[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NORTHERN NORTHERN BORDER: HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITIES IN THE
ARCTIC, PART I
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
MARITIME SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 19, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-37
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-838 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey John Katko, New York
Kathleen M. Rice, New York John Ratcliffe, Texas
J. Luis Correa, California Mark Walker, North Carolina
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Max Rose, New York Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Lauren Underwood, Illinois Mark Green, Tennessee
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Van Taylor, Texas
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Al Green, Texas Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Michael Guest, Mississippi
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Val Butler Demings, Florida
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
J. Luis Correa, California, Chairman
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Debbie Lesko, Arizona, Ranking
Dina Titus, Nevada Member
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey John Katko, New York
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California John Ratcliffe, Texas
Val Butler Deming, Florida Mark Green, Tennessee
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Mike Rogers, Alabama (ex officio)
officio)
Alex Marston, Subcomittee Staff Director
Kyle Klein, Minority Subcomittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Debbie Lesko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Michael Sfraga, Director, Global Risk and Resilience Program,
and Director of Polar Institute at the Wilson Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Ms. Abbie Tingstad, Senior Physical Scientist, Rand Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Ms. Victoria Hermann, President and Managing Director, The Arctic
Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Mr. Luke Coffey, Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for
Foreign Policy, Heritage Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
THE NORTHERN NORTHERN BORDER: HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITIES IN THE
ARCTIC, PART I
----------
Thursday, September 19, 2019
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation
and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:21 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. J. Luis Correa
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Correa, Demings, Lesko, Katko, and
Rogers.
Mr. Correa. Good afternoon, everyone.
The Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security
will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today--the subcommittee is
meeting here today to receive testimony on the ``Northern
Northern Border, Homeland Security Priorities in the Arctic,
Part 1.''
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
subcommittee in recess at any time. I want to thank you,
Ranking Member Lesko, and our panel of witnesses for joining us
here today. Welcome.
Today's hearing will discuss a changing Arctic and U.S.
strategic interests in that region, specifically, priorities
for securing the homeland. A change in climate has already led
to diminishing sea ice, opening up parts of the Arctic for
increased economic and maritime activity. Sadly, our Government
is ill-prepared for this new reality.
I am concerned that the aggressive actions of other
nations, mainly Russia and China, threaten to undermine the
international order. Russia has expended its military
installations and footprint in the Arctic, investing heavily in
a large icebreaker fleet of more than 50 icebreakers, reviving
Cold War bases and deepwater ports and, of course, solidifying
infrastructure in the region as well.
China has also made its Arctic ambitions very clear,
declaring itself a near-Arctic state and, despite being located
a thousand miles away, in investing strategically in economic
activity in key geographic areas in the region. China is
investing in what it calls a Polar Silk Road.
Russia and China both stand to profit significantly from
trade routes that will become increasingly passable as ice
shelves continue to recede. The image on the screens, the
images there, show the potential benefit of a Northern Sea
route through the Arctic.
According to The Washington Post, the Northern Sea route
shown in orange traverses 8,000 miles from East Asia to Western
Europe, and that is about 5,000 miles shorter than the current
route shown in blue. The Northern Sea route will enable China
to ship goods to Europe in about 2 weeks faster than it can
now, and it will provide Russia the opportunity to charge ships
a fee to travel through waters over which it can claim
jurisdiction.
Along with the new shipping routes, melted ice in the
Arctic will allow for increased tourism, fisheries, energy
exploration, and infrastructure development.
With these new opportunities come major challenges for us.
First, we must ensure that the Arctic development is
sustainable with minimal impact to the environment and
supportive of local communities, including the indigenous
people.
Next, we must ensure that the U.S. Coast Guard is prepared
to execute its multifaceted missions in this changing region.
The Coast Guard's mission in the Arctic includes port security,
search and rescue, regulation of shipping and fishing, law
enforcement, and support of scientific research. The Coast
Guard is also responsible for maintaining a U.S. presence in
our territory of waters and defending our security in economic
interests in the region.
The Coast Guard, however, is constantly being asked to do
more with less. For example, the Coast Guard has a major
icebreaking capability gap, and currently, the Coast Guard has
only two polar icebreakers, one which is a heavy-duty
icebreaker, and the only other which is dedicated to the Arctic
operations.
The Coast Guard has stated that 6 polar security cutters
will be necessary to successfully execute its mission in the
Arctic. Congress has made significant investments modernizing
Coast Guard assets, including fiscal year 2019 funds to begin
construction of its first new polar security cutter. It will
not be until the delivery of a second polar security cutter in
2025 or later, however, that the Coast Guard will have a heavy-
duty icebreaking capability in the Arctic.
In the mean time the Coast Guard will need to use other
resources and capabilities to meet its Arctic mission to the
best of its ability. This committee works hard to ensure the
Coast Guard and its DHS partners have the authority and
direction needed to protect the homeland. Sadly, the current
administration consistently makes DHS's mission more difficult;
and, in fact, the Coast Guard's mission is often overlooked and
deemed as a secondary status. The President has repeatedly
attempted to raid the DHS budget to pay for a Southern Border
wall above all else, and this ignores critical security needs
throughout the country, including at our maritime borders.
Additionally, at a time when international cooperation
leadership in the Arctic is sorely needed, the administration
has failed to prioritize diplomacy in the region, scrapping the
State Department's position of a special representative for the
Arctic.
We need to invest more in U.S. Government capabilities in
the Arctic, not less, in order to assure that the Coast Guard
and its partners can secure the homeland at our northernmost
border.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
the scope of Homeland Security priorities in the Arctic and
recommendations to address them. I look forward to holding a
Part II hearing at a future date so we can hear directly from
the Coast Guard and other Government partners on this most
important topic.
[The statement of Chairman Correa follows:]
Statement of Chairman J. Luis Correa
September 19, 2019
Today's hearing will discuss a changing Arctic and U.S. strategic
interests in the region, specifically priorities for securing the
homeland. A changing climate has already led to diminishing sea ice,
opening up parts of the Arctic for increased economic and maritime
activity. Sadly, our Government is ill-prepared for this new reality,
and I am concerned that the aggressive actions of other nations, namely
Russia and China, threaten to undermine international order. Russia has
expanded its military installations and footprint in the Arctic,
investing heavily in a large icebreaker fleet--consisting of more than
50 icebreakers--reviving Cold War bases and deep water ports, and
solidifying infrastructure in the region. China has also made its
Arctic ambitions clear, declaring itself a ``near-Arctic state''
despite being located almost 1,000 miles away and investing
strategically in economic activity in key geographic areas in the
region. China is investing in a ``Polar Silk Road.'' Russia and China
both stand to profit significantly from trade routes that will become
increasingly passable as ice shelves continue to recede. According to
the Washington Post, the Northern Sea Route, shown in orange, traverses
8,000 miles from East Asia to Western Europe--about 5,000 miles shorter
than the current route, shown in blue.
The Northern Sea Route would enable China to ship goods to Europe
about 2 weeks faster than it can now, and it would provide Russia
opportunities to charge ships a fee to travel through waters over which
it claims jurisdiction. Along with new shipping routes, melted ice in
the Arctic will allow for increased tourism, fisheries, energy
exploration, and infrastructure development. With these new
opportunities come major challenges. First, we must ensure Arctic
development is sustainable, with minimal impact to the environment and
supportive of local communities, including indigenous people. Next, we
must ensure the U.S. Coast Guard is prepared to execute its
multifaceted missions in this changing region. The Coast Guard's
missions in the Arctic include port security, search and rescue,
regulation of shipping and fishing, law enforcement, and support of
scientific research. The Coast Guard is also responsible for
maintaining a U.S. presence in our territorial waters and defending our
security and economic interests in the region. The Coast Guard,
however, has constantly been asked to do more with less. For example,
the Coast Guard has a major icebreaking capability gap. Currently, the
Coast Guard has two polar icebreakers--only one of which is a heavy-
duty icebreaker--and neither of which is dedicated to Arctic
operations.
The Coast Guard has stated that 6 polar security cutters will be
necessary to successfully execute its missions in the Arctic. Congress
has made significant investments in modernizing Coast Guard assets,
including fiscal year 2019 funds to begin construction of its first new
Polar Security Cutter. It will not be until the delivery of a second
Polar Security Cutter in 2025 or later, however, that the Coast Guard
will have heavy-duty icebreaking capabilities in the Arctic. In the
mean time, the Coast Guard will need to use other resources and
capabilities to meet its Arctic mission to the best of its ability.
This committee works hard to ensure the Coast Guard and its DHS
partners have the authorities and direction needed to protect the
homeland. Sadly, the current administration consistently makes DHS's
mission more difficult. In fact, the Coast Guard's mission is often
overlooked and deemed as a ``secondary status''.
The President has repeatedly attempted to raid the DHS budget to
pay for a Southern Border wall above all else--ignoring critical
security needs throughout the country, including at our maritime
borders. Additionally, at a time when international cooperation and
leadership in the Arctic is sorely needed, the administration has
failed to prioritize diplomacy in the region, scrapping the State
Department position of Special Representative for the Arctic. We need
to invest more in U.S. Government capabilities in the Arctic--not
less--in order to ensure that the Coast Guard and its partners can
secure the homeland at our northernmost border. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses about the scope of homeland security
priorities in the Arctic and recommendations to address them. I also
look forward to holding a ``Part 2'' hearing at a future date so we can
hear directly from the Coast Guard and other Government partners on
this topic.
Mr. Correa. Now I would like to recognize the Ranking
Member of the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from the State of
Arizona, Ms. Lesko, for an opening statement.
Ms. Lesko. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses here, and welcome to the audience.
I was the same. We were going to agree on just about
everything until you got to the part where you said the Trump
administration isn't doing anything, because they are.
Mr. Correa. I didn't say Trump.
Ms. Lesko. Oh, oh, oh, the current administration isn't
doing anything, but that I disagree with you on, and I will
actually reference it in my statement.
So, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate our shared
interest in this topic, and I appreciate you convening today's
hearing to learn more about what the Department of Homeland
Security can contribute to our position in the Arctic.
As 1 of 8 countries with a geographic footprint within the
Arctic Circle, the region is one of great National importance
to the United States, and I think we agree on that.
The area is abundant with natural resources, has immense
value for scientific research, is a strategic position for
National security purposes, and offers significant benefit to
commerce and maritime shipping.
Considerable changes are also taking place in the Arctic
that will allow these potential benefits to be realized to a
greater extent, while also making U.S. action more urgent.
Changes in the levels of seasonal sea ice in the Arctic Ocean
have allowed for increased transit through the area, while also
increasing interest from other Arctic countries like Russia,
and even non-Arctic countries, like China.
In a renewed era of great power competition, one thing we
can all agree on is the need to ensure the United States'
National security is in the face of growing influence in the
Arctic from Russia and China. As commerce grows in the region,
U.S. interests in freedom of navigation must be protected if we
are to fully realize the potential opportunities in a changing
Arctic.
The United States Coast Guard has a diverse range of
missions as a component of the Department of Homeland Security,
and recently, I was able to tour with them and it was a great
experience. Drug interdiction, environmental enforcement,
search and rescue, as well as port security are all
responsibilities of the United States Coast Guard. The Coast
Guard is also the sole owner and operator of the United States
polar-capable fleet and thus best placed to facilitate the
United States' sovereign presence in the Arctic.
Yet, as the Chairman has noted, the United States Coast
Guard relies on a single, aging, heavy icebreaker, the Polar
Star, to conduct polar operations. As with any aging platform,
the Solar Star suffers from frequent mechanical issues that can
result in the need for maintenance at sea.
In an attempt to remedy this situation, Congress, with the
support of President Trump, enacted funding for the first new
polar icebreaker in last year's appropriations. While funding a
new heavy icebreaker is an important first step, it is
imperative that this action is only the beginning of our
Nation's Arctic conversation.
The Coast Guard stated a need for 3 new heavy polar
security cutters, and 3 medium polar security cutters in 2013.
Since then, we have funded the first heavy polar security
cutter, as well as the Trump administration has financed long
lead-time terms for the second cutter.
To maintain the United States' position in the Arctic
during this dynamic period, we must consider the benefits of
our Arctic activity beyond just the military. We must recognize
the importance of this mission and continue to direct our
attention and investment to the Arctic region if we want to
continue our sovereign presence.
With renewed Coast Guard capability and continued National
focus in the Arctic region, our usage and presence will
continue to grow through increased commerce, research, and even
tourism, as we are able to transit more of the Arctic ocean for
longer periods of time. That is what we will need in order to
truly bolster our presence in the Arctic region, as other great
powers, like Russia and China seek to project their own.
This is a complex problem that requires complex solutions
to achieve our Nation's desired result. Many scholarly
organizations are focused on this issue. We will hear from some
today.
I look forward to hearing from you guys today.
Whether that solution is continued investment, interagency
efforts, existing international initiatives, or new
international initiatives, Congress must set a new course for
U.S. focus on the Arctic.
So, again, thank you for being here today. I look forward
to hearing more about this. I wish more people were here
because I guess we are going to have the secret and be able to
solve it together.
[The statement of Ranking Member Lesko follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Debbie Lesko
September 19, 2019
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate our shared interest in this
topic, and I appreciate you convening today's hearing to learn more
about what the Department of Homeland Security can contribute to our
position in the Arctic.
As 1 of 8 countries with a geographic footprint within the Arctic
circle, the region is of great National importance to the United
States. The area is abundant with natural resources, has immense value
for scientific research, is a strategic position for National security
purposes, and offers significant benefit to commerce and maritime
shipping. Considerable changes are also taking place in the Arctic that
will allow these potential benefits to be realized to a greater extent
while also making U.S. action more urgent. Changes in the levels of
seasonal sea ice in the Arctic Ocean have allowed for increased transit
through the area while also increasing interest from other Arctic
countries like Russia and even non-Arctic countries like China.
In a renewed era of great power competition, one thing we can all
agree on is the need to ensure U.S. National security in the face of
growing influence in the Arctic from Russia and China. As commerce
grows in the region, U.S. interests and freedom of navigation must be
protected if we are to fully realize the potential opportunities in a
changing Arctic.
The United States Coast Guard has a diverse range of missions as a
component of the Department of Homeland Security. Drug interdiction,
environmental enforcement, search and rescue, as well as port security
are all responsibilities of the United States Coast Guard. The Coast
Guard is also the sole owner and operator of the United States polar
capable fleet and thus best placed to facilitate the United States'
sovereign presence in the Arctic. And yet, the United States Coast
Guard relies on a single, aging heavy ice breaker, the Polar Star, to
conduct polar operations. As with any aging platform, the Polar Star
suffers from frequent mechanical issues that can result in the need for
maintenance at sea. In an attempt to remedy this situation, Congress
enacted funding for the first new polar ice breaker in last year's
appropriations. While funding a new heavy ice breaker is an important
first step, it is imperative that this action is only the beginning of
our Nation's Arctic conversation.
The Coast Guard stated a need for 3 new heavy polar security
cutters and 3 medium polar security cutters in 2013. Since then we have
funded the first heavy polar security cutter as well as long lead time
materials for a second. To maintain the United States' position in the
Arctic during this dynamic period, we must consider the benefits of
Arctic activity beyond just the military. We must recognize the
importance of this mission and continue to direct our attention and
investment to the Arctic region if we want to continue our sovereign
presence. With renewed Coast Guard capability and continued National
focus in the Arctic region, our usage and presence will continue to
grow through increased commerce, research, and even tourism as we are
able to transit more of the Arctic Ocean for longer periods of time.
This is what we will need in order to truly bolster our presence in the
Arctic region as other great powers like Russia and China seek to
project their own.
This is a complex problem that requires complex solutions to
achieve our Nation's desired result. Many scholarly organizations are
focused on this issue and I look forward to hearing from a few today.
Whether that solution is continued investment, interagency efforts,
existing international initiatives, or new international initiatives,
Congress must set a new course for U.S. focus on the Arctic. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Correa, thank you.
Mr. Correa. Ms. Lesko, I think you might have just come up
with a solution, the less the better to fix this problem but,
with that being said, I would like to also welcome our Ranking
Member of the Homeland Security full committee, and that is
Representative Rogers from the good State of Alabama. I would
like to recognize him for an opening statement.
Welcome sir.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Chairman Correa, and I appreciate
you holding this important hearing and I appreciate the
leadership of Ranking Member Lesko in this important issue.
It is critical that we recognize the growing strategic
importance of the Arctic to the U.S. interests. Russia and
China are making significant investments in the Arctic. To
them, the Arctic is a new battlefield where they are seeking
every advantage over the United States. The United States must
not be caught flatfooted. To defend our National security,
homeland security, and sovereignty, we must make needed
investments in Arctic infrastructure. To that end, I am pleased
that Congress has funded one new polar security cutter for the
Coast Guard and has appropriated funding for long lead
materials for a second. These heavy icebreakers are long
overdue, and once delivered, will greatly improve the Coast
Guard's capability itself and presence in the region.
Now, I thank each of the witnesses for appearing before
this committee today to help improve our understanding of the
Homeland Security implications of a changing Arctic.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Ranking Member Rogers follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Mike Rogers
September 19, 2019
Thank you, Chairman Correa for holding this important hearing
today, and I thank Ranking Member Lesko for her leadership on this
issue.
It is critical that we recognize the growing strategic importance
of the Arctic to U.S. interests.
Russia and China are making significant investments in the Arctic.
To them, the Arctic is a new battlefield where they are seeking every
advantage over the United States.
The United States must not be caught flat-footed. To defend our
National security, homeland security, and sovereignty, we must make
needed investments in Arctic infrastructure.
To that end, I am pleased that Congress has funded one new Polar
Security Cutter for the Coast Guard and has appropriated funding for
long-lead materials for a second.
These heavy icebreakers are long overdue, and, once delivered, will
greatly improve the Coast Guard's capabilities and presence in the
region.
I thank each of the witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee
today to help improve our understanding of the homeland security
implications of a changing Arctic, and I yield back.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much, Mr. Rogers.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that under
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
September 19, 2019
Under the current administration, a great deal of attention has
been focused on our Southern Border. One thing that I appreciate about
this committee, however, is our ability to simultaneously examine the
vast range of security matters facing the homeland. Among these matters
is the U.S. Coast Guard's mission to secure and protect the maritime
domain--which includes U.S. Arctic waters. Many forget that the United
States is, after all, an Arctic nation, given the geography of Alaska.
The vastness of U.S. Arctic waters results in National security
demands on the Coast Guard that are evolving and pressing. They demand
our attention. The Coast Guard has identified its responsibilities in
the Arctic as ensuring ``the homeland security, safety, and
environmental stewardship of U.S. waters.'' Executing this mission in
the region is becoming more difficult, as the Arctic's strategic
importance is growing, and maritime activity is increasing. Studies
show this increase in maritime activity is linked directly to climate
change, as global warming has caused an overall decrease in the
duration and thickness of sea ice coverage.
Warmer temperatures are also inviting a rise in recreational
activity and offshore exploration of natural resources. In addition to
climate change, the Coast Guard has had to contend with the increased
presence and aggression of geopolitical actors, like Russia and China,
in the region. Both nations have identified increased presence in the
Arctic as a strategic priority, motivated in part by the potential
economic benefits that Arctic shipping routes could bring. Russia is
increasing its military presence in the Arctic, building on what is
already the world's largest number of icebreakers. With almost 50
icebreakers, Russia has the capabilities, personnel, and infrastructure
needed to operate in the Arctic year-round.
China has likewise shown its Arctic ambitions, directing Chinese
companies and government agencies to maintain an increased presence in
the region to help create what it calls a ``Polar Silk Road.'' China
has also announced its first domestically built icebreaker and plans
for a nuclear-powered icebreaker. As we learn about the emerging
capabilities of other geopolitical actors in the region, I am concerned
about the Coast Guard's capability gaps in the Arctic--including a need
for additional icebreakers and long-range patrol vessels. The Coast
Guard currently has just 1 heavy polar icebreaker, the ``Polar Star,''
and 1 medium icebreaker, the ``Healy.'' The Polar Star is well past its
service life and conducts missions in Antarctica--not the Arctic.
Thankfully, Congress has made significant investments in building
new Coast Guard assets, including funds to begin construction on a new
Polar Security Cutter. This first Polar Security Cutter will replace
the Polar Star and its responsibilities in the Antarctic; only a second
Polar Security Cutter to be delivered in 2025 or later would finally
provide the Coast Guard with icebreaking capabilities in the Arctic. It
evident that the Coast Guard, and the U.S. Government as a whole, has
some catching up to do to be able to protect U.S. interests in the
Arctic. Without increased attention and investment in the strategies,
resources, and personnel needed to operate at our northern-most border,
the Coast Guard will risk falling further behind.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses about homeland
security priorities in the Arctic and how Congress can best support the
Government's critical missions in the region.
Mr. Correa. Now I would like to welcome the panel of
witnesses. Our first witness, Dr. Michael Sfraga, is a director
of the Polar Institute and Global Risk and Resilience program
at the Wilson Center. His work is focused on changing geography
in the Arctic and the impacts of social and political regimes
in the region.
Welcome, sir.
You have 5 minutes for statement.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SFRAGA, DIRECTOR, GLOBAL RISK AND
RESILIENCE PROGRAM, AND DIRECTOR OF POLAR INSTITUTE AT THE
WILSON CENTER
Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member Lesko, and Members of the committee.
As the Chairman noted, I am the director of the Woodrow
Wilson Center's Polar Institute and Global Risk and Resilience
program.
Members, today we are witnessing the opening of a new
ocean, a fourth accessible maritime border for the United
States. The Arctic Ocean joins the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of
Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean as a critical geographic
component of our country's maritime ring of security and
opportunity. Spanning nearly 5\1/2\ million square miles, the
Arctic Ocean covers an area roughly 1\1/2\ times the United
States, and half the size of the African continent. It is a
region we cannot ignore.
My testimony provides an overview of key issues facing the
United States, other Arctic and non-Arctic nations. I'd like to
reconceptualize the risks, the realities, and the opportunities
in the Arctic. I provide a new framework called Navigating the
Arctic's 7C's. The Cs are climate, commodities, commerce,
connectivity, communities, cooperation, and competition. To
effectively protect the homeland by addressing the challenges
and opportunities of a transformed Arctic, the United States
must thoroughly consider how it navigates the Arctic's 7Cs.
The first C is climate. You will hear more about that in a
moment. The climate change is real, it is rapid, and it is
palpable. According to NASA, September Arctic Ocean ice extent
has decreased from about 3 million square miles in 1980 to less
than 2 million square miles this month. The latest IPCC report
found with high confidence that the Arctic is warming 2 to 3
times as fast as the rest of the planet.
The second C is commodities. According to the USGS, the
Arctic is estimated to hold 13 percent of the world's
undiscovered oil and 30 percent of the world's undiscovered
natural gas. The increased availability of these resources due
to the rapid thaw in the Arctic has reenergized the global
market's interest in the Arctic. This interest is predicted to
endure, particularly in the wake of the recent attack on the
Saudi Arabian oil facilities.
The third C is commerce. Russia's Yamal Peninsula is now
emblematic of the new global Arctic. For example, China owns
nearly 30 percent of the initial Yamal LNG project; and Arctic
LNG tankers are built in the shipyards of South Korea.
Meanwhile, the United States does not have a major deepwater
port along 1,500 nautical miles of its Arctic coastline from
Dutch Harbor to Prudhoe Bay along the North Slope. Without a
viable deepwater port, or strings of ports in the U.S. Arctic,
commerce, search and rescue, and National security interests
will not be met. The June, 2019, National Defense Authorization
Act includes, ``requirements to locate and designate one or
more U.S. strategic ports.''
The fourth C, connectivity. We tend to think of
connectivity just as an internet connection; but we should
focus on a broader application of connectivity, addressing both
digital and physical infrastructure. We do not have a digital
or information divide in America's Arctic. We have a digital
and information abyss. Less than 5 percent of the U.S. Maritime
Arctic is charted to modern international standards. We lack
the basic information about our Arctic domain. Insufficient
access to reliable internet connectivity hinders education,
commerce, search and rescue, and impedes informed
infrastructure development and maintenance.
The fifth C is communities. The transformation of the
Arctic most acutely affects community in the region. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers has identified 31 Alaskan communities
and seriously threatened by environmental change and in
imminent need for relocation. These threatened communities are
similar, perhaps, to those in New Orleans, or even a future
Miami.
Six, cooperation. For over two decades, the Arctic Council,
a consensus-driven body, has fostered and maintained
international dialog, research efforts, and binding agreements
among the members, including Russia. Cooperation also exists
within the Arctic Coast Guard forum with representation from
each Arctic nation. The Arctic region is the only place, aside
from the International Space Station, where the United States
and Russia have maintained long-term cooperation, even in times
of high tension.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, my final C is competition. The
ability to project power in the Arctic can be measured in a
number of ways, including a Nation's ability to operate in the
region. China, which in 2019, as you noted, proclaimed itself a
near-Arctic State--and, Mr. Chairman, I am a geographer. They
are not a near-Arctic State. Currently has 4 icebreakers and is
developing 2 new icebreakers--1, nuclear-powered. Russia
operates, as you noted, over 50 icebreakers with 6 under
construction and 12 more planned. Russia is also revitalizing
Soviet-era military installations, and establishing new assets
along its Northern Sea route with new military bases from Franz
Josef Land to Wrangel Island. This denotes Russia's intent and
ability to maintain premier influence in the Arctic. The U.S.
Government, by comparison, as you noted, has 2 icebreakers and
is cannibalizing parts from the dry-docked Polar Sea to
maintain 1 single heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star.
The recent funding for an additional U.S. icebreaker or
polar security cutter is a step forward. The U.S. Coast Guard's
2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook describes the need for 6 new
polar security cutters, which will help support our homeland
security requirements and provide much-needed domain presence.
We should share a sense of urgency to see our polar
security cutter fleet fully funded and in service sooner rather
than later.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we often hear that the Arctic
is an emerging issue. I disagree. The Arctic has emerged. As I
have explained, it is no longer an isolated, remote region.
Rather, it is a critical component of our global, political,
economic, social, physical, and security landscape. The region
is experiencing rapid and dynamic change; and these 7 unique
drivers, these Arctic 7Cs, help frame these pressing global
issues in a way that may help to better understand and address
our future Arctic.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sfraga follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Sfraga
September 19, 2019
introduction
Good afternoon Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. My name is Mike Sfraga. I am
the director of the Polar Institute and the director of the Global Risk
and Resilience Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center. I also serve as
co-lead scholar for the Department of State's Fulbright Arctic
Initiative. I am honored to testify on the subject ``The Northern
Northern Border: Homeland Security Priorities in the Arctic, Part I.''
As we convene today, we are witnessing the opening of a new ocean:
A fourth accessible, maritime border for the United States. The Arctic
Ocean joins the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific Ocean as a
critical geographic component of our country's maritime ring of
security and opportunity. Spanning nearly 5\1/2\ million square miles,
the Arctic Ocean covers an area roughly 1.5 times the size of the
United States and nearly half the size of the African Continent. It is
a region we cannot ignore.
The Department of Homeland Security's Strategic Plan for fiscal
years 2020-2024 is a helpful filter through which my testimony should
be considered. The DHS Strategic Plan calls for confronting a ``complex
threat landscape'' by establishing ``a clear strategic vision that
achieves and advances our Department's essential mission by placing
American safety and security first.'' One of the guiding principles
includes championing `` `Relentless Resilience' for all threats and
hazards.'' The Arctic, including Alaska, the State by which the United
States is an Arctic nation, is experiencing rapidly-evolving threats--
and opportunities--that we must recognize and address.
My testimony provides an overview of key issues facing the United
States, and other Arctic and non-Arctic nations. To re-conceptualize
the realities, risks, and opportunities in the Arctic, I provide a
framework called Navigating the Arctic's 7Cs.
The 7Cs are: (1) Climate, (2) Commodities, (3) Commerce, (4)
Connectivity, (5) Communities, (6) Cooperation, and (7) Competition. To
effectively protect the homeland by addressing the challenges and
opportunities of a transformed Arctic, the United States must
thoroughly consider how it navigates the Arctic's 7Cs.
1. Climate
Climate change is real, rapid, and palpable. According to NASA,
September Arctic Ocean ice extent has decreased from about 3 million
square miles in 1980 to less than 2 million square miles this month.
The latest IPCC report found with high confidence that the Arctic is
warming 2 to 3 times faster than the global average. Associated sea ice
decline has many implications for the United States, including: A more
accessible border along the Alaska's coastline; increased risk to
mariners; stronger and more frequent storms; threats to coastal
communities due to coastline and permafrost degradation; and, shifting
subsistence patterns.
I recommend, as one example of cross-walking Federal
recommendations and efforts related to the Arctic, a review of the
United States Arctic Research Commission's Report on the Goals and
Objectives for Arctic Research 2019-2020, where you may find 9
recommendations that enhance the Nation's ability to ``Observe,
Understand, and Forecast Arctic Environmental Change.''
2. Commodities
According to USGS, the Arctic is estimated to hold 13 percent of
the world's undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the world's undiscovered
natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids.
The increased availability of these resources due to the rapid ice thaw
has reenergized the global market's interest in the Arctic for a source
of these commodities. This interest is predicted to endure--
particularly in the wake of the recent attack on Saudi Arabian oil
facilities.
The U.S. Arctic Research Commission's 2019-2020 document notes 5
recommendations to advance our understanding of Arctic natural
resources and may help shape the committee's further work in this area.
3. Commerce
There has been a 5-fold increase in commercial activity along
Russia's Northern Sea Route (NSR) since 2014, primarily driven by
resource extraction and subsequent transport. According to Business
Index North, 22,022 voyages with 20.1 million tons of freight transited
the NSR in 2018--twice the tonnage of 2017. Russia derives an estimated
20 percent of its GDP and 30 percent of its exports from the Arctic--
and aims to quadruple the cargo to 80 million tons per year by 2024.
Russia is building out their Arctic infrastructure to support such
activities--the United States is not.
Russia's Yamal Peninsula, an epicenter of this commerce, is now
emblematic of the new, global Arctic--for example China owns a nearly
30 percent stake of the initial Yamal LNG project, and Arctic LNG
tankers are built in the shipyards of South Korea. Meanwhile, the
United States does not have a major deep-water port along 1,500
nautical miles of its Arctic coastline: From Dutch Harbor to Alaska's
North Slope. Without a viable deep-water port or string of ports--in
the U.S. Arctic--commerce, search-and-rescue, and National security
interests will not be met. The June 2019 National Defense Authorization
Act includes ``requirements to locate and designate `one or more' US
strategic ports in the Arctic.''
4. Connectivity
There are many ways to describe connectivity in the Arctic context.
We tend to think of connectivity as just an internet connection, but we
should focus on a broader application of connectivity--addressing both
digital and physical infrastructure.
We do not have a digital or information divide in America's
Arctic--we have a digital and information abyss. Less than 5 percent of
the U.S. maritime Arctic is charted to modern international standards;
we lack basic information about our Arctic domain. Insufficient access
to reliable internet connectivity hinders education, commerce, search-
and-rescue, and impedes informed infrastructure development and
maintenance.
5. Communities
The transformation of the Arctic most acutely affects communities
in the region. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has identified 31
Alaskan communities as seriously threatened by environmental change and
in imminent need of relocation. In other words, 31 communities need to
vacate the land their ancestors lived on for thousands of years. These
threatened communities are similar to those in New Orleans and perhaps
a future Miami. It is the mission of the Department of Homeland
Security to guarantee a safe and secure environment to all American
communities, including those in the Arctic.
6. Cooperation
There is a high degree of cooperation between the 8 Arctic nations,
principally through the Arctic Council. For over 2 decades, this
consensus-driven body has fostered and maintained international dialog,
research efforts, and binding agreements among the members, including
Russia. Cooperation also exists within the Arctic Coast Guard Forum,
with representation from each Arctic nation. The Arctic region is the
only place, aside from the International Space Station, where the
United States and Russia have maintained long-term cooperation, even in
times of high tension.
U.S. participation and leadership in the Arctic Council and Arctic
Coast Guard Forum is in our Nation's best interest. These entities
reinforce a rules-based governance structure for the Arctic Ocean, and
help to effectively mitigate and address the impacts of a warming
Arctic.
7. Competition
The ability to project power in the Arctic can be measured in a
number of ways, including a nation's ability to operate in the region.
A lens through which we may consider this matter includes the number of
icebreakers in service and planned by the United States, Russia, and
China.
China, which in 2018 proclaimed itself a ``Near-Arctic State,''
currently has 4 icebreakers and is developing 2 new icebreakers, 1 to
be nuclear-powered. This is indicative of China's approach to the
Arctic--a long-term, carefully crafted, and purposeful strategy to
secure a diverse energy portfolio, presence, and regional influence
through economic development.
Russia operates 53 icebreakers, with 6 under construction and 12
more planned. Russia is also revitalizing Soviet-era military
installations and establishing new assets along the NSR, with new
military bases on Franz Josef Land, Kotelny, and Wrangel Island. This
denotes Russia's intent and ability to maintain premier influence in
the Arctic.
The U.S. Government by comparison has 2 icebreakers, and is
cannibalizing parts from the dry-docked Polar Sea to maintain our
single heavy icebreaker--the Polar Star. The recent funding for an
additional U.S. icebreaker or ``Polar Security Cutter'' is a small step
forward. The U.S. Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook describes
the need for 6 new Polar Security Cutters, which will help support our
homeland security requirements and provide much-needed domain presence.
We should share a sense of urgency to see our Polar Security Cutter
fleet fully funded and in service sooner rather than later.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, we often hear the Arctic is an emerging issue. I
disagree. The Arctic has emerged. As I have explained, it is no longer
an isolated or remote region; rather it is a critical component of our
global political, economic, social, physical, and security landscape.
The region is experiencing rapid and dynamic change and these 7 unique
drivers, the Arctic's 7Cs, help frame these pressing global issues in a
way that may help to better understand and address our future Arctic.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Dr. Sfraga.
Now our next witness, Dr. Abbie Tingstad, the associate
research department director of the Engineering and Applied
Sciences at the RAND Corporation.
Dr. Tingstad has authored a number of publications on the
Arctic, and she has done extensive research on the Coast Guard
capabilities, international cooperation, and the changing
strategic environment in the Arctic.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF ABBIE TINGSTAD, SENIOR PHYSICAL SCIENTIST, RAND
CORPORATION
Ms. Tingstad. Thank you very much, Chairman Correa, Ranking
Member Lesko, and other distinguished Members of the committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
We have known for many years that the Arctic region is
sensitive to environmental shifts, and today it is experiencing
one of the most rapid rates of climate change in the world.
These changes in the Arctic have created both homeland security
and international issues. The Northern Rim of the United States
is already an area of concern for illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing, search and rescue, and environmental
protection. In the future, trafficking and terrorism-related
problems could arise as well. In addition, the Arctic presents
possibilities for both engagement and conflict, with Russia and
China in and near U.S. territory.
Why does climate change in the Arctic matter, and what
could the United States do about it from a security
perspective? In the past, vast, harsh conditions, persistent
sea ice, and limited opportunities for economic development
have served as a deterrent to presence in the region. Climate
is changing patterns of physical access to the Arctic. Maritime
access is increasing, although unevenly, and land-based access
in some areas is also decreasing.
But climate is not the sole driver of change in the Arctic.
For example, technology is also very important. New sensors and
autonomous vehicles, for example, could increase the
accessibility of the Arctic across land, sea, and air. Other
change factors also motivate or discourage access to the
region, such as the available and cost of energy resources, as
well as indigenous autonomy and partnerships.
Among others, Russia and China are definitely taking
advantage of opportunities in the Arctic. Russia is
revitalizing fixed and mobile infrastructure for commercial and
military use. For its part, China has been promoting the Polar
Silk Road and engaging in Arctic affairs through the Arctic
Council, among other things.
Our work on the durability of Arctic cooperation among
stakeholders reveal that an increase in maritime safety and
security incidents might be most likely to bring Arctic
security into question for the United States. Examples of such
incidents include maritime vessel collisions, dark vessels
engaging in illegal fishing or drug running, oil spills, and
acts of terrorism or piracy.
Nations that appear to lack adequate capabilities to
prevent and respond to these types of incidents will face a
real or perceived security void in the Arctic.
This will result in both domestic and international
consequences to include potential declines in well-being for
indigenous communities, and a security void might also allow
other nations, notably China and Russia, to justify an increase
in presence and influence in the region.
Now that environmental access barriers are falling, we must
ask: How does climate change alter the needs and abilities of
the U.S. Government to carry out responsibilities and use its
authorities in the Arctic? Ultimately, the United States must
decide on the right level of National capability; and by virtue
of its history and authorities, the U.S. Coast Guard will play
a large role in any steps forward enhancing governance in the
region.
In our work on U.S. Coast Guard capabilities, several
assets arose in our analysis as being particularly pertinent to
Arctic operations. In addition to existing and planned
icebreakers, these include helicopters, aircraft, airfields,
National security cutters, medical evacuation capabilities,
satellite and other communication networks, rescue coordination
centers, and various types of specialist personnel, as well as
data.
Importantly, no single one of these capabilities arose as a
silver bullet; and there are also many gaps still existing for
the Coast Guard and others in the Arctic as well to include
communications, domain awareness, and response. Specific types
of mitigation options that we identified in our work include a
diverse range, including items such as communications
infrastructure, remotely controlled air, sea, and amphibious
craft for domain awareness, updating data gathering and
database construction processes to enable fusion of
information, and sustaining both longer-term operations, as
well as agile first response capability, among a series of
other things.
It is important to recognize that concerns about Arctic
security in closing capability caps are more than just Coast
Guard issues; they are matters of National relevance. In
addition to taking specific actions outlined such as those I
have just mentioned, the United States has the opportunity to
continue work with the Arctic Council and Arctic Coast Guard
Forum. Finding ways to keep discussion channels open for
important military security communications is also vital. The
United States might also reconsider ratifying the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
This is a time for the United States to continue engaging
in the Arctic. I will conclude by saying that fixing the
security void includes providing prevention and response
services that Americans expect from their government, whether
they live in Los Angeles, Houston, New York, or Utqiagvik,
Alaska.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Tingstad follows:]
Prepared Statement of Abbie Tingstad\1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
\2\ The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities
throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier, and more
prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public
interest.
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September 19, 2019
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and other distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you this afternoon. We have known for many years that the Arctic
region is sensitive to environmental shifts; today, it is experiencing
one of the most rapid rates of climate change in the world. These
changes in the Arctic have created both homeland security and
international issues. The northern rim of the United States is already
an area of concern for illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)
fishing; search and rescue; and environmental protection. In the
future, trafficking- and terrorism-related problems could arise as
well. In addition, the Arctic presents possibilities for both
engagement and conflict with Russia and China in and near U.S.
territory.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Abbie Tingstad, Stephanie Pezard, and Scott Stephenson, ``Will
the Breakdown in U.S.-Russia Cooperation Reach the Arctic?,'' RAND
Blog, October 12, 2016. As of September 16, 2019: https://www.rand.org/
blog/2016/10/will-the-breakdown-in-us-russia-cooperation-reach-
the.html.
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Why does climate change in the Arctic matter, and what does the
United States need to do about it from a security perspective? I would
like to present the following points:
The Arctic's on-going changes in climate promote both
challenges and opportunities; these are also influenced by
technology, economic, and other factors.
Climate change in the Arctic matters for U.S. security
because of the potential for a real or perceived security void
to develop in the absence of additional action.
Averting a security void requires sufficient capability to
promote safety, security, and stewardship in the region;
multiple types of investments are needed to do this.
changing arctic will foster problems and opportunities
The Arctic has recently attracted so much attention--from foreign
governments, commercial interests, and, increasingly, the U.S.
Government--because climate is changing patterns of physical access to
the region, altering the historical, broadly-held perception of the
Arctic as a relatively static place.\4\ The environment for native and
other local stakeholders is changing at an intensifying pace.\5\ One
reason for this is diminished ice-albedo feedback; less ice means that
a smaller fraction of solar energy is mirrored back into space,
exacerbating the warming of the Arctic environment.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ron Kwok, ``Arctic Sea Ice Thickness, Volume, and Multiyear Ice
Coverage: Losses and Coupled Variability (1958-2018),'' Environmental
Research Letters, Vol. 13, 2018.
\5\ Josefino C. Comiso and Dorothy K. Hall, ``Climate Trends In The
Arctic as Observed From Space,'' 2014, WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 5,
2014, pp. 389-409; R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer, eds., Climate Change
2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III
to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2014.
\6\ Comiso and Hall, 2014.
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In the past, the Arctic's vast, harsh conditions, its persistent
sea ice, and its limited opportunities for economic development have
served as a deterrent to Arctic presence. Though the Arctic was
strategic during the Cold War (Arctic nations still maintain military
assets in and around the area), the region itself was not a driver of
tensions so much as a battleground in a larger conflict. It is time to
re-evaluate security needs and capabilities now that warmer
temperatures are opening the Arctic to a different set of challenges
and opportunities.
The long distances between remote inhabited areas in the North
American Arctic will remain, and the environment across the region will
still be relatively harsh. Farmers in Greenland now grow potatoes and
Saami reindeer herders worry about newly-invading pests, but the Arctic
will not become a tropical paradise in our lifetimes. Warming has an
uneven effect on access to the Arctic--diminishing sea ice increases
maritime access, but thawing permafrost and softer ice roads inhibit
access via land. Even with general icemelt, some areas of the maritime
Arctic--notably the Canadian archipelago and northwestern Greenland--
are projected to experience particularly persistent sea ice.
Climate is not the sole driver of change shaping the Arctic's
future.\7\ Technology, even that which is not groundbreaking in today's
terms, is influencing access. Ships' hulls are hardened to break ice,
and sections of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline running through permafrost
are elevated on vertical support members. New sensors and autonomous
vehicles will increase the accessibility of Arctic land, air, and sea,
even if those areas are not directly accessed by humans. Growing
communications networks also will enhance reach across, into, and out
of the Arctic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, Kristin Van Abel, and Scott
Stephenson, Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia: Planning for
Regional Change in the Far North, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, RR-1731-RC, 2017. As of April 29, 2019: https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1731.html.
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Other change factors motivate or discourage access to the region.
For example, the availability and cost of energy resources influence
decisions on whether or how to operate in the Arctic.\8\ Indigenous
autonomy and partnerships also affect whether and how areas of the
Arctic are opened or maintained for business. The vast majority of
Greenlanders are indigenous, and Nuuk increasingly manages the
country's affairs, although Copenhagen still handles international
relations and external security. Canada's Inuit also have an
increasingly strong voice in their portions of the Arctic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Pezard et al., 2017.
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Among others, Russia and China are definitely taking advantage of
economic opportunities in the Arctic. Russia has been increasing its
military capabilities there, forming a northern command, establishing
two Arctic brigades, developing infrastructure, and deploying and
upgrading military assets.\9\ The Russian government and economic
sector is also investing in fixed and mobile infrastructure for
civilian or commercial use, and some of this infrastructure appears to
be dual-use. For example, this year, the Russian Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment released a plan for further developing
mineral resources in the Arctic and the logistics for bringing them to
market via the Northern Sea Route.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Andrew Osborn, ``Putin's Russia in Biggest Arctic Military Push
Since Soviet Fall,'' Reuters, January 30, 2017. As of April 22, 2019:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-insight/putins-russia-
in-biggest-arctic-military-push-since-soviet-fall-idUSKBN15E0W0.
\10\ ``Russia Releases Comprehensive Plan for Arctic Logistics,''
Maritime Executive, March 19, 2019. As of April 22, 2019: https://
www.maritime-executive.com/article/russia-releases-comprehensive-plan-
for-arctic-logistics.
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China has been promoting the idea of a ``Polar Silk Road'' in
recent years. This builds on China's decades-long interest in polar
science and its more recent participation as an observer in Arctic
governance issues through the Arctic Council. In its 2018 Arctic
policy, China reaffirmed its interests in participating in Arctic
governance and development.\11\ China's investment in the Yamal Liquid
Natural Gas project with Russia was substantial. Other investments have
been more modest, and some have not come to fruition (such as the
purchase of an unoccupied naval base in Greenland and the now-canceled
development of a resort in Svalbard).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ People's Republic of China, State Council, ``China's Arctic
Policy,'' white paper, January 26, 2018. As of April 22, 2019: http://
english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/con-
tent_281476026660336.htm.
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The economic promise of shipping lanes, hydrocarbon extraction, and
fishing all come with their own challenges. These activities raise the
risk of safety hazards and toxic spills. Furthermore, any increased
militarization of the Arctic raises the chance of an unintended
military confrontation in the Arctic.
We must consider whether and how to provision basic governance in a
changing Arctic. Such governance includes U.S. Coast Guard activities,
such as search and rescue, drug interdiction, and fisheries
enforcement. Although the Coast Guard already operates in the region,
its current resources are limited, and it could be overwhelmed with a
rapid increase in demand for service capabilities. Here, we explore the
concept of an Arctic security gap and some of the capability shortfalls
that may inhibit the United States' ability to avoid it--assuming this
is something the Nation decides to prioritize.
does the united states face an arctic security gap?
Our work on the durability of Arctic cooperation among
stakeholders--particularly among nation-states--revealed that, although
natural resources and territorial claims are important, they might have
less potential to escalate tensions over the next 2 decades than an
increase in maritime safety and security incidents.\12\ Examples of
such incidents include maritime vessel collisions, ``dark''\13\ vessels
engaging in IUU fishing or drug running, oil spills, and acts of
terrorism or piracy. Nations that appear to lack adequate capabilities
to prevent and respond to these types of incidents will face a real or
perceived security void in the Arctic. This will have consequences
domestically as well as internationally. Economic opportunities, such
as resource extraction, legal fishing, trans-Arctic shipping, and wind
and data farms, could stagnate. Indigenous community wellbeing could
decline, and broader social problems, such as violent crime and illegal
drug use, might be exacerbated. A security void might also allow other
nations, notably China and Russia, to justify an increase in presence
and influence in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, and Alexandra Hall, The
Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment:
Insights from a Scenario-Based Exercise Organised by RAND and Hosted by
NUPI, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-268-RC, 2018. As of
April 29, 2019: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE268.html.
\13\ Not emitting via the Automatic Identification System (AIS)
used to locate maritime vessels. AIS relies on the cooperative or
voluntary use of the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now that environmental access barriers are falling, we must ask:
How does climate change alter the needs and abilities of the U.S.
Government to carry out responsibilities and use its authorities in the
Arctic? It is imperative to know which key Government responsibilities
and authorities can be carried out in the Arctic and under which on-
going or emerging circumstances they will be necessary. For example,
defending the Nation's exclusive economic zone represents a small
fraction of the Coast Guard's discretionary budget. Should this be
increased--either in total dollar amount or as a fraction of the
budget--and why?
Answering these types of questions is a necessary step toward
understanding whether the United States has a security gap in the
Arctic and what the nature of any gap is. Such a gap, whether perceived
or real, could lead to undesirable and avoidable consequences.
Ultimately, however, the United States must decide on the right level
of capability in the Arctic. By virtue of its operational history,
statutory missions, and authorities, the Coast Guard will play a large
role in any steps toward enhancing governance activities in the Arctic.
However, our recent work on Coast Guard capability gaps in the Arctic
reveals that this Department of Homeland Security component and
military service is already operating at a disadvantage in the
region.\14\
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\14\ Abbie Tingstad, Scott Savitz, Kristin Van Abel, Dulani Woods,
Katherine Anania, Michelle D. Ziegler, Aaron C. Davenport, and
Katherine Costello, Identifying Potential Gaps in U.S. Coast Guard
Arctic Capabilities, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2310-
DHS, 2018. As of April 29, 2019: https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR2310.html.
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The numbers and capabilities of icebreaking vessels are frequently
cited as a proxy for Arctic operating capability or as a more general
reflection on Arctic interest or influence.\15\ Differences between
nations are acute; Russia holds a dramatic lead over all others with
dozens of these ships, including several newer ones, some of which are
nuclear-powered. In contrast, the United States has only 2 operational
icebeakers--the heavy icebreaker U.S. Coast Guard Cutter (USGCG) Polar
Star (commissioned in 1976) and the medium icebreaker USGCG Healy
(commissioned in 1999). More are planned through the Polar Security
Cutter program.\16\ Canada, Finland, and Sweden all have more
operational icebreakers than the United States. This summer, China
operationalized its second polar icebreaker, the first to be made in
China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Charlie Gao, ``The `Icebreaker Gap': How Russia is Planning to
Build More Icebreakers to Project Power in the Arctic,'' National
Interest, August 19, 2018. As of March 19, 2019: https://
nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/icebreaker-gap-how-russia-planning-
build-more-icebreakers-project-power-arctic-29102.
\16\ U.S. Coast Guard, ``Polar Security Cutter Program,'' webpage,
undated. As of September 16, 2019: https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/
Surface-Programs/Polar-Icebreaker.
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However, the availability of these specialized ships is just one of
many areas in which the United States may face capacity or capability
shortfalls. Generally speaking, infrastructure--ports, onshore
facilities, roads, railroads, airfields, hospitals, and urban centers--
is much thinner on the ground in the North American Arctic. Russia and
Northern Europe have booming cities and industries in the far north,
whereas the United States and Canada have far lower densities of
population. This limits the ability of U.S. organizations, such as the
Coast Guard, to carry out their roles and responsibilities in the
region. For example, northern Alaska has few facilities and airfields
that can support larger aircraft operations and maintenance. This is
one limitation on the scope and scale of Coast Guard summertime
presence (the Coast Guard budget is another). In some cases, more than
one stakeholder might need access to limited infrastructure in northern
Alaska, leading to competition for use.
our path forward requires multiple investments
On-going regional changes mean that U.S. efforts in the Arctic will
require regular access to the services common to other parts of the
United States. For example, most of the United States enjoys access to
year-round search and rescue and disaster relief support from a range
of national, State, and local entities. Several potential gaps might
stand in the way of Coast Guard--among other--operations in the Arctic.
The prioritization of these gaps in the context of other National needs
must be considered in decisions moving forward.
We found that no single capability worked in every Arctic scenario
or acted as a ``silver bullet'' to mitigate every shortfall. For this
study, we defined capability broadly, as a means to accomplish a
mission, function, or objective.\17\ Capabilities included individual
materiel assets, such as icebreakers and helicopters; fixed
infrastructure, such as ports and airfields; and organizations,
agreements for cooperation, and people (including training).
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\17\ Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland
Security Manual for the Operation of the Joint Requirements Integration
and Management System, Washington, DC, DHS Instruction Manual 107-01-
001-01, April 4, 2016, p. 3.
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First, we looked at the existing capabilities that the Coast Guard,
Federal interagency partners, local communities, and commercial
providers could use to add value in different scenarios. In addition to
existing icebreakers, the most valuable assets included MH-60 Jayhawk
helicopters; HC-130 aircraft; airports and airfields; ports; National
Security Cutters; drones, medical evacuation capabilities; satellite
and other communications networks; rescue coordination centers; Coast
Guard sector specialist personnel; and data on maritime traffic,
weather, ice, and other conditions important for on-scene response. The
variety of these examples help highlight the diversity of capabilities
that are needed for Arctic operations.
Second, we examined shortfalls in the existing capabilities within
the study scenarios. We found that the shortfalls varied as much or
more as the existing capabilities. In general, these gaps--defined as
capabilities not readily available or planned to be available to the
Coast Guard--fell into the broad categories of communications,
awareness, and response.
Communications are critical for Coast Guard (and a variety of
other) missions. Problems in the Arctic include patchy and unreliable
voice communications and extremely limited or nonexistent bandwidth.
An important aspect of awareness is understanding and assessing
situations. In the Arctic, the term ``operating blind'' is used to
describe the level of awareness: Threats and hazards are often poorly
understood, and those that are identified cannot be regularly monitored
because the capacity and capability to do so do not exist. There is
particular concern about threats and hazards that do not or cannot
actively emit signals, such as ``dark'' vessels and fast-moving ice.
The ability to fuse information from individual data streams into a
unified picture of activity and conditions is also challenging.
Finally, the ability to respond to a threat or hazard in the Arctic
is extremely limited and strongly depends on the proximity to the
incident location of scarce material assets, people, and supporting
infrastructure. Naturally, reducing the incidence of threats and
hazards is an important first step. However, if prevention fails,
ensuring that the right people and assets are available and can be
deployed rapidly to the right place is necessary. Responders must
consider harsh operating conditions and the few resources available for
coordination. Ensuring sufficient sustainment of operations is the next
challenge. Access to appropriate follow-up materiel and procedures,
including medical care and hazardous material clean-up, is not
guaranteed.
This study was not intended to provide recommendations on specific
ways to mitigate gaps. However, the diversity of ways in which workshop
participants elected to shore up capability and capacity in the context
of different scenarios alludes to a rich set of possibilities. No one
type of mobile asset, fixed infrastructure, organization,
collaboration, or other entity satisfied every potential gap. Rather,
combining existing capabilities and increasing their capacities, while
diversifying capabilities to support communications, awareness, and
response, is necessary to tackle current and future vulnerabilities in
the Arctic.
Specific types of mitigation options considered include the
following:
installing additional communications infrastructure and
leveraging the growing number of commercial communications
satellites in polar orbits
exercising communications tactics, techniques, and
procedures to train service members in overcoming decision-
making challenges associated with weak communications channels
investing in remotely-controlled air, sea, and amphibious
craft for persistent wide-area surveillance, especially if
these assets are networked together and to sensors on other
assets to provide a common operating picture
updating data-gathering and database construction processes
to enhance automation and improve data quality, make data
accessible, and fuse information into a common operating
picture
developing operating concepts, plans, and investment
strategies that recognize the need for agile first-response
assets as well as infrastructure and logistics to sustain
longer-term operations and (literally) conduct heavy lifting
investigating remotely-controlled airlift and oil-spill
response capability
adding small-boat landing capability to icebreakers
increasing the number of forward operating locations and
resources, including local and mobile elements
prepositioning key response items in partner communities
enforcing new industry self-help regulations
improving long-term relationships with native communities
(including through additional Coast Guard cultural training).
One issue that concerns me greatly is the characterization--in the
media at least--of the United States' Arctic operating challenges as
merely an ``icebreaker gap.''\18\ I do think that the United States is
dangerously limited in its ability to break ice. However, while this
generalization of Arctic challenges might be convenient, it distracts
from the broader problem of systemic capability shortfalls, as detailed
earlier.
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\18\ Gao, 2018.
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It is just as important to recognize that concerns about Arctic
security and closing capability gaps are more than just Coast Guard
issues--they are matters of National relevance. In addition to taking
specific actions such as those outlined earlier, the United States has
the opportunity to continue work in the Arctic Council and Arctic Coast
Guard Forum. Finding ways to keep discussion channels open for
important military security communications is also vital. The United
States might also reconsider ratifying the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea. Historically, Arctic cooperation and governance has
benefited when stakeholders operate under the same frameworks.
Change anywhere necessitates a re-evaluation of security needs and
capabilities. In this respect, the Arctic is not exceptional. Consider
continuing efforts by the United States to re-evaluate military
operations in anti-access environments in response to evolving threats
or how the use of drone boats and synthetic drugs is challenging
methods of drug interdiction.
This is a time for the United States to continue engaging in the
Arctic.\19\ Fixing the security void does not only involve military
might, but also includes providing prevention and response services
that Americans expect from their Government, whether they live in Los
Angeles, Houston, New York, or Utqiagvik, Alaska.
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\19\ Pezard et al., 2017; Abbie Tingstad and Stephanie Pezard,
``What Does `America First' Look Like in the Arctic?,'' RAND Blog, May
25, 2017. As of September 16, 2019: https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/
what-does-america-first-look-like-in-the-arctic.html.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Dr. Tingstad, for your comments.
Now I would like to call Dr. Victoria Hermann, who is the
president and managing director of the Arctic Institute for 5
minutes of comments.
Dr. Hermann is research-focused on human development in
resource economies. She was a fellow at the National Academies
of Science, and is a Fulbright Scholar.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF VICTORIA HERMANN, PRESIDENT AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,
THE ARCTIC INSTITUTE
Ms. Hermann. Thank you, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member
Lesko, distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon.
As the president and managing director of a regional Arctic
think tank, my research aims to identify the gaps in Federal
support to enhance Arctic security, to augment emergency
response, and to assist coastal Arctic villages in adapting to
the impacts of climate change that we can no longer avoid.
However, I live in Washington, DC, and, therefore, I cannot
observe the day-to-day coastal and marine changes along Arctic
coastlines that are the most immediate threat to our Northern
Border.
So, when I was invited to this hearing, I reached out to
colleagues in Alaska from the Norton Sound to Bristol Bay, with
a question: What is the most critical maritime security issue
we should discuss here?
Today, my testimony is guided by the many indigenous and
local Arctic experts I have listened to and learned from. If
there is one takeaway message from their message, it is this:
For America's northernmost citizens, for the world's
northernmost residents, climate change is already a life-
threatening everyday reality.
The most recent NOAA Arctic report card delivered an
unambiguous finding. The impacts of climate change are already
forcing the region to undergo an unprecedented transition.
Arctic air and sea temperatures are warming at more than twice
the rate of the global average. The Arctic ocean has lost 95
percent of its oldest documented sea ice. This new, more
dangerous normal poses the greatest threat to human safety, to
marine ecosystems, and to our capacity to respond to Maritime
emergencies.
In September, 2016, I first traveled to Nome, Alaska, a
remote port city of 3,500 residents just south of the Arctic
Circle. Through my research, I had the privilege of
interviewing 20 local leaders to discuss how the settlement's
infrastructure, population, and port are coping with the
consequences of a changing climate. I believe that these
interviews provide critical perspectives to support informed
committee deliberations through three key findings:
The first, Arctic coastal residents are the first
responders to any maritime security threat. As Austin Ahmasuk,
a lifelong Inupiaq hunter and community advocate, noted in his
interview, ``As we looked at how things like oil or hazardous
spills are treated in this region, we came to a very dramatic
realization. We are the first responders, and we have few
response assets to ensure healthy environments. Annually,
14,000 to 18,000 gallons of spilled oil, or hazardous
substances, occur in this region. We know our homelands and
home waters, but over the last 2 years, we have not been able
to speak at the table for our lands and waters.''
Disaster response and search-and-rescue capabilities are
only as strong as the commitments to communication channels,
technical commitments, and infrastructure investments to
support collaboration with community first responders on our
Nation's Arctic coast lines. Better integrating and enhancing
community-based observing networks as part of the Arctic Domain
Awareness Center, a DHS Center of Excellence, offers one
opportunity to address this issue if it is done in a way that
makes local leaders feel valued and included in upfront
decision making.
No. 2, climate change is creating significant economic
costs to U.S. coastal settlements and some local economic
opportunity. However, at present, local economies are
overburdened by costs, and are unable to capture economic gains
due to a lack of strategic investment in infrastructure. This
is, perhaps, best grounded by lifelong Bristol Bay commercial
fisherman, Brett Veerhusen.
``The Bearing Sea and Aleutian Islands are some of the
richest fishing grounds on earth, contributing to American and
the world's food security. Increased vessel traffic through the
Arctic poses both opportunities and challenges for our fishing
fleets, but those challenges can be devastating if we cannot
respond quickly to emergencies and protects those fisheries.''
The third and final point: Arctic residents that act as
first responders are living in a continual state of emergency
from climate impacts. Coastal communities are facing threats to
public safety, to food security, and traditional livelihoods
from changing terrestrial and marine ecosystem conditions.
Threats to human security and U.S. Arctic towns, villages, and
cities, must be integrated into investments and policy
decisions for a secure northern homeland.
Just this morning a news headline read, ``Summer, 2019, was
Hellish for the Arctic, the Front Line of Climate Change.'' The
Arctic has generated more crisis headlines like this than any
other region. Nonetheless, in Mr. Ahmasuk's words we struggle
mightily to have our voices heard. The hearing today is absent
of many voices of community first responders and indigenous
knowledge-holders. It is incumbent upon us here in Washington,
DC, to work harder to bring their voices to this table and to
reach further to meet them at their tables above the Arctic
Circle through field visits and hearings.
As we work toward that goal of building a more inclusive
dialog on maritime security and economic investment in
transportation, I urge us all to consider how we can ensure
every Arctic conversation and legislation is guided by those
local leaders and made with reference to the climate impacts
already costing billions of dollars in damages, multiplying
security threats, and devastating traditional maritime
livelihoods, not only for the 4 million people that call the
Arctic home, but for communities across America, because what
happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic. It affects
us all.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hermann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Victoria Herrmann \1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of The Arctic Institute or any of the sponsors of its research.
\2\ The Arctic Institute is an independent, nonprofit organization
headquartered in Washington, DC with a network of researchers across
the world with a mission is to help shape policy for a secure, just,
and sustainable Arctic through objective, multidisciplinary research of
the highest caliber.
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September 19, 2019
Chairman Thompson, Chairman Correa, distinguished Members of the
committee, and my fellow Arctic collogues, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you this afternoon to listen, to discuss,
and ultimately to learn how we--across civil society, Tribal councils,
academia, and Congress--can work together to address the widening
security threats to the 4 million people that call the Arctic home. If
there is one thesis to take away from my testimony, it is this: For
America's northernmost citizens, for the world's northernmost
residents, climate change is already an everyday, life-threatening
reality. It is incumbent upon those here today to safeguard American
lives in the Arctic against the impacts we can no longer avoid, and
empower local leaders and Alaska Native community champions as the
first responders of maritime emergencies.
The most recent annual U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration Arctic Report Card, released in December 2018, delivered
an unambiguous finding.\3\ The impacts of climate change are already
forcing the circumpolar region to undergo an ``unprecedented
transition'' in human history. As Arctic air and sea temperatures warm
at more than twice the rate of the global average, the Arctic Ocean has
lost 95 percent of its oldest documented sea ice. For the past 5 years
(2014-2018), Arctic air temperatures have exceeded all previous records
since 1900, and the 12 lowest sea ice extents in the satellite record
have occurred in the last 12 years. Following the 2018 U.N. Special
Report \4\ and the 4th U.S. National Climate Assessment,\5\ the Arctic
Report Card was only the latest installment in a protracted series of
disquieting findings that the Arctic has entered a new, more dangerous
normal.
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\3\ https://www.arctic.noaa.gov/report-card.
\4\ https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/.
\5\ https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/.
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The homeland security challenges raised by these scientific
publications is clear: The dramatic changes brought about by Arctic
warming pose the greatest threat to the stability of the region, and
requires a whole-of-Government approach to address the human security,
economic development, and marine environment dimensions of maritime
security in a climate-changed Arctic.
As the president and managing director of a regional Arctic think
tank, much of my field and policy research focuses on the human
security implications of a changing Arctic for remote Indigenous and
non-Indigenous communities across the circumpolar north. In co-creating
knowledge about the magnitude of more frequent and extreme slow and
sudden onset disasters for Arctic settlements, my research goal is to
identify gaps in Federal support to enhance coastal community
resilience and adaptive capacity; to augment emergency response to slow
and sudden onset climate disasters; and to capture localized economic
potential with an ecologically sustainable framework.
Today, my testimony will focus on community and transportation
infrastructure investment to meet that goal. These insights are guided
by the many Indigenous and local Arctic experts I have listened and
learned from, and are technically grounded in a qualitative research
project I completed to study the local consequences of sea level rise
and shoreline erosion in communities across the United States and U.S.
Territories.\6\ \7\ In 2016-2017 with the assistance of co-principle
investigator Eli Keene, I conducted over 350 interviews with local
American leaders to pinpoint the most pertinent social, economic, and
community vulnerabilities to coastal environmental hazards. Sixty-five
of these interviews were conducted in the State of Alaska. I believe
that these interviews provide critical perspectives to support informed
committee deliberations and decisions on maritime and transportation
security issues for the Arctic. In particular, this testimony will
emphasize the following points derived from these research interviews:
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\6\ www.americaserodingedges.org.
\7\ https://www.nationalgeographic.org/find-explorers/victoria-
stephanie-herrmann.
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(1) Arctic residents, fishermen, mayors, and subsistence hunters
are the first responders to any maritime security threat in
American Arctic and Subarctic waters. It is critical for
maritime security operations to bolster technical, financial,
and communication support to these first responders in an era
of increased commercial shipping and cruise tourism.
(2) Empowered coastal villages that act as first responders are
simultaneously facing a continual state of emergency from
climate change impacts. Coastal communities face threats to
public safety, food security, and traditional livelihoods from
changing terrestrial and marine ecosystem conditions. Threats
to human security in U.S. Arctic coastal towns, villages, and
cities must be integrated into investments and policy decisions
for a secure northern homeland.
(3) Climate change impacts are creating both significant economic
costs to U.S. Arctic coastal settlements and local economic
opportunity; however, at present local economies are
overburdened by costs and unable to capture economic
opportunities due to a lack of strategic investment.
These topics, among many others that were raised in interviews, are
highlighted here due to their relevance to Arctic maritime security in
2016, and because of their likelihood to increase as challenges the
United States will face in medium- and long-term time horizons.
(1) U.S. Arctic Residents are First Responders to Emergencies
In August and September 2016, I traveled to Nome, Alaska in the
Bering Strait region below the Arctic Circle. Nome is a remote town,
off-the-road system, of 3,500 residents and a leading contender for the
site of the first U.S. deepwater port in the Arctic. I had the
privilege of interviewing 20 local leaders, including the mayor, the
port manager, the marine advocate of Kawerak, Inc., and subsistence
hunting and fishing experts to discuss how the settlement's
infrastructure, population, and port are coping with the consequences
of a changing climate.
Austin Ahmasuk, a lifelong Nome resident, Inupiaq hunter, fisher,
trapper, and community advocate for Bering Strait villages has been
running community workshops through Kawerak, the nonprofit arm of the
Bering Strait Native Corporation, to help communities understand the
issues and needs that come with more ships. Mr. Ahmasuk noted in his
interview,
``As we looked at how things like oil spills or hazardous spills are
treated in this region, we came to a very dramatic realization--we are
the first responders. And we are looking at some 14,000 gallons or so
annually of [spilled] oil or hazardous substances in this region,''
Austin tells us. Austin has been running community workshops through
Kawerak, the nonprofit arm of the Bering Strait Native Corporation, to
help communities understand the issues and needs that come with more
ships.
``In fact, just today I was in contact with one of our communities in
our environmental program about a spill that was occurring in Brevik.
Just this morning [August 24, 2016]. So it's some 14,000 gallons
annually and the challenge with all those spills is the response. We
have very little response capability in this region.''
As my Arctic Institute collogues across the circumpolar north find
in their research, disaster response and search and rescue capabilities
are only as strong as the communication channels, technical
commitments, and infrastructure investments to support coordination and
planning collaboration with community first responders on any nation-
state's Arctic coastline. Aptly written by our Senior Fellow Andreas
Osthagen, PhD,
``The number of small-scale maritime emergency incidents occurring in
Arctic waters is increasing. Demands are made for national governments
to invest in and sustain relatively expensive Arctic capacities, such
as coast guard vessels, long-range helicopters, and oil-spill response
units. An often-overlooked dimension, however, are the local resources
already present in Arctic communities. Albeit few and far between,
Arctic communities is the foundation emergency management in the north
must be built on through three key approaches:''
Each of these areas can be improved by:
Information
Improve the spread of information concerning offshore safety
and survival for the local population.
Mandate training/exercise participation for maritime actors.
Mandate so-called `self-rescue' training and equipment for
maritime tourists.
Organize `how-to' campaigns in local communities together
with relevant non-profit organizations.
Make use of the Arctic engagement of non-profit
organizations with additional resources to create projects
aimed at local capacity enhancement.
Response
Increase the number of vertical and horizontal exercises
between the various local actors.
Enhance community role-clarification with clearly-defined
lines of responsibility in preparation for large-scale
incidents.
Explore how local maritime industries can be further
included in a system or network for local emergency response.
Operations (permanent)
Every Arctic community has some form of local engagement in
case of an emergency. It is thus up to the local and national
governments to provide a framework in which these resources can
be further improved and utilized.
Explore the options for a maritime component to the already
existing schemes.
Consider establishing a dedicated tool or hub for learning
and knowledge enhancement concerned with maritime emergency
management that can work on both the local and National levels
by informing communities and the public debate.\8\
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\8\ Taken from: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/utilising-local-
capacities-arctic/.
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(2) U.S. Arctic Coastal Residents and Local Governments Need Technical
Support and Locally Guided Investment To Address Maritime
Economic Costs and Economic Opportunities in a Climate Changed
North.
Arctic climate change poses both economic costs and opportunities
to the local, regional, and National economy, predicated on sustainable
decision making in how to effectively manage geohazards and changing
ecosystems. According to the Alaska Chapter of the U.S. Fourth National
Climate Assessment, for which I was the Review Editor,
``Alaska's marine fish and wildlife habitats, species distributions,
and food webs, all of which are important to Alaska's residents, are
increasingly affected by retreating and thinning arctic summer sea ice,
increasing temperatures, and ocean acidification. Continued warming
will accelerate related ecosystem alterations in ways that are
difficult to predict, making adaptation more challenging.
``Arctic sea ice--its presence or absence and year-to-year changes in
extent, duration, and thickness--in conjunction with increasing ocean
temperatures and ocean acidification, affects a number of marine
ecosystems and their inhabitants, including marine mammals, the
distribution of marine Alaska fish and their food sources.''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Taylor, P.C., W. Maslowski, J. Perlwitz, and D.J. Wuebbles,
2017: Arctic Changes and their Effects on Alaska and the Rest of the
United States. Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate
Assessment, Volume I. Wuebbles, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J.
Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock, Eds., U.S. Global Change
Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, 303-332. doi:10.7930/J00863GK.
This is perhaps best grounded by life-long Alaskan commercial
fisherman Brett Veerhusen in his observations working in some of the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
busiest U.S. Arctic and subarctic water,
``The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands are some of the richest fishing
grounds on earth, contributing to American and the world's food
security. Increased vessel traffic through the Arctic poses both
opportunities as challenges for our fishing fleets and coastal
communities. We must adapt so we can respond quickly to emergencies and
protect our fisheries.''
In early October, polar scientists will analyze the final data
collected from the summer of 2019. They will make an official
assessment of the Arctic sea-ice minimum for this year--the point at
which the Arctic has the least amount of ice. As we sit today,
approximately 3.9 million square kilometres of the Arctic Ocean are
covered by sea ice, only the second time the annual minimum has dropped
below 4 million square kilometres since satellite measurements began in
1979.\10\ These dramatic changes have immediate and dangerous
consequences for Arctic coastal communities, economies, the
infrastructure upon which they reply, and their capacity to respond to
and augment the response of the Coast Guard to maritime disasters.
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\10\ https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02653-x.
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(3) Coastal U.S. Arctic Settlements Are Living in a Continued State of
Emergency.
When I was invited to testify before the U.S. House Committee on
Homeland Security, I emailed a number of colleagues in Alaska, northern
Canada, and Norway with a question--what is the most critical issue for
us to discuss during this hearing. And despite their geographic,
cultural, and employment differences, working in fishing vessels, local
government, marine conservation, and reindeer herding, they all had one
answer: Climate change--the necessity to respond to and increase
investments in resilient infrastructure for coastal villages as they
face a rapid shift in climate and ecological systems. To borrow the
words of Anahma Shannon, environmental coordinator for Kawerak, from
her 2016 interview, ``Villages really suffer because they are in a
continual state of emergency.'' She went further to describe a
dangerous state of emergency in the village of Savoonga on St. Lawrence
Island in the Bering Sea caused by disappearing sea ice.
``Villages really suffer because they are in a continual state of
emergency. In normal years, every year, the ice would be close up. We'd
have thick ice, good ice. But in the recent years we haven't and 3
years ago now Savoonga had declared a food emergency and they usually
get 900 walrus, they only got 300 that year and they eat that every
day. Every day. So they went from having normal packed freezers to
having hardly being able to eat.''
There are no easy solutions for these villages from a maritime
security standpoint. By 2050, Alaska will be 2 to 4 degrees warmer than
it is today regardless of how much we reduce our greenhouse gas
emissions. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
predicts that Alaska's summer waters will be ice-free by 2030--11 years
from today. However, it is essential that any Arctic Congressional
discussion occurring in Washington, DC acknowledge that developing
investment strategies, maritime transportation policies, and a vision
for a more secure northern homeland must be rooted in the human
security of U.S. Arctic residents.
Amid the discussion around the cumulative impacts, the complexities
and differences of each individual community can get lost. While the
environmental challenges arising across Alaska are similar, even
similarly-situated communities approach these changes with different
histories, economic backgrounds, lands, natural resources, and
relationships between native corporations and other bodies of local
government. In the month Co-PI Eli Keene and I spent interviewing
community members and leaders in 5 coastal Alaska Native villages, the
most salient takeaway was the diversity in each community's
experiences.\11\
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\11\ These two paragraphs are taken from the co-authored post with
Co-PI Eli Keene, ``A Continual State of Emergency: Climate Change and
Native Lands in Northwest Alaska.'' November 15, 2016. https://
www.thearcticinstitute.org/continual-state-emergency-climate-change-
native-lands-northwest-alaska/.
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The Arctic has generated more crisis headlines about climate change
than any other region except the Pacific Islands. Nonetheless, in Mr.
Ahmasuk's view: ``We struggle mightily to have our voices heard.''
Importantly, the hearing [sic] Our today is absent of many voices of
community champions and indigenous knowledge holders, from the Bering
to the Barents Sea. It is incumbent upon us here in Washington, DC to
work harder to bring their voices to this table and to reach further to
sit at their table above the Arctic Circle through field visits and
hearings. As we work toward that goal of building a more inclusive
dialog on maritime security and economic investement in maritime
transportation in and for the Arctic, I urge us all to consider how we
can ensure every conversation and legislation made about Arctic
transportation and security is guided by local leaders and made with
reference to addressing the climate change impacts already costing
billions of dollars in damages, devastating family livelihoods, and
inflicting irreplaceable cultural loss not only on the 4 million people
that call the Arctic home, but on communities across America. Because
what happens in the Arctic doesn't stay in the Arctic. It affects us
all.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Dr. Hermann, for your testimony.
Our final witness is Mr. Luke Coffey, who is the director
of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy at
the Heritage Foundation. Prior to joining the Heritage
Foundation, Mr. Coffey served in the United Kingdom's Ministry
of Defence as Special Advisor to then-Secretary of State for
Defense, where he worked on Arctic security issues. He served
as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army, and was awarded the
Bronze Star.
Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF LUKE COFFEY, DIRECTOR, DOUGLAS AND SARAH ALLISON
CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Coffey. Thank you for that introduction.
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and distinguished
Members of the committee, I am honored to speak before this
committee today about Arctic security issues.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my
prepared statement that has been submitted for the record.
Mr. Correa. Please.
Mr. Coffey. Increased economic activity in the Arctic due
to advancements in technology and reduced ice will likely lead
to a larger military presence. This isn't because there is a
heightened threat of conflict in the region, but many of the
capabilities needed in the Arctic, such as search and rescue,
are more immediately, and at least for now, more effectively
provided by the military and the Coast Guard.
Reduced ice in the summer months means new shipping lanes,
increased tourism, further natural resource exploration but
these changes, in my opinion, will take time and should be put
into perspective.
For example, the Northern Sea route that is often touted as
a future rival to the Suez Canal has interestingly last year
only 18 million tons of goods transited along that route. Of
this, only 491,000 tons made the full journey from Europe to
Asia. This is 4 hundredths of 1 percent of the volume of goods
that transited through the Suez Canal during the same year.
So far, the Trump administration has been a mixed bag when
it comes to Arctic policy. On a positive note, Secretary
Pompeo's visit to Iceland was the first Cabinet-level visit to
that country in more than a decade; and it ended the Obama's
administration diplomatic sanctions on that country over the
issue of whaling. Also, the administration recently announced
the opening of a part-time diplomatic presence in Greenland;
and this is something that Heritage Foundation has been calling
for.
However, there have been some shortcomings. The
unwillingness of the United States to agree to a joint
statement during the 2019 Arctic Council Ministerial over the
issue of climate change was unfortunate. Sometimes, America's
voice is missing in the debate. At last year's Arctic Circle
assembly in Iceland, U.S. Government officials could not be
seen. They certainly were not heard. Those of us that were
there knew that--know that China happily filled this void, and
I am grateful that this year, Secretary Perry will be giving
the keynote address at that event.
Mr. Chairman, today the United States has 4 primary
security interests in the Arctic: First, ensuring the
territorial defense of the United States. In this sense, our
relationship with Canada is vital, and relations with Iceland
and Greenland are also important because these two countries
are essentially the forward operating bases of the North
American continent.
Second, enforcing U.S. sovereignty in the region. In the
Arctic, sovereignty equals security and stability. This means
respecting the sovereignty of others while maintaining the
ability to enforce one's own sovereignty. This will reduce the
chances of armed conflict and ensure that tensions remain low
in the region.
Third, meeting our treaty obligations in the Arctic under--
through NATO. Five of the world's 8 Arctic countries belong to
NATO, but the alliance has no agreed policy on the region and
this needs to changes.
Finally, ensuring the free flow of shipping and other
economic activities in the region. After all, economic freedom
tends to lead to prosperity and security.
Mr. Chairman, while the military threat in the Arctic
remains low, U.S. policy makers cannot ignore Russia and
China's role there. Both directly impact America's ability to
meet its security interests in the region. Russia's recent
steps to militarize the region is a concern. Russia has
invested greatly in its Arctic footprint by building or
refurbishing dozens of bases. The Arctic-based Northern Fleet
accounts for two-thirds of the Russia navy. An Arctic command
was established in 2015 to coordinate all Russia military
activities in the region. Russia can do as it likes inside its
own borders; but it is Moscow's actions in places like Georgia,
Ukraine, and Syria that makes Russia's motives in the Arctic
questionable.
In the simplest terms, China sees its role in the Arctic as
a place where it can expand its economic influence and
diplomatic interests; but considering the problems China has
created in places like Djibouti or Sri Lanka, there are reasons
to be worried.
Beijing's Arctic strategy offers a useful glimpse in how it
wants the rest of the world to see the role of China in the
region. Running 5,500 words long in the English language
version, the strategy is littered with all the popular Arctic
buzz phrases, ``common interests of all country,'' ``law-based
governance,'' ``climate change,'' ``sustainable development.''
The irony is not lost on observers of the South China Sea where
China has shunned international norms to exert dubious claims
of sovereignty, or by the fact that China is the world's
largest emitter of greenhouse gases.
Even though China's closest point to the Arctic Circle is
more than 800 nautical miles away, as you can see on the
screen, Beijing refers to itself as a near-Arctic state which
is a term that is completely made up. Extending Beijing's logic
to other countries would mean that Kazakhstan, Belarus, Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
Ireland are also ``near-Arctic states,'' and these aren't
countries we normally associate with the Arctic.
In conclusion, I want to highlight some of the challenges
of operating militarily in the region. Equipment has to be
hardened for extreme cold weather, high-frequency radio signals
can be degraded due to magnetic and solar phenomena. GPS can be
degraded due to poor satellite geometry, and some of Alaska's
shipping lanes have not been surveyed properly since Captain
James Cook sailed through in 1778. This is why proper
investment in the region by the Coast Guard and the DOD is so
important. This is not about preparing for war. This is about
just preparing for the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the
committee. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coffey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Luke Coffey
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Lesko, and distinguished Members of
the committee. I am honored to speak before this esteemed committee
about Arctic security issues.
My name is Luke Coffey. I am the director of the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The
Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own,
and should not be construed as representing any official position of
The Heritage Foundation.
The Arctic region, commonly referred to as the High North, is
becoming more contested than ever before. The Arctic encompasses the
lands and territorial waters of 8 countries on 3 continents. Unlike the
Antarctic, the Arctic has no land mass covering its pole (the North
Pole), just ocean. The region is home to some of the roughest terrain
and harshest weather on the planet.
The region is also one of the least populated areas in the world,
with sparse nomadic communities and few large cities and towns. Regions
are often very remote and lack basic transport infrastructure. In
Greenland no two population centers are connected by a road. Norway's
Ny Alesund, located on the Svalbard archipelago, is the world's most
northerly permanently inhabited place with a population of only 35.
Although official population figures are non-existent, the Nordic
Council of Ministers estimates the figure is 4 million,\1\ making the
Arctic's population about the size of Los Angeles. Approximately half
of the Arctic population lives in Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nordic Council of Ministers, Arctic Social Indicators, January
27, 2011, p. 13, http://library.arcticportal.org/712/1/
Arctic_Social_Indicators_NCoM.pdf (accessed September 16, 2019).
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The region is rich in minerals, wildlife, fish, and other natural
resources. According to some estimates, up to 13 percent of the world's
undiscovered oil reserves and almost one-third of the world's
undiscovered natural gas reserves are located in the Arctic.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. Geological Survey, ``Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal:
Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,''
July 23, 2008, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/ (accessed September
16, 2019).
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The melting of some Arctic ice during the summer months creates
security challenges, but also new opportunities for economic
development. Reduced ice will mean new shipping lanes opening,
increased tourism, and further natural resource exploration. However,
it will also mean a larger military presence by more actors than ever
before. This increase in economic activity will mean a larger military
presence. This is not because there is a heightened threat of conflict
in the region--on the contrary things are relatively calm.
However, many capabilities needed in the Arctic, such as search and
rescue, are more immediately, and at least for now, more effectively,
provided by the military and coast guard.
u.s. arctic security interests
The United States became an Arctic power on October 18, 1867, at
the ceremony transferring Alaska from Russia to the United States. At
the time this purchase was ridiculed and was known as ``Seward's
Folly''--named after the then-Secretary of State William Seward.
However with a stroke of a pen, Seward ended Russian influence in North
America, gave the United States direct access to the northern Pacific
Ocean, and added territory nearly twice the size of Texas for about 2
cents an acre along with 33,000 miles of coastline. In his retirement
Seward was asked what his greatest achievement was. He said: ``The
purchase of Alaska. But it will take another generation to find it
out.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Frederick W. Seward, ``Seward's Folly: A Son's View,''
University of Rochester Library Bulletin, Spring 1967, https://
rbscp.lib.rochester.edu/487 (accessed September 16, 2019).
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So far the Trump administration has been a mixed bag when it comes
to U.S. Arctic policy. On the positive side, there have been practical
policy outcomes regarding the Arctic since 2017. The Trump
administration has ended diplomatic sanctions applied to Iceland by the
Obama administration over the issue of whaling.\4\ Secretary Pompeo's
visit to Iceland was the first Cabinet-level visit since 2008 and did a
lot to improve bilateral relations with an important Arctic and NATO
ally.\5\ Secretary Mike Pompeo and his predecessor Secretary Rex
Tillerson both attended the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting--
continuing a trend first started under the Obama administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Bryan Walsh, ``Obama Takes Steps to Stop Icelandic Whaling.
Could He Do More?'' Time, September 16, 2011, http://science.time.com/
2011/09/16/obama-takes-steps-to-stop-icelandic-whaling-could-he-do-
more/ (accessed September 16, 2019).
\5\ Lesley Wroughton, ``U.S. and Iceland Boost Trade Ties, Discuss
Arctic Security,'' Reuters, February 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-iceland-pompeo/us-and-iceland-boost-trade-ties-discuss-
arctic-security-idUSKCN1Q41RT (accessed September 16, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There has been a renewed focus on China's role in the Arctic and
Secretary Pompeo made this issue his focal point at the recent Arctic
Council Ministerial. There has also been increased funding for the U.S.
Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter program. After years of putting it
on the back burner, the Trump administration recently announced that
the United States will maintain a part-time diplomatic presence in
Greenland.
However, there have been some shortcomings. The unwillingness of
the United States to agree to a joint statement during the 2019 Arctic
Council Ministerial strained U.S. engagement in the region. The
position of Special Representative for the Arctic has been left
unfilled by the Trump administration leaving the United States as the
only Arctic power without a Special Representative or Arctic
Ambassador.
Sometimes America's voice is missing in the debate. At last year's
Arctic Circle Assembly in Iceland, U.S. Government officials could not
be seen. They definitely were not heard. Those who were there know that
China happily filled this void.
Today, the United States has 4 primary security interests in the
Arctic region:
(1) Ensuring the territorial defense of the United States.--This is
particularly true as it pertains to the growing ballistic missile
threat. In this regard our relationship with Canada is key. This is
also why it is important for the United States deepen its relations
with Iceland and Greenland--both serving essentially the forward
operating bases of the North American continent.
(2) Enforcing U.S. sovereignty in the region.--In the Arctic,
sovereignty equals security and stability. Respecting the national
sovereignty of others in the Arctic while maintaining the ability to
enforce one's own sovereignty will ensure that the chances of armed
conflict in the region remain low. This is why investment in the U.S.
Coast Guard is vital to America's Arctic security interest.
(3) Meeting treaty obligations in the Arctic region through the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).--Five of the world's 8
Arctic countries belong to NATO. Another 2, Finland and Sweden, have a
very close relationship with NATO. However, NATO has no agreed common
position or policy on its role in the Arctic region. This needs to
change.
(4) Ensuring the free flow of shipping and other economic
activities in the region.--Economic freedom leads to prosperity and
security. With melting ice creating new economic and shipping
opportunities in the region it is in America's interests that shipping
lanes remain open in line with international norms.
U.S. Strategic Challenges in the Arctic
While the military threat in the Arctic remains low, U.S. policy
makers cannot ignore Russia's recent activities to militarize the
Arctic region or China's increasing role in the region. Both directly
impact America's ability to meet the 4 aforementioned security
interests.
Russia's Militarization
Russia is motivated to play an active role in the Arctic region for
3 reasons:
(1) Low-risk promotion of Russian nationalism.--Because nationalism
is on the rise in Russia, Putin's Arctic strategy is popular among the
population. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Arctic is an area
that allows Russia to flex its muscles without incurring any
significant geopolitical risk.
(2) The economic potential of the region.--Russia is also eager to
promote its economic interests in the region. Half of the world's
Arctic territory and half of the Arctic region's population is located
in Russia. It is well-known that the Arctic is home to large stockpiles
of proven, yet unexploited, oil and gas reserves. The majority of these
reserves is thought to be located in Russia. In particular, Russia
hopes the Northern Sea Route (NSR) will become one of the world's most
important shipping lanes.
(3) Russia's security in the region.--Russia has invested heavily
in militarizing its Arctic region. While the Arctic region remains
peaceful, Russia's recent steps to militarize the region, coupled with
its bellicose behavior toward its neighbors, makes the Arctic a
security concern.
While the Arctic region remains peaceful, Russia's recent steps to
militarize the Arctic, coupled with its bellicose behavior toward its
neighbors, makes the Arctic a security concern. The Arctic-based
Northern Fleet accounts for two-thirds of the Russian Navy. An Arctic
command was established in 2015 to coordinate all Russian military
activities in the Arctic region. Two Arctic brigades have been formed,
and Russia is planning to form Arctic Coastal Defense divisions, which
will be under the command of the Northern Fleet and stationed on the
Kola Peninsula and in Russia's eastern Arctic.\6\ Russia's Northern
Fleet is building newly-refitted submarines and Russia announced in May
2017 that its buildup of the Northern Fleet's nuclear capacity is
intended ``to phase `NATO out of [the] Arctic.' ''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ MarEx, ``New Forces to Guard Northern Sea Route,'' The Maritime
Executive, January 20, 2017, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/
new-forces-to-guard-northern-sea-route (accessed September 16, 2019).
\7\ Daniel Brown, ``Russia's NATO Northern Fleet Beefs Up Its
Nuclear Capabilities to Phase `NATO Out of Arctic,' '' Business
Insider, June 1, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/russias-northern-
fleet-beefs-up-its-nuclear-capabilities-phase-nato-out-arctic-2017-96
(accessed July 14, 2017).
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Russia is developing equipment optimized for Arctic conditions like
the Mi-38 helicopter and 3 new nuclear icebreakers to add to the 40
icebreakers already in service (6 of which are nuclear).\8\ Air power
in the Arctic is increasingly important to Russia; in January, the
Northern Fleet announced it would ``significantly expand the geography
of the Arctic flights.''\9\ These flights are often aggressive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Osborn, ``Putin's Russia in Biggest Arctic Military Push Since
Soviet Fall.''
\9\ Atle Staalesen, ``Russian Navy Announces It Will Significantly
Expand Arctic Air Patrols,'' The Barents Observer, January 2, 2018,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/01/russian-navy-
announces-it-will-significantly-increase-arctic-air-
patrols#.Wkt86ZewoVM.twitter (accessed September 16, 2019).
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Twelve Russian aircraft simulated an attack against NATO naval
forces taking part in a May 2017 exercise, EASTLANT17, near Troms,
Norway, and later that month,\10\ Russian aircraft targeted aircraft
from 12 nations including the United States.\11\ that took part in the
Arctic Challenge 2017 exercise, near Bod.\12\ In April 2018, Maritime
Patrol Aircraft from Russia's Pacific Fleet for the first time
exercised locating and bombing enemy submarines in the Arctic, while
fighter jets exercised repelling an air invasion in the Arctic region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Ibid.
\11\ Thomas Nilsen, ``Arctic Challenge 2017 Set for Take Off,'' The
Barents Observer, Mary 16, 2017, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/
security/2017/05/arctic-challenge-2017-set-take (accessed September 16,
2019).
\12\ Nilsen, ``Russian Bombers Simulated an Attack Against this
Radar on Norway's Barents Sea Coast.''
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Over the past decade, Russian investment in Arctic bases has
resulted in 14 operational airfields in the Arctic along with 16 deep-
water ports.\13\ Russia reportedly has placed radar and S-300 missiles
on the Arctic bases at Franz Joseph Land, New Siberian Islands, Novaya
Zemlya, and Severnaya Zemlya.\14\ Last year, Russia activated a new
radar complex on Wrangel Island.\15\ Beginning in 2019-2025, Russia
plans to lay a nearly 8,000-mile fiber-optic cable across its Arctic
coast, linking military installations along the way from the Kola
Peninsula through Vladivostok.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Robbie Gramer, ``Here's What Russia's Military Build-Up in the
Arctic Looks Like,'' Foreign Policy, January 25, 2017, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-buildup-in-
the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map/
?utm_-
content=buffer12641&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaig
n=buffer (accessed June 2, 2017).
\14\ Trude Pettersen, ``Northern Fleet Gets Own Air Force, Air
Defense Forces,'' The Barents Observer, February 1, 2016, https://
thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/02/northern-fleet-gets-own-air-
force-air-defense-forces (accessed July 14, 2017).
\15\ Damien Sharkov, ``Russia Deploys Air Radar on Arctic Wrangel
Island,'' Newsweek, January 4, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/russia-
deploys-air-radar-arctic-wrangel-island-538527 (accessed September 16,
2019).
\16\ Thomas Nilsen, ``Russia Plans to Lay Trans-Arctic Fiber Cable
Linking Military Installations,'' The Barents Observer, April 24, 2018,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/04/russia-slated-lay-
military-trans-arctic-fibre-cable#.Wt-EVDOjlWI.twitter (accessed
September 16, 2019).
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As an Arctic power, Russia's military presence in the region is to
be expected. However, it should be viewed with some caution due to
Russia's pattern of aggression. Last year EUCOM Commander General
Scaparrotti testified saying, ``Although the chances of military
conflict in the Arctic are low in the near-term, Russia is increasing
its qualitative advantage in Arctic operations, and its military bases
will serve to reinforce Russia's position with the threat of
force.''\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ European Command, ``EUCOM Posture Statement 2018,'' March 8,
2018, http://www.eucom.mil/mission/eucom-posture-statement-2018
(accessed September 16, 2019).
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china's increasing role
With the focus on what China is doing in the South China Sea, its
massive infrastructure investments in Central Asia and Africa, and the
trade war with the United States, it is easy to overlook another aspect
of Beijing's foreign policy: The Arctic.
In the simplest terms, China sees the Arctic region as another
place in the world to advance its economic interests and expand its
diplomatic influence. As a non-Arctic country, China is mindful that
its Arctic ambitions in international Arctic institutions are naturally
limited--but this has not stopped Beijing from increasing its economic
presence in the region.
China's Arctic strategy published last year offers a useful glimpse
into how Beijing views its role in the region.\18\ Running 5,500 words
long in the English language version, the strategy is littered with all
the Arctic buzzwords like ``common interests of all countries,'' ``law-
based governance,'' ``climate change,'' and ``sustainable
development.'' The irony is not lost on observers of the South China
Sea where China has shunned international norms to exert dubious claims
of sovereignty, or the fact that China is the world's largest emitter
of greenhouse gases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic
of China, ``China's Arctic Policy,'' White Paper, January 26, 2018,
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/- 01/26/
content_281476026660336.htm (accessed on September 16, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though China's closest point to the Arctic Circle is more than
800 nautical miles away, Beijing refers to itself as a ``near-Arctic
state''\19\--a term made up by Beijing and not found in the lexicon of
Arctic discourse. In fact, extending Beijing's logic to other countries
would mean that Belarus, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom are also
``near-Arctic states.'' These are hardly the countries that one
imagines when thinking about the Arctic. As Secretary Pompeo has said:
``There are Arctic states, and non-Arctic states. No third category
exists. China claiming otherwise entitles them to exactly
nothing.''\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ Radio Canada International, ``US Stuns Audience by Tongue-
Lashing China, Russia on Eve of Arctic Council Ministerial,'' May 6,
2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2019/05/us-stuns-
audience-tongue-lashing-china-russia-eve-arctic-council-ministerial
(accessed September 16, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But even with its self-professed and exaggerated role in the
Arctic, China does have legitimate interests in the region. After all,
China is a global trading nation. It is the world's second-largest
economy. It holds a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.
Thankfully, so far China's motivation in the Arctic seems to be
more about economics and less about security. But considering the
economic mess and massive debt China has left in places like Sri Lanka
and Djibouti, it is only normal to question China's motivations in the
Arctic.
So far the Trump administration has used every available
opportunity on the international stage to raise awareness of Chinese
ambition in the Arctic. During a recent trip to Iceland Vice President
Mike Pence made Chinese economic activity in the Arctic one of the
focal points of his visit.\21\ During the 2019 Arctic Council
Ministerial meeting, Secretary Pompeo devoted a sizable amount of his
speech highlighting the threat China posed to U.S. interests in the
region, saying, ``The United States and Arctic nations welcome
transparent Chinese investment that reflect economic interests, not
National security ambitions.''\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ ``Pence, in Visit to Iceland, to Discuss `Incursions' into
Arctic Circle by China, Russia: Official,'' Reuters, August 28, 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pence/pence-in-visit-to-iceland-
to-discuss-incursions-into-arctic-circle-by-china-russia-official-
idUSKCN1VI1QW (accessed September 16, 2019).
\22\ Simon Johnson, ``Pompeo: Russia Is `aggressive' in Arctic,
China's Work There also Needs Watching,'' Reuters, May 6, 2019, https:/
/www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-arctic-council/pompeo-russia-is-
aggressive-in-arctic-chinas-work-there-also-needs-watching-
idUSKCN1SC1AY (accessed September 16, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the most part China wants to increase access and influence in
the Arctic region for economic reasons and it is through this lens that
U.S. policy makers should approach Chinese activity in the Arctic
region.
conclusion
America's interests in the Arctic region will only increase in the
years to come. As other nations devote resources and assets in the
region to secure their national interests, America cannot afford to
fall behind. The United States needs to champion an agenda that
advances the U.S. National interest and devotes the required National
resources to the region. With the Arctic becoming increasingly
important for economic and geopolitical reasons, now is not the time
for the United States to turn away from its own backyard.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Coffey. I want to thank all the
witnesses for their testimony. Without objection, the witnesses
full statements will be inserted into the record. I remind each
Member that he or she will have 5 minutes of questions for the
panel, and I would now like to recognize myself for 5 minutes
of questions. Your testimony, all of you, covered a great deal
in terms of the challenges to our country and to our government
and to the Arctic and I would ask what do you see as the single
biggest challenge facing the United States and the Coast Guard
in the Arctic? Each one of you could answer that question.
Mr. Sfraga. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I will start because I
know my colleagues will have many other items, but to me, it is
this idea of domain awareness. If we don't have basic charting
as was pointed out, if we don't know the domain in which we are
to operate, we simply can't do it efficiently. You can't build
a port; you can't ship oil and gas; you can't develop an
Arctic; you can't protect communities; you can't forecast what
coastlines would look like unless we have fully charted the
U.S. oceans, including the Arctic around our region, especially
in Alaska. As was noted, those are lacking considerably.
So, I think that was one significant area of good
hydrological surveys of our territory, because even if you have
Coast Guard cutters and you want to put in ports, you still
won't know what terrain you are dealing with unless you have
basic data, so I would support the research related to
hydrological charting and surveying.
Mr. Correa. Yes?
Ms. Tingstad. I don't disagree with that at all, but I
would characterize the problem, maybe according to a slightly
larger scope, which is this issue of a potential security void
perceived or real coming about, because if the United States is
not able to provide the prevention and response capabilities
required in the Arctic as they are elsewhere across the United
States. I think that domain awareness is certainly a big part
of that. So, too, are communications and response capabilities
to include the ice breakers, but I want to highlight that our
research did find that it really takes a portfolio of
capabilities.
So, although ice breakers are important, for example, and
so, too, is charting, there are a suite of capabilities that
the Coast Guard, for example, will need to operate effectively
in the region. Thank you.
Mr. Correa. Dr. Herrmann.
Ms. Herrmann. I would add robust partnerships. As you,
Chairman Correa, said in your opening remarks, the U.S. Coast
Guard is forced to do more with less, and some of that could be
augmented by providing more partnerships, partnerships with
scientific institutions to increase our charting, partnerships
with those first responders in Alaskan native communities all
along the coastlines, more partnerships in the international
arena, as Mr. Coffey noted, about a lack of engagement----
Mr. Correa. So let me interrupt you. Statements were made
that we have traditionally had good relations, cooperation with
the Russians, two places, in space and at the Arctic. So do we
concur that given that cooperation can become competition that
can become friction, because now you are just not talking about
a frozen iceland, you are talking about major resources. Do we
see ourselves going in that direction?
Ms. Herrmann. I think we could if we don't provide robust
partnerships. We have, since the fall of the Iron Curtain,
since the fall of the Cold War, seen the Arctic as a peaceful
region, and we have tried very hard through the Arctic Council
to ensure that that has still been the case. However, when we
don't invest in our allies through those partnerships in
Scandinavia, if we don't invest in those partnerships with
Canada----
Mr. Correa. Running out of time. Let me have Mr. Coffey say
a few words. Thank you very much, Dr. Herrmann.
Mr. Coffey. I agree with the issue about situational
awareness, so I can't--I have nothing to add in terms of what
was already said, but I will say one thing about our lack of
awareness of the fact that we are an Arctic country. Outside
committee rooms like this or certain offices and certain think
tanks around town, there seems to be this inability to grasp
the idea that we are an Arctic country being so far away from
it where we are.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much. I am going to now
recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentle
person from Arizona, Mrs. Lesko, for 5 minutes of questions.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question will
be for Mr. Sfraga, is that how you say your name? By the way, I
read your testimonies, all of yours, and very interesting. Good
job. Can you describe China's Polar Silk Road Initiative and
its significance to the changing dynamic in the Arctic?
Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Ranking Member. China plays the game
of Go, big, long strategic vision. Their Polar Silk Road, their
shipping lanes, they see the Arctic like they see Africa. This
is a region that they would like to have a lot of influence in.
There is oil and gas; there is other critical minerals; there
is rare earth minerals; and so, there are a number of ways to
influence a region--militarily, economically. Economically is
where they are going with an over $20 billion investment in the
Yamal Peninsula, that is a way to influence the region.
So China, in my perspective, is influencing the region and
the Polar Silk Road as a resource area for them. It diversifies
their energy portfolio. It allows them to influence the dialog
and what is happening in a region, even though they claim to be
a near-Arctic nation. So this is long-term. They also are an
observer to the Arctic Council, which means they get to speak
at the Arctic Council when allowed to, to influence where they
can, the dialog. Not all of it is nefarious, but nevertheless,
this is long-term.
So we might think in election cycles or in weeks or months
or years, the Chinese think in decades. And so if a new ocean
is opening, they are going to try every way they can to
influence what is happening there governance-wise, and also
economically.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you. My next question is for Mr. Coffey.
Can you explain the significance of Russia's claim that the
Northern Sea Route is an internal Russian waterway? How does
that impact Freedom of Navigation concerns?
Mr. Coffey. Russia's claim that the Northern Sea Route is
part of its internal waterways is a very dubious claim that is
based on very loose interpretation of Article 234 of UNCLOS,
which says they can put certain restrictions on the navigation
and transit in its EEZ, due to environmental concerns and other
issues. Russia's claim is not within the norms of international
law. As far as I know the only U.S. ally that has challenged
this in terms of a Freedom of Navigation operation is France.
It did so recently in a transit to the Northern Sea Route, a
French supply ship, French naval supply ship, and I think
actually under certain circumstances when the time is right,
the United States should also show that it does not recognize
Russia's claim that this is an internal waterway and conduct
Freedom of Navigation operations in the region.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you. Interesting. Dr. Herrmann, do you
believe the United States needs to develop strategic ports in
the Arctic?
Ms. Herrmann. I think that at present the port
infrastructure and wider infrastructure in port cities isn't
built to reap the economic benefits of increased tourism in a
sustainable way. We have not invested in that environmental
sustainability both through regulation to ensure that we are
not polluting those critical fisheries to our food security and
to Alaska fishermen, but we are also not investing in that
infrastructure to ensure that when tourists come that Alaska
native craftswomen and -men are able to gain those economic
benefits, so increased investment in port cities all across the
Arctic, particularly, Nome, but I think that that is a key
thing that we need to do in the next 5 years.
Mrs. Lesko. So Dr. Herrmann, just so I understand, are you
saying that you are supporting it in the future, but not right
now because we haven't built the infrastructure yet?
Ms. Herrmann. We have not built the infrastructure yet. I
think that we need to, as I said in my statement, listen, and
learn from those who live in these port cities and be guided by
those voices, so I think that, you know, investing in those
assets before making the large-scale investment in a port,
making sure that those cities are well-supported and are being
led by local voices is the first step before any other major
infrastructure investment is taken.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you.
I am almost out of time, so I will yield back my time.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mrs. Lesko. Now I would like to
recognize Mrs. Demings for questions.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
our witnesses for being here. Unfortunately, our time is
limited. They have called votes, but I would like to ask this
question and whichever one of you feel best prepared, please
answer. How would you describe the geopolitical tensions that
currently are developing within the region, and what efforts do
you believe U.S. allies are engaged in to really foster
international cooperation?
Mr. Coffey. Perhaps I could have the first stab at that. As
I said, I believe that the level of geopolitical tension in the
region is low, especially in a security or military sense, but
as we have seen with Russia's actions in other places of the
world--Georgia, Ukraine, Syria--things could quickly change and
they seem to have the political will and a willingness to use
military force to advance national interests and I don't think
cold weather is going to stop them. So I think we have to plan
accordingly assuming that, you know, Russia could act in a
belligerent way in the region, especially considering that 5 of
the Arctic countries, as I said, are in NATO, and the United
States is obligated to defend Oslo, Norway, in the same way we
are obligated to defend Orlando, Florida, so that needs to be
factored into our way of thinking, I believe.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you. Doctor.
Ms. Tingstad. Thanks for that question. So in our work on
Arctic cooperation, we noted a long history of doing exactly
that in the region, and there are many structures and
frameworks in place to enable that. So, I don't want to
overlook that in this discussion. But as has already been
noted, our work also found that there were very few types of
flashpoints, or tensions, that could arise in the near-term
future at least in the Arctic because the stakeholders involved
benefit from this cooperation economically and in other ways as
well; but that said, I do think that one of the items that I
mentioned in my testimony is this idea of a security void and
nations being able to conduct their roles and responsibilities
in the region as they would elsewhere in their territories, and
I do think that that is something the United States needs to
pay attention to moving forward in the region. Thank you.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much. Regretfully, I am going to
have to yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Correa. I would now call Mr. Katko from New York.
Mr. Katko. Well, I don't regret that you finished early
because now I can ask questions and then go vote. So thank you
for accommodating that and thank you for having this hearing,
because it is a really important issue. One thing I love about
Homeland Security, we are generally on the same page all the
time, Democrats and Republicans, and this is another example of
that. So, I am just curious as we are having this whole
discussion here, I want to take a step back because everything
I have heard from everybody else I agree with, and we need to
increase funding the Coast Guard and get a presence up there
that is better and more sustained, but how did this happen?
Can anybody venture an opinion as to how we let our guard
down to this extent and allowed Russia to have so much more
influence in that area? Why would we do that especially with
our involvement with NATO and those countries? Anybody want to
hazard an opinion on that? Mr. Coffey, you want to start?
Mr. Coffey. Sure. Well, I think it goes back to the point I
made about the lack of awareness of our role status as an
Arctic power in terms of the policy community and DOD and
Department of Homeland Security, but also, the inability to
have a serious debate about this issue and our No. 1 security
alliance, NATO, and this is because of an internal division
between Norway and Canada over what role NATO should have in
the region. To give you just one example, the NATO strategic
concepts, its most recent one, which highlights all the future
challenges to the alliance doesn't even mention the word
``Arctic'' once. Literally it is not found. So that also feeds
into our policy making as well, so perhaps we are a little bit
behind the curve because of our--it is our own fault.
Mr. Katko. Doctor.
Ms. Herrmann. I would agree with that. The United States is
often called the reluctant Arctic nation, right? We are not at
the table as often because we don't view ourselves as an Arctic
nation. When you go to Moscow, when you speak with our Russian
colleagues, right, they know that they are an Arctic nation.
Our U.S. special representative to the Arctic, Admiral Pap,
that has been an empty office for the past 2 years now. We do
not promote ourselves as an Arctic nation. We are thousands of
miles away from Alaska and those voices just aren't heard in
these halls. So in order to ensure that those conversations are
happening at NATO, I think we first have to fully acknowledge
and come to the table as an Arctic nation.
Mr. Katko. I know we are talking about the Coast Guard and
the Coast Guard's presence and needs, but it is also a
Department of Defense issue as well obviously. I just--I am
just dumbfounded as to why we would let this happen, but
anybody else want to add anything to that? Doc?
Mr. Sfraga. I would add just a few things. As an Alaskan, I
have an interesting perspective, perhaps, in that the F-35s
will be vetted down in Eielson Air Force Base here in just a
little bit, and missile defense is almost exactly 100 miles
from my driveway, so we are hypersensitive about what happens
across the Bering Strait, what happens in the Indo-Pacific
region.
I think we have let our guard down as a country for a
number of reasons: One, if you go back in history, you look at
World War II, it was reactionary. Alaska was at the sphere of a
lot that happened in World War II, so we built an Alcan. We put
in more forces there. Then the Cold War happened.
During the Cold War, the United States and Russia played a
great game under the ice, and above the air. Still today, we
have Russian bombers that have come across and they are
escorted from international waters. But at the end of the Cold
War, there was a reset where we could sort-of let our guard
down and think about things. Then, of course, as a Nation, we
were looking elsewhere after 9/11. This now climate change
serves the fourth pillar of this where we are seeing this ocean
open before us----
Mr. Correa. I am going to interrupt you. We are running out
of time and I just want to thank the witnesses today for your
comments. We are going to continue to address these issues, and
I want to thank the Members of the committee also for the
questions and you can add additional questions for the
witnesses in writing and we would ask you to respond to them as
well.
Without objection, the committee record shall be kept open
for 10 days. Seeing no further business, the committee stands
adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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