[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
R&D TO SUPPORT HEALTHY AIR TRAVEL
IN THE COVID-19 ERA AND BEYOND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-75
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-649PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman
ZOE LOFGREN, California FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma,
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois Ranking Member
SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon MO BROOKS, Alabama
AMI BERA, California, BILL POSEY, Florida
Vice Chair RANDY WEBER, Texas
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas BRIAN BABIN, Texas
HALEY STEVENS, Michigan ANDY BIGGS, Arizona
KENDRA HORN, Oklahoma ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL CLOUD, Texas
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
JERRY McNERNEY, California PETE OLSON, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
PAUL TONKO, New York MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
BILL FOSTER, Illinois JIM BAIRD, Indiana
DON BEYER, Virginia FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida GREGORY F. MURPHY, North Carolina
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois MIKE GARCIA, California
BEN McADAMS, Utah THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. KENDRA HORN, Oklahoma, Chairwoman
ZOE LOFGREN, California BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Ranking Member
AMI BERA, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado BILL POSEY, Florida
DON BEYER, Virginia MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida MIKE GARCIA, California
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
C O N T E N T S
June 23, 2020
Page
Hearing Charter.................................................. 2
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Kendra Horn, Chairwoman, Subcommittee
on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 7
Written Statement............................................ 8
Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Chairwoman,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Statement by Representative Frank D. Lucas, Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 12
Witnesses:
Ms. Heather Krause, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 14
Written Statement............................................ 17
Dr. Byron Jones, P.E., Professor, Alan Levin Department of
Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering; Director, National Gas
Machinery Laboratory, Kansas State University
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36
Dr. Vicki Hertzberg, Professor and Director, Center for Data
Science, Nell Hodgson Woodruff School of Nursing, Emory
University
Oral Statement............................................... 40
Written Statement............................................ 42
Discussion....................................................... 55
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Ms. Heather Krause, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
Government Accountability Office............................... 72
Dr. Byron Jones, P.E., Professor, Alan Levin Department of
Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering; Director, National Gas
Machinery Laboratory, Kansas State University.................. 84
Dr. Vicki Hertzberg, Professor and Director, Center for Data
Science, Nell Hodgson Woodruff School of Nursing, Emory
University..................................................... 90
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Letter submitted by Representative Brian Babin, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 94
Letter and report submitted by Representative Bill Foster,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 96
R&D TO SUPPORT HEALTHY AIR TRAVEL.
IN THE COVID-19 ERA AND BEYOND
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 2020
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:32 a.m.,
via Webex, Hon. Kendra Horn [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee]
presiding.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Horn. I'll go ahead and get started. So, this
hearing will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is
authorized to declare a recess at any time.
And before I deliver my opening remarks, I want to make
note that, today, the Committee is meeting virtually, and in
this virtual format, I want to begin with a couple of reminders
to the Members and participants about the conduct of this
hearing. First, the Members should keep their video feed on as
long as they are present in the hearing to be counted, and
Members are responsible for your own microphones, so please
keep your microphones muted unless you are speaking.
And finally, if Members have documents they wish to submit
for the record, please email them to the Committee Clerk, whose
email address was circulated prior to the hearing. And thank
you all for joining us.
So, good morning, everyone, and welcome to today's remote
hearing on R&D (research and development) support healthy air
travel--to support healthy air travel in the COVID-19 era and
beyond. I'd like to welcome our witnesses and thank you all for
being here.
Commercial air travel is an essential part of the fabric
of our society and economy. It plays a critical role in
business, commerce, education, travel, and tourism. We take for
granted that we can now easily travel vast distances by air and
reach destinations that were once reserved for imagination. In
just over a century, air travel moved from our imagination to a
reality that has changed the way we interact with each other
and connect with the world. Our dependence on air travel will
only continue to grow.
In 2018, the International Air Transport Association
projected that global air travel will nearly double in 20
years, from 4 billion to more than 7 billion annual passengers.
As with many other industries, the COVID-19 pandemic has
dramatically impacted commercial air travel. In the United
States alone, passenger air travel was down an estimated 96
percent in April 2020 from April 2019 nearly a year before.
Worldwide, the air travel industry is projected to lose more
than $300 billion in gross operating revenues this year. And
the ripple effects of this shift extend well beyond the
airlines, to travel and tourism, business, supply chains, and
much more.
While Congress has provided financial support to the
airline industry through loan guarantees, workforce support,
and tax relief in the CARES Act, full recovery also requires
ensuring safety and re-establishing public confidence as we
continue to face the risks of COVID-19. To that end, airlines
are taking concrete and proactive steps to protect crew and
passengers through increased cleaning, modified boarding
procedures, and requiring the use of masks by passenger and
crew. These are positive steps, but are they enough to ensure
safety and reestablish trust?
Additionally, with each airline determining its own
approach, individuals are left on their own about what is safe,
and that's a confusing place to be. That's why today's
discussion is so important. It's about understanding what we
know, what we don't know, and what we need to know to reduce
confusion and provide clear, science-based guidance on ensuring
the safety of passengers and crew during this and any future
pandemic.
Because of the silent threat of asymptomatic or
presymptomatic individuals remains, Federal public health
agencies such as the CDC (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention) provide guidance and recommendations about
precautions and actions to reduce the spread of COVID-19.
However, agency roles and responsibilities for determining the
risk of virus transmission on aircraft and issuing guidance
about specific mitigation measures are unclear. The FAA
(Federal Aviation Administration) has conducted research on
cabin airflow and aircraft environmental control systems in the
cabin. What does that research tell us about mitigating any
risk of COVID transmission?
As a lifelong Girl Scout, I know the importance of being
prepared. The threat of COVID-19 demands a national response.
That's why we also need to examine the status of planning--for
the Federal Government, for the airlines, and for the traveling
public--so that we and the industry aren't caught off guard
with the threat of any future pandemics. Further, we need to
examine our aeronautics and aviation R&D plans, the extent to
which they include relevant research priorities and unique
experiences such as healthcare specialists and scientists to
deal with the mitigating--mitigating the risks of novel
viruses, and how R&D can inform our national plans.
In June 2016--June 16, 2020, article, the President of the
National Academy of Sciences wrote about the coronavirus
pandemic. She noted the need for ``actionable science to inform
rapid decisionmaking,'' ``strategic science to inform long-term
planning,'' and ``irreplaceable science to understand what
works.'' Today's conversation will consider what research has
been done, what research needs to be done, and what further
actions need to be taken to understand and mitigate the risks
of virus transmission through air travel. I can't think of a
better way to frame our discussion on R&D to help ensure the
resiliency of our air travel system during the COVID-19 era and
beyond. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Horn follows:]
Good morning, and welcome to today's remote hearing on
``R&D to Support Healthy Air Travel in the COVID-19 Era and
Beyond.'' I'd like to welcome our witnesses and thank you for
being here.
Commercial air travel is an essential part of the fabric of
our society and economy. It plays a critical role in business,
commerce, education, travel, and tourism. We take for granted
that we can now easily travel vast distances by air and reach
destinations that were once beyond imagination. In just over a
century, air travel moved from our imagination to reality that
has changed the way we interact with each other and connect
with the world. Our dependence on air travel will only continue
to grow. In 2018, the International Air Transport Association
projected that global air travel will nearly double in 20
years, from 4 billion to more than 7 billion annual passengers.
As with many other industries, the COVID-19 pandemic has
dramatically impacted commercial air travel. In the U.S. alone,
passenger air travel was down an estimated 96% in April 2020
from April 2019. Worldwide, the air travel industry is
projected to lose more than $300 billion in gross operating
revenues this year. And the ripple effects of this shift extend
well beyond airlines, to travel and tourism, business, supply
chains and much more.
While Congress has provided financial support to the
airline industry through loan guarantees, workforce support,
and tax relief in the CARES Act, full recovery also requires
ensuring safety and re-establishing public confidence as we
continue to face the risks of COVID-19.
To that end, airlines are taking concrete and proactive
steps to protect crew and passengers through increased
cleaning, modified boarding procedures, and requiring the use
of masks by passengers and crew. These are positive steps, but
are they enough to ensure safety and reestablish trust?
Additionally, with each airline determining its own approach,
individuals are on their own about what is safe. That's a
confusing place to be.
That's why today's discussion is so important. It's about
understanding what we know, what we don't know, and what we
need to know to reduce confusion and provide clear and science-
based guidance on ensuring the safety of passengers and crew
during this and any future pandemic. Because the silent threat
of asymptomatic or presymptomatic individuals remains.
Federal public health agencies such as the CDC provide
guidance and recommendations about precautions and actions to
reduce the spread of COVID-19. However, agency roles and
responsibilities for determining the risk of virus transmission
on an aircraft and issuing guidance about specific mitigation
measures are unclear. The FAA has conducted research on cabin
air flow and aircraft environmental control systems in the
cabin. What does that research tell us about mitigating any
risks of COVID transmission?
And as a lifelong Girl Scout, I know the importance of
being prepared. The threat of COVID-19 demands a national
response. That's why we also need to examine the status of
planning--for the Federal government, for the airlines, and for
the traveling public--so that we and the industry aren't caught
off guard with the threat of any future pandemics. Further, we
need to examine our aeronautics and aviation R&D plans, the
extent to which they include relevant research priorities and
unique experience such as health care specialists and
scientists to deal with mitigating the risks of novel viruses,
and how that R&D can inform national plans.
In a June 16, 2020 article, the President of the National
Academy of Sciences wrote about the coronavirus pandemic. She
noted the need for ``actionable science to inform rapid
decisionmaking'', ``strategic-science to inform long-term
planning,'' and ``irreplaceable science to understand what
works.'' Today's conversation will consider what research has
been done, what research needs to be done, and what further
actions need to be taken to understand and mitigate the risks
of virus transmission through air travel. I can't think of a
better way to frame our discussion on R&D to help ensure the
resiliency of our air travel system during the COVID-19 era and
beyond.
Thank you.
Chairwoman Horn. And the Chair now recognizes Ranking
Member Mr. Babin for an opening statement. Mr. Babin?
Mr. Babin. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate you and
glad to be with you virtually this afternoon.
The COVID-19 pandemic has touched virtually every aspect
of our lives. Families are self-isolating and limiting in-
person contact with friends and family. Many workplaces have
fundamentally restructured in response to this virus. Our
economy and employment levels are challenged as we attempt to
protect our public health.
While industries like restaurants and entertainment were
asked to sacrifice profits and solvency for the greater good,
other sectors like health care and grocers were asked to accept
greater risks. The aerospace industry was asked to span these
two different paradigms. On the one hand, air travel was
significantly curtailed in order to prevent the spread of the
disease. On the other hand, transportation, including air
travel, is considered an essential function to our society.
This places passengers, airlines, and the country in a
precarious position of continuing operations in the face of not
only health risks, but also risks to the overall viability of
the companies who are operating at a fraction of their normal
operating capacity.
According to recent press reports, airlines are operating
at between 15 and 17 percent capacity compared to last year. At
the same time, private jet flights have surged 70 percent, but
this doesn't do anything to help most Americans. Polling done
recently by the International Air Transportation Association
indicated that only 45 percent of the population was willing to
fly within one or two months of restrictions being lifted. This
does not bode well for an industry that our Nation depends upon
so heavily.
For this reason, it is crucial to understand the health
risks posed by airline travel as accurately as possible.
Research into how the virus propagates in an aircraft cabin via
airborne or surface transmission is the start. Characterizing
that environment will then allow airlines, aircraft
manufacturers, airports, government agencies, and the public to
develop technologies and processes to mitigate those risks.
HEPA (high-efficiency particulate airfilters), ultraviolet (UV)
lights, antimicrobial surface coating and treatments, increased
cleaning protocols, passenger screenings, masks, social
distancing, and limited movement in the cabin for restroom
access and service carts are all options that are being
considered.
But all of these options are traded against other
considerations such as power, weight, maintenance, cabin
pressure, comfort, certification, and, not least, cost. They
must also demonstrate efficacy. At the end of the day, the best
way to stay safe is to stay home. Any option to fly comes with
some element of risk. One could make the argument that the risk
of driving to and from the airport, walking through the
airport, and traveling on buses, tram cars, and so on are far
riskier than the actual flight. This may not be true, depending
on whether you have a preexisting condition or being a member
of a vulnerable population. Still, it does illustrate that the
aircraft is just one of the elements that we have to address.
It is the responsibility of our agencies, our legislature,
our industry, and our public to find the right balance of risk.
That balance may change as time goes by. Strict controls put in
place initially to ``flatten the curve'' may not be appropriate
in the long term. Conversely, controls may need to be
reinstated over time if new information is presented. Science
will characterize and inform these risks and decisions.
While other factors will undoubtedly play a role in final
decisions, understanding the air travel environment is the very
first step. This will require an assessment of a variety of
disciplines such as computational fluid dynamics, statistics
and modeling, epidemiology, sociology and psychology,
chemistry, biology, and many more. This is certainly not an
easy task, but it is not unachievable.
It is often said that these are unprecedented times, but
we have faced similar health challenges before. I am very
confident we can come through this stronger and more resilient
than ever. The aerospace industry and our scientific,
technical, and healthcare systems are absolutely second-to-
none.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I
yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Babin follows:]
The COVID-19 pandemic has touched virtually every aspect of
our lives. Families are self-isolating and limiting in-person
contact with friends and family. Many workplaces have
fundamentally restructured in response to the virus. Our
economy and employment levels are challenged as we attempt to
protect public health.
While industries like restaurants and entertainment were
asked to sacrifice profits and solvency for the greater good,
other sectors like health care and grocers were asked to accept
greater risks. The aerospace industry was asked to span these
two different paradigms. On the one hand, air travel was
significantly curtailed in order to prevent the spread of the
disease. On the other hand, transportation, including air
travel, is considered an essential function in our society.
This places passengers, airlines, and the country in the
precarious position of continuing operations in the face of not
only health risks, but also risks to the overall viability of
the companies who are operating at a fraction of their normal
operating capacity.
According to recent press reports, airlines are operating
at between 15 and 17 percent capacity compared to last year. At
the same time, private jet flights have surged 70 percent, but
this doesn't do anything to help most Americans. Polling done
recently by the International Air Transportation Association
indicated that only 45 percent of the population was willing to
fly within one or two months of restrictions being lifted. This
does not bode well for an industry that our nation depends upon
so heavily.
For this reason, it is crucial to understand the health
risks posed by airline travel as accurately as possible.
Research into how the virus propagates in an aircraft cabin via
airborne or surface transmission is the start. Characterizing
that environment will then allow airlines, aircraft
manufacturers, airports, government agencies, and the public to
develop technologies and processes to mitigate those risks.
HEPA filters, ultraviolet lights, antimicrobial surface coating
and treatments, increased cleaning protocols, passenger
screenings, masks, social distancing, and limited movement in
the cabin for restroom access and service carts are all options
being considered.
But all of these options are traded against other
considerations such as power, weight, maintenance, cabin
pressure, comfort, certification, and cost. They must also
demonstrate efficacy. At the end of the day, the best way to
stay safe is to stay home. Any option to fly comes with some
element of risk. One could make the argument that the risk of
driving to and from the airport, walking through the airport,
and traveling on buses and tram cars are far riskier than the
actual flight. This may not be true, depending on whether you
have a preexisting condition or are a member of a vulnerable
population. Still, it does illustrate that the aircraft is just
one of the elements that we have to address.
It is the responsibility of our agencies, our legislature,
our industry, and our public to find the right balance of risk.
That balance may change as time goes by. Strict controls put in
place initially to ``flatten the curve'' may not be appropriate
in the long term. Conversely, controls may need to be
reinstated over time if new information is presented. Science
will characterize and inform these risks and decisions. While
other factors will undoubtedly play a role in final decisions,
understanding the air travel environment is the first step.
This will require an assessment of a variety of disciplines
such as computational fluid dynamics, statistics and modeling,
epidemiology, sociology and psychology, chemistry, biology, and
many more. This is certainly not an easy task, but it is not
unachievable.
It is often said that these are unprecedented times, but we
have faced similar health challenges before. I am confident we
can come through this stronger and more resilient than ever.
The aerospace industry and our scientific, technical, and
health care systems are second-to-none.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and
yield back.
Mr. Babin. But I would also ask for unanimous consent,
Madam Chair, that a letter from the Airlines for America (A4A)
be added to the record. I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Without objection, it'll be added to the
record. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Babin.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairwoman of the Full
Committee, Ms. Johnson, for an opening statement.
Chairwoman Johnson. I want to express my appreciation to
Chairwoman Horn for holding this hearing and really make a
special thank you for the witnesses for appearing before the
Subcommittee today.
The aviation system is both an important contributor to
the U.S. economy and an important factor in the national and
global response to a communicable disease outbreak. At the
threat of--as the threat of COVID-19 continues, it is critical
for the health and safety of flight crews, airport employees,
and the flying public that science-based policies, practices,
and regulations are put in place to reduce the risk of further
spread of the virus. Research and development must be part of
the solution.
Congress has been attentive to public health concerns on
aircraft, paying particular attention to the issue of cabin air
quality. While researchers have learned about the airplane
cabin air circulation and the spread of communicable disease in
aircraft, many questions remain. Today's hearing will inform us
on the role of R&D in understanding and mitigating the risk of
virus transmission through air travel. I also look forward to
hearing from our witnesses about how the research is being
translated to operational solutions because the airlines, crew,
and the flying public really need clear information.
The coronavirus is a national and global crisis. Yet,
despite international obligations and recommendations from GAO
(Government Accountability Office), we continue to lack a
national preparedness plan to address the threat of
communicable disease transmission through travel. That is
troubling, given the devastating toll that the coronavirus has
taken on airlines and so many other industries. We need to be
prepared to avoid repeating the same mistakes with our future
pandemics.
I continue to be proud of how the research community and
our frontline workers like those in the aviation community
continue to rise to the ongoing challenge of COVID-19. I look
forward to the--hearing from our witnesses about how R&D can be
part of the solution to healthy air travel during this COVID-19
and into the future. I thank you and yield back.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Johnson follows:]
Good morning. Thank you, Chairwoman Horn, for holding this
hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for appearing before
the Subcommittee today. The aviation system is both an
important contributor to the U.S. economy and an important
factor in the national and global response to a communicable
disease outbreak. As the threat of COVID-19 continues, it is
critical for the health and safety of flight crews, airport
employees, and the flying public that science based policies,
practices, and regulations are put in place to reduce the risk
of further spread of the virus. Research and development must
be part of the solution.
Congress has been attentive to public health concerns on
aircraft, paying particular attention to the issue of cabin air
quality. While researchers have learned about airplane cabin
air circulation and the spread of communicable disease in
aircraft, many questions remain.
Today's hearing will inform us on the role of R&D in
understanding and mitigating the risk of virus transmission
through air travel. I also look forward to hearing from our
witnesses about how the research is being translated to
operational solutions, because the airlines, crew, and the
flying public need clear information.
The coronavirus is a national and global crisis. Yet,
despite international obligations and recommendations from GAO,
we continue to lack a national preparedness plan to address the
threat of communicable disease transmission through air travel.
That's troubling, given the devastating toll that the
coronavirus has taken on airlines and so many other industries.
We need to be prepared to avoid repeating the same mistakes
with any future pandemics.
I continue to be proud of how the research community and
our frontline workers like those in the aviation community
continue to rise to the ongoing challenge of COVID-19. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses about how R&D can be part
of the solution to healthy air travel during COVID-19 and into
the future.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Chairwoman Johnson.
The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Lucas of the Full
Committee for an opening statement. Mr. Lucas?
Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee and Chairwoman Eddie Bernice Johnson.
I can think of no more timely or important hearing than
the topics and subject matter we're covering today, examining
the status of R&D as it relates to supporting healthy air
travel.
As we heard in the hearing earlier this year, and addition
to COVID-19, there are potentially one million-plus pathogens
that exist in the wild, so the efforts that we apply to address
and deal with the struggles we have right now, whether it's
COVID-19 or other things, are more important to the future of
air travel than I think we could even possibly imagine.
Whether it is the health of our--each of us individually,
our families, or has COVID-19 has demonstrated, the world, the
issues discussed today have to be addressed in a thoughtful
manner that will help move everything forward. We didn't just
have trouble starting with this plague, but it is a reflection
of struggles we've had for decades.
I very much appreciate the Chair and the Ranking Member
for holding this hearing. I look forward to the witness's
comments, and let's work together to make sure the lives of our
constituents are safer and more productive as a result of this.
Yield back, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Lucas. And thank you
again to the witnesses.
At this point if there are Members who wish to submit
additional opening statements, your statements will be added to
the record at this point.
At this time, I'd like to introduce our witnesses for this
important hearing today. Our first witness is Ms. Heather
Krause, Director of the Government Accountability Office
Physical Infrastructure Team. The Physical Infrastructure Team
assists Congress and Federal agencies to address challenges
within the U.S. infrastructure, including transportation
systems. Since joining GAO in 2003, Ms. Krause has been an
expert on the safety and operations of the National Airspace
System. Ms. Krause received a bachelor of arts degree in
political science from the University of Minnesota Duluth and a
master's degree in public policy from the University of
Minnesota. Welcome, Ms. Krause.
Our second witness today is Dr. Byron Jones. At this time,
I would like to recognize Congressman Marshall for an
introduction of Dr. Jones. Mr. Marshall, you are recognized.
Mr. Marshall. All right. Good morning, Chairwoman Horn
and my good friend Ranking Member Babin. Hopefully, you got a
good connection with me. I'm running around the State of Kansas
right now, but I did not want to miss a chance to introduce a
fellow wildcat from the K State University.
Dr. Byron Jones is the Director of the National Gas
Machinery Laboratory at the Kansas State University located in
beautiful Manhattan, Kansas. He's a long-standing member of K
State's faculty. He served as the Associate Dean for Research
at K State's College of Engineering--by the way, I might add,
one of the top engineering programs in the country--and serves
as the Head of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering and is
Director of the Institute for Environmental Research.
His current research areas include aircraft cabin air
quality, aircraft environmental control systems,
turbomachinery, and aircraft bleed air contamination. Wow. He
serves as Technical Director of the FAA Air Transportation
Center of Excellence for Airliner Cabin Environment Research
and has chaired the development of the original ASHRAE
(American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-
Conditioning Engineers) standard 161 air quality and commercial
aircraft.
He has a bachelor's degree, of course, from Kansas State
University. Somehow we let him slip down to Oklahoma State
University (OSU) for his M.S. and Ph.D. from Oklahoma State
University and all in mechanical engineering. He's a licensed
professional engineer, of course, and a licensed commercial
pilot, wow, so that brings some substance to the discussion
today.
He brings a wealth of knowledge on this topic and, again,
welcome to Dr. Byron Jones from Kansas State University, the
home of the fighting wildcats.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Marshall. And of course I
would be remiss--Ranking Member Lucas and I always have to
celebrate all of the amazing Oklahomans that we have and
spending time at OSU absolutely is included in that. I would
venture to guess the Ranking Member agrees with me there.
So, our third witness today is Dr. Vicki Hertzberg,
Professor of the Nell Hodgson Woodruff School of Nursing and
Director of--at the Center for Nursing Data Science at both
Emory--both at Emory University. Professor Hertzberg is an
internationally recognized expert on big data and its impact on
health care. She has led research efforts in social contact and
disease transmission in densely populated indoor spaces,
including emergency rooms and aircraft cabins. Professor
Hertzberg received a bachelor of science degree in mathematics
and statistics and a doctoral degree in biomathematics, health
statistics track, from Miami University in Ohio. Welcome, Dr.
Hertzberg.
As our witnesses--each of you should know that you will
each have five minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written
testimony will be included for the record in the hearing. When
you've completed your spoken testimony, we will begin with
questions, and each Member will have five minutes to question
the panel. We have a timer here that you should be able to see
on your screen, and I will notify you as time is up. We will
begin today with Ms. Krause.
Ms. Krause, you're recognized.
TESTIMONY OF MS. HEATHER KRAUSE, DIRECTOR,
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES,
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Krause. Thank you. Chairwoman Horn, Chairwoman
Johnson, Ranking Member Babin, and Ranking Member Lucas and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss our work on reducing the risk of transmitting
communicable disease through the aviation sector.
Air travel more than any other mode of transportation
creates the potential for infected persons to move quickly from
one part of the world to another. Air travel greatly aided and
accelerated the global transmission of COVID-19, which is
having profound effects around the world. In light of the
resulting pandemic and warnings about the risk of air travel,
as noted earlier, U.S. passenger airline traffic fell
dramatically, dropping 96 percent in April 2020 as compared to
a year ago.
COVID-19 is only the latest communicable disease to raise
concerns about the spread of contagion through air travel.
Since 2002, there have been six major public health threats
with global ramifications, including SARS (severe acute
respiratory syndrome) in 2003 and the Ebola virus in 2014.
Ensuring that the United States is prepared to respond to
disease threats from air travel and conducting the necessary
research to reduce the risks of a contagion are two vital
responsibilities of the Federal Government.
My testimony today focuses on, one, the U.S. aviation
system's preparedness to respond to communicable disease
threats; and, two, the extent to which disease transmission on
aircraft and in airports has been a focus of FAA research.
Starting with our work on preparedness, the United States
still lacks a comprehensive national aviation preparedness plan
to limit the spread of communicable diseases through air
travel. In December 2015 during the Ebola pandemic we
recommended that DOT (Department of Transportation) work with
relevant stakeholders such as the Departments of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS) to develop a
national aviation preparedness plan for communicable disease
outbreaks. We concluded that the absence of a national plan
undermined the ability of public health in and transportation
sectors to coordinate on a response or to provide consistent
guidance to airlines and airports.
More than 4 years later, DOT is confronting an even more
widespread public health crisis with COVID-19 without having
taken steps to implement our recommendation. DOT and HHS
officials agree that a national aviation preparedness plan
could add value. However, DOT maintains that HHS and DHS have
both the legal authority and expertise for public health and
emergency response respectively and that these agencies should
lead any efforts to address planning for communicable disease
outbreaks, including for transportation.
We continue to believe that DOT would be in the best
position to lead this effort because DOT and FAA have stronger
and deeper ties to, and oversight responsibility for, the
relevant stakeholders that would be most involved in such a
broad effort, namely, airlines, airports, and other aviation
stakeholders. A national aviation preparedness plan can not
only provide a way for the public health and aviation sectors
to coordinate and more effectively prevent and control a
threat, it could also help minimize unnecessary disruptions to
the national aviation system, which to date have been
significant.
In addition, Annex 9 to an international aviation treaty,
to which the United States is a signatory, contains a standard
that obligates member States to establish such a plan.
Now turning to FAA's research and development, FAA has
sponsored limited Federal research into disease transmission
onboard aircraft and in airports. Instead, FAA's research has
focused on areas like reducing accidents, improving airport
operations and airspace management, and developing new
technologies. Such research is consistent with DOT's strategic
goals related to safety, infrastructure, and innovation.
Even so, FAA has funded some programs relevant to
mitigating communicable disease transmission in airports and on
aircraft. For example, in 2018 the Airports Cooperative
Research Program or ACRP, which is funded by FAA's Airport
Improvement Program, held a workshop on airports' roles in
reducing the transmission of communicable diseases. ACRP has
issued several reports, including guidance to airports and
airlines on infectious disease, mitigation onboard aircraft,
and for ways to reduce the spread of communicable disease in
airports.
The Centers for Disease Control within HHS, which is
responsible for the Nation's public health, also sponsors
health-related research involving air transportation. Such
research, along with developing and maintaining a national
aviation preparedness plan, is critical to ensuring the United
States is sufficiently prepared to respond to any future
communicable disease threat.
This concludes my statement. I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Krause follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Ms. Krause. The Chair now
recognizes--oh, excuse me--Professor--Dr. Jones, you're
recognized.
TESTIMONY OF DR. BYRON JONES, P.E.,
PROFESSOR, ALAN LEVIN DEPARTMENT
OF MECHANICAL AND NUCLEAR ENGINEERING;
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GAS MACHINERY LABORATORY,
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Jones. Good morning, Chairman Johnson--Chairwoman
Johnson, Chairwoman Horn, Committee Members, guests, I am
pleased to be able to offer my comments to this Committee
today. I am a mechanical engineer. I do not claim to be a
disease transmission expert. However, I have worked extensively
with the aircraft environmental control systems, and I believe
I understand how they function, how virus-containing droplets
are carried by the air within the cabin, and how ventilation
systems flush these droplets from the cabin. Sponsors of our
research on these topics have included the FAA, CDC NIOSH
(National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health), and
Boeing.
Aircraft and air travel play two distinct roles with
regard to disease spread during a pandemic. First, there is the
transport of infected people throughout the world, which allows
disease to spread across large distances. Second, there is
transmission of disease between people within the aircraft. I
will be addressing only the latter role, transmission within
the aircraft cabin.
If I can get my thing to scroll up here, with regard to
air travel, I believe the most critical research needed in the
near-term is collection of the data and development of the
tools needed to be able to quantitatively assess the risk of
COVID-19 transmission on aircraft and to be able to
quantitatively assess the effect of various mitigation measures
on that risk. The key word here is quantitative. Expert
opinions are plentiful, but reliable data are scarce. The air
transportation industry and the flying public need sound
quantitative information about risk and the impact of
mitigations to be able to devise and deploy the appropriate
mitigation strategies and to make informed decisions about air
travel.
It is unrealistic to expect the risk of COVID-19
transmission in aircraft to be zero in the near future.
However, it is realistic to expect that appropriate mitigation
measures can be taken so as to ensure the risks are comparable
to or lower than exposure risks we face in everyday life.
Unfortunately, we simply do not have the data nor the
knowledge to confidently make that judgment today. We need
these answers today, not in 2 years, not even in 6 months
because we're not talking about a traditional research effort
but rather an immediate, focused effort.
The scientific community is slowly learning about how
COVID-19 is transmitted. However, when all is said and done,
there's a lot more that we do not know than we do know. It is
believed that a primary means of transmission is via
respiratory droplets that are expelled when an infected person
coughs, sneezes, talks, or even breathes. These droplets are
then inhaled or otherwise transferred to the respiratory system
of an uninfected person. The largest droplets do not travel far
from the source. However, all but the largest droplets can
become partially or fully suspended in the air and be carried
much further by air currents. The smaller ones can stay
suspended more or less indefinitely and will stay in the cabin
air until they are flushed out by the ventilation air or
contact a surface.
High-risk environments are those environments with high-
occupant density, extended exposure time, and poor ventilation.
In this respect, aircraft cabins are both good and bad.
Aircraft cabins are well-ventilated and--with a combination of
outside air and HEPA-filtered recirculated air. One can be
confident the air supplied to the cabin is virus-free.
Additionally, the amount of air supplied relative to the
volume of the cabin is very high. This high ventilation rate
results in an exponential decrease in droplet concentration
with distance from the source as a ventilation air flushes the
droplets from the cabin as they spread. This exponential
decrease has been well-characterized through FAA and CDC NIOSH-
funded research. Some small fraction of the smaller droplets
will still be carried a number of seats from the source.
Exposure risk presented by these droplets is not known.
The ventilation is good on aircraft, but that is not the
whole story. The occupancy density is higher than just about
any other space we routinely occupy and that occupancy can
extend for several hours or more. Operating aircraft while
maintaining 6 feet personal distancing is not economically
feasible. Any realistic scenario for air travel in the COVID-19
environment will require other mitigation measures. We
understand qualitatively how these mitigations work. However,
as stated previously, we do not have the information needed to
quantitatively assess the risk of transmission in aircraft and
to assess the impact of mitigations on that risk. Ultimately,
we need this information to be able to confidently say that air
travel poses no greater risk of infection than other aspects of
our daily life.
I thank you for your attention, and I thank Congressman
Marshall for that wonderful introduction.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Dr. Jones.
Dr. Hertzberg?
TESTIMONY OF DR. VICKI HERTZBERG,
PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DATA SCIENCE,
NELL HODGSON WOODRUFF SCHOOL OF NURSING,
EMORY UNIVERSITY
Dr. Hertzberg. Ladies and gentlemen of the Committee,
good afternoon. First, a disclaimer. The contents of my
testimony represent my opinion and are not the official opinion
of the Emory University.
Second, I'm Vicki Stover Hertzberg. I earned a Ph.D. in
biomathematics from the University of Washington in Seattle,
Washington, in 1980. I was on the faculty at the University of
Cincinnati from then until 1995, and I have been on the faculty
of Emory University since 1995. I'm Professor and I direct the
Center for Data Science at the Nell Hodgson Woodruff School of
Nursing of Emory University.
Next, I review how I developed particular expertise that
qualifies me to testify before you today. After the SARS
pandemic in 2002 to 2004, many organizations became concerned
about how a novel infectious agent might spread in their
environments. There were two papers published in the medical
literature documenting such spread for SARS or severe acute
respiratory syndrome. One publication described how SARS spread
in an emergency department or an E.D.
This particular publication led to my collaboration with
Dr. Doug Lowery-North, an emergency medicine physician. We
studied movements of patients and staff in the E.D. at Emory
University Hospital Midtown to determine how frequently and for
how long patients and staff came into contact with one another,
that being within 3 feet or a meter, in order to understand
better how an infectious disease could spread in an E.D.
Another publication documented SARS transmission on a 3-
hour flight from Hong Kong to Beijing because airplane cabin
environments were of concern. Dr. Sharon Norris, the Chief
Physician of the Boeing Company at the time, was interested in
supporting studies of how a novel infectious agent transmitted
by large respiratory droplets might spread among passengers and
flight attendants or what I call the crew on an airplane.
She approached my colleague at Georgia Institute of
Technology, Professor Howard Weiss, an applied mathematician
and an expert in modeling infectious disease outbreaks, who was
also aware of our work in the E.D. Professor Weiss and I were
funded by the Boeing Company to determine how a novel
infectious disease might spread on an airplane, which we have
since called the ``Fly Healthy Study.'' We quantified behavior
and movements by passengers and crew during 10 flights across
the country so that we could determine which pairs of
individuals were coming into close contact as to enable
infection transmission.
A second goal was to document what infectious agents were
present on airplanes. There were three major findings from our
study. First, based on our simulations of movement, one to two
passengers or crew member will become infected as a result of
contact with an infectious individual on a cross-country flight
at the probability of infection that we tested. Two, tests for
respiratory viruses were negative for all air samples and all
18 respiratory viruses that were tested. Three, microbial
communities present on an airplane--on airplanes are highly
variable from flight to flight with the vast majority of
airplane-associated microbes being human commensals or
otherwise nonpathogenic entities. Our findings set a baseline
for non-crisis-level airplane cabin conditions.
What are the implications of our findings for air travel
in this pandemic? Our results state that if the SARS-CoV-2
virus is as contagious as the novel agent with the transmission
rate used in our simulations, one can expect one to two
passengers or crew to become infected on a full flight of
similar duration.
Implications of this finding is significant. Unless
airlines are willing to mandate that passengers and crew show
up at least 4 hours in advance of a flight for nasal pharyngeal
swabbing of all passengers and crew followed by PCR (polymerise
chain reaction) testing for presence of the virus and to
prevent anybody with a positive test from boarding, and if
flights continue to be at or near capacity, there is no way to
absolutely guarantee that SARS-CoV-2 virus will not be
transmitted during the flight.
What are the knowledge gaps? What are the unknown unknowns
regarding safety of air travel and live transmission of novel
infectious agent? First, I am not aware of good data that would
allow us to determine an infectious rate to use in simulations.
Two, the inverse problem needs to be solved, that is,
given a passenger who subsequently develops disease, where was
the infectious person likely seated?
Three, our results are only applicable to large
respiratory droplet transmission. We do not know about
transmission from aerosol--that is the smaller droplets that
are generated--or fomites--that is the physical objects that
facilitate infection transfer between people.
Four, our results are only applicable to time and flight
between 10,000 feet on ascent to 12,000 feet on descent. There
are other places along the way to traveling by air in which
infection can be transmitted, and we know little about those
places. These include transportation to and from the airport,
areas traversed from check-in to the gate, passenger mingling
in the gatehouse area, as well as at baggage claim.
Fifth, we do not know anything about passenger behaviors
and movements on double-aisle planes, long-haul flights, or
flights outside the United States.
This concludes my remarks. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hertzberg follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Dr. Hertzberg.
At this point we will begin with our first round of
questions, and the Chair recognizes herself for five minutes.
Again, thank you for--to our witnesses for your testimony
and to all of our Members for participating. As we can tell,
this is a critically important and timely issue that we are
addressing here.
And it's clear that while some research has been done on
communicable disease and transmission in aircraft, we have work
to do, and it hasn't risen to the priority that we need to have
progress to a national plan.
So, I'd like to begin with Ms. Krause. Clearly, as you
mentioned, this is not the first epidemic that our U.S. air
transportation system has had to face, and the question becomes
why we find ourselves ill-prepared in terms of a national plan.
So, a couple of questions for you.
First, how can we improve the resiliency of our air
systems--air travel systems in response to such outbreak?
And then, second, can you speak to the prioritization of--
and the development of a national plan, how we can expedite
that, especially given the circumstances we find ourselves in?
Ms. Krause. Absolutely. I think in a--implementing our
recommendation for DOT to develop a national aviation
preparedness plan is the way that we can build our resilience
for future communicable diseases. What that plan does is offer
a scalable and adaptable framework for individual airports and
airlines to align their efforts with and really bring some
harmonization and a national approach to responding to future
pandemics, so I think implementing our recommendation of DOT
coordinating with HHS and DHS and other stakeholders is key to
ensuring that we're prepared going forward.
On the second part was the priority of getting this done,
I mean, I think this is important in the sense that what we're
seeing is when we did our work back in 2015, you had 14
airports and three airlines with a number of different
individual plans, and they had some good components, but given
that it's fragmented, again, that sort of puts an emphasis on
why it's important to develop a national aviation preparedness
plan.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Ms. Krause. It is clear that
research and development is central to this. So, I'd like to
turn to Drs. Jones and Hertzberg for the next question. You
both noted there are unanswered questions about research and
the implication of COVID-19 and other communicable diseases for
air travel. And there's discussed both publicly and privately
funded research. So, given the urgency, Dr. Jones, that you
expressed in your testimony of prioritizing this research, I
would--I'd like for you to speak to--from your experience your
sense of who should be in charge of coordinating this research
and where the Federal Government role might be, how that might
interact with private research, and then the same question to
you, Dr. Hertzberg.
Dr. Jones. OK. This is Byron Jones. I'm not sure I'm the
one to make the decision on whether the government or private
or who should fund the research or be in charge of the
research. I mean, it benefits the flying public as well as the
private industry, so I would hope to see some kind of a joint
effort. And generally, the FAA has been the one who is taking
the lead with anything aviation, but, I mean, this is really
outside my role as a researcher.
You know, in terms of the need, I think what you're--in
the aircraft, we're going to have to have some kind of
mitigation. We can't sit 6 feet apart, and we don't even know
if that's far enough. So, we--you know, we really need to be
looking at how effective--you know, a facemask is, for example,
does it allow us to sit 3 feet apart, you know, 2 feet apart, 1
foot apart? We just don't know that, and that's the kind of
information we need.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Dr. Jones. Dr.
Hertzberg?
Dr. Hertzberg. You asked about who should be in charge
and the funding, et cetera, I--having thought about this for a
long time, I do think that it needs to be a true partnership
with the public health agencies, as well as the DOT agencies
that understand how airplanes work. We could not have done the
work that we did without significant input from Boeing
engineers, for instance. And we believe that that is really the
ultimate collaborative model to engage in. We also had
significant input from Delta Air Lines, from Homeland Security,
et cetera.
As for funding, there's been talk over the years of
getting this funded in the private sector that--that I believe
has never taken off for reasons I don't want to get into right
now. I could speculate, but that does nobody any good.
But in public health, it's always difficult to fund
something that you prevented, that you've prevented, you know,
and so that's really hard to fund something here to prevent
this disease from happening on airplanes.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Dr. Hertzberg.
Thank you to our witnesses. The Chair--my time is expired. I
now recognize Mr. Babin for 5 minutes.
Mr. Babin. Thank you, Madam Chair. Very, very
interesting, and I appreciate all the witnesses.
I would like to ask first to anyone who can answer this,
how does airline travel compare to other modes of public
transportation from a disease transmission standpoint? Some of
these questions, I know, have already been hit on. But is it
riskier than trains, ships, buses, or how does that healthcare
risk compare to overall safety, including accidents, of each
mode of transportation? Can any of you all answer that? I know
it's quite an involved answer, but just do the best you can.
Dr. Hertzberg. Can I take a stab at it first?
Mr. Babin. Sure. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Dr. Hertzberg. I don't think that we understand as much
as we have actually come to understand about airplanes in the
similar way about things like trains and buses and subways and
boats, so we don't know--we don't understand how people move
about on them necessarily, et cetera. I think that's there have
been a lot of publications over the years about disease
transmission on airplanes. SARS was not the first, and it won't
be the last. I believe there's actually papers being considered
right now about COVID-19 being transmitted on airplanes, so--
but you don't quite see the same level of interest in, oh, I
got it on the subway or I got it on a bus. That doesn't mean
that it shouldn't happen.
I will say that in assessing the bacteria and viruses that
were present on an airplane that we looked very much like--we
were very comparable to places that people spend a lot of time
in, so, for instance, office buildings, schools. We actually
looked very closely at something called the Boston subway
study, and we compared very comparable to that in terms of what
is present.
Mr. Babin. OK. Thank you. Anybody else want to take a
stab at that?
Dr. Jones. Yes, this is Byron Jones. I'll take a stab at
it as well.
Mr. Babin. Yes, sir.
Dr. Jones. The one big difference between airplanes and
other modes of transportation is that airplanes tend to be the
same from one airplane to the next to the next. There's not a
lot of difference in the environmental control systems in an
airplane and not a lot of difference in the seating density.
You go to other transportation modes, trains can be anywhere
from, you know, a crowded subway where everybody's crammed in
there to a railcar that's half-full. And so it's very hard to
generalize the comparison between aircraft and other modes of
transportation because there's a lot of dissimilarities.
But I guess the main thing is if you work with an
aircraft, you know what you're working with, you know what the
situation is, and in transportation--other transportation
vehicle, it could be anywhere all over the map. You just don't
know. But given this--if you have the same occupancy density,
you have the same ventilation rate, you would expect similar
results.
And the other factor would be, you know, the duration of
exposure. It's one thing to be on the subway for 5 minutes.
It's another thing to be in an aircraft for 3 hours next to
somebody.
Mr. Babin. Right. OK, thank you. I've got another
question I want to try to sneak in first, Dr. Krause, and this
is something people have been thinking about. The seat size and
proximity are ways that airlines manage costs. Everyone
understands that. If airlines reversed the recent trend of
smaller seats that are closer together, should we expect higher
prices? You know, when they have us spaced out on those
airplanes, they're about 2/3 full, and that's the max, that's
something to think about because these airlines have to make a
profit.
So, I'll start with you, Ms. Krause, if you don't mind.
Ms. Krause. No worries, thank you. No, I mean, I think
that there is certainly--you know, airlines generate profits
and revenues by having people in seats, so that certainly is a
factor that comes into play in terms of reducing the number of
seats that might be filled or adding more seats and not filling
them, so that's certainly a factor that plays in.
Mr. Babin. OK, thank you. I've got about 20 seconds left
if somebody else wants to take a stab at that.
OK. Well, with that, Madam Chair, I'll yield back. Thank
you so much.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Babin.
The Chair recognizes Chairwoman Johnson for 5 minutes of
questions.
Chairwoman Johnson [continuing]. Because, first of all, I
don't know who is leading the effort to determine how the
spacing and what have you should be on our airlines. Of course,
that's where many of us in Congress have very personal
questions because that is the method of which we travel to get
back and forth to work. So, who right now is in charge of
working with the airlines to determine what is safe and not
safe?
Ms. Krause. I can jump in there, Chairwoman Johnson. This
is Heather. I mean, I would offer that DOT and FAA generally
defer to the CDC when it comes to passenger safety and crew
safety. The airlines have taken a number of steps. I know that
was mentioned earlier in terms of aligning some of their
practices with the CDC guidance and have talked about upping
enforcement of some of those provisions like the use of masks
on airlines. But I think we would sort of offer that if
passengers start to find that the experience--their experiences
are inconsistent or confusing, that may impact their confidence
in the system, and so that may lead to the Administration and
Congress having to determine whether further action might be
needed.
I know the Administrator was at a hearing last week and
spoke about some of the efforts that they're getting underway
to come up with more specific recommendations and guidelines so
that that effort is also being done, but again, I would sort of
say it--as things start to play out, it will be up to the
Administration and Congress to determine whether further action
or clarification of those rules and responsibilities is needed.
Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you. Now, Dr. Jones and Dr.
Hertzberg, what in your opinion are the primary research gaps
regarding the risk of communicable disease transmission in
airline cabins in that environment of air traffic overall?
Dr. Jones. This is Byron Jones. I'll take a shot at that
first. I think the biggest thing I see in working with people
in the airline--in the air travel industry is we just don't
know the effect we have on that transmission when we take a
given mitigation. So, if, for example, we put a barrier between
the seats, we don't have the information--does that reduce the
risk by 5 percent or 95 percent? We just don't know that. My
question, if we require everybody to wear a mask, does that
reduce it by 10 percent or 99 percent? We just don't know
those. It's very difficult to get those data, and it's not an
easy thing to do.
We know how, once it becomes airborne, how it moves around
the cabin, but there's just a lot of--a lot that goes on in
that very near environment close to the person, that
interaction. We just don't know how that goes on, and that's
where we would expect most of the disease transmission to
occur.
Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you. Dr. Hertzberg.
Dr. Hertzberg. I would also say that we don't know what
role that physical objects play for transfer, so I cough into
my hands, I get up, I walk to the back to the lavatory, and on
the way I'm gripping the seatbacks to keep my balance. And on
the way back to my seat I do the same thing. And then you get
up 30 minutes later, you do the same thing on the way back to
the back lav, and you come into contact with germs that I've
transferred to those seatbacks. And then you touch your face,
OK, and we don't really understand what the role of that kind
of transmission could be in this disease. We don't understand
too much about whether it's aerosols or large droplets, so
there's just a lot that we don't know that's somewhat disease-
specific as well.
Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you very much. I think my
time's expired. I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Chairwoman Johnson.
Mr. Lucas, you're recognized. Mr. Lucas, I think you may
be muted.
Mr. Lucas. You would be correct as always, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Horn. There you are.
Mr. Lucas. Thank you for helping me. Let's touch for a
moment back on that size and seat proximity issue. As the Full
Chairwoman noted, it's an issue very important to Members who
travel a lot. When I first came to Congress, I was 6-4 1/2.
Now, time and Congress has ground the half inch off of me, but
I'm still 6-4 in those seats, and it's still a matter of
togetherness even before the public health and safety issues.
But isn't this an example that if we do the research, we
make determinations about spacing, setting comfort aside,
health issues, is this a situation where industry will expect
Congress to set standards so that they will be implemented?
Because, after all, it is a matter of cost control, seat
spacing, and proximity now. And the farther we're apart, if we
determine that's important, and I question the whole panel
about this, won't that add to cost even though it very well may
add to the quality of safety and certainly the quality of my
knees?
Dr. Jones. This is Byron Jones. I'll jump in. I mean,
obviously, if you reduce the seating density, you increase the
cost. I mean, there's no getting around that. That's why it
costs more to fly in first-class for those that have that
opportunity. Most of us don't. In--and I think the thing to
realize is is that it is--it will reduce the probability of
exposure if you reduce the seating density, but to reduce it
down to a very low level, you would have to make this seating
density so low that it would be impractical to operate an
aircraft in that mode economically.
The--now, when I say--I mean, let me back up. That's
assuming no mitigation, nobody wearing a mask, nobody's doing
anything else at all. Just--or just in there going about your
normal business. So, that's why I keep saying--emphasizing the
fact that you've got to have mitigations in there to keep that
spread from seat to seat, from person to person.
Mr. Lucas. Absolutely. And being the competitive industry
it is, whatever that combination of mitigations are, if it
increased the cost of doing business in a competitive industry,
and airline travel is incredibly competitive, it'll have to be
a standard implemented from the Federal level so that everyone
will respond the same.
Along that line, and I again ask everyone on the panel.
You've been really impressive with your responses and insights,
how much money in the industry as a whole are they spending on
doing this basic research? Because, clearly, these questions
are important to the viability of their staff. They're very
important to the viability of their customer base. And I'm not
asking for any particular airline, but the industry itself is
making investments, correct? They are making those investments?
Dr. Hertzberg. We did our study--we were funded from 2011
to 2014, and we got a lot of money from the Boeing Company. We
got assistance but no money from Delta Air Lines. We continued
to talk after our funding ended with Dr. Norris, who was the
Chief Physician. She was thinking along the same lines about
what about long-haul flights, et cetera? She was interested in
studying long-haul flights, for instance, to China or to Japan.
But the money was never forthcoming for reasons that I could
only speculate about.
Mr. Lucas. Absolutely.
Dr. Jones. This is Byron Jones again. My experience is
similar. We have received substantial funding from Boeing over
the years. The airlines, I think they see themselves more as
implementers as opposed to the people who generate the
information that's needed. That's just my opinion.
Ms. Krause. And this is Heather. I would just add that my
understanding is Boeing has talked about starting up some
research, but I haven't seen any--an estimate of other
investments made on research for private sector yet.
Mr. Lucas. Absolutely. Well, in my final moments I'll
just simply note the world has changed; it's never going to be
the same. And as we had our hearing earlier this year in
Committee with a million-plus other pathogens lurking out there
in the environment, what we do now is just necessity for the
rest of humanity's time on this planet.
And with that, I yield back, Madam Chair. Thank you very
much.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Lucas.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Lofgren for 5 minutes of
questions.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman.
You know, it strikes me that we are very unprepared for
this pandemic in terms of air travel and all public transit,
that we need to have some standards that are science-based and
that probably we're going to have to have a regulatory role in
order to make that happen because the private sector has simply
not done it. They haven't done the research. And even things I
understand that just changing where the airflow comes, whether
it's from the bottom or the top, would have an impact in terms
of dispersal of aerosols, and yet that hasn't been done.
When I look at not only in the aircraft themselves but in
the airports, it's very inconsistent airport to airport where,
clearly, disease is being transmitted. We know that for fact
here in California. LAX had a huge incident at the very
beginning of the pandemic.
So, Dr. Krause, it seems to me that we ought to vest the
research--there ought to be some public research because the
airlines are going down. I mean, they are going down
financially, and your description of somebody going to the
restroom, coughing, touching all the seats, I mean, that's a
reason why nobody wants to get on an airplane today.
So, do you think that the university community with some
basic research funding could quickly come up with
implementation recommendations based on science to get at least
a standard in place promptly before all the airlines go
completely under?
Ms. Krause. Dr.--this is Heather. Dr. Hertzberg might be
able to add some more. I would just offer that, you know, there
is a role for Federal research in this area in terms of
understanding the risk and transmissions, also to develop
mitigation strategies and develop--and kind of test
technologies. So, I'd offer that there is a Federal role to
evaluate different options to reduce the risk. Dr. Hertzberg
might be able to speak a little bit more to the university's
role.
I know that in our work that we've done in FAA R&D we
found that, you know, there can be some opportunities for FAA
to partner with the private sector to accelerate some research
and do that, so that might be something to look into in terms
of the Federal----
Ms. Lofgren. Well, maybe Dr. Hertzberg could comment on
that then.
Dr. Hertzberg. I think that universities are full of very
bright people and that they could, with the appropriate
funding, come up with some answers. In terms of the science
itself, science takes time.
Ms. Lofgren. Yes.
Dr. Hertzberg. And so it might be quickly, but quickly in
the timeframe of science.
Ms. Lofgren. OK.
Dr. Hertzberg. That could be 2 or 3 years.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, when I look at, for example, looking
not just at the aircraft but the airports, if you go to foreign
airports, there are measures in place to detect people with
temperatures, for example. We don't have that anywhere. We
could do an--and we don't have to do all the research
ourselves. Is that effective in the airports that use it? Is it
something that we ought to implement? It doesn't look like
anybody is in charge of doing these assessments.
Dr. Hertzberg. It's not a straightforward answer because
people can be asymptomatic----
Ms. Lofgren. Sure.
Ms. Hertzberg [continuing]. And have the virus and shed it
and transmit it that way, so just taking temperatures alone is
no guarantee.
Ms. Lofgren. My time is expired, Madam Chair. Thank you
so much. I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Ms. Lofgren.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Posey.
Mr. Posey. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
This is for Ms. Krause based on her expertise and reading
your testimony. You mentioned that there are a variety of
technologies that could help address infectious disease
transmission associated with air travel, but they're at various
stages of maturity. These technologies will help much-needed
consumer confidence that will lead to an increased air travel
obviously.
This is already being reflected in the travel data from
the TSA (Transportation Security Administration). According to
the TSA, checkpoint travel numbers for 2020 and 2019, the
United States had its highest travel throughput of 590,456
passengers this past Sunday. It's the highest since the start
of the pandemic. Some of the technologies that you mentioned
include handheld infrared thermometers by TSA agents, a mass
screening of crowds using thermal cameras, and aircraft
disinfection methods using heat, chemicals, and UV light. How
promising do these screenings and disinfection methods appear
to be to you at this point?
Ms. Krause. I think that's still to be determined, but
that, again, could be a role in terms of leveraging research
that's already out there and have been done even by some of the
research of the folks on the panel and looking for Federal
leadership and understanding sort of options and identifying
options and how to make it safer, so I'd say there's still
work--more work to be done to understand what works to mitigate
the risks.
Dr. Hertzberg. The other area of concern is that if--you
could have an airplane that's clean as a whistle, but you have
one infected--infectious person on there and you put a lot more
people at risk.
Mr. Posey. Are there other technologies in the works that
you think look promising?
Dr. Hertzberg. Not that I'm acquainted with other than
just doing rapid PCR--swabbing and doing rapid PCR on
everybody.
Mr. Posey. OK. Ms. Krause?
Ms. Krause. At this time, no. I think it is--there's a
number of ideas that are being floated out there and a number
of actions that the airlines are taking, different disinfectant
technologies. I think, again, it's all sort of research that
needs to be further developed to understand what might best
mitigate some of these risks.
Mr. Posey. Right. You mentioned that NASA (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration), along with the FAA, in
your testimony on how it is responsible for management with the
Federal Government's civil aviation research and development.
How could NASA help with identifying these technologies and
solutions?
Ms. Krause. At this point we--it's not something we've
looked into, but we'd be happy to work with you to get a better
sense of that.
Mr. Posey. Yes, with NASA's expertise on spacecraft air
quality issues--and they are working with the CDC and other
Federal agencies--it seems like it would just really be a great
synergy to bring them together.
Ms. Krause. Yes. I think it is. You're right. I think
it's important that the aviation--the different Federal
aviation industries--or agencies come together, as well as
public health, that really is going to need multiple Federal
agencies to coordinate and come up with solutions.
Mr. Posey. And who do you see as being the lead agency to
kind of get this moving and get it coordinated?
Ms. Krause. I mean, I think at this point FAA and DOT
have largely deferred to CDC when it comes to passenger health
issues. Again, they're--you know, they're looking to take some
different steps to establish some guidelines, but largely,
they've been leaving the research--we do think that the FAA has
a role in understanding how this research--what's out there and
being aware of the research and figuring out how to apply it on
aircraft, but there is a role for FAA there.
Mr. Posey. Thank you. I see my time is about to expire. I
yield back, Madam Chair. Thank you.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Posey.
Mr. Bera, you're recognized.
Mr. Bera. Yes, thank you. This obviously is quite
interesting I think to many of us in Congress because a lot of
us are going to get on an airplane today or tomorrow to fly
back to Washington, DC. And obviously, as a physician, I think
a lot of us, you know, rightfully, should be concerned about
our own health because we're all coming from, you know, 435
districts all around the country, and then we're all going to
fly back to our districts. And, you know, it is certainly of
concern.
You know, just thinking about it from a healthcare
perspective, you know, we know a lot more about this virus than
we did previously, right? We know that transmission is
certainly a component of exposure to virus load, as well as a
function of time as well and, you know, so it does give us some
cause for concern if you're on a--you know, for me coming in
from California, I'm going to be on long flights with that.
There are things we can do to certainly mitigate things.
Certainly, the science is pretty strong on face coverings,
facemasks, reducing the spread if I'm infected, you know, to
infecting others. We're still learning a lot about fomites and,
you know, the transferability off of inanimate objects like
solid surfaces, and we know different surfaces the virus
survives for a longer period of time.
You know, Dr. Hertzberg, your example of, you know,
touching the seats, we do know constant handwashing and
constant use of hand sanitizer, you know, as we--you know,
certainly will reduce the spread of the virus to ourselves--I
guess the question is for any of the panelists. There is some
suggestion that for those that are traveling more frequently
like Members of Congress, instead of just wearing the usual
face covering or facemask, that it may be appropriate for us to
wear N95 masks now that, you know, there's a better supply, and
I'd just be curious if, you know, any of the panelists have a
thought on that, whether we should suggest that Members of
Congress actually get N95 masks that they can use on those
travels or if we suggest that to passengers, if any of--maybe
Dr. Hertzberg.
Dr. Hertzberg. N95s need to be fit-tested, and so they
should not be worn just buying one off of Amazon and putting it
on.
Having said that, masks work in two ways. So, they--with
an N95, you're filtering out particles that you're breathing
in. But even, you know, surgical masks and cloth masks, they
prevent you from transmitting the large droplets even as you're
talking. And so I would--I think that masks in general are a
great idea.
Mr. Bera. So, we--you know--the----
Dr. Hertzberg. The N95 that I'm wearing protects me----
Mr. Bera. Right.
Ms. Hertzberg [continuing]. But it also protects you. The
cloth mask I'm wearing doesn't protect me, but it protects you.
Mr. Bera. And, you know, again, this may have been
touched on earlier, but it's my understanding that over recent
years the airlines have improved their ventilation systems and
the filters in those ventilation systems. Is that correct, any
of the panelists?
Dr. Jones. This is Byron Jones. Almost universally, the
recirculation air in the aircraft is HEPA-filtered, so you're
not spreading disease around through the aircraft by the
recirculation of the air. The basic functioning of the
environmental control system is pretty much the same as it's
been for, you know, the last 20 years or so, and the
regulations on that haven't changed dramatically in recent
times.
And the thing to keep in mind is the aircraft are in
service for a long time, so even if you start changing the way
they're made now, for example, the Boeing 787 has a different
system, but you're still going to have aircraft in service for
many years.
Mr. Bera. Right. And just a quick last question for Ms.
Krause. Most airlines if not all airlines are now mandating the
wearing of face coverings. Is that correct?
Ms. Krause. That's--yes, that's what's been reported. I
know that the airlines associated with the A4A in particular
are working to use--or have masks as part of their policies.
Mr. Bera. Right. And it looks like I'm out of time, so
I'll yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Bera.
Mr. Beyer, you're recognized.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Madam Chair. I had to find my
unmute button. And thanks so much for holding this hearing.
It's really interesting.
One of the major issues I was concerned with at the start
of the pandemic was the inability of the airlines to
effectively contact-trace passengers. And I learned that the
U.S. Government had been pressuring airlines for years to
collect contact information for passengers just in the case of
this kind of contagious virus, and yet the airlines allegedly
repeatedly refused, so we're just now coordinating a digital
app to do this across the industry. But as the coronavirus
spread across the United States, public health officials were
not able to effectively contact trace.
So, a question, Ms. Krause, in the 2015 GAO study that you
referred to a number of times, you found that DOT would be the
most effective in organizing a national aviation preparedness
strategy. First question is why no progress? I saw the pushback
that they thought maybe HHS or DHS would be better, but we are
now 5 years later with a strong GAO study that says they should
have putting together an aviation preparedness plan.
Ms. Krause. I think you hit on the reason why it is--we
haven't seen implementation or movement on it is because DOT
doesn't believe that they should be taking the lead. They see
HHS and DHS as the ones that should lead and based on their
public health and emergency preparedness responsibilities. They
do point to some of the actions they've taken as it relates to
COVID, things where they've facilitated calls with aviation
stakeholders, airlines, and Federal agencies, coordinating with
CDC on guidance from airline crew, but they don't see it as
something that they should be taking the lead.
We--you know, we reiterate that we feel it's important for
them to take the lead and that they should be taking the lead
given their long-standing relationships and deep ties to the
aviation industry, as well as their oversight responsibilities,
so we are looking for them to take the lead on it.
Mr. Beyer. It certainly makes sense. I'm always
fascinated because you don't usually see people say, oh, I
don't want responsibility for that. Most of us are empire-
builders. We pull things into ourselves. And certainly having
them take the lead doesn't mean that you exclude HHS or DHS
from the conversation or the construction.
Ms. Krause. Absolutely. I think that that's what makes it
really important. I mean, there really is a need for a
multiagency coordination effort when it comes to responding to
communicable disease threats. I mean, you really want to have
that coordination so you avoid confusion, inconsistencies,
duplication of resources, and really minimize the
inconveniences to passengers, so it's important that there is
coordination across these agencies responding.
Mr. Beyer. And, Ms. Krause, don't we have a constructive
international obligation based on the Chicago Convention, the
Annex 19 that you mentioned?
Ms. Krause. Yeah, so that--as a signatory to that
international aviation treaty, the U.S. is obligated to create
such a plan.
Mr. Beyer. If I ever get a chance to meet the Chair of
the Space Subcommittee, I'm going to recommend to her that we
have Science Committee legislation that mandates that DOT do
this national aviation plan, not just a GAO recommendation but
a mandate from Congress.
Ms. Krause. And that--oh, sorry. I would just add that is
something that GAO is looking to elevate to a potential matter
to Congress is to look to Congress to direct DOT to implement
this plan because we think it is very important.
Mr. Beyer. Well, you've--this hearing has been worthwhile
in many ways but especially what you've just presented.
So, a follow-up question, too, I opened saying we couldn't
contact-trace airline passengers. Wouldn't that have been much
easier if we had had this plan in place?
Ms. Krause. Yes, I think that we definitely see that the
plan would have provided some opportunity to outline some of
the coordination and roles and responsibility, as well as
communication mechanisms. When you have a preparedness plan,
one aspect of it that could be a benefit is testing out some of
those communication mechanisms, as well as identifying the
roles and responsibilities so when you get into situations
where you need to quickly respond, you have some agreement on
who's doing what.
Mr. Beyer. That's great. Thank you very much, Ms. Krause.
Dr. Jones, I'm almost out of time, but your notion of
showing up 4 hours ahead of time may become more plausible as
we develop tests in the near term that will give us a result in
30 minutes or less where you can do it with saliva or with
blood. And I hear those are coming in the coming weeks.
And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Beyer.
Ms. Wexton, you're recognized for 5 minutes of questions.
Ms. Wexton. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you to
the witnesses for being with us today.
I appreciate my colleague from northern Virginia
anticipating some of my questions actually about preparedness
and DOT's reluctance to get involved in developing these plans
because, as luck would have it--now, I represent Dulles
International Airport in my district, Virginia 10 here in
northern Virginia.
And as luck would have it, I had a Zoom call with a number
of representatives of various worker groups at Dulles Airport
yesterday, and they all were expressing concern about DOT's
reluctance or inability or unwillingness to engage in this kind
of comprehensive planning for aviation industry. So, it's--I'm
glad that we're looking at ways to require them to do that and
to mandate them to do that, but unless and until that happens,
we need to look at what the other options are.
And I'm very proud of Dulles Airport because they're one
of 14 airports reviewed by GAO in 2015 when you looked at the
preparedness of the U.S. aviation system in responding to Ebola
and to communicable disease threats from abroad. And Dulles had
independently developed a preparedness plan of their own
despite not being required to by U.S. law.
Ms. Krause, can you discuss what goes into an airport
developing a plan like that, a preparedness plan, and how heavy
of a lift is it?
Ms. Krause. I mean, what we found is when we looked at
the 14 airports, including Dulles, is we assessed it against
sort of high-level components that were--or many of them had
the high-level components that would be outlined in Federal
guidance and international guidance related to preparedness. I
think that we found that the plans had varying levels of detail
but that they were good, they had good elements in them.
I think that they--the big piece of it is that the FAA has
often said the some of those individual airport plans are
focused on situations where you're dealing with one or two
flights, you know, with infected passengers and it doesn't sort
of support that national-level response, so I think that's
where we feel like the national aviation preparedness plan
would really help take those various efforts from the different
airports and even airlines that also put together plans and
sort of get them working harmonized in support of a national
response.
Ms. Wexton. So, it's safe to say that there are
differences between the plans that the airports have, right? I
mean, those that even have them or had them going into this
pandemic. But absent a national preparedness plan, how can we
ensure that there will be adequate health and safety standards
across all airports as they develop plans related to COVID-19?
Ms. Krause. I think that's really where a plan comes in
is sort of identifying what are the things that you're looking
to coordinate and communicate on at a national level, and then
that can help the individual airports and airlines really align
their plans to those efforts.
Ms. Wexton. Well, I hope that we come up with a national
strategy because, you know, airports shouldn't have to--they
shouldn't have to reinvent the wheel every single local
airport, so--well, thank you very much. I will yield back with
that.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Ms. Wexton.
And I now recognize our honorary Subcommittee Member and
Full Committee Member Mr. Weber for 5 minutes.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is a great
hearing by the way. What a great hearing.
Dr. Jones, I want to go to you first if I can. You said
you're a mechanical engineer by trade, and I was an air-
conditioning contractor for 35 years. Do you know of any
studies or any information about relative humidity in air
cabins? In other words, the heavier the air, the more humidity,
we call it particulate matter droplets. Do you know? Does it
affect that?
Dr. Jones. It definitely has some effect on it. Two
things. One is obviously the low relative humidity, which is
typical in the aircraft cabin. The droplets evaporate more
quickly, so that means they become smaller. The viral material
and other material that's non-water-based in them would not
evaporate, so that material stays, so they--the lighter--the
smaller they are, the more easily they are to move about the
cabin.
The other thing is is that humidity has a pretty
significant impact on the viability of the viruses, and they
become active much more quickly in a moderate humidity range.
On the flipside of that is is that the air turnover is so
fast in the aircraft that we haven't seen much evidence that
there's loss of viability once they're airborne.
Mr. Weber. Well, thank you for that. I want to open up
the question for the panel. We've talked about SARS, Ebola. I
didn't hear H1N1 in there. Was there tracing that went on back
during those epidemics, pandemics, whatever you want to call
them? Was there tracing back then? Dr. Hertzberg, start with
you maybe.
Dr. Hertzberg. Yes, there was. There have been
publications where they have attempted to contact passengers.
We used a study of influenza infection on an aircraft that was
set on a tarmac and the air system was turned off and it sat on
that tarmac for 3 hours or something like that. And out of the
passengers, like 75 percent of them became later infected with
influenza. This was back in the 1970's.
There have been other reports of H1N1 being transmitted on
aircraft, and those have been traced. The classic study is one
of SARS that was reported in the New England Journal of
Medicine, a 3-hour flight from Hong Kong to Beijing, and again,
they did contact tracing for those individuals. Of course,
that's China, so it's a little bit different.
Mr. Weber. All right. How about you, Ms. Krause? Would
you like to weigh in on that?
Ms. Krause. Contract tracing is an area that we're
looking into a little bit more to understand some of the
challenges around developing that kind of a system when it
comes to the aviation system. I mean, I think there are
requirements for pilots if they're seeing infected passengers
to report it, so there is multiple agencies involved when
you're dealing with tracing and understanding contact.
Mr. Weber. OK. And, Dr. Hertzberg, I'm going to come back
to you. You talked earlier about being in contact with Boeing,
and of course Boeing is obviously the largest airplane
manufacturer in this country, I'm sure, but there's other
airplane manufacturers, especially Airbus over in France, for
example. Any input from any of those other manufacturers?
Dr. Hertzberg. No.
Mr. Weber. Not at all?
Dr. Hertzberg. No.
Mr. Weber. Have we reached out to them?
Dr. Hertzberg. Not to my understanding.
Mr. Weber. OK.
Dr. Hertzberg. But I'm just a little old faculty member
here doing my job.
Mr. Weber. Well, I thank you for that. And then the last
thing I want to say is I like Bill Posey's line of questioning
about NASA. Obviously, NASA is very, very good at quarantining
and for a lot of reasons, but any plans that anybody knows of
to actually get NASA maybe, Chairwoman Horn, we might want to
get some NASA people in here and talk to us, but does any of
our panelists witnesses had conversation with NASA directly
about that? No? Dr. Jones?
Dr. Jones. No.
Mr. Weber. And I guess, Ms. Krause, no?
Ms. Krause. No, but, I mean, I think that's--you know, to
leverage whatever Federal knowledge and research is out there
is important.
Mr. Weber. Yes, well, I appreciate that. All right. Thank
you, Madam Chairwoman, for letting me ride on your coattails. I
yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Weber.
It's always a pleasure to have you with us on this
Subcommittee.
And I want--we have gone through all of the Members that
are with us. Oh, wait, I stand corrected. I think we have one
that has returned. Mr. Lipinski, are you here? Oh, Mr.
Lipinski.
Mr. Lipinski. I was just put in. Thank you very much,
Madam Chair, for letting me join the Subcommittee here today
for this hearing. It's something that is critically important
right now for us, as the Chairwoman of the Full Committee,
Eddie Bernice Johnson, mentioned, for all of us that travel a
lot back and forth to D.C. and other places, so the safety of
air travel is really important.
And, like Ms. Johnson, I'm also on the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, and so this is something that we have
been going back and forth with the FAA on in terms of the FAA
putting requirements on for air travel, which has not really
been--FAA has not stepped up in that. The airlines have done
some of that voluntarily.
But I wanted to ask on the research side here today, I
want to ask Ms. Krause, do you believe that FAA and NIH
(National Institutes of Health) are adequately coordinating on
the research problems that we are discussing here today?
Ms. Krause. At this point, I mean, we've only had some
really initial conversations on that topic. I'm aware of
informal coordination that's happening but not a formal
coordination that's happening on this topic.
Mr. Lipinski. And how do you think that Congress could
better facilitate this coordination?
Ms. Krause. I think asking the question is important and
sort of encouraging that that coordination occur. I mean, I
think really leveraging all the knowledge that these different
agencies have, and it's important in this particular instance
to have public health as well as the aviation sector
coordinating in terms of figuring out the risks associated and
sort of what mitigation can occur for aviation and travel.
Mr. Lipinski. I wanted to ask all the panelists. Are
there ways the Federal Government can incentivize additional
public-private partnerships in research efforts about cabin
safety?
Ms. Krause. I mean, I can start. I can start with some
perspectives. I mean, I think when we have looked at FAA's R&D,
they do have a number of mechanisms that they can use to--and
that they do use to coordinate with the private sector on
addressing R&D issues. It can also provide them an opportunity
to collaboratively work with industry and the private sector in
accelerating needed research, so there are some opportunities
there.
Dr. Jones. Speaking from a researcher point of view,
money always talks, and, you know, if there's some money there,
the research will be done.
Dr. Hertzberg. From my experience, especially with the
Federal agencies, when there are specific calls put out, that
usually gets a good response to that. It takes a scientist a
long time to prepare a proposal for something that's
unsolicited, so I can write a proposal to the NIH or to the NSF
(National Science Foundation), and it would take me hundreds of
hours to do that. And based upon my discussions with the CDC,
when we were at the end of our Fly Healthy Study and trying to
kind of drum up more business, they were very unenthusiastic. I
could not imagine that we could have gotten similar enthusiasm
from the NIH or NSF, and therefore, in my own little cost-
benefit analysis I decided it wasn't--it was not going to pay
off to submit such a proposal at that time. I might do it
again. I might do it differently today.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. And in the little time I have
left, Dr. Hertzberg, on a different--kind of different subject
here in terms of not in the cabin but the safety of ground
crew, I have Midway Airport in Chicago in my district, and, you
know, a lot of airport workers are in my district from bag
handlers to maintenance techs. So, Dr. Hertzberg, do you have
any thoughts on how airport ground crew can best protect
themselves, be protected if travelers, maybe exposed, pass
through their workplace? So, what can we do for the ground crew
in terms of safety?
Dr. Hertzberg. They should be observing physical
distancing. They should be wearing masks. They should be
staying well-hydrated. They should be constantly washing their
hands and keeping their hands away from their face.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. And I want to thank all the
witnesses for their testimony today, especially--Dr. Jones is a
fellow mechanical engineer. I especially appreciate your work.
But I thank all--thank you, all of our witnesses, and I thank
the Chairwoman for allowing me to join with the Subcommittee
today. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Lipinski.
And before we bring this hearing to a close, I want to
echo my gratitude to our witnesses and all of the Members for
this incredibly insightful and important hearing. I think that
we have touched on and are just beginning in this critical
place and needed action. And, Mr. Beyer, yes, I agree we should
take some action, and I think more needs to be done. We've
raised important issues.
And I'm coming away with a few takeaways. Just to echo Mr.
Lucas, that these threats will continue. There are millions and
billions of potential threats to our health and safety, and
from our witnesses, that we simply don't know enough right now
about how to mitigate the spread in a quantitative way, Dr.
Jones, that we don't have a plan, and that we don't have clear
responsibilities, that more research is needed, interagency
coordination is absolutely required, that the need is
incredibly urgent and that Congress needs to act.
I know there are number of ways that we can direct this
research and move forward, but the timeliness and the
criticality of addressing these issues seems to me very
present, so I am--appreciate everyone and look forward to
working with my fellow Committee Members on this issue to take
action to address this and find a way forward, to incentivize
research, R&D, to keep it going, and then make sure that there
is a plan to increase public safety.
And thank you again to all of our witnesses here today.
The record will remain open for two weeks for additional
statements from Members and for any additional questions the
Committee may ask of the witnesses. Thank you again for your
participation, everyone today, and the witnesses are excused,
and we are now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
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Appendix II
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Additional Material for the Record
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