[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-45]
STATUS OF THE B61-12 LIFE EXTENSION
AND W88 ALTERATION 370 PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 25, 2019
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-275 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JACKIE SPEIER, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts MO BROOKS, Alabama
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma, Vice
Chair
Grant Schneider, Professional Staff Member
Sarah Mineiro, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 1
WITNESSES
Clark, Lt Gen Richard M., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force... 4
Verdon, Hon. Charles P., Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration............. 2
Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
Programs, U.S. Navy............................................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Clark, Lt Gen Richard M...................................... 24
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces........................... 17
Verdon, Hon. Charles P....................................... 18
Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr.................................... 29
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 35
Mrs. Davis................................................... 36
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 38
Ms. Horn..................................................... 39
Mr. Larsen................................................... 37
.
STATUS OF THE B61-12 LIFE EXTENSION AND W88 ALTERATION 370 PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 25, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will come to order.
I would like to welcome the witnesses, Dr. Verdon, General
Clark, Admiral Wolfe.
This is an important topic. I will dispense with my opening
statement and ask unanimous consent that it be inserted for the
record so that we can get to the witness testimony. We also
planned a classified session after this, but we wanted to have
as much of it in the public as we could.
With that, I will yield to the distinguished ranking
member.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 17.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank all the witnesses for being here
today. You were here back in March and April; appreciate you
stopping in to give us this update.
The B61 and the W88 are both critically important programs
in our Nation's nuclear modernization efforts. The B61-12 Mod
12 Life Extension Program consolidates and replaces older B61
that were first produced in 1968. Mod 12 will have advanced
accuracy and produce less fallout compared to previous versions
of the weapon. It is a necessary and prudent life extension and
a programmatic delay. I continue to strongly support this
program. As former president of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] Parliamentary Assembly, I know the credible
contributions the B61 currently makes to nuclear deterrence in
Europe, and I will continue to support it.
As I read in your submitted statement, the W88 Alt
[Alteration] 370 is needed to replace the arming, fusing, and
firing subsystems of the warhead, as well as refreshing the
conventional high explosives in the warhead.
While experiencing similar programmatic delays again, I
strongly support this program and recognize the unique
contributions our submarines provide our nuclear--as a nuclear
deterrent.
I look forward to hearing your testimony on the source of
the problem and how to move forward in a responsible manner.
And then I want to express my disappointment that we are
even having this hearing. We have a longstanding tradition in
our committee that we don't have hearings on--public hearings,
especially, on issues that are being considered in conference.
These issues are currently being negotiated in conference right
now that affect these programs. We usually have intake hearings
as we are preparing for the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], not as we are negotiating of the NDAA.
But, nonetheless, the majority has decided to do this in a
very public fashion. Again, our nuclear weapons and the issues
affecting them--as the chairman said, we are going to be going
into a classified session--could easily have been dealt with
solely in the classified session. So the only reason why we
must be in public is for there to have some difficult
discussions about support for the nuclear deterrent that we
have that is part of our Nation's security.
I think this is a disappointment. It is continued
politicization of the process of this committee that we have
seen throughout this year, and I am eager to hear what the
chairman considers as his questions that are so needed for him
to bring forward in the public that we couldn't have just had
in our discussion in our meeting that we are going to have
afterwards.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I appreciate the gentleman's eagerness.
Let's start with the witness testimony.
Dr. Verdon.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES P. VERDON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Verdon. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
on the status of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
Security Administration's B61-12 Life Extension and W88
Alteration 370 programs.
The U.S. nuclear deterrent continues to be the cornerstone
of America's national security and global stability. It is
imperative that we modernize all aspects of our nuclear
deterrent, including delivery platforms, the warheads, the
infrastructure required to deliver those warheads. And further,
we need to hire and train and retain the workforce necessary to
carry out these challenging tasks involved.
These modernization activities ensure that the U.S. nuclear
weapon stockpile continues to meet Department of Defense
requirements while enhancing warhead safety and security. With
the successful completion of the W76-1 Life Extension Program
in December of 2018, NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration] is currently executing five warhead
modernization activities. Some aspects are common across these
very complex activities; however, there are also many unique
aspects due to their different delivery requirements.
As with any complicated endeavor, unplanned technical
challenges arise, as has been encountered on the B61-12 LEP
[Life Extension Program] and the W88 Alt 370 associated with a
limited number of electrical components.
So first, let me--there are two main aspects of each
warhead modernization activity. The first is we must identify a
technically feasible design that meets the requirements set
forth. The second is we must establish confidence that the
design chosen will continue to meet those requirements and work
reliably 20 to 30 years after production.
Technical issues with some capacitors used in the B61-12
and W88 Alt 370 were identified while gathering data to certify
the reliability of these weapons for the required 20- to 30-
year stockpile life. Early tests on the capacitors now in
question and subsequent tests, including component, major
assembly, and full-up integrated system flight tests,
demonstrated that these components meet requirements today.
Industry best practices were used to stress the components
beyond their design planned usage as a way of establishing
confidence that they will continue to work over the necessary
lifetime of the warhead. During stress testing, a few of these
commercially available capacitors did not meet the reliability
requirements.
NNSA, in coordination with DOD [Department of Defense] and
supported by a blue ribbon panel established by NNSA, whose
memberships included representatives from the Air Force Nuclear
Weapon Center, the Defense Microelectronics Activity, Naval
Surface Warfare Center-Crane Division, Honeywell, Northrop
Grumman, and Pennsylvania State University, advised in June
2019 that the prudent approach was to accept the delay to these
programs and replace these components, rather than risk
component failure in the future years. These recommendations
were accepted by NNSA at that time.
Delays to the first production unit for both programs are
approximately 18 to 20 months. NNSA is working with DOD to
develop specific production schedules for the two programs in
question. Initial operational capability dates and last
production dates are being explored with the United States Air
Force to meet their deployment needs and with the United States
Navy to minimize impact of fleet operations.
All other components unaffected by the capacitor issues are
continuing with readiness and production activities on their
original timelines to mitigate delays and impacts on other
ongoing warhead modernization activities.
Upon identification of these issues, NNSA initiated two
internal reviews to identify cause and lessons to be learned.
Both teams gathered information from interviews, site visits,
and discussions with other organizations that undertake similar
electronic component work.
As a root cause, we identified that our methodology for the
insertion of commercial off-the-shelf, or COTS, components into
high reliability, long-life nuclear warheads needs to be
improved. We are examining our process to identify improvements
and actively working to mitigate such future risks. We are
using the W80-4 LEP and the W87-1 modification program to
incorporate these lessons learned to minimize the chance of
future COTS-related risks.
Progress is reviewed on a regular basis. And then be
assured that my team and I are actively engaged in every aspect
of the recovery process. Additionally, it is my responsibility
to ensure that NNSA learn from what occurred in order to reduce
the likelihood of reoccurrence during other ongoing warhead
modernization activities.
The efforts of our dedicated professionals across the
nuclear security enterprise continue to drive progress towards
our modernization milestones, and NNSA is an organization
striving for continuous improvement.
I look forward to continuing to work with Congress to
sustain the nuclear deterrent for both near term and long term,
a test that will require continued strong support of this
committee for adequate and stable investments to support the
scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to
maintain and modernize the stockpile.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Verdon can be found in the
Appendix on page 18.]
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman, General Clark.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN RICHARD M. CLARK, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S.
AIR FORCE
General Clark. Good afternoon, Chairman Cooper, Ranking
Member Turner, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to discuss modernization efforts for
the B61-12 gravity bomb. It is an honor to present the Air
Force before you today.
The return of great power competition means the United
States faces a more diverse and advanced nuclear threat
environment than ever before. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
highlighted that Russia has adopted military strategies and
capabilities that rely on nuclear escalation for their success,
which is a troubling doctrinal trend.
Despite U.S. efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons
in international affairs and negotiate reductions in the number
of nuclear weapons, neither Russia nor China have reduced the
role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies
or the number of nuclear weapons they field. Rather, they have
moved decidedly in the opposite direction. Therefore, the
United States must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent to
ensure our ability to deter aggression, assure our allies and
partners, hedge against uncertainties, and achieve U.S.
objectives should deterrence fail.
Modernization and recapitalization are paramount to
maintaining a credible deterrent in the evolving strategic
security environment. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for
the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy to
prioritize and fund their respective nuclear delivery systems
and warhead programs for synchronized delivery. The B61-12 Life
Extension Program and Tail Kit Assembly is one such effort, and
ensures the B61 meets USSTRATCOM [United States Strategic
Command] and NATO requirements well into the 21st century.
NNSA has a crucial role to play as all three legs of the
nuclear triad, as well as our forward-deployed nuclear forces,
require the warheads it develops and sustains, and they are
working diligently to deliver assured, reliable capabilities on
time to the warfighter. As a result of their diligence, NNSA
has identified an issue with capacitor components that did not
meet reliability requirements, and consequently, the B61-12
Life Extension Program and concurrent W88 Alteration 370
program will not meet initial production date requirements. I
am confident, however, that the capacitor issue will be
satisfactorily resolved.
The Air Force will continue synchronizing efforts with the
Navy, NNSA, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], and
USSTRATCOM, working in lockstep with them through the Nuclear
Weapons Council to understand and mitigate associated costs,
near-term impacts to deployment, and any follow-on implications
due to the delay, ensuring our nuclear modernization efforts
support the nuclear triad, forward-deployed nuclear forces, and
joint force requirements.
The Air Force values the continued support of Congress and
the Nation, and we are committed to providing the tools
necessary to deter the most existential threat to America's
survival. The flexible capabilities and complementary nature of
the nuclear triad, forward-deployed nuclear forces, and
associated weapons ensure the credibility of the U.S.
deterrent, while complicating an adversary's decision calculus.
Our nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are the backstop of
U.S. national security and underwrite every diplomatic and
military operation on the globe.
We are committed to ensuring the successful modernization
and recapitalization of these critical programs.
Thank you again for allowing me to appear today, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Clark can be found in
the Appendix on page 24.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, General.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF VADM JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Wolfe. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss a vital refurbishment effort of our sea-
based leg of the triad. It is an honor to testify before you
representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs, or SSP.
Nuclear deterrence is the Department of Defense's number
one priority mission. The Nation's nuclear triad of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and
ballistic missile submarines equipped with submarine-launched
ballistic missiles is the bedrock of our ability to deter
aggression, assure our allies and partners, achieve U.S.
objectives should deterrence fail, and hedge against an
uncertain future.
Today's Ohio-class submarine and Trident II (D5) Strategic
Weapon System together compose the sea-based leg of the
deterrent. The Trident II (D5) missile is capable of carrying
two different types of warheads, the W76 and the W88, both
deployed in the late 1970s and 1980s, respectively. Over the
last 20 years, the Navy and our partners at the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA,
have executed efforts to refurbish these warheads to address
aging and obsolescence.
The W88 Alteration 370 refurbishing effort begun in 2008
focused on procuring additional arming, fusing, and firing
units, and replacing the system's high explosives, in
conjunction with the routine replacement of discrete system
components. Historical challenges had delayed the initial
program production until December 2019, removing any schedule
margin for the refurbishment effort.
Recently during testing, NNSA identified an issue with
capacitor components that did not meet reliability requirements
and will not be available to this program in order to meet
required production dates. The Navy and NNSA are planning for
an approximately 18-month delay to the W88 Alt 370 program and
are working to understand associated costs and the follow-on
implications to our entire Trident II (D5) program of record.
Concurrently, the Navy is working with USSTRATCOM to
understand the near-term impacts to deployments and to ensure
that the Navy can continue to meet USSTRATCOM requirements. I
am confident that the Navy, NNSA, and the Nuclear Weapons
Council will address this refurbishment challenge with mission-
focused attitude and rigor.
Delays to warhead refurbishment programs are unfortunate,
but they are a potential reality for which the Navy prepares.
Issues associated with the W88 Alt 370 program highlight the
critical importance of a robust, nuclear enterprise-wide suite
of skilled workforce professionals, rigorous processes, and a
healthy manufacturing and industrial base.
Now, more than ever, the Navy needs the continued support
of Congress and the Nation as the Navy, NNSA, the Air Force,
and the Nuke Weapons Council work together to manage this delay
and to plan future warhead work across the enterprise.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe can be found in
the Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Admiral.
And thanks to all the witnesses for your excellent
testimony.
The purpose of this hearing today is just to watch over
taxpayer dollars because we have an obligation as stewards of
taxpayer money to make sure that it is properly spent. And any
time there is a delay or cost overrun, I think it is worthy of
note. These are vitally important programs for America, but
there are no sacred cows, so we need to make sure that 18-
month, 2-year delays, cost overruns, can be better understood
so they can be avoided in the future.
It is completely unrelated to this hearing today, but just
this morning we were told there is a Federal court decision in
Tennessee which is delaying the UPF [Uranium Processing
Facility] facility, which is one of the most expensive
buildings ever built, $6.5 billion, because the environmental
paperwork wasn't done properly. That is amazing.
Can any of the witnesses tell me about the approximate cost
of these capacitors that are delaying the life extension
programs of these vitally important warheads?
Dr. Verdon. Yes, sir. The original capacitors, the ones in
question, were basically around $5 per part. Their replacement
capacitors, which are built to now a new standard that wasn't--
that did not exist at the time the original capacitors were
procured, are more like $75 per part, because they are built to
a much more rigorous standard.
Mr. Cooper. So that is the cost of replacing the technical
component that could have failed in a stress test?
Dr. Verdon. Right.
Mr. Cooper. Now, the overall cost of these delays is
approximately what?
Dr. Verdon. So for the B61, early estimates right now, we
are still working it, but our estimates right now for the B61-
12 will be $600 to $700 million, and for the W88 Alt 370, the
NNSA costs will be around $120 to $150 million.
Mr. Cooper. So in rough figures, due to the defect of a
component that costs less than $100, taxpayers will face extra
charges on the order of close to a billion dollars?
Dr. Verdon. But it is our plan to address that by basically
balancing the workload within our modernization portfolio. As
part of our lessons learned from this activity, we have already
undertaken design simplifications on the 80-4 and the W87-1
that will allow us to, in the out-years, to move money that was
originally allocated for those activities to the B61-12 and the
W88 Alt 370. And then using the contingency and management
reserve that are currently in those programs, that is going to
be our approach, is not to request any increase to the bottom
line for the modernization effort, but to balance within the
modernization portfolio.
Mr. Cooper. So in exchange for spending the extra billion
dollars right now, we may be able to find another billion
somewhere so there would be no net extra cost to the taxpayer?
Dr. Verdon. That is our objective and our goal, and we are
working hard towards that.
Mr. Cooper. And we would know the answer to that question
in what year?
Dr. Verdon. Hopefully, very shortly in terms of our ability
to meet that. I would say it is probably within a year that we
would have a good idea whether we will be able to do that.
There is no increase needed in 2020, so it is really--the first
time we would need increased funding would be in fiscal year
2021.
Mr. Cooper. I very much hope your prediction comes true.
That would be wonderful.
Dr. Verdon. That is certainly our focused goal to achieve
that.
Mr. Cooper. And you would be willing to come back within a
year's time and help us understand that?
Dr. Verdon. Certainly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. We like accountability. That is a good thing. I
have no more questions right now.
The ranking member?
Mr. Turner. I yield my time to Joe Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Ranking Member Mike Turner.
Dr. Verdon, I appreciate your service with the National
Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA. Your statement, ``the
United States nuclear capabilities continue to be the
cornerstone of America's national security and global
stability, and serve as the ultimate deterrent against a
nuclear attack,'' is important as we look at deterrence within
the nuclear power competition context.
The overall age of our nuclear deterrent capabilities is a
weakness in the strategic triad. The U.S. nuclear weapons are
surpassing their intended service lives, as has been discussed.
The Nuclear Posture Review addressed the importance of
modernizing our plutonium pits, including 80 pits at 2 sites
per year by 2030.
Do you agree that in order to modernize our nuclear
capabilities, NNSA should comply with the Nuclear Posture
Review and increase capacity across two sites to modernize
plutonium pits? What delays in plutonium pit production impact
service life extension programs?
Dr. Verdon. So I do agree that the 2-site solution of 80
pits per year by 2030 is a prudent approach to managing the
stockpile going forward. And delays in that, yes, in my mind
will add risks to the long-term viability of the stockpile.
Mr. Wilson. Additionally, the program delays for B61 and
W88 have been costly and led to significant lessons learned. I
have supported the requirement of 80 plutonium pits per year at
2 sites, which has a strict timeline that I have been assured
can be attainable.
How will the NNSA consider the reports from the cost
estimating and programs evaluation for future service life
extension programs and ensure these problems do not continue
with future service life extension programs and plutonium pit
production?
Dr. Verdon. As I mentioned, we are a learning organization
and we have--as soon as this occurred, we instituted a lessons
team to go find the causes of this, and then we are applying
those lessons now to the other systems to minimize the chance
of this reoccurrence. And so we have revamped and changed how
we approached the work on these systems already, on the newer
systems, to learn from what occurred. And that is what a good,
you know, learning organization does, is they will make
changes. They utilize what has worked and they change what had
issues, and that is what we are doing right now.
Mr. Wilson. That is very encouraging. And I look forward to
continue working with you, in particular, the two-site
solution, the Savannah River Site and Los Alamos. I think it is
just so important to have two sites to reach the goals that
should be attained.
And General Clark, the B61 is consolidating four of five
variants of the B61. How do our NATO partners view the
necessity of this life extension and consolidation? What are
the impacts to the operational Air Force units of not
successfully executing this life extension?
General Clark. Sir, thank you for the question. Our NATO
partners view the B61-12 very favorably, especially as we take
the aspects of safe, secure, and reliable components and
consolidate that in the B61-12 and enhance those features. So
that gives us a better weapon set. It allows us the operational
requirements also that our combatant commanders as well as our
NATO partners require from that weapon. As was discussed
earlier, it is a more capable system.
But, really, it boils down to the safety, security, and
reliability. And by consolidating that into a single weapon, it
is much more manageable, it is much improved, and it
simplifies, I think, our maintenance and the sustainability of
that program out into the future.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for your very clear explanation of
these very complicated issues.
And now we throw it, of course, to Admiral Wolfe. What is
the operational impact of the W88 delay to the fleet's ability
to meet STRATCOM at-sea requirements?
Admiral Wolfe. Thank you for the question, sir. So as we
work with USSTRATCOM, we are looking at mitigation strategies.
Obviously, this delay is going to cause us to have to look at
how we re-plan, both how we turn around the stockpile. And what
I mean by turn around the stockpile is how we now re-plan to
get these weapons back to Pantex when they are ready and NNSA
is ready, and then get them back out to the fleet.
I would be happy in the closed session to go into a little
bit more detail about what that means. We will have STRATCOM as
well and we will be able to walk you through the implications
of that. But currently today, based on what we are doing with
STRATCOM, we will meet the requirements as we move forward.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
And one final for Dr. Verdon. You stated that more than
half of the National Nuclear Security Agency's facilities
across the nuclear security enterprise date back to the
Manhattan Project. Please speak to the impacts of the NNSA's
aging infrastructure and how it serves as an obstacle to the
life extension programs to the B61-12 and W88 Alterations.
Dr. Verdon. So the risk occurs with any of the potential
failure in those older buildings. While those sites that have
the buildings on them work, do heroic efforts to keep them
functioning, we do know and have tracked increased maintenance
costs on them. And if we were to lose some of those facilities,
it will immediately impact both the sustainment of the present
stockpile as well as delivery of future--of the modernization
warheads that the DOD is requiring.
Mr. Wilson. I thank each of you for being here today.
I am happy to yield back to Chairman Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina.
The gentlelady from Oklahoma is recognized.
Ms. Horn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all of
you for your testimony today.
Dr. Verdon, I would like to follow up on a few questions
helping us to understand this in your testimony, discussing the
critical cornerstone that is our Nation's nuclear arsenal and
our national security. So wanting to follow up, understanding
that there will be delays due to technical failures, as is the
nature of these challenges, can you speak to what lessons that
you have learned during these delayed programs that we can take
into the future to address that issue?
Dr. Verdon. Certainly, glad to address that. Yes. One of
the key lessons we learned, we always had a mixture when we
were working on our warheads, even back during the Cold War,
where 30 percent of our components--these components were made
from components off-the-shelf, COTS technology. Now it is
moved--so it used to be 30 percent outside, 70 percent inside.
Now we have moved more to 70 percent outside and 30 percent
inside.
And what we did not recognize, and one of the lessons we
learned, is the variability that can exist even within a given
vendor just between different lots. Different lots. So when you
buy the components, if you get different lots of them, there
can be variability in how they are produced. That is something
that we underestimated, but we are learning that. You know, we
have learned that now already, and have changed how we are
going to procure the parts and how we are going to test the
parts. We are going to be more rigorously testing the parts
earlier on in the process so that if there is an issue, we can
uncover it sooner. So that is one of the key lessons learned.
And then we even identified some organizational
improvements so that we have to be able to flow up information
more quickly to respond to. So there is--it has been across the
board that we have identified the major cause, I would say, is
our underestimation of the variability between lots.
But then we had a lot of what I will say contributing
causes--or not a lot--a number of contributing causes that we
are also addressing that will improve the flow of information
so that we can respond even quicker when we do uncover these
types of technical issues, which are, as you mentioned, are
inevitable in these types of programs.
Ms. Horn. Thank you.
And following up, I want to ask, and then this can be for
all three of you, your sense of addressing these critical
issues that impact our national security and knowing that we
are moving forward. What role can Congress play to help
mitigate the delays of these weapon systems and identifying
these potential pitfalls sooner? What do you need from us?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. So I
would submit, just as a general program manager, as we continue
to develop and look at how we build these systems, pushing
everything as far to the right as we do until we take all of
our margin away, and being able to get some of that learning
and actually make a turn in time so that we don't find ourself
in situations like this. That is incredibly important.
And as I said in my opening statement, if you look at the
age of these systems and the technology that we are using,
these are tough, tough issues to solve. And it is critical
technology that we are learning as we modernize these. So
anything that Congress can do to help us keep the funding on
schedule and on the timelines that we have requested helps us
get that testing done earlier and identify these so we don't
find ourself having to do some of these last-minute turns,
which kind of put us in these situations.
General Clark. Ma'am, I think I would certainly second
Admiral Wolfe's sentiments on that. Last minute, if you will,
recapitalization of modernization does put us in a box. The
other thing that I would add, though, is that the support for
NNSA, for our labs, for our production facilities, and to
ensure that they have the manpower and the expertise, not only
for now, but into the future, to ensure that the production,
the design, modernization of these weapons is consistent, and
that we can carry it out into the future.
Given the strategic environment that we are in, it is a
capacity and a capability that we have to have. And I know I
can speak for Admiral Wolfe and the Navy, but we in the Air
Force as well rely--I can't even stress how important our
reliance is on NNSA and the Department of Energy. So support
for our brothers and sisters in the Department of Energy is
critical.
Ms. Horn. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentlelady.
The gentleman from Tennessee is recognized.
No questions? Okay.
Are there any other questions for this panel then?
Oh, Mr. Lamborn, our auxiliary member. I ask unanimous
consent that he be able to ask questions.
Mr. Lamborn. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and committee.
Just a couple of quick questions. Thank you all for being
here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing.
At this point, given the delays in the 61 and 88, does it
make sense to make all of the non-nuclear components in-house?
You said 70 percent, but what about 100 percent?
Dr. Verdon. So that is also a lesson we are taking to look
at examining that more closely. What we have come to the
conclusion of, though, is we are going to be evaluating it on a
part-by-part basis, if you like. What we are finding is that,
also one of the lessons learned, is we are improving our
interactions with the vendors themselves. We are trying to make
sure that the vendors understand our requirements very early in
the process as we even begin to engage them so they can tell us
whether they think they can meet our requirements or not.
In some cases, the vendors want to work with us and will
actually improve their processes to actually meet our
requirements. So we are going to look at it on a part-by-part
basis. And for those parts that the vendors would have a hard
time meeting, we would look at those to bring back in-house.
For those that the vendors can meet and then we test that they
can meet, we will gladly stay with the process that we are
using right now.
So we are going to try to take a measured approach to that.
You know, it is an excellent question; it is one that we have
been asking ourselves quite a bit.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And apparently, a lot of the
non-nuclear component production is done in Kansas City. What
are the bottlenecks there, and what are you doing to fix it? I
know you partially answered that already.
Dr. Verdon. Yes, sir. In Kansas City, what we are finding,
actually, is floor space and manpower has been bottlenecks. We
are actively working right now to get them some additional
floor space. They are hiring. They are doing a great job hiring
their workforce. The site is doing an excellent job at that. We
are working to get them additional floor space and the
equipment that they need to enable to do the workload, the
increased workload, that they are seeing. So we are working
together to give them the extra capacity that they need.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And you mentioned--my last
question. You mentioned the workforce. How important is it that
we in Congress stay up to date with funding for you so that the
industrial base stays intact and the workforce stays as much up
to date as possible?
Dr. Verdon. As was mentioned, I think the funding, the
stability of the funding, the adequacy of the funding is
critical because that is what can actually send--you know, the
complex comes to a halt if the funding is, you know, not
adequate or it is not predictable. We have to sometimes slow
down. That is what does cause us issues. So that if it is
stable and predictable, then the sites can plan for the future,
which they have to when it comes to workforce, and so it is
actually very critical that we have that.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman from Colorado.
Any other questions from the subcommittee before we go into
closed session?
Looks like there are none.
So why don't we recess and go into closed session in the
SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility].
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 25, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 25, 2019
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 25, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. You noted in your testimony that NNSA is working to
identify design simplifications in future warhead programs that may
have on the order of $1 billion dollars in cost savings. Had the delays
in the B61-12 and the W88 not occurred, would these design
simplifications in the W80-4 and the W87-1 still have been pursued by
NNSA? What are the specific design simplifications that will save $1
billion?Are the future modifications, alterations, and LEPs overfunded
if $1 billion can so easily be found within them? When will NNSA
formally provide Congress with this updated cost information?
Dr. Verdon. NNSA will attempt to balance the funding across all on-
going weapon modernization activities to address B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt
370 funding needs. This approach will be challenging. NNSA is working
to do this by utilizing remaining contingency and management reserve
within the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370 programs, and by applying lessons
learned from these programs to reevaluate other on-going warhead
activities for the potential of cost avoidance. The W80-4 LEP is
already in Phase 6.3 so NNSA is looking at design/component
simplification. The W87-1 Modification Program is in Phase 6.2 so NNSA,
in coordination with the Department of Defense, is exploring both scope
reductions (a normal part of the process in Phase 6.2) and design
simplifications. Since no additional funding is required for the B61-12
LEP and W88 Alt 370 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, NNSA is working to
understand our ability to carry out this approach in time for FY 2021
funding discussions.
Mr. Cooper. How will NNSA determine the extent to which the
programs have sufficient contingency, given it is clear that neither
the B61-12 nor W88 ALT 370 had sufficient contingency?
Dr. Verdon. NNSA provided contingency for both of these two
programs at the start of each of their respective Phase 6.3 based on
DOE/NNSA policy as informed by the DOE Office of Project Management and
Oversight Assessment and Government Accountability Office best practice
standards. As with any program of this complexity, contingency is
utilized through the life of the program to address both previously
assessed risks and unplanned realized risks.
The W80-4 Weapons Design Cost Report (WDCR) is very comprehensive,
includes federal contingency, and is in close agreement with the Office
of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation's (CEPE) Independent Cost
Estimate (ICE). While the program includes an estimate of contingency,
CEPE's ICE utilizes historical actual data where contingency has been
realized in principle. The W87-1 WDCR will follow the same
comprehensive estimating process and, in accordance with NNSA's
policies, will be reconciled with CEPE's independent estimate.
Mr. Cooper. You noted in your testimony that some organizational
improvements have been identified as a result of the delays. Please
specify, in detail, the identified improvements and a timeline for
implementation.
Dr. Verdon. In October 2019, NNSA's Office of Defense Programs
instituted a reorganization and realignment to account for the
increased workload of future LEPs and to adjust for the W88 ALT 370 and
B61-12 LEP schedule slips. To meet these challenges, this
reorganization: Consolidates and manages all legacy and future weapons
efforts under a single office; Realigns strategic materials and
component production modernization efforts; Increases focus on
production and integration of production efforts across the enterprise;
Aligns technology maturation initiatives with research, development,
test, and evaluation efforts under a single office.
Organizational changes are also being made at the relevant
Management and Operating (M&O) contractors' sites. The federal program
management team is being augmented with the addition of federally-led
Integrated Product Teams focused on improving coordination and
communications, both between the numerous M&O-led Product Realization
Teams and up to federal program leadership. The M&O organizational
changes are the responsibility of the individual sites, but are
informed by the lessons uncovered by the NNSA review teams.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
Mrs. Davis. Dr. Verdon, numerous reviews and assessments have been
and are being conducted on NNSA's governance model. Recent reviews have
noted the lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities within the
enterprise, considering the cost and schedule delays of the B61-12 and
the W88 ALT 370 programs, does NNSA plan to evaluate how to improve and
clarify the roles and responsibilities within the enterprise? If NNSA
is not planning to evaluate how to make improvements to these areas,
please explain why in detail.
Dr. Verdon. In May 2019, NNSA released three strategic documents,
which serve as the guiding principles for how NNSA does business.
Collectively, these three documents, Strategic Vision, Strategic
Integrated Roadmap, and Governance and Management Framework, set the
stage for realizing the cultural changes necessary to ensure that NNSA
continues to demonstrate excellence and is responsive to the nation's
nuclear security and strategic defense needs now and into the future.
These documents set the expectation that NNSA execute its mission based
on clearly defined roles, responsibilities, authorities, and
accountability, and work with single purpose through more effective
teaming and improved mission integration. Clearly defined roles and
responsibilities coupled with effective integration of operations drive
collaboration, teamwork, communication, and efficiency across the
nuclear security enterprise, resulting in peak performance and mission
execution.
With respect to the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370, NNSA's Office of
Defense Programs formed two teams to examine and document root causes
and lessons from these delays. These teams determined that clarity
regarding roles and responsibilities between the organizations involved
was not a major factor. The respective organizations already had and
continue to have an understanding of their roles and responsibilities.
The teams identified that a more important contributing factor was how
those roles and responsibilities were being executed, as well as the
integration between the respective sites, Management and Operating
(M&O) contractors, and federal program managers. NNSA is working with
our M&Os to improve this integration.
Mrs. Davis. Dr. Verdon, the NNSA Act provides the Deputy
Administrator with specific authority for ``directing, managing, and
overseeing the nuclear weapons production facilities and the national
security laboratories.'' However, the field offices and many other
critical support functions such as infrastructure, operations, and
acquisition--which are necessary for delivering programs within their
original performance baseline--reside outside of the Deputy
Administrator's organizational purview.
Please specify, in detail, how you ensure each of the following
mission support functions are integrated to meet the strategic
direction of the Deputy Administrator: Field Offices; Infrastructure,
Operations, and Safety, and Health; Acquisition and Project Management.
Have any of the planned organizational and program changes, brought on
by the delays, been formally approved by the Administrator?
Dr. Verdon. For major activities such as warhead modernization
programs, NNSA works to ensure integration through both documented
plans and frequent ``face-to-face'' meetings. This provides each
relevant organization the information they need to enable the success
of the program in question. The documented plans (and any changes to
the plans) are coordinated between all relevant NNSA organizations and
M&O contractors. Face-to-face meetings occur at all levels and
frequency depending on need. For example, sites hold daily meetings to
ensure workforce understanding of the activities planned for that day
at that site. Leadership of the sites and Federal Managers hold weekly
meetings at minimum to ensure that all sites understand what is ongoing
and planned, and to ensure dependencies between each site are
addressed. Quarterly, there is a day-long in-depth review of each
project to provide further communication between all involved.
Organizational changes are being made at the M&O partner sites, while
the federal program management team is also being augmented with the
addition of federally-led Integrated Product Teams. These teams are
focused on improving coordination and communications between the
numerous M&O lead Product Realization Teams and federal program
leadership.
Mrs. Davis. Dr. Verdon, what, if any, modifications need to occur
with respect to how NNSA manages technology and manufacturing maturing
and readiness in light of the delays?
Dr. Verdon. One of the key lessons NNSA has learned from our review
of the delays is the need to modify our manufacturing and technology
readiness. NNSA is putting into place a number of changes to minimize
the chance of recurrence of the issue encountered with these two
programs in the future. For example, three changes being implemented
are:
1) NNSA has consolidated all technology and manufacturing
readiness/maturations efforts (TRLs and MRLs), outside of specific
weapons program modernization activities, under one program office.
These activities had previously been distributed among a number of
organizations. This consolidation enables a more strategic and
integrated approach.
2) For any new technology and/or components proposed for use in a
warhead modernization activity, NNSA has moved the assessment that
decides if the use of new technology will be supported to earlier in
the 6.X process, prior to entering Phase 6.2. We have also increased
the level of assessment needed. Of course, NNSA recognizes that in some
cases a new technology might offer some significant potential benefits,
and on a case-by-case basis the use of new technology will be
supported, but risk mitigations must be identified and pursued in
parallel.
3) NNSA has implemented more rigorous and frequent independent
assessments of technology and manufacturing readiness levels to assess
the progress of key components and to provide an additional indicator
as to whether TRLs or MRLs are falling behind their needed dates for
use, so that corrective actions can be taken in a timely manner.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. If NNSA plans to shift contingency from the W80-4 and
W87-1 to the B61-12/W88 Alt 370, will this shift be commensurate with
the planned simplifications of these programs designs? What are the
current contingency amounts for the W80-4 and the W87-1?
Dr. Verdon. NNSA will attempt to balance the funding across all on-
going weapon modernization activities to address B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt
370 funding needs. This will not be done by shifting contingency from
the W80-4 LEP or W87-1 Modification Program. NNSA plans to do this by
utilizing contingency and management reserve within the B61-12 LEP and
W88 Alt 370 and by applying lessons from both to reevaluate other
ongoing warhead activities for the potential of cost avoidance through
design/component simplifications and scope reductions. The W80-4 LEP is
already in Phase 6.3; therefore, NNSA is looking at design/component
simplification for that program. The W87-1 Modification Program is in
Phase 6.2, so NNSA, in coordination with the Department of Defense, is
exploring both design simplifications and scope reductions-- a normal
part of Phase 6.2. Since no additional funding is needed for the B61-12
LEP and W88 Alt 370 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, NNSA intends to have
additional details on the potential cost avoidance that can be
identified in the W80-4 LEP and W87-1 Modification Program in time to
inform FY 2021 budget/funding discussions.
The FY 2020 contingency for the W80-4 is $20 million, which is 2.2%
of the FY 2020 budget. The W87-1 is in early development stage and has
not established a baseline. Therefore, no contingency reserve is
allocated.
Mr. Larsen. Within the NNSA enterprise, who is responsible for
deciding when specific tests, such as the tests that identified the
issues causing delays, are done on warhead components?
Dr. Verdon. It is the responsibility of the design laboratory of
the component in question working with the relevant production site to
identify what and when tests are needed to provide the underpinning
evidence that components meet requirements.
Mr. Larsen. When were you and the Administrator made aware of
potential issues with the capacitors?
Dr. Verdon. The technical issue with the parts in question was
confirmed in April 2019, but the full extent and impact was still under
investigation at that time. In June 2019, the full extent, path forward
to fix, and potential impacts to the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370
delivery timelines were identified.
In 2014, the components in question were identified for use in both
systems. Between 2014 and 2018, testing of the components did not show
failures. However, in December 2018, NNSA was informed of the first
reported failure of one of the capacitors in question. The initial
failure occurred in December 2018 under extended life testing by a
testing vendor utilized by the Kanas City National Security Campus.
Between February 2019 and April 2019, Sandia National Laboratories
repeated those tests, confirming the failure, and conducted numerous
other tests to understand the extent of the issues. The full extent of
the issues, the path forward to fix the issues, and the potential
impacts to warhead delivery timelines were not established until June
2019.
The Administrator and I were formally notified in April 2019 that
the Sandia testing verified the single failure seen previously. We were
again formally notified in June 2019 as to the extent, the path forward
to address the issues found, and the resulting delays to the two
programs. NNSA personnel, along with personnel from the Air Force and
Navy were involved throughout the process. In May 2019, NNSA notified
Congress that technical issues were encountered on the B61-12 LEP and
the W88 Alt 370 that could result in delays, but the full extent was
not known at that time. Since then, in August 2019, NNSA provided an
update to Congress as information became available regarding First
Production Unit dates, resulting warhead delivery dates, and a first
estimate as to the cost impacts due to these delays. NNSA will continue
to provide updates to Congress during quarterly program reviews of
these programs.
Mr. Larsen. What additional costs will there be to the Air Force
due to the delay in B61-12 First Production Unit and when will the
Congress be formally notified of any additional costs? Will the delays
affect delivery of the warheads to NATO? If so, how?
General Clark. There are no additional costs to the Air Force due
to the delay. All costs are incurred by the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). The delays resulted in a slip in First
Production Unit schedules which will affect delivery of the warheads to
both United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and United States
European Command (USEUCOM). However, the Air Force has coordinated with
NNSA, USSTRATCOM, and USEUCOM to adjust B61-12 deployment.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Are the Navy and NNSA considering a new warhead
design for the Next Navy Warhead?
Dr. Verdon. The detailed requirements for a Next Navy Warhead are
still in development within the Department of Defense. It is too early
in the process to provide any details regarding what type of warhead
will be required to meet U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Navy needs.
Mr. Garamendi. NNSA has identified a need to hire additional FTEs
with federal program management expertise in the Office of Defense
Programs and in other critical mission support areas. Please specify
how NNSA is making full use of its current Excepted Service authorities
to hire additional Federal program management expertise. Would
additional federal FTEs decrease risk of delays and cost overruns
within LEP programs?
Dr. Verdon. NNSA has continued to hire additional FTEs within the
Office of Defense Programs and in other mission support areas at the
request of hiring managers by utilizing our Excepted Service (EN)
appointing authority.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, NNSA filled 99 positions externally under
the EN authority. Out of our allocation of 600 authorized EN FTE, NNSA
is currently at 597. To continue leveraging the EN appointing
authority, NNSA balances the start date of new EN employees with Agency
separation dates for departing or retiring EN employees. NNSA provided
technical assistance drafting legislative language to remove the
statutory cap on NNSA's EN authority so that it can be used to hire the
program management professionals needed to manage the programs.
As part of the root cause analysis and lessons learned from this
delay, NNSA's Office of Defense Programs identified the need for
additional federal project management and oversight staff on each of
the respective weapons modernization programs. This need for additional
federal FTEs in the Office of Defense Programs is consistent with two
independent staffing studies conducted by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) and NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and Program
Evaluation. NNSA is actively recruiting to fill these positions.
Mr. Garamendi. Are the Navy and NNSA considering a new warhead
design for the Next Navy Warhead?
Admiral Wolfe. At this time, the Navy and NNSA are considering
warhead designs for the Next Navy Warhead that will leverage existing
proven design elements (i.e., designs that have undergone underground
testing).
Mr. Garamendi. What additional costs will there be to the Navy due
to the delay in the W88 Alt 370 and when will the Congress be formally
notified of any additional costs?
Admiral Wolfe. The Navy and NNSA are continuing to evaluate the
budgetary implications of an anticipated 19-month delay due to
capacitor issues. At this time, we are assessing how the delay may
potentially increase Navy-funded workload at NNSA and our national
laboratory partners and as well as additional costs related to limited
life component exchanges and surveillance support. The Navy will
continue to work with the DOD within the resource allocation process as
we assess the potential impacts of the delay. Should the impacts
require assistance outside the normal process, the Department will
properly notify Congress.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HORN
Ms. Horn. Dr. Verdon, how will working on the ongoing programs for
longer at Kansas City affect workload at Pantex and delay start to W80-
4 (and potentially W87-1) at Kansas City?
Dr. Verdon. NNSA has identified a path forward to rebalance work at
Pantex due to this delay. NNSA continues to assess the impacts of the
delays in the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370 on the W80-4 LEP and W87-1
Modification Program. Once this assessment is completed, NNSA will
inform stakeholders of the results and will identify any impacts to
other ongoing warhead modernization activities.
Ms. Horn. Dr. Verdon, you note in your testimony that NNSA has
moved to procuring around 70% of warhead components from commercial
vendors. Given recent issues, have NNSA's assumptions about the use of
COTs changed for future warhead programs? If so, how would this affect
floor space and other needs at Kansas City? Would infrastructure and
production support costs increase? Also, at the time that NNSA shifted
its strategy to purchase more COTS, what additional steps did it take
to ensure the quality of purchased components? Describe in detail how
these steps have been found now to be insufficient.
Dr. Verdon. NNSA has determined that the use of COTs is still a
viable approach for our weapons modernization programs, but requires a
modification to the approach for implementation that existed at the
start of the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370. As part of the lessons learned
from the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370, NNSA is modifying our approach to
the continued use of COTs in weapon warhead modernization programs.
These changes include: Earlier and more frequent interactions with the
vendors to ensure they understand NNSA's requirements for the use of
their components and NNSA understands their ability to provide the
parts to meet our requirements. On a case-by-case basis, if no vendor
can be identified to provide the needed parts/component, design
requirements cannot be reasonably altered to accommodate available
commercial parts, and NNSA is not able to support or establish
commercial sources of supply, then NNSA will bring the production of
those components in-house. Increased and earlier testing of purchased
COTs parts to ensure requirements are being met and lot-to-lot
variations are assessed. Development of an approved COTs parts/vendor
catalog with the requirement that if a previously approved vendor/part
was shown to meet requirements it will be used in new applications.
Further, if the design or production site wants to use a new component
for ostensibly the same application, the justification for this will
need to be reviewed. Since the original time of the selection of the
parts now in question (2014), improved Military Performance Standards
have been established that help to ensure that parts identified will
meet NNSA's warhead life requirements.
When NNSA decided to place more reliance on the use of COTS parts,
our Management and Operating (M&O) contractors created a COTS parts use
and qualification methodology. This methodology was based on best
engineering practices of the time and was shown to be adequate in the
past. The B61-12 LEP, due to the complexity of the warhead and its
requirements, represented the first warhead modernization program
requiring the use of a much larger number of COTS components. A key
shortcoming in the original methodology was an underestimation of the
potential lot-to-lot variations that could occur in COTS parts
production.
Workload increases require the identification of additional
manufacturing/production floor space at a number of NNSA's M&O sites.
NNSA is working with the Kansas City National Security Campus and
Sandia National Laboratories to execute plans to identify and provide
this space in time to support all of our currently ongoing warhead
modernization programs.
[all]