[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-75]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
THE FISCAL YEAR 2021 ARMY AND
MARINE CORPS GROUND SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 5, 2020
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-602 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut PAUL COOK, California
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona MATT GAETZ, Florida
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California DON BACON, Nebraska
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland JIM BANKS, Indiana
FILEMON VELA, Texas PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico, MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
Vice Chair DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York
Elizabeth Griffin, Professional Staff Member
Jesse Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 2
Norcross, Hon. Donald, a Representative from New Jersey,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
WITNESSES
Geurts, Hon. James F., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition, Department of the Navy;
accompanied by LtGen Eric M. Smith, USMC, Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and Deputy Commandant
for Combat Development and Integration, U.S. Marine Corps...... 8
Jette, Hon. Bruce, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Department of the Army. 4
Murray, GEN John M., USA, Commanding General, Army Futures
Command........................................................ 5
Pasquarette, LTG James F., USA, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8,
Department of the Army......................................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Geurts, Hon. James F., joint with LtGen Eric M. Smith........ 59
Jette, Hon. Bruce, Ph.D., joint with GEN John M. Murray and
LTG James F. Pasquarette................................... 44
Norcross, Hon. Donald........................................ 43
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Gallego.................................................. 78
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 75
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 75
Mr. Mitchell................................................. 78
.
THE FISCAL YEAR 2021 ARMY AND MARINE CORPS GROUND SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 5, 2020.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Norcross
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD NORCROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND
LAND FORCES
Mr. Norcross. Good morning. We will come to order.
The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today
to review the Army and Marine Corps ground modernization
programs and fiscal year 2021 budget request.
First off, I would like to thank our witnesses for being
with us today. We certainly appreciate the work that went into
this year's budget request to Congress.
Let me tell you up front, this committee is especially--we
all are frustrated at the administration's disregard for
congressional authority to make appropriations and the faithful
execution of those laws. Attempts to reprogram funds as
authorized by Congress for Army programs such as the National
Guard and Reserve Equipment, Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, without
prior approval and contrary to our disapproval undermines this
relationship. I can't underscore that enough.
Our ability, together, to manage risk in the most realistic
and timely manner, this should be--this should worry not only
us but you as the witnesses that we continue this.
And as Chairman Smith said just the other day, the National
Defense Strategy does not include the southern border wall.
As we highlighted earlier this week at the full committee
Army posture hearing and also last week at the Navy and Marine
Corps posture hearing, the committee is eager to hear further
details from today's witnesses on how the services are
evaluating tradeoffs--acceptable risk between investment
priorities, current needs, and the industrial base stability.
The Army made significant changes and tough choices in the
fiscal year 2020 request to fund future capabilities without--
without--an increase in their budget top line during the
``night court'' process. We understand the Marine Corps is also
evaluating programs line by line in an effort to reallocate
funds and modernize priorities.
We understand that the goal is achieving a modernized and
lethal ground force that can match the strength of peer-to-peer
and near-peer competitors by 2028. However, once we lose our
ability to build and maintain weapons systems, it can be nearly
impossible to get that back. We have a duty to examine with
great scrutiny those choices we have made both for today and
for the future to ensure we don't get it wrong.
Our subcommittee intends to examine the rationale behind
these choices with the senior leadership here today.
I would like to welcome the distinguished panel of
witnesses: first, Dr. Bruce Jette, Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology--good to have
you back; General John Murray, Commanding General, Army Futures
Command--good to see you again; Lieutenant General James
Pasquarette, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8; Mr. James Geurts,
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition, who is on quite a roll this week; Lieutenant
General Eric Smith, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command and Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration.
We look forward to your testimony and discussing the topics
that we brought up earlier this morning and ones that you have
been hearing about across the spectrum.
Before we begin, I would like to turn to my ranking member,
Mrs. Hartzler, for any comments she would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Norcross can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would
like to echo your concerns with some of the reprogramming that
we have seen taking place and hope that we can work that out to
make sure that our men and women in uniform have what they need
and Congress still has the ability to prioritize those assets.
But I want to thank each of our witnesses today. Thank you
for your service and all that you do for our soldiers and our
Marines.
And we have a lot to cover here in a relatively short
amount of time. And this distinguished panel of witnesses, I
look forward to having your expertise in this healthy
discussion.
This budget request for ground system modernization is
essentially flat when compared to last year's levels. General
McConville, the Chief of Staff of the Army, stated that, quote,
``the Army's budget request represents a downturn in real
purchasing power from fiscal year 2020, and that progress is a
risk,'' unquote.
The Army has realigned approximately $2.4 billion in fiscal
year 2021. These funds were taken from Army-identified lower-
priority programs by eliminating or reducing approximately 80
programs across the Future Years Defense Program to better
invest in the Army's ``big six'' modernization priorities.
Programs such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the
Joint Assault Bridge, and munitions had quantities reduced,
while programs such as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon
System were eliminated.
The Marine Corps is also in the process of a major redesign
effort. And the Commandant, General Berger, has stated that,
quote, ``we will divest of legacy defense programs and force
structure that support legacy capabilities,'' end quote.
So I fully recognize the importance of prioritizing
modernization efforts necessary for great power competition
that aligns with the National Defense Strategy, especially when
budgets are flat with no real growth. I appreciate the Army's
efforts in finding savings through reform and making these
difficult choices and trades.
However, we need to better understand the near-term
strategic and operational risks that may result. I look forward
to working together to find that right balance between current
readiness and future modernization.
So, given this focus on next-generation capabilities, I
expect the witnesses to discuss how they are balancing
investments in capabilities for the future fight while at the
same time upgrading legacy platforms for current threats and
improved tactical readiness.
Regarding Army modernization, the budget contains $10.6
billion for 31 efforts being worked by the 8 cross-functional
teams to address the Army's top 6 modernization priorities.
This is about a 26 percent increase over fiscal year 2020
levels.
I am sure our witnesses will touch on most of these
programs today. And I am interested in hearing more about the
status of the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, Indirect Fire
Protection Capability, the Next Generation Squad Weapon, and
Long Range Precision Fires.
Regarding Marine Corps modernization, a full-rate
production decision is planned for the Amphibious Combat
Vehicle later this year, and I would like the witnesses to
update us on this program and discuss any challenges that could
be associated with a production ramp-up.
Finally, I want to stress the importance of jointness
between the Army and the Marine Corps. I would like our
witnesses to discuss how they are communicating and
coordinating on critical modernization programs that could
address similar operational requirements, such as body armor,
Long Range Precision Fires, and next-generation small arms
weapons.
So I thank the chairman for organizing this important
hearing, and I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
I understand each of the Army witnesses will provide short
opening remarks, starting with Dr. Jette, followed by General
Murray and General Pasquarette.
Then, Mr. Geurts, you will do it for the Marine Corps.
With that, without objection, the full prepared statements
will be in today's hearing record.
Hearing none, so ordered.
Mr. Jette, welcome--or Dr. Jette. Forgive me.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE JETTE, PH.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
Secretary Jette. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member
Hartzler, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, good morning. Thank you for your
invitation to discuss the Army ground modernization program and
the resources requested in the President's budget for fiscal
year 2021.
I am pleased to be joined by my Army colleagues, General
Murray and Lieutenant General Pasquarette, as well as our Navy
and Marine Corps counterparts. We appreciate your making our
written statement a part of today's record.
Mr. Chairman, the Army is nearly 2 years into the most
transformational change in modernization in the last four
decades. We recognize the need to rapidly and persistently
modernize our forces to stay ahead of technological change and
either reclaim or strengthen our advantage over adversaries. We
are committed to getting the right equipment into the hands of
the soldier at the right time.
There have been challenges, but I am happy to report to you
that we confront those challenges as one team, together with
unmatched collective experience, close collaboration, and
synchronized unity of effort. Our soldiers deserve no less.
Because of this close collaboration, the Army modernization
enterprise is gaining momentum: greater speed, efficiency, and
effectiveness as we focus on delivering the capability outlined
in the Army's modernization priorities.
We are making significant progress. There are many reasons
why, Mr. Chairman, but chief among them is the unique
relationship between the cross-functional teams of the Army
Futures Command and our program executive offices. Together,
they are bringing system concepts and designs to life.
Together, they are aligning requirements development and
acquisition expertise with representatives from testing,
logistics, science and technology, and other important Army
communities. Again, our soldiers deserve no less.
We are making significant progress in our reform efforts as
well. The Army continues to implement the initiatives granted
by Congress in order to streamline and gain those efficiencies
in the acquisition process.
Let me highlight just a few.
Middle-tier acquisition [MTA] authority, section 804,
allows us to rapidly prototype and accelerate select efforts
within the Army's modernization priorities and enable soldier
feedback for further refinement of those requirements.
Currently, under MTA, the Army has 11 rapid prototyping efforts
and 1 rapid fielding effort.
Other transaction authority allows the Army to attract
small companies and nontraditional businesses, a known source
of technological innovation. In fiscal year 2019, the Army
awarded 830 agreements, valued at roughly $5 billion.
Additionally, to streamline acquisition and deliver
results, one of my first actions upon entering this office was
to delegate milestone decision authority of acquisition
category 2, 3, and 4 programs to our program executive officers
and, when they felt appropriate, level 3 and 4 below them. This
alone has contributed greatly to efficiency and effectiveness
within our acquisition community.
The Army ASA(ALT) [Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology], my office, in
particular, has reviewed all of our policies to ensure that
they support sound business planning and incentivize
partnerships with industry.
Our approach to intellectual property [IP], for example, is
designed to make us a savvier partner by stressing early
planning for IP requirements, requiring tailored IP strategy,
ensuring negotiations of customer licenses and vendors early in
the process, and encouraging open communications with industry
throughout.
We also have established a unified policy on advanced
manufacturing to achieve a strategic investment by both Army
and industry as well as the systemic adoption of additive
manufacturing throughout the acquisition life cycle.
We are working closely with our Navy and Air Force partners
on key and common technical interests, such as counter-UAS
[unmanned aircraft systems], hypersonics, and directed energy.
Mr. Chairman, the bottom line in our mutual efforts is that
the Army's modernization program takes time and money. We are
working to achieve efficiency wherever possible, and we need
sufficient, predictable, sustained, and timely funding to
ensure a successful outcome.
Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss Army
modernization and for your strong support of the Army programs.
I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Jette, General
Murray, and General Pasquarette can be found in the Appendix on
page 44.]
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. MURRAY, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY
FUTURES COMMAND
General Murray. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler,
and distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify on behalf of the men and women of
Army Futures Command, the soldiers, engineers, scientists, and
civilians, from privates to Ph.D.s, that are working every day
to transform our Army.
And I appreciate the opportunity to join Dr. Bruce Jette
and Lieutenant General Jim Pasquarette as we continue as one
team to drive that transformation. I am also pleased we are
able to have this conversation with our Navy and Marine Corps
counterparts, Dr. Geurts and Lieutenant General Smith. No
service is able to go it alone, and, as history has shown,
joint teams win. And modernization is no exception.
And speaking of winning, our Chief, General McConville, is
known for his phrase, ``Winning matters.'' From the joint force
to industry, to academia, to our allies, I say, ``Winning
matters, but winning together matters more.''
Last year, we published a 2019 Army Modernization Strategy,
and our written testimony echoes that framework.
First is how we fight. Our concept, Multi-Domain
Operations, is the Army's contribution to the Joint Staff
warfighting concept called Joint All-Domain Operations.
Second, what we fight with. These are the capabilities and
force structures that we are designing and delivering.
And, third and finally, who we are. We are a team of teams,
centered around the powerful intersection of requirements and
acquisition. And as Dr. Jette mentioned, we at AFC [Army
Futures Command] and ASA(ALT) will continue to leverage that
close partnership all the way down to the cross-functional
teams and their program executive officer counterparts.
In 2020, we are building on the momentum that we gained in
2019 and making it irreversible. And there are two key
components to that momentum.
First is discovery. We are seeking out and finding the
ideas and innovations that solve Army problems. From our own
S&T [science and technology] efforts, partnerships with
universities, to traditional and nontraditional industry,
winning together involves innovation from every sector.
Second is delivery. We have already fielded an Enhanced
Night-Vision Goggle-Binocular as well as the Command Post
Computing Environment, a component of the Common Operating
Environment. And, in both cases, statement of need to delivery
of those capabilities was less than 18 months.
We also have successfully test-shot the Precision Strike
Missile and Extended Range Cannon Artillery, greatly extending
the range of two key long-range precision fire delivery
systems.
Looking forward, we will continue to capitalize on the
success we have had with the Integrated Visual Augmentation
System, better known as IVAS.
In all of our efforts, we are leveraging a soldier-centered
design approach to delivering capability, putting soldiers at
the center of our production. Within this approach, we are
committed to learning early and learning often. This means
focusing on characteristics, working with industry and our
soldiers, to make sure that when we do write requirements we
get them right the first time.
The key to getting this all right is our people. And in the
coming year, you will see initiatives that give us the
flexibility we need to seek out the best talent and manage it
as we develop the innovative workforce our Army needs.
And we will never be done modernizing. I call that
persistent modernization. And we are pairing with our
scientists and concept writers to look holistically at what
could be. Our assessments will inform both future concepts and
current S&T investments. This feedback loop allows us to
maintain our lead in a rapidly advancing world.
There is much more to discuss, and I look forward to
answering your questions here today. And it is truly a
privilege to lead and represent here today the tremendously
talented soldiers, civilians, and families of the United States
Army Futures Command.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES F. PASQUARETTE, USA, ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF, G-8, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General Pasquarette. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member
Hartzler, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to speak to you today about the fiscal year
2021 Army modernization budget request.
I appreciate the opportunity to be on this panel, given the
close cooperation that exists between AFC, ASA(ALT), and G-8 in
modernizing the United States Army. I also echo General
Murray's thoughts about being here with our brothers from the
United States Marine Corps.
The Army's fiscal year 2021 base budget request includes
$34 billion in research, development, and acquisition [RDA], 31
percent of which is aligned against the Army's six
modernization priorities.
To put that percentage into perspective, 31 percent of the
Army's RDA account is aligned against just under 6 percent of
the programs and efforts in the Army's equipping portfolio--a
testament to the Army's commitment to modernizing in accordance
with the National Defense Strategy.
This investment commitment in support of the modernization
priorities was not via an increase in RDA. In fact, the Army's
RDA top line has remained relatively flat over the last 3
years--again, about $34 billion.
However, inside this account, there has been a significant
increase in RDT&E [research, development, test, and evaluation]
for game-changing technological developmental efforts overseen
by Army Futures Command, resourced through a corresponding
decrease in procurement of legacy systems. This shift was
realized through the deep-dive process that I can outline
during our time together today.
From a FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] perception, the
Army reprioritized internally $7.4 billion in RDA, resulting in
the elimination or reduction of 80 programs. These dollars,
along with dollars previously identified in the PB20
[President's budget request for fiscal year 2020] deep dive,
resulted in a $9 billion increase in the PB21 FYDP for the six
modernization priorities. In total, there is $63 billion
aligned against the six modernization priorities in the PB21
FYDP.
Beyond the Army's modernization priorities, this budget and
associated FYDP also invested in other parts of our Army
required to fight and win against the near-peer threat in the
future. This includes investments in key enablers, those
capabilities we must have that directly support the next-
generation systems being developed by AFC.
Additionally, we began filling gaps in our ability to wage
large-scale combat operations that were created 15 years ago
when we optimized our formations and equipment for
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
All three investment areas--the modernization priorities,
the key enablers, and large-scale combat operation gaps--are
necessary for the Army to fight and win in the future, and it
is reflected in the fiscal year 2021 budget submission.
I will close by quoting Secretary McCarthy. ``This budget
is about finishing what we started over the last 3 years to
realize the Army we must have to fight and win in the future.''
I sincerely appreciate your time today, and I look forward
to your questions.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. GEURTS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF
THE NAVY; ACCOMPANIED BY LTGEN ERIC M. SMITH, USMC, COMMANDING
GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, AND DEPUTY
COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, U.S. MARINE
CORPS
Secretary Geurts. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member
Hartzler, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks for
the opportunity to appear before you today to address the
Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget request on
ground vehicles.
Joining me today is Lieutenant General Eric Smith, Deputy
Commandant for Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration.
With your permission, I will provide a few brief remarks for
the both of us.
We thank the subcommittee and all of Congress for your
leadership and steadfast support for the Department of the
Navy.
Our 2021 budget submission delivers ground vehicle and
weapon readiness while modernizing our force to deliver a more
lethal force in support of the National Defense Strategy. It
demonstrates our continued commitment to ensuring our Marines
have the equipment they need to execute our national security.
The Marine Corps ground portfolio has shown significant
progress over the last 5 years and is a top-performing
portfolio in the Department of the Navy. Programs are
consistently meeting or delivering ahead of schedule, putting
capabilities into the hands of the Marines in the field today.
We are working closely with our Army partners here, most
notably on the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] program, but
across the joint force, including SOCOM [U.S. Special
Operations Command], executing my favorite form of R&D
[research and development], ``rip off and deploy.'' If somebody
else has it and we can get it in the hands of the Marines
faster, that is the way we are going to do it, and that is
working exceedingly well. And I look forward to having that
discussion here today.
Last fiscal year, the Marine Corps, speaking of programs
like that, fielded the JLTVs, reaching IOC [initial operational
capability] in August, 10 months ahead of our program baseline.
To date, the Marine Corps has fielded over 500 of these
vehicles.
The Amphibious Combat Vehicle continues to execute on its
baseline schedule, and it will enter operational tests this
fiscal year, with the full-rate production decision this fall.
The G/ATOR [Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar] radar has
currently fielded 10 low-rate initial production systems,
successfully completing its operational test and achieving its
full-rate production decision this year.
The Marine Corps highest ground modernization priority, the
ground-based anti-ship missile, couples an unmanned JLTV-based
launch platform with the Navy Strike Missile. By leveraging
both of these proven capabilities, we are able to rapidly
accelerate that capability at a very affordable cost. And that
will allow us to attack our adversaries' sea lines of
communication while defending our own.
These and the many other programs reflect a lot of hard
work from the entire community and show the increased
integration between the Navy and the Marine Corps acquisition
requirements communities, the integration with our joint
partners. And, in doing so, we are putting transformative
capabilities into the hands of our Marines.
Continued budget predictability and stability will be
necessary to maintain this success. Thank you for the strong
support this subcommittee has always provided our Marines and
our families.
We thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and we look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Geurts and
General Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Norcross. Thank you for your opening statements.
We were just alerted that they are going to be moving votes
up, so Mrs. Hartzler and I are going to defer our questions and
go right to our committee.
Mrs. Hartzler. Does General Smith have some remarks?
Mr. Norcross. Your remarks were combined, correct?
General Smith. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you for that.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I echo the concerns that the chairman and the ranking
member expressed over reprogramming.
Dr. Jette and General Murray, the Assistant Secretary for
Acquisition, Army Futures Command, and Army Materiel Command,
have apparently reached a transition to sustainment agreement
on hundreds of Army weapons systems and platforms, including
current ground systems.
We understand that transition to sustain generally provides
a path to a system's disposal. What is the significance of this
agreement, from your perspective? What objectives does this
agreement seek to achieve? And how will you know if the
objectives are achieved?
Secretary Jette. Thank you, ma'am.
So we took quite a focused look at trying to determine how
we could free up capital for, actually, our investment
portfolio and realized that we tend not to transition things to
sustainment, we keep moving them along--and we need to balance
between those things that are modernized and about at the end
of their useful life and going to be replaced by something else
in the near future--and layered that into a collective group,
Army Materiel Command, Army Futures Command.
So Futures is concerned about what we need and when we need
it. Materiel Command is looking at can they accept it, how can
they sustain it. And then the purpose of ASA(ALT) in this
process is to determine whether we discontinue producing
anything that is not needed and how we transition that to
sustainment. I, in fact, sit on both the equipping peg and the
sustainment peg, so I am sort of the linchpin between the two.
We established a committee, a methodology, and went through
all of the programs, to include meetings with all the PEOs
[program executive offices], to determine which things ought to
be transitioned and could be. That led to this number in the
vicinity of 100.
We are using that same model to develop a similar
methodology to determine what things can be transitioned to
divestiture. We haven't finished that, and that is part of the
objective this year, is determine what we can get out of the
force.
And we do know that we have a good number of systems that
we sustain in small numbers. They tend to be associated with
lower-priority issues, which means that they tend not to be
looked at for replacement items along the road.
So we are making a significant effort in trying to figure
out how to get the same type of effort going against
divestiture as we had going against the transition.
General Murray. Ma'am, the only thing I would add is, we
have an entire four-star command called Army Materiel Command
that is responsible for sustainment.
And so, as we looked at what was being funded within the
equipping peg, in the RDA accounts that all the investment
futures systems came from, there were a number of things that
it made sense to transition, under the leadership of General
Gus Perna, to sustainment.
And you said sustainment to divestiture, and, as Dr. Jette
pointed out, it is actually two entirely different processes.
For the divestiture piece that Dr. Jette mentioned, a majority
of that input is coming from U.S. Army Forces Command.
So we are asking units what equipment no longer leaves the
motor pool, no longer leaves an arms room, no longer leaves a
supply room just because soldiers don't use it anymore. And
that is really the equipment we are focused on, is, with input
from soldiers, is equipment they don't need to accomplish their
mission.
Ms. Sherrill. And so, if I understood you correctly, the
equipment you were just speaking of is transitioned to
divestiture, which you are saying is separate from transition
to sustainment.
General Murray. It is two different things. The transition
to sustainment, at this point, is to sustain for continued use.
It is not to divest.
And then we have taken on a second effort, as Dr. Jette
mentioned, to begin to look at things we can completely divest
of. And that is the only way you really, truly free up
resources, as opposed to just moving it around, who has
responsibility for paying. And so the only way you ever truly
free up resources for the Army is through divestiture.
Ms. Sherrill. That is helpful. Because in my conversations
with General Perna, there was some concern that, in
transitioning, the transition to sustainment was moving things
out of the capability of updating them and investing in them
and reconfiguring them for more modern use.
Those are some of my fears. I wonder if you could address
that.
General Murray. And that was part of it. And it was a long
process that General Perna had, and, at the end, Dr. Jette and
Gus Perna and I sat down and we decided what was going to
transition to sustainment, what wasn't, and there was complete
agreement amongst the three of us.
So transition to sustainment does not necessarily mean
there won't be further investments. There are always going to
have to be investments to maintain the capability, the
maintenance that has to go into extending the life, et cetera,
et cetera.
Fundamentally, and not necessarily in all cases, what
transition to sustainment means is there will be no further
upgrades, so go to a better weapons system, to put a new engine
in something, but the sustainment dollars are still there.
Ms. Sherrill. That sort of allays some of my concerns when
we are talking about issues of updating them.
And I see my time is expiring, so thank you so much.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
We are going to back it down to 3 minutes so we can get
some questions in. We have about 20 minutes before the members
will have to leave for votes.
Mr. Mitchell, you have been focused on the OMFV [Optionally
Manned Fighting Vehicle]. Certainly, we have an opportunity to
have that discussion here.
Mr. Mitchell. Thanks, Mr. Chair. We will have that after I
make a brief comment. And it is unfortunate that all of our
hearings, or many of them, have started out talking about
reprogramming. So, at this point in time, I think I need to
make some comment on that.
I believe our border is part of our national security, in
contrast to some that are here. Unfortunately, Congress has a
duty in Article I, one they failed to undertake because
compromise is a four-letter word. We can't compromise. We
failed to address the border wall or border security
adequately. We failed to compromise, internally or with the
administration. So you are left with reprogramming money that
should go to other things. I am sorry for you. It is no kind of
way to make decisions.
We failed in our responsibility here, Mr. Chair. We failed
here. We failed in working with the administration.
That is our responsibility, not yours. And, frankly, it is
a shame.
Let me go to the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. I will
keep the same team I have had in the full hearing with the
Army. I am concerned I have not gotten an adequate explanation
of the abrupt cancellation of the procurement and what that
does to the schedule, what delays that creates in the schedule.
You all identified, we agreed, that was a critical item.
Now we are, in my opinion, pushed back. And no one has answered
what the cost and delays will be in multiple inquiries.
Frankly, I have gotten a whole lot of discussion around it, to
be very honest with you.
So I am not going to ask you to address it here, but I am
going to ask you all to address it for the record, of what
happens from the original schedule to the new schedule on that
Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle and what the cost changes
are. And we want an answer for the record. It is an issue that
is a concern for many people here, because that was a pretty
abrupt change.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 78.]
Mr. Mitchell. The other point I will make with you is that
we are increasingly asking the private sector, venture capital,
to invest in innovation, technology, development of some of
these things. People did that, to a fair extent, and we
abruptly canceled it.
What impact do we believe that is going to have, Dr. Jette,
in the future when we are telling people, please do that, and
then all of a sudden we changed our mind? How do we fix that
now at this point?
Secretary Jette. Sir, I agree that if we were to abandon
the effort on OMFV, it would be a wasted effort, it would be a
wasted expenditure on the part of the company.
I was actually at their facility and talking to them just
last week, and we have made it clear, OMFV is continuing. The
objective that we were pursuing is unchanged. It is the
methodology by which we are trying to get there. Their
investments will continue to contribute to their next
submission, and we expect them to participate.
Mr. Mitchell. Let me make one quick point, which is the--I
serve on the Future of Defense Task Force. And one thing that
has become abundantly clear to the task force members is, in
our procurement process, we outline a problem, then we tell
folks frequently how to solve the problem, rather than asking
the private sector, rather than asking contractors, what do you
think is the best way to solve this problem, and see what
innovation we get. And that is part of the problem I think
happened in this procurement.
So I would desperately ask you folks to start with your
acquisition folks to say, just tell the sector what your
problems are, what you are trying to address, and let's see
what ideas they have, rather than believe we can cook them all
within the five walls of the Pentagon.
Thank you. And I have to yield back because we only have 3
minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Mr. Vela.
Mr. Vela. General Murray, I think what I will do is I will
defer the debate over the reprogramming for another day, but I
would like to say that, after you and I spent one full day on
the border, I want to personally thank you for a fulfilling
experience with our Vietnam veteran pinning ceremony. I
firsthand saw what you are doing with respect to academic
research in the medical technology field and in the space
field. And I just want to thank you for the time you spent with
us down on the border.
General Murray. Sir, it was my pleasure, especially the
opportunity to pin some pins on some very well-deserving and
long-overdue Vietnam veterans. So thank you for that
opportunity. And then, of course, the visit to the border and
the university.
Mr. Norcross. Does the gentleman yield back?
Mr. Vela. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Norcross. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. General Murray, I am a big fan of Futures
Command and, of course, of your leadership, as you know.
I had the opportunity yesterday to hear your comments at
the McAleese conference. You told a story about your work and
the work that the Futures Command has done to take even the
warfighters' input into goggles. Would you please retell that
story as to how that helps you formulate what you are doing?
And if you have another one from your comments yesterday
that would also be insightful for this committee, if you would
tell that, I would appreciate it.
General Murray. Yes, sir. And you are challenging me to
remember what I said yesterday.
So, specifically--and I think the comment refers to, and I
referred to in the opening remarks, soldier-centered design.
And it dawned on me very early that one of the commercial
industry's best practices is customer-centered design, and I
realized that we did not do that with our soldiers. The first
time soldiers saw a piece of equipment was when we delivered it
for limited user tests, and it usually didn't fare well because
we didn't have soldiers involved from the front.
So that has become a standard principle for everything, not
only within the cross-functional teams but, thanks to Dr.
Jette, throughout the acquisition community, that we get
soldiers involved early and often in terms of the design.
A couple clear examples. And, ma'am, you mentioned Next
Generation Squad Weapon. So we started off with five different
vendors, and we have had soldiers--and when I say ``soldiers,''
it is not me and General Pasquarette; it is the privates, the
sergeants, and the captains and lieutenants who will actually
be using the equipment--provide input to us. And then,
importantly, we listen to their input and make modifications.
IVAS is probably the clearest example that I could think
of. We have had over 6,000 hours of soldier touchpoints. We are
doing it inside of 3-week sprints. So, every 3 weeks, the
engineers will put the equipment on soldiers, and soldiers will
provide feedback to the engineers, and the engineers will make
that change over the next 3 weeks, and we will just repeat that
cycle consistently.
As an example, we were on path to deliver a set of goggles
that could see 600 meters. We put them on a soldier, and the
soldier said, why do you think I need to see 600 meters?
Because when you go long, it is a very narrow field of view.
You get no peripheral vision. And the insight was, they would
much rather be able to see to the side for situational
awareness [than] to be able to see 600 meters.
So if we had proceeded on normal path, we would have
delivered a pair of goggles that soldiers would not have been
happy with. And so we made that design modification, and they
can now get what they want. Plus, the sight we are delivering
that will be on the rifle is capable of seeing 600 meters, and
they can see through their sight with their goggles. So we
really got the best of both worlds.
Secretary Jette. If I can quickly add--and it may relate
back to the last question concerning OMFV. Our path forward is
very similar for OMFV, although modified because we can't make
a large number of replicants of vehicles, to pursue this
methodology and a maturation process for OMFV, starting with
industry, rough digital prototype, fine digital prototype, a
physical prototype.
And we have had reform in acquisition. What General Murray
has worked with us on is methodology by which we can reform
requirements development. So, at every one of those interfaces,
there is a revision of the requirements, informed by industry,
informed by the prototyping, informed by touchpoints by
soldiers, at digital touchpoints by soldiers, modeling and
simulation.
Mr. Norcross. We will continue with Mr. Brindisi.
Mr. Brindisi. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Norcross. Yield back.
Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is on the Joint All-Domain Command and
Control, the JADC2, that the Air Force is working on. I know
the goal is trying to make it integral through all of our
services, and your future weapons systems will need to dovetail
in.
How is that working? Are we getting good coordination with
the Air Force in putting a joint JADC2 plan together?
General Murray. So JADC2, the concept of any sensor, any
shooter, any C2 network in near real-time, is actually a joint
concept.
Mr. Bacon. Good.
General Murray. So it is a Joint Staff concept. The Air
Force has an effort going on. We obviously have an effort going
on. The Marine Corps and the Navy have an effort going on. And
to answer your question directly, sir, yes, we are all
integrated under the leadership of the Joint Staff, J6, right
now.
The only question is how you deliver it and, you know, how
you establish--the most important thing, because if you get
down to what I just described, it all comes down to data and
data architectures. So how you build that architecture that
allows all the services to plug in--nobody is arguing with the
concept of JADC2. It is just how we get for a joint force to
enable that fight and that data architecture.
Mr. Bacon. General Smith, anything else to add?
General Smith. Sir, I concur with General Murray. We are
involved. We went to a conference together out in Nellis. We
are daily engaged and involved with JADC2.
But the concept of--which I don't think we do as good a job
as we should of explaining what ``any sensor, any shooter''
really means. A Marine on the ground in place X should be able
to pass data through the Joint All-Domain Command and Control
to an Army unit that then fires a PrSM [Precision Strike
Missile] missile, or to an Air Force F-35A, or that F-35B that
is flying passes it to me, and I shoot a GBASM, a ground-based
anti-ship missile.
The concept is simply passing data. And we are being very
mindful that the systems, the form factors that we need, as
ground forces, are able to feed into something without being
forced into a specific methodology over which to pass data. And
I think we are there, sir, and the cooperation, collaboration
is quite good.
Mr. Bacon. In my last 50 seconds, we walked away from EW
[electronic warfare] back in the mid 1990s. I have heard a
great briefing from the Joint Staff, I have heard one from the
Air Force, where there is a high priority, we have a plan to
right the ship.
How about your services? Do you feel like we are in the
same boat? Are we pointed the right way, headed the right
direction?
General Murray. Quickly, sir, for time, absolutely. So
systems not only to, most importantly, understand the
electromagnetic spectrum, which we don't have right now, and so
first you have to understand before you can influence and
impact and protect, and then actually standing up units within
the multi-domain task forces that will have EW capability
within them.
Mr. Bacon. Okay.
General Pasquarette. Just from a fiscal perspective, we are
committed $600 million in 2021 and across the FYDP $3.4 billion
in an area that we know we need to catch up on. And so we are
committed to the way ahead.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much. I will yield.
Secretary Geurts. Chair, we are good on Department of the
Navy. We can give you a brief in detail.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
Secretary Geurts. Yep.
Mr. Norcross. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For both General Murray and General Smith, I know your
respective services are working on countering unmanned aerial
surveillance with the Common Aviation Command and Control
System [CAC2S] for the Marines and Integrated Air Defense
Battle Command System for the Army.
My concern is that these are going to be become stovepiped.
They are separate initiatives, separate ventures. And two
things are wrong with that, in my opinion. It is not as good as
one joint effort, because two heads are better than one, right?
And, secondly, they won't be able to communicate and
interoperate in a multi-domain environment.
So are you aware of that, and are you working to work
together on that vital issue?
General Smith. So, sir, one, good to see you again, sir.
And as far as CAC2S, the command and control system, which
for us incorporates all of Marine Air, fast movers and rotary
wing, that is the overarching system underneath which we pass
data, as far as counter-UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles].
There is actually a joint task force, if you will, that has
been stood up under the executive agency of the Army to make
sure that our counter-UAS systems are, in fact, joint. Those
specific systems--ours is called MADIS [Marine Air Defense
Integrated System]; that is the Marine--it is our small,
counter-UAS system that fits on a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.
That is a specific system, and those systems are being looked
at to find out which is the best to be the joint force system.
The command and control architecture that is unique for a
naval force versus a land force, those are in fact different,
but they do have the ability to communicate and talk. So we are
very comfortable with our CAC2S because of our unique necessity
to bring in fast-moving aircraft and control airspace.
Mr. Lamborn. Great. General Murray.
General Murray. Yes, sir. So IBCS, Integrated Battle
Command System, is a system that is part of the JADC2
overarching architecture. And we are having great success--we
will do a limited user test here pretty soon--on linking air
defense sensors and air defense shooters, primarily from the
Patriot standpoint right now. And we will continue to integrate
more and more weapons systems and more and more sensors into it
as we mature the system.
And as General Smith mentioned, under the Army's
leadership, there has been an executive agency established for
the Army to lead the counter-UAS effort for the Department of
Defense. And so, inherently, that will be joint, because it is
from all the services. We are just the executive agent managing
the program.
And then, as you know, we have had a long history of
fielding counter-small-UAS systems to both Iraq and Afghanistan
over the past 5 or 6 years, and so there is some history to
that.
Mr. Lamborn. Along that line, does Army have plans to use
Iron Dome that the Israelis have developed but we now co-
produce?
General Murray. Can I go past time, sir? Am I good?
So Iron Dome--the 2019 NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act], there was--and there was a report submitted that we would
purchase two batteries of Iron Dome with the intent of
integrating them into our integrated air defense system. We do
air defense in layers, and so the connections between high-
altitude, mid-altitude, and low-altitude systems is very
important to us.
It took us longer to acquire those two batteries than we
would have liked, for a lot of different reasons. And we are in
the process right now. We believe we cannot integrate them into
our air defense system based upon some interoperability
challenges, some cyber challenges, and some other challenges.
So what we ended up having, really, is two standalone batteries
that will be very capable, but they cannot be integrated into
our air defense system.
And so we are working a path right now--the report came in
last Friday--on our way forward. We anticipate a shoot-off open
to U.S. industry, foreign industry, to go after whatever is the
best solution to provide that capability.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Norcross. Okay. That is our call to votes. We are going
to push this up until the point we have to run. We can come
back.
So thank you, Mr. Lamborn, for that line of questioning.
So I want to go back a little bit and try to, with Mrs.
Hartzler, get into some of the meat of why we are here today.
So, Dr. Jette, Secretary Geurts, tens of billions of
dollars have been shifted around based on night court, the
National Defense Strategy. There is no question about that. But
a clear return on investment. When we made those decisions,
those tradeoffs, there was risk involved. We see that each and
every day. And you have had to make those tough decisions.
According to the 2018 September GAO [Government
Accountability Office] report, the Army hadn't finalized the
method for these investments on how we evaluate them. Can you
give us an update from when that report came out to where we
are today, how you are looking at the shifts that we made, and
how are we evaluating against what we originally thought?
So, Dr. Jette, would you like to start first?
Secretary Jette. Yes, sir. I think that we end up,
actually, having part of the answer from General Murray and
part of the answer from the ASA(ALT) side.
We look at return on investment, and we have been
relearning some things that we had practiced effectively during
the Cold War, because now we are going back to large-scale
operations, and how we can make measurements in effectiveness.
So the implementation of modeling and simulation to
determine whether or not a particular capability that we are
trying to put into a weapons system provides us some sort of an
operational advantage. Because the purpose here is to get a
product which does something for the soldier in the field,
helps us win decisively. If we do that, then we generate, in
its implementation, deterrence.
Mr. Norcross. But we made the choice to go over the six
priorities. How are we evaluating whether those and their
associated programs underneath them were the right move? How
are we evaluating that now?
Secretary Jette. I will turn that over.
General Murray. So one of the beauties of standing up AFC
is I own probably 70 percent of the analysts, the ORSAs
[operations research and systems analysts], in the Army. So we
have, over the course of the--even before we named the six
priorities, we did some sophisticated modeling and simulation
where we injected potential capabilities of the things that we
were developing and measured differences in outcomes of those
scenarios. And the scenarios, I won't get into them here, but
they were tied to specific places and specific locations in the
world.
So we established a base case with current capabilities and
current tactics and current doctrine. And then we modified the
scenario and also updated our opponents' capabilities, where we
project them to be, and then begin to measure the difference,
capability by capability, platform by platform, developmental
program by developmental program, on what those differences
were and how much of a difference that investment would make.
Mr. Norcross. So where you are today, those decisions were
made, those investments were made, and although just the
beginning, you still feel across the spectrum of those
decisions you are on target for what you originally planned?
General Murray. I do, sir. And as budgets flatten--and, as
a matter of fact, you know, if you look across the FYDP, it is
not 1 percent loss of buying power. We are about $7 billion of
lost buying power, if we remain flat, across the FYDP.
There are still some tough decisions to be made. And when
we talked about night court, there were a lot of tough
decisions. And those tough decisions could lead into within the
``31+3'' signature programs. We just don't know yet. Because
there are some that, depending on where you are in the world,
contribute more than others. And so we still have a lot of
tough decisions to make in the future.
Mr. Norcross. We understand the dollars and cents, but the
direction is the important one, that we are investing and we
are now measuring that investment, that it was the right way.
Secretary Geurts.
Secretary Geurts. Yes, sir. I think of your question in two
aspects. One is, how do we measure the risk and performance of
the trades we made on the battlefield? Ultimately, that is, you
know, in the warfighters' eyes.
And the biggest risk is in that transition. You know, we
are facing tough decisions--the F-18 lines, the P-8 line, a lot
of places where getting the ``when do you stop'' and ``when do
you have enough confidence to start'' is really challenging,
and being very thoughtful about where your outs are if you
didn't get it quite right and where you are at the point of no
return. So we spent a lot of time thinking that.
The other transformation is not what we are buying but how
we are buying it. And that, I don't think you have the same
level of risk. As you heard in my hearings yesterday, we saved
$25 billion just by buying the equipment using modern, more
thoughtful acquisition methods. So the risk in that calculation
is not the same as the warfighting risk. We have to go on both
of those directions but be thoughtful.
And then, last, we have to work on the absorption rate of
the field to be able to absorb new technology. So, even if I
can deliver it quickly, if we don't have the training and the
education and the force design right, it won't matter how fast
I can get it out there; I can't absorb it.
And so a lot of very thoughtful work in the Marine Corps
particularly about how to train to absorb new systems. Because
if you don't have that third element right, you can do the
first two great and then it all backs up in the motor pool.
Mr. Norcross. So I want to pursue that, but I want to give
my ranking member time before we go to votes.
Mrs. Hartzler. Sure. Thank you very much.
Dr. Jette, I was very encouraged by General Murray's
comments about development of the Next Generation Squad Weapon.
And I just applaud what you are doing, having the soldier look
at it and making those revisions. That makes so much sense.
And this new Next Generation Squad Weapon, of course, is
going to require a new caliber to be using these weapons, a
6.8-millimeter round. I understand that ammunition is going to
be produced at Lake City Ammunition Plant in Missouri, which we
are very excited about. Many of my constituents work there and
have worked there for years. I am very proud of what they do.
Could you update us on this effort? And do you require any
additional funding in fiscal year 2021 for additional tooling
or modernized equipment at Lake City?
Secretary Jette. Thank you, ma'am.
So we have three candidates. Each of the three candidates
have different configurations for the 6.8 round. One of them
looks very much similar to a conventional bullet that we are
all used to. The second one looks more like a lipstick case.
And the third one looks somewhat similar to the conventional
bullet but it is shaped like a----
Mrs. Hartzler. I had a chance to see those.
Secretary Jette. Ah.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yeah, very interesting.
Secretary Jette. The good part about that is that we think
that the performance of the weapons are showing great promise.
The tough thing that it leaves me with, just as you are
alluding to, is: Now, how the heck do I make all of those? And
I don't know which one, but when I do decide that I am going to
make them, then we have to make a lot of them.
Lake City is where we intend to produce them. And what we
are working preliminarily with the vendors is being able to
take the technology that they are using--in the case of the
brass casing, we just have to redo dies and things, and we can
use similar machines that we already have in place. In the case
of the other two, we will have to develop some new equipment,
but they have already developed that equipment as part of their
development scheme.
Mrs. Hartzler. Good.
Secretary Jette. So we will probably be producing the
initial tranche for a year or two as we reset Lake City and be
able to put the equipment in place.
Mrs. Hartzler. But as far as funding goes, do you think you
are going to need any additional funding or are we spot-on for
what you anticipate is new tooling, machining to make this?
Secretary Jette. Yes, ma'am, right now I think that we are
fine.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay.
And, General Smith, as far as the Marine Corps, can you
discuss similar efforts in developing the next-generation small
arms capability and how you are coordinating with the Army?
General Smith. Yes, ma'am. So we coordinate on all of our
small arms, to include the Next Generation Squad Weapon and
IVAS. We have Marines involved in IVAS testing.
So what we are committed to is the best weapons system that
the Marines can have. So what we will do is continue to
coordinate with Army Futures Command in all the testing and the
requirements development so that what we owe you is, where
there are differences, where we find a difference, where we
need, as a navally focused force, we have to explain that to
you. We can't just say, well, we are different because we are
different. We have to explain that to you.
But, right now, we are in step with and coordinating
closely everything from the modular handgun all the way up to
Next Generation Squad Weapon with the Army.
Mrs. Hartzler. At this point, have you seen any differences
that you are going to need as the Marines compared to the Army?
General Smith. I don't think anything in the small arms
category, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay.
General Smith. We are working joint sniper rifles, et
cetera. So, frankly, in the small arms category, no, ma'am, and
to include body armor.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Thank you.
Are we going to ask more questions now, or----
Mr. Norcross. We are up against votes, so we are going to
suspend, barring our votes. We don't think it is going to be an
hour, but it could be up to an hour. And we are going to come
back because we just got our first top line in. It is not easy
to get you all in one room at one time, so we will suspend
subject to the call of the chair.
Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. We have great coffee in the back. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Norcross. Again, thank you for bearing with us.
Democracy takes time, and certainly we just went through some
of that.
So I want to pick up where I dropped off with regards to
measuring the reallocation and the requirement that we have:
Are we doing the right thing? Are we getting the right
outcomes, at least in year two?
So, General Murray, you started to say the process by which
you are measuring the ability to get things done in an
appropriate amount of time and more touchpoints along the way,
which we all agree with. In fact, we will talk about IVAS a
little bit. Microsoft, I think, is a great case study on how to
do it.
So that is the method by where we go. What I want to say
and ask you, we reallocated based on new six priorities. Within
those six, many programs, are we going in the right direction?
Have we measured those decision points? Not how we are getting
to it, but is it the right decision? Did we make the right
move? Any indication on that, and how are you measuring that?
General Murray. So there is lots of elements to this, Mr.
Chairman, and----
Mr. Norcross. There is, and this is why we want to have
that discussion.
General Murray. Right. There is the industrial base risk,
some of the things that were unfunded or reduced or eliminated.
I mean, there is that risk.
There is the risk of going fast and making mistakes as you
go along to get capability enhancements out to soldiers. There
is risk in--that we are prioritizing the wrong things, which I
think you are now focused on.
And that is where I would go back to what I tried to
explain before, is the ultimate--you know, I guess the ultimate
judge of whether we made the right decisions hopefully will
never happen, that we never have to use these capabilities in
an all-out conflict, and that is going to be the ultimate judge
of whether we made the right decision or not.
Short of that, we do have ways of conducting modeling and
simulation in some pretty realistic scenarios, and in those
cases, we are substantially better off in multiple theaters
than we were with the equipment that it is replacing.
Mr. Norcross. You are comfortable with that.
General Murray. Yes, sir.
General Pasquarette. May I have a point?
Mr. Norcross. Please.
General Pasquarette. When I first came in as the G-8, sir,
about--I don't know--18 months ago, Secretary Esper, our
SECARMY [Secretary of the Army] at the time, said: Listen, in
deep dive one, I knew--I knew we took a lot of risk on this
program to take the dollars that I thought we needed to place
against the modernization priorities. So, when you do deep dive
two, which is up here on the Hill right now that you are
looking at, I want you to do analysis to see where there was
any unacceptable risk, and so do the analysis as you build the
current--this program we are discussing now.
And, in that process, we identified 12 programs that we put
in almost $600 million against based on that analysis. It went
through Dr. Jette and General Murray, but it had to go actually
all the way to Secretary Esper and General Milley, that they
had to approve putting any dollars back in that were reduced or
eliminated the time before.
Mr. Norcross. On the legacy programs?
General Pasquarette. Yes, sir. And so we have the details,
and we can provide that to your staff as a part of our process.
Secretary Geurts. Yes, sir. Kind of to build on that, I
would say, you know, we talk about a hollow force. We also
guard very closely in the Department of Navy, hollow
acquisition programs. As you try and do a lot, you have got
resources you can, if not careful, get optimistic or overly
optimistic and close off paths. And so we spent a lot of time
looking to make sure: Okay. We are going to make a pivot. We
are going to transition. Where is all the transition risk, and
are we going to transition to a program that is whole as
opposed to transition to a hollow program?
Where I have seen issues in the past is where we have
become too optimistic, hollowed out the program, and, you know,
had to have a 350-yard drive, and then our best five iron and
one putt in from 30 feet, as opposed to have the right programs
to pivot into, with an ability to go back out if that pivot
wasn't the right one.
Mr. Norcross. We all believe that we will be batting a
thousand, but there are times that----
Secretary Geurts. Sure.
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. Through technology or other
reasons, that we are not getting to where we expected.
Secretary Geurts. Yes, sir, but I would also counter the
risk of playing it too safe or the risk of not looking at this
of a pacing threat, and the risk of not doing something for
fear that we don't have it a thousand percent right is also not
the right way to go. And so we have got to balance. We have got
to be ready tonight, but I don't want to, in 2030, be ready for
a 2020 fight.
And that is where I think the leadership--and part of it is
a really--the best way to get after it out of my SOCOM days
was, the more closely you can link warfighter to acquisition to
technologist, close that distance down, like you are seeing
here between Futures Command and the Army acquisition to G-8,
what you are seeing here with General Smith and I.
So that is--it is an iterative loop. What do you need? How
can you get it to me? What do I need to get it to you? And that
is a constant dialogue. The closer that link is with Congress
as a clear partner in that, that is when we can get our
institutional speed up.
That institutional speed is our best hedge against risk,
both in terms of are we going to the right thing, or have we
pivoted too fast and we need to have a fallback plan?
Mr. Norcross. So exactly where we wanted go. So you are
comfortable with the decisions and the priorities. Now we are
discussing the speed of which, which are actually dollars and
technology that you are combining to those.
Where is your biggest challenge right now in terms of
anticipated, where you would be at this point, and where you
actually are? And is it a technology issue, or is it a dollar
issue? So let's go right back.
General Smith. Chairman, I will take that from our side. I
would say it is both. How do we reference point? Are we where
we should be? No, sir, we are not.
General Berger's focus has been on being prepared by 2030
for what he calls the decade of uncertainty. We know that the
pacing threat continues to move, and we cannot continue to hold
at our current mission sets and our current requirements. We
have to move toward the pacing threat.
Mr. Norcross. Well, I think what we will stipulate, we all
know we aren't where we want to be.
General Smith. So----
Mr. Norcross. But are we where we anticipated to be at this
point since the change?
General Smith. Sir, we are. General Berger has been pretty
clear that the budget 2021 is the budget upon which we pivot to
his future force, what he wants to do. So, for us, things like
ground-based anti-ship missile, which is our number one ground
program. We have to get that if we are going to be--the
component that the Navy, the fleet commanders need our Fleet
Marine Force to provide to the joint force. We are the littoral
force as it is. The missile systems that we fire, the weapons
we fire should clearly be able to strike a ship and actually do
cost imposition.
And I will, very quickly, sir--for example, the Naval
Strike Missile, which is already produced by the Navy; so it is
a program we pick up off the shelves--it is about 1.7 million.
When that begins to go after to significantly damage, or a
couple of them, to sink a billion-plus dollar enemy warship,
that is real cost imposition. That is what we are striving
toward.
We are exactly now where I think we need to be. We will
test fire that system, for example, this June. We test fired
the sled upon which it will fire, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle,
in December successfully. We will fire the missile this June,
and then we will be in a position to take advantage of that and
actually move forward with the capability that the joint force
wants and must have to compete with a peer competitor.
Mr. Norcross. Okay. What we are going to do is I want to
give Mrs. Hartzler a chance, and we will just pivot back and
forth.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yeah. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the strategy and what you are doing, and it is
tough, looking at the risk and how fast to go. Supply chain is
certainly a part of that. Industrial base, keeping that going
for not only modernization but also to be able to continue to
repair and to take care of what we already have into the
future. So tough job, and I look forward--I appreciate this
discussion with members here so that we can help in this
transition.
I wanted to ask some questions about some more specific
programs and as you make this transition, so I will start with
Dr. Jette. I understand that the Long Range Precision Fires
remains the Army's number one modernization priority, and the
Precision Strike Missile is a critical program within that
mission area.
So what is the Army doing to ensure continued competition
in the Precision Strike Missile program, and are there lessons
learned from the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle effort that
could be applied here?
Secretary Jette. First, ma'am, you are correct. A long-
range precision fire is the number one priority. A bit to the
chairman's question, one of the other things that we are
contributing to to make sure we have got things scaled right is
I know that General Murray and his team are working on a fires
study to make sure that we even have within that focus area the
right priorities. And so we are very supportive of that.
Precision Strike Missile, we recently had a test firing. Of
the missiles that we had two candidates, the two candidates,
one missile was successful firing; the other missile had some
technical problems. Not insurmountable. And where we are with
that is we will have another test firing, I believe, later this
month, or early next month. I can get you--I will get you the
exact time we are going to do the testing.
So we definitely know one candidate is ready to go to that
firing. The other candidate has some makeup to do. We are
currently negotiating with them as to how to resolve that
because we have to keep a level playing field between two
competitors. I can't give someone else more money than I gave
the other ones, and I am getting someplace with one competitor,
and the other one has to make some adjustments. So we are
trying to negotiate out a fair and equitable deal within our
authorities to see if we can keep the second competitor
involved.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great. Where--I am interested in, General
Murray, your test--your fire study that is underway. When is
that going to be completed, and should we wait until this is
done to inform the requirements for the missiles that you are
developing?
General Murray. So it is due to be done the end of this
month. I have got to see the Secretary and the Chief here
probably shortly after it is done, and then, you know, once the
Chief and the Secretary get a good look at it, I would be happy
to come up and talk to you about it.
It was designed to look within the fires portfolio across
the PrSM missile, across long-range cannon artillery to look--
we had a number of programs inside Long Range Precision Fires,
and what it was designed to do is go out to the two theaters,
INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] and EUCOM [U.S. European
Command], and specifically the target tiers, and look at their
targeting work list, if you will, and then try to figure out
the most important investments within the portfolio, so we can
kind of rank order from one--look where there were similarities
and where there was vast differences in how the theaters and
the actual warfighters valued those capabilities.
So it wasn't specific to the two competitors for PrSM or a
specific, you know, program itself. It was more of a rank
ordering within that portfolio, what is most valued by the
warfighter.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is great. I love your approach of
starting with the warfighter, what is the needs.
And, Dr. Jette, there will be time, then, to incorporate
what your lessons learned and this other--very good.
I wanted to ask General Smith--and I loved General Murray's
quote from earlier, your comments: A joint team wins. I love
that, and then you said: Winning matters. Winning together
matters most.
I might make a poster on that or something. It was good
stuff. Good stuff.
And so I know you--the Marines is also looking at the
precision fires development long range, so how are you
coordinating with the Army in this development process, and
where are you in developing this new weapon?
General Smith. So, ma'am, the Secretary of Defense, by
January of 2020 asked us to deliver the--all of us, the joint
force, to deliver the joint warfighting concept, and,
underneath that, there is a precision fire--a Long Range
Precision Fires piece, which the Navy leads. The Navy--each of
the services has an element of logistics, et cetera.
So we are coordinating on the concept of Long Range
Precision Fires, although what we are seeking now is a system
with an active warhead that can go after--an active seeker, go
after a ship. As the littoral combat force, things that we
fire, we can--we are capable of firing an Army ATACMS [Army
Tactical Missile System] off of our HIMARS, High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System, now, but what we are not capable of
doing is going after a ship that is moving. A land-based
target, we can do.
We have to have a system that can go after this. So the
Deputy Secretary of Defense just tasked us to take over the
ground launch cruise missile way forward, and that will go
after things like tactical Tomahawks, Navy strike missiles--
Navy strike missiles and naval Tomahawk that has got an active
seeker that gets you at ranges of 750 and beyond. That is what
matters in the contested environment of the South China Sea or
in the INDOPACOM area, and we are coordinating. I just talked
to the Army PrSM PM [program manager] probably 2 months ago out
at DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], and so we
are coordinating, and I think much of what we will do in the
ground launch cruise missile arena will be things we will
actually pass for consideration to the Army, but we talk about
that on a very regular basis. So we are not stovepiping or
railroad tracking. We are integrating.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Thank you for doing that. It
makes sense to have some commonality, but then you may have
some variations that is needed depending on the theater, so it
makes sense----
General Murray. Ma'am, if I could add?
Mrs. Hartzler. Yeah.
General Murray. So it is often overlooked. So we talk about
the missile all the time, and General Smith mentioned the
HIMARS, and so one of the design principles of the PrSM is it
is the same launch that we have always had, so we are not
having to buy new launchers, and one--two missiles now fit in
one pod as opposed to one in one pod. So we have doubled the
load out, and we are using existing launchers, which the Marine
Corp also has.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great. Great. I love your approach. Keep it
up. Thanks. I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. So, the night court and what we went through,
there is some things that appeared to have worked pretty well
and things that might be a little bit challenged.
Let me start with IVAS. Microsoft--and we have been out
there and been briefed--seems to be quite different. I don't
know if it is Microsoft's approach to things, if it is new
Futures Command, but it is different, and I think we are
hearing that from both sides.
But, as we move down and the touchpoints which you have
talked about, we are going to come to a decision whether or
not, in this year's budget, requesting close to a billion
dollars for the actual purchase for 40,000.
Are we flying before we buy this? Are you going to be
comfortable going right to 40,000?
And then, General Murray, what is the magic about 40,000?
Where does that number come from instead of saying 5,000, get
them out to the field, and get some more real-time feedback?
General Murray. To answer your first part, first question,
Mr. Chairman, yes, I am very comfortable, and it is primarily
based upon the number of soldier interactions we have had with
IVAS. It is primarily based upon the feedback we have gotten
from soldiers, which we never would have gotten before until we
did the traditional way of taking it to a limited user test
evaluation, and then we would go into some sort of EMD
[engineering and manufacturing development]. We go into some
sort of--and so the intent is--and the large spike in funding
is we want to buy this out in 2 years and get the buy done.
It is a limited number. It is not designed for every
soldier in the Army, and I am sure the Marine Corps is looking
at this the same way, is we talked a couple years ago about
what we called the close combat force, and so this is designed
for those soldiers that will be in close combat.
We call it the close combat 100,000. It is probably going
to end up being about 120,000 over the lifetime of the buy, but
it is a very unique capability that will go to those soldiers
that execute close combat at the--and we kind of define that by
the platoon level and below. So it is more than just infantry.
It would be some of the forward observers, some of the medics,
et cetera.
But, to answer your question specifically, I just think,
you know, we have basically done probably at least a dozen LUTs
[limited user tests] in the development of this program, and so
I am very comfortable with where we are.
Mr. Norcross. And, just to drill down a little bit on that,
in the environments, the physical environments, we haven't been
out, as I understand, in the jungle. We certainly haven't been
up into the cold regions. How do you mitigate those factors
into the operation of the units?
General Murray. So we will eventually get up to the Alaska
test range, and we will eventually get down to the Panama and
to the--but we do have, at each of our test centers, ways of
recreating some of those environments. So you have the option
of either going to Alaska. I was at Natick [U.S. Army Natick
Soldier Systems Center], and it is not--they weren't testing
IVAS, but I was at Natick the other day and talked to some
soldiers that were testing cold-weather gear and walked in the
chamber with them at 20 below zero. And so we have the
opportunity and ways of recreating those environments on our
current test facilities and in our current lab systems.
Mr. Norcross. So you are telling me we are going through
that presently; we just physically haven't been to the
different environments?
General Murray. We will get them through that level of
testing, yes.
Mr. Norcross. Because, again--I think Mrs. Hartzler will
agree--Microsoft appears to be very different. So far, the
feedback going back and forth works very well. The step to a
billion dollars is a very big step.
General Murray. Uh-huh.
Mr. Norcross. I like to refer to Reagan. We will trust, but
we want to verify before we start doing this.
So are you looking--you said 2 years. Is that a 20,000 per
year?
General Murray. No. The number will actually be much higher
than 40,000, and so--and General Pasquarette can correct me if
I'm wrong, but the original plan was to buy that capability out
in 2 years, and the actual number of IVAS systems will be
somewhere between probably 100,000 and 130,000.
Mr. Norcross. So the 40,000 would still--that is not full-
rate production? We are not moving without any chance of----
General Murray. Correction?
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. Change or correction?
General Murray. We are always trying to learn and adjust as
we go.
Mr. Norcross. Because, as you know, once they hit the
field, there is varieties.
Okay. So let me switch to the other side of the coin where
things have been a little bit more challenged and the--our
fighting vehicle, the OMFV.
Going into this, it started long before Futures Command got
into full swing, but the idea of asking our partners, giving
them the requirements that I will call soft, general areas that
we want to do, they made a tremendous investment by company,
and yet here we are canceling the program. Could be for good
reasons. We are not disputing that. We asked them to make an
investment, and now we are switching.
How do we keep saying to our industrial base, okay, that
was a screw-up, your investment is not lost, we are going here?
I mean, for any company to make those sort of investments--it
is a risk. We understand. They knew it was going in. But it
doesn't help our case that this is the new way that we are
going to do things and bringing our industry along. So I would
like to hear each of your opinions on how our partners are
going to react to this.
Dr. Jette, if you----
Secretary Jette. Sir, in the first--first of all, what I
want to say is the fundamental of OMFV hasn't changed. We
aren't canceling the OMFV. Much like in prior systems, I know
people reflect back to FCS [Future Combat Systems] and say, oh,
you canceled that vehicle program, you canceled another vehicle
program, here you go doing it again. That is not intending--
that is not our intent. Our intent is to continue with OMFV.
When we used the MTA authorities, we knew that the
objective was to try and move forward as quickly as possible
and make our assessments of how we were doing rather than,
let's say, some of our prior efforts. Comanche, you know, we
had problems, and we just kept going along, see if we could fix
them, fix them, fix them, and a few billion dollars a year
later, we ended up canceling.
So our view of this was to start out with a program that
was MTA, go fast because that is what we understood--and I
think that the way that the Secretary has described it: an
unprecedented interaction with industry. The Secretary and the
Chief both spent an entire day, just them, with CEOs [chief
executive officers] of the corporations to get them involved.
So we gained a great deal of their input, and I think that,
when we finally came to the conclusion that we needed to reset,
it wasn't that we didn't have input from industry. They told us
what they said they could do. When we put it all together in a
package and put it out there and said, ``Okay, now, put this
all together in one piece,'' we ended up where we were.
Mr. Norcross. But what was the mechanism that didn't work
to stop this further back before they went all the way through
the submission phase? It didn't come up at the last moment,
obviously, but why weren't we able to intercept that based on
the way that you are looking at this, at an earlier point,
before one dropped out, the other one couldn't make it across
the finish line, and we end up with one?
Secretary Jette. So I think that was part of our assessment
and how we are trying to move forward. If you--I have sort of
described the new method, which is we have an interaction with
industry phase right now. In fact, it is ongoing. Subsequent to
this, they will submit white papers, and we will have five OEMs
[original equipment manufacturers] that we will select, down-
select to.
We are not going to bending metal at that point because
that was one of the things that I think was part of the issue
with the first one. In trying to go so fast, we asked for
vehicle deliveries of prototypes at the very beginning.
Instead, what we need to do is we need to keep--we need to
lower the bar. That itself pushed people out of competition.
Mr. Norcross. Lower the bar for investment?
Secretary Jette. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. Okay.
Secretary Jette. So more people could enter the competition
and participate, get things past their boards.
So, in this case, going to a digital design requires them
to be professional in their engineering capabilities but
doesn't require them necessarily to bend metal. It also gives
us an ability to take the money that we have in the program and
apply it to multiple vendors to keep the competition in place
longer.
The digital design phase isn't a stagnant design; they
don't just give it to us, and then that is it. Each one of
these vendors are going to continue to have an interactive
discussion. So, as General Murray has said on the soldier
touchpoints that we have gone through on IVAS, we are going to
be doing virtual soldier touchpoints as well.
In some cases, we will do mockups of certain aspects of the
equipment to see if it is really going to work the way that we
think it is going to work or not. So we are not spending a
great deal of money on bending metal and soldering pieces
together or welding pieces together, but, in fact, getting the
knowledge that we need.
At the end of that phase, instead of a requirement, which
is what we have done--this is, in my view, one of the most
innovative things that we have come out of this effort. Another
change was that we originally said: Here is the requirement
document. Here are the things you have to deliver. Show up.
Mr. Norcross. Right.
Secretary Jette. But there is a requirement document.
Requirement documents are pretty stiff.
Those are appropriate, and we spent quite a bit of time
together, General Murray and I, just going over that one aspect
of this. We have the--we don't have a really good lexicon for
how to do this smarter. So we ended up building one.
Requirements, in our view, at this point, are for things we are
going to build where we are pretty specific. That is
production.
If we are doing a prototyping phase in MTA, we want to
evolve the requirements as we learn through the phases of your
prototyping. So he starts off with an operational--that is what
is out there today, an operational characteristics. It is a
requirement, but it is--we use the different term because it is
not this rigid thing at the end.
As we go through each of those phases, we will revise the
operational and technical characteristics for each of them
based upon what we learned. When we get into a phase, we will
interact with the vendors that are involved and get them to do
just what you have asked us to do: Tell us what they think that
we haven't asked for. Let us make assessments. Let us do
modeling and simulation concurrently. Let's do studies and
analysis. Let's get soldier touchpoints involved here. And then
come back at the end of that next phase for them to compete for
the next down-select with a revised set of characteristics.
Mr. Norcross. So, without beating this subject up, industry
made a sizeable investment. They now hear and see what you are
talking about now.
Are they going to continue this and be partners, or do you
think, instead of three, we are going to open up to six, taking
into play some maybe original manufacturing equipment, things
that can make it much less costly than starting from scratch?
Where is industry with us because I know what we have heard,
and it hasn't been pretty because of their investment.
You know, they have felt as if, if we were going to be
here, we could have done this many millions of dollars sooner.
And I am homing in on this because it is a fundamental change
of industry coming with us, not just we are telling them what
to do. And I think it is indicative of what we are going to do.
We just chock this one off, and do they understand that we
now--as you would say, irreversible? We are not going to use
that old model; this is our new model?
Secretary Jette. Sir, last week, I met with our big--this
kind of--big vehicle manufacturers, and I was taking a look at
mobile protective firepower, MPF, and we--I had this discussion
with them. I understand it. It is a sting. I also understand
that some of the things that they have done are still viable
and useful in the next phase.
So we are trying to do as--be as supportive as possible in
the process. So far, my estimate is that--that at least what I
would consider the standard competitors are still intending to
participate, and there are a number of others who have talked
to the PEO already. I think he said 11 so far have talked----
Mr. Norcross. Good.
Secretary Jette [continuing]. To him about this. And the
PEO--one of the other things that I think that we have really
tried to do within my time as ASA(ALT), has been make sure, all
the way down to the PEOs and PMs, our doors are open. If
industry wants to come in, they just have to get a meeting with
us, and we will do that.
Mr. Norcross. Okay.
General Murray. And, sir, if I could real quick, so--and I
think the root of this is trust. I mean the trust going
forward.
Mr. Norcross. Yeah.
General Murray. And I agree with you 100 percent. And I
just want to make sure you understand this was not a quick or
easy decision when we decided to restart the program.
So we went through probably 2, 3, 4 weeks of discussion Dr.
Jette and I were part of along with the Army senior leadership.
And there was a lot of debate. The issues you are talking about
were brought up and discussed, and ultimately the decision was
made to restart the program. But it was not an easy decision.
Mr. Norcross. We have learned by it. We will get back to
some more of my questions.
Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Yeah. Good discussion here, and I
had a couple of fairly short questions still dealing with this
program, and then another one for--give it back to the chairman
for a few minutes.
But how does restructuring of the Optionally Manned
Fighting Vehicle program affect plans for future upgrades and
fielding of modernized Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and
how important is competition--well, we have kind of covered
that. So fielding the ones that we have now, how is the
restructuring of this program going to affect their further
upgrades?
General Murray. So the M2 Bradley, there is money and plans
to upgrade to the A4 version for--I believe it is now down to
four brigades worth of vehicles?
General Pasquarette. Between four and five, sir.
General Murray. Between four and five.
So the plans before that we had, it has not impacted that
at all. And that would be the last upgrade to the Bradley
fighting vehicle.
And you have heard me say this before. You have probably
heard the Chief say it before, is the Bradley has been a
phenomenal vehicle. Development of the Bradley started in 1963
and delivered in 1981 was the first Bradleys we delivered. And
we have run out of room to upgrade the Bradley.
One of the major issues with the Bradley is power. It is an
underpowered vehicle right now. The A4 fixes some of that, but
we have got--and that is why we remain committed to the OMFV
program. We have got to replace the Bradley. We have just run
out of room to continue to upgrade it. But the plans that were
there are still in the program.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. That is good.
And it is my understanding the Army is planning to use a
digital engineering approach as part of the restructured
Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle effort.
The Air Force, through Dr. Roper, is also using digital
engineering and digital manufacturing for many of their
advanced weapons systems. I am a big fan of this. I think this
is tremendous, the way we should go. It is the way the
commercial industry is going.
So I have--I am just curious. Have you reached out to Dr.
Roper and the Air Force to gain any insights that they may have
in respect to this approach?
Secretary Jette. So one of the fortuitous things is that
the three acquisition executives knew each other well before we
ended up in the same--in these seats, and so have a pretty good
relationship.
I have reached out to Dr. Roper on this and a number of
other issues, and we are trying to share as best as possible
across our programs. I will tell you that we are sharing even
into the black world. Any of our classified programs, we have
given full open access to, and the idea there is I don't need
to invent anything he has already done.
Mrs. Hartzler. Exactly. Exactly.
Secretary Jette. So we are trying to maximize our leverage
of each other's development work.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is great. Very encouraging.
And, on another topic, Dr. Jette--and this is from an
earlier question as well. We talked about Lake City Ammunition.
It says the Army's budget request for 5.56-millimeter
ammunition is $68.5 million. This is a slight increase from
fiscal year 2020. However, it appears from what we have learned
in the last week or two that this request did not take into
consideration the change in contractor management at Lake City,
plus the increase in costs to produce enhanced-performance
5.56-millimeter rounds. Based on initial estimates that I have
seen from the contractor, the 5.56-millimeter line would need
an increase of $37.6 million just to maintain current capacity
and produce 310 million rounds of ammunition.
So did the Army consider these cost increases when it
prepared the fiscal year 2021 budget request, and what actions
are you taking to mitigate any shortfalls in 5.56-millimeter
ammunition production?
Secretary Jette. Do you want to take the program piece, and
then I will----
General Pasquarette. I will just start on the ammunition in
general and specifically on 5.56. We go line by line every year
on our requirements for ammunition, ma'am, because each year we
have a--we check what our training plan is, our training
strategy, combat and command requirements, and actually how we
fight--we plan on fighting in the future, and that drives the
number.
And then we want--we must fund everything we must have, and
we can't afford to buy more ammunition than that amount. So I
will--we are--I don't have the details exactly on the 5.56. I
owe you that back.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yeah. This is just something we heard about
recently. It is my understanding, you know, the requirement
hasn't changed, but the cost has, is what is needed----
General Pasquarette. Yeah.
Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. To create that same amount of
ammunition. So----
General Pasquarette. So we will have to work that----
Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. The former contractor lost a
significant amount of money, and the new one basically can't
afford to make the amount at the same price and needs more
money if it is to be able to fulfill that anyway. So----
General Pasquarette. Yeah.
Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. If you could look at that and
get back with us----
General Pasquarette. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. That sounds good. Thank you.
Secretary Jette. Ma'am, can I just add?
Mrs. Hartzler. Sure.
Secretary Jette. We are taking--so I have restructured how
we are approaching the organic industrial base within ASA(ALT).
I have a centrally selected program manager, colonel, who is
now basically the mayor and governor of these facilities. He
has full control over the contracts, and we are looking at all
the contracting methodologies.
If I was to do a very top view of how we have approached
these, it was all very close-in battles. ``I need a new
doorknob for something.'' There was no prediction of where we
needed to go, what we needed to do. Do I need more ammo
capacity for this caliber? Do I need less? How about the
machines? How easy are the refit, et cetera, et cetera.
So we are taking a stem-to-stern, if I can borrow that from
the Navy, look at just exactly how do we run these facilities
to optimize them and not end up with a mountain of the wrong
caliber ammo.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Thanks.
Mr. Norcross. General Smith, understanding that the still-
pending force structure modernization priorities we spoke about
earlier, yet we are in the middle of a budget season, explain
to us what ``lightened the force'' means, and where is that
taking you not only in this budget cycle, but beyond?
General Smith. Sure. I truly do appreciate that question.
``Lighten the force'' means exactly that, and I will get to
the very important why.
Logistics is and can be an Achilles' heel of any operation.
As we talk about pacing threat and we talk about operating in
the Indo-Pacific, our ability to sustain ourselves inside the
weapons engagement zone as the, quote, ``stand-in forces''
depends on our being able to resupply and sustain those forces
that are, for example, within the first island chain, or,
frankly, anywhere globally.
Every pound that we take off, whether it is the polymer
ammunition that we are working with the Army--we are doing .50
caliber, the Army is doing 7.62, and the Brits are doing 5.56--
to lighten the load by 20 or so percent, to some of the battery
packs that we are working out with Johns Hopkins that will
lighten our battery ability, our ability to generate our own
power, to water purification, to physically going from ceramic
plates down to plastic plates, which we are working now on
personnel protective equipment, to the ROGUE Fires Vehicle,
which is a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle stripped of most of its
armor, and that starts lightening things by thousands of
pounds.
Every short ton that I take off is a short ton that my
counterpart in the Navy, Vice Admiral Jim Kilby, does not have
to transport and move. That matters to the operational
commander. That gets me to the fight faster. It means my
resupply mechanisms are less--need to be less robust. It means
I can sustain myself inside that weapons engagement zone.
For me, that is pretty important because I personally have
a second lieutenant son who is inside that weapons engagement
zone now. He is forward deployed in Japan. And he is a
logistics officer. So we talk about this. That is my back
channel to how we are doing, if we are actually doing what we
are supposed to be doing. I get an earful every time I talk to
him.
That is what ``lightening'' means. Everything from helmets
to body armor to ammunition, to vehicles, to form factors of
radios, batteries, power, all of that combined, sir, because
every pound adds toward a short ton.
Mr. Norcross. Is it also with sheer numbers?
General Smith. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Norcross. Also with sheer numbers?
General Smith. Oh, absolutely, sure. Absolutely.
When we just--when we did some of the studies we have been
doing with the Navy for how we will sustain ourselves, we
actually calculated how big is an expeditionary advanced base,
which is really a platoon-sized unit, reinforced. We can't say
it depends or it is about this big. How many exact Marines? How
many radios? How many corpsmen? What are they carrying.
I have to calculate that poundage out that turns into short
tons so I know what requirement to levy on or to request of the
Navy so that they can transport me, and that goes to military
sealift, which is not part of this committee, I know, but that
is vitally important for logistics sustainment.
We have not gotten lighter in the last 20 years. We have
slowed the rate of weight increase, which is unacceptable. So
our goal is I am not adding a pound to the fleet reinforce. We
have to really reduce the weight, and we are starting to do
that. I mean, we are actually having real results in lightening
the individual load on the Marine and ultimately on the unit.
Mr. Norcross. So when do you think you will reach the final
number or goal of where you are, because----
General Smith. Sir----
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. We are in between budgets.
General Smith. Sure. So, sir, we will never cease trying to
lighten the load. I mean, every time a new polymer comes out
that will provide similar protection, we will take it, and we
will drop weight. We are never going to cease trying to cut
weight. So I----
Mr. Norcross. But the force structure itself?
General Smith. Oh, I am sorry, sir. Force structure, the
Commandant will start moving that. I won't get ahead of my
Commandant, but I believe he will start to show that very soon
after we get the 2021 budget explained, and then his full pivot
is toward the 2022 budget. That will lay out force design,
which are the changes in training, manning, and equipping. That
will show which units might be morphing or changing missions.
He will start to roll that out, I believe, this spring. So
I am comfortable saying this spring for him.
Mr. Norcross. So this budget includes those interim
numbers----
General Smith. Uh-huh.
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. As you are going to the new----
General Smith. Sir, it does, and the Commandant made some
modifications to 2021--a lot of it was in training and
education--so that, when we take a full step out in 2022, and
then 2023 and 2024 and beyond, that, when we gain things like
Naval Strike Missile--we call it GBASM, ground-based anti-ship
missile. When we get that, there is a unit who is ready to fire
it, those long-range precision fire units, artillery, are ready
to fire that system, so that our command and control units,
when these new technologies emerge, are actually organized to
accept that equipment, and we don't have to then organize for a
new technology.
I use Moore's law a lot, sir. Moore's law: If we continue
to accelerate the pace of change, the unit has to be able to
absorb and utilize that equipment immediately. I can't--the
pacing threat won't wait; I can't wait.
So the Commandant's focus has been on training and
educating the forces to use it. Again, I think I have a very
smart son, but he is not trained to fire a 750-nautical-mile
anti-ship missile. He would say he is. I would say he is not.
You know, his mom would probably say he is, but he needs more
training to do that.
We have already begun that training to move from an
industrial age to an information age training base because I am
fortunate that I own the training and education process for the
Marine Corps, and we started that already under General
Berger's leadership.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great. And I applaud your efforts to lighten
the load, and I think the new generation--Next Generation Squad
Weapon and the new ammunition very much will be part of that,
and so that is really exciting.
Dr. Jette, and I have to leave at 12:30 to catch my plane,
so I am trying to talk fast. If you could help me, that would
be good too. I have a couple more questions, and then I will
leave one for the record.
So, during Tuesday's Army posture hearing, Secretary
McCarthy testified that the Army is coordinating its hypersonic
development efforts with the Air Force and the Navy, and so
could you elaborate further on these joint service coordination
efforts specifically in regard to the Army's long-range
hypersonic weapon? This is something I am definitely focused
on, and I know that all the services are. It is critical we get
this capability as soon as possible.
So, once again, to the theme of working together, all team,
how are you coordinating with the others? And are we
reinventing the wheel, or are we working together and saving
money and saving time?
Secretary Jette. Yes, ma'am. Okay. So the Department of
Defense has designated the Army as the executive agent. We have
a joint program going--that is not a joint program. We have a
cooperative program between the Navy and the Army, and with
some aspects with the Air Force specifically.
This program is put into my senior PEO. I have one three-
star PEO, and--Lieutenant General Neil Thurgood, who has--he
was the deputy director of MDA [Missile Defense Agency]. He was
a PEO of missiles in space. He has been PEO aviation. So he has
got a great deal of background in this area, and he is now in
charge of the material solution for hypersonics within the
Army.
The Navy and the Army are fully connected at the
programmatics. They are working with the Air Force. They had
some different issues with firing from an aircraft versus
firing from the ground and the sea. But they are continuing to
work through those issues.
We are responsible for the commercial production of the
hypersonic reentry vehicle. The Navy is responsible for
production of the launch vehicle, 34-inch--34.5-inch launch
body, and we will--we are doing joint testing so that we are
not testing our piece and their piece; we are testing things
together.
The Navy is leading the first test. We follow by leading
the second test, et cetera. So we are--it is truly a very well-
integrated program.
Secretary Geurts. It can't be any more--the Navy is
building all the rockets for the program, the Army is building
all the glide bodies, and we are doing all the joint testing
together. So it could not be a more closely linked program.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great. I saw the prototype--well, the
picture at the Army Caucus breakfast the other day, and that
was really interesting, so I am glad to hear that.
So, Dr. Jette and General Murray, in section 240 of the
NDAA fiscal year 2020, it requires Secretary of Defense to
identify the military services or agencies that will be
responsible for the conduct of air and missile defense in
support of joint campaigns as it applies to defense against
current and emerging missile threats, including against each
class of cruise missile.
Do you know whether the Secretary of Defense has made this
certification, and can you provide any information on how this
certification was coordinated with the Army?
General Murray. Ma'am, I am unaware if the Secretary has
made that decision yet or not.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Well, okay. Very good.
I had a couple of questions on active protection systems
that I will submit for the record unless we have time before
12:30, but go ahead.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. We are going to try to wrap up by
12:30, so----
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay.
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. Obviously you can make--General
Murray, Chief of Staff of the Army's unfunded priorities list
includes $151 million for creation of what you are calling the
Multi-Domain Operations Task Force. What is the documentary
requirement from DOD or the Joint Staff for the Army to provide
this capability under its title 10 responsibility?
General Murray. So it is fundamentally the same demand that
we get for just about any other capability. So it came directly
from the combatant commanders, specifically Admiral Davidson in
the Pacific and from General Walters in U.S. Army Europe. The
151.4 is really an acceleration of MDTFs, Multi-Domain Task
Forces 2 and 3, 2 in Europe and number 3 for the Pacific. So
that would give two in the Pacific is specifically what Admiral
Davidson has asked us to produce.
Some of that is facilities and sustainment. Some of it is
fleshing out an organization we call I2CEWS [Intelligence,
Information, Cyber, Electronic Warfare and Space]. So it is
really the heart of the Multi-Domain Task Force. It is
intelligence. It is cyber. It is electronic warfare, and it is
space capabilities that really enable this--the Multi-Domain
Task Force.
Mr. Norcross. Very good. I want you to get your questions
in----
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Very good.
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. And we are going to wrap things
up.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. I wanted to follow up first, just
quickly, on something the chairman said and you shared in the
testimony, I think General Pasquarette, about there is--as far
as risk, you went back and discovered 12 programs that,
before--and you
re-funded those at $600 million. You said you could give us a
list, and so I would just say, could you give us a list, yes?
General Pasquarette. Yes, ma'am. I think it is up here with
the staffers, but we will follow up and make sure it gets to
your office.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. The two APS [active protection
systems] questions. So what is the Army doing to maintain
momentum in fielding non-developmental active protection
systems for the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker, as we believe
soldier protection is our number one priority and this
capability needs to be rapidly fielded? So I guess that is the
first question: What are you doing to maintain the momentum?
And can the committee provide additional resources to
assist in the fielding the remaining Army brigade combat teams
as continued testing on the Stryker and the Bradley platforms,
so----
Secretary Jette. Do you want to take the piece----
General Pasquarette. Well, we are--our leadership has given
us direction that we must head down these paths for our three
major systems that we are concerned about: Abrams, Bradley, and
Stryker. And, with Abrams, thanks to the support of Congress,
we have committed to four sets of that kit. We are actually
mounting the A kits now. And one of those, we are going to
mount--a company, I believe during Defender Europe, is going to
mount one of the B kits as a part of that operation to validate
the means to do that.
Stryker, on the other end of the spectrum, it is a tough
science project. The ability to defeat a round with an active
protective system to the degree that doesn't allow penetration
with the secondary effects of what is left of the round coming
at it, we are still working with industry and the S&T world on
how to do that.
In the middle of that is Bradley, where we have--looking at
a similar program similar to Trophy on the Abrams. We are
testing that right now. I defer to Dr. Jette about how that has
gone. But we want to move forward with--it is called Iron Fist
Decoupled is the system, and we are working to see if that is
something that will work with the Bradley or not. Sir.
Secretary Jette. So the light system is continuing to be
tested to determine whether or not it actually performs the
manner we want it to perform for the Bradley.
We have not stopped and said, ``Well, this is the
solution.'' In fact, we are looking for additional APS systems
and approaches to systems.
Mrs. Hartzler. Is that been put out there for industry
asking for----
Secretary Jette. Yes. And in a different forum, I can show
you some of the successes we have had, and they are
significant. They, I think, will lead us to some different
views of how we execute APS.
I believe that we have absolutely a need to find an
alternative way to protect these vehicles from the type of
fires that they can have to deal with. I have already got an
80-ton tank. I can't make it any heavier, and I can't make
light armored vehicles weigh 80 tons. So we are going to have
to come up with a better method, and we have several
technologies which we are incorporating into our OMFV method as
part of sprints--sprints are short demonstrating technology
cycles--which lead to the development of them over a period of
time.
Mrs. Hartzler. That might be a good classified briefing
maybe to learn about some of the new systems. Maybe it would
be. Okay.
Does the Army have sufficient APS capability to protect all
armored brigade combat teams in multiple theaters? So I believe
you have purchased four?
General Murray. Yeah. Not currently, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. And, finally, what risk is the Army
incurring if it doesn't pursue other proven non-developmental
APS technologies for current ground platforms like Bradley and
Stryker? Well, it sounds like you are pursuing it.
Secretary Jette. We are.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yeah.
Secretary Jette. And so one of the--my perspective on this
is that we pursued things to try and get them done quickly, and
we looked at NDI, non-developmental items. APS is a unique
category of a non-developmental item.
If you put a number of different companies in, they come
out with their products, they bring it there, and they are
going to try and sell it to you, and you don't choose one of
them because you are going to choose one; maybe later a second.
If you don't win the competition, you have no place to go with
the product. So they are all governmentally funded. And we
didn't have--we haven't had a governmentally funded program for
APS since FCS.
So I believed that one of the things we needed to do was
start opening the aperture and look for those things which we
could invest in the nascent stages of these APS systems, or all
we are going to ever get are the ones that are already
developed by foreign governments or already exist in place. And
that is one reason why there is not really a lot of NDI options
laying on the table, and we just need to test them. We are
going to have to do some work in development to get where we
need to go.
Mrs. Hartzler. Do you need more money to do that from us?
Secretary Jette. I don't think we need it this year. I am
going to look at 2022 when we start submitting it next year.
Mrs. Hartzler. All right. I look forward to continuing the
discussion on this.
Thank you very much. This has been a great hearing.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Let me just wrap this up, sort of beginning or ending where
we began. We talked about the shift to modernization, National
Defense Strategy, and in any of the selections that were made,
either to cancel a legacy or enter into one of our six
priorities, you are measuring against the threat as defined in
National Defense Strategy.
This year, there are 12 items that the Army had previously
canceled or reduced that we are now going to continue. So that
gets to the heart of my first question: Is that evaluation--
obviously took place here. Not each of the 12 items. Can you
give us a little synopsis or a story what made you reflect back
and make that change to continue it? Was it the industrial
base? Has the threat changed? What exactly caused this to
change in the Army?
General Pasquarette. I can give an example of one system
called UCS, Unified Command System. There was guidance to try
and be more efficient with that. It is something every State is
supposed to have in the National Guard in case of an emergency
to stand up quickly, to react to that crisis.
And we were looking--the direction from the leadership was
see if we can't consolidate it. Why do we need 54 of these? Can
we have 16 regionally, and you go get it when you need it?
Upon reflection, because of the demand, the requirements
out there in the National Guard to react immediately, the
analysis was done. You can't go from Texas to Oklahoma to go
get your piece of kit to come back to Texas for the emergency.
So it was guidance to look at this. We took the dollars
initially thinking it would work out. Upon analysis, we showed
the leadership that you have to have it there to meet the
requirement, and so there was an agreement by the--decision by
the Secretary and the Chief that, yes, let's put money back in
it. That is one example.
Mr. Norcross. Can you give me a hardware example, something
where a hardware piece of equipment might have been changed?
General Pasquarette. Not off the top of my head, Mr.
Chairman. There is--I can't--maybe----
Mr. Norcross. Either industrial base collapses or--just
trying to get a feel for----
Secretary Jette. Let me make sure I am giving you the right
answer here. Fuel trucks is one of them. We did an assessment
based upon our initial assumptions in particular theaters of
what our operational needs would be. That went with the set of
assumptions we had in the analysis that generated the decrement
in the budget.
Over the next year, we went back and reviewed all of the
decisions we had made and found that one of the assumptions was
false, and what that did was it drove us to coming back and
saying: This assumption can't be accomplished. We need to go
back and relook our fuel truck requirements, and then we
decided to put the fuel trucks back in.
General Pasquarette. I would say another one was crypto
modification. We realized we took money out of it, and then,
when we looked at it, we were not going to be in compliance
with the NSA [National Security Agency] guidance for our
systems to operate, and so, again, that was a decision made.
Upon reflection and analysis, feedback, in order to be
compliant, we had to put those dollars back in.
That is just another example, sir.
Mr. Norcross. So is there a formal process to reevaluate
all the programs, or is it brewing up, I would say, from those
that are in those programs saying, ``Wait, you didn't take this
into consideration,'' be it an industrial base or a threat?
General Murray. It is both. And so we get a significant
amount of input, because the things we are looking at as we go
through the program review, which we are going through right
now, really starts at the low levels and then works its way
through colonels and one-star generals and two-star generals
and three-star generals, and eventually ends up with Dr. Jette
and I. So it gets looked at at multiple points.
And there are objections raised just about every one of
them in terms of--you know, eventually, it becomes a risk
decision. And another thing I would say that has added to some
of the changes is people often focus on the ``31+3,'' and that
is the only thing that the Army's investing in. It is really
more holistic than that.
So we look at the enablers for those 31+3s, and fuel trucks
are a great example. I mean, I can build the best tactical
vehicle in the world, and if I can't get fuel to it, it is not
going to good for much more than about a half a day. So, as you
look at enablers, they are not part of the 31+3, but they are
the critical enablers that go along with the 31+3.
Mr. Norcross. You can imagine, with any budget that comes
out, my colleagues look down the list and say, oh, that is
mine.
We want to make sure that, when we address their questions
that they are based on reliable set of figures that is
consistent across the program and not just you happen to be in
the right state at the right time for the right thing. And that
is the overarching theme because we will be with you. But when
we question you on--drill down on some of these subjects, it is
so I can answer them and look them in the eye and say: We are
going to support their decision because, A, they have done
this, they have reviewed it, and it is the right thing to do.
So, when we get these questions to you, it is so 9 times
out of 10 we can address questions.
With that, seeing I am the only one left, I want to thank
you for your time, particularly working with us during the
votes.
And we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 5, 2020
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 5, 2020
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 5, 2020
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Mrs. Hartzler. The Army's budget request for 5.56mm ammunition is
$68.5 million. This is a slight increase from FY20; however, it appears
that this request did not take into consideration the change in
contractor management at Lake City, plus the increase in cost to
produce enhanced performance 5.56mm rounds. Based on initial estimates
that I have seen from the contractor, the 5.56mm line would need an
increase of $37.6 million just to maintain current capacity and produce
310 million rounds of ammunition. Did the Army consider these cost
increases when it prepared the FY21 budget request and what actions are
you taking to mitigate any shortfalls in 5.56mm ammunition production?
Secretary Jette. The Army did anticipate and account for estimated
unit price increases pending the change in contractor management at
Lake City, starting with FY20 Unit Costs (UC) when the new contract
became active. Unit price increases specifically for enhanced
performance 5.56mm rounds incorporated normal expected inflation.
Although quantities would be reduced as a result of a higher UC
increase than expected prior to the selection of new contract
management, the Army has sufficient stockpiles of 5.56mm to address the
seeming shortfall. The Army's 5.56mm requirements are complemented by
other Service procurements as well as substantial yearly Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) cases. The Army is confident that with the
combination of all 5.56mm FY21 requirements, the current inventory
posture, and the fact that the contract has firm fixed pricing as low
as 150M/year, that Lake City will maintain its current capacity.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Dr. Jette can you please provide a detailed report of
the Army's RDT&E spending related to IFPC over the past 5 years,
including planned spend for FY20? We would like to understand why there
is no plan to test Iron Dome with U.S. systems this year.
Secretary Jette and General Murray. At your request, the table at
the bottom depicts the Army Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) expenditures for Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)
from Fiscal Year 2016 (FY16) to FY20. We will gladly provide you
additional details under separate cover.
The IFPC program has changed a great deal during the past 5 years
as a result of testing and changing of operational requirements. Over
FY16-19, the Army was developing the original IFPC capability to
address cruise missile, short range air defense and Counter Rocket,
Artillery, and Mortar defense missions. These efforts included work to
integrate the AIM-9X missile with the Multi-Mission Launcher (MML), as
well as exploration of other, lower cost, interceptors through the
Expanded Mission Area Missile (EMAM) program.
The Army's Acquisition Strategy shifted during 2018 and 2019 due to
both critical design issues and Congressional direction to field an
interim Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) capability. The MML and
interceptor experienced engineering limitations in handling payloads
and reloading procedures which proved untenable. The Army took lessons
learned from this experience and in FY19, implemented a revised
strategy for the enduring IFPC solution, which is expected to alleviate
these issues. We are taking a competitive approach with industry to
first demonstrate candidate launcher-interceptor solutions through
modeling and simulation, system integration lab testing, and then a
live fire shoot-off at White Sands Missile Range with Cruise Missile
and Unmanned Aircraft Systems targets. As the Army executes this
strategy, we will field an interim CMD capability, Iron Dome Defense
System-Army (IDDS-A), in FY21.
In answer to your question about testing, the Army does plan to
test Iron Dome in FY20 with U.S. specified system software and hardware
adaptations. In June 2020, a System Integration Lab is scheduled to
test the U.S. software by executing scenarios to assess system
performance. In August 2020, mobility testing of the Iron Dome prime
movers adapted to U.S. vehicles (HEMTTs) is planned to be conducted in
Israel prior to delivery of the first Battery to verify safety and
performance requirements. Then in September 2020, live fire testing is
expected to occur in Israel on the adapted Iron Dome system using U.S.
provided cruise missile surrogate targets. Finally, in FY21 the Army
plans to execute interoperability and performance testing at White
Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, using the first Iron Dome Battery with
U.S. Army Soldiers.
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.epsMr. Lamborn. General Murray, you raised concerns about the
ability to integrate Iron Dome in the U.S. air defense systems. It is
my understanding the U.S. Marines were able to do so with CAC2 and the
G/ATOR radar. Can you please:
a) Explain why the Marines were able to do so and the Army was not,
including in the form of using these as an interim capability?
b) Provide a list and details on all contracts signed with Israel,
Raytheon and/or Rafael to attempt to integrate Iron Dome with: Sentinel
A3; Sentinel A4, IBCS, and/or Link 16.
c) List and describe all other non-contractual efforts to integrate
with Sentinel A3; Sentinel A4, IBCS, and/or Link 16, including whether
they use outside vendors or analysts.
General Murray. The Army observed the USMC successfully demonstrate
initial ``interoperability'', but not ``integration,'' of an Iron Dome
launcher and TAMIR interceptor with the USMC system Ground/Air Task
Oriented Rader (G/ATOR). Interoperability links systems together and
allows systems to exchange data via a common data network. This
provides situational awareness and allows engagement coordination and
de-confliction. Interoperability does not optimize performance across
disparate systems. Like interoperability, integration links multiple
systems together. However, with integration the connection is much more
robust and allows the use of data to go beyond coordination and de-
confliction and allow optimization of components (e.g., Sensors and
shooters) to maximize effectiveness and/or efficiency. Integration is
the requirement for IFPC Inc 2 components, as it is for all future Army
Air Defense capabilities, to become part of the tiered and layered air
defense.
The USMC demonstrated the ability to pass G/ATOR tracking data to
the Iron Dome system using the USMC mission command node (Common
Aviation Command and Control System, or CAC2S), through a cross-domain
solution (security filter), then to a surrogate Iron Dome mission
command node (a surrogate Battle Management and Weapon Control (BMC)
system) for the engagement calculations before sending the mission to
the launcher and interceptor. Additionally, the USMC employed the
Sensor in a sectored, non-rotating mode, which does not meet the Army's
360 degree requirement for cruise missile defense. The USMC
demonstration has informed Army contracting activities planned for
Fiscal Year 2020 (FY20), in which the Army will assess the path forward
for Iron Dome's BMC ``interoperability'' with Integrated Battle Command
System (IBCS) for the interim systems.
This approach will require a supplier to mitigate cybersecurity
risk, and IBCS will be limited to providing Fire Direction, not Fire
Control, to the Iron Dome system. This assessment activity achieves
interoperability with Iron Dome, however, this type of interoperability
does not meet the enduring IFPC requirement. The Army needs to be able
to execute fire control from IBCS, without using additional Command and
Control systems that the Army has to sustain over time.
b) Provide a list and details on all contracts signed with Israel,
Raytheon and/or Rafael to attempt to integrate Iron Dome with: Sentinel
A3; Sentinel A4, IBCS, and/or Link 16.
The Army awarded two contracts related to Iron Dome components and
their integration with Sentinel and the Integrated Air and Missile
Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). The first was part of the
Enhanced Mission Area Missile (EMAM) program that was developing
additional missiles for use in the IFPC system, which included the
Sentinel A3, IBCS, and the Multi Mission Launcher (MML). The second was
for the adaptation and procurement of Iron Dome Defense Systems for the
U.S. Army (IDDS-A), which will undergo performance testing and
interoperability testing with IBCS.
The Army awarded contract W15QKN-14-9-1001 to Raytheon Company
(teaming with Rafael) to integrate a SkyHunter interceptor (U.S.
variant of TAMIR) with a U.S. surrogate launcher and IBCS on June 4,
2018. The contract value was $2,597,398. Raytheon/Rafael was unable to
provide necessary source code and high fidelity models and simulations
to continue with the effort in April 2019. Funding for EMAM ended in
FY19.
The Army awarded contract W31P4Q-19-D-0024 to the Israeli Ministry
of Defense (IMOD) for IDDS-A on August 1, 2019. To date, the Army
awarded $287,510,625 to adapt the Iron Dome System to the IDDS-A
configuration and to procure two IDDS-A batteries plus an additional 48
TAMIR interceptors. The IMOD will deliver the first IDDS-A battery by
30 September 2020 for shipment to the U.S. no later than December 2020.
The IMOD will deliver the second IDDS-A battery and additional
interceptors by December 31, 2020 for shipment to the U.S. There are
additional contract options the Army could execute if required for
further adaptation work and logistics support. In FY21, the Army will
execute interoperability and performance testing at White Sands Missile
Range, New Mexico, using the first Iron Dome Battery with U.S. Army
Soldiers
c) List and describe all other non-contractual efforts to integrate
with Sentinel A3; Sentinel A4, IBCS, and/or Link 16, including whether
they use outside vendors or analysts.
The February 25, 2020, ``Enduring Indirect Fire Protection
Capability Increment 2 (IFPC Inc 2) Report to Congress'' describes in
detail the interaction and assessments the Army executed in
coordination with the Israeli Missile Defense Organization (IMDO)
concerning Iron Dome.
In FY19, the Army generated a number of design reference missions
for analysis through high fidelity modeling and simulation to determine
if the potential missile systems have acceptable performance against
the threats. Modeling tools included the Army Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (AIAMD) simulation and Sentinel Digital Simulation
(SDS) for Sentinel A3, as well as SDS runs with updated Sentinel A4
specifications. In keeping with prioritized threats, the design
reference missions included simulated engagements of 1) maneuvering and
non-maneuvering subsonic CM and UAS, and 2) Rocket, Artillery and
Mortar, or ``RAM.''
To support this assessment the Army executed several Technical
Interchange Meetings (TIM) culminating in two major exchanges. From 23-
25 September 2019 the U.S. Government hosted representatives from the
IMDO and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems at Redstone Arsenal. An
objective of the meeting was to understand and agree to requirements
for data to support integration into U.S. AMD architecture, as well as
potential componentization of the systems launcher and TAMIR
interceptor for Enduring IFPC requirements. A joint memorandum between
the Army and IMDO agree upon the transmission of Iron Dome engineering
technical data no later than October 31, 2019.
IMDO transmitted Iron Dome System data on October 31, 2019. The
data included engineering information (e.g., architectural
documentation, sequence diagrams, and system models); however, it did
not include mission command and interceptor component level source
code, algorithms, or mathematical models necessary to successfully dis-
integrate Iron Dome components and then integrate the Iron Dome
launcher and missile into the U.S. Army's IBCS.
During the second major data exchange, the Army and representatives
from IMDO and Rafael Advanced Defense systems met at Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama from November 12-14, 2019. During this TIM, Army subject matter
experts (SMEs) reviewed technical data and assessed the feasibility of
integrating Iron Dome components in the Army's AMD architecture. Army
SMEs assessed a high risk of integration with Iron Dome System into the
AIAMD architecture due to performance dependencies between the BMC,
Multi-Mission Radar (MMR), and TAMIR interceptor.
The Army's analysis concluded the Iron Dome launcher and TAMIR
interceptor's performance is highly reliant on the BMC and the MMR. For
Iron Dome's launcher and TAMIR interceptors to be a viable option for
Enduring IFPC Inc 2, the BMC and MMR functions require transferring
into the Army's IBCS. Additionally, Technical Interchange Meetings
concluded the IMDO does not currently possess component-level models
(e.g., missile seeker model, missile guidance and control model,
missile-fusing model, Six-Degrees of Freedom (6-DoF) IFS) needed to
verify launcher and missile performance within the AIAMD architecture.
The tightly coupled nature of Iron Dome components within the Iron Dome
architecture and a lack of sufficient technical data requires further
development, prototyping, and integration to provide a potential
Enduring IFPC Inc 2 capability.
The Army's FY19 analysis concluded further performance evidence is
required from U.S. Industry and IMDO. The Army's Enduring IFPC Inc 2
competitive approach strategy moving forward requires industry to
demonstrate integration through a successful kill-chain live fire
demonstration, which reduces program risk and provides required
performance data for analysis, and eventual contract award to one
vendor.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO
Mr. Gallego. I understand that there have been some problems with
the Amphibious Combat Vehicle identified during operational testing.
Can you outline what the problems are and how they are being mitigated?
Will these problems affect planned full-rate production for ACV in
the coming months?
Secretary Geurts. Director Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
identified four primary issues in their Operational Assessment report:
Issue 1: Investigate options for preventing damage to steering/
suspension when encountering battlefield debris, such concertina wire.
Mitigation: The ACV operator vision aid system has been improved to
provide ACV unit enhanced situational awareness with respect to
tactical land and water movements in both day and night environments,
which will significantly improve the ability of the vehicle crew to
navigate around or otherwise avoid battlefield debris. Issue 2: Improve
ACV reliability by implementing corrective actions on Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) vehicles to reduce the failure rate and maintenance
demand. Mitigation: 43 design modifications have been implemented into
the LRIP design to improve system reliability. Effectivity of these
modifications will be assessed during planned Reliability Qualification
Testing and Initial Operational Test & Evaluation. Issue 3: Resolve
vision block and Remote Weapon System (RWS) sight freezing and fogging
issues in extreme cold weather environments. Mitigation: LRIP test
articles are equipped with improved vision blocks. Additional testing
will be conducted to assess improvement in the area of extreme cold
environments. Proper preventive maintenance procedures were developed
to combat RWS sight freezing issues noted during previous testing.
Issue 4: Investigate the development of a cold weather special mission
kit to keep Marine crews warm when operating with hatches open in
extreme cold. Mitigation: The Program Office will investigate options
for development of a cold weather special mission kit while other
engineering changes are completed. The Department does not anticipate
any of the issues identified in the DOT&E report to have an adverse
impact on the Full Rate Production decision.
Mr. Gallego. As I understand it, the 1st Marine Division at Camp
Pendleton will be the first to receive ACV. When is that delivery
scheduled?
Secretary Geurts. Company D, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st
Marine Division, Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, CA
will be the first to receive ACV. Initial delivery to one platoon is
scheduled for the fourth quarter of FY 2020. The fielding,
provisioning, and training of this platoon will achieve Initial
Operational Capability for the ACV Family of Vehicles.
Mr. Gallego. What is the wider delivery plan for ACV for the fleet?
Which units will receive ACV, and when?
Secretary Geurts. The ACV delivery plan is prioritized to both the
Supporting Establishment and the 1st Marine Division during the initial
fielding of vehicles. This will ensure a robust training curriculum is
established early for operators and maintainers while simultaneously
delivering capability to the fleet. Subsequent fielding to 2d Marine
Division, Camp Lejeune, 4th Marine Regiment, Okinawa, and 3d Marine
Regiment, Hawaii, will follow, as priorities for the USMC are
continuously evaluated. The 4th Marine Division, Marine Forces Reserve
and the Maritime Prepositioning Force are scheduled to complete ACV
fielding last. The ACV delivery plan will however, require re-
evaluation, following the completion of USMC Force Design to Force
Development planning.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MITCHELL
Mr. Mitchell. Dr. Jette and General Murray, what the specific
impacts to the schedule and costs for delivering the Optionally Manned
Vehicle caused by the decision to cancel the original solicitation for
prototypes? What are the changes being made to the overall requirements
and capabilities of the vehicle?
Secretary Jette and General Murray. Specific impacts to the
schedule and cost of the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV)
program are evolving as we revisit requirements and the acquisition
strategy. On January 16, 2020, the Army decided to cancel the OMFV
solicitation because we determined we were asking for a great deal of
capability on a very aggressive schedule. The solicitation included a
request for early physical bid samples from industry and a First Unit
Equipped (FUE) date of Fiscal Year 2026. The Army is still determining
the new FUE date. The new schedule will reduce risk by providing more
time for preliminary and detailed design phases prior to entering into
a build and test phase with physical prototypes. Additionally, the Army
expects these efforts will increase competition.
Going forward, the Army has begun with a broad set of
characteristics for the OMFV, and will refine them into requirements
through a cooperative and iterative process with industry. In late
February 2020, the Army released nine broad characteristics for
industry feedback: survivability, mobility, growth, lethality, weight,
logistics, transportability, manning, and training. The Army will
conduct extensive engagement with industry to determine their ability
to meet the desired characteristics and what trades may be necessary,
and will use industry feedback and performance trades analysis to
gradually refine the desired characteristics. This refinement will
occur in conjunction with a phased acquisition plan that seeks to
maintain competition. Digital designs, modeling and simulation, and
Soldier Touchpoints will inform and sharpen the characteristics for
prototyping and testing.
Mr. Mitchell. Dr. Jette and General Murray, what is the plan for
testing, developing, and/or procuring active protection systems on the
Stryker and Bradley platforms moving forward? What is the current
status of testing?
Secretary Jette and General Murray. Both the Stryker and Bradley
platforms participated in an expedited effort to identify mature, non-
developmental hard kill active protection systems (APS) for platform
integration and characterization activities.
For the Stryker, the Army tested and determined the Iron Curtain
system was not immediately suitable for the platform. The Army then
conducted a follow-on demonstration with two systems: the Rafael
Trophy-Medium Variant system, and the Rheinmetall Active Defeat System.
While both systems demonstrated the ability to intercept threats,
neither system is suitable for the Stryker platform. However the Army
believes there is value in collecting additional data from these
systems to inform future application of APS for Stryker and other
ground combat platforms. The Army plans on conducting follow-on testing
to collect ballistic data, to include residual penetration data through
a vehicle agnostic effort beginning in 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 2021.
For the Bradley, the Army selected Elbit's (formerly Israeli
Military Industries) Iron Fist-Light Decoupled (IF-LD) system for an
urgent materiel release based on the initial characterization results.
Funding adjustments to the Bradley program has now resulted in the Army
prioritizing available funding for the A4 modernization effort over
procurement of IF-LD systems. Pending additional funding to support
urgent fielding, the expedited effort is delayed.
Additional protection capabilities being considered for the Stryker
platform, and other ground combat platforms include: laser warning
receiver integrated with the Modular APS Controller and Framework; soft
kill APS and passive signature management that impacts the infrared
signature of the vehicle.
Mr. Mitchell. Dr. Jette, I have a question about the Army's plans
for its developmental, opposed-piston Advanced Combat Engine (ACE). In
December of last year, the Army successfully conducted a proof of
concept test of the ACE engine, an engine that has been in development
since 2012, as an internal alternative to the non-developmental combat
vehicle engines available in the national defense industrial base. Yet,
experts predict the continued development of the engine could cost an
additional $100 million over several years to have an engine ready for
Low Rate Initial Production. I understand there are domestically
manufactured diesel engines designed for use in combat vehicles that
are fully developed to military specifications. These engines,
available in the national defense industrial base, have been selected
for use in a range of Army priorities, including the Optionally Manned
Fighting Vehicle, Mobile Protected Firepower, and the Armored Multi-
Purpose Vehicle.
Will you please explain why the Army is pursuing the development
its own diesel engine while fielded and proven engines are available
from private industry?
What gap is the Army hoping to fill with the Advanced Combat
Engine?
What applications does the Army believe the ACE can have in the
future? Could it include any of the vehicles under development by the
NGCV CFT?
Does the Army see a risk of weakening the defense industrial base
should it develop, productionize, and compete its engine for future
land defense platforms?
How does the Army reconcile the development of its engine with its
obligations under 10 USC 2377 to forego its development of a new item
when a comparable item can be readily purchased in the marketplace?
Secretary Jette. The Army is pursuing an Advanced Combat
Powertrain, which includes the Advanced Combat Engine (ACE), due to the
need for combat vehicle platforms with protection from near-peer threat
environments to maintain pace with the force. The driving need for this
development is for a 45-60 ton (T) combat platform to maintain pace
with the force and provide electrical power to support protection,
lethality and communications systems as well as provide propulsion and
thermal management to protect the signature under armor in the volume
of current combat vehicle powertrains. A market survey and analysis
showed available combat powertrains are not sufficient to meet these
requirements, and engines developed for commercial applications were
not sufficient for military operating conditions without further
development. The Army used a competitive acquisition strategy to
develop a new powertrain to meet these requirements in 2015, which
resulted in a new combat vehicle engine design that was demonstrated in
December, 2019. The Advanced Combat Powertrain, including the ACE,
started development in 2015 with the objectives to improve the power
density by 1.5 to 2.0x, increase fuel efficiency by 25 percent,
increase electrical power available by 10x, increase mobility (range by
an additional 100 miles, speed on grades by 50 percent and accelerate
30 percent faster), and improved thermal management, with the Bradley
powertrain as the baseline.
What gap is the Army hoping to fill with the Advanced Combat
Engine? The Advanced Combat Powertrain, including the ACE, addresses a
gap for mobility of combat vehicles that weigh more than 45 tons.
What applications does the Army believe the ACE can have in the
future? We are assessing its continued value and industrial viability.
The ACE may have application to new platforms or upgrades to existing
combat systems that result in system weights of 45T-60T. The engine
architecture is scalable, allowing growth to cover systems up to 80T.
The current application being explored is the Optionally Manned
Fighting Vehicle. The OMFV is expected to be equal to or larger than
the current Bradley Family of Vehicles, and the Army desires room for
future growth which would require a larger ( 1000 horsepower) engine
with much greater electrical power generation but in as small a package
as possible.
Could it include any of the vehicles under development by the NGCV
CFT? The Advanced Combat Engine, may have application to the Optionally
Manned Fighting Vehicle and the Optionally Manned Tank.
Does the Army see a risk of weakening the defense industrial base
should it develop, productionize, and compete its engine for future
land defense platforms? There is no anticipated impact to the defense
industrial base as a result of the engine development program. The ACE
was developed in partnership with Cummins, who currently manufactures
combat vehicle engines. If the Advanced Combat Engine goes into
production, it must be produced by an industrial base partner. The Army
does not plan to manufacture the engine.
How does the Army reconcile the development of its engine with its
obligations under 10 USC 2377 to forego its development of a new item
when a comparable item can be readily purchased in the marketplace? The
Army performed a market survey and analysis showing available combat
powertrains were not sufficient to meet the required mobility for
combat vehicles greater than 45 tons, and engines developed for
commercial applications were not sufficient for military operating
conditions without further development. The Army used a competitive
contracting strategy in 2015 to develop a new powertrain with a target
of 1000 horsepower in the volume of the current Bradley's powertrain to
meet these requirements, which resulted in a new combat vehicle engine
design that was demonstrated in December 2019.
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