[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-62]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
HEARING
ON
REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS
FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 11, 2020
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-509 WASHINGTON : 2020
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
RICK LARSEN, Washington ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
JIM COOPER, Tennessee SAM GRAVES, Missouri
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
RO KHANNA, California AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
JASON CROW, Colorado, Vice Chair DON BACON, Nebraska
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan JIM BANKS, Indiana
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
Bess Dopkeen, Professional Staff Member
Eric Snelgrove, Professional Staff Member
Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 1
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 3
WITNESSES
Oxford, Vayl, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment.................................................... 8
Shaffer, Hon. Alan R., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment and Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment.................................................... 5
Szymanski, VADM Timothy G., USN, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command............................................. 7
Whelan, Theresa M., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.......................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 27
Oxford, Vayl................................................. 64
Shaffer, Hon. Alan R......................................... 40
Szymanski, VADM Timothy G.................................... 53
Whelan, Theresa M............................................ 29
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 89
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY,
POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 11, 2020.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:39 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James R.
Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. The hearing will come to order. I want to
welcome everyone to today's hearing on reviewing the Department
of Defense strategy, policy, and programs for countering
weapons of mass destruction.''
Before we get started, I want to introduce and thank our
four witnesses before us for their contributions on this
important issue: first, Ms. Theresa Whelan, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
Security in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy; the Honorable Al Shaffer, Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the current Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs; Vice Admiral Timothy Szymanski,
the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command,
now the coordinating authority for CWMD [Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction]; and last but not least, Mr. Vayl Oxford,
Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Welcome to everyone.
Over the past few years, both Russia and North Korea have
employed chemical weapons and nerve agents. In Syria, pro-
regime and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] forces use
chemical weapons on civilian populations to achieve their
tactical and strategic objectives.
Advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology, and gene
editing are rapidly changing the playing field to allow
countries and individuals acting with nefarious intent, or even
just by chance, to produce biological agents in a scope and
scale not yet encountered.
And adversaries are working on the development of
hypersonic weapons to deliver warheads faster, possibly faster
than our ability to counter them.
All of these advances are exacerbating the complexity of
the world's WMD threats.
Indeed, the current coronavirus outbreak and global panic
underscores how important scientific research and preparedness
across the interagency is for our national and economic
security.
Our four witnesses hold positions that comprise the bulk of
the Department's assigned roles and responsibilities associated
with aligning CWMD policy and strategy and programs, executing
those programs, delivering current and future personal
protective equipment and other capabilities to our warfighters,
and eliminating our remaining U.S. stockpiles of lethal
chemical agents.
So I am told that our witnesses have been directed by the
Office of Management and Budget not to speak today to the
fiscal year 2021 President's budget request, despite this
hearing taking place after the budget was released yesterday.
For the record, I am deeply disappointed by this directive,
which violates longstanding precedent regarding congressional
oversight. We have much to oversee on policy, programs, and
strategy, and that oversight will be limited without a full
understanding of the fiscal year 2021 budget request.
I look forward to hearing about the Department's activities
to manage and counter the threat of a drastically morphing CWMD
landscape.
This year, we tasked GAO [Government Accountability Office]
to review the preparedness of U.S. forces to counter North
Korean chemical and biological weapons on the Korean Peninsula.
GAO has already highlighted many unsettling issues.
Most pressingly, we questioned whether U.S. Forces Korea
planners have access to the relevant intelligence on North
Korean chemical and biological weapon sites needed to
effectively plan and, if necessary, conduct counter-WMD
operations.
I am deeply concerned that our preparedness for a
significant state-level WMD event is wholly inadequate. We owe
it to the men and women in uniform to ensure that they are
trained and equipped to successfully operate and perform in a
contaminated environment.
In closing, there is much work to be done to strengthen
CWMD policy, programs, and preparedness. This includes
understanding the 2014 strategy in the context of today's
threat landscape, the budget request alignment to the current
strategy, and how the Department's strategy and end states are
consistent with the national-level strategy and whole-of-
government effort.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and note
that following this discussion we will move to a closed,
classified session.
So, with that, before we turn to the witnesses, I would now
want to turn to Ranking Member Stefanik for any comments she
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Langevin.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
The intent of this first subcommittee posture hearing of
the new year is to review the Department's strategy, policy,
and programs for countering weapons of mass destruction. As I
have stated previously, while the DOD [Department of Defense]
faces urgent challenges daily, we can never afford to lose
sight of the critically important mission of countering weapons
of mass destruction.
This is especially true given recent events, as we respond
and contain the global impacts of the coronavirus outbreak.
This evolving threat should serve as a reminder for how
important our involvement is in this arena, through activities
like the Biological Threat Reduction Program; nuclear,
chemical, and biological preparedness plans; crisis response
exercises; and the development of sound policy that guides our
collective response to these types of events.
And, most importantly, it should serve as a reminder that
events of this magnitude require a whole-of-government
response, not limited to just the four DOD organizations
represented here today, but inclusive of HHS [Department of
Health and Human Services], the CDC [Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention], DHS [Department of Homeland Security],
State Department, and State and local officials. The
relationships that you build with these agencies and the
repetitions in times of peace will underpin the effectiveness
of your partnerships in times of crisis.
I appreciate the relentless efforts of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency; USSOCOM [United States Special Operations
Command]; OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy;
Acquisition and Sustainment; and countless other organizations
to prevent, prepare, and respond to CWMD events around the
globe.
While our collective conscience hopes that these weapons
will never be used to wage war in the future, we need only look
to the Syrian, North Korean, and Russian regimes for proof that
this is not the reality of the world we live in. The pursuit,
proliferation, and potential use of weapons of mass destruction
remains a high-consequence threat that we must plan for.
Finally, I am interested to hear from our witnesses today
how recent efforts to streamline and provide additional
leadership and accountability to this problem have matured.
I am also interested in any lessons learned from the
Department's response and contributions to the coronavirus
efforts and how these insights are evolving our CWMD posture
and our view of the criticality of the domestic industrial base
and the Strategic National Stockpile.
And while I know we are not going into specific fiscal year
2021 budget numbers today, I ask each of the witnesses to
highlight any specific interest items relevant to the
discussion today that the committee should be focused on during
our reviews of the President's budget request.
Thank you to our witnesses, and I yield back to the
chairman.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ranking Member Stefanik.
And we will now hear from the witnesses and then move into
a question-and-answer session after that.
I thank all of you for the contributions you are making to
our national security.
And, with that, I would like to recognize Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary Whelan to begin.
STATEMENT OF THERESA M. WHELAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY,
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Ms. Whelan. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin and Ranking
Member Stefanik and members of the subcommittee. I am honored
to testify today regarding the Department of Defense's
countering weapons of mass destruction efforts.
The DOD CWMD enterprise's mission--to dissuade, deter, and,
when necessary, defeat actors who threaten or use WMD against
the United States or our interests, and to be prepared to
respond to and mitigate the effects of WMD use--is, as you both
mentioned, extensive and complex.
Mission success requires the expertise and collaboration of
many DOD components. OSD Policy develops CWMD policy,
strategies, and implementation guidance to ensure the effective
development of capabilities and activities. OSD Policy also
leads related interagency and international engagements.
The threats of WMD use and proliferation are rising. All of
the National Defense Strategy's ``2+3'' actors--China, Russia,
North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations--have or
are pursuing WMD capabilities that could threaten the United
States or U.S. interests.
Further, the WMD threat landscape is continuously changing.
Rapid biotechnology advances are increasing the potential,
variety, and ease of access to biological weapons. Converging
enabling technologies, such as artificial intelligence,
heighten concerns about these developments.
OSD Policy works with DOD components and other departments
and agencies to raise awareness and develop strategies to
mitigate potential threats, while ensuring the United States is
postured to realize the benefits offered by emerging
technologies.
Through proactive collaboration and coordination, the
Department leverages the distributed nature of its CWMD
expertise to address WMD threats across the mission spectrum,
from preventing acquisition and proliferation, to containing
and reducing threats, to responding to WMD-related incidents
and contingencies.
The DOD CWMD Unity of Effort Council is our collaborative
and crosscutting venue for raising awareness of issues,
identifying shortfalls and opportunities, and driving toward
solutions. In 2019, the Council focused on four primary issues:
two on the potential use of pharmaceutical-based agents as
chemical weapons, one on joint force readiness for a Korea
contingency, and one on enterprise-wide prioritization. The
Council also continued working issues raised in 2018.
I want to conclude by highlighting OSD Policy's work to
advance the three NDS [National Defense Strategy] lines of
effort in the CWMD context.
The first is restoring readiness through lethality. One of
our primary objectives is to ensure that our forces can operate
and win in a CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear]-contaminated environment, which denies adversaries the
benefits of using WMD.
Even before its charter was signed, the CWMD Unity of
Effort Council began working with INDOPACOM [United States
Indo-Pacific Command] to review CWMD-related readiness
requirements and ensure it is prepared to meet them. The
Council actively monitors DOD progress towards meeting
requirements and, where appropriate, is addressing identified
shortfalls to ensure our forces are more agile and lethal.
OSD Policy is also working to reform the Department for
greater performance and accountability. To ensure the best
return on investment, OSD Policy is leading an effort, through
the CWMD Unity of Effort Council, to prioritize WMD threats and
provide related policy guidance for the Department to organize
DOD CWMD operations, activities, and investments around a
cohesive threat picture.
The CWMD Unity of Effort Council prioritization anticipates
DOD components will align their prioritization efforts. For
example, OSD Policy will incorporate the Council's WMD
prioritization guidance into our cooperative threat reduction
methodologies.
Finally, a core tenet of many of our CWMD programs is
strengthening alliances and building partnerships. Through work
to reduce WMD threats, the Department's CTR [Cooperative Threat
Reduction] program empowers partners to detect, prevent, and
reduce WMD threats on their own. This reduces the burden on DOD
resources, allows for greater interoperability, and reduces WMD
threats worldwide.
The DOD CWMD enterprise's agility and expertise will enable
us to address the existing and emerging WMD threats of 2020 and
beyond. Thank you for your continued support for our CWMD
mission, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Secretary Whelan.
Secretary Shaffer is now recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN R. SHAFFER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT AND ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT
Mr. Shaffer. Thank you, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member
Stefanik, and members of the subcommittee. I thank you for
inviting us to testify on the Department of Defense's efforts
to counter threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.
I have prepared a written statement for the record, but, in
the interest of time, I would like to highlight just a few key
points for you now.
While the Department-wide efforts for countering weapons of
mass destruction have many key players, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs, which I am charged to lead, is responsible
for developing and fielding capabilities to deter and defend
against the use of weapons of mass destruction and to provide
the means to respond effectively should these weapons be used.
In that effort, we work very closely with each of the
panelists before you as well as other DOD, interagency, and
international counterparts to provide U.S. forces these
capabilities that they need.
I think it is instructive to provide the priorities of my
office. As I said, my office is the office responsible for
developing and fielding capabilities for defense against
chemical and biological weapons and for the safety, security,
and modernization of the nuclear deterrent, in partnership with
most offices in the Pentagon.
Consistent with the National Defense Strategy, our highest
priority is maintaining the viability and modernization of the
nuclear triad as an effective deterrent. At nearly the same
level, we aim to ensure that no soldier, sailor, airman, or
marine is harmed by chemical or biological weapons and,
specifically, to increase emphasis on the emerging chemical and
biological warfare threats that we are seeing come into the
field now.
Our third major priority is to accelerate the destruction
of existing stocks of old chemical weapons--the stockpile of
our chemical weapons and to develop the capability to safely
dispose of chemical weapons and biological weapons our forces
might encounter in hostile environments.
Finally, we need to continue to emphasize rebuilding an
effective and diverse workforce to be able to handle the
threats of the future.
We are in an interesting time for countering weapons of
mass destruction, as the convergence of a number of scientific
disciplines, including artificial intelligence, synthetic
biology, molecular engineering, and system-level autonomy, are
opening the door for development of new challenges.
Whether it is Russia or China upgrading their nuclear
forces with new and advanced nuclear weapons or the use of
novel chemical weapons in 2018 in the suburbs of Salisbury,
England, threats from WMD continue to evolve, modernize, and
expand. In many ways, we have thrown off the old norms.
In particular, I am very concerned that, as the norms
against the use of weapons of mass destruction continue to
erode, those seeking to develop novel chemical weapons or push
the boundaries of biology and genetic engineering for nefarious
purposes continue to expand. I look forward to discussing these
issues with the committee.
In closing, I will continue to work with my interagency
stakeholders, my partners around this table, and our
international allies to provide the capabilities to deter,
confront, and defeat the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Our Nation and our forces deserve this.
I appreciate the committee's continued support for these
efforts, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shaffer can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Secretary Shaffer.
Admiral Szymanski, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF VADM TIMOTHY G. SZYMANSKI, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER,
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral Szymanski. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin,
Ranking Member Stefanik, and members of the subcommittee. I am
honored to appear before you today on behalf of the U.S.
Special Operations Command in its role as the Department's
coordinating authority for countering weapons of mass
destruction.
Special operation forces have a longstanding operational
role in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. As coordinating authority for countering weapons
of mass destruction, SOCOM is also responsible for coordinating
across the joint force to conduct campaign planning, assess
execution of the campaign plan, and make recommendations to the
Department leadership.
In its coordinating authority role, SOCOM relies on the
guidance and partnership of the distinguished Department
leaders here at this table. Our work is nested tightly within
national Department policy and strategy, as conveyed by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Global Security, to ensure unity of effort with the
rest of the Department and U.S. Government.
We partner closely with the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense
Programs to support a robust nuclear, chemical, and biological
defense posture for the joint force.
And the Defense Threat Reduction Agency supports as a
combat supporting agency, providing timely information-sharing,
intelligence and planning coordination, and technological
solutions for the joint and special operation forces.
In the 10 months since I last updated you on SOCOM's work
as the coordinating authority, world events have driven a
number of changes in the landscape of nuclear, chemical, and
biological threats, while other changes continue to evolve in
ways that are harder to measure. Additionally, SOCOM remains
focused on countering the global threat from violent extremist
organizations, but the command and coordinating authority role
have oriented to also address great power competition.
What has not changed is the need for informed, coordinated
action across the U.S. Government and a close relationship of
trust with our partners and allies. As DOD coordinating
authority, our goal is to position the Department to support
just such coordinated action and nurture those key
relationships to prevent the emergence of weapons of mass
destruction capabilities, protect the United States and its
citizens and our national interests from threat actors either
developing new or advancing existing programs, and respond to
and mitigate the effects of any use.
I refer you to my written statement for additional
information regarding our approach to this mission and look
forward to your questions.
In closing, I would like to thank the members of this
subcommittee once more for their support of this important
national security mission. It is a privilege to work together
with Ms. Whelan, Mr. Shaffer, and Mr. Oxford every day to keep
our country safe from nuclear, chemical, and biological
threats. I look forward to our continued partnership with them,
with Members of Congress, and with our interagency and
international partners to ensure our safety now and into the
future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Szymanski can be found
in the Appendix on page 53.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral Szymanski.
Director Oxford is now recognized.
STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT
Mr. Oxford. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your
continued support to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
[DTRA].
I am pleased to join my colleagues appearing before you
today. They represent the key leaders in the Department to
counter the threats associated with weapons of mass
destruction.
I also am proud to represent the men and women of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, an agency that in the last
year was designated as a mission assurance center of excellence
for the Department based on our vulnerability assessments of
defense critical infrastructure around the world.
We advanced the development of advanced nuclear weapons
effects to help STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command]
based on NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] requirements. We
participated in a New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty
mission and the exhibition of Russia's newest strategic
delivery system, the RS-18 variant 2 ICBM [intercontinental
ballistic missile] Avangard, that is designed to deliver the
hypersonic glide vehicle that is to be nuclear capable.
We expanded the application of artificial intelligence and
machine learning to a variety of our data analytics efforts, to
include applications to build 3D models of underground
facilities based on intelligence and geospatial data.
Our Integrated Munitions Effects Assessment was designated
as the enterprise solution for supporting the warfighter for
combating weapons of mass destruction and hardened and deeply
buried targets.
Catapult, our mission-driven data analytics platform that
integrates over 1,100 data sources, was approved as a program
of record.
Continued support with CENTCOM [United States Central
Command] and SOCOM was necessary to counter Iranian nuclear
ambitions and to continue to pursue the D-ISIS [Defeat ISIS]
campaign and to confront the Taliban threat in Afghanistan.
Since appearing before you last, the Agency has continued
its pivot towards the goals of the National Defense Strategy
and to confront the ever-complex and dynamic threat environment
composed of state and non-state actors, along with their
proxies and surrogates. This environment places increasing
demands of working across DOD, the interagency, and with
international partners.
Further, the adversaries we have faced have spent decades
developing globally connected networks, requiring us to adopt
global partnerships and a global perspective to fully identify
the threat networks associated with China, Russia, Iran, and
the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]. To address
this global nature of the threat, we have amplified our
partnership with USSOCOM to take on additional support for the
geographical commanders responsible for dealing with these
adversaries.
Beginning in 2018, I directed a full bottom-up review of
the Agency's programs and personnel to make sure that we were
aligned and focused our efforts on strengthening the nuclear
deterrent, tailoring our support to the conventional force, and
evolving our counter-threat network capabilities from a unique
focus on VEOs [violent extremist organizations] to a threat-
based focus on all the adversaries in the National Defense
Strategy.
In doing so, we recognized that we must confront and
overcome several key challenges: scaling our network analysis
approach from the D-ISIS, Taliban, and al-Qaida threats to a
globally connected nation-state threat; recognizing that
actions against nation-states to compete in the gray zone
requires a different decision calculus than countering
terrorist networks, thus necessitating even closer
relationships with the combatant commanders, OSD, the Joint
Staff, the interagency, and our international partners; and,
most importantly, recognizing the need to more fully understand
the intentions and motivations of near-peer competitors.
I will close with two recent examples of long-term efforts
paying off in significant ways.
First, the CTR program's biosurveillance program work with
Thailand enabled their officials to detect their country's
first case of the novel coronavirus outbreak, thus helping them
mitigate further spread of the disease.
Second, the FDA [Food and Drug Administration] recently
licensed the first and only Ebola virus disease vaccine, made
possible by DTRA research and development. With hundreds of
thousands of doses now administered across the U.S., the EU
[European Union], and Africa, it is protecting healthcare
workers, reducing the allure of Ebola as a threat agent, and
better protecting the warfighter.
Again, thank you for your support of the Agency, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford can be found in the
Appendix on page 64.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Director Oxford.
Members will now be recognized for 5 minutes. I will begin
by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
Secretary Whelan, how is the Department thinking about
biotechnology and synthetic biology and other nontraditional
materials and capabilities that could be used to cause mass
destruction?
Ms. Whelan. Thanks, Congressman, for the question.
Actually, this is a very important issue, and we are glad that
you are raising it and raising the awareness. It is one of
great concern to us that we have been looking at from a policy
perspective, and I will let my colleagues also comment on what
they are doing specifically in their areas of expertise.
We have actually funded the National Academy of Sciences to
do a study for us on the changing nature of biodefense threats
and potential security vulnerabilities to give us some
overarching perspectives on it.
But we are very concerned about the linkage between new
biotech capabilities and new computer-based AI, artificial
intelligence, that can enable and lower barriers to access
capabilities to use new biotechnology in nefarious ways.
So this is something the Department is concerned about, and
I will ask my colleagues if they would like to comment on what
they are doing specifically to address the issues.
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, if I could, when we look at the
nefarious ways that synthetic bio could be used, it can be used
to direct modifications to the human genome, allowing for new
pathogens to be created. Known pathogens can be started from
scratch without a lot of advance warning. They can engineer and
produce novel pathogens that have never existed before. We can
make pathogens more dangerous, more transmissible, more
virulent in their makeup.
Within the Agency, working with Mr. Shaffer's NCB [Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense] office, we have undertaken
several different initiatives to counter this threat.
First of all, we are increasing our hazardous assessment of
emerging threats based on large datasets to inform future
capability development.
We are developing new hazard prediction models with data
produced from threat agent science.
We are also developing detectors capable of detecting broad
levels of emerging threats; similarly, developing diagnostics
to rapidly provide the warfighters assessments of the threats
they face.
We are also developing medical countermeasures to start to
address some of these novel agents that may appear on the
battlefield in the future.
Those are just a few of the examples of what the chem-bio
development research program that we execute on behalf of Mr.
Shaffer's office is attempting to satisfy.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Director.
Secretary Whelan, there has been increasing attention to
disease surveillance and response globally, particularly as the
coronavirus crisis accelerates. A global biological pandemic
would arguably present the single biggest threat to the U.S.
short of a nuclear war.
Considering the ongoing response to the coronavirus, what
are you learning about the gaps in the Department's ability to
respond to large-scale biological events, whether manmade or
naturally occurring?
Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Congressman.
So we have been--we are actually still in the middle,
obviously, of supporting our colleagues, particularly at HHS
and DHS and CDC, in responding to the coronavirus. And
certainly, within DOD, our Health Affairs Office has issued
some of its own guidance to the force for their health
protection.
We are still assessing how this could impact us more
broadly. We have our office's NORTHCOM [United States Northern
Command] and our defense planning offices have looked at
planning for pandemics. We have faced this problem before with
H1N1 [influenza A, swine flu] back about 10 years ago, and then
we recently faced it looking at Ebola in West Africa. So we are
constantly absorbing the lessons learned and using them to
address our force protection.
But let me turn to Mr. Shaffer for some of his comments.
Mr. Langevin. Yes. I am particularly interested in the gaps
in the Department's ability to respond.
Mr. Shaffer. Sir, I think that, as Ms. Whelan said, we are
still in the middle of analysis. I have the Defense Logistics
Agency that comes underneath my portfolio. They are involved
every day in a whole-of-government approach in a telecon and
emergency response meeting.
They are gathering up where we are with respect to ability
to fulfill the supply chain. I do think we have to look at
ability to mass-produce vaccines, develop and mass-produce
vaccine in a very short order. We have to balance some of the
FDA restrictions on rapidly deploying vaccines with the help
that they will give.
But I think it will take some time to deconstruct where we
saw the specific gaps in the supply chain. My job is worrying
about the supply chain and then in other parts of the policy
response. We are committed to doing that. And I will come back
with a supply chain answer after we have a chance to analyze
it.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, good. Thank you.
Director Oxford, any comment?
Mr. Oxford. So, Mr. Chairman, one thing I would bring to
light is what we talked about when we talk about synthetic bio
and couple that with the announcement that was made last night
with the Chinese hacking Equifax. If you couple that with the
other hacking they have done over time, of Anthem, Marriott, et
cetera, OPM [United States Office of Personnel Management], the
large database that is being created, in conjunction with what
we do in outsourcing our genetic engineering to the Chinese
because it is cheaper, you can imagine what the potential
outcomes are.
So we ought to be looking at this as not necessarily a
dangerous road but we ought to be looking at it from what we
can understand about transmissibility and those kinds of things
in case there were a separate kind of outbreak.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Director.
Ms. Stefanik is now recognized.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Oxford, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has
been a valuable tool that DOD uses to proactively reduce the
threat posed by weapons of mass destruction through
partnerships with foreign countries. And, in fact, I have had
the opportunity to learn more about those as I have led
congressional delegations.
Last year, Congress increased the amount authorized and
appropriated by $35 million. Can you explain the return on
investment of the CTR program and also explain its importance
nested under the National Defense Strategy?
Mr. Oxford. Yes. Thank you for the question. And, again,
when we receive adds like that, what we do is we sit down with
Mr. Shaffer's office and Ms. Whelan's office and we go through
a prioritization across the globe to make sure we are applying
those in the most applicable way.
Since I took office, I have made an emphasis of not only
accounting for the National Defense Strategy priorities but
also working more directly with the combatant commanders to
make sure we are operating in the right locations within their
geographical areas, as they understand the region better than
we might in DC, just to make sure we are putting the right
pressure points on the system.
So I think what you have found over time, when you go to
places like Jordan, when you see the Philippine coastal watch
center, and what I mentioned about the work that we have done
in Thailand that identified the coronavirus very quickly, there
is value added throughout the world with these programs.
Ms. Stefanik. Next question is for Mr. Shaffer. This is
somewhat of a follow-up to the chairman's question.
Obviously, in the midst of the coronavirus outbreak,
concerns have been raised that the Strategic National Stockpile
isn't sufficiently prepared to deal with emerging diseases.
There are legitimate concerns about shortages of medicines,
health supplies, surgical masks, and vulnerabilities in our
supply chain when the manufacturing of these items has moved to
China.
So how is DOD building resilience into its stockpile of
chemical and biological supplies? And what are we learning from
this particular instance with the coronavirus experience?
Mr. Shaffer. Congresswoman, that is a terrific question.
As I tried to explain, we are still in the process of
understanding where our gaps and shortfalls are. I think we all
recognize that, not just in the chemical-biological agent area
but in a large number of areas, we have outsourced our
manufacture of critical equipment. You talk about chemical-
biological effects. I look at microelectronics, where we don't
have nearly enough indigenous capacity. I think that is a
nationwide problem.
We are going to come back and take a look at what we have
to do for chemical and biologic defense for our troops. And
then, getting beyond that, we will work with CDC and other
parts of government for a whole-of-government response.
My concern really is for our troops that we deploy and
making sure those troops and the families that are with them
have the protection that they need, have the right antidotes,
have the right protective gear. But it is something I think we
all have to step back and take a look at, are we prepared for
this type of event.
Ms. Stefanik. And the reason I emphasize it, I know it is
repetitive of the chairman's question, but it is really
important to learn the lessons. And there are concerns on both
sides of the aisle to make sure that we apply what we are
learning today of the shortfalls and make sure that we address
in the future.
Admiral, SOCOM has now been the coordinating authority
capacity for 2\1/2\ years. Can you explain how SOCOM views this
responsibility and what specific actions the command has taken
to better coordinate countering-WMD activities across the
Department?
Admiral Szymanski. Yes. Maybe I can start with the second
half of the question first, on the coordination piece, because
I think, since we briefed you last year, we have aligned with
the NDS in concert with, you know, my great colleagues here at
the table.
But we have been able to take--if you recall, our
functional campaign plan is based on a model of pathway defeat,
in the opening statement from Secretary Whelan, from
acquisition to use.
We have been able to take key objectives and tasks and
lines of efforts in that and build that into the global
campaign plans of three other combatant commands. Two of those
are still in draft, two of the threat actor nations that the
other geographical combatant commanders have that global
campaign response for across the lines of prepare, protect, and
respond.
So that is one. We have been able to actually integrate
some of the concepts, the key tasks and objectives, into our
globally integrated exercises that the Chairman is using, and
we have been able to develop a common operating picture, with
the great help of DTRA, on all of our DOD-wide operations,
activities, and investments to see that in real time on the
Joint Staff's common integrated--COP [Common Operational
Picture].
What was the first part of your question? I answered the
second.
Ms. Stefanik. You know, you are 2 years into being the
coordinating authority. It was broad; how you view this
responsibility, and then what specific action. So I think you
covered it, and we can get more into detail in the closed
session.
I will yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ms. Stefanik.
Mr. Larsen is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Shaffer, soon after coronavirus was discovered, the
Chinese mapped the genome and blasted that out into the
scientific community so that folks could start working on
diagnostics and vaccine development. Now, the diagnostic kit
was developed fairly quickly, but the vaccine is probably 4
months away, 5 months away from test and probably a year away
or maybe slightly less from being okayed.
What role are you all playing here in the United States,
maybe with the CDC or without, to kind of facilitate a solution
on that? And then what is the broader lesson as well?
Mr. Shaffer. Thank you, sir.
So I think you hit it in your question. The role of the
Department of Defense is to support HHS and CDC in developing a
vaccine. We won't take lead in that. We will make our
facilities available for test, but we are in a support role for
the greater health emergency.
I do think we have to take a look at lessons learned, at
how long does it take to create a vaccine that can be used, and
then how do we think about taking time out of that equation.
And I think that is something we are all going to have to
discuss over the next coming months.
There are ways to cut some time out. It comes with risk.
And it is like everything, it is going to be a risk-versus-
value assessment. But we need to look at taking time out, and
we will support the CDC in every way possible.
Mr. Larsen. Okay.
So, Mr. Oxford, the downside of this is that the genome of
the coronavirus was mapped pretty quickly and blasted out to
the rest of the world, and you probably saw it and said, ``Oh,
no, I have to do something in defense about this.'' As opposed
to an offense, create a vaccine, you have to figure out what
this might mean for defending against its use against anybody,
including our folks.
How have you all approached that at DTRA?
Mr. Oxford. So, again, you know, our posture this time
versus the Ebola outbreak is really to be in support of HHS.
They have a lot of leadership there that didn't exist in 2014,
so they have taken the reins on this.
What we are looking at are things similar to what I
mentioned before. If this were a different kind of virus that
posed a lot more serious consequence, what should we be doing
at that point in time?
And Mr. Shaffer has hit on this as well, that, you know,
one of the things, if you are in the offensive chemical
business, you do, you develop countermeasures alongside of
that. We don't have that luxury. So what we have to do is get
out in front of it with the science, as I mentioned before,
looking at what the potential emerging threats are and starting
to look at broad-based medical countermeasures ahead of the
threat.
In the closed sessions, we can talk about some of the other
research that we know are going on and what measures we are
already taking, because we know they are happening.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
So coronavirus presumably is a natural bio threat, but
synthetic drugs like fentanyl aren't. And so I think we can
probably all relate, as Members of Congress, in our districts
to the opioid crisis and the role that opioids play, including
fentanyl.
But that is as a domestic crisis. Are you looking at
fentanyl as a bioweapon, a synthetic bioweapon? And what steps
are you taking?
Mr. Oxford. Absolutely. In fact, we have done this, again,
in conjunction with the chem-bio defense program under Mr.
Shaffer's guidance. Since we were last before you, we have
actually done field trials with live agent. We have done it
here in the U.S., as well as with the Brits in the U.K. [United
Kingdom].
I can tell you in the open session that the results of
those tests say that fentanyl is about equal to VX [nerve
agent, synthetic chemical compound] in terms of its lethality.
Carfentanyl is a thousand times. So, if you reverse that, what
that means is a lot less agent to cause the same kind of damage
as VX.
We also know that the materials, fentanyl and carfentanyl,
will persist in the environment, soil and water, for weeks to
months. So it is not something that just goes away, as chlorine
will. So it poses other challenges for long-term operations.
We can talk about force protection and some of the other
features in the closed session.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
And then in your testimony and in our discussion in the
last couple weeks, you talked about the transition more from
threat-based to network-based, looking at threats to more
networks. Can you discuss any of that in this open session?
Mr. Oxford. We can talk a lot more in the closed session,
but one of the things--I would go back to some of the other
questions about getting out in front of these--these--the
exporting of capability, for example, to China.
We need to be looking at the supply-chain network both
incoming and outcoming from this country. We need to identify
what components others may be relying upon U.S. technologies
that we want to identify up front, as well as what they may be
exploiting within universities and those kinds of things.
So there is a lot there that the network analysis will
illuminate, as the ranking member mentioned. What this does is
allow us to use the authorities of the interagency, like
Commerce and Treasury, to act on information the Department of
Defense can develop.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Conaway is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Panel, thank you all.
Turning to something a little more mundane, but can we get
an update on our Chemical Demilitarization Program? It has had
a couple of Nunn-McCurdy breaches in the last 8 years. We have
another billion in spending this year. Are we going to make the
2023 deadline?
And I guess I would ask Mr. Shaffer--you looked like you
were about to answer that--can you give us a status on that
overall program?
Mr. Shaffer. Yes, sir, we will make the December 2023
deadline, and we will actually beat it. We have a new program
manager that we put in place of it.
When we get upstairs, I will have a placemat to put in
front of you.
The destruction has gone up remarkably in Colorado at the
Pueblo Arsenal. And we have started destruction in Bluegrass in
Kentucky against the other major stockpile.
We are also bringing on line three additional static
detonation chambers. To a layperson, you can think of, we heat
the thing to such a degree that it vaporizes the entire
munition.
Yeah, we are going to make it.
Mr. Conaway. On our budget?
Mr. Shaffer. Oh, absolutely. We will not be asking--well,
it depends, sir. On our original budget estimate or what we
have right now? We will make it on the budget estimate for
right now. We will not go higher.
Mr. Conaway. The other question was, the report that you
just said you had, you were looking at accelerating--or ways to
accelerate the destruction. And that is what you are talking
about there, that you may get it in ahead of time?
Mr. Shaffer. Yeah, bringing on--so we have done a number of
things. We are bringing on additional static detonation
chambers. We are working with the local State environmental
agencies to increase our throughput. We are going to 24-hour
operations in some cases.
And the increase in the rate of destruction of the existing
stockpile is remarkable. I think, as of a year ago, we were
somewhere under 20 percent. I have Dr. Charles Ball behind me,
who is responsible for this. Within the next couple of weeks,
we will be over 50 percent destroyed at Pueblo.
Mr. Conaway. All right. Good news.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Conaway.
Ms. Houlahan is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Shaffer, my first question is for you. It is my
understanding that the GAO completed a report about 5 years ago
that established that the Department had made progress at
researching, developing, and making available medical
countermeasures against biological threats but did not use its
established process for annually updating its list of threat
priorities.
From there, it is my understanding, as well, that the
Department concurred with the GAO's findings and identified
steps to address their recommendations.
Can you, in this environment, possibly share with us what
the Department has done over the last few years to implement a
process to ensure that the biological threats list is
prioritized appropriately?
Mr. Shaffer. So, ma'am, I hate to say this, but 5 years ago
I was departing the Department, going for a great 3 years in
Paris, and no one has talked to me about this GAO report. So
let me take this one for the record and get a better answer
back to you.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I would appreciate that one.
Mr. Shaffer. Yes.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 89.]
Ms. Houlahan. And my second question actually sort of
relates to that as well. I am concerned that we don't give
enough attention to biological and chemical weapons and spend a
lot more time thinking about nuclear threats than we possibly
should. And I am just trying to make sure that we have a
really--what are we doing to make sure that we think about
these issues and that we are addressing these in an adequate
way?
How are we making sure that we are having adequate
investments in biological threats and that we are not spending
our time in threats that are potentially antiquated in some
ways?
Mr. Shaffer. Yes, ma'am. I presume that is for me. So I
will answer this in kind of a broad perspective.
When I took over responsibility, I looked at where we were,
what our investment priorities were. I had to hire a new Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical-Biological Defense
Programs. My charge to her was, we have got to increase
emphasis on nontraditional agents.
Nontraditional agents include fourth-generation nerve
agents, they include pharmaceutically based agents, and they
include biological agents from either genetic modifications,
synthetic biology, and that like.
Her job is to increase our investment, shift our investment
portfolio. I have run that up through the leadership.
This will be crass, but one of my first tasks to her--I
will clean it up--was by this April develop a scare-the-heck-
out-of-them briefing for senior leadership within the
Department. We will be happy to bring it over to you. When we
get into the classified environment, the things that we are
seeing are among the most worrisome that I have seen. I came on
Active Duty--I shouldn't tell you this--in 1976. I am concerned
with where the threat space is going----
Ms. Houlahan. So, sir----
Mr. Shaffer [continuing]. And she has to get it right.
Ms. Houlahan. So, sir, I am deeply concerned as well, and
I, you know, did not come on Active Duty in 1976 but, rather,
in 1989, but these are the things that keep me up at night. Do
you feel as though the President's new proposed budget
adequately, kind of, reflects these priorities and where the
threat currently is vis-a-vis nuclear versus biological versus
chemical?
Mr. Shaffer. So I will tell you that the President's budget
does have a fairly good investment for chemical-biological
programs.
Within that portfolio, I have tasked Dr. Vann [Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological
Defense] to shift the emphasis. We can do some of that within
the year of execution. I am actually really targeting fiscal
year 2022 to come in with a significantly altered investment
profile.
We are where we are, but we are going to work it very hard
to get the profile right.
Ms. Houlahan. And do you think, proportionate to the
nuclear threat, that the President's budget is a good
representation, an accurate representation of our concern, the
things that keep you and I up at night?
Mr. Shaffer. So my answer will probably surprise you. Yes,
it does, only because of what I am seeing also in the nuclear
enterprise in China and Russia.
We are seeing just really, really aggressive behavior in
all three forms of weapons of mass destruction from those
nations, from Iran, from North Korea. So I have a hard time
parsing out any particular weapon that could kill literally
hundreds of thousands of people. It could be chemical, it could
be biological, it could be nuclear. All three are very, very
challenging threats.
Ms. Houlahan. And you would probably be surprised, as well,
to hear that I am also concerned about all of those three
threats, and I just want to make sure we get it right----
Mr. Shaffer. Good. So do I.
Ms. Houlahan [continuing]. Spend the right kind of
resources.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ms. Houlahan.
Mr. Scott is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As we talk about countering these threats, it is obviously
not just the U.S. but our partner nations that are helping us
counter them.
And, Mr. Oxford, you mentioned the Chinese hacking Equifax.
There is public reporting that China has threatened Germany,
Denmark, and France that if Huawei is discriminated against or
not selected in the development of their networks that there
will be retaliation, economic retaliation, from China towards
companies from those countries.
We have seen the U.K. move forward with Huawei network
integration. That is obviously a concern for many of us on this
committee and throughout the United States. And we expect that
other nations--obviously, some have chosen not to and are being
threatened. Some will choose to use the cheaper solution.
My concern is with regard to intelligence-sharing and the
potential exposure of sources if we share across with an ally
that is using the Huawei network.
So my question, Mr. Shaffer, I guess is for you. When we
talk about acquisition efforts with the United Kingdom or with
other partner nations who are using Huawei or other companies
that we deem to be not safe for us to transmit sensitive
information through, what issues do you see moving forward with
these types of bilateral engagements with countries that are
our friends and partners if they are using Huawei to design
their networks?
Mr. Shaffer. Sir, the use of Huawei by our closest allies
and friends is a concern. There is an awful lot of activity
going on at the diplomatic level. If we do not believe a nation
can protect information, we will not share it with them. And I
think anything else we say is probably best saved for the
closed session.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
Mr. Shaffer. But you hit upon a very strong concern. It is
a strong concern by Secretary Esper. It is a strong concern by
both myself and my boss. And when you look at the convergence
of digitization of data with artificial intelligence that Mr.
Oxford just talked about, there is a substantive threat to the
Nation. And I will just leave it at that.
Mr. Scott. I will accept that. And I would just make one
further statement. I mean, hacking is something that you expect
from a rogue nation or from a terrorist organization. China is
one of the largest nations in the world, one of the three most
powerful nations in the world. The fact that they conduct
themselves this way is of great concern to me and, I know, the
committee as a whole. And I will leave it at that and wait
until we go behind closed doors.
And, Mr. Chairman, I would yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Bacon is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much. I thought I wasn't next in
line.
First of all, I appreciate all of your expertise here
today----
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Bacon, I misspoke. I apologize.
Mr. Bacon. Okay.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Gallagher is now recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bacon. That is what I was thinking, too.
Mr. Langevin. Yeah.
Mr. Gallagher. I assumed that it is because Bacon is a
general and I am just a captain, but----
Mr. Langevin. My apologies.
Mr. Gallagher. That is fine. That is fine.
I don't know who to direct this to. Possibly to Mr.
Shaffer.
How much have recent advances in synthetic biology and our
ability to, sort of, literally print organisms--right? We are
not just talking about CRISPR [clustered regularly interspaced
short palindromic repeats], rearranging the A, T, C's, and G's.
We are sort of printing sequences of A, T, C's, and G's. There
is sort of a commercial market for that.
Give us a sense of how that has changed the threat picture
and where we are relative to the Chinese in that space.
Mr. Shaffer. So I will tell you, I have a very good staff.
I am not the biological expert, but my understanding is that
the U.S. still leads in these technologies, but there is an
awful lot of information, intellectual property flow to China.
We know the Chinese are very good. We know that they are
using advanced techniques. I think it is something we have to
monitor very closely.
And the whole business of academic freedom and academic
research, coupled with national security, is something we all
have to think about in the information age. What is the risk-
payoff benefit between total openness of information and
ability to do very exquisite data mining?
And this is something I think we--as a technologist, I can
explain where the opportunity is, where the threat is, but we
are really opening up a really significant policy debate, sir.
Mr. Gallagher. Yeah.
I don't know if anyone on the panel has thoughts on--I
mean, we are seeing the emergence of companies that are
manufacturing and printing organisms right now, which is
stunning.
To what extent does DOD think about that as an area where
we need to invest further? I would just open it up, if anybody
does study these issues.
Mr. Oxford. I think, similar to the question that Ms.
Houlahan asked before, it depends--I mean, there is plenty of
money in chem-bio research; it is a matter of focus. So I think
it is a matter of, what is our purpose for getting into that
field versus what the Chinese and others may be doing.
So I think it is really a matter of focus and intent that
we have to look at. We would be doing this for the right
reasons; they may not. So I think it is really the focus that I
would go to.
Mr. Gallagher. Quickly, and this may be relegated to a
classified session, but to what extent when we war-game
scenarios on the Korean Peninsula are we including the
assumption that the DPRK will initially use biological and
chemical weapons?
For example, the thousands of artillery pieces that are
built into Kaesong Heights that can range Seoul will be armed
with chemical and biological weapons. Is that a worst-case
scenario we plan against? Do we plan against it at all?
Ms. Whelan. Congressman, yes, absolutely. I mean, we have
to be ready to operate in a CBRN-contaminated environment.
And, in fact, our readiness to operate in such an
environment, we believe, hopefully, is a bit of a deterrent to
the use. If we can show that no matter what you throw at us,
our forces are still going to be able to operate effectively,
we think that might actually serve as a deterrent.
But, yes, we do plan for that. More detail would have to
wait until the closed session. But it is absolutely on our
radar screen.
Mr. Gallagher. And just one quick follow-up. And I do hope
we can follow up in classified session. I mean, it is one thing
to allow our troops to operate in such an environment, but when
you are dealing with the second-largest metropolitan area in
the world, I mean, there are limits to our ability to minimize
civilian casualties in such a scenario, correct?
Ms. Whelan. Yes, there are. That is right.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay.
Well, with that, in an effort to get to the classified
session, I will yield the minute and 2 seconds I have left.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
Ms. Slotkin is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Slotkin. I apologize. I am just coming in, so I am
going to yield my time and just listen, because I don't want to
take us off track.
Mr. Langevin. All right. Thank you very much.
Now Mr. Bacon is recognized.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate you coming in and sharing your expertise
today, to our great panel.
I have three questions. I am going to direct them, and try
to keep the answers succinct, if you would.
My first question is to Ms. Whelan and Mr. Shaffer. If a
WMD attack or accident occurs, the United States may need to be
able to treat massive numbers of casualties quickly. This will
likely create a demand on emergency and medical services that
would overwhelm local or regional available resources. And so,
like, at UNMC, or University of Nebraska Medical Center, we
have a great capacity to treat bio emergencies, and we are
trying to expand upon that.
So my question is, to Ms. Whelan and Mr. Shaffer, what are
we doing to ensure that we have the capacity at the national
level to effectively respond to a WMD-scale event, in terms of
medical facilities, beds, and specialized training?
Thank you.
Ms. Whelan. Thanks, Congressman.
So, on the DOD side, we actually have a CBRN Response
Enterprise that we have put together over the last two decades.
And we have about 18,000-plus, give or take, Active and Reserve
forces who are trained to be able to support the local first
responders and, obviously, FEMA [Federal Emergency Management
Agency].
We work through FEMA at the national level and would only
be engaged, at least with our Federal and Reserve forces,
through FEMA at the national level. At the State level,
obviously, the National Guard can come into play under State
authority.
So we are prepared to support if there is a domestic event.
Mr. Bacon. Mr. Shaffer, anything else to add?
Mr. Shaffer. No.
Mr. Bacon. Okay.
My second question is to Admiral Szymanski and Mr. Oxford.
At the University of Nebraska Omaha, we have the National
Strategic Research Institute, which is a university-affiliated
research center that is focused on technologies for detecting
and countering nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as
well as disease outbreak.
Can you speak to the importance of these kind of
university-affiliated research centers in building our ability
to detect and respond to WMD events?
Mr. Oxford. Congressman, I think one of the things that
would be interesting is we have used the center in Omaha to
actually attract future talent. We fund some of the research
out there.
We have also used some of the staff expertise within the
office to actually help us start to war-game some of the
advanced threats. For example, we just ran a limited nuclear
war game within the agency to find out what challenges we may
have confronting, for example, Russian use of nuclear weapons.
It was talent that was out at the facility that we actually
used.
Mr. Bacon. Uh-huh.
Admiral Szymanski. I think, generically, to all those
affiliated universities, SOCOM uses a number of universities
for different aspects of SOCOM's enterprise and its portfolios.
And just recently we conducted a conditions-based assessment or
an overall assessment of our sensitive activities going
forward. We can talk a little bit more about that. But we would
not be able to get some of the analysis and the research done
that is required otherwise without those affiliated
universities.
Mr. Bacon. Well, our University of Nebraska is very proud
of what it does, and they want to continue supporting DOD.
While Mr. Oxford is here, I would just like feedback on
some questions on Open Skies. Can you give us an update on the
Open Skies mission? You know, it has been a little bit under
the microscope lately, and I am a big supporter, but I would
like to get your update.
Mr. Oxford. Sure. Thanks for the question.
First of all, last fall, working with the Joint Staff-
Policy and the National Security Council, there was a
determination made to actually increase the strategic value of
every mission that we flew. So we have actually, without going
into detail, we have started flying in places within and over
Russia that we hadn't before. We just completed a mission in
late January that--we had never flown in January before.
So this is a matter of using the strategic nature of the
treaty that may not have been used the way it should have for
the last 20 years. We have another mission going on right now,
so back-to-back missions. And if we fly all the missions
currently planned this year, it will be the busiest Open Skies
season ever.
Mr. Bacon. Great to hear.
What is the value of Open Skies to our allies? Because I
think that that is an area that we are missing in our
discussions.
Mr. Oxford. So, you know, when we talk about leaving Open
Skies, we have a lot of consultation with our treaty partners.
And they have been universal in the need for this dialogue,
this ability to do that, and the ability, again, to continue to
put pressure on Russia.
I was at EUCOM [United States European Command] last week.
We were talking about EUCOM's European strategy for 2020. And
it is clear NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] was
coming together, like it hasn't in many years, as a community,
worried about Russian influence, and the ability to push back
on Russia has become more of a NATO issue. So these kinds of
capabilities, I think, they find very valuable.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
I yield.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Bacon.
I believe all members have had the opportunity to go
around, one round of 5-minute questioning. So, with that, if
there are no additional questions, we are going to recess now
and move to the closed session.
[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 11, 2020
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 11, 2020
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 11, 2020
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
Mr. Shaffer. While the rapid advances in technology have made it
increasingly less practical or effective to maintain a threat list,
following the outcome of the GAO report 14-442SU, the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program (CBDP) established mechanisms to improve
stakeholder awareness of existing and emerging threats, similar to how
the intelligence community has moved to Dynamic Threat Assessments to
allow continuous review and updates to the threat environment. The CBDP
incorporates a series of threat reviews and discussions into our
planning process referred to as Threats, Risks, and Vulnerabilities
(TRV) discussions. The TRV is a classified forum with the intelligence
community, Services, the Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands to discuss
both chemical and biological threats. This forum also considers our
defensive capabilities to address those threats and is our primary
mechanism for sharing threat priorities across the CBDP stakeholders.
The CBDP Joint Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review process, led by the
Army's Executive Agent Secretariat, and Medical Countermeasures (MCM)
working groups subsequently hold follow-on discussions about the
alignment of MCM research and development efforts with the threat
information and the National Defense Strategy to ensure the CBDP
medical portfolio addresses the highest priority threats while
considering available MCM candidates and resources. These working
groups meet throughout the year to address key programmatic changes,
discuss program strategic guidance, address new information about
changes to the threat environment, and evaluate Service vulnerabilities
to inform priorities for resourcing and capability development. The
CBDP is also developing an analytic methodology that will help inform
these discussions by ``scoring'' existing and potential threat agents;
an adversary's ability and intent to use the agents; and the ability of
our defensive capabilities to mitigate the impacts of the threats. We
anticipate having this capability available to inform our threat
discussions in October 2020. We will document updated threat
prioritizations in annual CBDP Planning Guidance. Additionally, the
CWMD Unity of Effort (UOE) Council is working within the Department to
develop a mechanism to ensure the department's priorities for CWMD,
informed by threat, risk, and policy considerations, are clearly
articulated across the Department. The CBDP efforts inform, and are
informed by, the CWMD UOE work. In total, these efforts have improved
the Department's ability to ensure that development of defensive
capabilities against traditional and non-traditional threats are
aligned and considered through holistic, threat-informed, and riskbased
assessments. [See page 16.]