[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DOE'S MOUNTING CLEANUP COSTS: BILLIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND
GROWING
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 1, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-29
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
energycommerce.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-903 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Chairman
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois GREG WALDEN, Oregon
ANNA G. ESHOO, California Ranking Member
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York FRED UPTON, Michigan
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
DORIS O. MATSUI, California CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KATHY CASTOR, Florida BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland PETE OLSON, Texas
JERRY McNERNEY, California DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
PAUL TONKO, New York GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York, Vice BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
Chair BILLY LONG, Missouri
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon BILL FLORES, Texas
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
Massachusetts MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
TONY CARDENAS, California RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
RAUL RUIZ, California TIM WALBERG, Michigan
SCOTT H. PETERS, California EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
DARREN SOTO, Florida
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
------
Professional Staff
JEFFREY C. CARROLL, Staff Director
TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Deputy Staff Director
MIKE BLOOMQUIST, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
Chair
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Ranking Member
Massachusetts, Vice Chair MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
RAUL RUIZ, California DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
KATHY CASTOR, Florida SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
PAUL TONKO, New York JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
SCOTT H. PETERS, California
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Colorado, opening statement................................. 2
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Brett Guthrie, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, opening statement.................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Oregon, opening statement...................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Witnesses
Anne White, Assistant Secretary, Office of Environmental
Management, Department of Energy............................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Answers to submitted questions............................... 70
David C. Trimble, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
Government Accountability Office............................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Answers to submitted questions............................... 99
DOE'S MOUNTING CLEANUP COSTS: BILLIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND
GROWING
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:29 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Diana DeGette
(chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives DeGette, Schakowsky,
Kennedy, Ruiz, Kuster, Castor, Clarke, Pallone (ex officio),
Guthrie (subcommittee ranking member), Burgess, Griffith,
Brooks, Mullin, Duncan, and Walden (ex officio).
Staff present: Mohammad Aslami, Counsel; Kevin Barstow,
Chief Oversight Counsel; Chris Knauer, Oversight Staff
Director; Jourdan Lewis, Policy Analyst; Perry Lusk, GAO
Detailee; Jon Monger, Counsel; Elysa Montfort, Press Secretary;
Meghan Mullon, Staff Assistant; Kaitlyn Peel, Digital Director;
Nikki Roy, Policy Coordinator; Jen Barblan, Minority Chief
Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Margaret Tucker Fogarty,
Minority Staff Assistant; Brittany Havens, Minority
Professional Staff Member, Oversight and Investigations; Peter
Kielty, Minority General Counsel; and Alan Slobodin, Minority
Chief Investigative Counsel, Oversight and Investigations.
Ms. DeGette. The Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations will now come to order. Today, the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations is holding a hearing entitled,
``DOE's Mounting Cleanup Costs: Billions in Environmental
Liability and Growing.''
The purpose of the hearing is to discuss the DOE's
management of its environmental cleanup program and significant
increases in environmental liabilities over the years.
And I will note before we start that there is another
hearing going on downstairs in the Energy and Commerce
Committee. There is also a full committee markup going on in
Natural Resources.
So people will be coming in and out, but it doesn't mean
that they are not paying attention. The Chair now recognizes
herself for purposes of an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DeGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO
Today, we continue the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations' longstanding efforts to oversee the Department
of Energy's management of its environmental cleanup programs.
Over the course of the Cold War, the United States
developed an industrial complex to research, test, and produce
nuclear power reactors and weapons. This effort left behind
thousands of tons of radioactive waste, and contaminated soil
and water at sites nationwide, and the United States Government
is financially liable for cleaning it up.
It now estimated that it will cost hundreds of billions of
dollars to do so. The Department of Energy's Office of
Environmental Management, or EM, is largely responsible for
this difficult task.
It does this by managing contractors and complex cleanup
operations at sites across the United States. I know how
important this work is because there is just one of these sites
up the road from my district, the Rocky Flats Plant in
Colorado.
The good news is that over the prior decades, EM has
successfully cleaned up Rocky Flats and many other sites. The
bad news is that they have--there are 16 remaining sites which
still need major work and are, arguably, the most challenging
and costly to clean up.
On top of that, the estimated cost to address these
remaining sites is large and quickly growing. For example,
according to GAO, EM's environmental liability grew by a total
of $214 billion since just 2011 and, as of 2018, this figure
had climbed to a staggering $377 billion.
During this same period, EM spent $48 billion on cleanup
efforts, which means that environmental liability is growing at
a faster rate than DOE's spending and, possibly, even its
ability to clean up these sites.
The GAO has told the committee that this growing liability
poses not only a financial risk to the taxpayer, but possibly
to cleanup operations if corners are cut or important tasks are
deferred to future dates due to costs.
Over the last few decades, this committee, the GAO, and
others have raised numerous concerns about DOE's management of
these cleanups. Unfortunately, many of the same concerns and
questions continue to this day.
In 2017, and again this year, GAO included the Federal
Government's environmental liabilities in its ``high risk''
list, which are those Federal programs that are most at risk to
fraud, waste, or mismanagement.
But this should come as no surprise. Over the years, GAO
has raised numerous concerns about DOE's EM office. Even today,
GAO will testify that DOE has not conducted a formal analysis
to fully understand the root causes of why these environmental
liabilities are growing each year by tens of billions of
dollars.
If they don't understand what is driving costs, it is
difficult to believe how they can fully control them. The GAO
will also report that EM is still failing to follow best
program and best project practices, like having a regularly
updated management plan and roadmap, having reliable life-cycle
cost estimates and master schedules that are updated on a
regular basis, and conducting risk management throughout the
life of the program.
Now, I appreciate that many of the challenges facing EM
span several administrations and, further, that DOE has begun
to make changes in how it is attempting to manage these sites.
I also appreciate that Assistant Secretary White--and thank
you for being here--will tell us today that she intends to
implement many of the recommendations GAO and others have made
in recent reports.
But, you know, I have been on this committee a long time.
We have many seen DOE make these promises before with regards
to cleanup operations. And here we are talking again about a
program that needs major management attention.
So, Secretary White, we look forward to working with you to
make sure that it actually happens this time.
And finally, beyond the promises, I remain concerned that
EM lacks sufficient staff, expertise, and resources--most
importantly, resources--to accomplish the tasks that we will
talk about today, including implementing the GAO's
recommendation.
To that end, the Trump administration's proposed budget
cuts to EM will not make things any better, particularly when
it comes to implementing some of the best practices that are
being proposed.
So, in conclusion, I am hoping EM can fully explain to
Congress and the American people what is driving the continued
increase in DOE's environmental liability but also whether the
GAO believes any new DOE proposals will reverse this trend.
Cleanup of these sites is critically important. We need to
have it happen, and we can't be sitting here again in 5, 10, or
20 years hoping that it will.
[The prepared statement of Ms. DeGette follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Diana DeGette
Today, we continue the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations' long-standing efforts to oversee the Department
of Energy's management of its environmental cleanup programs.
Over the course of the Cold War, the United States
developed an industrial complex to research, test, and produce
nuclear power reactors and weapons.
This effort left behind thousands of tons of radioactive
waste, and contaminated soil and water at sites nationwide, and
the United States Government is financially liable for cleaning
it up.
It now estimated that it will cost hundreds of billions of
dollars to do so.
The Department of Energy's Office of Environmental
Management-or ``EM''-is largely responsible for this
difficulttask. It does this by managing contractors and complex
cleanup operations at sites across the United States.
I know how important this work is because one site, the
Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, is just up the road from my
district.
The good news is that, over the prior decades, EM has
successfully cleaned up Rocky Flats and many other sites.
The bad news is that the remaining 16 sites-which still
need major work-are arguably the most challenging and costly to
cleanup.
On top of that, the estimated cost to address these
remaining sites is large and is quickly growing.
For example, according to GAO, EM's environmental liability
grew by a total of $214 billion since just 2011. And, as of
2018, this figure had climbed to a staggering $377 billion.
During this same period, EM spent $48 billion on cleanup
efforts, which means environmental liability is growing at a
level that is outpacing DOE's spending and, possibly, its
ability to cleanup these sites.
GAO has told the committee that this growing liability
poses not only a financial risk to the taxpayer, but possibly
to cleanup operations if corners are cut or important tasks are
deferred to future dates due to costs.
Over the past several decades, this committee, GAO, and
others have raised numerous concerns about DOE's management of
these cleanups. Unfortunately, many of those same concerns and
questions continue to this day.
In 2017, and again this year, GAO included the Federal
Government's environmental liabilities to its ``High-Risk''
list which are those Federal programs that are most at risk to
fraud, waste, or mismanagement.
But this should come as no surprise.
Over the years, GAO has raised numerous concerns about
DOE's EM office.
Even today, GAO will testify that DOE has not conducted a
formal analysis to fully understand the root causes of why
these environmental liabilities are growing each year by tens
of billions of dollars. If they don't understand what is
driving costs, it's difficult to believe they can fully control
them.
GAO will also report that EM is still failing to follow
best program and best project practices, like having a
regularly updated management plan and roadmap; having reliable
lifecycle cost estimates and master schedules that are updated
on a regular basis; and conducting risk management throughout
the life of the program.
I appreciate that many of the challenges facing EM span
several administrations and further that DOE has begun to make
changes to how it is attempting to manage these sites.
I also appreciate that Assistant Secretary White will tell
us today that she intends to implement many of the
recommendations GAO and others have made in recent reports.
But many on this committee have seen DOE make these
promises before with regards to cleanup operations. And yet we
are again in this room talking about a program that again needs
major management attention.
Finally, beyond the promises, I remain concerned that EM
lacks sufficient staff, expertise, and resources to accomplish
some of the tasks it will talk about today including
implementing the many recommendations GAO has made to improve
this program.
To that end, the Trump administration's proposed budget
cuts to EM will not make things any better, particularly when
it comes to implementing some of the best practices that are
being proposed.
So, in conclusion, I hope EM can fully explain to Congress
and the American people what is driving the continued increase
in DOE's environmental liability but also, whether GAO believes
any new DOE proposals will reverse this trend.
Cleaning up these sites is a critically important task of
the Federal Government. Hundreds of billions of tax dollars are
at stake. So too is the health and environment of the
communities that surround these sites.
This is an area we must get right, and I intend to have
this committee continue paying attention to this important
area.
With that, I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. And so with that, I yield back. I want to
thank the witnesses for appearing, and I want to recognize the
ranking member, Mr. Guthrie from Kentucky, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRETT GUTHRIE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you. Thank you, Chair DeGette, for
holding this important hearing. Thanks to our witnesses for
being here.
The U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Environmental
Management, which I will refer to as EM, was created in 1989 to
clean up the radioactive legacy of the Cold War and was tasked
with cleaning up 107 sites across the country.
As part of this effort, EM is responsible for completing
the safe cleanup of environmental legacy resulting from five
decades of nuclear weapons development and Government-sponsored
nuclear energy research.
To date, DOE has completed a cleanup of 91 of its 107 sites
with 16 sites remaining. While 85 percent of the original 107
sites have been cleaned up, the remaining 16 sites has been
described to the committee as the most challenging sites.
The EM still has a lot of work to do. This work has been
ongoing for decades and will continue for decades to come with
some of the current sites not estimated to be cleaned up until
2070 or 2075.
One of the ways that EM's work is measured and estimated is
through the amount of environmental liabilities, which is
estimated cost to clean up areas where Federal activities have
contaminated the environment.
To develop its environmental liability estimates, EM uses
the approved life cycle cost for all cleanup projects at each
of its sites and adds any adjustments and accounts for any
potential cost decreases.
The United States Government's liability was $577 billion
in fiscal year 2018 and was the third highest liability listed
in the financial report of the United States Government.
DOE is the driver of most of this liability, accounting for
$494 billion due to its nuclear cleanup responsibilities. Most
of DOE's liability, $377 billion out of $494 billion, lies with
the cleanup costs associated with sites under the
responsibility of EM.
DOE's financial statement for the year 2018 showed a sharp
increase in environmental liability, more than $110 billion.
EM's environmental liability has grown annually and outpaced
the agency's annual spending on cleanup activities. For
example, fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2017's environmental
liability grew almost $105 billion--between 2011 and 2017 grew
almost $105 billion, from $163 billion to $268 billion.
In the same period, EM spent approximately $40 billion.
Similarly, in the past two fiscal years, environmental
liability grew by $122 billion with DOE spending only $12
billion on cleanup activities.
In 2017, GAO added the Federal Government's environmental
liability to its high risk list and it remained on GAO's high
risk list for 2019.
Further, GAO has conducted additional work surrounding
DOE's environmental liability including a report that was
released in February as a result of what became a bipartisan
request by this committee to examine the performance of EM's
operational activities and the role of performance assessments
in informing those activities.
GAO's concern stems from the fact that while the number of
sites to be cleaned up have decreased, the cleanup costs have
increased and the timetable for completion keeps getting
delayed.
And as the timetable for cleanup completion is delayed,
costs continue to go up, especially since about 40 percent of
the money EM spends on cleanup costs goes toward minimum safe
operations, or ``min-safe,'' costs to maintain the sites,
including costs of power, staffing, and security.
Additionally, according to GAO, DOE should conduct a root
cause analysis to determine why the cleanup costs, especially
the $110 billion increase, went up so much.
GAO has also found that EM does not follow program
management leading practices or project management best
practices. GAO's concern is that DOE could be wasting billions
of dollars and not implementing the cleanup program efficiently
and effectively.
Lastly, GAO reported that DOE does not have a strategy on
how to make the cleanup program more efficient and effective.
DOE recognizes the need to strengthen program management
oversight accountability to ensure value for the American
taxpayer.
DOE and EM are working towards completion and closure of
the mission. But we still have decades to go. In the meantime,
it is critical that we understand what EM is doing and changing
in order to clean up the remaining sites in a timely cost-
effective manner.
This mission is an important one, not just for the sake of
completing cleanup but also to ensure that the environment and
public health in the communities where the sites are located
are protected.
I look forward to hearing from Assistant Secretary White on
ways DOE and EM plan to evaluate, strengthen, and clean up the
mission and how EM plans to address GAO's concerns.
I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I yield
back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Guthrie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Brett Guthrie
Thank you, Chair DeGette, for holding this important
hearing.
The U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Environmental
Management (EM) was created in 1989 to clean up the radioactive
legacy of the Cold War and was tasked with cleaning up 107
sites across the country. As part of this effort, EM is
responsible for completing the safe cleanup of environmental
legacy resulting from five decades of nuclear weapons
development and Government-sponsored nuclear energy research.
To date, DOE has completed cleanup at 91 of its 107 sites,
with 16 sites remaining. While 85 percent of the original 107
sites have been cleaned up, the remaining 16 sites have been
described to the committee as the most challenging sites.
EM still has a lot of work to do. This work has been
ongoing for decades and will continue for decades to come, with
some of the current sites not estimated to be cleaned up until
2070 or 2075.
One of the ways that EM's work is measured and estimated is
through the amount of environmental liabilities, which is the
estimated cost to cleanup areas where Federal activities have
contaminated the environment. To develop its environmental
liability estimates, EM uses the approved life cycle costs for
all cleanup projects at each of its sites and adds any
adjustments and accounts for any potential cost decreases.
The United States Government's environmental liability was
$577 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 and was the third highest
liability listed in the Financial Report of the United States
Government. DOE is the driver of most of this liability,
accounting for $494 billion, due to its nuclear cleanup
responsibilities. Most of DOE's liability--$377 billion out of
the $494 billion--lies with the cleanup costs associated with
sites under the responsibility of the EM. DOE's financial
statement for fiscal year 2018 showed a sharp increase in
environmental liability--more than $110 billion.
EM's environmental liability has grown annually and
outpaced the agency's annual spending on cleanup activities.
For example, between FY 2011 and FY 2017 EM's environmental
liability grew almost $105 billion-from $163 billion to $268
billion. In that same period, EM spent approximately $40
billion. Similarly, in the past two fiscal years, the
environmental liability grew by $122 billion, with DOE spending
only $12 billion on cleanup activities.
In 2017, GAO added the Federal Government's environmental
liability to its high risk list, and it remained on GAO's high
risk list for 2019. Further, GAO has conducted additional work
surrounding DOE's environmental liability, including a report
that was released in February as a result of what became a
bipartisan request by this committee, which examined the
performance of EM's operational activities and the role of
performance assessments in informing those activities.
GAO's concerns stem from the fact that while the number of
sites to be cleaned up have decreased, the cleanup costs have
increased and the timetable for completion keeps getting
delayed. And, as the timetable for cleanup completion is
delayed, costs continue to go up, especially since about 40
percent of the money EM spends on cleanup costs goes toward
minimum safe operations, or ``min-safe'' costs to maintain the
sites, including costs for power, staffing, and security.
Additionally, according to GAO, DOE should conduct a root
cause analysis to determine why the cleanup costs, especially
the $110 billion increase, went up so much. GAO also found that
EM does not follow program management leading practices or
project management best practices. GAO's concern is that DOE
could be wasting billions of dollars, and not implementing the
cleanup program efficiently and effectively. Lastly, GAO
reported that DOE does not have a strategy on how to make the
cleanup program more efficient and effective.
DOE recognizes the need to strengthen program management,
oversight, and accountability to ensure value for the American
taxpayer. DOE and EM are working towards completion and closure
of the mission, but we still have decades to go. In the
meantime, it is critical that we understand what EM is doing-
and changing-in order to clean up the remaining sites in a
timely and cost-effective manner.
This mission is an important one, not just for the sake of
completing cleanup, but also to ensure that the environment and
public health in the communities where these sites are located
are protected. I look forward to hearing from Assistant
Secretary White on ways DOE and EM plan to evaluate and
strengthen the cleanup mission and how EM plans to address
GAO's concerns.I thank our witnesses for being here today. I
yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the chair of the full committee,
Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes for purposes of an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Today, the committee continues its oversight of the DOE and
the Office of Environmental Management's efforts to clean up
the legacy nuclear waste sites remaining from the Cold War.
Decades of producing materials for our country's nuclear
weapons program has led to a massive and ongoing cleanup of
nuclear and hazardous waste and these sites contain some of the
most dangerous materials on earth and some of the costliest and
technically challenging to clean up.
Waste at these sites consists of millions of gallons of
radioactive waste, thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel and
other nuclear material, as well as contaminated soil and water.
And the consequences for not getting this right are
enormous to the environment, to human health, and to the
taxpayer.
The U.S. Government is responsible for costs associated
with cleaning up these contaminants at Federal sites and
facilities, and the estimated cost of future environmental
cleanup is referred to as ``environmental liability.''
DOE is currently responsible for over 80 percent of the
Federal Government's total environmental liability, which
includes ongoing DOE cleanup efforts at 16 sites around the
country, and the costs associated with this effort are vast and
rapidly growing.
As of this year, it has climbed to a staggering $377
billion. And while one would expect that, over time, as more
money is spent, that DOE's environmental liability would be
decreasing.
But just the opposite is occurring. Since 2011, DOE has
seen environmental liabilities grow by over $200 billion while
spending in the same period was $48 billion.
So even though we are spending billions each year,
environmental liabilities are growing at a level that is
outpacing DOE's spending.
In 2017 and again in 2019, the GAO included the Federal
Government's environmental liabilities on its high risk list.
GAO continues to find numerous management challenges with how
DOE is managing the cleanup effort.
For example, according to GAO, DOE has not conducted a root
cause analysis to learn why the runaway growth in environmental
liabilities has occurred, and that means DOE does not know with
certainty why this number keeps climbing.
And GAO has also found that the Department of Energy fails
to follow program and project management leading practices, and
this is all extremely concerning considering that the
Department of Energy has also inconsistently reported on its
cleanup status to Congress, and information that has been
reported has often been incomplete or misleading.
So the Department's recent budget materials for EM also do
not reflect the funding EM anticipates is needed to meet its
future cleanup responsibilities and I appreciate that Assistant
Secretary White is taking positive steps which appear to
reflect her understanding of the significant challenges facing
the Department of Energy.
But DOE needs to answer some key questions about how they
are managing the cleanup program and this committee needs to
know if EM is planning to make the changes that GAO says are
necessary, what resources it needs to make these changes, and
who is responsible for implementing these changes.
So, finally, I want to say that the Department needs the
money to do these cleanups, obviously. I don't understand how
the Trump administration's proposed budget cuts to this office
would help DOE accomplish this enormous mission.
As we look forward to the difficult cleanup tasks ahead,
this committee will continue to call on the Government
Accounting Office to conduct its important work in this area
and will continue to demand that the Department of Energy take
tangible actions necessary to build a disciplined and effective
cleanup program.
So, Madam Chair, these are some of the most costly,
dangerous, and difficult sites in the world to clean up, and so
I appreciate what you are doing in having this hearing because
we really have to get this right.
I don't think anybody else wants my time so I will yield
back, Madam Chair. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Today, the committee continues its oversight of the
Department of Energy (DOE), and the Office of Environmental
Management's (EM) efforts to clean up the legacy nuclear waste
sites remaining from the Cold War.
Decades of producing materials for our country's nuclear
weapons program has led to a massive and ongoing cleanup of
nuclear and hazardous waste.
These sites contain some of the most dangerous materials on
earth and some of the costliest and technically challenging to
cleanup. Waste at these sites consists of millions of gallons
of radioactive waste, thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel
and other nuclear material, as well as contaminated soil and
water. The consequences for not getting this right are
enormous-to the environment, human health, and the taxpayer.
The U.S. Government is responsible for costs associated
with cleaning up these contaminants at Federal sites and
facilities, and the estimated cost of future environmental
cleanup is referred to as environmental liability.
DOE is currently responsible for over 80 percent of the
Federal Government's total environmental liability, which
includes ongoing DOE cleanup efforts at 16 sites around the
country.
The costs associated with this effort are vast and rapidly
growing. As of this year, it has climbed to a staggering $377
billion.
One would expect that over time, as more money is spent,
DOE's environmental liability would be decreasing. But just the
opposite is occurring. Since 2011, DOE has seen environmental
liabilities grow by over $200 billion, while spending in the
same period was $48 billion.
So, even though we are spending billions each year,
environmental liabilities are growing at a level that is
outpacing DOE's spending.
In 2017, and again in 2019, the Government Accountability
Office included the Federal Government's environmental
liabilities on its High Risk List.
GAO continues to find numerous management challenges with
how DOE is managing the cleanup effort.
For example, according to GAO, DOE has not conducted a root
cause analysis to learn why the runaway growth in environmental
liabilities has occurred. That means DOE does not know with
certainty why this number keeps climbing.
GAO has also found that DOE fails to follow program and
project management leading practices.
This is all extremely concerning considering that DOE has
also inconsistently reported on its cleanup status to Congress,
and information that has been reported has been incomplete or
misleading. DOE's recent budget materials for EM also do not
reflect the funding EM anticipates is needed to meet its future
cleanup responsibilities.
I appreciate that Assistant Secretary White is taking
positive steps which appear to reflect her understanding of the
significant challenges facing DOE. But DOE needs to answer some
key questions about how they are managing the cleanup program.
This committee needs to know if EM is planning to make the
changes GAO says are necessary, what resources it needs to make
these changes, and who is responsible for implementing these
changes.
Finally, DOE needs money to do these cleanups- and I don't
understand how the Trump administration's proposed budget cuts
to this office would help DOE accomplish this enormous mission.
As we look forward to the difficult cleanup tasks ahead,
this committee will continue to call on GAO to conduct its
important work in this area and will continue to demand the DOE
take tangible actions necessary to build a disciplined and
effective cleanup program.
Madam Chair, these are some of the most costly, dangerous,
and difficult sites in the world to cleanup. We must get this
right.
Ms. DeGette. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Walden, for 5 minutes for purposes of an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON
Mr. Walden. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate
you holding this hearing about the growing environmental
liabilities associated with the U.S. Department of Energy's
nuclear waste cleanup and I can't help but--after my friend
from New Jersey described the President's budget, and I
disagree with it in some of these areas, at least the President
put out a budget, unlike our Democrat majority that punted on
the issue of a budget this time. This subject is of enormous
importance to the Nation, especially for local communities near
contaminated sites such as those at Hanford.
We know all too well the issues that the Office of
Environmental Management handles. The threat of potential
environmental disaster and pollution persists in the minds of
Oregonians and people throughout the Pacific Northwest.
As you all know, we have 56 million gallons of Cold War-era
toxic nuclear waste sitting in corroding and leaking metal
tanks, some of which were built to last a whopping 20 years. It
has been more than 20 years since World War II.
Hanford is a worrisome neighbor for us and the Federal
Government has not always been a trusted and reliable partner.
It also presents a difficult and complex challenge with a scale
that is difficult to appreciate on paper.
The Hanford site itself is nearly half the size of Rhode
Island--half the size of Rhode Island. In August of 2017,
Secretary Perry and I went out to Hanford to get a firsthand
look and an evaluation of the work being done there to clean up
that site. Indeed, there is a lot of work going on.
But there is plenty left to do, as you all know. But the
end goal is to mobilize high-level nuclear waste into a glass
material similar to this puck that they gave us out there. By
the way, this is not actually nuclear waste. I would just point
that out. It is not exactly radioactive.
This difficult work must be done as safely and efficiently
as possible and in a cost-effective way. Cleaning up the waste
at Hanford and at other sites across the Nation is a top
priority and under my leadership last Congress on this
committee we made a bipartisan request that the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, known as the GAO, examine this issue of
performance management at the cleanup sites under the control
of DOE's Environmental Management, or EM.
EM is responsible for remediating the environmental
contamination attributable to the Nation's nuclear weapons
systems including the cleanup of liquid nuclear tank waste,
stabilization, and packaging of nuclear materials and
decommissioning--decontaminating closed nuclear facilities.
The financial costs of DOE's environmental liabilities are
high and we all know that. In total, DOE's EM liabilities are
$377 billion with DOE's total environmental liabilities
reaching almost $500 billion.
These numbers increased by $110 billion between fiscal 2017
and 2018 due in large part to DOE recalculating the baseline
costs for the Hanford site, and I understand that is the first
time that's been done in basically a decade since 2009.
A few months ago, GAO issued our requested report and we
appreciate your work on this matter, and found accountability
to be lacking in key areas such as whether or not cleanup
performance is cost-efficient and effective, and according to
your report, DOE and EM have not established classification
requirements such that most cleanup activities would be treated
as projects subject to more stringent requirements instead of
operational activities.
So as a result, there is greater risk to cost overruns and
scheduled delays, and we have, obviously, seen both of those
over the years at Hanford.
DOE spends, roughly, $6 billion a year on cleanup. But we
don't always have a clear visibility into what that means in
terms of completing the mission.
EM reports on the amount of nuclear cleanup completed each
year but for that amount of money spent how many radioactive
tanks should have been treated?
How much soil and water should have been remediated? We
don't have clear answers to these questions because, according
to GAO, EM's performance measures for operations activities do
not always provide a clear and reliable picture.
Although EM has undertaken several studies to address the
growing costs in its cleanup program, GAO found that EM had not
conducted a formal root cause analysis to identify the causes
for the growth in its environmental liability.
So these issues and others have been acknowledged by the
Department and Environmental Management and has proposed or is
exploring changes to allow for quicker and more cost-effective
cleanup of the remaining sites. EM is pursuing an end-state
contracting model for several sites and using a multifaceted
approach to address liabilities including the use of current
cleanup technologies for waste, composition, and risk, updating
key project life cycle estimates, and providing transparency
when it comes to liability data.
So I look forward to hearing more from the Department today
on its actions and proposals and, ultimately, however to
progress on the cleanup of the waste at Hanford and other sites
requires a safe, secure, and permanent storage location for the
waste.
And while this hearing should help get the cleanup efforts
on a better track, Yucca Mountain is the cornerstone of the
Nation's nuclear waste disposal and we need to move forward
again, this time in this Congress, again in a bipartisan way,
to improve the performance and effectiveness of cleanup and
build a durable solution at Yucca.
This committee led on that effort under John Shimkus'
leadership on the subcommittee and we passed the bill with 340
votes in the House. It is time to do it again and get the
Senate to put it on the President's desk.
With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Walden
Thank you, Chair DeGette. I appreciate you holding this
hearing about the growing environmental liabilities associated
with the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear waste
cleanup.
This subject is of enormous importance to the Nation, and
especially for local communities near contaminated sites, such
as those at Hanford. We know all too well the issues that the
Office of Environmental Management (EM) handles. The threat of
potential environmental disaster and pollution persists in the
minds of Oregonians and people throughout the Pacific
Northwest. With 56 million gallons of Cold War era toxic
nuclear waste sitting in corroding and leaking metal tanks,
some of which were built to last just 20 years, Hanford is a
worrisome neighbor and the Federal Government has not always
been a trusted and reliable partner.
It also presents a difficult and complex challenge with a
scale that's difficult to appreciate on paper. The Hanford site
itself is nearly half the size of Rhode Island. In August of
2017, Secretary Perry and I went out to Hanford to get a
firsthand look at the work being done to clean up the site.
There is plenty left to do, but the end goal is to immobilize
high-level nuclear waste into a glass material similar to this
puck. This difficult work must be done as safely and
efficiently as possible in a cost-effective way.
Cleaning up the waste at Hanford and at other sites across
the Nation is a top priority. Under my leadership last
Congress, we made a bipartisan request that the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) examine the issue of performance
management at the cleanup sites under the control of DOE
Environmental Management-or EM.
EM is responsible for remediating the environmental
contamination attributable to the Nation's nuclear weapons
program, including the cleanup of liquid nuclear tank waste,
stabilization, and packaging of nuclear materials, and
decommissioning and decontaminating closed nuclear facilities.
The financial costs of DOE's environmental liabilities are
high--in total, DOE's EM liabilities are $377 billion, with
DOE's total environmental liabilities reaching almost $500
billion. These numbers increased by $110 billion between fiscal
year 2017 and 2018 due in large part to DOE recalculating the
baseline costs for the Hanford site.
A few months ago, GAO issued our requested report, and
found accountability to be lacking in key areas such as whether
cleanup performance is cost-efficient and effective. According
to the GAO, DOE and EM have not established classification
requirements such that most cleanup activities would be treated
as projects, subject to more stringent requirements, instead of
operational activities. As a result, there are greater risks to
cost overruns and schedule delays.
DOE spends roughly $6 billion a year on cleanup, but we
don't always have clear visibility into what that means in
terms of completing the mission. EM reports on the amount of
nuclear cleanup completed each year, but for that amount of
money spent, how many radioactive tanks should have been
treated? How much soil and water should have been remediated?
We don't have clear answers to these questions because,
according to GAO, EM's performance measures for operations
activities do not always provide a clear and reliable picture.
Although EM has undertaken several studies to address the
growing costs in its cleanup program, GAO found that EM had not
conducted a formal root cause analysis to identify the causes
for the growth in its environmental liabilities.
These issues and others have been acknowledged by the
Department, and EM has proposed or is exploring changes to
allow for quicker and more cost-effective cleanup of the
remaining sites. EM is pursuing an end-state contracting model
for several sites, and using a multifaceted approach to
addressing liabilities including the use of current cleanup
technologies for waste composition and risk; updating key
project lifecycle estimates; and providing transparency when it
comes to liability data. I look forward to hearing more from
the Department today on its actions and proposals.
Ultimately, however, true progress on the cleanup of the
waste at Hanford and other sites requires a safe, secure, and
permanent storage location for the waste. While this hearing
should help get the cleanup efforts on a better track, Yucca
Mountain is the cornerstone of the Nation's nuclear waste
disposal. We need to move forward in a bipartisan way to
greatly improve the performance and effectiveness of the
cleanup and build a durable solution at Yucca.
I welcome today's witnesses and thank them for their
attention to these important issues.
Ms. DeGette. The gentleman yields back, and I thank him.
And I agree. I think it is time for another trip out to
look at Hanford and Yucca. I was there many, many years ago
with Joe Barton when he was chair of this committee. So we
should do it.
I ask unanimous consent that the Members' written opening
statements be made part of the record, and without objection,
so ordered.
I would now like to introduce our panel of witnesses for
today's hearing: the Honorable Anne White, who is the Assistant
Secretary, Office of Environmental Management, Department of
Energy; David C. Trimble, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment of the Government Accountability Office. Thank you
both so much for being here today.
And you are aware that the committee is holding an
investigative hearing and when doing so has the practice of
taking testimony under oath.
Do either of you have any objections to testifying under
oath?
Ms. White. No.
Mr. Trimble. No.
Ms. DeGette. Let the record reflect the witnesses have
responded no. The Chair then advises you that under the rules
of the House and the rules of the committee you are entitled to
be accompanied by counsel.
Do either of you desire to be accompanied by counsel during
your testimony today?
Ms. White. No.
Mr. Trimble. No.
Ms. DeGette. Let the record reflect the witnesses have
responded no. If you would, please rise and raise your right
hand so you may be sworn in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Ms. DeGette. You may be seated. Let the record reflect that
the witnesses have responded affirmatively, and you are now
under oath and subject to the penalties set forth in Title 18,
Section 1001 of the United States Code.
The Chair will now recognize the witnesses for a 5-minute
summary of their written statements. In front of you is your
microphone, that you have already found, and a series of
lights.
The light will turn yellow when you have a minute left and
then red to indicate your time has come to an end.
Ms. White, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENTS OF ANNE WHITE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND DAVID C.
TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT,
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
STATEMENT OF ANNE WHITE
Ms. White. Thank you.
Chair DeGette, Ranking Member Guthrie, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here. I
appreciate the time your staff has spent with me over the past
few months.
We have had very constructive meetings. I look forward to
discussing efforts underway to reduce the liabilities and
enhance contracting approaches to propel the cleanup mission
towards safe completion sooner and at a responsible cost to the
American taxpayer.
Madam Chair, the Government's nuclear defense programs
played an integral role in ending World War II and the Cold
War. Our Nation was unified in its effort to end those wars.
That kind of resolve and unity of purpose is needed today
as we address the resulting environmental legacy. From day one,
Secretary Perry has made the cleanup mission a priority.
EM has completed cleanup at major sites over the past 20
years and made significant progress at the remaining 16 sites.
Rocky Flats, Fernald, and Mound were completed. Six of the nine
reactors along the Columbia River at Hanford were cocooned.
We treated 10 million gallons of tank waste and have poured
4,180 canisters of high-level waste glass at Savannah River
Site. We remain committed to completing cleanup so that our
host communities can envision a vibrant future with enduring
and diverse economic opportunities.
The Department also acknowledges that EM is the largest
program of its kind in the world and represents one of the
Government's top financial liabilities.
The liability increases that are of concern to me and to
this subcommittee did not accrue overnight. But understanding
some of the causes enables EM to offer solutions now.
We can continue to live in the past or we can choose to
understand the past, make course corrections, and move forward
with collaborative solutions. It is time to choose the latter.
Our knowledge and technology have matured significantly
over the years. We need to employ cleanup technologies that are
reflective of the latest knowledge in the areas of waste
composition and risks, lessons learned over decades of cleanup,
and attainable end states to drive down costs of these
liabilities.
Those efforts start with truly getting to the bottom of
what we are dealing with using accurate up-to-date information.
EM just underwent an independent review of the remaining
cleanup of the entire Hanford site and it is providing a new
level of transparency when it comes to liability data.
Having been on the contractor side of this program for 25
years I consider myself informed on the program's successes and
its failures. I have become well acquainted with the numerous
GAO reports that have provided EM with recommendations.
Implementing the changes recommended in those reports is
part of the challenge I agreed to take on once confirmed and I
reiterate my pledge to personally review GAO recommendations
and continue with development and refinement of plans that
address those recommendations.
I have established a team of experienced contract and
project management experts across the DOE complex to undertake
the transformational initiatives required to fulfil EM's
mission.
EM is making real progress in implementing a number of GAO
recommendations. We are implementing a 10-year strategic
planning options analysis to evaluate current approaches and
other recently identified opportunities that could reduce risk
and life cycle costs.
With billions of dollars in procurements coming up at some
of our largest sites over the next few years, EM has a
significant opportunity to improve procurement processes,
contract management, and oversight performance.
One of our most transformative initiatives is a new end-
state contracting model that will greatly enhance contract
management. It will provide for better requirements definition,
reduce risk by reducing task order time horizons and improve
contract incentives to drive performance.
Today, we face some important decisions about the
trajectory of the cleanup mission. I view this as an
opportunity to employ the most successful and sustainable EM
program.
Madam Chair, EM's greatest successes have historically been
achieved through hard work of our leaders determined to get
things done. I appreciate the support Congress has shown for
the cleanup mission and I look forward to working with the
subcommittee to deliver cost-conscious site completions that
protect the public, worker safety, and the environment.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. White follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much.
Now it is time for Mr. Trimble to testify, 5 minutes. You
are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE
Mr. Trimble. Chair DeGette, Ranking Member Guthrie, and
members of the subcommittee, my testimony today will focus on
DOE's large and growing environmental liability and GAO's
recent work on longstanding management weaknesses at EM that
have limited the effectiveness of the cleanup program.
What is environmental liability? It is the estimated cost
to clean up contamination from Government activities. This is
challenging for DOE and EM as they are responsible for cleaning
up radioactive and hazardous waste at sites across the country
generated during weapons production from the Manhattan Project
through the Cold War.
This waste poses risks to both the public and the
environment. EM must address contaminated soil and ground
water, decommissioned contaminated buildings, and construct and
operate facilities to treat millions of gallons of radioactive
waste.
These contaminated sites are often located near large
rivers and ground water sources for nearby communities. Why
does this issue deserve your attention now?
In short, DOE's environmental liabilities are huge and have
now reached a half a trillion dollars. Further, environmental
liabilities are now the Federal Government's third-highest
liability and DOE accounts for 85 percent of the total.
In addition, this problem is getting worse as the growth
and the liability is vastly outpacing the EM's ability to
reduce it. As has been noted, over the last 7 years, EM spent
$48 billion on cleanup. But the liability did not decrease.
Instead, it increased by $214 billion. Further, we noted in
our high risk report that DOE's liability numbers likely
understate the true liability and will continue to grow.
EM receives about $7 billion a year in funding each year
and actually has fewer sites to clean up than it did in 2011.
So why the runaway cost growth?
Notably, over 40 percent of EM's budget does not go to
cleanup activities but, rather, simply to maintain its sites.
At several locations these overhead costs consume over half of
the site's budget.
Most concerning, though, is that EM has not done a root
cause analysis to understand the factors driving this cost
growth. GAO's recent work has focused on management of the EM
cleanup program. Here are some of our key findings.
EM does not have a nationwide cleanup strategy and relies
primarily on individual sites to establish their own
priorities, which do not always balance overall risks and
costs.
EM does not manage its work as an integrated program. A
recent work compared DOE's cleanup policy to nine leading
program management practices and found EM did not meet any of
them.
These practices include basic tools like having a program
management plan, a schedule, and measuring program performance.
We also found that EM does not follow most project management
practices.
Specifically, EM's policy did not meet nine of 12 leading
practices reexamined. These practices include such things as
identifying root causes of problems and developing a corrective
action plan to address cost overruns.
EM's shortcomings in project management are especially
notable because of the project other parts of DOE have made in
this area. Why the disconnect? EM does not classify the vast
majority of its work as projects. This approach has allowed EM
to avoid DOE's stricter requirements for project management.
Our work has also found that the data EM uses to track and
report on its cleanup work has significant limitations. This is
important because bad performance data is similar to driving a
car without working gauges on your dashboard.
Notably, cleanup milestones for EM sites across the country
are routinely changed when in danger of being missed. But these
changes are not tracked or recorded.
So why have the problems of EM's cleanup mission not
received more attention? One reason is that EM has not
consistently reported to Congress on its cleanup efforts.
Under the 2011 defense bill, EM must annually report
estimated cost and funding needs for future cleanup activities.
EM's 2017 submission to Congress was only the second one since
2011, and it did not include a detailed list of planned cleanup
actions or required funding.
GAO is encouraged by the actions EM is reportedly planning
to address our recommendations. Let me note that three of the
criteria GAO uses in assessing progress in Federal high risk
are particularly relevant to EM at this time.
First, EM needs a comprehensive plan for the changes that
need that be made. Second, EM needs to understand and address
the staff skills needed to make and sustain these changes. And
third, EM will need to monitor its progress against its plan to
adapt and adjust as necessary.
In closing, the actions EM needs to take involve
significant cultural change at DOE headquarters, the sites, and
the contractors. The scope of this effort will require
sustained support from senior DOE leadership, Congress, as well
as key stakeholders.
Thank you again for the committee's commitment to oversight
of this important issue.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Trimble. It is now time for
Members to ask you questions. The Chair recognizes herself for
5 minutes.
I want to begin by getting a greater understanding of the
challenges facing DOE's Environmental Management office in
cleaning up these sites.
Mr. Trimble, is it fair to say that the remaining sites
where cleanup work remains are some of the most complex to
clean up and will be the most costly?
Mr. Trimble. Absolutely. The sites that are left are some
of the biggest and scariest. Hanford and Savannah River, of
course, pop to mind.
Ms. DeGette. Yes. OK.
You testified that in fiscal year 2011 the environmental
liability facing EM was estimated to be $163 billion. Since
then, that number has climbed each year and now the liability
is estimated to be $377 billion. That's a $214 billion increase
in just 7 years.
Now, it is my understanding that EM has been unable to
articulate to GAO why the environmental liability keeps growing
at a rapid pace like that. Is that true?
Mr. Trimble. Yes, that is true.
Ms. DeGette. And it is also my understanding that EM's
environmental liability could keep growing, and if that happens
I was just saying to Mr. Guthrie increasing liability not only
poses a threat to the taxpayer but to the environment because
operations might need to be delayed or even deferred.
So, very briefly, I just would like you to tell me would
delaying work on the projects increase the risk to both the
taxpayer and the environment?
Mr. Trimble. Absolutely. Delays increase the overall cost
of the work and when you delay the work it means those
communities face the environmental risks for that much longer.
Ms. DeGette. Now, in your testimony, Mr. Trimble, you
describe how EM is facing a number of challenges about how it
manages its environmental cleanup programs.
For example, GAO found that EM is not following a number of
best program and management practices. Is that correct?
Mr. Trimble. Yes, that is correct.
Ms. DeGette. And GAO also found that EM has not resolved
longstanding management challenges and doesn't have a
programwide cleanup strategy to this day to address increased
cleanup costs. Is that right?
Mr. Trimble. That is correct.
Ms. DeGette. Now, I think you testified in your--in your
statement that they really need to develop three things: a
comprehensive plan, staff skills, and a way to monitor the
progress and they also need cultural change over there.
Is that, in essence, what needs to happen?
Mr. Trimble. Yes. The scope of these changes are brought
and significant, and when you make those kind of changes it
invariably involves cultural change in the organization.
Ms. DeGette. And so I turn to you, obviously, Secretary
White, and want to ask you what is your position on those
recommendations that GAO has made?
Ms. White. So during my confirmation hearing I talked
specifically about the recommendations and that I am looking
forward to implementing them.
Having been in the field for quite some time, there were
cases where I said wow, GAO really has that right. So----
Ms. DeGette. Uh-huh. But what about in particular what Mr.
Trimble says, the comprehensive plan, the staff skills,
monitoring the progress and the cultural change?
Ms. White. Absolutely. We are moving out on all of those
recommendations. They are--we will respond to those with all
concur and we have already begun to revise our program and
project management policy--the cleanup policy to ensure it
incorporates the best management practices pointed out by GAO.
For the first time in the history of the program we have
all of the sites' life cycle baselines loaded into one
centralized system in headquarters so that we will be able to
monitor progress and track changes and look at milestones and
have meaningful metrics that are going to all us to more
carefully monitor performance, very consistent with the GAO
recommendations.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, and I guess I want to ask you,
because--and I know more people are going to ask about this,
but the budget constraints--are those going to impact your
ability to implement these changes?
Ms. White. So I don't believe so because the changes that
we are making are going to be at headquarters mainly and it is
going to involve, as we say, new kind of communication with the
sites, and right now that is called program direction funding.
We have plenty of funding to do so.
Ms. DeGette. And what is your opinion about that, Mr.
Trimble?
Mr. Trimble. Well, we have not looked directly at the
budget. My----
Ms. DeGette. Well, what about the other structural changes
at the----
Mr. Trimble. Yes. What I would say is that I think part of
the effort, given the scope of the changes that we are talking
about, that the EM would benefit from a thorough analysis of
the resources it needs to carry out these changes because if
you implement program and project management best practices you
need staff with different skills. Or the staff may be there. I
am not sure. But you have to do that assessment and you either
have to train or hire additional skills who are expert in these
areas to actually successfully execute the change in direction.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, and thanks to both of you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Guthrie for 5 minutes.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you. Thank you, Chair, for the
recognition, and these are to Secretary White.
Did the taxpayer get good value for the $6 billion EM,
roughly, spent last fiscal year on nuclear waste cleanup?
Ms. White. I think by and large, yes. We do struggle at
Hanford because of the complexity and some of the costs
associated with carrying out our work there. But I believe the
taxpayer got good value for their money.
Mr. Guthrie. OK. It leads----
Ms. White. We can do better, though.
Mr. Guthrie. OK. This leads to my next question. So I think
you might answer, but I was going to--are you implementing
reforms to ensure that the taxpayer is getting good value for
cleanup procedures and how will those reforms help better
account for EM's performance for dollars spent?
Ms. White. Yes. So one of the major things we are doing is
our end-state contracting approach and very similar to Rocky
Flats is--it takes that same kind of process but applies it to
a smaller time period and not necessarily closure.
And what that is going to allow us to do is that we have
our preaward, we select and we are selecting based on personnel
first because in my experience in the field it is having the
right personnel, not necessarily the right company or group of
companies.
So that is our first criteria. Once we make the award then
we are sitting down with the contractor and partnering to
figure out, OK, what is the first task order going to look
like. It could be 2 years of work. It could be 3 years of work.
It will depend on the site.
But what that does is, as one of my predecessors said, it
allows us to chunk the work so that we can better manage it
rather than having these 10-year periods of performance that
can be very difficult to monitor and measure and look after.
So this is going to put us on a much shorter time horizon
which will allow us to better understand what exactly it is it
we are buying and have the scope very well understood, and once
that happens that is what allows us to really monitor progress
and ensure that we are spending money effectively.
So that is one of the biggest things. The other thing we
are moving out on and have been looking at for a while is our
existing contracts have performance evaluation measurements
plans and they are developed at the site level. We have put
together--these are called PEMPs--we have put together a PEMP
review board and we are going to be looking very carefully at
the PEMPs as they roll out, again, to ensure we are not just
paying fee for contractors to show up and do their base work.
We want to be paying contractors to really exceed and excel.
So that is one of the things we are doing. Same thing with
a fee determination board. We stood one up at headquarters so
that we can be reviewing how a fee is getting paid to
contractors and ensure some consistency because some fee
determination officials are easier graders than others and so
we want to just try and drive some consistency there about what
our expectations are at the programmatic level.
Mr. Guthrie. OK. Thank you.
And while DOE's most recent financial statements have shown
a sharp increase in environmental liability over the last
fiscal year, DOE's liability has been increasing for years.
For example, between 2011 and 2017, EM's liability grew
$105 billion. Why does DOE's environmental liability keep going
up?
Ms. White. We are going to find that out.
Mr. Guthrie. OK.
Ms. White. We are in the process of doing a detailed root
cause analysis to have a look. Most what we know intuitively,
though, is that it is time. Time is money. So as the life cycle
baselines kick out, the liability goes up. But we are going to
do a much more detailed analysis than my spidey senses.
Mr. Guthrie. OK. And, similarly, why do timetables for--
estimated timetables for cleanup keep getting delayed?
Ms. White. So there are a lot of factors involved there,
some of which is the regulatory agreements we have at these
sites by and large are pretty old and we have learned a lot
since we entered into these agreements, and industry commercial
disposal options have opened up that were not necessarily
accounted for previously.
So that is some of it. Some of it is just not really being
effective in holding the contractors accountable to complete
the work scope. There are a number of factors. But putting
together our program and project management policy I believe is
going to address a lot of these concerns.
Mr. Guthrie. I am going to switch to my last questions
because I only have about 20 seconds. What can Congress do to
support or assist?
Ms. White. Just--you have been very supportive in terms of
funding traditionally. So that would be good.
Mr. Guthrie. OK. Thank you. Well, that completes my
questions and I will yield back.
Mr. Kennedy [presiding]. Chair thanks the gentleman.
The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Castor, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Office of Environmental Management, referred to as EM,
is responsible for cleaning up our Nation's legacy nuclear
weapons sites.
Today, EM has completed cleanup at a number of sites.
Sixteen sites, however, still need cleanup and these are
probably the most challenging to address.
GAO has published several reports that express serious
concerns about EM's management of its nuclear waste sites.
Mr. Trimble, you have testified that EM does not have a
programwide strategy to appropriately address its vast and
growing environmental liability, correct? Why not?
Mr. Trimble. That--I mean, I think that is the key
question. I think the answer is that for the longest time, and
we are talking decades here, the EM program has largely been
managed through a delegation of key decisions to the sites.
In many ways, the EM program has operated as a
confederation of sites rather than as a coherent program with a
plan and clear direction.
Ms. Castor. In fact, in a January 2019 report GAO discussed
EM's lack of a programwide strategy, and here is what you said:
``Without a strategy that sets national priorities and
describes how DOE will address its greatest risks, EM lacks
assurance that it is making the most cost-effective cleanup
decisions across its site.''
Will you put that in simple layman's terms? What does it
mean that EM does not have a strategy and how is this affecting
cleanup efforts?
Mr. Trimble. Well, it means that key decisions regarding
resources and how to address risk are made at the micro level
at each site. So that collectively when you look at the EM
budget their risk benefit analysis isn't being done. You will
get inconsistent decisions regarding priorities and the
deployment of resources across sites. You may be spending money
at one site where there is a greater risk at another site.
The other issues are you just--you end up being very
inefficient in terms of tackling your most pressing
environmental tasks.
Ms. Castor. All right. GAO reported that EM, quote, ``does
not collect or maintain reliable cost, schedule, or milestone
data on its projects.
Ms. White, without reliable cost, schedule, or milestone
data, how can EM have a clear picture of whether it is
effectively managing its environmental liabilities?
Ms. White. That is a great point and that is, again, why we
have moved out with a number of initiatives to incorporate GAO
recommendations and that includes the program and project
management policy which is going to gather the data, ensure
that we have good sound cost estimating. That is going to be
extremely important on our end-state contracting model
because----
Ms. Castor. And I know you said don't go back and look at
the past. But, I mean, that is irresponsible. A lack of
reliable data makes it difficult to effectively manage----
Ms. White. And it has been--it has been that case for
decades. So we are trying to change it.
Ms. Castor. Yes. In fact, in your testimony you say the
Department views this as an opportunity. The most successful EM
is a program reflective of the latest scientific knowledge
about ways to using the most up-to-date cost and schedule
estimates and that incorporates lessons learned from the last
30 years of cleanup.
But for decades EM has tried to develop overall strategies
to better manage and prioritize risks. Those strategies have
come and gone. But as we have heard today the problems persist.
So I am going to ask this as simply as I possibly can. Do
you have a plan and is your plan supported by the right staff
and resources so that it will succeed in addressing these
problems?
Ms. White. Yes, we do have a plan. As I said, we are going
to improve our program management and project management.
Ms. Castor. And I hope getting a handle on the liabilities.
For you to admit that you don't even have an understanding of
the liabilities is very serious.
Ms. White. And, again, at the recommendation of GAO we are
doing a very detailed root cause analysis of what is driving
that. Some of it is that scope gets added. Some of it is that
we learn more about the work at hand.
So it is a number of factors. But we are going to get to
the bottom of that and as soon as we do I would love to come
brief your staff.
Ms. Castor. Well, if DOE is serious about cleaning up
environmental hazards, the Department needs to manage its
efforts professionally and effectively.
It is long past time for DOE to get its act together and I
look forward to hearing from the Department on the progress.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Kennedy. The Chair thanks the gentlelady.
The Chair recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Walden.
Mr. Walden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and again I
want to thank the work of the GAO and Secretary White. Thank
you for stepping into this and trying to clean up this mess.
As you say, it has been going on a long time, and we are
making progress, but we know there is a lot more work to be
done.
It has been mentioned there was a sharp increase in
environmental liability over the last fiscal year of more than
$110 billion, growing from $384 billion to $494 billion.
As I understand it, this was primarily due to an increase
in the estimated costs of the cleanup at the Hanford site in
Washington for which the life cycle costs had not been updated
since 2009.
Is that correct?
Ms. White. That is correct.
Mr. Walden. OK. And does DOE know what specifically made
Hanford's life cycle costs increase so much over a 10-year
period?
Ms. White. It was largely due to expanded time that it is
going to take, and as Mr. Trimble noted, there is a very high
hotel cost that is associated with our sites--just keeping the
lights on, if you will.
So when you increase the time that costs drags along with
you. So it is almost all driven by time.
Mr. Walden. OK. So during the Obama administration they
never updated this baseline cost is how I would look at this.
According to information provided to the committee by DOE,
Hanford accounts for about 64 percent of the Office of
Environmental Management's fiscal year 2018 liability. What
about Hanford makes it account for over half of EM's liability?
Ms. White. It is one of our more complex sites.
Mr. Walden. Sure is.
Ms. White. Again, we entered into an agreement in 1989.
That is a little bit cumbersome right now because things have
changed.
The other part of it is though we have made really good
progress out there. PFP, for example, is moving forward. The K-
Basin sludges are going to remove the radioactive material from
one of the last reactors and many other things. The whole river
corridor cleanup project was fairly successful.
So progress is being made. Our real challenge there is the
tank waste.
Mr. Walden. Yes, it is, and I know when Secretary Perry
made a commitment early on to go out and see it and I toured,
as I said, the site with him and the National Lab, which does
amazing work as well.
It looked like they were finally getting the new equipment
in place and installed where they could begin to deal with this
cleanup and so I applaud the work that Secretary Perry and you
are doing here to kind of finally get this in the right
direction.
The question I have too is how many other sites need to
have their life cycle costs updated and should we expect cost
increases when those are updated?
Ms. White. So we have, as I said, loaded all the life cycle
baselines into a centralized system for the first time in the
history of the program. We are analyzing that data now.
I would not expect to see anything like the increase that
we saw on Hanford.
Mr. Walden. OK. So this mission has been going on for
decades. It will continue for decades, unfortunately, for sites
like Hanford that are not estimated to be cleaned up until 2070
to 2075, I believe, is the latest estimate.
While I want to ensure that this mission is completed
safely there are environmental and safety concerns about the
length of time it is estimated to take to clean up some of
these sites.
For example, it is my understanding some of the tanks at
Hanford have already started to leak because the tanks weren't
made to hold waste for this length of time.
Isn't that correct?
Ms. White. That is correct.
Mr. Walden. We had leakers there, I know. What are--what
are some of the risks of the mission taking longer than
expected and what is EM doing to prevent these risks from
harming the public or the environment?
Ms. White. Yes. So some of the risks involve, of course,
worker safety, first and foremost. The other part of the risk
is, you know, for example, PUREX Tunnel 2--those kind of
things. So----
Mr. Walden. And that is the one where the rail cars are
underneath and----
Ms. White. Correct.
Mr. Walden [continuing]. The roof collapsed and opened them
up?
Ms. White. Correct. And the other tunnel we just finished
grouting that tunnel completely. So that was a big success and
it takes some risk off the table.
So there are things we can do to remediate risks as they
arise.
Mr. Walden. I know that the little piece of glass I have
here that was what--eventually these will be long tubes of
glassified nuclear waste. But I notice when recently they
announced they had finished turning three gallons of this toxic
sludge into glass, I believe, which meant only 56 million
gallons left to go.
So I mean, this--they are just starting up but I think that
is correct, isn't it?
Ms. White. Yes. The three gallons actually was sent offsite
as part of the test bed initiative and disposed of in Texas. So
we actually removed waste from the State of Washington.
Mr. Walden. Well, that is good. For my friends in Texas, we
are glad to send you some of our byproduct of saving the world.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Walden. Yes, so this is a message, and finally it is 10
seconds. I don't know if they can throw this slide up. But for
those uninitiated, when you see the site of Hanford you see
right next to it the Columbia River.
Ms. White. Yes.
Mr. Walden. The mighty Columbia River, and this is--and I
know some of the geology tilts the other way. So they told us,
you know, the odds of it ever leaking into the river are pretty
slim. But, you know, we really don't want our salmon to glow at
night and so we need to keep after this and I am glad you are
on it and I am glad GAO is keeping an eye over your shoulder as
well.
So thank you, Mr. Chair, for your indulgence and thanks for
the work you're doing.
Ms. White. Absolutely. Thanks.
Mr. Kennedy. The Chair thanks the ranking member, and I am
grateful that you have that disc in your pocket.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms.
Schakowsky, for 5 minutes.
Jan?
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chair. I
appreciate that.
Ms. White, you have been there a short time. But you have
been in the business and in the field as a contractor for a
long time, right?
Ms. White. That is correct. Twenty-five--over 25 years.
Ms. Schakowsky. So you know that we are talking about a
problem that has existed for the last 50 years, really, and I
think there is good reason, including river contamination
potentially, that we need to do more and that this is really
long, long overdue--50 years of nuclear weapons production and
energy research.
I am glad we are having this hearing because I think a lot
of people are not aware of this and yet we are talking about
billions of dollars. Three hundred and seventy-seven billion
dollars is what was spent.
Is that the budget or the increase? That is the whole
budget, right, for last year?
Ms. White. That's the liability. Yes.
Ms. Schakowsky. That is the liability?
Ms. White. Right.
Ms. Schakowsky. And it is the third greatest of the
liabilities that we have in our agencies, right?
Ms. White. That is right.
Ms. Schakowsky. Yes. And it has been growing, even though
the number of sites hasn't increased and so, really, the GAO
has helped us try and figure out why, and let me first turn to
Mr. Trimble here.
Where is all that money going? I understand that half,
sometimes 60 percent, is just going to keep the lights on at
these places--not to remediate but to keep the lights on.
Mr. Trimble. That is correct. There is a large amount of
money that is basically called min safe--keep the facility
operating if you have a closed facility. Make sure the roof
doesn't collapse, to protect the workers.
So about half of the money or 40 percent of the money is
going to that work. I think the challenge in terms of seeing
what you're getting for your money is without operating it as a
program with a clear direction of where you want to be and
where you expect to be, and without using project management
skills to help you get there and measure your progress it is
hard to tell what you are getting for the rest of your money.
There is stuff being done. You are hearing buildings being
closed or being remediated. But you don't know necessarily
whether it should have been twice as much as they got done or
they are getting great results and they are getting twice as
much done with the same dollars, right, because they are not
evaluating it against best practices. You don't know what you
should be doing with the dollars you are spending.
So it is hard to tell whether you are getting value and
whether you are getting to where you need to go at the end of
the day.
Ms. Schakowsky. So the 2070 time line is that something
that you projected? Who projected that it would be done by--
that seems unreasonable to me.
Ms. White. That was a result of an independent review we
had one. It was part of our TPA milestone. A tri-party
agreement milestone requires us to update the life cycle
baseline and we did that, and what some of it has to do with
long time lines is maintenance on the facilities and having to
have, as you say, the hotel load to keep the lights on as part
of the funding profile.
So there are a number of factors there, and we are actively
looking at alternatives because of the life cycle baseline cost
increase. Our project management order requires us to do an
analysis of alternatives, which is underway now.
Ms. Schakowsky. So you agree with the GAO findings, do you?
Ms. White. I do. I do.
We need to do better in program and project management and
I think we can do better. In terms of the priorities across the
various sites, unfortunately, CERCLA has a national priorities
list and the sites are treated separately.
However, in 2015, there was a omnibus risk report that came
out that was actually required. It was a congressional report
and it pointed out a number of opportunities to look at our
work scope more in the way that Mr. Trimble would like us to.
Ms. Schakowsky. When you were working as a contractor did
you see these kinds of problems, inefficiencies, things that
needed to be changed?
Ms. White. There were times I did. There were times,
though, when I also saw really absolutely amazing work get done
by absolutely amazing people who were ready to innovate and
roll up their sleeves and go.
It has been more that than the inefficiencies and less than
stellar cost behavior.
Ms. Schakowsky. How do you explain to the taxpayers that
while the number of sites has not changed that there has been
this astonishing increase in the cost?
Ms. White. Again, the latest increase is driven almost
completely by Hanford. We are doing good work at our other
sites and we are doing good work at Hanford, too. We are
coalesced around the direct feed low-activity waste mission. It
is going very well. So we are starting to pick up some speed
and momentum and a little velocity.
Ms. Schakowsky. So you are saying--am I out of time?
Oh, I am sorry. I am out of time. That goes so fast.
Ms. White. It does.
Ms. Schakowsky. Doesn't it?
Ms. White. It does.
Ms. Schakowsky. OK.
Ms. White. I will come and brief you----
Ms. Schakowsky. I hope you will start going real fast, too.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Schakowsky. I yield back. Sorry.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. The Chair thanks the gentlelady.
The Chair will recognize the gentlelady from Indiana, Mrs.
Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you very much and I agree, our 5 minutes
goes really fast.
I want to talk--I want to start out with you, Mr. Trimble,
with respect to the report from February of 2019 where GAO made
seven recommendations and focused on the project contract
management piece.
Should most of the cleanup work be classified as operations
activities or as projects? And that seems to be what part of
your report talks about is a huge problem and difference.
Mr. Trimble. Yes. I think what we say in that report is
that large chunk of the work currently managed as operations
activities are projects and what we noted in there is that
other people, the experts--some of the project management
experts in DOE headquarters felt the same way and raised these
concerns to EM in 2015 and EM at that time did not yield there.
Mrs. Brooks. And why does the classification as to what
work they are doing make a difference between operations
activities versus the project?
Mr. Trimble. The main--the main reason is over the last 10
years DOE's management of contracts and projects has been on
GAO's high risk list since 1990. It is another high risk area.
For the last 10, 15 years we have done a lot of work in
that area and DOE, to its credit, has made significant
improvements to how it manages projects and what that means is
they tighten up their requirements in something called Order
413.
So on the weapons side, NNSA, where they are building large
projects, they have tightened up those requirements and they
have seen significant meaningful results as a result of those
tighter requirements.
By classifying it as an operations activity, you avoid
those tighter requirements. They are not subject to all the
improvements we have worked so hard over the last 10 years to
make.
Mrs. Brooks. Is there any cleanup activity or work that you
think should still be classified as operational activity versus
moving the cleanup over to the other category?
Mr. Trimble. No. These decisions really need to be left to
experts at DOE. What our recommendation is that EM needs to
work with the project management experts at DOE headquarters to
come up with a way of classifying this work appropriately.
Mrs. Brooks. So, Assistant Secretary White, is that
happening?
Ms. White. Yes. So what we are doing is in our program and
project management policy is all work is going to be covered by
a strict gated process and it fits in nicely with our end-state
contracting model because we will treat--say we have a 2- or 3-
year task order. We are going to treat that as a gated process
as a project that we are going to monitor and oversee.
Mrs. Brooks. So it will be reclassified then as a project
rather than operation activity?
Ms. White. We--what we are going to do, again, is our
program and project management policy follows all the GAO best
management practices and we are going to use that.
Within and underneath that we will also use 413.3.
Mrs. Brooks. And does that satisfy you, Mr. Trimble, as to
how the work will be classified?
Mr. Trimble. Proof is in the pudding. We have not seen
that. I think there is--our concern would still be the role for
DOE headquarters and their office of project management and
understanding those distinctions.
One of the key areas of--that is involved in doing best
practices for project management is having independent
oversight meaning independent of the people either running that
project or running the program.
Mrs. Brooks. Right.
Mr. Trimble. So that will be a key element of that.
Mrs. Brooks. Has EM ever classified a cleanup work as a
capital asset project?
Ms. White. Yes. Yes.
Mrs. Brooks. And which one was that?
Ms. White. That I know off the top of my head was Main
Plant demo out in New York.
Mrs. Brooks. And why was that classification not continued
for other cleanup projects?
Ms. White. So 413 is a project management order that, to
me, is most amenable to when you are building something. What
our program and project management policy does, again, it
incorporates all the best practices pointed out.
It also includes a gated process which means we would work
with the project management office--the overall DOE project
management office--on all of these things.
Mrs. Brooks. So are you--so are you now working with DOE
project management office at the highest levels in a different
way than you have been working than EM has been working with
them for decades?
Ms. White. Not--yes. So we have been--we work with them
very routinely. So with our, again, a revised policy we are
going to be working very closely with them. We have been
working closely with a number of people in the building. We
have some very good program and project management experts
involved in helping us develop this policy. So I think we are
in very good stead.
Mrs. Brooks. Is EM operating under any kind of constraints
to change the way these projects are managed as to whether or
not they are projects versus operational activities?
Ms. White. No. We don't have any constraints. The policy
will be an EM policy. So I don't feel constrained.
Mrs. Brooks. OK. Thank you. I yield.
Mr. Kennedy. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. The Chair
will recognize the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you
both for appearing before us today.
Over many years, GAO has identified management concerns
which encompass nearly all aspects of DOE's Office of
Environmental Management called EM including its direction
management ability to make effective decisions and to address
the legacy of nuclear contamination from the Cold War. This we
all know.
So I want to drill down on this a bit, Mr. Trimble. What
exactly does it mean that DOE's Environmental Management Office
does not follow leading management practices?
Mr. Trimble. Well, I think the easiest way to understand
that is the leading practices both in program and project
management are there to help you deliver your project or your
deliverable on time and on budget.
So when you are not following these practices, and these
are practices that--these come from industry. They come from
government. These aren't things GAO comes up with. These are
standard things people do to succeed.
So if you are not following any of these, it means your
chance of success is probably none. You have to follow these if
you want to deliver on time and on budget.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Trimble, you noted in a report just a few
months ago that until EM reviews and revises its cleanup policy
to include program management leading practices related to
scope, cost, scheduled performance, and independent review, the
EM program is at risk of continued uncontrolled changes to the
program scope, exceeding its cost estimate and schedule,
failing to meet its programmatic goals, and increasing DOE's
environmental liabilities.
Why is it important that EM change or revise its cleanup
policy to follow best practices in addressing cleanup
activities and why is it not doing it?
Mr. Trimble. It is critical because without doing so you
are never going to get a handle on that liability growth. To
achieve the mission, to protect these communities, to protect
the taxpayers' interests, you have to change course and embrace
these best practices.
I think the challenge in the past has been, as I mentioned,
DOE writ large has been on our high risk for project and
contract management since 1990 when we started that list and
this has not been something culturally that comes naturally to
DOE.
Ms. Clarke. Mm-hmm. So would it be fair to say that EM's
operations activities are still at risk of uncontrolled changes
which could further balloon costs and add time to the already
long schedules for cleaning up these sites?
Mr. Trimble. I am encouraged by the changes we hear DOE is
talking about. But until those are fully implemented, yes,
absolutely.
Ms. Clarke. Ms. White, I would think that if EM followed
these best practices for program management and project
management we might experience better outcomes.
I understand that you are in the process of trying to adopt
many of the recommendations made by GAO to implement these best
practices. But what is your plan for adopting these recommended
practices? What are your time lines for implementing them and
do you have the resources to take on this challenge?
Ms. White. So our program and project management policy is
in the last throes of internal review. It'll then go out to the
sites for their review and get reviewed by a number of
stakeholders really because what this is it is a bit of a
culture change.
So we want to make sure we engage all of our stakeholders,
if you will, and when I say that I mean the PM organization
within DOE--project management organization--and, again, the
sites.
So that should be rolling out fairly shortly. The other
thing I want----
Ms. Clarke. What does fairly shortly--I mean, has this
process already begun?
Ms. White. Oh, yes. We started revising the cleanup policy
well before we even got the----
Ms. Clarke. But you are saying creating this culture of
buy-in, essentially, right?
Ms. White. Yes. So----
Ms. Clarke. What is that like?
Ms. White. So basically because the sites are CERCLA sites
by and large, they are on a national priority list and they are
on a path. So by doing this program management policy it is
going to be a bit of a change for kind of the relationship
between the sites and headquarters. So that is one factor.
The other thing----
Ms. Clarke. Yes. So the question I have is it is a change
in culture, right, and oftentimes change is very difficult when
people are hardwired on the way things used to be.
How are you working at changing that culture and where are
you in that process? Are you getting the buy-in that is
required to expedite this? That is the important thing right
now, right?
Ms. White. I am getting the buy-in to expedite and get this
rolling. The other thing is we got really good buy-in and a lot
of excitement around our end-state contracting model, which is
a huge change to the way we have been doing business. But,
again, we have got a lot of really good energy around that and
a lot of good cooperation. So I feel very pleased with the
progress.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Trimble, what are your reactions to some of
the ideas that Ms. White is laying out here today?
Mr. Trimble. I am encouraged by their acceptance of our
recommendations and some of the ideas I would--you know, my
mother who, God bless her, is 97 now--always told me, ``I
didn't raise you to be an optimist.''
[Laughter.]
Mr. Trimble. Why I am at GAO, I suppose. But, you know, if
you look back over these issues going back to--you know, GAO
has been reporting on this--these--the challenges in the
cleanup program since the 1970s.
As I have said, the changes we are talking about are
fundamental. The areas that I would caution or have questions
in terms of some of the proposals is their end-state
contracting. I don't know enough about what that actually means
in practice of judge.
It sounds great. Contracting has been a challenge for DOE
so that is good. But contracting is not project management.
Contracting supports management. And so you have to have
management set up and then use contracting.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Kennedy. The Chair thanks the gentlelady.
The gentleman from Oklahoma is recognized. Mr. Mullin for 5
minutes.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for being
here.
Ms. White, I just want to talk a little bit more about the
project management. It is something that I do and have done my
whole life. I understand job sites. I understand the culture to
which you're talking about. But I don't understand implementing
best practices.
As a general contractor, if I want to make changes on my
job site, it is my job site. I am going to make changes because
it is for the best of the project. It is not allowed--it is not
even open for discussion. We are going to implement them
because it is the way we move the project forward. Those that
don't want to get on board they can find another job.
It is just the way that it works. Construction works
certain ways. And so when you're talking about cleanup sites,
you're working off $377 billion and rising. Would that be fair?
Ms. White. We hope not it is rising.
Mr. Mullin. Well, it is. Mr. Trimble, $377 billion and
rising. Would you agree?
Mr. Trimble. Absolutely. Yes.
Mr. Mullin. OK. So $377 billion and rising. Are you working
off any type of budget?
Ms. White. So we get usually around $6 billion plus per
year.
Mr. Mullin. So are these--are they going out to bid? Are
you bidding these projects?
Ms. White. Yes. So the way we are doing our----
Mr. Mullin. So if you're working off bids----
Ms. White. Yes.
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. You have got a project. We know
what needs to be accomplished on the project. We are bidding it
out. How are we not working off a budget?
Ms. White. So the way we have been doing contracting
previously is it was a 10-year ordering period and, quite
frankly----
Mr. Mullin. What do you mean 10-year ordering period?
Ms. White. So it is a 10-year period of performance. So
we----
Mr. Mullin. So they bid to work for 10 years?
Ms. White. They bid--yes, 10 years.
Mr. Mullin. Are they open bid? Are they bid a dollar
amount? How is that bid out?
Ms. White. They are open competition.
Mr. Mullin. No, I mean--I mean, do they bid it saying, I am
going to work for 10 years for X amount of dollars and I am
going to have X amount of employees on there and this is
equipment is going to be brought on?
Ms. White. So, basically. But----
Mr. Mullin. What do you mean--and just help me understand.
I am not trying to badger you. I am just saying, basically, it
sounds like to me if you're doing a $377 bid and rising that
you're not really bidding it out. You're getting a start price
and there's a thousand change orders that's coming behind it
each day.
Ms. White. Yes. Yes, and that was----
Mr. Mullin. So why are we allowing change orders? Did they
know the job? Did they know the scope of it before they went
in?
Ms. White. Not in many cases?
Mr. Mullin. How did they not? We knew what needed to be
done. And how long have we been on the site now?
Ms. White. So, traditionally----
Mr. Mullin. Not traditionally.
Ms. White. OK.
Mr. Mullin. We know what needs to be done. I am not talking
about the past. You're--we are looking forward.
Ms. White. Yes. So looking--looking----
Mr. Mullin. The past are mistakes we can learn from.
Ms. White. Looking forward, that's our end-state
contracting model exactly, so that we will know exactly what--
--
Mr. Mullin. So why isn't that already implemented them?
Ms. White. We are. We have RFPs on the street right now.
Mr. Mullin. So we are going to go to project. We are not
going to allow change orders because this happens all the time.
The change orders was the sneaky way that you came into a job
late at a low price and you used up----
Ms. White. We call it buy-in the job.
Mr. Mullin. Right. And then so now you get jobs all the
time and change orders aren't allowed. They will tell you right
off the bat. Change orders are not allowed until the--unless
the GC instructs change orders because, you know, every change
order comes with another change order from everybody
downstream.
Ms. White. Right.
Mr. Mullin. So that's how you get out of hand. So are
these--are these bid by Federal contractors? Who are these bid
by?
Ms. White. So usually it is--a LLC is set up by a group of
large contractors--Jacobs, Fluor, Bechtel.
Mr. Mullin. So were they--that are Federal employees that's
out there working on it?
Ms. White. So we have oversight responsibility but we don't
do the field work.
Mr. Mullin. So who is the general contractor on the job
sites?
Ms. White. So the general contractor on the job site would
be considered probably the president of the LLC.
Mr. Mullin. And the LLC bids the project and then moves
forward?
Ms. White. Yes, under our end-state contracting model how
it is going to work is we select people based on personnel
first because, based on my experience in the field, that's the
most important factor for a successful project.
Mr. Mullin. Personnel--explain that one to me.
Ms. White. So that's their key personnel. Who the company
is bidding to be the president----
Mr. Mullin. Well, to me, anybody that's been on this job
site should be fired. They are not doing their job right. So
how are you basing it personnel? I am just giving you the facts
of the matter. I am a business man and this is what I do for a
living so I get it. I would keep no one there.
If I am taking over a company that's failing, which these
projects are failing because they are going way over budget and
no end in sight, why would I keep the management intact?
Ms. White. I am not saying we are. I am just telling you
the way we are rolling out this contracting model and how it is
different and how it is going to improve performance.
Mr. Mullin. But I have questions when you're saying you're
basing it on personnel. What personnel are you looking for?
Because the model to which is being used isn't successful. It
is kind of difficult for me to say that I am going to bid a job
based on the personnel to which is coming forward.
Ms. White. There's a number of factors. It is not the only
factor.
Mr. Mullin. It should be based on the--on the work that
needs to be done and is the company capable of delivering it or
not.
Ms. White. Yes, and all of those factors are involved as
well.
Mr. Mullin. But you are saying you are--and I am not--I
will wrap up in just a second. I just want to clarify what
you're saying on here. You are saying you're basing the bid on
personnel.
Ms. White. No, I am not.
Mr. Mullin. But that's what you said.
Ms. White. There's three factors. It is personnel, it is
work scope, and it is their organization. So there's a number
of factors involved in the bidding process and the most
important thing that is going to improve performance is the
postaward negotiations which will limit or eliminate change
orders.
Mr. Mullin. Everything you said is why Federal contracts
cost so much. When you're bidding a job, double it. You're
still not going to come in on it.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Kennedy. Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms. Kuster, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Kuster. Thank you very much and thank you for being
with us today.
You know, I think the frustration you hear in a bipartisan
way is that we are hired by the constituents to protect public
safety and to protect the public dollars. These are hard-earned
tax dollars, and it is our role to find that balance, and we
want to work with you.
But when you're talking hundreds of billions of dollars, I
think it is important for us to have a plan and have a strategy
and not just continue to come back and pour more money after--
good money after bad. And so I think that's what you are
hearing from us.
I noted in the GAO report that the Office of Environmental
Management--and I am just going to quote here--lacks the
information needed to evaluate overall project performance and
assess whether it has sufficient staff or the right staff with
the rights skills to carry out the cleanup mission.
Now, you didn't create the problem and I appreciate you
coming on to do your part to clean this up. Let me start, Mr.
Trimble, with you.
Does the Office of Environmental Management have sufficient
capacity to appropriately handle the cleanup of our Nation's
most hazardous sites at this time?
Mr. Trimble. I think that is a key question and I would
encourage Anne to--as they embark on these new initiatives to
do an assessment of that.
One, you know, we have talked about DOE headquarters having
a project management office. You know, they can avail
themselves of that office. But I would note that there is a
robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul aspect of what is going on, because
in fact there was a Paul Bosco who moved from that office over
to EM to support EM in this transformation. But that just tells
you how thin the bench is, right----
Ms. Kuster. Right.
Mr. Trimble [continuing]. Both at DOE headquarters and in
the EM. So as they assess this, you know, Assistant Secretary--
you know, the efforts by the assistant secretary is great but
you need the horses on your bench to carry out because there
are a hundred other issues the assistant secretary has to
manage and you need the resources to do that, and I think an
assessment of that in terms of the skilled staff and the level
of staffing is important.
Ms. Kuster. And then let me ask you, Ms. White, the same
question. Does your office have sufficient capacity to
appropriately handle cleanup of our Nation's most hazardous
sites and my understanding is we are down to a dozen or so but
these are the most challenging sites.
Ms. White. Yes. So we are having a look at that, especially
within the context of some of our new approaches and
innovations. So we are having a close look at that and that is
something that is in process as we speak, and I also--we are
required, EM, to have an advisory board. So ours is creatively
called EM Advisory Board and we are also having them take a
look at this issue for us.
Ms. Kuster. And can I just ask, as the Oversight
Subcommittee of our Energy and Commerce Committee if we can be
considered part of your advisory board if you could report back
to us on that assessment of staff and personnel whether you
have the right people with the right skills.
So here is my--another concern that I have. In March, DOE
released its fiscal 2020 budget request. But this
administration has proposed reducing the Office of
Environmental Management budget to $6.5 billion, which is about
10 percent reduction below last year, 2019. This seems to me
like we are headed in the wrong direction. How will cutting
your budget by 10 percent help bring down the program's
substantial environmental liability and help clean up these
sites?
Ms. White. So the budget request is adequate for what we
need to get done for 2020 and I feel confident that the work
scope we have planned will get accomplished within the current
budget.
Ms. Kuster. But how do we work through the backlog of sites
and--look, I am not a nuclear engineer but I am a mom and a
citizen and I can tell you that leaving it out there longer
waiting for some type of sabotage, some type of accident, is
not making our constituents across this country safer. So how
is cutting your budget helping you to deal with the backlog of
these sites?
Ms. White. Again, the budget we requested is adequate for
the scope we have planned. Is the scope we have planned going
to bring down liabilities? Maybe it is not the right scope.
So we are working very diligently, as I said, with our end-
state contracting model to ensure we have a great understanding
of our work scope and then stick to the plan. Have a plan,
stick to the plan.
Ms. Kuster. My time is up. But with your indulgence, Mr.
Chair, could I ask Mr. Trimble's comment on that?
Mr. Kennedy. Please.
Mr. Trimble. Yes. The budget--I mean, I think the danger
without trying to get a handle on the backlog of liability is
important because at some point this growth and dynamic we are
seeing starts to resemble an interest-only loan on your house,
right, and you can't----
Ms. Kuster. Just what I was thinking of. We are not making
progress.
Mr. Trimble. You're not bringing down the principal. One
observation regarding the budget and the--sort of connecting
that to the lack of a sort of strategic plan here is if you
have a longer-term plan you realize this mission continues to
2070, 2080, you will look out over that time and realize we
have a challenge with cesium removal or a challenge with this.
I need technology to answer that to lower our cost. You do
that through technology development. What I noted in the budget
is I think their--the amount for technology development was
zeroed out, and this is important because there is currently a
National Academy of Sciences that has been helping EM on the
issue of technology development to help EM achieve its mission.
So I think----
Ms. Kuster. But we are not going to move into the future
with zero research and development.
Mr. Trimble. It is a question.
Ms. Kuster. Great. Thank you very much, and I yield back.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and
recognizes Mr. Duncan from South Carolina for 5 minutes.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. Thank you both for being here.
And I am sitting here listening to the testimony and
listening to the questions today, and I wonder how many Members
of Congress--how many members of this committee--have actually
been to Hanford, Washington, or to Savannah River Site or Idaho
Flats or Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
How many have actually taken the time to understand what we
are talking about today? Because in the production of the
Nation's atomic arsenal we use chemical separation facilities
and there's only one chemical separation facility left in the
Nation and that is H Canyon at Savannah River Site.
Now, Savannah River Site is different than Hanford. Hanford
is a closure site. That means we are going to close it down. We
are going--we are going to clean up the property and,
ultimately, it is going to be just a cleaned up site. Savannah
River Site has continuing emissions for this Nation and H
Canyon is vital.
But when H Canyon is operating, there will be waste created
that'll ultimately have to be taken out of these tank farms.
What we are talking about are tank farms. Huge 800,000 gallon
tanks and usually there are, what, 12, 15 in a tank farm?
Fifteen 800,000 gallon tanks. Those tanks are bigger than the
room we are sitting in right now.
And so when the plutonium is created for our Nation's
arsenal, when the stuff separated away to find the plutonium
and use it, this stuff settles out in the tank farms, much like
a septic tank where liquids flow, solids settle down, then the
next set, more solids settle down.
And so you've got all this stuff underground in carbon
fiber--carbon steel tanks, rather. Some of these at Hanford are
single-wall carbon steel tanks, which are starting to leak.
Where does Hanford sit? It sits on the Columbia River.
Where does Savannah River Site sit? It sits on the Savannah
River. Where does Oak Ridge sit? On the Tennessee River.
These are areas that are environmentally sensitive that
could affect a lot of people and our Nation's environment had
this waste leaked into the soil and ultimately got into the
river system in the Columbia River with regard to Hanford.
And so Savannah River Site, we have 35 million gallons came
out of 43 tanks. That waste has been vitrified. That means it
has been turned into glass. While it was still molten, it
actually filled up ten-foot stainless steel canisters.
These canisters still sit at Savannah River Site but they
were destined to go to Yucca Mountain. But when we decided we
were going to not use Yucca Mountain for its intended purposes,
which was the law of the land, that waste--defense waste still
sits at Savannah River Site along with plutonium that's got to
go somewhere that came out of the nonproliferation.
And so we have got all this waste. Let us go back to
Hanford. Hanford is a cleanup site. They not only had tank
farms, they also found a bunch of radioactive material all over
the site that had to be taken care of. That waste has to go
somewhere.
And so there are challenges when you have an 800,000 gallon
tank underground to get into that tank to get the waste out.
When I was in Hanford in 2008 they were worried about the lid
collapsing on the tank so they were going through 12- and 14-
inch pipes into those tanks to try to clean it up.
Now, we are talking about solids in there. We are talking
about peanut butter paste like semi-solids. We are talking
about salt waste. We are talking about liquids. Liquids are
easy to pump out. But how are you going to--peanut butter type
waste out from inside that tank? They were sticking robots into
that tank operating to push that solid up--that semi-solid up
to get it out of that tank. It was a challenge.
That's where some of the costs comes from. Finally, they
discovered they could cut into the tank and it has made it much
easier to get into those 800,000 gallon tanks to get that waste
out.
But once that waste has come out at Hanford, it has got to
be vitrified. It has got to be solidified so that it doesn't
leak into the soil and, whatever capacity we decide to store it
in as a nation, we can't have it continuing to leak into the
ground.
So they turn it to glass. Glass doesn't go anywhere. It
doesn't leak into the ground. But these are costs. I am a
fiscal hawk. I really believe we ought to look at every dollar
this Nation spends.
But I believe my constituents and people around the Nation
would be OK with spending money to get the waste out of these
tanks to keep it from leaking in the Savannah River, to keep it
from leaking into the Columbia River or the Tennessee River or
wherever it may be, versus a lot of money our Government spends
on other things.
Environmental Management, they spent $48.5 billion since
2011. If you go back, pass that for decades, you had stimulus
money, ARA money trying to build vitrification facilities, high
waste--liquid disposal sites at Hanford to deal with this
waste.
The liability is $377 billion. I will guarantee the
liability will go up if that waste makes it to the river. It is
already in the ground at Hanford in some places and having to
be cleaned up.
So this is a great hearing to talk about the environmental
management of this waste that came out of our weapons programs
in sites all over this country that are being cleaned up but
also a reminder that we are going to continue making waste at
Savannah River Site because it has ongoing missions and how we
deal with that waste is something that we ought to continue
talking about and I want to challenge every member of this
committee--subcommittee and full committee--to take it upon
yourselves to go to Hanford and understand what they are
dealing with with 800,000 gallon underground tanks and tank
farms. Multiple tanks, not just one.
Go to Savannah River Site and understand what they are
dealing with with underground tanks, what they are dealing with
in H Canyon, its ongoing missions, and the waste that will be
created then, because this isn't going away as our Nation
continues to try to be safe in a global environment that we
have.
And so I thank the Department for what they do, and I am
standing in your corner as a member of the Cleanup Caucus to
try to help clean up this Nation, and I yield back.
Ms. White. Thank you.
Mr. Kennedy. The Chair thanks the gentleman and the Chair
recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here, for the work
that you do, and for coming to try to address, as Mr. Duncan
put it, some critical issues that our Government needs to
address, and I think the question being how do we do so as
expeditiously and as efficiently as we possibly can.
So building off of a little bit of what Mr. Duncan
indicated, since 2011 EM has spent over $45 billion to try to
address the cleanup responsibilities. And yet, we seem no
closer to cleaning up these sites or reducing the department's
environmental liabilities.
In fact, DOE reported that the environment liabilities
managed by EM grew to $377 billion last year--$100 billion
increase from the year before and more than double what it was
in 2011.
So I want take a few minutes to try to figure out what we
have bought with all the money we are spending and how we can
try to start to buy down some of that liability.
Mr. Trimble, to begin with, how have the cleanup activities
at--that EM has spent money on in recent years gotten us closer
to actually cleaning up the sites and why are we spending more
and yet seeing that liability continue to grow?
Mr. Trimble. Well, there has been accomplishments with the
money spent. I think there--you know, you can't deny the
commitment and the professionalism of the folks in the field
doing this work.
I think the challenge, from our perspective, is should we
have gotten more done with the same amount of money, and to
answer that question you need to have used program and project
management best practices because that is how you are able to
measure and manage your work to achieve results and that is
what we haven't seen.
Mr. Kennedy. And do you expect that those will be adopted,
going forward?
Mr. Trimble. I am encouraged by the direction Assistant
Secretary White is taking. I think, obviously, the proof is in
the pudding. Ultimately, we will have to see how those get
implemented.
My concern, again, being sort of the doubting Thomas, is
the scope of the changes we are talking about are fundamental.
They involve more than just EM. They involve all of DOE and the
commitment of senior leadership there.
The changes we are talking about, you know, EM has had,
what, I think about seven assistant secretaries since 2010 or
so. You know, I am hoping Assistant Secretary White is there
for another 10 years. I mean, it would be great to have that
kind of continuity and commitment to this mission.
But the danger has always been you have transition. The
other thing is the EM as a mission within DOE has sort of been
the neglected child that has been moved around multiple times
within the organization. Even though its budget is bigger
than--science has its own under sector. EM's budget, just its
budget is bigger than science. You add in the liability, I
don't know what--maybe NNSA is bigger but nobody's bigger. And
yet, they are only at the assistant secretary level.
Mr. Kennedy. And so I wanted to build off of a little bit
of what you said. A significant portion of those cleanup
dollars, some 30 to 60 percent for individual sites' budgets,
according to testimony, is going to what's called minimum
safety, or min-safe, work.
What is min-safe work referring to and why should we be
concerned about it?
Mr. Trimble. Min-safe is--it is overhead. I don't mean to
be dismissive of the need to do that overhead. You're talking
about keeping the water running, the electricity, the guard
force, keeping buildings from collapsing.
The challenge there is that the percentage of min-safe is
huge. As a total of the budget, it is 42 percent. Some--several
sites it is over 50 percent. At one site, it is over 70
percent. So that means the dollars actually going to cleanup
are a fraction of what is appropriate.
Mr. Kennedy. So, Ms. White, kind of using that as--turn to
you, how can we continue to make progress on the underlying--
building off of the testimony of Ms. Kuster as well about the
interest-only mortgage--how can you continue to or how can we
make progress on the underlying liabilities if such a large
percentage of this is just simply going to min-safe work?
Ms. White. Right. So that is actually kind of a pet peeve
of mine. Some of my people could share that with you. So we are
actually launching on a major initiative where we are looking
at, OK, how are we defining min-safe, how are we looking at
landlord services, and are we mixing some of those things up,
which will allow us, I believe, to mine some money out of that
min-safe bucket but still be absolutely and completely safe
ops. So we are actually very excited about it.
Mr. Kennedy. And GAO, I understand, has also reported that
the department's estimates of environmental liabilities is
likely to continue to grow as we have discussed. Recently, DOE
issued a life cycle cost report for the Hanford site which said
that cleanup could take until the year 2078, as we heard
earlier, and cost as much as $677 billion, a figure that the
secretary of energy called shocking.
That is just one site and doesn't include the cleanup costs
of the other 15 sites. So I think we can all agree that $677
billion is a big number. Do you believe that that estimate for
the Hanford site is accurate and, if so, how much will EM
liabilities grow next year as a result?
Ms. White. So I believe it is accurate. I don't expect to
see it to grow. One thing I do want to state is we are
actually--EM is doing well on most of our sites. Our big
challenge is the tank waste at Hanford and that's really what's
been driving the liability increases all along.
Mr. Kennedy. All right. One moment.
I want to thank our witnesses for their participation at
the hearing. I want to thank our colleagues as well for their
questions. Clearly, it is an important area that we need to get
right. And I remind Members that, pursuant to committee rules,
they have 10 business days to submit additional questions for
the record to be answered by witnesses who have appeared before
the subcommittee. I ask the witnesses to agree to promptly
respond to any such questions you should receive.
And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you
very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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