given the importance of
the European economy to Russia. So, we need to rebuild those
alliances and partnerships, both because they are good for
America, but if we want to have an effective strategy for
coping with Putin's Russia, we have to do it with those strong
allies and partners.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
And, Director Morell, any addition?
Mr. Morell. Ma'am, just to answer your direct question
about Vice President Biden, I think the important thing is that
Putin will test him immediately. And the Vice President will
need to respond along the lines that all four of us are
suggesting in order for Putin to be constrained. And if the
Vice President does not respond that way, then Putin will see
an open field ahead of him. So, he will test within the first
few months a new President.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Ms. Titus.
We are now going to try one more time Mr. Zeldin. I think
he has fixed his computer and it may be working for him now.
Mr. Zeldin. Mr. Chairman, do you have me?
Mr. Castro. I do.
Mr. Zeldin. All right. So, thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
First of all, I would like to State that I view Russia in
many ways as an adversary of the United States. Vladimir Putin
thinks he is 7 feet tall. If he could have his way, he would
put the USSR back together again. That is where I come from.
But, first, I am approaching this from a position of facts.
I have been trying over the course of the hearing to follow a
bunch of bad assumptions to take the story into different
directions and it is unfortunate.
But, first off, before I get into some of that, to followup
on the exchange just now, as the question was presented
conclusively that Joe Biden was going to get elected in
November, and how would that impact his relationship with
Vladimir Putin, if we are going to go there, to complete the
record, yesterday he released a 110-page agenda, and nowhere in
those 110 pages does it mention Russia or terrorism once. It
does mention other nations and, obviously, a lot of other
priorities. So, to help answer that question of my colleague.
To also help cleanup one thing that Mr. Morell said about
declaring the briefer in the room as a junior briefer, this is
a 30-year CIA briefer. The woman who briefed the President is a
30-year career staffer.
Next----
Mr. Morell. Sir?
Mr. Zeldin. No, thank you. Please, it is my time now. You
had your opportunity. So, we will cleanup a few things.
Next, we are following what really was the Susan Rice
version in her op-ed in The New York Times. That is that there
was compelling evidence, there was a conclusion based on
compelling evidence that Russia placed a bounty on U.S. service
members and that the President was briefed. Now I do not know,
Ms. Wallander, if your assumption that you come into this
hearing is following the Susan Rice assumption. I do not know
what you might disagree with of what Susan Rice wrote in her
op-ed, but having known the rest of the facts and not playing
along with story time here at this hearing, there are important
facts that should be understood, so we could have a productive
conversation.
So, there was a PDB that was given in written form to the
President of the United States. In that PDB, there was a
concern expressed that is an appropriate topic of this
discussion today and this hearing. In it was also a dissent.
That 30-year career CIA briefer shows up at the briefing and
chooses not to brief that information because she disagrees
with it. So, the President was never told that in the briefing.
Now I am having trouble playing along with ignoring the
facts, to call it ``a junior briefer'' and ignore 30 years of
service in the CIA. I have trouble playing along with the
reality that there was some kind of a conclusion on this based
on compelling evidence that there was not a dissent and the
President was told this.
So, with all that being said, with a couple of minutes I
have left, first off, General Nicholson, I have a tremendous
amount of respect for you. Thank you for your service to our
country. We have spent multiple Christmas days in Afghanistan.
You have sacrificed a ton for your country, and as you know, I
have a tremendous amount of respect for you.
And actually, it has been on those trips with you and your
team where I learned a lot about Russian interests in
Afghanistan and the way that they meddle with the Taliban, and
otherwise. So, I know that you are a subject matter expert on
it.
I just want to hear your thoughts on the fact that there
was classified information that was leaked to The New York
Times and how that impacts the process.
General Nicholson. [Audio malfunction.] Having said that,
as you know from our conversations there--and thank you for
your many visits to the theater and for checking on the troops
and the dialog with us--we have been watching the Russians for
some time and we are concerned about their behavior. And so,
having this hearing, having this conversation, getting this up
on the radar screen, I think is a form of pushback on Russian
behavior.
And this opportunism that the Russians have demonstrated in
Afghanistan and elsewhere, in my experience militarily when we
respond and we identify they are trying to exploit an
opportunity and we respond effectively, that is one of the ways
that we can cause him to look elsewhere, if nothing else, and
to dial down on what they are doing.
So, I thank the members for having this hearing and getting
this on the screen. They will be watching this and they will
know that we are watching them.
Mr. Castro. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Zeldin.
Mr. Zeldin. I guess
[audio malfunction] does not want to answer the question.
I appreciate it. Thank you.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
And, Mr. Morell, I know you wanted to say something. Your
words were directly addressed. If you want to make a quick
response, that would be fine.
Mr. Morell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Zeldin misrepresented my statement. I did not say she
was a junior officer. I said she was the most junior officer in
the room. That is a very significant difference.
Mr. Castro. Okay. Thank you.
All right. We are going to go to Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I want to thank all the panelists for being here today.
I think it is very instructive to note what the White House
has not denied. The White House has not denied that the CIA
assessed that Russia paid bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S.
troops. The White House has not denied that the CIA made this
assessment with a medium level of confidence. The White House
has not denied that this information was included in the
President's Daily Brief in February.
The main excuse from the White House is that Donald Trump
was not orally briefed on this issue, but that excuse has now
gone away because, for at least nearly 2 weeks, the President
has seen the news coverage on this issue, first, coming out of
The New York Times, and then, being confirmed by The Washington
Post, by NBC, by The Wall Street Journal, and multiple other
press outlets. And the President has yet to utter a single word
condemning Vladimir Putin.
But the President has found time to criticize NASCAR driver
Bubba Wallace. The President has found time to play golf on
numerous outings. What kind of message does that send to
Vladimir Putin?
And I have heard some of the strong comments from my
Republican colleagues and I appreciate them, that Russia is not
our friend. But those are just empty words if you cannot even
condemn Donald Trump for not saying a single thing about Russia
placing bounties to kill our troops.
And so, Mr. Morell, I have some questions for you. You had
said that, if intelligence had a medium level of confidence or
higher that this was happening, you would expect the U.S. in a
normal administration would have taken action right now, is
that right?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lieu. Okay. And I heard some of my Republican
colleagues use a word, you know, ``verify'' or ``validate.''
That is not how intelligence works at all, right? You just have
confidence levels. It is nearly impossible to verify or
validate a fact. For example, when Obama sent in a strike to
kill Osama bin Laden, no one was 100 percent sure that Osama
bin Laden was there, isn't that right? You just have confidence
levels in intelligence?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir, you never have certainty in
intelligence.
Mr. Lieu. And based on numerous non-denials from the White
House, it is very clear this is not a hoax. And so, what I want
to understand is--and this is for any of the panelists--what
kind of message is this sending to Russia and Vladimir Putin
when the President of the United States cannot still utter a
single word condemning Russia, not just for the bounty program,
but just for generally arming the Taliban, right? No one
disputes that. And the President cannot even condemn that. So,
what kind of message do you think, Panelists, that sends to
Russia?
Mr. Morell. So, I will jump in first here, Congressman.
Vladimir Putin, one of his strategic tactics, or one of his
tactics, is to divide us as a people, is to have us at each
other's throat. So, he must be very pleased with the arguments
we are having politically about this issue.
Mr. Lieu. So, let me followup on that. I find it
fascinating that so many Republicans are bending over backward
to give Russia the benefit of the doubt. I do not understand
that. I personally served on active duty in the United States
military. It is very clear that Russia is not our friend and
Putin is not our buddy. We should not be giving Russia the
benefit of the doubt. We should be giving the CIA the benefit
of the doubt.
I also wanted to make another point, which is the
Republicans are bringing up, for example, Soleimani and how
there is also intelligence about him. Well, yes, and Democrats
agreed there was a lot of intelligence on him and that he was a
bad guy. That was never the dispute. Intelligence was never the
dispute. The dispute was, was there appropriate use-of-force
authorization to take him out? I believe there was not. And
second, what was going to be the consequences if we did that?
In this case, this is an issue regarding intelligence. The
CIA has made this assessment, and the President of the United
States still has not been able to condemn Vladimir Putin. I
cannot understand that, and for Republicans to remain silent on
this, you are rewarding Putin.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Mr. Lieu.
I will now go to Mr. Keating from Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
I have a question for Dr. Wallander, but for the rest of
the panel as well. When we look at what we do in response to
Russia, we are always, first, looking at sanctions, and
certainly sanctions, including individual sanctions, should be
explored, particularly with some of the oligarchs, I believe.
But the question is this: I would like your comments on how
much more effective it is to work in concert with these
responses, particularly with our European allies. And just this
go-it-alone strategy, when we do get around and the President
does get onboard, sometimes reluctantly, to these sanctions--I
mean strengthening NATO, working harder and more visibly for
Ukraine independence reform, working on energy issues.
Financial transparency issues and money laundering issues are
important as well. These are the things, we should take an
across-the-board approach in terms of reacting to Russia's
malign activities. And how important it is to work in concert,
I believe. But can you reflect on your experience in the go-it-
alone versus an allied approach?
Dr. Wallander. Well, thank you very much, sir.
In order to be effective with economic or financial
sanctions in the case of Russia, you, the United States, have
to coordinate with Europe to be effective for a couple of
reasons. One is the volume of trade between Russia and Europe
far exceeds that of the United States. U.S. trade with Russia
is something like 2 percent of our global trade. So, to have
impact, you have to look at Europe.
Second, a lot of Russian financial transactions end or go
through Europe. So, if you do not coordinate with Europe on
financial, banking, financial institution transactions, there
are workarounds that the Russians are very clever. You know, I
sometimes say, if they put as much energy into running a real
market economy, their economy would be a lot more successful.
They are really good at workarounds. And so, to get to do those
workarounds without the United States coordinating with Europe,
you are just not going to be effective.
And the last point I would like to make is I agree with Mr.
Brzezinski that we should be looking at, if you want impactful
economic sanctions, that you should be looking at sectoral
sanctions. You can only sanction the oligarchs so many times.
Many of the oligarchs are actually not politically influential
or even close to the Kremlin. So, for impact, sectoral
sanctions are important and targeted sanctions on the defense
and security elite that is so core to the Putin leadership. If
you want to be effective, you need to think in terms of
targeting those areas.
Mr. Keating. And in terms of the Wagner Group, and you look
at their activities in Crimea, Syria, now in Libya and parts of
Africa, what theaters that we may not be looking at where you
would be keeping a watchful eye on the Russians going forward?
Dr. Wallander. Going forward, I think we need to look at
Central Asia, for many of the reasons General Nicholson pointed
to. I think that I am concerned also about that the Russian
government can use the Wagner Group for deniable training of
some countries in Europe or in the Middle East. And once they
are there, they tend to have influence, and then, they tend not
to play by the international rules of the game. So, I think
beginning to treat the Wagner Group as more quasi than private
would strengthen the ability of the United States to counter
these kinds of destructive asymmetric operations.
Mr. Keating. Last, in the hearings we had this week in our
subcommittee, they stressed the importance, our witnesses, of
not moving away from the option of dealing directly with the
Russian people, giving them information. Many of Putin's
activities are not well received in Russia. In fact, if they
did know the truth, instead of what they are getting, it would
become a domestic problem for him. Do you believe that is a
very important approach we should take, too?
Dr. Wallander. Well, Putin's disapproval ratings have been
growing. His approval ratings have been falling as a
combination of economic challenges and, also, the challenges of
the COVID crisis in Russia. So, there is evidence that Russians
do pay attention and do have views of their leadership. And
there is also evidence that Russians have, although official
media sources inside of Russia are constrained, Russians
actually get their information from a wide variety of platforms
that are available to them.
Mr. Keating. My time has elapsed. I am sorry, Doctor. I
yield back. But thank you so much for being here with us
today----
Dr. Wallander. Sure.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. And to all our witnesses.
I yield back.
Ms. Stiles. Congressman Malinowski, we can turn to you,
sir, if you want to begin chairing.
Mr. Malinowski [presiding]. So, it is Mr. Phillips next.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses.
I will start with a few obvious truths. One of which is I
am terribly disappointed that Secretary Pompeo once again
chooses not to be with us, stonewalls our efforts to provide
important oversight on some terribly important issues that we
and the rest of the world face.
I am terribly disturbed by Vladimir Putin's ongoing
provocations and aggression, all with impunity. I am
particularly disturbed and disgusted by the possibility that
Russians provided bounties to the Taliban to kill American
service men and women. I will not try to continue the
litigation of whether it is true or not. We have done so.
But I want to turn to a couple of questions. One of which
is--perhaps, General Nicholson, if you might begin--is it even
possible that the GRU operates independently of Vladimir Putin?
General Nicholson. I will give you my perspective, with
great respect for Director Morell and Dr. Wallander and Dr.
Brzezinski. They understand the Russians extremely well.
My perception, there is an almost feudal set of
relationships inside Russia. On one level, you could view it
that way. People like to deliver outcomes to the center, to the
czar, if you will, or to Putin, that they think he will like,
that will curry favor. So, there is a dimension to this where
people will act independently on what they think the boss wants
and deliver that to him. And so, I think that it is possible
that there can be independent actors within this system doing
things that others in the system might view as reckless or
irresponsible.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, sir.
Do any of our witnesses see it differently?
Dr. Wallander. I agree exactly with General Nicholson's
analysis. I would point out that the GRU has engaged in
multiple operations that have been exposed and they have not
been pulled back. And so, from that, I take it that, while
those operations may not have been ordered, they may have been
about pleasing the boss and about creative implementation of
general directives, we, nonetheless, should hold the Russian
leadership accountable because, if they did not like it, they
did not stop it. So, therefore, they own it.
Mr. Phillips. Well said. I couldn't agree more.
Some of you have spoken, Director Morell, you spoke about
Putin's greatest fear is his middle class in Russia turning
against him. Mr. Brzezinski, you talked about the need for a
strategy of disruption and creating uncertainty. I think we
would all agree that, if we intend to do so--and we should--it
must be in conjunction with our allies. And I would welcome
perspectives from each of you in my remaining time relative to
the State of affairs with our allies. Are we in a position
right now with our relationships to do so? Do our allies trust
us or are those relationships compromised and perhaps
presenting a challenge to some cooperation in that respect?
General Nicholson. I will jump in here, sir. Having led a
41-nation coalition that was built around the core of NATO, I
will tell you, having served in NATO multiple times, it is one
of our most important sources of strength in the national
security arena. And the protection, if you will, of that
cohesion and that strength of the alliance is paramount for our
national security. And I know we in uniform took that very
seriously. Indeed, the whole is greater than the sum of the
parts, if you will, especially when it comes to the legitimacy
of our actions. It is not just adding up GDPs, adding up
military capability, which is significant and gives us enormous
strategic advantage over Russia. It is the legitimacy that
comes with having 41 nations together in Afghanistan. That is
an important source of strength.
Mr. Phillips. But, sir, if I might ask, would you say that
those relationships are less strong than they perhaps were as
short as a few years ago?
General Nicholson. Well, candidly, as a leader within NATO,
I was concerned that some of the comments that we saw and some
of the pressure being put on key allies within NATO risks our
cohesion. Having said that, it is true that many of our allies
have not met their obligation to spend 2 percent of the GDP on
their defense, and their readiness has suffered because of it.
So, it is not a black-or-white issue. I mean, the allies, given
the threat posed by Russia, do need to invest more in their
readiness and in their modernization. The way we go about it,
though, I think needs to reinforce our cohesion, not
[audio malfunction].
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, sir.
Director Morell, I would welcome your perspective on our
allies, our relationships, and whether that has been eroded
over the last few years.
Mr. Morell. Sir, I have had many conversations with foreign
officials who I used to deal with, and almost to a person,
whether in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia, they are concerned
about their relationship with the United States. And they tell
me that, because of that, they need to hedge, and that that
hedging includes increased conversations with both China and
Russia. So, I hear that. I hear that almost constantly.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Phillips.
I am going to recognize myself at this point. And I wanted
to start with, to go back to a pretty basic question to you,
Mr. Morell. And that is, what is the standard for including a
piece of information in the President's Daily Brief? It is more
than just that the information is true or likely true; it has
to be important, isn't that the case?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir, it has to be important to the
national security of the United States of America.
Mr. Malinowski. Right. So, if this information was included
in the President's Daily Brief, that would mean that the
intelligence community made a judgment that it was important
enough for the President.
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Malinowski. Is that a fair assessment?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Malinowski. And we do not actually know why the
intelligence briefer chose not to orally brief. So, any of that
is speculative at this point.
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Malinowski. Okay. Now, when something is important and
it comes to the White House, but there are gaps in the analysis
or potentially differences of opinion about the level of
confidence, then one of the things the White House can do is to
go back to the intelligence community and ask for a deeper
dive. And we know that in this case that did happen, that Mr.
Ratcliffe produced a sense-of-the-community memorandum upon
being asked by the White House. But what strikes me as odd
about that is that it seems as if a White House, if a National
Security Advisor felt a real desire to get to the bottom of a
piece of information like this, would not he have asked for
that deeper dive immediately, in this case several months ago
when it was first brought to the attention of the White House?
Mr. Morell. Sir, I would think so. I do not understand the
timing in this case, but, yes, I would think so.
Mr. Malinowski. Okay. And are you concerned that the timing
might have been related to the media reports rather than to a
sense of urgency to get to the bottom of the intelligence?
Mr. Morell. Sir, I just do not know the timing. So, I
cannot answer that.
Mr. Malinowski. Understood.
And let's get back to the more important question of the
response here. Now we have heard from Secretary Pompeo--and we
wish he were here to tell us in person--but we have heard from
him that he has raised Russian support for the Taliban on
several occasions with his counterpart--I assume Mr. Lavrov--in
the Russian government. Ms. Wallander, knowing that, would you
say that President Putin would take such expressions of concern
seriously if they are only coming from the Secretary of State
and they are never coming directly to him from the President of
the United States?
Dr. Wallander. One of the things that is clear is that the
Russian leadership pays close attention to what it is hearing
from different senior levels in the U.S. Government, and when
they get mixed messages, they use that to their advantage and
cherry-pick the messages they want to hear from the messages
they do not want to hear. So, I think it does matter that if it
is the case--and I do not know if it is the case--that they
have not heard a consistent, clear, strong message on concern
in this area from several senior leaders of the U.S.
Government, they would read into that that they do not need to
worry about it and it is not a strong U.S. expression of
concern.
Mr. Malinowski. And they do recognize the President speaks
for the United States above all others. I mean, we do know--we
do not know exactly what was discussed--but we do know, because
it has been publicly reported, that President Trump has spoken
to President Putin on the phone something like a half dozen
times in the last couple of months. That, in and of itself, is
a little bit odd or out of the ordinary, would not you say from
your experience?
Dr. Wallander. The frequency of calls isn't necessarily
unusual. President Obama spoke frequently with Vladimir Putin
during the escalation in the Ukraine crisis in order to be able
to let him know we knew what was happening and what we were
planning to do to counter Russian actions. So, the frequency
itself might not be. It would depend on what the content of the
message was.
Mr. Malinowski. Right. But if Pompeo is saying, ``I am
concerned about what you are doing in Afghanistan,'' and the
President is saying, ``I would love to share intelligence with
you on counterterrorism. I want to invite you to the G7. I want
to have a good relationship with you, and can you believe this
Russia hoax?'' and all of that stuff, how seriously do you
think Mr. Putin would take any expressions of concern from the
State Department?
Dr. Wallander. If that were the content of the messages,
that would be a very mixed message, and the expressions of
concern from the State Department would not rise to the level
of serious.
Mr. Malinowski. Okay. Thank you so much.
My time is up, and I would like to recognize Mr. Allred.
Thank you.
Mr. Allred. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I really want to thank our panel for their excellent
testimony and your excellent written testimony.
I think that many of my colleagues have covered very ably a
lot of the ground that I wanted to discuss, but I want to begin
by noting that I have not been privy to the intelligence around
this incident. But I agree with Mr. Brzezinski that the fact
that bounties are even plausibly in place on American service
men and women shows that our policy toward Russia is, at the
very least, completely ineffective at deterring their
aggression. And we know, as General Nicholson has noted, that
the Russians have provided arms and support to the Taliban that
have been used against American service members. So, whether we
accept this intelligence or not, or whether the President was
briefed on this particular instance or not, the President and
this administration are clearly on notice as to Russian
intentions against us in Afghanistan and certainly may have
American blood directly on their hands.
Last November over Thanksgiving, I was in Afghanistan
visiting our embassy, Bagram, went to some of our forward-
operating bases where our Rangers are training and working with
the next generation of Afghani officers. And when I think about
those young service members who are working with those young
Afghans, and I think of our President repeatedly praising
Vladimir Putin, offering ventilators, saying he believes Putin
over our intelligence agencies, and, of course, trying to get
them readmitted to the G7, among many other things that we
could list, it is incomprehensible. And I can find no strategic
goal in it. I have no rationale behind it. And so, I am left
wondering, what could possibly be motivating these actions?
But my role, and I think our role on this committee, is to
try and inform policy and inform our constituents and inform
the American people as to what we can do. And while this
President may not act, we know that Congress has acted several
times during this term to try to take steps, and we were
willing to do more.
And so, I do want to ask, what has worked for us in a
multilateral and multinational approach in the past to check
Russian aggression? What steps have worked, and are those
mechanisms still effective? Is it necessary for us to find some
other mechanisms? I will ask that to the entire panel, perhaps
beginning with Dr. Wallander.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you for your question.
We do have some evidence of what is effective. In the
summer of 2014, when Russia provided surface-to-air missiles to
the so-called separatists in Ukraine and that missile was used
to shoot down the Malaysian airliner No. 17, it was very
quickly exposed publicly and the Europeans, in coordination
with the United States, imposed significant sanctions on the
Russian economy. And the Russians both withdrew those
capabilities and stopped--they did not stop their intervention,
but they stopped the escalation of delivery of equipment that
they had been engaged in and pulled it back and went more
covert and more deniable. And that affected their operational
effectiveness.
And so, they are sensitive to what we do and the costs we
impose. Those costs vary by circumstance. I cannot tell you, I
cannot lay out a map of what it would be in every circumstance.
My colleagues have suggested some. We have talked about some.
But I think the important answer for you is that we know that
the Kremlin is cost-sensitive and does respond when we are
clear and firm in our policies.
Mr. Allred. Mr. Morell, do you want to add anything to
that?
Mr. Morell. No, I agree 100 percent.
Mr. Allred. Mr. Brzezinski.
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I would reiterate it this way: when we
are committed to our values, that denies opportunity to
autocrats like Putin trying to undercut political cohesion, to
undercut the cohesion among our allies. It reduces his
motivation to kind of push against liberal democracy and
replace it with authoritarian nationalism. When we are
steadfast in our military resolve, Putin will be more cautious.
We have demonstrated that repeatedly. When we are committed to
our allies and partners, when we do not abandon them in the
field or withdraw our forces from their territories, Putin is
less likely to push against them. And if we are steadfast in
leveraging our economic power, Putin does not have any
capability to match that, but we have to exercise it.
Mr. Allred. Well, my time is up, but, General, thank you
for your service and I am sorry we did not get a chance for you
to weigh in. If you have anything you want to add, perhaps the
chairman will allow you a few seconds.
Mr. Malinowski. It is fine, if short. Do you have anything
to add, sir?
General Nicholson. Thank you, Chairman.
I wanted to add that, you know, war is more like a
wrestling match than a chess game. And so, while discussions of
confidence levels and assessments are going on on the ground,
leaders are taking actions immediately to protect our service
members and to respond, and to fill in any gaps. If we do not
know with confidence, why not? Well, let's try to cover that
gap. So, I would say our teammates, our colleagues that are out
there on the front lines right now, they are doing everything
they can to protect our service members and they are adapting
to this.
The one thing I would add on responding is back to the
power of the alliance. So, the legitimacy that comes with 41
nations saying, hey, this is unacceptable; you do not threaten
the U.S. and its coalition partners on the ground, that does
have power and it shouldn't be underestimated.
Thank you for the question, sir.
Mr. Allred. Thank you.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. Well said.
I now recognize Mr. Levin of Michigan.
Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
thank the ranking member as well for this really important
hearing.
And I want to thank all the panelists. We go through a lot
of hearings. You all are really outstanding witnesses and I
appreciate it.
I want to start with you, Mr. Morell. You said in your
testimony that, in your experience, quote, ``Even if it was
only vaguely clear that the Russians might be paying bounties
to Taliban-associated militants for killing American soldiers,
that information would have made its way to the highest levels
of the U.S. Government, including the President, before the
analysts concluded their work.'' Would you tell us why
information like this would have been run up the chains so
quickly, even if it was only vaguely clear?
Mr. Morell. Because of its significance, sir. We are
talking about bounties on the heads of American soldiers, and
the significant strategic step forward that would suggest for
Putin's activities against us.
Mr. Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Morell. I worked with a number of National Security
Advisors in my time. I do not think a single one of them would
not have told the President this information when the National
Security Advisor first heard it, when they first read the raw
intelligence.
Mr. Levin. And regardless of politics, obviously. We are
all patriots, right? I mean, it is just about our country's
interests?
Mr. Morell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Levin. And protecting her? Okay.
So, Secretary of Defense Esper is actually testifying
before another committee right now, and I understand that he
said, and I am quoting, ``To the best of my recollection, I
have not received a briefing that included the word bounty,''
end quote. He, then, said that he was briefed on intelligence
reports that Russia made, quote, ``payments,'' end quote, to
militants.
If this happened during your tenure, is there any chance
that this would not have been brought to the Secretary of
Defense's attention? And what would the Secretary likely to
have done, knowing this, that payments were made in this way to
the militants to attack our soldiers?
Mr. Morell. Two thoughts, sir. One is the Secretary of
Defense is a recipient of the PDB. So, if it was in the PDB,
the Secretary of Defense should have read it or should have
been briefed on it.
Second is the Secretary of Defense has, of all the Cabinet
members, the most interest here in making sure that this is run
to ground, in making sure that his or her soldiers are well
cared for and protected. So, I think they would speak the
loudest for something to be done here.
Mr. Levin. Thank you.
General Nicholson, I want to ask you a question, sir,
about--and I do not mean to be naive, but I really do not
know--you have led our troops at every level and our coalition
partners. When news like this happens, do our troops find out
about it, that this idea that there may have been bounties on
them and that the President isn't doing anything about it? I
mean, do they hear about this?
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you. Thank you, sir, for asking.
Information that has to do with what we would call force
protection is extremely important. It comes right to the top of
the list, because casualties, friendly casualties, be they
coalition or Americans, are going to affect the political will
to sustain the effort. So, there is a military reason you do
that. And then, of course, there is the moral obligation you
have to all the members of your team to protect them. So, this
is critically important.
I think our service members understand that their chain of
command, I mean starting with their leaders on the ground, are
committed to their protection. And to be honest, studies of
military units, and all that, it is usually your nuclear group
that is the most important and your immediate. And I think
there is no question in the minds of those service members that
their immediate group and their leadership, General Miller in
Afghanistan, are going to be doing everything they can to
ensure their protection.
Mr. Levin. Everything they can. And then, if they have a
question, if it seems in publicly available information that
way up the chain that someone may not be looking out for them,
I mean, I just worry about the morale of our troops. It just
concerns me. Again, not to do with politics, but just, I mean,
they are out there defending our country, for God's sake.
General Nicholson. Well, I couldn't agree with you more,
sir, in terms of our internal strength and cohesion is one of
our greatest sources of strength and effectiveness on the
battlefield, and the unwavering commitment. And all of the
members, I know all of you have been enormous supporters of our
troops in the field. We deeply appreciate that.
So, sure, it does cause some head scratching from time to
time when you see things like this happen.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. And thanks for your service.
Thank you. I yield, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Congressman Levin.
And I would now like to recognize the member of our
committee who in a past life might have been the person
analyzing and briefing this information, Congresswoman
Spanberger.
Ms. Spanberger. Not to make light--thank you, Mr.
Malinowski--of a prior comment, but at the time that I left the
agency I was far too junior to have the role of briefing the
President of the United States, not to mention I was on the
operations side of the house.
[Laughter.]
But I am grateful to all of our witnesses for being here
today, for the breadth of information, knowledge, and
commitment to service and our Nation that you have demonstrated
throughout your careers and continue to demonstrate.
As a Member of Congress, one of my very top priorities is
keeping our service members safe. I am personally furious over
the allegations that Russia seems to have further endangered
our men and women in uniform serving in Afghanistan by putting
bounties on their heads with Taliban-linked militants, asking
them to target them.
I have been grateful to hear strong denunciations among
many of my colleagues during this hearing, but I would urge
many of them to go one step further. I would love to hear them
call upon the White House to do the same, to stand up to
Russia.
And this gets me to my first question, which I will direct
at you, General Nicholson. You have raised concerns about
Russia and its support for the Taliban for a number of years.
And then, separately, we have seen that President Trump has
held off in condemning Putin in a whole variety of ways. He has
offered him intelligence. He has publicly sided with him over
the intelligence community. He has advocated for Russia to join
the G8. He has repeatedly given him praise. And then, most
notably, he hasn't issued what I think is an important and
necessary step, which is, if this is true, Russia will see the
full force and strength of the United States across the board
politically, economically, and wherever else that may take us
for us to protect our U.S. service members. That is what I
would like to see.
But my question for you, General, is, when we see these
patterns, and patterns of nefarious behavior by Putin and
Russian, but, then, also, patterns in the administration that
isn't standing up to escalatory behavior, either directed at
our country or other Western allies, what do you think that
that portrays to Russia? And what sort of calculation do you
anticipate or do you assess that they might be making, given
the pattern of behavior that they are put up against?
General Nicholson. Thank you, ma'am. Thanks for your
service and thanks for your focus on this issue.
I do think, clearly, Putin and Russia are targeting the
cohesion of NATO. And so, many of the actions they have taken,
not just in this regard, are targeted at that. And if they can
erode the cohesion of NATO, if they can convince just one
member, one voting member, to not invoke Article 5 if they were
to threaten an ally, clearly, these are the kinds of scenarios
we have spent a lot of time looking at during my multiple
assignments in NATO as a flag officer.
So, I do think they are trying to erode the cohesion, and
they are doing it in multiple ways, as the other witnesses have
spoken about eloquently in terms of the information operations,
in particular, and we have seen this in America. So, I do think
this is something we need to be concerned about.
And the ways we can reinforce cohesion in NATO are
leveraging the system. I will give you a quick example. I do
not mean to take up too much time. But when you look at the
threats initially to the eastern States of the alliance after
the invasion of Ukraine, and the actions that NATO has taken
then, it took a little while. It is a large alliance. But we
now have alliance troops stationed in the East. We have large
exercises in the East. We have a regular rotation of forces to
the East. Those nations in the East have improved their
readiness and posture, new weapon systems, et cetera.
It tends to take longer in an alliance. Everything is
harder in an alliance. But the alliance, at the end of the day,
is, in my view, the effective mechanism to respond, if that
helps.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
And in your testimony, you have noted that mistakes and
miscalculations can, in fact, lead to war and they can be
particularly dangerous when it comes to our relationship with
Russia. What does it tell you, looking at these allegations,
that Russia is willing to risk potentially? And I am going to
caveat it heavily like a former intelligence officer would. If
these things are true, what would that demonstrate to you that
they might be willing to risk, given what some of their goals
are, among them, disrupting the cohesion of NATO?
General Nicholson. And I will throw in the same caveat on
``if this is true,'' but I would say, one, it is a
miscalculation and a mistake. And so, No. 1, that we would not
find out about it. I mean it is clumsy execution. It is poor
execution. Their tradecraft was pretty bad if we have received
these reports. If they trusted criminal proxies, and those
criminal proxies dealt with Taliban criminal proxies, well,
they have essentially entrusted the foreign policy of Russia to
criminal proxies in Afghanistan. And that was a real
miscalculation and very sloppy on their part.
What it would say, though, is that they made a mistake, in
my view. So, there was a miscalculation that they could pull
this off and a mistake in that they have risked that there are
strategic consequences for this essentially tactical action.
And the final point I would make is, when Vladimir Putin's
approval ratings are the lowest they have been in 20 years, do
you really want to risk economic sanctions against Russia over
something like this? What is the cost-benefit analysis? And
that leads me to believe, again, poorly conceived, sloppily
executed, if it turns out to be true.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, General Nicholson. I
appreciate your comments.
And I think reflecting back on the patterns of behavior, I
think there is an element here that is unfortunate, in that
they might have also made the judgment that they would not
taste the level of wrath or retaliation that they would face
under any other administration that learned of allegations of
bounties being put on the heads of U.S. service members.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much.
And then, finally, I would like to recognize Representative
Houlahan for what I believe will be our last round of
questions.
Ms. Houlahan. Thanks, and I do apologize for being late. I
was at the hearing that Representative Levin was referring to
where Secretary Esper mentioned that he had not heard of
bounties, but had heard of payments for the lives of soldiers
and sailors.
And I just wanted, for the record, to read the definition
of a bounty, which is ``a sum paid for killing or capturing a
person.'' And so, I do not think that we should be getting
ourselves caught up in semantics.
I also really want to make sure that I say for the record
that, were this intelligence, uncertain as it appears to be,
about another malign actor such as North Korea or Iran, we
would not be having this conversation about trying to fall over
ourselves to explain why this is either not real or actionable
intelligence or not something to worry about.
And so, I would love to know, also, from Dr. Wallander or
Mr. Morell, if you would not mind just telling me a little bit
about what is in it for Russia to offer a bounty on lives of
soldiers and sailors? Why would they want to potentially
escalate tensions between the U.S. and Russia? Did they expect
to be caught or found out? If you could kind of try and
characterize for me, and for others, why would this happen and
why is this, in fact, an escalation?
Dr. Wallander. Well, thank you for your question. It is a
great question, and it cuts to the heart of the discussions
about Russia and what it is doing and why it is a threat to the
United States.
It is an escalation because it is an act of the Russian, if
true, it is an act and a policy of the Russian Ministry of
Defense and political leadership to have American soldiers
killed. Normally, the United States and Russia seek to
deconflict in theaters, like in Syria. Even during the cold
war, the Soviet Union and the United States, when they were
involved in conflicts in the same region, took great care to
not kill one another's soldiers because of the potential
escalatory implications. So, that is why it is significant.
Why Russia would want to have American soldiers killed in
Afghanistan I still think comes back to wanting to help drive
us out, to complicate things. They do not want us there. They
do not want NATO there. I know it is more than NATO, General
Nicholson, but in the Russian frame it is NATO.
And then, why do it this way? Because they want to exploit
the deniability, the asymmetric operations. They want to have
the benefit of the action without the costs. And they have been
doing this for going on a decade, not at this level of
seriousness, but this is part of a pattern that we have seen
for quite some time.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
I was wondering, Mr. Morell, if you have something to add
to that as well.
Mr. Morell. I was just going to add, to go back for just 1
second to Ms. Spanberger's and General Nicholson's conversation
about whether this is in Putin's strategic interests or not,
what I think we have seen over a long period of time is
Vladimir Putin make decisions that are not in the strategic
interests of the Russian State. Over and over again, he has
done things that has made it difficult for his country to have
any relations with the West, integrate the Russian economy in
any way with the European economies. And I think because of his
actions, Russia is destined to continue to degrade as a State.
So, he is not thinking about the strategic interests of the
Russian State. He is thinking about a very narrow set of
interests, about power in the world, being seen as a great
power, and being seen as a great leader. It is not about, in
his mind, what is in the interest of Russia.
Ms. Houlahan. Thanks.
And with the last minute of my time, I would like to kind
of end with General Nicholson. Your testimony that you gave
ended with what I think is very true. You said, ``Our long war
in Afghanistan will only end at the peace table.'' So, how do
you think that these allegations, if they are true would impact
the prospect of U.S. peace with the Taliban?
General Nicholson. Thank you, ma'am.
Unfortunately, they have a negative impact because it
indicates the Taliban are not acting in good faith. So, the
Russians offered, but if the Taliban accepted, if this is
validated, then it would indicate that they are acting against
the spirit, certainly, and perhaps even the letter, of the
agreement that they signed with the United States a few months
ago.
So, I think getting that process on track and having the
Taliban deliver on the conditions that they are to have
delivered at this point--and that is severing ties with Al
Qaeda, that is initiating the dialog with the Afghan government
and representatives of the Afghan people--it is a sustained
reduction in violence, and that has not happened, either.
So, I think this construct that we have come up with, it is
not perfect, but it is the best one we have. It does give us an
avenue forward. Like many peace processes, it is kind of, you
know, one step forward, two steps back, one step sideways. But
I think we need to have the stamina to see it through.
But there is a condition built in that, before we progress
to the next level of reductions, they need to meet certain
conditions. So, I think if we stick to our agreement and hold
the Taliban to it, it gives us our best opportunity to move
forward.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, General.
And thank you so much for my time. Apologies again for
being tardy, and I yield back.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much. Thanks to all the
members and our witnesses.
I think this was a very, very interesting and helpful
discussion. There is obviously a lot that we do not know. There
are some things that we do know, but cannot discuss in a public
forum such as this. But I have heard enough to reinforce my
concerns about what seems to be just a breakdown in the
national security decisionmaking process. I mean, we do know
that the President was briefed, but he does not read his
briefings. We know that the Secretary of Defense and the
National Security Advisor knew about this, but they, too, did
not choose to take the initiative to ask the intelligence
community to get to the bottom of it.
And while all this was going on, all of the messages that
we were sending, certainly from the White House to President
Putin, were positive about the relationship, whether the G7 or
pulling out of Germany or intelligence-sharing, or all of the
other things that we have heard about. That does not strike me
as the way any normal administration would react to information
like this, even if there was not 100 percent certainty. And all
of you, I think, from your different perspectives, have helped
to reinforce that conclusion.
So, I am grateful to all of you for your decades of service
and for sharing your insights with us today, and to all of the
members for their excellent questions.
And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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