[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-55]
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE ERA OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 11, 2019
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-507 WASHINGTON : 2020
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
RICK LARSEN, Washington ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
JIM COOPER, Tennessee SAM GRAVES, Missouri
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
RO KHANNA, California AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
JASON CROW, Colorado, Vice Chair DON BACON, Nebraska
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan JIM BANKS, Indiana
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
Jason Schmid, Professional Staff Member
Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 1
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
WITNESSES
Langan-Riekhof, Maria, Director of the Strategic Futures Group at
the National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.......................................... 4
Mercado, Victorino, Performing the Duties of Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 6
Nikolich, Milan, Director, Defense Research and Engineering for
Research and Technology, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering........................... 9
Tipton, Neill, Director for Defense Intelligence (Collection and
Special Programs), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence................................................... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Langan-Riekhof, Maria........................................ 29
Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 27
Mercado, Victorino, joint with Neill Tipton and Milan
Nikolich................................................... 36
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 51
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE ERA OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 11, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:37 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James R.
Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. The subcommittee will come to order.
We want to welcome everyone to today's hearing on ``Climate
Change in the Era of Strategic Competition.''
Today we will receive testimony on the impacts of climate
change, from extreme weather events to changing Arctic ice
coverage, on U.S. national security and how the Department's
strategies and plans are addressing those critical challenges.
Climate change appears to present three types of threats:
direct threats to U.S. military installations, and to our
ability to train and execute various missions, and more
indirect geopolitical unrest. The IETC [Intelligence and
Emerging Threats and Capabilities] Subcommittee held a joint
hearing with the Readiness Subcommittee exactly 8 weeks ago
today to discuss the resiliency of military installations to
emerging threats, including climate change.
Today's follow-on hearing is meant to highlight the threat
that climate change presents geopolitically; home in on the
Department's efforts to plan for the emerging operating
environment; and hear about innovative approaches and
technologies to address and ameliorate the threat.
The Armed Services Committee, and this subcommittee in
particular, has placed considerable focus on the intersection
of climate change and geopolitics, and how that intersection
implicates our strategic and operational planning. There's
broad bipartisan agreement that climate change is going to have
a significant--is going to have, and is having, significant
implications for our defense posture. I want to be clear, the
purpose of this hearing is not to debate the relative
criticality of climate change as compared to other emerging
threats, but rather to understand how climate is impacting our
security, our ability to operate and to plan, and how climate
change shapes the threats that we are already watching.
How has Russia changed its posture in the high north to
take advantage of an increasingly Arctic-free--ice-free Arctic,
and how does drought in Iran inform the decision making of its
leaders, as it would affect the decision making of leaders in
other parts of world? Are violent extremist organizations, like
Boko Haram, taking advantage of water scarcity and how is it
affecting our food supply around the world to increase their
power and influence? And what parts of world do we expect
climate stresses to drive instability?
So while I would have preferred to have our--have your
senior leadership testify--and I want to put this on the
record--we wanted to have your senior leadership testify before
the subcommittee, I do want to thank all of our witnesses here
today for your willingness to speak on this critical topic.
So with that, I will now turn to Ranking Member Stefanik
for her remarks. Before I do that, I want to thank the ranking
member for your bipartisan support and recognition of the
challenges that we face with respect to climate; and I want to
turn the floor over to Ranking Member Stefanik.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Langevin, and it has been
a true privilege to work with Jim on these issues for a number
of years. Thank you for holding this important hearing today to
discuss the critical role that the environment plays in our
national security. I also appreciate that we will be discussing
this within the context of strategic competition and the
Department's planning efforts to support the National Defense
Strategy, or NDS. Welcome to our witnesses. It is great to see
you today.
As you know, the issue of strategic competition as
identified within the NDS can best be summarized as a challenge
to U.S. prosperity and security from other nations, namely
China and Russia, who seek to shape our economic, diplomatic,
and security decision-making processes to their own advantage.
When this committee hears from the Department of Defense
about the National Defense Strategy, we often focus on policy
issues and emerging military capabilities. It is important that
we also consider the economic, diplomatic, and environmental
impact on our constituents. A strong economy and clean
environment are the most visible and public sign of American
strength. The United States cannot unilaterally address the
human causes of a changing climate.
China is the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases,
and is currently building more coal-powered electrical
production plants than the rest of the world combined. In fact,
they are adding more coal fuel generation capacity than the
entire European Union currently operates. Yet their existing
capacity isn't even close to being used at full capacity,
sitting idle for long periods of time. Because of poor energy
sector management, China will negate the rest of the world's
efforts to reduce greenhouse gases.
In addition, nearly 50 percent of Russian Government
revenue comes from taxes on fossil fuel industries, and the
Kremlin recently announced tax breaks for oil exploration.
Russia also plans to boost coal production in an effort to
capture as much of the current market demand as possible, while
also betting on the slow transition to cleaner energy sources.
This committee and the American public are very aware of
Russian efforts to control the information environment through
internet trolls and state-backed media outlets. What is less
known is that these same pro-Kremlin propaganda platforms
routinely spread disinformation about climate-related issues,
mostly focused on European nations, to undermine efforts to
reduce reliance on Russian energy sources. Just like we must
consider our competitors' military capabilities when we are
modernizing our own defenses, we must consider the actions of
other nations when developing solutions to a changing climate.
Globally, a changing climate will provide additional
instability in already fragile regions like the Middle East,
Africa. It will create challenges for emerging nations in
Southeast Asia, and could fuel rising tensions in contested
areas like the Arctic.
At the local level, we have seen--we have also seen the
negative impacts of a changing climate in our communities,
including in my own district in upstate New York. Pollution,
extreme weather events, and invasive species threaten our
native plants and wildlife; and they are harming productivity
in key economic sectors such as construction, agriculture, and
tourism, putting pressure on State and Federal budgets and
adding to our long-term fiscal challenges.
While most of the efforts to address climate change lie
outside of this committee's jurisdiction, I am proud to work in
a bipartisan manner with all of my colleagues to develop
consensus-driven legislative solutions. I believe that our
approach to addressing this issue must be done in a way that
does not restrain, but enhances our ability to compete
globally.
And I want to mention one commonsense effort the Department
is making at Fort Drum in my district. Fort Drum is 100 percent
energy independent, using renewable sources to power training
capabilities and enable operational flexibility, ensuring that
we are resilient, energy secure, and ready for the 21st century
challenges.
I look forward to hearing additional feedback from our
witnesses today.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. I thank you, Ranking Member Stefanik, and I
thank you for your remarks.
And I will turn to the--our witnesses. In January 2016, the
Department assigned responsibilities for addressing the major
risks to readiness and the vulnerabilities posed by climate
change. Today, we will hear from individuals from the
organizations tasked with executing those responsibilities.
First, Dr. Neill Tipton is the Director of Defense
Intelligence in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence, USDI. The USDI is tasked with overseeing the
planning, organizing, coordinating, and balancing of climate
change for all DOD [Department of Defense] intelligence. The
organization also coordinates with the DNI [Office of the
Director of National Intelligence] on all related risks,
potential impacts, considerations, and effects of altered
operating environments related to climate change and
environmental monitoring.
Next, Ms. Maria Langan-Riekhof is the director of the
Strategic Futures Group at the National Intelligence Council
within the Office of the DNI. Ms. Langan-Riekhof's organization
is responsible for the Global Trends strategic assessment that
outlines how key trends and uncertainties, including climate
change, should inform the national intelligence community and
senior leaders.
Mr. Victor--Mr. Victorino Mercado is the Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [USDP].
The USDP is tasked with developing policies, plans, programs,
forces, and posture needed to implement the DOD strategy,
including adapting actions to increase resilience to climate
change.
And, finally, Dr. Milan Nikolich is the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering for Research and Technology in the
Office of the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering
[R&E]. The Office of R&E is tasked with overseeing defense-
related research in climate science for the development of
approaches and technologies that reduce risk and promote
mission execution.
With that, we will start with Ms. Riekhof, Ms. Langan-
Riekhof, to begin the opening statements.
STATEMENT OF MARIA LANGAN-RIEKHOF, DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC
FUTURES GROUP AT THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Ms. Langan-Riekhof. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member
Stefanik, and Chairman Garamendi----
Mr. Langevin. Can you pull your mic down?
Ms. Langan-Riekhof. It looks like it is on. Better? Okay.
Thank you. And distinguished members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to discuss the intelligence community's
assessment of the national security implications of climate
change.
In my opening remarks, I will speak briefly about how the
intelligence community approaches this topic; and I will
highlight a few of the key implications for national security.
The role of the intelligence community is to provide
timely, objective, and relevant insights to advance national
security. Our job is to consider all factors that could affect
the global threat landscape, and this includes climate change.
We examine how climate trends affect U.S. national security
across a range of issues and dimensions. To inform our
judgments, we rely on reports produced by U.S. Federal science
agencies, peer-reviewed scientific journals, and reports from
scientific organizations and panels.
The intelligence community uses this reporting stream in
conjunction with our all-source intelligence reporting. Our
analysts produce intelligence assessments focusing on the
implications for national security, and their work will be
reflected in my testimony today.
As we discuss these assessments, I would like to underscore
a couple of points about what we do and do not know. For one,
it is difficult to discern the national security implications
of climate change in isolation, because it interacts with other
environmental conditions and human factors. In many cases,
climate change exacerbates existing stressors, such as natural
resource constraints that contribute to food and water
shortages.
Second, it is difficult to project when and where specific
disruptive events and other climatological effects will have
the most significant national security impact because of the
complexities in the Earth's systems, uncertainties in modeling,
and the unpredictability of human choices. We do make judgments
about the general risk factors.
And in the next several years, we assess that the security
risk for the United States linked to climate change will arise
primarily from distinct extreme weather events, and from
worsening preexisting problems around the world. The very
studies I mention generally agree that during the next 20 years
and beyond, climate change will increasingly compound extreme
weather events. Many scientists warn that the abrupt--the risk
of abrupt climate change, which would have the most severe and
national security implications, will increase over the next
several decades and beyond.
I would also like to remind everyone that the intelligence
community does not assess the direct impacts of climate change
on the U.S. homeland.
So, turning to some of the key implications of national
security, I have submitted a statement for the record that
provides our assessment of some of the effects of climate
trends on various facets of national security. In my time this
afternoon, I would like to highlight three of these: potential
political instability, Arctic competition, and China's approach
to climate issues.
In the coming two decades, we assess that an increasing
number of countries will encounter climate-related hazards such
as extreme weather events, drought, heat that will stress their
capacity to respond, to cope, and to adapt. We already have
seen water crises exacerbate social unrest and immigration from
fragile states in the Middle East and North Africa, such as
Syria and Libya, in part by aggravating the effects of other
factors including preexisting socioeconomic grievances,
ineffective government institutions. With continued rising
temperatures, more countries are likely to face such challenges
with greater frequency, increasing the risk of unrest, of
migration, and inter-state tension.
Countries with weak political institutions, poor economic
conditions, and other existing risk factors, such as political
strife, probably will be the most vulnerable to climate-linked
instability or migration and would be the hardest-pressed to
respond and to recover from these crises.
Second, we assess that the changing conditions in the
Arctic will have significant security, economic, and social
implications for both Arctic and non-Arctic states. Scientists
tells us that the Arctic is warming at rates more than twice as
fast as the rest of the earth. The Arctic would be free of ice
cover in the summer, potentially as early as 2030, making it
more consequential for economic insecurity reasons.
These conditions would drastically shorten maritime routes
between Asia, Europe, and North America and enable increased
commercial activity including mining, energy exploitation,
shipping, and fishing. As a result, the Arctic is emerging as a
new domain for strategic competition as Russia, China, and
others are dramatically increasing their activities and
investments in the region.
And, third, China is attempting to boost its image as a
leader in combating climate change, despite its role as the
largest carbon emitter, and its continued support for high
emissions development globally. China played a pivotal role in
2015 in broadening the scope of commitments by developing
countries under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, and China repeatedly touts its more than $100 billion
in annual investments in green technologies.
However, the country remains the world's largest coal
consumer, and is building mostly low-efficiency, coal-fired
power plants abroad. Beijing is likely to continue to avoid
energy decisions that impose significant economic costs.
Climate change and its resulting effects have wide-ranging
implications for national security, presenting both risks and
challenges for the U.S. The IC [intelligence community] plays
an important role in identifying and analyzing these
implications for policymakers. We appreciate the opportunity to
discuss our analysis and to share our work with Congress and
the American people. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Langan-Riekhof can be found
in the Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mercado, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF VICTORINO MERCADO, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF ACTING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND
CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Mercado. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik,
Chairman Garamendi, and distinguished members of this
committee, thank you for the opportunity to be part of this
hearing on climate change and strategic competition.
It is a privilege to be here together with my colleagues
and to speak on behalf of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. I will focus my remarks in the Department's
approach to protecting U.S. national security interests in the
Arctic, a region in which changes to the physical environment
are especially apparent and strategically important.
The Department assesses long-term threats, risks, and
challenges including in the Arctic within the context of the
National Defense Strategy. The NDS was released in 2018 and is
the Department's guiding document on the key security
challenges facing our Nation. The NDS is clear that the primary
challenge to the United States security and prosperity is the
reemergence of long-term strategic competition with great
powers. The strategy states that the erosion of our military
advantage against China and Russia is undermining our ability
to deter aggression in key regions.
Moreover, as the strategy makes clear, the threats posed by
China and Russia are immediate, pressing, and of an order of
magnitude that sets them apart from other challenges. We are
seeing the strategic competition take place in key areas across
the globe, including in the Arctic. While the Department has
oriented towards addressing strategic competition, we continue
to recognize the existence of a range of other challenges. The
effects of a changing climate--climate change, are one such
issue.
The Arctic is a region in which strategic trends are
amplified by the effects of the changing climate and physical
environment. Most notably, the Arctic continues to grow more
accessible as the sea ice diminishes. The Arctic is becoming
more navigable over greater periods of time, resulting in
increased interest in activity in the region.
Countries are exploring the potential of Arctic shipping
routes, as well as opportunities in natural resource
development and tourism. The door is opened to increased
activity in the Arctic by the United States, our allies,
partners, but also our strategic competitors. The Arctic will
continue to be characterized by extreme temperatures, vast
distances, magnetic anomalies, which complicate communications
and market seasonal variations. Together, these conditions form
a harsh and demanding operating environment for all, including
the U.S. joint force.
The DOD 2019 Arctic Strategy takes into account these
environmental conditions as part of the Department's strategic
approach to the region. We developed this strategy at Congress'
prudent direction, updated from our 2016 strategy, because of
the strategic significance with which the Department views the
Arctic.
Our Arctic Strategy is anchored in the priorities of the
NDS, and frames the Arctic in a broader geopolitical context.
It recognizes that competition in the Arctic is one dimension
of a wider global competition. Addressing competition in the
Arctic requires the Department to effectively implement the
NDS, as well as take specific steps for the region using a
whole-of-government approach.
The Department's desired end state for the Arctic is a
secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are
safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work
cooperatively to address challenges. This end state recognizes
some of the distinctive and historic characteristics of the
Arctic security environment. The Arctic has been largely stable
and a conflict-free region partly because of its relative
inaccessibility and the geographic barriers to human activity
in the region. It also reflects the deliberate decisions of
Arctic nations to engage constructively on shared challenges in
the region.
The immediate prospect of conflict in the Arctic continues
to be low, but the Department maintains a clear-eyed approach
to our competitors' activities and their implications for U.S.
interests. In making these assessments, we begin with the
fundamental difference between Russia and China.
Russia is an Arctic nation. China is not. Russia's military
investments in the Arctic contribute to its territorial
defense, but may have implications for access to the region.
China is seeking a role in the Arctic to include governance,
despite it having no territorial claims in the region. There is
a risk that, to further its ambitions, China may repeat
predatory economic behavior in the Arctic that it has exhibited
in other regions.
The DOD Arctic Strategy establishes three defense
objectives derived from the NDS that guide the Department's
approach to addressing competition in the Arctic: Defend the
homeland is number one; compete, when necessary, to maintain
favorable regional balances of power; and ensure common domains
remain free and open.
Our network of allies and partners are key strategic
advantage for the U.S. in the Arctic. They are the cornerstone
of the Department's strategic approach. Six of seven other
Arctic nations are either NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] allies or NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partners. Our
allies and partners are highly capable and proficient in the
Arctic region's arctic conditions. They also share the U.S.
interests in maintaining the international rule-based order
including in the Arctic region.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Mercado, Dr. Nikolich,
and Mr. Tipton can be found in the Appendix on page 36.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Mercado.
Next, let me properly say the title. It is Director of
Intelligence, Director of Defense Intelligence, Collection, and
Special Programs. We will now hear from Dr. Neill Tipton.
STATEMENT OF NEILL TIPTON, DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
(COLLECTION AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS), OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Tipton. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on the role of the defense intel
enterprise's understanding the implications of climate change
during this era of strategic competition.
As the representative for the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence, I concur with the statements you heard from
Maria Langan-Riekhof from the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, and the NIC [National Intelligence
Council] and their overarching assessments on the implications
of climate change and extreme weather; and we will continue to
rely on these entities for their strategic perspective on these
changes to our world.
While the DIE [Defense Intelligence Enterprise] executes
many roles in the Department, none is more vital than our
direct intelligence support to warfighters. In order to stay
ahead of potential threats, we are working a number of relevant
initiatives within the Defense Intel Enterprise. We are
ensuring the U.S. and allied safety of navigation. We are
monitoring geopolitical boundaries for climate change-related
disputes, and we are expanding our portfolio of partnerships.
The Department of Defense, primarily through the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, maintains worldwide maritime
and aeronautical safety of navigation databases, products, and
services in support of U.S. and partner warfighters. Impacts to
the shorelines of the world require continuous data collection
and updating of safety of navigation products. We rely on this
data to ensure the U.S. maintains its ability to project power
worldwide.
The warming in the Arctic is leading to an increase in
access to previously inaccessible areas, and a corresponding
increase in military and commercial activity above the Arctic
Circle. The warming in this region increases or will increase
human activity, and lead to a potential for increased disputes
to access and resources. To provide policymakers and
warfighters with a better common operating picture in these
areas, the Defense Intel Enterprise and our IC partners are
conducting a review of four maritime claims in the Arctic
region, where some states assert overlapping entitlements, and
this assists both defense and national policymakers in
providing clarity in resolving potential disputes.
In addition, we recognize that global resource competition
will remain an ongoing national security risk. As assessed by
the Defense Intelligence Agency, several regional conflicts in
recent years have been exacerbated by disrupted access to
critical resources. Shortages in food and water are often
driven by a combination of poor resource management and extreme
weather events, such as extended droughts.
Whatever the root cause, prolonged resource shortages are
likely to contribute to population displacement, and further
worsen geopolitical instability and humanitarian crises in
already fragile and poor economies. Monitoring these trends
will become more important so we can help prioritize and
mobilize our humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.
The Defense Intel Enterprise recognizes that we are only
one stakeholder in this area. In addition to the traditional
military intelligence sources and analysis that we use, and the
substantive support we get from the intelligence community, we
rely on a substantial amount of scientific reports to provide
accurate assessments for decision makers. As such, Defense
Intel Enterprise components are involved in a number of
partnerships with academia and other Federal science agencies
through a variety of channels such as various working groups
and grant processes. This enables us to work in an innovative
environment with America's talented scientists on extremely
complex models, some of which provide the Department with the
ability to view changes in topographic features and geography
over time.
So we will--the Department will focus on ensuring it
remains ready and able to adapt to a wide variety of threats,
regardless of the source, to fulfill our mission to ensure our
Nation's security.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Tipton.
Dr. Nikolich, you are recognized for 5 minutes to summarize
your statement.
STATEMENT OF MILAN NIKOLICH, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
Dr. Nikolich. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, and Chairman Garamendi, I am
pleased to be here today to discuss the Department's research
and engineering activities related to the changing climate.
We recognize that the changing climate constitutes a
national security issue with potential impacts to DOD missions,
operational plans, and our infrastructure. Our work is focused
on understanding and forecasting changes in the global
operational environment to inform warfighter planning and
operations. Our work also provides new technologies and
insights for risk management.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering provides guidance, direction, and oversight on
climate research and technology efforts that enable the
military services to execute their missions. We engage in
interagency and international partnerships on climate research.
We work to mitigate the impacts of changing climate on DOD test
ranges. We are also working to understand how the operational
environment is changing.
To do this, we are utilizing modeling and simulation for
prediction. Additionally, we are enhancing the Department's
ability to sustain activities and operations through adaptation
and resilience.
Service in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
research activities are complementary, coordinated, and aligned
with the unique capabilities and missions. For example, the
Army is updating and expanding the DOD climate assessment tool
for improved forecasting of operational risks to our
infrastructure. The Navy is exploring new platforms for
sustained operations--observations, excuse me, in the Arctic.
They are also developing global weather, ocean, and sea ice
prediction models.
The Navy and Air Force collaborate with interagency
partners on the National Earth System Prediction Capability,
which is the next generation of predictive models. The Air
Force leverages national and allied partners' seasonal and
climate model projections to provide planning products for the
DOD and for the intelligence community. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense's Strategic Environmental Research and
Development Program is identifying new approaches for ensuring
infrastructure resilience to the changing climate.
The Test Resource Management Center actively monitors
potential impacts from weather and natural events at our test
ranges. The Department's interagency and international partners
are central to our work. We are engaged in a number of
interagency committees through the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy such as the Subcommittee on
Global Change Research. As a result of our engagement, DOD
benefits from the significant R&D [research and development]
investments across the Federal Government related to the
changing climate. These committees also support international
coordination and collaboration.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Dr. Nikolich.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for your opening
statements.
We are going to now move to questions; but before I do, I
ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed
to participate in today's briefing after all subcommittee
members have had the opportunity to ask questions. Is there any
objection?
Without objection, non-subcommittee members will therefore
be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. I now
recognize myself for 5 minutes for opening questions, and will
recognize members in the order of seniority according to their
appearance before the subcommittee.
Ms. Langan-Riekhof and Mr. Tipton, I would like to refer
back to this year's Worldwide Threat Assessment and the quote
that global environmental degradation, as well as climate
change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, economic
distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond.
First of all, do you agree the administration's Worldwide
Threat Assessment? And also, I want to say that if you agree,
then what regions of the world should we be watching most
closely for climate change-driven instability?
Ms. Langan-Riekhof. Chairman, thank you for that question.
As the National Intelligence Council takes lead with the
worldwide threat testimony, and my unit actually has
responsibility for the climate analysis that goes into it. So
we just very recently have been looking at last year's
testimony as we prepare for next year's testimony, and we
continue to agree with that analytic assessment. There are a
range of places to look at as far as where we might see climate
stresses that could lead to some type of conflict.
One place, or one type of area, in particular, will be
areas where there are potential water conflicts or water
disputes. To date, water has not led as a single cause for any
conflict between two nations. That said, as we move forward,
and there are increasing droughts and there are increasing
strains on water resources which supply more than one nation, I
think those are areas that we need to be watchful for. Those
are, in particular, in the Middle East, Northern Africa, as
well as in South Asia where areas have experienced extreme
drought. Water supplies are going to be challenging going
forward, and we already are seeing that those are areas where
they, you know, that could be an area of increasing tension.
That is just one example.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Tipton.
Mr. Tipton. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
We agree with Maria's characterization of the problem. Some
of the specific areas that we pay attention to that we know are
potential hotspots are Sub-Saharan Africa, where they are
particularly vulnerable to climate variability, where droughts,
floods, cyclones, desert desertification, can cause potentially
agricultural yield losses up to more that 20 percent. So we
fully support and concur with Dr. Langan-Riekhof's assessment,
and monitor the same areas.
Russian impact on water supplies going to the Crimea, there
are a variety of areas around the world--South Asia--that we
pay attention to, but we really take the lead from the IC in
helping us understand those global strategic implications.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
I guess maybe to drive into that, dive in just a little
further, the assessment also states that heat waves, droughts,
and floods, combined with poor governance practices, are
increasing water and food insecurity in the world. The
assessment specifically mentions Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, and
Jordan.
Can you discuss further implications of social unrest,
migration, and inter-state tension within these nations?
Anything else you want to expand upon?
Ms. Langan-Riekhof. I think it is important to remember
when we think about the causes of conflicts or internal
instability that for almost any of the ones we are talking
about, it is hard to narrow it down to a mono-cause. It is
compounding strains. Climate, extreme weather events, often
tend to be that threat multiplier in these cases. But for a
decade now, we have been watching some of the implications of
extended drought in the Middle East. We have had 5 years of
drought conditions in Central America, which has challenged
agricultural production.
So, again, I am going back to water issues; but when
communities are strained by water, we see depleted crop
production. We see issues of internal migration and families
moving into urban areas, increasing the strain on cities and
government provisions. And in countries where there are cases
of corruption or poor government services, that just kind of
ratchets up the possibility of greater instability.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
So, Ms. Langan-Riekhof and Mr. Mercado, the
administration's Worldwide Threat Assessment states also that
diminishing Arctic sea ice may increase competition,
particularly with Russia and China, over access to sea routes
and natural resources. Can you--I know you touched on this in
your opening statements, but can you further characterize
Russia and China's behavior in the Arctic?
And, moreover, in March, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the EUCOM [United States European Command] commander
testified that operational plans have been changed to respond
to Russian movement of weapon systems to exert influence over
the Arctic. And I wanted to ask: Are we postured sufficiently
to counter Russian moves to exert control over the region?
Maybe we will start with Mr. Mercado, and then we will go--
--
Mr. Mercado. Chairman, as I said in my opening statement,
great power competition focused on Russia and China is of great
concern for us. As we watch what Russia is doing, how they are
modernizing their ports, putting missile systems, systems--
modernizing their airfields so they can base aircraft out of
that, and how they are treating countries that want to transit
the North Sea Passage, asking, making them or demanding that
they ask for permission, maybe use their icebreakers and
elements like that, we are concerned.
When we see China, who is not an Arctic nation, deploy
research vessels up there, engage with various countries, not
directly with the countries, but through other contacts, and
based on my experience, looking now how--what their behavior
brought us in the Pacific, in the Western Pacific and the South
China Sea and their track record, so we are concerned with some
of their activities up there.
When we look at our posture in the Arctic, especially the
northern warning center that we have that is aging in--was
built in the 1950s, I know that us and Canada are looking at
options, alternatives to modernize that, but not just for that
warning piece, but also all the future threats like
hypersonics, missiles, and things like that.
So the Arctic has the attention of both the northern--
NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] commander, General
O'Shaughnessy, as well as the EUCOM commander, General Walters.
We always do our planning by doing an intelligence assessment
of the environment. So, we update all our plans based on the
environment and how that could change, the intel assessment,
and then adjust our plans accordingly, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Mercado.
Ms. Langan-Riekhof, do you want to comment, please?
Ms. Langan-Riekhof. I agree with Mr. Mercado's statements.
I think we need to remember that Russia views the Arctic as an
essential element of its national sovereignty. Just looking at
its coastland, Russia's total Arctic coastline is 24,000
kilometers; and we have watched Moscow seeking to project
greater influence in the Arctic through many of the things Mr.
Mercado mentioned: infrastructure development, refurbishing its
military facilities, training, deployments.
You know, Russia is concerned about foreign influence. It
is investing and increasing its commercial activities as sea
ice declines. So, yes, this is an area of concentration for the
Russians.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
The ranking member is now recognized.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
The Department has recently increased training activities
in the Arctic, or near-Arctic environments, with exercises like
Trident Juncture. What impact have these exercises and the
development of an Arctic Strategy had on the Department's
operational concept development, and what does the Department
plan on doing differently and, broadly, how does OSD integrate
climate science and policy into the development of our military
policy?
Mr. Mercado, I will ask that to you.
Mr. Mercado. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I think Trident Juncture, along with a number of activities
that we have embarked since the Arctic Strategy, as we get into
implementation and part of that implementation is enhancing our
Arctic operations and an example of that is just last month,
where the 2d Fleet deployed a maritime op center to Iceland,
and then deployed four ships up there. And we are learning
there is nothing like taking ships in a very harsh climate and
learn the impact to all our weapons systems, the communications
up at that area of latitude, and then also, the resiliency we
have for our sailors in that environment. If you look on the
other coast where up in Alaska, we do a number of training
events, again, to understand the effects of the cold, harsh
climate on our operations.
So, I think since the Arctic Strategy, we have made a
concerted effort to learn and assess gaps in our training; and
we will also learn from our allies and partners as well who
have much more experience and expertise in operating in that
climate.
Ms. Stefanik. I would be remiss if I didn't add, you
mentioned Alaska, but one of the most effective and useful cold
weather training facilities is at Fort Drum in my district,
where we have significant capabilities, and are able to develop
that skill set that is going to be an issue that we have to
tackle as we look to the Arctic.
I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
Mr. Mercado, we have seen public reporting that China is
pursuing small-scale floating nuclear reactors to support the
artificial island bases in the South China Sea. Is DOD aware
and tracking those developments?
Mr. Mercado. I am not familiar with that specific report. I
am tracking some of the nuclear efforts of Russia in the
Arctic, but I am not aware of that specific report in the South
China Sea.
Mr. Gallagher. Interesting.
Where--I guess then, more broadly, where does DOD stand in
terms of developing similar technology, nuclear micro reactors?
Basically the idea is that particularly in permanent bases,
given the vulnerabilities inherent to the grid, vulnerabilities
for cyber attack, that it would make sense to develop an
alternative source of energy and that there is promising
technology in the pipeline right now. I would just be curious,
anyone on the panel take a swing, where we stand on developing
that technology relative to our competitors, China and Russia
in particular.
Dr. Nikolich. Let me respond to that.
So the Department is looking at technologies having to do
with what we call micro reactors in two formats: One of which
is to serve as an energy source for our fixed locations where
there are challenges to normal provision of electricity and
energy, and those instances where a transportable capability
might have application in operational settings. And so we are
looking at both of those, and both at in terms of exploring the
technologies and considering applications.
Mr. Gallagher. What--I mean, what can we do in Congress to
help expedite that process? I mean, the risk is that the
Chinese gained a market advantage in these technologies. We
have seen some of the capital in the private sector go to China
actually and that we may not be able to catch up. Are there
things here we can do in Congress to help DOD explore those
options more expeditiously----
Dr. Nikolich. I would say----
Mr. Gallagher [continuing]. That are promising? I mean----
Dr. Nikolich. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Gallagher. Do you think they are promising? I mean----
Dr. Nikolich. Yes, I think the thing that I would say is
that in our pursuit of this, we are doing these activities in
strong partnership with the Department of Energy. I think there
is a general belief that this segment of capability could
constitute a new area of revival for commercial providers and
so there are--there are hopeful prospects in this area. I
think, probably, the best I could say in terms of what we would
ask is, for the request we put forward, if they could be
supported by the Congress.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
And I thank the ranking member for her indulgence.
Ms. Stefanik. I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Garamendi is now recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the courtesy of joining you on this hearing.
I believe all of us are aware of the work that this
subcommittee has done over the last several years in addressing
the climate change issue. Much of that work found its way into
the Readiness Committee mark, and just quickly share some of
what was put into the mark, and I see some colleagues here who
are aware of it.
What we wanted to do in the mark was to make sure that the
1,100 facilities that the Department of Defense--mark, actually
more than a mark, it is going to be up for a vote this
afternoon or this evening--that the Department of Defense and
its 1,100 facilities take into account climate change and the
impacts that it will have, or could have, from natural events,
hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, deluges, whatever, oh, rising
sea level, also.
And so there is a requirement that the major bases have a
master plan within the next 3 years to deal with this. And
also, the Department of Defense will have limited authority,
spending until there are plans that actually carry out climate
resiliency. So that will be for all of the new MILCON [military
construction] programs.
And then the structures themselves will be redesigned to
the maximum energy conservation and resiliency for earthquakes
or tornadoes or floods or whatever it happens to be, and we
want to make sure--and this is a pilot program. This may fit in
with what Mr. Gallagher just brought up and that is energy-
sufficiency, microgrids and energy conservation on all of the
bases. And it will be $133 million special fund to carry out
these projects.
And, finally, we expect there will be power outages.
Welcome to California, and PG&E [Pacific Gas and Electric
Company], and Southern California Edison. So there will be
black startup programs on key bases to test it, along with the
microgrids that go with it.
Much of what has been discussed here is also in the bill,
having to do with icebreakers; and, again, this committee has
played a major role. The first heavy icebreaker is in process
of construction, early stages design, and it is nearly complete
in construction soon but it is one of at least four that we
need to deal with the challenges of the Arctic which have been
discussed here in some depth.
Beyond that, we do know that we are going to have to deal
with sea level rise; and it turns out that a lot of our bases
are on the shore. We have considered two different options for
the largest military shipyard in the world, Norfolk. One option
is to figure out which seawalls might fit. The other is to
outfit everybody with waders. One was those two things are
going to have to be done because we are already seeing the sea
level rise there.
Beyond that, just down the line, what else should we be
doing? Let's start with design side of it and, quickly, I don't
know, 30 seconds apiece. What else should we be doing?
Dr. Nikolich. Sir, I would like to maybe bring out a few
points about what we are doing in terms of basic research and
understanding that can support the direction you are
describing. I would illustrate it maybe with a particular case.
As we think about the receding of ice in the Arctic, we
concern ourselves with the idea of thawing permafrost and
research that is going on having to do with an understanding of
what that means in terms of our ability to support structures
and their design, and, along with that, how we might be able to
instrument some of those--put instrumentation on some of those
structures so that we can determine the onset of stresses that
we could take steps to correct before catastrophic damage is
effected.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Sir.
Mr. Tipton. So, Mr. Garamendi, first, this is far beyond my
area of expertise but from the Defense Intel perspective,
obviously we will follow the lead of our partners in research
engineering and A&S [acquisition and sustainment] in terms of
how we protect our intelligence capability systems, buildings,
and installed capacity that we have around the world and in the
United States. And we will, you know, continue to work but the
broader implications of those changes and what that means for
the nations around the world and the implications, then, for
us.
Mr. Garamendi. If I might interrupt quickly.
Mr. Tipton. Sure.
Mr. Garamendi. Actually, you are going to be involved in
some of this, some of your assets, for anticipatory--where the
fires are going, where the flood might be. There are
observation platforms that are available, and in the
legislation this year, we do move those, make those assets
available for climate-related challenges.
Mr. Mercado. Sir, having watched the events where our bases
have felt the extreme effects of weather, and also most of my
time has been in the Pacific watching Guam take some severe
hits time and time again, and us failing to improve the
infrastructure and learn from that, this is hugely important
from my standpoint in strategy, plans, and capability. What we
need to be able to do is to generate forces, and the key to
generating our forces is our bases and so to the degree that we
can base, train, mobilize, operate, and generate those forces
to where they need to be, you know, it is hugely important. So,
all those things are much needed.
Mr. Garamendi. We will be looking at the new construction
projects on Guam, specifically for that Category 5 typhoon.
Ms. Langan-Riekhof. For the intelligence community, over
the past year, we have taken steps to increase intelligence
sharing and collaboration across the IC and beyond. There has
been the establishment of the Environmental Security Working
Group in the spring of this year. It was sponsored, you know,
by the NIC, the National Intelligence University, and the Civil
Applications Committee to work across the community, to share
information, to make sure we are bringing in the most recent
and scientific research on climate, and to look at the broad
range of risks that affect all of the agencies and the whole of
the U.S. Government. That is a program that now is meeting
monthly, and is exploring the range of implications.
Mr. Garamendi. If I might, Mr. Chairman, a final 30-second
comment, the work that you did, your subcommittee has done in
the previous years informed us that the Department of Defense
is a major consumer of fossil fuels of all kinds; and as a
result of your work in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act], there will be encouragement for energy conservation on
the bases, on the facilities, in the ships, planes, and so on
and so forth, all of that to deal with the emissions issue.
Really, thank you, and thank you so very much for the time
and the work your committee has done over the many years. We
will continue to take your work and forward it into Readiness.
Mr. Langevin. Absolutely. Thank you, Chairman Garamendi. I
want to thank you for your leadership on the Readiness
Subcommittee and the time and attention you have put into the
climate change issue, and it has been great working with you
and particularly on the joint hearing that we recently held
together between this subcommittee and the Readiness
Subcommittee. So thank you for that.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Crow for 5 minutes.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you to all the witnesses for joining us today on
the important topic.
Mr. Mercado, beginning with you, over the past several
months, I have been holding roundtables with senior leaders
from the Department of Defense and Department of Energy and
outside experts to explore the importance and challenges
associated with the effects of climate change on our
operational capabilities and our installations. As the threat
from extreme weather due to climate change continues to grow,
we are asking our troops to fight in increasingly extreme
environments.
At the policy and planning level, how is the Department
adapting its strategy to reflect the changing environment we
are seeking our soldiers to operate in? And what additional
authorities are necessary to adapt at the rate that we are
seeing ourselves having to adapt?
Mr. Mercado. Sir, I think we start with implementing the
Arctic Strategy that we developed and published. So it is one
thing to develop the strategy. It is the other thing, the next
step is to implement it; and from that, the ways we have
identified to do that is to first build the awareness of not
only the Arctic, but also trying to predict severe climate.
Also enhancing our operations, like I said earlier, about
increasing the operations that we conduct, either in the Arctic
or in other places with regard to it, so we can learn and make
our systems more resilient, not only the ones that are ashore,
but also our ships and also our service members.
And then the other part is much broader and applies to the
Arctic and the Arctic Strategy about working with our partners.
Some of the partners, like I said earlier, have very large
expertise in operating in these environments; and we can learn
from them as we work to them to increase that skill set.
Mr. Crow. A follow-on question for the whole group, whoever
wants to chime in on this one. You know, you represent various
agencies, you know, departments, but there is a lot of our
government that has equities in the Arctic. Which of those are
not represented here today that you think are relevant for this
discussion, and do you have challenges with siloing? Are people
kind of within agency silos, and are there things that Congress
can do to help break down any barriers that might exist and
increase collaboration across the Federal Government?
Dr. Nikolich. If you would allow me, maybe one--speak to
one aspect of that, and that has to do with in our research and
technology area. We are participants in a number of committees
under the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy
that are specially designed to help foster our collaboration
and sharing of information, knowledge, models, and all the rest
across the interagency to the benefit of all executive branch
members.
It is worth pointing out that those are brought together
actually as a statutory requirement. So, as a result of action
on the part of Congress, those committees have come together.
Mr. Crow. And is that operating effectively in your view?
Dr. Nikolich. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crow. Okay. Would the others like to chime in on that?
Mr. Tipton. Not on that, Mr. Crow, not on that specific
subject, but related to your question about siloing and
breaking down of the barriers between some of the components--
if you look at what has happened over the last 10 years within
defense intel and the intelligence community, the changes that
have been implemented in terms of forcing that integration
across the various practitioners within those very broad
enterprises have been very, very effective.
Dr. Langan-Riekhof mentioned the ESWG, the Environmental
Security Working Group, that is an example of a fairly new
entity that brings together all these various components to
cause to happen that information sharing that you need to have
to have that collaborative effect and break down those
stovepipes. So I think in a nutshell, we have made tremendous
progress in enabling those crossflows of communication within
the Defense Intel Enterprise, the IC, and our relationship with
academia, with all the other folks that have a role in this
kind of activity.
Mr. Mercado. Sir, the value of plans is it helps break down
stovepipes. Like I said, planning starts with intel,
preparation of the environment, and the assessments. And then
it is critical to planning, once you have developed that plan,
is the posture associated with executing that plan because the
plan is no good unless the bases and the posture that you have
in the region can support that. So that brings all of the other
DOD components, and all the services who have to execute the
plans and all the training and force development and all that
that entails.
So at least with the strategy and how we--we have a
resurgence of planning in the Department, I think that is
helping to bring different parts of the Department together.
Mr. Crow. I am out of time.
So, Mr. Chair, I would yield back.
Mr. Langevin. I thank you, Mr. Crow.
We are going to do a second round. So, if you have further
questions, you will be able to get them in then.
So I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Dr. Nikolich, what modifications would we need to make for
our forces to be able to operate in newly opened Arctic? I know
we have touched on some of this already, but what changes would
we need to--modifications would we need to make? And are
surface fleets capable of operating in subfreezing waters? And
do we have sufficient polar satellite coverage?
Dr. Nikolich. Let me respond in this way: With respect to
operational capabilities, it is really outside my area of
expertise, but I would say that with respect to developing the
understanding to inform how we need to go about doing that and
the capabilities that are necessary, the Navy is, of course,
leading the way in gathering the necessary data to go into our
modeling capabilities to project what conditions we are likely
to face, and, in turn, then provide a basis for determining
specific capabilities.
With respect to observational capabilities, I beg your
pardon, but I can't speak in particular depth, but I can say
that two things are happening: the first of which is we are
drawing not only on our own capabilities and sensors that are
being emplaced, but also drawing from the sensing capabilities
within the civil component of our space capabilities. And
through our partnerships, we can look for opportunities for our
partners to collaborate, in terms of providing data sources for
our models.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Anything else, Mr. Mercado? Mr.
Mercado, do you want to chime in about modifications that we
need to make?
Mr. Mercado. Yes, Chairman. I think, based on the nature of
the environment, much of the operations are conducted by the
Air Force, and also the submarines. As you know, we conduct
ICEX [Ice Exercise] there. So recently now, I am interested to
see the feedback from the Navy's efforts to start operating
more in that environment.
So I think we have much to learn on the surface side, but
we have very good engineers that can adapt, like we have
adapted to the dust in the Middle East. And as we operate more
up in the Arctic, we will learn more to make our surface force
more resilient.
Mr. Langevin. Would this include additional expansion of a
base and operating facilities?
Mr. Mercado. Well, sir, part of the Arctic Strategy talks
about reviewing infrastructure required to project power and
operate in the Arctic. So we have some work to do to do that
assessment on the requirements for a strategic port up in
Alaska or other places that will help enable those operations.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
With that, unless there is any other comment, I will yield
to the ranking member.
Ms. Stefanik. Great. One final question. Dr. Nikolich,
while this isn't specifically a DOD issue, I did want to get--I
did want to raise this for your awareness and get your
feedback.
We have heard from the commercial sensing industry about a
concern about the development of 5G networks, especially those
networks that will operate in similar bands to the same bands
used by weather satellites to detect water vapor, potentially
compromising weather forecasting. This might be for you or Mr.
Mercado. Is this something that DOD is aware of, and are there
any research efforts to mitigate this potential challenge?
Dr. Nikolich. I am sorry, but I am not knowledgeable on
that specific topic, but that I am not knowledgeable off the
top of my head doesn't mean that we are not aware of it. So if
you will allow me, I would prefer to take that for the record
and give you a proper and thorough answer on that.
Ms. Stefanik. Sure. I appreciate. I will take that response
for the record and look forward to it. Mr. Mercado, do you have
anything to add?
Mr. Mercado. Nothing other than I know that 5G is a
concern. But we can take that question for the record.
Ms. Stefanik. Okay. With that, I yield back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 51.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ranking Member.
One final question I had, Ms. Langan-Riekhof and Mr.
Mercado will probably be the appropriate ones to address this,
but could you please describe U.S. engagement with the Arctic
Security Forces Roundtable, and what are the priorities that
have been discussed?
And are there participating nations--are the participating
nations concerned about expanding Chinese influence in the
region? We have talked about Chinese influence in the region
already, but anything else you want to expand upon there, but
if you take the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable.
Mr. Mercado. Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with that
roundtable, but I can reiterate my concern about China's
operations in the Arctic region. But my main concern is, as I
watch their activity, as we watch their activity is to avoid
another episode similar to the South China Sea, because I would
think that somewhere in the past, as China started to reclaim
those features, we had an opportunity probably to check that
behavior. So what I am hoping is that we don't make the same
mistake as we monitor China's activities in the Arctic.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Do you have anything to add, Ms.
Langan-Riekhof?
Ms. Langan-Riekhof. I would also have to take back that
question on the security forces in the Arctic. I don't have any
information on that. But we are closely tracking what China is
doing in the Arctic: its commercial activities, its shipping
activities, and also, many of its public statements it has made
about its Arctic policy, calling itself a Near-Arctic state,
and introducing the Polar Silk Road and linking it to the Belt
and Road Initiative. So we are following it closely. I don't
have any specific information.
Mr. Langevin. If you can look into that and get back to us,
that would be helpful. Thank you.
With that last question, I will yield to Chairman Garamendi
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, we are not going to be very successful in the
Arctic, and probably anywhere else where there is an ocean,
unless we become a signatory to the Law of the Sea. It is a
major problem that we have in the South China Sea. It is
certainly going to be, and is today, and will be in the future,
even a greater problem in the Arctic. For example, Russia is
claiming everything to the North Pole and beyond. We have no
pushback because we have no status, failing to be a signator to
the Law of the Sea.
Secondly, for the near term, probably for the next decade,
we will not be able to operate on the surface in the Arctic
Ocean with naval ships unless somebody starts putting heavy
plate on one side--on both sides of the ship. So we are going
to have to depend upon icebreakers, of which we only have one
heavy. We will have two heavies soon. We are going to have to
deal with this.
And for the Department of Defense, this is a major and
very, very important budget item. You can talk forever, but
until there are icebreakers or naval ships are built for ice,
which nobody has planned yet, we are going to depend upon the
icebreakers displaying American power in the Arctic.
Final point--I don't know if there is any final here, but
next point: Climate refugees. It was spoken to earlier by the
panel. The climate refugee issue is of profound importance. We
see them today. We talk about this mostly in the Sahel of
Africa, but the issue of immigration from Central America is
very, very much a climate issue, and we are talking climate
refugees along with violence. And so, we are seeing this and we
need to plan for that, not just for the military, obviously for
immigration issues here in the United States, but also for
dealing with our military operating, as an example, in the
Sahel of Africa.
So those are issues. I would love to have a comment on any
of these subjects: Law of the Sea, what we are really going to
be able to do for the next decade in the Arctic as a military
power. And finally, you have already talked about climate and
climate refugees. Any comment you would like to make in the
next 2 minutes.
Mr. Mercado. Sir, on the Law of the Sea, it has been an
issue. And in all the international forums that I have
experience with or been involved with, our partners bring it up
and they challenge us. And what I tell them is that, yes, I
mean, we are not a signatory, but always judge us by our
actions. Judge us that we always abide by the Law of the Sea.
All our forces do that. So while we understand that there are
issues with us being a signatory, that hasn't happened yet,
but, again, judge us by how we comport ourselves on the high
seas. And that is the approach we have to take at this point.
With regard to icebreakers, absolutely, in the Department
we support and we need icebreakers. So we support the Coast
Guard effort to build up the icebreaker fleet. And that would
be helpful for operations, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Chairman Garamendi. I want
to thank our witnesses again for your testimony here today.
Again, I will reiterate that I would have liked to have had the
more senior leadership here testifying. They originally said
that you would be the best people to come and testify, but this
is also a senior leadership policy issue that we are going to
have to confront and deal with for the foreseeable future.
And so the senior leaders at the Department are going to
have to become more expert on this issue and this topic
themselves, as they are going to have to spend more and more
time dealing with the effects of climate change, the
consequences, both in planning, operations, in mitigating the
effects of climate change on our bases, our military planning;
again, the consequences of climate change worldwide as a result
of, again, desertification or climate drought, where we might
be asked to respond, again, on just a whole host of levels.
So I hope in the near future that we will have senior
leadership here as well testifying on this topic who themselves
will be up to speed on and expert in these topics as well. They
are going to need to be, going forward.
So, with that, I know members had some questions that had
asked for information to be returned to us on the record. I
would ask that you respond to those questions expeditiously.
And, with that, I want to thank you again for your
testimony and the work you are doing in this area and many
others. With that, the subcommittee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:46, the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
December 11, 2019
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 11, 2019
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
December 11, 2019
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Mr. Mercado. I defer to Dr. Nikolich and OUSD(R&E) on this issue.
[See page 20.]
Dr. Nikolich. Yes, the Department is aware of this issue and we
have been engaged in ongoing interagency discussions on the matter.
While we have not conducted detailed studies to assess the impact of 5G
signals upon weather satellites, the Department has a long history of
active research into technologies that have the potential to apply to
this issue--specifically, beamforming technologies to concentrate the
transmitted signal directly onto the receiver in a way that minimizes
stray signals and communication methods that function using the lowest
possible signal levels. We use these technologies to minimize adversary
detection and to gain efficiencies but they can also potentially
mitigate against the possibility of the interference you have
referenced. [See page 20.]