[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-49]
F-35 PROGRAM UPDATE:
SUSTAINMENT, PRODUCTION, AND AFFORDABILITY CHALLENGES
__________
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
meeting jointly with
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 13, 2019
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-806 WASHINGTON : 2020
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
JOHN GARAMENDI, California, Chairman
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
ANDY KIM, New Jersey, Vice Chair AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma JOE WILSON, South Carolina
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania ROB BISHOP, Utah
JASON CROW, Colorado MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico MO BROOKS, Alabama
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
Melanie Harris, Professional Staff Member
John Muller, Professional Staff Member
Megan Handal, Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut PAUL COOK, California
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona MATT GAETZ, Florida
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California DON BACON, Nebraska
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland JIM BANKS, Indiana
FILEMON VELA, Texas PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico, MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
Vice Chair DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
(Vacancy)
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Jesse Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 5
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Norcross, Hon. Donald, a Representative from New Jersey,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 4
WITNESSES
Behler, Hon. Robert F., Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense................. 11
Bromberg, Matthew F., President, Military Engines, Pratt &
Whitney........................................................ 36
Fick, Lt Gen Eric T., USAF, Program Executive Officer, F-35
Lightning II Joint Program Office.............................. 10
Lord, Hon. Ellen M., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Sustainment, Office of the Secretary of Defense............ 8
Maurer, Diana, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 6
Ulmer, Gregory M., Vice President and General Manager, F-35
Program, Lockheed Martin Corporation........................... 35
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Behler, Hon. Robert F........................................ 115
Bromberg, Matthew F.......................................... 142
Fick, Lt Gen Eric T.......................................... 100
Garamendi, Hon. John......................................... 57
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky......................................... 63
Lamborn, Hon. Doug........................................... 59
Lord, Hon. Ellen M........................................... 88
Maurer, Diana................................................ 65
Norcross, Hon. Donald........................................ 61
Ulmer, Gregory M............................................. 124
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 176
Mr. Banks.................................................... 174
Mr. Brown.................................................... 168
Mr. Langevin................................................. 161
Mr. Turner................................................... 164
F-35 PROGRAM UPDATE: SUSTAINMENT, PRODUCTION, AND AFFORDABILITY
CHALLENGES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness, Meeting Jointly with the
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 13, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Garamendi
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness) presiding.
Mr. Garamendi. The hearing will come to order, and we will
begin with opening statements. The normal process here is for--
I will open and then I am going to turn to Mr. Lamborn, and
then Mr. Norcross, and then Mrs. Hartzler.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Garamendi. Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to
this hearing, especially to my colleagues, who are Ron and
Vicky and Doug, when he shows up----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. To this hearing--joint hearing
of the Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land Forces
Subcommittee concerning the F-35 program.
The hearing comes at a very critical time for the F-35
program. After nearly two decades of development, the aircraft
has entered into its operational testing period and is actively
deployed around the globe, and has seen its first combat
missions.
Acquisition continues apace. We have delivered over 450 F-
35s to the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and key international
partners. By 2023, the fleet is expected to include more than
1,100 aircraft stationed at 43 operational sites.
As the Department of Defense's costliest weapon system, it
goes without saying that the F-35 has been the subject of much
concern, criticism, and occasional optimism.
With acquisition costs expected to exceed $406 billion and
sustainment costs estimated at more than a trillion over its
60-year life cycle, this scrutiny is warranted.
In fact, sustainment activities will ultimately contribute
to 70 percent of the program's total costs.
So, today's discussion, the first F-35 hearing led by the
Readiness Subcommittee, will rightfully focus on sustainment
issues.
The F-35 sustainment enterprise faces formidable
challenges. These include unacceptable high operating and
support costs; inadequate repair capacity at depots; spare
parts shortages compounded by insufficient reliability of
parts, components; and deficiencies in the platform's ALIS
[Autonomic Logistics Information System] system.
As a result of these problems, only about half of the F-35
fleet was available to fly at any given time in 2017 and 2018.
The program has had a complex relationship with its prime
contractors, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, who bear the
responsibility for some of the program's sustainment challenges
and problems, and from whom we will hear in the second panel.
While the Department paid insufficient attention to
sustainment in the program's early years--that bears repeating
but I won't at the moment--we have seen an increased focus on
the problems of sustainments resulting in measurable progress,
and we acknowledge that progress.
Costs per flying hour are decreasing and the aircraft's
mission capability rates, while still too low, did increase
this year, partially as a result of the spotlight placed on
improving mission capability by former Secretary of Defense
Mattis.
Yet, attention to these problems must outlast any
particular leader or directive. As we look ahead to the next
few decades of the F-35 service, failing to create an effective
cost-efficient sustainment system will diminish readiness,
squander taxpayer resources, and discourage the services and
our partners from continuing to purchase the F-35.
This would create unacceptable risks for the program and
would be an abdication of the trust and investment of the
public and our allies.
The capabilities the F-35 brings to the battlefield are
essential to the objectives of our new National Defense
Strategy and to those of our international partners.
I am not interested in dwelling on the mistakes of the
past, but I do think we all agree that the stakes are too high
for us to allow this program to fail and we all--the Congress,
the Senate, the Department of Defense, and the contractors--we
all must take a constructive and collaborative approach toward
solving the F-35 sustainment challenges, and I look forward to
discussing how we can do that in today's hearing.
Now, with the arrival of my colleague and ranking member of
the subcommittee, and by the rules of this committee, I turn to
Mr. Lamborn.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garamendi can be found in
the Appendix on page 57.]
STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Lamborn. Well, thank you, Chair--Chairman Garamendi. I
truly appreciate the opportunity to conduct this joint hearing
with our colleagues on the Tactical Air and Land Forces
Subcommittee, which I am also on. So, I guess I will wear two
hats, along with Vicky Hartzler and others.
The F-35 program is an example of a program that seems to
be like it was designed so that it is too big to fail. From the
program's inception, the Pentagon has struggled to resolve
conflicts between the services regarding the Joint Strike
Fighter's requirements, failed to protect the government's
ownership of an intellectual property that was funded by
taxpayer dollars, and failed to manage cost growth.
Lockheed Martin has delivered over 458 aircraft to our
military and to international partners participating in the
program. We now enter the period where sustainment and
readiness of the F-35 fleet are critical to our national
security.
One of the biggest concerns I have is whether the
government has full access to the intellectual property
required to sustain the F-35.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses in both panels
about how we are addressing that issue. We are at risk of
allowing one company to be in a monopolistic position to the
government, which would enable it to charge a premium for
sustainment contracts.
My next concern is that we must build capacity within the
depots and maintenance systems of our Armed Forces. Failing to
do so will guarantee future sustainment challenges.
When you talk to the pilots and maintainers in the field,
they have serious questions about the Autonomous Logistics
Information System, known as ALIS, that supports mission
planning, supply chain management, and maintenance.
Operators are spending countless hours inputting data that
is supposed to be automated. From my perspective, it appears
that the software architecture is outdated, and I look forward
to discussing the way ahead.
Within the data management part of the program, I am also
deeply concerned about simulator support for the force. My
understanding is that there are significant issues in replacing
the servers that support these systems, which significantly
reduces the ability of our pilots to train.
Finally, supply chain management for F-35 is still a work
in progress and has a long way to go. The prime contractor is
responsible for maintaining--excuse me, managing replacement
parts packages and government personnel onsite have limited to
no visibility into the actual parts on hand.
We are receiving consistent feedback from the field that
these packages are not configured for the correct version of
the aircraft that they were supposed to be supporting.
Because the contractor is managing the supply chain instead
of the military managing the supply chain, the program is
incurring unnecessary costs to move parts between countries and
to support our partner nations.
So, I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and
for their testimony, and I know you are working hard to address
these shortcomings. The foundation of these problems were laid
decades ago, in some cases.
But we have to pick up the pace on sustainment as we get
closer to full-rate production. At $406 billion for acquisition
and more than $1 trillion estimated for sustainment, we cannot
afford any further mismanagement of this program.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lamborn can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
I now turn to my colleague, chairman of the Tactical Air
and Land Forces Subcommittee, Don Norcross.
Your opening remarks, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD NORCROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank my good friends from California, Colorado,
and Missouri for agreeing to this joint hearing with the
Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces.
I welcome, too, the distinguished panels of witnesses for
taking the time to come before us. To meet our constitutional
oversight responsibilities, we must hear from the Department
program leaders as well as those independent agencies that help
us evaluate program progress or shortfalls.
We should also take the opportunity to get on the record
the testimony from our two prime contractors responsible for
production and sustainment of this critical capability for the
warfighter and for the American taxpayer, who is funding the
program.
I agree with everything that has been said so far and note
that the F-35 program is trying to recover from risky
acquisition decisions made by past program leaders--previous
decisions that resulted in unforeseen increases in funding for
development [and] production to address the failing assumptions
made for the high concurrency designed into this program.
That bill for the past ``acceptable'' concurrency risk is
now due and has resulted in the significant fiscal challenges
facing us today. Block 3F configured aircraft delivered today
are only somewhat combat mission capable.
There are still material deficiencies that negatively
impact the low-observability characteristics of this aircraft,
and that is only a fifth-generation aircraft that can provide.
And yet, as the system development and design phase of the
program has officially ended, we now embark on the next upgrade
known as Block 4, which is estimated to cost an additional $20
billion in development and retrofit costs for both today's
fielded aircraft and future production aircraft to achieve full
combat capability.
Today, we want to understand what fixes you are making to
the struggling ALIS system, which we have heard from two of our
colleagues so far.
Where are we finding the qualifying alternate sources of
supply resulting from Turkey's suspension from the program? And
what strategy and execution plan to establish greater capacity,
effectiveness, and insight with the prime contractor
deficiencies with supply chain parts management and the
concurring--that are currently plaguing the efficiency of the
production line?
Finally, I would like to learn from the Department what
they are doing to establish common cost categories and metrics,
and evaluating the true ownership cost of the aircraft, whether
defined in terms of cost per flight hour or cost per tail year.
I believe it is imperative for leaders to establish a
Department-wide policy for guidance when we are comparing
costs--apples-to-apples input between some of the legacy
programs and the future generation aircraft.
The Tactical Air and Land Subcommittee will continue to
support the program, but we don't have unlimited resources,
which seem to continually need this elusive term
``affordability.''
With that, I again look forward to the hearing and yield
back to my chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Norcross can be found in the
Appendix on page 61.]
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Norcross.
Mrs. Hartzler.
STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
As the chairman mentioned, this hearing continues the
committee's ongoing oversight and continuing review of the F-35
program.
As members of this committee, we understand and recognize
the importance of fifth-generation capability as well as the
need to grow additional fifth-generation capacity in order to
meet the objectives of the National Defense Strategy and
maintain a credible deterrence posture.
I was pleased to see the latest F-35 production contract
award, the largest in the history of the Department of Defense,
has resulted in significant lower unit recurring flyaway costs
for the F-35 from $89.3 million per F-35A aircraft of the
previous contract to $77.9 million for this contract award,
representing a 12.8 percent decrease.
According to the Joint Program Office, this $34 billion
agreement will see the delivery of 478 F-35 aircraft, which
will almost double the size of the current F-35 fleet by 2022.
However, given the size, the scope, and complexity of the
program [and] that the fleet size will nearly double over the
next 2 years, this hearing provides a timely opportunity to
update our members on the challenges currently facing the
program going forward, to include what actions are being taken
now to ensure long-term affordability and drive down
sustainment costs.
I want to briefly run through a few issues that I expect
the witnesses to cover today. Regarding Turkey's recent
suspension and ultimate removal from the program, I join
Chairman Norcross in an interest in receiving an update on the
current posture of the F-35 industrial base to include
qualifying and ramping up alternative sources for the parts
that were being produced in Turkey.
I also expect the witnesses to update us on the acquisition
plan, cost estimates, and a test strategy for the Block 4
modernization program.
I understand next year's budget request will be the first
production year for Block 4 aircraft and I would like to know
whether you are experiencing any challenges with the overall
Block 4 development schedule and will these new aircraft result
in higher unit costs.
We were recently notified that the full-rate production
decision has been delayed by over a year and I am interested in
hearing what programmatic impacts this delay would have, if
any, on the program's current acquisition strategy.
Today's hearing is also a good time to update us on some of
the outcomes from the initial operational testing [and]
evaluation that is ongoing, specifically the challenges
associated with developing the joint simulated environment
capability which is needed to realistically test fifth-
generation capability.
And, finally, I would appreciate the witnesses to the
degree they can in an open hearing address how they are
approaching cybersecurity concerns and testing, specifically as
it relates to ALIS, which has been mentioned--the [Autonomic]
Logistics Information System--and the overall integrity of the
supply chain.
So, I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today.
I look forward to an open and candid discussion and, with that,
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in
the Appendix on page 63.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mrs. Hartzler.
I would now like to welcome to the hearing our witnesses on
the first panel: Honorable Ellen Lord, Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; Lieutenant General
Eric Fick, Program Executive Officer for the F-35 Joint Program
Office; Robert Behler, Director of Operational Testing and
Evaluation at the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Ms.
Diana Maurer, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management
at the Government Accountability Office [GAO].
I am going to start with the Government Accountability and
let us get an outline of what has happened. I know that the GAO
has been on this issue for a long, long time--multiple reports
over the last several years.
So, Ms. Maurer, if you would care to start us off. All that
is good and not so good.
STATEMENT OF DIANA MAURER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND
MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Maurer. We will give you the full picture.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Pull that microphone up close and
be personal with it.
Ms. Maurer. All right. Sure.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Maurer. I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's
findings and recommendations on F-35 sustainment.
U.S. air power depends on the F-35, and when we talk to
pilots and mechanics in the field, we hear good things that
they have to say about the amazing capabilities of the
aircraft.
But the success of the F-35 ultimately depends on
sustainment and for too many years sustainment has taken a back
seat. While in recent years this has changed for the better,
DOD [Department of Defense] has increased its attention and
commitment to sustainment challenges.
Let there be no doubt, the program is trying to dig itself
out of a big hole. Many important plans, agreements, and
details on how to supply and maintain the F-35 were not worked
out before the Marines, Air Force, Navy, and international
partners began using the aircraft.
As a result, we have a very capable, very expensive system
that is not flying nearly as often as planned. During the last
fiscal year, F-35s were on average able to perform one of their
many potential missions less than two-thirds of the time and
all missions only about one-third of the time.
These figures are far from the goals set by the Secretary
of Defense and the services. Our work has identified several
reasons for these outcomes.
First, there are not enough spare parts to go around. As we
reported earlier this year, F-35s cannot fly about 30 percent
of the time due to supply issues.
In addition, parts are breaking more often than expected,
it is taking twice as long as planned to fix them, and the
necessary depot repair capabilities won't be completed until
2024.
And then there is ALIS, the information system vital to the
F-35's maintenance, logistics, and mission execution. If ALIS
doesn't work, the F-35 doesn't work, and ALIS has been
struggling for years.
In addition, DOD's options for improving sustainment are
constrained by the overall structure of the program. For
example, contractors largely own the technical data, provide
the spare parts, and manage the global logistics system.
Now, to help with these challenges, my statement today
discusses 21 recommendations we have made over the past few
years and DOD by and large agrees and has started taking action
to address most of them, and that is very encouraging.
However, improving sustainment will not be quick and it
will not be easy. It will require action by DOD, action by the
contractors, continued robust congressional oversight, and full
implementation of GAO's recommendations.
Continued focus and action on sustainment is necessary to
ensure the F-35 is able to meet our national security goals for
many decades to come.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this
morning and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Maurer can be found in the
Appendix on page 65.]
Mr. Garamendi. I want to thank you and your colleagues at
the GAO for its work--your work--over almost two decades now on
this program. We would do very well in our role of oversight to
pay attention to the 21 recommendations that you have made.
And I will now ask Ms. Lord for her review of those 21
recommendations.
Ms. Lord.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN M. LORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Lord. Good morning.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Lord. Chairman Garamendi, Ranking Member Lamborn,
and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee,
Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, and distinguished
members of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify.
I am pleased to join Robert Behler, Lieutenant General Eric
Fick, Diana Maurer to discuss our continued efforts to develop,
build, and sustain an affordable and ready F-35 air system.
With more than 458 fielded aircraft operating from within
the U.S. and abroad, our warfighters are beginning to
experience the true game-changing capabilities the F-35 brings
to bear as well as identifying challenges that need to be
addressed.
As Under Secretary, I have maintained a laser focus on
driving down costs, improving quality, and increasing fleet
readiness. The Department is actively transforming the F-35
program to deliver the efficiencies, agility, and readiness
outcomes we need in a time of strategic competition.
I would like to briefly walk through how the F-35
enterprise is working to dramatically improve F-35 sustainment
outcomes by focusing on a subset of our actions to achieve the
Department's goals of improving aircraft availability and
reducing sustainment costs.
I have submitted a more in-depth statement for the record.
As the F-35 fleet continues to grow and the air system's
capabilities are enhanced, it is crucial that we stay focused
on improving fleet readiness to ensure the F-35's critical
capabilities are available to the warfighter.
I would like to thank Congress for their support in helping
us maintain a balanced investment approach. With your help, the
program continues to make steady progress in enhancing fleet
readiness, but much work remains.
My team has identified several success elements that we
have documented in a comprehensive life cycle sustainment
plan--we call it LCSP--that are required to drive fleet
readiness improvements.
For example, we are focussed on a number of efforts to
accelerate supply chain improvements, to increase supplier
capacity, decrease lead times for spares, and optimize spares
available on the shelf.
The Department is also accelerating depot component repair
activations by 6 years to meet fleet component repair demands.
Additionally, we are working to improve ALIS field-level
functionality and responsiveness.
ALIS is a key enabler to the platform's operational
availability and, sadly, as presently constituted, ALIS is not
delivering the capabilities the warfighter needs.
The Department is progressing towards a future ALIS
developed and sustained utilizing agile software development
techniques designed to rapidly deliver flexible applications on
a modern, secure architecture.
I see a number of our industry partners demonstrating a
high degree of confidence in developing the kinds of open
architectures needed to support the warfighter.
The problems with ALIS are ones we can and must solve. The
F-35 enterprise recognizes that the U.S. services, the F-35 JPO
[Joint Program Office], and industry must collaborate to reduce
sustainment costs.
I am personally overseeing an effort to understand the
barriers preventing more rapid improvement to both readiness
and affordability.
The intent is for the F-35 program to uncover performance
drivers and apply commercial best practices where appropriate
to targeted interventions.
The Department is using these insights to support
accelerated implementation of key success elements in our LCSP.
Specifically, we have identified that driving down support
costs, both in terms of labor cost and labor demand, is the key
lever in reducing overall F-35 sustainment costs because
sustainment support accounts for over a third of all
sustainment costs.
Additionally, as we learn more about the readiness barriers
and the cost drivers, we are using this knowledge to help
inform our analysis of Lockheed's 5-year fixed-price
performance-based logistics, or PBL, proposal.
We are in the early stages of working in conjunction with
our industry partners to analytically understand if, when, and
to what scope an F-35 PBL contract could be awarded.
Our goal is to ensure that any such contract meets the
readiness and affordability goals important to the F-35
warfighter and in the best interest of the American taxpayer.
In conclusion, the Department continues to demonstrate our
commitment to provide an affordable, lethal, supportable, and
survivable F-35 air system.
While the Department is grateful to Congress for passing a
2-year budget agreement that provides budgetary certainty the
Department needs to implement the National Defense Strategy, I
want to reiterate how regrettable it is that we are, again,
under a continuing resolution. CRs cause great damage to
military readiness and disrupt our ability to modernize our
forces.
I strongly urge Congress to pass a defense appropriation
and authorization bill now so what we can move forward with the
many important programs needed to ensure our readiness and
deter our adversaries.
I want to thank both subcommittees for your longstanding
bipartisan support and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lord can be found in
the Appendix on page 88.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Ms. Lord.
Yes, we are going to go at those issues that you raised.
That is the subject of the hearing. We will get at it.
Lieutenant General Fick.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN ERIC T. FICK, USAF, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, F-35 LIGHTNING II JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE
General Fick. Chairman Garamendi, Chairman Norcross,
Ranking Members Lamborn and Hartzler, and distinguished members
of the Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces
Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to join Under
Secretary Lord, Director Behler, and Director Maurer to discuss
our continued and collective efforts to develop, deliver, and
sustain the F-35 air system with the capabilities our
warfighters demand at a price our taxpayers can afford.
Since becoming the F-35 PEO [Program Executive Officer]
this past summer, I have been both impressed by and proud of
the progress that my joint and international team has made,
together with our industry partners, in modernizing and
sustaining the air system now deployed in combat operations
around the world.
Ranking Member Hartzler noted our recent production
contract award, but production success, of course, is nothing
if not followed by progress in the area of sustainment.
As our operational fleet continues to grow, we are
committed to maturing our global sustainment solution to
increase aircraft availability while simultaneously driving
down operations and support costs.
As you well know, if we are missing parts and we can't get
our jets airborne, the ability to deliver combat effects on
this aircraft are significantly diminished.
Getting parts to the field when they are needed,
expeditiously repairing broken parts, and improving the
reliability and the maintainability of the aircraft are all
critical items we need to achieve to get to consistently higher
mission capability rates while simultaneously driving down
sustainment costs.
While I am both personally and professionally unsatisfied
with where we are today, I will offer that we are seeing
measured progress on both fronts. Actions undertaken by the F-
35 enterprise and by our warfighting maintainers in 2019
increased the mission capability [MC] rates of our U.S.
operational fleet from 55 percent in October of 2018 to 73
percent in September of 2019, even as our fleet grew by an
additional 91 aircraft. That is the MC rate of a single
deployed unit.
In this past summer, our four deployed Air Force units from
the 388th Fighter Wing at Hill led the first F-35A combat
employment, encompassing 1,319 sorties for 7,248 flight hours.
I am pleased to share that the 388th saw their mission
capability rates increase from 72 percent in April to 92
percent by the time they returned in October. We know what
success looks like and we must make that the norm for the
program, not the exception.
Just as in aircraft availability, we are also making steady
measured progress in bringing down our sustainment and
operating costs for the F-35.
While much work remains ahead of us, this program is
demonstrating a downward glide slope in this area. In 2019
alone, our negotiating team drove a 9 percent reduction in
prime contractor sustainment costs for the U.S. Air Force,
directly reducing our overall cost per flying hour.
I am committed to aggressively continuing on this path
across all services and partners and to sharing our progress
with you as we do it.
My sustainment team and I fully understand that there is no
silver bullet in this area and our coordinated and data-
informed effort across a wide spectrum of work is required.
For the F-35 enterprise, this coordinated effort is
captured in the F-35 life cycle sustainment plan that Ms. Lord
mentioned, which is the most execution-friendly sustainment
plan I have ever seen.
As a result of the initiatives defined in this plan, as
well as the combined efforts of the Joint Program Office, the
U.S. services, and industry in executing it, we are seeing
meaningful evidence that our targeted initiatives across nine
individual lines of effort are improving aircraft availability
while simultaneously driving down O&S [operating and support]
costs.
We are reducing to aggressively accelerate our software
modernization cycles, our supply chain deliveries, and our
depot repair capabilities, and to prioritize reliability and
maintainability projects so that we have the right return on
our investment for our warfighters.
The life cycle sustainment plan also encompasses our path
forward for the F-35 Autonomic Logistics Information System, or
ALIS, with which you are all familiar.
While we have seen recent improvements in ALIS
functionality and responsiveness, significant additional work
is required, work that can't be done in old and outdated ways.
We must change the way we deliver ALIS capabilities and we must
do so now.
In closing, I once again observe that with more than 460
aircraft fielded around the world and delivering combat
effects, the F-35 is more affordable and lethal than ever
before.
On behalf of the men and women of the F-35 enterprise, you
have my commitment to continue to execute this program with the
due diligence, engineering excellence, and professional
impatience required so that we may develop, deliver, and
sustain this fifth-generation air system the warfighter
requires on a timeline that makes a difference.
With your help we will continue to bring this game-changing
capability to our U.S. and international warfighting partners
for decades to come.
Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Fick can be found in the
Appendix on page 100.]
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, General.
Mr. Behler.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. BEHLER, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST
AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Behler. Chairman Garamendi, Chairman Norcross, Ranking
Member Lamborn, Ranking Member Hartzler, and distinguished
members of two committees, thank you very much for inviting me
to join my colleagues today to discuss the status of the F-35
program.
As you know, DOT&E [Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation] plays a vital role in the acquisition and fielding
process. I have submitted a more detailed statement for the
record. But this morning I would like to give you a quick
overview of where the F-35 operational testing stands today.
DOT&E, the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] Operational Test
Team, or the JOTT, the F-35 Program Office, the service
operational test agencies have been collaborating closely to
evaluate the F-35's lethality, survivability, and readiness,
and we have been making good progress.
So far, the JOTT has conducted 91 percent of the open-air
test missions, actual weapons employment, cybersecurity
testing, deployments, and comparison testing with fourth-
generation fighters including the congressionally directed
comparison test of the F-35A and the A-10C.
IOT&E [initial operational test and evaluation] events have
assessed the F-35 across a variety of offensive and defensive
roles. Based on the data collected so far, operational
suitability of the F-35 fleet remains below service
expectations.
In particular, no F-35 variant meets the specified
reliability or maintainability metrics. In short, all
variants--the aircraft are breaking more often and taking
longer to fix.
However, there are several suitability metrics that are
showing signs of improvement this year. There are two phases of
formal IOT&E remaining. The first is electronic warfare testing
against robust surface-to-air threats at the Point Mugu sea
range.
The other is testing against a dense, modern, surface and
air threats in the Joint Simulation Environment [JSE] at the
Naval Air Station Patuxent River.
I will approve the start of these tests when the necessary
test infrastructure is ready. The Joint Simulation Environment
is essential. The JSE is a man-in-the-loop synthetic
environment that uses actual aircraft software.
It is designed to provide a scalable high-fidelity
operationally realistic simulation. I would like to emphasize
that the JSE will be the only venue available other than actual
combat against peer adversaries to adequately evaluate the F-35
due to the inherent limitations of open-air testing.
These limitations do not permit a full and adequate test of
the aircraft against the required types and density of modern
threat systems including weapons, aircraft, and electronic
warfare that are currently fielded by our near-peer
adversaries.
Integrating the F-35 into the JSE is a very complex
challenge but is required to complete IOT&E which will lead to
my final IOT&E report.
The current schedule indicates that the JSE will not be
ready to start final phase of operational testing until July of
next year.
As you know, most of the IOT&E results are classified.
However, I would be happy to provide observations to you and
your staff in the appropriate venue.
Again, thank you very much for this opportunity to be here
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Behler can be found in the
Appendix on page 115.]
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Behler, thank you. General Fick and Ms.
Lord, thank you very much for your testimony.
We have a lot of questioners and each questioner has a lot
of questions. So, we are going to try to move expeditiously as
we can.
I will attempt to limit myself to 5 minutes as will Mr.
Lamborn, Mrs. Hartzler, and Mr. Norcross. So, we will have a go
at it.
Spare parts, ALIS, contractor control, depots, and by the
way, who runs this program? Joint Program Office or the various
services themselves?
Fundamental questions we need to answer. Let us start with
ALIS. What are we going to do about it?
Ms. Lord and Mr. Fick--General Fick--what are we going to
do here? Are we going to rebuild this entire system? Planes
don't run with ALIS not working properly. What are we going to
do?
Secretary Lord. ALIS is being dealt with under the
framework of our life cycle sustainment plan. One of the things
we know we need to do in terms of having adequate sustainment,
reaching cost per flight hour, getting the aircraft
availability that we need, is to tackle discrete problems. ALIS
is one of them.
So, what we have done in the plan is we have actual
assignments around ALIS. We have specific individuals
responsible for it and dates that they need to meet. The core
of what is being done is to rearchitect ALIS. As we continue to
patch ALIS as it exists today--and General Fick has a lot of
specifics around that--we are making sure that we are
transitioning to Agile and DevOps as we have demonstrated the
capability to do through the Air Force's Mad Hatter efforts at
Kessel Run up in Boston.
What we are doing is rearchitecting ALIS to make sure it
meets the needs of the warfighter while making good use of
taxpayer dollar and we are working on a detailed plan right now
as to when that capability will be delivered.
But we are taking multiple lines of effort that exist today
with ALIS and we are coalescing those in 2020 to one effort.
Mr. Garamendi. We would like for the record what those
multiple lines are----
Secretary Lord. Absolutely.
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. In the detail.
Secretary Lord. And for the LCSP or for ALIS?
Mr. Garamendi. Both. But right now, for ALIS.
Secretary Lord. Absolutely. We will certainly get those to
you. Absolutely.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Garamendi. Very good.
General Fick, do you want to add?
General Fick. If I could just pile on a little bit. The
four individual lines of effort that we are--that have
historically been running on ALIS, or what I would characterize
as ALIS classic, which is ALIS that was developed as the
program evolved, the version in the field right now is ALIS
3.1.1.1.
We are in the process of fielding ALIS 3.5 as we speak.
That will bring about 300 stability fixes to that baseline
functionality to allow it to be a better system for the users.
That is the legacy system.
At the same time, we have been working on what we called
ALIS Next, which was an exploration of new architectures. We
have been working on what is called the Mad Hatter initiative,
which is an Agile DevOps-focused look at what we do.
Mr. Garamendi. So, excuse me for interrupting but I will.
The--so we are looking at the--the fundamental architecture is
one of my--Mrs. Hartzler said earlier is 20 years old. So, you
are looking at a new architecture, in other--a new foundation,
a new system, Mad Hatter or whatever it is.
When?
General Fick. So, we are working that transition literally
as we speak. We have heavily leveraged Dr. Jeff Boleng, who
works for Ms. Lord as the OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] software expert. We have leveraged the work of the
Boston Consulting Group to terminate further efforts----
Mr. Garamendi. ALIS is controlled by Lockheed Martin. Are
they working with you? Against you? What is the deal?
General Fick. They are working with us. The fourth line of
effort outside of Mad Hatter was IRAD [internal research and
development] that Lockheed is doing, and so what we are working
to do with Jeff Boleng's help is to coalesce those efforts into
a single new version of ALIS marching forward that leverages an
underlying data architecture that is expandable with the
expanding fleet in ways that the current ALIS is not.
Mr. Garamendi. And what is your deadline to achieve this?
General Fick. We believe that we will be able to make
significant progress by next fall, by September of 2020. But we
are starting movement in that direction right now.
Mr. Garamendi. And definition for significant?
General Fick. We hope to be able to turn off select SOUs--
squadron operational units--by September of 2020.
Mr. Garamendi. And what resources do you need to accomplish
this, or can you pry it out of Lockheed?
General Fick. So, we will be looking to work with Lockheed
with the--with the group from Kessel Run, the Mad Hatter team,
as well as the team at Hill Air Force Base, the 309th software
sustainment group, to do that work.
My intent is to do it within existing program funds. But we
have not finished our assessment whether additional funds will
be needed at this time.
Secretary Lord. If I may just add to that. The Air Force
has a high level of competency in software development and we
are trying to leverage what we have, particularly at Hill Air
Force Base and Warner-Robins, along with Lockheed's capability,
to make sure we take the Air Force's experience and success and
leverage that on the F-35.
In fact, General Goldfein has specifically asked General
Bunch, who is now Commander, Air Force Materiel Command out at
Wright-Patt and who I spoke to this morning about this very
task, to make sure that he is leveraging all the Air Force has
to bear.
I think we need to move forward quickly, and we need to
make sure we understand exactly what the maintainers are
experiencing, and we need the Air Force's help to do this.
So, this will be a collaboration between the government and
Lockheed Martin, and Lockheed Martin--I have spoken directly
with Marillyn Hewson about this--is going to need to leverage
their software expertise and their best and brightest on this.
Mr. Garamendi. A final question from me and then I will
turn to my colleagues, who will carry on.
Who has the proprietary information? Who has the rights to
the existing ALIS software and architecture?
Secretary Lord. Right now, that is between Lockheed and the
government, and one of the key elements of coming up with a new
ALIS architecture and software--I am sorry, data standards and
all of the other parts that would make a very good system is
understanding the entire data set as it exists today, what all
the algorithms are and we are still in the process of going
through that with Lockheed Martin and we are still having
discussions over various parts of that, but understanding where
all of the intellectual property is and making sure the
government has access to what it has paid for is a key portion
of rearchitecting ALIS.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Much more to be said about that.
Mr. Lamborn, your turn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing and I want to follow up on what you just brought up
about intellectual property.
Ms. Lord and General Fick, I will ask you this question.
Can you give us a little more detail--a little more
granularity, if you will--on how we--where we are at now with
resolving these intellectual property issues with the prime
contractor and do you still have major--any major concerns?
General Fick. So, we still do have concerns. There still
are roadblocks as we go to execute everything from as simple as
documents that get uploaded into a system and U.S. Government
documents that can get uploaded into a system and come back
with Lockheed Martin proprietary markings on them.
That is a frustrating occurrence, but it is not one that
keeps us from doing work. What we are working to do is to
figure out where the places in which those proprietary or
intellectual property assertions actually keep us from doing
the kind of work that we intend to do.
One of those cases, to Mr. Behler's point, is within the
JSE. So, our initial integration of the ``F-35 in a Box'' into
the JSE was held up by a dispute between the government and
Lockheed over the intellectual property contained within nine
individual algorithms within ``F-35 in a Box.''
That slowed our progress in getting started and slowed our
early progress once we had begun. But that is one specific case
in which we identified----
Mr. Lamborn. And has that one been resolved?
General Fick. So what happened in the case of ``F-35 in a
Box'' is in order to get on contract, in order to start moving
forward, we had to sign up to accept less than government
purpose rights to be able to move but reserved the right to
challenge that intellectual property assertion.
So, we brought in DCAA [Defense Contract Audit Agency].
They dug through the paperwork, working closely with Lockheed
Martin to determine whether Lockheed could prove through their
records that those software elements had been exclusively
developed at contractor expense.
DCAA could not come to a conclusion based upon the data
they were presented and that contracting officer's final
determination, or COFD, was that they could not prove that
those elements had been developed exclusively at their expense
and, therefore, should be government purpose rights.
Lockheed Martin has protested that finding by the
contracting officer and elevated that to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals for final adjudication and that issue
is still being resolved.
So, basically, we are getting to a place where we don't
need all the data but the data that we need, it is important
that we pursue it. And so, this is the way in which we are
looking at what do we need, okay, let us go get it.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Ms. Lord, do you have anything to add to that?
Secretary Lord. I think one of the challenges we have is
the fact that a lot of the ALIS data and functionality works
back through Lockheed Martin computers.
So, what we need to do with our newly architected ALIS is
to have that in a government cloud and accessible. So this
deconflicting of Lockheed data and the government data will
become much clearer.
We also have fundamental standards that we need to set down
such as data standards, so it is very, very clear.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
And Mr. Behler, you mentioned JSE and you said that you
think it is going to be operational for testing in the last
quarter of this fiscal year.
Is it on track to meet this requirement?
Mr. Behler. Actually, what I said, it would be ready for
the physical year next year.
Mr. Lamborn. Oh, okay.
Mr. Behler. So, it would be July of 2020 when we think it
will be ready to start operational testing.
Mr. Lamborn. And that is the last quarter of this fiscal
year, but go ahead. Go ahead.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Behler. You are absolutely correct, sir.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Behler. So----
Mr. Lamborn. According to staff.
Mr. Behler. Yes. So, the question was why is it required?
Mr. Lamborn. Is it on track to actually be operational by
that time?
Mr. Behler. Well, that is what the master schedule says,
sir, and I guess I am not the program manager and I guess I
would ask the program manager if he feels comfortable.
We have been--we have been closely coordinating with the
program office and NAVAIR [Naval Air Systems Command] out at
Pax River to find out when this thing is going to be ready.
There is enormous challenges and there is a lot of unknown
unknowns still out there. But I will let General Fick kind of
give you what he believes----
Mr. Lamborn. Yes. Thank you.
General Fick.
General Fick. Sir, so I do believe that the JSE
development, the ``F-35 in a Box'' integration into JSE is on
track. The team, led by my tech director behind me, has spent
an extraordinary amount of time going through and developing a
very detailed line-by-line schedule that looks at that
integration.
And to put it in context, we are not only integrating the
``F-35 in a Box'' into this environment. We are also
integrating all of the blue and red threat vehicles, ground
systems, airborne systems and weapons, electronic warfare, and
all of the things that you need to bring a full 8-on-8 or
greater scenario to life in a synthetic environment.
So, to Mr. Behler's earlier point, this is a--it is a very
challenging enterprise that we are trying to actually come as
close to combat as we can come without actually putting iron in
the sky.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
Now I will turn to Chairman Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Ms. Lord, in my opening remarks we talked about a defined
standardization cost categories and metrics for understanding
both the costs per flight hour and costs per tail per year.
We are talking about the F-35 today in particular but this
committee deals with many platforms and systems. When we start
to deal with legacy issues versus fifth-gen and other systems,
apples to apples, the metrics that we are using seem to move.
We use certain metrics for one system and different metrics for
another. Some of them cross-pollinate.
Talk to me about this issue and how you deal with it and
other systems and platforms, but more particular, how can we
standardize so that when we are talking about this system's
flight per hour, per cost, is the same measurement as we are
doing for other platforms, whether it is the F-18 or any other.
Secretary Lord. We found when we embarked on the 80 percent
mission capable journey that Secretary Mattis at the time had
set out for us that we were using the same words with different
definitions across the services and even between programs.
So, words matter, and we are standardizing how we measure
things. When we talk about mission capability it is really the
total up-time as safe to fly and capable of at least one tasked
mission over the total possess time. So those are aircraft that
are with the unit and can be flown.
What we found----
Mr. Norcross. Let me just interject a question right there,
because we mentioned about the availability rate of the F-35s.
They had two different ratings--one as a single mission capable
and then full mission capable. So that goes directly to your
question.
Secretary Lord. Yes. So, in terms of air vehicle
availability rate, that is defined as total up-time capable of
safe to fly plus at least one mission over total active time,
which is possessed and non-possessed, which translates to those
aircraft that are out of--out of reporting. They could be in a
depot, for instance.
So that is the big difference between AVA [air vehicle
availability] and MC. It is confusing and I think we need to
talk in a little bit clearer terms.
Mr. Norcross. But that is just part of it. It is also
Lockheed and others who are looking at their sustainment or
their O&S costs under one guise and we are talking about
another, and the reason I bring that up will go to my next
question.
But as we make these decisions, you know, we don't have an
unlimited pocketbook to pay for these things and we are trying
to make these decisions when they come out.
Secretary Lord. Understood.
Mr. Norcross. We need to have standards so we can make
accurate decisions on the cost.
Secretary Lord. And if I may make one comment.
We found that we had apples to oranges, as you were saying,
types of comparisons. That is one reason that we hired the
Boston Consulting Group to look at all the costs in terms of
cost per flight hour [CPFH] so that we could understand all the
drivers, whether it was direct labor, indirect labor, whether
it was repair of repairables, whether it was spares, and on and
on and on.
And as we peel back to get to that $25,000 per hour goal in
2025, we found that we had about $3,000 per flight hour that we
couldn't clearly trace back through Lockheed Martin as to the
origin of those costs.
So, we are working closely with Lockheed Martin to
understand it and it is the fundamental basis of some of this
confusion we have.
So before we get on the path so that we make sure that we
are going to achieve that goal with certain steps, we all need
to have the same data set, the same fact basis so that we can
define our terms, all have the same definition, and then have a
plan that we all can trace because up to this point that has
been a huge discovery process.
Mr. Norcross. Absolutely. Again, just the one issue we saw
the F-35, the CPFH, was $44,000 an hour versus the F-18,
$25,000.
My point is everybody is making decisions hearing these
numbers and if we are not comparing one to the other----
Secretary Lord. Exactly. Whether you account for fuel,
whether you account for government labor, on and on and on.
Mr. Norcross. We have to standardize this, and General,
Turkey suspension from the program. We don't expect them to
come back. I would like to say that is permanent, but we have
some meetings taking place today that--who knows? They had Lot
12. We were going to receive how many? Was it 24 aircraft in
those lots?
General Fick. It is 24.
Mr. Norcross. Let us talk about the replacement parts,
where we are with those and some of the challenges, and then
what is going to happen to those 24.
General Fick. Okay. Sir, so there were between Lockheed
Martin and Pratt & Whitney 1,005 parts that were single or dual
sourced into Turkey and so we began just over a year ago and
very quietly but deliberately taking actions to establish
alternative sources for all of those parts.
Lockheed and Pratt have been making spectacular progress
against that goal, targeting the end of March of 2020 as a time
at which we will have alternative sources stood up for all of
them.
We are not quite there yet so we have, on the airframe
side, about 11 components that still we have yet to fully
mitigate to be able to be at full reproduction on those parts
by the end of March, and on the engines there is, I believe,
one integrally bladed rotors, IBRs.
Mr. Norcross. Just a quick followup. For the record, Turkey
is still supplying their parts as of today.
General Fick. Yes.
Mr. Norcross. Will follow up more on that, but I want to
give my colleagues a chance.
General Fick. Sir.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Is it a surprise that we are still getting those parts and
how long do you expect, or will we continue to buy those as you
are setting up an alternative source?
General Fick. So, we are working closely with Ms. Lord and
with Lockheed and Pratt to figure out what the most expeditious
way is to wean ourself from those parts.
There are a lot of orders still out and parts still in
production that will be delivered presently after the end of
March.
But what we did not do as we worked to stand up those
alternative sources over the course of the last year was to
actually dual produce those parts. So, we didn't go and over-
produce parts that we had already bought against those Turkish
providers.
So what we are working on right now is to figure out what
the right laydown is of work orders that might be terminated
and work in progress lost or if we can extend the acceptance
region to accept those parts and not have to buy duals. That is
what we are working closely with----
Mr. Norcross. But as of today, the suspension of Turkey is
not impacting our parts in any delays so far?
General Fick. Correct.
Secretary Lord. Not at all. In fact, they have been very,
very good suppliers.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Norcross, thank you for getting into
that. A lot of this is blowing in the wind to today. We will
see what comes of all of it with the meeting that is taking
place as well as the congressional point of view, which may
differ from what the White House point of view is at the end of
this day. We will see where we are. Very, very important
issues.
Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
Just to keep along the same line of questioning about
Turkey, just wanted to follow up. What impact, Ms. Lord, is a
yearlong continued resolution? What impact would that have on
your trying to find new sources and bring them up to production
for these parts?
Secretary Lord. In terms of a CR, it hurts the overall
program. But I am not aware of any direct impact on resourcing
the parts because Lockheed has--and Pratt have ongoing money to
do that. The real challenge is really how we deal with that
work in progress that General Fick was talking about and how we
make sure we don't waste any of the money already spent on
partially built parts.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Thank you.
I want to shift to cybersecurity, General Fick and Dr.
Behler. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, cybersecurity and
associated cybersecurity testing of the platform needs to be a
high priority.
So, General Fick, could you please outline for us what
actions you are taking to ensure the integrity and the security
of the F-35 supply chain to include ALIS--[Autonomic] Logistics
Information System?
And then, Dr. Behler, could you please provide us with your
assessment of the program's test strategy for cybersecurity?
So General Fick.
General Fick. Ma'am, so as we look across the program at
all of the elements of the air system from the air vehicle
through to ALIS, the training systems and the joint
reprogramming environment, we work to make sure that those
development efforts are all fully compliant with the RMF [Risk
Management Framework] JSIG [Joint Special Access Program
Implementation Guide] rules associated with the cybersecurity
performance of the system.
So, our development work, our fielding work, is all
intended to be full up RMF compliant as we do that work. We do
work very closely--our development test team works very closely
with the JOTT under Mr. Behler's cognizance to do dedicated
cyber testing, to include penetration testing over and above
the RMF JSIG test work--development work.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
Dr. Behler.
Mr. Behler. About the--what we have left in IOT&E, one big
portion of that is cyber testing to complete it on the aircraft
and on ALIS 3.5. It is very challenging to do it on the
aircraft because if we do it on the aircraft, we got to be sure
that we can take everything out that we thought--you know, that
we put in there.
Right now, we are not sure we can do that. We wouldn't want
to put an airplane in the air. We are probably going to do it
in an anechoic chamber. You know, we can, you know, do all the
stuff we want to do--you know, all the techniques we want to do
using RF [radio frequency] signals and all that sort of stuff.
I am glad you asked that question because I am biased a
little bit about cyber and software because before coming here,
I spent 6 years at Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering
Institute and that is all I thought about was cybersecurity.
And if I look at our weapons system today, you know, we
have a very good acquisition process to buy hardware and our
budgets are based on hardware. But it is really software that
makes a difference.
Every weapons system we have today is all about software.
It is defined by software--not enabled but defined. Without
software, boats don't leave the pier, airplanes don't fly, et
cetera.
We need to do better in cyber testing, and this is not
putting more money into the problem. This is about intellect.
We need to get the A Team on the DOD side to help us do
cybersecurity.
But as we--for this particular program we are going to do
much of what General Fick said about penetration testing and
adversarial assessment.
But I will caveat this saying that we do not have all the
tools that the adversary has to do the adversarial assessments.
That is where the intellect comes in. We need to do better.
Mrs. Hartzler. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the
highest threat, the planes that are flying right now, where
would you put us at--the cybersecurity of our current operating
planes? Or maybe you want to answer it in----
Mr. Behler. Well, I think that is a very difficult question
to ask. You know, it is----
Mrs. Hartzler. If you are still testing----
Mr. Behler. We are still testing, and we need to continue
the testing. Every day we find another vulnerability and I will
also say this is a very complex program both in ALIS and the
aircraft. Millions of lines of software code.
The more code you have, the more complex. The more complex,
the more vulnerabilities. We need to figure out a better way to
write programs for our weapons systems, to write less software
rather than more software.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay.
General Fick.
General Fick. Ma'am, I will add, as we talk about--
specifically about ALIS and about moving to modern code-based
lines and modern code architectures, one of the fantastic steps
that the Air Force did in terms of moving ahead with their Mad
Hatter and Kessel Run team is they are changing the way they
think about accreditation and certification of software and
they are making it so that it is designed and not patched on.
They are exploring new ways to have--to basically accredit
the development environment so that software that is developed
within that environment comes out cyber secure and that is not
something you think about after you have actually put the
software elements in place.
So, to Mr. Behler's point, bringing the right minds to
think about it from a modern software construct perspective
makes a lot of difference.
Mrs. Hartzler. It makes a lot of sense. Final comment?
Mr. Behler. If I could just add one very small part. You
know, if we look at what we are able to do today in software
testing, we are in the lower left-hand corner doing our work.
The adversary is in the upper right-hand corner. It is the
junior varsity playing the NFL and we got to do better.
Mrs. Hartzler. On that positive note, I yield back.
Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi. I want to thank our four colleagues for
raising some critical issues with regard to the software. This
committee--we really are supposed to be out of this room at
12:30 so it can be swept for security, and guess what the next
committee hearing is?
It is on the subject of software, G5, or 5G, rather, and we
are going to go right back into it with the next committee
hearing. Maybe we can all stick around and learn something.
Mr. Courtney, you are next.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses that are here today.
When the F-35 decision was made to go to single engine, one
of the biggest driving factors was the Navy's adamant
testimony. CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Roughead pointed out
that having a dual engine system and trying to find the space
on carriers and amphibious ships would be almost impossible.
So I would like to focus, Lieutenant General, just for a
minute on the afloat spare package issue, which represents one
of the four types of parts packages for supporting the F-35 in
different environments.
It is unique, however, in its space and maintainer
limitations given that the package must provide the necessary
parts to sustain F-35s on a ship while competing for space with
all the other materials a carrier or amphibious vessel must
carry while on deployment.
So I am going to ask two questions and then let you run
with it. In working with the Navy to develop the requirements
for the afloat spares package, what kind of obstacles either
from a fiscal or practical standpoint have you encountered and
what adjustments have been made?
And secondly, what has the program learned from early
deployment such as the USS Essex and how do you anticipate
challenges will evolve as the B and C variant are increasingly
embarked on carriers and amphibious vessels? Are there specific
parts or components such as the stealth canopy that present
particular challenges to the afloat environment?
General Fick. Sir, thank you for your question. Very
insightful and very meaningful.
As we look at the afloat spares package, much like the
deployable spares package that goes with land-based units that
go into combat, what is important is that you marry up that
package with the pedigree of the aircraft that you deploy
forward.
As we look at early deployments of As, Bs, and Cs, we, in
some cases, had a wide mix of aircraft from different LRIPs--
low-rate initial production lots--which means that in some ways
you may end up with a deployed or an afloat spares package that
has parts for a lot that may or may not actually be in your
squadron anymore.
So, the notion that you can have an afloat spares package
that you buy once and you only check when you buy it and you
never look at it again, we need to throw that notion out the
window.
My team is working very close with Dan Frye, my product
support manager right behind me, to do reviews on the DSPs
[deployment spares packages] and ASPs [afloat spares packages]
on no less than an annual basis but also in terms of as they
prepare for spin-ups, for deployments, to look at the kits to
make sure that the kits onboard the ship reflect the
configuration of the aircraft that are brought onboard. It is
absolutely essential to making this work.
Relative to problem parts, you mentioned the canopy. Right
now, the canopy is our current top mission capability rate
degrader. From over the course of the last 6 months, I think it
has averaged about 5 percent of our NMCS--non-mission capable
for spares--as associated with the canopy.
I wouldn't necessarily characterize that as a B model or a
C model issue as much as I would characterize it as a fleet
issue. In fact, the Bs particularly have seen fewer canopy
issues than the A models have thus far.
Mr. Courtney. When you have deployments on the Essex, I
mean, any sort of early feedback?
General Fick. So just reinforcing your point, sir, that
making sure that the ASP matches the aircraft that are on board
is critical. There may be one or two others.
One of the things that we have noticed as we integrate this
air system into the supporting infrastructure both on land and
at sea is that we have got to get the comms right.
And so, in a couple of cases, as we have deployed aboard
these amphibious craft we have noticed that data, for instance,
that ALIS is attempting to transmit off board is transmitting
much, much slower than we would otherwise have thought it
would.
What has happened in both cases so far on two previous
deployments has been that router switch settings and basic
network configuration issues prevented the transmittal of data
at appropriate rates to allow us to operate the aircraft in the
sense that we need to.
So, we need to do better at helping those who we are
boarding ALIS with to actually understand what those settings
need to be, understand what those configurations need to be.
So it is not a matter of trying to invent how we integrate
ALIS into a ship each time. It is a matter of just plugging it
in and going.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
It is interesting we keep coming back to ALIS.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Garamendi, and my son,
Hunter, sends you greetings. And South Carolina--and I thank
all of you for being here--but South Carolina is grateful. F-
35s have been warmly welcome at Marine Corps Air Station
Beaufort and we would like to welcome F-35s to the Joint Air
Base McEntire at Eastover, South Carolina. Colonel Ghandi would
be very happy to be right on the flight line to wave you in,
and we would really appreciate the service.
And Secretary Lord, Fleet Readiness Center [FRC] East is
the largest industrial depot that generates combat air power
for both the Marine Corps and Navy variants of the F-35. The
infrastructure of FRC East continues to lag in upgrades and new
construction commitment from the Navy.
The problem of antiquated legacy maintenance facilities is
particularly acute in the Navy and how is the Joint Program
Office, the Navy, and Marine Corps to ensure that we continue
to commit resources to the right efforts to improve FRC East in
their maintenance performance?
Secretary Lord. We are looking at the capability of 68
actual depot repair lines. We only have 30 of 68 up and going
right now and we have committed to accelerate those to have
them all completed by 2024, and it comes down to a number of
items.
It is getting equipment. It is getting tooling. It is
getting the actual repair information out there. So what we
have done is come up under our LCSP with a plan to do that and
we are going back and working with Lockheed Martin and Pratt on
each of these.
But we are working down line by line on those and we meet
monthly with both--all of the services to talk about the
progress that is being made.
Mr. Wilson. That is very encouraging, and we appreciate
your service.
And General Fick, the F-35 program does not maintain a war
reserve materiel stock of F-35 engines, unlike other tactical
aircraft programs.
Was that a deliberate decision within the program to not
maintain a war reserve materiel stock of engines and, if so,
how will this risk be mitigated by not having war reserve stock
during major contingencies?
General Fick. So, sir, a program decision was made early
on. I don't know exactly the date, but a program decision was
made to spare modules instead of sparing engines, which
presupposes then that you can take a module and insert it into
an engine that requires a new, you know, compressor or turbine
or burner module.
The program is working closely with the services today to
reassess whether that is the right approach or not. In most
cases, as we have deployed forward, we have ended up taking
spare engines with us despite the initial plan to take modules
from a sparing perspective.
That decision, I understand, was made for cost reasons.
Much more cost effective to spare a module than an engine. But
if you can't install the module in the engine then it isn't
very much used, too.
So, we are exploring--in light of recent deployments we are
exploring whether that construct still makes sense today.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much. Again, your service
is so critical, and we have faith in your leadership.
And Ms. Maurer, at the end of 2022 the F-35 worldwide fleet
is expected to double from approximately 488 aircraft to 985.
How will the sustainment enterprise keep pace with the
expanding fleet and need for additional parts? What is the
Department of Defense doing over the next 3 years to increase
depot repair capacity?
Ms. Maurer. Well, I think the first thing I hope that they
are doing is implementing all 21 of our recommendations that we
have made to them over the course of many years to help enhance
sustainment of the program.
Specific to the depot, we do know that the Department has
made important progress in enhancing the depot capabilities,
but they are 8 years behind their initial plans for doing so.
Mr. Wilson. Well, we need your cheerful encouragement that
we come up to date.
And Secretary Lord, what is the service responsibility for
funding the needed construction and modernization, again, at
FRC East? Is it Navy or Marine Corps?
Secretary Lord. I would defer to General Fick on that. I am
not sure.
General Fick. Sir, I am going to have to take that question
for the record. I am not--I am not up to speed relative to what
needs to happen from a facilitization perspective specifically
at FRC East.
But what I can tell you is, to Ms. Lord's previous point,
is that we have now 68 planned workloads on contract with
Lockheed Martin to actually stand those up from an organic
depot perspective to include, as I understand it, capabilities
to be stood up at FRC East.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. I look forward to getting
a full and complete response and thank each of you for your
service.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Garamendi. I want to compliment my colleagues here on
raising critical questions. The FRC, otherwise known as depots,
the sustainment is not coordinated with the purchases of new
airplanes.
You are headed into a situation where we are going to have
1,100 planes and we will not have the ability to maintain them.
And so, the readiness is going to decline. The question
that I am going to be pursuing in the months ahead is can we
wait until 2024 to have half of the--to have the depots
operating at half of the potential or half of what they need.
The answer is no, we cannot wait unless we want a bunch of
airplanes sitting, unable to fly. And this is the sustainment
issue. This is the ALIS issue. This is also the spare parts
issue--all of those things.
Fact of the matter is this program has not paid attention
to sustainment and it will from here on out. I will have you
over here every week having another discussion about it.
Ms. Maurer, you have listened to the testimony thus far. I
would love to be asking you on every question that we asked Ms.
Lord and General Fick and Mr. Behler, to comment on that. But I
am well beyond my time.
I am now going to turn to Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Lord and Lieutenant General Fick, in the GAO's
sustainment report issued this past April 2019, you provided a
recommendation for the Department to develop an intellectual
property, or IP, strategy that includes identification of all
critical technical needs and associated costs.
The report states that DOD concurred with the
recommendations but has not yet implemented it, and also that
DOD's inability to obtain intellectual property and technical
data from the contractor is an issue across the entire F-35
supply chain.
Can you please provide an update on the DOD's
implementation of an intellectual property strategy and what
challenges remain in obtaining the necessary technical data and
IP from industry partners to better address supply chain
deficiencies and bring down costs?
Secretary Lord. We are doing a fundamental rewrite of all
of our acquisition policy this year and we are concurrently
reworking the entire curriculum at the Defense Acquisition
University to make sure our acquisition professionals have the
ability to really understand what is out there in policy.
Our policy in the past has been very legalistic, I would
say, and what we have done is decomposed it into what I call
the adaptive acquisition framework with a variety of different
acquisition authorities explained that Congress has given us
over the last 5 years or so, along with contract types that
should be used.
One of the critical components of this is understanding
intellectual property, so we actually have an intellectual
property policy that is just about to be released where we
worked closely with the Army, who began at the forefront of
this.
And what we are fundamentally saying is before we put
together an acquisition strategy you have to think about what
information is critical to a program, particularly in terms of
sustainability, so you are not always held hostage to the prime
on that through the life of the contract and that you can find
better cost solutions through a variety of different providers.
So we provide direction, asking the acquisition
professionals to think about what is the information, the
intellectual property that you need and that you don't need,
and to make sure that is clearly articulated in the request for
a proposal and then is addressed during contract negotiations
because, frankly, if that was thought through at the beginning
of programs you would not be where we are in the F-35 program
today where the intellectual property is an afterthought and we
are having to wrestle it as we go through each contract.
So, it is core and fundamental to what we are doing. When
we are training acquisition professionals now, versus kind of
locking them down at Fort Belvoir usually for 8 or 12 weeks and
learning, we are moving from sort of a transmit mostly mode of
instructors to really doing adult learning where it is
experiential learning where we have actual operators coming in
and explaining what their experience has been on programs, have
people live through the life of what they learned during
particularly problematical acquisitions--mistakes they made and
so forth.
So, it is right at the forefront and I think you will see a
lot coming out on that shortly.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Fick.
General Fick. Sir, I think Ms. Lord hit most of it. What I
would go back to is the notion of--if I were to encapsulate our
strategy in broad--in broad strokes, I would say it is to
pursue the data that we need and only that data.
Back in the beginning of this program as it was stood up as
a TSPR program--a total system performance responsibility
program--with Lockheed Martin in charge we didn't think about
those data elements because we didn't think we would ever need
them.
So now what we are doing is, to Ms. Lord's point, putting
those data elements on contract every time we need them
delivered and in cases where the intellectual property issues
get in our way, such as the ``F-35 in a Box'' issue we
discussed earlier, we are actively challenging them.
One of the things as we talked about the standup of those
organic depots is it is critical that the data that enables us
to do that work is delivered as we work to stand up those
organic capabilities, and that is a great success story.
As we have worked through those 60 of 68 items on contract
now, each of those come with the data required to allow the
organic workers, be they Air Force or Navy, to do that--to do
that work.
So we are making progress, but it is a broad problem.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. And I only have a few seconds
left.
Ms. Maurer, are you aware of any other weapons system with
similar supply chain problems from the lack of cost data or
intellectual property from contractors?
Ms. Maurer. You know, the F-35 program is unique in many
aspects from the way it was first created and developed--the
fact that it is an international program, the extent of the
involvement of the prime contractor.
And I would say, unfortunately, that the nature of the
problems facing the F-35 program from the sustainment
perspective are also unique.
Just real quickly on the international property or
intellectual property issue, that was an issue we flagged in a
report in 2014 and we are quite pleased to see that the DOD is
making progress in addressing it.
But I really encourage you and the other members of the
committee to pay close attention to that because I completely
agree with Mr. Behler's comment earlier that weapons systems
today are essentially flying or sailing or moving pieces of
software, and the intellectual property is an important piece
of that.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Carbajal, thank you for raising that
issue and thank you for calling on Ms. Maurer. I would like to
make that a standard procedure.
Mr. Bacon, you are next.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you for being here and for your leadership
on an important program.
Ms. Lord and General Fick, I would just like to get a real
clear opinion from you and impression. What will a continuing
resolution, particularly if it goes into the next year--what
will be the impacts on the F-35 program?
General Fick. Sure. From a--from an F-35 perspective, what
I look at are, basically, three areas. My ongoing development
activities, specifically, the development associated with the
generation of modifications to the platform was a new start in
2020 and so those efforts will not be able to continue.
One of those new start mod efforts was DCA, our dual-
capable aircraft--critical capability. That is very, very
important to us that we get that. That is thing one.
Thing two I would characterize is we have actually a plus-
up of C model production from 2018 to 2019. We will be held at
2019 quantities if we are unable to get a budget in this year.
And then the final thing I would add is that we also, thank
you very much, had EOQ [economic order quantity] as part of
this budget and that will help us to continue to drive
production costs down in Lots 15 and beyond.
So, if we don't get that--it is, roughly, half a--$500
million or so--if we don't get that, that will delay our
ability to start that work and the effectiveness of EOQ and
production.
Mr. Bacon. Ms. Lord.
Secretary Lord. So General Fick gave you many specifics. I
will tell you if we have a CR, we continue to have to rearrange
work to not be able to move forward.
So there is an enormous amount of administrative time that
is really non-value added that goes to that and we have to
continue to think ahead about what is the next impact. So the
EOQs--the economic order quantities--for instance, we are
always trying to figure out where those economies of scale are
and how to best work that. We can't do that if we don't know
when we are getting the money.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. Thank you.
I think it is important that Congress realizes there is
impacts across the entire enterprise with a continuing
resolution and we owe it to you and the F-35 program here to
get our house in order.
General Goldfein calls the F-35 the quarterback of, you
know, the battlespace because it can receive all this data,
fuse it, and disseminate it.
I have been concerned for years that we don't--that we are
not going to get this right--that we want to ensure that the
fifth-generation aircraft are getting this data, but more
importantly, the fourth-generation and, hopefully, we can get
the data back to the air operations center. So while the F-35
is still over the battle site, the next sorties that are taking
off have the current battlespace data so that we can be more
effective, save lives, and get the job done more effectively.
How are we doing on this fusing of the data and
transmitting of the data? So, really, I think this is probably
mainly for General Fick but if others--anybody else has any
feedback I will appreciate it.
Mr. Behler. Yes, sir. That is a terrific question. We
have--we have been doing operational testing with fourth and
fifth gen together and what we are finding is the combination
we are having a more lethal and more survivable force.
The F-35 as the quarterback, like General Goldfein likes to
say, is absolutely correct. You know, a stealth airplane has
some challenges with how much weapons they can hold because you
want it all internal to keep yourself real stealthy and low-
observable.
So you need a truck that carries weapons for you and we
have found that, you know, you put the F-35 with the A-10,
which we did some--a lot of close air support--the combination
of those two weapons together really provides a capability that
we have never had before.
F-35 with the F-15--with the F-15 and then the future EX F-
15--it will be just a big truck carrying weapons out in front
of the F-35 doing the defensive and offensive counter air, and
the communication will be--right now will be with a Link 16.
But we hope that we will get better combinations of----
Mr. Bacon. How are we doing at getting--thank you for that,
because being a 30-year Air Force guy myself, I am totally with
you on this. So, I mean, we want to make sure that we optimize
this and take advantage of it.
How are we doing getting the data back to the air
operations center? Because that is really sort of a concern
that I have not heard that we have really solved this because
what we want to do is as the F-35s are leading the fight, the
next wave has the data and also that our joint force is getting
the data and so we can disseminate where the tanks--the enemy
tanks are at, where the enemy S-300s could be, you know, and so
forth.
Mr. Behler. Right. Exchanging that information with the
fleet, with the AOC [air operations center], with the tankers,
is all critical to this mission, especially when you are flying
a high-density, high-threat environment.
Right now, the data from the F-35 to the AOC is not as good
as it should be. I mean, you almost feel like there ought to be
an ALIS terminal in the AOC to gather that information real
time or having software--defined radios and--but we are not
real-time enough, but we need to do that.
And going forward in the future, the AOC--I mean, it is one
of those things that technology begets doctrine, not doctrine
begets technology.
We have more capability in the F-35 than we have ever had
in any other airplane; data fusion and the ability to
understand the full situation we are in is one of them. That
needs to be disseminated to the rest of the wings that are out
there flying.
The AOC is important, but I think it is more important to
get the information out to the other warfighters and especially
the tankers, too.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank both chairs and both ranking members for
convening this hearing today on the sustainment, production,
affordability challenges of the F-35. A lot of hearings
happening on Capitol Hill today.
I think this is one of the most important not only today
but in the 116th Congress. I say that because the F-35 is the
most expensive program in the history of the Department and
arguably one of the most complex acquisition, production, and
sustainment programs.
So, I want to thank the chairs. I also want to thank the
professional staff members on HASC [House Armed Services
Committee] for assisting Congress through your arduous and
diligent effort engaging the Department and industry so that we
understand this program and we can fulfill our congressional
oversight role.
We have heard about insufficient spare parts. We have heard
that the Autonomic Logistics Information [System] known as ALIS
is struggling.
Mr. Behler, you mentioned that aircraft are breaking more
often and taking longer to fix, and while General Fick, in your
short tenure you are observing or seeing progress, I think
Secretary Lord probably captured what most of us understand and
appreciate, that much work remains.
So, I am going to indulge the chairman, Chairman Garamendi,
and start with a question with Ms. Maurer from the GAO, our
watchdog. I value tremendously the work that you do, the work
that your colleagues do, and the recommendations that you make.
So, you mentioned that there were 21 recommendations. You
said that DOD agrees with most, so I assume there is one or
more that they don't agree with.
So, could you please either identify the most significant
recommendation that DOD does not agree with? And then, Ms.
Lord, if you could kind of respond so I can have a little bit
of back and forth, and to the extent that DOD does agree with
all of them, which recommendation are--concerns you most in
terms of the rate at which they are implementing that
recommendation, and then perhaps Ms. Lord could respond.
Thank you.
Ms. Maurer. Sure. Well, first off, thank you very much. It
is a privilege and honor to spend my professional career at GAO
and serving the Congress and the taxpayer, so thank you.
In terms of our recommendations, DOD has concurred with a
vast majority of them. The relative handful--and we are talking
about 3 or 4 out of the 21--are related to the issue of cost
assessment.
A lot of that dates back to some of our prior work and GAO
and the Department basically have a philosophical difference of
views on how robust cost assessments and cost estimates should
be and the extent of--extent to which you build flexibility or
a variation around the future cost estimates, whether you have
a point or whether you have a range, and I think a lot of the
differences are around that point.
Secretary Lord. This really gets to the nature of the types
of systems that we are developing today. They are hardware
enabled but software defined. We also have an adversary who is
rapidly changing what they are doing.
So, we have overall requirements but we want to maintain a
very flexible requirement level to some degree to be able to
respond to that. We also want to make sure that in the
software-defined environment we are able to really take
advantage of DevOps in terms of coding software.
So, essentially, we are developing, producing, and
sustaining software all at the same time, running testing every
night. We talked about having cloud environments where we
have----
Mr. Brown. Okay. Let me just do this. I think I have the
call of your response. What is your response, Ms. Maurer?
Ms. Maurer. So in terms of the recommendations that we
think are most important, we had a couple of recommendations in
a report that we did this year as well as one that was issued
about a year and a half ago that asked the Department, or the
program more specifically, to look fundamentally at the
structure of the overall approach to sustainment as well as the
approach to a supply chain.
We found and we were very concerned about the fact that
over a period of many years the Department had been incremental
and reactive in its approach to these critical issues.
We have started to see the Department getting traction on
some of those. But frankly, there is a long way to go. There
are a lot of important details that have not----
Mr. Brown. And could you just--in the last 30 seconds I
have can you give us a sense of what that does in terms of the
sustainment, production, and affordability?
Ms. Maurer. Well, for example, one of the key things that
has not been worked out is the movement of spare parts around
the global supply pool, right. That means we have to--the
contractor has to move parts between the U.S. services and the
partners.
That requires a number of specific trade agreements to move
the parts from country A to country B. Those have not all been
negotiated. That slows down the ability to move parts and it
affects the overall ability to sustain the system in the field.
Mr. Brown. Thank you. I wish I had more time.
Will there be a second round, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Garamendi. No, there will not be a second round.
Mr. Brown. Okay.
Mr. Garamendi. We will move to the contractors----
Mr. Brown. Okay.
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. And you may want to ask them
that question.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us today.
Mr. Behler, I would like to begin with you. We have had a
lot of information given back to us about the ALIS system. We
all know how it is designed to work, taking lots of data in,
using that to integrate that, make sustainment choices.
We have heard about the challenges with software, how the
system is supposed to operate versus how it does operate, what
happens with sustainment issues, supply chain, all those kinds
of things.
But what I want to ask is if we get all those problems
fixed it still seems like to me that there is indeed a
challenge because that system relies on with the F-35 being
able to communicate--give that information back and forth.
And we know that if we find ourselves in a contested
environment, comms are going to be denied. So then the question
becomes is what happens to ALIS in a comms-denied environment
or what we are doing to really channel comms.
As you know, there are a lot of different things that we do
to manage that under an EMCON [emissions control] condition.
Give me your perspective on how does ALIS function within that
environment, especially if it is over a long period of time.
Mr. Behler. Right. So that is a question we have been
asking for a while. We have actually taken aircraft to austere
locations and operated them for an extended period of time to
see if we can do exactly what you are suggesting to be able to
and the exact days that it can go without refeeding the ALIS
into the connected back to Fort Worth, you know, that is to be
determined.
We really don't know that yet. But you bring up some really
important points. You know, in a comms-denied environment how
do we do command and control of just the air warfare but not
having access to ALIS.
When we were out on the aircraft carrier the Abraham
Lincoln to watch the sortie generation there, it is kind of an
austere location when you think about it. The biggest challenge
with ALIS of getting the information of the aircraft into the
current system on the carrier which had--all the ALIS modules
had to be brought out there and it just ran out of room because
there was so much space required and so much--you know, the
heating requirements, electrical requirements.
So that is going to be something that we are going to have
to do more investigation on and we will be definitely writing
that in our--in our final report.
Mr. Wittman. It seems like the problems that you point out
now--software, sustainment issues, supply chain--potentially
could be exacerbated if you are operating in a comms-denied
environment.
So I hope that you all look very carefully at that because,
to me, that seems like the largest strategic question that we
are going to have to address and there may not be as direct an
answer to it as a software issue and the other operational
issues that have been pointed out.
Mr. Behler. Yes. They are an enormous challenge. I will
leave you with one point. I believe that information is like
ammunition.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Mr. Behler. It needs to be in the hands of the warfighter.
Mr. Wittman. Exactly.
Mr. Behler. It doesn't need to be back in some central
location. It has got to be right where it needs to be, like at
the squadron-level ALIS system in an operational environment.
Mr. Wittman. Lieutenant General Fick, let me get you to
drill down a little bit on that. We know that our large-deck
amphib ships are the operating platform for the F-35 Bravo.
That variant has proven to be a game changer for the Marine
Corps.
But what happens with that is that that aircraft is able to
gather so much information and our large-deck amphibs,
unfortunately, don't have the ability to take that information
in in real time so the C2 [command and control] capabilities
there then are very, very limited.
So, tell me your perspective on what do we do to get the
full power capability of the JSF, the F-35 Bravo, through our
Navy's large-deck amphibs?
To me, there is a limiting factor there. It is not just the
structural issues of the heat on the deck and reinforcing the
deck but it is--you know, what are we doing to be able to get
that information in real time and utilize it in ways that are
tactically important to the warfighter?
General Fick. Sir, thank you for the question.
First, if I can go back to the previous one. We do carry a
requirement to do disconnected ops for 30 days with ALIS in its
current instantiation, and as we work to rearchitect ALIS and
to look at what the requirements as we march forward from both
a data architecture and a hardware architecture perspective, we
need to examine that requirement to operate in austere
locations so that we get the right system built in to be able
to accommodate that.
Relative to the big-deck amphibs, we have had cases over
the course of the last 12 months in which ALIS data
specifically was choked coming off the--coming off the
platform.
In each of those cases, I understand that it was basic
network settings that some combination of we not communicating
properly with the ship's company or them not communicating
properly with the F-35 folks onboard prevented us from getting
the network set up in a way that enabled that communication to
happen.
So, I think two things need to happen as we march forward.
One is we need to look at what is the bare minimum amount of
data that has to flow in this new architecture to allow us to
do the things we need to do on the ship. So we minimize the
demand for that pipe.
Then the second part, sir, is to make sure that when it
comes to instantiating ALIS aboard those big-deck amphibs or at
those austere basing locations that we actually have a very,
very well-defined installation process so that we don't have to
discover these things again.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you for your question.
We are not doing a second round of questions but in
deference to my chair, co-chair, Mr. Norcross does have another
set of questions that he would like to get on the record.
Mr. Norcross. Just a quick followup, General, dealing with
the Turkey question. They had 24 aircraft in the most recent
contract award. How do you mitigate that issue to preserve the
unit price for the contract, taking those 24 into
consideration?
General Fick. Sure. So what we did to maintain both the
flow and the overall quantity as we--as we worked very, very
closely with Lockheed Martin because we had already been a
handshake before this Turkey removal happened.
We work closely with Lockheed, my negotiating team, and the
Air Force, I would add, because what we were able to do is to
slide congressional plus-ups from U.S. Air Force A's into those
positions in the production line to allow the U.S. Air Force
then to take possession of those aircraft as they flow off. So
that the eight Turkish designated----
Mr. Norcross. When you say the plus-ups, the potential
plus-ups that we are talking about?
General Fick. From Lots 12 and 13 specifically.
Mr. Norcross. Okay.
General Fick. And then looking at potential plus-ups in 14
to take care of the 8 Turkish F-35As in Lot 12, the 8 Turkish
F-35As in Lot 13 and then also in Lot 14.
Mr. Norcross. And they have two more production aircrafts.
So, we are adding those in anticipation of O&S that is now
running out of control and we are not handling those F-35s that
are coming off the line now and we are talking about adding 24
in a more expedited role. How do you plan to handle that cost?
Those 24 are coming in quicker----
General Fick. Yes.
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. Than we had planned for,
correct? So, the O&S side of that equation is now being pushed
forward. How are you addressing that----
General Fick. Being accelerated? So, these aircraft were--
sir, I guess I would like to come back to you with a more
complete answer. Ultimately, those aircraft were intended to be
purchased by the Air Force in Lots 12 and 13 and 14 anyway.
They are just being accelerated by a number of months forward.
Mr. Norcross. We understand what you are saying.
General Fick. Okay.
Mr. Norcross. It is not the acquisition costs.
General Fick. It's sustainment. Right.
Mr. Norcross. It's how do we accelerate the costs of
maintaining and those O&S.
General Fick. Yes.
Mr. Norcross. Ms. Lord, just quickly, do you have anything
to add to that?
Secretary Lord. Just that we are trying to work with the
economies of scale here to our benefit as we work forward----
Mr. Norcross. For the purchase price, absolutely. But----
Secretary Lord. No. No. No. But as we also work forward on
sustainment contracts we are doing the same type of thing where
we are looking at the costs very carefully and making sure that
the indirect costs associated with the direct costs are coming
down so that we get those and making sure that we structure all
the contractual agreements so that they do have incentive fees
that have to be earned versus fees that go along with that.
Mr. Norcross. The point we are trying to make here, and I
think it is across the board, is that the sustainment costs are
a major issue. I think the acquisition costs are going
relatively well, if not good.
But when we push or accelerate those planes into the
sustainment side of the equation earlier, we are not prepared
for them.
So, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Norcross. That is the
fundamental point we have been raising throughout this entire
hearing.
We are going to have to move on now to the industry--
Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney. Thank you. I was just
about to ask another question of the current panel, but I am
going to not do so.
I would like--if you are--I am sure the current panel has
other appointments--would like to get to them. But perhaps your
staffs can stick around, if they would do so.
All too often I have seen the first panel head out the door
when they should be here to listen to what others have to say.
So, thank you very much for that. Thank you very much.
Here is what we are going to do. We are talking about $1.4
trillion over the next 20 years or so. That will be taxpayer
money spent on what most people consider to be the most
important element of the air battles that may take place in the
future and we got a big problem here. This thing is not working
well and in many cases is not working at all.
And so, we are going to have another opportunity to speak
to the four of you in early January, and we may do it in a
closed hearing. We are likely to do it in a closed hearing. So,
enjoy the holidays.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. Appreciate your
testimony.
We are going to now move to the second panel. We are going
to take a short break, no more than 5 minutes, as people move
and to reassemble themselves.
So, thank you.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Garamendi. Begin our second panel now, and we have two
witnesses.
Mr. Greg Ulmer, vice president and general manager of the
F-35 program for Lockheed Martin, and Matthew Bromberg,
president of Military Engines at Pratt & Whitney.
So, Mr. Ulmer, if you would like to start. You were here to
listen to the previous panel.
Mr. Ulmer. I was.
Mr. Garamendi. So, start wherever you want and then we will
have our turn.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY M. ULMER, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL
MANAGER, F-35 PROGRAM, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION
Mr. Ulmer. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Norcross, Chairman Garamendi, Ranking Member
Hartzler, Ranking Member Lamborn, distinguished members of the
committee, I appreciate this opportunity to testify on behalf
of Lockheed Martin and the F-35 II--Lightning II industry team.
I thank you for your support and your continued partnership
in advancing this critical program and for your steadfast
support of our men and women in uniform.
Before I take your questions today, I would like to provide
a brief update on the F-35 program from industry's perspective.
While we continue to face challenges, there is no doubt the
program is beginning to hit its stride and we will continue to
work with the services, the Joint Program Office, our
international partners, and Congress to ensure the program
remains on track.
I have submitted my full statement to the committee, which
I ask be made part of the hearing record at this time.
The F-35 stealth technology, supersonic speed, advanced
sensors, weapons capacity, and increased range make it the most
lethal, survivable, and connected aircraft operating in the
world today, and with more than 455 aircraft now deployed on
operational missions and conducting advanced training
exercises, we are seeing users deploy the aircraft and weapons
system beyond what was ever first envisioned.
F-35s now operate from 20 bases, 3 ships, and 9 countries
operating aircraft on their own home soil. The F-35 has and is
transforming coalition operations today.
The F-35 is also empowering economic growth. The program
has 1,500 Tier I suppliers with more than 1,400 of those in the
United States, spanning 45 States and Puerto Rico, and supports
more than 220,000 direct and indirect jobs.
In the United States alone the economic impact is more than
$44 billion annually.
The industry team is ready for full-rate production. Our
plan is to deliver 131 aircraft this year. Currently, we are
delivering at a rate of 12 aircraft per month, which positions
us to meet next year's aircraft delivery rate of more than 140
aircraft, and we have additional capacity to accommodate
increased production rates atop of that.
Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Government recently announced
the agreement for Lots 12 through 14 contract, which achieved
the shared government and industry challenge of delivering a
less than $80 million aircraft 1 year earlier than originally
planned and reduced costs on all 3 variants by an average of
12.7 percent.
As operational deployments continue to increase, we are
keenly focused on the need to reduce sustainment costs and
improve mission readiness. We believe with the same disciplined
approach we can deliver cost reductions similar to those that
we have realized in production.
Sustainment costs will continue to decrease as operational
lessons learned are implemented, data-informed predictive
health monitoring improves, spares parts availability
increases, and a more robust repair capacity is realized within
our military depots and across the original equipment
manufacturers.
We firmly believe a 5-year performance-based logistics
contract structure coupled with $1.5 billion in advanced
funding from Lockheed Martin will provide stability and funding
needed to accelerate cost savings and improve readiness rates
for the F-35 while allowing the program to operate within its
existing budget today.
Today, we are developing and leveraging and integrating new
technology to ensure the F-35 stays ahead of ever-evolving
threats while widening the gap over fourth-generation aircraft.
In conclusion, we are on a positive glide path with the F-
35 and we are quickly solidifying its role as the backbone of
fighter fleets of our nation and well--those as well of our
closest allies.
On behalf of the men and women of Lockheed Martin, we thank
those in uniform and their families for all that they do today
and every day to keep us safe, and we appreciate the critical
role Congress plays to ensure our warfighters ready to succeed
on the battlefields of not only today but of tomorrow.
I thank you for this opportunity and your strong support
for the F-35 and I stand ready to answer your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ulmer can be found in the
Appendix on page 124.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Ulmer.
Mr. Bromberg.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW F. BROMBERG, PRESIDENT, MILITARY ENGINES,
PRATT & WHITNEY
Mr. Bromberg. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Garamendi, Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member
Lamborn, Ranking Member Hartzler, and distinguished members of
the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to share Pratt &
Whitney's role in the production and sustainment of the F135,
the propulsion system for the Joint Strike Fighter.
Also, thanks for the constant congressional support of this
program. I also want to acknowledge Under Secretary Lord,
General Fick, and Lockheed Martin for their partnership.
From the 369,000 Wasp engines produced in World War II to
nearly 200 F135 engines we will deliver in 2020, every Pratt &
Whitney engine bears a seal that proclaims two words:
dependable engines.
Our focus today and tomorrow remains squarely in supporting
the warfighter and doing so in a manner that safeguards the
American taxpayer.
The F135 propulsion system is the world's most powerful and
advanced operational fighter engine. The F135, developed with
our international partners, provides unmatched performance,
safety, reliability, and affordability, all of which contribute
to the National Defense Strategy.
Production and affordability are top priorities. Today, we
have produced more than 500 F135 engines and in 2019 we are on
track to produce our contracted engines, doubling our output
over the past 2 years.
In 2020, we aim to achieve a production rate of
approximately 200 engines and modules per year, which will
remain steady for the program of record. We are also investing
in surge capacity to support increases in production and
sustainment.
Through a jointly funded war on cost, Pratt & Whitney has
reduced the average production cost of the F135 by 50 percent.
While we are pleased with our progress to date, we recognize
the imperative to do more.
Looking forward, we have the opportunity to invest in
longer-term cost reduction projects such as developing
alternative suppliers and leveraging advanced manufacturing
technologies in digital, automation, and additive.
These activities require a long-term vision and consistent
funding. With a worldwide fleet of more than 500 F135 engines,
Pratt & Whitney is driving towards world-class sustainment.
As the fleet grows, we are committed to reduce sustainment
costs by 50 percent. The most important factor is reliability
and, fortunately, the F135 has consistently exceeded 94 percent
mission capability.
Pratt & Whitney drives high mission capability through
advanced digital analytics, prognostics, and health monitoring.
In addition, the component improvement program is a critical
funding priority to maintain levels of reliability and low-cost
sustainment.
Effective sustainment requires collaboration between the
government and Pratt & Whitney. We have a strong history of
public-private partnerships and working across government
agencies. Sustainment is a core competency.
We support more than 100,000 engines around the world
between our commercial and military franchises and we are
committed to sustaining the F135.
With development of the baseline Joint Strike Fighter
program complete, focus is now on modernization. It is
important to assure that the growth in aircraft capability is
matched with propulsion growth.
Fortunately, the F135 has ample design margin to permit
agile upgrades. We are, again, working closely with the Joint
Program Office to develop a propulsion upgrade roadmap.
In conclusion, the F135 is an integral part of the National
Defense Strategy. The F135's unique capabilities of power and
stealth provide the warfighter vital advantages.
The F135 supports more than 33,000 high-technology jobs
across 31 States. We remain laser focused on meeting our
commitments, production, cost, readiness, life cycle
affordability, and propulsion growth. We are committed to
delivering the most capable engine to the warfighter while
providing the most value to the taxpayer.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittees. I, too, have a written record which will be
submitted in. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bromberg can be found in the
Appendix on page 142.]
Mr. Garamendi. I almost want to invite Ms. Maurer to join
us at the table. So, if you would come up, we may ask some
questions because we are going to go right back at issues we
talked before. Prerogative of the chair to change things if the
chair thinks it is important, and I do.
We had a lot of questions that were asked of the previous
panel, all of which are questions that should be asked of the
two of you and, Ms. Maurer, you may want to comment along the
way or maybe ask to comment along the way.
Where to start? Lockheed Martin--Mr. Ulmer, you own ALIS.
What are you going to do about it not working?
Mr. Ulmer. Yes, sir. We have been working for some time now
to improve the ALIS system.
Mr. Garamendi. Let us go right to the heart. Are we headed
for a new architecture?
Mr. Ulmer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. And how long will it take and what will it
be to bring that new architecture on, and will it be secure?
Mr. Ulmer. Lockheed Martin is working with the Joint
Program Office and our international partners relative to
establishing, as you heard in the previous panel from General
Fick, that we are targeting September of 2020 relative to
implementation of that new architecture, and it will have the
security requirements from cybersecurity as well as sovereign
data management.
Mr. Garamendi. Your original contract called for ALIS to
work. It doesn't. Are you paying for the upgrade?
Mr. Ulmer. We are spending about $50 million relative to
internal funds to improve ALIS--as General Fick alluded to,
classic ALIS. We are also implementing additional company funds
in the order of $120 million in terms of the new architecture
investments to support the path forward.
Mr. Garamendi. I am going to turn the remaining 3 minutes
43 seconds over to Ms. Escobar.
Ms. Escobar. Chairman, thank you so much.
Mr. Garamendi. Plus five if you need it.
Ms. Escobar. Well, thank you so much, and good morning.
Thank you all for your testimony and for your time here today.
Mr. Ulmer, I really appreciated that you laid out exactly
how you have been able to ramp up and prepare and plan ahead,
and I actually would like to know a little bit more about your
plan going forward.
You know, the GAO report talked about some trade
complications with regard to parts and would like to know about
your long-term plan for the parts, and would you be using U.S.
sourcing?
Do you have a 5-year timeline, 10-year time line sort of a
vision? Does Lockheed have a vision for assisting us and, if
so, if you wouldn't mind laying that out in a little bit more
detail than in your testimony, please.
Mr. Ulmer. Okay. A little clarification on the question.
Are you talking about from, like, a Turkey alternate resource?
Ms. Escobar. Yes.
Mr. Ulmer. All from a Turkey alternate resource?
Ms. Escobar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ulmer. Yes, ma'am. We are on a trajectory to resolve
all the alternate resource parts by March of 2020. As General
Fick alluded to in the previous testimony, there are a handful
of parts on the order of magnitude of 20 that are beyond that
March 2020 timeline.
But by December of 2020 we will have the ability as the--on
the airframe side to completely resource all material from
Turkey. There is approximately 850 parts. We understand each
one of those parts in terms of what alternate resources
requirements are doing.
We are approaching those within the United States capacity
and ability--approaching the supply chain to manage those
parts. We are also--in some cases in the international
environment we have supply that is already being provided by
current international participants that produce similar or same
parts. We are taking advantage of that relative to risk
reduction of those parts.
So, it is a full enterprise approach relative to managing
those parts. But I want to assure you that by the end of next
year all of those parts will be resourced and we are well on
our way.
Many of the 850 so have already been resourced and are
protected.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, sir.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Ms. Escobar. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
And I am going to follow up on some of these major issues
that we have been talking about. But first I want to bring up
an issue I don't think we have touched on yet and that is
simulator servers, and my understanding is that we have had an
unusually high failure rate among the simulator servers and
that many locations have had to wait months to receive repaired
servers.
So, Mr. Ulmer, given the severe impact that this has on
training, what is Lockheed Martin doing to ensure that this
will not be a problem in the future?
Mr. Ulmer. So, we have had an infant mortality issue with
the blade servers, and we have modified those servers. That
modification occurred in May of 2019. We have seen significant
improvement from that modification.
Today, we are currently going to each site to update those
servers. We are doing it in a fashion such that as we remove a
server for use, we rework that server and we have a return pool
to try to rapidly backfill those parts back into the supply
base.
So, our approach is really to get a supply pool that is
being worked as we pull parts from the sites and then we
position those parts back in as quickly as we can.
Mr. Lamborn. So, I realize security concerns are paramount
here, but you are producing enough spares that you can quickly
do replacements when one breaks?
Mr. Ulmer. Yes, sir. We have worked with Collins, a
supplier, relative to that and we are buying additional spare
capacity on top of the requirements just to sustain and
maintain the units.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
And for both of you, when it comes to intellectual
property, I am really concerned about the issues that we have
had so far. You know, the taxpayer paid, ultimately, for the
intellectual property.
So, what are your two companies' current positions on
intellectual property within the F-35 program and will the
government have access to all of the IP that it needs to
sustain and operate the F-35?
Mr. Ulmer. Chairman, I would offer that data rights and
intellectual property, as we heard from the first panel, is a
significant issue.
The beginning of the F-35, the approach for data rights was
really focused on four tenets: to support operations; to
support maintenance, align maintenance; to support the standup
of the bases; and to support training.
As the programs matured and progressed, the U.S. Government
position on data rights and IP has matured and progressed
relative to that. So we have work to do as an enterprise
relative to that data rights associated with the F-35.
I also would like to emphasize the supply base for the F-
35. Lockheed Martin is responsible for approximately 30 to 40
percent of that intellectual property.
The other is third-party suppliers, and so Lockheed Martin
is working with those third-party suppliers to establish data
rights required to support the enterprise, going forward.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Bromberg.
Mr. Bromberg. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question.
First, for the F135 our development, production, and
sustainment contracts have data right packages included in them
and we are compliant with those.
Secondly, when design the engine and produce the engine, we
design it with sustainment in mind, and when we plan to sustain
the F135 we will do so initially at the Tinker Heavy
Maintenance Center in Oklahoma City where we sustain many other
U.S. service engines. And there we provide all the tactical
data for those maintainers to ensure they can deliver and
support the F135.
We are incentivized to do that based on the mission
capability metrics of the performance-based logistics contract.
It is how we have done every other management program and how
we will execute this one.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Ulmer, I will finish up with this question. Given the
challenges we've seen with the management of the F-35 supply
chain, isn't it premature to jump into a 5-year contract--
performance-based logistics contract--as opposed to going on a
1-year cycle where we make sure all the bugs are worked out
before we go to a 5-year cycle?
Mr. Ulmer. That is the discussion we are having with the
OSD and JPO today relative to what is the appropriate approach
to a performance-based logistics contract.
The benefit of stepping to a performance-based logistics
contract today is today we do annualized contracts and within
those annualized contracts the industry does not have a long
time to make an investment relative to cost-saving initiatives
to get costs out, to bring improvements forward relative to a
new part on the aircraft.
We have examples where we have resourced parts on the
airplane to take advantage of life-cycle cost savings, in
particular the digital--the distributed aperture system where
we have resourced a completely new component on the aircraft.
It is forecasted to save $3 billion across the life of the
program.
It will be 45 percent more reliable. It has twice the
capability of the current and that is the kind of investment we
want to make over a longer-term horizon is that kind of
opportunity to make those kinds of investments to bring the
price down.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
And since you are here, Ms. Maurer, could you comment on
this before I yield back?
Ms. Maurer. Sure, real quickly.
Mr. Lamborn. The indulgence of the chairman.
Ms. Maurer. Yes, thank you for the question.
From a GAO perspective, we think that there are potential
benefits of going to multiyear performance-based contracting
approach for sustainment. That is a general proposition.
However, in a report that we issued last year we expressed
some concerns about DOD's ability to enter into such multiyear
contracts in part because the Department lacks good information
about the overall cost of sustainment as well as the unresolved
nature of many of the data rights and intellectual property
issues.
We think that these issues need to be resolved before DOD
can enter into long-term sustainment contracts--multiyear
sustainment contracts.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garamendi. We are coming down to a smaller group here,
so we are going to be a little less formal.
Mr. Lamborn raised an extraordinarily important issue. Ms.
Maurer, you commented on that, and the Department and the
negotiations are underway for a multiyear contract.
And I want you to go back to what you were saying and go
into more detail about the issues that need to be resolved or
at least a pathway to resolution before we move to a multiyear
contract. If you will hone in on that.
Ms. Maurer. Sure, absolutely.
So in the report that we issued last year we talked
specifically about the Department's lack of good information
about what the true costs are for sustaining the F-35 and we
think that is an important part of the Department's ability to
negotiate with a contractor for that, get the best bargain, the
best value for the money that the taxpayers will ultimately be
responsible for these costs.
DOD, at the time of our report, did not have good
visibility and understanding of the overall costs of
sustainment. That is one issue.
Mr. Garamendi. This is an issue that has--that requires our
attention. We are talking $1.4 trillion over the next 25 years
or so--an extraordinary amount of money that is really going to
be controlled by two companies, both of whom are at this table.
Now, that is a pile of money. Obviously, you have
subcontractors that are--and others that are involved in this
including the military portion of the $1.4 trillion or so.
This--our committees--Mr. Norcross and I are not going to
back away from getting into the detail and for my part here I
don't see a multiyear contract going forward until the
fundamental questions that have been asked thus far and several
that have not yet been put on the table are resolved.
And heretofore the contractors have had the long end of the
lever and the government has been on the short end of the
lever. That is going to change.
That is going to change because thus far this program has
not worked well. Made progress, no doubt about it. But we got
some very, very serious problems that have to be resolved.
And so, the power is shifting so that the government will
have at least that fulcrum moving closer to the government side
as we go into these years out ahead.
So be aware, gentlemen. Be aware. We have got to solve
these problems and there is a whole list of them.
Mr. Norcross, it is your turn.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Mr. Ulmer, just quickly, let me follow up. I don't want to
talk too much. You said 30 to 40 percent of the intellectual
rights are within Lockheed Martin, assuming the others are with
whom? The gentleman to your left? Subcontractors that you
control or subcontractors that others control?
Mr. Ulmer. It is a mix. There is GFE--government-furnished
equipment--on the aircraft. There is the additional subtiers
under Lockheed Martin that control that, the different industry
elements of the program.
Mr. Norcross. So you will have control over your
subcontractors in this issue?
Mr. Ulmer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. The ones that, obviously, we have? Okay. Just
putting that aside. So, we heard a lot today about issues that
have gone on and I think it is important to talk about those.
But I also want to say bringing down the cost per unit, it
is a very good thing. But those costs, will we accelerate those
even though we are bringing them down? We are shifting over to
Mr. Garamendi's committee those sustainment costs and that is a
big issue.
Turkey--the parts supply has always been a challenge for
you--things that you control versus things that we control or,
certainly, the engine compartment.
When we are setting up the 850 parts that Turkey was
involved in, who was making the actual decision who is going to
stand up with which companies, and for both of you I assume you
make the decision for your engine components and who--how do
you make that decision versus oversight from others? We put you
in that position by pulling Turkey out.
Mr. Ulmer. So, we follow our normal resource acquisition
process, which we do each and every day. So, we are constantly
looking at do we have the appropriate supply base, do we need
to seek alternate sources for other reasons than political.
It might be financial performance. It might be poor health
of a company. It might be poor performing equipment. We have a
very detailed process relative to how we resource our material
or source our material.
Mr. Norcross. But for Turkey you are following----
Mr. Ulmer. We are following our normal process in
conjunction with sharing that information with the Joint
Program Office.
Mr. Norcross. Okay. So, when we start dealing with that
were you anticipating that the parts that you are getting today
from Turkey were going to continue to this point? Were you
surprised in your planning for moving forward?
Mr. Ulmer. I don't quite understand the question. Were we--
--
Mr. Norcross. The initial question when Turkey was going to
be informed that they were suspended from the program there was
a potential for the parts to stop that day.
Mr. Ulmer. Yes.
Mr. Norcross. Which would have put us in a very precarious
situation and throw our schedule way off. They are still
supplying and is there reason to believe that they might stop
anytime soon?
Mr. Ulmer. Other than politically, no. The Turkish industry
is very much a part of F-35. They are strong performers. They
produce high quality at a low cost.
They are very interested in if in a political environment
able to remain within the F-35 program they desire to do so.
Other than politically, we are not concerned relative to that
supply.
Mr. Norcross. So, they could continue, hypothetically, to
supply us. Up to what point are you planning now to cut them
off and be cut off by----
Mr. Ulmer. Per direction, we have been directed to target
March--end of March 2020--to terminate our relationship
relative to Turkish supply.
Mr. Norcross. And that----
Mr. Ulmer. Our approach--our approach to date----
Mr. Norcross. Transition does not postpone any of the
production line by that standard?
Mr. Ulmer. No, sir. Our approach to date was we are not
opening any new additional purchase orders or ordering
additional material beyond the March of 2020 timeframe.
If Turkey has the capacity and ability to produce
additional parts within that time slot between now and March in
2020, industry will take advantage of getting that supply.
Mr. Norcross. That was a best-case scenario when we were
talking about this over a year ago.
Mr. Ulmer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. So, when the sole source contracts for those
850 parts--is it a competitive contract with you or does that
have more to do with who can get that to us quicker?
Mr. Ulmer. Chairman, first off, it is not just single
source. We have actual single source, dual source, and even
triple source.
Mr. Norcross. Right. I am just talking about the single
source replacement for Turkey parts.
Mr. Ulmer. Yes. Restate the question, please.
Mr. Norcross. Is it--when you go for the single source,
which I think there is only maybe a half dozen critical items
in there, is that a competitive contract to you or is it who
can supply that part in the timeframe we need?
Mr. Ulmer. In this specific--in this specific circumstance
if there is competition to be had, we will approach that from a
competitive situation. If there is a--if there is an industry
participant that has that capability, a subject matter
expertise that gets to a quick solution, we will procure it
immediately that way to protect the risk--against the risk--and
then over time we will competitively bid that work beyond this
period of performance.
Mr. Norcross. So short term it is a risk. Long term it is
pricing.
Mr. Ulmer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bromberg. And, Chairman, I would like to just add from
a Pratt & Whitney perspective, we have 200 parts that have been
sourced in Turkey. The Turkish suppliers are actually high-
performing suppliers, as you have heard today. Low cost, high
quality, on-time delivery.
We have been coordinating our actions with the Joint
Program Office for actually the past couple years and, like
Lockheed Martin, we are on track to handle a separation in
March of 2020 with potential a final separation in December of
2020.
To your question of how we resourced it, we actually
sourced about 80 percent of those parts back into the United
States for the sake of speed in order to protect the program
schedule and many of the most critical parts are actually back
into Pratt & Whitney where we have the capability to ramp up
much faster than working anywhere else.
So, we did that for the sole reason and in conjunction with
the Joint Program Office to protect the speed of the production
line.
Mr. Norcross. Just real quickly, are all the new suppliers
U.S. based or do any of our partners get a taste?
Mr. Ulmer. Initially, we--from a Lockheed Martin
perspective, we sought U.S. sources. There were some specific
cases where international partners already were sourcing the
same exact material. So to reduce risk we went with those
international companies.
Mr. Bromberg. Exactly the same position for Pratt &
Whitney. About 80 percent were sourced in the United States
where we had existing capacity or the capability to do the
work; 20 percent went to international suppliers that already
did similar work and can ramp up quickly.
Mr. Garamendi. Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let us talk about parts a little bit here. Reliability and
maintainability is really important--that the part is reliable,
it does what it is supposed to do, and we are able to maintain
it, and I understand that we have been making steady progress
on both of those fronts.
So how has the reliability and maintainability improvement
projects--how are they progressing and to what extent are these
projects having any impact, positive or negative, on the
manufacturing floors?
Mr. Ulmer.
Mr. Ulmer. Yes, ma'am.
If we look over the course of the procurement of the
aircraft in particular from Lot 6 annually to today,
reliability and maintainability has improved significantly lot
over lot.
So, the aircraft today that we are delivering today are a
lot more reliable than the ones we delivered 6 years ago, 7
years ago.
We continue to focus on reliability and maintainability
improvement on the program. I will tell you, in comparison to
other programs the enterprise has not necessarily funded
reliability and maintainability improvements.
To give you an example, on the F-22 program, which has a
fleet of approximately 185 aircraft, that program funds
approximately $70 million in support of reliability and
maintainability improvements on that fleet.
This year in this FY [fiscal year] the F-35 program has
funded $7 million for a fleet of 455 aircraft. That said,
industry has made a significant investment relative to
reliability and maintainability improvements on the platform
and that really is the reason why lot over lot we have seen
that significant improvement as those parts become more
reliable in the fleet.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Bromberg.
Mr. Bromberg. Yes, ma'am. So, from an engine perspective,
the F135 is the most reliable fighter engine we have ever
produced. In 230,000 hours of operation it has maintained an
average mission capability of north of 94 percent and, in fact,
this milestone in service, 200,000 hours, it is 10 times more
reliable than the F-100 was at the same milestone.
So, I think that is a testament to the fantastic engineers
and technicians in Pratt & Whitney that know how to design
dependable engines.
However, we have to be vigilant, and just as Mr. Ulmer
said, we are firmly supporting the component improvement
program which has a proven track record on all our engines at
addressing reliability issues early when it can be done cost
effectively and ensure sustainment and mission capability.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great.
Let us talk about availability because that has been an
issue--the availability of parts and flight lines are just
down, waiting, and even our forces are having to cannibalize
some of the parts from other aircraft to keep them flying.
So, what are you doing to work with DOD and the Joint
Program Office to improve the management of ready-to-issue
spare parts, and I would also say not just the management but
the availability of the parts?
Mr. Ulmer. Several different aspects in terms of our
approach to improve reliability of parts on the aircraft and
availability of parts on the aircraft.
First, in the lots--again, back to Lot 16 we went to what
was called a Tech Refresh 2 configuration for the F-35. We
had--we have some units that we needed to accelerate those
updates to those airframes to get more reliable parts. An
example is Eglin Air Force Base had a fleet of aircraft that
did not have that refresh in them.
And so, as part of the acceleration process we went and
accelerated the implementation of that Tech Refresh into those
fleets such that they have newer, more reliable parts.
We also have a reliability improvement program where you
identify the top poor performers on the aircraft in terms of
those items need to be improved.
And so, we understand what those are and we have
historically worked those top performers down. We are also
improving the health diagnostic system on the aircraft. Many
times, from an availability perspective, we were telling the
mechanic or the technician--the flight line technician--to
remove a part when in fact it was not broken.
And so, the health diagnostic system on the airplane, when
we went from the development program to the 3F configuration we
saw a 60 percent improvement of no false alarms of those parts
on the aircraft.
So we are no longer having the mechanic take that part off
the airplane and staying on the airplane.
Mrs. Hartzler. So, the question was more--not so much
issues with parts that are already on but the availability,
that they are available to begin with.
So, what are the parts that you seem to have a shortage of
the most? Is the canopy an issue? What are some of the other
parts that you are short?
Mr. Ulmer. So, the primary driver as alluded to by General
Fick is the canopy. The wing-tip lens is another part from a
portability perspective. We understand each one--each and every
one of those parts.
Ready for issueness has also been--the issue has been with
the electronic digital file that is associated with those
parts. The GAO report indicates that as an issue on the
platform.
In the last 2 years, we have done several things to resolve
that problem. One is any parts coming out of the facility when
we deliver an aircraft, we ensure that those electronic files
are correct and appropriate.
For the parts coming out of the warehouse, we are ensuring
that those parts from a digital pedigree are appropriate and
can be consumed by the warfighter without issue.
There are parts within the supply that still have that
issue that were issued prior to our corrective actions. Within
the last 2 years we have cleansed that data by approximately 50
percent, and so we have taken an extreme effort relative to
cleansing the data associated with those parts such that when
the mechanic goes to reach that item off the shelf and
implement it, it is in fact capable of doing so.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great. Can I----
Mr. Bromberg. Do you mind if I also answer the question,
ma'am?
Mrs. Hartzler. No way. No. Sure.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bromberg. You know, I think--from an engine perspective
again, we contract separately from the airframe. We plan our
production systems separately from the airframe and we are
going to maintain sustainment separately from the airframe.
We collaborate in many areas but there are some
differences. In terms of how we think about the demand for
production and sustainment, from the inception we design our
engines for sustainment, as I mentioned before.
So, when we loaded the capacity requirements to produce
parts, we loaded all those for new engines, modules, and spare
parts.
As a result, we actually have a fairly significant stock of
spare parts both in Pratt & Whitney and military facilities
around the world, and part of our mission capability is because
our nonmission capability due to supply when the part is not
available is averaging less than 2 percent.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is great.
Mr. Bromberg. So, I think the team has done a nice job. We
need to remain vigilant because, as we have talked about in the
prior panel, that forecasting and stocking problem changes over
time. But we have got dedicated sustainment professionals and
that is what they do.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great.
Mr. Chair, can I ask one more question here?
Mr. Garamendi. Do you need more time?
Mrs. Hartzler. I do need more time.
Mr. Garamendi. Go for it.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. So, Mr. Ulmer, a recent Department of
Defense inspection general report titled ``Audit of F-35 Ready-
for-Issue Spare Parts and Sustainment Performance Incentive
Fees'' found that the DOD did not receive ready-for-issue F-35
spare parts in accordance with contract requirements and paid
performance incentive fees on the sustainment contracts based
on inflated and unverified F-35A aircraft availability hours.
So, do you plan to reimburse DOD for these pay performance
incentive fees?
Mr. Ulmer. Ma'am, the current recent sustainment contracts
have those incentives now embedded in them relative to our
performance. So previously, prior to that report, we did not
have that kind of incentive. We do now in terms of issue
effectiveness, part availability, those kinds of metrics.
Separately from that, on our own accord we are off
cleansing the data, as I just--as I just testified--relative to
resolving that problem at our expense to cleanse those parts.
Mrs. Hartzler. So, going forward, this isn't going to be an
issue and just to clarify, going back, what this audit was on
you say you have paid back those fees?
Mr. Ulmer. No, ma'am. We haven't paid back those fees.
Prior to this--prior to the implementation of those incentive
fees, we did not have that in terms of the contract
performance. We do today. So, I don't earn a fee today if I
have those issues.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. All right.
I yield back.
Ms. Maurer. Mr. Chairman, could I--30 seconds on
reliability and----
Mr. Garamendi. Yes, please do.
Ms. Maurer [continuing]. It is directly relevant to the
ranking member's question.
A good thing for further oversight is to recognize the fact
that the operational requirements document that underlies the
F-35 has eight reliability and maintainability requirements;
four of those eight are being met.
Those are the four that are contractually required. The
other four that are not contractually required are not being
met, and that is an issue we have reported on extensively over
the last couple of years.
Mr. Garamendi. So, it helps to have a contract?
Ms. Maurer. Absolutely, and put it into the contract. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, I have got so many questions, but I am
going to turn to Mr. Brown and try to control myself.
So, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Once again, I want to thank both chairs and both ranking
members for conducting today's hearing as we conduct our
responsibility--our congressional responsibility or oversight
responsibility of the F-35 program sustainment, production, and
affordabilities.
And I am especially pleased that for today's hearing and
this panel here because this is the first time in my 3 years as
a member of the House Armed Services Committee that I can
recall that we have invited our defense industrial base
partners to present and make themselves available to
questioning from Members of Congress and I think that it is
important.
I do also want to once again thank Ms. Maurer, you and your
colleagues at the Government Accountability Office. I can tell
you that I frame my positions--I base many of the decisions
that I make as a member of this committee based on the good
work that you do. You are our watchdogs and you do fantastic
work.
I had an opportunity to visit on July 30th the F-35
production line. I hope perhaps to get out to the F135
production line at Pratt & Whitney in the near future and I
want to certainly take the opportunity to thank Lockheed Martin
but more particularly the members of the team--the members on
that production line who I had an opportunity to meet with--the
machinists, the assemblers, the mechanics, the coders, and from
the engineers to the back office that is a group of dedicated
men and women who are doing their very best to make sure that
our warfighters have the systems, the platforms, that they need
to do their job, to do effectively, and to come home safely to
their families.
So, to Lockheed Martin and to--I am sure the same can be
said about the men and women at Pratt & Whitney. I thank that
dedicated workforce.
Ms. Maurer, maybe we can do another sort of back and forth,
this time with you and Mr. Ulmer. You had, in the GAO report,
sort of four categories where you grouped your recommendations.
One was DOD lacks critical information to effectively plan
for long-term F-35 sustainment and one of the recommendations
there was that the DOD needs to obtain comprehensive cost
information for F-35 spare parts.
Can you just sort of, you know, flesh that out a little
bit? What was the problem? What is the recommendation and then
perhaps Mr. Ulmer can be responsive to your remarks.
Ms. Maurer. Sure. Absolutely.
So, I think as we all know, when the program was first
launched it was launched under a very different construct than
programs are typically launched today.
Back when it was started almost 20 years ago, the idea was
that the government was going to hand over logistics support
almost entirely to the contractor. So that is the way the
program was formulated and executed for a number of years.
Fast forward to now, when the Defense Department is trying
to get a clean financial opinion, one of the big challenges it
is facing right now to get that clean financial opinion is
putting a dollar value on the parts that it is purchasing for
the F-35 program.
One of the things we found in our report earlier this year
is that DOD currently literally doesn't know where the parts
are and they can't match up the dollars that they spent back to
specific major end items and major parts.
That makes it very difficult for them to get a clean
financial opinion. I know that right now the Joint Program
Office and OSD is working closely with Lockheed and the other
contractors to resolve that issue.
But since that wasn't built into the contract, it wasn't
built into the structure of the program, it is a pretty major
undertaking.
Mr. Brown. So, Mr. Ulmer, what is industry doing to assist
the Department in addressing that recommendation?
Mr. Ulmer. First off, I would like to say I believe we have
a very solid working relationship with GAO. We do an annual
review on the program--a deep dive on the program--and then we
support any specific audit or request with full transparency
with the GAO.
Relative to the parts, Lockheed Martin has a property
management system that is accredited by DCMA, the Defense
Contract Management Agency. We are working right now with the
JPO relative to the program office setting up their own
property management system.
We are supporting that effort as we speak across the entire
F-35 enterprise. So, we will help and we are helping the JPO
program office acquire all that information as alluded to.
Mr. Brown. Ms. Maurer, are you--do you have anything that
you want to add or----
Ms. Maurer. We are aware that this is an ongoing
initiative. It is something that is going to take a while to
dig out from. It is not something that is going to resolve very
quickly.
We are encouraged by the progress we have seen from the JPO
and we want to see them work closely with Lockheed as well.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
Mr. Bromberg, let me ask you, what is Pratt & Whitney doing
to help the government reduce its procurement costs for engines
and subsequent sustainment costs after fielding?
Mr. Bromberg. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question.
As I indicate in my remarks, we are pleased with the 50
percent reduction of the unit price of an F135 to date but we
are not satisfied that that is enough, going forward.
We recognize that the strategy we used to achieve the 50
percent reduction needs to evolve. The program I alluded to was
a jointly funded government-Pratt & Whitney program called
Pratt's War on Cost--$200 million of investment that yielded
2,000 different actions that took 50 percent of a unit price of
an F135 down, resulting in $7 billion, $8 billion of program
savings to the government. Very successful program.
However, where we are now with 500 engines in service, a
very stable engine configuration in achieving that 94 percent
mission capability that we talked about, we need to shift to a
different strategy that allows us to leverage the long-term
procurement plan for the F135 and maintain a stable
configuration for the engine so we can maintain the
reliability.
So the way we will do that is by leveraging two primary
areas: one, advances in manufacturing technologies that did not
exist when we launched the program such as digital, automation,
and additive; and secondly, developing alternative suppliers
where we find we don't have enough of a competitive landscape
so that we can get true value to the taxpayer. Those are both
long-term strategies but strategies that we are working with
the Joint Program Office to embrace.
That cost reduction I talked about will lend directly to
sustainment cost reduction. In terms of a depot visit, 60
percent of the cost is from new materials. So the more we
reduce the price of an engine and the materials that go into
it, the more cost effective the maintenance is.
Secondly, it goes to the component improvement program,
sir, we talked about earlier, make sure you maintain
reliability. And, finally, it's effective management at the
operational level and the depot level, something Pratt &
Whitney takes very near and dear to its heart.
We have thousands of sustainment professionals and we are
going to work collaboratively with the government to do that.
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, if I could have the benefit of the
same indulgence that you showed to my colleagues. I just have
one more question.
Mr. Garamendi. You are stretching it.
Mr. Brown. Short question. Hopefully a short answer.
Just for Mr. Ulmer, how confident are you that you will get
to $25,000 cost per flight hour by 2025 as you have stated and
what tools do you need from the Department or Congress to help
you get there?
Mr. Ulmer. The confidence is high if we resource load the
approach, and what does that mean? The resource load of the
approach is General Fick and Ms. Lord indicated we have a life
cycle sustainment plan. We need to make sure that we apply the
necessary resources to that plan to allow the cost savings on
the back side of that plan.
And then the other element I would add is the performance-
based logistics contract. We need a long-term contract relative
to allowing industry to make those investments over a longer
period of time that have those cost savings reductions on the
back side.
We have a history and Blueprint for Affordability [BFA] on
the F-35 program. Two different cycles. The BFA 1 cycle with a
$500 million investment; over the life cycle of the program, a
$6 billion savings across that life cycle. That is the approach
and the benefit relative to that.
Mr. Brown. I thank the chair and I yield back no time.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Garamendi. Always sufficient time for good questions
and thank you for the good questions.
We are really out of time. The next hearing is about to--
will commence in less than an hour and they are going to bring
the doggies in here to make sure that none of you are leaving
some of your equipment behind to snoop on what the next
classified hearing will have.
Going forward, heads up. If you haven't figured it out, the
Readiness Subcommittee, together with the Tactical Air and Land
will be coordinating our efforts in the months ahead to drive
out of this F-35 program the known problems.
There is a long list of them. GAO--Ms. Maurer, you and your
team are extraordinarily important to us, to this program, and
to the contractors for their attention to issues that they may
not observe or be willing to observe, and so we are going to
really rely heavily on you.
Also, I want to point out that the professional staff here,
Ms. Harris from my staff and the professional staff on Mr.
Lamborn's side, Mr. Norcross, have done an extraordinary job
following this along.
We are going to come back at this in January and we are
going to go at it in additional detail. We didn't get into the
cataloguing issue, into the issue of parts which, fortunately,
Mr. Brown has brought up together with Mrs. Hartzler. We are
going to go at those in more detail.
There is a transition underway here from total reliance
upon the contractors to a shared responsibility into the
future.
It seems to me, and I will put this on the table because I
am sure it is going to happen, is that the services, now that
they are getting these planes and being held accountable for
the operational readiness of the planes, are going to demand
more authority and responsibility, and that is going to shift
the nature of the Joint Program Office in the future and shift
the relationship between the contractors and the Department of
Defense, Joint Program Office, and the various services. That
shift is already underway. The Defense Logistics Agency is
going to be playing a major role, going forward.
Thank you, Ms. Maurer, for pointing out that there are
7,000 parts that the Defense Logistics Agency has on various
shelves somewhere around the world. Sixty-three hundred of
those are parts that fit various tranches of the F-35.
So how does that fit into this? What are the roles of these
various agencies, going forward? We are looking at--I was
reminded that I will not be here for the end of this program,
which is apparently not 20 years from now, which was my
personal time horizon, but 58 years from now. Not likely to be
my responsibility then.
However, for us, this is our here and now. We got to get
this right, and so we are going to rely on everybody, going
forward.
I want to particularly thank my colleagues here for their
questions, for their attention to this matter.
We will see you in mid-January. Thank you so very much.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
November 13, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 13, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
November 13, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. FRC East is the largest industrial depot that
generates combat air power for both the Marine Corps and Navy variants
of the F-35. The buildings at FRC East, like all of the other fleet
readiness centers in the United States, continue to lag in upgrades and
new construction commitment from the Navy. What is DOD doing to address
the sustainability of F-35 in terms of depot upgrades, specifically at
FRC East? How should the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
address the future needs of FRC East, which is the only Navy fleet
readiness command resident on a Marine Corps air station? The problem
of antiquated, legacy maintenance facilities is particularly acute in
the Navy. How can the Joint Program Office, the Navy, and the Marine
Corps ensure that we continue to commit resources to the right efforts
to improve FRC East and their maintenance performance?
Secretary Lord. The Department of the Navy, as outlined in the
Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers Infrastructure Optimization Plan
(IOP), is not only addressing the sustainability of the F-35, but also
the future needs of FRC East (FRCE) by upgrading various depot
facilities and equipment. This includes the construction of a new F-35
maintenance hangar, and the construction of an advanced composites
repair facility in addition to numerous other MILCON projects. The IOP
requests a rough order of magnitude investment of $3.5 billion over the
next decade. Of this total, approximately $1.5 billion is required for
MILCON projects, an estimated $1 billion for sustainment, restoration,
and modernization of facilities, and roughly $1 billion for equipment
recapitalization. Modernization will enable the depots to fulfill their
current production requirements and achieve the production objectives
within the COMFRC Strategic Plan. The Joint Program Office, the Navy,
and the Marine Corps, to include the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, understand the importance of FRCE to
the F-35 Program, along with the other naval aviation depot support
that FRCE provides, and will work together to determine the best way
forward to realize the requirements laid out in the IOP.
Mr. Langevin. FRC East is the Navy's only depot dedicated to
maintaining the F-35B and if need, the F-35C. FRC East resides on a
USMC installation, MCAS Cherry Point. However, FRC East is owned by the
Navy, specifically, Naval Air Command (NAVAIR). FRC East requires
significant investments to build and modernize facilities there to
maintain the F-35. There appears to be some disagreement between the
Navy and Marine Corps over who is responsible for paying to upgrade
facilities at FRC East. I am concerned this argument is delaying
progress. Which service is responsible for funding the needed
construction and modernization efforts at FRC East? The Navy or the
Marine Corps?
Secretary Lord. The Department of the Navy is responsible for
funding construction and modernization efforts at all Fleet Readiness
Centers (FRC)s. In support of the F-35B and F-35C Fleet, and the
required facilities at FRC East, the Navy and Marine Corps are working
an acceptable solution agreeable to both parties. The DON will provide
an update once this agreement is completed, estimated to be NLT the
3rd/4th QTR CY2020 timeframe.
Mr. Langevin. The facilities at our depots that are being used to
maintain the F-35 were designed for 2nd and 3rd generation aircraft.
That is to say, they were built in the 1940s and 50s. A 5th generation
fighter needs modern maintenance facilities. Otherwise, I do not
believe we will be able to sustain the F-35 in a war against a near-
peer adversary. Does the Navy and Air Force have a comprehensive plan
to modernize the depots being used to maintain the F-35? If so, what is
that plan and what is the timeline for implementation?
Secretary Lord. Yes the Navy and Air Force have a comprehensive
plan to modernize the depots.
For the Navy, COMFRC is modernizing all three Depots in support of
F-35 aircraft, engines, and components. COMFRC's Infrastructure
Optimization Plan (IOP) provides a roadmap to update the Industrial
Depot's facilities and equipment to support both legacy and fifth
generation weapon systems. Phase 1, completed in 1st quarter 2019,
included an initial baseline assessment of the Depot's most critical
production and manufacturing facilities and critical equipment. Phase 1
identified an estimated $3.5B requirement over 10 years (roughly $1.5B
Military Construction (MILCON), $1B Sustainment, Restoration, and
Modernization (SRM), and $1B Industrial Support Equipment). COMFRC's
Phase 1 Report to Congress was submitted in April 2019. IOP
Implementation is already underway. We received initial FY19 and FY20
Industrial Support Equipment funding as well as approval to increase
rates in FY21 to fund the SRM requirements. We also continue to compete
for MILCON funding through the Navy MILCON program.
In 2018, the Air Force accomplished a comprehensive baseline
assessment and developed a 20-year roadmap for modernizing all three
organic depots to support legacy and fifth generation weapon systems.
The Air Force plan identified requirements stratified across 4
dimensions (IT/industrial software, equipment/technology, facilities,
and infrastructure). In 2019, the Air Force began leveraging the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to refine our plan and optimize our
industrial processes. Our leadership is working Planning Choices via
Air Force corporate structure for prioritization of funding options. We
continue to compete for MILCON funding to support legacy and fifth
generation weapon systems beyond FY28.
Mr. Langevin. According to a June 2018 GAO report, the Department
was planning to defer fixes for some of the F-35's deficiencies until
after a full-rate production decision. Category 1 deficiencies are
those that could jeopardize safety, security, or a critical requirement
for the aircraft. Will you approve full-rate productionn with Category
1 deficiencies still open?
Secretary Lord. The twelve open F-35 Category 1 deficiencies (as of
9 December 2019) are summarized below, along with the rationale for
proceeding with a full-rate production decision. Although #5 will
require a small hardware modification for customers who desire a
solution, all other planned actions for these deficiencies are being
phased to coincide with planned software updates.
1. F-35B Tailboom & Horizontal Tail Damage During Sustained
Supersonic Flight: All missions can be accomplished while complying
with the time limit imposed at the high-speed edge of the flight
envelope. There is no evidence to-date of any significant sustainment
issues due to exceedance of the time limit.
2. F-35C Tailboom & Horizontal Tail Damage During Sustained
Supersonic Flight: All missions can be accomplished while complying
with the time limit imposed at the high-speed edge of the flight
envelope. There is no evidence to-date of any significant sustainment
issues due to exceedance of the time limit.
3. Hydraulic line rupture caused by a blown tire: There have been
no operational observances of this issue to date. The System Safety
Risk Assessment concluded that the design is compliant (low risk) and
does not need further mitigation.
4. Radar Sea Search limited to a small pre-designated area: U.S.
services concurred with the design for Sea Search in 2014 and the
fielded baseline meets these requirements. Follow-on improvements for
Sea Search are planned for 2024 and require enhanced processing
capability, enabled through Block 4.
5. Cabin Over-pressurizations Create Conditions Possible to Induce
Barotrauma: There have been no operational observances of this issue to
date. The System Safety Risk Assessment concluded that the design is
compliant (low risk). An improvement to cockpit pressure regulation is
under investigation, but has yet to be flight tested.
6. Unanticipated thrust limits in jetborne flight on hot days:
Significant improvements have been made with vehicle and engine
software updates in 2019, and with enhanced fleet procedures.
Additional software updates in mid-2020 will restore compliant engine
performance for F-35B.
7. Obscured Night Vision Camera scene during below-mean starlight
ambient lighting conditions: No alternative technology is ready for
implementation today, requiring use of shipboard lighting on very dark
nights. A software improvement will be attempted in mid-2020.
8. Incorrect inventory data for complex assemblies continues to
result in grounding conditions: Ongoing data quality issues with
information stored in the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS)
may cause occasional delays in releasing aircraft for flight. Data
quality improvements continue to be worked.
9. Lack of DTED Elevation Data for Pilot Entered Waypoints: The
pilot interface was concurred with by services during system design,
but this issue was identified during operational test. Software
resolution is expected in mid-2020.
10. SINS alignments aboard QE class carriers fail to achieve
mission capable solution: A workaround solution of in-motion alignment
has been successfully used aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth during recent
events. Software solution for SINS cable alignments will be released in
late 2020.
11. Classified DR #445: Details are classified. The solution
appears to be a non-F-35 software update planned for mid-2020.
12. Classified DR #494: Details are classified. The solution will
be included in an F-35 software update in mid-2020.
Mr. Langevin. You have said in the past that Turkey makes nearly
1,000 parts for the F-35. Do you still expect those Turkish suppliers
to be replaced by March 2020?
Secretary Lord. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) is working with
Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney to develop, identify and qualify
alternative sources for 817 air vehicle parts ( 3% of bill of material)
and 188 propulsion parts (6% of bill of material) currently made in
Turkey so that they may also be removed from the supply chain. The U.S.
Services have provided $589M for this activity, which began in March
2019. Plans are underway to transition the majority of parts in the
Turkish supply chain by March 2020. Of note, production of six landing
gear components, the Center Fuselage, and F-135 Integrally Bladed
Rotors (IBRs) do not support an abrupt supply cut-off date of March
2020. The JPO is working mitigation strategies to develop alternative
sources to Turkish supply for these parts:
Six Landing Gear parts are anticipated to be transitioned
by the end of December 2020 to alternative sources. Based on current
rough estimates, an abrupt March 2020 supply cut-off date for landing
gear would disrupt 81 on-time aircraft deliveries. Lockheed Martin is
working to mitigate these late deliveries by using a pool of available
landing gear until there is a sufficient line of balance with alternate
sources.
The JPO is currently developing courses of action to
transfer center fuselage work from Turkey to Northrop-Grumman
facilities in Palmdale, CA, where the rest of the center fuselage work
is currently executed. The center fuselage is a major component of the
F-35 aircraft and full transition to Palmdale requires simultaneously
terminating purchase orders in Turkey while preserving work in progress
and raw material. These purchase orders pre-date the alternate source
activities. Although the schedule impact to aircraft of transitioning
center fuselage to Palmdale is much less severe than landing gear, the
F-35 Program is seeking alternatives in additional tooling for Palmdale
to make up the capacity currently sourced from Turkey.
The IBR portion of the propulsion system is the long lead
component that would pace production after landing gear and center
fuselages. The JPO has worked with Pratt & Whitney and USD (A&S) staff
to provide funding to procure additional milling machines to
manufacture IBRs originally provided by Turkish suppliers. These
milling machines will be installed in Pratt & Whitney's Connecticut
facility and will increase capacity to support F-35 needs. If the
supply of these three parts were disrupted in March 2020, it is
foreseeable that we would expect to start seeing aircraft delivery
delays within a few months. Although we are aggressively qualifying
alternate sources and facilitating them to produce at rate, our current
modeling, paced by landing gear, suggests that the impact of a March
2020 supply disruption is estimated to be 81 aircraft delivered after
their contracted schedule delivery date. The JPO estimates that
maintaining these supply chains until December 2020 would provide the
time needed to avoid production line impacts.
Mr. Langevin. Within the F-35 supply chain, do you see
manufacturing of spare parts competing with manufacturing of parts for
new production aircraft when it comes to industrial base capacity? The
military depots should help relieve capacity challenges for the
industrial base on parts repairs. However, according to GAO, current
projections show the depots will not have the ability to fully meet the
demand for repairs until 2024. What steps are you taking in the
interim?
General Fick. Manufacturing of parts to meet production and initial
spare requirements do compete for existing industrial base capacity
today. The requirement for initial spares will grow proportionately
with the number of new production aircraft; similarly, we expect the
demand for the repair of Line Repairable Units (LRUs) will grow as the
fleet grows. The same subcomponents required to produce parts for
production and initial spares are also required for the repair of these
LRUs. From an F-35 perspective, the primary role of the military depots
is the repair of LRUs. Currently, some Original Equipment Manufacturers
(OEMs) are also repair facilities. This repair burden competes for
capacity with the manufacturing of new parts to support production and
initial spare requirements. To alleviate the impact repair places on
OEM capacity, the F-35 enterprise (JPO, Lockheed Martin, and Pratt &
Whitney) have accelerated activation of organic depot repair
capability. To date the depot repair acceleration plan is on track to
enable all organic repair activations to reach full rate by 2024. As of
31 December 2019, 30 of 68 Depot Activations have occurred, exceeding
our 2019 goal by one workload. In the interim, we are encouraging
Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney to enter into discrete Performance
Based Logistics agreements and Master Repair Agreements to incentivize
OEMs to invest in repair capability and production capacity of
critically in-demand spares. Additionally, in September 2019, the JPO
awarded a Special Tooling and Test Equipment (STATE) contract to
provide additional resources to meet the anticipated 5-year demand of
sustainment, production and modification parts.
Mr. Langevin. I understand that industry is responsible for
selecting new vendors that will replace the Turkish supply chain. Where
are we in that process? How many of those parts will be production
ready through new vendors by March 2020, by which time Turkey will be
suspended from the program? If there are new suppliers that will not
have contracts in place and be production ready by March 2020, how long
can industry maintain current or planned production rates? When could
we start seeing delays that impact the production line?
General Fick. Turkey has been suspended from the program. The F-35
Joint Program Office (JPO) is working with Lockheed Martin and Pratt &
Whitney to develop, identify and qualify alternative sources for 817
air vehicle parts ( 3% of bill of material) and 188 propulsion parts
(6% of bill of material) currently made in Turkey so that they may also
be removed from the supply chain. The U.S. Services have provided $589M
for this activity, which began in March 2019. Plans are underway to
transition the majority of parts in the Turkish supply chain by March
2020. Of note, production of six landing gear components, the Center
Fuselage, and F-135 Integrally Bladed Rotors (IBRs) do not support an
abrupt supply cut-off date of March 2020. The JPO is working mitigation
strategies to develop alternative sources to Turkish supply for these
parts:
Six Landing Gear parts are anticipated to be transitioned
by the end of December 2020 to alternative sources. Based on current
rough estimates, an abrupt March 2020 supply cut-off date for landing
gear would disrupt 81 on-time aircraft deliveries. Lockheed Martin is
working to mitigate these late deliveries by using a pool of available
landing gear until there is a sufficient line of balance with alternate
sources.
The JPO is currently developing courses of action to
transfer center fuselage work from Turkey to Northrop-Grumman
facilities in Palmdale, CA, where the rest of the center fuselage work
is currently executed. The center fuselage is a major component of the
F-35 aircraft and full transition to Palmdale requires simultaneously
terminating purchase orders in Turkey while preserving work in progress
and raw material. These purchase orders pre-date the alternate source
activities. Although the schedule impact to aircraft of transitioning
center fuselage to Palmdale is much less severe than landing gear, the
F-35 Program is seeking alternatives in additional tooling for Palmdale
to make up the capacity currently sourced from Turkey.
The IBR portion of the propulsion system is the long lead
component that would pace production after landing gear and center
fuselages. The JPO has worked with Pratt & Whitney and USD (A&S) staff
to provide funding to procure additional milling machines to
manufacture IBRs originally provided by Turkish suppliers. These
milling machines will be installed in Pratt & Whitney's Connecticut
facility and will increase capacity to support F-35 needs. If the
supply of these three parts were disrupted in March 2020, it is
foreseeable that we would expect to start seeing aircraft delivery
delays within a few months. Although we are aggressively qualifying
alternate sources and facilitating them to produce at rate, our current
modeling, paced by landing gear, suggests that the impact of a March
2020 supply disruption is estimated to be 81 aircraft delivered after
their contracted schedule delivery date. The JPO estimates that
maintaining these supply chains until December 2020 would provide the
time needed to avoid production line impacts.
Mr. Langevin. How many open Category 1 deficiencies do you have on
the F-35 today?
Mr. Behler. The F-35 program has 13 open Category 1 deficiencies
that are ``In Work & Under Investigation,'' per the latest Program
Office Deficiency Report Metrics, dated 31 October 2019.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. Is the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) capability currently
on track to meet the NATO need date of January 2024? The original plan
was to cut-in DCA capability into Lot 13. Did this happen, and if not,
what were the reasons for the delay? Are you experiencing any technical
challenges or issues with the development of DCA required software?
General Fick. Yes, the F-35 JPO and DCA stakeholders are on track
to meet the accelerated DCA design certification need date of Jan 2023
and NATO operational need date of Jan 2024. To meet these dates, DCA
capability must be incorporated into the 30P05 Operational Flight
Program (OFP) production software build that will go into Lot 13
production aircraft. Provided DCA capability is in the 30P05 OFP
production software drop, all Lot 13 F-35As will receive this software.
The JPO has incentivized Lockheed Martin to expedite delivery of DCA
software into Lot 13 production aircraft. DCA stakeholders continually
assess the certification processes and timelines since the JPO does not
control nor lead some of the major processes such as Weapon System
Safety Rules and Operational Certification.
Mr. Turner. Please provide a status update of the F-35 Hybrid
Product Support Integrator (HPSI). When you do expect the HPSI to be
fully operational at Wright-Patterson? Are there any challenges or
issues with moving the capability from Ft. Worth to Wright-Patterson?
General Fick. The F-35 Hybrid Product Support Integrator (HPSI)
achieved Initial Operational Capability in May 2016 and Full
Operational Capability in July 2019. The process to relocate all HPSI
functions from their current locations to Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base (WPAFB) in Dayton, Ohio is ongoing today. The core team--to
include the new HPSI Director and Deputy Director--has been stood up at
WPAFB with functional areas beginning to transition as early as summer
2020. The HPSI planning team is currently working through challenges
associated with continuity of HPSI operations during the transition to
mitigate the risk of knowledge and experience loss. This potential
attrition of current employees during the move to WPAFB is one of our
major concerns. We expect the full transition to WPAFB to be complete
in June 2022.
Mr. Turner. What are you doing to ensure that there are no Chinese
parts in their F-35 supply chain? What contractual efforts are you
taking to make sure this is the case with your sub-suppliers?
Mr. Ulmer. The F-35 Joint Program Office controls the F-35 global
supply chain through Lockheed Martin (LM) and Pratt & Whitney's
management of contractual requirements. Together with our industry
partners the F-35 program closely monitors the F-35 Global Supply Chain
in accordance with strict Department of Defense acquisition
requirements to ensure no parts or components from unapproved sources
are included in delivered products. All F-35 contracts contain these
strict acquisition requirements governed by Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulations (DFARS) and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) clauses.
These clauses are passed down contractually with F-35 suppliers and
their sub-tiers and compliance to regulations are certified during
negotiations and surveyed in various forms during contract execution.
Lockheed Martin maintains a risk and opportunity management plan to
ensure continuous monitoring within the supply chain. The process and
tools outlined in this plan provide visibility of potential events
before they impact the program in a structured and disciplined manner,
including risks and opportunities throughout the LM Aero supply base.
Throughout the procurement lifecycle, we have embedded controls to
ensure the integrity of our products from sourcing through contract
closeout. During the source selection process, suppliers are required
to have the necessary Proprietary Information Agreements, Non-
disclosure Agreements, Manufacturing License Agreements, Technical
Assistance Agreements, site surveys, etc. Lockheed Martin also
restricts sources of supply for certain specialty materials to domestic
and Canadian sources. During the selection process, a supplier will not
be solicited if they are owned and/or operate in a prohibited country.
In conjunction with the Program Office, Integrated Product Teams,
Supply Chain Management (SCM), Lockheed Martin Operations, and other
functions, our Supplier Quality Management (SQM) team performs initial
supplier reviews, including Quality Systems, Special Processes, and
surveys required to identify suppliers approved for procurement. SQM
performs on-going supplier control functions, including surveillance of
the supplier's performance during manufacturing, to ensure compliance
with the terms and conditions of the purchase order, and that
consistent supplier quality assurance methods and practices meet
program requirements. To defend the customer from counterfeit materiel,
during site surveillance, LM Aero anti-counterfeit measures are put in
place for prevention, detection, investigation, mitigation and
reporting. If any potential non-conforming, counterfeit work, or
tampered product were to be identified, the part(s) would immediately
be quarantined, prompting an investigation by all appropriate functions
to determine the origin of the part(s). For existing suppliers, LM uses
all available open source data and some third-party vendors to track
parent companies, subsidiaries, and joint ventures, including their
country of incorporation. Triggers could be the mention of LM or
supplier products with association to a non-qualifying country.
Lockheed Martin Supply Chain investigates any potential merger and
acquisition that could disrupt or change source of supply or limit
competition. We develop a risk assessment and investigate parent
company lineage including connections to China or other non-qualifying
countries.
Mr. Turner. What has industry learned from other fighter programs
(i.e., F-22) that you have applied to improve sustainment outcomes for
the F-35?
Mr. Ulmer. The F-35 industry team applied numerous lessons learned
from preceding fighter programs in developing the F-35. These lessons
included advancing the design state of the F-22, F-16 and F-117.
Specifically, the heart of the F-35's unrivaled situational awareness
was derived from the F 22. The F-35's ability to avoid ground collision
came from the F-16. The Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) system
is an evolutionary cousin of the system employed in the F-22. The F-35
Low Observable (LO) coating system also traces its lineage to the F-117
and F-22. The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) is derived
from the F 22's Integrated Management Information System (IMIS). These
evolutions combined to produce the most advanced fighter in history.
While these systems are intended to advance the airplane's warfighting
capabilities, they also bring significant gains in reliability and
maintainability. LRIP 6+ F-35s have the best reliability and
maintainability performance in the USAF fighter inventory. By using
predecessor aircraft as a starting point, the F-35 design team, many of
whom transitioned from F 16 and F-22, were able to improve on high
performing designs to gain an operational edge. The avionics suite
takes advantage of improved cooling system performance as well as
improved speed and throughput to provide the pilot with unparalleled
battlefield performance. With each successive Low Rate Initial
Production lot, we've seen improved performance and fewer failures as
parts remain on the jet longer. More than 59% of the parts on the
aircraft have never failed, and more than 84% are exceeding planned
reliability. The improved PHM system aids maintainers in detecting and
troubleshooting faults, and the design team continues to introduce
improved fault detection and isolation techniques. The most recent
software version reduced unwarranted parts replacements by more than
70%. The first generation of LO materials used on the F-117 were vastly
improved with the introduction of the F-22, but that coating system
employs materials that require hours to cure. By comparison, the F-35
coatings represent another full cycle of improvement and have reduced
cure times significantly. As a result, the F-35's LO performance on all
three variants is more than double the design requirements for all
production lots. This results in unscheduled maintenance actions for
the LO system occurring only half as often as the design requirement.
Further, ongoing advances in coatings and processes will continue to
reduce the LO burden on maintenance. The engineering team continues to
advance these designs by introducing faster cure times and material
improvements that will continue to reduce maintenance manhours per
flying hour. Finally, ALIS has drastically improved on IMIS in terms of
the capabilities it brings to the flight line and in terms of fleet
management. That said, ALIS is operating on a technology base
equivalent to the flip phones used in the early 2000s. In order to keep
pace and maximize warfighter support, the industry team is supporting
DOD in a major redesign of ALIS with a goal toward enabling true
agility in software support taking advantage of the IT advancements
over the past decade. Taken together, these advances have resulted in a
17% improvement in Mission Capable (MC) Rate for the Combat Coded
aircraft over the last year and enabled deployed units in the Middle
East to achieve Full Mission Capable Rates exceeding 90% during their
recent 6-month deployment all while taking advantage of data fusion
technologies initiated on the F-22, that today provides unprecedented
battlespace awareness and connectivity in the F-35 to not only the
pilot; but the air, land, and sea assets available within the
battlespace. Without the basic design elements from the F-35's
ancestors, this level of performance improvement would not have
occurred. The industry team is fully committed to continuing
enhancements that will allow the F-35 to excel against the rapidly
advancing threats our adversaries are fielding.
Mr. Turner. What are you doing to ensure that there are no Chinese
parts in their F-35 supply chain? What contractual efforts are you
taking to make sure this is the case with your sub-suppliers?
Mr. Bromberg. Pratt & Whitney (``P&W'') recognizes and remains
compliant with applicable regulatory and contractual restrictions on
sourcing F135 parts from the People's Republic of China (``China'').
P&W does not presently procure any F135 parts from suppliers in China.
P&W is subject to U.S. export-control regulations that restrict
sourcing certain items from China. Specifically, the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (``ITAR'') and the Export Administration
Regulations (``EAR'') establish license requirements, and corresponding
policies of license denial, for exports to China of items (including
technical data and software) controlled under the ITAR's U.S. Munitions
List or the ``600 series'' of the EAR's Commerce Control List. In
practice, these export controls preclude P&W from sourcing ITAR or 600-
series hardware from China by prohibiting the exchange of technical
data necessary for the design and manufacture of the hardware.
Beyond the regulations that govern international trade controls,
F135 contracts awarded to P&W include terms and conditions that
restrict the sourcing of parts from China, in particular the contract
clause at DFARS 252.225-7007, Prohibition on Acquisition of Certain
Items from Communist Chinese Military Companies (DEC 2018).
P&W complies with the export-control regulations and contractual
sourcing requirements that restrict sourcing of F135 parts from China.
To that end, P&W's procurement processes involve multiple layers of
controls to identify and prevent procurement of ITAR or 600-series
hardware from Chinese suppliers. First, P&W's due-diligence program for
on-boarding new hardware suppliers requires each new supplier to
complete an online questionnaire developed by TRACE International. This
questionnaire requires each supplier to provide business ownership and
operational information so that P&W can, among other things, assess the
legality of procuring hardware from that supplier. Following the
initial screening process, if P&W proceeds to engage the supplier, P&W
requires the supplier to agree to standard terms and conditions that
require, among other things, compliance with applicable law, including
U.S. export-control regulations.
Further, as an automated control, P&W utilizes an Enterprise
Resource Planning (``ERP'') software system with procurement
functionality that blocks issuance of purchase orders to non-U.S.
suppliers if P&W does not have an applicable export license or other
authorization. This software provides an added safeguard against
unauthorized sourcing of ITAR or 600-series items from China.
With respect to sub-suppliers, P&W's supply chain is independently
subject to the same regulatory restrictions described above. P&W
facilitates compliance throughout the supply chain by indicating how
its technical data disclosed to suppliers is controlled for export-
control purposes. As noted above, P&W's contracts with suppliers
require suppliers' compliance with applicable law, including U.S.
export-control regulations. Further, P&W flows to suppliers the
mandatory clauses (which by their terms must be flowed by suppliers to
sub-suppliers) and other relevant clauses that appear in P&W's F135
prime contracts, including those that impose restrictions on sourcing
F135 parts from China.
Mr. Turner. What has industry learned from other fighter programs
(i.e., F-22) that you have applied to improve sustainment outcomes for
the F-35?
Mr. Bromberg. The F135 program benefits from all current and prior
military and commercial engine programs at Pratt & Whitney (P&W). P&W
actively shares lessons learned across multiple disciplines to create
an environment that supports rapid advancements and calculated risk-
taking. The F119 is the engine whose architecture is most closely
related to the F135 engine. While the support structure for the F119 is
less complex than the F135, the F119 has recently experienced its first
scheduled depot maintenance wave, providing valuable learnings for the
F135 program as it approaches first scheduled depot maintenance visits
in 2021.
The F135 program has evaluated and adopted numerous lessons learned
from the F119 program. The following information is a summation of the
more impactful opportunities in three key areas: people, process, and
parts. P&W continues to focus on affordable readiness with a clear
priority of always having the right part available, at the right place,
at the right time--a core sustainment principle.
People P&W manages programs based upon a matrixed structure which
integrates disciplines from across the company into part-family teams.
These teams are led by an engineer who has cradle-to-grave
responsibility for his or her part family. The F119 program taught us
that such a matrixed part family team was necessary for efficiently
managing parts through the complexity of sustainment, including the
integration of requirements for part distress limits, repair
requirements, new parts, and the capacity to perform maintenance. The
part family sustainment team lead manages priorities for parts through
all phases of sustainment, including preparation for first scheduled
depot maintenance. This team has proven invaluable to the F119 and F135
programs, and our new commercial programs have adopted a similar
approach.
An additional resource that has proven invaluable to the F135
program and is widely utilized across all other P&W engine programs is
our Field Service Representatives. Embedded with each unit is a highly
skilled P&W technical leader with knowledge of engine maintenance,
technical data interpretation, distress mode evaluation, propulsion
system diagnostics, and many other competencies. These individuals are
capable of assisting the operators and maintainers to achieve effective
readiness outcomes. Moreover, they impact affordability positively by
supporting proactive maintenance decisions that can result in an
engine's staying on wing versus being removed or that can allow a field
team to perform maintenance locally in lieu of a depot visit for an
engine.
Processes Scheduled depot maintenance relies upon a complex
integration of parts that are determined to be serviceable as is,
require repair, or require replacement. Depending on the engine module,
this integration can span hundreds to thousands of parts. The F119
program adopted concepts from a process utilized by the U.S. Air Force
to manage depot maintenance known as Depot Repair Enhancement Program
(DREP), which evaluates part supportability related to depot
maintenance plans. P&W created processes and tools to evaluate part
demands for each engine module, identify gaps, and manage gap closure
focused on short-, mid-, and long-term supportability. This
supportability process assists with prioritization of actions, shows
clear ownership of those actions, and is a standard communication tool
to use both internally and externally. The F135 program is integrating
these processes and tools into our standard work and is expanding upon
them to enable use across the entire F135 global depot network (which
represents an additional complexity versus the F119, which has one
depot at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex). The F135 team has
also benchmarked other P&W engine programs such as the F117 program and
our commercial programs to learn how to optimize the management of
engines/modules through a global depot network. We have evaluated the
tools they use and processes for prioritization and logistics
efficiencies.
Parts Scheduled depot maintenance occurs when a limit on flight
hours, cycles, time, or specified deterioration has been reached.
Limits drive an inspection or replacement of parts to maintain the
performance and safety specifications of the engine. Parts that require
inspection to remain in service must have published technical data,
including deterioration limits, for depot inspectors to utilize. The
F135 program has learned the value of having these limits established
prior to the first depot visit, as well as the value of a streamlined
approach to limit expansion and new limit generation to enable timely
part dispositions. The most efficient means of reducing depot costs is
to reuse parts, and the second-most-efficient means of reducing depot
costs is to repair parts. The readiness of sources to perform piece-
part repairs was a valuable lesson learned from F119. Fifth-generation
engine hardware that makes up the F119 and F135 engines requires some
of the most advanced manufacturing processes in aerospace. These same
precise and challenging processes are used to repair fifth generation
engine piece parts. Dual-sourcing complex repairs, executing multi-step
repairs in single locations, utilizing highly efficient sources for
high-volume/low-complexity repairs, and close collaboration with repair
suppliers to understand their process improvement recommendations are
all lessons learned from the F119 program.
Ensuring sufficient levels of new parts in inventory before the
ramp of first scheduled depot maintenance visits is the last key lesson
from the F119 program. In the beginning of scheduled depot maintenance,
each engine module brings learning opportunities and discoveries of new
and different deterioration that could not have been foreseen. Planning
for sufficient amounts of parts to create a rotable pool of new and
repaired parts to support depot turn-time reduction and compensate for
long piece-part repair times while processes are matured is of critical
importance. The creation of a rotable pool of parts requires
preplanning and is an invaluable resource for the duration of a program
to enable engine/module supportability. We are pursuing the opportunity
to create a right-sized rotable pool for the F135 program but note that
part funding challenges have created some headwind.
While not exhaustive, the above summation of people, process, and
parts lessons from the F119 program highlights the key learnings the
F135 program is leveraging from its predecessors. We continue to learn
from the F119 program as we strive to maintain high readiness levels
and pursue our cost-reduction objectives to enable an affordable F135
sustainment program.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
Mr. Brown. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has
responsibility and funding to address deficiencies in the defense
industrial base and to assure availability of suppliers to DOD for
critical technologies. We are aware that the Department has identified
OLED technology as critical to the F-35 Program and a host of other DOD
programs, most notably that it is a solution for the category one
deficiency for ``green glow'' in the HMD.
What is your investment plan is to identify and apply sufficient
funding to the domestic Active Matrix Organic LED industrial base to
ensure a supply chain for future military displays?
When do you estimate the OLED solution will be fielded for all
operational F-35 aircraft?
Secretary Lord. DOD conducted an industrial base assessment of the
organic light-emitting diode (OLED) microdisplay industry in 2018, from
which it identified a single qualified domestic supplier and a
potential second source supplier. Currently, F-35 relies on a single
source supplier to resolve the green glow issue in the Helmet Mounted
Display (HMD). In order to improve the health of the OLED industrial
base, the DOD has invested $8.75M since CY2014 to help improve
technology maturity and manufacturing methods. The F-35 JPO is actively
engaged in ensuring the domestic OLED supplier continues its business
with military customers through continuing to place new orders. The JPO
is currently receiving its first order of 62 Helmet Display Units
(HDUs). The JPO also released a request for proposal (RFP) for an
additional order of 62 OLED HDUs in October 2019 with award expected to
support OLED HDU deliveries in Q4 CY2020. Having a qualified second
source supplier is equally as important as maintaining the health of
the primary source supplier. The F-35 Enterprise is working with
Lockheed Martin (LM) and Collins Aerospace to identify and qualify a
second OLED manufacturer within the United States by Q4 CY2021. In
parallel, LM has also been directed to further mature the OLED HDU
design, which will productionize OLED HDU requirements throughout the
F-35 Enterprise in Lot 14 (FY2022) and beyond. The Industrial Policy
office within the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment conducted a site visit to the only qualified OLED
microdisplay supplier in November 2019. The Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) ASA(ALT) and F-35 JPO SMEs
accompanied the site visit in order to fully understand the challenges
faced by the supplier in satisfying the warfighter's needs and
maintaining its health within the defense industrial base. The
Department, along with the services, is working on a funding plan to
assure the availability of domestic OLED microdisplay suppliers.
Mr. Brown. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps recently signed a
memorandum that directs acquisition programs to incorporate open
architectures into our major programs to ensure that we have the
agility to stay ahead of our adversaries. The F-35 was developed before
these standards were established. As we look to Block 4 and beyond, has
the F-35 Program identified which of the modern standards (including
but not limited to OMS and FACE) will be required in future software
releases beginning with Block 4 and how interoperability will be
maintained between the competing architectures of each service?
Secretary Lord. Block 4 hardware and software changes have opened
the F-35 architecture to more efficiently accept OMS and FACE
applications. One OMS development effort is currently underway--
embedded training (ET). Additionally, one FACE effort is awaiting
contract award; this effort is directed at examining how an existing
FACE application could fulfill a Block 4 capability (Required
Navigation Performance Area Navigation). Additionally, each of the
Block 4 capabilities are being examined on a case-by-case basis to
determine the ability of an OMS/FACE application to fulfill new F-35
requirements. TR3 hardware, a key hardware enabler for Block 4
capabilities, has been developed using Commercial off the Shelf (COTS)
processors and industry standard interfaces enabling the integration of
OMS and FACE applications into the F-35. TR-3 enables OMS/FACE and
fields with software release 40P01. The Program will never be fully OMS
compliant across all F-35 capabilities but we will aggressively
leverage its use on those capabilities for which the OMS standards are
suitable.
Mr. Brown. The establishment of the Joint Simulation Environment
has been identified as the the primary requirement that is preventing
the necessary testing for the F-35 program to complete IOT&E.
What have been the reasons for the delay, and how is this affecting
the transition to full rate production?
Intellectual property issues have been given as a reason for delay
in integration. Yet, the F-35 has been successfully integrated in other
simulation environments such as the Virtual Warfare Center, which is
run by Lockheed's competitor Boeing, for over a decade. What's the
difference in intellectual property here that is driving the delay?
Secretary Lord. Difficulties with integration of F-35 In-A-Box
(FIAB), a Lockheed software model incorporating actual F-35 air vehicle
software and fusion algorithms into the Joint Simulation Environment
(JSE), have been the primary driver for delays in preparing JSE to
support IOT&E. Completion of IOT&E and the following DOT&E report are
required before the decision to move into Full Rate Production can be
made. The F-35 models integrated into the Virtual Warfare Center and
the JSE vary in fidelity and application. The Virtual Warfare Center
utilizes the Virtual Cockpit which is an LM licensed effects-based
model that emulates the projected performance of the F-35. This allows
the Virtual Warfare Center to be used for requirements development and
scenario excursions but it does not operate at the fidelity of actual
F-35 performance to allow accreditation for IOT&E activities or use for
future developmental activities. To be suitable for that purpose, the
JSE utilizes FIAB, a high-fidelity model based on the actual F-35
operational flight program software and fusion algorithms. Specific to
the Joint Simulation Environment, LM asserts that certain portions of
FIAB were developed exclusively at private expense, limiting the
Government's right to use it. The Government challenged LM's assertions
and determined that LM failed to support its assertions of development
exclusively at private expense. LM appealed the Government's
determination to the Armed Service Board of Contract Appeals. The JPO
negotiated Special License Rights with LM for FIAB that are sufficient
to support JSE requirements pending the outcome of the appeal.
Mr. Brown. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has
responsibility and funding to address deficiencies in the defense
industrial base and to assure availability of suppliers to DOD for
critical technologies. We are aware that the Department has identified
OLED technology as critical to the F-35 Program and a host of other DOD
programs, most notably that it is a solution for the category one
deficiency for ``green glow'' in the HMD.
What is your investment plan is to identify and apply sufficient
funding to the domestic Active Matrix Organic LED industrial base to
ensure a supply chain for future military displays?
When do you estimate the OLED solution will be fielded for all
operational F-35 aircraft?
General Fick. The F-35 JPO is fully aware of and actively engaged
with the Organic Light Emitting Diode (OLED) manufacturing challenges
and has made continuing investments to improve domestic OLED industrial
capabilities associated with the Program. Specifically, the JPO is
addressing this concern by initiating a second order of 62 OLED Helmet
Display Units (HDUs). The Request for Proposal (RFP) for this second
order was released from the JPO in October 2019 with award expected to
support OLED HDU deliveries Q4 CY20. The F-35 Enterprise is also
working with Lockheed Martin (LM) to identify and qualify a second OLED
manufacturer within the United States. In parallel, LM has been
directed to further mature the OLED HDU design which will productionize
OLED HDU requirements throughout the F-35 Enterprise in Lot 14 (CY22)
and beyond. The F-35 program is currently taking delivery of the first
order of 62 F-35 OLED HDUs to support the first two carrier-based F-35C
squadrons for the United States Navy (USN) and United States Marine
Corps (USMC). To date, 37 OLED HDUs have been received, with the
remainder to deliver by February 2020. The combined 124 OLED HDUs to be
delivered across both orders have been coordinated with the USN/USMC to
meet requirements through CY23.
Mr. Brown. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps recently signed a
memorandum that directs acquisition programs to incorporate open
architectures into our major programs to ensure that we have the
agility to stay ahead of our adversaries. The F-35 was developed before
these standards were established. As we look to Block 4 and beyond, has
the F-35 Program identified which of the modern standards (including
but not limited to OMS and FACE) will be required in future software
releases beginning with Block 4 and how interoperability will be
maintained between the competing architectures of each service?
General Fick. Block 4 hardware and software changes have opened the
F-35 architecture to more efficiently accept OMS and FACE applications.
One OMS development effort is currently underway--embedded training
(ET). Additionally, one FACE effort is awaiting contract award; this
effort is directed at examining how an existing FACE application could
fulfill a Block 4 capability (Required Navigation Performance Area
Navigation). Additionally, each of the Block 4 capabilities are being
examined on a case-by-case basis to determine the ability of an OMS/
FACE application to fulfill new F-35 requirements. TR3 hardware, a key
hardware enabler for Block 4 capabilities, has been developed using
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) processors and industry standard
interfaces enabling the integration of OMS and FACE applications into
the F-35. TR-3 enables OMS/FACE and fields with software release 40P01.
The Program will never be fully OMS compliant across all F-35
capabilities but we will aggressively leverage its use on those
capabilities for which the OMS standards are suitable.
Mr. Brown. The establishment of the Joint Simulation Environment
has been identified as the the primary requirement that is preventing
the necessary testing for the F-35 program to complete IOT&E.
What have been the reasons for the delay, and how is this affecting
the transition to full rate production?
Intellectual property issues have been given as a reason for delay
in integration. Yet, the F-35 has been successfully integrated in other
simulation environments such as the Virtual Warfare Center, which is
run by Lockheed's competitor Boeing, for over a decade. What's the
difference in intellectual property here that is driving the delay?
General Fick. Difficulties with integration of F-35 In-A-Box
(FIAB), a Lockheed software model incorporating actual F-35 air vehicle
software and fusion algorithms) into the Joint Simulation Environment
(JSE) have been the primary driver for delays in preparing JSE to
support IOT&E. Completion of IOT&E and the following DOT&E report are
required before the decision to move into Full Rate Production can be
made. The F-35 models integrated into the Virtual Warfare Center and
the JSE vary in fidelity and application. The Virtual Warfare Center
utilizes the Virtual Cockpit which is an LM licensed effects-based
model that emulates the projected performance of the F-35. This allows
the Virtual Warfare Center to be used for requirements development and
scenario excursions but it does not operate at the fidelity of actual
F-35 performance to allow accreditation for IOT&E activities or use for
future developmental activities. To be suitable for that purpose, the
JSE utilizes FIAB, a high-fidelity model based on the actual F-35
operational flight program software and fusion algorithms. Specific to
the Joint Simulation Environment, LM asserts that certain portions of
FIAB were developed exclusively at private expense, limiting the
Government's right to use it. The Government challenged LM's assertions
and determined that LM failed to support its assertions of development
exclusively at private expense. LM appealed the Government's
determination to the Armed Service Board of Contract Appeals. The JPO
negotiated Special License Rights with LM for FIAB that are sufficient
to support JSE requirements pending the outcome of the appeal.
Mr. Brown. Nearly every major fighter program in recent history has
undergone a power plant upgrade that has enabled greater performance.
With increasing threats such as faster, longer range air to air
missiles and new technologies on the horizon like directed energy that
will require additional power generation, the F-35 will likely be no
different. How important is the Advanced Engine Technology Program to
future blocks of the F-35, and how does a potential new engine fit into
JPO's plans for the program?
General Fick. The F-35 aircraft and F135 engine meets the
warfighter's requirements today and will continue to provide sufficient
power and cooling through the development and fielding of our Block 4
capabilities. Therefore, at this time there is no plan to re-engine
with an Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP) propulsion system.
New F-35 requirements are articulated by our warfighters in a Draft
Statement of Requirement (DSOR) document and submitted through the
Requirements Working Group into the Joint and International F-35
Governance Structure. To posture the program to respond in the event a
propulsion-related DSOR is generated, the F-35 Operational Advisory
Group (OAG) has approved a study to determine propulsion and related
Thermal Management System (TMS) growth requirements for the F-35 in Lot
17 and beyond. The JPO is currently developing a Statement of Work
(SOW) to define the study scope and deliverables. This study, along
with the associated user requirements for potential future
capabilities, will help determine when a new or upgraded F-35 engine
may be required.
Mr. Brown. Which portions of the F-35 contract have unlimited
rights, government purpose rights, restricted rights, and limited
rights? At what point do the government purpose rights transition to
unlimited rights? Where do the contractor and government disagree over
which rights are granted?
General Fick. There are currently thousands of items of technical
data and computer software on F-35 contracts for which Lockheed Martin
(LM) and its suppliers have asserted the Government has less than
unlimited rights. Beyond these assertions, the full magnitude and
impact of limitations on the Government's ability to obtain and utilize
F-35 technical data and computer software is unknown. We find ourselves
in this situation because initial F-35 development contracts did not
require the delivery of appropriate technical data and the fact that
contractors do not generate a data assertion until a contractual
delivery requirement exists. We did not request delivery of these
elements of technical data because early F-35 development was executed
in a Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) environment.
Specific to the Joint Simulation Environment, LM asserts that certain
portions of F-35 In-a-Box (FIAB) were developed exclusively at private
expense, limiting the Government's right to use FIAB. The Government
challenged LM's assertions and determined that LM failed to support its
assertions of development exclusively at private expense. LM appealed
the Government's determination to the Armed Service Board of Contract
Appeals. The JPO negotiated Special License Rights with LM for FIAB
that are sufficient to support JSE requirements pending the outcome of
the appeal. Government purpose rights transfer to unlimited rights five
years after award of the contract action that required development of
the item. The contractor and government agree on the process outlined
in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation System (DFARS) that
specifies the level of rights the government obtains in technical data
and computer software based on how development of the data and/or
software are funded. The government has formally challenged Lockheed
Martin's assertion that it developed nine components of F-35 In-a-Box
software exclusively at private expense, as noted above. F-35 In-a-Box
is currently the only formal data rights challenge on the F-35 program.
Future challenges may arise in the event our program needs for
technical data encounter Lockheed Martin (or sub-contractor) assertions
that those data are not available for delivery or use.
Mr. Brown. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps recently signed a
memorandum that directs acquisition programs to incorporate open
architectures into our major programs to ensure that we have the
agility to stay ahead of our adversaries. The F-35 was developed before
these standards were established. As we look to Block 4 and beyond, has
the F-35 Program identified which of the modern standards (including
but not limited to OMS and FACE) will be required in future software
releases beginning with Block 4 and how interoperability will be
maintained between the competing architectures of each service?
Mr. Ulmer. Lockheed Martin started the F-35 with open architecture
attributes available at original contract award. Doing so was part of
the design. Over 70% of F-35 software is Supplier provided software.
The SDD contract had requirements for Open Systems although the Air
Force and Navy had not established OMS and FACE standards. The JPO
utilized a series of reviews led by the Software Engineering Institute
(SEI) to assess compliance with the goals by the Modular Open System
Architecture (MOSA) consortium, which has been rebranded to Modular
Open System Approach. These reviews produced positive findings and
these attributes still support the services' goals going forward.
1. Mission Systems, which is the area of focus for OMS, was modeled
at the system level and at the software level using the Unified
Modeling Language (UML) using stereotypes and design patterns assured
common patterns throughout the design that provided for both modularity
and reusable software across domains.
2. For SDD COTS operating systems were chosen for use in Mission
Systems. This included the Mercury Systems Operations System which was
the dominate Operating System used in that domain at that time and
supported many of the POSIX APIs. For the general-purpose processing
Green Hills Integrity 178 was selected and ultimately directed by the
contract because of the high security assurances. For Technology
Refresh 3 (TR3) both Operating Systems will be replaced by Linux for
the non-safety critical processing which is compliant with both FACE
and OMS. The safety critical processing will utilize a COTS OS that
supports a subset of POSIX required under the FACE safety critical
profile.
3. The software is also developed with layers that isolate
application software from the underlying hardware and Operating System.
This layer has allowed the Mission System Software to transition
between TR0, TR1 and TR2 with ease and allowed the software to be
easily moved to the Linux based trainers. The transition to TR3 is also
expected to be straight forward. As Lockheed Martin worked with the USG
on the acquisition strategy for the Technical Refresh 3 (TR3)
processor, Lockheed Martin continued pursuit of open systems
architecture. During this time, the USG considered FACE, HOST, and OMS,
each of which have some different constructs.
The program has established an approach for evaluating new
capabilities and how OMS or FACE can be applied.
1. Many of the new capabilities are simply expansions of
functionality of existing components in the system. In this case the
best approach may be to implement the new capability by simply
modifying the existing components. This approach minimizes additional
translation software and additional regression testing. There will be
exceptions and they are discussed below.
2. When a new capability includes adding new components to the
system, then those components would be assessed for a FACE or OMS
solution. The selection of which standard would be driven by multiple
factors. a. If the component has safety or nuclear considerations, then
OMS is not applicable, and FACE would have to be used. b. If a
component already exists that is FACE or OMS compliant, then that would
determine the approach. c. The JPO, based on future use on other
programs, directs the use of either FACE or OMS and the basis for the
new component.
3. There is also the potential that an existing F-35 component has
a potential for use on other programs. In that case, the JPO can direct
that existing components be converted to OMS or FACE. This would cause
additional cost for the F-35 but may save costs in other areas.
Components that impact the integrated sensor management and fusion or
safety critical threads could cause significant regression testing
which would need to be considered.
Finally, it is critical to realize that as the F-35 modernizes,
complex improvements are being incorporated. The nature of the highly
integrated F-35 computational need will not change. This means that as
a single-seat fighter with the potential to fly well into ``harm's
way'', that fusion and the balance of all F-35s have to operate in a
rapid integrated manner in order to counter our enemies' advancing
threat. As such, there is no separate F-35 architecture for one service
vs another. While Lockheed Martin can and does integrate other
developers' applications and capabilities, the baseline software is
structured to enable continued integration of other people's software,
while preserving dominance of our fighter for our services, partners
and foreign military sales countries.
Mr. Brown. The establishment of the Joint Simulation Environment
has been identified as the the primary requirement that is preventing
the necessary testing for the F-35 program to complete IOT&E.
What have been the reasons for the delay, and how is this affecting
the transition to full rate production?
Intellectual property issues have been given as a reason for delay
in integration. Yet, the F-35 has been successfully integrated in other
simulation environments such as the Virtual Warfare Center, which is
run by Lockheed's competitor Boeing, for over a decade. What's the
difference in intellectual property here that is driving the delay?
Mr. Ulmer. The U.S. Government Joint Simulation Environment (JSE)
has been working to integrate its first model-based Fifth Generation
weapons system, the F-35, into an amalgamated Land, Sea, and Air
simulation environment to conduct testing and accredit the simulation
as a supplement to open-air formal Operational Testing. This high-
fidelity simulation environment requires complex representations of the
F-35; including Operational Flight Program (OFP), real-time models, and
other software code for each major piece of hardware, weapon, software
algorithm and any key features of the Air System. The F-35 is a highly
integrated air system utilizing inputs from all its sensors, mission
planning, and on-board data to coalesce and fuse an operational picture
with attack options for the single-seat pilot. This is different from
most, if not all, fourth generation weapons systems. Fourth generation
weapons systems employ federated building blocks that can be worked
separately; however, the strength of the F-35 comes from tight
integration where all systems work together to achieve dominance.
However, when the USG first embarked on the JSE integration, more of a
federated approach was anticipated by government JSE personnel. This
approach met with integration difficulties and resulting delays;
including, the necessary work such as USG delayed accreditation of the
NAVAIR special access development facility in Oct 2018. As time
progressed, the JSE realized that Lockheed Martin was needed to help
stand up models and integrate them in a tightly integrated simulation
environment. Hence, at the USG's request, Lockheed Martin has placed
full-time support personnel in place at Patuxent River NAS and
routinely brings in subsystem experts to stand up their capability. The
JSE and LM teams are working closely together to help integrate F-35
baseline and subsequent modernization capabilities into Joint
Simulation Environment (JSE). With respect to the question regarding
the JSE simulation vs the Lockheed Martin F-35 presence at the Boeing
Virtual Warfare Center, it is important to understand there are
fundamental differences between the two. Lockheed Martin has a similar
high-fidelity simulator ``VSIM'' (F-35 Verification Simulator) which
provided key knowledge and experience helping JSE integrate this Fifth-
Generation capability. Both JSE and VSIM are unlike the Virtual Warfare
Center's (VWC) implementation which is ``effects based.'' Put simply,
the VWC maps effects-based outputs to a given set of input stimuli. The
VWC is able to have a lower-fidelity simulation environment as the
facility is used to identify technology investments and tactical
considerations but is not being used to supplement flight test
requirements. During testimony, the PEO cited Intellectual Property
(IP) as the issue that drove JSE to be late. Even though there were
Intellectual Property issues that needed to be worked, Lockheed Martin
demonstrated our working VSIM in an LM developed environment for the
JSE team to duplicate if desired. The F-35 simulation is comprised of
many models--just some of which are Northrop Grumman Radar, BAE
electronic warfare, and many different suppliers' models. It had
literally taken years for Lockheed Martin to obtain licenses and/or
permission to utilize these models in our VSIM product. In fact, over
70% of the F-35 is represented by suppliers external to LM F-35
program. Most of those models were not covered in LM's licenses/
permissions as transferable to the USG and LM did not own them nor have
rights to provide them to others. However, LM did have one aspect of
wholly LM developed IP that is the root of all our Fifth-Generation
high-fidelity simulations that support our VSIM models to run in real
time. LM licensed this capability to JSE and upon special request (over
and above the license) showed the source code to named NAVAIR personnel
to help JSE progress even more. Even after LM highlighted the F-35 OFP
and helped identify the supplier's models necessary, there were other
parallel activities that had to be worked for JSE to be successful
outside of Intellectual Property constraints. In the timeframe of
concern, JSE began procuring simulation computers, environments, F-35
cockpits, and other hardware enablers for their high-fidelity
simulation. Unfortunately, their initial federated view of the
simulation need did not push the JSE team into taking advantage of LM
technical help to integrate quickly, which led to delays in standing up
the JSE. In summary, LM believes the USG underestimated the complexity
of implementing F-35 5th Generation highly integrated technology into a
high-fidelity simulation environment. Further, in the beginning the USG
attempted to be successful without involving Lockheed Martin for rapid
learning and support, only contributing to the delays. The delays are
technical in nature--making multiple models into tightly integrated
code which must run in real time with fusion engines and is much more
complex than a VWC effects-based simulation. The LM and JSE team are
working closely together, progressing rapidly, and are fully teamed for
success.
Mr. Brown. Nearly every major fighter program in recent history has
undergone a power plant upgrade that has enabled greater performance.
With increasing threats such as faster, longer range air to air
missiles and new technologies on the horizon like directed energy that
will require additional power generation, the F-35 will likely be no
different. How important is the Advanced Engine Technology Program to
future blocks of the F-35, and how does a potential new engine fit into
Lockheed's plans for the program?
Mr. Ulmer. Lockheed Martin, along with the F-35 Joint Program
Office, Government Think Tanks, and Industry, continuously evaluate the
capabilities of our adversaries to identify enhancements for the F-35
Air System. The threats are evolving at a rapid pace with focus areas
in producing large quantities of Fifth Generation-like fighter
platforms, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), Surface-to-Air Missile Systems
(SAMs), long-range weapons, Naval assets, powerful radars, lasers,
hypersonics, cyber, and expanding their frequency diversity to include
passive systems. Not only are they advancing their weapon systems into
each of these areas, but they are producing in numbers that drive our
5th Gen capability for the future. Lockheed Martin applies Operational
Analysis (OA) to not only analyze F-35 capability needs for this future
fight, but also to evaluate the F-35 improvements necessary when
operating in joint multi-domain operations against this advancing
threat. Lockheed Martin's OA shows that a propulsion system upgrade
improves tactical and operational performance of the F-35 against the
advanced threats expected to be deployed in the 2025--2030 timeframe.
This propulsion upgrade allows for improvements in range, thrust, and
Power and Thermal Management System (PTMS) capacity to support advanced
sensors and system upgrades that will deliver dominance against our
adversaries. As our adversaries improve their capabilities with longer
range weapons, the F-35's range and persistence needs to increase. In
addition, enabling the F-35 to carry additional weaponry will improve
lethality but will require external carriage of many of the enhanced
weapons. To allow for increased range with these external weapons,
range and thrust enhancements are required. In addition, due to
adversary mission systems improvements, the F-35 must continuously
evolve software and hardware capabilities. Those new F-35 mission
systems will require PTMS improvements. Throughout the Block 4 (Follow-
on Modernization) efforts, Lockheed Martin continuously evaluates the
full mission capabilities required to derive the range, thrust, and
PTMS capacity remaining in the platform for additional enhancements.
Lockheed Martin views the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP) as
a critical technology development and maturation effort that offers
significant propulsion system improvements for the F-35A and
potentially F-35C variants. Our F-35 technology development roadmaps
include a propulsion system upgrade with the AETP engine. Lockheed
Martin is working with AFLCMC, Pratt & Whitney, and General Electric to
evaluate integration of the AETP engine in the F-35 aircraft. This
effort is designed to facilitate an abbreviated engine upgrade
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) program.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
Mr. Banks. The F-35B's extended range and data collection
capabilities provide targeting information far beyond the capabilities
of current amphibious warships. How would a reduction in F-35Bs impact
the Navy and Marine Corps distributed operations?
General Fick. The capability of the F-35B as a fifth generation
fighter gives us a low-observable capability, which allows for flight
in regimes and envelopes not available to fourth generation aircraft.
This gives us the opportunity to penetrate non-permissive environments
and destroy long-range targets that could be embedded anywhere, to
include the mainland of the threat nation hosting these targets. F-35B
capabilities include sensing, collecting, and in some cases destroying
various targets with a significantly reduced kill-chain. The Marine
Corps continuously evaluates the balance of F-35B and F-35C aircraft.
The service considers both variants highly capable in the expeditionary
environment for complimentary reasons. While any reduction in F-35Bs
would adversely impact our ability to distribute a 5th-generation
maritime capability across our Marine Expeditionary Units, those
impacts can be mitigated by the capabilities of the F-35C, which can
use expeditionary arresting gear to operate out of airstrips which
don't allow conventional operations. A reduction in both variants, F-
35B and the F-35C, would limit the Marine Corps' total TACAIR capacity
and the services combat flexibility against current sophisticated enemy
air defenses threat capabilities which will certainly continue to
advance over time. The remaining life of our aging legacy fleet, whose
efficacy against future threats is limited, stresses the importance of
having available F-35B aircraft to support transition. Ultimately, a
reduction in F-35B aircraft limits support to distributed-operations
requirements assigned in OPLANS and puts at risk the capacity to
support Global Force Management in support of the National Defense
Strategy.
Mr. Banks. With so much uncertainty around a ``mix'' of F-35B and
F-35Cs, how is the DOD working with industry suppliers to clarify
future production rates?
General Fick. The JPO stays in continuous discussions with the U.S.
Marine Corps and the Department of the Navy regarding their aircraft
requirements. As decisions are contemplated, we discuss with our
industry partners to ensure they understand our capacity demands and
timing requirements. Lockheed Martin currently has capacity to build 57
F-35Bs and F-35Cs per year in its Ft Worth, TX facility. Beginning in
Lot 15, that capacity increases to an F-35B/F-35C mix of 60 aircraft
per year. There is additional capacity to produce three additional F-
35Bs per year at the Italian FACO in Cameri, Italy.
Additionally, as we prepare to release the Lot 15 Request for
Proposal (RFP), we will be requesting variable quantity pricing to
accommodate any reasonable changes in the mix after the RFP has been
released. We have remained in dialogue with both Lockheed Martin and
Pratt & Whitney about potential for change to minimize any negative
impacts.
Mr. Banks. What is the status of Lockheed Martin developing
alternative sourcing for Turkey suppliers?
Mr. Ulmer. Source selection of all parts requiring alternate
sources is complete. As of 10 December 2019, 98% of the parts are
forecasted to not have supply disruption with a 31 March 2020 cutoff.
There are currently 15 non-supporting parts to a 31 March 2020 Turkish
supply cutoff which include: Collins Aerospace landing gear
subcomponents (6 parts), Northrop Grumman center fuselage major
component (1 part), Northrop Grumman non-center fuselage hardware (2
parts), Lockheed Martin Airframe machined parts (3 parts), and Marvin
Alternate Mission Equipment (3 parts). If the source of supply from
Turkey is not allowed to continue through December 2020, the non-
supporting parts are projected to create production line impacts that
may result in behind schedule deliveries for up to 81 aircraft.
Lockheed Martin continues to work closely with our supply base to
expedite part deliveries to support the 31 March 2020 cutoff or develop
production mitigation plans to minimize impacts to aircraft production
and delivery.
Mr. Banks. What are some of the challenges to agile software
development, such as ALIS, when doing business with the government? Are
there things Congress or the Department can do to help speed things up
so we are getting technology improvements to the warfighter more
rapidly?
Mr. Ulmer. Lockheed Martin has numerous experiences developing
software using agile methodologies in the execution of government
contracts. From those experiences we have seen practices that have
worked well and practices that could be improved. The following are
some practices that we have seen that could be improved upon and
recommendations for improvement:
Upfront contracting actions can delay the start of
program execution and release timelines due to lengthy proposal and
negotiation timelines. In addition to needing separate contracts for
development and release of software, which drive two contract
proposals, the lack of flexible contracting, including no Time and
Materials contracts and limited Level of Effort contracts, forces
detailed Statements of Work to be negotiated and limits flexibility
after contract award. It is recommended that these processes be
reviewed for improvement where appropriate.
Individual contracts have varying requirements for
software development artifacts/reviews/metrics. For example, some
contracts have requirements for Preliminary Design Reviews and Detailed
Design Reviews, whereas other contracts have moved away from the
requirement for these reviews and instituted periodic incremental
reviews. A consistent and reduced set of artifacts/reviews/metrics
across software development contracts would allow for greater
efficiency in the development efforts.
Government Security Clearances take many months to
process. This slows down the ability to ramp up staffing for new
projects with developers needed to work classified software
development. An improved cycle time for Government Security Clearances
would allow fast ramp up of new projects.
Authority To Operate (ATO) timelines for IT systems used
to execute contracts can slow the start of projects by months.
Similarly, ATO of contracted products can add several months into
product delivery schedules, delaying release to production. It is
recommended that the ATO process be reviewed to identify opportunities
for improved performance while maintaining the appropriate security
posture.
Historical oversight practices (such as audits) that are
applied to agile software development can be unnecessarily burdensome
and contradicts the stated goals of agile software development
principles. They have the effect of requiring unnecessary documentation
to be produced which does not contribute to the quality of the product.
The necessity of these practices should be reviewed against the value
they provide and scaled back when appropriate.
In some programs, contracts have been executed that
specifically prevent the complete development cycle from being
employed. For example, software development was funded, but per the
statement of work, complete test was specifically disallowed from being
performed. This results in a non-agile process on programs intending to
use the agile methodology. It is recommended that this practice be
avoided in future contracts.
After development and test are complete often the release
of the product to the warfighter is delayed by various certification
activities, including, but not limited to weapon certification,
airworthiness, and export authorization. Lockheed Martin recognizes the
vital importance of these activities and the desire to deliver
capability to the warfighter as rapidly as possible, and to that end we
are recommending that these processes be more effective and efficient
by utilizing all available advances in technology to compliantly
expedite these efforts.
Funding: Consistent and synergistic funding of Agile
pursuits has been a challenge. Due to contracting issues, but also
funding within the contracts, the ability to perform contracted Agile
work ebbs and flows between isolated contracts, as well as within
contracts where funding is provided in piece parts.
Earned Value (EV): The ANSI Standard DCMA Imposed EV
system has inherent difficulties dealing with Agile. For instance, in
Agile we do Program Increment planning routinely within a given
contract--where scope and pursuits are adjusted. Further, progress is
reported on ``Storypoints'' and other non-standard methodologies that
the traditional EV tools and report formats do a poor job reflecting.
These practices, if improved, could directly reduce the time to deliver
capabilities to the warfighter by using current technology to
compliantly reduce the duration of contract award, development, and
post development activities. Lockheed Martin looks forward to working
collaboratively with the government to identify improvements to these
practices.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. In response to House report language in the FY19 NDAA,
earlier this year DOD confirmed to the committee significant
limitations related to F-35 sensor data processing, storage, in-flight
transmission and post-mission data retrieval and dissemination. a)
Please provide the current Block 3F system capability and limitations
to collect, store and transmit content and complex metadata associated
with synthetic aperature radar (SAR), moving target indicator (MTI),
multi-spectral electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) and RF
electromagnetic transmissions; b) Please provide all Block 3 and Block
4 system program requirements to collect, store and share information
collected by F-35 sensors.
General Fick. There are no outstanding significant limitations to
the Block 3F system capability to collect, store, and transmit complex
metadata; no Category I Deficiency Reports (DRs) exist related to these
capabilities. With the introduction of Block 4 capabilities, however,
there is an overall requirement for improved data processing, handling,
and storage to facilitate collection, storage, and sharing of data from
F-35 sensors and Mission Systems. The Technology Refresh 3 (TR3)
hardware upgrade of the Integrated Core Processor, Aircraft Memory
System, and Panoramic Cockpit Display Electronics Unit and Display Unit
will be introduced in 2023 (Lot 15) to provide a minimum of 4 times the
current processing power as well as significantly improved data storage
capacity. Further detail on full Block 3 and Block 4 system program
requirements in this area can be provided in an appropriate setting at
the committee's convenience.
Mr. Bacon. In response to my question last year, the JPO stated
that the F-35 program had no requirement to transmit a digital call for
fire (CFF) request and likewise had no requirement to be interoperable
with Army and Navy fire control systems like AFATDS, TLAM etc. Please
confirm if this is still the case and summarize how the F-35 intends to
provide digital CFF and targeting support to U.S. and NATO Army, Navy,
Marine and SOF units in permissive and contested EMS environments.
General Fick. The F-35 does not have a requirement for digital Call
For Fire (CFF). However, the F-35 has several means to communicate
digitally with various ground and air support units to facilitate air
to ground targeting. Ongoing studies related to further data
dissemination in permissive environments continues to feed F-35s
requirements and roadmaps. New F-35 requirements are articulated by our
warfighters in a Draft Statement of Requirement (DSOR) document and
submitted through the Requirements Working Group into the Joint and
International F-35 Governance Structure.
Mr. Bacon. Last year in response to my question the JPO stated that
new tools were being fielded to shorten the timeline to create a new
mission data file (MDF), then estimated to take 12-18 months. a) Have
these tools been fielded and how long does it currently take the USRL
to create a new mission data file? b) When a new threat is detected,
how long does it take to push an update to the F-35 defense system?
General Fick. a) Yes, several improvements to the current tools,
reprogramming lab infrastructure, and reprogramming processes continue
to reduce the time to produce and field mission data files (MDFs).
While multiple factors affect MDF production timelines, we are seeing
that production timelines are trending in the right direction. To field
a new MDF in a new region of the world, the predicted timeline is
currently approximately 16 months. Additional improvements are
scheduled for fielding by February 2020, which will bring that timeline
down to approximately 9 months.
b) The United States Reprogramming Lab is currently producing
mission data file updates for new threats in an existing MDF between
22-118 hours. As mentioned above, multiple factors can affect this
timeline. The same tool and infrastructure improvements cited above are
projected to reduce these production timelines as well.