[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ONE YEAR LATER: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TSA MODERNIZATION ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 29, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-46
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-462 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey John Katko, New York
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Mark Walker, North Carolina
J. Luis Correa, California Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Max Rose, New York Mark Green, Tennessee
Lauren Underwood, Illinois Van Taylor, Texas
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Al Green, Texas Michael Guest, Mississippi
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Val Butler Demings, Florida
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
J. Luis Correa, California, Chairman
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Debbie Lesko, Arizona, Ranking
Dina Titus, Nevada Member
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey John Katko, New York
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Mark Green, Tennessee
Val Butler Deming, Florida Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Mike Rogers, Alabama (ex officio)
officio)
Alex Marston, Subcomittee Staff Director
Kyle Klein, Minority Subcomittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Debbie Lesko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Ms. Patricia F.S. Cogswell, Acting Deputy Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. William Russell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
For the Record
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Letter From the American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO...................................................... 2
Appendix
Questions From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Patricia F.S. Cogswell 43
Questions From Ranking Member Debbie Lesko for Patricia F.S.
Cogswell....................................................... 44
ONE YEAR LATER: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TSA MODERNIZATION ACT
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Tuesday, October 29, 2019
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation
and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. J. Luis Correa
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Correa, Cleaver, Coleman,
Barragan; Lesko, Katko, Green, and Bishop.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. Correa. Good morning, everyone. Welcome. The
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security will now
come to order.
I like to start off by welcoming Mr. Dan Bishop of North
Carolina to the committee.
Welcome, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be
with you.
Mr. Correa. I look forward to working with you, sir.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on,
``One Year Later, the Implementation of The TSA Modernization
Act.''
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
subcommittee in recess at any point.
I want to thank you, Ranking Member Lesko, and our
distinguished witnesses for joining us today.
One year ago this month Congress enacted the first
comprehensive reauthorization of the TSA, known as the TSA
Modernization Act. The Act incorporated a substantial number of
bills and provisions that originated in this committee. It
stands as a testament to the committee's long-standing
bipartisan efforts to conduct oversight of TSA.
I thank my colleagues, Mrs. Watson Coleman and Ms. Katko--
and Mr. Katko, I should say, for their leadership in advancing
legislation last Congress that--I am glad to carry on those
efforts with the Ranking Member Lesko in this Congress.
The TSA Modernization Act enhances and improves our
Nation's transportation security. The Act is too comprehensive
to describe in detail in the few minutes that we have, but I
would like to highlight a few key points.
First, the Act established a 5-year term for the TSA
administrator to provide stability to the agency's leadership.
Sadly, the current chaos and leadership vacancies within DHS
have undermined those efforts. Administrator Pekoske has been
forced to wear 2 hats, acting as both TSA administrator and DHS
deputy secretary.
I commend the administrator for answering the call to duty,
but the role of TSA administrator is a full-time job that
requires full-time dedication to ensuring the security of our
transportation system. I hope the President will nominate
permanent leaders to fill many of the DHS vacancies, and thus
provide TSA with the stable leadership that Congress envisioned
when it passed this legislation.
In addition to establishing the administrator's term, the
TSA Modernization Act first pushes TSA to enhance its strategic
planning efforts; No. 2, secures public areas of airport and
surface transportation systems; and it improves the security of
air cargo transportation.
We appreciate TSA's dedication to implementing the many
directives and reporting requirements in this legislation, as
well as TSA's transparency in updating the committee on its
progress. Although TSA has made significant progress on
implementing the Act, I am still concerned that TSA has not yet
complied with the provisions that present some of the
committee's biggest priorities in this act.
First, TSA is late in providing this committee a report on
recommendations to reform its personnel management system. As
you know, this subcommittee recently highlighted issues facing
the TSA work force at its hearing in May.
Transportation security officers serve on the front lines,
securing our Nation's transportation system, yet are among the
lowest paid workers in the Federal Government. They are also
not afforded some of the basic workplace protections that most
other Government employees enjoy. Improving working conditions
for these officers is key to TSA's evolution as a professional
National security agency, and I look forward to hearing more
about the status of this important report.
I am going to ask, at this point, unanimous consent to
enter into the record a letter from the American Federation of
Government Employees.
[The information follows:]
Letter From the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
October 29, 2019.
Honorable Lou Correa,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, House
Homeland Security Committee, Washington, DC 20515.
Honorable Debbie Lesko,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security,
House Homeland Security Committee, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Correa and Ranking Member Lesko: On behalf of the
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, which represents
more than 700,000 Federal and District of Columbia employees who serve
the American people in 70 different agencies, including the 44,000
Transportation Security Officers who protect the flying public, we
appreciate the opportunity to submit this letter for the record for the
Subcommittee's hearing, ``One Year Later: Implementation of the TSA
Modernization Act.''
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are sworn to protect the
nation's aviation security. They conduct themselves with the utmost
professionalism and respect for the importance of the work they do.
Every day, they identify and eradicate threats to aviation security.
TSOs take pride in making sure all systems are working and that
personnel are fully trained in operations and observing standard
operating procedures to ensure security.
Today, we commend the Subcommittee for its examination of how the
TSA Modernization Act has enhanced airport security, and where it has
fallen short. As the Committee considers the implementation of the Act,
we point out one provision, Section 1907, which required the TSA
Administrator to convene a working group consisting of representatives
of the TSA and representatives of AFGE to recommend reforms to TSA's
personnel management system. Security screening requires a substantial
investment in technology, but it is essentially a human function and
thereby requires a commensurate investment in the personnel who carry
out these crucial functions.
TSA's personnel management system is perhaps the worst in the
Federal Government. It is a system that gives agency management
tremendous discretion and very little accountability because it
deprives employees of full due process and collective bargaining rights
guaranteed to other Federal employees under Title 5. Under Title 5,
personnel management is governed by a set of checks and balances that
ensures merit system principles are upheld for the benefit of good
government. Title 5 processes provide mechanisms that prevent managers
from hiring, firing, demoting, or disciplining employees for bad
reasons such as politics, bias, bigotry, or to shift blame for
mismanagement. Because TSA's workforce has fewer and weaker protections
against the consequences of mismanagement, it is unsurprising that the
agency experiences massive turnover, low morale, and a low level of
trust in management's decisions.
The recent decision to change the terms of coverage under the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) for TSA's large
``part-time'' workforce is a good example of the misuse of authority in
the area of personnel management. Without notice, bargaining, or
rationale; without any mention during any of the Section 1907 Work
Group meetings, TSA issued a ``management directive'' on September 20,
2019 that effected a reduction in the agency's contribution to FEHBP
premiums for its part-time workforce. TSA defined part-time as all
employees ``assigned to work schedules of 32 hours or less per week (64
hours or less per pay period) . . . ''. Prior to the issuance of this
directive, TSA paid the same portion of FEHBP premiums for its full-
time and part-time workforce. Now, for those hired after September 30,
2019, FEHBP premiums will be pro-rated for those assigned to part-time
schedules. Of course, the assignment of a part-time vs. a full-time
schedule is at the sole discretion of management. Likewise, regular
assignment of overtime for a ``part-time'' Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) at management's discretion will not affect his or her
status as a part-time employee with a lower employer subsidy for FEHBP.
When TSA was established and granted authority to have a large
portion of its workforce on permanent part-time status in order to
maximize its flexibility, it agreed to provide FEHBP coverage on the
same basis for its part-time and full-time workforce. This arrangement
was far from optimal, as the vast majority of those assigned to part-
time schedules wanted and needed a full-time paycheck. The full FEHBP
subsidy has served as an important offset to the undesirable and
inadequate part-time schedule and associated salary. Indeed, TSA has
acknowledged that low TSO salaries and involuntary part-time schedules
have been large factors in creating the agency's difficulties with
turnover and low morale, both of which undermine its ability to carry
out its mission. Indeed, apart from the base meanness of the action, it
is difficult to understand why TSA has decided to worsen its problems
by cutting health insurance benefits for such a large portion of its
workforce.
The decision to convene a Working Group under Section 1907 of the
TSA Modernization Act of 2018 was a second-best effort to address TSA's
miserable record on the use of its vast flexibilities and discretion in
the area of personnel management. AFGE has argued strenuously that
TSA's personnel management shortcomings will not be solved unless and
until its employees are provided the same rights under Title 5 as other
Federal employees, including Federal law enforcement officers elsewhere
in the Department of Homeland Security. The Working Group was not a
substitute for collective bargaining rights, which at TSA exist almost
entirely at the whim of each subsequent Administrator. Thus, the extent
of these rights is highly politicized and varies with an
administration's level of support toward the right of employees who
elect union representation to engage in collective bargaining.
Nevertheless, AFGE participated fully and in good faith in the
Section 1907 Working Group meetings. As the surprise FEHBP reduction
for a substantial portion of the TSO workforce shows, it is not at all
clear that TSA participated on the same terms.
The Section 1907 Working Group met over several months this year
and TSA is preparing the Group's report to Congress. What was
remarkable about the Working Group was that all proposals for
improvement were made by the Group's AFGE members. Rather than a robust
discussion of the needs of personnel from both a management and labor
perspective, the Agency's participation was primarily delivered in the
form of decisions to recommend AFGE's proposals or decline them with
little or no discussion. Included were proposals to change pay scales
to incorporate regular and reasonable increases over time, essential
decisions about fitness for duty, fair representation of the workforce
including reasonable grievance procedures and neutral arbitration, and
basic rights at work. Without fair pay and representation for its TSOs,
TSA will continue to experience high turnover, requiring significant
investment in hiring and training.
Because TSOs are so essential to the security of the flying public,
they should be under the same law that governs personnel management in
the rest of the Federal Government. It is just as important to TSA's
mission that its workforce have fair compensation, full due process and
union rights as it is to every other component of DHS. During the
historic 2018-2019 Government shutdown, the Nation learned about the
dedication and mettle of TSOs at the same time they learned of their
meager pay and substandard rights on the job. Please remember that TSOs
showed up at work every day during that difficult period. Many had to
find additional temporary jobs to try to make ends meet as the shutdown
dragged through three pay periods, but they kept their promise to the
American public. TSOs are frequently required to perform mandatory
overtime, are faced with ever-changing shifts and insufficient rest
time between shifts, and management failure to execute the rotation of
duties in accordance with standard operating procedures. These
represent potential security threats, many of which we tried to address
through the Working Group. Congress must understand that while AFGE did
its best, TSA did not reciprocate and thus the Section 1907 of TSA
Modernization Act was not fully utilized to improve personnel
management in a way that will enhance aviation security.
As the Subcommittee continues to examine the implementation of the
TSA Modernization Act of 2018, please know the workforce stands ready
and determined to ensure the security of the flying public. We take
pride in our work protecting America's airports and skies. Should you
have any questions, please contact Julie Tippens[.]
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Alethea Predeoux,
Director, Legislative Department.
Mr. Correa. Second, TSA is substantially late in providing
a strategy that was due in February regarding plans to open
procurement--the procurement process to a wider network of
technology companies, including participation of small
businesses. TSA relies on the small number of vendors today to
provide many of the screening technologies in use at airports
Nation-wide. As you know, small businesses, in particular, face
difficulties in competing for TSA awards due to limited
procurement cycles, high cost of certification, and lengthy
testing and evaluation processes. I look forward to hearing
what steps TSA is taking to ensure these processes are open and
fair to all. Finally, TSA is overdue in providing an assessment
of potential enhancements to surface transportation security.
As you know, mass transit and other surface transportation
systems are particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and
it is important that TSA prioritize completion of these
requirements. TSA must work to come into full compliance with
the requirements of the TSA Modernization Act as soon as
possible.
Once again I would like to thank TSA and the GAO for being
here today, and I look forward to our conversation.
[The statement of Chairman Correa follows:]
Statement of Chairman Lou Correa
October 29, 2019
One year ago this month, Congress enacted the first comprehensive
reauthorization of TSA, known as the ``TSA Modernization Act.'' The Act
incorporated a substantial number of bills and provisions that
originated in this committee. It stands as a testament to the
committee's long-standing bipartisan efforts to conduct oversight of
TSA. I thank my colleagues Ms. Watson Coleman and Mr. Katko for their
leadership in advancing legislation last Congress, and I am glad to
carry on those efforts with Ranking Member Lesko this Congress. The TSA
Modernization Act enhances and improves our Nation's transportation
security. The Act is too comprehensive to describe in detail in the few
minutes I have here, but I'd like to highlight a few key provisions.
First, the Act established a 5-year term for the TSA administrator
in an attempt to provide stability to the agency's leadership.
Unfortunately, the current chaos and leadership vacancies within DHS
have undermined those efforts. Administrator Pekoske has been forced to
``wear 2 hats,'' acting as both TSA administrator and DHS deputy
secretary. I commend the administrator for answering the call to duty,
but the role of TSA administrator is a full-time job that requires
full-time dedication to ensuring the security of our transportation
systems.
I hope President Trump will nominate permanent leaders to fill the
many DHS vacancies he has created, and thus provide TSA with the stable
leadership Congress envisioned when we passed this bill. In addition to
establishing the administrator's term, the TSA Modernization Act pushes
TSA to enhance its strategic planning efforts, secure public areas of
airports and surface transportation systems, and improve the security
of air cargo transportation. We appreciate TSA's dedication to
implementing the many directives and reporting requirements in this
bill, as well as TSA's transparency in updating the committee on its
progress. However, though TSA has made significant progress on
implementation overall, I am concerned that TSA has not yet complied
with provisions that represent some of the committee's biggest
priorities in the Act.
First, TSA is late in providing this committee a report on
recommendations to reform its personnel management system. As you know,
this subcommittee recently highlighted issues facing the TSA workforce
at a hearing in May. Transportation Security Officers serve on the
front lines securing our Nation's transportation systems, yet are among
the lowest-paid workers in the Federal Government. They are also not
afforded some of the basic workplace protections that most other
Government employees enjoy. Improving working conditions for officers
is key to TSA's evolution as a professional National security agency,
and I look forward to hearing more about the status of this important
report.
Second, TSA is substantially late in providing a strategy that was
due in February regarding plans to open procurement processes to a
wider network of technology companies, including increasing
participation of small businesses. TSA relies on a small number of
vendors to provide many of the screening technologies in use at
airports Nation-wide. Small businesses, in particular, face
difficulties in competing for TSA awards due to limited procurement
cycles, high costs of certification, and lengthy testing and evaluation
processes. I look forward to hearing what steps TSA is taking to ensure
these processes are open and fair for all.
Finally, TSA is overdue in providing an assessment of potential
enhancements to surface transportation security. Mass transit and other
surface transportation systems are particularly vulnerable to terrorist
attacks, and it is critical that TSA prioritizes completion of these
requirements. TSA must work to come into full compliance with the
requirements of the TSA Modernization Act as soon as possible.
Mr. Correa. With that I would like to turn this
conversation over to the Ranking Member Lesko for an opening
statement.
Mrs. Lesko.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome, as
well, Representative Dan Bishop from North Carolina.
Welcome. This is a great committee. You are going to enjoy
it. Very important.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here, and the TSA
officers and other employees that are here from TSA and DHS.
Thanks for being here and participating.
I am pleased that this subcommittee is meeting today to
oversee implementation of last year's bipartisan
reauthorization of the Transportation Security Administration,
the TSA Modernization Act.
Terrorists, of course, continue to target both surface and
aviation transportation in ways that are constantly evolving.
The TSA Modernization Act recognizes this reality and provides
direction to the agency at a critical time.
Importantly, this legislation marks the first-ever
reauthorization of TSA since the agency was created in 2001
following the terror attacks of September 11. In so doing,
Congress fulfilled its Constitutional role to provide
oversight, accountability, and direction to the Federal
Government and the resources appropriated to protect the
traveling public.
The TSA Modernization Act took measurable steps to update
many offices and programs within TSA and make the agency more
prepared for current and evolving threats to transportation
security. Some of these provisions included the establishment
of a 5-year term for the TSA administrator, authorizing the use
of third-party explosive detection canines for passenger and
cargo screening, providing additional resources and support to
the Federal flight deck officer program, and outlining new
enrollment objectives for TSA PreCheck.
Now, a little more than 1 year after enactment, it is
prudent for our subcommittee to echo the bicameral
bipartisanship that facilitated the passage of this landmark
legislation as we examine how effectively TSA has worked to
implement the law.
I commend Administrator Pekoske, who is currently serving
doubly as the acting director--acting deputy secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, for working closely with
Congress on this legislation last year, and for his team's
dedication to providing regular briefings to the relevant
committees on implementation status. This work, along with
Congressional oversight, has resulted in 87 percent of the
law's required actions for TSA being either successfully
completed, or on track for successful completion in a timely
manner.
For many of these provisions, GAO serves as the committee's
watchdog on implementation in its review of TSA programs,
offices, and security mitigation efforts. So I am pleased that
they are represented here today, as well.
I look forward to hearing from TSA and GAO today on the
status of outstanding provisions in the law, as well as what
the agency has accomplished over the last year in fulfilling
its statutory requirements.
[The statement of Ranking Member Lesko follows:]
October 29, 2019
Statement of Ranking Member Debbie Lesko
I am pleased that the subcommittee is meeting today to oversee
implementation of last year's bipartisan reauthorization of the
Transportation Security Administration, the TSA Modernization Act.
Terrorists continue to target both surface and aviation transportation
in ways that are constantly evolving. The TSA Modernization Act
recognizes this reality and provides direction to the agency at a
critical time.
Importantly, this legislation marks the first-ever reauthorization
of TSA since the agency was created in 2001, following the terror
attacks of September 11. In so doing, Congress fulfilled its
Constitutional role to provide oversight, accountability, and direction
to the Federal Government and the resources appropriated to protect the
traveling public.
The TSA Modernization Act took measurable steps to update many
offices and programs within TSA and make the agency more prepared for
current and evolving threats to transportation security. Some of these
provisions included the establishment of a 5-year term for the TSA
administrator, authorizing the use of third-party explosive detection
canines for passenger and cargo screening, providing additional
resources and support to the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, and
outlining new enrollment objectives for TSA PreCheck.
Now, a little more than 1 year after enactment, it is prudent for
our subcommittee to echo the bicameral bipartisanship that facilitated
the passage of this landmark legislation as we examine how effectively
TSA has worked to implement the law.
I commend Administrator Pekoske, who is currently serving doubly as
the acting deputy secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, for
working closely with Congress on this legislation last year and for his
team's dedication to providing regular briefings to the relevant
committees on implementation status. This work, along with
Congressional oversight, has resulted in 87 percent of the law's
required actions for TSA being either successfully completed or on
track for successful completion in a timely manner.
For many of these provisions, GAO serves as the committee's
watchdog on implementation in its review of TSA programs, offices, and
security mitigation efforts, so I am pleased that they are represented
here today.
I look forward to hearing from TSA and GAO today on the status of
outstanding provisions in the law, as well as what the agency has
accomplished over the last year in fulfilling its statutory
requirements. Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mrs. Lesko.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under
the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
October 29, 2019
A year after enactment, it seems appropriate to look closely at the
Transportation Security Administration's implementation of the TSA
reauthorization legislation. The TSA Modernization Act included
important provisions that this committee championed, including many
Democratic priorities that were included although we were in the
Minority when the bill passed. Among them was my bill, the TSA OPEN for
Business Act, which will improve the agency's partnership with small
businesses, ensure procurement activities are open to all, and
diversify the marketplace.
Also included was my Air Cargo Security Improvement Act, which will
evolve TSA's cargo security efforts by reestablishing a dedicated cargo
security office, directing reviews of cargo security programs, and
requiring a pilot of new cargo screening technologies. Another key
provision was the requirement for TSA to convene a working group with
labor representatives to work on reforms to TSA's personnel management
system, since Transportation Security Officers do not receive the same
basic workplace rights and protections afforded to most other Federal
employees. The Act also highlights surface transportation security as a
significant area of focus, directing a study of new technologies and a
survey of transit agencies' operational needs. I thank TSA for its
efforts to implement the agency's first-ever reauthorization, a complex
law with a large number of provisions. I appreciate TSA's commitment to
transparency and providing this committee regular updates.
However, although on paper TSA estimates nearly 60 percent of
requirements are completed, many of those counted are provisions that
codified existing activities, and many others were relatively minor.
When it comes to some of the key provisions and priorities of this
committee, there is much work left to do. Important reports and
notifications are late--including on each of the critical topics I've
described. I look forward to hearing from TSA how they plan to meet
their responsibilities under the law.
Mr. Correa. I want to welcome the panel of witnesses.
Our first witness, Ms. Patricia Cogswell, is the acting
deputy administrator for TSA. Prior to joining TSA, Ms.
Cogswell held several leadership positions within the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and DHS, including as
acting under secretary for DHS intelligence and analysis.
Our next witness, Mr. William Russell, is a director at the
Government Accountability Office, GAO's homeland security and
justice team, where he is responsible for leading GAO's work on
aviation and surface transportation security. Mr. Russell has
over 17 years of experience at GAO, and was previously an
assistant director in GAO's contracting and National security
acquisitions team.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. Now I ask each witness to summarize
their statements for 5 minutes, beginning with Ms. Cogswell.
Welcome, ma'am.
STATEMENT OF PATRICIA F.S. COGSWELL, ACTING DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Cogswell. Good morning, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member
Lesko, and distinguished Members of this committee. On behalf
of TSA's employees, I want to express our appreciation for the
continued support of Congress, the productive relationship we
have with this subcommittee, and as well with the Government
Accountability Office, as well as the authorities provided by
the TSA Modernization Act of 2018.
Implementing the TSA Modernization Act is a priority for
TSA. I am grateful for the invitation to testify about our
efforts to execute these authorities.
Since its creation following the September 11 attacks,
TSA's on-going commitment to ensuring transportation security
has enabled public and commerce to continue traveling securely
and freely. Eighteen years later, the reality is that
transportation systems remain highly-valued targets for
terrorists, and their methods of attack are more decentralized
and opportunistic than ever. TSA must meet the challenge of a
pervasive and constantly-evolving threat environment in both
the cyber and physical realms.
In meeting this challenge, TSA's most important asset is
its people. I am very proud of the 63,000 dedicated
professionals who make up our work force and every day
demonstrate our core values of integrity, respect, and
commitment. Together, the efforts of our work force secures and
facilitates transportation for an average of 85 million
passengers, 2.56 billion in cargo, and critical transportation
infrastructure around the country.
Earlier this year a significant portion of our work force
went without pay for 35 days during the partial Government
shutdown. Despite suffering financial and personal hardships,
they demonstrated true professionalism and commitment to the
transportation security mission. We are grateful to Congress
for continuing to explore ways to prevent this from happening
again, and stand ready to help you in achieving this goal.
2018 was a very important year for TSA and its direction.
Not only did we release our strategy and administrator's
intent, highlighting our strategic priorities and improving
security and safeguarding the transportation system,
accelerating action, and committing to our people, but the TSA
Modernization Act became law, the first reauthorization of our
agency.
2019 has been the year of implementation. We have conveyed
through 8 progress meetings with this committee--subcommittee
staff that, as of today, TSA has implemented more than 60
percent of the 180 requirements mandated by the Act, and 72
percent of those with specific deadlines. Completed
requirements include conducting a global aviation security
review, creating an air cargo division, establishing a surface
transportation security advisory committee, initiating a pilot
program to test CT Technology for air cargo, executing an
automated exit lane technology pilot program in Phoenix Mesa
Airport.
Additionally, consistent with the TSA Modernization Act,
requirements to grow TSA PreCheck enrollment and limit the use
of PreCheck lanes to those with known traveler numbers, we
successfully conducted 2 pilots, both ensuring the feasibility
and throughput for TSA use of PreCheck-only lanes, as well as
the future lane experience model where non-PreCheck passengers
designated as lower risk would receive alternative screening
procedures.
Continuing to evaluate risk in assessing technology,
policy, and procedures in place to address that risk is
critical to our mission execution. Recent examples of where we
have done so consistent with the Modernization Act include
updating the Federal Air Marshal concept of service--concept of
operation through prioritized mission deployment strategy
focused on high-risk travelers, and revised international risk
assessment models, as well as implementing changes to address
insider risk, including establishing an Aviation Security
Advisory Committee Subcommittee on Insider Threat to assess
ways to improve airport worker controls.
Building on this critical work, TSA plans to produce a road
map for mitigating insider risk in all modes of transportation.
TSA also recognizes our strategic success depends on our
work force. TSA commissioned a blue ribbon panel of public and
private-sector human capital experts to review TSA's human
capital policy and policy processes, and re-established our
National Advisory Council, which is comprised of advisors from
our uniformed work force. Through recommendations from these
groups and others, TSA developed a number of work force
initiatives that we are now implementing, such as our two-tier
performance system, our model officer recognition program, and
our TSA career progression.
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify you--
before you today. TSA is grateful for the authorities provided
through the Modernization Act, and is committed to implementing
them as quickly as possible. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cogswell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patricia F.S. Cogswell
October 29, 2019
Good morning Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. On behalf of all TSA
employees, I'd like to express our appreciation for the continued
support of Congress, the productive relationship we have with this
subcommittee, and the authorities provided through the TSA
Modernization Act of 2018, the first reauthorization of our critical
security agency. Thank you for inviting me to testify about our
implementation of the TSA Modernization Act and the work we are doing
to keep the Nation's transportation system secure.
TSA was created in the wake of the September 11 attacks and through
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 was charged with
the mission of protecting the Nation's transportation system to ensure
the freedom of movement for people and commerce. Much has changed since
then, but our fundamental mission has not, nor has our most important
asset--our people.
I am extremely proud of the 63,000 dedicated professionals who
comprise TSA's workforce, who demonstrate our core values of integrity,
respect, and commitment and provide security for our transportation
systems each and every day. Together, the efforts of our workforce
secures and facilitates the transportation for a daily average of 85
million passengers, cargo, and industry with daily revenues totaling
over $2.56 billion, and critical transportation infrastructure across
the country. Exemplary of their dedication to the mission, earlier this
year Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), Federal Air Marshals,
vetting and intelligence personnel, Transportation Security Inspectors,
canine handlers, and support staffs worked for 35 days without pay
under extraordinarily challenging circumstances during the lapse in
appropriations--despite suffering personal financial hardship. Although
TSA was able to leverage the flexibility provided by our authorities
and appropriations to use prior year carry-over funding to provide a
small portion to our workforce, the impact was real. In fact, our 2019
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) results reflected that nearly
44 percent of our workforce indicated the partial Government shutdown
had a ``very negative'' or ``extremely negative'' impact on their
everyday work, while an additional 39 percent characterized it as a
``moderately negative'' or ``slightly negative'' effect. We are hopeful
that such circumstances can be avoided in the future and look forward
to working with Congress to develop solutions.
The U.S. transportation system accommodates approximately 965
million domestic and international aviation passengers annually--this
equates to the screening of 2.8 million passengers, 1.4 million checked
bags, and 5.1 million carry-on bags each day. In surface
transportation, there are more than 10.1 billion passenger trips on
mass transit per year, approximately 600 million passengers traveling
over-the-road buses each year, and more than 1 million hazardous
material shipments on trucks every day. Beyond those usage numbers
associated with a relatively open network of transportation modes, the
physical scope of the system encompasses approximately 138,000 miles of
railroad tracks; 4.2 million miles of highway; 616,000 highway bridges;
503 road tunnels; and nearly 2.7 million miles of pipeline.
Although the scope of our transportation system is significant, it
is critically important from a planning and execution perspective to
also recognize that demands are increasing. For instance, the last 12
months represent the highest volume of air travelers in the agency's
history, and we just completed the busiest summer travel season ever,
screening more than 262 million aviation passengers and crew between
Memorial Day and Labor Day. These increased numbers will likely
continue as the aviation industry estimates anticipated annual growth
of 4.5 percent for passenger travel and 2.5 percent for cargo over the
next 20 years. Thanks in part to the support of Congress, TSA has been
able to take measures to address the recent increases in volume, with
current staffing levels at 2,100 more full-time employees than last
year as well as a 20 percent increase in the allocation of overtime to
ensure airports have the flexibility to schedule officers during peak
times.
Today, aviation and transportation hubs remain highly-valued
targets for terrorists. Adversaries whose methods of attack, which now
includes the potential use of unmanned aircraft systems (or drones),
are more decentralized and opportunistic than ever before. The reality
for TSA is that every day we are challenged by a pervasive and evolving
threat environment, both in the physical and cyber realms. We are
constantly working to address these challenges and recognize that we
must both ensure we are effectively countering known threats, while
investing in analysis, research, and development to prepare for the
threats of the future, including changes to improve our people,
procedures, and technology.
TSA's continued success is contingent upon our ability to rise to
the challenge of outmatching dynamic threats to our aviation and
surface transportation systems and doing so within the parameters of
increasing demand--and, importantly, our fiscal environment. We are
grateful to Congress for the support it has provided for us to execute
our mission. Implementing the TSA Modernization Act is a priority for
the Agency. TSA, through its leadership corps and organizational
structure, has implemented more than 58 percent of the 180 requirements
contained within the TSA Modernization Act and continues its efforts to
execute those that remain. As part of our implementation approach, in
the last year we have provided 8 regular status updates on all
requirements, including communicating challenges associated with
carrying out Congressional direction.
The authorities provided by the TSA Modernization Act of 2018 have
provided more flexibility for meeting the challenges the agency faces
today. Our Nation relies on the professionals at TSA, and across both
the domestic and international transportation community, to protect
passengers and commerce traveling to and within the United States.
Securing the Nation's transportation system, which is complex,
expansive, and interdependent, requires a collective effort; it is not
something that the Government can accomplish alone. To that end, TSA
recognizes the critical importance of partnering with stakeholders in
developing transportation security solutions. For instance, pursuant to
the TSA Modernization Act, we are currently working with Phoenix-Mesa
Airport to collect and analyze data associated with automated exit lane
technology.
We are also pleased to immediately use the authority provided by
the TSA Modernization Act to establish a Surface Transportation
Security Advisory Committee, which was established in April and held
its second meeting last week. TSA is grateful for the invaluable
insights provided by this new committee as well as continued support
and collaboration we receive from stakeholders through the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee, DHS Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Committee's Transportation Systems Sector Coordinating, and
other forums. The discussions, feedback, and input provided by those
entities, as well as new working groups we established pursuant to the
TSA Modernization Act--focused upon explosives detection, canine
capacity, and public area security--are facilitating formal and regular
information sharing between transportation stakeholders and the
development of best practices and guidance for countering determined
adversaries.
Resiliency is reflected in TSA's people, structure, and doctrine.
As required by the Modernization Act, we conducted an overarching
efficiency review of the organization, better aligned our structure to
improve how we execute our surface transportation security, elevated
our vetting and air cargo missions, and performed comprehensive reviews
of our personnel system. These efforts, along with Congress
establishing a 5-year term for the administrator, have placed TSA on a
sound course for years to come.
The TSA Strategy, which mirrors the TSA Modernization Act's
emphasis on enhancing security technology and risk-based decision
making, ensures our focus on capability innovation and threat-informed,
information-driven operations. The Administrator's Intent explains how
we will execute the Strategy through 2020. The TSA Strategy and
Administrator's Intent detail how we will accomplish them. Both
documents are posted on our website for public review and transparency.
In our Strategy, we list 3 priorities: Improve security and safeguard
the transportation system; accelerate action; and commit to our people.
These priorities reflect TSA's focus on preserving front-line
operations, quickly transitioning to new solutions and capabilities,
and creating efficiencies to optimize limited resources.
improve security and safeguard the transportation system
TSA's operational environment requires robust partnerships and
effective security operations across all modes of transportation. We
strive to strengthen our operational approach through a proficient and
professional workforce, more effective threat detection capabilities,
enhanced intelligence and vetting, and better communication and
coordination with stakeholders. Simultaneously, we also strive to
improve the passenger experience.
When Administrator Pekoske testified before this subcommittee
earlier this year, he explained the efforts TSA was taking to rapidly
test computed tomography (CT) screening systems and expand their use at
airport checkpoints. CT technology allows TSA officers to more easily
identify potential threats in a less invasive way, and eventually may
eliminate the need for passengers to remove liquids, electronics, and
food items from carry-on passenger bags. This technology enhances the
effectiveness of TSA's security screening process and improves the
passenger experience. Thanks to the support of Congress, TSA recently
awarded a contract for 300 CT units. The deployment of this technology
along with Credential Authentication Technology (CAT), which identifies
documents that are fraudulent or have been tampered with as well as
providing our officers direct access to individual passenger vetting
results, is transforming the effectiveness and efficiency of our
checkpoint screening process.
TSA has explored a number of other ways to improve performance,
manage risk, and use resources more effectively. Consistent with the
TSA Modernization Act requirement to limit the use of TSA PreCheck
lanes to only individuals with Known Traveler Numbers, which represents
approximately 20 percent of passengers traveling through our Nation's
airports each day, we successfully conducted pilots at 2 airports,
demonstrating that TSA can achieve higher throughput for ``pure
PreCheck'' lanes. In addition, we also sought to test our Future Lane
Experience (FLEx) model at 2 airports to assess throughput when we
provide alternate procedures for processing passengers identified as
lower risk; this screening is not as streamlined as what a TSA PreCheck
member would receive but is more efficient than standard processing.
CAT units are integral to further expanding these initiatives.
Similarly, TSA conducted joint pilots with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), using the facial recognition system and photo
galleries CBP built to meet its biometric entry-exit program mandate,
to assess how facial recognition technologies could be used to
potentially automate Travel Document Checker (TDC) functions at our
checkpoint. TSA recently conducted a pilot program at Las Vegas
McCarran Airport, adding an automated facial matching capability to
existing CAT systems to assess operational effectiveness for matching a
traveler's image to the photo on the ID they present to the officer at
the TDC. In carrying out these efforts, which are designed to find ways
to both improve security effectiveness and enhance the passenger
experience, TSA is committed to ensuring appropriate privacy and data
protections are in place. Building upon the biometrics report DHS
submitted to Congress earlier this year, we are currently working with
DHS Science and Technology Directorate to analyze data derived from the
Las Vegas pilot to evaluate camera system and system matching
performance and assess any variation in biometric performance based on
the reference image source.
Looking abroad, for the last 2 years, TSA has implemented enhanced
security requirements for all commercial flights to the United States.
Those measures include enhanced screening of passengers and electronic
devices and heightened security standards for aircraft and airports.
These new security measures have been implemented at 283 last-point-of-
departure airports in 106 countries. These airports service
approximately 338 U.S. and foreign airlines, transporting an average of
375,000 passengers on 2,100 flights daily. While those actions are
effective in the near term, TSA is focused on raising the global
baseline for aviation security through long-term partnerships and
cooperation. As mandated by the TSA Modernization Act, earlier this
year TSA conducted a Global Aviation Security Review. Through that
process, we identified a number of best practices related to enhancing
collaboration with foreign partners on aviation security capacity and
performed focused audit visits to determine compliance with TSA
Security Directives/Emergency Amendments. TSA is using that review to
advance the improvement of international aviation security standards
for passengers.
TSA also continues to improve air cargo security. Earlier this
year, per the TSA Modernization Act, TSA established an air cargo
division, reviewed the effectiveness of the certified cargo screening
program, and conducted a feasibility study of the potential use of CT
systems for screening air cargo. Consistent with the TSA Modernization
Act requirement as well as the results of that study, TSA has initiated
a pilot program with an all-cargo entity to test the effectiveness of
CT for screening in such a setting. As threats continue to evolve, TSA,
in cooperation with partners world-wide, will work to improve
intelligence sharing and standardize best practices, while also
pursuing technological security advancements.
In addition to our aviation passenger screening mission, TSA
continues to oversee the security of the surface transportation system.
On a daily basis, TSA assists surface stakeholders by conducting
vulnerability assessments, analyzing security programs across the
surface sector--from pipelines, to mass transit, to freight rail, to
over-the-road bus entities--providing training and exercise support,
sharing intelligence information, and executing collaborative law
enforcement and security operations--such as those operations conducted
by the Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response (or VIPR) teams. Since
December 2018, TSA, in partnership with the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), has conducted 4 Validated
Architecture Design Reviews, which are in-depth cybersecurity
assessments, at select pipeline companies and has 4 additional
assessments scheduled. We also conducted 18 intermodal security
exercise training programs (I-STEP) exercises this past fiscal year to
evaluate and enhance the preparedness level of the Nation's surface
transportation modes. In an effort to improve the support and services
we provide, over the last several months TSA has elevated the Surface
Operations leadership position, realigned resources to focus on surface
inspections, established the Surface Transportation Security Advisory
Committee, and distributed a survey to more than 3,000 surface
transportation stakeholders to better assess their needs.
Finally, TSA continues to work to address current and evolving
threats by looking at emerging technologies, including from outside the
transportation environment, to assess how they might be applied in the
surface transportation environment. Through the process of establishing
operational test beds, TSA works with surface transportation owners and
operators to develop and deploy technology solutions to advance
security for different modes of transportation (mass transit, highway
motor carrier, pipeline, and freight rail). While TSA does not procure
the technology for surface transportation operators and owners, the
test bed approach assists with development of their technology
requirements, helps inform their acquisition decisionmaking process,
and enables TSA to share the results of the testing in various
technology forums. As an example of how the test bed approach assists
stakeholders, Los Angeles Metro used results from its test bed
partnership with TSA last year to support its application for a
Transportation Security Grant to procure state-of-the-art stand-off
explosives detection systems. These systems are in service, helping to
secure the LA Metro system from terrorist threats.
accelerate action
In many ways, 2019 represents a year of implementation of a number
of initiatives that TSA accelerated last year--specifically, deployment
of both CT and CAT technology at the checkpoints. This year has also
included a renewed focus on developing the next generation of Advanced
Imaging Technology (AIT) devices. TSA is currently partnering with the
DHS Science and Technology Directorate, the Department of Energy, and
security stakeholders to assess next generation enhanced AIT systems.
Through providing automated target algorithms with more data, these
systems should increase detection performance and reduce potential
false alarms without compromising an individual's privacy. TSA will
also continue to conduct airport trials of alternative AIT solutions
designed to reduce processing times and improve performance accuracy.
By embracing emerging technologies, leveraging agile processes, and
facilitating collaboration, TSA is positioning itself to keep pace with
industry partners while advancing security across all modes of
transportation. To that end, TSA has formalized a strategic management
process that aligns strategy and policy to operations by leveraging
risk assessment capabilities to inform budgeting and investment
decisions. We used this approach in the development of the TSA fiscal
year 0-24 Capital Investment Plan that was submitted to Congress
earlier this year pursuant to the TSA Modernization Act requirement.
Additionally, consistent with the direction of the TSA
Modernization Act, TSA conducted a review of advanced security
screening technology testing and evaluation, acquisitions, and
procurement practices within TSA and, among other things, assessed how
it can further encourage innovation and competition among technology
stakeholders, including through increased participation of and funding
for small business concerns. Through TSA's Innovation Task Force Broad
Agency Announcement, we solicited solutions to 9 different problem
statements related to issues ranging from alarm resolution to identity
verification to automated security design. In response to that request,
TSA received 85 total submissions from 104 unique vendors, 55 percent
of which had never responded to a TSA solicitation before, and 72
percent that had never contracted with TSA. Of the 12 solutions that
were ultimately selected for demonstration in an operational
environment, 7 were provided by small businesses. In fiscal year 2019,
over $460 million of TSA's $1.87 billion of funding available for
contracts, or 24.5 percent, was obligated to small businesses,
exceeding our established small business goal of 23 percent for the
year. Finally, on October 11, 2019, TSA announced the opening of a
window for the qualification of vendor CT systems under the Checkpoint
Property Screening System (CPSS) program. The notice also advises
industry that resulting solicitations for qualified systems may include
set asides for a portion of CPSS requirements.
commit to our people
TSA recognizes that our strategic success depends upon our
workforce. Our priority to Commit to Our People focuses on our ability
to attract, hire, train, develop, promote, and equip our workforce at
all levels of the organization. TSA commissioned a Blue-Ribbon Panel
comprised of public and private-sector leaders with extensive human
capital expertise to conduct a full review of the human capital service
policy and delivery at TSA, including TSO pay and compensation, to
identify ways we can improve as an organization. Among a number of
findings, the Panel reaffirmed that TSA's authorizing statute, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), provides TSA with
greater authority and flexibility to manage our workforce than the
Title 5 General Schedule. Working within that authority, TSA currently
has a number of initiatives under way that are designed to enhance our
ability to compete as an employer and attract and retain talent.
Two-Tier Performance System.--Based upon input from our
workforce, we determined that the way we had implemented our
multi-tier performance system was placing significant paperwork
burdens on our employees and supervisors without providing
meaningful distinctions between employees or benefits for their
professional development. Beginning this month, TSA shifted to
a simpler two-tier system for the screening workforce (e.g.,
meets standards/does not meet standards) that will streamline
the process and significantly reduce subjectivity.
Model Officer Recognition.--Also earlier this month, TSA
announced a new program that provides the agency with a
mechanism to better recognize its top officers for the work
they are doing throughout the year with monetary and non-
monetary awards for special acts as well as pay increases.
TSO Career Progression.--This initiative provides a clearly-
defined and transparent career path for uniformed officers with
pay increases tied to enhanced skills and training. The first
phase of TSO Career Progression was implemented in August 2018,
and TSA has updated and rolled out 6 new training classes this
past year.
Over the last few years, TSA has seen significant improvements in
the results of the annual FEVS. While we are proud of the advancements
reflected through the FEVS, we realize that as an Agency we must
continue to innovate and compete as an employer to ensure our workplace
attracts, keeps, and develops great personnel. We are confident that
the actions we have taken to improve employee communications with
senior leadership through reestablishing the National Advisory Council
and creating uniformed advisors to the administrator, as well as the
initiatives noted previously, will advance our efforts toward that
goal.
conclusion
TSA is grateful for the authorities provided through the TSA
Modernization Act and is committed to implementing its requirements as
quickly as possible while executing our strategic priorities. While
those goals are ambitious, they are necessary to stay ahead of
persistent, determined adversaries while also preserving individual
freedoms and the benefits of an open, efficient transportation system.
TSA was created in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on
our homeland, and we are resolute in our desire to ensure that a
similar event never occurs in the future. We are confident that through
vigilance, collaboration with domestic and international partners, and
the continued support of Congress and all of our stakeholders, such an
attack will not occur on ``Our Watch.''
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I am honored to serve in this capacity along with the dedicated
men and women of TSA. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much, Ms. Cogswell.
I would like to recognize Mr. Bill Russell to summarize his
statement in 5 minutes.
Sir.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM RUSSELL, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Russell. Good morning, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member
Lesko, and Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here
today to discuss TSA progress to implement the TSA
Modernization Act.
As you know, the Act included provisions intended to, among
other things, improve aviation security, screening
technologies, oversight of passenger screening processes, and
surface transportation.
The Act also included a number of provisions for GAO to
review TSA's progress.
This statement summarizes past work and observations from
some of our on-going work in assessing TSA's actions for
selected areas.
Overall, this body of GAO work shows that TSA has made
progress consistent with provisions under the Act, but can
improve in a number of areas.
First, in terms of international aviation security, TSA
took steps to strengthen assessments of foreign airport
operators. For example, since our December 2017 report, TSA
further enhanced its foreign airport assessments by capturing
better data on vulnerabilities so they can be effectively
mitigated.
In addition, the Act included a provision for GAO to review
security directives for airports in foreign countries that
offer last-point-of-departure flights to the United States. TSA
may revise or issue new security directives for domestic air
carriers, and emergency amendments for foreign air carriers
when threat information or vulnerabilities at foreign airports
indicate an immediate need for air carriers to implement
additional security measures.
In our review of this process, we found the TSA did not
fully define how to coordinate with industry representatives
prior to updating directives, which can lead to some
difficulties in implementing needed changes.
TSA had also not yet fully determined whether to cancel or
incorporate many long-standing security directives into air
carriers' security programs in full accordance with TSA policy.
We made several recommendations to address these issues, and
TSA concurred with them.
The Modernization Act also included provisions related to
oversight of passenger screening rules. TSA developed screening
rules by considering current intelligence and other factors to
identify passengers who may require enhanced screening. In our
forthcoming report we found that oversight of this process has
improved. TSA coordinates rule reviews through quarterly
meetings, and notifies an expanded set of DHS and TSA
stakeholders of rule changes, as called for under the Act.
We also found that, while TSA tracks some data related to
rule implementation, it does not comprehensively measure rule
effectiveness. We recommended that TSA explore additional data
sources for better measuring the effectiveness of these rules.
TSA is currently reviewing this recommendation.
In terms of screening technologies, we reviewed the process
used by TSA to deploy those technologies to airports, and in
our forthcoming report we found that TSA considers risks in its
deployment decisions, but has not fully documented them.
Importantly, we also found that, after screening
technologies have been deployed to airports, TSA does not fully
ensure that these technologies continue to meet detection
requirements, even though performance of that technology can
degrade over time. We made several recommendations to address
these issues, and TSA is currently reviewing them.
Per the Act, we also reviewed TSA pipeline security
efforts. We found that TSA's management of key aspects of its
pipeline security can be improved, although coordination with
pipeline operators is good. For example, TSA needs to better
evaluate the number of staff and resources that it devotes to
pipeline security, and to include a strategic work force plan
that can help it effectively identify the skills and
competencies, such as cybersecurity expertise, necessary to
carry out responsibilities. TSA concurred with those
recommendations to address the issues, and has efforts under
way.
In conclusion, TSA has taken important steps to improve
security and response--Modernization Act, but additional
actions will be needed, going forward, and we will continue to
review TSA progress to implement these remaining portions of
the Act.
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, this concludes my
prepared remarks, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Russell
October 29, 2019
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-20-225T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Threats to the Nation's transportation systems persist and continue
to evolve. Within DHS, TSA is the Federal agency with primary
responsibility for the prevention of and defense against terrorist and
other threats to the United States' civil aviation, and rail, public
transit, pipeline, and other surface transportation systems. The TSA
Modernization Act includes provisions intended to enhance security
across this broad range of systems and further called on GAO to review
TSA's progress in these areas.
This statement summarizes past and on-going work related to TSA's
actions to address selected aviation and surface transportation
security areas covered by the TSA Modernization Act. This statement is
based on products GAO issued from December 2017 through October 2019
and draft reports with TSA for comment.
To perform this work GAO reviewed TSA program documents, visited
domestic and foreign airports, and interviewed TSA officials, DHS
officials, and transportation industry stakeholders, including
associations and air carriers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations designed to address the challenges
discussed in this statement. TSA concurred with recommendations from
prior work and is currently reviewing recommendations from our draft
reports, including those regarding passenger screening rules and
aviation screening technologies.
transportation security.--tsa has taken steps to improve security areas
identified in the tsa modernization act, but additional actions are
needed
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has made initial progress in certain security
areas mandated by the TSA Modernization Act, but additional actions are
needed.
International aviation security.--In December 2017, GAO
reported that TSA has taken steps to enhance its foreign
airport assessments. Since that time, TSA has developed a tool
to better track and address foreign airport vulnerabilities. In
addition, TSA reviews security directives and emergency
amendments it issues to address security concerns. However,
TSA's review process does not fully define how to coordinate
with industry representatives and it has not determined if it
is appropriate to incorporate the security measures of many
long-standing directives into air carrier security programs in
accordance with TSA policy. In October 2019, GAO recommended,
and TSA officials agreed, that TSA better define how to
coordinate with air carriers when reviewing directives and when
to incorporate directives into security programs.
Passenger screening rules.--TSA develops screening rules by
considering current intelligence and other factors to identify
passengers who fall within the scope of the rules for enhanced
screening. GAO found that TSA coordinates rules reviews through
quarterly meetings and notifies an expanded set of DHS and TSA
stakeholders of rule changes as called for by the Act. TSA
tracks some data on rule implementation but does not
comprehensively measure rule effectiveness. In its draft
report, GAO recommended that TSA explore additional data
sources for measuring the effectiveness of its rules. TSA is
currently reviewing this recommendation.
Aviation screening technologies.--GAO found that TSA does
not ensure that screening technologies continue to meet
detection requirements after they have been deployed to
airports. According to officials, the agency uses
certification--a step in the test and evaluation process--to
confirm that technologies meet detection requirements before
they are deployed to airports, and calibration of the
technologies to confirm that technologies are at least
minimally operational while in use at airports. While these
processes serve important purposes, performance can degrade
over time. In its draft report, GAO recommended that TSA
implement a process to ensure technologies continue to meet
detection requirements after deployment. TSA is currently
reviewing this recommendation.
Surface transportation pipeline security.--In December 2018,
GAO identified some weaknesses and made recommendations to
strengthen TSA's management of key aspects of its pipeline
security program. For example, TSA does not have a strategic
workforce plan to help ensure it identifies the skills and
competencies--such as the required level of cybersecurity
expertise--necessary to carry out its pipeline security
responsibilities. GAO recommended, and TSA concurred, that TSA
develop a strategic workforce plan. As of October 2019, TSA has
not yet fully addressed this recommendation. We will continue
to monitor progress.
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and Members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) actions to implement the
TSA Modernization Act.\1\ Within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), TSA is the Federal agency with primary responsibility for the
prevention of and defense against terrorist and other threats to the
United States' transportation systems. Threats to the transportation
system persist and continue to evolve. For example, in March 2017, TSA
imposed new screening measures to enhance aviation security after
intelligence agencies confirmed that terrorist organizations had the
capability to plant explosives in personal electronic devices, such as
laptops.
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\1\ The TSA Modernization Act was enacted as part of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018. Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 132
Stat. 3186, 3542 (2018).
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The TSA Modernization Act includes provisions intended to, among
other things, improve screening technologies, streamline the passenger
screening process, mandate more rigorous background checks of airport
workers, strengthen airport access controls, increase passenger
checkpoint efficiency and operational performance, enhance security in
public areas of airports, and improve surface transportation
stakeholder coordination. The Act also included provisions for GAO to
review TSA's progress in a number of these areas.
This statement summarizes past work and preliminary observations of
our on-going work on TSA's actions to improve aviation and surface
transportation security in select areas mandated by the TSA
Modernization Act (the Act). This statement is based partly on 5
reports we issued from December 2017 through October 2019 on
international aviation and pipeline security. In addition, this
statement discusses key findings based on 3 draft reports regarding
passenger screening rules, surface transportation, and passenger and
checked baggage screening technology--which are currently with TSA for
comment. Further, this statement includes preliminary observations from
our on-going review of the security of airport public areas.
To perform work for our prior reports and draft reports with TSA
for comment, we examined TSA program documents, visited domestic and
foreign airports, and interviewed TSA officials, DHS officials, and
transportation industry stakeholders, including associations and air
carriers. Further details on our scope and methodology are available
within each of our published products. In addition, we regularly
followed up with relevant officials to solicit updated information on
agency actions taken in response to our recommendations. For our on-
going work on the security of public areas, we reviewed and analyzed
the best practices and recommendations cited in the 2017 Public Area
Security National Framework. We also interviewed TSA headquarters and
field-based officials, as well as airport operators and law enforcement
personnel in selected airport locations.
The work upon which this statement is based was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
tsa has taken steps to improve aviation security, but additional
actions are needed
TSA Has Taken Actions to Strengthen International Aviation Security but
Could Take Additional Steps to Ensure the Security of U.S.-
bound Flights
Civil aviation, including U.S.-bound flights, remains a target of
coordinated terrorist activity. In the last 2 years, we issued reports
on TSA's foreign airport and air carrier inspection programs (December
2017), assessments of Cuban aviation security (July 2018), and TSA's
process for reviewing security directives and emergency amendments that
apply at last-point-of-departure airports (October 2019).\2\
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\2\ A last-point-of-departure flight is a flight that does not make
any intermediate stops between a foreign and U.S. airport.
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Foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections.--In
December 2017, we reported that TSA had taken steps to enhance its
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections since 2011,
including aligning resources based on risk, resolving airport access
issues, making evaluations more comprehensive, and creating operational
efficiencies.\3\ For example, we found that TSA had implemented
targeted foreign airport assessments in locations where risk was high
and developed a system to strengthen its data analysis capabilities.\4\
However, we also found that TSA's database for tracking the resolution
status of security deficiencies did not have comprehensive data on
security deficiencies' root causes and corrective actions. In addition,
the database lacked adequate categorization mechanisms such as
capturing subcategories that would better explain the root causes of
security deficiencies. We recommended, among other things, that TSA
fully capture and more specifically categorize data on the root causes
of security deficiencies that it identifies and corrective actions. To
implement this recommendation, TSA developed a tool to capture airport
vulnerability data and provided training to staff in the use of the
tool and developed guidance that delineates updated categories for root
causes in its data systems.
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\3\ GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Strengthened Foreign Airport
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections, but Could Improve Analysis to
Better Address Deficiencies, GAO-18-178 (Washington, DC: Dec. 4, 2017).
Through its foreign airport assessment program, TSA assesses the
effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports using selected
aviation security standards and recommended practices adopted by the
International Civil Aviation Organization, a United Nations
organization representing 191 countries.
\4\ According to TSA officials, the Global Risk Analysis and
Decision Support System has provided them with a number of benefits,
including the ability to run standardized reports, extract and analyze
key data, and manage airport operational information, such as data on
security screening equipment.
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Cuban aviation security.--In July 2018, we reported on TSA's
efforts to ensure the security of air carrier operations between the
United States and Cuba.\5\ We found that TSA's inspections and
assessments in Cuba generally followed standard operating procedures,
but TSA did not inspect all air carriers at its own established
frequency. We recommended that TSA improve its ability to identify
certain air carriers requiring inspection in Cuba and develop and
implement a tool that more reliably tracks their operations between the
United States and Cuba. In response to our recommendation and as
required under the TSA Modernization Act, TSA developed several tools
and processes that corroborate and validate flight schedule data.\6\
For example, TSA developed a tool to analyze aggregate flight data and
validate or identify service to the United States from international
locations and began issuing monthly reports on unscheduled operations
to its inspectors responsible for Cuba. By taking these steps, TSA is
better able to identify operations requiring inspection and corroborate
and validate flight schedule data.
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\5\ See GAO, Aviation Security: Actions Needed to Better Identify
and Track U.S.-Bound Public Charter Operations from Cuba, GAO-18-526
(Washington, DC: Jul. 12, 2018).
\6\ See Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 1957(a), 132 Stat.
at 3597.
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Security directives and emergency amendments.--When threat
information or vulnerabilities at foreign airports indicate an
immediate need for air carriers to implement additional security
measures, TSA may issue new or revise existing security directives (for
domestic air carriers) and emergency amendments (for foreign air
carriers).\7\ The TSA Modernization Act includes a provision for us to
review the effectiveness of the TSA process to update, consolidate, or
revoke security directives, emergency amendments, and other policies
related to international aviation security at last-point-of-departure
airports.\8\ As of March 2019, there were 46 security directives and
emergency amendments (i.e., directives) in effect related to air
carrier operations at foreign airports.\9\
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\7\ See 49 C.F.R. 1544.105(d), 1544.305, 1546.105(d).
\8\ See Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 1953(b), 132 Stat.
at 3594.
\9\ Twenty-eight directives addressed threats (e.g., explosives in
laptops) and 18 pertained to vulnerabilities identified at foreign
airports (e.g., inadequate perimeter fencing).
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Earlier this month, we reported that TSA reviews directives, but
its process does not fully define how to coordinate with industry
representatives and TSA has not determined if it is appropriate to
incorporate the security measures of many long-standing directives into
air carrier security programs in accordance with TSA policy.\10\
Representatives from 4 domestic air carriers stated that coordination
with TSA on directives has improved. However, representatives from 6
air carriers and 2 associations indicated that TSA has issued revised
directives that are vague or difficult to implement because TSA did not
sufficiently involve them in the review process. This contributed to
TSA officials offering different interpretations of aircraft cabin
search requirements. Further, TSA policy states that directives are not
intended to be permanent and are expected to eventually be canceled or
incorporated into security programs. Our analysis found that TSA issued
more than one-half (25) of the directives prior to 2014, meaning they
have been in effect for more than 5 years. Several have been in effect
for more than 10 years. We recommended, among other things, that TSA
better define how to coordinate with air carriers when reviewing
directives and when to cancel or incorporate long-standing security
directives and emergency amendments into security programs. TSA agreed
with our recommendations and plans to develop a process for more formal
and consistent coordination with air carrier and industry association
stakeholders and consideration of directives for cancellation or
incorporation into security programs.
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\10\ GAO, International Aviation Security: TSA Should Improve
Industry Coordination and Its Security Directive and Emergency
Amendment Review Process, GAO-20-7 (Washington, DC: Oct. 3, 2019).
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TSA Created a Domestic Aviation Security Working Group to Develop and
Update Leading Practices with Transportation Security
Stakeholders
Public area security.--In November 2013, an armed individual
entered the Los Angeles International Airport, firing multiple shots
killing a transportation security officer and injuring 2 others and a
passenger. As a result of this and subsequent airport attacks, TSA co-
hosted a series of security summits with stakeholders and published the
Public Area Security National Framework in May 2017 outlining a series
of best practices and recommendations to secure airport pubic areas.
The TSA Modernization Act required TSA and the DHS Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency to establish a public area security
working group to promote collaboration between TSA and public and
private stakeholders to develop non-binding recommendations for
enhancing security in public areas of transportation facilities.\11\
The Act also requires TSA to periodically share best practices
developed by TSA and transportation stakeholders related to protecting
public spaces of transportation infrastructure from emerging
threats.\12\
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\11\ See Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 1931(b), 132 Stat.
at 3569-70.
\12\ See Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 1932(a), 132 Stat.
at 3571. See also Pub. L. No. 115-254, 1931(c)(2), 132 Stat. at 3570.
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In March 2019, TSA officials established the public area security
working group to engage with stakeholders to validate and update the
best practices that were developed in the 2017 Public Area Security
National Framework. The working group consisted of security
stakeholders from both aviation and surface transportation modes. In
October 2019, TSA officials told us that they plan to issue an updated
list of best practices in the fall of 2019.
Insider threats.--Recent incidents involving aviation workers
misusing their access privileges have heightened concerns regarding the
risk of insider threats at airports. TSA estimated in 2018 that there
were approximately 1.8 million people with unescorted access to secured
areas of the Nation's airports.\13\ We have on-going work examining the
actions TSA, airport operators, and air carriers have taken to mitigate
concerns regarding insider threats at airports and the extent to which
TSA's Insider Threat Program is guided by a strategic plan.
Additionally, the TSA Modernization Act requires TSA, in consultation
with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee to conduct a study
examining the cost and feasibility to airports, airlines, and TSA of
implementing enhanced employee inspection measures at all access points
between non-secured areas and secured areas of certain airports.\14\ We
will review this study once submitted by TSA.
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\13\ In general, secured areas of airports are areas for which
security measures, such as access controls, must be carried out to
prevent and detect the unauthorized entry, presence, and movement of
individuals and ground vehicles, and include areas where domestic and
foreign air carriers enplane and deplane passengers and sort and load
baggage, and any adjacent areas not separated by adequate security
measures. See 49 C.F.R. 1540.5, 1542.201.
\14\ See Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 1931(b), 132 Stat.
at 3572. Established in 1989, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
provides advice to the TSA administrator on aviation security matters,
including the development, refinement, and implementation of policies,
programs, rule making, and security directives. Committee members
represent stakeholder groups affected by aviation security
requirements. See 49 U.S.C. 44946.
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TSA Coordinates Reviews of Passenger Screening Rules, but Could Better
Measure Rule Effectiveness
Screening rule changes.--In 2010, TSA began identifying passengers
for enhanced screening who are not known or suspected terrorists, but
who fall within the scope of screening rules. Specifically, TSA
identifies passengers for enhanced screening through the application of
screening rules, which TSA develops by considering current intelligence
and other factors. TSA refers to these rules and lists as Silent
Partner and Quiet Skies. Silent Partner rules identify passengers for
enhanced screening on inbound flights to the United States. Quiet Skies
rules--a subset of the Silent Partner rules--identify passengers for
enhanced screening on subsequent domestic and outbound flights. The TSA
Modernization Act includes a provision for GAO to review the oversight
mechanisms and effectiveness of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies.\15\
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\15\ See Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 1949(e), 132 Stat.
at. 3589.
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We found that TSA coordinates reviews of Silent Partner and Quiet
Skies through quarterly meetings and notifies an expanded set of DHS
and TSA stakeholders--including DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program
and the Federal Air Marshal Service--of rule changes as required under
the Act. We also found that TSA has not identified a means to
comprehensively measure rule effectiveness. TSA officials explained
that they had not yet fully assessed the rules' effectiveness because
it was difficult to measure. TSA has access to data--such as the
outcomes of enhanced screening of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies
passengers at airport checkpoints--that could be explored to better
assess rule effectiveness. Exploring additional data sources could help
TSA refine and supplement the agency's existing efforts to measure
program effectiveness. In our draft report, we recommended that TSA
explore additional data sources for measuring the effectiveness of
Silent Partner and Quiet Skies rules. TSA is currently reviewing the
draft report and is scheduled to provide any comments by early November
2019.
TSA Should Ensure Aviation Screening Technologies Continue to Meet
Detection Requirements after Deployment
To protect the U.S. aviation sector, including the roughly 440
airports it regulates, TSA deploys technologies to screen passengers
and their carry-on and checked baggage for homemade explosives and
other prohibited items that could, among other things, cause
catastrophic damage to an aircraft. The on-going threat of terrorism
requires TSA to continually assess the effectiveness of its screening
operations and, when necessary, develop and deploy new screening
technologies. The TSA Modernization Act includes a provision for us to
review whether TSA allocates resources appropriately based on risk at
TSA-regulated airports, among other things.\16\
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\16\ See Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 1923, 132 Stat. at
3561.
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Our review of TSA acquisition documents found that TSA considers
risk at the beginning of the screening technologies acquisition
process. However, TSA officials could not provide an example of when
risk information for specific airports had directly influenced
decisions about where and in what order to deploy screening
technologies to airports in the recent past. Fully disclosing what risk
factors are weighed and how decisions are made could better ensure that
TSA's deployment of screening technologies matches potential risks. We
recommended that TSA officials document their assessments of risk and
the rationale behind decisions to deploy screening technologies.
We also found that TSA does not ensure that screening technologies
continue to meet detection requirements after they have been deployed
to airports, when performance can degrade over time. According to
officials, the agency uses certification--a step in the test and
evaluation process--to confirm that technologies meet detection
requirements before they are deployed to airports, and calibration of
the technologies to confirm that technologies are at least minimally
operational while in use at airports. They stated that these processes
are sufficient to assure TSA that screening technologies are operating
as intended. While these processes serve important purposes, they do
not ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection
requirements after they have been deployed because performance can
degrade over time. Developing and implementing a process to ensure
technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment
would help ensure that TSA screening procedures are effective and
enable TSA to take corrective action if needed. In our draft report, we
recommended that TSA develop and implement a process to ensure
technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment.
TSA is currently reviewing the draft report and is scheduled to provide
any comments by early November 2019.
actions are needed to improve surface transportation security
TSA Should Improve Coordination for its Surface Transportation Security
Training Program
The TSA Modernization Act includes a provision that we review
resources provided to TSA surface transportation programs and the
coordination between relevant entities related to surface
transportation security.\17\ According to our analysis, TSA Surface
Programs received $123 million in fiscal year 2017 and $129 million in
fiscal year 2018.\18\ The surface program appropriation represented
about 1.6 percent of TSA's total appropriation in both fiscal years,
according to DHS data.
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\17\ See Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 1966, 132 Stat. at
3607.
\18\ Surface activities are primarily carried out by 3 TSA
offices--Security Operations; Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal
Service; and Policy, Plans, and Engagement. TSA reported that these
offices were collectively allocated about 99 percent of TSA's Surface
Programs appropriation in fiscal year 2017 and 93 percent in fiscal
year 2018.
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We also found that in fiscal years 2017 through 2019, TSA reported
using surface program resources for non-surface activities. For
example, in fiscal year 2018, TSA reprogrammed $5 million from the
Surface Programs account to Mission Support activities to address
security requirements and increase hiring of transportation security
officers.
Further, we found that TSA could improve internal coordination
roles and responsibilities for planning and implementing its voluntary
Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP)--a program
intended to engage with system operators and Governmental security
partners to enhance surface transportation security. For example,
officials from TSA's office that provides intelligence briefings during
program exercises stated that they do not typically participate in
planning meetings because they are not consistently invited to attend.
In our draft report, we recommended that TSA clarify roles and
responsibilities for all offices involved in the coordination of
surface transportation exercises, including when these offices are to
coordinate. TSA is currently reviewing the draft of this report and is
scheduled to provide any comments by early November 2019.
Actions Needed to Reflect Pipeline Security Roles in Key Documents and
to Address Weaknesses in TSA's Pipeline Security Program
Management
More than 2.7 million miles of pipelines transport and distribute
the natural gas, oil, and other hazardous liquids that the people and
businesses within the United States depend on to operate vehicles and
machinery, heat homes, generate electricity, and manufacture products.
Responsibility for safeguarding these pipelines is shared by TSA; the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), within
the Department of Transportation (DOT); and pipeline operators. TSA
oversees the security of all transportation modes, including pipelines.
PHMSA oversees pipeline safety. DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) on their roles across all transportation modes in
2004, and an Annex to the MOU in 2006 to further delineate their
pipeline security-related responsibilities. The TSA Modernization Act
included a provision for GAO to review DHS and DOT roles and
responsibilities for pipeline security.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. K, tit. I, 1980, 132 Stat. at
3619.
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We reported in June 2019 that key pipeline security documents need
to better reflect the current operating environment.\20\ For example,
the MOU Annex has not been reviewed to consider pipeline security
developments since 2006. As a result, the MOU Annex may not fully
reflect the agencies' pipeline security and safety-related activities.
We reported that by developing and implementing time frames for
reviewing the MOU and updating it, as appropriate, TSA and PHMSA could
better ensure any future changes to their respective roles and
responsibilities are clearly delineated and updated on a regular basis.
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\20\ GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Key Pipeline Security
Documents Need to Reflect Current Operating Environment, GAO-19-426
(Washington, DC: June 5, 2019).
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In addition, TSA's Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol
Plan, issued in March 2010, defines the roles and responsibilities of
Federal agencies and the private sector, among others, related to
pipeline security incidents. For example, in response to a pipeline
incident, TSA coordinates information sharing between Federal and
pipeline stakeholders and PHMSA coordinates Federal activities with an
affected pipeline operator to restore service. However, TSA has not
revised the plan to reflect changes in at least 3 key areas: Pipeline
security threats (e.g., cybersecurity threats), incident management
policies, and DHS's terrorism alert system. By periodically reviewing
and, as appropriate, updating its plan, TSA could better ensure it
addresses changes in pipeline security threats and Federal law and
policy related to cybersecurity, incident management and DHS's
terrorism alert system, among other things. We made 5 recommendations
to address these issues, including for TSA and DOT to develop and
implement a time line for reviewing and updating the 2006 MOU Annex and
for TSA to periodically review and update its 2010 pipeline incident
recovery plan, as appropriate. TSA and PHMSA have actions under way to
address our recommendations. For example, PHMSA officials stated that
PHMSA and TSA continue to collaborate on updates to the 2006 MOU Annex.
TSA has also developed and provided pipeline operators with
voluntary security guidelines, and evaluates the vulnerability of
pipeline systems through security assessments. However, in December
2018 we identified some weaknesses and made recommendations to
strengthen TSA's management of key aspects of its pipeline security
program.\21\ For example, we reported that the number of TSA security
reviews of pipeline systems has varied considerably over time. TSA
officials stated that staffing limitations--ranging from 1 full-time
equivalent in 2014 to 6 from fiscal years 2015 through 2018--within its
Pipeline Security Branch have prevented TSA from conducting more
reviews. Further, TSA does not have a strategic workforce plan to help
ensure it identifies the skills and competencies--such as the required
level of cybersecurity expertise--necessary to carry out its pipeline
security responsibilities. We recommended that TSA develop a strategic
workforce plan. As of October 2019, TSA has not yet fully addressed
this recommendation. We will continue to monitor progress.
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\21\ TSA agreed with our recommendations. See GAO, Critical
Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed to Address Significant
Weaknesses in TSA's Pipeline Security Program Management, GAO-19-48
(Washington, DC: Dec. 18, 2018).
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Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Russell, thank you very much. You have a
minute left. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Correa. I thank all the witnesses for your testimony. I
will remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
ask questions of our panelists.
Now I would like to recognize myself for the first set of
questions. The first one is for Ms. Cogswell.
As you know, part of the TSA Act, Congress codified a 5-
year term for the administrator of TSA. The current
administrator, Mr. Pekoske, is wearing 2 hats. One is the
administrator, and the other is acting secretary. Given these
dual roles and duties, who is running the day-to-day operations
at TSA?
Ms. Cogswell. Sir, thank you very much for your question.
As part of his re-designation and position as the senior
official performing the duties of the deputy secretary, he has
authorized me to run most of the day-to-day operations for TSA.
Through that process I have a series of areas where I consult
with him on a regular basis to ensure consistency with his
direction and approach.
Mr. Correa. Thank you. How do you decide which issues are
delegated to him versus you, and how has that affected the
implementation of the Act?
Ms. Cogswell. With--the way we have been approaching this
process is through long-standing close collaboration. As you
might expect, I talk to him multiple times a week. I look for
any issues that I believe are particularly sensitive or time-
consuming in nature to ensure that there is no instance where
he would be caught off guard.
Mr. Correa. Given the concerns that we have--and I am sure
you are doing a great job--do we need a stable leadership at
the top of the agency? Should these vacancies be filled?
Ms. Cogswell. It is incredibly important for TSA to have
stable leadership over an extended period of time. I think it
is one of the best parts of the Act, was creating that goal and
that mindset. I know the administrator shares that goal. I know
he very much is a believer in this role, and this position, and
would very much like to be able to see out the remainder of his
term.
At the same time, we recognize the importance of continuity
across the Department of Homeland Security. I can think of no
one better qualified to be able to serve in this type of
position than David Pekoske.
Mr. Correa. As you know, Homeland Security has such a
critical role defending our citizens, not only here, but around
the world. So we want to be of as much help as possible, making
sure you are able to implement your mission.
Turning to another issue, which is workforce issues, as you
know, the subcommittee has focused on the issues affecting the
work force. Section 1907 of the Act requires that TSA convene a
work force group with labor and submit to Congress a report
containing recommendations to reform TSA's personnel management
system.
What is the status of that report?
Ms. Cogswell. Sir, the working group has formed and had
many productive discussions, down to and including we extended
the period of time because the discussions were so productive
they had additional items they wanted to conclude. The working
group concluded its deliberations at the end of August, and
completed the drafting of the report in September. The report
is now in clearance.
Mr. Correa. When will you expect that?
Ms. Cogswell. I hope that it will be in a matter of weeks.
Mr. Correa. A matter of weeks. Thank you.
The statute also says that the working group should
consider reforms to the TSA personnel management system,
including appeals to the merits of some protection board and
grievances procedures. Were those topics considered by the
working group?
Ms. Cogswell. Specifically, the group highly focused around
discipline and grievances, yes.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much. Madam Chair--excuse me--
Madam Chair? I am the Chair. I would like to turn over--I now
yield and I would like to recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the gentleperson from Arizona, Mrs. Lesko, for
questions.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You also had, like, a
minute left. So we are really buzzing by here. This is great.
Mr. Correa. We are going to have a second round.
Mrs. Lesko. Oh, OK. I am going to have a question for both
of you.
In the GAO's initial report from the TSA Modernization Act,
the review found that TSA does not ensure that screening
technologies continue to meet detection requirements after they
have been deployed to airports. In this review the GAO
recommended that TSA implement a process to ensure technologies
continue to meet detection requirements after deployment, and
that TSA is currently reviewing this recommendation.
So my first question is for Mr. Russell.
Can you expand on this a little bit more? So we are putting
in new technologies like, let's say, CT scanners, and we are
not checking up on them to see if they are still working. Is
that what you are saying?
Mr. Russell. Right. So what we found is, for the fielded
screening technologies--so think about the body scanners, other
pieces of equipment--there is an initial certification process
when they complete the procurement process to ensure--run it
through all its paces, it does meet all the requirements, as
expected. Then it gets deployed to airports.
So what we found is that, on a--usually, a daily basis,
most airports have a calibration kit that they run through the
equipment that checks various diagnostics for the--that
equipment is working properly. But that check does not include
ensuring that the actual detection of an explosive or other
prohibited item is operating at the same level as when it left,
let's say, the factory and that certification testing. So that
is what we are getting at.
Mrs. Lesko. So, Mr. Russell, is that done? This detection,
would it normally be done by people that are just trying to
sneak things through? Is that what it would be? Or are you just
saying after hours, or whatever, they would--you would test it?
How do you test it?
Mr. Russell. So that is where we had the recommendation,
that we think TSA should devise a process for how you
periodically check that the equipment, once fielded, is, in
fact, still operating at that high detection level when it left
the certification process.
Mrs. Lesko. OK, thank you.
Ms. Cogswell, in relation to that, what can TSA do better?
Do you have any ideas how you can do this?
I went to that area where you were testing the different
technologies and that type of thing. So how would you do a
better job at this? How would you test somebody? Would you do,
like, surprise checks with undercover people? How--what are you
thinking?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you, ma'am, and do very much appreciate
your visit out to our transportation security integration
facility, and would offer any of your colleagues, if they would
like to come see it, as well, we would be happy to have you
out.
This item is still under review. We are still putting
together our official response.
I think you have highlighted one of the most important
pieces is ensuring that the plan that we come up with will meet
GAO's interest, while recognizing--we already do testing today,
as you highlighted. We already have processes by which we have
covert testing against our systems to look for overall
throughput, including a move to what we call index testing,
where we do an assessment across our system to really
understand what performance levels are at each time.
This recommendation, I think, goes at a slightly different
area, which is the efficacy of the technology over time. We
have got a couple ideas around this, but we will want to have a
good discussion with GAO to make sure it matches their
interests and thoughts. Because, to your exact point, we can't
actually really bring a live explosive to a checkpoint on a
regular basis, given all the equipment we have.
How is the best way to approach this that meets the needs,
but is feasible and effective?
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you. with the 51 seconds I have left, I
have a question that really doesn't deal with this GAO report,
but it is to do with the REAL ID. You know, it is set to be in
effect that everybody's supposed to have a REAL ID, a travel
ID, by October 1, 2020. Do we have any, like, thoughts--does
TSA have any thoughts? Because I am worried that people aren't
going to get these things in time.
I mean, people are trickling in, getting these. Like, I
have gotten one, my son has gotten one. But the deadline hits--
what are we expecting is going to happen? Because I think all--
every single Congress Member is going to be--like, tons of
calls are going to happen because they are going to show up at
their airport without this REAL ID, and they can't fly.
Ms. Cogswell. So at this point the most important thing we
can do is get wider awareness of the deadline out to as many
people as possible, and help people understand that they have
more than one option. So both--you can get a REAL ID-compliant
license, but if your State is not quite there, you also have
other options to receive compliant documentation. Examples
include passports, a global entry card, a military ID.
So--but critical through all of this is to get the word out
as far as possible, not only to the entire travel industry, who
are working very hard with us, with local motor vehicle
administrators to help create that awareness, to conduct local
enrollment events at airports, at other locations, to try to
ease that burden and make it more readily visible to people on
how they can quickly update. But right now, most critical, we
need to get the word out.
Mrs. Lesko. I think all of us should help in doing that,
because otherwise there is going to be a big--a lot of people
are going to call our offices, I think.
So you had mentioned one of the alternatives is global
entry already. Is PreCheck also an alternative?
Ms. Cogswell. At this time--and it is important to
recognize how PreCheck works today. Through PreCheck we conduct
a series of additional verifications looking for threat
information in--within someone's background. However, when
someone shows up at the travel document checker, at the front
of the queue, what they are often presenting is their driver's
license.
Under statute and implementing regulations, we are not
allowed to accept a non-compliant driver's license after
October 1, 2020.
Mrs. Lesko. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mrs. Lesko. Now I would like to
recognize Mr. Cleaver for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Cogswell, thank you for being here.
Mr. Russell, thank you, as well.
This--none of this has anything to do with your work, but,
you know, I have been in--almost every other month, it seems,
whenever we have had either a full hearing, a committee
hearing, we have had a new director or a new acting director,
which can't possibly be one of the better things that is
happening to the agency. You know, and that is not a question.
It is a declaration.
So my concern is that not only are we having, you know, the
changes at the top, but, you know, when you--when we talk about
the work force issues, we still have a--an unbelievably high
turnover rate of TSA employees. That is--I hope that is as
troubling to you as it is to me, because, you know, I go--I do
an average of 1,800 air miles a week. So, you know, I get a
chance to know the guys for about 6 months. Then there are a
whole new group coming in. It seems like every flight, every
other time I come to airport, they are training a new group to
come in.
My analysis is that it is due to the poor pay. Are we going
to get that changed?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for the question, and I
appreciate the--your efforts and interest in ensuring that you
are caring for our work force. I appreciate it very much, and
know they appreciate your engagement at the checkpoint when you
go through. It means a lot to them when people care about them
enough to ask how their day is, rather than just rushing along.
So thank you so much for your support.
As to pay, what we have authority to do now and already do
is provide a retention incentive. So for those airports where
retention is significantly above what we would like to see, we
are authorized and do pay a differential to them now. That
differential ranges from about 5 percent over the regular
salary, to up to 60 percent over the salary, depending on local
working conditions and the level of retention we issue--we see
at that specific location.
We have additional authorities with respect to other pay
reforms that we can take. Within the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act there is broad ability for us to
set what type of pay system we have. What we don't have,
however, is budget to make broad-scale changes across the
board.
Mr. Cleaver. OK, let's put a period right there for a--you
can put a comma, but--because--so let me interpret what I
thought I heard you say, that significant changes can be made,
but there is a need to increase the funding for positions
before that can be done on a scale that would assure employees
that there is a future in this.
Ms. Cogswell. We are very much working right now on a
series of options that we are considering within the
administration, and look forward to working with Congress,
going----
Mr. Cleaver. OK, all right, thank you.
Ms. Cogswell [continuing]. Into the future----
Mr. Cleaver. You are very kind. What I'm--I guess you
can't--we need to pay them more money. If we or I need to push
for a higher budget, if we--if there is an understanding that
everything is being done now to increase the salaries with the
budget that is there, then my belief is that we need to do a
budget increase, whatever we need to do, because I have never
understood this.
The people in whose hands we place our lives every--for me,
every week, sometimes 3 or 4 times a week, we pay them less
money. I mean, I--it just doesn't register, you know, with me.
I don't--I can't figure it out. So I want to fix it.
Mr. Russell, am I--can you help me? Somebody help me. Go
get--can you help me? What do you think? What needs to be done?
Mr. Russell. Yes. So one of the things that we have seen in
2018, we did a report that looked at the staffing allocation
model, just to figure out how many airports--or how many TSOs
you need to go to the airports, and what we found is that
system is effective, but it is budget-constrained. So they plug
in the amount of funding that they have, and then try to make
the numbers work to best support the airports.
So it could be a different number of TSOs that are needed
if you unconstrain it when you do that model without the
current budget. If that helps.
Mr. Cleaver. I think my time has run out before my
questions ran out. But thank you very much, both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Cleaver, we will have a second set of
questions coming up. Thank you.
I would like to recognize Mr. Bishop now for 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Cogswell, TSA's explosives detection canine program is
a critical element to screening passengers and baggage for a
wide range of explosives threats. The TSA Modernization Act
included several provisions aimed at improving that program.
Section 1928 requires TSA to issue behavioral, medical, and
technical standards for third-party explosives detection
canines to screen passengers and property. What is the status
of this provision, and can you provide any insight into what
the committee can expect to see in terms of standards?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much. I share your
appreciation for our canine detection teams. You know, I--every
time I go out to airports or other locations and I see the
canines in action, while I love my job, I wish I loved my job
half as much as those dogs love their job.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Cogswell. Every day you see their incredible dedication
and their hard work. I love really seeing both the canines and
their handlers in action.
I will say, as to your specific question, we have formed
the working group, and the working group has submitted their
recommendations to TSA. We are now in the process of
formalizing those into standards, and should have those
completed in the next month or 2.
Mr. Bishop. The law also authorizes the third-party canine
cargo screening program. How has this provision been
implemented, and what has the response been from transportation
stakeholders?
Ms. Cogswell. We issued the implementing regulations last
December, and began immediately training the various teams. We
have more than 230 teams that have been certified to date,
including a number of third-party entities who are able to
provide that certification.
Overall, we have seen a tremendous interest out of the
cargo environment, and receive a lot of support from industry
for implementing that provision.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, ma'am.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. I would like to
recognize Ms. Barragan now for 5 minutes of questions, sir--
ma'am.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Cogswell, you mentioned in your opening remarks some
progress done on surface transportation security. The Act, the
TSA Modernization Act, pushes TSA to study innovative ways to
advance surface transportation security. Under section 1981 of
the Act, the TSA is required to conduct the feasibility
assessment of introducing advanced security technologies into
surface transportation systems, and increasing vetting and
identifying verification of the surface transportation
passengers.
The assessment was due to Congress by April 3, 2019, but
has not yet been produced. Can you tell us why that is the
case, and whether there has been an impact on the staffing that
has impacted this deadline?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much. As was noted also in my
testimony, we stood up the Surface Transportation Security
Advisory Committee.
We have also done a significant outreach effort across the
country to engage with the various stakeholders involved in
this process to identify where some of their highest interests
and needs are, to ensure that, as we developed various ideas
for that feasibility study and analysis, we were taking on
those items of most interest.
Ms. Barragan. So do we know when the study is going to be
ready for Congress, the one that was due in April?
Ms. Cogswell. We still have some additional work under way
within TSA to finalize up that analysis, and then it will need
to go into review. So it will be issued early next year.
Ms. Barragan. Early next year. OK.
In 2013, a gunman shot and killed a TSA officer at Los
Angeles International Airport, my home airport. In 2017, a
gunman shot and killed 5 people at Fort Lauderdale
International Airport. In the aftermath of these shootings, DHS
and TSA called for airports to create unified operation centers
to coordinate emergency response and improve communications.
In section 1987, the TSA--of the Modernization Act--
required TSA to provide stakeholders a framework for
establishing such centers. This language came from my bill, the
Strengthening Local Transportation Security Capabilities Act.
Ms. Cogswell, what is the status of this effort, and what
resources has TSA provided to airports?
Maybe you can shed some light on how many airports have
created these unified operation centers.
Ms. Cogswell. We have issued those guidelines. We have--
currently are staffing full-time at 12 unified operation
centers, and have another 4 that are staffed intermittently,
depending on the various exercises or response activities under
way at those locations.
We are working across the board with airports to understand
what model works best with them, and what their expectations
are for the other stakeholders within the airport community to
promote a positive, unified response.
Ms. Barragan. OK. What more can TSA and Congress do to push
airports to establish the centers? Is there anything else that
we can do to be helpful?
Ms. Cogswell. Continuing to talk about it. You are
highlighting the need. The reason for people to not meet each
other for the first time on a bad day, to regularly work
problems together, is the most important thing.
Ms. Barragan. OK. I want to take a moment to applaud the
work of TSA, and the work of the men and women who are on the
front lines, I call it, at our airports. I am a firm believer
that the greatest terror threat is going to come through
airports and seaports, and the TSA officers and the work they
do is so critical to the safety of Americans in the homeland.
So I want to applaud their work, day in and day out.
My colleague touched upon the issue of pay and salaries. I,
frankly, can't understand why we pay the men and women on the
front line such a low amount of money, when they are
responsible for our security. So I am greatly concerned about
what we can do to increase morale, increase retention, and
making sure that they have representation to be in the
strongest position possible.
Now, the TSA Modernization Act directed your agency to
create a working group to work with labor representatives and
produce a report outlining recommendations on how TSA could
perform its personnel management system. I am aware that TSA is
late in submitting this report to Congress, so I am hoping you
can provide clarity on it. When can we expect this report?
Can you now list any recommendations provided by this
working group?
Ms. Cogswell. The working group had a very productive
discussion, agreed upon a number of joint recommendations. The
report is in final administration clearance. We hope to have it
cleared within the next few weeks.
Ms. Barragan. Great. Thank you, I yield back.
Mr. Correa. Mrs. Watson Coleman, you are recognized for
questions.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Cogswell, how are you today? Good. Ms. Barragan just
asked you about the working group. Did the working group
consist of the union members, as well? Was it the full--OK.
When was it constituted?
Ms. Cogswell. It started in the spring and went--after the
shutdown, and went through full meetings, went through the end
of August.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So the report that you are going to
make is something that has--that you are going to report on, is
that consensus between the union and the agency?
Ms. Cogswell. Right----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. With regard to these TSOs?
Ms. Cogswell. Yes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Well, we are really excited to see
that.
The National Deployment Force, that--which is the short-
term deployment force when there is a need, whether it is
seasonal or issue-related, is sent to assure that there is
adequate screening resources. The NDF was codified in section
1988 of the TSA Modernization Act--actually, based on my bill,
the TSA National Deployment Force Act.
The NDF was deployed last year to larger airports like
Seattle and Denver, where TSA did not meet its hiring goals,
and to airports in Hawaii, where TSA has a difficult time
attracting candidates. What steps are you taking to hire
permanent TSOs at those particular challenging airports?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for the authorization of
the National Deployment Force. They have provided critical
assets, not only for the issues you have identified, but in
response to a wide range of various needs across TSA. This is a
critically important aspect for us.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Right. I agree with you 100 percent. I
just wanted to know what we are doing about trying to recruit
people to work at those airports.
Ms. Cogswell. Absolutely.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Can you----
Ms. Cogswell. We have increased the retention incentive in
those locations, and authorized additional, over-normal
allocation hiring, so that they could ensure consistency over
time with the full complement of staff needed, as well as
authorizing some additional measures: Local travel, et cetera,
so that there could be more load balancing in specific areas
between hub and spoke airports in those areas.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So the work group that you--that was
constituted--and report that is going to come out, it is also
going to address these issues at--these areas that you
particularly like to live in, live at, but you don't
necessarily want to work there under the current conditions. Is
that so?
Ms. Cogswell. So the----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Will that affect how you work out
these challenging airport hirings and retention?
Ms. Cogswell. So the work group specifically looked at
discipline procedures, as well as grievance procedures,
focusing on those elements directly.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Did it not also look at hiring and
retention?
Ms. Cogswell. It did not.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Was it--was there an intention for it
to look at the issue of retention, in particular?
Ms. Cogswell. That was not an area where we signed them up
for this round. We are having a number of other areas.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I am asking, though, does the bill,
the law, include the discussion with the work group around
those areas?
Ms. Cogswell. I do not remember at this time.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I am not quite sure, but I think it
does, because I think we were concerned about the recruitment
and the retention and the discipline, you know, and any other
sort of employee procedures. So I would appreciate feedback on
that, if you don't mind.
I want to ask you about something that has come to my
attention with--regarding the Federal air marshals. There was
an article in September of this year that sort-of spoke to what
is considered a crisis and chaos in the Federal air marshal
area, and TSA's alleged inability to respond in such a way that
keeps these air marshals from burning out.
You have had a series of suicides, you had several
allegations of just sort-of mental health issues, and a lot of
it having to do with scheduling, and the hours working, and the
deprivation of sleep, and things of that nature. I was just
wondering, do you all have something that you are doing
internally that is addressing these issues, in particular, that
you could highlight for us now, and perhaps we could discuss
later?
Ms. Cogswell. Absolutely. I look forward to discussing it
more in-depth.
So, just as a highlight, I would note that that article did
not bring forward new data. It was looking at prior
information. So that--the important piece to note is we already
had a number of items underway.
The first is where we are looking at what the right mix and
balance is of flying versus on-ground time. That can mean, yes,
your training time. It can mean what we call ground-based
assignment, where you rotate out of flying for some period of
time and perform some other security function--for example, at
the airport. It also looks at how we best provide services to
our air marshals so they have the help they need, should they
need it, and equip other members of the work force to help
engage with their colleagues.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Through you, Mr. Chairman,
it is an issue that I really would like for us to look at in a
more in-depth way.
Mr. Correa. So noted, and we will go in that direction.
Thank you.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I yield back. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much. Now I would like to
recognize a gentleperson from New York, Mr. Katko, for 5
minutes of questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity. Welcome to you all, thank you for being here.
As part of the TSA Modernization Act there was multiple
insider threat provisions contained in it. So I just want to
kind-of get an update. I know we are past the deadline for
that, and given an opportunity to explain why we haven't
received the information yet.
But for each one of these, if you could, just tell me where
we are at in the process. But actually, before that, tell me
briefly why we are not--you haven't met the deadline that is
included in the bill.
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much. The most important part
through all of those insider threat elements is to ensure
close, detailed cooperation and collaboration with the various
stakeholders involved.
As you well know, we don't actually implement these by
ourselves in most instances. We are actually asking the
airports to implement when we issue any kind of regulatory
action. So what we want to do is ensure that the
recommendations we identify, as much as possible, are done
through a jointly collaborative process. Then our feasibility
analysis, including the economic analysis that goes with it,
fully is in--fully informed by what our stakeholders see and
believe would be the impacts.
Mr. Katko. Now the deadline, I believe, is October. Do you
have a projected deadline on when all these provisions will be
accounted for and reported back to us?
Ms. Cogswell. So the--probably the largest piece, the
feasibility study, we had to do a survey of--more than 310
airports responded to that, which was wonderful input toward
that analysis. That one is wrapping up, in terms of its
process, and is about to go into interagency clearance. I hope,
therefore, you would receive it early in the new year, if not
before then.
Mr. Katko. OK.
Ms. Cogswell. As to a number of other provisions, we have
gone through an effort to receive direct input from the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, and are working to put
together an overall road map for insider threat for all modes.
Mr. Katko. OK. I understand that, but it sort-of didn't
answer my question. When do you expect to have all this done?
Ms. Cogswell. So the actual report for all the
recommendations we look to have to you by early January.
Mr. Katko. OK, I appreciate that. I am concerned that there
is a provision that we asked you to follow that you didn't get
it in a timely manner. But I do appreciate the diligence with
which you are doing it. If it goes past January, we might be a
little bit more upset than we are right now. Just be
forewarned.
Switching gears here, the PreCheck is PreCheck, though,
which was passed into law. What is the status of the law's
requirement to preserve the integrity of the TSA PreCheck lanes
by only allowing enrolled passengers in PreCheck, while also
establishing what the administrator said was the established
modified screening lanes, or flex lanes that you call them, for
other passengers determined to be low-risk?
Ms. Cogswell. As you know, sir, we conducted pilots earlier
this year for both models. Coming up on that, we determined
both models are feasible. Both models have demonstrated
throughput that we can manage. What we then needed to do was
two-fold. No. 1, determine all of those locations, those
airports where, based on current flow, projected volumes, we
can go ahead and implement well in advance, and which locations
doing a pure PreCheck lane wouldn't allow us to manage the
overall throughput for that airport.
At this point in time, we believe that we are ready to
start executing and have started executing cutting over for all
of those airports where we believe we can do so now. We
believe, in the end, that is going to be about 75 percent of
the total of 440 airports where we will be able to implement.
Mr. Katko. OK. So now the current status of the PreCheck
lane, is there non-PreCheck members still going through the
PreCheck lane?
Ms. Cogswell. There is. But, as I noted, we are starting to
cut over now. You will start seeing airports roll that--will--
--
Mr. Katko. When you say, ``cut over,'' what do you mean?
Ms. Cogswell. We actually started this week.
Mr. Katko. When you say, ``cut over,'' though, what do you
mean by that?
Ms. Cogswell. So for those airports, specifically, we will
no longer have rules-based inclusion being used in that
process.
Mr. Katko. OK. When do you expect to be at 100 percent
PreCheck only in PreCheck lanes? Because that is really what
the bill is about. That is what we are really interested in.
Ms. Cogswell. We are very mindful of the deadline and the
interest to achieve that deadline. We very much also recognize
the importance of providing a consistent experience.
What we want to also not do, however, is totally disrupt an
airport by doing so in a way that doesn't make sense. Critical
to this is us being able to identify additional low-risk
populations that would be eligible for some other kind of
modified screening that is not as streamlined as PreCheck. That
process is taking us a bit longer than I think any of us had
hoped for, but critically important for us to get right.
We will continue to provide you updates.
Mr. Katko. OK. But I want to be--forewarn you all that that
is not an optional date for--to be in compliance. So I don't
want to have to have another hearing back here, saying you
didn't comply with that date, either.
It is very important, from a security standpoint, that only
people that are in PreCheck, which is a higher level of
repetitive screening of those candidates, should be in
PreCheck. Also, people pay for it. It is a service that they
expect to have and enjoy. So that is not an optional deadline
in that law. So I want to forewarn TSA that, if that deadline
is not met, there is going to be a lot of problems from this
committee.
Ms. Cogswell. Understood.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Katko. I concur with you on that
specific point. That should not be an option.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
Mr. Correa. I would like to ask unanimous consent from this
committee to have Ms. Jackson Lee join us here, and to have Ms.
Jackson Lee ask 5 minutes' of questions.
Without objection.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me acknowledge the Chairman and the
Ranking Member for their courtesy, and the Members of the
committee.
With a little bit of nostalgia, this is a committee I
chaired some years ago. So I want to, first of all, express my
appreciation to all of the TSOs that work across the Nation. To
reiterate what I have done over and over again, that since 9/11
the American people would be absolutely shocked and amazed of
the terrorist threats and danger to the aviation system that
TSOs have prevented.
I am concerned on several things. But let me, first of all,
start with--every time we mention the employment landscape, or
the labor numbers, it looks like TSA says all is well. But you
will find not even in the ordinary course of business, where
there are holidays or otherwise, that there are long lines, and
people are not in place, or shifts are changing.
What are you doing to modernize, from the perspective of a
free flow of--a seamless system that has enough TSOs to be in
place, whether or not they are at the AIT machine or elsewhere,
to provide that extra level of comfort regarding the security
mechanism that they are responsible for?
Ms. Cogswell. TSA has an extensive model where we receive
information from the aviation community about projected
volumes, number of tickets sold, when new flights will be on
board, so that we can model not only airport by airport, but
down to checkpoint by checkpoint, based on projected volumes.
You have highlighted correctly there are instances where
those models don't quite work. No. 1, of course, is any time
there is a thunderstorm set that comes off the East Coast. But
in a series of other instances, we look for how best to meet
the need.
I will say the most important part, from our perspective,
is ensuring that we are working to retain our throughput time
lines within our established parameters, which is 30 minutes
for standard, and 10 minutes for PreCheck.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Does that mean--let me try to pierce that.
Does that mean--do you have every TSO that you need to make the
system work across the United States of America at this time?
Ms. Cogswell. There are a number of instances, and we are
working closely with those airports, where airline volume
continues to increase at a very hefty rate, which is fantastic
for our economy of this country.
Unfortunately, a number of these airports were not actually
built to accommodate that level of throughput within the
existing lane structure. In those instances, we work very
closely with the airports to understand how best can we open up
a new lane, move shops or other to make additional space. We
then staff those lanes as they become available.
We also talk with them about what their longer-term plans
are for redevelopment of their terminals to surface--service
those additional volumes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I want to make the same point and follow
up about the deadline regarding the certified identification,
and I would hope that we could get an update as we move toward
the deadline. I just fear a great deal of confusion, and also
persons' inability to have that ID.
I would encourage--and let me just ask the question,
because I have another question. Are you all doing a sort-of
last-minute, massive education outreach level that you can
actually hear it, and pierce it? That means it has to be on all
levels of social media, including the old-fashioned television.
I have seen and heard nothing. Absolutely nothing. So----
Ms. Cogswell. Yes, we are working extremely closely across
the board with the travel industry, talking to them about how
they can change up some of the communications they have, as
passengers are actually buying tickets. We are actually--as
people are flying now, our officers are advising someone, ``The
document you are providing today''----
Ms. Jackson Lee. You will do a--because my time is--you
will do an outreach campaign, yourself----
Ms. Cogswell. We are doing outreach.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are budgeted to do that?
Ms. Cogswell. TSA is doing a full outreach around the
traveling public. DHS is----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Before the deadline?
Ms. Cogswell. We have started already.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Let me ask you about the travel
program. I want to raise the name of Crystal Sonnier. She is
with the New Black Panther Party. I have spent the time dealing
with the crisis of treatment by the TSA when she travels over
and over again. From my perspective and her background, she
proposes--or poses no threat.
What is her route of getting off of--I assume it shows up
on her ticket. I use her as an example. She is allowing me to
use her name. What is the process for someone--like when I
first came here Ted Kennedy was on the list. John Lewis was on
the list. How do you extract yourself from being--off this
list?
I would also say that, as they do their job, I think it is
very important to do their job. Let me be very clear. But can
you have them particularly sensitive to the approach, to the
language, to how you move the person around?
Obviously, they are not a threat right there, because you
already see that they don't have any weapons, they are already
in the security area. But what is their process?
Ms. Cogswell. Yes, ma'am. There is a couple pieces I would
highlight out of this.
The first and foremost is the ability to go through what is
called DHS TRIP. So anyone who has had an issue while traveling
may apply through DHS TRIP. This is a program that is
Government-wide, but we manage it out of TSA.
The No. 1 thing we find is the vast majority of individuals
who are actually applying aren't actually on a watch list, but
might have a sounds-alike name, similar spelling, similar name,
similar date of birth, and therefore are inadvertently matched
against a record. Quite easy for those individuals. We are able
to distinguish them after they provide us additional
information. We then give them a redress number. When they use
that redress number in their travel, as they are making it with
the airline, we therefore know not that person, and therefore
they will not match.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will pursue that with you further, and
try to directly make sure that we can find a way.
I think it should be publicly made--Mr. Chairman, this is
something that happened in the early, early, early stages of
TSA, when an 8-year-old boy--we spent, like, 2 years trying to
get him off the watch list. We--the late Senator Ted Kennedy,
as I said, John Lewis, and a number of others were on this
list, and were either rejected for tickets, or couldn't get
through. So we haven't heard as much, but we still have some of
them, as you well know.
I think, for the traveling public, certainly TSO--TSA and
TSOs are doing their job. But I really want to make sure that
there is a pathway for those who are going through security and
are not threats, and are treated as such.
But I thank you for yielding, and I look forward to working
with you and monitoring the modernization program. Thank you. I
yield back.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. I think she is
absolutely right. That is a very important issue.
Were you, Mr. Cleaver, on that list as well?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I left out my pastor here. Thank you. Yes,
you were. Don't want to speak out of turn, but I think he knows
how it feels. I assume, because he has a very important and
unique name. I yield.
Mr. Correa. Thank you. Well, that being said, I would like
to start a second round of questions, if I may, and I will
start out with myself, recognizing myself for another 5 minutes
of questions.
I want to follow up with--to Mr. Cleaver's comments about
TSA personnel pay. We still have a lot of part-time folks
working, correct?
Now, if I was to extrapolate from my discussions some of
your workers, you do have high turnover. I think, if you have a
part-time job, most of the folks working for you are there
part-time until they can get another full-time job somewhere.
So I think that is the crux of the issue. So this is a
budgetary challenge that we have?
Ms. Cogswell. We, actually, as part of the 2020 budget,
changed up the ratio for our part-time, and are decreasing the
number of part-time individuals authorized across our airports.
There are specific locations where it still makes a lot of
sense. You have individuals who have retired from other jobs,
and don't actually want to work a full schedule. Works very
well for them, and especially in some of those locations,
depending on the type of work force----
Mr. Correa. So would you say a lot of those part-timers
would prefer to be part-time or full-time?
Ms. Cogswell. Those part-timers, those specific ones I
highlighted, would prefer to stay part-time. There are others,
however, who would very much like to--and would prefer to----
Mr. Correa. I imagine there is a lot of folks that are not
retired who would probably want some stability from a full-time
job, and don't have that opportunity.
So I guess my next question is, in terms of budget, we have
that tax, that fee we pay on tickets. That is supposed to go to
airport security?
Ms. Cogswell. Yes.
Mr. Correa. It goes to airport security?
Ms. Cogswell. All but the amount set aside under the Budget
Control Act to go to deficit reduction.
Mr. Correa. Say that again.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Correa. I love the way you put that. Would you restate
that? It doesn't go to airport security. It does not.
Ms. Cogswell. That amount does not. That amount goes to
deficit reduction. The remainder comes to TSA.
Mr. Correa. So we tax our passengers for security, and that
money does not go to security, it goes to debt budget
reduction. Thank you.
Let's move on to small business participation. This
committee is also focused on increasing small business
participation, especially in the area of new screening
technologies. The Act requires TSA to produce a strategy back
in February to outline how you are supposed to get there.
What is the status of this strategy, and why are we 8
months late on this specific area?
Ms. Cogswell. The strategy is within administration
interagency clearance. We hope to have it out within the next
few weeks.
I will say this is an area that I do actually feel quite
proud, and might take a few minutes talking about some of the
areas----
Mr. Correa. Please do. I--we want to follow up on this,
specifically.
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you. Seek to incentivize and build out.
We agree with you that it is critically important to continue
to look for new entrants in this space, that we not solely see
just a consolidation of the market, but that we also look for
the best ideas even for--and, frankly, more importantly--from
individuals who maybe never even thought of themselves as
working in the security community.
Just as a couple examples I would like to highlight, last
year we ran a special exercise through DHS Science and
Technology with a number of entities out in the wider world,
including educational institutions, to look at new algorithms
for our AIT machines, the on-body screening detection systems.
Incredibly promising work, all from individuals who had not
previously provided this kind of service to TSA before. We have
those algorithms in the lab now. Depending on the results, we
would look to deploy them out on our existing fleet, increasing
both our detection and reducing our false positives that we see
in that arena.
Other examples. Of the $2.1 billion the TSA spent last year
in acquisitions, $450 million was actually to small business,
exceeding our target for last year, almost a quarter of our
entire work.
Mr. Correa. CT machines. Do you see small businesses
engaging in this area?
Ms. Cogswell. Yes.
Mr. Correa. Of business?
Ms. Cogswell. One of the vendors who is directly involved
and is currently undergoing trials is, in fact, a small
business.
Mr. Correa. What percentage of your non-service contracts
are set aside for small businesses?
Ms. Cogswell. So at this time we have do not have a set-
aside, but we have indicated in the current CT procurement that
we may choose to have a set-aside.
Mr. Correa. Do you have a set-aside for veterans?
Ms. Cogswell. I don't know the answer. I can follow up with
you.
Mr. Correa. Please.
Ms. Cogswell. If I might highlight one other area, if it is
acceptable----
Mr. Correa. Please do.
Ms. Cogswell. So in this past year, just as an example, we
do a broad agency announcement that also seeks different
angles, different work against key problem areas through our
innovation task force.
Last year we received 85 submissions from 104 different
vendors, 55 of which had never responded to a TSA solicitation,
72 of which had never--72 percent had never contracted with
TSA. Of the ones awarded, we selected 12 for demonstration, 7
are small business.
Mr. Correa. Now I want to encourage you to continue to look
for small businesses. That is where the innovation is going to
come from. I think--I am sure your traditional standard
contractors are doing a fine job, but if you want to think out
of the box, come up with some ideas, you have got to go
somewhere where you haven't gone before. So please continue to
do that work.
I am out of time, so I would like to recognize Mrs. Lesko
for 5 minutes of questions, as well.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question is for
Ms. Cogswell.
Section 1906 of the law requires TSA to complete a
comprehensive agency-wide review to produce spending reductions
and administrative savings that can be achieved by streamlining
offices within TSA. This provision also asked TSA to eliminate
duplicative programs and reduce the number of senior executive
service personnel by as much as 20 percent.
I would assume--one of my questions is going to be if we
can reduce these duplicative--if I am saying it right--
programs, and reduce the number of senior executive personnel,
could we then move the money over to the concern about TSO
officers pay?
Anyway, this report was due on August 1. I guess we don't
have the report yet. So my question is two-fold: When do you
think we will--going to have the report, and can we utilize any
of these savings and move it over to TSO pay increases?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much, ma'am. We have completed
the analysis, including already implementing significant
realignments across the agency.
We also have projected in some additional cost savings for
headquarters associated with our move later--sorry, going into
next year out to Springfield of about 11 percent across
headquarters functions, with the sole intent of reallocating
those resources to the field.
The report itself is within interagency clearance, and we
hope to get it to you within the coming weeks.
Mrs. Lesko. Wonderful. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mrs. Lesko. I would like to
recognize Mr. Cleaver for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I was having
difficulties getting through the airport, which is because of
my last name, I--but for an American airline Government
relations person here in Washington, I am not sure that I would
not still be on there. But I don't--that is not what I want to
talk about. I want to talk about money.
This is not your fault, as I said before, but I think you
are about the fourth person this year that I have raised this
issue--because of my concern. So, you know, how long are you
going to be here? How long are you going to be here in the job?
Ms. Cogswell. I am not intending to leave any time soon. I
was selected at this job--I have been here about 18 months.
Mr. Cleaver. OK. See, the problem is that, you know, I talk
to one person and they say, OK, you are right, we are going
to--we have got to do something. Then the next month we have a
new director and a new acting director. So I don't--I mean I
don't want to waste your time and my time talking about
something that, you know, you won't be around long enough to
address.
Tell us, what is the starting salary for a TSO?
Ms. Cogswell. If you look at the base salary, without the
locality pay included, it is about $27,000, roughly equivalent
to a GS-4 in the general schedule. If you add in locality pay,
most locations is about $33,000.
Mr. Cleaver. The GS-4 is probably not going to get shot at.
Ms. Cogswell. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Cleaver. A GS-4 is probably not going to get shot at.
Ms. Cogswell. The GS-4 position that it is modeled after is
the position that is designated by OPM for what is called
unarmed security guard is the comparator. I share with you,
however, the very strong interest in recognizing the incredible
professionalism of our work force, the increasing automation
that they are required to know, the sheer variability in their
environment, and completely concur with you that I value them
well above that.
Mr. Cleaver. OK. So we have got to get this fixed. I mean,
I know--let me just--you know, maybe I will have to do
something when we get--I am hopeful we are going to get a
budget or some kind of spending bill, because there are a
couple of things that I want to try to get in there. One is
that we got to stop paying these people who are putting their
lives on the line a pittance.
The other part is my airport is--and you are the fourth
person that I have talked to about the Kansas City
International Airport, Kansas City, Missouri is 1 of only 2
airports in the country where we don't have the Government TSA
workers. You know, I can't work--there is nobody around long
enough to work with, because I want to get that stopped and
changed.
San Francisco is the other airport, and--but I don't want
ours to stay like it is.
So there are 2 things that I need your help on. One is the
money and one is this private contractor who is running the TSA
airport in Kansas City, Missouri. I am not mad at him or her,
but it started out, you know, just like--we were--the facial
recognition, you know, we started--it started out as, you know,
some kind of a test pilot--a pilot project, rather. The pilot
then rolling now for--since 9/11. I need it to be changed. Can
you change it by the time I come back next week?
Ms. Cogswell. The Screening Partnership Program is
established in law, sets out the exact parameters for how we
are--put out the parameters, the requirements for how the
program operates, how we identify which vendors will be able to
meet the----
Mr. Cleaver. Well, there are only 2. I mean, everybody else
is on the Federal program. So I don't----
Ms. Cogswell. We have 24.
Mr. Cleaver. Little bitty airports. I am talking--you are
talking about little, tiny--I have been to those airports, too.
Wichita Falls, Texas, where I graduated from high school, I
mean, I--you are right.
But I am not--I am talking about the largest city in the
State of Missouri, the largest city in the lower Midwest.
We are still running on a program that is supposed to be
temporary.
Ms. Cogswell. We are happy to come and talk with you more.
We work very closely----
Mr. Cleaver. When can you----
Ms. Cogswell [continuing]. Airports involved. They are the
ones who determine whether or not----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Who? The airports?
Ms. Cogswell. The airport authority is the actual one who
says they want to pursue the private entity.
Mr. Cleaver. OK, we don't have an airport authority. I
guess it would be the mayor of the city. We don't have an
airport authority.
Ms. Cogswell. We would be happy to come and talk with you
more specifically about your airport.
Mr. Cleaver. I would be happier. I will try to work with
you after.
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Cleaver. Now I would like to
recognize Ms. Jackson Lee for 5 minutes of questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I again say how grateful I am for your
kindness, and to the committee?
Let me say, too, Congressman Cleaver, please count me as
joining in enthusiastically. When this program began, I was in
opposition to it. Again, not in any negative reflection on
contractors, but I think because the TSOs are front-line
security for National security, there should be a consistent
managing structure.
As indicated, Congressman, the airports opted in. They were
given the--this--but it was put into law by us, individuals
who, I think, thought privatization was a good thing. Many of
us opposed it. But it is in law, so that means the airport can
opt in. But they can opt out, except for--as sort of a lease
situation--not a lease, but a contract, whether it runs out or
not. But that is what happened.
I think the other thing that I want to make sure is that we
are no longer thinking about not having TSOs at small airports.
Remember, that was proposed in some, I think, mindless concept
that we won't put them at the small airports. We will wait
until someone gets on the plane as a terrorist, and go to the
big airport. So I just want to get that answer. That is no
longer on the table, regarding small airports not having TSOs
under the Transportation Security Administration.
Ms. Cogswell. Correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. OK. The other thing is I want to join and
make the point about the salaries of TSOs, because one of the
modernizations is the questions that GAO mentioned--and I would
like him to expand--is the modernization of technology.
I want to know, are we moving fast enough? Is TSA moving
fast enough with a new type of technology to detect more
sophisticated ways of terrorist behavior, sir?
Mr. Russell. Certainly. So we have seen, with the computer
tomography at the checkpoint, you know, that is the latest
technology that is being piloted. But certainly, we have
thinking adversaries, they are changing tactics, new threats.
When we last looked at TSA's covert testing program, you know,
we saw that there were some challenges there in what their own
teams were able to find when they did their covert tests.
So I think the key there for TSA is, really, once you know
the vulnerabilities, whether it is technology or processes or
things that your TSOs might be doing or could be doing better,
to find a mitigation solution and effectively get those
implemented. So we had a few recommendations that TSA is
working on in that regard.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I yield to the deputy to see--are you
moving on the recommendations of GAO, particularly with
technology?
Ms. Cogswell. We are moving on those recommendations. We
have a significant program. I highlighted our innovation task
force is one of these key areas where we are able to rapidly
bring on board potential solutions that have gone through kind-
of an initial review with that ability to do demonstrations,
determine the effectiveness well before it is ready for full
market. This lets us expedite our development of our
requirements process, frankly, as well as help understand
whether or not there is feasibility in a specific location: A
significant improvement over traditional procurement processes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So does that mean, holistically, that you
are trying to make amends, or correct the slowness in
technology, or to expand technology, and then train TSOs on
that new technology?
Ms. Cogswell. Correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that a goal that you are working on?
Ms. Cogswell. Absolutely, to all 3 of those, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Then I would add--and I compliment the
gentleman from Kansas--from Missouri, Kansas City, on raising
the contracting issue.
My concern would be in these airports that accepted that, I
want to make sure the salaries are comparable, and that you are
taking under advisement the need for increased salaries.
What do you need from us? I know money. But what is a
structure that you need to increase the salaries of your TSOs?
Ms. Cogswell. So just to highlight the point you made about
the difference between the TSOs and the SPP airports, we do
require that they pay the same amount that we do. So if we are
able to identify additional funds to increase salaries, they
would be required to match, as well.
What we would like in the near term is the ability to have
some robust conversations with you about different models. What
is within our authority? What is the options within the funding
caps that we receive for the coming years to determine the best
path forward?
Extremely--I can't say enough how extremely valuable we
think it is that you are asking these questions and expressing
this interest, incredibly valuable for the work force of our
morale, as well as the interest--demonstrating the interest and
importance that these officers perform on a day-to-day basis.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If I could squeeze one more question in,
we opened a couple of years back the academy in Georgia. I want
to know how that is working. This whole idea of professional
development, are you all still encouraging?
I understand you send TSOs to that school after they have
been on staff for a while. You have changed the format. Is that
working? Is that accurate, what I am saying? Can you tell me
how that is working?
Ms. Cogswell. Absolutely. Yes. We changed our model. What
we had found, when we stood up our centralized capability, was
we were bringing people on board immediately, sending them to a
multi-week training. Then, in rapid order, you know, they were
really understanding what life was like working at a
checkpoint, and deciding perhaps it wasn't the best fit.
Through our new model we are able to train them on certain
functions that don't require that full training, let them
experience the environment, see how loud it is, see what it is
like interacting with several thousand people a day, make sure
it is a good fit for them, then go through the training.
We are seeing a decrease in the number of people leaving
after the training, saving us the expense of that, as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So professional development is very
important.
Ms. Cogswell. Critically important, and part of our TSO
career progression, as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We need to keep funding it.
Ms. Cogswell. Absolutely. Thank you very much for that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. I yield back, Mr. Chairman,
thank you very much.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much. I want to thank the
witnesses for your very, very valuable, important testimony. I
want to thank the Members, also, for their questions.
If I can, Ms. Cogswell, you heard some of the messages here
today were very important to us to try to reduce turnover,
implementation of technology, PreCheck.
Of course, the issue Mr. Cleaver brought up, which is, how
do you get off those lists, once you are on them?
If the Members of the committee have any additional
questions for the witnesses, we ask that you respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions.
Without objection, the committee record shall be kept open
for 10 days.
Seeing no further business, this subcommittee stands
adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Patricia F.S. Cogswell
air cargo
Question 1. Section 1925 of the TSA Modernization Act required TSA
to submit a feasibility study and conduct a pilot program regarding the
use of Computed Tomography or other technologies to screen air cargo.
TSA recently began its pilot program and has not submitted its
feasibility study to date.
What is the status of the feasibility study and the pilot?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What steps did TSA take to select the technology being
tested under the pilot?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does TSA plan to work with additional industry
stakeholders during the pilot?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. What process does TSA have in place for certifying and
qualifying emerging technologies for use in air cargo security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
technology donations from industry
Question 5. TSA recently finalized its Capability Acceptance
Process (CAP), which outlines a strategy to allow industry
stakeholders, such as airports and airlines, to donate approved
security technologies to TSA.
Does TSA have concerns that small- and medium-sized airports may
not have the resources to donate equipment, so these facilities may
wait longer than others to receive equipment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Does TSA plan to rely on donations from industry rather
than the normal appropriations process for funding its security
requirements?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
pipeline security
Question 7. In December 2018, GAO released a report to TSA
regarding its pipeline security activities with 10 recommendations. GAO
found that TSA has not established a workforce plan for the Pipeline
Security Branch to hire workers with the appropriate skills.
What steps is TSA taking to ensure it is hiring qualified staff,
including staff with cybersecurity expertise, to meet its current
needs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
facial recognition
Question 8. TSA recently ended a pilot program at the McCarran
International Airport in Las Vegas to study the use of facial
recognition technology to verify passengers' identities.
Is TSA planning additional pilots?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. Will TSA go through a public notice and comment process
prior to wide-spread deployment of facial recognition technology?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. Will TSA publish a public version of the report it
completed on biometrics and facial recognition technology under Section
1919 of the TSA Modernization Act?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
airport wait times
Question 11. Section 1922 of the TSA Modernization Act required TSA
to provide real-time wait time information at airport checkpoints
within 1 year of enactment.
What is TSA doing to ensure that wait times are being measured
equally at different airports?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. Certain airports already have their own tracking tools
in place. How is TSA planning to ensure data accuracy and consistency
of this information across different platforms?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Debbie Lesko for Patricia F.S. Cogswell
section 1922 of tsa modernization--real-time, wait time reporting
Question 1. Please provide the committee with an update on how TSA
is performing on evaluating, establishing, and publishing technical
requirements for airport compliance with Section 1922 of the TSA
Modernization Act. Please include an updated time line.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Please provide the committee with an overview of TSA-
sponsored or supported wait-time reporting demonstrations to date,
including the TSA Advancing the Checkpoint Experience program, and each
demonstration's objective.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. TSA checkpoint wait time reporting is expected to
inform the passenger experience. Combined with aggregate data
collection and advanced analytics, wait time reporting can result in
operational cost savings, more efficient staffing models, better asset
management, increased screener productivity, and an improved passenger
experience. How is TSA looking to leverage these potential operational
benefits in its development of Section 1922 data and system
requirements?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Air passenger volume has been growing 4-6 percent
annually, and Airports Council International forecasts approximately 30
percent growth in passenger traffic from 2018 to 2023. Given the clear
need for both broad strategic and localized responses to this dramatic
increase, how is TSA ensuring compliance with Section 1922 to empower
TSA Headquarters with standardized, network data and analysis along
with actionable queue intelligence to on-site TSA managers?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. In 2018 and early 2019, the TSA Innovation Task Force
(ITF) conducted a real-time wait time technology pilot at Chicago
O'Hare International Airport. The ITF demonstration led to
significantly shorter TSA wait times and other operational benefits at
the airport. What were the lessons learned from this demonstration, and
how will this demonstration inform formal Section 1922 requirements?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. While several airports are independently reporting TSA
checkpoint wait times, there are currently no formal data standards for
TSA checkpoint wait-time reporting. Section 1922 does, however, define
when a wait time begins and ends. Presently, what is TSA doing to
ensure that airports are reporting accurate and comparable data sets?
How will this be defined and addressed in the eventual requirements?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. Given the time pressure, is TSA considering procurement
models that will ensure the Section 1922 mandate is met within the 18-
month window? What procurement models are under consideration? When
will decisions be made on a Nation-wide procurement strategy?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. Given that CBP is under similar pressure to measure and
reduce wait times, how and where is TSA collaborating with CBP to
ensure accurate and standardized data is available on both inbound and
outbound passenger journeys?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. The deadline for REAL ID compliance is October 1, 2020.
According to a U.S. Travel Association survey conducted within the last
month, 99 million Americans do not have a REAL ID or any acceptable
identification that can be used once REAL ID is enforced. U.S. Travel
estimates that 89,000 could be turned away at the airport on the first
day alone, which would cause chaos at our airports and cost our economy
more than $40 million.
What is TSA's plan for handling passengers who show up without a
REAL ID or an acceptable alternative starting October 1, 2020? Will
they be turned away at the checkpoint? Will there be a screening
process in place to get them through the checkpoint?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. Is it possible for TSA to designate PreCheck
enrollment as an acceptable alternative to REAL ID?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11. What authority does TSA have to designate acceptable
alternative identification?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12a. In order to reduce the burden on State DMVs and
individuals, has DHS looked at allowing States to query verification of
citizenship/legal status and identity through trusted traveler programs
like PreCheck or Global Entry, since members of these programs have
already been vetted?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12b. What is TSA's plan for handling passengers who show
up without a REAL ID or an acceptable alternative starting October 1,
2020? Will they be turned away at the checkpoint? Will there be a
screening process in place to get them through the checkpoint?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12c. What authority does TSA have to designate acceptable
alternative identification?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]