[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                       CHINA'S MARITIME AMBITIONS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND NONPROLIFERATION

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                             JUNE 30, 2020
                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-123
                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
        
        
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       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
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                              ___________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
41-197PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2022   



                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	     STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California		     LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York	     BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	     JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas


                    Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

         Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation

                  BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman,

DINA TITUS, Nevada                   TED YOHO, Florida, Ranking Member
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia	     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
AMI BERA, California		     BRIAN MAST, Florida
ANDY LEVIN. Michigan		     JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia
                                       

                     Don MacDonald, Staff Director



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Poling, Mr. Gregory B., Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia, 
  Director, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for 
  Strategic and International Studies............................     7
Mastro, Dr. Oriana Skylar, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise 
  Institute, Assistant Professor of Security Studies, Georgetown 
  University.....................................................    19
Erickson, Dr. Andrew S., Professor of Strategy, China Maritime 
  Studies Institute, Naval War College Visiting Scholar, Fairbank 
  Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University.................    33

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    59
Hearing Minutes..................................................    60
Hearing Attendance...............................................    61

                           OPENING STATEMENT

Opening statement submitted for the record from Chairman Bera....    62

              ADDITONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    65

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record from 
  Representative Wagner..........................................    67

 
                       CHINA'S MARITIME AMBITIONS

                         Tuesday, June 30, 2020

                           House of Representatives
              Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and
                                   Nonproliferation
                       Committee on Foreign Affairs
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in 
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ami Bera 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Bera. The Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and 
Nonproliferation will come to order. Without objection, the 
chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any 
point and all members will have 5 days to submit statements, 
extraneous material, and questions for the record subject to 
the length and limitation in the rules. To insert something 
into the record, please have your staff email the previously 
mentioned address or contact full committee staff.
    As a reminder to members, please keep your video function 
on at all times even when you are not recognized by the chair. 
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and 
please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. 
Consistent with the H.Res.965 and the accompanying regulations, 
staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate, when 
they are not under recognition, to eliminate background noise.
    I see that we have a quorum and will now recognize myself 
for opening remarks. Before I start my opening remarks, let me 
welcome back the members on the subcommittee._I know we miss 
being here together, but we have in the interim, had a robust 
agenda in terms of looking at a number of issues that are 
pertinent to the region as well as non-proliferation.
    And with that, let me give myself 5 minutes for opening 
remarks. I want to thank the ranking member and the members of 
the subcommittee, our witnesses, and members of the public for 
joining us at today's hearing. Over the past several months, we 
have seen how COVID-19's race around the world has sparked 
remarkable upheaval and disruptions in the global economy and 
international stability. This subcommittee held the first 
hearing on the novel coronavirus in early February, and 
subsequently had additional hearings. And I, as a doctor, 
continue to remain concerned about the both global pandemic and 
the disruptions around the global pandemic, but also the 
economic challenge.
    China is central to what is happening. We know the novel 
coronavirus initiated in China. We saw the disruptions in 
supply chains with this pandemic. We saw the lack of 
transparency around the coronavirus. And those are all issues 
that are important for us to take a look at, and we will. We 
have also seen China's economic coercion and predatory lending 
practices around the world, what is happening in Hong Kong, and 
multiple issues, but today we are here to focus on China's 
maritime ambitions.
    I was first elected to Congress and sworn in, in 2013, and 
through the years that I have been on this subcommittee, I have 
viewed China's action in the maritime domain with deep 
concern._We watched with alarm when China built up and 
militarized features in the Spratly Islands and other areas in 
the region. In recent months, we have seen China has continued 
its coercive actions and aggressive actions. Chinese fishing 
boats have swarmed Indonesian waters near the Natuna Islands in 
December and China sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in April.
    We have seen the same story in the East China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean. In May, Chinese coast guard ships pursued a 
Japanese fishing boat in Japanese waters. I also continue to 
have concerns about China's influence in the Indian Ocean like 
at the Hambantota port, and the implications for the United 
States and other countries in the region.
    These actions pose serious threats to regional stability 
and this is not what you see out of a responsible global 
leader._And China has to make that decision._Does it want to be 
a responsible global leader or will it be a nation that sits 
apart? And China's actions in these areas are vitally important 
to the world's economy.
    We know the large number of goods and services that moves 
through the South China Sea and are vital as we look at 
economic recovery. Shared values and principles like freedom of 
navigation matter, but China ignored an international court 
ruling that declared they had violated the U.N. Convention for 
the Law of the Sea in 2016. A convention, by the way, that the 
United States should have ratified a long time ago.
    Now, as we move forward, we have our friends in the region 
and I talked to many of them such as our Quad Coalition, our 
like-minded colleagues in Japan, India, Australia. If you talk 
to the other nations in the region such as Vietnam, the 
Philippines, et cetera, and they all express concern at China's 
aggressive behavior in the maritime space.
    As we think about this and as we move forward, again China 
can be an isolated nation or it can choose to work in a 
collaborative, cooperative way with the rest of the world's 
leaders and the rest of the world's global economy. Going 
forward, we will be looking at a number of these issues and it 
is our hope, over time, that China understands that it can 
better accomplish its goals by having a cooperative 
relationship. Certainly they will be a competitor, but we hope 
for a cooperative relationship built on values of free market, 
values of freedom. Unfortunately, we have seen in recent years 
China going in the opposite direction.
    I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses, and I now 
yield to my friend from Florida, our ranking member, 
Representative Yoho for any opening comments you may have.
    Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it, and I 
look forward to our expert panel today. And I do thank you for 
your leadership, because I remember February 5th when we had 
that first hearing on coronavirus and one approximately 2 weeks 
later. You were definitely on the cutting edge of that exposing 
the origin of that. I look forward to hearing, as I said, from 
our expert witnesses.
    And I think what we need to do is define what China is 
trying to do, you know, what are they doing, what is their 
ultimate goal, and then how do we counter what they are doing. 
You know, when you look at what China has done, they have 
encroached on so many nations of the ASEAN block of nations, 
whether it is the Philippines, the Vietnamese, Brunei, you 
know, the list goes on, Malaysia, Indonesia. Not just on their 
sovereignty of their land, but their EEZ zones where they do 
their commercial fishing, explore for minerals off the coast 
that belong to those nations, China has encroached upon those.
    In addition, China has ignored international laws. When the 
Philippines sued them over the rights of their EEZ, the Chinese 
lost that court. They did not honor the ruling of that, said it 
does not apply to them yet they apply a nine-dash line that is 
anything but accurate. It is fallacy. It is their wish list. 
And for them to claim a nine-dash line that is sovereign 
territory of China would be as ridiculous as the United States 
claiming all of the moon because we put a flag on it first.
    And I think these things need to be brought into 
perspective, because again it goes back to what is China trying 
to accomplish? They are building a five--or a blue-water navy. 
They are expanding in areas that are not theirs. They have lied 
to not just us and to President Obama in the previous 
administration about militarizing those dredged land masses in 
the South China Sea and the East Sea, they have militarized 
those even though they said they were not.
    And so when one looks at what they are doing, their 
expansion of what they are doing, it looks like they are 
looking to claim and take over landmasses that do not belong to 
them, and I think these all need to be pointed out. And again, 
I think we need to look at what is China's ultimate goal and 
then we need to call them out on this.
    And the way that we can do that is you can do it in one of 
three ways. You can have a conflict which nobody wants and 
nobody is advocating. You can have economic pressure put on 
China. And then there will be the humiliation action, and I 
think humiliation regardless of what China does is going to 
come to them. But I think the best way to deal with this is 
through economic actions and it should not be the United States 
alone. It should be all nations affected by this because all 
nations are going to be affected by China's aggression in that 
area. And if we do these things, we can have peaceful 
resolutions, which is the ultimate goal of all of us, and open 
and free trade.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back and I 
look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ranking Member Yoho.
    I will now introduce our witnesses. Our witnesses for 
today's hearing are Mr. Gregory Poling, Dr. Oriana Skylar 
Mastro, and Dr. Andrew Erickson. I would like to thank all of 
our witnesses for being here today.
    Mr. Gregory Poling is Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia and 
Director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. 
Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro is an Assistant Professor of Security 
Studies at the Edmond A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at 
Georgetown University and a Resident Scholar at the American 
Enterprise Institute. And Dr. Andrew Erickson is a Professor of 
Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies 
Institute.
    I will now recognize each witness for 5 minutes and, 
without objection, your prepared written statements will be 
made a part of the record. I will first call on Mr. Poling for 
his testimony.

 STATEMENT OF MR. GREGORY POLING, SENIOR FELLOW FOR SOUTHEAST 
 ASIA, DIRECTOR, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, CENTER 
            FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

    Mr. Poling. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Yoho, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear today.
    U.S. policy in the South China Sea has been remarkably 
consistent for decades and that is because administrations of 
both parties have recognized that we have the same consistent 
set of interests here. The first, which is not limited to the 
South China Sea at all, is defense of freedom of the seas as 
defined by the international law of the day. Second, the U.S. 
has been committed to uphold its security commitments to our 
allies and partners in Southeast Asia without being drawn into 
the sovereignty disputes over the islands themselves. And the 
third, the U.S. has been committed to ensure American military 
access to this important international waterway.
    Time and again, U.S. policy has been drawn back to that 
same set of interests. But unlike the consistency of U.S. 
policy, Chinese interests and Chinese claims have expanded 
considerably over the decades. Prior to the 1990's, the South 
China Sea featured a dispute over islands and then Beijing 
decided to declare straight baselines in internal waters around 
the Paracels and, more worryingly, historic rights throughout 
the entirety of the South China Sea, claiming in some form all 
waters, all airspace, all seabed, in contravention of 
international law.
    Over the last decade, Beijing has become far more 
aggressive in pursuing that illegal claim. At the end of 2013, 
China embarked on an unprecedented campaign of artificial 
island building and militarization, which today allows China to 
deploy a 24/7 presence of naval, coast guard, and paramilitary 
forces throughout every inch of the nine dash line, slowly 
pushing its neighbors away from their legal rights, out of the 
waters guaranteed to them by international law.
    And if Beijing's current strategy continues, it will 
undermine or severely diminish all of those U.S. interests that 
have been defended by subsequent administrations dating back 
for the better part of a century. First, China will set a 
precedent that will undermine key components of freedom of the 
seas and international law including the equality of all 
nations, big and small.
    Second, U.S. partners and allies in the region will rightly 
begin to wonder what benefit they get from supporting a 
forward-deployed U.S. presence in the region if it cannot help 
the defend their interests against an aggressive neighbor.
    And third, as a result, the United States will find its 
ability to operate, not just in the South China Sea but in the 
region more broadly, severely diminished. This crisis has been 
a long time coming. And in defense of previous administrations, 
they did not sit on their hands, they increased capacity 
building support for regional partners. They stepped up the 
presence of the U.S. Navy in the region. They strengthened 
deterrents.
    But there is no military solution to the South China Sea 
dispute. It is not entirely a military problem. What the 
Pentagon has done is to buy time and continue to buy time. Time 
for a coalition of international parties led, but not solely 
including the United States, to bring diplomatic and economic 
pressure to bear on China, hopefully to bend Beijing toward a 
compromise that would be equitable and more acceptable to the 
international community.
    Now to do that will take years. But as a start I would 
suggest three areas that the United States needs to pursue 
immediately. The first is U.S. officials need to put the South 
China Sea back on the top of the diplomatic agenda in the way 
it was in 2016 in the run-up to the Philippines arbitration 
award which the chairman mentioned.
    Now at that point you had the majority of States in Europe 
as well as a number of States in North America and Asia 
supporting the ruling when it came out. Almost none of those 
States continue to do so today and that is because neither 
Washington nor Manila has been asking them to. This issue must 
be put, front and center, in the United Nations, in ASEAN 
meetings, in the G-7, in order for Beijing to bear the kind of 
reputational cost that would convince it that it cannot be both 
a global leader and a bully in the South China Sea at the same 
time.
    Second, the United States should treat China's militias, 
the vanguard of its activities in the South China Sea, the same 
way it does similar illegal actors in North Korea or Russia. 
INDOPACOM should undertake the same kind of surveillance 
operations to publicly name and shame illegal Chinese 
paramilitaries in the South China Sea that it currently does in 
the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea to identify North Korea 
and sanction the violations.
    It should also identify the networks of government and 
business elites in China that support the militia. Target them 
for sanctions, try to ban them from access to international 
financial markets the same way the United States treated Russia 
for its support for paramilitaries in the Ukraine.
    And, finally, U.S. officials need to prioritize rebuilding 
an alliance with the Philippines that is both credible and 
effective. That does not mean giving the Duterte government a 
pass on human rights violations, but it does mean recognizing 
that the alliance is bigger than any one leader. The United 
States must have rotational forces deployed along the so-called 
first island chain that rings China, and there is no place 
south of Japan that that can happen other than the Philippines.
    Admiral Davidson has recognized this. The United States 
might not be able to do that under Duterte, but we must prevent 
further erosion of the alliance and we must prepare a plan for 
a post-2022, post-Duterte Philippines that will allow us to re-
engage. That concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the 
opportunity.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Poling follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    I will now call on Dr. Mastro.

   STATEMENT OF DR. ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, 
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF SECURITY 
                 STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

    Dr. Mastro. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Yoho, members of 
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to share my 
views on China's maritime ambitions today. China wants to 
become a maritime great power. This is a term that Chinese 
President Xi Jinping uses as part of his national rejuvenation 
rhetoric. And to this end, China wants to build a blue-water 
navy that can control its near seas, fight and win regional 
wars, and protect its vital sea lanes and its many political 
and economic interests beyond East Asia.
    In this testimony I am going to cover China's approach to 
the near seas, and so this is the South China Sea and East 
China Sea in particular, and touch upon its intentions in the 
Indian Ocean. China's ambitions in the near seas pose the 
greatest threat to the interests and security of the United 
States and its allies. China considers the East China Sea and 
the majority of the South China Sea to be a part of its 
territory.
    China does not accept or respect Japan's sovereignty claims 
in the former case, or Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, or Vietnamese claims in the latter case. 
In China's ideal world, Beijing would enjoy sovereignty, which 
means absolute control and a monopoly over the use of force in 
these waters, and this would entail the exclusion of the United 
States military from these waters.
    In the short term, China realizes that these goals are 
unrealistic, and so I think it is best to characterize their 
current ambitions as establishing sovereignty over the disputed 
islands and gaining the power to dictate the rules and regulate 
all activities in the surrounding waters. This means that 
countries would have to obtain Chinese permission to operate 
there.
    Chinese maritime ambitions in the East China Sea and South 
China Sea are detrimental to U.S. and allied interests mostly 
because of these ultimate objectives of control. China has 
rarely relied on use of force directly from military coercion 
to achieve its goals, instead it prefers to employ positive 
inducements and nonmilitary tools like economic, legal, or 
political tools as well as gray-zone activities, which are 
activities that allow a country to stay below the threshold of 
overt military action to secure gains without provoking a 
military response. In other words, even if we convinced China 
to change their behavior in how they are pursuing their 
ambitions, this is still a threat because of the ultimate 
nature of what they are trying to achieve.
    In the Indian Ocean, China has different ambitions. Under 
Xi Jinping, their maritime ambitions have extended beyond the 
near seas. For the first time, in 2019, the Defense White Paper 
called for the transformation of the Chinese navy from a near 
seas defense navy to a far seas protection navy. And China also 
designated maritime interests as the same level of importance 
as territorial integrity.
    I think China currently aims to be able to operate in the 
Indian Ocean and beyond, but it does not aspire to prevent 
others from doing so as it does in the near seas. In these 
waters, China's ambitions are currently driven primarily by the 
desire to protect strategic lines of communication and its 
economic and political interests. For example, just last year, 
more than 166 million Chinese ventured abroad for tourism.
    We also know that 80 percent of China's oil passes through 
the Malacca Strait, and with One Belt, One Road China has more 
and more commercial and economic interests to protect. China is 
more flexible in the Indian Ocean because it is not engaged in 
territorial disputes there. They do not have specific 
adversaries that they are in constant campaigns against, so 
they are a bit more flexible than they are in the near seas.
    But this does not mean that their presence in the Indian 
Ocean is not without its challenges or risks. Because they are 
increasingly focused on far seas protection, they are 
outfitting their fleet with longer-range air defenses, aircraft 
carriers, and larger ships that allow greater endurance away 
from home ports. This creates a latent capability that could be 
used in the future to coerce smaller countries.
    China could also use its greater access to collect 
intelligence on the United States that could support operations 
and regional contingencies like Taiwan. In the future, they 
might also be able to develop the ability to meaningfully hold 
at risk U.S. assets in these waters in the event of a wider 
conflict.
    But currently one of the biggest issues is how they are 
trying to gain influence and access because they will need 
ports for logistical support and resupply and maintenance 
throughout the Indian Ocean region. And as was already 
mentioned, China's attempt to gain such access are undermining 
stability, democratic norms, and sound economic development as 
they rely a lot on bribery and debt-trap diplomacy.
    In my testimony I come to main conclusions, therefore. The 
first is that China's ambitions in the South China Sea and East 
China Sea are different than they are in the Indian Ocean and 
beyond. For the near seas it is mainly about sovereignty and 
regional hegemony. In the far seas, China is concerned with 
protecting the sources of the Party's domestic legitimacy like 
economic growth, protection of Chinese nationals, and guarding 
against external pressure.
    Two, China's ambitions in the East China Sea and South 
China Sea are detrimental to U.S. interests even if its methods 
are mainly problematic because they are effective and difficult 
to counter. In contrast, in the Indian Ocean and beyond, there 
are aspects of China's current objectives that are legitimate 
that do not necessarily threaten U.S. interests but its methods 
are currently undermining democratic principles and sustainable 
growth and there is a risk that China could change its strategy 
to disrupt freedom of navigation as its capabilities evolve.
    While China's maritime ambitions are problematic in both 
the near and the far seas, U.S. policy needs to consider these 
differences in both the degree of threat and risk. First, we 
need to prioritize countering Chinese ambitions in the South 
China Sea and East China Sea and this includes taking a 
hardline, risk-acceptant approach to countering China in the 
near seas.
    But we need to devise more of a hedging strategy in the 
Indian Ocean, and this could include elements of cooperation 
with China to address nontraditional security threats while 
also preparing to respond strongly in case their ambitions 
there do evolve and change and they start employing their 
newfound capabilities for coercive purposes. In my written 
testimony I lay out more specifics about how we can pursue both 
policies in the near seas and the far seas. Either way, success 
will require bipartisan consensus and an agreement that 
maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific is genuinely critical 
to U.S. interests.
    The United States has made some progress in this area, but 
given the extent of Chinese maritime ambitions, it is not yet 
enough. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Mastro follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you for your testimony.
    And, finally, Dr. Erickson.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW ERICKSON, PROFESSOR OF STRATEGY, CHINA 
MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE VISITING SCHOLAR, 
    FAIRBANK CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

    Dr. Erickson. Yes. Thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member 
Yoho, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this 
opportunity to share my personal analysis and recommendations.
    Greg and Oriana have done a great job addressing a number 
of important issues. My written statement contains additional 
specifics and recommendations. Rather than duplicating their 
efforts, let me underscore several larger themes and key 
dynamics that I think can help inform our discussion today as 
well as the way forward.
    China under Xi Jinping has what, to me, is clearly the most 
assertive and ambitious national strategy of any great power 
today. This includes the unification of claimed territory and 
commanding respect and deference at home and abroad. A major 
problem with this forceful and ambitious approach is that these 
goals run rough-shod over the rights and well-being of millions 
as well as the freedom of non-Chinese societies. They have 
great potential to jeopardize the peace of China's region and 
also the rules and functions of the international system on 
which all of us depend.
    Today in many ways, Hong Kong is ground zero of this 
struggle. There are additional tensions and challenges in the 
near seas as my colleagues on the panel described. However, 
even worse, if the United States and its allies and partners do 
not counter China's coercive envelopment of formerly free 
peoples and places, there will be much worse to come.
    This coercive envelopment has a strong geographic pattern 
to it. Since the Chinese Communist Party took Beijing in 1949, 
it systematically extended a cordon of control and coercion in 
concentric circles radiating from the capital across China's 
heartland and now at present the major focus is remaining 
unresolved disputed claims in the near seas. That is why that 
is rightly a major focus of our discussion today.
    Here, there is a similar process of envelopment, coercive 
envelopment, albeit at sea rather than on land as in the case 
with the tragedy occurring in Hong Kong right now. At sea, as 
my colleagues have mentioned, China uses three sea forces. I 
must emphasize each of these are a component of China's armed 
forces--the People's Liberation Army Navy, the China Coast 
Guard, and the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia. Each is 
the largest such force in the world in terms of numbers of 
ships.
    Now we could have a long discussion about exact comparisons 
and qualities and capabilities of ships and in some cases, you 
could argue, vis-a-vis the U.S. Navy gold standard, it is an 
apples-to-mandarin oranges discussion. Nevertheless, in these 
vital contested sea spaces, presence matters. The ability to be 
present matters. The ability to be there to decide whether or 
not to engage in various options matters.
    And here is where China's overwhelming and still rapidly 
growing numbers are posing very significant challenges for our 
efforts to keep the peace and the stability in the region. In 
the naval dimension, for example, while many advocate a U.S. 
Navy of 355-plus ships, both manned and unmanned, China already 
has its own fully manned navy of 360 warships according to data 
recently released by the Office of Naval Intelligence. And the 
projections get more disparate over time, out to 2030.
    China has the world's largest coast guard by a very large 
margin. So when it comes to efforts at coercive envelopment in 
the near seas, these numbers are one of the many factors that 
we are going to have to address. I would be very happy to 
elaborate on all these issues, but I want to close by 
underscoring the challenge of Chinese efforts at a coercive 
envelopment in prioritized areas for sovereignty projection and 
assertion. That is really one of the greatest challenges of our 
time. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Erickson follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you for your testimony.
    I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each, and 
pursuant to House rules all time yielded is for the purposes of 
questioning our witnesses. Because of the hybrid format of this 
hearing, I will recognize members by committee seniority 
alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your 
turn, please let our staff know and we will circle back to you. 
If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone and 
address the chair verbally. I will start by recognizing myself 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Poling, you mentioned that we need to place this issue 
at the top of our agenda. I think that the ranking member and 
myself, for purposes of this subcommittee, do place this issue 
close to the top of our agenda and recognize the urgency of 
addressing it now as opposed to several years from now because 
of the possibility of a kinetic conflict.
    If we think about the U.S. approach to this region in the 
post-World War II era, I think we can be very proud of what we 
did in helping rebuild Japan, creating an economic powerhouse 
in a competitor and defending the Korean Peninsula, but also 
seeing the Korean miracle, an economic competitor.
    Watching the tremendous growth of Singapore, Australia and 
New Zealand and others in the region are now watching the 
subcontinent of India develop. All of these are democracies 
that share free market principles, share the freedom and 
principles of democracy, and, in fact, we can take credit for 
helping China develop its economic prowess. But we have not 
seen China move in that direction of values-based individual 
liberties, free markets, et cetera.
    Maybe this is a question for Mr. Poling. I have always 
characterized China as if you give them an inch and do not stop 
them, they are going to take a foot. If you do not stop them at 
a foot, they are going to try to take a yard. If you do not 
stop them at a yard, well--and that is why I was so concerned 
about their initial building of islands in the South China Sea. 
Now we have a bigger problem today because we did not stop them 
on the front end.
    You talked about the importance of creating this coalition 
of nations. And as I talk to our European allies, as I talk to 
the countries in the region, they understand they are going to 
have to live with China as a global power in the region, but 
they are also very leery in a way that today that I did not see 
previously.
    If we were to directly confront some of the Chinese 
paramilitary actions, to stop them today at a time where 
hopefully we could de-escalate things, what steps do you think 
China would take, if there was a direct confrontation with one 
of these paramilitaries?
    Mr. Poling, if you want to take that.
    Mr. Poling. Well, thank you, Chairman. I think that most of 
the value of the maritime militia for China lies in the veneer 
of deniability, the veneer of civilian activity that it has. So 
in most cases what Beijing wants to use the militia for is to 
play chicken either with the U.S. Navy or with neighbors and 
then back off if things get hot.
    If the U.S. started really unmasking the militia in the 
ways that I have suggested or that Dr. Erickson has suggested, 
among others, I think what you would see, first, is Beijing 
reacting in kind of the horizontal ways we have come to learn, 
lashing out with economic sanction against not just the U.S., 
but especially smaller parties who might support us--Vietnam, 
the Philippines, et cetera.
    You might see Beijing undertake a number of the 
administrative decisions in South China Sea that I think it 
already has it in its back pocket, things like declaring 
straight baselines around some of the Spratlys or an air 
defense identification zone. I mean there is any--I think there 
is a long list of non-kinetic, nonconfrontational ways that 
Beijing would seek to escalate, and this will be a long-term 
game of whack-a-mole, all right.
    The U.S. will have to continually respond and push back and 
convince Beijing that we will not, neither us nor our partners, 
will retreat and, ultimately, if Beijing wants to be a global 
leader it will have to come to the table for compromise. I 
entirely agree with you that if you give an inch, China will 
take it as weakness and seek a mile.
    Mr. Bera. You know, so I agree with you that if it is just 
the United States versus China defending everyone in the 
region, I believe we will be less effective than if we can 
create a multinational coalition of like-minded nations that 
see the same threats that China poses to freedom of navigation 
and maritime security in the region. And I do sense in this 
time of COVID that countries are a bit more willing to join a 
multinational coalition. I assume that is the right approach.
    In the last few seconds that I have, if any of the 
witnesses want to talk about the possibility of creating that 
coalition.
    Dr. Mastro. Chairman, if I can just add that I think the 
important thing is to start with diplomacy. You know, if we do 
not have active diplomacy, if we do not rank this as high as 
like the Middle East peace process, then we are not showing 
countries that it is really important so why should they take 
the risk to FONOPS or other military activities with us if we 
are not even willing to sit down and have a big summit with 
Southeast Asian countries to do it.
    So I do think we do have to start with the diplomatic 
aspects of this.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you so----
    Dr. Erickson. Mr. Chairman, I would also advocate a whole-
of-government approach that includes in securing our own supply 
chains more effectively, also seeking to involve willing allies 
and partners by helping to also enhance their supply chain 
security reducing Beijing's ability to coerce them. We can then 
increase the chances that they will feel willing and able to 
join us in some of these important maritime endeavors.
    So that is another dimension I would like to call for 
cooperation and I think there is a strong interest in building 
on that.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    I notice I am out of time. Let me recognize the ranking 
member, Mr. Yoho.
    Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all the 
expert testimoneys, very enlightening.
    Mr. Poling, you brought up a statement that you said the 
previous administrations, not to point fingers at anybody, did 
not really drop the ball or they kept doing things, but is it 
not true that we stopped freedom of navigation operations and 
then they got started again under President Trump?
    Mr. Poling. So we--it is true that the Trump Administration 
has increased the frequency and routine nature of freedom of 
navigation operations. They were never stopped. The problem was 
in 2015, following testimony in the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, the question of freedom of navigation became much 
more public and that led to, I think, a lot more self-
flagellation and concern within the Obama Administration about 
when they should be done and how they should be done. Prior to 
that they happened quite regularly.
    And so I think the Trump Administration----
    Mr. Yoho. Excuse me. It was my understanding that we went 
to peaceful navigational purposes versus freedom of navigation 
with our military ships doing the war games. I remember it 
pretty clearly because we wrote a bill that got incorporated 
into the NDAA. I just wanted to point that out because I think 
if we show just a pullback of any that vacuum gets created and 
it gets filled by somebody else.
    Let me move on to something else and I appreciate again 
your expertise. Why the expansion of the Chinese navy? If you 
guys--I think it was Dr., is it--Mastro? You were saying that 
China is doing that to protect their interests, but what 
interests have changed that have not been there for the last 70 
years? The land borders have not changed. The only thing that I 
have seen change is China's claim to land borders, erroneously. 
What is your thought on that?
    Dr. Mastro. Thank you for the question. The first thing on 
the expansion of the Chinese navy is that that is primarily for 
regional contingencies. We do talk about the East China Sea and 
the South China Sea as both being near seas, but the South 
China Sea is actually quite large, you know, bigger than half 
the continent of the United States.
    Mr. Yoho. Right.
    Dr. Mastro. And so if you look at their ability to project 
power down there they do, they have some challenges, and so I 
think mainly their focus is on Taiwan contingencies first, East 
China Sea, South China Sea second. But they are also interested 
as I have mentioned in expanding beyond into the Indian Ocean. 
And I mention the economic and political interests because 
those actually did not exist previously.
    So the number of Chinese nationals oversees, for example, 
is a relatively new phenomenon. I wrote a paper about it maybe 
about 8 years ago. And you have tens of thousands Chinese 
companies operating now in the Indian Ocean region that were 
not there before that we have seen an uptick because of One 
Belt, One Road as well. And also China used to not be so 
reliant on oil and energy from outside, and now they are one of 
the top importers and they rely on the Malacca Straits for 
that.
    Mr. Yoho. Okay.
    Dr. Mastro. So they do have increased interests and 
vulnerabilities that they need to----
    Mr. Yoho. I understand it. But I do not see any country 
challenging China as a Nation, you know, nobody is trying to 
attack them. And, you know, what I see is an overreaction--not 
overreaction, but an overaggressiveness of China and it gives 
pause to think why are they doing that. And it is because of 
the--what I see, it is because of the aggression that they are 
doing and the false claims that they are laying the land.
    To call those landmasses islands, I think, gives them an 
air of legitimacy. They are not islands. They are landmasses 
that they have taken.
    A rhetorical question I want to ask, do any of the ASEAN 
bloc of countries have the capacity to stand up to China? Does 
anybody want to weigh in on that?
    I will hear a no.
    Dr. Erickson. I would be happy to weigh in for this.
    Mr. Yoho. I told you it was rhetorical, so I will answer 
it. No, they do not.
    I have talked to the ASEAN bloc of nations to stand up as a 
bloc, and I understand their compact says we do not interfere 
with the politics of another nation, but that was 50 years ago. 
The conditions have changed. China is becoming very strong, 
very aggressive, and if we do not stand up together as a bloc, 
and I have said this to Prime Minister Li, the incoming chair 
from Vietnam. If you do not stand up today as a bloc, is it 
going to be possible 3 years from now? And understand, it is 
not just ASEAN standing up, it would be the U.S., Canada, Great 
Britain, Germany, the French, Australia, Japan, South Korea, 
and India. If we do not stand up to China today, it will not be 
possible.
    And I think the other thing we need to do besides standing 
up collectively is they can do what they are doing in China 
because they have the economic resources. We need to implement 
the manufacturing, the ABC method, which is to manufacture 
anywhere but China, because we are paying them and they are 
creating the money that we are fighting against. And I think it 
is time the world wakes up and I am glad to see they are doing 
it.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Sherman.
    Mr. Sherman. A lot of foreign policy is playing to the 
domestic crowd. The Chinese Government has a crisis of 
credibility because they cannot answer the question, why are 
these guys running the country? They cannot claim to be a 
democracy. The divine right of kings is not selling very well. 
And they got power by claiming to be the vanguard of the 
proletariat, but I cannot say that without laughing. So unless 
they can continue to provide incredible economic growth, they 
are going to have to hide behind hypernationalism as their 
reason to continue in power.
    We in the United States have some of the same issues. The 
Pentagon has always had a terrible time when we fight an 
asymmetrical foe from the Philippine insurrection through 
Vietnam and then Syria. The Pentagon has covered itself in 
glory every time we have faced a symmetrical foe. The greatest 
glory of all, beating the Soviet Union without having to have a 
major war.
    So there is every reason for China to try to exaggerate the 
importance of this and have a conflict with America as long as 
it does not get too out of hand. There is every reason for the 
Pentagon to say we need to spend hundreds of billions of 
dollars building a naval presence that can beat China in the 
South China Sea.
    And yes, this is a priority, but remember we have some 
other--is it a more important priority than the fact that the 
Ukraine is occupied, or parts of it? Is it more important than 
the independence of the Baltic States? Is it more important 
than the attack on the Ladakh region of India by China 
recently? Is it more important than the Uyghurs being held in, 
a million of them being held in camps? We have got a lot of 
priorities.
    And to put this in context, I have often heard it argued 
that these islands are critical because there is trillions of 
dollars of trade that goes through them. That is all trade in 
and out of Chinese ports and a few oil tankers that could stay 
out of the region if they chose to by detouring just a few 
miles.
    So these islands--this maritime issue is of great 
importance, but we have many things of great importance. And 
one thing I do not want to see is to see this maritime dispute 
be used to justify a huge increase in our military budget or 
anything that would bring us close to war with China on their 
home ground.
    Now one of the things that is of concern is the law of the 
sea and China is violating it. We, however, have not ratified 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; China has. 
And while the law of the sea is very important to us, there are 
literally scores of maritime disputes around the world in which 
one country or another is unwilling to follow the law of the 
sea. Cyprus is suffering from that based on what Turkey is 
doing.
    So the question I have here is, do we need a huge buildup 
in the American Navy if we are going to be effective, or can we 
limit China's avarice for the oceans off its shores through 
just diplomatic efforts and perhaps some economic sanctions? I 
do not know which of the witnesses would like to address that.
    Dr. Mastro. I can go first, sir, if that works.
    So I do not think--I think you are absolutely correct that 
a buildup of the American Navy would not be enough, because as 
I mentioned in my written testimony, China is relying extremely 
heavily on legal, economic, and political means to get what 
they need. And so ratifying, you know, the U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, trying to get other countries in the region 
to----
    Mr. Sherman. If I can interrupt, would that be in our 
interest to ratify that treaty?
    Dr. Mastro. I think it would be. There are, of course, 
downsides. But in terms of the leverage that it gives to us to 
convince countries in the region that we are serious about 
freedom of navigation and international norms and principles, I 
think it would go a long way. And I think we should get those 
countries together to agree, maybe not on the sovereignty of 
the islands, but on the maritime rights that those islands give 
whoever owns them because China is alone in thinking that, 
because you have a right to this small island you control the 
whole South China Sea.
    So the Navy, of course, is not enough, but it is a key 
component because I do believe that U.S. deterrence against 
China has been successful in the past couple of decades and our 
deterrent has been weakened. And so if we are pushed to operate 
farther and farther out and we cannot operate in the South 
China Sea, I am afraid that then we can no longer really deter 
China and we will see increased aggression there.
    Mr. Sherman. Yes.
    Dr. Mastro. So I do think we need to maybe not sort of just 
build more expensive stuff that might be part of it, but really 
rethink our force posture in the region more generally.
    Mr. Sherman. And I do want to comment on Turkey. There are 
a number of disputes involving Turkey and I do not want the 
record to think that I think Turkey is on the wrong side of 
every one of those. I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me recognize the gentlelady from Missouri, Mrs. Wagner.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am deeply 
concerned that domestic discontent and international 
distraction resulting from the coronavirus pandemic is pushing 
Beijing to behave erratically and aggressively abroad, 
particularly in the maritime domain where China is already 
seeking to erode and replace U.S. influence. The United States 
must stand by its partners in the Indo-Pacific as we protect 
the rule of law and freedom of navigation.
    As cofounder of the ASEAN Caucus, I am greatly concerned 
that China is looking to ramp up militarization of the South 
China Sea while the rest of the world, frankly, grapples with 
the pandemic response. In April, China rammed and sank a 
Vietnamese fishing vessel and announced new administrative 
districts covering as we said its illegal installation in the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands. These actions have pushed ASEAN 
leaders to issue a strong statement in opposition to China's 
claims. Kind of highly unusual for the consensus-based 
organization.
    Mr. Poling, do you believe that Chinese aggression will 
push ASEAN countries to adopt a more assertive posture against 
China?
    Mr. Poling. Ma'am, I, unfortunately, think it unlikely. I 
think individual countries especially Vietnam are fed up, and 
some like the Philippines and Indonesia may be getting there, 
but ASEAN as an organization is ill-equipped to deal with the 
South China Sea. ASEAN is an important organization, but this 
is not an issue that you can get through consensus-based 
decisionmaking that requires Cambodia's approval on anything.
    So I think the statement we saw this weekend which was a 
very modest strengthening of previous ASEAN statements is about 
the most the organization is capable of doing.
    Mrs. Wagner. Dr. Erickson, I understand that China is 
building a series of military and commercial facilities known 
as the string of pearls connecting its South China Sea 
installations to the Strait of Hormuz. These installations seem 
to serve the dual purposes of boxing in India, a potential 
rival, and boosting China's presence near strategically 
important maritime choke points. How capable is the Chinese 
navy of projecting power in the Indian Ocean and what are its 
ambitions?
    Dr. Erickson. Well, thank you for those important points. 
China is working to go further afield in projecting influence 
and ability to secure its interests in selected cases and this 
is very much an ambitious work in progress. We see concretely 
already a naval base in Djibouti, and as you rightly pointed 
out, there are a series of other ports where sometimes it is 
unclear what the ultimate purpose is, but clearly there is 
extensive Chinese involvement and ample potential for 
upgrading.
    I think we need to keep a very close eye on this. I think 
our regional diplomacy with the countries concerned will be 
essential. But I do think it is important to note as Dr. Mastro 
did that this is a different type of effort on China's part 
from the hard-edged sovereignty advancement efforts in the East 
China Sea and the South China Sea, so it is a different type of 
dynamic. It is a question of longer-term influence over a 
broader geographic area and that gives us more opportunities 
for diplomacy and economic engagement with the host nations 
involved.
    Mrs. Wagner. Well, Okay, let's----
    Dr. Erickson. I should also say this is one of many ways in 
which Hong Kong matters and in which various policies we may 
consider toward Hong Kong will influence China's operations in 
the Indian Ocean region. There are various Chinese commercial 
conglomerates engaged in the construction and operation of 
these ports that may seek favorable treatment for their 
business interests in Hong Kong courts. That is something to 
keep an eye on and that might be a place of important 
information-gathering and leverage.
    Mrs. Wagner. I am running out of time. I agree with you. I 
also think that we have some opportunities, Dr. Erickson, to 
work closely with India.
    Dr. Erickson. Yes.
    Mrs. Wagner. And to make sure that we improve our U.S.-
Indian maritime cooperation and deepen our ties between perhaps 
our navies.
    So I am out of time. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bera. Let me recognize the gentlelady from 
Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. Thank you to the chair.
    And I want to followup with Dr. Erickson. I was hoping that 
you might be able, sir, to discuss the Chinese coast guard 
specifically in their activities in the South China Sea to see 
if you could enlighten or shed some light on whether or not 
these new and increased operations are a threat to the U.S. 
interests and to our security.
    Dr. Erickson. Thank you for the excellent question. China's 
coast guard really in many ways is almost like a second navy. 
It is by far the largest in the world in terms of numbers of 
ships. And while many of them are capable of far-ranging 
operations, the vast majority of China's more than one thousand 
coast guard ships are deployed generally near to China.
    Unlike coast guards such as the U.S. Coast Guard, China's 
coast guard has a very important sovereignty advancement 
mission, and China's coast guard by organizational, recent 
organizational changes is now formally one of China's, part of 
one of China's armed forces, as I mentioned before. So there is 
a hard-edged sovereignty advancement mission that it has that 
is very different from how the U.S. Coast Guard pursues its 
operations.
    Combine that with the sheer numbers and the increasing 
capabilities of this force as well as some of the capabilities, 
limitations in capabilities of China's neighbors in ASEAN, as 
has been discussed extensively here, and this is a real problem 
for regional security, stability, and the rules and norms that 
would be optimal in making this region peaceful and prosperous.
    This is a significant problem. It is one that we can 
ameliorate through improved partner capacity-building and 
cooperation with our allies and partners in the region. Japan 
is also making good contributions here. We can work to do more 
with Japan and support Japan's own efforts. And maintaining the 
maritime presence that we can in the region will likewise be 
important to not allow a vacuum that China can exploit.
    Finally, I am in favor of the U.S. Coast Guard's increasing 
presence in the Western Pacific and including in the East China 
Sea and the South China Sea. While the numbers are on that will 
not be huge, it does involve a set of unique capabilities and 
cooperative efforts that I think will be very useful to the 
larger set of things we need to do here. Thank you.
    Ms. Houlahan. I really very much appreciate that answer, a 
really very complete answer.
    For Dr. Mastro in the minute and a half or so that I have, 
I was wondering what are the current U.S. and Chinese 
diplomatic initiatives to reduce the risk of military 
escalation in the South China Sea. How are our current 
established agreements being maintained and being strengthened 
and what are the diplomatic gaps that you might see that could 
use further attention and dialog between those two countries, 
our two countries?
    Dr. Mastro. Thank you, ma'am, for the question. I think 
most of our focus when you talk about diplomacy has been on the 
military diplomacy side. We do have a series of operational 
agreements. For example, CUES that talks about how militaries 
should interact with each other if there is an incident at sea. 
One of the big issues is if the United States was going to have 
a direct line of communication with China in case there is an 
incident to avoid escalation.
    And while we have, periodically, had hotlines, the Chinese 
do not answer the phone when we call them and I think this is 
for a number of reasons. Some say they want to get their act 
together before they talk to us. I think that there is a 
strategic benefit to being silent because it increases the risk 
to the other side and maybe makes the United States capitulate.
    But a lot of our diplomatic initiatives are mainly about 
trying to deal with crises, crisis management, which is 
important, but I do think we need more on this broader 
strategic side to show China that we want to have a diplomatic 
resolution to the South China Sea issue and to push back on 
their interpretation of sovereignty in the diplomatic realm as 
well.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I really appreciate your time. I 
am nearly out and I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think this is 
a fascinating hearing. Thank you for holding it and thank you 
to our panel.
    In listening to sort of the litany of Chinese assertiveness 
if not aggression, one comes to the conclusion that under 
President Xi we are seeing a real transformation in China's 
posture. Under Deng Xiaoping it was sort of hide your strength 
and do not necessarily assert yourself too boldly. Under 
President Xi, after all of that buildup in strength, let's 
assert it.
    It seems to me in the South China Sea, the only power that 
can counter Chinese influence is us. ASEAN is not a military 
organization, and even if you looked at its collective military 
might, it is anemic. It has no capacity to counter the Chinese 
juggernaut. India, which just suffered a first major set of 
casualties in an armed conflict or military conflict with 
China, clearly is not anywhere near capable of deterring a 
Chinese military threat even today, neither on the seas nor on 
land. That leaves us. And meanwhile, China is--the title of 
this hearing is Maritime Ambitions. It is not just in the South 
China Sea.
    The fact that the Chinese built and now are operating the 
Hambantota port facility, which could easily become a military 
base because of the indebtedness of the Sri Lankan government 
and its inability to finance and serve the debt on that 
finance, has given China a strategic location through which 
passes, I am told, about, you know, 30 percent of all the 
world's shipping. And it is a real nice reminder to India that 
now China has that strategic location.
    We mentioned Djibouti, another key chokehold in terms of 
international shipping lanes. And to make it all perfect, China 
has asserted on its own that it is an associate Arctic power 
even though it has no land that is literal in the Arctic, and 
it has indicated that it wants to create bases, including in 
Greenland, to bolster that assertion. So it seems to me we are 
dealing with a very aggressive and assertive China in key 
maritime locations all around the world.
    And it also occurs to me that, frankly, what we are dealing 
with in the South China Sea, potentially, is a direct threat to 
us and to international shipping because the assertion being 
made is this is a Chinese lake. This is our hegemon and you 
need permission and consent and, if necessary, we will lay 
claim to other sovereign territory, the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands, to wit. We will even build artificial islands so we 
can extend our territorial waters under international law even 
if it encroaches on others such as the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, and of course Taiwan.
    Mr. Poling, would that be a fair summary of what we kind of 
know about and conclude from Chinese intentions and behavior?
    Mr. Poling. I think it would, yes. China wants the South 
China Sea to be a Chinese lake. And as you indicated, President 
Xi has put this issue among a few others at the heart of his 
China dream. It underpins his claim to legitimacy. So, 
certainly, we are going to continue to see China push and push 
and push the envelope here because Xi has linked his political 
future to it.
    Mr. Connolly. Can I just followup on one other issue with 
you, Mr. Poling, that Mr. Sherman was starting to pursue with 
Dr. Mastro.
    It seems to me that the United States has shot itself in 
the foot by not becoming a signatory to the law of the seas, so 
we do not have--we are not at the council's, or the table of 
council in UNCLOS, the Chinese are and that means they can 
burrow down into committee work where we are not present and 
their influence gets spread. Their point of view gets advocated 
for and argued, ours does not.
    Have we made a strategic error in retreating from 
institutions like UNCLOS that could very much serve U.S. 
interests at a time like this?
    Mr. Poling. Absolutely. It is the only issue on which you 
can get every chief of naval operations, members of the 
environmental lobby, you know, U.S. shippers, all at a table 
and they all agree on something. And the fact that we have not 
ratified UNCLOS is an enormous strategic own-goal for the 
United States.
    Mr. Connolly. And I would argue on my own that the decision 
by the Trump Administration to pull out of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership I also think was an enormous strategic blunder that 
created a vacuum for China and I would be surprised if China 
was not still uncorking champagne in Beijing to celebrate that 
self-inflicted wound by the United States. I yield back. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
    I will take the chair's prerogative to ask an additional 
question and I know the ranking member also has additional 
questions. And I appreciate the witnesses for sticking around 
to continue to answer questions.
    I think it was last year, this committee had a hearing on 
the second island chain and the freely associated States. And I 
know we have not talked about China's maritime strategy in the 
second island chain, but I'd like if each of the witnesses 
potentially could touch on that from their perspectives.
    We have seen economic coercion there to try to isolate 
Taiwan, et cetera, in some of the freely associated States, but 
I do have deep concern if China does start to grow their ties 
with the second island chain, just the mass of territory in 
terms of maritime territory that would be covered would be 
quite large. So, perhaps, starting with Mr. Poling, then Dr. 
Mastro, if you could comment on that.
    Mr. Poling. I would be happy to. I think that we should be 
concerned about Chinese inroads, economic or political, within 
Micronesia in particular. This is the U.S. strategic backyard. 
It has been since World War II. It is a place where the U.S. 
has insurmountable advantages unless we give them up ourselves. 
So again, it would be an enormous U.S., you know, failure if we 
allowed our primacy in the second island chain to slip away.
    What is needed is vigilance and so far we have been 
vigilant in responding to Chinese inroads. I just worry that 
our interest in the Pacific islands is always so episodic that 
there is always the risk that we look away. And Beijing is 
waiting to take advantage if we do.
    Mr. Bera. Great.
    Dr. Mastro.
    Dr. Mastro. I think there are two main things to be 
concerned about that are somewhat separate. The first is the 
issue of coercion. And as I mentioned in my testimony, China is 
very good at keeping things below the threshold of conflict so 
it is very difficult for the United States to respond. So they 
do have more military capability is, you know, in the second 
island chain, I would expect them to also have these more 
military coercive tools that they would use in such a way that 
it would make it hard for the United States to respond and so 
they would have more influence.
    The other issue is operational. If China does control the 
first island chain, the second island chain will become much 
more contested. This is just a matter of range of systems. You 
know, until there were South China Sea islands, China couldn't 
target U.S. bases in the Philippines and Australia very 
effectively. And now because they can take off, you know, their 
aircraft can take off from those islands with, you know, air 
launch cruise missiles, now all of a sudden those are at risk.
    So once the second island chain is contested as their 
military is able to operate more freely in the first island 
chain, then it becomes more difficult to defend, you know, 
Japan, for example. And so this is why--I am not sure we have 
convinced the committee, but this I think this is why at least 
I am trying to argue that this is the priority.
    This is the most important issue, more important than the 
other issues, I think, that Mr. Sherman mentioned because Asia 
is the most dynamic and prosperous part of the world. The 
United States needs to maintain its position there. And even 
though Russia is also a threat, Russia spends $65 billion on 
its military while China spends a hundred billion and meanwhile 
our NATO allies spend almost three times as much as our Asian 
allies do. So to a previous point made, they absolutely need 
the United States military to be there to defend them or else 
China is just, you know, going to run amok over everybody.
    Mr. Bera. Dr. Erickson.
    Dr. Erickson. Yes. Chairman Bera, I want to further 
underscore the importance of your emphasis on this. It is a 
strategic area for the United States. One of the many unique or 
important aspects is the Kwajalein Atoll missile testing 
facility, some things that would be hard to replicate 
elsewhere.
    And one reason we need to keep being vigilant, as Greg 
Poling has rightly pointed out, is because China has a sort of 
checkbook diplomacy and influence approach. That is one of its 
preferred approaches that it has advantages in pursuing, and in 
the Pacific islands there are some areas of limited-size 
population and economy where a targeted Chinese investment 
could have a significant impact.
    So I just want to agree with all that has been said here 
and hopefully we can redouble our efforts to shore up this 
critical area and not let China subvert it. Thank you.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    And let me recognize the ranking member, Mr. Yoho.
    Mr. Yoho. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I appreciate all of 
our witnesses. You guys have brought just a great insight. You 
know, as we talk about that second chain of islands and if we 
look at the landmass through the Pacific island nations, it is 
more landmass than I think a good portion of the world, you 
know, when you look at that area it just covers such a broad 
area and we cannot afford to secede that to anybody or lose 
that to anybody.
    And I want to go back and talk about UNCLOS again, because 
Mr. Sherman brought this up and I do believe if we are at the 
table we can negotiate better. But I look at--I think there is 
167 or 169 countries that have signed that, China being one of 
them, yet China does not follow the mandate of that 
organization.
    You know, if you look at the Philippines' claim, China lost 
that lawsuit. If you look at China's claim as a near-Arctic 
country and they are laying claim to that, I wonder what good 
it is to sign it if these other nations are not going to 
enforce it. You know, and I do not want to get into too much 
politics, but, you know, we pulled out of TPP, and Hillary 
Clinton as candidate said she would have pulled out of that.
    I look at the Paris Climate Accord that we were in. It was 
not signed or ratified. President Trump pulled out of it, yet 
the United States is the only country that has reduced their 
net greenhouse gases and I think leadership comes from the 
actions that you do whether you sign a deal or not. And for the 
countries that have signed the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention, they need to act up collectively. And I think Mr. 
Connolly brought up very well that nobody in the ASEAN bloc of 
nations has the capability of standing up.
    The point is, if they were to stand up as a bloc that 
represents 653 million people, roughly three trillion dollars 
in trade, they would not be standing alone. It would be these 
other nations. And until we as, I guess, civilized nations 
challenge China, China is going to continue to do what they are 
doing. I think we all need to be concerned of why China is 
doing what they are doing.
    I think it has been pointed out very well in the Michael 
Pillsbury book, The Hundred-Year Marathon. Their ultimate goal 
is, and Xi Jinping has said this at the, I believe it was at 
the 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017, when he said the era 
of China has arrived. No longer will they be made to swallow 
their interests around the world; it is time for China to take 
the world stage.
    I think it is very evident of what they are doing with Hong 
Kong, the South China Sea, controlling both ends of the Panama 
Canal, and their expansion in their chain of pearls through 
their Belt and Road Initiative, it is very clear and evident. 
It is time the world wakes up. And we do not want a conflict, 
we just want people to be accountable and play by the rules of 
the game. And I would like to hear any final thoughts that you 
guys may have and I want to thank the chairman for having a 
great meeting and I really do appreciate it.
    Dr. Mastro, do you want to start?
    Dr. Mastro. Sure. Thank you, sir, for those thoughts. I 
would just say that, while I understand the frustration with a 
lot of international institutions, I do believe that our 
approach needs to be to try to change them from within or 
establish new institutions that are more effective.
    Mr. Yoho. I agree.
    Dr. Mastro. One of the things that I always look at is, you 
know, the only reason we have a U.N. command on the Korean 
Peninsula is because the Soviets did not show up to veto it. 
And so in some cases, China is able to get away with what they 
are doing because we actually do not have the consensus we 
think that we do. Twenty-seven nations agree with China's 
position that EEZs you have the right to regulate military 
activity.
    So this is something that we need to be more proactive at 
making sure that China is diplomatically isolated. In some 
cases we wish they were, but actually they are not. And so I do 
think that that ratification would help for us to be there, not 
for the sake of, you know, the institution itself, but because 
there is political power associated with it would be useful, 
but we have to think about it, go in with our eyes open and say 
if we are not getting what we need from this institution maybe 
it is time to start a new, different one that actually helps us 
accomplish our goals.
    Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
    Mr. Poling.
    Mr. Poling. I would just agree wholeheartedly with that. I 
mean the U.S. wins this competition by being a leader and the 
best way to lead is to be open and honest about the faults and 
weaknesses of current national institutions, but not to turn 
our backs on them. And UNCLOS is something that we negotiated 
that we should be holding China to. We should not be using 
China's malfeasance as an excuse not to ratify.
    Mr. Yoho. Dr. Erickson.
    Dr. Erickson. Yes. Thank you, Ranking Member Yoho, and I 
understand the concerns. I think we need to redouble our 
messaging efforts to make it clear that China often signs 
agreements or makes pledges but does not honor them in 
practice. So when it comes, for example, to the U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, I personally strongly support U.S. 
ratification of that. I think it would have many, many 
benefits.
    But I think what the U.S. needs to state more clearly in 
the present context is we have not ratified UNCLOS but we 
adhere to its actual provisions much more faithfully than China 
which has ratified it. It is an example of one of many very 
important disparities that I do not think are sufficiently 
recognized.
    I agree there are sometimes agreements, treaties that have 
not stood the test of time or are against our interests. I 
personally have gone on record as saying good riddance to the 
INF Treaty, because if Russia would not comply and China would 
not join, we should not have our hands tied on successfully 
deterring Chinese aggression and adventurism in the Western 
Pacific.
    Moving forward, I think there are some things that we can 
build off additionally. As has been mentioned before, Xi 
Jinping is antagonizing and being aggressive toward so many 
different neighbors at once, I think that is going to give us 
opportunities to build better cooperation and coalitions 
against Xi Jinping's aggression. It is a marked departure from 
previous Chinese Communist Party leadership and I think it 
represents an overextension that we can use in the long run to 
subdue this negative approach that Xi Jinping is taking. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Yoho. I agree with you wholeheartedly, and you 
justified my point about UNCLOS. And thank you and I appreciate 
everybody and, Mr. Chairman, as always, thank you for your 
graciousness.
    Mr. Bera. You are welcome. And I want to give a thank you 
to our witnesses for their answers to our questions and their 
comments. Member questions are now concluded. I will now move 
to make a closing remark.
    I do think this is a top issue. Clearly, in the 21st 
century, the Indo-Pacific region and its maritime security, and 
freedom of navigation, will be increasingly important and 
should be at the top of our foreign policy concerns. I also 
think in the midst of this global pandemic, this economic 
challenge that we face at a global level does give us a silver 
lining and an opportunity to rethink what the multinational 
approaches look like in the 21st century.
    The United States can be very proud of what we accomplished 
in the post-World War II era, rebuilding Europe helping rebuild 
large parts of Asia, creating stable, free-market democracies 
and allies, friends, with shared values, and creating a 
relative era of peace. We as a planet have not faced a 
challenge like this global pandemic-that affects all of us, not 
just one State or one country, but the entire world 
simultaneously_while also facing the challenge of rebuilding 
coming out of this pandemic. And it will give opportunities, I 
hope, to create the multinational coalitions of like-minded 
countries to move us into the 21st century to address these 
challenges.
    Now I do not anticipate that China will rise to the 
occasion and join with like-valued countries like the United 
States, our European allies, our Asian allies, and others 
around the world, but I would hope that they do. And we will 
always compete economically. That is fine. It is a fair playing 
field. But we can continue an era of prosperity and peace if we 
were to build on the values that ourselves and other countries 
hold so dear, in terms of democracy, human rights, and free 
markets.
    And also this was our first hybrid type of hearing in this 
new era of a pandemic and I really want to tip my hat to the 
Foreign Affairs staff, Camilla and Samantha, for the work that 
you did. I think it came off without a hitch and hopefully this 
gives us an opportunity as we continue to convene to continue 
to have more of these hearings because they are extremely 
important.
    And with that let me recognize the ranking member, if he 
has any closing remarks.
    Mr. Yoho. Mr. Chairman, I would just say I agree with 
everything you said, especially with the staff.
    And I just want to add that China's actions are not those 
of a responsible, wanna-be superpower. China will not alter its 
course or actions in the East Sea, the South China Sea, Arctic, 
or elsewhere until it meets sufficient resistance to change its 
behavior. And we can do that together as nations that pull 
together to just get them to be responsible players. Thank you.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ranking Member Yoho. I want to thank 
our witnesses and the members who participated in this very 
important and interesting hybrid hearing, and with that the 
hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX

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