[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ANTAGONIZING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: PUTIN'S FROZEN CONFLICTS AND THE
CONFLICT IN UKRAINE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
March 11, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-103
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Democrat Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and The Environment
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois, Ranking
GREGORY MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
DAVID TRONE, Maryland RON WRIGHT, Texas
JIM COSTA, California MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
Gabrielle Gould, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Baer, Honorable Dan, Senior Fellow, Europe Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Former United States
Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe......................................................... 12
Ostrovsky, Mr. Simon, Special Correspondent, PBS Newshour........ 22
Vartanyan, Ms. Olesya Analyst, Eastern Neighborhood,
International Crisis Group..................................... 26
Nix, Mr. Stephen B., Regional Program Director, Eurasia,
International Republican Institute............................. 33
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 61
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 62
Hearing Attendance............................................... 63
ANTAGONIZING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: PUTIN'S FROZEN CONFLICTS AND THE
CONFLICT IN UKRAINE
Wednesday, March 11, 2020
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and the
Environment
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC,
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Keating. Last month marked 6 years since Russia invaded
Ukraine, 6 years of conflict in Ukraine, and it is not cold by
any means, with cease-fires that failed to hold to this day.
I would like to start the hearing with a brief clip, if we
could, from less than a year ago, because I think it is
important to remember how devastating this conflict has been
and how, importantly, it continues today.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Keating. I also would like to recognize Ambassador
Yelchenko of Ukraine and a delegation of Ukranian veterans. And
thank you for joining us; if you could please stand and be
recognized.
[Applause.]
Mr. Keating. The subcommittee's meeting today, as I
mentioned, is to hear testimony on Putin's frozen conflicts and
conflict in Ukraine. Without objection, all members may have 5
days to submit statements, questions, extraneous material for
the record, subject to the length and limitation in the rules.
I will now make an opening statement. As we have seen from
the films that we have just witnessed, the conflict in Ukraine
continues. This is Ukraine. However, when we look around the
region, Ukraine simply is the most recent incidents where
Russia has exploited divisions and deployed resources to
destabilize the borders of its post-Soviet neighbors.
Today we are looking at the conflicts in Ukraine, Georgia,
and Moldova. Each took a place in different decades, and
Russia's intervention in each was very different as well.
However, to this day, none of these countries maintains full
control over its borders, and it is instead trapped in the
incredibly precarious situation of striving to make critical
reforms to strengthen democratic governance and develop closer
ties to the West, all while being unable to fully govern and
serve all of its citizens.
In Moldova fighting ceased in the 1990's when the conflict
displaced some 130,000 people in the multiethnic region of
Transnistria. However, despite decades now of dedicated
diplomatic efforts, Russian troops remain in the region, and as
recently as 2018 were reported to be carrying out military
exercises there.
In Georgia, more than 800 military personnel and civilians
died in the conflict, and 20,000 Georgia residents were forced
to leave their homes in now-occupied regions of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. Ethnic Georgians who remained faced harassment
and discrimination and lack access to many basic services and
economic opportunities.
In Ukraine, the war still continues in the east. Nearly one
and a half million Ukrainians have been displaced, and over
13,000 lives have been lost, including over 3,000 civilians. In
Crimea, which was once an economic hub of tourism for Ukraine,
people there essentially live in a police State.
It is important that we take the time to assess these
conflicts for a few reasons. First and foremost, because of the
incredible human toll they have taken on local communities.
Innocent civilians have lived through these wars, this
destruction, because of Russia's arrogance and aggression. We
must not lose sight of how these conflicts have directly harmed
generations of Moldovans, Georgians, and Ukrainians.
Further, it is important that we remember that these
countries are pro-Western. They are working to strengthen their
democracies and ties with Europe and the United States, both
economically and in terms of our security partnerships. These
are our friends and partners.
If we are to succeed and overcome in the global crisis and
challenges we face in climate change, terrorism, and threats
from Russia and China, our best path forward is to work
together in a broad coalition of partners who share our
democratic values. And these countries will be strong partners,
once they have achieved sovereignty over their own borders.
Russia clearly knows that, too, and that is the reason why
this is not a time for us to let our support wane from these
countries, or let politics get in the way of our clear security
interest in this region, because finally we cannot be naive and
act as if Russian aggression is over. The Kremlin continues to
identify fissures in the West and deploy minimal resources to
tear wide open and allow them to stay frozen and festering.
We need an informed, realistic response to Russia's
tactics. So far, we have failed to reach resolutions to any of
these conflicts. Instead, have allowed them to remain
distractions that pull resources away from the critical work we
must be doing to grow and strengthen our coalition of allies to
address the shared challenges and threats ahead.
We did not plan for the conflict in Moldova, nor after that
the conflict in Georgia, nor after that the conflict in
Ukraine. And, still, none of these conflicts are resolved. It
is past time we identify why our efforts so far have not been
successful, change course to not repeat the same mistakes, and
learn from these conflicts, so that we are prepared to address
what we should assume will be inevitable future Russian
aggression in the region.
That is why I am pleased we are joined by a distinguished
panel of witnesses who can speak to these realities and the
realities on the ground, and our efforts to date in resolving
them. Thank you all for being here, traveling great distances
to join us, and I turn now to the ranking member,
Representative Kinzinger, for his opening statement.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To our guests
testifying, thank you for being here. To our guests here, thank
you for being here as well.
One thing that we need to remember is Russia is kind of a
paper tiger. So, militarily, whenever the United States pushes
back on Russia, they are quiet. Whenever Turkey pushes back,
frankly, on Russia, they grow quiet. They are good at going up
to a brick wall, but obviously stopping when they hit that
because they have no ability to make it through.
I remember during the initial Crimea situation I was
downstairs on the treadmill watching the news, and I remember
seeing I think it was a Ukrainian naval commander that stood
and faced down Russian forces. And he said, ``The United States
is with us.'' And I remember watching that on the treadmill and
getting pretty choked up because I knew what it meant to be
America and to be an American, and I was very proud.
When we look at the conflicts right now in Ukraine,
Georgia, and Moldova, it is important to note that five
conflicts exist inside these countries, all carrying their own
unique problems. They have one distinct common denominator,
however, and that is Russia. These conflicts have shown
Russia's willingness to use an advanced set of tools to prevent
nations that used to be within the Soviet sphere of influence
from moving closer to Western institutions.
One of the five tools developed and deployed by the Kremlin
was to hide behind the guise of protecting ethnic Russians
across the region. While open hostilities between Russia and
Georgia have been going on since the fall of the USSR, it was
Putin's distribution of passports to Georgian citizens in 2002
that laid the groundwork for Russian intervention in 1908.
We now see the Russian-occupied territories of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia slowly moving their borders to occupy more
Georgia territory. Many ethnic Georgians in these regions have
fled for fear of persecution, and some have died given the lack
of medical care provided inside these areas. In Ukraine, Russia
used, quote, ``little green men'' in Crimea and the Donetsk
regions. This tactic has allowed the Kremlin to deny any
involvement in the invasion and occupation of these
territories, even though we know quite better.
As a result, nearly 6 million Ukrainians are now living
under the control of Russia and their proxies. This may be one
of the most pressing foreign policy issues that this
subcommittee faces. What happens there is important to the
Transatlantic relationship and to our national security.
Both Ukraine and Georgia have been stalwart allies of the
United States since gaining their independence. The continuous
provocations by the Russian Federation must be dealt with.
While these cases outline the fragile situation Ukraine and
Georgia find themselves in, I believe there is a silver lining.
Russia intervened in both countries out of fear that
freedom and democracy were approaching their doorstep. Both
Ukraine and Georgia had expressed interest in increasing their
cooperation with the West, especially with NATO. Putin
intervened to prevent democratic values from taking hold in the
region. However, this tactic drastically failed.
Last year, the Ukrainians elected a political outsider who
ran on an anti-corruption platform and pledged to push back on
Russia's malign influence as president. Mr. Zelensky has got a
difficult road ahead of him, and the United States and our
European partners must be willing to assist Ukraine in
countering the Kremlin.
Since Georgia independence in 1991, we have witnessed the
Georgia people march toward democracy and a deeper partnership
with the West. Just this weekend, our allies in Georgia proved
that while Russia occupies their territory, it would not halt
them from their goals of EU and NATO accession. Democracy is
not easy. It needs to be cared for, and it needs to be fought
for. That is what occurred in Georgia.
Following months of negotiations, protests, and violence in
the streets, we saw a political compromise rarely seen in
established democracies like the United States, let alone a
young democracy like Georgia. With the help of the American
Embassy in Tbilisi, and our new Ambassador, Kelly Degnan, we
witnessed the ruling Georgian Dream Party agree to transition
toward a proportional electoral system.
The ruling party willingly gave up some of their power to
strengthen and protect their nation's democracy. If this does
not demonstrate the Kremlin's failed strategy, I do not know
what does. There is still work to be done in Georgia, like
ensuring the 2020 parliamentary elections are free from
interference and strengthening the business environment to
allow Americans and European investment, but our Georgian
allies must be commended for their work to defend their
democracy.
Again, I want to thank the panel for joining us today, and
I want to thank the chairman for calling this. We will have
plenty to talk about, and I yield back to the chairman.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Now, for a 1-minute opening, Mr.
Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Ranking
Member Kinzinger, for holding this important hearing on Russian
aggression in Eastern Europe. And thank you to our witnesses
for being here today.
The fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's marked a
critical turning point for freedom and democracy in Europe. For
the first time in more than a century, countries in Eastern
Europe would have the opportunity to choose the path of
democracy and self-government over the tyranny of Communism and
totalitarian rule.
For many nations, however, these ambitions were often
undermined by Russian desires to prevent these nations from
moving closer to the West and away from their influence.
The first decades of the 21st century have seen Russia seek
to undermine and outright halt democratic ambitions and sew
discord and conflict in former Soviet countries, thus
escalating tensions with the West and reviving long-held fears
of an aggressively expansionistic Russia determined to maintain
the stronghold on its former satellites.
I look forward to today's hearings with today's witnesses
and to a really informative discussion on this very important
issue.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Keating. I will now introduce our panel of witnesses.
Ambassador Daniel Baer is an American politician and former
diplomat currently working as a senior fellow in the Europe
Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He
served in the Obama Administration's State Department, first as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and then as United States
Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe from 2013 to 2017, directly engaging with Russian
diplomatic representatives over the conflicts in Ukraine,
Georgia, and Moldova.
Mr. Simon Ostrovsky is an award-winning documentary film
maker, an investigative journalist, best known for his coverage
of the 2014 Crimea crisis and the war in Eastern Ukraine for
Vice News Service where he investigated and made clear that
Russia used unmarked soldiers to annex Crimea and highlighted
the real and devastating effects on the civilian populations in
Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
For his coverage of the war, he was awarded the prestigious
DuPont Award from Columbia University and was nominated for two
Emmys.
Ms. Olesya Vartanyan--is that correct?--is an International
Crisis Group analyst for the Eastern Neighborhood. Based in the
Tbilisi, she researches and produces reports on regional
security issues in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
Ms. Vartanyan travels frequently to South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, providing updates on the increasing deteriorating
living conditions of those who remain these occupied
territories. She has worked for several other news outlets in
the past and won the first EU Monitoring Mission's Special
Prize in Peace Journalism in 2013.
Mr. Stephen Nix is Regional Program Director for Eurasia in
the International Republican Institute. He previously worked at
the U.S. Agency for International Development and spent time
living in Ukraine. There he served as an outside legal counsel
for the Committee on Legal Reform in the Ukranian parliament.
Mr. Nix's polling work at IRI has provided policymakers
with a window into the attitudes of Ukrainians and ethnic
Russians living throughout the territories of Ukraine, as well
as Georgia and Moldova.
We appreciate all of you being here today, look forward to
your testimony. Please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. And
without objection, your prepared written statements will be
made part of the permanent record.
I will now go to Ambassador Baer.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BAER, SENIOR FELLOW, EUROPE
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, FORMER
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Baer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and
members of the committee. Thank you for holding this hearing
and for inviting me to testify alongside such distinguished
fellow panelists.
When I was serving overseas, Simon's reporting was a
crucial source of information about what was happening on the
front lines. I remember when he was captured by militants,
beaten, and held in a cellar for several days--a reminder of
the risks that journalists like Simon take so that the rest of
us can know what is happening.
I am grateful to be here with Ms. Vartanyan and Mr. Nix,
too. Crisis Group and IRI do great work around the world, and
they attract great people.
In recent years, we have devoted more attention to
understanding how the U.S. should manage and respond to China's
increasing influence and assertiveness. This is prudent.
However, our focus on China should not be a get out of jail
free card for Vladimir Putin, nor can we afford to allow our
own domestic political convulsions to pervert U.S. foreign
policy.
Members of this committee took different votes on
impeachment. They should not take different positions on
national security threats going forward.
The United States has an enduring interest in a Europe that
is, in President George H.W. Bush's words, ``whole, free, and
at peace.'' Putin's efforts to undermine democratic progress in
Europe and to coerce European countries, particularly those
that are former Soviet republics, is inimical to this strategic
interest. We stand to benefit from the prevalence of rule of
law, peace, and prosperity in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova,
and of course their citizens do, too.
Putin uses his backyard as a testing ground for tactics
that he can deploy elsewhere, including against the United
States and our allies. We saw the invasion of Crimea by little
green men, Russian forces that, contrary to the laws of war,
did not wear identifying insignia. In Donetsk and Luhansk, the
Russian military experimented with techniques that are more
often associated with non-State actors in order to carry out
their military objectives.
Putin has weaponized energy security, coercing governments
by turning off or threatening to turn off natural gas. Cyber
attacks are another weapon in Putin's arsenal of aggression.
Many Americans were aghast that Russia intervened so
dramatically in our 2016 election. None of our friends in
Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova were surprised. They have been
dealing with Russian active measures and opportunistic
politicians who take advantage of them for years.
Under Putin, Clausewitz's famous aphorism that ``War is the
continuation of politics by other means'' has been inverted.
For Putin, intervention in politics is the continuation of war
by other means.
My fellow panelists will speak to the humanitarian cost of
the conflicts, and these costs should not be seen as distinct
from strategic ones. Humanitarian disasters have a
destabilizing effect and represent lost economic opportunity in
addition to their human costs.
Looking forward, the U.S. should continue to support the
sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova,
within their internationally recognized borders. In the case of
Ukraine and Georgia, this includes continued security
assistance and cooperation, which should be coupled with
political support and public backing.
In addition, we should continue to invest in European
security more broadly, including the European Deterrence
Initiative. Furthermore, we should work with NATO and our
partners in the region, including Ukraine and Georgia, to
coordinate strategy in the Black Sea, which Putin uses as a
launch pad to wreak havoc in the Middle East.
The U.S. should remain a resolute partner to Ukraine in its
quest to build a more robust system of rule of law and to
pursue the reforms that the Ukranian people recognize as
imperative to deliver a better future for their children.
Ukraine civil society and independent journalists hold the
government to account, and we should take heed of their
warnings when things are off track.
In Georgia, just last weekend, the major parties agreed on
a framework that, if implemented, lays the groundwork for
constructive democratic parliamentary elections later this
year. We must support it.
And, Mr. Kinzinger, I saw your statement of support, in
addition to Ambassador Degnan's, this week.
The Trump Administration rightfully sanctioned the corrupt
former chair of the Democratic Party in Moldova, Vlad
Plahotniuc. There have been recent reports, however, that
despite travel sanctions, Plahotniuc has been in the United
States. This makes our commitment to enforcing consequences for
corrupt actors look flimsy and raises questions about why he is
being allowed to flout our sanctions. He and any family members
that are under sanctions should be removed immediately.
Reportedly, the Trump Administration is planning to make a
decision this week about the future of U.S. participation in
the Open Skies Treaty. Open Skies has been a tool for showing
support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. It is
true, the Russians have been uncooperative in their
participation in Open Skies and have often acted in bad faith,
but we should hold them accountable. Pulling out of the OST
would hand Putin a victory.
In closing, I want to again thank Mr. Keating, Mr.
Kinzinger, and members of the committee. I hope the committee
will continue to engage on this topic and others and will call
government witnesses to explain and defend the Administration's
approach to these difficult issues.
I am happy to endeavor to answer any questions, and I
appreciate your submitting my longer statement for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baer follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Mr. Ostrovsky.
STATEMENT OF SIMON OSTROVSKY, SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT, PBS
NEWSHOUR
Mr. Ostrovsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
members of the committee, and, Ambassador, thank you for your
kind words. I was not expecting that.
Six years ago today, when I was a reporter for Vice News, I
was running around the streets of Simferopol in Ukraine's
Crimea region filming a pro-Ukraine protest, which was one of
the last public displays in support of Ukrainian Statehood that
would be permitted in Crimea before Moscow took total control
of the region and formally annexed it just a few days later.
Today, in accordance with the Russian constitution, public
manifestations and protests are permitted, but what happens in
practice and what is on paper are two very different things.
And I know this because I have covered Russia and the former
Soviet Union for the better part of the last two decades.
I actually started my reporting career covering the Second
Chechen War, which ended that Russian region's aspirations for
independence. The Chechen independence movement is considered
illegitimate in Russia, but I found Moscow's attitude toward
ethnic Russians living under Ukrainian rule to be very
different.
Independence-minded Chechens are illegal separatists.
Independence-minded ethnic Russians have historic rights to
self-determination.
Since Russia took effective control of Crimea, those who
disagree with what has happened have had to flee or have been
jailed. The few that dare occasionally to protest openly are
quickly bundled away in police vans and handed severe
sentences. In some cases, they have disappeared entirely.
So how did it come to this? Well, the day after Crimea held
its unrecognized referendum on independence, which was made
possible by Russian troops who had taken control of the region,
I was traveling around the peninsula asking everybody I met
what country they thought we were in. It was a confusing time,
so answers varied.
At one point I actually shouted, ``What is this country
called?'' to a group of teenagers who were drinking. And they
replied in unison ``Russia.'' Others told me it was still
Ukraine. In one case, a guy told me we were back in the Soviet
Union.
One woman I filmed at a rally responded by saying something
along the lines of ``The West has not tasted the Russian
jackboot in a while, and it is about time they woke up and
smelled the coffee.'' And I thought it was a pretty colorful
way for someone to express themselves, but after my story
broadcast, I started getting strange messages from viewers.
They had seen the very same woman appear under different names
at different anti-Ukraine protests, in different locations
around the country. They even sent screenshots from other TV
reports she had already been featured in. Same woman, different
names.
I started to realize that the grass-roots support for
splitting from Ukraine might not be so grass-roots after all.
The protests that were gathering in front of administration
buildings and Ukrainian military bases were actually part of a
massive propaganda effort that would become the hallmark of
Russia's campaign to destabilize and dismember its southern
neighbor.
I did not know at the time but we would see echoes of this
strategy in the U.S. 2016 Presidential vote, where people
ginned up by Russian puppet accounts on social media were told
to come out into the streets and face each other in protests.
The social media aspect of this strategy might be new, but the
messages being put out are not. We saw the same thing happen
during the Rwanda genocide. The Hutus used radio broadcasts to
dehumanize Tutsis as cockroaches, resulting in a slaughter.
And, in Bosnia, media aligned with Belgrade told Bosnian
Serbs gangs of Muslims were on their way to rape and murder
their wives and daughters. This one started a regional ethnic
war and gave us the term ``ethnic cleansing.''
When I was in Crimea, the story being pushed on Russian
speakers was that a fascist junta had taken power in Kiev, and
gangs of violent skinheads were on their way to ban the Russian
language through force. Nothing could have been further from
the truth. But Russian broadcasts that were blaring at full
tilt out of every television in Russian-speaking homes of
Ukraine sparked a war that has lasted 6 years and claimed close
to 14,000 lives.
The last time I was in Eastern Ukraine was in December
filming a report for PBS NewsHour Weekend. After nearly 6 years
of war, attitudes had really shifted. No longer did I hear from
residents a full-throated defense of Russia's military presence
in the region. And unlike Crimea, Russia-occupied Eastern
Ukraine has never been formally annexed by Moscow. Its Russian-
speaking residents have been left in limbo, living under puppet
regimes with no international status and no future.
Many have realized that Moscow's real plan for them is not
integration into Russia, but reintegration into Ukraine. Moscow
is seeking a special status for the Donbass that would give it
veto powers over decisions being made in the Ukrainian capital,
like NATO membership or joining the European Union.
Its residents are simply pawns in that plan and are
beginning to think that maybe things were not so bad before the
war started after all.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ostrovsky follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Ms. Vartanyan.
STATEMENT OF MS. OLESYA VARTANYAN, ANALYST, EASTERN
NEIGHBORHOOD, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Ms. Vartanyan. Good afternoon, Chairman Keating, Ranking
Member Kinzinger, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. Today, at this important hearing, I will speak
about the situation in Georgia.
I have visited Georgia's two breakaway regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia many times in recent years, and every time I
go I see how life there is growing even more difficult and
challenging.
Weak local administrations are unable to provide basic
services, and Russia has built up a new militarized divide,
hampering movement to and from Georgian-controlled territory.
Allowed to fester, local problems can only raise the risk of
protracted instability and further violence with repercussions
for the South Caucuses region and its people, as well as for
already complicated U.S. relations with Russia.
In my testimony, I will speak about three problem areas in
particular--the internal situation in the breakaway regions and
Russia's rule, ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and the situation at the line of separation.
And I will begin with the internal situation, just some
examples of what the life on the ground looks like for a local
resident. Last year, an old mother of my good friend in
Abkhazia had to struggle with broken ribs for weeks only
because local doctors could not read the X-ray films. They did
not make it on purpose. Most local doctors have not received
professional trainings for the kids, and often lack the
equipment necessary for even the most basic health checks.
Every time there is a heavy rain in Abkhazia, its main
town, Sukhumi, is flooded and travel boats often become the
only means of transport because cars cannot get down the water-
logged streets. Local policemen pay out of pocket for uniforms
and to fuel their cars, motivating them to seek bribes to cover
those costs.
Such problems dishearten local people. Nevertheless, the
local elites remain broadly loyal to Russia, which is the only
regional power that recognizes independence and supports the
regions politically, financially, and militarily. Still, some
representatives of the de facto leaderships--at least
privately--express disappointment at Russia's reluctance to
support the further development of the regions as viable
States.
Last week I was in Moscow to discuss situation in the
Georgian breakaway regions, and similar to all of these years
of the past decade since Russia recognized Georgia's regions,
many in Moscow appeared reluctant to increase Russia's
investment.
The second issue I want to address is ethnic Georgians
living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There are around 50,000
of them, and they are 25 percent of population in Abkhazia and
almost 10 percent of people living in South Ossetia.
In addition to everyday hurdles, the local ethnic Georgians
face discrimination from the local de facto authorities.
Schools do not teach in their native Georgian language. They
lack the right to run or vote in local elections, and they are
kept out of many jobs.
Few ethnic Georgians in these breakaways have local
passports, and they are treated as foreigners. The lives of
most of them are split between breakaway regions and Georgian-
controlled territory, as they must cross into Georgia proper to
earn a living, have access to medical care, and receive
pensions.
Crossings has never been easy, but in the last couple of
years it has become a bigger problem. And the de facto
authorities close the crossings more often and for long periods
of time with no warning and for reasons that often have nothing
to do with security concerns.
In fact, de facto authorities of South Ossetia have closed
most crossing points since last September, and many ethnic
Georgians living in the region were left with no income to buy
food or firewood and went hungry and cold with winter. Some
Georgians from these regions told me that if problems with
crossings continue, they will eventually have to immigrate.
Finally, a topic some members of this committee are well
aware of, which is the process called borderization. For almost
9 years, the de facto authorities and Russian border guards
have dug trenches, erected fences, and installed video cameras,
to define the line that separates Abkhazia and South Ossetia
from Georgia-controlled territory.
Some of these barbed wire fences run through the center of
many Georgian villages, and I know that some of you saw this
firsthand when visiting the region. That greatly affects the
people in the area and provokes many new incidents that may
have a potential to turn violent if they stay unaddressed.
For all these years, the current Georgian government has
responded with what it calls ``strategic patience.'' In light
of its decision to normalize relations with Russia, Tbilisi
made attempts to mitigate sources of friction that could
undermine the normalization process. Consequently, the Georgian
government has not attempted to stop a force at borderization.
In fact, it has even disrupted people by its own--disrupted
protests by its own citizens against Russia's actions.
Nevertheless, there are signs that Georgia's strategic
patience is wearing thin, and last August the Georgian
government established a police outpost in an area where
Russian and de facto South Ossetian authorities had planned to
build new barbed wire fences, which led to a serious escalation
in tensions between both sides, and since then massive talks
helped to calm the situation.
But if no steps are taken to resolve more fundamental
grievances between the two sides, the parties could quickly
find themselves again with a potential for violent clashes.
My longer written statement offers some thoughts about how
the United States can help to address each of these three areas
and encourage greater stability in this troubled part of the
world. And I will be happy to discuss these ideas in the Q&A
session.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Vartanyan follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Mr. Nix.
STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN B. NIX, REGIONAL PROGRAM DIRECTOR,
EURASIA, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
Mr. Nix. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
The conflicts imposed by Vladimir Putin on Ukraine,
Georgia, and Moldova have created military, political, and
policy challenges in all three countries. In addition to
providing factual analysis to you today, we hope to provide the
subcommittee with recommendations and how the U.S. can engage
in all three situations.
Starting with Ukraine, President Zelensky has dramatically
enhanced his government's efforts to resolve the crisis in the
occupied territories of Donbass and Crimea. The Ukrainian
government has increased its level of engagement with Ukrainian
citizens still residing in these territories, improved the
quality of critical public services to address needs created by
the conflict, and the government has reinvigorated diplomatic
efforts to increase international pressure on the Kremlin to
allow for the reintegration of these territories.
It is crucial that the United States does all it can to
support the Zelensky government in achieving these aims. IRI
polling is very clear in stating that 82 percent of Ukrainian
citizens want the territories in Donbass to be reintegrated
into Ukraine. So it is very clear how the Ukrainian people
feel.
In sum, Ukrainians remain resolute in their desire to
restore their country's territorial integrity. Until the
Kremlin removes its troops, seals the border with Russia, peace
is impossible. While the conflict continues, the United States
can take concrete steps to support the Ukrainian government's
goal to reintegrate residents of the occupied territories into
Ukrainian society.
Our recommendations are as follows: first, we believe
economic sanctions are having the desired effect. The United
States should not only continue to impose strategic and
targeted sanctions on the Russian Federation but should expand
them until Ukraine's territorial integrity is restored. The
U.S. should also encourage our European allies to continue and
expand sanctions.
Second, with a monthly average of approximately a million
checkpoint crossings in the Donbass region alone, there is a
high level of civilian crossings and traffic across the
territories. Why is this important? Ukrainian citizens from
Donbass and Crimea cross these checkpoints in order to collect
their pensions, to obtain passports, and other important legal
documents that retain a legal and social relationship with the
Ukrainian government in Kyiv.
Third, the United States should increase its efforts to
support the Ukrainian government's goal of filling the
information vacuum in Donbass and Crimea. Greater access to
information about government-controlled Ukraine will allow
residents in the occupied territories to feel more included in
Ukrainian society in political processes.
Now, quickly, to Georgia, in Abkhazia and Ossetia, the
frozen conflicts continue to affect Georgian domestic politics
in profound ways, particularly regarding security and economic
policy. Most notably, the very existence of Russian-backed
separatist authorities have been cited as the primary barrier
to Georgian accession to NATO.
Public opinion in Georgia is also very clear. Eighty-five
percent of Georgian citizens would like to see their country
have EU membership. Eighty percent seek NATO membership. Very,
very clear that Georgian citizens want their country to be
integrated into the West.
In terms of recommendations, we suggest the following.
Again, the U.S. should expand sanctions on the Russian
Federation. The U.S. should further encourage and support
Georgia in playing a larger role in NATO engagement and
enlargement and provide it with a clear accession roadmap with
defined benchmarks and targets.
Finally, the U.S. should continue to support the Geneva
International Discussions, which are really the only existing
format for addressing security, human rights, and humanitarian
challenges stemming from these unresolved conflicts.
And then, finally, and very briefly, on Moldova, the
Transnistria conflict differs from the other two in that the
conflict is generally peaceful. There is frequent people-to-
people contact, and both territories have been steadily
increasing their economic integration.
Two quick recommendations on Moldova. The U.S. should
support Moldova and Ukraine in their continued development of
reform efforts, particularly regarding anti-corruption, and the
U.S. should also leverage its participation in the five plus
two negotiations to build on the successes of the confidence-
building measures that have been taking place to date.
And I will close, if I could, with a quote from our late,
great Chairman, Senator John McCain, who spoke to a group of us
about the territories that are part of our discussion today.
Senator McCain said, ``Putin wants Ukraine, Georgia, and
Moldova within the Kremlin's sphere of interest. He believes
that keeping the conflicts in the disputed territories alive
will help him achieve that goal--a goal we cannot allow him to
achieve.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to take any
questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nix follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. I thank the witnesses. I will now recognize
myself for 5 minutes. Just quickly if someone has a thought on
this, Ms. Vartanyan mentioned this briefly with the Russian
people, it is always important to distinguish the Russian
people from the policies of Putin himself when that is
possible.
Could any of you really get a sense of the Russian people's
view of this? Or is the propaganda that is there so widespread
that they really do not have a view of this? Anyone? Mr. Nix.
Mr. Nix. As you know, Chairman Keating, we have a fairly
robust program in Russia. We cannot really talk about it. As
you know, IRI has been designated by the Ministry of Justice,
the Russian Federation, as an undesirable organization. As
such, any communication with us, any work with us, can be
criminally prosecuted.
All I can say is that in our interaction with the
opposition leaders in Russia, we hear stories of tremendous
economic collapse, economic problems, disaffection with the
leadership.
You saw the results of the local elections last fall in
both Moscow and St. Petersburg where the ruling party of
President Putin did not allow its candidates to run under their
own party banner. That tells you something about the slipping
support that the regime enjoys right now.
Again, that is anecdotal, but that is what we are hearing
from the opposition.
Mr. Keating. Yes. Thank you.
Mr. Ostrovsky, in your background, you were mentioning in
effect the orchestrated manner, how their information is being
manipulated. Mr. Nix mentioned about the information barrier
that is there. What can we do tactically? Are we doing enough
in the U.S.? Can we do more in terms of exposing this and
countering these kind of activities?
Mr. Ostrovsky. I do not know if I can, as a journalist,
really give recommendations to the U.S. Government of how they
should deal with disinformation and propaganda coming out of
Russia and the former Soviet space. But I think there needs to
be a wider recognition of its effect, and the fact that it
persists to this day, and that it is a serious problem.
But we also need to talk about its limitations. You know,
to talk about the question that you asked earlier, I think
attitudes really have shifted. And I have seen interviews with
Russian sociologists that say that a lot of Russians feel
buyer's remorse over the annexation of Crimea and the effect on
Mr. Putin's popularity ratings, which were bumped up a good
year or two, those effects have now washed away and he is
seeing some of the lowest approval ratings that he has seen in
his entire 2-decade-long career as president.
So while there is a lot of disinformation floating around,
I think its purpose in a lot of cases when it targets us is to
confuse the situation rather than push any kind of ideology by
sending our various confusing, often contradictory narratives.
And in Russia itself, you know, the agenda is usually to
improve the Kremlin's and Mr. Putin's own ratings.
Mr. Keating. Yes.
Ms. Vartanyan.
Ms. Vartanyan. Well, I will respond to your initial
question about Russian people and their attitude. So I think
Georgia provides quite a good example in that because more than
10 years have passed since the war, and during these years I
have seen such a great evolution in the way people think and
what even my friends in Russia say about what happened in
Georgia.
And it started with blaming Georgia for what happened in
South Ossetia, and now actually I see more of my friends coming
and visiting me in Georgia. And I think one of the reasons for
that is actually the policy that the Georgian government has
kept. Georgia invited Russians to come, and even now during
some of the seasons you can see more Russians actually walking
along the central streets and speaking freely Russian than,
let's say, 10 years ago.
And I think which kind of approach and which kind of
engagement with the people, it helps to really change the
moods. And because of that, actually, in my testimony I have
been calling on more engagement with those who live in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, because more can be done through more
contacts and through more engagement, so that they can see an
alternative.
Mr. Keating. Okay. Ambassador Baer.
Mr. Baer. Yes. Let me just add one thing to your first
question, which is I agree that these things have a shelf life
and they tend to go rotten like fruits in terms of the Russian
people's general attitude toward them.
But the other thing that I recall is that, you know, I used
to joust every week with the Russian ambassador about Ukraine,
and I never saw him get so angry or red-faced as when I talked
about the Russian soldiers who were dying in Eastern Ukraine
and that the Russian government would not admit that they were
Russian soldiers and that these military men--mostly men--were
going home in secret and their families were not being allowed
to mourn them and their military deaths.
And that used to drive the Russian ambassador crazy, and I
think part of what we should be doing more is reminding people
within Russia about the costs that these conflicts have not
just for the people in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, but also
the costs that they bear for Russians, because they do keep
Russia as a pariah in the international community and because
they have imposed direct costs on Russians.
Mr. Keating. Interesting. I now yield to ranking member,
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, to all of you, thank you for your testimony. Mr.
Baer or Ambassador Baer, to add to what you said, you know, it
is an honor to serve your country, even if it is a country we
disagree with, and to deny those Russian soldiers the honor of
serving their country, even if you very much disagree. If I was
asked to not admit I was an American in my service to my
country, I would be pretty ticked off, quite honestly.
You also mentioned, talking about Russian disinformation,
you know, I have a Russian-created story about me out there. If
you did not know, I created ISIS with John McCain actually, and
there are people on the internet that believe that, and it is a
real problem. You know, the reality is there is always going to
be people that want to accept a conclusion that comports to
their world view. The Russians exploit that, and I think it is
wrong for any administration ever, under any party, to deny the
seriousness of that undermining any kind of democracy.
This is part of the Russian shadow war--the shadow war of
misinformation, the shadow war of little green men, because
they can say they are not there, is below the threshold kind of
actions, whether it is cyber, whether it is space, whether it
is putting people in there under a mercenary--the Wagner Group
that supposedly Iraq did independently, but are not.
It is important to know hundreds of members of the Wagner
Group were killed by U.S. military a few years ago, and Russia
was very quiet after that. Russia, as I said in my opening
statement, they go up to a brick wall, and when they hit a
brick wall they back up. Putin is a smart man. He knows this.
But he also knows he can push as far as he possibly can.
And you look at the situation and the conflict recently
with Turkey and how quickly, of course, Russia backed down. The
point is, Russia is a paper tiger. They are a power in the
region. They are somebody that has to be dealt with, but they
exist--and I think it was actually John McCain, my good friend,
that said they are basically a gas station, and so you go after
their energy. Energy is low. That is hurting Russia. They are
going to get desperate. But that is how you do these battles,
and you are very clear about what their actions are, so they
are very weak.
I have got to also mention real quickly, in Georgia, the
violations on the line that are happening are significant,
including Russian police or local police in the occupied areas
that basically are allowed and given automatic weapons when the
agreement says that you can, as a police officer, only have a
sidearm; the moving of the border.
They understand that the Russian--a Georgian response is
exactly what Russia is trying to provoke, and so it puts
Georgia in a tough position of, how do we defend our territory
but also not provoke a larger Russian response? And that is
where American involvement and visits--I have been twice to
that part of the area and seen the border. It sends a message
to Russia and the people behind the line that the U.S. is
paying attention, that they are not forgotten, and that there
will be consequences to a broader conflict.
Let me ask first off, Mr. Baer and Mr. Nix, when we talk
about NATO, Ukraine and Georgia and NATO, there has been some
resistance all over in the United States, but generally I think
the American people are very much in support of this, but there
is resistance in Europe.
When you have troops in Georgia, Russian troops in Georgia,
and they say that is the reason we cannot bring them to NATO,
all that does is send Russia a lesson that all you have to do
is put a few troops in a country and they will never join NATO.
Can you briefly talk about that? And then you, Mr. Nix.
Mr. Baer. Sure. I mean, I think, Mr. Kinzinger, you quite
aptly put the problem in front of us, which is that when we
allow Russia to deny these countries the opportunity to make
their own decisions about their security arrangements simply by
occupying part of these countries, we create an incentive for
Russia to do that elsewhere where it wants to.
And, obviously, we have--our policy has been since 2008
that NATO is open to membership to Ukraine and Georgia, and
that we envision that eventuality. I think, you know, because
the conflicts remain unresolved, that is a stumbling block as
we talk with Europeans and other NATO allies.
I think one other point to make--that they are making is to
remind everybody that our assistance to Georgia, in particular
in this case, is not a one-way street. Georgians have sent over
10,000 soldiers over a decade to serve with ISAF in
Afghanistan. And so Georgia and Ukraine--and we have done joint
trainings with the Ukrainians as well--we do have a security
relationship with them, and it is potentially even more two-way
street over the long run.
Mr. Kinzinger. That is right. We need Georgia--if you look
at their location in the region, it is either stuff goes
through Russia or Iran or Georgia. Georgia, pound for pound,
has actually provided more force to Afghanistan than any
country except the United States.
Mr. Nix.
Mr. Nix. That is a salient point, that Russian presence has
been the biggest barrier to NATO membership for Georgia. Again,
the numbers are overwhelming in support. This is what the
Georgian people want. You have correctly pointed out that our
European friends are more reluctant.
There are a couple of ideas percolating, one of which I
know you are very aware of, and that is to perhaps exempt the
occupied territories from the provisions of Article 5. That has
been discussed. We have tested it in polling data. There is
public support for that, but it is still very tricky in
domestic politics in Georgia.
That could be seen in some circles as being some sort of
concession, and so I do not think you will see that come up
prior to the Georgian parliamentary elections in October. But
in the long term, I think it does have some appeal and it is
worth further discussion with our European allies.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. Time flies when you are asking
questions, but not when you are watching other people ask
questions. Thank you all.
I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Vice Chair Spanberger.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses here today. I appreciate your
participation in this hearing and the thoughts that you have
provided. Ambassador Baer, you spoke about your--I do not
remember, did you call it jousting with the Russians during
your time at the OSCE. And I was wondering if you could perhaps
just expand on that a bit more, and could you expand on--I
would love your perspective on how Russia does use its role at
the OSCE and other international organizations to disrupt peace
and reconciliation in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
And from your perception, what can the United States do to
account for the strategy that we see them employing, so that we
can better enable international institutions to support peace
efforts? And the question is directed to Ambassador Baer, but I
welcome anyone else who wants to add something as well.
Mr. Baer. So I think that is a really interesting question
that merits a long discussion, which, you know, I mean, the
Russians are actually incredibly talented multilateralists.
They participate in the United Nations, OSCE, other
multilateral fora, and they often have the most skilled
lawyers. They have people who have institutional knowledge and
remember and can quote, you know, when you say, ``I think we
should do X,'' they say, ``Oh, but in 1993, you proposed
this,'' and blah blah blah.
And so, you know, I think they are serious about their
engagement in these fora. What they are not serious about is
building a system of law and principles and institutions that
can undergird a peaceful international politics. They use these
fora as ways to advance their own national interest and only
their own national interest as--and I should say, as President
Putin defines it, which is really, I mean, President Putin's
personal interest. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that
Russia has no foreign policy as such. It only has domestic
policy that manifests itself in their international political
engagements.
And so I think what is important for us to recognize is
that they are often trying to trap us into withdrawing from
international fora. They are trying to be just difficult enough
to get us to pull the plug.
And one of the things that we should be wary of--and that
does not mean we should not hold them accountable, but we
should be wary of taking the bait and discarding things that
are useful to us and that are consistent with our general
principled approach to building out an international system
that is girded in institutions and universal principles, so
that we can over the long run bring others like Ukraine,
Georgia, and Moldova, knit them more firmly into the
international community, and hold Russia accountable.
Ms. Spanberger. Would anyone else want to comment on that?
Perfect.
Well, so then, if I can go back to the OSCE just a bit
more, and the work of the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Center, as
well as OSCE's special monitoring mission in Ukraine. I would
love for you to elaborate a bit on that work, and if you have
any specific recommendations that you would make that the
United States, from a policy standpoint, could be doing to best
support these initiatives. I would love to hear your thoughts
on that.
Mr. Baer. So the CPC at the OSCE works across the OSCE
area, and they play an important function, particularly in
supporting the missions that are deployed and early on in
crises, in facilitating diplomacy, et cetera.
As for the SMM, you know, it is pretty remarkable to me
that it has been 6 years since we negotiated the agreement for
the SMM. And I have got to tell you, it was thanks to Victoria
Nuland, I was--my team and I were negotiating over the course
of several days. The OSCE, as you probably know, decides
everything based on consensus, which means that you have to get
the Russians on board.
And, you know, indeed the Russians were, at that time,
claiming that there were these gross violations of the human
rights of Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine, and so part of
the argument for deploying the SMM was to be an observer
mission, to document those things as well as any other issues
of concern related to OSCE principles.
And we were unsuccessful in getting them to allow an OSCE
office in Crimea. That was--an SMM office in Crimea, and that
was part of the last piece of negotiating. And I wanted to hold
out for that, and Ambassador Nuland told me, ``Baer, make the
deal.'' And I did, and I am, you know, pretty astonished at how
successful the OSCE has been over 6 years. And I know there are
always complaints with the mission of over 1,000 people that
are spread out across some difficult territory.
But I think they have done remarkable work in documenting
on a daily basis what is happening on the ground. And for
policymakers that has been incredibly important, and for the
Ukrainian government that has to make a case not only to its
own people but also to the world about what continues to happen
at the line of contact, what are overwhelmingly and have been
for years, overwhelmingly Russian and Russia-based separatist
violations of agreements that have been made.
You know, if there were not an objective body to document
those things, the political situation would be worse, and the
situation on the ground I think would be more violent than it
is today. And so I think the United States should continue to
support the extension of the SMM, and we should continue to try
to seek to support wherever we can their technical capacities
and make sure that we are paying our share of the budget.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Representative Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Russian-backed protracted conflicts in countries like
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are incompatible with our
strategic interest in a prosperous and peaceful Europe. The
United States has punished Russian aggression against these
sovereign countries by imposing robust sanctions, as Mr. Nix
pointed out, on Russia, publicly condemning Russia's malign
actions and stiffening Ukrainian and Georgian defense efforts
through arms sales.
We must continue to defend Europe against Russia's attempts
to undermine rule of law, democracy, and sovereignty.
Russia's behavior has been increasingly aggressive in the
Sea of Azov and in the Kerch Strait, where it has bolstered its
naval presence and begun kind of interfering with Ukrainian
shipping and naval transit.
Ambassador Baer, how should the United States support
Ukraine against Russian efforts to diminish freedom of
navigation?
Mr. Baer. Thank you, Representative Wagner. I think, you
know, I only had a moment to highlight it in my opening
comments, but I think one of the things that this--that we
should not lose track of in this hearing is the importance of
the Black Sea region strategically.
And you mentioned the recent Russian efforts to limit
navigation in the Kerch Strait. There was an unprovoked attack
on Ukrainian naval vessels in December of--14 months ago. That
was one of the instances--by the way, I mentioned the Open
Skies Treaty in my opening testimony. That was one of the
instances in which we used an extraordinary Open Skies flight
in order to bring Ukrainians, as well as other partners and
allies, on board to overfly and to see what was going on on the
Earth below, land and sea.
And so I think one of the things that is really important
is for us to make sure that we are including Georgia and
Ukraine and, you know, Moldova does not have Black Sea
frontage, but Romania is a partner in the Black Sea, as well as
Turkey, in developing a concerted strategy to have security in
the Black Sea region.
As I said, Putin uses that not only as a way of menacing
the Ukrainian navy or that--or the Georgians, but he uses it as
a launching pad in order to wreak havoc in the middle East, and
I think we should be concerned about it for that reason as
well.
And going back to Mr. Kinzinger's point, you know, this is
one of the reasons why we have a strategic interest in having a
long-term partnership with these countries, not just protecting
them from conflicts but also partnering.
Mrs. Wagner. In the interest of time, I appreciate that.
Russia aggressively uses its energy dominance as a coercive
foreign policy tool. However, I understand that some hope the
Southern Gas Corridor, which will connect Caspian Sea natural
gas reserves with European markets, will diminish Russia's
leverage in Europe.
One of the Southern Gas Corridor's three new pipelines is
set to run through Georgia, where Russia has fomented
protracted conflicts in key regions.
Ms.--I did not get your proper--Vartanyan; am I close? Are
you concerned that Russia will seek to destabilize the
situation in Georgia to undermine the Southern Gas Corridor
project?
Ms. Vartanyan. Russia is already very well present in
Georgia. Russia bears responsibility for the regions of the
conflict of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I mean, the Russian
fleet--Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, and Russian military
bases are located in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are the
territories that they are very close--they are very central,
especially South Ossetia, inside Georgia.
So because of that, it is so important, actually, to pay
attention to the developments on the ground. And United States
plays a very important role. On the one hand, it supports
Georgia's policy on no recognition. But on the other, United
States is also part of the negotiations before that have been
taking place so far.
And I think that the United States can continue and
reinforce its participation in that, and that can potentially--
hopefully, that can help to sustain stability on the ground and
also prevent new incidents and violence.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. During the cold war, the United
States used Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Voice of
America to spread the truth of freedom and democracy to the
world behind the Iron Curtain.
Mr. Nix, what role does Russian propaganda and
disinformation play in maintaining frozen conflicts in post-
Soviet countries? And how should the United States use
organizations like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe to
respond? In 1 second.
Mr. Nix. Thank you for that, Mrs. Wagner. Well, certainly,
Russian information plays a huger role in Ukraine and also in
Georgia. In the Ukraine case, I would say this. It is
definitely affecting public opinion in the occupied
territories. People there watch nothing but Russian television.
The Zelensky government, as I said in my opening statement,
has made a concerted policy change in how to deal with Donbass
and Crimea, and that is to engage with the people who live
there. They want to create connections and relationships. They
want to make it easier for people to cross the border.
The information space is very important. The Zelensky
government has launched a Russian language television broadcast
into Donbass in a way to educate people on the reforms that he
is undertaking under his presidency and to connect up with the
citizens. They need help. They need assistance from us. So, in
addition to the American-based VOA broadcast, which should be
enhanced, we should be supporting the Zelensky government in
all of these efforts to----
Mrs. Wagner. That is a very good recommendation. I thank
you for that.
I am out of time. I appreciate the indulgence of the chair,
and I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Representative Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. Mr. Nix, my question for you
regarding Ukraine has to do with the perception--your
perception of the current attitudes of the Ukrainian people
with respect to the United States, with respect to NATO, with
respect to the EU.
I served as an FBI agent in Ukraine post-Crimea, pre-
Donbass, and I always took note of this in my travels
throughout the country. Where do you see their attitudes right
now toward the United States, toward NATO, and toward the EU?
Mr. Nix. Thank you for being here, Mr. Fitzpatrick. We
appreciate the role that you have played in Ukraine and your
strong advocacy of Ukraine's sovereignty.
With regard to public opinion, it is very, very clear.
Every poll that IRI conducts in Ukraine, the numbers in support
of EU membership and NATO membership trend upward. The vast
majority of Ukrainians want to see their country in the
European Union, and a majority want to see their county in
NATO.
Now, obviously, those numbers differ when you do the
breakdowns between Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine. But
still, even in Eastern Ukraine, a majority of citizens want to
see their county in Western institutions. And, in fact, the way
the question is asked, should Ukraine be part of the EU or
Putin's Customs Union?
And the results are very clear. Ukrainians want their
country as part of the West.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. And in that data, is there a disparity
between the age groups?
Mr. Nix. Well, obviously, young people are more predicated
toward the West. Pensioners are more inclined, to the degree
that people do support the Customs Union, that is relegated to
older people.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. And with regard to the policy change you
referenced regarding President Zelensky doing more outreach to
both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, do you believe that that
change is in an attempt to reunify the country, or something
else?
Mr. Nix. No. I think it is a clear attempt to reunify the
country. And, again, it is a stark departure, with all due
respect, from the previous Presidential administration. But his
goal is to reach out and connect up with these people. That is
why I said in my opening statement a million people cross the
checkpoints, and there are very few checkpoints.
In fact, in Luhansk, many people prefer to cross between
the border between Russia and Ukraine proper, not the point of
contact because it is easier. So a lot can be done by the
United States to assist the government--more border crossing,
ease of travel. And I can tell you, I have been to the border
crossing at Kalynchak and Kherson Oblast right across from
Crimea. If you look across 200 yards to the Russian side, there
is a gleaming bus terminal, there is a taxi place, there is
restaurants, there is cafes. Standing on the Ukrainian side,
there is the border guards, us, a small kiosk to pass out some
information, and a beer tent with a dirt floor and some
sleeping dogs.
That is the difference between what people see when they
leave Crimea and when they enter Ukraine proper. And it was a
calculated decision by the Poroshenko administration--and I
understand it--they did not want to accept the status quo. So
they did not want to invest in a structure on the Ukrainian
side, but this is a long-term engagement. Peace will take some
time. The government very badly wants to make it easier for
people to cross from the occupied territories, both in Donbass
and Crimea, and that is an important initiative that the U.S.
can engage in.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. So what is the current status of border
crossing right now? Because I have never been to Crimea. I hear
it was always considered a huge vacation destination--beautiful
area for the Ukrainians to go to. Do you see that increasing?
And, second, and I will just finish with this last
question, do you see any realistic prospect of reunifying
Ukraine?
Mr. Nix. Well, as to Crimea, yes, it was a popular place. I
used to vacation in Crimea when I lived in Ukraine, and it was
very, very popular. The numbers are down. The economy in Crimea
is suffering. There is a lack of tourism, but there is another
big issue, and this goes to connecting up with the Ukrainian
people.
The Zelensky government is trying to figure out now what to
do about water. There are huge water shortages in Crimea.
People do not have sufficient drinking water. What does the
government do? As you know better than anybody, Mr.
Fitzpatrick, 4 years ago Ukraine shut off all the water supply.
There is a vast series of canals that have been built
connecting the Dnipro River and fed into Crimea and supported--
basically supplied 90 percent of Crimea's water supply.
The Ukrainian government has to decide whether or not to
turn the tap back on to alleviate the suffering of the people,
Ukrainians still living in Crimea. But the question is: does
that contribute to military and industrial enterprises that are
propped up by Russia? Those are the types of tough decisions
that Zelensky has to make, but my understanding, he is leaning
toward turning on the water again because he wants to help
improve the lives of daily Ukrainians.
As far as your final question, is reunification possible,
yes, I believe it is. Again, the majority, the vast majority of
Ukrainians want to see their country united again. I think
President Zelensky is determined to do that, but it will be
small steps like the prisoner exchanges and other exchanges.
It is a very long-term prospect, and I truly believe, as I
said in my opening statement, that sanctions will be the only
thing that will ultimately bring Vladimir Putin to the
negotiating table on Dongass and Crimea both.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, sir.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
I appreciate, Ambassador Baer, your comments on Open Skies,
on the Open Skies Treaty. I share the importance of continuing
that. I was with General Walters just a few weeks ago. He
echoed the same sentiment, so I hope that treaty that is on
pause, you know, can continue because there are advantages. And
you just brought forth a very important one in the Black Sea
area and that enable incursion.
You know, one of Putin's greatest goals must be--in the
area we are talking about is to seek division between the U.S.
and our allies, our European allies. And I would just like your
opinions, how seamless is our approach right now? What are some
concerns you might have in that regard? What can we do to make
sure that the division does not extend to something that will
hurt our ability in the area that we are discussing today?
Ambassador Baer, do you----
Mr. Baer. Let me be quick at the outset and just say I
think you are quite right that it is an objective to divide the
U.S. and Europe, and obviously to divide European countries
within each other and against each other. That is an objective
of Putin's government.
And one other thing that I think is really important to
highlight, especially in this context, is the importance of you
all, because I think one of the challenges we have today--and I
was in Munich a few weeks ago for the security conference--is
that the Europeans are not exactly sure where the United States
stands. And so even those who willing to still be good partners
with us do not actually know exactly what we stand for right
now.
And we can go into the reasons for that, but I think one of
the--whatever one diagnoses the reasons being, one of the
affirmative things that can happen is for members of the House
and Senate to carry the flag and to drive home the importance
of the Transatlantic relationship, our commitment to it over
the long term, and our commitment to the same principled kind
of foreign policy that has been a hallmark of Republican and
Democratic administrations since the end of World War II.
Mr. Keating. That brought me to another point that I think
is important, too. What is the importance and why is it--other
than deflecting the blame away from himself, why is Putin
targeting, in your opinion, Ukraine for the fiction that they
were involved in interference in the U.S. elections in 2016?
Ambassador?
Mr. Baer. Because when somebody will buy a story, you sell
it.
Mr. Keating. Yes. Any other comments on that at all? Mr.
Nix mentioned sanctions. What would you recommend for the type
of sanctions? Is it against the oligarchs? Is it against--what
is your--when you say ``sanctions,'' further sanctions, what
did you have in mind?
Mr. Nix. I would advocate for a combination of both
sectoral sanctions and individual sanctions. Again, we believe
that they are having the desired effect. And to go back to your
point, Mr. Chairman, about Russia dividing the allies, I think
the sanctions issue is one where they have had success.
We need to convince our European allies that they should
not just merely extend European sanctions on the Russian
Federation; they need to expand them as we have.
Mr. Keating. Any other comments on those points? Any other
members seek to be recognized? Representative Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. If you do not mind, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nix, I understand that Georgia is interested in
negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States. How
would a U.S.-Georgian trade agreement impact the economic
situation of average Georgians and internally displaced persons
and those living in the occupied territories?
Mr. Nix. That is a trade agreement that the Georgian
government would actively seek, it covets, because it would
drastically improve the economy. If you look at the polling
data, the economy is the biggest issue among Georgian voters. I
mean, we cite to the NATO and EU numbers, but when you ask,
what is the most important problem facing Georgian citizens, it
is the economy and jobs. And certainly a trade agreement would
help jumpstart the Georgian economy, which has been in free
fall primarily because of Russian boycotts on Georgian goods.
Mrs. Wagner. I have one more question. Do you mind? In
2018, Georgia launched a peace initiative to improve the
quality of life in the disputed regions. Ms. Vartanyan, how has
the peace initiative furthered prospects for peace in Georgia?
And how can the U.S. support these efforts?
Ms. Vartanyan. Well, it is a great topic for me to discuss.
Mrs. Wagner. Yes.
Ms. Vartanyan. Also, we at Crisis Group wrote a very
comprehensive report on the situation with the development of
trade prospects with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. And during my travels to Abkhazia, for instance,
I could see that actually many more people want to do trade.
And this is mainly because of problems with the economy in
Russia, and also the fact that they started receiving less
funds after Crimea annexation and also with problems with the
economy and sanctions related to issues.
And this is the very moment actually to act, and that was
very positive step from the Georgian side, that they started
developing the plan. And I understand that we are still
making--some certain initial steps have been made.
And if you allow me--you mentioned some free trade
agreement, and I understand this is something that is still in
discussion. But the EU has already signed free trade agreement
with Georgia, and has already contributed heavily to the
Georgian economy.
And not only--initiatives like these, they provide space,
and they give more ideas, you know, to those who work on the
conflicts, because, for example, with EU trade agreement, it
potentially can expand to the areas that are not under direct
control of the Georgian government. And I understand that there
are some European diplomats that are doing thinking on that.
We wrote about this in the report. I will be happy to share
more ideas. But I see that you have 2 more minutes, and would
you allow me to jump on another question that you mentioned--
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty?
Mrs. Wagner. Yes.
Ms. Vartanyan. You know, in my past life, I used to be a
journalist, and I spent 4 years working for the Radio Liberty.
Georgia is a great country in terms of providing good lessons
included for Ukraine. In 2009, Radio Liberty, they opened a new
program, a Russian language one, which is part of the Georgian
service. It is called Ekho Kavkaza, and I had an honor to work
for it.
This is a program that brings together journalists from the
breakaway regions and from the rest of Georgia. It is 1-hour
show, you know, with news and stories from all these places.
And I should say that in the beginning when we were starting,
it was extremely controversial thing because not everyone wants
to hear the story from the other side.
Ten years have passed. They actually celebrated an
anniversary some weeks ago, and I can tell you that now with
Ekho Kavkaza it is the only one that in many cases provides the
alternative to anything that is developing on the ground. And
people turn to it, even local ones, when they want to hear an
alternative about the developments on the ground, because this
is the only source of information made by the local journalists
alternative to the Russian propaganda.
So I would say that for me personally it is a very good
example how you start despite difficulties and problems, and
you still reach out to the other side. You engage with them,
and you actually by--by giving them a chance to work with you,
you are not fighting propaganda with propaganda. But you are
working with them and you give them a chance to get good source
information.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you very much. I appreciate the
indulgence of the chair.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you.
Mrs. Wagner. And this peace agreement--or, pardon me, the
free trade agreement, Mr. Chairman, is something that we should
probably talk about pursuing.
Mr. Keating. Great. Well, thank you. Thanks,
Representative.
As a final invitation for comment, you know, when we
organized this hearing, we did not organize a hearing on
Ukraine, individually on Moldova, individually on Georgia,
individually--we put the three countries together for a reason.
And I think if you wanted to have any final comments, if
you could, just tell us in your view what is the importance of,
for instance, what happens in Ukraine to Georgia, the
importance of what happens in Ukraine to Moldova, the
importance to the U.S. and the importance to our European
allies.
Mr. Nix.
Mr. Nix. Mr. Chairman, I think the common link, you
mentioned the situation in the Black Sea. That is a common link
between the three countries, and so you have the weaponization
of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation. It is now
bristling with airfields and surface-to-air missiles. It is
used as a staging point to maneuver against both Ukraine and
Georgia on the Black Sea.
And then, finally, the link to Moldova is, that is exactly
how the Russian 14th Army in Transnistria is supplied--through
air transport from Russian bases in Crimea. So that is one of
the common links that we face in these three conflict areas.
Mr. Keating. Great. Anyone else before we close? Ambassador
Baer.
Mr. Baer. Yes. I think, you know, there are two recent
events that connect to what we are talking about today in the
last few weeks--the terrible humanitarian disaster in Idlib and
the possibility of--well, the reality that close to a million
people have been displaced and add to the humanitarian toll
already of what has been an incredibly violent and devastating
war in Syria, and the announcement I think this morning or last
night that Putin has now successfully gotten the Duma to extend
his potential rule until 2036.
You know, the first connects to why, you know, Crimea
matters to the broader picture, not only to us but to our
European allies, because the security of the Middle East is a
crucial issue for them and one that their domestic publics are
seized with.
And the second I think connects to what we are talking
about here today, because as much as we talk about Putin's
desire to control Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia through these
conflicts, and to use them as tails that wag the dog, in my
time in government, I came to believe that actually his bigger
interest was not necessarily controlling them per se, but
actually preventing their positive examples.
The power of a democratic, prosperous Ukraine that has rule
of law and that treats its citizens fairly, no matter their
background, is one that would provide a powerful counter-
example to the Putin who wants to rule until 2036 and who robs
from his own citizens and does not run a system that actually
delivers for them a promising future.
And the same is true, obviously, of Georgia and Moldova.
And so to me it is even worse than it looks, because it is
actually spite that causes him to try to tear these countries
apart and prevent their progress, because he does not want to
have to deal with the powerful example that they might set and
show the Russian people what is possible in their country as
well.
Mr. Keating. I could not agree more. I think that there is
no coincidence that the act of war started when they were
unable to control the political side of things as Ukraine was
moving toward EU membership. That is unquestionable, and that
is what I think precipitated this as well. It is, once more, a
reminder that in all of these three countries we began with a
film of a hot war that is going on right now in Ukraine,
something for us to always keep in mind, that all of these
countries are on the front line. They are on front line in
terms of the hybrid warfare that is occurring from Russia, and
they are in the front line with an active military and hostile
war that is occurring in Ukraine.
Once again, we are honored to have veterans here this
afternoon from Ukraine. Your presence is greatly appreciated
here to remind us that you are indeed on the front line.
With that, I will adjourn and thank our witnesses for a
very, I think, enlightening hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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