[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE STATE OF PIPELINE SAFETY AND SECURITY IN AMERICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 1, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-28
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
energycommerce.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-891 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Chairman
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois GREG WALDEN, Oregon
ANNA G. ESHOO, California Ranking Member
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York FRED UPTON, Michigan
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
DORIS O. MATSUI, California CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KATHY CASTOR, Florida BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland PETE OLSON, Texas
JERRY McNERNEY, California DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
PAUL TONKO, New York GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York, Vice BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
Chair BILLY LONG, Missouri
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon BILL FLORES, Texas
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
Massachusetts MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
TONY CARDENAS, California RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
RAUL RUIZ, California TIM WALBERG, Michigan
SCOTT H. PETERS, California EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
DARREN SOTO, Florida
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
------
Professional Staff
JEFFREY C. CARROLL, Staff Director
TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Deputy Staff Director
MIKE BLOOMQUIST, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Energy
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
Chairman
SCOTT H. PETERS, California FRED UPTON, Michigan
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania Ranking Member
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
JERRY McNERNEY, California, Vice CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
Chair PETE OLSON, Texas
PAUL TONKO, New York DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, BILL FLORES, Texas
Massachusetts RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas TIM WALBERG, Michigan
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, opening statement................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Oregon, opening statement...................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Witnesses
Howard ``Skip'' Elliott, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration................................ 11
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Answers to submitted questions............................... 155
William Russell, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office............................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Answers to submitted questions............................... 161
Lawrence Friedeman, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio........................................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Answers to submitted questions............................... 162
Carl Weimer, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust........... 77
Prepared statement........................................... 80
Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Association of Oil Pipelines................................... 102
Prepared statement........................................... 104
Answers to submitted questions............................... 164
Christina Sames, Vice President, Operations and Engineering
Services, American Gas Association............................. 111
Prepared statement........................................... 113
Answers to submitted questions............................... 166
Submitted Material
Letter of May 1, 2019, from American Public Gas Association to
Mr. Rush and Mr. Upton, submitted by Mr. Rush.................. 137
Letter of April 29, 2019, from Donald F. Santa, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Interstate Natural Gas Association of
America, to Mr. Rush and Mr. Upton, submitted by Mr. Rush...... 140
Letter of April 30, 2019, from Nick Wagner, President, National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, to Mr. Rush
and Mr. Upton, submitted by Mr. Rush........................... 150
Letter of May 1, 2019, from Brigham A. McCown, Founder and
Chairman, Alliance for Innovation and Infrastructure, to Mr.
Rush and Mr. Upton, submitted by Mr. Rush...................... 152
THE STATE OF PIPELINE SAFETY AND SECURITY IN AMERICA
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building,
Hon. Bobby L. Rush (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Rush, Peters, Doyle,
McNerney, Loebsack, Butterfield, Welch, Schrader, Kennedy,
Veasey, Kuster, Kelly, Barragan, O'Halleran, Blunt Rochester,
Pallone (ex officio), Upton (subcommittee ranking member),
Latta, Rodgers, Olson, McKinley, Griffith, Johnson, Bucshon,
Flores, Hudson, Walberg, Duncan, and Walden (ex officio).
Staff present: Omar Guzman-Toro, Policy Analyst; Zach
Kahan, Outreach and Member Service Coordinator; Rick Kessler,
Senior Advisor and Staff Director, Energy and Environment; John
Marshall, Policy Coordinator; Lisa Olson, FERC Detailee; Tuley
Wright, Energy and Environment Policy Advisor; Mike Bloomquist,
Minority Staff Director; Jordan Davis, Minority Senior Advisor;
Peter Kielty, Minority General Counsel; Mary Martin, Minority
Chief Counsel, Energy and Environment; Brandon Mooney, Minority
Deputy Chief Counsel, Energy; Brannon Rains, Minority Staff
Assistant; and Peter Spencer, Minority Senior Professional
Staff Member, Environment and Climate Change.
Mr. Rush. The subcommittee will now come to order.
The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for the
purposes of an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
I want to thank all the witnesses who are attending this
very important hearing today on pipeline safety and security.
And I want to welcome all of our distinguished panelists that
will be appearing before us today on two separate panels.
I also want to express my disappointment and my deep-seated
concern that we will not be hearing from one of the agencies
responsible for oversight of pipeline safety, TSA, who actually
presides over some of the most disturbing outstanding issues
that need to be addressed by the members of this subcommittee.
While we did invite TSA to appear before us today, so that
the members of this subcommittee could address many of the
issues that were spelled out in a December 2018 GAO report, TSA
declined to send a witness. And frankly, I find it to be
unacceptable and it will be addressed as we move forward. TSA
needs to answer the questions that we have, that members of
this subcommittee have and want to get answers to.
In the meantime, I look forward to engaging with the
panelists that are present with us today, examining the state
of pipeline safety and security as it currently stands before
the Nation.
I have the pleasure of representing portions of Will
County, Illinois, as part of the First Congressional District
of Illinois. And Will County has the dubious distinction of
accounting for 8 percent of all the pipelines in my State, and
officials there were able to provide my office with critical
insight into how pipeline safety and security protocols play
out on the local level.
As we all know, local communities are always the ones most
directly impacted when something goes wrong with America's
pipeline, as we have, unfortunately, witnessed far too often in
areas extending from the Merrimack Valley in Massachusetts to
Aliso Canyon and San Bruno in California.
From county first responders, who are usually the initial
actors on the scene, to local emergency management agencies,
who are required to participate and carry out emergency
preparedness exercises to plan and prepare for disasters, local
agencies play a huge role in helping to mitigate disasters, and
they are not always provided with the adequate funding or
resources to do the job which we require of them.
Many times when private companies are mandated by Federal
law to comply with consent decrees, they pull in local
resources, such was the case with a recent spill in Romeoville,
Illinois. Will County officials were required to contribute
many hours of manpower and staff in order to help Enbridge meet
its court-ordered decree, but they were not compensated any
money for this huge responsibility that they had to accept.
While there is the Hazardous Materials Emergency
Preparedness, HMEP, grant program, it appears that there are
some severe limitations upon this program. The HMEP or TAG
program operates with limited and unpredictable levels of
funding and has burdensome restrictions on how that money may
be utilized.
I look forward to today's hearing and to a robust
discussion on both sides of the issue of this outstanding
priority issue that is before us.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time. And
now, I recognize my friend and colleague, my friend from
Michigan, Ranking Member Upton.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rush follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bobby L. Rush
I want to thank you all for attending this very important
hearing today on pipeline safety and security, and I want to
welcome all of our distinguished witnesses that will be
appearing before us on two separate panels.
I also want to express my disappointment and concern that
we will not be hearing from one of the major agencies
responsible for the oversight of pipeline security, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) who actually
preside over some the most disturbing outstanding issues that
need to be addressed.
While we did invite TSA to appear before us today, so
Members could address many of the issues that were spelled out
in a December 2018 GAO report, they declined to send a witness,
which I find to be unacceptable and must be addressed moving
forward.
In the meantime, I look forward to engaging with the
panelists that are here, to examine the state of pipeline
safety and security as it currently stands.
I have the pleasure of representing portions of Will County
as part of the First Congressional District of Illinois.
Will County accounts for 8-percent of all pipelines in my
State, and officials there were able to provide my office with
critical insight into how pipeline safety and security
protocols play out on the local level.
As we all know, local communities are always the ones most
directly impacted when something goes wrong, as we've
unfortunately witnessed far too often in areas extending from
the Merrimack Valley in Massachusetts to Aliso Canyon and San
Bruno in California.
From county first responders who are usually the initial
actors on the scene, to local Emergency Management Agencies
(EMA) who are required to participate and carry out emergency
preparedness exercises to plan and prepare for disasters, local
agencies play a large role in helping to mitigate disasters and
they are not always provided the adequate funding or resources
to do so.
Many times, when private companies are mandated to comply
with Consent Decrees, they pull in local resources such as was
the case with a recent spill in Romeoville, Illinois.
Will County officials were required to contribute many
hours of manpower and staff in order to help Enbridge meet its
court-ordered decree but were not compensated any money for the
role they played.
While there is the Hazardous Materials Emergency
Preparedness (HMEP) grant program, it appears that there are
some severe limitations with this program.
The HMEP, like the Technical Assistance Grants, or TAG
program operates with limited and unpredictable levels of
funding and has burdensome restrictions on how the funding may
be used.
So I look forward to working together with my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle, as we have done in the past, to
examine the different types of grant programs available.
It is important that we look at all of the different
funding mechanisms at our disposal in order to make sure that
we are providing our first responders, emergency management
agencies, and all of the other critical State and local
stakeholders with the resources they need to effectively do
their jobs and keep all of the Nation's pipelines, and the
communities they traverse, safe and secure.
With that I yield the balance of my time, and now I would
like to recognize my friend and colleague, Ranking Member Upton
for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also my friend for
sure.
This is an important hearing as we begin our work to
reauthorize the Nation's pipeline safety laws. I want to thank
you for making this a bipartisan effort, for working with us to
select the witnesses and prepare for the hearing. We have a
great track record when we work together from the very start,
especially when it involves public safety.
Throughout my time in Congress, I have especially
prioritized pipeline safety. It is personal, as we had to deal
with a bad pipeline accident in my home State. I recall the
2010 oil spill in the Kalamazoo River, not too far from my
district, which led to the passage of the Upton-Dingell
pipeline safety bill in 2012. And in response to the Kalamazoo
spill specifically, we cut down on the incident reporting time,
24 hours now, and we upped the financial penalty for
violations.
In 2016, we came together again to pass another bipartisan
pipeline safety bill, which is now set to expire in October. I
am proud of the work that we accomplished with that bill,
particularly the language that I was able to include requiring
mandatory annual inspections for certain pipeline crossings,
such as the Enbridge Line 5, which crosses the Straits of
Mackinac at a depth of more than 250 feet below the surface of
the water, that was built some 60 years ago.
Mr. Chairman, as we turn to this upcoming reauthorization,
I am grateful for the commitment from you to adopt the same
bipartisan formula that worked so well the last two times as we
did pipeline safety.
I am confident that today's hearing will provide us with a
good start. We have two panels offering a diverse range of
views, including the Administrator of PHMSA, the Commissioner
from the Ohio Public Utility Commission, and a representative
from the GAO, representatives of oil and gas pipeline
operators, and pipeline safety advocates. As one can tell from
the witness lineup, an effective pipeline safety and security
program requires communication and cooperation among a wide
array of stakeholders.
Today's hearing will also allow Members to examine GAO's
recommendations to address significant weaknesses in TSA's
Pipeline Security Program management. I will confess that I was
most disappointed to learn that, while TSA was invited to
participate in today's hearing, they officially declined to
appear. And I guess you could say, like the Alamo, we are going
to remember that.
We know from the committee's oversight that TSA staffing
issues are a major limitation. TSA has some 50,000 employees.
Only a handful--actually, it is a handful plus one, six--are
assigned to pipeline safety. That is not very good.
Strengthening cybersecurity for pipelines is an issue that
I care deeply about, and I believe that Congress does need to
act in both the House and the Senate. I have introduced a bill,
H.R. 370, the Pipeline and LNG Facilities Cybersecurity
Preparedness Act, that would help address some of the
vulnerabilities outlined in the GAO report. And although my
bill is more focused on DOE's role, as the sector-specific
agency for energy, I am committed to getting it over the finish
line, and I am open-minded about ways to strengthen
cybersecurity through our pipeline safety reauthorization bill.
And I know that we can make it bipartisan.
So, at the end of the day, we cannot separate pipeline
safety from pipeline security, and we cannot allow agencies to
carry out a turf war over jurisdiction, especially if they are
going to refuse to come before this important committee.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding the
hearing, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Fred Upton
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing to begin
our work to reauthorize the Nation's pipeline safety laws. I
would also like to thank you for making this a bipartisan
effort, and for working with us to select the witnesses and
prepare for this hearing. We have a great track record when we
work together from the very beginning, especially when it
involves public safety.
Throughout my time in Congress, I have especially
prioritized pipeline safety. It's personal for me, as it is for
those of us who have had to deal with a pipeline accident in
our home State. I often recall the 2010 oil spill in the
Kalamazoo River, near my district, which lead to the passage of
our pipeline safety bill in 2012. In response to the Kalamazoo
spill specifically, we cut down on the incident reporting time
and upped the financial penalties for violations.
In 2016, we came together again to pass another bipartisan
pipeline safety bill, which is set to expire at the end of this
fiscal year. I am proud of the work we accomplished with that
bill, particularly the language that I was able to include to
require mandatory annual inspections for certain pipeline
crossings, such as Enbridge's Line 5, which crosses the Straits
of Mackinac at a depth of more than 250 below the surface of
the water.
Mr. Chairman, as we turn to this upcoming reauthorization,
I hope that we can receive a commitment from you to adopt the
same bipartisan formula that worked so well the last two times
we did pipeline safety reauthorization.
I am confident that today's hearing will provide us with a
good start. We have two panels offering a diverse range of
views, including the Administrator of PHMSA, a Commissioner
from the Ohio Public Utility Commission, a representative from
the Government Accountability Office, representatives of oil
and gas pipeline operators, and pipeline safety advocates.
As one can tell from the witness lineup, an effective
pipeline safety and security program requires communication and
cooperation among a wide array of stakeholders.
Today's hearing will also allow Members to examine GAO's
recommendations to address significant weaknesses in TSA's
pipeline security program management. I was disappointed to
learn that while TSA was invited to participate in today's
hearing, the agency declined to appear. Going forward, I
encourage the administration and TSA to take this matter
seriously and cooperate with the committee.
We know from the committee's oversight that TSA staffing
issues are a major limitation. Even though TSA has over 50,000
employees, only a handful are assigned to pipeline security. I
understand that TSA only had 6 full time equivalent staff
assigned to pipeline security in 2018. Only 6 out of 50,000
employees!
Strengthening cybersecurity for pipelines is an issue I
care deeply about, and I believe Congress needs to act. I have
a bill, H.R. 370--the Pipeline and LNG facility Cybersecurity
Preparedness Act, that would help address some of the
vulnerabilities outlined in the GAO report.
Although my bill is more focused on DOE's role as the
sector-specific agency for energy, I am committed to getting it
over the finish line, and I am open-minded about ways to
strengthen cybersecurity through our pipeline safety
reauthorization bill.
At the end of the day, we cannot separate pipeline safety
from pipeline security, and we cannot allow agencies to carry
out a turf war over jurisdiction. Especially if they are going
to refuse to testify before the Energy and Commerce Committee.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing
and I will yield back.
Mr. Rush. I want to thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes for his opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are millions of miles of pipeline transporting
natural gas, oil, and other commodities across the country. And
when a pipeline fails, it can be destructive, and even deadly.
Late last year, a failure in Massachusetts' Merrimack Valley
caused one death, 21 injuries, and damaged over 130 homes. In
February, a gas field explosion at a residence in Dallas,
Texas, killed a 12-year-old and injured his family. And these
tragic events underscore the need for a strong Federal safety
pipeline program.
And I want to welcome Skip Elliott, Administrator of the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
pronounced PHMSA, to the committee. Administrator Elliott, I
wish you success in your effort to manage an agency notorious
for its inability to meet congressionally mandated deadlines
and carry out its mission in an efficient and effective way.
And certainly, there are dedicated career staff at PHMSA who
work hard to make our pipelines safer, but there are too many
outstanding mandates from the 2011 and 2016 pipeline safety
reauthorizations that PHMSA has failed to finalize, and that is
unacceptable.
As part of the 2011 reauthorization, Congress required the
use of automatic or remote-controlled shutoff valves on newly
constructed transmission pipelines to limit damage when a
rupture occurred. The National Transportation Safety Board
recommended use of this technology 25 years ago, after a
pipeline explosion in my congressional district in Edison, New
Jersey. I was in Congress then, and yet, here we are still
discussing the same issue.
The 2011 law also required operators to install leak
detection systems on hazardous liquid pipelines, but 8 years
later PHMSA still has not finalized the rule. And in what I
consider to be the most important provision of the 2016
reauthorization, Congress gave PHMSA emergency order authority
to address imminent industrywide safety hazards that pose a
threat to life or significant harm to property or the
environment. Yet, PHMSA has failed to implement this, too.
And it is not all PHMSA's fault. The prescriptive cost-
benefit analysis required by the '96 reauthorization hamstrung
the agency. If we want PHMSA to finalize more rulemakings, we
must remove or adjust this overly burdensome requirement.
We also need to restore the mechanisms for citizens to
pursue legal action to compel PHMSA to fulfill its statutory
duties. If the Federal Government can't or will not carry out
its mandated responsibilities, citizens should have the right
to take legal action.
In the aftermath of the 2010 San Bruno pipeline explosion
that killed eight people, San Francisco sued the Federal
Government for having abjectly failed to enforce safety
standards. Unfortunately, the court dismissed that suit because
it found that the law did not permit mandamus-type citizen
suits against the Government, and that was never Congress'
intent and it must change.
I am also extremely disappointed, as my colleague from
Michigan said, that the Transportation Security Administration
Administrator David Pekoske refused to testify or even send a
witness today. And on a bipartisan basis, we invited TSA to
testify on its pipeline security program, which the Government
Accounting Office has criticized for having significant
weaknesses. I am concerned that TSA lacks the resources,
expertise in energy delivery systems, and, frankly, the
commitment to keep up its obligations under the law. And so,
Fred, I want to thank you for pointing that out, too.
There was a serious security breach last week when someone
shot at the Magellan pipeline in Minnesota, causing a release
of over 8,000 gallons of diesel fuel. If TSA can't be bothered
to be here to discuss this security breach and justify its
performance to Congress, then perhaps it is time we look for
another Federal agency other than TSA to handle this critical
responsibility.
And finally, I would like to thank Carl Weimer for all of
his help over the years to this committee and Congress because
I am told he will soon step down as the Executive Director of
the Pipeline Safety Trust. Twenty years ago next month, the
Olympic Gasoline Pipeline exploded in Bellingham, Washington,
and that killed 18-year-old Liam Wood and two 10-year-olds,
Wade King and Steven Tsiorvas. And I say their names because it
is critical that we not forget these kids. Since then, Carl and
the Trust have taken the outrage of that event and used it to
improve the pipeline safety landscape, to the benefit of all of
us.
You know, again, the role of citizens, the role of
individuals in drawing attention to what needs to be done here
is very important, and I certainly want to highlight that.
The Pipeline Safety Act reauthorization has typically been
a bipartisan effort, and we look forward to continue working
with colleagues on both sides of the aisle to update and
improve this critical Federal program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.
There are millions of miles of pipeline transporting
natural gas, oil and other commodities across the country. When
a pipeline fails, it can be destructive and even deadly. Late
last year, a failure in Massachusetts' Merrimack Valley caused
one death, 21 injuries and damage to over 130 homes. In
February, a gas-fueled explosion at a residence in Dallas,
Texas killed a 12-year old and injured his family. These tragic
events underscore the need for a strong Federal safety pipeline
program.
I want to welcome Skip Elliott, Administrator of the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
to the committee. Administrator Elliott, I wish you success in
your effort to manage an agency notorious for its inability to
meet congressionally mandated deadlines and carry out its
mission in an efficient and effective way. Certainly, there are
dedicated career staff at PHMSA who work hard to make our
pipelines safer, but there are too many outstanding mandates
from the 2011 and 2016 Pipeline Safety reauthorizations that
PHMSA has failed to finalize and that's unacceptable.
As part of the 2011 reauthorization, Congress required the
use of automatic or remote-controlled shut-off valves on newly
constructed transmission pipelines to limit damage when a
rupture occurs. The National Transportation Safety Board
recommended use of this technology 25 years ago after a
pipeline explosion in my Congressional District in Edison, New
Jersey. Yet, here we are, still discussing this issue.
The 2011 law also required operators to install leak
detection systems on hazardous liquid pipelines--but 8 years
later, PHMSA still has not finalized a rule. And in what I
considered to be the most important provision of the 2016
reauthorization, Congress gave PHMSA emergency order authority
to address imminent, industrywide safety hazards that pose a
threat to life or significant harm to property or the
environment. Yet PHMSA has failed to implement this, too.
It's not all PHMSA's fault. The prescriptive cost-benefit
analysis required by the 1996 reauthorization hamstrings the
agency. If we want PHMSA to finalize more rulemakings, we must
remove or adjust this overly burdensome requirement.
We also need to restore the mechanism for citizens to
pursue legal action to compel PHMSA to fulfill its statutory
duties. If the Federal Government cannot or will not carry out
its mandated responsibilities, citizens should have the right
to take legal action.
In the aftermath of the 2010 San Bruno pipeline explosion
that killed eight people, San Francisco sued the Federal
Government for having abjectly failed to enforce safety
standards. Unfortunately, the court dismissed that suit because
it found that the law did not permit mandamus-type citizen
suits against the Government. That was never Congress' intent
and it must change.
I am also extremely disappointed that Transportation
Security Administration Administrator David Pekoske refused to
testify or even send a witness today. On a bipartisan basis, we
invited TSA to testify on its Pipeline Security Program, which
the Government Accountability Office has criticized for having
``significant weaknesses.'' I'm concerned that TSA lacks the
resources, expertise in energy delivery systems and, frankly,
commitment, to keep up its obligations under the law.
There was a serious security breach last week when someone
shot at the Magellan pipeline in Minnesota causing a release of
over 8,000 gallons of diesel fuel. If TSA can't be bothered to
be here to discuss this security breach and justify its
performance to Congress, then perhaps it's time we looked for
another Federal agency to handle this critical responsibility.
Finally, I'd like thank Carl Weimer for his all of his help
over the years to this committee and Congress because, I am
told, he will soon step down as Executive Director of the
Pipeline Safety Trust. Twenty years ago next month, the Olympic
Gasoline Pipeline exploded in Bellingham, Washington killing
18-year-old Liam Wood and two 10-year-olds: Wade King and
Stephen Tsiorvas. I say their names because it is critical we
not forget these children. Since then, Carl and the Trust have
taken the outrage of that event and used it to improve the
pipeline safety landscape to the benefit of all of us.
Pipeline Safety Act reauthorization has typically been a
bipartisan effort, and I look forward to continuing to work
with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to update and
improve this critical Federal program this year.
Mr. Rush. I want to thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Walden, for 5 minutes for his opening statement.
Mr. Walden. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rush. Good morning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON
Mr. Walden. Thanks for having this hearing. I think it is
really important that we work together to reauthorize and
modernize the Nation's pipeline safety program.
This is really an important hearing, and I am pleased that
we are beginning this process on a bipartisan basis, Mr.
Chairman, which is the tradition of the Energy and Commerce
Committee on matters relating to pipeline safety and security.
The Federal Government, acting through the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, known as PHMSA, has
an important responsibility to develop and enforce regulations
for the safe, reliable, and environmentally sound operation of
the Nation's 2.7 million miles of pipelines.
Pipelines are among the safest and most efficient ways to
transport critical fuels and feedstocks, such as natural gas
and petroleum, to our homes and businesses. And simply put, the
safe operation of our Nation's pipeline and safety system is
essential to help keep prices low for consumers and drive our
economy forward in a positive direction.
PHMSA cannot do this important job by itself. It must
coordinate effectively with other Federal agencies, such as the
Department of Energy, FERC, and TSA, and especially with the
States. In fact, it is important to recognize that much of the
responsibility for pipeline safety falls on the States. It is
often State pipeline safety workers who are on the front lines
inspecting and enforcing safety requirements. And in many
cases, it is also the States' responsibilities to regulate
rates and ensure the adequate investments are made in pipeline
maintenance and modernization.
As Members of Congress, it is our responsibility to ensure
that PHMSA and the States have enough resources and the
appropriate tools to get the job done. With PHMSA's
authorization expiring at the end of this fiscal year, it is
time for us to get our work done.
As we turn to reauthorization, I will remain focused on
protecting public safety and consumers. These are not mutually
exclusive goals, and I am optimistic we can find bipartisan
agreement, as we always have when it comes to pipeline safety.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we can get a commitment to work
together on the drafting process from the very beginning. That
would really be consistent with our practice from the last
round of reauthorization, and I think it would contribute
toward a better quality work product. So, I hope we can do
that.
There are many areas where I believe we can update and
strengthen the law to drive innovation and lower the barrier of
entry for new technologies. New technologies for pipeline
construction and integrity management can help improve
efficiency and safety at the same time.
I also believe we should examine recent pipeline safety
incidents and incorporate lessons learned in our work. We
should also make sure to provide PHMSA with clear directions,
recognizing they already have a backlog of congressional
mandates. They are working on two high-priority rules for both
gas and liquid pipelines.
PHMSA must also finish its work on other important safety
rules relating to pipelines valves and rupture detection,
integrity management, class location, and public education and
awareness. I believe PHMSA is on the right track, and I look
forward to the agency completing this important work.
At this point, I will close by thanking our witnesses for
appearing before us today. We are going to hear a range of
perspectives to help inform our work, including PHMSA, the
State of Ohio, pipeline operators, and safety advocates.
We are also going to examine the findings of a recent GAO
report which raises numerous serious concerns about the
effectiveness of the Transportation Security Administration's
Pipeline Cybersecurity Program. As the committee of
jurisdiction for energy and interstate commerce--and let me say
this very clearly--I am very disappointed that TSA refused to
provide a witness for today's hearing, and I would urge this
administration in the strongest terms possible to cooperate
with our committee and respond to what I believe are legitimate
oversight requests relating to pipeline safety and security.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thanks again for holding the
hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Walden
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing to begin
our work to reauthorize and modernize the Nation's pipeline
safety program. This is an important hearing, and I am pleased
that we are beginning this process on a bipartisan basis, which
is the tradition of the Energy and Commerce Committee on
matters relating to pipeline safety and security.
The Federal Government, acting through the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, known as PHMSA has
an important responsibility to develop and enforce regulations
for the safe, reliable, and environmentally sound operation of
the Nation's 2.7 million miles of pipelines. Pipelines are
among the safest and most efficient ways to transport critical
fuels and feedstocks such as natural gas and petroleum to our
homes and businesses. Simply put, the safe operation of our
Nation's pipeline system is essential to help keep prices low
for consumers and drive our economy forward.
PHMSA cannot do this important job by itself. It must
coordinate effectively with other Federal agencies, such as
DOE, FERC and TSA, and especially with States. In fact, it is
important to recognize that much of the responsibility for
pipeline safety falls on the States. It is often State pipeline
safety workers who are on the front lines inspecting and
enforcing safety requirements. In many cases, it is also the
States' responsibility to regulate rates and ensure that
adequate investments are made in pipeline maintenance and
modernization.
As Members of Congress, it is our responsibility to ensure
that PHSMA and the States have enough resources and the
appropriate tools to get the job done. With PHMSA's
authorization expiring at the end of this fiscal year, it's
time for us to get to work.
As we turn to reauthorization, I will remain focused on
protecting public safety and consumers. These are not mutually
exclusive goals, and I am optimistic that we can find
bipartisan agreement as we always have when it comes to
pipeline safety.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we can get a commitment to work
together on the drafting process from the very beginning. That
would be consistent with our practice from the last round of
reauthorization, and I think it would contribute toward a
better-quality work product.
There are many areas where I believe we can update and
strengthen the law to drive innovation and lower the barrier of
entry for new technologies. New technologies for pipeline
construction and integrity management can help improve
efficiency and safety at the same time. I also believe we
should examine recent pipeline safety incidents and incorporate
lessons-learned.
We should also make sure to provide PHMSA with clear
directions, recognizing that they already have a backlog of
Congressional mandates and they are working on two high
priority rules for both gas and liquid pipelines.
PHMSA must also finish its work on other important safety
rules relating to pipeline valves and rupture detection,
integrity management, class location, and public education and
awareness.
I believe PHMSA is on the right track, and I look forward
to the agency completing this important work.At this point, I
will close by thanking our witnesses for appearing before us
today. We are going to hear a range of perspectives to help
inform our work, including PHMSA, the State of Ohio, pipeline
operators, and safety advocates.
We are also going to examine the findings of a recent GAO
report, which raises numerous, serious concerns about the
effectiveness of the Transportation Security Administration's
pipeline cyber security program.
As the committee of jurisdiction for energy and interstate
commerce, I am very disappointed that TSA refused to provide a
witness for today's hearing. I would urge the administration--
in the strongest terms--to cooperate with our committee and
respond to what I believe are legitimate oversight requests
relating to pipeline safety and security.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Rush. The Chair wants to thank the gentleman for his
opening statement and reassure him that our side is eager to
work with him on a bipartisan basis to address all of the
issues which we are recently concerned about. I want to thank
you.
The Chair would like to remind Members that, pursuant to
committee rules, all Members' written opening statements shall
be made part of the record.
And now, we will proceed to the witnesses' opening
statements, beginning with panel one. I would now like to
introduce our first panel of witnesses for today's hearing.
The individual to my left is the distinguished Honorable
Howard R. Elliott, Administrator for the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, PHMSA. And next to Mr. Elliott
is Mr. W. William Russell, the Acting Director of GAO. And next
to him is Commissioner Lawrence Friedeman, the Public Utilities
Commissioner for the great State, the Buckeye State, the State
of Ohio.
And I want to say that we thank all of our witnesses for
being with us today, and we look forward to your testimony.
Let me take a moment just to let you know that I will
recognize you for 5 minutes to provide an opening statement.
Before we begin, I would like to explain the lighting system
that is before you. In front of you is a series of lights. The
light will initially be green at the start of your opening
statement. The light will turn yellow when you have 1 minute
remaining. Please begin to wrap up your testimony at that
point. The light will turn red when your time expires.
And so, with that said, Mr. Elliott, welcome, and we
recognize you for 5 minutes for the purposes of an opening
statement.
STATEMENTS OF HOWARD ``SKIP'' ELLIOTT, ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; WILLIAM RUSSELL,
ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND LAWRENCE FRIEDEMAN, COMMISSIONER,
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO
STATEMENT OF HOWARD ``SKIP'' ELLIOTT
Mr. Elliott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ranking Member Walden, Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Upton,
and esteemed members of this subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today. I look forward to updating
this subcommittee on the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration's progress in closing open congressional
mandates and in executing our broader safety mission.
Let me first say that I understand the frustrations that
have been expressed regarding the outstanding congressional
mandates on pipelines and hazardous materials safety. We are
working hard to ensure our Nation's pipeline system remains
safe and finalizing the mandates remains a top priority for
PHMSA.
Of the 11 remaining mandates from the 2011 and 2016
Pipeline Safety Act--there were 61 in total--three are tied to
reports and other actions, and the remaining eight are tied to
in-progress rulemaking efforts. Those mandates from the 2011
Act, the ones that have been opened the longest, are being
addressed by three of PHMSA's current rulemakings for gas
transmission pipelines, hazardous liquid pipes, and rupture
detection in valves.
PHMSA continues to make progress on these rules. The liquid
pipeline safety rule moved out of DOT for final review several
months ago. We have also completed our work on the gas
transmission pipeline final rule and the valve and rupture
detection rule. And these rules are both undergoing internal
review at DOT.
I understand that many of you and many of our stakeholders
may feel like we are not moving fast enough on our rulemakings.
As a safety practitioner, I appreciate and I fully share those
comments. As PHMSA Administrator, it is my responsibility to
prioritize and pursue those rulemakings that will provide the
greatest safety impact and have the highest likelihood of
preventing events that could negatively impact people and the
environment.
To that end, I refer the members of this subcommittee to my
written testimony regarding details of two completed safety
congressional mandates dealing with comprehensive oil spill
response plans for railroads and the transport of lithium ion
batteries by air. In addition, we issued a final rule to
modernize technologies for plastic pipelines that we hope will
further accelerate aging distribution gas line replacements,
which is one of the greatest concerns we have at PHMSA. In
addition to congressional mandates, many of PHMSA's rules must
also address recommendations from the National Transportation
Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office, and our own
safety concerns.
PHMSA is working to meet the needs of our expanding
domestic energy production as well. In August of 2018, PHMSA
established a new Memorandum of Understanding with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission that eliminates unnecessary and
duplicative regulatory reviews by both agencies.
Going forward, PHMSA will operate as the Federal
Government's LNG safety authority. To date, PHMSA has issued
approximately letters of determination for new LNG facilities.
PHMSA has also established a team of cross-agency experts that
are updating the LNG facilities safety standards that date back
to 1980.
In addition, PHMSA continues to work to ensure that the
agency has a full complement of field inspectors and
headquarters staff to meet the demands of our safety mission.
Safety is the highest priority for the U.S. Department of
Transportation and for all of us at PHMSA. I am pleased to say
that, while making progress on mandates, PHMSA's oversight role
is to continuing to have a positive impact on safety. Our
integrity management requirements have led pipeline operators
to conduct over 90,000 repairs in high-consequence areas.
Our field efforts are having an impact, too. Last year,
PHMSA conducted over 12,000 days of inspections and
investigations of pipeline systems. These field activities are
helping to improve safety, as evidenced in the number of
reported pipeline incidents which for 2018 was below the 5-year
average, even with PHMSA's expanded regulatory oversight of
underground natural gas storage facilities.
Additionally, both pipeline-related fatalities and the net
volume spilled from hazardous liquid pipelines was also below
the 5-year average, down 33 percent and 20 percent,
respectively, although we know that even one pipeline casualty
is one too many.
These facts, while notable, do not give me reason to pause
during our ongoing safety mission at PHMSA. And even though we
use statistics to help us measure improvements in safety, it is
the vivid reminder in places like Bellingham, Marshall, San
Bruno, Aliso Canyon, Merrimack Valley, and most recently,
Durham, North Carolina, that serve as our motivation and
commitment for working even harder to improve pipeline safety.
Thank you again for inviting me to today's hearing, and I
look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Elliott follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Administrator Elliott.
And now, the committee will recognize Mr. Russell for 5
minutes for purposes of an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM RUSSELL
Mr. Russell. Good morning, Chairman Rush, Ranking Member
Upton, Ranking Member Walden, and members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the state
of pipeline safety and security in America and TSA's pipeline
security program. My statement is based primarily on our recent
December 2018 report.
As you know, more than 2.7 million miles of pipelines
transport oil, natural gas, and other hazardous liquids that we
all depend on to heat homes, generate electricity, and
manufacture products. Pipelines serve as the veins of our
economy and run through both remote and highly populated urban
areas. As a result, our pipeline network is a prime target for
terrorists, foreign nations, and others with malicious intent
to do physical and cyberattacks. A successful pipeline attack
could have dire consequences on public health and safety as
well as the U.S. economy.
The Transportation Security Administration, TSA, is the
lead agency to ensure the security of our pipeline network. And
in our recent report, we found that TSA provided pipeline
operators with voluntary guidelines to enhance the security of
their facilities. Pipeline operators and industry associations
also reported they effectively coordinate and exchange security
information with TSA.
That said, we identified a number of weaknesses in TSA's
management of its pipeline security program, and I would like
to highlight four key areas for improvement.
First, pipeline security guidance itself. It is important
for TSA to ensure that its security guidelines, which were
updated in 2018, March of 2018, that they clearly define how to
determine the criticality of a pipeline facility. As a result,
pipeline operators may not be fully reporting all of their
critical facilities, so that TSA can apply appropriate
oversight and ensure that any vulnerabilities have been
addressed.
Second, workforce planning. TSA also needs to better
evaluate the number of staff and resources that it devotes to
pipeline security. For example, in our review we found the
staffing was as low as one person in 2014 and has since
increased to a total of six FTEs.
Establishing a strategic workforce plan could help TSA
ensure that it has identified the necessary skills,
competencies, and staffing allocations that the Pipeline
Security Branch needs to carry out its full responsibilities,
including conducting necessary reviews of pipeline companies
and facilities.
Third, assessing risk. TSA uses throughput and risk to
identify the top 100 most critical pipeline operators for
review, but has not updated the assessment methodologies since
2014 to account for changes in the threat environment. For
example, threats to cybersecurity were not specifically
accounted for, making it unclear if cybersecurity threats were
considered.
Last, effective monitoring. While we found that TSA does
conduct pipeline operator and facilities security oversight
reviews and makes recommendations to address issues found, it
has not tracked and documented the implementation of those
recommendations for over 5 years. Until TSA monitors and
records the status of pipeline operator progress to implement
needed changes, it will be hindered in its efforts to determine
whether its reviews are, in fact, leading to a significant
reduction in risk.
We made a total of 10 recommendations to address these
issues. I am happy to report that TSA agreed with all of them
and has actions underway to address them, largely in this
fiscal year.
In conclusion, robust security of our pipeline system is
vital to our economic interests and to mitigate the risks of a
malicious attack. TSA has an important role in this process,
and by implementing the changes, can more effectively carry out
this mission.
Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Upton, and Ranking Member
Walden, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I look forward
to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rush. I thank the witness for his opening statement.
And now, the Chair recognizes Commissioner Friedeman for 5
minutes for the purposes of an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE FRIEDEMAN
Mr. Friedeman. Good morning. Chairman Rush, Chairman
Pallone, Vice Chair McNerney, Republican Leader Upton,
Republican Leader Walden, thank you. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here this morning, as well as thanks to the
other members of the subcommittee.
My name is Larry Friedeman. I am a commissioner at the
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, known as the PUCO. Each
day as I pass through the PUCO's lobby, I am reminded of our
mission statement. And that is, to provide adequate, safe,
fairly priced, and reliable utility services to the Ohio
citizens. In short, we are to promote the general welfare by
assuring the provision of essential services to all Ohioans.
Implicit in the mandates is not only the need to establish
service, but, just as importantly, to maintain the provision of
safe utility services over time. Pipeline safety integrity is a
foundational element of utility service upon which all Ohio
citizens rely, and there is no higher consideration within the
context of pipeline transmission and distribution than that of
public safety.
Ohio has a robust pipeline safety program dedicated to
ensuring the safety and reliability of natural gas service to
Ohioans. We have 113 natural gas pipeline operators and more
than 71,000 miles of transmission, distribution, and gathering
lines. Ohio is one of eight States that act as interstate
agents for the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, PHMSA, and has done so since 1973. We have 12
interstate pipeline operators with over 8,500 miles of
regulated interstate transmission lines.
While these pipelines are located within the boundaries of
the State of Ohio, the PUCO does not exercise jurisdiction over
them. But, pursuant to an agency agreement with PHMSA, the PUCO
inspects interstate natural gas pipeline systems based on an
inspection plan agreed to with PHMSA. It investigates incidents
and refers any rules of enforcement identified to PHMSA for
disposition.
Ohio also receives funding from PHMSA pursuant to the State
Pipeline Safety Program Base Grant. This is a reimbursement-
based grant authorized to support up to 80 percent of a State's
cost to administer a gas pipeline safety program. In order to
qualify, each State's program must comply with PHMSA
requirements.
We are proud to say that for the last 2 years Ohio's
program has received the maximum score available on those
annual audits conducted by PHMSA. Yet, in 2018, notwithstanding
the maximum score, Ohio received not 80 percent, but 72.16
percent of expenses incurred.
The Ohio program has 10 inspectors, performs over 150
audits annually, and they are primarily focused on pipeline
distribution facilities. Ohio has built and maintained its
pipeline safety program in no small measure because of the
assistance received pursuant to the PHMSA Pipeline Safety
Program Base Grant. Through the years, the program has enabled
the PUCO to hire, retain, and train properly its staff. The
training occurs at a PHMSA training center in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.
Now, complementary to the PHMSA-related activities, the
State of Ohio has undertaken some independent initiatives that
I think worth mentioning. More than a decade ago, the PUCO, in
cooperation with Ohio's major natural gas utilities, embarked
on a capital investment program to replace bare steel and cast
iron distribution pipes. The purpose of the program is replace
the pipes with upgraded materials which not only enhance the
structural integrity of the system, but prolong the useful life
of the system. It is not only remedial, but preventative in
nature.
Since the inception of the program, Ohio's four largest
investor-owned natural gas utilities have invested over $3.6
billion in replacement and have replaced over 5,000 miles of
distribution main line and more than 1 million service lines.
The progress and value of the program is perhaps best
manifested by the fact that, at the end of 2010, about 20
percent of the total pipeline fell within categories targeted
for replacement; at the end of 2018, that percentage has been
reduced to 12. It is an inescapably long program in duration,
but the PUCO has ordered accelerated cost recovery to
incentivize accelerated replacement rather than authorizing
recovery at more typical regulatory paradigm structures.
In conclusion, I recount the Ohio State's specific
activities. In addition to the PHMSA-related activities, to
help demonstrate the sheer magnitude of the compelling
importance and desirability of Federal-State cooperation and
coordination, and enhancing the structural integrity of the
natural gas transmission and distribution system,
deliverability, reliability, and, most importantly, safety are
wholly dependent on effective pipeline safety measures. I would
strongly urge the subcommittee's continuing support for safety
reauthorization. And more specifically, I would urge your
consideration of increasing the total reimbursement to the full
80 percent, as authorized by Congress.
Thank you so very much for your time. I would be happy to
answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Friedeman follows:]
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Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks all the witnesses for their
opening statements, and we have now concluded the opening
statements.
We will now move to Members' question. And each Member will
have 5 minutes to ask questions of our witnesses. We will start
by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
Administrator Elliott, there are quite a few issues that I
would like to discuss with you, but, as I say, I only have 5
minutes to do so. And therefore, I will send additional
questions in writing to you regarding the timeline for when
PHMSA expects to complete its congressionally mandated
rulemaking. That letter, that transmittal will be coming to you
soon.
And I would also like to hear back from your agency on some
of its workforce issues. Specifically, I would like to hear
whether or not PHMSA does, indeed, have all the sufficient
number of professional staff with the right expertise to handle
all those responsibilities that fall under the agency's
jurisdiction, including conducting timely pipeline inspections
and finalizing its rulemaking.
One timely matter that I would like to discuss with you at
this time is the issue I spoke about in my opening statement.
How do we get more funding and assistance to the State and
local level in order to help emergency management agencies and
first responders with the resources they need desperately to
fully and effectively carry out their duties? Also, is there a
defined obligation on the part of pipeline operators to work
with county-level emergency managers to develop and maintain an
emergency preparedness plan before an event or an exercise
occurs?
Mr. Elliott. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for those
questions, and I will try to answer them in the order they were
given.
Let me first start by addressing, if you don't mind, the
issue of mandates. I am the Administrator. I am responsible for
ensuring that we work quickly to complete the mandates. I can't
attest to actions by previous Administrators. I am the
Administrator now; it is my responsibility. I understand that.
But I think we have made good progress. The three rules
that we have heard, going back to a Railroads, Pipelines, and
HAZMAT Subcommittee meeting last June, really made it clear
from both sides of the aisle that we need to move these
mandates.
As I indicated in my comments, I went back to the staff and
I said, ``We need to do better than we are doing now.'' And I
looked at the oil spill plan for railroads because that was
close to being done and was a very, very important rule, as
well as the prohibition of lithium batteries in passenger
aircraft, which was another great concern.
But the pipeline bills were equally important. We finished
our work on the liquid pipeline rule. And again, as I had
mentioned, that has been over at OMB now for about 50 days, and
we are hoping to get a response back fairly soon.
The two other rules that were of greatest concern, the gas
transmission pipeline, we have completed our work there. It has
been done for a while and it is going through the internal
review process at DOT. We have been very responsive to
questions that are coming back from the Office of the
Secretary. So, we are being as responsive as we can to respond.
The one bill that I think seems to have obtained the most,
and probably rightfully so, the most focus is the rupture and
automatic valve rule. And that wasn't in a final rule stage.
That one was in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. So that one,
agreeably, has languished the most. Our team has finished the
writing of that Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. That, too, is
also being reviewed by the Secretary's Office.
So, all three of those we really hope to see two final
rules completed and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking moving
forward. We have several other mandates behind that that we are
working equally hard on.
To address the question about staffing, we have 581
employees at PHMSA. About 310 are assigned to the pipeline
side. I have mentioned before it is tough for us to compete
with industry to hire good, qualified, as you said, pipeline
engineers.
Interesting, I was in Atlanta yesterday, and my Director of
Human Resources was over at Virginia Tech trying to figure out
how we can create a better recruiting bed at colleges and
universities that put out good engineers. I think part of the
problem is we need to make people more aware of the important
safety mission of PHMSA, because I think once they understand
that, we are going to be more attractive to be in a place to
hire. But, right now, we have done a great job in filling the
gaps, the voids that we had in our hiring, and it has given me
a better position to see how effective are we with the current
staff.
I especially appreciate your comments about emergency
responders. In my 40 years in the railroad, I was responsible
for emergency response. And during that time, I lived in New
Jersey and was actually the part-time emergency management
coordinator for the town that I lived in in south Jersey. So, I
fully appreciate the fact that we need to do more to help
emergency responders. And you are absolutely correct, it is a
responsibility of the oil and gas industry to make sure that
they work with emergency responders, especially on drills and
exercises.
Mr. Rush. I want to thank you. And I want to just remind
you that we will be submitting additional questions for the
record.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Upton for 5 minutes for the
purposes of asking questions.
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And again, I want to appreciate the testimony that you all
provided us today. I know that we have a good number of
questions.
I particularly want to thank Mr. Elliott, the
Administrator, for his personal review of the Nation's
pipelines. I know you have been to Michigan a number of times.
You have met with Republicans and Democrats, as we all care
about these issues. And I just really appreciate your hands-on
experience and your willingness to come and help us here.
It is been clear for a long time that pipelines are really
the safest way to transport oil and gas as it relates to
incidents. But, of course, as you said in your testimony, it
just takes one bad issue to really blow up and make a mess, a
big mess of things in a major way.
As you heard in my opening statement, yes, we are
disappointed that TSA is not here. And I guess some could
suggest that TSA has really increased by sixfold their
inspectors, because it has gone from one to what I thought was
six, but I am now told that it is now less than a handful; it
is actually four. Is that correct?
Mr. Russell. That is correct.
Mr. Upton. So, there I was giving them the benefit of the
doubt that it was a handful plus one, but it is actually less
than a handful of folks around the country, which I don't think
is a very good trend.
This committee has worked a long time on cyber protections.
God help us if somebody gets into one of these systems and does
something bad, that would really pose a problem. We are all
aware of public events the FBI and others have talked about.
But I guess I want to refer this to Mr. Russell, as the GAO.
In your report, what type of emphasis has TSA, knowing that
they have these massive resources to look at the potential for
a cyberattack on any of our pipelines, what have they done to
address that, knowing that, in fact, there are published
incidents of collusion? Let me put it that way. State-
sponsored.
Mr. Russell. That is correct. So, as DNI Coats recently
acknowledged in the last intelligence assessment, you have
nation states with the full capability to do harm to our
pipeline network. And as you mentioned, with TSA's resources,
it was six when we concluded our report in December. So, if it
is down to four, that is, as you mentioned, less than a
handful.
And one of the concerns that we found in our review was the
pipeline security officials did not necessarily have the
requisite expertise and skills when it came to cybersecurity.
And that is one of the things that we recommended that TSA try
to account for when it does its workforce plan, as part of one
of our recommendations.
Mr. Upton. On page 6 of the GAO report, it says, and I will
quote this to you, ``Our analysis of TSA's data found that at
least 34 of the top 100 critical pipeline systems TSA deemed
highest risk indicated that they had no critical facilities.''
Can you dive a little deeper into that? What are they missing?
Where should they be?
Mr. Russell. Sure. So, the way it works now is it is a
voluntary process. So, the pipeline operators----
Mr. Upton. Should it be mandatory?
Mr. Russell. One of the first steps, I think, and where we
went with the recommendation, was for TSA to clarify their
guidelines first, to make it more clear what is the definition
of a critical facility. And that is what we found, is that
there is some confusion around that, such that a full third of
the top 100 most critical pipeline operators had not identified
any critical facilities, which, then, affects which reviews
that you do.
Mr. Upton. I am sorry to interrupt, but what wouldn't be
critical? I mean, we had this Kalamazoo Enbridge line that went
in the Kalamazoo River. It was a billion dollars for Enbridge
to clean that up. They didn't report it for what turned out to
be a couple of days, and it was a pretty major--in Michigan,
so, you know, it crosses your hand here. But a billion dollars,
just a small--I mean, what is not critical that they would look
at?
Mr. Russell. Well, these are self-reported, so it is up to
each of the pipeline operators to self-identify what is their
critical facility. And that brings it around, I think, to one
of the other points in the opening statement, around the
recommendation followup. So, as TSA does their corporate
security reviews, they may ask questions of the pipeline
operators, hey, it looks like you may have a critical facility
here. That may even be a recommendation. But if they don't go
back to follow up to see if it is implemented, then you are
continuing to have that risk.
Mr. Upton. Knowing that my time is expired, let me just
make a quick comment, not a question. And that is, for that
particular pipeline, good news, it was completely replaced,
replaced at the new standards that this committee pushed
through. I want to say it was about $4.5 million per mile as it
crossed the State. But we took care of it the right way.
Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Russell. Sure.
Mr. Upton. I yield back.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Peters from the
great State of California for 5 minutes.
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having
this hearing today.
I had a couple of questions, maybe to follow up on the
issue of resource constraints. I heard requests over the years
for the increased use of technology to expedite gas pipeline
inspections and safety monitoring. It might be a little bit of
a double-edged sword with respect to cyber, but I will get to
that with Mr. Russell.
But, Mr. Elliott, are there technologies that you think
need to be incorporated so that industry and regulators can
better evaluate pipeline safety, particularly given the
resource restraints we see at TSA?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question. The
short answer is yes. If I can elaborate, I will tell you that
in my year and a half as the Administrator of PHMSA, but backed
by many years in the rail industry, where we saw technology
move in leaps and bounds, I have seen the same thing in the use
of technology to help quickly expand the capabilities of in-
line pipeline inspection technology.
One concern that I have with that is, even as good as it
is, it is still not perfect. And much of the in-line inspection
tools that are in place today--and again, the level of
sophistication is amazing--really focus on three purposes. One
is to extend the usable life of the infrastructure. The second
actually is to help reduce the amount of actual physical
inspections that have to be done, thereby reducing cost. And
the third is an absolute tangible improvement in safety.
At PHMSA, we focus on trying to encourage the research and
development both with the dollars that we have that go into R&D
and what we encourage industry to do, to really focus, first
and foremost, on the absolute safety value there. One of the
criticisms we get is PHMSA's inability to move quickly to get
out of the way of industry to implement this new safety
technology. And I would agree with that. I think our special
permitting process is a bit slow. Part of the language that we
are trying to look at in reauthorization will help speed that
up. But I do think that technology will continue to expand at a
rapid pace and will continue to improve pipeline safety.
Mr. Peters. And you think that is something that is being
taken care of by industry? Or do you think that Congress needs
to take action?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, I do believe that is something
that industry is taking care of themselves, because it benefits
the ability to, as I have mentioned, to extend the life of the
infrastructure and help reduce inspection cost. I will tell you
that, as PHMSA, we spend our R&D dollars more on what we
consider to be step-change R&D, maybe not the safe R&D. For
example, one of the R&D efforts that recently has been
successful in dollars that we put is the ability to locate
plastic pipe. Distribution lines are going more to plastic
pipes. You can't use the same technology to locate the pipes.
So, we would like to see more industry dollars go to some of
that more step-change safety that is not really being focused
on as much.
Mr. Peters. I didn't hear you mention, explicitly mention,
leak detection as one of the purposes, the objects of the
technology, but I assume that would be covered as well?
Mr. Elliott. Yes, I do think--and again, in my time I have
been relatively impressed, at least in the leak detection
capabilities that exist in control rooms. But probably more to
your point, there is more that I think that can be done to
identify smaller, some of those imperceptible leaks which tend
to plague the industry. I think the larger releases, the
systems seem to do a very good job. But you are probably
correct, both with the in-line inspection capabilities that
might identify issues before they ever turn into a leak--all of
that I think with time will continue to reduce the likelihood
of both large-scale leaks and small leaks.
Mr. Peters. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Russell, in terms of lethality and cost of recovery,
are pipelines in America more at risk from a cyberattack or a
physical attack?
Mr. Russell. I think there are definitely physical security
concerns, as we have seen with environmental groups and others
that cause damage. But the cyber threat is one that is ever
emerging and ever evolving. And I think that is one where we
thought there is more that could be done.
Mr. Peters. Let me ask you this, because I have a minute
left.
Mr. Russell. Yes.
Mr. Peters. As industry continues to deploy technology, how
should the Government make sure that, from a cyber perspective,
our citizens are protected? Because, I mean, technology is the
point where bad actors tend to try to make those inroads. What
do you think is the role for the Government, either
administrative or the Congress, to make sure that we protect
our citizens from a cyberattack?
Mr. Russell. Sure. I think it boils down to robust
oversight. So, do pipeline operators understand what their
operating systems are, their control systems----
Mr. Peters. Right.
Mr. Russell [continuing]. Data systems, the industrial
control systems that would be the point of attack? And have you
adequately protected those? Anything that Government can do to
put out a framework--so, for example----
Mr. Peters. I have got 4 seconds left. So, I appreciate the
answer. I would say let's continue to work on that together.
Thank you for showing up. And when you say ``oversight,'' and
we have the TSA not showing up, obviously, that frustrates the
purpose, the ability of us to do oversight. So, I just note
that for the record as well.
And I yield back.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio,
Mr. Latta, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Latta. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks very much for
holding today's hearing. It is very, very important that we
have this hearing.
And I want to thank our panelists for being with us today.
I would also like to, again, welcome Commissioner Friedeman
for being with us today. He comes from northwest Ohio, not too
far from where I am from. And so, we appreciate you being here,
making the effort.
If I could start my question with you, if I may,
Commissioner Friedeman, as you mentioned in your testimony,
Ohio is only one of eight States that acts as an interstate
agent for PHMSA, which comes with considerable additional
responsibility. Will you inform the subcommittee about Ohio's
working relationship with PHMSA?
Mr. Friedeman. Yes. Thank you for the question,
Representative Latta.
I think if you were to ask the commission staff
anecdotally, they would characterize the relationship as
professional, mutually respectful, cooperative, as well as
productive. I mean, there is an acknowledgment of a shared
accountability, I believe, in terms of the interstate pipeline
and the assumption of responsibilities associated with the
inspection. It enables the commission staff, frankly, to
leverage in terms of funding in a way, again, to train,
retrain, and retain good, qualified individuals, which then
serves to benefit Ohio, and exemplary in terms of the
compelling need to address these same situations nationally.
So, it is a very positive relationship.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much.
Administrator Elliott, what could Congress do to help drive
innovation and foster an environment where operators can
incorporate new technologies and best practices?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question.
I think perhaps the best way is just continued support, and
perhaps even a greater thirst for understanding how the oil and
gas pipeline industry applies technology and innovation. Again,
as I had mentioned earlier, it is a fairly constant drumbeat
for us at PHMSA to encourage the pace at which that gets put
into place. But I do believe that the more that people
understand what is in place, and what more can be done, there
might be some additional encouragements that can be brought to
bear.
Mr. Latta. Let me followup. Would more data and information
demonstrating the capabilities of new technologies operating in
real-world situations be helpful to PHMSA as it pursues updates
to inspection and maintenance/repair critical in these
regulations?
Mr. Elliott. Yes, I think we have a large thirst for good,
reliable data. We maintain a lot of that already, but I think,
Congressman, the only way we are going to continue to get
better is to continue to seek information/data that is going to
allow us to continue to improve our safety mission.
Mr. Latta. Thank you.
Commissioner Friedeman, I understand that Ohio has a good,
accelerated pipeline replacement program. Would you talk a
little bit about the commission's role to ensure that pipeline
rates are adequate to allow for pipeline replacement and
modernization?
Mr. Friedeman. Yes, sir. Thanks again for the question.
The commission needs to remain cognizant of the fact that
the costs associated with the capital investment concomitant to
the implementation of the program are essentially allocated
socially across rate base. So, as I alluded to in my opening
statement, there is a means by which we, the commission, not
only incentivized accelerated replacement, but accelerated
recovery. Now associated with that accelerated recovery is an
annual audit where the commission could revisit the expenses
and the prudence, and the various criteria by which we can
appropriately balance the costs associated with the investment
against the benefits derived from the investment.
Mr. Latta. Thank you.
Mr. Russell, if I could go to your testimony when you
found--you said, on page 5, ``We found that TSA's Pipeline
Security Branch had issued revised Pipeline Security Guidelines
back in March of 2018, but TSA had not established a documented
process to ensure that revisions occur and fully capture
updates to supporting standards''. But you go down, you get
right into ``reflect the dynamic threat environment and to
incorporate cybersecurity principles''.
I am concerned because in this subcommittee and this full
committee we hear a lot about the attacks that occur out there.
And how much is TSA taking these threats on the cyberattacks
that are occurring on the pipelines out there to make sure that
these guidelines get in place?
Mr. Russell. Right. So, they were able to update them in
March 2018, as you mentioned. Part of that update was to
include more guidance for the pipeline operators on
cybersecurity issues. Why we think it is very timely and needed
for them to have a process to continue to update that is, about
a month after the guidelines came out, there was a new set of
an updated framework from NIST that included some additional
provisions around supply chain risks and some other things that
are important to also incorporate. So, our concern is that we
want TSA to have a process, so you don't wait another 6 or 7
years to, then, incorporate those standards into the Security
Guidelines.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, my time is expired and I yield back.
Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the chairman of the full committee,
Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Obviously, we are beginning the process of developing
legislation to reauthorize the Pipeline Safety Act. And first,
we have to understand the current state of affairs and what
work remains incomplete from previous reauthorizations. But,
unfortunately, as I noted in my opening statement, numerous
congressional mandates from the 2011 and 2016 reauthorizations
have not been finalized by PHMSA.
So, I wanted to start with Administrator Elliott. I would
like to ask you for updates on some of these outstanding
mandates. First, what is the status of the rulemaking on
emergency order authority that was included in the 2016 Pipes
Act?
Mr. Elliott. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. As
you may recall, we submitted an Interim Final Rule for the
emergency order authority, which we believe gives us the
intended authority that Congress was looking for. We have
since, after further public review and comment, have made some
modifications to that specifically about the timelines that
industry may have to do an appeal to that process. We have
completed our final rule language, and it is currently over at
OMB.
Mr. Pallone. OK. Now what is the status of the rulemaking
mandated in the 2011 Act to expand integrity management beyond
high-consequence areas?
Mr. Elliott. Well, really, that falls into two rules that
we are working on, the liquid safety rule, which I had
mentioned in my comment there are some integrity management
aspects there. We have finished our work there, and that also
is at OMB.
The other component is in the gas transmission rule. When I
first came to PHMSA about a year and a half ago, that gas
transmission rule was affectionately referred to as the ``mega
rule''. It had gotten so big, I don't know how it could have
ever moved. So, we split it into three parts, the mandate
section, another section of the bill that deals with integrity
management, some damage prevention, and the third part is
gathering lines. We have completed our work on the mandate
section, and we are actively working on the second section of
that that deals with some additional integrity management work.
Mr. Pallone. And then, lastly, what is the status of the
rulemaking mandated in the 2016 Act to regulate underground
natural gas storage facilities?
Mr. Elliott. Right. We have completed our work with that,
and that is also being reviewed by the Office of the Secretary.
Mr. Pallone. Now I know, Administrator Elliott, that you
inherited many of these delayed mandates, but the fact remains
that your agency is behind schedule, obviously. So, we hope we
will begin to see major progress this year.
And I wanted to shift briefly to Bill Russell from GAO.
Your December 2018 report highlighted troubling weaknesses in
the Transportation Security Administration's pipeline security
program. And in your report, you found that the TSA Pipeline
Security Branch had not calculated relative risk among the top
100 critical pipeline systems using its risk-ranking tool since
2014, and that the risk-ranking tool did not include current
data. So, my question is, can you please elaborate on these
findings and how GAO's recommendations address the shortfalls
you identified in TSA's risk-ranking tool?
Mr. Russell. Right. So, the risk-ranking tool is critical
because that really shapes which companies, which pipeline
operators TSA is going to review with the limited resources
that they have. So, what we saw is some shortcomings in how
they thought about the threats that were encountered.
Obviously, from 2014 to now, there have been evolving threats.
One of the questions we had was the extent to which some of the
cybersecurity issues had been factored into that initial risk
assessment. Another one had to do with just the safety of the
pipeline system. So, for example, a pipeline network may be
more vulnerable if, for example, PHMSA has identified some age
and safety issues. Was that factored into the risk ranking in
order to prioritize reviews? So, we had four different
recommendations to try to get at some of these issues.
Mr. Pallone. I mean, you know I am very concerned,
obviously, as many of us are here, that TSA is working with
outdated information, which can have dire consequences for a
program focused on the security of the country's pipeline
network. And again, it is unacceptable that TSA refused to
testify at this hearing or explain how it is responding and
reacting to the troubling findings in GAO's report. But I
certainly appreciate what GAO is doing and your ongoing efforts
to do oversight of this.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Mr. McKinley, my friend
from West Virginia, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will go back, the title of this hearing says it is the
``State of Pipeline Safety and Security in America''. The state
of pipeline safety and security in America. So, I am just
curious, if we look back--I have got a chart here that says
that, in the last 10 years, we are now transporting nearly 40
percent more material through our pipelines, gas and fuel oil,
and whatever, a 40 percent increase on that.
Also, we have seen that, since 1999 to today, last year,
the number of incidents have not varied much. I guess back to
an earlier comment, someone said, if there is just one, it is a
problem. And I don't think anyone would disagree with that. But
I think the reality is, when you are transporting 614 million
cubic feet of material, that there is a chance, just like in an
airplane, with 737 Max and others, there is going to be a
chance of something going wrong. But, over nearly 20 years, we
virtually had no increase in incidents. We were 275; we dropped
to 233, 258, 264, 278, 303. There were 286 last year. So, it is
essentially the same, and we are transporting tremendously
increase in product.
So, I am curious on this. How would you grade, Mr. Elliott,
how would you grade your performance? Is it the fact that there
are any, this is a ``C'' or a ``D''? Or how would you give it a
grade in overall safety and security of America with our
pipeline system?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for that very important
question. Before I assign a grade, I will tell you we can never
ever do enough. We will constantly strive every day, at least
while I am in the Administrator's chair, to improve the safety,
not only of pipeline safety. And a lot of people forget we also
have the responsibility of surface transportation safety, which
is 1.2 million shipments of hazardous materials a day, in
addition to the 2.7 million miles of pipeline that we have.
But if I were to give a grade, I would give us a ``C,''
because I think we are doing well, but we are never doing good
enough. I think some of the comments that we had earlier, I do
think that we will continue to see great advancements in safety
through technology, innovation, research and development. But,
from my perspective, I think it is going to be constantly
working with the highly professional team at PHMSA to make sure
that each and every day that we are out working with operators
and members of the public to make the transportation of energy
products by pipeline as practical and safe as possible.
Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
Mr. Russell, how would you grade it? Because you have got
an outside view of it. Given the increased traffic, virtually
no increase in number of incidents, but there are incidents.
And as I said before, I don't like that, either. But how would
you grade it?
Mr. Russell. I think, overall, based on our most recent
report, it is clearly needs improvement, whether it is taking
care of some elements in the Pipeline Security Guidelines that
the pipeline operators rely on to help manage their processes,
being a little bit more diligent on just following up on the
common-sense recommendations that the pipeline security folks
at TSA make to those operators.
Mr. McKinley. Well, if I could, let me follow up with that
a little bit.
Mr. Russell. Sure.
Mr. McKinley. Because I interpret what you are saying is
maybe more regulations. So, I am curious, because I have got
the Atlantic Coast Pipeline. I think we have heard about that.
There are 67 permits that had to be granted, 67, for FERC, FAA,
the Federal Communications Director, and NOAA, the National
Park Service, the Corps of Engineers in Huntington, Pittsburgh,
Norfolk, Wilmington. I could go on and on. Sixty-seven
different permits to be able to--do you think the increased
regulations--I am not talking about doing away with any of
them--but increasing the number of regulations, is that going
to give us more safety and security of our pipeline?
Mr. Russell. Well, I will say, for the TSA role, there
isn't a regulation. It is a voluntary-based system. So, I think
our point is just making sure that that process works as
effectively as possible, in the absence of a regulation.
Mr. McKinley. I will think about that a little bit. Thank
you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Russell. Sure.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Doyle for 5 minutes.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing today.
This conversation is particularly important to my district
of Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania's energy mix has rapidly
transformed in recent years due to the Marcellus Shale. And as
a result of the natural gas boom, Pennsylvania is experiencing
a buildout of infrastructure from pipelines to the Shell
cracker plant in Beaver County, just outside my district. This
can be a great resource, but only if we ensure that the
pipelines meet stringent safety and environmental standards, so
that we are protecting the health and safety of the people of
Pittsburgh as well as the country.
Mr. Elliott, Carnegie Mellon University in my district is a
world-class center for robotics, which can play a vital role
for monitoring the safety and security of pipelines and
protecting the environment. How does PHMSA take into account
new and emerging technology, and how do you ensure the
performance standards reflect the most effective technology
available?
Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you, and I
appreciated visiting the gas transmission work going on in your
district last week.
As I mentioned, PHMSA provides R&D dollars to help ensure
that we are staying current with the most cutting-edge. One of
the ways that we do that is on a biennial basis--and we are
actually thinking now to do it more often--we hold an R&D forum
where we allow colleges and universities, and others that are
involved in pipeline research and development, to come in, and
we kind of spell out what we are looking for, where we think we
need to see research and development progress in the pipeline,
especially the pipeline safety area. And then, from that forum,
we receive applications for R&D, some of it actually including
robotics that you mentioned about. And then, based on the best
applications, we will provide the funds that we have to pursue
that R&D. I wish we could do more, but we do the best we can.
Mr. Doyle. Let me ask you, several pipelines are under
construction in Pennsylvania right now. Late last year, it was
reported that energy transfer in Sunoco had amassed more than
800 State and Federal permit violations while building two
pipelines, the Rover and Mariner East 2, across Pennsylvania
and Ohio. I have concerns that the two pipelines, despite being
under construction, have polluted waterways with gallons of
drilling fluid and created sinkholes in backyards. Can you
please describe some of these violations?
Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question,
and we continue to work very closely with our State partners in
Pennsylvania that have been doing most of the oversight there.
And I will tell you, yes, I think we have at PHMSA a concern,
based on our dialog with the State pipeline office, about
perhaps a lack of professional construction methods that are
being used. So, I think we wholly support the actions that are
being taken at the State level to enforce perhaps a more rigid
construction standard.
The work that I did for many years in the railroad
industry--and Pennsylvania was one of the big States that we
worked in--I also oversaw all of the environmental aspects of
the railroad. And I will tell you that I have a great concern
anytime there is any kind of impact to the environment, whether
or not it is hazardous substance or whether or not it is
material that basically is a byproduct of directional boring,
which was some of the case we had here.
Mr. Doyle. Right.
Mr. Elliott. So, I agree with the aggressiveness that the
State oversight is providing here.
Mr. Doyle. Studies have shown, since 2010, at least two
critical detection systems designed to help operators avoid
costly accidents only were detecting right away spills roughly
12 percent of the time. In fact, random observations from the
public were nearly four times more effective in detecting
leaks. Given that PHMSA studies have shown that industry leak
detection can be unreliable, what is PHMSA doing to incorporate
modern leak detection standards into its rulemaking, and when
can we expect action on that?
Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, again, thank you for the
question. And we have incorporated some additional leak
detection language within both our liquid and gas rulemakings.
But I will also say that it is our intent, I think, to continue
to see progression in the technology and the actions by the
operators that will identify the potential for any kind of
small leak. The larger leaks, typically, are the ones that the
industry will quickly identify through their control rooms. It
is those small leaks that propagate and may go unnoticed for
many days. I think that is where technology is going to be most
useful, to find areas of likely release and get in and correct
that long before it can ever harm the environment.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Rush. I want to thank the gentleman for yielding back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Griffith, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to pick up with Mr. Doyle's questions. But,
first, I want to thank you for mentioning Virginia Tech, which
is in my district, and I hope that you all were successful in
finding some folks there who are willing to work for you. There
are a lot of good people. So, I know that it was a worthwhile
trip.
Mr. Doyle was already picking up on it, and there are a lot
of new technologies coming out. One that I have looked at that
I think has some real potential is fiberoptic, you know,
placing that out there to track leaks.
We have a couple of pipelines coming through Virginia, one
of which comes through my district and comes very close to
Virginia Tech. And a lot of people are concerned about the
safety, and the small leaks, as you said, are where the new
technologies can go. But what is PHMSA doing to remove any
regulatory barriers--and let me know if you think there are
some--and incentivize the adoption of new technologies? Because
we have got this big gas pipeline coming through, and it
appears to me that FERC is not requiring that they use some of
these new technologies to make sure that these facilities are
completely safe. And even if it is just a small gas leak, what
is small today, as you know, can be big tomorrow and can cause
a problem not only to the environment, but to the people who
live near that pipeline.
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question. I
think one of the items that I have been most impressed with is
we have seen advancements in technology. And I do believe that,
as we see new construction and complete replacement of
pipelines, I do think that you are going to see--and some is
available today and some will continue to be available--that
the pipeline installation process will include systems that
will self-report the health of the pipeline above and beyond
what happens today with in-line inspection technology.
So, I think the combination of several things, continuing
use of integrity management systems by the operators, the
continued expansion of technology and in-line inspection
technology, and then, the continued use of self-diagnostic
capabilities with new and totally replaced pipeline. I do think
that in the not-too-distant future we will probably see new
constructed pipeline that will be able to self-report on a
regular basis its real-time health.
Mr. Griffith. So, here is my concern and the concern my
constituents have. And I know they were trying to sell product,
but some folks came in with their fiber optics and they were
able to show how they can detect based on the temperature
change. If you just lay that fiberoptic on top of the pipeline,
you can tell if there is a small leak. You can also tell if
somebody is trying to do physical harm to the pipeline, for
whatever reasons, because they in real time can see if somebody
is driving up or walking up to the pipeline, if somebody starts
digging near the pipeline. They can see all of that.
And yet, the pipe is not in the ground yet. The technology
appears to be ready. And FERC doesn't seem to be requiring it.
Do you all work with FERC to say, hey, this is new technology?
It is not that expensive, and when you are talking about a
pipeline that is going to be in the ground for decades and near
a lot of communities, I think people would sleep a lot better
in my district if they knew that that was there. And it is not.
There is no plan for it. The pipe is not in the ground yet in a
large part of my district. What can we do to encourage the
operators to do that? And what can you all do to work with FERC
to say, hey, this is something that really ought to be done?
Mr. Elliott. Well, we will continue to have dialog with
FERC on a regular basis, and we will discuss that. But I think
one of the other things that we can do in the regular dialog
that we have with the oil and gas operators is to continue to
push the use of new technologies that will minimize leaks and
releases of pipelines. We can have that conversation with them.
Mr. Griffith. I certainly hope that you will. And there are
some new people in FERC. So, I don't want to say that they are
all like this, but I will tell you, at one point a few years
back, we had three Congressmen from our region who asked for
additional hearings and we got nothing. And that is very
discouraging. It doesn't seem like they are very open to input.
I hope you have a different experience.
That being said, I have got a few more seconds. What is
your favorite new technology on pipeline safety? You have got
to have one that you are just like, hey, that is pretty neat.
Mr. Elliott. To me, I actually think it is the ability to
locate nonmetallic pipeline that is becoming so prevalent in
natural gas distribution systems in major metropolitan areas,
because I think that has the greatest opportunity to create
safety. I know in the incident that occurred in Durham, North
Carolina, where a directional boring machine tapped into a
distribution line--I just think that the ability to be able to
more accurately identify nonmetallic pipeline is probably my
thing.
Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Mr. McNerney from
California for 5 minutes.
Mr. McNerney. Well, I thank the chairman for that.
And I thank the witnesses this morning.
Administrator Elliott, on September 9th of 2010, I was on
the San Mateo Bridge when the San Bruno explosion occurred. Two
of my three children live in peninsula just south of San
Francisco. Also, the Aliso Canyon leak, which was incredibly
dangerous, and we were very lucky that there were no explosions
with that, occurred in California. Near my district we have
three large natural gas storage facilities, including the
MacDonald Island, which is 82 billion cubic feet.
So, are the inspections by the California Public Utility
Commission and the Federal authorities for these facilities,
and the high-pressure transmission pipelines, doing enough to
keep our communities safe? Are they doing enough?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, I do believe that the work being
performed is adequate. I, first, want to say, when I first came
to PHMSA, it was the discussion of San Bruno and the eight
fatalities that occurred there, and that Aliso Canyon was the
worst natural gas release we have ever had in this country. So,
those resonate very much.
We are so dependent upon the use of our State partners to
oversee certain operations. And 80 percent of the pipeline
system in the U.S. today falls to the oversight of our State
partners. I think, as I said earlier, there is always more we
can do. We always need to strive to get better. We need to work
more closely with our State partners to make sure that we are
being as forward-thinking as possible. But I would have to say
that, at this point in time, I do think the work is adequate.
Mr. McNerney. Well, we clearly have our complaints about
the pace of PHMSA's rulemaking, but are we being too demanding
about the safety of our constituents? Is that part of the
problem?
Mr. Elliott. No, I mean, you can never not take into
account the absolute importance of the safety of your
constituents. And as I had mentioned earlier, we have every
reason to continue to focus on improving and completing those
mandates, so the safety value of those rules can get out and be
in place.
Mr. McNerney. What is the holdup in these rulemakings? I
mean, is industry dragging its feet or you don't have enough
personnel? Do you need more resources from Congress? I mean,
what is the holdup here?
Mr. Elliott. As I had mentioned before, I understand it is
my responsibility, as the Administrator today, to complete
these mandates, going back to 2011 and 2016, and we work on
that every day. For most of the mandates that have been brought
to our attention as being most important, the liquid, the gas,
the rupture detection valve rule, we have completed our work on
those, and they are going through the necessary review before
they can be published as a final rule, except for the rupture
and automatic valve rule, which is a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. So, granted, we have got a ways to go on that, but
it has got the greatest attention at PHMSA, sir.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
Mr. Russell, I have introduced some good cybersecurity
bills in Congress and in a number of others in previous
Congresses. Your example of the TSA's criteria for determining
pipeline facility criticality as a potential for mass
casualties or significant health effects, it is very concerning
that the pipeline operators interpret this differently. What
more can the TSA do to provide more clarity to operators of
whether the facilities qualify and the additional steps that
are necessary to make the infrastructure more secure?
Mr. Russell. Thank you for the question. Certainly, TSA did
update the guidelines in 2018. So, that is a good thing, to
make them more current. But it is really some of those key
terms. What does mass casualty mean? How does that translate to
the area you are operating in? Again, issues around the
criticality, what exactly does that mean? So, I think either a
glossary or more specificity around some of those key terms is
what we are proposing that TSA try to do.
Mr. McNerney. Good. Thank you.
Commissioner Friedeman, how do you deal PHMSA's shortage of
personnel? Is that a factor affecting your capability to do
your job?
Mr. Friedeman. Not that I have been informed from our
staff, recognizing, however, that there is an assessment on
basically an operator's proportionate throughput that offsets
any shortfall relative to funding. So, there is a budgetary
opportunity on the part of the commission to address some of
the issues inferentially that you are talking about.
Mr. McNerney. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Johnson of Ohio for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Friedeman, welcome today from the great State of Ohio.
We may have covered some of this ground already, but I want to
dig in a little deeper. I really appreciate you being here to
discuss how the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio best keeps
our pipeline systems functioning and safe. Ohio's safety
program has received the maximum score available, as you know,
on PHMSA's audits over the last 2 years, which I think
demonstrates how seriously PUCO takes pipeline safety.
Now I appreciated that in your testimony you reiterated
PUCO's mission Statement, which focuses on reliability and
safety, but also affordability. And I am sure each of these
issues were taken into consideration when Ohio developed its
accelerated pipeline replacement program.
So, I know Congressman Latta got into this a little bit,
but can you talk a little bit deeper about the program's
importance and your commission's replacement program and your
commission's role to ensure that pipeline rates are adequate
and just to allow for pipeline replacement and modernization?
Mr. Friedeman. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. Thank
you for the comments relative to the PUCO.
As I had indicated previously, the costs associated with
the investments are obviously socialized across ratepayers. So,
there is a need to balance, once again, to attempt to achieve
the equilibrium between benefit and cost. And that is really
something that is, I think, inherit in the nature of the
recovery mechanism that we use relative to using a rider,
rather than waiting for a rate case. So, that enables the
commission to review on an annual basis.
Mr. Johnson. What are some of the balancing factors? I
mean, when you talk about your philosophy of balancing quality
and safety with cost and acceleration, what are some of the
factors that you use to balance all of that out?
Mr. Friedeman. Well, obviously, one of the key
considerations is bill impact, recognizing again that
affordability is a function--affordability across all
ratepayers. That is, from the highest perspective, the
consideration relative to the social costs associated.
In terms of the implementation of the program itself, there
is a recognition that bare steel cast iron noncathodically
protected infrastructure is subject to deterioration over time.
So, basically, the staff, in conjunction with, in cooperation
with the utilities in the State, identified pipelines that fall
within the bucket targeted for replacement. And it was a very
methodical approach that was started over a decade ago, and I
believe that the various utilities are at various stages of
completion, but that all four of the major investor-owned
utilities are intending to complete their programs by 2033. And
to the credit of other utilities, not those of the big four,
they are beginning to adopt the same process, or at least
express an interest in doing so, recognizing, I think, the
benefits to be derived.
Mr. Johnson. OK. All right. Well, thank you.
Administrator Elliott, as you know, PHMSA's State partners
oversee more than 80 percent of the Nation's pipeline
infrastructure, especially the gas distribution pipelines that
connect our homes and businesses to the main transmission
system. Can you talk a little bit about State programs and the
methodology that PHMSA uses to distribute pipeline safety
grants?
Mr. Elliott. And, Congressman, thank you for the question.
There are all but two States that participate in the State
program with PHMSA. Alaska and Hawaii are the two. So, on an
annual basis, PHMSA will work with the State to receive
information about their current inspection program, about the
goals that they have achieved, about the staffing that they
have. We take that information, and then, we will conduct a
review of the State program, looking very much at the same
information, the adequacy of the program. Is staff adequately
trained? Are they meeting their goals?
And then, with the dollars that are allocated to PHMSA as
part of our State-based grant, we look at the dollars that the
State has projected that they have for the State program. Then,
we add those dollars, and then, factor in the score. And that
ultimately provides the funding to the State.
It has been mentioned before that, while PHMSA can fund up
to 80 percent, over the last few years it has hovered more
closely to about 70 percent. And actually, one of the things
that we have done--we recognize the importance of funding the
State programs. Occasionally, we will get a question about,
well, what do you do for poor-performing States? And one of the
answers is we can reduce the amount of funding, but, to me,
that is counterproductive. Why would you reduce the amount of
funding? So, we try to keep the funding as robust as possible.
But, in the last few years, we have actually taken some unused
funds at PHMSA and moved it over to the State-based program to
put in as much dollars as we can for the program.
Mr. Johnson. OK. Well, thank you.
And I apologize for going over, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
the indulgence. I yield back.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Kuster from New
Hampshire for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you for being with us today.
I want to dive right into an accident that was very close
to home in the neighboring community. In September of 2018, an
accidental release of high-pressure gas caused an explosion
just across the border from my district in Lawrence, Andover,
and North Andover, Massachusetts, referred to as the Merrimack
Valley incident. Over 130 structures were damaged as a result
of the accident. More than 20 individuals were injured and,
very sadly, one person lost their life.
So, what we have learned is that the tragic accident could
have been completely avoided. And it is imperative, in my view,
that Congress work to identify additional safety measures that
can help prevent these types of accidents. So, I want to
address Mr. Elliott. My understanding is, in 2011, the Pipeline
Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act required the
use of automatic or remote-controlled shutoff valves on
transmission pipelines, but, to date, PHMSA has not implemented
this mandate, despite the NTSB finding that the use of the
automatic shutoff valves is effective in preventing and
reducing the severity of pipeline explosions. So, my question
is, why has PHMSA not implemented this mandate over 8 years
since this bill was signed into law?
Mr. Elliott. Thank you for your question, and we continue
to feel for the Rondon family and the loss of their loved one
in the incident up in Massachusetts.
You are correct that the requirement for automatic shutoff
on transmission lines is part of the rupture detection and
valve rule. In this case, we were dealing with a gas
distribution line. And so, the rules didn't necessarily apply
there.
But let me just expand what I think needs to be done or
what we can do there. And I think it is important to say----
Ms. Kuster. And is there any sense of urgency?
Mr. Elliott. Congresswoman, I think there is a significant
sense of urgency. I think this is a case, too, where the
importance between PHMSA and the State partners actually works
as intended. This was, in every sense of the word, a monumental
failure on the part of the operator. We set the minimum
standards, Federal standards, for pipeline safety. States can,
and have for many years--and it has been over 50 years that
States have been allowed to oversee their intrastate process--
but the States had the ability where, if it is not in conflict
with the minimum Federal regulations, to apply their own
regulations to strengthen what the Federal Government has in
place. And that is exactly what happened in Massachusetts. If
you recall, the State legislature included specific language
that now requires a professional engineer to sign off on the
plan, in the belief that doing that would have prevented this
incident.
The minimum Federal requirements are very clear. They
require qualified individuals and a qualification process at
every step of the process. So, we believe that the Federal
standards, if they had been adhered to in the Merrimack Valley
incident, would have prevented this. But this is a good case
where the State felt they needed to go above and beyond the
Federal standards.
I think, going back to your original question, I think
there will be a lot further discussion about the importance of
automatic shutoff valves not just on transmission lines, but on
gas distribution lines.
Ms. Kuster. So, what is the holdup from instituting this
requirement?
Mr. Elliott. Right. Well, as I had mentioned before, the
rupture detection and automatic valve rule is probably one that
has languished the longest at PHMSA. It is in a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking stage. We have finished our work on it. And
I have committed that we will move that not only into the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, so we can get it out to get
public comment, but, then, move it to the final rule as quickly
as possible. It is still on schedule to become a final rule
before the end of the year.
Ms. Kuster. Can I ask you, do you know what percentage of
new pipeline infrastructure has automatic shutoff valves? Is
this accepted technology now and it is being installed?
Mr. Elliott. I do not know specifically, but I can
determine that, and I will as quickly as possible get back to
you with that information. But I don't have the specifics of
that.
Ms. Kuster. And what is your sense of the timeline for when
Congress can expect, and the public, the American public, for
the mandate for the automatic shutoff valve to be implemented?
Mr. Elliott. Well, again, that rule, even though it is in a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking stage, we still have it on the
books to be completed in this year. That may be a bit
aggressive, but we are going to work as hard as we can at PHMSA
to move that bill forward.
Ms. Kuster. I appreciate that, and I urge you, the urgency
of now to protect our constituents. So, thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Elliott. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Bucshon, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think you can see the bipartisan frustration with delays
in action from Federal agencies. This is, not blaming anyone
here, but this is kind of a frustration not only in this area,
but across the board where congressional intent, determined and
passed into law sometimes decades before, has not been carried
out. And it is a frustrating problem, and it sounds like you
are doing the best, Mr. Elliott, at least at PHMSA to resolve
some of those frustrations.
I also want to say that, just as technology evolves in our
own personal lives--you know, no one would go out and buy a
computer with 20-year-old technology--we shouldn't be putting
pipelines in the ground with 20-year-old technology. As Mr.
Griffith pointed out, there is new technology, including fiber
optics, that, in my view, if we are putting new pipeline in the
ground and technology exists, we should find a way to utilize
that, because we wouldn't buy a computer for ourselves with 20-
year-old technology. It makes no sense. This happens across the
Government, and it is very frustrating. I understand that there
are stakeholders and there are costs involved in new
technology, but we need to be more nimble in this process,
especially as it relates to something as critical as pipeline
safety,
So, with those opening comments, Mr. Friedeman, I have a
question. This has been addressed a little bit. But I
understand over the last several years States have implemented
mechanisms to accelerate the replacement of pipelines. That is
a positive thing. In your testimony, you explain how these
campaigns have helped rapidly modernize Ohio's aging
infrastructure with over 5,000 miles of distribution main lines
and more than 1 million service lines being replaced since the
inception of the program nearly a decade ago.
How do you at the State level balance the need for these
investments with, ultimately, the cost that is borne by the
ratepayers? It is a difficult balance, I understand.
Mr. Friedeman. Yes, sir, it is a difficult balance. I think
it is a qualitative as much as it is a quantitative assessment.
Mr. Bucshon. Yes.
Mr. Friedeman. As I indicated previously, there is a
sensitivity relative to affordability, an acknowledgment that
affordability is not a constant across all ratepayers. And
then, it is very difficult, as you suggest, to assign a
quantitative value to that. It is a consideration. It is a
variable that goes into the decisionmaking process. I can't be
more specific than that. I am sorry, I hope that is
responsive----
Mr. Bucshon. No, that is. I mean, it is a difficult process
as it is in southern Indiana, you know, and the State of
Indiana, where we have the need for updating pipelines and
other infrastructure. And then, of course, people like me hear
back from our constituents about that, and I think sometimes
maybe we don't, as a society, give as much information about
the process to everyone, so that people understand. I think
most people understand, if you have more safe and updated
pipelines, that may necessitate in the short run, or even in
the long run, higher rates to cover the capital improvements
that have been made. And I think sometimes the frustration that
I hear is that that understanding of that is not projected as
well as it could be maybe to the ratepayers. And I am sure you
guys do a great job of trying, doing your best to do that. But
I would encourage everyone to try to project that to the
ratepayers, because we hear about it.
We also hear about unfunded mandates from the Federal
Government, and specifically, EPA and a number of other
agencies that are blamed for that. But, many times, again, it
is just a frustration.
Mr. Russell--and I have about a minute--as you know, risk-
based decisionmaking is the best way to approach complex
problems like cybersecurity, especially when you are dealing
with 2.7 million miles of pipelines. Is it true that TSA is not
attempted to understand the relative risk of a safety instant
among the Nation's most critical pipelines? Would you say that
that is true or not true?
Mr. Russell. I think, for their older risk assessment, the
one that was done in 2014, one of the observations was not
factoring in maybe some of the PHMSA safety data that would get
at the age of a system and how that might affect the system's
vulnerability. And that is one of the things we would like to
see them take on.
Mr. Bucshon. OK, great. And then, the last thing I will say
is I am still struggling, me personally, to understand why the
TSA, as the agency of record on some of these things--and I
suspect that has happened over time--but I think someone
mentioned that maybe we should revisit the jurisdictional
issues related to pipeline safety as part of our
reauthorization. I just want to throw that out there.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Doyle [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes Mr. O'Halleran for 5 minutes.
Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member, and
to all our witnesses before us today for joining our
conversation on how Congress can ensure the pipelines of today
do not harm our citizens, our economy, and environment of
tomorrow.
I believe Congress has a duty to legislate; the agencies
have a duty to carry out the laws and implement regulations in
the spirit of the statute. In this vein, Mr. Chairman, it is my
hope that we, as a committee, can continue working in a
bipartisan fashion, as we have in the past, to reauthorize the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's
pipeline safety program.
Administrator Elliott, I thank you for appearing before our
committee today to provide perspective regarding pipeline
safety issues. However, given TSA's role overseeing their
pipeline security program, and with the growing threat of
cyberattacks facing our Nation, I find it troubling that TSA
neglected to send a representative to appear before us in this
vein. Hiding from the GAO report's negative findings is not the
way to do this. Sooner or later, the TSA will have to let the
American people know why they have not met their duty. And I
just, having been involved in public safety in the past, I just
can't imagine why this type of process is not addressed in an
appropriate way.
Administrator Elliott, I appreciate the diligent, behind-
the-scenes consultation you described in your testimony before
our agency issues a rulemaking. However, since you became
Administrator, which specific new actions and processes have
you put into place to ensure these rulemakings are done in a
timely fashion?
Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question,
and especially with regards to security. I think Ranking Member
Upton said it best. At PHMSA, we understand you can't separate
safety and security, and even though we have the safety
function, the professional men and women of PHMSA that are out
doing the inspections, I think it is worth mentioning, also are
trying to, where they can, identify security concerns and
convey that back to the industry and our colleagues at TSA.
With regards to what we are doing to try and expedite the
rulemaking process, besides focusing on the sheer importance of
moving the mandates, which I can guarantee we focus on every
day, one of the things we have done that may have had, or will
have, the best outcome is, you know, PHMSA really is two modal
administrations in one. And we have actually just started to
complete the work of basically bringing all the rulemaking
activities into one single entity within PHMSA. And that's
going to allow us to be more agile, more responsive to
rulemakings, both on the pipeline and the hazardous material
surface transportation side. It basically gives us the same
ability to bring new resources together to form a single entity
that is going to allow us to do work quicker and more
efficiently, and again, as we say, flex more, depending on
where the regulatory need is going to be. So, that is probably
the most important thing we have done, other than focusing on
mandates each and every day, sir.
Mr. O'Halleran. I thank you.
Section 30, Mr. Elliott, of the 2011 Pipeline Safety Act
requires development of protocols to consult with Indian tribes
that have hazardous material pipelines within their
jurisdiction, and we know many of them do. How would you
describe the agency's protocols to work with tribes on a
pipeline near a reservation boundary and with the spill
response zone entirely within the reservation?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question.
Actually, I think it is good, and I will explain why. It was
last year, in 2018, that one of the senior field members of the
pipeline team actually prepared a protocol that sets out how we
are going to communicate with tribal authorities before we go
in to do inspections, typically, with oil and gas operators.
That is kind of independent of what the operators do, but we
feel that it is absolutely necessary to make sure that we
provide the communications, and more importantly, the respect
to the tribal leadership about the pipelines that operate
underground within their territories. But I think, more
importantly, to also create a stronger link between the tribal
leadership and the PHMSA representatives, so they know who to
call.
Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Elliott.
Mr. Chairman, as a citizen--forget the fact that we are
here in Congress--but, just as a citizen, it really perturbs me
that an agency of Government does not appear before the
oversight committee.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Doyle. The gentleman yields back.
I think both sides of the aisle and this entire committee
shares your thoughts on that.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Walberg for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to the panel for being here.
Administrator Elliott, thank you for being here, and thank
you wearing that amazing blue tie. With a Buckeye at the other
end of the table, we appreciate a Wolverine representation
there.
[Laughter.]
I don't know if anybody else noticed, but I did. And after
the 10 years football drought we have had, we will take
anything.
Mr. Elliott, as you know, one of the challenges for States
in colder climates like Michigan is inspecting pipelines for
potential cracks, leaks, and not having to shut off or disrupt
gas flow, especially in winters like last winter with the polar
vortex that we experienced. That is why I am excited about the
development of new technologies like robotic smart pigs for in-
line inspections that could be used to help make pipelines
safer. Other developments in recent years include drones for
mapping and detecting leaks, software solutions to help analyze
pipelines, and, as Mr. Griffith mentioned, fiberoptic cable
technologies.
My question is, how does PHMSA work with operators or other
technology innovators to develop and identify potential
technologies for further attention in its regulatory processes?
And secondly, what could Congress do to help drive innovation
and foster an environment where operators can incorporate new
technologies and best practices?
Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question.
With regards to my tie, while it is not the beloved cream and
crimson of my Hoosiers, at least it is Big 10 colors.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Mr. Elliott. You are welcome.
With regards to how we can continue to foster accelerated
growth in technologies, especially technologies that provide
greater safety, as I mentioned earlier, I think there are two
important ways to do that. One is the absolute responsibility
of PHMSA, and not only me, but the staff--I get the opportunity
to talk to a lot of oil and gas executives, and it is probably
one of the first points that I always make about the importance
of safety technology and how we need to continue to invest,
again, not so much in safe R&D, but, basically, some of the
step-change safety that will help, I think, get us this next
level of safety.
But I think the second part is from the congressional point
of view. I think, again, have this great thirst to understand,
I mean to ask industry to come in and be very specific about
their paths to more aggressive implementation of this safety
technology.
I came from the railroad industry where we have seen
tremendous improvements in technology and R&D, all designed to
eliminate causes of incidents that will create catastrophic
incidents, rail incidents. And I have seen the same thing in
the pipeline incident.
But I think the one thing that is missing is the ability to
communicate that effectively to those people, both on the
regulatory side as well as the congressional side, to fully
understand what is going on, and then, to provide good
recommendations about how all that good work can be----
Mr. Walberg. How the program is helpful?
Mr. Elliott. Yes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Mr. Friedeman, as we have heard today, while PHMSA still
has mandates for the 2011 reauthorization unfinished, they have
made the most of the resources they have to bring these complex
technical rulemakings close to the finish line. However, as you
noted in your testimony, States can play an important role in
taking some of the burden off of PHMSA by assuming safety
authority over interstate gas pipelines. Like Ohio, Michigan is
one of only eight States that act as interstate agents and
perform inspections. Can you describe how your relationship
with PHMSA has impacted the overall safety and integrity of
Ohio's pipeline system?
Mr. Friedeman. In my discussions with the safety team at
the commission, once again, anecdotally, that relationship I
think is perceived by staff to be very productive, to be
mutually respectful. And I believe there is, in becoming an
interstate agent, an assumption of responsibility and an
acknowledgment of the responsibility to promote the welfare of
the citizens of Ohio. I would commend the State of Michigan for
doing the same. I would believe that there is that same
assumption of responsibility and acknowledgment at play there.
I think, given the activities within the State of Ohio that
I, hopefully, described today, you can appreciate the sheer
magnitude of pipeline activity nationally. I mean, it is
absolutely remarkable. There are in excess of 2 million miles
of distribution, transmission, and gathering lines.
In order to accept the charge of a regulator or
responsibility of a regulatory to promote general welfare and
the delivery of adequate and reliable service, and safe
service, I think the magnitude underscores the compelling need
of the parties to act in a cooperative and coordinated fashion.
Again, I believe that the relationship between PUCO and PHMSA
is a clear demonstration of what can be accomplished through
that coordination.
Mr. Walberg. OK. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Rush [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Butterfield, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you very much, Chairman Rush. Thank
you for holding today's hearing.
This topic is a very timely one for my district, as two
people tragically lost their lives, and others were seriously
injured, as a result of an explosion originating from a natural
gas line in Durham, North Carolina, that occurred on the
morning of April 10th of this year. I just received a news
break just a few moments ago that there is yet another gas leak
in the 500 block of Duke Street there in Durham. We don't know
the extent of it. The news reports are that no one has been
injured, and that is a good report.
But, Mr. Chairman, the explosion in Durham demonstrates
just how important the safety and security of our pipelines are
and how the work of this subcommittee to reauthorize the
Federal pipeline safety program is critically important.
And let me thank the three witnesses. But I will first
address this question to the Administrator. Do you have any
knowledge of the Durham explosion that I made reference to a
moment ago?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, yes, I do.
Mr. Butterfield. Can you elaborate on it for me, if you
could?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, we were saddened to learn of the
second loss of life from this incident.
When incidents occur--and we are very thankful that in the
State of North of Carolina we have a very good pipeline
partner--but what we typically do anytime that there is a
fatality, serious injury, or significant evacuations, we will
dispatch members of our Pipeline Accident Investigation
Division to go in and assist the State. And I need to
underscore that, assist the State, because they have the
predominant oversight.
We know that, when we arrived, it was still kind of being
treated as a fire scene and that other agencies were there as
well. We worked with our State partners, and I do know that one
of the problems in helping, that has prohibited us from
basically understanding the specific point of damage with the
distribution line is the damage to the building and the
asbestos-containing material and the debris. So, they have
actually had to do an asbestos cleanup.
We know that they are getting close to being able to do the
excavation of the actual distribution line that was hit by the
boring machine. Our accident investigation team will be there
again to assist the State. And then, once that area is
uncovered, then that piece of pipe will go to, typically, go to
a laboratory for analysis. So, we will continue to work with
the State to assist in the investigation in any way we can.
Mr. Butterfield. But, based on you investigation thus far,
do you believe that there could have been anything done to
avoid this explosion?
Mr. Elliott. Well, you know, this was a case where the
excavation putting in the fiber optics had done the one call.
The lines had been marked. But I think one of the
determinations we are going to have to make is whether or not
this was an area where the operator would have been required to
do an excavation, to hand dig, and look to make sure that the
directional boring didn't strike the distribution line. So, I
think we will know more after the investigation is complete,
Congressman.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend from Iowa, if he wants
to consume some of my time. If not, I will yield back.
Mr. Loebsack. Go ahead.
Mr. Butterfield. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes Mr. Olson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Olson. I thank the Chair for holding this very
important hearing to Texas 22.
And welcome, to our three panelists, to the first panel.
My first question is for Administrator Elliott. As you
might know, I represent one of the fastest-growing communities
in the country. Our pop base in Texas 22 is booming. In some
areas, we have thousands and thousands of families who are
living on a land that used to be rice, sugarcane farms, and
cattle operations. That has made big changes for flood control,
like Hurricane Harvey, but it has also put a challenge on
pipeline safety. Clearly, there are pipelines all across Texas
that used to be under wide-open spaces that are now under
families' feet and schools. My district has that problem, that
situation, over and over and over.
I would like to ask you about how inspections and, quote/
unquote, ``class location rules'' change as land above
pipelines changes. Am I correct that there has been a rule in
the works since 2013? And will you work closely with Congress
to make sure you all are taking it seriously?
Mr. Elliott. So, Congressman, thank you for the question.
With regards to how class location evolves with the increase of
population, as you know, there are several class locations. And
as new growth occurs near a pipeline, then there are certain
restrictions, and it is the responsibility of the operator to
determine that growth. Are there now buildings and populations?
And then, they have the responsibility to do several things.
One of them is to reduce the pressure of the pipeline that is
now going through this high-consequence area, part of the class
location.
Mr. Olson. One question for you on your workforce. At
breakfast this morning with a lead in the energy operations,
somebody in touch with the pipeline industry. And they are
concerned because they admitted they poach your people. Your
people, our best and brightest, they can pay them a lot more
than you can pay them.
Mr. Doyle and I have a bill that addresses this for FERC by
addressing them to have higher pay than the normal Federal
level. Would that be something you would like to have? Have a
little weapon to keep them? Because, again, they admitted these
are great people; we want them in our employ; and so, we are
poaching off of PHMSA.
Mr. Elliott. Well, certainly we are in competition with
industry. And when we do hire pipeline inspectors who typically
have engineering degrees, and after we put them through some of
the best possible training, they even become more marketable to
industry folks. So, we are always looking at ways, Congressman,
to find new sources of recruiting. I mentioned a little
earlier, our HR Director has actually been tasked to go into
colleges and universities that have engineering programs and,
basically, do a better job of selling the safety mission of
PHMSA, because I think that is attractive to a lot of folks.
We continue to look at ways to incentivize individuals that
want to come to work for PHMSA. One of the most alarming things
to me, for example, we had 10 job offers out for pipeline
engineers. Sixty percent turned that offer down for various
reasons. Many of those are actually because they had better
offers elsewhere.
So, I guess that is a long way of saying we probably would
encourage any help we could get to better incentivize
pipeline----
Mr. Olson. So, it would be OK with more money, not the
restrictions that are placed right now, something like the SEC
has to regulate securities and exchange. Would you be OK with
more money to pay these people?
Mr. Elliott. I would be happy to see that, but I will work
with whatever tools I have.
Mr. Olson. Yes, sir, that is our toolbox to give you.
The last questions is, Commissioner Friedeman of Ohio, as
Texas 22 grows, we know that a lot of new pipe is being built,
especially for local distribution lines. You described in your
testimony how one phase is replacing older existing lines. Can
you talk about how pipeline technology has changed in recent
years and what this means for safety and spill prevention?
Mr. Friedeman. I think inherent in the replacement program
is that, first of all, it is an inevitably long duration
because of the scope of the activity required. And the natural
consequence of that is technological advancement as the program
evolves. An illustration of that would be the composite
material in plastic. So, there is a certain remedial nature
when you have an accelerated main replacement program that
identifies pockets and susceptibility. When you replace old
infrastructure with new infrastructure, not only are you
mitigating the risk associated with leakage, but what you are
doing is replacing it with technologically improved composite
material at the time, which should, then, extend the useful
life beyond that which was historical. So, there is just an
inherent benefit to a well-coordinated program.
Mr. Veasey [presiding]. I thank you.
I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Elliott, I wanted to ask you, in your testimony you
reiterated that, ``The mission of PHMSA is to protect people
and the environment by advancing the safe transportation of
energy products and other hazardous materials that are
essential to our daily lives.'' And most of the time, we do
pretty well at achieving this mission, but incidents are too
frequent, and everybody knows that we have to do better.
Last year, February the 23rd, Linda Rogers was just 12
years old when she was killed by a natural gas leak and an
explosion in her family's home in the district that I represent
in Dallas. And we know the difference between transmission and
distribution of natural gas, and the different approaches to
safety that are obviously required for each of those. But,
after this explosion, more than 300 nearby homes were evacuated
due to the quantity and severity of the natural gas leaks
discovered in the residential neighborhood, and reports show
that more than 2 dozen homes across the north Texas and central
Texas area have blown up since 2006 because of leaking from
natural gas pipelines. And tragically, nine people have died
and at least 22 others have been injured badly.
I appreciate you making clear in your testimony that
completing the hazardous liquid rule, which includes installing
a leak detection system, is one of your highest priorities. Do
I have your commitment on making leak detection systems a
priority in this rule?
Mr. Elliott. Yes.
Mr. Veasey. Beyond a rulemaking effort, there are recent
pipeline industry-recommended practices addressing pipeline
safety systems, leak detection, and integrity management
systems that have been developed by the American Petroleum
Institute in response to recent disasters. What are you doing
to incorporate industry-recommended practices into your regular
scheme?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question. And
we are very aware of the tragic incident in Dallas with Atmos
Energy. And, similarly, we had sent inspectors and
investigators to work with the Texas Railroad Commission. We
continue to work with them on some of the ongoing concerns.
But we will, with regards to the mandates, we will continue
to work to complete those that will bring the greatest safety
value to not only protecting people, as you said, as well as
the environment.
Mr. Veasey. Do you have any programs or efforts to collect
and promote industry best practices?
Mr. Elliott. And again, yes, and to that, we regularly will
look at industry standards that have been in practice for a
while that have shown tangible safety benefits. And we will,
then, through incorporation, make those regulations. We have
several of those that we are working on now, working on the
language, and several of those deal with pipeline safety.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
And just kind of switching gears, I wanted to ask, as you
know, in today's pipeline technology, we have a lot of
technology that is being used for leak detection, different
things like that, to make sure that the transmission of natural
gas is being done safely. What is being done, because we have
talked a lot about it on the grid, but you don't hear it a lot
as it relates to pipelines, like hacking, the technology
actually being compromised as it relates to transmission of
natural gas through pipelines?
Mr. Elliott. Well, I think, as some of the discussion today
has pointed out, you cannot separate safety and security. And
while we work every day to improve safety, we understand we
also have a responsibility, where we can, to help improve
security. And one of those areas, actually, that is ongoing now
is we are trying to understand, Congressman, how we can go into
major pipeline control rooms that control these operations,
some of them many thousands of miles in length, and perhaps be
a little better armed to ask the pipeline control room
operators questions about their SCADA security systems. Are
they adhering to best practices within the cybersecurity realm?
Again, we don't profess to be the security organization, but I
think we can probably do a better job of ensuring that we ask
the right questions to help understand that they are, in fact,
doing that.
Mr. Veasey. Do you feel that the people that are actually
providing the technology, the technology that is being provided
to the pipelines, that those companies are being vetted enough
and that whatever they are providing to these pipelines is
secure enough to make sure that any sort of hacking isn't
taking place, and that those companies aren't somehow complicit
with that?
Mr. Elliott. Yes, it is certainly outside of my real area
of expertise, but I can tell you, again, I fall back on my
railroad experience, because we had the same issue with
dispatching of trains and the concerns about cybersecurity and
positive train control.
And I will tell you, I have every reason to believe that
the vetting of companies that are involved in providing that
kind of SCADA system, cybersecurity link--I have no reason to
believe that the oil and gas industry do not adequately vet
those companies.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you very much. I appreciate you.
Now I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Hudson.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Elliott, good to see you again. Thank you for being
here with us today to examine ways to increase the safety of
our constituents and all Americans.
While pipelines are the safest means of energy
transportation, unfortunately, there are from time to time
instances of failure. In these moments, it is critical our
first responders are trained and prepared to handle these
dangerous situations. Back home in North Carolina, some local
and small fire stations don't have the budget to send their
first responders to specific emergency pipeline safety. Last
year, we had over 70 emergency responders take free online
classes to receive pipeline emergency response training.
By using technology, we are creating safer communities. In
recent years, technology has been developed to internally scan
pipelines to find issues and detect leaks before they become a
problem. I know a lot of the questions today have surrounded
technology, but do you want to just, more generally, add more
detail to what PHMSA is doing to encourage pipeline operators
to continue innovating and incorporating the most cutting-edge
technologies and best practices?
Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for your question. And
the first part of the discussion, I don't think we can ever do
enough, especially in rural areas with volunteer fire service
companies, to do enough in industry, whatever it may be, to
train our emergency responders enough. We did that religiously
in the rail industry, and I know the pipeline industry has
similar practices. But that is something I totally support.
Again, I go back to the topic about technology and
innovation, I guess my one area--and I don't necessarily
consider it a concern, but I think it is where we have to focus
more--that is through the oil and gas pipeline industry. It is,
again, to move away from what I consider to be safe R&D and to
move into some of the more research and development work that
will deliver further safety enhancements.
You know, we have talked about, and I very rarely anymore
talk about the fact that the pipeline industry has a rate of
99.997 percent safety. Having come from a heavily regulated
industry, I am of the belief that we are not necessarily going
to be able to regulate that last little bit of safety. It is
going to come through adherence to certain regulatory items
like integrity management, I think adherence to very
comprehensive safety management systems that are less driven by
regulations, but more by the safety culture of the company. And
I think continuing to drive and invest more in technology and
R&D, again, that is more step change than some of the
traditional in-line inspection R&D that is going on today. I
think that is where we can have some of the best investments
and advancements in safety.
Mr. Hudson. I agree with you on that. Would you support a
pilot program or an alternative process that would allow PHMSA
to work more closely with pipeline operators on some of this
newer, safer technology?
Mr. Elliott. Absolutely. I mean, one of the criticisms that
we have heard, rightfully so, from industry is we are too slow
in allowing new safety technology to come to pass. As I have
mentioned, we have to be absolutely sure that this new
technology does, in fact, deliver not only the ability to
extend the life of the infrastructure and to be a surrogate for
physical inspection, but it has to deliver safety value. And
sometimes it takes us a little longer to understand that. I
think our special permit process is good, but I think there are
ways we can improve the ability to move good technology into
the application process faster than we are able to do it today.
Mr. Hudson. Appreciate that.
Do you have any recommendations for Congress on ways to
encourage more early-stage R&D to supplement the work that
PHMSA is doing today?
Mr. Elliott. I mean, I do the best I can, so I will take
whatever encouragement Congress can offer to provide greater
investment and focus on R&D.
Mr. Hudson. Well, I would just ask that maybe take that
back and think about it. We would appreciate any advice that
you have for ways we can partner with you, because I think we
all agree, both sides of the aisle, we want these innovative
technologies. We want to continue to move in the direction that
you are describing where we continue to be on the cutting edge
of safety and move as quickly as possible to keep our
communities safe. So, if you would take that back as homework,
and we would love to have any feedback you might bring back to
us.
Mr. Elliott. That is the kind of homework I appreciate.
Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. OK. Thank you.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Hudson.
And now, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Barragan.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
Thank you for being here today, gentlemen.
Are any of you familiar with the 2015 oil spill in Santa
Barbara? Yes, Mr. Elliott?
Mr. Elliott. Yes.
Ms. Barragan. This was the Refugio State Beach spill.
Mr. Elliott. Yes, the Plains issue?
Ms. Barragan. All American Plains. Can you tell me how
something like this happens and where the pipeline safety
program that PHMSA, where do they fall into the picture of this
spill?
Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question.
And undeniably, this was a significant impact. Matter of fact,
I just sat through a briefing that NOAA provided last week that
actually showed kind of the impact from the point of origin,
where the oil came underneath the highway and down the
embankment, and then, out into the coast.
I do have to preface my remarks by saying, as you know, it
is currently being litigated in the Department of Justice and
involved in others. But I will tell you this: that from the
PHMSA point of view, we really see this as a case where our
integrity management rules and the responsibilities of this
operator were not adhered to, and were not adhered to in a
pretty significant way.
Ms. Barragan. Well, there were multiple violations, right?
And they weren't fixing what had to be fixed, isn't that right?
Mr. Elliott. That is generally correct, yes.
Ms. Barragan. How are the American people supposed to trust
pipeline companies who can't do the right thing, and then, end
up having a spill where you have the California coastline, just
marine life, people, economy, and a huge impact? How are the
American people supposed to trust when a company tells us day
in and day out, ``Hey, we are going to come in; we are going to
put this in; it is going to be safe; nothing is going to
happen''?
We hear the statistics on how safe it is. And then, you see
these examples where there are constant violations and they are
not doing the right thing. People start asking, Where is the
oversight on this? I think it is hard for the American people
to trust these pipeline companies. And it is hard as well when
you hear that, since that time, there hasn't been a lot done,
and there have been all these delays that are happening.
And so, when you think about the President trying to open
up new California coastline, and the coastline in general, to
drilling, it is a huge concern, rightfully speaking, after you
take a look at what has happened.
Let me ask, the Trump administration's requested budget for
PHMSA is roughly 8 percent less in 2020 than it was in 2019.
How will that impact the pipeline safety program, and does it
open us up to have more incidences of what happened in Santa
Barbara, if we are putting less money into it than more?
Mr. Elliott. Well, thank you for that question, very
important points. I want to comment about what needs to be done
for operators that don't follow the requirements. I think it is
true in any case, and at least from my experience in a year and
a half at PHMSA, that there is a spectrum. There are some
extremely good, conscientious operators, and we are very
thankful that they are there. And I understand the issue of
public trust. All it takes is one operator to kind of dispel
that trust.
I think here, anyway, the process is working probably as it
should, in that there were a number of parties to the
investigation against Plains, and even criminal investigation
and penalty. And again, I can't really get into it, but some
discussion is ongoing about what the impact will be to Plains
with regards to a settlement.
But in regards to----
Ms. Barragan. The budget cuts. Is the 8 percent budget cut
going to make it more likely, less likely--I mean, how is it
going to impact the pipeline safety program?
Mr. Elliott. You know, I worked in my prior career to make
sure that every dollar we have is effective in allowing us to
conduct our safety mission. And I really see that we are able
to do that at PHMSA. It is----
Ms. Barragan. Mr. Elliott, I only have 10 seconds left. Is
an 8 percent cut in the budget going to help safety and the
pipeline safety program, yes or no? Is it going to help it?
Mr. Elliott. So, I will make sure that there is no
degradation in PHMSA's ability to conduct its safety mission
with the dollars that are provided to us, whatever that may be.
Ms. Barragan. Well, I don't have a lot of confidence in
that, but thank you for responding.
Mr. Elliott. I understand.
Ms. Barragan. I yield back.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
And now, I would yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from
Washington, Ms. McMorris Rodgers.
Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you. I thank the chairman for the time.
And I appreciate all the witnesses being here. I think it
has been a really important discussion, a discussion both on
current standards and regulations and how we are doing as far
as meeting those standards, but also looking at how do we do
this in a smarter way, and embracing innovation and technology
and the solutions that are before us. Because we all want to
make sure that we are keeping our communities safe and our
shorelines safe from these kinds of situations.
I wanted to ask, Mr. Elliott, I just wanted to ask, coming
from a rural area, I wanted to dig a little deeper into how do
you approach pipelines in highly populated areas versus the
rural areas, where there are less people and development. And
we have class location requirements for pipelines located in
areas where we have seen recent population growth. I just
wanted to hear a little bit more about how do you go about the
rural versus the more populated. And my colleague here from
Texas talked about his growing area, too.
Mr. Elliott. Well, thank you for the question. And
certainly, there is an important dichotomy between oil and gas
pipelines in populated versus rural areas. I really believe
that it falls back to the absolute importance of adherence to
the pipeline and safety, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration's integrity management rules that require
pipeline operators to have an absolute adequate understanding
of all the operations within their network, whether or not it
is a high-consequence area or a rural area, to make sure that
that line is operating in as safe a fashion as possible, and
that they are doing the appropriate inspections to ensure that
any concerns that might be due to weld issues or lack of
cathodic protection or corrosion are found and addressed long
before they are ever an impact. And I think that our integrity
management rules have been extremely effective over the years
in making sure in holding operators accountable for
understanding the health of their pipeline throughout their
network, regardless of whether or not it is rural or high
populated.
Mrs. Rodgers. And would you also speak just to, what are
the procedures that you have in place to determine the risk?
Because whether it is rural or a growing area, or what happened
on the California coast, what are the procedures that are in
place to address the----
Mr. Elliott. Again, that all, for the most part, falls back
to the operator and the application of their integrity
management system. But one of the items that we do at PHMSA, I
mean, we do our own risk assessment to make sure that we
adequately work with operators to do inspections of gas and oil
pipeline systems, both in rural and high-density areas. Again,
with limited resources, we use kind of a risk analysis. We look
at the past history of the operator. We look at past incidents
of problems with that pipeline. That helps us set our
inspection process to look at these lines.
Mrs. Rodgers. Would you update me on the review? I
understand there has been a review underway since 2013 on the
class location requirements.
Mr. Elliott. So, the class location rulemaking that we are
working on, we put out an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
to seek comment about whether or not industry could use certain
integrity management tools in lieu of having to take additional
steps in the higher-level class locations, the high-density
areas. In other words, can some of this technology and
sophisticated in-line inspection capability replace the ability
to have to reduce certain pipeline pressures?
And I think it was mentioned earlier, and rightfully so, I
mean, some of the growth is basically expanding so rapidly that
it is difficult to basically take some of the steps that are
currently part of the class location program. So, we are
working through a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that will help
us understand more fully can we somehow apply additional
integrity management inspection process to higher class
locations as we see population growth.
Mrs. Rodgers. OK. I had one more question, and this was to
Mr. Russell, but I, too, am frustrated that TSA is not here.
And I guess I will ask this final question on the record.
Thank you very much. I have run out of time. I yield back.
Mr. Veasey. Are there any more questions?
If not, that concludes our first panel. I would like to
thank our witnesses for joining us today to testify on this
very important issue.
And at this time, I ask staff to prepare the witness table
such that we may begin our second panel shortly.
Thank you. Thank you, participants.
Mr. Veasey. We will now hear from a second panel of
private-sector stakeholders. Those witnesses include Mr. Carl
Weimer, executive director for Pipeline Safety Trust; Mr.
Andrew Black, president and CEO of Association of Pipelines;
and Ms. Christina Sames, vice president, operations and
engineering services, American Gas Association.
We want to thank our witnesses for joining us today. We
look forward to your testimony, and at this time the Chair will
recognize Mr. Weimer for 5 minutes to provide his opening
statement.
STATEMENTS OF CARL WEIMER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY
TRUST; ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
ASSOCIATION OF OIL PIPELINES; AND CHRISTINA SAMES, VICE
PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS AND ENGINEERING SERVICES, AMERICAN GAS
ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF CARL WEIMER
Mr. Weimer. Good afternoon. I would like to thank Chairman
Rush and Ranking Member Upton for inviting me to speak today on
pipeline safety and for--I would also like to thank this
committee for continuing this bipartisan effort to protect
people and the safety of America, as you always do.
Before we get into various pipeline safety issues, let me
give you a brief overview of where we stand today regarding the
safety of pipelines in this country.
While everyone testifying today supports the goal of zero
incidents, we still have a long way to go to reach that goal.
According to PHMSA data, since the PIPES Act was signed less
than 3 years ago, there has been over 1,700 reportable pipeline
failures.
Over those failures, nearly 800 are considered significant
incidents under PHMSA's definitions and the number of
significant incidents had been increasing over the past decade.
For the past 15 years, the emphasis in reducing pipeline
incidents has been focused on performance-based integrity
management programs in high consequence areas.
Unfortunately, it would appear that these integrity
management programs have not yet lived up to their promise as
significant incident rates within high consequence areas
continue to climb for hazardous liquid and gas transmission
pipelines.
The pipeline safety system that Congress has created also
plays a part in PHMSA's inability to get things done. One large
barrier to getting better regulations in place is the cost
versus benefit analysis that Congress has uniquely created for
PHMSA.
With a large pipeline system where the probability of a
failure is low but the consequences can be huge, it is nearly
impossible to pass regulations under the current cost benefit
rules.
If you are really interested in longstanding issues such as
effective leak detection, automated shutoff valves, regulation
of over 400,000 miles of totally unregulated gathering lines,
then the cost benefit language in the statute needs to be
fixed.
PHMSA's penalty authority also results in civil penalties
that are economically insignificant to many operators and are
much smaller than those imposed by some States.
The wording in the statute for criminal penalties also does
not align with the better wording for PHMSA's hazmat operations
and creates a very high bar to prove. We have provided
suggested changes to the statute that can give PHMSA more
flexibility and penalty assessment in the ability to bring
criminal charges on companies in the rare cases where that is
warranted.
As currently written, the pipeline safety statutes do not
prohibit the release of gas or hazardous liquid from a
pipeline.
Under current PHMSA rules as determined by recent court
rulings, an operator can cause a significant incident without
necessarily having violated a safety regulation.
In other words, under PHMSA's rules, an operator has to
have a plan for operating and testing their pipeline but they
don't necessarily have to have a plan that works.
To close that loophole, we ask that you add language to
make clear that the intent of the statute is to avoid releases
of gas or hazardous liquids.
In the PIPES Act, Congress asks GAO to produce important
reports on the integrity management program for both natural
gas and hazardous liquid pipelines after the new PHMSA rules,
which they have been working on since 2010, are published.
Since those rules have yet to be published and may be
delayed further, these important reports are not yet due. The
current integrity management rules have been in place for over
a decade, are well understood, and NTSB has done a study on its
effectiveness. So we ask that Congress direct GAO to produce
these important reports as soon as possible instead of waiting
for the proposed rules.
Congress should also ignore industry calls for a relaxation
of class location rules because of integrity management is in
place until the GAO reports are done and the number of
incidents under integrity management show a downward trend.
Also in the PIPES Act Congress directed PHMSA to make it
clear that the Great Lakes, coastal beaches, and marine coastal
waters are considered unusually sensitive areas.
This mandate has yet to be accomplished. The need to do
this came as a surprise to us since, clearly, these are
unusually sensitive.
We were also surprised to learn that PHMSA does not
currently have a way to define and map all such areas. Congress
should also ask GAO to do a study of whether PHMSA's
definitions and identification of such areas along with
commercially navigable waterways are consistent with other
environmental regulations and whether PHMSA currently has GIS
data layers that allow the agency and the industry to know
where such boundaries are. Users of this data are to ensure
that pipeline operators are accurately identifying these areas.
Congress should also mandate that such areas be made public
so State and local governments, along with the public, can
ensure that PHMSA and pipeline companies are considering these
important areas.
I see that my time is about up so I want to thank you again
for asking me to testify today and I stand ready to help answer
any questions and work on reauthorization.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weimer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Weimer.
Mr. Black, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. BLACK
Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
I am Andy Black, president and CEO of the Association of
Oil Pipelines. AOPL represents liquid pipeline owners and
operators transporting crude oil, refined products like
gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and home heating oil, and
industrial products like propane and methane.
We have over 55 member companies which deliver over 21
billion barrels annually over a 215,000-mile network of
pipelines. I am also testifying on behalf of the American
Petroleum Institute, which represents all facets of the oil and
natural gas industry including exploration and production,
refining, marketing, and pipeline and marine transportation.
Pipelines are the safest way to deliver the liquid energy
we all need and use every day. No other mode of transportation
is as safe for the American people or the environment as
pipelines.
And pipelines are getting safer. Over the last 5 years,
pipeline operators have reduced the number of liquid pipeline
incidents impacting people and the environment by 20 percent.
This is Government data publicly available from PHMSA.
PHMSA data also shows pipeline incidents caused by incorrect
operation impacting people and the environment are down 38
percent over the last 5 years and pipeline incidents caused by
corrosion, cracking, or weld failures impact people and the
environment are down 35 percent over that period.
Member companies of AOPL and API work hard to improve
pipeline safety. We are transparent about where we are doing
well and where we can do better.
The statistics I just shared come from the performance
report we develop jointly each year analyzing pipeline safety
data. We use this analysis to guide our industry wide pipeline
safety programs focusing on key safety issues as we strive
towards the goal of zero incidents.
Through this strategic effort, the pipeline industry has
addressed key safety recommendations from Congress, PHMSA, the
NTSB, and issues identified through analysis of safety data.
Recent safety accomplishments include developing new best
practices for finding and fixing cracking in pipelines,
managing leak detection programs, responding to pipeline
emergencies, and applying safety management systems to
pipelines.
API also just released an updated best practice for
inspecting and performing maintenance on pipelines using the
latest inspection technologies and analytical techniques.
Harnessing technology to advance pipeline safety is a theme
we are pursuing across industry and we recommend Congress adopt
as well. For example, high-tech tools can travel inside a
pipeline scanning it like an MRI or an ultrasound at the
doctor's office.
Pipeline operators have the opportunity to find issues
early, perform preventative maintenance, and keep pipelines
operating safely.
The problem is Federal regulations can't keep pace with
fast-moving technology innovations. Outdated PHMSA regulations
sometimes conflict with the latest knowledge and techniques.
Congress can do more to allow PHMSA and pipeline operators
to improve safety by harnessing technology and innovation such
as creating a pilot program to test pipeline safety
technologies and approaches. We were thrilled to hear
Administrator Elliott say ``Absolutely'' when asked if he was
interested in authorizing a voluntary information-sharing
program encouraging joint stakeholder problem solving,
requiring regular PHMSA and stakeholder review of pipeline
safety research and development advances, improving the
approval process for alternative safety technologies, and
encouraging voluntary discovery, disclosure, correction, and
prevention of pipeline safety violations.
Next, protecting public safety and the environment from
attacks on pipelines is a top reauthorization priority for us.
Pipelines are the safest way to deliver the energy American
families and consumers use every day at their industrial
facilities. Recent attacks on pipelines by turning valves or
attempting to damage the pipeline itself are dangerous.
Members of the public, surrounding communities, and the
environment are put in danger by attacks on pipeline facilities
that could easily result in a spill.
Congress should deter future attacks against pipeline
facility by closing the loopholes in the scope of criminal
Federal liability and in Federal pipeline safety law put by
previous Congresses on a bipartisan basis.
AOPL and API also recommend improving PHMSA programs and
regulations by easing hiring and retention of PHMSA inspectors,
which we discussed on the first panel, improving due process in
enforcement proceedings, tailoring requirements to pipeline
operating status, adjusting incident reporting requirements for
inflation, and incorporating the latest best practice on
inspection repair and tank maintenance.
I look forward to answering any of your questions on these
proposals, our pipeline safety performance record, or the
action operators are taking to improve pipeline safety further.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rush [presiding]. And now the Chair would like to
recognize Ms. Sames for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINA SAMES
Ms. Sames. Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Upton, and
esteemed members of the committee, thank you for the invitation
to be here.
I am Christina Sames, vice president of operations and
engineering at the American Gas Association. Prior to AGA, I
worked for the Pipeline Research Council International, which
is a research consortium, and also spent 12 years within
PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety where I worked on everything
from regulations on damage prevention to unusually sensitive
areas and initiative like, well, community assistance, the
pipeline mapping program, and moving damage prevention forward.
AGA represents more than 200 local energy companies that
deliver natural gas to 74 million natural gas customers.
Natural gas pipelines deliver gas through 2.5 million miles of
pipeline including 2.2 million miles of local distribution
pipe.
The gas utilities distribution pipelines are the last
critical link to the delivery chain that brings natural gas
from the well head to the burner tip.
AGA's members live in the communities they serve and
interact daily with both customers and regulators to oversee
pipeline safety locally. Our customers are our neighbors, our
friends, and our family members.
The industry uses a variety of tools to ensure the
integrity of their distribution systems. This includes
prescriptive and risk-based regulations along with voluntary
actions.
A key risk-based regulation used by operators is
distribution integrity management, a regulatory process that
allows an operator to develop a unique safety plan specific to
that system's operating characteristics and risks to determine
how best to mitigate those risks and to prioritize the work
that needs to be done. The process strengthens the systems and
improves safety. Upgrading distribution pipeline systems is
important to safety and reliability. We currently have 43
States and the District of Columbia that have expedited
pipeline replacement programs and over the past 20 years the
amount of cast iron and bare steel in use has declined
dramatically, replaced by modern pipelines which increase
system safety and reliability.
The distribution industry has proven it can simultaneously
increase delivery and improve safety. PHMSA data shows the
distribution incidents have declined as the mileage and
consumers have increased.
But while we have come a long way, recent tragic incidents
demonstrate more needs to be done. The April 10th incident in
Durham, North Carolina was caused by third-party excavation
damage, which continues to be the primary cause of distribution
incidents.
The tragic incident in Merrimack Valley was unprecedented.
Why the NTSB is still investigating, they have stated the cause
was over pressurization of a low-pressure gas distribution
system.
Post incident, AGA immediately brought together industry
experts and published a shared InShare technical paper
capturing leading practices to prevent over pressurization.
AGA created a board-level task force to escalate our
existing pipeline safety efforts and determine what more can be
done. We hosted a crisis leadership and communications summit
and developed a technical paper that covers the skills required
to perform engineering work on a natural gas system.
AGA's member safety efforts exceed expectation and
regulations. The AGA board adopted a commitment to enhancing
safety that lists specific activities above and beyond
regulation. We participate in peer reviews, bench marking
activities, safety summits, and other industry programs to
enhance safety.
Relative to reauthorization, AGA asks the subcommittee to
consider three high-level principles. Preserve industry
engagement and pipeline safety rulemaking by upholding the
PHMSA regulatory process. Support flexibility in rulemaking by
recognizing that the gas distribution system differs and avoid
one-size-fits-all regulations. Don't obstruct pipeline safety
replacement programs via new mandates that delay pipeline
replacement or require a replacement faster than work can be
accomplished safely, reliably, without compromising quality.
Our full statement covers several pipeline safety
reauthorization topics. We would like to highlight how integral
PHMSA's gas pipeline advisory committee process is to the
pipeline safety rule making.
Providing stakeholders supporting vital roles which
includes input from subject matter experts actually accelerates
rulemaking and their implementation.
We also support the GPAC cost benefit analysis process. To
the best of AGA's knowledge, not one single rulemaking has been
held up by this process.
More importantly, cost benefit analysis protects the public
as regulatory costs are ultimately borne by the customers.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sames follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rush. As chair, I want to thank all of the witnesses
for their opening statements. This concludes our opening
statements and we will move now to Member questions and I will
start by recognizing my friend Mr. Doyle for 5 minutes.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
courtesy.
Pittsburgh has had a record amount of rain over the past
year that has caused flooding and landslides throughout our
region. As recently as September of 2018 a landslide in
neighboring Beaver County caused a pipeline to explode and one
house was completely destroyed and 30 more homes had to be
evacuated.
We know that extreme weather will continue because of
climate change. Mr. Black and Ms. Sames, how does the industry
take into account extreme weather events and earth movements
and how does industry plan to adapt as we are seeing more and
more of this severe weather?
Mr. Black. Pipeline operators face requirements today to be
aware of that operating environment. Earth movements, any
change. So there is a current requirement right now for that
pipeline operator to have understood what stress might be
placed on a pipeline by land movement.
We have a practice in information sharing among our
industry and we'll bring pipeline operators together to tell
stories about incidents or near misses or precautions that were
taken based on that information.
If the climate continues to change, pipeline operations
right now continue--will continue to be faced with those
requirements and ongoing practices to assess that operating
environment.
Mr. Doyle. Ms. Sames?
Ms. Sames. Congressman Doyle, I am actually from the
Pittsburgh area originally. I am very familiar with all the
rain you have had along with other areas of the country.
So we look at a variety of things. We are looking at new
flood mapping that is coming out. We are monitoring the
weather. We are putting sensors on our lines to look for ground
movement.
We have been doing this for a while in areas where we have
seismic activity but we are looking at it now for other areas
because we are seeing changes, and with changes you have to
adapt.
So operators are not including this more in their
distribution integrity management plans.
Mr. Doyle. Mr. Weimer, how about you? What should be done
to properly address climate adaption and resiliency?
Mr. Weimer. Yes, thanks for the question.
Clearly, the pipeline operators are supposed to be--have
control of their pipeline and under integrity management they
are supposed to look at risks and find out how to mitigate
those risks. I think as we have seen with changing weather,
whether it is river scours that caused two releases into the
Yellowstone River in your area in the Midwest, there has been a
number of big failures because of ground movement flooding.
In Texas, there has been failures because of wet soil. When
the NTSB looked at integrity management they thought it was
working pretty well for things like corrosion but it wasn't
working very well for some of these other threats that are
harder to find.
So I think we need to get a better handle and the industry
is working on some of that. We also need to think about it when
we are siting pipelines. You know, it doesn't make much sense
to put a pipeline on the side of a hill that can fail.
So some of the routing of some of those pipelines needs to
be considered, too.
Mr. Doyle. How about--you know, Pennsylvania has a history
of coal mines where we were a coal-producing State and we have
many abandoned mines throughout our State.
So subsidence is also a concern for energy infrastructure.
How is subsidence and geological formations taken into account?
Ms. Sames. Well, the one good thing with distribution lines
is many of them are plastic, which means they have a little bit
more flexibility to move with the ground. It only goes so far,
which means that where you have a sudden change, a sudden drop,
a sudden sink hole, which you do experience in Pennsylvania and
a few other areas, you're focusing on emergency response--how
do you quickly shut off the gas to that area when there is a
subsidence that is so fast and so dramatic that it causes the
pipeline to break.
Mr. Black. Thinking about your question, Congressman, on
rivers, the industry updated a recommended practice on waterway
crossings to address the river scour issue. What once was a
recommended practice just about calm coastal areas has now been
upgraded to address the river scour issues.
Pipeline operators have to take those responsibilities
seriously and do.
Mr. Doyle. OK.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. I appreciate the courtesy
you have shown me and I will yield back.
Mr. Rush. I thank the gentleman for yielding the chair.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Upton for 5 minutes.
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
the panellists for waiting. Aren't you glad we don't have three
panels, right?
A couple of questions. Ms. Sames, to follow up on what you
just said, and I was going to ask about new technologies as we
look--you know, as we look at this next bill and there has been
some questions raised about, you know, sort of like plastic and
paper, plastic and steel. So you indicated that plastic is
emerging volumewise, I guess you could say, in a lot of new
pipelines.
Can you talk a little bit about the advantage or
disadvantage and where do you think plastic is as it relates to
steel? What hurdles might be there and help us?
Ms. Sames. In case it's not obvious, you start talking
technology with by background I start getting really excited.
So plastic now takes--accounts for more than 50 percent of
the distribution pipe. That is increasing because we are
replacing the cast iron and bare steel.
Mr. Upton. And that is primarily in gas because oil really
doesn't work, right?
Mr. Black. Still coated steel. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Upton. I am sorry to interrupt. Go ahead.
Ms. Sames. That's fine. So some of the benefits of plastic,
and it only goes up to a certain size, which is why you see on
the liquid lines and the interstate lines really coated steel.
But on plastic--on distribution we use a lot of plastic
because it is flexible, it is easier to insert, it is not
subject to corrosion. So there's a lot of benefits that we see
with it.
And the product has come a long way since the initial--the
initial products back in the '60s and '70s. So we are seeing a
shelf life of--lifespan of these plastics--these newer
plastics--they are predicting well over a hundred years. That
is pretty darn good.
The down side of plastic is----
Mr. Upton. What's the cost difference between----
Ms. Sames. Definitely cheaper.
Mr. Upton. Substantial? Is it substantial?
Ms. Sames. Mm-hmm. Right. Right. So the customers are
bearing that cost benefit, which is why you see bills so low
right now between the cost of natural gas and being able to use
plastic. It is a lot cheaper.
The one down side with plastic is an issue that we continue
that struggle with, which is third-party damage. The Durham
incident, third-party damage again.
So if you all could find a way to stop the telecoms, the
water, and sewer lines from hitting us, I would greatly
appreciate it.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Black, do you want to comment on it at all
or not?
Mr. Black. We are excited about the technology advances.
They're not in plastics and the liquids but they are about
inline inspection technologies, leak detection technologies. We
have encouraged Congress to direct PHMSA to implement a pilot
program allowing for real-world testing of technology and
applications. We think that will give them more information
that they need so that they can update regulations to advance
technology.
Mr. Upton. In the last Congress, both Mr. Black's and Ms.
Sames' organizations submitted letters of support for our
action to strengthen DOE's cybersecurity program for pipelines.
We appreciated that.
This bill has now been introduced--reintroduced as H.R.
370, Pipeline and LNG Facilities Cybersecurity Preparedness
Act. Can you continue to support that? I don't know if you have
taken another look at it. It really hasn't changed. But we
would--let me just say we would welcome your written support
for this a second time.
Ms. Sames. We do support that bill. It gives DOE a great
coordination role, which I think is very much needed. So yes,
you continue to have our support.
Mr. Black. We are glad to support that bill to help it get
through the committee process. Cybersecurity is important. We
encourage all of Congress to work on this--a holistic approach
with energy, transportation, and intelligence-related
committees.
An important goal is not having duplication and conflicting
sets of guidance that could set operators back.
Mr. Upton. Great. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Rush. Thank you for yielding. The Chair recognizes
himself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Weimer, so good to see you again before the
subcommittee. You have provided your expertise to the members
of this subcommittee on pipeline safety, reauthorization
efforts, and we certainly appreciate you being here once again
with us.
In your testimony, you stated that since the year 2010,
despite all the high-profile pipelines incidents, congressional
interest, NTSB and GAO recommendations, PHMSA is incapable of
producing new safety rules mostly due to the unique and overly
burdensome cost benefit requirements that the agency must
adhere to.
Why do you call the cost benefit requirement for PHMSA
unique and how does it contribute to an agency's inability to
implement significant new rulemaking even when they are
directed to do so by law?
Mr. Weimer. Thank you for the question, Chairman Rush. Yes,
I am on the gas advisory committee for PHMSA and we have
another board member who is a law professor at the University
of Arkansas who is on the gas advisory committee. I am on the
liquid advisory committee.
Both of these committees often focus on the cost benefit.
It was put into the statute in the mid-90s and PHMSA, just
because of timing efforts, was one of the few places where the
cost benefit requirements landed.
We don't have a problem with cost benefit. We think it
makes sense to consider the costs versus the benefits and that
is already required under executive orders.
We are not talking about that. We are talking about the
uniqueness in the statute where the industry can, because of
the Administrative Procedures Act, can legally challenge that
and the cost benefit is--the only place we know of it is in the
PHMSA statute.
Other places like EPA and some other agencies have mention
of cost benefit. But it is not--they don't have to justify the
cost the way PHMSA does.
Even a former Administrator, just two Administrators back,
has recently said that one of her frustrations as Administrator
was trying to get rules passed because of the cost benefit
statute, and you see it slowing things down because PHMSA
doesn't always have enough data to justify the cost because
they have to get that data from the industry.
So the industry comes forward with any rulemaking and says
things are going to cost billions and billions of dollars and
PHMSA really can't argue with that. Good information to know.
The committee should certainly take that into
consideration. But it shouldn't be the only way you can get a
rule passed.
Mr. Rush. What kind of corrective strategies would you
recommend that the Congress take?
Mr. Weimer. Well, I think in our testimony we provided some
red line version of what cost benefit language got put into the
statute in the '90s and we recommended that that be removed to
make it more of an even playing field with just about every
other statute we see.
Mr. Rush. You feel very strongly about the need for
enacting minimum standards for the 435,000 miles of natural gas
gathering lines traversing our Nation.
What are the dangers, in your opinion, of leaving those
lines unregulated?
Mr. Weimer. Thank you for that question. Yes, it is pretty
amazing. As the shale plays have turned out in this country,
especially in places like Pennsylvania, you know, rapidly there
was hundreds of thousands of miles of new gathering lines put
in.
A lot of those shale plays have pressures coming out of the
ground at much higher pressures. So the pipelines going in are
larger and much higher pressure. They are basically the same as
gas transmission pipelines that are already fairly well
regulated.
These pipelines run right past homes. Even in rural areas
they run past clusters of homes. Were it failed, it would be
the same as a failure of a gas transmission pipeline and in
most places they are completely and totally unregulated.
So, you know, to prevent failure so people don't show up in
front of this committee again with the latest failure minimum
standards for these gathering lines need to be enacted.
Mr. Rush. My time is up. I certainly want to thank you very
much.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Latta from Ohio for 5 minutes.
Mr. Latta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our panel
of witnesses today for appearing.
Mr. Black, if I could start with you. You said something
kind of interesting that we talk about in this committee a lot.
Energy and Commerce is a great committee. We have very
broad jurisdiction. We think it is the best committee in
Congress--not only think, we believe it.
But you said something that we really believe, because what
we see in this committee are technologies and inventions that
are really 5 to 10 years out and so one of the things we have
to be careful when we are, you know, working on legislation is
to make sure that we are not hindering the progress out there
in the community.
And you have mentioned that--on, you know, making sure that
the Federal regulations, you know, keep pace in what you're all
doing out there. But what I would like to do is--my first
question I would like you to go, if you would further expand on
your testimony and comments regarding a pilot program to test
cutting-edge safety technologies.
And would you tell us about what those new technologies are
and are available out there and how they might offer the
opportunity for further improvement for pipeline safety?
Mr. Black. I will give you one example. Pipeline integrity
management regulations are almost 20 years old. That is before
the iPhone. We had smart pigs then but they weren't nearly as
smart as they are now. Right now, there are improved
technologies of travel inside the pipeline collecting data.
At the same time that we now have terabytes of data on
pipeline features whereas we didn't before, we also have better
analytical techniques to know what that increased information
tells us. Yet, the PHMSA regulations are almost 20 years old
and are not up to date.
So the latest know-how and techniques on prioritizing risks
in pipelines is not what PHMSA is requiring operators to do.
Repair criteria updates are not in what we understand would be
the next hazards liquids rule that is moved.
We can see PHMSA needing real-world experiences from a
controlled environment by selecting pipeline operators to test
any new technologies. It could be leak detection technologies.
It could be scheduling repairs and maintenance under new
analytical techniques.
If they can gather information like that, they can have
more confidence to update regulations in the manner that they
should with equivalent or better level of safety, maybe they
won't be so slow.
Mr. Latta. Well, I assume you have discussions with PHMSA
on a frequent basis. When you bring this up to them, what do
they say about upgrading those regulations that bring this new
technology out?
Mr. Black. Well, they know that it's important to us that
integrity management regulations be updated. You have heard
Administrator Elliott say that he is open to pilots.
We hope this would be an issue that they would work on.
They also have the special permit process which has been
cumbersome and slow and only allows one operator to get a
waiver for an equivalent level of safety or better.
It may be ill-suited to pipeline integrity management
regulations. But it is something that we need to consider with
them.
The industry just released API-recommended practice 1160.
That is all about performing maintenance and repairs on
pipelines and as the Administrator said they have a goal--we
all have a goal in avoiding spending resources on issues that
aren't high priority and making sure that we are on high
priority.
Whatever it takes, whether it is congressional action or a
pilot program or a repair permit or a rulemaking we need to
update those regulations.
Mr. Latta. Thank you.
Just continuing on this topic, we know that the technology
is ever changing and adapting. But, again, what do you--how do
we get to that point of working with the agency to make sure we
get those technologies out there?
Mr. Black. Well, we found the model in the motor carrier
statute at the Department of Transportation. They have the
authority to do this pilot program, and if Congress directs
them to do that and creates that authority, hopefully, that is
something that they will create.
We also have rich exchanges on research and development
advances. They are funding research and development. We are
funding research and development.
The collaboration between the two is episodic and not as
good as it should be. One of our proposals is that Congress
direct PHMSA to review its research and development programs
and have us do it within the entities that Mr. Weimer was
describing--the liquid and gas pipeline advisory committees.
If you put that in the statute that that is something that
PHMSA should be doing, we believe that will maybe force more
regular and frequent and fast discussions of R&D advances
because we share the same goal--zero incidents, improving
pipeline safety and technology.
Mr. Latta. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired and I yield back.
Mr. Rush. I want to thank the gentleman for yielding back.
Mr. Walberg is--no, I am sorry. Mr. Olson is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Olson. I thank the Chair, and welcome to the second
panel.
I want to start by thanking each of your organizations for
your performance--of pipeline performances during Hurricane
Harvey.
Hurricane Harvey hit southeast Texas in late August of
2017. Parts of my home received 5 feet of rain over 2 days. The
largest petrochemical complex in the world is along the Houston
Ship Channel, which is 52 miles long.
It is America's largest exporting port for the last 10
years. All that product comes from Eagle Ford, Permian Basin,
somewhere else. It got there without a major spill--major
incident.
So thank you, thank you, thank you. Hurricane Harvey shows
how safe you guys are.
Our first question is for you, Mr. Black and Ms. Sames. As
they mentioned on the first panel, Texas 22 is booming. One
example--our population, we think, will be over one million in
the next Census. It has grown almost 30 percent in the last 10
years.
As the population keeps increasing, people are moving to
areas that were rural before. There were pipelines there, and
so with all that traffic flowing to the Port of Houston, the
port of Freeport, coming from the west Permian Basin flows
through Fort Bend County. Can't get there without Fort Bend
County.
So can you all please talk about how the industry works
with new communities as they are built around existing
pipelines? How to make sure that first responders and others
know what the risks are?
Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. Well, you are certainly right, Congressman, that
not only is the population of that area in your district
growing but the benefits within Texas of increased oil and gas
production are helping Houstonians and others have benefit from
lower prices, more availability to U.S. and North American
supplies.
It is important for us to expand pipeline capacity to help
feed those needs and to make sure that the public along the
existing route is aware of pipelines that are there.
We are ready to work with anybody that is constructing a
pipeline to make sure that they are safely not threatening the
pipeline. The ``call before you dig'' program and public
awareness programs are very important.
Mr. Olson. Ms. Sames, your comments, ma'am?
Ms. Sames. Well, in addition to what Andy said, there is
also the Pipeline Informed Planning Alliance document that
helps to--helps communities as they are building around
existing pipelines. There are a lot of great practices in
there.
It was a collaborative effort that included, you know, the
Pipeline Safety Trust, the oil industry, the gas industry,
emergency responders, Governors, cities. I lost count of how
many. It is a good document and it really provides guidance
around how communities can build safely around these existing
pipelines--these larger existing pipelines.
Simple things like if you're building a school near an
existing pipeline put the parking lot near the pipeline, not
the school, but also make sure that there is a good exit so
that when people--if something happens in that small stretch
that they have an escape route. It is things like that that are
within the document. Hopefully, they will consider it.
Mr. Olson. I thank you, too, because pipelines provide
green space all over Fort Bend County and Brazoria County. A
park right by my house, the biggest park my hometown of Sugar
Land has, is built over an existing pipeline. The markers are
all along the park. But it's a park and people are there.
They're flying kites. They've got this little dirt bike trail.
That is because a pipeline is there. That land is available. It
would have been taken up but that pipeline gave us green space.
So thank you for that.
I want to get back to the staffing issues I talked about
with PHMSA in the first panel. You know, they can't function
without the right agents, the right people in place, and
sometimes, I mentioned, they get poached because their people
are so good.
Mr. Doyle left, but he and I have a bill to give FERC a
sort of waiver to keep employees, pay them higher than average
Federal salary. That has happened for the SCC. Would you
support that going through PHMSA, having that have more
financial resources to keep the people they've got?
Mr. Black. I will tell you about the proposal that we have
made to the Congress on this and the committee. We understand
that if PHMSA had Schedule A hiring authority for its
inspectors, they would be able to better attract and retain
pipeline operators.
From what we have learned about the Federal personnel
process, that would help. It is in all of our interests for
PHMSA to be able to have quality inspectors on the job. I
haven't studied your bill. I am happy to do that. But the
spirit of being able to have PHMSA maintain quality inspectors
is one we support.
Mr. Olson. Thank you. One final comment, and this is a
question for you, Mr. Black. Are the Horned Frogs going to beat
the Sooners this year in football?
Mr. Black. Well, as a TCU grad, they should every year.
Yes, sir.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Olson. OK.
Mr. Rush. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the panel.
Mr. Black and Ms. Sames, I think you share some of the
frustrations regarding PHMSA's inability to comply with
congressional mandates relating to pipeline safety rulemakings.
In your view, what is keeping PHMSA from complying with
deadlines on their significant rulemakings?
Mr. Black?
Mr. Black. Congressman, we believe there was a strategic
mistake by the last administration to lump many large complex
issues into a few mega rulemakings. The rulemaking process is
not build for that.
We believe that they should have separated them out. The
Administrator has acknowledged that and that is what they are
doing. We don't believe cost benefit requirements are what
delayed those rules.
Now, certainly, if a proposal is overly broad it deserves
to be reviewed further. We think the American people, who
ultimately pay the cost of regulations, deserve to know that
the benefits outweigh the costs and we think cost benefit
analysis improves regulations.
Lastly, some of the proposals that we have seen to remove
cost benefit from the PHMSA statute risks, number one, later--
longer delays because the Office of Management and Budget might
return something to PHMSA that hasn't had cost benefit
analysis.
And, two, I would hate to end the requirement that a risk
benefit analysis and a cost benefit go before the public
advisory committee that Carl and our industry reps are on.
Those are great discussions to improve regulations.
We think, to answer your question, it has been mistakes of
just lumping too many things in mega rules. That is why they
were delayed. They are recovering now.
Mr. Walberg. Ms. Sames, any additions there?
Ms. Sames. I fully agree with Mr. Black. But in addition,
just an observation. It is my opinion, my observation, that
PHMSA's staff--technical staff--are pretty darn good at moving
things forward after the advisory committee meets.
It appears that something is occurring after it leaves
their technical office to that rulemaking. I don't know exactly
what it is but----
Mr. Walberg. Does OMB add to the delays?
Ms. Sames. I am sure that there are some with OMB. But it
appears that there may be things beyond PHMSA within the
department that may also be holding things back a little bit. I
don't know where the obstacle is.
But I can tell you that the industry is very frustrated. We
like certainty. How often do you have the industry sending in
letters to the secretary asking for them to move a rulemaking
forward? And we have been doing that.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Ms. Sames, in your written testimony you highlight that
every natural gas distribution system is different in terms of
design, use, age, location, external risks, operating history,
current operating conditions, et cetera, et cetera.
Could you please talk about how, as a result of these
differences, prescriptive regulations that take basically a
one-size-fits-all approach might not be the best idea?
Ms. Sames. Thank you for the question.
Distribution lines are really different from the
interstates and the liquid. You have--for example, on
distribution you have plastic. You have steel. You have coated
steel. You have bare steel. You have all of these different
materials that were put in over the ages.
You also have different pressures and different sizes. It's
just very unique compared to everything else.
So when you get a prescriptive regulation it doesn't take
any of that into account and I will give you an example.
Atmospheric corrosion surveys are done every 3 years. Now, if
you are in a desert environment you may not need an atmospheric
corrosion survey every 3 years.
However, if you are along the ocean you probably need it
more frequently, which is why it is important to have not only
those prescriptive regulations but also the risk-based
regulations that we get through integrity management. That kind
of balances things out of it.
Mr. Walberg. OK. On the first panel I asked about the role
of States like Michigan, which have robust inspection programs
themselves, play in pipeline safety--specifically, their
coordination with PHMSA.
Has this model helped your Michigan utilities meet higher
safety standards at low regulatory burden as they invest in
transitioning away from the old cast iron or steel distribution
pipes?
Ms. Sames. I think it has because the local inspectors know
the environment. They know the operators. They're spending a
lot of time with the distribution operators and that allows
them to collectively move safety forward in a way that is the
lowest cost to the customers.
The members that I have, they are all publicly traded
utilities for the most part, which means that their rates are
going through the commissions and it really is a partnership--
how do you improve safety, how do you do things the right way
at the lowest cost to the customer and the least burden.
Mr. Walberg. And they should have a better grasp on the
situations?
Ms. Sames. Correct, because they are there. They live and
work in the same communities that we are serving.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Sames. You are welcome.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much. I appreciate it, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Black, earlier you indicated that, you know, there were
concerns about a tax on pipelines and I share that, and I
understand you also have indicated in speaking with Mr. Latta
that, you know, one of the things we can do is to have
voluntary compliance and so forth.
But one of my concerns is, as you heard me on the previous
panel, is we got pipelines going in the ground, you know, as we
speak or in the process. They are not in the grounds yet. Once
we get them in the ground we are not going to put new
technology--you know, we are not going to say ``Dig it up'' 5
years from now and put in the new technology.
And so the concern is why aren't the companies putting
those pipelines in the ground now, putting in the technology?
And, again, there may be others.
But, you know, I had a demonstration of what could be used
with the fiber optics and, of course, you'd have to have some
broadband in the area so we'd have to work on that.
But the fiber optics that will tell you if somebody is--if
there is a leak that just occurs naturally or if somebody is
making an attack on a pipeline that's underground they can see
it, you know, live action and get out there and do something
about it before the harm you indicated, which I agree with you,
could be harm to the community.
You know, it's not just about stopping the pipeline. There
could be an environmental risk. There's a risk of explosion or
fire or whatever. So if the industry is not already doing it,
it seems to me that would be smart.
In fact, as a recovering attorney, let me posit that
because that technology is out there the gas companies might
very well be at risk of having not used the best equipment and
may have some liability damages in the future.
So why aren't they doing it? And that makes me worry that
voluntary doesn't work and that we may need to have, you know,
regulatory that says, you know, if there's something out there
that increases public safety we ought to do it.
What say you?
Mr. Black. We are excited about leak detection technology
development. I know operators are talking with vendors about
technologies to see, sniff, and hear signs of small leaks,
which are the hardest ones to detect.
That can include acoustic smart balls, fiber optic cables.
I have heard of copper cables with conductors. PHMSA conducted
a study on leak detection technologies as a result of a mandate
from Congress.
We heard what you alluded to on the first panel. Sometimes
the claims of performance--we are not sure yet about how they
will do road tested. So operators have having those
conversations right now and hoping to be able to have
confidence in those technologies.
I am aware of several pilot programs, not in a DOT pilot
but in a company sense, where they're testing some of those new
technologies. We think the pilot program will help an operator
work with PHMSA and try and implement, hey, this is how we want
to do for leak detection--are you OK on that.
Mr. Griffith. But here is the problem with my constituents,
and there are two coming through Virginia. One comes directly
through my district. Another one is a little bit further north.
OK, great. You do a pilot project. Wouldn't it make more
sense to go ahead and put that in the ground now? Because
they're not--once the pilot project comes back and says yes, it
works, they're not going to dig up the corridor over hundreds
of miles and suddenly put down that technology that works.
So aren't we--if we had something that already could do
that and you said, well, the new stuff doesn't work any better
than the old stuff, I would say, OK, let's wait and see or--but
we don't have anything that will give us that detection and at
least with the one technology, and again, I admit there are
others that are probably out there, it changes the temperature
of the gourd.
They can tell immediately if there's a leak out there and
it would seem to me that the companies would want to do this
and put it down in advance and then if you needed the software
upgrades down the road you might be able to do that a whole lot
easier than--I mean, the ditches are dug right now and they are
laying the pipe. Why aren't they doing it, and that is what
calls into question for me voluntary versus us having some
regulations.
Now, if it's going to take us 20 years to get the
regulations that isn't going to work either. I am not sure
there is an answer to that, Mr. Black. Let me go to Ms. Sames
for something different because you have referenced it, I
think. But the finalizing of the rulemaking on the automatic
shut off valves and remote controlled shut off valves which, to
me, makes a lot of sense and I think that's the one you're
asking them to hurry up and get it done.
But can you explain for the public the difference between
the transmission and distribution systems and what
considerations need to be made on these auto shut offs for each
of those?
Ms. Sames. Sure. So automatic and remotely controlled
valves we are putting them on our intrastate transmission. I
can't speak to the interstates. But we are putting them on our
intrastates where we have what I will call consistent pressure.
The problem with automatic shut off valves is they sense a
pressure drop, which means that if you have pressure
fluctuations in the line, it is going to shut off and now you
are shutting off customers, which is why they tend not to work
as you get further downstream.
You have too many pressure fluctuations because people are
turning on their stoves. They are turning on their furnaces.
They are using more natural gas, which is sucking the gas from
the system which is dropping the pressure.
We are very supportive of them in many instances where you
don't have those pressure fluctuations.
Mr. Griffith. Well, how about the--and I know you said it
was--you were doing intra but how about that 42-inch pipe
coming through my district? Wouldn't that work better there?
Ms. Sames. I cannot speak to that one, sir.
Mr. Griffith. Yes, ma'am. I appreciate it.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rush. I thank the gentleman, and I want to thank all
the witnesses for your patience and for your participation in
today's hearing, and I want to also remind Members that,
pursuant to committee rules, you have 10 business days to
submit additional questions for the record, which will be
answered by the witnesses who have appeared before the
subcommittee, and I ask each witness to respond promptly to any
such questions that you may receive.
And this--we have a unanimous consent request to enter into
the record the following information: a letter from the
American Public Gas Association, a letter from the Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America, a letter from the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, a letter from
the Alliance for Innovation and Infrastructure.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Rush. And the Chair now adjourns this committee.
At this time, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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