[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE COST OF DOING NOTHING: MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITIES IN
AN EMERGING ARCTIC
=======================================================================
(116-14)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 8, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-647 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, SAM GRAVES, Missouri
District of Columbia DON YOUNG, Alaska
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD,
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland Arkansas
RICK LARSEN, Washington BOB GIBBS, Ohio
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
JOHN GARAMENDI, California RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., ROB WOODALL, Georgia
Georgia JOHN KATKO, New York
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana BRIAN BABIN, Texas
DINA TITUS, Nevada GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
JARED HUFFMAN, California MIKE BOST, Illinois
JULIA BROWNLEY, California RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida DOUG LaMALFA, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania
MARK DeSAULNIER, California PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Chair BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York Puerto Rico
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
GREG STANTON, Arizona ROSS SPANO, Florida
DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas GREG PENCE, Indiana
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
ABBY FINKENAUER, Iowa
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
HARLEY ROUDA, California
------
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York, Chair
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BOB GIBBS, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
JOHN GARAMENDI, California BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire, Vice SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)
Chair
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation:
Opening statement............................................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation:
Opening statement............................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure:
Opening statement............................................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
WITNESSES
Panel 1
Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard:
Oral statement............................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Panel 2
Rear Admiral Shepard M. Smith, Director, Office of Coast Survey,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
Oral statement............................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Colonel Phillip J. Borders, Commander, Alaska District, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers:
Oral statement............................................... 33
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Panel 3
Admiral Thad W. Allen, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.):
Oral statement............................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and
the Arctic, Center for Strategic and International Studies:
Oral statement............................................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Abbie Tingstad, Ph.D., Senior Physical Scientist, The RAND
Corporation:
Oral statement............................................... 50
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Hon. Mead Treadwell, Cochair, Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson
Center:
Oral statement............................................... 58
Prepared statement........................................... 59
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Post-hearing clarification of remarks from U.S. Coast Guard...... 13
Statement of Willie Goodwin, Chairman, Arctic Waterways Safety
Committee, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen............. 18
Report by Council on Foreign Relations, ``Arctic Imperatives:
Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America's Fourth Coast,''
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Maloney....................... 42
APPENDIX
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Admiral Charles W.
Ray, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard......................... 75
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard................................... 79
Question from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Admiral Charles W. Ray,
Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.............................. 81
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Rear Admiral Shepard
M. Smith, Director, Office of Coast Survey, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration................................. 82
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Rear Admiral Shepard M.
Smith, Director, Office of Coast Survey, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration..................................... 83
Questions from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Rear Admiral Shepard M.
Smith, Director, Office of Coast Survey, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration..................................... 84
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Colonel Phillip J.
Borders, Commander, Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers...................................................... 84
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Colonel Phillip J. Borders,
Commander, Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers....... 84
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Admiral Thad W.
Allen, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)................................. 84
Question from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Admiral Thad W. Allen,
U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)........................................ 85
Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Admiral Thad W. Allen,
U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)........................................ 85
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Heather A. Conley,
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 86
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Heather A. Conley, Senior
Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 86
Question from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Heather A. Conley,
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 87
Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Heather A. Conley,
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 87
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Abbie Tingstad,
Ph.D., Senior Physical Scientist, The RAND Corporation......... 87
Questions from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Abbie Tingstad, Ph.D.,
Senior Physical Scientist, The RAND Corporation................ 88
Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Abbie Tingstad, Ph.D.,
Senior Physical Scientist, The RAND Corporation................ 89
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Hon. Mead Treadwell,
Cochair, Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center................ 89
Question from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Hon. Mead Treadwell,
Cochair, Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center................ 90
Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Hon. Mead Treadwell,
Cochair, Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center................ 90
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
May 8, 2019
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: Members, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation
FROM: Staff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation
RE: Hearing on ``The Cost of Doing Nothing: Maritime
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities in an Emerging Arctic.''
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
will hold a hearing entitled ``The Cost of Doing Nothing:
Maritime Infrastructure Vulnerabilities in an Emerging Arctic''
on Wednesday, May 8, 2019, at 2:00 p.m., in 2167 Rayburn House
Office Building to examine the findings and recommendations of
the recent report by the U.S. Committee on the Marine
Transportation System (CMTS) entitled ``Revising Near-Term
Recommendations to the Prioritize Needs in the U.S. Arctic.''
The Subcommittee will hear testimony from the U.S. Coast Guard
(Coast Guard or Service), the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps),
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and
experts on Arctic infrastructure.
BACKGROUND
The United States is an Arctic Nation. The U.S. Arctic, as
defined in statute,\1\ encompasses U.S. territory north of the
Arctic Circle with over 46,600 miles (75,000 km) of shoreline
in Alaska, including the Aleutian Islands.\2\ Three Arctic
seas--the Bering, the Chukchi, and the Beaufort--border Alaska;
the U.S. Arctic Exclusive Economic Zone contains 568,000 square
nautical miles (SNM), of which less than half is considered by
NOAA to be ``navigationally significant.'' NOAA has designated
38,000 SNM of the navigationally significant areas as Arctic
survey priority locations, and estimates that it could take up
to 25 years to conduct modern hydrographic surveys in the
priority locations if resources remain at their current
level.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, as amended (Public
Law 98-373); The Arctic region is the area north of the Arctic Circle,
North Latitude 66.5622+. The Arctic Ocean dominates the Polar region,
covering six million square miles (15.6 million square kilometers).
Arctic temperatures range from an average winter temperature of -40+ F
(-40+ C) to an average summer temperature just under 32+ F (0+ C).
\2\ Alaska ShoreZone: Mapping over 46,000 Miles of Coastal Habitat.
(2018) NOAA, Office of Response and Restoration, sourced from https://
response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/alaska-shorezonemapping-over-
46000-miles-coastal-habitat.html on October 10, 2018.
\3\ NOAA National Ocean Service, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/
economy/arctic/, accessed May 21, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Historically these seas are frozen for more than half the
year, restricting the Arctic maritime season to June through
October in a typical year, and limiting unaided navigation to
an even shorter period. However, this pattern appears to be
changing as ice-diminished conditions become more extensive
during the summer months. On September 16, 2012, Arctic sea ice
reached its lowest coverage extent then recorded, subsequently
paving the way for the longest Arctic navigation season on
record.\4\ Ice coverage in 2019 tied with 2007 as the joint
seventh smallest winter maximum in the 40-year satellite
record; ice coverage in 2017 and 2018 have been the first and
second smallest on record, respectively.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Jeffries, M. O., J. A. Richter-Menge and J. E. Overland, Eds.,
2012: Arctic Report Card 2012; see https://www.bbc.com/news/science-
environment-20454757
\5\ See https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2019/03/arctic-sea-ice-
maximum-ties-for-seventh-lowest-in-satellite-record/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The melting of Arctic sea ice raises the possibility of far
shorter voyages and substantial cost savings for ocean carriers
sailing between major trading blocs (i.e., Russia, northern
European nations, Asian/Pacific nations, and the United States
and Canada). In 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a
decree ordering an annual Northern Sea Route cargo goal of 80
million tons a year starting in 2024.\6\ While present cargo
ship traffic in the Arctic is mostly regional, not trans-
Arctic, the ramifications could extend far beyond the region if
the Arctic were to become a viable shipping route.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2018/05/its-order-
kremlin-shipping-northern-sea-route-increase-80-million-tons-2024,
accessed April 17, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to allowing for more vessel transits through
the region, rising temperatures in the Arctic will likely
enable more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Melting
permafrost could pose challenges to onshore exploration
activities. Increased oil and gas exploration, shipping, and
cruise tourism in the Arctic will likely increase the risk of
maritime accidents and pollution in the region. Effective
strategies for cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters
have yet to be developed and remain a subject of industry
research and testing.
THE POLAR CODE AND ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY
International cooperation in the Arctic is facilitated
largely through the Arctic Council, established in 1996. The
Council is made up of the eight Arctic nations (Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the
United States), and 13 non-Arctic Nations with observer
status.\7\ The Council is a consensus-based, intergovernmental
forum that works to promote environmental, social, and economic
aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic. Iceland
chairs the council until 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-
council/observers, accessed May 21, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2009 the Arctic Council called upon the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) to formulate and adopt the
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters,
referred to as the Polar Code. The Polar Code went into effect
on January 1, 2017, and enacts mandatory requirements intended
to improve vessel safety and prevent pollution from vessels
transiting in the Arctic, including ship construction,
navigation, crew training, and ship operation.\8\ The Code
applies to passenger and cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more
engaged in international voyages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``Polar Code.'' Polar Code, International Maritime
Organization, 2019, available at www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/
polar/Pages/default.aspx.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 1. Vessel transits in the U.S. Coast Guard's D17 Arctic area of
concern. The ``D17 Arctic area of concern'' is defined as an area north
of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east into the Canadian Arctic
to Banks Island and west into Russia past the Russian port of Pevek.
Source: Modified with data provided by the U.S. Coast Guard and from
Figure 5 in the U.S. Coast Guard. Port Access Route Study: In the
Chukchi Sea, Bering Strait, and Bering Sea. Preliminary Findings. 23
December 2016. Docket Number USCG-2014-0941 and USCG-2010-0833.
U.S. COAST GUARD ARCTIC ASSETS
While several U.S. agencies have a physical presence and
substantial interests in the Arctic, the Coast Guard's
experience, material assets, and installations located
throughout Alaska establish it as a key presence in the region.
The Coast Guard's significant presence in Alaska is anchored by
the Seventeenth District offices in Juneau and the Service's
largest command, Air Station Kodiak.\9\ In addition to
continuous operations from year-round facilities throughout the
state, the Coast Guard conducts seasonal operations, as part of
its Operation Arctic Shield, in locations such as Kotzebue,
Nome, and Utqiagvik (formerly Barrow).\10\ However, with no
assets permanently stationed above the Arctic Circle the
Service's seasonal presence includes employing mobile command
and control platforms such as large cutters and ocean-going
ice-strengthened buoy tenders, and establishing seasonal air
and communications capabilities by leasing facilities. These
mobile and seasonal capabilities facilitate search and rescue,
maritime border security, intelligence gathering for maritime
domain awareness, emergency response, and marine environmental
protection and law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The 17th District encompasses over 3,853,500 sq. miles and over
47,300 miles of shoreline throughout Alaska and the Arctic.
\10\ https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-17/
17th-District-Units/Air-Station-Kodiak accessed April 18, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2012, the Coast Guard has implemented Arctic Shield
operations to perform Coast Guard missions, broaden
partnerships, and enhance and improve preparedness, prevention,
and response capabilities. For example, the Service deployed a
number of assets as part of its Arctic Shield 2017 operations
including: Coast Guard Cutter (CGC) HEALY, a medium icebreaker;
CGC SHERMAN, a high endurance cutter; CGC ALEX HALEY, a medium
endurance cutter; CGC MAPLE, a seagoing buoy tender; and two
Coast Guard MH-60 Jayhawk helicopters from Air Station Kodiak,
Alaska. Arctic Shield 2017 included Operation Arctic Guardian,
an oil spill exercise near Utqiagvik, Alaska, engagement with
nine remote Alaskan villages, a historic transit of the
Northwest Passage by CGC MAPLE and joint operations with the
Royal Canadian Navy, as well as the completion of 28 search and
rescue cases that resulted in 20 lives saved. Compared to
Russia's 46-vessel icebreaker fleet, with 12 more ships under
construction,\11\ the U.S. Coast Guard is forced to stretch
assets and capabilities to secure a wide mission set with
limited resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Ronald O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service. Coast Guard
Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues
for Congress. Updated March 1, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decade-long effort to provide the United States with the
capabilities necessary for assured year-round access to the
polar regions has recently found footing in Congress, and
substantial progress has been made to deliver by 2024 the
Nation's first new heavy icebreaker in more than 40 years. The
Coast Guard and Navy have established a Joint Program Office to
capitalize on experience and best practices from both Services.
In FY 2019, Congress appropriated an additional $675 million to
fund the detail design and construction of a new heavy
icebreaker, the Polar Security Cutter. On April 23, 2019, the
Coast Guard awarded a $745.9 million fixed-price incentive-firm
contract to VT Halter Marine Inc., a Pascagoula, Mississippi
shipyard, for the construction of the first icebreaker with
options to extend the contract for two additional vessels. The
construction of the third icebreaker will most likely provide a
dedicated Arctic asset. The primary mission of Polar Security
Cutters 1 and 2 will be to take over the Coast Guard's existing
responsibilities in the Antarctic to ensure a self-rescuing
capability.
While much of the Nation's focus regarding the Arctic in
recent years has been on the critical need for new heavy
icebreakers, new vessels are far from the only need in the
region. A report conducted by the Homeland Security Operational
Analysis Center identified four major gaps in Coast Guard
Arctic Capabilities including unreliable communications, lack
of adequate maritime domain awareness, scarcity of available
assets (especially ice-resistant air support and icebreakers)
and supporting infrastructure, and institutional difficulty to
identify, articulate, and close capability gaps.\12\ The report
states that if these capability gaps are not closed by the
2030s, the Coast Guard risks facing substantial vulnerabilities
in several of its missions in the Arctic including search and
rescue, marine safety, ice operations, marine environmental
protection, and ports, waterways, and coastal safety.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (2018)
Identifying Potential Gaps in the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Capabilities
[https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2310].
\13\ Ronald O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service. Changes in
the Arctic: Background & Issues for Congress. April 24, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard's ability to exercise both military and
civil authorities is uniquely suited to address the inter-
jurisdictional challenges of the Arctic. In its revised Arctic
Strategic Outlook, released April 2019,\14\ the Coast Guard
highlights three areas of necessary improvement to secure
mission success: enhancing capability through asset
acquisition, improved communications infrastructure, and Arctic
Domain Awareness; strengthening rules-based order to establish
Arctic maritime norms; and adapting the Coast Guard mission set
to the Arctic through new practices and technologies. These
conclusions generally address capability gaps identified in a
2016 GAO study.\15\ The Coast Guard must adapt to enforce
evolving regulatory frameworks for maritime activity in the
Arctic and a changing strategic context, and will do so by
forming new partnerships to promote rule of law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy (Washington, D.C.:
April 2019).
\15\ U.S. Government Accountability Office (2016) Arctic Strategy
Is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate
Known Arctic Capability Gaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARCTIC INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGES
Numerous governmental and academic reports have identified
infrastructure and operational challenges to maritime
transportation in the U.S. Arctic. Liabilities mentioned
include limited satellite coverage and architecture to support
voice and data communications, the lack of a deep-draft port
(i.e., depths greater than 35 feet), hazardous weather and ice
conditions, and the lack of channel marking buoys and other
floating visual aids to navigation, which are not possible due
to continuously moving ice sheets.\16\ In addition, to ensure
safe and efficient maritime transportation in the region, it is
necessary to conduct surveys to improve nautical charts,
improve communications capabilities, improve weather
forecasting and modeling, construct a deep-draft U.S. Arctic
port, and develop community and regional emergency response
networks in preparation for vessel and aircraft accidents and
environmental damage related to increased ship traffic and
industrial development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Arctic Council (2009) Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment; U.S.
White House (2013) National Strategy for the Arctic Region; U.S.
Government Accountability Office (2014) Maritime Infrastructure: Key
Issues Related to Commercial Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next
Decade; Alaska Arctic Policy Commission (2015) Final Report; U.S.
Committee on the Marine Transportation System (2016) A Ten-Year
Prioritization of Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic; Council on
Foreign Relations (2017) Arctic Imperatives, Reinforcing U.S. Strategy
on America's Fourth Coast; Center for Strategic and International
Studies (2017) Maritime Futures, the Arctic and the Bering Strait
Region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to known infrastructure requirements, the Coast
Guard is exploring the need for the creation of new vessel
routing measures to reduce the risk of marine casualties and
increase the efficiency and predictability of vessel traffic in
the U.S. Arctic.\17\ The Coast Guard is also conducting several
Arctic-focused research projects in collaboration with academia
at the Arctic Domain Awareness Center, including methodologies
to minimize environmental damage from spilled oil in extreme
cold, enhanced navigational capabilities in the Arctic,
establishing exposure limits for Search and Rescue team members
in extreme cold, and developing a classification system of ice
conditions.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ U.S. Coast Guard. Port Access Route Study: In the Chukchi Sea,
Bering Strait, and Bering Sea. Preliminary Findings. 23 December 2016.
Docket Number USCG-2014-0941 and USCG-2010-0833.
\18\ U.S. Coast Guard. Acquisition Directorate. Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation. FY18 RDT&E Project Portfolio. March
2018. Examples: Next Generation Arctic Navigational Safety Information
System (proj #6211), Arctic Operations Support (proj #6210), Robust
Maritime Arctic Communications (proj #6213), Safety Parameters for ICE
Operations (proj #5301), Response to Oil in Ice (proj #4701), Ice
Condition Risk Assessment Tool (proj #6512), and Arctic Technology
Evaluation 2018 (proj #62101).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other efforts to improve Arctic capabilities include the
International Arctic Ocean Buoy Program, which maintains an
international network of drifting buoys in the Arctic Ocean to
provide meteorological and oceanographic data for real-time
operational and research purposes. Additionally, H.R. 1314, the
Integrated Coastal and Ocean Observation System Act Amendments
of 2019, has been re-introduced in the 116th Congress to
reauthorize funding for the U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing
System (IOOS), both for observation data in the Arctic and
other U.S. regions.
EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE, NEAR-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System
(CMTS) is a Federal Cabinet-level, inter-departmental committee
that creates a partnership of Federal departments and agencies
with responsibility for the Marine Transportation System (MTS).
In 2010, the CMTS was directed by statute (PL 111-281, Section
307(c)) to coordinate transportation policy in the U.S. Arctic
for Safety and Security. Since then, they have published
recommendations for Arctic infrastructure needs in 2013 and
2016, and revised those recommendations in 2018. The CMTS
recently released its findings and recommendations to
prioritize infrastructure needs and secure sovereignty in the
Arctic (summarized in Appendix I). These recommendations span
five key categories integral to the Arctic MTS, including: (1)
navigable waterways, (2) physical infrastructure, (3)
information infrastructure, (4) emergency response, and (5)
vessel operations.
The CMTS recommendations from 2016 remain largely unchanged
except for recommendation for the Coast Guard to finalize a new
Port Access Route Study for the Bering Strait. Outstanding
near-term recommendations from 2016 emphasize the urgency of
congressional authorizations and appropriations to support
prioritized Arctic infrastructure projects across the five
categories.
WITNESS LIST
PANEL I
Admiral Charles W. Ray, USCG, Vice Commandant,
United States Coast Guard
PANEL II
Rear Admiral Shepard Smith, Director, NOAA Office
of Coast Survey
Colonel Phillip J. Borders, Commander of District
Alaska, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
PANEL III
Ms. Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President,
Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Ms. Abbie Tingstad, Ph.D, Senior Physical
Scientist, RAND Corporation
Admiral Thad Allen, USCG ret., Senior Executive
Advisor, Booz Allen Hamilton
Hon. Mead Treadwell, Co-Chair, Polar Institute
Advisory Board, Woodrow Wilson Center
APPENDIX I: NEAR-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CMTS ARCTIC
INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS REPORT \\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\\ https://www.cmts.gov/downloads/
NearTermRecommendationsArctic2018.pdf
Near-Term Recommendations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navigable Designate Port Clarence as an
Waterways Arctic Maritime Place of Refuge.
-----------------------------------
Review Port Clarence facilities to
assess whether adequate support
facilities are available at Port
Clarence or in the region for a
ship in need of assistance.
-----------------------------------
Leverage existing data-sharing
frameworks, such as Data.gov, the
Alaska Regional Response Team,
and Alaska Ocean Observing
System, to facilitate waterways
planning and response to
environmental emergencies.
-----------------------------------
Support Arctic Waterways Safety
Committee efforts to bring
stakeholders together.
-----------------------------------
Work with stakeholders to
coordinate research efforts to de-
conflict research within
commercial and subsistence use
areas.
-----------------------------------
Leverage international
partnerships supporting waterways
coordination.
-----------------------------------
Designate M-5 Alaska Marine
Highway Connector to connect the
Arctic Ocean and the western
section of the Northwest Passage.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Physical Prioritize the need for Arctic
Infrastructure port reception facilities to
support international regulatory
needs and future growth.
-----------------------------------
Expand Arctic coastal and river
water-level observations to
support flood and stormsurge
warnings.
-----------------------------------
Co-locate new Continuously
Operating Reference Stations and
National Water Level Observation
Network stations to significantly
improve the Arctic geospatial
framework with precise
positioning and water levels.
-----------------------------------
Review U.S. Arctic maritime
commercial activities to
identifying major infrastructure
gaps that should be addressed to
promote safe and sustainable
Arctic communities.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Information Expand partnerships to provide new
Infrastructure satellite Automatic
Identification System (AIS)
capabilities for offshore
activity information.
-----------------------------------
Advance Arctic communication
networks to ensure vessel safety.
-----------------------------------
Place hydrography and charting of
the U.S. maritime Arctic among
the highest priority requirements
for agency execution.
-----------------------------------
Improve weather, water, and
climate predictions to an
equivalent level of service as is
provided to the rest of the
nation.
-----------------------------------
Implement short-range, sea-ice
forecasting capability.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
MTS Response Services Continue collaboration with State
and local authorities to ensure
readiness of Arctic maritime and
aviation infrastructure for
emergency response and Search and
Rescue (SAR).
-----------------------------------
Develop a plan to transport
critical response equipment from
the contiguous U.S. into the
Arctic area in the event of a
catastrophic event.
-----------------------------------
Continue coordination through
international fora to provide
significant opportunities for
engagement across the Federal
Government and the international
Arctic response community.
-----------------------------------
Support Pan-Arctic response
equipment database development,
best practices recommendations,
and information sharing for
continued development of
guidelines for oil spill response
in the Arctic.
-----------------------------------
Evaluate facilities currently
available on the North Slope for
use as seasonal staging areas by
those engaged in readiness
exercises or research.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Vessel Expand U.S. icebreaking capacity
Operations to adequately meet mission
demands in the high latitudes.
-----------------------------------
Finalize the Port Access Route
Study for the Bering Strait and
continue efforts to provide
routes for vessel traffic in the
U.S. Arctic.
-----------------------------------
Update domestic law to implement
the mandatory provisions of the
Polar Code and the Convention on
Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers.
-----------------------------------
Examine existing training and
safety standards applicable to
the U.S. fishing fleet with
respect to the new Polar Code
requirements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE COST OF DOING NOTHING: MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITIES IN
AN EMERGING ARCTIC
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m. in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sean Patrick
Maloney (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Maloney. Listen, thank you all for being here. I am
sorry for the late start. We had just come off the House floor.
We appreciate that the Vice Commandant is here. We had an
opportunity to spend some time together in southern Florida
recently, got to participate in an event where USS Bear--excuse
me, the U.S. Coast Guard vessel Bear--was able to bring back
about $70 million in confiscated cocaine and marijuana, so I
want to, before we even begin, thank Admiral Ray for all the
help he provided when I was in Florida, and all the great men
and women who I was able to learn from.
Well, good afternoon, we will come to order, this
afternoon's hearing is on Arctic maritime infrastructure, both
what is needed now and what is needed in the near future.
The simple truth is that the Arctic is warming. The
statement is not conjecture, but measurable and observable
fact. Melting sea ice and the opening of navigable waters make
shorter voyages and substantial cost savings possible for ocean
carriers sailing between major trading blocks. So today we will
explore what infrastructure is necessary to safely and reliably
sustain increased levels of commercial and governmental
activity in this remote and inhospitable region.
Similarly, increased oil and gas exploration, commercial
shipping, and adventure tourism in the Arctic are likely to
increase the risk of maritime accidents and create new sources
of pollution in what still remains a mostly unspoiled domain.
Yet, at present, harbors of refuge are few and far between.
Despite several surveys, no deepwater port facility has been
built to support high-latitude maritime operations.
The U.S. Coast Guard is tasked with maintaining maritime
safety, search and rescue, emergency response, and law
enforcement across this vast area, but is asked to undertake
these missions with limited resources or, in the worst of
circumstances like the Government shutdown, without being paid.
Certainly it was great news 2 weeks ago when the Coast
Guard announced the award of a contract to finalize design and
begin construction of the first new heavy icebreaker in over 45
years. But the reality remains that Coast Guard District 17,
the district responsible for Alaska and the U.S. Arctic, has
pressing air support deficiencies and substantial unmet
shoreside infrastructure needs that pose considerable
challenges to the Coast Guard capabilities and mission
readiness.
As much as the Arctic is a uniquely challenging
environment, it is also uniquely vulnerable. We currently rely
on the international cooperative efforts for coordinated search
and rescue, navigational safety, and environmental safety for
oversight and response in the high north. Strong U.S.
involvement in the Arctic Council and International Maritime
Organization can help mitigate risks and ensure the safety of
maritime operations.
But at what point do we become too reliant on a shared
infrastructure and capabilities offered by our Arctic
neighbors?
For several years now this subcommittee has examined the
rapid emergence of the U.S. Arctic as a genuine new frontier, a
frontier filled with grand promise, but great peril, too. I
look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses this
afternoon, to gather their recommendations on how best to
secure our sovereign presence in the Arctic by making a
strategic and sustained commitment to address our present and
future maritime infrastructure needs.
[Mr. Maloney's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney, a Representative in
Congress from the State of New York, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation
Good afternoon, and welcome to this afternoon's hearing on Arctic
maritime infrastructure; both what is needed now, and what will be
needed in the near future.
The Arctic is warming. That statement is not conjecture but a
measurable and observable fact.
Melting sea ice and the opening of navigable waters make shorter
voyages and substantial cost savings possible for ocean carriers
sailing between major trading blocs. Today, we will explore what
infrastructure is necessary to safely and reliably sustain increased
levels of commercial and governmental activity in this remote and
inhospitable region.
Similarly, increased oil and gas exploration, commercial shipping,
and adventure tourism in the Arctic are likely to increase the risk of
maritime accidents and create new sources of pollution in what still
remains a mostly unspoiled domain. Yet, at present, harbors of refuge
are few and far between. Despite several surveys, no deepwater port
facility has been built to support high-latitude maritime operations.
The U.S. Coast Guard is tasked with maintaining maritime safety,
search and rescue, and emergency response, and law enforcement across
this vast landscape, but is asked to undertake these missions with
limited resources, or in the worst of circumstances like the government
shutdown, without being paid.
Certainly, it was great news two weeks ago when the Coast Guard
announced the award of a contract to finalize design and begin
construction of the first new heavy icebreaker in over 45 years. But
the reality remains that Coast Guard District 17, the District
responsible for Alaska and the U.S. Arctic, has pressing air support
deficiencies and substantial unmet shoreside infrastructure needs that
pose considerable challenges to Coast Guard capabilities and mission
readiness.
As much as the Arctic is a uniquely challenging environment, it is
also uniquely vulnerable. We currently rely on international
cooperative efforts for coordinated search and rescue, navigational
safety, and environmental safety for oversight and response in the High
North. Strong U.S. involvement in the Arctic Council and International
Maritime Organization can help mitigate risks and ensure the safety of
maritime operations. But at what point do we become too reliant on the
shared infrastructure and capabilities offered by our Arctic neighbors?
For several years now, this subcommittee has examined the rapid
emergence of the U.S. Arctic as a genuine new frontier; a frontier
filled with grand promise but great peril, too. I look forward to
hearing from our expert witnesses this afternoon to gather their
recommendations on how best to secure our sovereign presence in the
Arctic by making a strategic and sustained commitment to address our
present and future maritime infrastructure needs.
Mr. Maloney. I now call the ranking member for any opening
remarks.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman Maloney.
The United States defines the Arctic as an area north of
the Aleutian Islands. That area includes 568,000 square
nautical miles of the United States exclusive economic zone,
but very little maritime transportation infrastructure exists
there. Extreme weather and sparse populations have kept
maritime transportation in the area to a minimum. Fisheries and
limited coastal transport occur there, and large commercial
vessels skirt the southern part of the area, following the
great circle route.
The Arctic has new and promising prospects for routine
commercial vessel operations, resource extraction, and
fisheries further to the north. In the last several years a
small number of recreational and passenger vessels have begun
to venture into the far north.
The Coast Guard has no year-round presence north of the
Aleutian Islands since abandoning its loran station in 2008.
Cutters and air assets do venture into the area during the
summer and the Healy conducts research north of the Bering
Strait. Unfortunately, as the GAO pointed out in 2016, the
Coast Guard has no plan for or assets to address increased
vessel traffic and other maritime uses of the Arctic. This is
troubling, since vessel traffic and other uses seem certain to
increase significantly over the next two decades, and even more
troubling, given the interests of Russia and China in the
Arctic.
The United States needs to be able to fully assert its
sovereignty in the Arctic, as well as carry out its search and
rescue maritime safety, living marine resources, and
environmental protection responsibilities. Of course, this
nearly blank slate gives us the opportunity to carry out these
missions in new and innovative ways.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today in what
they believe we need to do to assert our sovereignty in the
north to ensure a safe and efficient maritime transportation
system there.
Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
[Mr. Gibbs's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation
The United States defines the Arctic as the area north of the
Aleutian Islands. That area includes 568,000 square nautical miles of
the United States Exclusive Economic Zone, but very little maritime
transportation infrastructure exists there.
Extreme weather and sparse population have kept maritime
transportation in the area to a minimum. Fisheries and limited coastal
transport occur there, and large commercial vessels skirt the southern
part of the area following the Great Circle Route.
Diminishing sea ice for longer periods of the year is making travel
in the Arctic a more promising prospect for routine commercial vessel
operations, resource extraction, farther North fisheries and even
recreation. In the last several years, a small number of recreational
and passenger vessels have begun to venture into the far North.
The Coast Guard has had no year-round presence north of the
Aleutians since abandoning its three LORAN stations in 2008. Cutters
and air assets do venture into the area during the summer, and the
HEALY conducts research north of the Bering Strait.
Unfortunately, as GAO pointed out in 2016, the Coast Guard has no
plan for, or assets to address increased vessel traffic and other
maritime uses of the Arctic.
This is troubling since vessel traffic and other uses seem certain
to increase significantly over the next two decades, and even more
troubling given the interest of Russia and China in the Arctic.
The United States needs to be able to fully assert its sovereignty
in the Arctic as well as carry out its search and rescue, maritime
safety, living marine resources, and environmental protection
responsibilities.
Of course, this nearly blank slate gives us the opportunity to
carry out these missions in new and innovative ways. I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses today about what they believe we need to do
to assert our sovereignty in the north, to assure a safe and efficient
maritime transportation system there.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. I would now like to
recognize the gentleman from Oregon's Fourth District, the
chairman of our committee, my friend Peter DeFazio, for any
opening remarks you would like to make.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, and thanks for holding this
incredibly important hearing. This has been a topic that has
escaped the notice of past administrations and the Congress
itself, and we really need to begin to plan more quickly than
any of us ever thought for the opening of the Northwest
Passage.
In fact, I don't know where I was, because I have been
doing a lot of travel and talking to a lot of people over the
weekend, but I talked to someone who was going on a cruise, and
they expect to try and get across.
And I said, ``Well, I hope you are in touch with the
Canadians and our Coast Guard, because, you know, we don't have
a lot of capability up there.'' But it is a sailing ship out
of, I think, Denmark or something. It is a known cruise
company.
In any case, the future is here, potentially. And, you
know, we have got to begin to deal with it much more
pragmatically and strategically. That is why we have the Coast
Guard here today.
I am thrilled we are finally on track for an icebreaker,
hopefully to be followed by five more. And, you know, begin to
be able to deal with both the challenges of our duties at the
South Pole and in the Arctic. And the Great Lakes need a little
help, too, with ice breaking. I don't want to neglect the Great
Lakes.
You know, I applaud the Coast Guard for releasing the 2019
Arctic Strategy. I think that that is a great step forward. And
you know, we look forward to your testimony today and whatever
other recommendations you might provide to the committee.
And also I know the--we have a number of other witnesses on
the second panel, and I think the chairman has done a great job
of assembling a group of folks who will help instruct us on
whatever we might need to do in a Coast Guard reauthorization
or other bills to move forward productively in the Arctic.
So with that I yield back the balance my time.
[Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Earlier this year, the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
convened two hearings to examine how Federal infrastructure policy
could help mitigate and adapt to climate change.
Today, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee
tackles a topic that has for the most part escaped the notice of
Congress. And that topic is the need to look both strategically and
pragmatically at maritime infrastructure needs in a rapidly evolving
Arctic environment.
First off, I want to thank Chairman Maloney for devoting the
subcommittee's time and attention to this issue of growing national
importance. I also want to commend him for assembling a panel of expert
witnesses that are second to none.
Whether you agree about the science of global warming or not, the
plain fact is that the Arctic has emerged as a region in flux due to
rising temperatures. Decreased sea ice coverage, melting of permafrost
and glaciers, and accelerated erosion of coastal areas now exposed to
increased wave action--the effect of a warming climate is real,
measurable, and fundamentally changing the Arctic environment.
Now, it is not only conceivable, but likely, that the Arctic Ocean
will become passable, at least on a seasonal basis, for maritime
commerce and resource exploration and development in the next fifteen
or twenty years.
Moreover, based upon experience which shows that the actual rate of
observed physical environmental change in the Arctic commonly exceeds
the rates forecast by model projections, we would be wise to assume
this new future will arrive much, much sooner than anticipated.
Unfortunately, the Federal Government has been far too complacent
over the past twenty years in confronting this substantial challenge
through national and international policy. Modest ``whole of
government'' planning efforts have fallen short of addressing current
infrastructure needs.
We have seen the Coast Guard's fleet of heavy icebreakers wither
away. Furthermore, little demonstrable progress has been made in the
construction of a deep water port, installation of telecommunication
and navigation systems, and investment in other infrastructure
necessary to support maritime transportation in this hostile and
forbidding region.
Recent positive events indicate that maybe, just maybe, the Federal
Government is starting to turn the corner and give the emerging Arctic
the attention it is due.
I applaud the Coast Guard for releasing its 2019 Arctic Strategy
and updating its policies and priorities in this region of growing
geopolitical tension and challenge.
I also was pleased to see the Coast Guard and U.S. Navy Integrated
Program Office award the first contract in over 40 years to VT Halter
Marine to finalize design and to construct the lead hull of what I hope
will be a fleet of six new heavy icebreakers. This was very good news
indeed!
Yet there is so much more that must be done. Today, I want the
witnesses to offer pragmatic, yet effective, recommendations for the
types of Arctic maritime infrastructure investments the Congress should
support, and a strategy and timetable for when we should commence to
undertake this substantial work.
In closing, I appeal to members on both sides: we gain nothing by
failing to recognize the awakening of an accessible and exploitable
Arctic. The last thing we can afford to do is wait until we are forced
to act; an outcome that will surely be far more costly, far more
difficult, far less thoughtful, and with many more unintended
consequences.
Let's use this hearing constructively and build on what we learn
today to ensure that we avoid just such a scenario. Thank you.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman and, seeing the ranking
member, proceed to our first witness.
We are very fortunate to be joined by Admiral Charles W.
Ray, Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard.
Thank you, sir, for being here today. We look forward to
your testimony. I did mention the Bear; I should probably
mention that we were also on the Isaac Mayo before I get myself
in trouble. I want to thank those remarkable men and women, as
well, and for all the work you do.
And we are in possession of your written statement. So if
we could ask you to keep your opening remarks to 5 minutes,
that would help the Members proceed to their questions.
Go ahead, sir, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY, VICE COMMANDANT, U.S.
COAST GUARD
Admiral Ray. Good afternoon, Chairman Maloney, Ranking
Member Gibbs, Chairman DeFazio, distinguished members of the
subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to address you as
the 31st Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, and thank you for
entering my written comments in the record.
Before I move on to the Arctic, sir, I wanted to just thank
this committee for your support for the Pay Our Coast Guard
legislation, and thank Chairman DeFazio for the same support.
As I travel around, as I have with you down in Miami, out to
the west coast to L.A., up to Kodiak, and down to Puerto Rico,
this is one of the most frequent subjects that comes up with
our folks that are out doing the work of the Nation and the
Coast Guard. And so I thank you for your support moving
forward, and we really need to get this across the goal line.
Thank you.
Moving on to the Arctic, Admiral Schultz and I look forward
to continuing to work with this committee to advance our
Nation's security sovereignty and economic interests in the
Arctic. As you all know, the United States is an Arctic nation,
and the Coast Guard has been the lead Federal agency up there
for over 150 years.
As the Nation's only surface presence in the region, the
Coast Guard advances our national interests with a unique blend
of polar operational capability, regulatory authorities, and
international relationships. Over the past decade, as the
chairman stated, as accessibility has improved, global
competition has increased. The Arctic is involved in an
increasingly important geostrategic region that requires a
whole-of-government approach.
Today nations seek to shape the security environment to
their own advantage. Our two near-peer competitors, Russia and
China, have declared the Arctic a strategic priority and
continue to aggressively develop the capability and
infrastructure to expand their influence.
Even in the face of this increased competition, U.S.
interests are well served by working with the eight Arctic
nations. The Coast Guard continues to build trust and diplomacy
with allies, partners, Native residents, and international
bodies like the International Maritime Organization and the
Arctic Coast Guard Forum to promote our Nation's influence in
this critical region.
Our recently published Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms
our commitment to American leadership. It establishes three
lines of effort to achieve long-term success. First will be
our--we will enhance our capability to operate effectively in
the dynamic Arctic domain. We will strengthen rules-based order
and an adherence to the rule of law. Thirdly, we will innovate
and adapt to promote resiliency and prosperity.
For the United States to lead in the Arctic we must
maintain a physical presence. The foundation of this presence
is the Coast Guard's icebreaking fleet, and I want to thank
this committee--I can't thank you enough; it was 43 years in
the making for us to get where we are today--for your support
to begin long-overdue recapitalization of our only heavy
icebreaker. And as you all know, we awarded that contract in
2013, and we hope it is the first of several that we need to do
the Nation's business in the polar regions.
Our presence also includes the operation in communities in
the polar regions and in the Arctic and waters across the
region, most notably every year we have a year-long operation
called Operation Arctic Shield that includes deploying ships,
aviation assets, and Coast Guard crews to the Arctic to conduct
research and operations, law enforcement, marine safety, and
engage with the communities. Part of this is facility and
vessel inspections. Part of it is contingency response
exercises.
We are focused on the Marine Transportation System. For
over 150 years your Coast Guard has operated in the Arctic and
served Alaska communities. We are committed to this vital
region, and currently we maintain shore infrastructure in
Alaska, all across Alaska, and that is the stepping-off point--
Kodiak is--for most of our work in the actual Arctic. And so we
appreciate your support for infrastructure where we will soon--
the next few years--home-port six Fast Response Cutters and two
Offshore Patrol Cutters.
As you know, the Coast Guard faces an extensive shore
infrastructure backlog that we last tracked at about $1.7
billion. A big part of that is across Alaska, where we need to
work on piers and wharves and houses and community centers for
our people.
In closing, a strong presence in Alaska enables the Coast
Guard to safeguard our national interests in the Arctic. I
thank this committee for your unwavering support as your Coast
Guard invests in our Alaska fleet and infrastructure. Thank you
for this opportunity to testify, and I welcome your questions.
[Admiral Ray's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice Commandant, U.S.
Coast Guard
introduction
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here to discuss the U.S. Coast
Guard's strategy and operations to advance safe and secure maritime
activity, including the opportunities and challenges of Arctic
infrastructure.
The Coast Guard has been operating in the Arctic since 1867, when
the United States purchased Alaska from Russia. As in all U.S. waters,
our missions include enforcing laws and regulations, conducting search
and rescue, and advancing navigation safety and environmental
stewardship. As the Nation's visible maritime presence in the Arctic,
the Coast Guard is also addressing the region's broader national
security interests, including: economic security, environmental
security, food security, geopolitical stability, national defense, and
sovereignty.
Our Nation's security demands on the Coast Guard in the Arctic are
both pressing and enduring. The Arctic is one of the world's most
challenging operating environments due to the extreme weather, vast
distances, and lack of infrastructure. Additionally, as nations,
industry, scientists, and the public explore and pursue emerging
opportunities, the region is experiencing rising geopolitical interest
and expanding human activity. Ensuring safety and security in this
dynamic region requires a whole-of-government approach, in which the
Coast Guard stands ready to play a significant role. The Coast Guard's
vision for the Arctic is a cooperative environment that balances the
needs and requirements of the region's diverse group of stakeholders.
Our recently published Arctic Strategic Outlook reaffirms our
commitment to American leadership in the region through partnership,
unity of effort, and continuous innovation, and establishes three lines
of effort to achieve long-term success. First, we will enhance
capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic domain; second,
we will strengthen the rules-based order; and third, we will innovate
and adapt to promote resilience and foster prosperity.
national interests in the arctic region
The United States is an Arctic nation with extensive sovereign
rights and responsibilities in this region. As access to the Arctic
evolves, many nations across the globe aspire to assert or expand their
role in governing the region. The United States must be vigilant in
protecting its national interests to ensure other nations do not
develop their competing interests in the Arctic at our expense.
Actions and intentions of Arctic and non-Arctic States are shaping
the security environment and geopolitical stability of the region. In
particular, our two nearest-peer competitors (Russia and China) have
both declared the Arctic a strategic priority. Twenty percent of
Russia's landmass is north of the Arctic Circle, and both onshore and
offshore resource (minerals, oil, and gas) development is crucial to
the Russian economy. Russia is also advancing the growth of the
Northern Sea Route (NSR) for trans-Arctic shipping and other commercial
opportunities. The NSR reached a new shipping record last year with
9.74 million tons of goods transported along the route, and Russia
advertises that number could increase ten-fold by 2030. The Russian
government is currently rebuilding and expanding military bases that
had previously fallen into disuse. These renewed capabilities include
air bases, ports, weapons systems, troop deployments, domain awareness
tools, and search and rescue assets. Additionally, Russia has the
world's largest number of icebreakers. With nearly 50 icebreakers that
include four operational, nuclear-powered heavy icebreakers, and three
new heavy, nuclear-powered icebreakers currently under construction,
Russia maintains the capabilities, capacities, experienced crews, and
infrastructure necessary to operate into the Arctic year-round and
surge as required.
China has recently taken an active role in Arctic development,
pursuing economic investments with every Arctic nation in key strategic
areas, such as oil and gas development, ports, railways, and
infrastructure. With the release of their Arctic Policy in January
2018, they have declared themselves a nation intrinsically tied to the
Arctic, and signaled their intention to play a security and governance
role in the region. China has directed Chinese companies and government
agencies to become more involved in Arctic affairs, and is rapidly
developing its ability to operate in the region. China is also
launching its first home-built icebreaker, XUE LONG II, and has begun
designing a nuclear icebreaker expected to have twice the icebreaking
capability of its conventional icebreakers.
The United States also has economic and environmental interests in
the Arctic, which are linked to the changing and expanding Arctic
activity. Significant increases in natural resource extraction in the
American Arctic have not yet materialized, but industries continue to
explore opportunities to leverage emergent economic prospects. Tourism
and transpolar flights are also increasing, both of which could
potentially increase search and rescue demands and environmental risks.
Additionally, we have observed steady but measured growth of shipping
through the Bering Strait over the past ten years.
As the Arctic continues to experience longer and larger periods of
reduced or ice-free conditions, industry and other nations will likely
continue to explore the possibility of seasonal trans-Arctic commercial
shipping through the three Polar routes: the Northern Sea Route through
the Russian Arctic, the Northwest Passage through the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago, and the Transpolar Route through the central Arctic ocean.
These routes could offer considerable savings between northern ports in
Asia, Europe, and North America over traditional routes. However, the
high variability of environmental conditions and limited shore
infrastructure in the North American Arctic will pose a danger to even
seasoned operators and likely increase the demand for Coast Guard
services.
coast guard operations in the american arctic
Operation ARCTIC SHIELD is the Coast Guard's year-round planning
and operational endeavor which provides mobile and scalable presence in
the Arctic domain. In 2018, ARCTIC SHIELD operations advanced national
and Coast Guard strategic goals by aligning operations to mitigate
real-world threats and leveraged opportunities of strategic interest.
This involved staging helicopters at a forward operating location in
Kotzebue, AK, and deployment of major cutters, air assets,
communication equipment, personnel, and logistics to support Coast
Guard operations. The Coast Guard also deployed the medium icebreaker
HEALY to conduct maritime patrols and support scientific operations. A
high endurance cutter and a medium endurance cutter operated in the
Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas, conducting maritime patrols and
serving as forward deployed response assets. Additionally, the Coast
Guard worked collaboratively with multiple agencies to enhance
prevention and response plans at all levels of government.
Our 2018 operational highlights include: completion of two dozen
search and rescue cases (saving or assisting over 50 lives); conducting
multiple exercises and training evolutions; hosting oil spill response
drills; visits to numerous remote villages (educating more than 4,000
children in boating and water safety programs); as well as exchanges
and joint operations with the Royal Canadian Navy and Coast Guard.
This year, ARCTIC SHIELD 2019 shoreside operations are currently
underway, with a focus on western Alaska and the Bering Strait. A
three-pronged approach of outreach, operations, and assessment of
capabilities will support marine safety, search and rescue, law
enforcement, and other Coast Guard statutory missions in the Arctic.
Consistent with our recently updated Arctic Strategic Outlook, our goal
is to further develop a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities
required to operate in this austere environment, as well as to broaden
partnerships in support of Arctic operations.
In 2019, operations will continue to be supported with increased
cutter, aircraft, and shoreside presence across Alaska. Specific
activities include facility and vessel inspections, gold dredge fleet
inspections, maritime safety compliance enforcement, ice rescue
training, marine mammal protection enforcement flights, sovereignty
patrols, and scientific research. Planned activities include an oil
spill preparedness and response exercise on the North Slope and a joint
marine pollution contingency exercise with international partners.
Year-round outreach efforts will continue to deliver education and
awareness services to Arctic communities and outlying native villages.
icebreaking capacity and acquisition status
The ability for the United States to lead in the Arctic, both
diplomatically and operationally, hinges on having the capabilities and
capacities to ensure national security and uphold sovereignty. Purpose-
built U.S. icebreakers enable American influence through assured access
to the polar regions, safeguarding our national interests. These
platforms deliver Coast Guard authorities anytime, anywhere, and
without these capabilities, we risk significant gaps in our ability to
respond to regional contingencies.
The current Coast Guard icebreaker capacity is one heavy polar
icebreaker, CGC POLAR STAR--commissioned in 1976, and one medium
icebreaker, CGC HEALY--commissioned in 2000. The primary differences
between heavy and medium icebreakers are endurance and power. The Coast
Guard considers a heavy icebreaker to be one that can break at least
six feet of ice at a continuous speed of three knots and operate year-
round in the Arctic, with the necessary systems and endurance to
protect its crew in the event it has to ``winter-over'' in substantial
ice conditions. Conversely, medium icebreakers are designed to operate
seasonally in the Arctic.
Due to the strong support of the Administration and Congress, the
FY 2019 appropriation included full funding for acquisition of our
first Polar Security Cutter (PSC), and some long lead time materials
for the second. This investment sends a strong message that the Nation
is serious about our interests in the Arctic. Just two weeks ago, the
joint Coast Guard and Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO) awarded VT
Halter Marine Inc., of Pascagoula, Mississippi, a fixed price incentive
(firm) contract for the detail design and construction of the lead PSC.
We are as close as we have been in over 40 years to recapitalizing our
icebreaking fleet, and continued investment will ensure we meet our
Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and dynamic polar
regions.
In order to conduct the full range of Coast Guard missions, Coast
Guard icebreakers must be fully interoperable with interagency and
international stakeholders, including the Department of Defense (DoD),
to carry out national defense operations. Thus, the new PSC will
include sufficient space, weight, and power to conduct the full
complement of multi-mission activities that support our Nation's
current and future needs in the Arctic.
The Coast Guard also understands that we must maintain our existing
heavy and medium icebreaking capability while proceeding with
recapitalization. Construction on the first PSC is planned to begin in
2021 with delivery planned for 2024; however, the contract includes
financial incentives for earlier delivery. Maintenance of POLAR STAR
will be critical to sustaining this capability until the new PSCs are
delivered. Robust planning efforts for a service life extension project
on POLAR STAR are already underway and initial work for this project
will begin in 2020, with phased industrial work occurring annually from
2021 through 2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the
vessel's service life until delivery of at least the second new PSC.
shore infrastructure
In addition to having the necessary platforms to maintain our
presence in the Arctic, the Coast Guard maintains a robust shore
infrastructure laydown in Alaska. Shore facilities support all Coast
Guard operations and personnel, as well as provide required
infrastructure to support the needs of the Service's operational
communities. Investments in shore infrastructure are critical to
modernizing the Coast Guard and equipping our workforce with the
facilities required to meet mission.
With approximately 10% of the Coast Guard's real property inventory
located in Alaska, the need for proper capital investments is all the
more critical given the vast distances between shore facilities in that
region. We are currently building waterfront facilities and shore
infrastructure to support the delivery of six new Fast Response Cutters
(FRC) and two Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) to Alaska, as well as the
critical housing and family support facilities to accommodate the
additional personnel and their families to operate and maintain these
new assets. Additionally over the last few years, we have built a new
hangar to support forward deployed helicopters in Cold Bay, 20 new
housing units in Kodiak, as well as new facilities in Kodiak to enable
our transition from C-130H to C-130J aircraft. These efforts reaffirm
our commitment to the region and our need for infrastructure to support
Arctic operations.
conclusion
The Coast Guard will continue to lead across the national and
international landscape to help shape the Arctic domain as a
cooperative environment while preserving our sovereign rights. We
understand the significant investment required to secure the Arctic,
and we appreciate and embrace the trust the Nation has placed in the
Service to accomplish this. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today and for all you do for the men and women of your Coast
Guard. I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, Admiral Ray. I will now proceed to
Members' questions, which will be limited to 5 minutes. I will
begin by recognizing myself.
Admiral, first let me start by saying--because the focus of
today's hearing is on the Arctic and Alaska in many ways, you
know--I should mention that we lost a member of the Coast Guard
community in Alaska, a young man named Michael Kozloski, who
was actually a resident of my district, whose family lives
about 8 miles from my house. His wife, Brie, and their kids--at
least grew up there, I should say. And that is a loss we felt
very acutely in the Hudson Valley.
I want to thank the Commandant for coming up for the
funeral and for the extraordinary support that the Coast Guard
has shown to Mr. Kozloski's family. We hate to see these things
happen, but it is a reminder of the sacrifices the members of
the Coast Guard make every day. So we thank the Coasties for
that.
Let me ask you about the--I am interested in the Polar
Security Cutter. You talk about--can you describe for us the
capabilities that that vessel is going to provide, how many
ships we need, how that compares to the fleets that we see from
the Russians and from others?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. Thank you for your question. Thank
you for attending Boatswain Kozloski's funeral. It is part of
the inherent nature--the dangerous nature of our business.
Well, we thank you for your support. It meant a lot.
With regards to the Polar Security Cutter, the Commandant
has been saying--and we have all been saying this--we did a
study a few years ago called the High Latitude Study which did
analysis on the Coast Guard's 11 mission areas, which ones
apply to the Arctic, the Antarctic. And it kind of arrayed
where we need to be, and when. And a long story short, we need
the ability to project year-round presence in the Arctic. And
that is possible with the right kind of icebreakers. It is
possible to be up there summertime and wintertime.
And so, when we do the math--and it is fairly
straightforward--and you do what it takes to do that, when you
consider shipyard availabilities, we need six overall
icebreakers. Three of those need to be heavy icebreakers to be
able to project our presence in the Arctic and do our yearly
duty to break out the National Science Foundation station in
McMurdo, which is also vital to the Nation's interests down in
Antarctica.
And then we need three medium icebreakers that do any
number of things, from scientific research to projecting
sovereignty in places where there are boundary areas. They will
be Polar Security Cutters, as well. And it is important that we
talk about them as security cutters, as opposed to just
icebreakers, because all Coast Guard ships are multimission,
and they can be doing one mission one day and the next day they
could be doing search and rescue, law enforcement, or any of
the others.
So six and three is how we have been shaping this up. But
we are really excited about the first one, now that we have got
that off the ways and going, and we expect to--great things
from Halter down in Pascagoula. They have got a great record.
And if that answered your question, sir----
Mr. Maloney. Yes. I am also interested in how our
capabilities compare to those of other great powers who may be
thinking strategically about the Arctic, particularly Russia,
China. Could you say a word about that, and what kind of
comparison would you make between our capabilities right now
and those of those two countries?
Admiral Ray. As we say in the maritime services, we are in
a big stern chase with the Russians, sir. I mean, they have got
50 icebreakers of various classes. Four of them are nuclear-
powered heavy icebreakers. They have been committed to a
rebuilding program for their icebreaker fleet for many years
without fail.
The Chinese just this year launched their second
icebreaker, which is approaching a heavy icebreaker, which is
Xue Long 2. And they are extremely aggressive with how they
sail these. The Xue Long 1, which was their first icebreaker,
has been to the Arctic every year for the past five or six--our
Arctic--off of our--and they are not an Arctic nation. And so
the Xue Long 2, the expectation is they will be similarly in
their way that they sail and engage around the planet.
Of course in the Baltic states--I am sorry, in the
Scandinavian states there are multiple icebreakers, but they
are mainly littoral close-in, they are not projecting over the
horizon. So when we think of other nations' icebreakers, we
primarily think of the Russians and the Chinese; the Swedes
have some long-distance icebreakers, but, other than that, that
is kind of the--that is the ones that we talk about.
Mr. Maloney. And if I could get you to say a word about the
shoreside infrastructure that we are also going to need.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. With regards to Coast Guard
shoreside infrastructure, our current focus is where all of our
people depart from to go to the Arctic. That is the Kodiak,
that is our northernmost place. And so that is where we have
the most plans and the most specifics about investment.
Our approach, as you know, to operating in the Arctic,
given the dynamic nature of it, is we will take these
icebreakers--when we get sufficiently built out, we can move
them wherever the fight is. And ``fight'' is just a term of
art. Wherever the action is we will move those icebreakers. So
it could be as far south as, you know, approaching the Bering
Sea, or as far east as our border with Canada. And so that is
our approach, is mobile infrastructure that will deploy. And
that is why icebreakers, or Polar Security Cutters, are so
important. That region is not ice free. There is just less
multiyear ice than there has been in the history of the world.
But--so the ability to move and operate in ice-covered
waters, whether it is just a year's worth of ice or a couple of
years, that is our approach, operationally. The preponderance
of our infrastructure requests for the U.S. Coast Guard are in
Kodiak and other parts of Alaska, where we support that region.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Gibbs?
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you.
First of all, Admiral, and all the men and women who serve
under you, I want to thank you, gratitude of the country,
because the Coast Guard is doing great work in drug
interdiction and everything else you do--and security. So I
want to make sure you--we appreciate what you all do.
My first question, when we are talking about the Polar
Security Cutter, the PSC--and we got that going now--I guess
one of my first questions, you are talking down the road if we
get the first one--it has been 40 years, I guess, whatever it
was you said--to getting, you know, a second or third one. And
would it be more economical to maybe work on--to get the
production line set up to--just to do, like, five heavies,
instead of doing any medium icebreakers, and just--you know,
could we save dollars by making a long-term commitment to make
all heavies and not change the production cycle, the production
assembly line, and all the work that goes into developing a
whole new--you know, a different-sized ship? But--go ahead.
Admiral Ray. It could be, sir. I mean there is no doubt
that there are economies of scale when it comes to producing
the same class of ship from the same yard over.
I think every--all the bodies that have studied this agree
that we need at least three of these heavies.
Mr. Gibbs. Yes.
Admiral Ray. So--and the 43 years I referred to earlier,
that is the last time we built a heavy icebreaker. Look
forward; we can't wait 43 years. We are looking to having her
in the water in 2024, at the latest, with incentives on the
contract to do it sooner than that, 2023, which is fairly rapid
for this class of ship.
So--and we intend to continue to seek Polar Security Cutter
2 and 3 moving forward, and then we will be in a position to
decide how things are shaping up.
Mr. Gibbs. Yes, I just wanted to raise the question. And,
you know, you have to get that production set up, maybe, to
transition to a different class. Maybe that doesn't make sense,
and the heavies can do more, anyways.
On this first one, when it is operational--of course, a lot
of the time it is going to be spent down for the National
Science Foundation, the McMurdo Station in Antarctica. What do
you look--do you anticipate how many days that would be up in
the Arctic?
Admiral Ray. Sir, when I first came in the Service in 1981
we had down, I want to say, five icebreakers. And we did Arctic
East, Arctic West, we did an Antarctic patrol. So when we have
the capacity that we need, we will send these ships north and
south, and they will be--we will be operating in places that we
traditionally operated, but we haven't had the capacity to do
lately.
So with regards to when we would send in the Arctic, we
will need to get--we are doing work to extend the service life
of Polar Star. We are starting that next year, because we need
to extend her out until we get a second heavy icebreaker. When
we have two heavy icebreakers, then we can talk about--in
operation--we can talk about sending one north. And that one
could be--that will not be before 2023.
[A post-hearing clarification of Admiral Ray's remarks
follows:]
Post-hearing clarification of remarks from the U.S. Coast Guard
The goal of Polar Star's SLEP is to extend her service life until
delivery of the second PSC to ensure self-rescue capability. The Coast
Guard does not intend to expand the CGC Polar Star's operations beyond
current operational tempo (OPTEMPO) following service life extension
activities. Once the first PSC is delivered, the Coast Guard will
continue to operate Polar Star to ensure self-rescue capability. Since
capacity of the icebreaking fleet will increase by the addition of a
PSC, while one of the Coast Guard's heavy icebreakers is conducting the
Antarctic mission, the other will have capacity to conduct other
missions, including Arctic operations.
Mr. Gibbs. OK, I want to talk a little bit about gaps. I
know in panel 3 they will talk about some of the gaps, I guess
shortfalls, and they should discuss navigable waters, physical
infrastructure information, infrastructure responsibilities,
vessel operations, and also the GAO report of the Coast Guard
studies; the gaps would be communications, Arctic, Maritime
Domain Awareness, infrastructure, training, exercise
opportunities in ice breaking.
Can you kind of relate to us how you are trying to fill
these gaps, and what our operational status is, I guess, on--
when you talk about these challenges you have, and the gaps?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. We have--with regards to the
waterways--kind of just going down top to bottom, if you don't
mind--we have worked with the Waterways Safety Committee to
study the waterways, starting from the Unimak Pass, which is
down in the Aleutians, all the way up to the Bering Strait.
And so, understanding--we developed, working with the
Russians, a port access route study, which is, in essence, the
prequel for a traffic separation scheme that has been both
coordinated with the Native community with regards to the
migratory patterns of their subsistence lifestyle, and then
with the draft--and worked with NOAA and others. So I guess on
the front end of prevention work on the waterways, I think we
have moved down the road with that.
With regard to physical infrastructure, as I said, thanks
to this committee we have got a good start on infrastructure
that we need to be able to sail and operate from Kodiak. That
is our center of gravity in Alaska. Just about everyone that
goes to the Arctic, their last stop is in Kodiak before they go
there. So we are making progress to do that. And that is where
their families live, that is where their kids go to school,
that is where--that is our center of gravity. So that is our
part with regards to physical infrastructure.
With regards to the information infrastructure, there is
several things going on. We are working with the Department of
Defense to get access to MUOS, which is an updated Department
of Defense satellite communication, and we are making progress
to where we can communicate reliably with satellite
communications up to the 85th latitude, which is further than
we have ever been able to do before. We have been somewhat
constrained to either line-of-sight communications and/or HF
communications, which is a little bit intermittent up there.
And then we launched this year two CubeSats that we--in
cooperation with other Government agencies--to do a polar orbit
to receive emergency signals. And so, when you put those
together, we are working on the communications part.
And then lastly, with regards to our vessel operations, we
have talked about the icebreaker or the National Security
Cutter. And to us that is the most fundamental leap forward.
Mr. Gibbs. OK. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Maloney. Mr. Brown?
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Ray, let me start by saying thank you very much for
your service and your leadership of the fine men and women that
serve in the Coast Guard. I have an opportunity, the privilege,
to serve on the House Armed Services Committee, where we have
oversight of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines, so this
term, being appointed to the Transportation and Infrastructure,
it is a real honor to kind of round out all of the components
that work together in defense of our Nation and our Nation's
interests, both home and abroad.
In your testimony you mentioned Operation Arctic Shield as
the Coast Guard's year-round planning and operational endeavor
which provides mobile and scalable presence in the Arctic
domain. You also mentioned the Coast Guard's goals to further
develop a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities
required to operate in the Arctic, as well as the broadened
partnerships in support of Arctic operations.
My questions, there are two, are related. Can you talk
about what those partnerships are, and explain their value? How
do we better leverage them to ensure we are meeting our
operational needs?
And related to that, how can we upscale or strengthen or
improve your relationship with the Navy to fill existing gaps
in our capabilities?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. Thank
you for your service across the armed services. You have
covered the whole gamut now. Thank you.
Well, our partnerships--it is really--this Arctic Shield, I
am really proud of this. We have been doing it for several
years now. It starts, literally, at the village level. We
engage with village elders and across multiple villages across
the North Slope, and we--our people go up there all year round,
but we particularly surge in the summer when it is ice out.
And we engage it at the school-kid level. We educated over
400 kids from the North Slope, and that is a lot of kids on the
North Slope. We educated 400 of them in, you know, kind of
water safety and things like that.
And then you work your way up to the Native corporation
level, which are really significant elements of governance
there in Alaska and in the Arctic, all the way up to the State
and then, of course, the Federal level. We work across all
partners.
Our specific partners for Arctic Shield are the Department
of Defense. We work with the Northern Command. They do--and the
Alaska--folks in Alaska down in Elmendorf, they do a lot of our
transport of our equipment up there, and so we interact. Our
helicopters are housed in an Alaska Air National Guard hangar
in Kotzebue, which I think we rent for about $1 a year, which
is a pretty good deal in Alaska. And we--so great cooperation
across the way.
With regards to the Navy, we are consistently at the table,
planning with the U.S. Navy. We would not be where we are today
with our Polar Security Cutter program, were it not for our
integrated program office with the U.S. Navy. I meet with
Assistant Secretary Geurts, who is just an incredible servant
of the Nation with regards to acquisition. He is one of the
best we got. And were it not for him and his crew, we wouldn't
be where we are with Polar Security Cutter--of course with your
support, as well, but the ability to execute that.
Our Commandant and CNO are engaged with regards to the
requirements for strategic planning. We have provided input to
the Navy, and they have accepted that. They are leaning forward
to meet their requirements with regards to the NDAA.
Mr. Brown. Thank you. Let me ask this question. In your
testimony you also talked about the need for the Coast Guard to
maintain a robust infrastructure in Alaska to support
operations and capacity needs. You also state that
approximately 10 percent of the Coast Guard's real property
inventory is located in Alaska.
The questions: with the reduced ice conditions, or
certainly the changing ice conditions in the Arctic, and free-
flowing seas that create erosion, are there any Coast Guard
installations that are currently at risk as a result of the
changing landscape? And is the Coast Guard tracking which
installations may be at risk in the future? And if you need to
take that for the record, that is fine, as well.
Admiral Ray. Sir, I think I can answer that. The weather in
the Kodiak region, which is about our furthest north and west
place, has been pretty consistent over the past few years. I
mean it--there is bad weather there, and a big tidal range, and
you are just one storm away from having a problem, but with
regards to the durability and resiliency, we are in there--that
is why this recapitalization of our shore infrastructure is so
important. It is a consistent drumbeat.
We are literally updating World War II-era buildings to
modern resiliency standards. And when we do that they will last
for 50 or 70 years. But north of that we are generally
operating out of temporary facilities. We are doing it--that we
are moving on our ships and in our aircraft to different
places.
So I will do a review and get back to you if there is any
other ones that we need to track, but I am not aware of any
right now.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Weber?
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, we appreciate
you being here. And in full disclosure, my uncle, the last of
five surviving boys, was a Coastie. And so we sure appreciate
what you all do.
The Bering Strait width, offhand, do you know how wide that
is across there?
Admiral Ray. The closest point is--I have to--I have looked
at this several times, and you hear between 50 and 75 nautical
miles. But it is not any more than 75.
Mr. Weber. So safe to say you don't go summer camping up
there.
Admiral Ray. No, sir. But, I mean, I have been through it
several times. But I have read it, this comes up pretty
regularly. And in fact, I made a note to myself last night to
recheck what the latest estimate--the last estimate I saw was
about 70 nautical miles.
Mr. Weber. Did you put that note in your iPhone?
Admiral Ray. No, sir. I wrote it a little green book.
Mr. Weber. Well, that is the way we normally do it, you
know, at our age.
Do you expect--how many days away, when you get the first
PSC, do you expect them to be at sea on task, so to speak, on
the mission?
Admiral Ray. Our general planning factor for our cutters,
major cutters, is 185 days away from home port. That is general
planning. We exceed that with some degree of regularity. Rarely
do we not meet that, unless there is a maintenance issue. And
with some of our older cutters now, that is a little bit of a
problem.
So 185 days away from where home port is. For instance,
when the Polar Star goes south through Antarctica, it is about
a 100-day mission, more or less, maybe approaching 120. And
then, when Healy goes north, it is at least a 3- or 4-month
patrol up north in the Arctic. So that is kind of the standard
planning factor.
Mr. Weber. Would those numbers be the same for the second
PSC?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weber. Third?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. I mean, that is--we will look at it.
We look at it quite frequently. In fact, with the National
Security Cutters we just went through a pretty extensive review
a couple of years ago about how many days away from home port
was recommended. Because the flipside of that is you got to do
maintenance on them when they are back in. And we need people
to continue to want to go to sea, so they got to have a little
bit of time to see their family. So there is a flip side.
But generally speaking, 185 days is our planning factor,
and we revisit it every few years.
Mr. Weber. Absolutely. Do you see a Chinese and a Russian
presence up there around the Bering Strait? Have you been able
to determine who is there the most?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. There they are there, the Russians--
I mean the transits through the Bering Strait have been--a lot
of it has been as a result of the Russian kind of growth in
their petroleum exploration on the North Slope of Russia. And
so there is a--and more transit is expected. That growth is
going to continue as they go down to Asia.
With regards to the Chinese, thus far, other than their
commercial enterprises, where they are engaged with the
Russians--and they are, to a degree--their independent
icebreaker operations are primarily--they will call it
research, we call it other things when they go up north above--
--
Mr. Weber. Reconnaissance?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. And so that is generally--and they
are there from the shoulder seasons, we call it, early summer
to late fall, all the way through the summer, depending on what
their operational plan is.
Mr. Weber. Did I understand you to say the Russians have 50
icebreakers, 4 of which are nuclear?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weber. Are you able to identify those going through,
what percentage----
Admiral Ray. They are generally working, staying up on the
North Slope, those--their Northern Sea Route. They do not
venture south. Most of the time their operations are from the
northern part of the--just north of the Bering Strait over
west, all the way to Europe.
Mr. Weber. So those nuclear vessels could stay out a lot
longer than the traditional vessels.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weber. OK. And then you said something that caught my
attention. You said you have, generally, line-of-sight
communications?
Admiral Ray. Well, there are multiple frequencies that we
use for operational communications. We do sat phones, everybody
is informed of that. A lot of the smaller vessels that are--and
there are small vessels that you wouldn't think would be up in
the Arctic that are up there now.
Mr. Weber. So you try to hail them by radio.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir FM radio is what--that is line-of-
sight radio.
Mr. Weber. Oh, that is line of sight.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weber. OK, I got you. OK, I misunderstood that.
Admiral Ray. So, depending on how high your antenna is is
how far your line of sight is.
Mr. Weber. I got you. OK. Well, I appreciate that, Admiral.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Larsen?
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, to start
I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record
testimony of Willie Goodwin, the chairman of the Arctic
Waterways Safety Committee.
Mr. Maloney. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Willie Goodwin, Chairman, Arctic Waterways Safety
Committee, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen
executive summary
The Arctic Waterways Safety Committee (AWSC) appreciates this
opportunity to submit testimony to the Subcommittee on this topic of
extreme importance to mariners of the far north.
Our goal in submitting this testimony is to help educate the
Members of the Subcommittee on the very serious challenges confronting
northern communities, marine mammal subsistence hunters, and other
northern mariners as a result of the increases in large-vessel marine
traffic we are seeing in our northern Alaskan coastal waters. We also
wish to highlight the tremendous risk created by the lack of
communications and other infrastructure to support the maritime
interactions of these disparate user groups, as well as the lack of
infrastructure to support disaster response in this remote and
treacherous region.
As America's Harbor Safety Committee for the waters from the Bering
Strait Region to the border with Canada, the AWSC is charged with
responsibility for ensuring a safe maritime environment for all
mariners working in or transiting through these waters. Through local
efforts and the largely unfunded work of the AWSC, we are identifying
and developing traffic-management measures to address the increase in
maritime risks accompanying this traffic. However, it is imperative
that our federal government become more engaged on these matters to
help ensure the ongoing success of our work and the safety of all
mariners in America's northern waters.
testimony
Who Are the Mariners of America's Northern Waters?
For millennia, virtually the only mariners in the waters from the
Bering Strait Region to Canada were marine mammal subsistence hunters.
Today, these hunters, traveling or hunting in small 6-8 person skiffs,
continue to constitute the largest class of mariners found in these
waters. The subsistence food economy of northern Alaska, which also
helps to feed Native residents throughout the state, is heavily
dependent on seasonal marine mammal harvests.\1\ In some communities,
90 percent of the food supply comes from the ocean. The principal
marine resources are the five main arctic marine mammals: the bowhead
whale, beluga whale, walrus, ice seals, and polar bear. These large
mammals are so important to Alaska Native food security that
subsistence hunters have come together to create five tribally-
authorized hunter groups to work with the Departments of Commerce and
Interior on harvest management and habitat protection under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ BurnSilver S, Magdanz J, Stotts R, Berman M, Kofinas G (2016)
Are mixed economies persistent or transitional? Evidence using social
networks from arctic Alaska. American Anthropologist 118(1):121-129.
See also, graphics showing subsistence sharing networks and outflows
from two northern Alaskan villages, included with testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Failure of the harvests for these animals, for any reason,
threatens food security and can spell hunger for many.
In addition to the above, given the absence of a road system in
northern Alaska, the coastal waterways are central to travel among
communities. For all mariners, nature itself presents serious
challenges, from the treacherous waters of the Bering, Chukchi, and
Beaufort Seas to seasonal ice, rapidly changing weather patterns, high
winds, heavy fog, and whiteouts. As the Subcommittee is learning, these
natural risks are now compounded by the presence of large ocean-going
vessels entering the Arctic for reasons related to marine research, as
well as tourism, and commercial, industrial, and international transit.
Arctic Residents Have Valuable Experience with Large Vessel Traffic and
Coastal Industrial Activities.
Northern residents, especially the bowhead whale subsistence
hunters of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC), have been
working with offshore oil and gas operators since the 1980s, to address
impacts of exploration and development activities on the marine
environment, marine resources, and subsistence hunting activities.
Through the annual process of the Open Water Season Conflict Avoidance
Agreement, initiated in 1985, the whaling captains of the AEWC have
developed a highly successful collaborative process through which the
ocean is shared, using an agreed ship-to-shore communications protocol
and time-area arrangements, and with requirements for sound
environmental management. Reliance on this process has facilitated
successful offshore development in the Beaufort Sea, while ensuring
maritime safety, a healthy marine ecosystem, and unaffected subsistence
harvest opportunities.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Lefevre, J, (2013) A Pioneering Effort in the Design of Process
and Law Supporting Integrated Ocean Management, Environmental Law
Reporter, 43 ELR 10893-10908.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar approaches to collaborative management have enabled
operations at the Red Dog Mine to co-exist with marine and terrestrial
subsistence hunting activities in the NANA Region.
In 2012, as the reality of ice retreat and increasing arctic
maritime traffic became apparent, the five arctic marine mammal hunter
groups,\3\ in consultation with the U.S. Coast Guard's District 17,
began working together to form the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee.
The 15-member AWSC was incorporated as a not-for-profit entity in
October 2014. This is yet another example of the commitment of northern
residents to collaborative problem solving and management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The bowhead whale subsistence hunters of the Alaska Eskimo
Whaling Commission, the beluga whale hunters of the Alaska Beluga Whale
Committee, the walrus hunters of the Eskimo Walrus Commission, the seal
hunters of the Ice Seal Committee, and the polar bear hunters of the
Alaska Nanuuq Commission (now Nannut Co-Management Council).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Arctic Waterways Safety Committee Has Oversight of the Waters from
the Northern Bering Sea to the Canadian Border.
The AWSC is the largest Harbor Safety Committee in the United
States, by area. And it is the only Harbor Safety Committee that
includes subsistence hunters. This is because, in Alaska, the greatest
number of marine users are subsistence hunters, working from small
skiffs to gather marine food resources for their communities and for
subsistence sharing with Native families throughout the state.
In other areas of the country, hunting tends to be more of a
recreational activity. In the Arctic, hunting sustains life. Thus, in
northern Alaska, a hunter is someone who gets things done. In this
case, the marine mammal hunters took the initiative, with the Coast
Guard's guidance, to identify the key maritime interests and bring them
together.
The 15 members of the AWSC include one seat for a representative
from each of the five marine mammal hunter groups, as well as the North
Slope Borough, the Northwest Arctic Borough, the City of Nome, the
Alaska Marine Pilots Association, Marine Research (vessel operators and
research funders), Cruise Tourism, Tug and Barge Operators, Oil and
Gas/Mining, Fishing, and Regional Tribal Entities.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See, Arctic Waterways Safety Committee Brochure, included with
testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Immediately following its formation, the AWSC began to work closely
with the Coast Guard, NOAA, and the Alaska Delegation to Congress to
advocate for bathymetric surveys through the Bering Strait and along
norther coastal areas. The AWSC engaged with District 17 in their work
on the Port Access Route Study for the Bering Strait Region and is in
the process of engaging in the Chukchi Sea/Beaufort Sea PARS. The
Committee is engaged with NOAA and Coast Guard District 17, providing
updates and additions to the Coast Pilot and Notice to Mariners, with
seasonal notifications of subsistence hunting times and areas.
The AWSC is in the process of drafting the Arctic Waterways Safety
Plan for its region of coverage. To create this Plan, the AWSC has
consulted the well-established guidelines for offshore oil and gas
activities, taken from the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission's Open
Water Season Conflict Avoidance Agreement, as well as the guidelines
from the NANA Region's work with Red Dog Mine. The AWSC is using the
Puget Sound Waterways Safety Plan as a guide and consulting with
District 17 whenever possible.
To address the substantial amount of marine research traffic,
especially federal traffic, now working in the Arctic, the AWSC works
very closely with NOAA, NSF, BOEM, Coast Guard, and the University of
Alaska, Fairbanks to develop marine research protocols. The goal is to
promote vessel safety and to help reduce interference with subsistence
hunting. Standards of Care for Research Activities were completed in
2016 and are available on the AWSC website.
Another initial area of focus is tug-and-barge operations. The tug-
and-barge guidelines are being put together in cooperation with Crowley
Maritime, one of the principal tug-and-barge operators in northern
Alaska.
Continuing to Build a Safe Maritime Environment in Alaska's Arctic Will
Take Investment.
The AWSC has become the primary forum for arctic waterways-users to
gather, exchange information, and coordinate their operations with each
other and with subsistence hunters, with meetings now attracting more
than 50 individual participants. Federal agencies, including Coast
Guard, are enthusiastic about this public forum and certainly are
making use of it. Academic researchers, environmental groups, and
commercial and industrial vessel operators express their gratitude for
the opportunity to participate in this collaborative venue. Working
together, the Committee and its participants are making a difference on
the water. The opportunity to meet, exchange ideas, raise concerns, and
reach consensus on solutions creates the opportunity to increase safety
for everyone using Alaska's northern coastal waters.
The AWSC's success and growing recognition in such a short time are
remarkable. However, its success so far is small compared to the
challenges presented by the growing presence of large vessels in waters
that are home to thousands of mariners in small craft and to marine
mammals who themselves must adapt to a rapidly changing ecosystem.
Already the incidents of ship-strikes and line entanglements on
whales are rising noticeably. In 2017, the Committee was notified of 24
different research cruises planned for arctic waters in a three-month
period. In 2016, Crystal Cruise Lines brought approximately 2,000
people to the Arctic on the Crystal Serenity for a cruise up the coast
of Alaska and through the Northwest Passage. Smaller commercial and
private cruise traffic is becoming a regular phenomenon. It is not
unusual for vessels to anchor offshore and discharge foreign passengers
into coastal communities. Residents report unidentified vessels hauling
unknown cargo through Alaska's coastal waters.
Clearly the forum provided by the AWSC and the work it has been
able to accomplish during its brief existence are worth continuing.
However, unlike Harbor Safety Committees in other coastal areas, AWSC
membership is largely representative of subsistence users. Thus,
resources for supporting travel to meetings, meeting venues, and staff
time needed for work on the Waterways Safety Plan, consultations with
the USCG, researchers, and others, and even for preparation of this
testimony must be found through outside resources or gained through
volunteer efforts. Philanthropic groups generously assisted with the
start-up of the Committee, but those resources are no longer available.
Multiple meetings of multiple groups are occurring in and about the
Arctic, many with federal support. Growing numbers of ``experts'' are
offering opinions and recommending plans for ``The New Arctic.'' The
Arctic Waterways Safety Committee is the only group that is actually
making a difference on the water. It is imperative that our federal
government invest in this critical consultative process as the AWSC
works to conduct the traffic and infrastructure planning necessary to
ensure safe navigation in Alaska's northern waters.
The Need for Coastal Communications Infrastructure in Northern Alaska
Is Urgent.
Thanks to Mr. Ed Page and his team at the Alaska Marine Exchange,
there is AIS coverage for most of the northern waterway, which means
vessels can be tracked through the AIS system. However, since Shell's
departure from the Arctic in 2015, there has been no infrastructure for
ship-to-shore communications. Local residents cannot warn transiting
vessels if they are entering waters occupied by hunters or other local
residents in small craft. Transiting vessels cannot communicate with
potential sources of emergency assistance on shore if they are in
distress.
When the Crystal Serenity passed along the northern coast, as it
left Nome and headed for Greenland, an unexpected pan of ice offshore
of Utqiagvik (Barrow), threatened to drive the 2,000-passenger ship
into waters occupied by bowhead whale subsistence hunters conducting
the critical fall harvest. To avert disaster, staff for the Alaska
Eskimo Whaling Commission, on a Sunday morning, had to scramble to find
a contact in the corporate offices of Crystal Cruise Lines who could
establish communications with the skipper of the Serenity. This lack of
communications infrastructure and the disregard for human life it
demonstrates would not be tolerated anywhere else in the United States.
Why is it tolerated in Alaska?
It is impossible to stress enough the risk to life caused by the
lack of communications infrastructure covering these waters. It leaves
local residents vulnerable to potentially deadly interactions with
large vessels. It leaves transiting vessels without a means of seeking
assistance from local mariners in the event of an emergency. Alaska is
a very large state with an extensive area for the Coast Guard to cover.
The Coast Guard station at Dutch Harbor is 700 miles from Nome and
1,200 miles from Pt. Barrow. That's greater than the distance from
Washington DC to Omaha, Nebraska. If there were an emergency in these
northern waters, local hunters might be the only responders on-sight
for days.
When the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and offshore oil and gas
operators initiated the Open Water Season Conflict Avoidance Agreement
in 1985, the first mitigation measure put in place to ensure maritime
safety and preserve the bowhead whale subsistence harvest was a radio
tower at Deadhorse. Through 2015, an elaborate system of radio towers
with ship-to-shore capabilities using VHF and satellite phones
supported real-time communications and marine safety, especially for
subsistence hunters. Every community from St. Lawrence Island to the
Canadian border had a radio tower staffed by individuals who
coordinated the movements of large vessels with the activities of small
subsistence hunting boats. Beginning with the radio tower at Dead
Horse, this privately-funded communications infrastructure grew and
expanded over the course of 30 years. Oil and gas operators funded and
used this system. Tug-and-barge used it. Transiting vessels used it.
Coast Guard used it.
Marine mammal hunters depended on this communications system as
their lifeline to shore. The Arctic Ocean is a dangerous place at any
time. Northern waters still experience sea ice. Wind, weather, and sea-
state can change without warning. Storms with hurricane-force winds are
not uncommon. Adding large ocean-going vessels to these waters, where
people are already risking their lives to feed their families, can be a
prescription for disaster. The risk is multiplied by the lack of sound,
reliable communications and traffic management.
On any given day in any given area, there may be hundreds of people
on the water in small craft, working and risking their lives to feed
their communities and to support Alaska's subsistence food economy.
Unknown numbers of ocean-going vessels are now transiting these waters.
There is no ship-to-shore communications infrastructure.
AWSC representatives have reached out to the Coast Guard. We have
reached out to the White House. We have reached out to the Committee on
Marine Transportation Systems. We have looked for ways to attract
private investors. We have briefed members of Congress.
summary
The Arctic is no longer opening. It is open. Our residents are
subsistence hunters. We are hardworking people who get things done. We
feed our communities and look for responsible ways to share our
resources. But we aren't going to get much further protecting our
coastal waters--or the resources that are vital to our survival, or our
hunters and residents, or the people transiting along our coast--
without resources and engagement from our federal government.
To summarize, here is the situation today. What we have as the
Arctic opens and what we need.
This is what we have:
At any given time and in any given location, we have
hundreds of citizens transiting and hunting in our coastal waters in
small craft.
We have increasing numbers of large ocean-going vessels
coming through those same waters, largely unaware of our hunters'
presence.
We have a public forum, the AWSC, where local, federal,
and international maritime interests are working together to develop
consensus measures for arctic transit and maritime safety, as well as
critical maritime notifications and advocacy for infrastructure and
additional critical safety measures.
This is what we need for maritime safety:
We need resources to continue the work of the AWSC.
We need a consistent Coast Guard presence in our waters.
We need infrastructure for ship-to-shore communications
with the vessels that are transiting our waters.
We need infrastructure and other resources to support
disaster response.
We need modern ocean floor mapping for the vast majority
of our waters.
We need a way to ensure that mariners are aware of the
traffic management measures so far agreed to under our Waterways Safety
Plan.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The AWSC isn't even listed on the U.S. Coast Guard's Port
Directory link on its Homeport website.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And that is the short list.
If you remember nothing else from this testimony, please remember
this. The Arctic is home to thousands of U.S. citizens in coastal
maritime communities working on the water in small craft. The Arctic
also is a frontier where thousands of people are now traveling in large
vessels in poorly charted waters. Without communications
infrastructure. Without comprehensive traffic safety measures. Without
disaster response infrastructure or even protocols. And with very
limited Coast Guard coverage. Our federal government can work with us
to support the approach we are taking, putting safety measures and
infrastructure in place before the unthinkable happens. Or our federal
government can take responsibility for addressing human disaster in one
of the harshest environments on earth, without infrastructure or even
communications capabilities.
I encourage you to choose the first option.
Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. And
related to that my first question is about indigenous peoples.
I wanted to highlight a little bit more about their indigenous
needs amidst the traffic, increased traffic, of larger ships.
You mentioned North Slope cooperation. But obviously,
transit is going north and then going, presumably, east or
west. So how is the Coast Guard fully collaborating with
indigenous groups in the U.S. Arctic to balance their
sovereignty and subsistence hunting needs with the growing
presence of larger vessels?
Admiral Ray. We--in fact, I know Mr. Goodwin, and thank you
for--you know, for your entering his statements.
We pride ourselves on taking into account the perspective
of the Natives when it comes to the use of the oceans adjacent
to the lands that they have occupied for centuries. And we go
about it in multiple ways. But primarily with regards--the
Bering Straits port access route study was a good example. That
was specifically designed with the migration routes of the
whales that they hunt, of the walruses, and other animals that
they use for their lifestyle.
And so we will do the same thing we have started. We have
started the initial phases of an Arctic Coast port access route
study, which will take the same things into, you know, into
account.
We also engage with the elders with regards to just how to
operate in the Arctic. And, you know, it is really an
interesting situation to go up there as a person from the lower
48 and try to, you know, provide value. It is an important
thing to go up and respect them, and we preach this. When--we
have kind of instruction for our people that have never been to
the Arctic, and we talk to them about the value of doing that,
and respect of the elders. It sounds--maybe it doesn't sound
exactly that high tech, but it is really important.
And so we take their input into effect with regards to any
scheme that we propose. And these are schemes that will go all
the way to the International Maritime Organization. They have
factored in the Native perspective.
Mr. Larsen. We take the same approach to Representative
Young.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Larsen. How far along are you in putting together
firmer operation plans in the Arctic? It sounds like you are
doing some experimenting, but how much of this con ops is
actually getting written into the Coast Guard's longer term
operation plans?
Admiral Ray. Well, we are--you know, the Arctic is a place
that you don't--when you need to operate there, it is too late.
You need to be planning now to operate there. Everything is
harder. When you go north it is harder. It is harder to fuel
airplanes, it is harder to get airplanes started, it is harder
to moor ships, it is harder to--everything we do is dangerous,
as the chairman talked about. That was in Homer, Alaska. That
is far south, compared to where I am talking about operating.
And so it is--we send new Coasties up there. Every year we
go up there in Arctic Shield and they will rotate. We have air
crews, we have crews from multiple ships we send up there. We
send people to Nome and other places to do commercial vessel
inspections. And so all these people are learning how to
operate in the Arctic. And it is a yearly thing that we do, and
we surge it during the summer months when there is more
activity, so we are more ready.
So you get there--this operation is--it is ongoing. Last
year alone we had 20 search and rescue cases. And the number
that sticks in my mind is I think we had 35 lives saved. Now,
some of this varied from caribou hunters out east of the North
Slope to actual people in distress at sea. We are not--if we
get a call, we will go wherever it needs to be to look for
them. So----
Mr. Larsen. Would you----
Admiral Ray [continuing]. We are doing the actual
operations.
Mr. Larsen. Would you assess that you are making now--you
are at a point where you are making marginal changes, or you
are still making larger changes to operation plans?
Admiral Ray. Well, the biggest----
Mr. Larsen. If you could wrap, I have got another question,
so just make it quick.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. We are making marginal changes that
will go along--regarding capability.
Mr. Larsen. All right. And finally, how does not being part
of the Law of the Sea Treaty help or hinder the Coast Guard
sovereignty operations in the Arctic?
Admiral Ray. The Law of the Sea could help us moving
forward, and multiple people believe it would be a significant
help when it comes to rights over extended continental seabed
and other issues. The Coast Guard operates as if we were a
party to it. And thus far, that has been effective for us.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maloney. Mr. Lowenthal?
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And Admiral, thank you
for coming to speak with us about the urgent need to improve
our Coast Guard's Arctic capabilities, and to continue to
protect our country's significant interests in this region.
As the Coast Guard's Arctic Strategic Outlook notes, sea
water temperature rise has already begun to affect the
migration pattern of fish stocks in the Arctic, creating new
risks of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing that can
undermine our efforts to maintain healthy fish stocks. I am
proud that the U.S. brokered the Central Arctic Ocean Agreement
to prevent over-fishing in the Arctic with a joint effort for
scientific monitoring of fish migration in this region.
In addition to a moratorium on unregulated fishing, this
effort will help to establish a scientific baseline measure for
the Arctic Ocean ecosystems so we can measure the effects of
climate change and fisheries activity.
But Admiral, these are just good intentions without the
resources we need to protect American interests in the Arctic,
both to enforce fishery laws and to conduct this important
research. Admiral, can you tell us how the Coast Guard is
working to support these scientific and fisheries enforcement
missions now, and what capabilities the Service is investing in
to ensure that we carry out these initiatives in the years
going forward?
Admiral Ray. Sir, we support the science efforts of NOAA
and NMFS and others with regards to understanding the fish
stocks in the Bering and north. And we--and so--and we also
work with the other Arctic nations to understand their
assessment of fisheries, you know, progress, and their
perspective on the fisheries.
I think the bottom line is the Coast Guard has maintained a
presence in the Bering Sea continuously in my lifetime, and
focused on fisheries, focused on enforcing fisheries.
There was a time a few years ago when we were nose to nose
with the Russians over the fisheries in the Bering Sea. Those--
we cooperate much better now than we did a few years ago. So we
have a presence, we understand the fisheries, and we move our
forces to be in a position to surveil and to, in some cases,
rescue the fishermen that are working in those regions.
Mr. Lowenthal. I was just wondering--following up on the
last point, what are the capabilities that the Service now is
investing in to ensure that we carry out these initiatives in
the future? Could you kind of target--tell us a little bit
about exactly what you are investing in, what are the
capabilities to carry out this venture in the future?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. Thank you. Thanks to this committee,
we are--so we talked about the Polar Security Cutter. That will
provide a platform to do fisheries enforcement from anywhere in
the Arctic.
The second thing is National Security Cutters which we have
been building for several years, and have had great effect on
our enforcement missions. We will be home-porting two Offshore
Patrol Cutters in Kodiak. They will have the reach to go all
the way up to the ice edge, and they are not ice cutters, but
they will have the ability to get to the ice edge.
So--and then H-60 helicopters. We are--once again, thanks
to this committee, we are actually growing the fleet of those
H-60 helicopters to be able to reach out to get to the
fishermen. And our H-65 helicopters, we are extending the
service life of those. Those are the ones that embark on our
ships in the Arctic and in the Bering Sea.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Admiral, and I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. Mr. Gallagher?
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, as you look at the Arctic as a zone of increasing
competition, in the past year there has been a lot of reports
that the Chinese Communist Party has attempted to secure a
greater presence, not only Arctic in general, but in Greenland
in particular. And we have had to work with our allies--Denmark
in particular--to deny them that access.
Tell us a little bit about how you view the Chinese threat
in that region in general, and then how we should be thinking
about Greenland in particular.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. I was just in Finland about a month
ago with the folks from Denmark and Greenland, and so kind of
have pretty fresh perspective from them.
Of course, we have got a strategic United States base,
Thule Air Force Base here in northwest--or north--or western,
and that is critically important. And there is no doubt in my
mind that part of the Chinese intent is to get as close to that
as they can. And so we need to be mindful of that, I believe.
What our icebreaker fleet will allow us to do, speaking
from a Coast Guard perspective, is it will allow us to have the
capacity to patrol around Greenland, as we did, you know, in
years past. And so, having that presence is important to our
allies to be able to work there to support them. Because when
you get east of Nuuk on the lower west side of Greenland, there
is no humans around that side on the east side and north. And
they need--you know, that is a partnership that we need to
continue to develop, and that is our intent.
Mr. Gallagher. Do you think there is room for a greater
U.S. presence in Greenland, going forward? I know--I believe it
is finalized, that we have opened up a consulate in Nuuk, which
I view as a great step forward, and long overdue. Do you think
there is room to expand our presence?
Admiral Ray. Well, I won't speak to the terrestrial part of
it, that is not my purview. But I do believe having the ships
that are capable of sailing those waters is important, and
there is room for advancement on that.
Mr. Gallagher. And then we had--I believe last week the
Pentagon delivered its annual report on Chinese military
capabilities, and there was a special section contained therein
solely devoted to Chinese activity in the Arctic. Perhaps you
could give us the Coast Guard's perspective on that report, or
that section. I know it is related to my first question, but I
just wanted to give you a chance because I am not sure that
report has yet been widely read on the Hill, but I view it as
particularly important.
Admiral Ray. My perspective on the Chinese activity in the
Arctic is that it is not much different than Chinese activity
in the rest of world. They exert presence, they kind of sail
where they can, and by maintaining--establishing a presence,
they kind of--it almost becomes an acceptance of that.
I mean, to talk about the Chinese in the Arctic when the
closest point of China to the Arctic is somewhere around 900
nautical miles, that is kind of a stretch. And so you heard our
Secretary of State the last couple of days, and his comments
about that, and we certainly concur with that.
I think in the Arctic what we see is they are doing
exploration, they are doing science, but they are also doing
exploration for economic purposes, and they are doing
exploration for other purposes, as well.
Mr. Gallagher. And finally I just want to close by saying
that you have some incredible young men and women in northeast
Wisconsin that are representing the Coast Guard very well, and
we appreciate their presence and they are a great part of our
community. So thank you for being here today.
Admiral Ray. Thank you, sir. The Great Lakes are an
important part of the Coast Guard. Thank you.
Mr. Maloney. Would the gentleman like to yield 30 seconds
to the ranking member for a question?
Mr. Gallagher. I would be honored to yield.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you. Thank you for yielding.
Just a quick question, Admiral. The Coast Guard is
finalizing its Bering Sea port access route study, and the
implementation of that, shipping routes, and safety, and--in
the Arctic region. And the concern I have--there is a study
done 5 years ago in the Atlantic coast port access route study,
and I believe nothing has really come about that, or
implementation of that. Can we get a commitment that the study
for--the Bering route study will be, you know, implemented?
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir. In fact, we have made great progress
on that. That was, you know, ratified at the International
Maritime Organization this past year, and it was kind of
unprecedented cooperation between us and the Russians. It just
shows there are things we could cooperate on when we don't
cooperate on other things.
And the Coast Guard has prided ourselves through the North
Pacific Coast Guard Forum and now the Arctic Coast Guard Forum,
we find areas that we think have room for cooperation, and we
focus on those and not others. And that access route study was
one of those.
Mr. Gibbs. And we will work for implementation when we get
it.
Admiral Ray. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. OK, thank you.
Mr. Maloney. Well, thank you, Admiral. I want to, without
objection, move on to the second panel, but I want to thank
Admiral Ray for his time.
I also want to associate myself with the questioning and
the remarks of the gentleman from Wisconsin. A lot of us are
very concerned about the strategic threat posed by the Chinese
in the Arctic and everywhere else. And so I want you to
understand that there is broad-based concern here on their
activities, and we would be very interested in your ongoing
perspective on that, and what are you seeing. It is something
we are all very interested in.
Sir, thank you very much for your time. We would like to
move to the second panel.
Admiral Ray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
[Pause.]
Mr. Maloney. I would like to now welcome our second panel
of witnesses. We are joined by Rear Admiral Shepard Smith,
Director of the Office of Coast Survey of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA, and Colonel Phillip
Borders, Commander of District Alaska of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers.
Thank you for being here, gentlemen. We look forward to
your testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record.
As with the previous panel, since your written testimony
has been made part of the record, the subcommittee requests
that you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes, if possible.
You may proceed, Admiral Smith.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL SHEPARD M. SMITH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
COAST SURVEY, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION;
AND COLONEL PHILLIP J. BORDERS, COMMANDER, ALASKA DISTRICT,
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. Good afternoon, Chairman Maloney,
Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the subcommittee. My name
is Shepard Smith, and I am the Director of the Office of Coast
Survey at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
within the Department of Commerce. Thank you for inviting me to
testify today on our work to support safe and efficient marine
transportation in the Arctic.
The U.S. is an Arctic nation by virtue of Alaska's
geography. The remote and harsh environment there results in
short operating seasons and other unique challenges, requiring
extensive collaboration with international and regional
partners. To this end, NOAA cooperates with academic, regional,
State, and indigenous stakeholders. We also rely on and support
our Federal partners and the Coast Guard, Navy, Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Departments of Interior and Energy, all of
whom, including NOAA, are part of the interagency Committee on
the Marine Transportation System.
NOAA's services and products related to navigation,
weather, and emergency response science are featured heavily in
parts of the CMTS 10-year prioritization of infrastructure
needs in the U.S. Arctic.
We have been working to increase NOAA's presence in the
Arctic since 1870, when the Coast and Geodetic Survey schooner
Yukon surveyed Alaskan waters and our Arctic work began. I will
give a general overview of NOAA's services, but focused mostly
on our navigation services that support maritime commerce,
emergency response, and environmental stewardship in the
Arctic.
NOAA is committed to producing reliable marine
transportation, weather, hazard assessment, and other services
to safeguard life, property, infrastructure, and security in
the Arctic. This work also allows stakeholders and constituents
to make informed decisions that protect Arctic communities,
economies, and ecosystems. NOAA's navigation services--notably
our nautical charts--are essential to moving goods and services
safely and efficiently in the Arctic.
Nautical charts are built upon the core NOAA competencies
and responsibilities: positioning tides and water level data,
shoreline mapping, and hydrographic surveying.
NOAA supports accurate positioning through the National
Spatial Reference System. This is the national coordinate
system managed by our National Geodetic Survey that allows us
to make precise spatial measurements. To continue our efforts
to make the system more accurate, NOAA completed the collection
of airborne gravity data on mainland Alaska last year. We are
planning on returning to Alaska in 2020 to complete surveys of
the Aleutian Islands.
Along the coast NOAA's National Water Level Observation
Network provides long-term observations to inform the decisions
of increasingly vulnerable Arctic communities. In cooperation
with the Alaska Ocean Observing System, AOOS, NOAA is
developing portable, low-cost systems to fill information gaps
in the Arctic. This will allow the National Weather Service to
provide improved storm surge warnings and forecasts in small
coastal communities.
The scale of the hydrographic surveying requirement in
Alaska and the Arctic is vast. Over the past 3 years NOAA and
its contract partners acquired 1,500 square nautical miles of
Arctic survey data. Our survey plans for 2019 include an
extensive set of project areas in Kuskokwim Bay. NOAA's 51-
year-old survey vessels and our survey contractors are an
essential component of the balanced hydrographic survey program
NOAA employs in Alaska and across the Nation.
NOAA continually works with our stakeholders to inform our
survey priorities. Our Federal advisory committee, the
Hydrographic Services Review Panel, convened in Juneau last
year in August for just this purpose.
The CMTS 2015 report on vessel traffic through the Bering
Strait predicts that it will increase 500 percent by 2025,
along with the risk of oil and other hazardous material spills.
NOAA supports the Coast Guard response by providing oil spill
modeling tools and data management, including the Arctic
Environmental Response Management Application, known as ERMA.
Last August NOAA participated in a mutual aid deployment
exercise on Alaska's North Slope oil field, and provided oil
spill response training to over 200 industry and State and
Federal representatives.
With 3 percent of the Arctic Circle within Alaska,
international cooperation is also critical for the success of
our efforts. NOAA participates in the Arctic Council and its
working groups, such as the Protection of the Arctic Marine
Environment and Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program. NOAA
is also a member of the Sustaining Arctic Observing Network and
the Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and
discuss NOAA's Arctic marine navigation and related services. I
appreciate the subcommittee's time and attention, and look
forward to answering your questions.
[Admiral Smith's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Shepard M. Smith, Director, Office
of Coast Survey, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
introduction
Good afternoon Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members
of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here today with my U.S.
Coast Guard and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers colleagues to discuss our
work supporting safe and efficient marine transportation in the Arctic.
The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) cooperates and coordinates on a regular basis
with these agencies in support of the nation's economic and national
security interests in the Arctic.
NOAA's Arctic responsibilities cut across every NOAA mission area,
from weather and sea ice analyses, to navigation services and fisheries
management. For over two hundred years, NOAA and its predecessor
organizations have provided foundational data, products, and services
to support safe, efficient maritime commerce across the nation. NOAA
has a long history in the Arctic, including conducting research and
providing weather and climate services, sea ice forecasting, nautical
charting and other navigation services, natural resource management,
and oil spill preparedness and response. Today, as sea ice diminishes
and economic and maritime activity in the Arctic grows, NOAA remains
committed to its work in the Arctic. For this testimony, I will focus
on the NOAA components highlighted in the Committee on the Marine
Transportation System's 2018 report on critical infrastructure
investments necessary to support a safe and secure Arctic marine
transportation system.
cmts report
In December 2018, the Committee on the Marine Transportation System
(CMTS) issued an update [https://www.cmts.gov/downloads/
NearTermRecommendations
Arctic2018.pdf] on the near-term recommendations in its 2016 Ten-Year
Prioritization of Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic [https://
www.cmts.gov/downloads/NSAR_1.1.2_10-
Year_MTS_Investment_Framework_Final_
5_4_16.pdf].\1\ The report's recommendations span five key categories
integral to the Arctic Marine Transportation System (Arctic MTS),
including: (1) navigable waterways, (2) physical infrastructure, (3)
information infrastructure, (4) emergency response, and (5) vessel
operations. As the report describes, even as sea ice retreat increases
opportunities for navigation-related activities, the Arctic remains a
challenging environment for marine transportation. There are still
unpredictable ice floes, extreme weather conditions, and seasonal
accessibility based on variation in ice location. NOAA's navigation
products, as well as its weather, and emergency response science and
services feature heavily in the physical, information infrastructure
and emergency response sections of the report. The U.S. MTS Arctic
Infrastructure Table at the end of the report is a good snapshot of
current conditions and gaps in critical Arctic MTS infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These reports are accessible online at https://www.cmts.gov/
topics/arctic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
noaa's arctic mts services
Because most of the U.S. Arctic is not connected by road or rail,
marine transportation is an essential means of transporting goods and
people. NOAA's navigation, observation, and positioning services are
important for safe and efficient maritime commerce, security, community
re-supply of food and fuel, construction, and other commerce-related
activities. Thus, nautical charts for Alaska and the Arctic are a key
component of NOAA's nautical charting mission.
The major requirements for nautical charts are (1) accurate
positioning, (2) coastal oceanography such as tides and water levels,
(3) shoreline mapping, and (4) hydrographic surveying. As described
below, NOAA is taking steps to improve the accuracy and reliability of
these core capabilities in the Arctic and the nautical charting and
navigation services they support.
NOAA released its National Charting Plan in 2017 to improve chart
coverage and take full advantage of the capabilities of today's
technologies, including digital Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs).
This national plan updates and incorporates NOAA's older Arctic
Nautical Charting Plan. These plans are based on extensive outreach to
users. They also are designed to ensure NOAA continues to lead and
implement international requirements for surveying and ENC charting.
Positioning and the National Spatial Reference System
Nautical charts rely on accurate shoreline information and precise
positioning, elevation, tide, and water level data, all of which are
dependent on an accurate land-based reference framework. NOAA's
National Geodetic Survey (NGS) provides the authoritative framework for
all positioning activities in the Nation, known as the National Spatial
Reference System (NSRS). This authoritative coordinate system defines
latitude, longitude, height, gravity, and shoreline information, which
supports a wide range of important activities, including mapping and
charting, navigation, transportation, infrastructure, flood risk
determination, national security, and ecosystem management.
Land elevation and positioning data in Alaska currently have errors
of up to a meter or more. To rectify this and modernize the NSRS, NOAA
collects airborne gravity data under its Gravity for the Redefinition
of the American Vertical Datum (GRAV-D) initiative. GRAV-D data
collection for mainland Alaska was completed in 2018. GRAV-D plans on
returning to Alaska in 2020 to complete surveys of the Aleutian
Islands. NOAA is also working to provide improved positioning in Alaska
through its network of Continuously Operating Reference Stations
(CORS). These efforts are part of NOAA's 2022 update to the NSRS, which
will enable up to centimeter-level accuracy for latitude, longitude,
and height, using Global Navigation Satellite System survey techniques
at any location.
Tides and Water Levels
As stated above, accurate water level data is essential for
accurate nautical charts. NOAA's Center for Operational Oceanographic
Products and Services (CO-OPS) operates and maintains the National
Water Level Observation Network (NWLON). In addition to providing data
essential for surveying and charting, these long-term observations of
coastal water levels improve understanding and predictions of coastal
change, storm surge, and saltwater intrusion into freshwater systems
that are urgently needed to inform decisions by increasingly vulnerable
coastal communities in the Arctic. Presently, CO-OPS operates 27 long-
term NWLON tide stations in Alaska, 10 of which are located in the
Arctic. CO-OPS has identified over 30 gaps in NWLON coverage for
Alaska, the majority of which are in the Arctic.
To supplement NWLON data, the Alaska Ocean Observing System (AOOS),
which is a part of the NOAA-led Integrated Ocean Observing System
(IOOS) program, has helped install portable, low-cost systems that help
to fill observation gaps needed for NOAA's National Weather Service
(NWS) storm surge warnings and forecasts in small coastal communities.
NOAA is also collaborating with private industry to build a public data
management system that parallels the CO-OPS website. This system will
serve as an example for advancing nationwide access to external source
water level data. Recently, the NWS funded CO-OPS to install an NWLON
station in Unalakleet, Alaska, to provide real-time information for
storm surge models, as well as navigation. The maintenance of this
station, as well as others in Alaska, has been contracted out to a
local Alaska company. NOAA also plans to replace the Port Moller
station in the Aleutians, which burned down in 2017, with Fiscal Year
2019 dollars.
noaa
Shoreline Mapping
Shoreline surveys are also critical to keeping nautical charts up
to date. In 2018, NOAA updated 4100 miles of Arctic shoreline for its
Continuously Updated Shoreline Product in conjunction with the
rescheming of related NOAA ENCs. This data enables mariners to pinpoint
their locations relative to the coast, navigate to and from ports
safely, and find harbors of refuge when in need.
In conjunction with AOOS, the state of Alaska, and other partners,
NOAA is also supporting the development of an Alaska Coastal Mapping
Strategy for publication in 2019. This strategy will include Arctic
priorities in its assessment of needs for coastal topography and
nearshore bathymetry, along with other types of mapping. The effort is
intended to identify state stakeholder priorities for new collections,
the costs associated with mapping, and ways to leverage new mapping
projects and partnerships.
Hydrographic Surveying
The scale of the hydrographic survey requirement in Alaska and the
Arctic is vast, with 426,000 square nautical miles within the U.S.
Exclusive Economic Zone and nearly half of that significant to
navigation. Soundings on some nautical charts in the Arctic are still
from Captain Cook.
Through the Office of the Coast Survey, NOAA continues to
prioritize and undertake hydrographic surveying in the expansive,
remote and harsh Arctic environment. Over the past three years, NOAA
and its contract partners have acquired nearly 1,500 square nautical
miles of hydrographic survey data in the Arctic. For 2019, our survey
plans include an extensive set of project areas in Kuskokwim Bay.
NOAA's survey contractors are an essential component of the balanced
hydrographic survey program NOAA employs in Alaska and across the
nation. The 51-year old NOAA Survey Vessel Fairweather will also survey
around Cape Newenham.
NOAA also works with private sector partners and academia to
develop and deploy unmanned surface vessels (USV) for chart-quality
surveys. For the past two years, our contractor in Alaska has employed
USVs to conduct hydrographic surveys. In August 2018, NOAA and
researchers from the University of New Hampshire's Center for Coastal
and Ocean Mapping made the first successful launch of a USV for an
operational hydrographic survey from a NOAA vessel in the Arctic. NOAA
also tested four Saildrone USVs in the Bering and Chukchi Seas and is
further investigating the use of Saildrones as an additional, cost-
effective survey capability. Based on the success of that mission, we
are currently updating our Bering Sea charts with the USV data.
Weather and Sea Ice Forecasts
The ability to transmit timely weather and accurate information and
sea ice forecasts depends heavily on the ability to predict inclement
weather and changes in currents or ice cover and extent. One side
effect of an ice-diminished Arctic is a reduction in the dampening
effect of ice on waves. As spring and fall storms intensify, wave
action increases due to a lack of ice cover. In addition, diminished
fall and spring sea ice also has the potential to intensify high
latitude storms as both moisture and heat are exposed with the open
water. Thus, early warning of impending storms is important for both
ships and coastal communities in the Arctic.
NOAA's NWS is increasing targeted in-situ observations, both
surface-based and aloft, to improve model assimilation of observed
data, situational awareness, and scientific understanding of the
Arctic. NWS is also leveraging new remote sensing capabilities, such as
unmanned aerial systems (UAS), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and
satellite technology in addition to next generation autolaunching,
upper air systems at all NWS Alaska Region sites. The NWS Alaska Region
has also proactively addressed both current and emerging operational
forecast gaps by establishing and resourcing the Alaska Environmental
Science and Service Integration Center, which will support both
regional and international Impact Decision Support Services.
Moreover, NOAA is focusing on the science fundamentals to improve
coupled water, ice, atmosphere models. Much of the focus of model
improvements to date have been on the mid- and lower-latitudes. Areas
of specific improvement are the stable Arctic boundary layer,
interactions between the oceans, ice, and atmosphere in the marginal
ice zone, riverine impacts to ice, and troposphere-stratosphere
interactions. These activities will improve NOAA's ability to forecast
the weather and Arctic sea ice.
The National Ice Center (NIC), a partnership among NOAA, the U.S.
Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard, provides sea ice assessments for the
Arctic. The NIC produces a daily, 48-hour Marginal Ice Zone forecast in
text format. The NWS Alaska Sea Ice Program also produces a short-
range, sea-ice forecasting capability with 5-day sea ice graphical and
text forecasts. Besides short-range products, NOAA NWS is developing
experimental weekly sea ice forecasts that include sea ice extent,
concentration, and sea ice melt and freeze dates.
The NIC uses data from NOAA Joint Polar Satellite System and
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-West (GOES-West),
and Department of Defense (DoD) weather satellites, as well as
leverages data from European and Japanese, and purchases data from the
commercial sector to support its mission. These data sets inform the
timing and accuracy of weather and hazard forecasts out to seven days,
including better predictions for fog, ice formations, and ice breaking
in the Arctic. In addition, researchers at NOAA's Earth System Research
Laboratory have developed a fully-coupled ice- ocean-atmosphere model
focused on 0-10 day forecasts. Currently, this modeling team is working
with the NWS to advance Arctic sea ice forecast capabilities.
Oil Spill and Hazard Preparedness and Response
Decreasing summer sea ice is contributing to growth in commerce,
tourism, and energy exploration in the Arctic. According to another
CMTS study of vessel traffic in 2015 (which the CMTS is now working to
update as well), shipping transits through the Bering Strait are
expected to increase 500 percent by 2025. This increased activity
heightens the risk of accidents and discharges of oil and hazardous
materials. NOAA's Alaska regional Scientific Support Coordinator
provides scientific support to the federal on- scene coordinator for
oil spills and other emergencies such as search and rescue. NOAA's
contributions include modeling the fate and movement of spills,
identifying natural resources at risk, and providing software, mapping
tools, and data management capabilities. By law, NOAA is also a trustee
for natural resources that have been injured by oil and chemicals
spills and conducts damage assessment and restoration of these
resources.
NOAA participates in joint training and workshops with interagency
partners and other Arctic nations on activities such as the use of
mechanical recovery, dispersants, and in situ burning following
transboundary spill events. NOAA compiles baseline information on
natural resources in the Arctic and promulgates standard techniques and
guidelines for observing and measuring oil spills and assessing
shorelines.
NOAA Office of Response and Restoration (ORR) also maintains the
Arctic Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA ) to
integrate and synthesize data into a single interactive map, provide
quick geospatial visualizations, and improve communication and
coordination among multiple responder agencies. As a common operational
picture, ERMA brings together all of the available information needed
for an effective emergency response. In 2017, with funding assistance
from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, NOAA improved
its display for the Arctic by adding polar projection base maps. This
provides a less distorted display of the region while maintaining
accurate bearings to the coastline and provides a better tool for pan
Arctic data sharing and perspectives.
Interagency preparedness exercises are essential for critical
improvements in spill response procedures. In August 2018, NOAA
participated in the Mutual Aid Deployment (MAD) exercise on Alaska's
North Slope oil field. The 2018 exercise was hosted by Exxon Mobil and
included over 200 industry and state and federal representatives. NOAA
provided support with oil spill trajectory modeling, weather forecasts,
resources at risk and sensitive areas information, facilitation of the
Endangered Species Act Section 7 consultation, Shoreline Cleanup
Assessment Techniques planning, ERMA , in-situ burn planning, and data
management planning. NOAA, with other members of the Alaska Regional
Response Team's Food Safety Workgroup, also led the development of the
``Ensuring Food Safety Following an Oil Spill in Alaska: Regulatory
Authorities and Responsibilities'' report that was released in December
2018.
International oil spill exercises are also important. In November
2018, NOAA ORR staff traveled with colleagues from the U.S. Coast Guard
and the State of Alaska to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia, to participate in
a ``Seminar on Understanding Maritime Pollution Threats and Response
Systems in the Russian Federation-United States Trans-Boundary Area.''
The meetings concluded with an international tabletop exercise to test
and practice the provisions of the existing ``Joint Contingency Plan of
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Combating
Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas.''
During the United States chairmanship of the Arctic Council for
2015 and 2016, NOAA chaired the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and
Response (EPPR) Workgroup. Under this leadership, the U.S. delegation
to the workgroup delivered several important projects including a Pan-
Arctic Oil Spill Response Equipment Database, a Circumpolar Oil Spill
Response Equipment Viability Analysis, an updated Guide on Oil Spill
Response in Ice and Snow Conditions, and further advancement of
exercise procedures for the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil
Pollution Preparedness and Response. Currently, NOAA is a member of
U.S. Delegation for EPPR and provides the current state of the art of
response techniques, particularly on the use of dispersants in Arctic
environments.
noaa research supporting the arctic mts
NOAA continues to observe and model long-term changes occurring in
sea ice thickness and extent which are important both for global
climate modeling and understanding how access to the Arctic is changing
with reduced seasonal ice cover. Deployed Seasonal Ice Mass Buoys
provide near real-time data on ocean and air temperature through the
sea ice that, combined with data from the atmosphere and ocean,
contributes to the fundamental understanding of the role of the sea ice
cover in the global climate system. These observations enable seasonal
to decadal predictions in sea ice cover.
international, interagency and local engagement
NOAA, in collaboration with numerous other agencies, has supported
U.S. participation in the international Arctic Council since its
establishment in 1996. The U.S. served as the second chair of the
council from 1998 to 2000 and chaired the Council again from 2015 to
2017. Through the Council's Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
working group and other efforts, NOAA has supported coordination of
efforts to promote safe Arctic navigation. Last year, the Council
launched a public website to assist in the implementation of the Polar
Code. To better address Arctic hydrographic and nautical charting
challenges, NOAA has also participated in the Arctic Regional
Hydrographic Commission since 2010.
NOAA serves as Vice Chair of the U.S. Arctic Observing Network
Board after serving as Chair and has continued work towards a sustained
and well-defined network of Arctic observations across NOAA, other
Federal agencies, the State of Alaska and Alaska Native Tribes,
academia, industry, and international partners, such as the Sustaining
Arctic Observing Network. NOAA is a long-standing sponsor of the Arctic
Report Card, an annual, peer-reviewed report developed by 85 scientists
across 12 countries. The Arctic Report Card issued its 13th report in
December 2018. The publication's annual update provides reliable data
and observations to support local and regional decision makers in
making informed decisions for Arctic communities, national security,
industrial growth, environmental health, and food security.
On a local level, the increase in vessel traffic through the Bering
Strait into the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas is of concern to Alaska
Native coastal communities in the region. These communities rely on
subsistence hunting of marine mammals, which are critical to their
nutritional, cultural, mental and spiritual well-being. NOAA has been
working with the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee (AWSC), as well as
Alaska Native Organizations and regional bodies, to ensure the increase
in research vessel traffic does not negatively impact the ability of
the communities to hunt marine mammals. Since 2015, NOAA has requested
community input for summer survey plans with the AWSC. During these
briefings on planned work, NOAA also details its findings from its
prior year surveys.
looking to the future: enhancing noaa's core missions in the arctic
While NOAA's core missions remain the same, advances in technology
are providing opportunities to greatly enhance the accuracy,
timeliness, and integration of our products and services, including
those that inform and support marine navigation and transportation in
the Arctic. To ensure that we consider the needs of and challenges
facing our Arctic stakeholders, NOAA continues to look for innovative
partnerships with the private sector and other stakeholders, including
the ability of the private sector to incorporate NOAA data and services
to develop new applications to enhance operations and efficiency.
conclusion
NOAA plays a unique and important role in providing critical
information infrastructure to support safe, reliable, and efficient
marine transportation. Rapidly changing conditions and increased
accessibility bring new urgency to NOAA's work to support increased
activity in Arctic waters. Local, state, federal, and international
partnerships are critical to achieving successful Arctic operations in
this unique and challenging environment. NOAA is working to develop and
apply technology and data in innovative ways to improve our navigation
products and services. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today. I appreciate the Subcommittee's time and attention and look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, Admiral.
Colonel Borders?
Colonel Borders. Thank you, sir. Admiral Smith, thank you
very much. We work with NOAA quite often in the Corps of
Engineers, especially up in Alaska. In fact, I just received
the concurrence to move through design with our Whittier study.
So thank you.
Chairman Maloney and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, I am Colonel Phil Borders. I am the commander of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Alaska District. I
actually live just outside of Anchorage, so I flew down here to
this hot weather.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
and discuss navigation needs in the Arctic, particularly the
Port of Nome. Today I will provide you a quick overview of the
Corps navigation program in Alaska, then focus in upon the
preliminary conclusions of our soon-to-be published draft
integrated feasibility report and environmental assessment for
the Port of Nome Modification Study, highlighting some of the
navigation needs in western Alaska and the Arctic.
As you know, the increased ocean water temperatures,
reduction in pack ice, and the longer opening of the Northern
Passage, Alaska and Alaskan ports are of vital interest to our
Nation and our North American allies. Since 1902, when Congress
requested the Corps to perform preliminary examinations of the
Wrangell Channel in southeast Alaska, the Corps has played an
important role in addressing navigation needs in the State.
In Alaska few communities are connected to Alaska's limited
road system, resulting in ports and harbors playing an
important role in statewide transportation and economy. The
Corps of Engineers has constructed, overall, 62 harbors and
channel projects over the last 117 years, with 57 of those 62
still in use today. Recently, construction projects in Alaska
in Valdez and Port Lions, along with the 9 current navigation
studies my district has, and the 2 authorized navigation
projects that are ready for design, shows the demand of
navigation improvements in Alaska remains strong today.
As part of the Corps' program in Alaska, the district has
investigated the need for navigational improvement in the
Arctic. In our 2013 report entitled ``Alaska Deep Draft Arctic
Port System Study,'' we noted more than 3,000 vessels used the
great circle to transit annually, and there are over 400 Bering
Strait transits annually. So the opening of the Arctic waters
to maritime traffic is presenting new challenges with respect
to maritime safety and environmental protection, as well as
opportunities for greater efficiencies in shipping.
This ability of vessels to transit into and through the
Arctic has increased in conjunction with the lengthening of
time of open water, free ice, currently from about May to
November.
A prime example of the navigation is Nome, Alaska. The
Corps' navigation project at Nome was originally completed in
1923, and then expanded in 1954, and again modified in 2006. So
we have been at this for a while. Located 737 miles north of
Dutch Harbor along the Aleutian chain, Nome is the only major
port facility in western and northern Alaska providing safe
freight transfers for vessels in excess of 22 draft capable
facilities.
Currently, multiple Government vessels, large cruise ships,
research vessels, and large fuel tankers conduct lightering
into Nome to access necessary facilities to bring both crew and
cargo ashore. In total, vessels exceeding the draft depth
entered the port spent over 1,200 hours in anchor offshore at
Nome in 2017 alone, just to conduct those lightering
operations.
Due to the lack of available deep draft along the western
and northern coast, the U.S. Coast Guard, as stated earlier, is
limited to small vessels and helicopters. The nearest Coast
Guard station to Nome is about 800 miles away south in Kodiak,
as the admiral mentioned. However, because of the long sailing
times through remote and often challenging waters, security and
safety become our concern of paramount, both for the Coast
Guard and for the Corps.
An increasing number of oil and gas transferred vessels are
transiting the Atlantic, making spills a growing concern,
mainly because of the limited facilities or ready available
supplies, should a cleanup happen at sea.
In summary, though Nome is not the only community in Alaska
in need of navigation permits, the situation in Nome is a good
example. We are proud to work in collaboration with many other
Federal agencies as we do routinely, and recommend Arctic
implementation and needs of the Arctic.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members. I am open
to your questions, as always.
[Colonel Borders's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colonel Phillip J. Borders, Commander, Alaska
District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
introduction
Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, I am Colonel Phillip J. Borders, Commander of U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) Alaska District. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the role of the Corps
in support of commercial navigation in the Arctic. The Corps works in
collaboration with other federal agencies, and with state, local, and
tribal entities on this issue.
I will provide you an overview of the involvement of the Corps in
Alaska's port development, and an update on our soon to be published
Draft Integrated Feasibility Report and Environmental Assessment for
the Port of Nome Modification study.
the corps of engineers navigation program in alaska
Since 1902, when Congress authorized the Corps to perform
preliminary examinations of Wrangell Channel in southeast Alaska, the
Corps has played an important role in support of commercial navigation
in the state. Due to few connections to Alaska's road system, many of
the state's coastal communities rely on ports and airports for
transportation. The Corps of Engineers has improved the channels at 62
ports in Alaska over the last 117 years. Fifty-seven of these ports are
in use today. The Corps recently completed projects to deepen the ports
of Valdez and Port Lions.
A 2013 Corps report, entitled ``Alaska Deep Draft Arctic Port
System Study'', noted that ``[m]ore than 3,000 vessels use the Great
Circle route through Alaska's Unimak Pass each year and there are over
400 Bering Strait transits annually. The opening of Arctic waters to
maritime traffic is presenting new challenges with respect to maritime
safety and environmental protection as well as opportunities for
greater efficiencies for shippers.'' This ability of vessels to transit
into and through the Arctic has increased in conjunction with the
lengthening of time of open water/ice free conditions, currently about
May to November of each year.
port of nome modification study
Over the past 10 or so years, the Corps has been evaluating the
costs and benefits of options for channel improvements at one or more
ports in western Alaska. In the first phase of that effort, we explored
14 potential sites and concluded that a proposal involving two of these
ports (Nome and Port Clarence) had the best potential for justification
based on a further analysis. By February 2015, the Corps had dropped
Port Clarence from consideration. It has focused since then on options
for the Port of Nome.
The Corps first improved the Port of Nome in 1923. It modified that
project in 1954, and again in 2006 to its present configuration.
Located 737 miles north of Dutch Harbor, Nome is the largest port in
western and northern Alaska. Its main commercial docking area is in
waters with a depth of -22ft MLLW.
Currently, multiple government vessels, large cruise ships and
larger research vessels conduct business in Nome while anchored
offshore in deeper water. This business includes the transfer of
personnel and equipment to and from the ships. In addition, large fuel
tankers anchored offshore of Nome lighter their load by offloading it
to smaller vessels for delivery to Nome and other small communities of
the area.
Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members, this concludes my statement.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward
to answering any questions you may have.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, Colonel. We will now proceed to
Members' questions, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Colonel, can you help me understand the subject you were
just talking about? What is the optimal depth for that port in
Nome? I know we are fortunate enough to be joined by Admiral
Allen, who is going to tell us it is--I think, according to
your standards--deeper than 22 feet, deeper than the 35 feet
they might get to with additional docking. Shouldn't it be 45
feet? Can you talk a little bit about that, sir?
Colonel Borders. Sir, in this project, it is a civil works
project using the Remote and Subsistence Harbor Act of WDRA
2007. So we maintain the draft and the study--has been upon the
vessels that use it and the Coast Guard vessels. So the study
is looking forward to between 30 and 40 MLLW, mean lower low
water, for the study that we have out there.
I understand the 45-foot depth, but that is for another
organization. If they want, they have that capability there--
for the Arleigh Burke-class, I believe, is what you are
referring to sir.
Mr. Maloney. And so if I could just press you on that a
little bit, what does that answer mean that you just--could you
put that into terms that a normal human could understand?
Colonel Borders. So the community of Nome, sir, on the
shipping vessels that are up there, it is the assessment of the
vessels that use that facility normally, and that is where we
come up with between the 30 and the 40.
Mr. Maloney. Right, but we have got a dynamic situation,
don't we, Colonel? You would agree the whole point of what we
are talking about today is the emerging reexamination of the
Arctic, and developing a strategic plan, of keeping up with the
great power competition. It is not going to be enough to just
service the vessels who are using it now. Isn't that fair to
say?
I mean, in other words, do we have any other deepwater
ports anywhere nearby?
Colonel Borders. Sir, there is Port Clarence, which is----
Mr. Maloney. That is it, right?
Colonel Borders [continuing]. Natural deepwater with no
facilities----
Mr. Maloney. You are not considering Port Clarence any more
are you, right? So this is the only one we are considering,
right, is Nome?
Colonel Borders. So it is the one that have, over the last
three studies, has come to the conclusion that Nome is the best
viable port with a benefit-cost ratio that also supports the
community because we are using a civil works authority to do
this.
Mr. Maloney. And so, if we want to have a port, that is
going to be it. And if we want to have a port we can actually
use into the future with all the capabilities we want to
develop--and we are going to spend a lot of taxpayer money on--
it has got to be deeper than 22 feet, even 35 feet, doesn't it?
Colonel Borders. For national defense reasons, sir, I think
that you are correct for--45 feet would be the optimal. But
once again, this is--we are doing this under a civil works
premise right now, and the authorities that the Corps has. So
we do a lot of MILCON work, we are just currently not using
that for this particular project.
Mr. Maloney. I understand, thanks. And I appreciate your
point. But I also think you appreciate the larger point, which
we are paid to focus on, at least on this side of the dais.
Admiral Smith, can you tell me a little bit about what your
challenges are in the Arctic, what your infrastructure needs
are? Obviously, it is a vast region. The extraordinary work you
do in other places simply hasn't been possible in that region.
I understand that.
Can you put some context around that for us, and what we
ought to be thinking about, what we ought to expect, what you
would need to really bring it up to the same kind of standards
we enjoy in other places?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. Most of our work for hydrographic
surveys in the Arctic for shipboard work has been staged out of
Dutch Harbor using Nome as a sort of forward-operating base
when it is accessible to us.
And, you know, as a result of that and the vast distances
that we have talked about earlier, it is a very short
operational season available to us for surveying. And so the
two ships that we have and our contractors have to cram a whole
season's worth of activities into that short window.
We have--recognizing this challenge, we are looking at ways
of hitting that area as hard as we can with as many platforms
as we can during that short season. So, to that end, we are
looking at unmanned systems with--that are independent, with
high-endurance, ship-based unmanned systems that can sort of be
a force multiplier for our existing ships and future ships, and
increased use of partnerships and crowdsourcing for the region.
All of those together are still not going to be enough,
because it is such a huge challenge. But we are being very
creative with all of the technology and resources available to
us.
Mr. Maloney. And we also heard Admiral Ray talk about how
everything is harder in the Arctic. Could you say a word about
how you track ice movement and ice flows, oil spills,
potentially, and any additional challenges you have there?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. Very briefly, it is an interagency
effort with NOAA and the Navy and the Coast Guard for, you
know, different parts of the program. There is a lot of
satellite observations, aircraft observations, and that
tracking has been consistent over time.
The oil spill response is particularly tricky, because we
rely on modeling, which itself is then relying on observations
and mapping, which is sparse in the Arctic. So we are investing
in science for understanding the behavior of oil in that type
of environment, as well as in the modeling necessary to support
it.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Gibbs?
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to
start out a little bit of a lighter note. I guess Captain Cook
surveyed Alaska in 1778, and hopefully some of that survey data
has been updated since then. You don't have to answer that.
I do want to talk a little about the charts and the survey
and what actions can NOAA take to complete surveys and process
the data from those surveys of navigationally significant areas
of the Arctic charted more quickly.
And I want to tie this in a little bit with this other
concept or a process called a Continuously Operating Reference
System, or CORS. You know, the coastal mapping with the Army
Corps NOAA does, they play together, interact. And I guess the
two questions that come out of that really--does NOAA
coordinate coastal mapping requirements and survey operations
with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Coastal
Mapping Program?
And also, could you tell the committee how this important
program relates not only to NOAA's mission, but geographic data
more generally? Because I have kind of heard that sometimes our
coasts change on the maps, can you explain this whole area of
how we developed these charts, and how we can do it better and
more efficiently?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. I
understand the first question to be about the process of taking
from observation until it is useful to the public. I am pleased
to report that we have made huge progress on that in the last
decade or so. This has been a personal passion of mine. And
that has resulted--the improvement has been a result of both
processing improvements in hydrographic surveying, but also
changes in the way that we update our charts and distribute
them.
And, in fact, it is the charting changes that have probably
led to the most notable improvement in this. So instead of
waiting for a new edition of a paper chart to be printed,
distributed to warehouses, and then sent out to customers, we
are entirely digital now, and all charts are printed on demand.
So when a new survey comes in, we can update it on the chart,
and it can be available next Thursday.
So the holdover from being a print shop is now gone, and
that has cut years off of the time it takes to update charts.
The Continuously Operating Reference Systems are GPS-based
reference systems that are very dense. In the continental U.S.
they are largely partnerships. And so where there is any
infrastructure--from university or other Federal agencies--we
tend to have these. This is one area where, because there are
thinner communities and less activity in general, we have less
in Alaska.
But I am pleased to report that the National Geodetic
Survey has a foundation CORS program that I know we will be
hearing more about soon that will provide the underlying
highest order positioning system to underlie the 2022 datum
changes.
Coordinate with the Army Corps? Absolutely, both for the
channel programs, channel dredging--that is where most of the
data comes from--but also for the coastal mapping program from
the system run out of Mississippi and their other programs
around the country.
We have a 100-percent interoperability. That is, we can use
the data when necessary. We also do coordinate knowing what
each other's plans are, so that we can meet each other's needs
as we go forward. So we don't always use the data, because it
is not always relevant, but we do have available full
interoperability. And that really ties into the coastal change,
as well, particularly with less ice in Alaska, there is more
erosion of the coastline, and we are seeing more coastal
change. And with larger scale charts, that sort of change is
more relevant and easier to----
Mr. Gibbs. I appreciate it, I am glad to hear that you are
working together on that.
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. Colonel, we are told that the Chief's Report for
the Port of Nome Modification Study--due fall 2019--is there
any changes to that schedule? And is the Corps encompassing
expected national security and other associate benefits in
their evaluation of the Arctic deep draft port?
Colonel Borders. Sir, we don't anticipate any change. In
fact, we anticipate achieve support in June of 2020 for the
report. So we are on schedule for that.
I believe the second part of your question was----
Mr. Gibbs. About national security or other associated
benefits.
Colonel Borders. We do--we have included national security
in this report structure. Uniquely enough--so there is
currently no metric in our process to address that, but we are
addressing that as far as being in the report, so that, like
the chairman spoke to earlier, it can be it can be looked at in
the larger perspective outside of the authority that we are we
are looking at this project.
Mr. Gibbs. I know you have got a challenge, because that is
really the only possibility of having a deepwater port in that
area, right?
Colonel Borders. That is my understanding, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. And the challenge----
Colonel Borders. It is the best chance, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. Yes, and the challenge is getting the draft deep
enough.
All right. Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Brown?
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Smith, in your
testimony you talk about the need for strategic partnerships
and increased capability to ensure a steady stream of data and
accurate information for sea ice and weather forecasts. The
National Ice Center, which is located in my district in
Suitland, Maryland, is one of those strategic partnerships
between NOAA, the Navy, and the Coast Guard.
Could you just talk a little bit about the ice center, and
the value of that data, and what it means for operations in the
Arctic?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. Well, I will do my best, and if I
don't meet your needs I can do--we can get followup information
to you.
So the ice center provides operational forecasts and
conditions that are suitable for marine navigation. It is one
of a suite of services that we provide to--that supports
shipping services, marine navigation in general. It is, you
know, heavily used, of course, for military, commercial,
recreational, and other services.
And so I am not sure what the--I mean I think that is the--
--
Mr. Brown. In my district, you say something nice about it,
and then they all feel good that----
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brown [continuing]. They are being, you know,
acknowledged for their good work. So thank you very much.
Admiral Smith. And if I could also just say that that--the
three-agency cooperation for an operational program like that
is unusual, and really, really noteworthy. And we are really
pleased to be part of that.
Mr. Brown. Great. Well, thanks.
Colonel Borders, in your testimony--at least in your
written testimony, you point out that the Corps of Engineers
has improved channels at 62 ports in Alaska, and that 57 of
those are still in use today. With the increasingly ice-free
conditions in the Arctic, what are some of the things we can do
better to increase our capacity in the Arctic and improve
efficiency at our ports?
Colonel Borders. So a lot of it, sir, is getting in the
studies. So down here in the lower 48--excuse the
colloquialism--but a lot of the environmental studies, marine
mammal studies, the endangered species studies, they are easy
to gather, they are quickly gathered because the data is over
and over years.
But when I had the mayor of Kotzebue in my office, and we
did one of our civil works milestones, the agency decision
milestone. So Mayor Smith--Eugene was in there, and he got a
brief with me. And he said, literally, to get the information
we can give to NOAA so they can make the right decision, we are
going to have to put a fisherman or a fisher person on that
dock to count the number of ringed seals that go by. The data
just doesn't exist.
So some of it is collecting and learning more, I think, is
the best answer, sir.
Mr. Brown. So what do you need from Congress to help you
with that?
Colonel Borders. Right now, sir, we just need the studies
that we have to continue to be funded and supported. I would
say that, outside of that--maybe I am speaking outside of my
lane a little bit, but for NOAA and other agencies to have the
ability to conduct some more broad-based studies in Alaska so
that data is more openly, readily available, so when we get
ready to build something we can build it.
Mr. Brown. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. Well, seeing no other Members who might have
questions, I am going to thank the gentlemen for their
testimony. We do have a third panel, so I am going to try to
move ahead with this. Thank you both very much. Let's go to the
third panel.
[Pause.]
Mr. Maloney. Well, thank you all for being here. Without
further delay I would like to move now to our final panel of
witnesses.
We are joined today by Admiral Thad Allen, U.S. Coast Guard
retired, coauthor of the Council on Foreign Relations report,
``Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America's
Fourth Coast''; Ms. Heather A. Conley, senior vice president
for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic for the Center for
Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Abbie Tingstad, senior
physical scientist for the RAND Corporation; and the Honorable
Mead Treadwell, cochair of the Polar Institute for the Woodrow
Wilson Center.
Thank you all for being here today. We look forward to your
testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record.
As with the previous panels, since your written testimony
has been made part of the record, the subcommittee requests
that you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
I am going to start with you, Admiral Allen. Thank you all
for being patient and for allowing us to get through the other
panels first.
In particular, Admiral Allen, I want to thank you very much
for your four decades of service to the country. We respect
very much your service to the Coast Guard, your work during
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. And of course, Deepwater Horizon.
And I have read the report you coauthored for the Council on
Foreign Relations, and it is a terrific piece of work. I know
it has been out there for 2 years, but we are very thankful for
your presence today. I wanted to give you an opportunity to
highlight for us the importance of some of the issues you
raised in that report.
Go ahead, sir.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, U.S. COAST GUARD (RET.);
HEATHER A. CONLEY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR EUROPE, EURASIA,
AND THE ARCTIC, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES;
ABBIE TINGSTAD, Ph.D., SENIOR PHYSICAL SCIENTIST, THE RAND
CORPORATION; AND HON. MEAD TREADWELL, COCHAIR, POLAR INSTITUTE,
WOODROW WILSON CENTER
Admiral Allen. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman Maloney,
Ranking Member Gibbs, other members of the committee--and I saw
some old friends here that are no longer in the room, I will
try and reach out and touch them at another time--I am pleased
to be here with my distinguished colleagues, all of whom have a
lot to add to the testimony today.
And I would like to comment on the Corps of Engineers and
NOAA. Their testimony, as you know, was to the point, but
incredible support provided to me during the hurricanes in the
oil spill response, and my entire service and the Coast Guard.
For the record I am here today testifying in my personal
capacity, not representing any entity. And I used to say when I
was giving speeches that I am going to be frank and honest.
Because I am retired, my pension is assured. I can only tell
you today that I am retired.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Allen. In 2016, as you noted, I was honored to
colead an independent task force sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations that issued a report entitled ``Arctic
Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America's Fourth
Coast.'' That report developed recommendations for policymakers
to consider in the transition process, as you noted, in 2016. I
am going to summarize the key findings of that report, and the
full report is available, and I have recommended to the staff
it be appended to the report of the of the hearing, sir.
Mr. Maloney. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Report by Council on Foreign Relations, ``Arctic Imperatives:
Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America's Fourth Coast,'' Submitted for
the Record by Hon. Maloney
The report is retained in committee files and a PDF may be
downloaded from the Council on Foreign Relations website at https://
www.cfr.org/report/arctic-imperatives.
Admiral Allen. As stated in the report, the Arctic is a
crossroads of international politics and a forewarning for the
world. The United States, through Alaska, is a significant
Arctic nation with strategic economic and scientific interests.
As sea ice continues to melt, countries inside and outside the
Arctic region have updated their strategic and commercial
calculations to take advantage of the changing conditions
stemming from the opening of the region.
The United States needs to increase its strategic
commitment to the region or risk leaving its interests
unprotected.
The task force organized its work into four interrelated
areas: U.S. policy; U.S. national security; economic, energy
and environmental issues; and, finally, Alaska and Alaska
Natives. We consulted broadly, and support a comprehensive,
integrated approach in assessing future options in the Arctic.
That approach includes sustaining international partnerships--
that was noted by Admiral Ray--of the Arctic Council,
International Maritime Organization, and the Coast Guard Arctic
Forum.
The task force identified six main goals U.S. policymakers
should pursue to protect the United States growing economic and
strategic interests in the Arctic.
First, ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The Senate should help secure the United States legal rights to
more than 386,000 square miles of subsea resources along its
extended continental shelf by ratifying this treaty. Admiral
Ray talked about rules-based operations in Alaska. This is the
overarching global governance strategy for this globe and, in
my view, the United States should be ashamed it hasn't ratified
it yet.
I am retired.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Allen. Fund and maintain polar icebreakers. We
recommended six; I won't get into that, because it has been
detailed fairly significantly in the hearing to date.
Improve Arctic infrastructure.
Invest in telecommunications, energy, and other
infrastructure in Alaska, and find locations for safe harbor
ports and a deepwater port.
Three, strengthen cooperation with other Arctic nations.
Continue diplomatic efforts with the Arctic Council and work
with other Arctic states, including Russia, on confidence-
building and cooperative security measures.
I would add continuing cooperation with Russia is vital,
and the Coast Guard has done that through my entire career, and
needs to continue to do that, regardless of the larger security
environment we are operating in.
And finally, fund scientific research. Sustain budget
support for scientific research beyond 2017 to understand the
regional and global impact of accelerated change.
I am going to omit my other comments, because they have
been covered by other folks. I would like to go to just maybe
just one comment to close with, and it is in response to
Admiral Ray's comments about peer competitors.
There is an old saying that I wish I could attribute to an
author, but I can't, unfortunately. And the quote is, ``You
don't have sovereignty unless you can exert it.'' Our peer
competitors understand that about the Arctic, and are
demonstrating strategic intent with their current actions. In
the United States we spend more time arguing about who
understands the climate better.
Before I retired from the Coast Guard I was asked by a
Member of Congress about my opinion on global warming. I
responded there was water where there didn't used to be, and I
was responsible for it. It is time to understand that we are
all responsible for the Arctic and this planet. I would be
happy to take your questions.
[Admiral Allen's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)
Mr. Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the
committee, I am pleased to have been invited to testify on this
important topic and I thank you for the opportunity.
I am also pleased to be here with my distinguished colleagues.
Admiral Charlie Ray is a superb leader. I have enjoyed long standing,
valuable relationships with both NOAA and the Army Corps of Engineers.
Their support to me and the Nation was critical in the responses to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
Heather Conley is an old friend from CSIS and an expert in her field.
Abbie Tingstad represents RAND where I served as a Senior Fellow and I
welcome her. And finally, Mead Treadwell, who has made Arctic issues,
governance, and infrastructure his life's passion.
For the record I am testifying in my personal capacity today and am
not representing any other entity.
In 2016, I was honored to co-lead an independent Task Force
sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) that issued a
report entitled ``Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on
America's Fourth Coast.'' That report developed recommendations for
policy makers to consider in the Presidential transition process.
As stated in the report, ``The Arctic is a crossroads of
international politics and a forewarning for the world. The United
States, through Alaska, is a significant Arctic nation with strategic,
economic, and scientific interests. As sea ice continues to melt,
countries inside and outside the Arctic region have updated their
strategic and commercial calculations to take advantage of the changing
conditions stemming from the opening of the region. The United States
needs to increase its strategic commitment to the region or risk
leaving its interests unprotected.''
The Task Force organized its work in four interrelated areas: U.S.
Policy; U.S. National Security; Economic, Energy and Environmental
Issues; and, finally, Alaska and Alaska natives. We consulted broadly
and support a comprehensive, integrated approach in assessing future
options in the Arctic. That approach includes sustaining international
partnership through the Arctic Council, International Maritime
Organization, and the Coast Guard Arctic Forum.
The Task Force identified six main goals that U.S. policymakers
should pursue to protect the United States' growing economic and
strategic interests in the Arctic:
``Ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The
Senate should help secure the United States' legal rights to more than
386,000 square miles of subsea resources along its extended continental
shelf by ratifying this treaty.
Fund and maintain polar ice-breaking ships. Congress
should approve funding for up to six icebreakers to improve operational
capacity in the Arctic, so as to have at least three operational ships
in the polar regions at any one time.
Improve Arctic infrastructure. Invest in
telecommunications, energy, and other infrastructure in Alaska and find
locations for safe harbor ports and a deepwater port.
Strengthen cooperation with other Arctic nations.
Continue diplomatic efforts within the Arctic Council and work with
other Arctic states, including Russia, on confidence-building and
cooperative security measures.
Support sustainable development and Alaska Native
communities. ``Maintain the [Arctic] Council's focus on sustainable
development, environmental protection, and continued involvement of the
Arctic's indigenous peoples.''
Fund scientific research. Sustain budget support for
scientific research beyond 2017 to understand the regional and global
impact of accelerated climate change.''
In regard to today's hearing the report emphasizes that, ``The
United States needs to bolster its infrastructure and assets in the
Arctic to safeguard its strategic interests, defend its national
borders, protect the environment, and maintain its scientific and
technological leadership.''
More specifically, almost no marine infrastructure is in place
within the U.S. maritime Arctic. In some areas infrastructure is
provided by the oil and gas industry to support their facilities.
However, this infrastructure supports industrial operations. Other
needs are creating severe challenges for public authorities at the
local, state, and national level. New commercial activity would be
hampered by inadequate infrastructure. Deepwater ports exist in Norway,
Iceland, and Russia, the largest of which is in Murmansk, Russia, but
the North American Arctic has no major port to service transoceanic
maritime transportation. The port at Nome, Alaska, is only twenty-two
feet deep, but the city of Nome hopes to build out its docks to reach a
draft of thirty-five feet deep without dredging. The Army Corps of
Engineers defines a deepwater port as forty-five feet deep. The Task
Force urged policymakers to reinforce U.S. strategic presence in the
Arctic by making a sustained commitment to boosting technology and
building the infrastructure for safe operations in the region.
In closing I would like to make a general comment on the U.S.
position in the Arctic and appreciate Admiral Ray's comments on peer
competitors.
There is an old saying that I wish I could attribute to an author--
but can't. ``You don't have sovereignty unless you can exert it.'' Our
peer competitors understand that about the Arctic and are demonstrating
strategic intent with their current actions. In the United States we
spend more time arguing about who understands the climate better.
Before I retired from the Coast Guard I was asked by a member of
Congress about my opinion on global warming. I responded that there was
water where there didn't used to be and I was responsible for it. It is
time to understand that we are all responsible for the Arctic and this
planet.
I recommend the CFR report be appended to the record of this
hearing and I am happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you very much, sir.
Ms. Conley?
Ms. Conley. Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, thank
you so much for this kind invitation to testify before you this
afternoon. And thank you for your thoughtful work for many
years related to strengthening America's capabilities in the
Arctic.
I actually really appreciate the title of this hearing, as
there is a cost to doing nothing, and there is also a cost for
taking action. I thought, since my written testimony is already
placed in the record, that I would just provide a few moments
of reflection on Secretary Pompeo's, I think, groundbreaking
speech on Monday in Finland, and then to just offer some ideas
for your consideration.
Although Secretary Pompeo's speech against the backdrop of
the Arctic Council was perhaps a misplaced moment, because the
Arctic Council does not deal with hard security, nor does it
really deal with economic issues, I think it is an important
moment that a senior U.S. Government official has now stated
that we are in a new age of strategic engagement in the Arctic.
This is not new news to this committee, but I think it is new
that it has been articulated.
But as I note in my written testimony, we fall again into a
trap of our own making by describing what our competitors are
doing, and that in some way substitutes for what we are not
doing. So we can talk about Russia's 41 icebreakers, but we
need 6. We can talk about the 16 deepwater ports that perhaps
Russia may have, but we just need 1. We need to have more
flexible, capable forces and assets that can operate in ice-
covered waters and can fight in cold weather.
So my suggestion--and it came to me as I was listening to
the testimony--is, quite frankly, we do need an operational
plan, I would argue, along the lines--and I closely follow U.S.
force posture in Europe and NATO--we need something akin to the
European--it was first called the Reassurance Initiative, it
went to the European Deterrence Initiative, and now it is the
European Defense Initiative.
What happened? U.S. had withdrawn forces from Europe, and
then the annexation of Crimea and the incursion into the Donbas
occurred, and all of a sudden we had to get very focused and
have a dedicated spending on air, land, and maritime component
to make our forces more robust.
I would argue we need an Arctic sovereignty initiative. It
needs to work both with the Coast Guard and with the Navy. It
needs to be multiyear and dedicated. We have to take the
urgency of great power competition in the Arctic and move
forward with actual spending. What I have heard is lots of
conversation about what we should do; we have to put the
imperative of what we will do. And again, it is not about what
our competitors are doing, it is about what the U.S. must do to
protect its security interests in the Arctic.
Again, just two more or three more brief reflections on
Secretary Pompeo's speech. He noted that respect and
transparency are the price of admission in the Arctic. Well, I
would probably rephrase that, and I would say that it is
respect for international law and norms, which is the price for
stability, security, environmental protection, and prosperity
in the Arctic.
So we--right now everyone is respecting international law,
but we don't have transparency. We have a lack of transparency
of why Russia is constructing very sophisticated air bases with
surface-to-air missiles, and developing new and exercising new
Arctic-specific equipment. We don't have transparency on what
China is doing in their observation centers or in their
infrastructure development norms and Arctic code of conduct,
and greater confidence-building measures are needed.
Secretary Pompeo also alerted us to the differences in the
maritime legal interpretations of the Northwest Passage and the
Northern Sea Route. This is important. But lumping Canada and
Russia into the same bucket, I think, is incorrect. We have an
ally and a NATO partner that we share protection of North
America and NORAD. We have a difference of opinion. We manage
that opinion. Russia's difference of opinion is a slightly
different issue.
But again, we have to look at this in context. The reason
that we don't have a major issue right now with that legal
interpretation is because the traffic has been so minimal in
the Northern Sea Route. In 2018 there were 27 full transits
through the Northern Sea Route. We haven't really raised this
issue, quite frankly, because it hasn't been used that much.
And I suspect that the Northern Sea Route is not the primary
interest for the Chinese. It is the transpolar, or central
passage that is of importance to them. I don't believe they are
going to pay those port fees in the future.
So I--just one closing comment that I have, and that is our
work at the Arctic Council. The U.S. position on the Arctic
Council and the declaration, unfortunately, had the unique
result of having Russia and China sound more like environmental
advocates, and working more harmoniously with our own allies
than the U.S. We have to effectively use these vehicles,
whether it is the International Maritime Organization or the
Arctic Council, to shape the influence we want. When the U.S.
walks away from these institutions, we cede influence and power
to our competitors.
We have to stop kicking our own goals and get busy working
on developing America's capabilities in the Arctic. Thank you.
[Ms. Conley's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for
Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the kind invitation to speak to you
once again and for holding this important hearing to discuss what we
must do to ensure American sovereignty in the Arctic.
It has been my great privilege to testify before this subcommittee
for the past four years on the Arctic. But it is my great frustration
that I find myself repeating my previous testimonies, with the only
exception that I offer updates on what our competitors, China and
Russia, are doing to secure their strategic interests in the Arctic.
Unfortunately, the only updates on U.S. policy that I can offer you
today is what you already know very well, primarily due to the hard
work of this subcommittee: first, the U.S. has finally set the wheels
in motion to construct one heavy ice-breaker which we hope will be
available for use in Antarctica by 2024. We hope that the Polar Star
will continue to be operational while the new icebreaker is being
built. We hope there will be additional heavy and medium ice-breakers
built in the future that could be regularly utilized in the Arctic. But
hope is not an effective operational plan. Second, various U.S.
agencies and departments have produced several more Arctic studies and
strategies which underscores that the United States has perfected our
ability to describe an Arctic policy, but we cannot or will not
implement one. Rest assured our competitors are implementing their
policies.
a lost decade
After spending over a decade researching U.S. strategic interests
in the Arctic and the geopolitics of the region, I am encouraged that,
over the past several months, there is a new and growing consciousness
in Washington about the rise of great power competition in the Arctic
and in particular, the role of China in the Arctic. This consciousness
has also been heightened by the extraordinary and unprecedented pace of
climate transformation we are witnessing in the Arctic. Our most
predicative models are now off by decades.
Unfortunately, it has taken the U.S. a decade to realize what U.S.
Coast Guard Rear Admiral Gene Brooks, then Commander of District-17,
told us in 2008: ``The Arctic is upon us, now.'' U.S. policy toward the
Arctic never included a sense of urgency and anticipation to build the
infrastructure and capabilities to protect America's fourth coast, or
to prioritize our needs in the Arctic, or to make tough budget
decisions. We have lost a decade. The U.S. cannot sufficiently
safeguard U.S. territorial waters and our Exclusive Economic Zone,
particularly given the up-tick in LNG carriers and other foreign-
flagged vessels traversing the narrow Bering Strait. I fear the U.S.
Coast Guard has now become so accustomed to being inadequately
resourced to execute its mission in the Arctic that it accepts its lack
of readiness as a state of normalcy that cannot be challenged. The U.S.
Coast Guard continues to rely on outdated capabilities and thinly
resourced budgets which equates to a seasonal U.S. Coast Guard presence
(July-October). Should an incident occur in the American Arctic, the
only way that the U.S. can effectively manage is if it occurs during
the summer season and near a pre-positioned U.S. maritime asset. Years
of underinvestment and policy stagnation are coming home to roost.
In my testimony last year, I described in detail what China and
Russia are doing economically and militarily in the Arctic and
underscored my growing concerns that the U.S. was now at risk of losing
its ability to protect and project its sovereignty and maintain full
access to the Arctic. We cannot strategically sustain another lost
American decade in the Arctic.
the power of american presence
While I recognize this goes beyond the remit of this subcommittee,
but as this is the only subcommittee that hosts regular Arctic
hearings, this subcommittee is the best place to have a broader and
more holistic conversation about U.S. policy toward the Arctic. It is
essential that we broaden our concept of physical presence and its
relationship to sovereignty in the Arctic. Sovereign presence can take
the form of scientific ventures, sustainable infrastructure
development, diplomacy, and an enduring security and maritime presence.
All instruments of U.S. power must be deployed.
Growing U.S. Science and Diplomatic Presence in the Arctic. China
has effectively used scientific research and its investments in Arctic
indigenous communities to enhance its physical presence in the region.
China opened its first Arctic scientific research station in 2004 on
the island of Svalbard. Today, Chinese scientists have registered 80
projects on the island, including biological, social, and atmospheric
studies.\1\ In 2017, China conducted a circumpolar scientific research
program in which their icebreaker, the Xue Long, traversed both the
Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route in the same season. In 2018,
Beijing opened the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory (CIAO) in
Northern Iceland. The facility has a wide mandate and focuses on
climate change, satellite remote sensing, geosciences, oceanography,
and fisheries among other issues.\2\ Two weeks ago, at the fifth
International Arctic Forum in St. Petersburg, China and Russia agreed
to establish the Chinese-Russian Arctic Research Center to study issues
such as ice conditions along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a vital
Arctic maritime transit route for both Russian and Chinese economic
ambitions.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Av Ole Magnus Rapp, ``Kina raser mot Norge,'' Klassekampen,
March 7, 2019. https://www.klassekampen.no/article/20190307/ARTICLE/
190309978; ``China at Loggerheads with Norway Over Access to Arctic
Archipelago,'' Sputnik, March 12, 2019. https://sputniknews.com/europe/
201903121073147498-norway-china-arctic-arhipelago-svalbard/.
\2\ Melody Schreiber, ``A new China-Iceland Arctic science
observatory is already expanding its focus,'' Arctic Today, October 31,
2018. https://www.arctictoday.com/new-china-iceland-arctic-science-
observatory-already-expanding-focus/.
\3\ Pavel Devyatkin, ``Russian and Chinese Scientists to Establish
Arctic Research Center,'' High North News, April 15,2019. https://
www.highnorthnews.com/en/russian-and-chinese-scientists-establish-
arctic-research-center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the U.S. has a substantial polar science budget, we should
more actively pursue bilateral arrangements across the circumpolar
Arctic to create additional American scientific observation and
research centers.
Diplomatically, China has increased the frequency of visits by
senior Chinese officials to capitals as well as a variety of
international conferences. It has also increased its embassy personnel
in Arctic Council member states, particularly in Iceland. This is
critically important as Iceland assumed the chair of the Arctic Council
yesterday (May 7th). It is encouraging news that the U.S. will
reportedly have a foreign service officer spend about half of his or
her time in Nuuk, Greenland. This is a step in the right direction, but
it is not enough. The U.S. should consider increasing its diplomatic
presence in Greenland as well as in Iceland, Northern Norway and in
Finland by establishing what the State Department once termed American
Presence Posts (APPs). These posts could include either diplomats or
scientists who open a small office in strategic locations to ensure
consistent American diplomatic presence.
Growing U.S. Infrastructure and Security Presence. It took over ten
years to begin the procurement process for one U.S. heavy icebreaker
which will largely be deployed to Antarctica. A similar timeline to
construct critical infrastructure like a deep water port or improve
satellite communications would leave the U.S. ill-prepared to address
the growing economic and military presence of Russia and China in the
Arctic. Although the Coast Guard's Arctic strategy always underscores
the need for the U.S. to enhance its marine domain awareness and
communication capabilities in the region, very little action is taken
to increase these capabilities. U.S. military requirements exist for
communications support for submarines, aircraft, other platforms, and
forces operating in the high northern latitudes but these requirements
do not take into account increased Coast Guard operations as a result
of accelerated Arctic melting.\4\ The U.S. should consider the
expansion of current commercial satellite communication networks
already in place, including Iridium Satellite, a commercial satellite
communications service available in the Arctic that is used by the U.S.
Air Force.\5\ To further improve our operational capabilities, the
Coast Guard should host additional forward operating location bases in
Alaska as well as increase hangar space and aviation assets that are
staffed beyond the summer season.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Patrick L. Smith, Leslie A. Wickman, and Inki A. Min,
``Broadband Satellite Communications for future U.S. Military and Coast
Guard Operations in an Ice-Free Arctic,'' Aerospace Corporation, July
1, 2011.
\5\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond icebreakers, the U.S. lacks ice-strengthened surface
vessels. Currently, U.S. Navy submarines are the only vessels capable
of regularly monitoring the Central Arctic Ocean. NATO's Trident
Juncture exercise last fall should have been a powerful wake-up call
for the U.S. military. While the exercise did not occur when ice
conditions were present, U.S. troops experienced harsh weather
conditions not seen since the Cold War. It is encouraging that the
Secretary of the Navy has announced additional exercises in Alaska this
September but again, these exercises, while providing valuable
experience, occur in the more benign summer months when sea ice in the
Bering Sea is at a minimum. Working in less challenging conditions does
not improve familiarity with cold-weather warfare and ice conditions
which have atrophied over the years. Ironically, the planned U.S.
exercise will likely occur at the same time the Russian military will
be implementing its Tsentr-2019 exercise which will test some of
Russian's most advanced and modern Arctic-designed weapon systems.
The U.S. must develop an operational plan that envisions a
persistent security presence in the Arctic. A key pillar of this
presence must include the enhanced protection of our missile defense
architecture located in the Arctic. This will be critical as Russia's
military footprint near Alaska and Greenland grows, and as China's
growing economic and scientific infrastructure could support a strong
PLA and PLAN presence. We must also carefully analyze the potential
dual-use capabilities and implications of Chinese-built infrastructure
for nearby U.S. troops and assets.
the cost of doing nothing will escalate
If the U.S. chooses not to enhance its physical presence in the
Arctic or use multilateral instruments like the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), the Arctic Council, and other entities to protect
our interests and reinforce international legal norms, U.S. access to
and influence in the Arctic region will diminish and our allies and
partners in the region will increasingly accommodate Russia's and
China's preferred policy outcomes. It is difficult to calculate the
exact cost and national security implications of doing nothing, but we
can already see the ``cost'' of policy stagnation over the last lost
decade. The U.S. has fallen behind its competitors and policy options
have been eroded.
There are several other near-term strategic costs of doing nothing
that must be considered should the U.S. continue to choose not to
increase its physical presence in or develop an operational plan for
the Arctic.
Iceland's Arctic Council Chairmanship. As Iceland now assumes the
chairmanship of the Arctic Council, we must be alert to the likely
increase of influence by China on the Arctic Council. Economically,
China has invested approximately $1.2 billion [https://www.cna.org/
cna_files/pdf/COP-2017-U-015944-1Rev.pdf] in Iceland (between 2012 and
2017), representing 5.7 percent [https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-
2017-U-015944-1Rev.pdf] of the country's GDP, after Iceland became the
first European nation to sign a free trade agreement with China in
2008.\6\ The U.S. must enhance its bilateral diplomatic engagement with
Iceland throughout this two-year period just as it increases its
security presence through the European Defense Initiative (EDI) with
increased hangar space at Keflavik Air Force Base to conduct anti-
submarine operations in the North Atlantic. It should be noted that
Russia assumes the Arctic Council chairmanship mantle after Iceland in
2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Mark E. Rosen and Cara B. Thuringer, ``Unconstrained Foreign
Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security,'' CNA
Corporation, November 2017. https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2017-
U-015944-1Rev.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Arctic Council itself is at an organizational crossroads.
Political will among member states to affect change is low, which makes
the intergovernmental forum ripe for both prolonged stagnation (leading
to irrelevance) and potential influence by permanent observers such as
China. The U.S. can choose to spend its time and diplomatic energy
wordsmithing a ministerial declaration (to avoid the words ``climate
change'') or it can meaningfully engage to shape the Arctic Council's
future.
China's Economic Growth in Greenland. In the context of China's
growing economic presence in the Arctic, Greenland has leapt to the
forefront of U.S. concern. Chinese investments in Greenland center on
energy and mineral resources, making Chinese state-owned enterprises'
(SOEs) the top foreign investors [https://jamestown.org/program/china-
greenland-mines-science-nods-independence/] in Greenland.\7\ In 2018,
the U.S. and Danish governments intervened at the last minute to
prevent Beijing from being awarded a contract to develop three airports
in Greenland, the site of deep-water ports and a critical location for
the U.S. ballistic missile early warning system. While this
intervention may have temporarily arrested China's efforts to invest in
Greenland, such a ``whack-a-mole'' policy is not a comprehensive or
strategic plan for the region. Working closely with the Danish
authorities, we need a more robust plan of action for Greenland and a
comprehensive analysis of a growing Chinese economic and scientific
presence in Greenland and its implications for Thule AFB and the larger
U.S. ballistic missile early warning system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Growth of Arctic LNG. The focal point of Arctic economic
development for Russia and China is the Russian Yamal LNG-1 and Yamal
LNG-2 projects on the Yamal Peninsula. This is a powerful example of
the economic interaction between our two peer competitors. Chinese
companies own 29.9 percent of the $27 billion project of Yamal LNG-1,
an ``anchor'' investment that can translate into future ``cluster''
infrastructure investments such as port, rail, and telecommunications
projects. Recently, two Chinese companies--China National Oil and Gas
Exploration and Development Company (CNODC), a subsidiary of China
National Petroleum Corporation, and China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC) signed agreements with Russia's Novatek to buy a
combined 20 percent stake in the Yamal LNG-2 project.\8\ Such an
agreement, along with the Yamal LNG-1, will undoubtedly spur an
increase in use by LNG carriers of the Bering Strait. As larger vessels
become more frequent through the passage, U.S. Coast Guard resources
will be increasingly strained, inhibiting their ability to protect
America's coastline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Katya Golubkova and Maria Kiselyova, ``Russia's Novatek to
sell 20 percent in Arctic LNG 2 to China,'' Reuters, April 25, 2019.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-gas-novatek-cnodc/russias-
novatek-to-sell-20-percent-in-arctic-lng-2-to-china-idUSKCN1S11WY.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia's Extended Outer Continental Shelf Claims. The Russian
government has presented extensive scientific data in 2001 and again in
2015 to claim significant portions of the continental shelf extending
far into the Central Arctic Ocean. In 2016, the Danish government
rejected the Russian government's approach to open bilateral
negotiations on a mutually acceptable solution (Denmark has submitted
scientific data for overlapping claims) to the extended outer
continental shelf claims, preferring to wait for the conclusions of the
Committee on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLSC). Canada has
also submitted a claim that overlaps with Russia's. Thus far, this
issue has been handled appropriately within the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, should Russia choose to take a more
unilateral approach to its claims, this could destabilize the region.
As the claimants await a ruling that is likely to take several more
years, Russia has reinforced its conventional military presence on the
Kola Peninsula as well as its military footprint across the Russian
Arctic to include radars, air bases, and coastal defense systems on
remote islands like Wrangel Island [https://www.tearline.mil/
public_page/russias-resurgent-military-posture-in-the-arctic-a-case-
study-of-wrangel-island/], Kotelny Island [https://www.tearline.mil/
public_page/the-ice-curtain-protecting-the-arctic-motherland/], and
Severnaya Zemlya.
Sovereignty and Svalbard. The 1920 Treaty of Spitsbergen or
Svalbard grants Norway sovereignty over Svalbard but allows signatories
of the treaty to access and participate in the economic development and
scientific understanding of Svalbard. Norway regulates these activities
without discrimination. The Treaty also prohibits Norway from
establishing a naval base or any military fortification or use Svalbard
for warlike purposes.\9\ This is the legal basis upon which China has
established its 2004 scientific station and Russia has invested in coal
mines. There have been tensions between Russia and Norway over
fisheries management as well as mine ownership concerns, but such
disputes have been resolved due to mutual interest in preserving the
cooperative nature of the Arctic region. Some experts, however, have
expressed concern that Russia's new Arctic command on the Kola
Peninsula, which emphasizes the planning and training of amphibious
operations supported by missile strikes on shore, could leave military
options available to it in an effort to alter the archipelago's neutral
status.\10\ President Putin recently cautioned in a speech on April 9th
in St. Petersburg, ``I wouldn't like tosee the Arctic turning into
something like Crimea . . . ''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Heather A. Conley, et al. History Lessons for the Arctic,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2016, 15.
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
161219_Conley_HistoryLessonsForArctic_Web.pdf
\10\ Pavel K. Baev, ``Russian Strategic Guidelines and Threat
Assessments for the Arctic,'' George C. Marshall European Center for
Security Studies, Security Insights No. 26, ISSN 1867-4119, April 2019.
https://www.marshallcenter.org/MCPUBLICWEB/mcdocs/
security_insights_26_-_baev_march_2019_-_final_-_letter_size.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After a decade of stagnation, the U.S. finds itself lagging behind
its peer competitors. A lack of policy priorities, commitment of multi-
year financial resources, and political will has shifted the U.S. from
being a reluctant Arctic power to an inadequate Arctic power. The U.S.
must reassert its presence in all its manifestations to protect
American sovereignty, ensure U.S. access to the region, and shape and
influence its future development. If not, we will continue to occupy
ourselves by describing what others are doing in the Arctic every time
a Congressional hearing is held. The strategic costs to the U.S. for
this path will be great.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, Ms. Conley.
Dr. Tingstad, am I saying your name correctly, Doctor?
Ms. Tingstad. You are, sir.
Mr. Maloney. Tingstad.
Ms. Tingstad. Thank you.
Mr. Maloney. Go ahead, ma'am.
Ms. Tingstad. Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, thank
you very much for the opportunity to appear before you this
afternoon.
The three main points I would like to leave the committee
with today are: one of the greatest concerns that has emerged
in my research are incidents that might imperil safety, bring
military or other assets together in escalatory ways, or
release toxins into the environment in the Arctic; the second
point is that, although there are many factors that will impact
future outcomes in the Arctic, cooperation at all levels,
including issues to do with geopolitics and governance, will be
among the most influential; and third, mitigating capability
gaps to enable safety, security, and stewardship activities
will help enable U.S. governance in the Arctic, but will
require investing in organizations and people, as well as in
multiple types of assets and infrastructure.
There is no silver technology or other bullet. The
solution, whatever the specifics, will be multifaceted. I will
return to each of these points briefly in the remainder of my
time.
First, the importance of discrete events. One of the
primary findings from the research I referred to in my written
testimony was the concern of stakeholders writ large about
safety, risk of escalation stemming from marginal insulated
incidents, and the containment and mitigation of environmental
hazards.
In addition to the immediate concern about loss of life and
property, among other things, these types of events have the
potential in the future to cause a chain reaction leading to
general issues of rising tensions, perhaps between
stakeholders, as well as the creation or perception of a
security and governance void in the Arctic region. This will
naturally impact indigenous and other local communities, it
will impact the role of the U.S. Coast Guard, and it could lead
to increased involvement or even assertiveness from individual
Arctic stakeholders, to include Russia and China.
Let me pause for a minute on Russia and China. One of the
other aspects of our work has been looking at the durability of
Arctic cooperation. Naturally, Russian assertiveness in the
Arctic and the emergence of China as a long-term player in the
region has raised questions about the durability of this
cooperation for getting ahead of governance and other issues,
something I touched upon momentarily. The United States and
others are right to be wary of Russian and Chinese activity in
the Arctic, but must be mindful of some important points.
First of all, Russia and China do not have identical
histories, stakes, or interests in the region. Russia's
confidence in the efficacy of the protective ice barrier for
its long strategically and economic economically important
northern rim, is understandably waning. In contrast, China does
not hold any territory in the Arctic. It is, of course, one of
13 Arctic Council permanent observer states, and as such has
participated by the council's rules and in the spirit of
cooperation thus far. That said, the economic and military
resources at China's disposal make it a very powerful
stakeholder, and there is no doubt that China seeks investment
and influence in the region. Whether China's near Arctic state
concept will catch on with others, creating the potential for a
negotiating bloc, also remains on the horizon.
Returning to cooperation and governance as two important
factors among many in influencing the vulnerability of the
Arctic to safety and security incidents, these decisions that
Arctic stakeholders make about these as a group and
individually will shape activity in the Arctic and affect the
resources required and available to govern that activity. This
is very important for demands on the maritime transportation
system, and the transportation system writ large, I would
argue, in the Arctic, and on the U.S. Coast Guard in terms of
what the Service does, when, where, how often, and at what
intensity.
I will conclude by talking about the third point I raised,
which is about U.S. Coast Guard capability gaps in the Arctic.
And what we found in our research was that there are three main
types of gaps: communications in navigation; maritime and other
domain awareness; as well as response capabilities.
Some specific recommendations that came out of our study
included installing additional communications infrastructure.
Admiral Ray talked a little bit about that earlier. Also,
investing in remotely controlled air, sea, and amphibious craft
for providing persistent wide-area surveillance; updating data
gathering and database construction processes to enhance the
role of automation; developing operating concepts, plans, and
investment strategies that recognize the need for both agile
first-response assets, as well as infrastructure and logistics
to sustain longer term operations and to conduct heavy lifting;
increasing the number of forward-operating locations and
resources, including local and mobile elements, as well as
continuing improving long-term relationships with Native
communities, and pre-positioning key response items in those
partner communities.
I conclude by reiterating once again that any mitigating
strategy will involve a multifaceted approach. Part of good
governance is being equipped to prevent and mitigate problems
by making the right investments in organizations and people, as
well as in multiple assets and infrastructure. Thank you.
[Ms. Tingstad's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Abbie Tingstad, Ph.D.,\1\ Senior Physical
Scientist, The RAND Corporation \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
\2\ The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities
throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more
prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and other distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you this afternoon. Ongoing and emerging transformations in the
Arctic are raising many important questions, and we do not yet have all
the answers. How will or should international and domestic governance
evolve? What is next for indigenous communities? How will China's role
evolve? What is the United States' path?
I am going to focus on anticipating and pre-emptively addressing
some key Arctic vulnerabilities. The three main points I would like to
leave the committee with today are:
1. One of the greatest concerns that has emerged in my research
are incidents that might imperil safety, bring military (or other)
assets together in escalatory ways, or release toxins into the
environment.
2. Regional cooperation and governance will influence demands on
the maritime (and broader) transportation system and the U.S. Coast
Guard through their role in generating, preventing, and mitigating
problems.
3. Mitigating capability gaps to enable safety, security, and
stewardship activities will require investing in organizations and
people, as well as in multiple types of assets and infrastructure.
I elaborate in detail on these points in what follows.
the arctic is vulnerable to incidents endangering safety, security, and
environmental integrity
There are many uncertainties about the Arctic. However, we do know
something about the primary drivers of change and how these could shape
and disturb the Arctic's complex environment. In our research, my
colleagues and I have used scenarios to explore the types of changes
that might result in regional safety, security, and environmental
vulnerabilities.
Several fundamental drivers of change influence potential paths of
change in the Arctic. These factors include economics, technology,
climate and physical environment, the regulatory environment, and
social issues.
Not all drivers play the same role in Arctic change. One way to
think about these drivers is that they raise or lower the ``cost of
doing business'' by promoting, restricting, or controlling access.
Principal among these drivers is climate, which has enhanced maritime
access, but has negatively affected winter road seasons and
transportation infrastructure. Other forces shaping access include
technological advances in drilling, automation, network and
connectivity; legal conventions, other laws, and regulations; military
postures and operations; and widely observed operational and cultural
norms.
Other change drivers shape activities in the Arctic. Some examples
are indigenous community autonomy, anticipated or existing hydrocarbon
and fishery resources, and perceptions of the Arctic within domestic
political discourse. These types of forces also both discourage and
motivate activities in the Arctic. For example, an increased emphasis
on the health of the Arctic environment could motivate ecological
monitoring and some types of tourism, while discouraging further
resource extraction and large-scale shipping.
These drivers of change can be combined to form scenarios that
illustrate potentially dangerous Arctic situations. My colleagues and I
used these scenarios during two research activities that took place in
2017:
a series of Coast Guard-focused scenarios deliberated on
during two workshops with servicemembers and other partners \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Abbie Tingstad, Scott Savitz, Kristin Van Abel, Dulani Woods,
Katherine Anania, Michelle D. Ziegler, Aaron C. Davenport, and
Katherine Costello, Identifying Potential Gaps in U.S. Coast Guard
Arctic Capabilities, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2310-
DHS, 2018. As of April 29, 2019: https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR2310.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
an Arctic cooperation tabletop exercise conducted with a
multinational Arctic stakeholder group in Oslo, Norway.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, and Alexandra Hall, The
Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment:
Insights from a Scenario-Based Exercise Organised by RAND and Hosted by
NUPI, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-268-RC, 2018. As of
April 29, 2019: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE268.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our Coast Guard Arctic scenarios featured alternative assumptions
about development of activity in the Arctic. We then combined these
assumptions with plausible events or longer-term problems that would
necessitate some kind of Coast Guard participation. The scenarios often
included cooperation with partners in various capacities. Although the
workshops were designed somewhat differently, participants at each
event were invited to develop concepts of operation for each scenario,
identify capabilities to use to achieve some level of incident
resolution, and assess the most limiting gaps.
The Coast Guard scenarios covered a variety of situations. For
example, participants began one workshop by considering the following
events that might occur in the present-day Arctic:
a ship collision in the Bering Strait
a passenger plane crash somewhere north of the Alaska-
Yukon Territory boundary
activists in kayaks protesting new offshore oil drilling
programs
a small coastal community threatened by a storm surge and
severe weather.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Tingstad et al., 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The participants then considered events that might occur in the
2030s. Within the context of a future world in which measured economic
growth draws people and primarily legal economic activity north, Coast
Guard workshop participants discussed
the implications of a new, deepwater port
an offshore oil rig explosion
a protest for environmental reasons against hydrocarbon
extraction.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Tingstad et al., 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the context of a future world in which disorder is
increasing, regulations loosen, people are migrating north, and
international cooperation is weakened, Coast Guard workshop
participants discussed
a suspected cyber attack that takes out power in three
U.S. Arctic villages
foreign vessels increasingly fishing illegally in the
U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone
a suspected terrorist attack on a cruise ship
illicit trafficking of people and goods.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Tingstad et al., 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The objective of the Oslo exercise was to test the limits of Arctic
stakeholder cooperation by unfolding a series of events--in which no
particular nation stood out as the ultimate aggressor--over the course
of the 2020s. These events could potentially raise tensions among two
or more Arctic nations, as well as among other stakeholders, including
indigenous communities and the hydrocarbon industry. Following a set of
starting conditions, participants considered the issue of overlapping
claims for continental shelf extensions, opportunities and risks
associated with further development of waterways through the Northwest
Passage and the Northern Sea Route, and responses to two potentially
escalatory incidents: the blocking of one vessel by another and a near
collision between ships.\8\8 Participants were asked to consider
plausible stakeholder responses and posit under what conditions Arctic
cooperation might unravel at each step of the exercise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ These were intentionally focused on the maritime domain because
international incidents of significance are somewhat more plausible in
this domain during the timeframe of the early to mid-2020s.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the primary findings from both the Coast Guard scenario
analysis and the Oslo international tabletop exercise was that
stakeholders at all levels were concerned about safety, risk of
escalation stemming from marginal incidents (particularly those
involving military or law enforcement), and containment and mitigation
of environmental hazards. The following situations were of particular
concern: \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ These observations are naturally driven by the events of the
scenarios presented. However, researchers and participants
participating in both analyses were strongly encouraged to question
assumptions and lead discussions down other paths to ensure that
thinking was not constrained to the particular futures at hand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Countries choose recurring safety issues or unplanned
military encounters to emphasize larger longer-term or extra-regional
security issues. Participants were concerned that such incidents might
have unintended consequences among domestic audiences.
Maritime access and activity increase faster than
anticipated and countries cannot manage the situation with existing
fixed and mobile infrastructure, leading to loss of life and
environmental degradation. Increasing disorder leads to real or
perceived voids in governance, regulation, and security. Countries with
particularly vested economicinterests forcefully attempt to contain and
control mounting turmoil.
During the course of the Coast Guard workshops, many discussions
focused on concern about the ability to perform search and rescue, law
enforcement, or pollution response. During the Norway exercise,
participants were concerned about the outcome of the United Nations'
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf examination of
competing claims for continental shelf extensions, the possibility of
deep ocean hydrocarbon extraction, and shifting alliances--as well as
NATO's presence in the Arctic.
cooperation and governance make a difference
Many factors influence the vulnerability of the Arctic to safety
and security incidents. Cooperation and governance stand out for
several reasons.\10\ First, they shape activity in the Arctic and
affect the resources required and available to govern that activity.
Second, there is an important co-dependency between them: Cooperation
between different stakeholders internationally and domestically enables
or constrains governance as well as resources to support it; \11\
similarly, governance issues both motivate and test the boundaries of
cooperation. Third, both cooperation and governance have tremendous
ramifications both at home and abroad and are strongly influenced by
domestic policies (and often by domestic perceptions). Finally, there
are some strong examples in recent Arctic history of employing
cooperation and governance tools to make decisions ahead of potential
crises.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Cooperation includes long-term and short-term activities that
facilitate shared decisionmaking and/or resources. Governance involves
constructing, implementing, and enforcing laws, regulations, practices,
and general guidance.
\11\ Such as for policy enforcement and to support and mitigate the
consequences of economic development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout modern Arctic history, cooperative decisionmaking on
governance has built a foundation for reducing vulnerability to
incidents, events, or patterns of concern.\12\ For example, the
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears was put into effect in
1973 at a time of heightened Cold War tensions.\13\ Some more recent
examples of cooperation include the 2018 agreement to prevent
unregulated high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean; \14\ the
U.S.-Russian proposal, approved by the International Maritime
Organization, to define six two-way routes in the Bering Strait to
enable safer shipping; \15\ and the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing
International Arctic Scientific Cooperation.\16\ Arctic cooperation on
the international scale (such as the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic) has been
broadly facilitated through the Arctic Council since the council's
formation in 1996, alhough these activities have notably (and perhaps
for good reason) excluded military security topics.\17\ The Arctic
Coast Guard Forum brings together the relevant coast services from all
eight Arctic states.\18\ The International Code for Ships Operating in
Polar Waters (Polar Code) is a landmark step, facilitated by the
International Maritime Organization, toward risk reduction in maritime
polar environments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, Kristin Van Abel, and Scott
Stephenson, Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia: Planning for
Regional Change in the Far North, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, RR-1731-RC, 2017. As of April 29, 2019: https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1731.html
\13\ ``Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears,'' Oslo,
November 15, 1973. As of April 18, 2019: http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/
agreements/agreement1973.html
\14\ See Jane George, ``A New International Deal Protects the
Central Arctic Ocean's Fish Stocks,'' Arctic Today, October 3, 2018. As
of April 18, 2019: https://www.arctictoday.com/new-international-deal-
protects-central-arctic-oceans-fish-stocks
\15\ ``IMO Approves US-Russian Proposal on Bering Strait Shipping
Routes,'' World Maritime News, May 23, 2018. As of April 18, 2019:
https://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/253399/imo-approves-us-russian-
proposal-on-bering-strait-shipping-routes
\16\ ``US Signs Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic
Scientific Cooperation,'' National Science Foundation News Release, May
12, 2017. As of April 18, 2019: https://www.nsf.gov/news/
news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=241923
\17\ Arctic Council, ``Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic,'' May 12, 2011. As of April
18, 2019: https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531
\18\ A North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum and a Pacific Coast Guard
Forum similarly seek to build cooperation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, partnerships with indigenous organizations and
communities at the international and subnational level, as well as
relationships with commercial, academic, and nonprofit entities, cannot
be overlooked. These types of partnerships can be particularly
important for law enforcement, incident prevention, and incident
mitigation.
Recently, Russian assertiveness in the Arctic and the emergence of
China as a long-term player in the region has raised questions for some
Arctic nations about the power of cooperation and partnerships for
addressing governance issues. Russia has been increasing its military
capabilities in the Artic, forming a northern command, establishing two
Arctic brigades, developing infrastructure, and deploying and upgrading
military assets.\19\ The Russian government and economic sector is also
investing in fixed and mobile infrastructure for civilian or commercial
use, and some of this infrastructure appears to be dual-use. For
example, this year, the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment released a plan for further developing mineral resources in
the Arctic and the logistics for bringing them to market via the
Northern Sea Route.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Andrew Osborn, ``Putin's Russia in Biggest Arctic Military
Push Since Soviet Fall,'' Reuters, January 30, 2017. As of April 22,
2019: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-insight/putins-
russia-in-biggest-arctic-military-push-since-soviet-fall-idUSKBN15E0W0
\20\ ``Russia Releases Comprehensive Plan for Arctic Logistics,''
Maritime Executive, March 19, 2019. As of April 22, 2019: https://
www.maritime-executive.com/article/russia-releases-comprehensive-plan-
for-arctic-logistics
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China has been promoting the idea of a ``Polar Silk Road'' in
recent years. This builds on China's decades-long interest in polar
science and its more recent participation as an observer in Arctic
governance issues through the Arctic Council. In its 2018 Arctic
policy, China reaffirmed its position that the Arctic matters to states
without recognized territory in the region. China's Arctic policy
states unambiguously that its goals with respect to the Arctic are
to understand, protect, develop and participate in the
governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common
interests of all countries and the international community in
the Arctic, and promote sustainable development of the
Arctic.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ People's Republic of China, State Council,``China's Arctic
Policy,'' white paper, January 26, 2018. As of April 22, 2019: http://
english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/
content_281476026660336.htm
China's investment in the Yamal Liquid Natural Gas project with
Russia was substantial. Other investments have been more modest, and
some have not come to fruition (such as the purchase of an unoccupied
naval base in Greenland and the development of a now-cancelled resort
in Svalbard).
The United States and others are right to be wary of Russian and
Chinese activity in the Arctic, but must be mindful of some important
points. Russia and China do not have identical histories, stakes, or
interests in the Arctic. Like the United States, Russia has territory
in the region. Russia's confidence in the efficacy of the protective
ice barrier for its long, strategically and economically important
northern rim is understandably waning. Its recently increased regional
assertiveness should be interpreted against the backdrop of other
factors, such as broader Russian military reforms and Russia's
continued cooperative behavior on applied matters, such as Bering
Strait navigation and scientific advances. Thus far, Russia's policies
on Northern Sea Route administration have had limited impact on the
freedom of others to navigate in the region (in part because of the
route's overall limited navigability). Russia continues to have many
economic incentives to participate in cooperative governance frameworks
and discussions on Arctic issues.
In contrast, China does not hold any territory in the Arctic. It is
one of 13 Arctic Council Permanent Observer States; China has
participated by the council's rules and in the spirit of cooperation. A
number of Arctic nations have put up roadblocks to Chinese investment,
largely because of domestic pressure. That said, the economic and
military resources at China's disposal make it a very powerful
observer, and there is no doubt that China seeks investment and
influence in the region. This cannot necessarily be assumed to be
restrained or benign.
When it comes to the shifting geopolitics of the Arctic, Russia or
China do not operate in a vacuum. Alliances, interests, and actions
shift over time, and these shifts have implications for governance and
cooperation. For example, some of Russia's recent activities have
brought other Arctic states closer together (such as Finland and Sweden
signing a trilateral agreement with the United States). The question of
whether China's ``Near-Arctic State'' concept will catch on with
others, creating the potential for a negotiating bloc, remains on the
horizon.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Pezard, Tingstad, and Hall, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States decisionmakers will need to contemplate the potential
impacts shifting geopolitics will have on governance and the associated
needs for infrastructure and other capabilities in the Arctic. As
discussed, governance has an important influence on shaping demand for
Arctic access and the transport systems of the future. Real or apparent
gaps in governance and such materiel capabilities as infrastructure
could create the perception of a security void. This might invite more
presence and influence from stakeholders with vested regional
interests.
it will take more than one investment to shore up arctic capabilities
and capacity
What are the key capability gaps for U.S. Arctic operations? One
issue that concerns me greatly is the characterization--in the media at
least--of the United States' Arctic operating challenges as an
``icebreaker gap.'' \23\ I do think that the U.S. is dangerously
limited in its individual ability to break ice. This numbers game--in
particular, comparisons to the overwhelming size of the Russian
icebreaker fleet--also has real significance from a great power
competition perspective. Another reason for the icebreaker focus is the
long lead time to plan and build these unique ships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Charlie Gao, ``The 'Icebreaker Gap': How Russia is Planning to
Build More Icebreakers to Project Power in the Arctic,'' National
Interest, August 19, 2018. As of March 19, 2019: https://
nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/icebreaker-gap-how-russia-planning-
build-more-icebreakers-project-power-arctic-29102
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, while this generalization of Arctic challenges might be
convenient, it distractsfrom the broader problem of systemic capability
shortfalls. In our examination of broad priorities for closing Coast
Guard capability gaps, we found that no single type of capability
worked for every scenario or acted as a ``silver bullet'' solution for
mitigating shortfalls. For this study, we defined capability broadly,
as a means to accomplish a mission, function, or objective.\24\ Our
scope included such individual materiel assets as icebreakers and
helicopters; fixed infrastructure like ports and airfields; and
organizations, agreements for cooperation, and people (including
training).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland
Security Manual for the Operation of the Joint Requirements Integration
and Management System, Washington, D.C., DHS Instruction Manual 107-01-
001-01, April 4, 2016, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, we looked at the existing capabilities that the Coast Guard,
federal interagency partners, local communities, and commercial
providers could use to add value in different scenarios. In addition to
existing icebreakers, some of the most valuable assets included MH-60
Jayhawk helicopters, HC-130 aircraft, various airports and airfields,
ports, National Security Cutters, drones, medical evacuation
capabilities, satellite and other communications networks, rescue
coordination centers, Coast Guard sector specialist personnel, and data
(maritime traffic, weather, ice, and other conditions important for on-
scene response). These examples help highlight the diversity of
capabilities that are needed for Arctic operations. No one asset can do
it all alone.
Second, we examined shortfalls in the existing capabilities within
the study scenarios. We found that the shortfalls varied as much or
more as the existing capabilities. In general, these gaps--defined as
capabilities not readily available or planned to be available to the
Coast Guard--fell into the broad categories of communications,
awareness, and response.
Communications are critical for Coast Guard (and a variety of
other) missions. Problems in the Arctic include patchy and unreliable
voice communications and extremely limited or nonexistent bandwidth.
An important aspect of awareness is understanding and assessing
situations. In the Arctic, ``operating blind'' is a term that is used
to describe the limited level of awareness: Threats and hazards are
often poorly understood, and the capacity and capability are lacking to
regularly monitor those that are identified. There is particular
concern about sensing previously unidentified threats and hazards that
do not or cannot actively emit signals, such as ``dark'' vessels and
fast-moving ice. The ability to fuse information from individual data
streams into a unified picture of activity and conditions is also
challenging.
Finally, the potential for response to a threat or hazard in the
Arctic is extremely limited and strongly depends on the proximity to
the incident location of scarce material assets, people, and supporting
infrastructure. Naturally, reducing the incidence of threats and
hazards is an important first step. However, if prevention fails,
ensuring that the right people and assets are available and can be
deployed rapidly to the right place is necessary. Responders must
consider harsh operating conditions and the few resources available for
coordination. Furthermore, access to appropriate follow-up materiel and
procedures, including medical care and hazardous material clean-up, is
not guaranteed. Ensuring sufficient sustainment of operations is the
next challenge.
This study was not intended to provide recommendations on specific
ways to mitigate gaps. However, the diversity of ways in which workshop
participants elected to shore up capability and capacity in the context
of different scenarios alludes to a rich set of possibilities. No one
type of mobile asset, fixed infrastructure, organization,
collaboration, or other entity appeared to satisfy every potential gap.
Rather, a combination of existing capabilities (in many cases with
increased capacity) and diversification of capabilities to support
communications, awareness, and response appears to be necessary in
order to tackle current and future vulnerabilities in the Arctic. Some
specific types of mitigation options considered include:
installing additional communications infrastructure and
leveraging the growing number of commercial communications satellites
in polar orbits
exercising communications tactics, techniques, and
procedures to train servicemembers in overcoming decisionmaking
challenging with attenuated communications channels
investing in remotely controlled air, sea, and amphibious
craft for providing persistent wide-area surveillance, especially if
these assets are networked together and to sensors on other assets to
provide a common operating picture
updating data-gathering and database construction
processes to enhance the role of automation to improve data quality,
make data accessible, and fuse information into a common operating
picture
developing operating concepts, plans, and investment
strategies that recognize the need for both agile, first response
assets as well as infrastructure and logistics to sustain longer-term
operations and (literally) conduct heavy lifting
investigating remotely controlled airlift and oil-spill
response capability
adding small-boat landing capability to icebreakers
increasing the number of forward operating locations and
resources, including local and mobile elements
prepositioning key response items in partner communities
enforcing new industry self-help regulations
improving long-term relationships with native communities
(including through additional Coast Guard cultural training).
There are also some broader governance-related issues to
contemplate when it comes to getting out in front of problems, such as
those related to incidents that put safety, security, and environmental
integrity at risk. First, continuing to participate in discussions and
decisionmaking is very important. Historically, Arctic cooperation and
governance has benefited from stakeholders operating under the same
frameworks. The United States has the opportunity to continue work in
the Arctic Council and Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Finding ways to keep
discussion channels open for important military security communications
is also vital. Reconsidering the ratification of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea also is an option.
Second, enabling stewardship and security (including law
enforcement) through the provisioning and maintenance of appropriate
infrastructure and capabilities, as well as organizations and people to
support Arctic operations, is important. First and foremost, this
provides opportunities for incident prevention and mitigation. It also
demonstrates the presence of the United States as a capable and
reliable partner, both internationally and in a domestic context.
Importantly, as demonstrated by Russia, certain types of infrastructure
can send a mixed message, so we should consider the messaging
associated with our investments. Ultimately, it will take more than one
investment and the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies and
organizations to get out in front of the issues that keep those
responsible for safety, security, and stewardship in the Arctic awake
at night.
Throughout history, the Arctic has been largely inaccessible place
to outside cultures. However, because of climate and improvements in
technology, we can no longer view the Arctic as ``falling off the top
of the map.'' The Arctic is changing rapidly in many respects. By
making the right investments in organizations and people, as well as in
multiple types of assets and infrastructure, we can get in front of
tomorrow's Arctic problems, some of which are already upon us today.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, Dr. Tingstad.
Governor Treadwell, thank you for joining us. You may
proceed.
Mr. Treadwell. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Maloney,
Ranking Member Gibbs. Thank you for the opportunity to be here
today.
I believe I first testified before this committee during
the consideration of OPA 90, when I was a local government
official. I was working to help make sure we had the
infrastructure after a major oil spill. In the early 2000s, as
a Commissioner on the Arctic Research Commission, was the first
of several times I have been before this committee to say we
needed icebreakers. Working with Admiral Allen, when he was
Commandant, to try to help make that happen, it is good to see
it happening today. And thank you for your continuing attention
on this issue.
As your wrap-up batter today, let me just talk about the
issue of how do you actually get the infrastructure we need in
the Arctic. And I have got three basic ideas that I wanted to
share with you. I want to make sure that it is understood that
these are my ideas or the opinions that I express are my own,
not the Wilson Center. I do cochair the polar program at the
Wilson Center, and we are holding a major symposium with the
National Ice Center and the U.S. Arctic Research Commission in
July, to which you are all invited.
But the first thing I would like to say is that we are--you
are constantly being asked to appropriate funds for Arctic
infrastructure, whether it is icebreakers or--that might be
justified by security or economic development. The problem that
I see is that our security plans, our civil plans, our
commercial plans all identify the need for the same thing:
ports, charting, communications. But we still have stovepipes
that don't really work together to figure out how to pay it.
Now we do have CMTS, which is a cross-government effort, to
look at the Marine Transportation System. But it doesn't
include the State government, which can bring significant
resources to the table as well. And I want to appreciate the
work that CMTS has done in the Arctic, but I just want to say
we need to get away from this, and a couple of examples.
When you heard the Coast Guard say today that we have
floating bases with these new icebreakers, that is tremendous.
But it is leaving the civil authorities who need to finance
ports to kind of act on their own. And we really should be
working together to get the security issues covered, as well as
the civil and commercial issues covered.
When you heard the question on telecommunications, the same
issue--I chair an advisory board for Iridium. We have got 66
new satellites operating, a 360-by-360 process that works and
serves the military, and this is something where the commercial
needs and the security needs can be answered together.
The second point I want to make is that when it comes to
finding revenue, especially to pay for icebreakers--when the
admiral and I were serving together it cost something between
$60 and $80 million a year to run our icebreaker program. Now
the Russians are charging half a million dollars to go across
the Arctic Ocean per ship. So to make up $80 million is 160
ships. That is one ship a day during the open navigation
season. All right?
Senator Murkowski and Senator Sullivan have proposed a bill
which the Wilson Center has worked on--I worked on developing
it as chair of the Arctic Circle Mission Council on Arctic
Shipping and Ports--which says let's create an Arctic Seaway
Development Corporation very similar to the St. Lawrence Seaway
Corporation which exists in Congressman Gibbs's district. The
St. Lawrence Seaway approach has two nations working together.
We could have several nations working together in the Arctic to
put together a seamless system to get people across the Arctic
Ocean. And that concept is well described in S. 1177.
But Mr. Chairman, I guess I would put it this way: When we
come ask you for money for icebreakers and talk about inbound
Arctic shipping, it is not really American taxpayers' jobs to
pay the bill so China can sell goods to France. It is our job
to set up a system so that tariffs and revenue can come in to
help pay for those icebreakers, and that is the concept in that
legislation.
Mr. Chairman, finally, the third thing I would like to say
in terms of paying for Arctic infrastructure is it is a lot
easier to pay for something when there is more economic
activity.
Now there was a large push during the Bush and then Obama
administrations to make OCS drilling work offshore. There was
expectations that it was going to help pay for the major ports
in the Arctic. It didn't happen, for whatever reasons, and we
can discuss those.
But I would predict that the next big wave of economic
activity the Russians have already shown us how to do. They are
bringing 16\1/2\ million tons of LNG from Yamal through the
Bering Strait--2,600 miles through the ice to get there--while
we have got big fields at Prudhoe Bay, and the Canadians have a
big field at the Mackenzie Delta, that are lying fallow. Now,
this is not something that requires congressional
appropriation, but it does require congressional and diplomatic
attention.
And with that opportunity I predict that sometime by the
end of the next decade you are going to see maybe as much as 50
million tons a year of LNG moving out of Russia, maybe as much
as 30 to 40 million tons of LNG a year moving out of Alaska and
the Canadian Mackenzie Delta. And I believe that relatively
benign economic activity, which has a lower carbon impact than
some of the fuels being used in Asia today, is going to help
bring the economic activity necessary to pay for the
infrastructure. So I would just urge you to pay attention.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your time.
[Mr. Treadwell's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mead Treadwell, Cochair, Polar Institute,
Woodrow Wilson Center
Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Congressman Young, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today. My name is Mead Treadwell, and I live in
Anchorage, Alaska. I am the Cochair of the Woodrow Wilson Center's
Polar Institute,\1\ Chair of the Iceland-based NGO Arctic Circle's
Mission Council on Arctic Shipping and Ports,\2\ and Chair of the Polar
Advisory Board at Iridium Communications, Inc. I am also the former
Lieutenant Governor of Alaska (2010-2014) and Commissioner and Chair of
the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (2001-2010) under President Bush
and President Obama. While I am here through my affiliation with the
Wilson Center, the following thoughts and opinions are my own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Alongside the National/Naval Ice Center and the US Arctic
Research Commission, the Wilson Center will co-host the 8th Symposium
on the Impacts of an Ice-Diminished Arctic on Naval and Maritime
Operations (IDA-8) on July 17-18, 2019, in Washington, D.C.
\2\ For more information about the Arctic Circle's Mission Council
on Shipping and Ports, including the Council's Draft Final Report and
Recommendations, please visit: https://
arcticcircleseawayreport.wordpress.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you also for the title of this hearing. The United States
cannot afford to ``do nothing'' about the general lack of marine
infrastructure in the Arctic.Inaction undercuts efforts to develop a
safe, secure and reliable Arctic marine transportation system. Your
hearing is well-timed. Just this week, the eight-nation Arctic Council
Ministerial occurred in Finland. There, Secretary of State Pompeo
challenged Russia and China to help maintain the Arctic as a peaceful,
lawful region as they expand their infrastructure and presence.\3\ In
doing so, he underscored the need for a stronger U.S. presence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For a transcript of Secretary Pompeo's remarks in Finland,
please visit: https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/05/
291512.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. infrastructure gaps you will hear about today are little
different from those outlined in the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
that was adopted by the Arctic Council in 2009. Those shortages range
from a shortage of icebreakers, an absence of Arctic deep water ports
and ports of refuge, an absence of bunkering and refueling
capabilities, an absence of salvage capability, and difficulties in
communications, charting, ice monitoring and situational awareness.
There are three ways we can more speedily fill the gaps we discuss
again today.
1. First, we can appropriate capital funds for infrastructure,
justified by security or economic development. Security plans, civil
plans, commercial plans all identify similar needs. We need to have
these plans mesh together better. All sides appear to be ``going it
alone,'' where Polar Security Cutters are described as ``mobile bases''
for the Navy and Coast Guard, and civil and commercial authorities are
left to justify and finance northern ports, communications, and
icebreaking services on their own. If we work better together, we can
get more done, faster.
2. Second, we can create a business, an Arctic Seaway Development
Corporation, modeled on the St. Lawrence Seaway, where we bring nations
together to offer a reliable, voluntary, tariff-based service that will
attract and justify infrastructure investment. That's the purpose of S.
1177, ``The Shipping and Environmental Arctic Leadership Act,'' \4\
developed by an extensive process at the Arctic Circle and the Wilson
Center, with consultations with Arctic states and observing nations
from across the globe. Sometimes dubbed ``Uber for Icebreakers,'' the
business plan requires just a small percentage of the traffic served by
Suez, diverted to the Arctic, to pay for the icebreakers we need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For the text of S. 1177, ``The Shipping and Environmental
Arctic Leadership (SEAL) Act,'' please visit: https://
www.murkowski.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SEAL%20Act.pdf. For the one-
pager produced by Senator Murkwoski's office, please visit: https://
www.murkowski.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SEAL%20Act%20One-Pager.docx
Mr. Chairman, if the Arctic were an isthmus, rather than an
ocean, and it had been a glacier that retreated rather than sea ice, we
would be building a canal right now, and looking at tariffs to help pay
the bill--just as Suez and Panama do. Russia has developed a tariff
based system that the Secretary of State this week criticized because
it is compulsory in an ocean that we believe the rule of law requires
be open for freedom of navigation. The proposal we have is a voluntary
``best practice'' that insurers and ship owners, encouraged IMO rules,
should sign up for. It wins business on establishing reliability on an
ocean which has failed to attract regular service because reliable
infrastructure is not in place.
3. Third, we can sell more resources and induce more private
capital to invest in the American Arctic. Russia is cleaning our clock
in serving global LNG markets from Yamal, and the vast gas resources
we've found at Prudhoe Bay and Point Thomson and the Canadians have
found in the Mackenzie Delta are still lying fallow. Pipelines planned
to bring gas south in both Alaska and Canada have been so expensive as
to not be able to compete with new gas supplies in North America. If we
look at shipping LNG directly, we have just 600 miles to get through
the ice zone, while the Russians must traverse 2600 miles of ice to
make it to the Bering Strait. Economic activity in the North will help
pay for infrastructure in the North.
Let me give some examples of ways we are making progress on all
three approaches:
Many of us here pushed the last three administrations to
include funding for new icebreakers to meet critical U.S. needs. At
last, a contract was issued this past month for the U.S. to start
construction on a new heavy Polar Security Cutter, and for preliminary
work to be done on two more PSCs--half of the the six vessel goal
announced by the President in his 2017 address to the Coast Guard
Academy.
We have also made progress in developing a system of
ports in the US Arctic, including a deepwater port capable of servicing
large ships like the new Polar Security Cutters. In 2015, Congress
established a Port Clarence Council with the State of Alaska and Bering
Straits Native Corporation to develop a strategy for developing Port
Clarence, America's only deep water port in the Arctic. At least eight
other western and Northern Alaska communities, including Nome and Adak,
Utqiagvik and Prudhoe Bay, have aspirations and plans to support
increased Arctic shipping.
In 2018, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
approved a joint-proposal between the U.S. and Russia to establish a
two-way shipping lane through the Bering Strait. I'm proud of the work
we did first at the State of Alaska, and later at the Wilson Center, to
encourage negotiations between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Russian
government to get this started.
Iridium's new polar-orbiting network of satellites is
providing enhanced communications, marine and aviation tracking
capability pole-to-pole, and is available to support the Global
Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS). Other ice and ship-monitoring
space-based radar systems are coming along, too.
For 152 years, the United States has been an Arctic nation. But it
has never faced the imperatives it does today now that its third coast,
the Arctic, has become accessible. Our challenge in the Arctic is to
unlock its value while maintaining our values. We want the benefits of
shorter shipping routes and untapped natural resources. We want to
maintain our values--respect for traditional ways of life, food
security, and the natural environment; the inviolability of our
maritime boundaries; and the right of any vessel to freedom of
navigation and passage. We can do both.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with some specific recommendations.
1. Let's keep up the funding for icebreakers we have authorized
and follow through on the system of ports needed in Alaska. To meet our
goals of safety, security, and reliability in the Arctic, the military,
civil, and commercial sectors need to work together. Whether it is a
defense authorization bill, a Coast Guard authorization bill, or a
general transportation authorization bill, I urge the Congress to move
away from the ``stovepipe'' approach as you push our agencies to make
appropriate plans for the Arctic.
2. The best way to fulfill our infrastructure gaps in the Arctic
is to generate new revenues. I urge this committee to sponsor companion
legislation and hold hearings on S. 1177, ``The Shipping and
Environmental Arctic Leadership Act,'' which would do just that.
3. The largest driver of shipping in the Arctic Ocean today is LNG
exports from Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula in Russia. Why can't the
United States and Canada, which have ample gas reserves on the Arctic
coast, also export their gas and other natural resources to Asian,
North American, or European markets? I believe we can, and am--in my
private business--encouraging this to happen. Making it happen won't
require Congressional funding, but it will require Congressional and
diplomatic support.
pass s. 1177, ``the seal act''
Based on the premise that American taxpayers--like those of other
Arctic coastal states--should not have to bear the full cost of
developing an international seaway so that Asian producers can sell
goods more efficiently to European consumers, S. 1177, ``The Shipping
and Environmental Arctic Leadership (SEAL) Act,'' would create a
congressionally chartered seaway development corporation--similar to
the Saint Lawrence Seaway--with the power to collect voluntary shipping
fees in exchange for providing access to icebreakers, ports, and port-
side facilities. Its singular task would be to establish a working
relationship with the other Arctic coastal states to develop an
integrated marine transportation system capable of offering seamless,
reliable service to ships using the Arctic Ocean. Fees collected by the
corporation would be used to lease spare icebreakers (``Uber for
Icebreakers'') and fund marine infrastructure and other projects needed
to ensure safe, secure, and reliable shipping in the Arctic Ocean.
Passing S. 1177, introduced by Senator Murkowski and Senator
Sullivan in April, would send a clear message that the United States
remains committed to maintaining its role as a key player in polar
governance and cooperation. It would also encourage the military,
civil, and commercial sectors to work together to strengthen the US
presence. Revenues received would help finance, build, and operate key
marine transportation infrastructure such as Polar Security Cutters,
deep draft ports, places of refuge, port-side facilities, and
additional equipment or systems.
encourage lng and other exports from the american arctic
Today, the single greatest driver of vessel activity in the Arctic
Ocean is Russia's ongoing development of multiple Liquified Natural Gas
(LNG) export facilities with direct access to the Northern Sea Route
(NSR). In 2013, Yamal LNG--a joint-venture including Novatek, the
Russian government, and other entities--began construction of an LNG
plant at Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula. Four years and $27 billion
later, the Christophe de Margerie--a revolutionary first-in-its-class
icebreaking LNG carrier--completed a winter traverse of the NSR,
stopping at Sabetta to take onboard the first LNG shipment from the
plant that it successfully delivered to a buyer in South Korea. In
February of this year, the company announced that it had offloaded more
than 130 cargoes and shipped more than 10 million tons since start-up
began in December 2017. By my own estimate, total LNG production from
the Arctic could amount to as much as 80 million tons per year in the
next 15 years if tidewater capacities in Russia, Alaska, and Canada
come to market--making Arctic states the world's dominant suppliers of
LNG.
With Russia's success in bringing such large and growing amounts of
Arctic LNG to markets in Europe and Asia, it seems increasingly
plausible--if not imminently doable--that we in Arctic America do the
same from Prudhoe Bay, Point Thompson, and--in Canada--from the
MacKenzie River Delta. Alaska also has sizable deposits of precious
metals and rare earth minerals (REMs) that could be exported via ship
in the future. Right now, these projects would need no additional
funding from Congress. But they will require Congressional and
diplomatic support in the years ahead.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am
happy to answer any questions you may have. I would also be very
pleased to provide additional information to committee members and
staff at any time.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. Before we proceed to
Members' questions--yes, I would ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Graves of Louisiana be allowed to join the panel for the
purposes of participating in today's hearing.
Without objection.
I now proceed to Members' questions and recognize myself
for 5 minutes.
Admiral Allen and Ms. Conley, I am interested in following
up on your comments about asserting sovereignty in the Arctic.
I take your point, Admiral, about, you know, you have
sovereignty where you can assert it. What does that look like
in the Arctic? And help us understand the gap between--I take
it you don't think we can now. What does it look like?
And the same question to you, Ms. Conley, or to any of the
members of the panel.
Admiral Allen. It kind of depends on where you sit. I have
had a lot of conversation with my counterparts, especially the
Chief of Naval Operations, when I was the Commandant. From a
U.S. security standpoint and Navy missions, subsurface
capability and capacity meets their mission set from where they
sit.
But as Admiral Ray was discussing, if you have an event in
the Arctic and you don't have a platform there to operate from,
command and control communications beyond what the current
infrastructure is up there, you are not going to get it there
in time to be meaningful or impactful. Therefore, in my view,
in terms of nonsubmarine missions not related to DoD, right now
I would say there is a lack of sovereignty in Alaska. And we
need to be truthful about it.
Mr. Maloney. And would the--same question to you, Ms.
Conley, but please be specific, as well, I have read the
recommendations from the report. Do those cover it? Are there
other things that sovereignty looks like? Please give us your
thoughts.
Ms. Conley. Chairman, thank you so much. I mean what we are
talking about is a whole-of-government approach. And what has
been sort of unfair is that we have placed this burden on the
Coast Guard because they are the leading force that provides
that law enforcement, sovereign presence in the Arctic. But
they are one important element of a wider array.
We need a stronger diplomatic presence in all of the Arctic
countries. We can put Russia aside for a moment because of the
current challenges. This is exactly what Congressman Gallagher
was saying about our presence in Greenland. We need a bigger
science presence. Right now China is opening up scientific
observatory centers. We are a science power in the Arctic. We
need to increase our sovereign presence.
But on this security nexus we need to think about
increasing the forward-operating locations, not simply Kodiak,
but additional--we need--what is concerning me about Admiral
Ray's testimony is that so many of the assets he was talking
about, I don't believe are really going to be destined for the
Arctic. They are available, but they won't be there on a
persistent presence, beyond just this season.
Right now we practice in the summer season. We have to have
a persistent permanent presence. This will take the Navy, quite
frankly. The Navy's strategy, to me, was quite disappointing.
It did not talk about ice-strengthened surface vessels. We got
banged around in Trident Juncture in good weather. We need a
surface fleet capable of a persistent presence. We need the
helicopters. We need the communications. It is a plan, and we
have to exercise that plan. So it is a whole-of-government
strategy.
Mr. Maloney. I appreciate that. Would you say a word on--
and again, to any of the panel--but on the deepwater port
issue? Help me understand the challenges and needs, and related
to what we just talked about.
Ms. Conley. If I can just offer, we have to get out of the
mode of studying, and doing. We study things in lieu of action.
Mr. Maloney. Like, where are you going with this, Ms.
Conley?
Ms. Conley. We have to--and this is joining with the
private sector, but we have to make the decision to do it. And
I don't know how Congress can move that forward, but we are
going to be 10 more years studying the matter, and we have to
start doing it. And that is where this whole-of-government
Arctic sovereignty initiative, where there is incentive by the
Government to then help the private sector join in that
cooperation. Then I will be quiet, I am sorry.
Mr. Maloney. No, you are here to testify. So go ahead and
testify.
Yes, sir.
Admiral Allen. Well, I see Mr. Graves is in the room, so
maybe I will comment on how the Army Corps of Engineer scopes
projects.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Allen. Maybe I am practicing law without a license,
or out of my lane here, but their authorization language and
their appropriation language stovepipes projects. I think what
the colonel was trying to say, given the authorization they
had, the report is going to detail what they can do.
And getting back to Heather's comments, we need to be
thinking about what is a whole-of-government response and what
we are going to need up there in the future. And the 22 feet at
Nome and what they can actually do, whether it is extending the
pier or dredging, is not going to get us to a point where we
will have the flexibility to bring the draft vessels we need in
to give us extended presence up there.
Mr. Maloney. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Treadwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you take a look
at the Bering Strait, the Russians have got a beautiful port at
Provideniya, just across the Bering Strait. We can't rely on
that. We have a natural deepwater port at Port Clarence, and we
have a port at Nome that is already doing work. Port Clarence
needs a road, Nome needs dredging. Together you are talking
about a system of ports which is about a $300 million problem.
And if we can find $300 million we will do it.
Now, one of the reasons why I talk about a system to
generate revenue is if you go to Cold Bay, Alaska, a wide-body
jet probably lands there once a year. But we keep it plowed all
year. We keep it ready, because it is the one port of refuge
for an aircraft going across the Pacific. We need to understand
that if we can create a revenue source from this new Arctic
traffic, we are going to be able have the money to come and pay
for some of this infrastructure.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Gibbs?
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you. I am very intrigued by the comments
here.
Admiral, you have been around a long time. You have seen
the capabilities, what has happened from 10 years ago and what
is happening. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard
to the growing Arctic capabilities versus the increased
maritime activity in the Arctic and--in which the--over the
Coast Guard's responsibilities? So can you just elaborate what
you have seen? Are we making progress or not? How are we doing?
Admiral Allen. Well, I hate to cover the same ground that
Heather raised, but what happens is we have separated
functional capability and mission by the authorizations and
appropriations the individual agencies get, and neither of
those, individually, by agency, are enough to address the
comprehensive integrated approach you need in the Arctic.
That is the reason this notion of a comprehensive campaign
plan, or a larger view of the area up there, is probably going
to be necessary. Because nobody can afford to have their
budgets earmarked. Certainly, the Coast Guard is not going to
want their budget earmarked to improve the Port of Nome. So
everybody is going to be trying to optimize what they can
within their jurisdiction and the capabilities required to
execute their mission.
The issue is if you add all those up they don't come up
with a comprehensive integrated plan, and I think--and I would
agree with Heather Conley, I think we are in alignment on
this--that is what is called for.
Mr. Gibbs. I guess to follow that a little bit, we had a
lot of discussion about Nome. I kind of got the impression that
is the only option, but then I hear about the challenges of
getting the port deep enough. Are--is there other areas we
should be looking at, even though there might not be a
population? Is there other things, kind of looking outside the
box, that maybe Nome is not the place to have it?
Mr. Treadwell. Mr. Gibbs, through the chair, there is a
natural deepwater port of refuge at Port Clarence, which is a
fairly short road connection from Nome. If a road could go in
that area where the Coast Guard had loran stations, where there
is some power capability left behind, where it may be used to
support a graphite mine is available. The proponents of that
port and Nome are working together and look at this really as a
system of ports. Because, you know, the people are in Nome,
which--it may be better to work with both.
But that deepwater port has been used since the 1840s by
ships going in when they couldn't come into Nome, and there is
an exposure. So there is a reason to work together with those
ports.
Mr. Gibbs. OK, and go ahead, Admiral. Oh, go ahead.
Mr. Treadwell. And just one other thing. The admiral
addressed the issue of the Corps of Engineers authorities. I
did a lot of work on the Port Clarence-Nome issue over the last
4 or 5 years, and the Corps--because there is no port now
collecting revenue, they can expand a port but they can't
really--the law doesn't contemplate frontier ports. It really
needs to. They can't really look at the security issues that
they need to look at, and that is a challenge for both Nome and
Port Clarence.
Mr. Gibbs. Now this other port, you say it is a deepwater
port, naturally?
Mr. Treadwell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. That is interesting. Admiral, did you----
Admiral Allen. I would just add that you can build a
deepwater port, but it may be more expensive to build a road to
it. So you have to look at the entire system of surface rail,
what is going on with permafrost, how do you actually construct
an artery to get to the port. That is--this all has to be
integrated.
Mr. Gibbs. Now some of the questions or testimony you
talked about in the Bering Strait, you know, especially China--
I think Ms. Conley talked about they want to do the transpolar
route, which would shorten it, but you got to get through a lot
more ice.
How do we collect revenues? Did I hear somebody mention
something about tariffs or a possibility--who was that?
Yes?
Mr. Treadwell. The Senate has a bill pending, Senate bill
1177, which is called the SEAL Act, introduced by Senator
Murkowski, Senator Sullivan, and Senator King from Maine. The
bill essentially creates a Seaway Development Corporation,
which is modeled on the legislation that created the St.
Lawrence Seaway in your district. It sets up a system to go out
and work with other nations to use the icebreaker capabilities
across the Arctic--really, across the world--to offer a
reliable service in the Arctic and to charge a tariff for it.
Now, if you read the Secretary's speech in Finland the
other day, he criticizes Russia for demanding a $500,000 or so
tariff for use of the Northern Sea Route. That tariff is paid
by people because the route does save the money and it saves
them more than $500,000. The concept here is set it up
voluntary, the insurance industry has set up a best practices
forum at the Arctic Council, and set this up as a best
practice, and see if you could collect some money.
And I would just put it this way. The Suez Canal uses
about--serves about 18,000 ships a year; 5 percent of that is
900 ships; 900 ships paying $500,000 is $450 million a year,
and that can cover the operational needs of a lot of
icebreakers.
And so the concept is to do what the United States did with
St. Lawrence. We don't charge a tariff. The Canadians do, but
we work together to have a seamless system. It is similar to
the concept of Comsat, where we created the international
satellite system, and to bring the world together to offer a
seamless service.
Mr. Gibbs. Just a quick one, Mr. Chairman--to do that,
would you have to have a treaty or agreement with Russia for
the Bering Strait?
Mr. Treadwell. Well, I was one, Congressman, who worked to
try to get this system the Coast Guard announced, where we have
the traffic system with Russia in the Bering Strait, and I
believe it is important that we cooperate with Russia. But one
of the things this does is it develops a revenue source that
helps us pay for the additional infrastructure we need.
And you know, the Russians right now have the de facto
monopoly on ship services in the Arctic. Their plans have been
done by international consulting companies for something like a
billion-dollar-a-year ship services market supporting ships
going across the Arctic. And the U.S. is sitting on its hands.
And that is why this legislation has been introduced.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. Mrs. Miller?
Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Conley, in West Virginia our economy relies very
heavily on international exports of our natural resources and
manufacturing products. How does the lack of the American
presence in the Arctic have negative consequences on our trade
interests?
Ms. Conley. Congresswoman, there are certainly economic
opportunities that the Arctic presents in both shipping of and
exporting goods, as well as what we call destinational
shipping, which is countries that are going to the Arctic to
get mineral and energy resources and taking them back to
market. So I would argue for the citizens of West Virginia
increasing safe and secure trade and transshipment is a--
potentially, a very positive development for U.S. economic
growth.
We are challenged by two things--and this gets back to the
lack of ratification for the Law of the Sea Treaty. We cannot
in the Arctic potentially mine the seabed because we are not
signatories, and have not ratified it. And we cannot extend our
Outer Continental Shelf because we aren't ratifying. These
are--we are losing opportunities for economic investment in the
Arctic region, which would benefit all American citizens. And
we are not able to protect and ensure the safe and secure
transit of those goods, either energy or exported goods, if we
do not have the appropriate infrastructure to safely do it.
Mrs. Miller. Well, that sort of answers my next question on
what Congress could do to help alleviate the issue.
Ms. Conley. So what is so important is that we understand
the Arctic as a national imperative. I think many times, if we
think about the Arctic, we may think about simply Alaska's
needs for infrastructure. But this is a whole-of-nation effort.
If we want to grow the American economy and jobs, we need to
think of the Arctic as something enhancing our prosperity.
But we also have to do it in a secure and stable way that
protects America's exclusive economic zone, our Territorial
waters, and our coastline. So it is sovereignty. It is
enhancing American prosperity. But we can only do that with a
much more emboldened presence in the Arctic. Our competitors
understand the strategic value of the Arctic; we have forgotten
it.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Treadwell, a deepwater port in the Arctic is
imperative, as you have mentioned, for American trade to
compete in the region. What progress has been made to develop
this port infrastructure? Have we done things to identify? And
are we helping to facilitate doing such a thing?
Mr. Treadwell. Well, the answer is we haven't done enough.
And I will put it this way. There is a Port Clarence Council,
which has been established to try to develop an economic plan
for Port Clarence. It was established by Congress, and it set
it up between the State of Alaska and the Bering Straits Native
Corporation. And the Coast Guard and the Corps of Engineers
have been cooperating with that council as they have done their
work.
The city of Nome has been working with the Corps of
Engineers on applicability there for appropriations under the
upcoming Water Act. The Congress has asked the military to look
at the military needs for a port. And, you know, I will just
say with some experience around here, that when you when you
ask an agency to say what it needs, if it actually says what it
needs then they are told to pay for it. So you are not exactly
seeing everything that I hoped we would see with some of this
legislation.
But the fact is I believe there is enough on the record
right now for Congress to find that it would be absurd for us
to go into a brandnew ocean, newly accessible to the world, and
not have a deepwater port of refuge, and not have a port which
could have us play a role in assisting shipping and
transshipping. And frankly, as we do that, not doing it with a
way to have a tariff or some sort of revenue source to help pay
for it.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Graves?
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for being here to testify today.
You are all familiar with the fact that in recent weeks we have
finally awarded a contract for the first heavy icebreaker, the
Polar Security Cutter, in decades. And we have awarded a
contract for one. I think we were all of the understanding that
that boat is likely going to be south.
You compare our capabilities and assets to those of other
Arctic nations, and even, to some degree, as you noted, non-
Arctic nations. We are getting blown away. Not even close to
the capabilities those nations have, compared to the United
States. Yet you have all noted the strategic importance of the
Arctic to the United States.
I am just curious. What is your opinion as to why the
United States is so far behind other Arctic nations in regard
to our capabilities and preparation for changing conditions in
the Arctic, and even just capabilities in the Arctic?
Ms. Conley. Well, it is a great question. I think we have
forgotten how strategic the Arctic is. During the Second World
War and the Cold War it was so strategic because it reduced the
distances between the North Pacific and the North Atlantic. It
was vital to protect the United States from Alaska. And then,
at the end of the Cold War, we forgot that strategic
imperative.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, so we forgot. And let's say
that is the excuse, that we just forgot. But then, when you see
what some of these other countries are doing--and let's be
candid, these aren't necessarily nations that are close allies
of ours--why would that not raise our concerns, or at least
curiosity?
Ms. Conley. Because it didn't fit into our focus on the
Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. As Admiral Allen said, I
mean, this is about budgets. And anything that takes focus away
from what we are driving towards is a distraction to budgets.
And I think this is what our military services have really been
wrestling with. They are articulating why the Arctic is
important now, but no one is redirecting resources to that.
So either they are not getting the signal from the top that
we have to restructure our priorities, and we are going to have
to make some hard choices. What they are saying is this is an
issue, but we don't have either the--we are stretched on
capabilities and readiness, or we don't have those resources.
And our allies, though--excuse me--our adversaries, our peer
competitors, understand the strategic importance and are using
this time and space to build their capabilities.
Admiral Allen. Yes, I am not going to sugarcoat this. For
20 years high-level decisions about strategic presence in the
Arctic and ice breaking have been relegated to mid-level
bureaucrats in OMB. Let me repeat for the record, the Office of
Management and Budget.
Mr. Treadwell. Mr. Chairman, as somebody who was an
official who often tangled with those OMB officials and was
told I shouldn't say what needed to be said around here, I
concur with the admiral.
I am going to just give you an analogy. Anchorage, Alaska,
is the fifth largest air cargo port in the world. I used to fly
on KAL 007. And we tried to stay, obviously, as far away from
Russian airspace, because when it didn't happen people were
killed. A Member of Congress was killed. At the end of the Cold
War a group of us worked very closely to try to establish the
global aviation system.
And if today you get on an airplane in Detroit and go to
Shanghai, you are dropping pennies from heaven into the Russian
Treasury. They collect over $500 million a year to pay for a
global air traffic system. We collect it, it is used to support
Essential Air Service. And we set up a revenue model, whether
it was with taxes or fees, to help cover that global seamless
system.
Now I have had Commandants--not the ones that I am sitting
next to--say, ``Well, I am not sure I want to charge for
icebreaker services for the Coast Guard, because if somebody
needs it and they are going to have to pay for it, they may not
call me when they are needed, and lives could be lost.'' And I
understand that. On the other hand, I will say this, that if
you are going to use the Arctic Ocean and save 20 days' travel
with a ship that might be carrying 15,000 containers, you can
probably afford to drop $500,000 on a voyage, and it only takes
a few hundred of those ships, one or two a day, to actually pay
for the infrastructure we need.
And so we need to think a little bit more creatively, and--
as we put together this proposal we met with parliamentary
authorities, we met with civil authorities, we have met with
shippers in Japan, Korea, China, Singapore, across Europe. Not
everybody is aligned, but we did find this: All of them said,
``We see the opportunity in the Arctic, but we are not going to
use it until somebody has established reliability.''
And we put--the admiral and I worked together on Arctic
policy, the actual Arctic policy, the statement signed by
President Bush in 2009, implemented by Obama, where we said we
want an Arctic Ocean which is safe, secure, and reliable. And
we have really dropped thinking about reliability now.
So I can't tell you--I mean the Arctic is always out of
sight, out of mind for people until they get--you know, until
it is--until the weather report says you are getting cold air.
But I will say this. It is--10,000 people today will cross the
Arctic Ocean on aircraft, and we have got a way to pay for what
we need for safety. We have to think about how to do that for
shipping.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. We now proceed to the
second round of questions.
I do understand Mr. Larsen to be en route. It wasn't my
intention to go to a second round, but as a courtesy to Mr.
Larsen we are going to prolong the torture a little bit longer,
ladies and gentlemen.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Maloney. But I do very much appreciate the subject you
are raising.
Dr. Tingstad, would you like to get in on any of this? You
have three very aggressive fellow witnesses today. I feel like
you might have something to add to this conversation.
Ms. Tingstad. I have actually been humbled and honored to
sit back and watch the wonderful conversation happening here.
But yes, and I would like to reflect momentarily on hard
choices. You know, I thought that was a very astute question
about, you know, what has happened, why are we not thinking of
the Arctic more strategically, or why haven't we. And the U.S.
has a lot of focus areas around the world, a lot of focus
areas, domestically, as well. And there have been choices made
to not invest in the Arctic, not focus on the Arctic. There was
a lot of sea ice. And now that the rubber is meeting the road,
it is time to start refocusing on the Arctic.
I would like to bring to you, you know, all of our
attention, as we have continued to do over the course of, I am
sure, many of these types of testimonies and hearings, that the
U.S. Coast Guard has an impressive array of statutory missions.
And that is a Service that is already stretched very thin,
doing missions all around the world. And to think of what might
happen with some of these discrete incidents--it is the Coast
Guard that I was talking about earlier--those discrete
incidents and helping the U.S. enforce governance and
sovereignty in the Arctic, it is the Coast Guard that is going
to be the stuckee for that in many cases--with partners,
naturally, international and domestic partners.
But I just wanted to continue to raise that for the
committee, that it is an important issue. There are hard
choices to be made, but I am not--I don't want to speak from a
position of authority on this, but I am not sure the Coast
Guard is in a position to make any more hard choices about its
resources if it needs to stretch them into a more active
Arctic. So I wanted to leave the committee with that.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbs?
Mr. Gibbs. I want to--just a thought--just a question. How
far behind are we, compared to what Russia and China are doing,
and the possibility of catching up if--you know, how fast do we
need to act to catch up?
When we talk about all the infrastructure, the
communications, and the--all the icebreakers and everything,
you know, how critical is this? I mean what do we got to do
right away--I guess I am just challenging your minds here a
little bit because I was delaying for Rick Larsen, but go
ahead.
Ms. Conley. My own estimate, we have lost a decade. And
this gets back to when President Bush signed the National
Security Presidential Directive in 2009, Admiral Allen's last
act in the Oval Office. We stopped. We didn't pursue--Russia
started including the Arctic in its military doctrine in 2007,
2008. China built its first Arctic research station on Svalbard
in 2004. So we have just lost a decade.
It can't take this long to build an icebreaker, it can't
take this long to decide on a deepwater port. We are now--you
know, the more time we lose we will not be able to recover it.
And I fear we are going to lose access because we will not be
able to----
Mr. Gibbs. Yes, but we are going to lose the commercial
aspect of it, but I would also argue there is a national
security aspect, correct?
I yield back, thanks.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Larsen?
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are all very kind
to let me come back here and ask a few questions.
And I want to first just say hello to Admiral Allen again,
as well as to Mr. Treadwell. These two gentlemen have been here
since--testifying on the Arctic since 2001, at least since I
have been here. So thanks for having another hearing on the
Arctic.
So a couple of questions. First with Ms. Conley--and I know
some of this has been asked, or some of this subject matter has
been asked.
But could you, through--you have testimony--answer the
question. What are China's motivations regarding the increased
Arctic presence?
Ms. Conley. So, quite frankly, there is a strong desire for
economic presence. First and foremost, energy resources, which
is why they are now investing very strongly in the Yamal LNG
project. And I think this will expand. So, energy.
Secondly--and I don't think we should discount that it is
the protein--fisheries are continuing to be very attractive for
China's alternative sources.
And then finally, shipping. This is an alternative to the
Straits of Malacca, should those, for conflictual purposes, not
be available to them. They see the opportunity of reducing
transshipment by 30 percent, which is why the transpolar route
is very important.
Right now the Arctic is primarily energy. That will be the
back-and-forth to Yamal. But every year, COSCO, the shipping
company, tests a containership. The Northern Sea Route is too
shallow for deep container traffic. That is what makes the
transpolar route--and if you looked at the map, which is why
Iceland is so vital to China's projection in the Arctic,
because again they will need to use the Bering Strait. But you
could see where potential port infrastructure in Iceland would
then be a dispersant to both North America, as well as northern
Europe, potentially.
So the Chinese--their vision is to 2040, 2050. They are
thinking that far ahead. They are seeing what is possible. They
are looking for those opportunities. It may not work, but to
have that length of projection of what you want, and to shape
it to have access to fisheries, shipping, energy--at this point
I don't foresee a military role, it is predominantly economic.
But there will be dual-use capabilities.
We have to remember that the U.S. missile defense
architecture is in the Arctic, and Thule Air Force Base in
Greenland, of course, and Fort Greely in Alaska, that could
also be potentially compromised. So we have to think more long
term on that.
Mr. Larsen. And that gets to the next question. What should
our motivations be in the Arctic? What should U.S. motivations
be?
Ms. Conley. This is about protecting the United States. It
is about ensuring that we protect our territory, our airspace,
our maritime capabilities, first and foremost.
And then, secondly, we want to shape this region to make
sure it is stable and prosperous, to make sure rules and norms
are followed, that we have access to the high seas.
And in order in order to do that, we have to increase our
physical presence across the region, both terrestrial and
maritime.
[Slide]
Mr. Larsen. Yes. So there is a map up. And if you look to
the side you can see it. If you put on my glasses you can see
it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Larsen. You can barely see it without them. But it
doesn't do a lot of justice to the issues here. And, Admiral
Allen, maybe you could talk a little to that, but--since you
have been chewing on this problem for a while.
Off of the coast of the United States, it is just fairly
open water. But if you go to Canada, I mean, it gives an
impression of the land masses in northern Canada. But there is
many more islands, and the same with Russia. It is not as
unpopulated by islands and land as it comes across in the map.
The point is that almost every country's Arctic is a different
Arctic. And it is impacted by different weather, as well.
So, in your time thinking about this, what challenges do
each of those Arctics provide to those countries, compared to
the challenges that we have with our Arctic? I am sorry I don't
have a lot of time left. I won't keep the committee here long.
Admiral Allen. Thank you, sir. Excellent question. First of
all, let me associate myself with Ms. Conley's remarks. I
support them completely. Let me just add a couple of things
onto it.
Each one of those routes is different because of the status
of the waterways related to whether or not they're in
international waters, internal waters, in Territorial sea, or,
in the case of the Bering Straits, under the Law of the Sea
Treaty that would be classified as a transit strait. A transit
strait is a strait that connects two international bodies of
water, and transit through there cannot be an inhibited.
And when we talk about fees and tariffs, that is all
possible, but there was a landmark case in the Torres Strait
north of Australia, where they attempted to establish a
pilotage charge. And there may be some conflicts moving ahead
that have to be discussed, but it is not clear. There is a
difference in the Canadian view of the Northwest Passage route
versus our view. There are still claims on our boundary of the
Beaufort Sea between the U.S. and Canada. And one of the
reasons that the Russians can establish charges there is
because internal waters--and they can make that mandatory,
because it is not a transit strait.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Allen. Was that helpful?
Mr. Larsen. That is helpful. That is one of the
differences.
Did--Ms. Tingstad, do you have a----
Ms. Tingstad. If I may, I had a followup.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, sure, I guess.
Mr. Chairman, is that all right?
Mr. Maloney. Without objection.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Larsen. All right. Thank you for the extra time.
Ms. Tingstad. Thank you.
Mr. Maloney. That is the final question. Well, thank you
all very much----
Mr. Larsen. I am sorry, so just to follow up quickly----
Mr. Maloney. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Larsen. It is up to you.
Mr. Maloney. But without objection--go ahead, no. I thought
you were going to submit it for the record, I am sorry. Did I
misunderstand you?
Ms. Tingstad. No, I----
Mr. Maloney. Oh, forgive me.
Ms. Tingstad. I just have a----
Mr. Maloney. I am--no, I apologize. Go ahead.
Ms. Tingstad. No, not at all, no.
I wanted to add that, in terms of the differences in the in
the Arctic, we should look forward to the changes that are
occurring that are occurring differentially across the region.
So those routes that we see here--I mean, those are lines for
convenience, approximately where they would be, of course, but
then there is also going to be a differential in how quickly
those waters will be open, and for how long during the year.
So, you know, we are looking at--actually, some studies
have shown that that middle route across the center is actually
going to be more frequently open for longer durations than the
route that goes across the Northwest Passage--some long lying
ice that is projected to stay out there for some time. Thank
you.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, Dr. Tingstad, and forgive my
clumsiness. I misunderstood your initial response.
I want to thank our panel. Seeing no further questions from
the Members, I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's
hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have
provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them
in writing. And I have asked further unanimous consent that the
record remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and
information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in
the record of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
If no other Members have anything to add, with sincere
thanks to all of you for your expertise, your service, your
contribution today, your travel from far away, we very much
appreciate your participation.
And the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix
----------
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Admiral Charles W. Ray,
Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
Question 1. What intelligence assets does the Coast Guard need for
Arctic MDA?
Answer. As a member of the National Intelligence Community, the
Coast Guard both contributes to and benefits from the capabilities of
Intelligence Community partners. The Coast Guard must continue to
improve information and intelligence collection in the Arctic,
including support for the development and dissemination of collection
requirements for Arctic marine conditions, climate, maritime safety,
and security threats.
Unlike Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star--our existing heavy polar
icebreaker--the new Polar Security Cutters will include intelligence
collection capability similar to that of our National Security Cutter
fleet. Our National Security Cutters operate seasonally in the Arctic
now, but the new Polar Security Cutters will provide more access in the
polar regions, together with advanced maritime domain awareness
capabilities.
Question 2a. What are existing Coast Guard shoreside assets?
Answer. Please see attachment.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 2b. Are they sufficient?
Answer. The Coast Guard has made a significant investment and
commitment to maintaining a robust presence in Alaska, as we continue
to field new assets with modern capabilities and invest in adequate
shoreside facilities to enable our front line operations.
With approximately 10% of the Coast Guard's real property inventory
located in Alaska and the vast distances between units in the region,
sufficient funding to invest in new facility construction and
maintaining our existing plant is critical. With the support of
Congress, the Coast Guard received funding and is in the planning
stages to build out waterfront and maintenance facilities to support
delivery of six new Fast Response Cutters and two Offshore Patrol
Cutters to Alaska.
The Coast Guard was also funded to construct the first phase of
housing to accommodate additional personnel and their families
associated with new assets (i.e., OPC, FRC, HC-130J) being delivered to
Kodiak. We are in the early stages of design work on those housing
units now. Over the last few years, the Coast Guard also constructed a
new hangar to support forward deployed helicopters in Cold Bay and new
facilities to enable our transition from HC-130H aircraft to HC-130J
aircraft in Kodiak.
As reflected on the unfunded priorities list (UPL), one of the
Coast Guard's priorities in Alaska remains an additional phase of new
family housing in Kodiak.
Question 2c. How do these bases interact with local community
infrastructure?
Answer. The Coast Guard's primary operational interaction with
local communities in the Alaskan Arctic is through Operation ARCTIC
SHIELD, a year-round planning and operational endeavor which provides
mobile and scalable presence in the Arctic. Last year's operations
yielded many successes. We executed nearly 20 search and rescue cases,
resulting in over 35 lives saved or assisted, and educated over 3800
local children on boating safety.
Through extensive engagements with other federal, state, local, and
tribal agencies, we performed mass rescue, oil spill, and ice rescue
exercises; conducted search and rescue training; positioned assets
during cruise ship transits; and performed safety and compliance
examinations.
These capacity-building collaborations would not be possible
without leveraging the existing infrastructure in local Alaska
communities as a force multiplier. For example, as part of that
temporary footprint, this year we will again use ``Forward Operating
Location Kotzebue,'' an Army National Guard hangar we've leased, as a
staging base for rotary-wing assets to support our full suite of
missions in the Arctic. Utilizing existing facilities whenever possible
removes the need to construct, maintain, and staff permanent
infrastructure in arduous and often remote areas.
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
Question 1. When the new icebreaker is delivered, how will you
balance missions in the Arctic and Antarctic? Why is it so vital to
have three heavy and three medium icebreakers?
Answer. The High Latitude Mission Analysis Report determined that a
minimum of six polar icebreakers, at least three of which need to be
heavy icebreakers, are needed to provide year round assured access to
the Arctic, and seasonal access to the Antarctic. Cutter capacity
demand is driven by the seasonality of employment taking into account
platform types, deployment lengths, and required post-deployment ship
maintenance and replenishment time requirements. Missions for Polar
Security Cutters (PSCs) will be determined by the operational need
across the range of Coast Guard authorities and responsibilities, as
well as the interagency needs of our federal government partners.
Annual support of OPERATION DEEP FREEZE is planned to continue. Medium
and heavy icebreakers will be used in the Arctic year round to provide
presence and promote maritime safety, security, and stewardship.
Question 2. What resources does the Coast Guard have to respond to
an oil spill in the Arctic? Do you need additional resources?
Answer. The Coast Guard serves as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator
for oil spill response in the coastal zone of the United States. The
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires owners or operators (plan holders)
of certain oil-handling facilities and applicable tank vessels and non-
tank vessels to prepare and submit response plans to the Coast Guard.
Commercially available response resources in the Arctic are critical
and provide the primary response capability. Under Vessel and Facility
Response Plan regulatory requirements, owners/operators must ensure
personnel with adequate resources can respond to oil spills in the
coastal waters of Alaska.
The USCG conducts oil spill planning efforts through the National
and Regional Response Teams (NRT and RRT) and Area Committees. Sector
Juneau, Sector Anchorage, and Marine Safety Unit Valdez provide
incident management personnel and expertise to mitigate and respond to
oil spills. The Seventeenth Coast Guard District and its subordinate
units maintain contingency plans that align with the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 CFR Sec. 300) to
strengthen response efforts within the state.
While industry is the primary provider of oil spill response
equipment, the Coast Guard's National Strike Force and other Deployable
Specialized Forces are available to provide oil spill response
expertise and have access to pre-positioned oil response equipment
staged around the state of Alaska. This pre-positioned equipment
includes 51 caches of pollution response equipment across eighteen
local coastal communities to mitigate potential impacts to shorelines
in the event of a spill.
Question 3. Besides icebreaking, can you provide specific examples
of other capability gaps in the region like weather forecasting,
communications, aids to navigation, and ice forecasting? How do these
gaps make operating in the Arctic different from operating in other
U.S. territorial waters?
Answer. In 2018, the Coast Guard sponsored research by the Homeland
Security Operational Analysis Center/RAND Corporation into potential
gaps in U.S. Arctic capabilities. This study gave an independent and
objective analysis of the Coast Guard's current and future state to
effectively conduct statutory missions in the Arctic. The study
identified three potential gaps as well as a fourth gap that deals with
how the Service addresses gaps.
The first gap involves limitations in voice and data communications
due to sparse infrastructure, vast distances, weather conditions, fewer
satellites in the polar orbits, and atmospheric conditions in the high
latitudes. The Coast Guard continues to work with the Department of
Homeland Security in a whole-of-government effort to improve
communications.
The second gap noted by RAND is a lack of consistent awareness
regarding threats and hazards, such as poorly chartered waters and the
potential for fast-moving ice and low visibility. The Coast Guard
continues to address lessons learned from Operation Arctic Shield to
better identify threats and hazards in the region. Operation Arctic
Shield also includes operational surges during peak activity periods
and provides a mobile, scalable presence to reduce risk.
The third gap noted in the study relates to challenges in incident
response ability, due in part to the limited number of assets and
ability to sustain operations once on scene. Some of the same
communications limiting factors also impact these capacity issues. To
optimize our response resources, the Coast Guard will continue
Operation Arctic Shield to conduct mobile and scalable operations. We
will also continue to collaborate with other federal, tribal, state,
and local partners to improve maritime operations. The Coast Guard is
also committed to supporting international forums such as the Arctic
Coast Guard Forum to leverage the expertise and capabilities other
Arctic nations can bring to bear during a response.
Lastly, the RAND study noted an inability to effectively articulate
Coast Guard needs and risks in the Arctic. In April 2019, the Coast
Guard released an updated Arctic Strategic Outlook, which articulates
the Service's long-term Arctic vision and describes the accelerating
national security, economic, and environmental risks and opportunities
in the region. The Strategic Outlook reaffirms the Coast Guard's
commitment to American leadership in the region through partnership,
unity of effort, and continuous innovation.
Question 4. How will you ``strengthen partnerships'' when our
Arctic partners are clear-eyed about climate change, but the U.S. is
not?
Answer. In accordance with the Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic
Outlook, the Service partners with the other Arctic nations as well as
other partners and allies with aligned Arctic interests and values to
promote a conflict-free region where international law and respect for
sovereignty are upheld.
As part of our ongoing efforts to strengthen regional partnerships,
the Coast Guard currently conducts extensive engagements with a broad
portfolio of Arctic partners and stakeholders. These include: Operation
Arctic Shield; regular interagency, intergovernmental, and
international meetings; and routine international engagements such as
through the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) and non-governmental Arctic
forums.
The Coast Guard continues to assert leadership in the region by
strengthening partnerships across the Arctic community of
international, federal, tribal, state, and local agencies and
stakeholders. The Coast Guard plays a leadership role in multilateral
organizations focused on Arctic governance, such as the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), as well as the operationally-focused ACGF.
The Service also cooperates with Arctic allies and partners through
combined operations and exercises to safeguard and secure the Arctic
domain.
Question 5. How does the Coast Guard plan to incorporate resiliency
into plans for future ports and shoreside infrastructure in the Arctic?
How will resilient infrastructure design impact the United States'
presence in the region?
Answer. As Coast Guard facilities and assets are planned for
recapitalization, resiliency for natural disasters is factored into
facility plans and designs. Additionally, Coast Guard shore
infrastructure is constructed in accordance with international and
local building codes when there are more stringent codes due to
localized vulnerabilities such as natural disasters. The Coast Guard
also incorporates operational readiness requirements (backup
communications, logistic chains, etc.) into facilities through the
planning, design, and construction processes.
Question 6. How is the Coast Guard collaborating with indigenous
groups in the U.S. Arctic to balance their sovereignty and subsistence
hunting needs with the growing presence of large vessels?
Answer. Alaska Natives have unique knowledge of the Arctic region
that is of critical importance to those who work and operate there. The
Coast Guard works closely with Alaska Native communities to better
understand and serve the region. To facilitate this collaboration,
Coast Guard liaisons meet regularly with Alaska Native communities,
both locally and at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC.
Each year during Operation Arctic Shield, the Coast Guard conducts
training, education, and outreach to local communities. During Arctic
Shield 2019, the Coast Guard participated in boating safety events
throughout the Arctic region and hosted numerous community service
events and tours of Coast Guard assets to increase awareness and
information exchanges. The Coast Guard also provided ice rescue
training and fishing vessel safety training prior to the Kotzebue
salmon season. Additionally, the Coast Guard forward deployed two MH-60
aircraft to Kotzebue to provide expanded search and rescue coverage,
maritime domain awareness, and living marine resources operations.
The Coast Guard also played a large role in forming the Arctic
Waterway Safety Committee, one of approximately 300 harbor safety
committees nationwide. These committees provide a forum to discuss
local marine interests and act collectively to develop best practices
for a safe, efficient, and predictable operating environment for all
stakeholders. The Arctic Waterway Safety Committee charter includes
voting members from all five subsistence co-management groups (i.e.,
Bowhead Whale, Walrus, Polar Bear, Ice Seal, and Beluga Whale). Active
Coast Guard participation during these meetings fosters communication
and understanding of areas of possible conflict with subsistence
activities.
Additionally, the Bering Strait Port Access Route Study, and
resultant International Maritime Organization actions to establish
voluntary two-way routes through the Straits, addressed, in part,
sensitive coastal waters and the subsistence activities of local
residents when identifying the safest transit routes for large vessels
through the area. When completing this study, the Coast Guard conducted
significant community engagement and received extensive input from
local residents and their representative groups to identify their
concerns and experience/knowledge in this area. The resulting
guidelines will improve navigational safety while protecting breeding
areas and nurseries vital to Arctic marine mammals and the traditional
way of life for Alaska Natives, including subsistence hunting grounds.
Question from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Admiral Charles W. Ray, Vice
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
Question 1. What efforts are the Coast Guard making to assess
current and predicted vessel traffic in the region and--if warranted--
recommend measures to improve maritime safety and environmental
protection for Arctic species?
Answer. The Coast Guard assesses Arctic vessel activity and trends
through a variety of means. At the tactical level, the Coast Guard uses
all source fusion intelligence, tracks, and databases to monitor vessel
activity in the Arctic areas of interest. The Coast Guard derives this
information from sources such as satellite and terrestrial Automatic
Identification System data, exchanges with Canadian counterparts, open-
source research, and other classified means.
Additionally, the Coast Guard assesses vessel traffic trends
through area committee engagements. The Coast Guard played a key role
in establishing, and is very active in, the Arctic Waterway Safety
Committee, one of more than 300 harbor safety committees nationwide.
The purpose of these committees is to bring together stakeholders and
local marine interests within a single forum to discuss vessel traffic
projections and implications from multiple perspectives. The Arctic
Waterway Safety Committee also includes voting members from all five
subsistence co-management groups (i.e., Bowhead Whale, Walrus, Polar
Bear, Ice Seal, and Beluga Whale), which fosters communication and
understanding of potential conflicts regarding subsistence activities.
The Coast Guard also conducts Port Access Route Studies to assess
and enhance navigational and environmental safety and--in the case of
the Arctic region in particular--to reconcile the right of navigation
with other waterway uses such as subsistence hunting and fishing. For
example, the Coast Guard recently completed the Bering Strait Port
Access Route Study. During this study, the Coast Guard engaged
extensively with international, federal, tribal, state, and local
leaders to better understand vessel traffic trends and other factors
that may impact navigational safety. As a result of this study, the
Coast Guard proposed six two-way routes and six precautionary areas in
the Bering Sea and Bering Strait. Approved by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and implemented in December 2018, these
measures reduce the likelihood of maritime casualties such as
collisions, oil discharges, and hazardous material releases which may
threaten the marine environment, including many endangered species and
remote indigenous communities that rely on traditional subsistence
activities.
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Rear Admiral Shepard M.
Smith, Director, Office of Coast Survey, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
Question 1. What resources does NOAA have to model and predict ice
movement, or the movement of oil spills in Arctic waters? Are these
models sufficient for commercial use?
Answer. The National Weather Services' Alaska Sea Ice Program
(ASIP) produces ice analysis and other decision support services for
customers and partners operating in the Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean.
NOAA also operates the National Ice Center (NIC) in partnership with
the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. The NIC provides global to
tactical scale ice and snow products, ice forecasting, and other
environmental intelligence services for the United States government.
It coordinates closely with the Canadian government on ice-related
activities.
NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration provides oil spill
modeling during coastal oil spills in support of the Federal On-Scene
Coordinator, usually the U.S. Coast Guard. NOAA uses the General NOAA
Operational Modeling Environment (GNOME) to predict oil movement and
weathering in a wide range of situations including those with sea ice.
GNOME incorporates the latest operational current models, ice models,
wind models, and real time observations. NOAA then predicts oil
behavior with GNOME. The GNOME tool and source code are freely
available to the public and commercial sectors.
NOAA enhances its ability to predict the movement of oil in ice by
working with partners to ensure that as more predictive models become
operational, they can be drawn into GNOME. Recently, NOAA has worked
with the DOI Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, the
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, and the Department of Homeland
Security Arctic Domain Awareness Center (ADAC). GNOME can now ingest
the Navy's Global Operational Forecast System operational model,
including ice variables.
NOAA's oil and ice modeling capabilities have improved greatly over
the past six years in order to be ready for anticipated increases in
vessel traffic and the related risks to people and the environment.
However, the services we provide rely heavily on the advancement of the
entire observing and modeling community, including efforts and
investments of other agencies such as the NASA, the National Science
Foundation, and the Departments of Energy and Interior, and on the
physical and chemical observations needed to validate the models. Some
areas remain problematic. For example, observation of oil location and
extent from satellite imagery is nearly impossible under a large area
of continuous ice and even difficult in just ice infested water.
Question 2. What unique conditions exist in the Arctic that
complicate oil recovery? Do we have the resources to address those
issues?
Answer. The unique conditions that complicate oil recovery can be
summed up by a 2014 National Academies of Science consensus report on
the current state of science and engineering regarding oil spill
response and Arctic marine environments: ``Arctic oil spill response is
challenging because of extreme weather and environmental conditions;
the lack of existing or sustained communications, logistical, and
information infrastructure; significant geographic distances; and
vulnerability of Arctic species, ecosystems, and cultures. A
fundamental understanding of the dynamic Arctic region . . . is needed
to help guide oil spill response and recovery efforts. Information on
physical processes--including ocean circulation, ice cover, marine
weather, and coastal processes--is important to frame the environmental
context for the Arctic ecosystem and can help responders predict where
oil will spread and how weathering might change its properties.''
(National Research Council 2014. Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S.
Arctic Marine Environment.)
NOAA works closely with other Federal agencies with statutory
responsibilities, along with state and local partners, to leverage
resources and capabilities in the event of oil spills. For instance,
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires owners or operators of certain
oil-handling facilities and applicable tank vessels and non-tank
vessels to prepare and submit oil and hazardous materials spill
response plans to the Coast Guard.
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Rear Admiral Shepard M. Smith,
Director, Office of Coast Survey, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
Question 1. How will UAS improve NOAA's surveying and charting
capabilities and what are the challenges of using UAS in the Arctic?
Are you coordinating with the FAA?
Answer. NOAA's Office of Coast Survey is currently developing small
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) capabilities to augment our shoreline
mapping efforts, where the speed and remote operation of UAS can
increase the safety of acquiring data while providing a more
comprehensive data product than what is currently collected from small
boats. With UAS, we have the ability to create a shoreline terrain
model, which is of particular interest in the Arctic for analysis of
erosion and storm surge. In addition, NOAA's National Geodetic Survey
is currently testing small UAS systems to facilitate the transition
from research to operations.
Large UAS systems (with medium altitude and long endurance) can
also be very effective in remote areas such as Alaska and the Arctic,
which would improve the efficiency of shoreline and photogrammetry
surveys. They could also support lidar sensors for shallow water
bathymetric mapping in coastal regions. However, many of these systems
are not currently capable of ship based operation, precluding use in
remote areas. This effort is coordinated with the FAA through NOAA's
Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research UAS Program Office, and
platform certification is performed in association with NOAA's Aircraft
Operations Center under the Office of Marine and Aviation Operations
(OMAO). OMAO provides trained UAS pilots and operational expertise to
investigate new technologies and applications for UAS, and this year,
OMAO is expanding those efforts with its new Unmanned Systems
Operations Program. The new program provides centralized coordination,
support and guidance for unmanned marine and aircraft systems across
NOAA, evaluates emerging Unmanned Systems technologies, and determines
where opportunities exist to cost-effectively carry out NOAA mission-
critical activities. The Unmanned Systems Operations Program's work
will inform future acquisitions of UAS. Among the options, OMAO is
investigating hybrid quadrotor unmanned aircraft that can be launched
from ships and have longer endurance to meet a variety of NOAA
missions, which has already been tested onboard NOAA ships.
Question 2. Why is NOAA's work important to help indigenous and
commercial mariners cooperatively operate in the Arctic?
Answer. NOAA's work is important in assisting Native Alaskan
communities because most rely on subsistence fishing and hunting of
marine mammals, and changes in ice and vessel traffic are creating a
direct impact to their way of life. As the Arctic ice continues to
retreat, increased fishing and shipping will create a greater
likelihood of conflict between commercial mariners and Native Alaskans.
NOAA's service can provide data to inform decisions and reduce the
potential for conflict.
Question 3. What steps are you taking to address coastal and inland
flooding in the Arctic? Is federal funding sufficient for these
efforts? If not, what do you need?
Answer. NOAA is working to improve its observation networks and
forecasting capabilities to better predict coastal and inland flooding,
and to improve decision support services to those in vulnerable remote
Alaskan communities. One key factor in forecasting coastal flooding is
accurately predicting sea ice, which has a dampening effect on waves.
The National Ice Center (NIC), a partnership among NOAA, the U.S.
Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard, provides sea ice assessments for the
Arctic. The NIC uses data from NOAA JPSS and Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellites-West (GOES-West), Department of Defense (DoD)
weather satellites, European and Japanese satellites, and purchased
data from the commercial sector to support its mission. These data are
provided directly to users in Alaska to support environmental
monitoring and weather forecasts by the NWS. Data from these satellites
will improve the timing and accuracy of weather and hazard forecasts
out to seven days, including better predictions for fog, ice
formations, coastal and inland flooding, and ice breaking in the
Arctic.
Moreover, NOAA is focusing on the science fundamentals to improve
coupled water, ice, atmosphere models. Areas where further research and
understanding are needed are the stable Arctic boundary layer,
interactions between the oceans, ice, and atmosphere in the marginal
ice zone, riverine impacts to ice, and troposphere-stratosphere
interactions. These activities will improve NOAA's ability to forecast
the weather, Arctic sea ice, and coastal and inland flooding.
NOAA believes the level of funding committed to improving these
capabilities is currently sufficient.
Questions from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Rear Admiral Shepard M.
Smith, Director, Office of Coast Survey, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
Question 1. What resources does NOAA have to model and predict ice
movement, or the movement of oil spills in Arctic waters? Are these
models sufficient for commercial use?
Answer. See response to Maloney 1.
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Colonel Phillip J.
Borders, Commander, Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Question 1. What infrastructure is needed to support vessels
operating in the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort seas?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What is the Army Corps experience working in the
Arctic, and are engineers sufficiently trained to design adaptive
infrastructure for a more dynamic Arctic environment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Colonel Phillip J. Borders,
Commander, Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Question 1. What steps are you taking to address coastal and inland
flooding in the Arctic? Is federal funding sufficient for these
efforts? If not, what do you need?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Admiral Thad W. Allen,
U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)
Question 1. Has the Administration's refusal to acknowledge climate
change hindered our efforts in the Arctic?
Answer. There is no singular view on climate change in the federal
government so I would hesitate to use the term ``Administration.''
There are many subject matter experts throughout government that
understand the science associated with climate change and are
concerned, as we all should. There are also a number of high-ranking
officials, many with no scientific or academic credentials that
question global warming or climate change. Our inability to address
long standing issues in the Arctic span administrations and political
parties. Even when consensus is achieved in the Executive or
Legislative Branches, creating and implementing policy or passing
legislation has not been accomplished. As a result, the Arctic and the
rest of the globe are paying the price for inaction. Finally, until
recently there was institutionalized resistance in OBM to create and
fund programs of record to address ice breaking needs, infrastructure
improvements, and navigational improvements. We all collectively own
the problem of climate change. But, because agency's authorities and
jurisdictions are comingled as are authorization and appropriations
responsibilities in the Congress, there is no single point of
accountability. The situation is further complicated by state, local,
and tribal interests which must be considered. While it is tempting to
ascribe the current Administration's ``refusal to acknowledge climate
change'' as the problem, short sided and myopic views that are
political driven are neither the cause or the cure for needed change in
the Arctic, they are just the latest reason by a number of
``Administrations'' to do nothing. The current administration chose not
to continue the Arctic Executive Steering Committee created in the
previous administration and the Secretary of State spoke about
shrinking sea ice as ``new opportunities for trade'' at an Arctic
Council Ministerial. Disturbing? Yes--but so was 8 years of failing to
fund icebreakers and defunding modernized LORAN in Alaska by the prior
administration. It is time to stop admiring the problem and do
something.
Question 2. What role could port and maritime transportation
infrastructure play in facilitating international cooperation and
regional economic development?
Answer. An Arctic deep-water port would provide logistics for
shipping and a forward operating base to respond to incidents, stage
patrols, refuel ships and aircraft, and improve navigation and
communications. These capabilities and infrastructure would reduce the
risks to maritime commerce and facilitate trade and other uses of an
Arctic with greater access.
Question from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Admiral Thad W. Allen, U.S.
Coast Guard (Ret.)
Question 1. What types of oversight might reduce the likelihood of
an oil spill in this region?
Answer. First, let me be clear, there is no risk-free way to
extract carbon fossil fuel from the earth. The level of oversight
should be commensurate with the risk acceptance of the public and that
varies by region. Assuming increased oil production will occur in the
Arctic in the future, I would emphasize the basic points I made to the
Congress and Presidential Commission following the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill where I was the National Incident Commander.
1. There needs to be independent, third party inspection of
drilling systems similar to inspections required for aircraft and
vessels. Attempts to create such a system have been curtailed by the
current administration. Industry standards created the systems in use
on the Deepwater Horizon and they failed. This is beyond the
Committee's jurisdiction and lies in oversight of the Department of
Interior and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE).
2. Standby response equipment and well containment equipment must
be available and deployable within a reasonable timeframe. Again, these
standards will be driven by risk acceptance.
3. There are no forward operating bases or infrastructure to
support a large-scale spill response in the Arctic. Until that
infrastructure is in place deployable platforms like icebreakers must
be available to establish presence, command and control, logistics, and
air support.
Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Admiral Thad W. Allen, U.S.
Coast Guard (Ret.)
Question 1. What infrastructure investments can we make now to
lower the ``cost of doing business'' in the Arctic in the long-run?
Answer. Investments should be focused on basic, enabling
infrastructure that benefits multiple users and reflects broad
stakeholder engagement, investments that create an enabling or
multiplier effect for follow on investment. Included are ports,
connecting highways and/or rail, communications, navigation systems,
emergency response capability, weather observing, environmental
sensing, and workforce development. This will require a balance of the
art of the possible and what is needed in the long term. For example,
deepening the Port of Nome is possible but may not achieve the long-
term depth needed for larger vessels to operate further north than
current ports at Dutch Harbor and Kodiak. That said, a deep-waster port
with no interior access via roads has limited capability.
Communications, navigation and emergency services serve all communities
and commercial activities.
Question 2. What is a reasonable timetable to initiate broad
infrastructure investments that will enable a ready Federal presence?
Answer. The comprehensive, long term investment plan needed for the
Arctic is an exercise in applied civics and governing that involves all
stakeholders and, above all, a consensus. I do not believe the elements
needed to create and execute that plan exist today. Successful efforts
in the past (Apollo Space Program, South Pole Station and associated
Antarctic infrastructure at Palmer Station and McMurdo Sound,
intercontinental railroad, transatlantic telegraph) had three
components: diverse stakeholders, consensus, and predictable funding.
They also had a single, empowered entity to execute the plan. The Navy
originally explored the Antarctic and built the South Pole Station in
the 1950s. That program was ultimately transferred to the National
Science Foundation where it has been stabilized and now operates under
an effective long-term plan. Such a program could be a public-private
venture or a regional authority (Port of NY/NJ). Thought could also be
given to international agreements with regional partners. At any rate,
I would recommend immediate focus be given to the governing structure
that could create and implement the desired plan.
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Heather A. Conley, Senior
Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for
Strategic and International Studies
Question 1. Has the Administration's refusal to acknowledge climate
change hindered our efforts in the Arctic?
Answer. Yes and no. Yes, it has harmed the U.S. in that, rather
than lead the policy direction and course of the Arctic Council, last
month we unnecessarily wasted political capital on preventing
ministerial statements, making Russia and China look like environmental
stewards, and further isolating the U.S. diplomatically. Thankfully,
bipartisan support in Congress has allowed the United States to
continue to fund its science activities in the polar regions but again,
these activities are not directed to enhance and strengthen U.S.
policies and decisions in the Arctic.
No, whether you believe in climate change or not, this does not
prevent the administration from taking decisions related to the safety,
protection, and defense of U.S. territorial waters, its Exclusive
Economic Zone, and its territory by ensuring the U.S. has the necessary
icebreakers, maritime domain awareness assets, and deep-water ports to
successfully manage the emergence of an increasingly ice-free Arctic
Ocean.
Question 2. What role could port and maritime transportation
infrastructure play in facilitating international cooperation and
regional economic development?
Answer. As noted above, it will play a significant role. The Bering
Strait will experience an uptick in maritime traffic, particularly bulk
and LNG carriers. Without proper infrastructure, the risk of casualties
or and environmental catastrophe grows, which could devastate U.S.
waters and coastline and harm Alaska's economic potential. With
enhanced infrastructure, Alaska can play an important role in the
future of Arctic maritime transportation, particularly as vessels will
increasingly use the Bering Straits to access either the Northern Sea
Route (NSR) or the Transpolar route to connect markets in Northern
Europe and Asia. This infrastructure will also help reduce IUU fishing
activity in the Bering Sea and northern Pacific Ocean. A 2017 CSIS
report titled, ``Maritime Futures: The Arctic and the Bering Strait
Region,'' [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
171027_Conley_MaritimeFutures_Web.pdf?mHPGy0uKqRMcek
0zw6av5jI332MeELk5] further discusses the need for updated maritime
infrastructure in greater detail.
Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen for Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice
President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Question 1. Shifting the focus away from economic opportunity in a
more accessible Arctic, can you speak to the global economic losses
associated with climate change, from sea level rise, drought,
instability, and natural disasters?
Answer. It is difficult to calculate the global economic losses due
to climate change. We only can attempt to calculate the costs of
relocating cities and towns from America's coasts due to sea level rise
from the massive calving of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Wildfires in the
Arctic will increase smoke and particulate pollution in mid-latitude
climates as the Arctic tundra dries, coupled with increased lightning
strikes due to storm severity. There are also significant
reconstruction costs for roads, railroad, pipelines, runways, and
buildings constructed on rapidly melting permafrost in the Arctic.
Permafrost thaw increases methane and C02 release into the atmosphere.
Mid-latitude climates appear to be deeply impacted by the upward and
downward lobes of a weakening jet stream which typically makes Alaska
warmer in the winter and the continental U.S. colder, increasing home
fuel costs. In the summer, this phenomenon reverses, causing more
severe heat waves or cooling patterns depending on location. Finally,
there are potential significant losses in ocean food sources due to
ocean acidification and the increase in microplastics.
Question 2. Are China's motivations for increasing Arctic presence
strategic, economic, or both?
Answer. Both. Strategically, Beijing wants to ensure that it has
full access to Arctic resources (natural, mineral and protein
resources) and cannot be denied access by the five Arctic coastal
states. It wisely uses a variety of international organizations, like
the Arctic Council, to shape the organization's agenda and influence
its future course of development. As it works multilaterally, it
enhances its economic weight bilaterally with Arctic states by
investing in Arctic economies, funding key infrastructure (rail, ports,
undersea cables), investing in scientific centers across the Arctic,
and giving generously to indigenous populations. As a new region to
develop and expand its Belt and Road Initiative (the so-called ``Polar
Silk Road''), China views the Arctic as a future maritime transit route
to European markets and alternative to the Straits of Malacca. It is
particularly interested in rare earth minerals in Greenland and energy
resources from the Yamal peninsula.
Question from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice
President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Question 1. What types of oversight might reduce the likelihood of
an oil spill in this region?
Answer. To reduce the likelihood of an oil spill in the Arctic, it
is essential that international energy companies employ the highest
safety and regulatory standards possible when operating in the Arctic
and that there is sufficient infrastructure and capabilities that can
be deployed immediately alongside highly trained personnel in response
to a spill. The U.S. Coast Guard does not have sufficient
infrastructure and capabilities to meet this requirement. The Coast
Guard should increase the number of its forward operating locations in
Alaska as well as increase hangar space and aviation assets.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Coast Guard currently relies on outdated
capabilities and thinly resourced budget which equated to a seasonal
presence (July-October). Congress should do more the make sure
resources are properly allocated and priorities identified to improve
overall U.S. presence and reduce the likelihood of incidents in the
region.
Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice
President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Question 1. What infrastructure investments can we make now to
lower the ``cost of doing business'' in the Arctic in the long-run?
Answer. We must invest now in Arctic infrastructure to lower future
costs and protect the American Arctic. This begins by enhancing U.S.
icebreaking capabilities, increasing satellite coverage to support
improved domain awareness, developing a deep-water port in the American
Arctic, and increasing the number of Coast Guard forward operating
locations in the Arctic that can be staffed year-round rather than only
during the summer months. Congress should also insist that the U.S.
Navy has ice-strengthened surface vessels in its fleet, increase the
number of live search and rescue exercises in the American Arctic, and
encourage public-private partnerships to help develop needed
infrastructure. The 2017 CSIS report titled, ``Maritime Futures: The
Arctic and the Bering Strait Region,'' [https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
171027_Conley_MaritimeFutures_
Web.pdf?mHPGy0uKqRMcek0zw6av5jI332MeELk5] further discusses these
investments in greater detail.
Question 2. What is a reasonable timetable to initiate broad
infrastructure investments that will enable a ready Federal presence?
Answer. This should have occurred a decade ago. The United States
is late to need to defend its sovereignty in the Arctic. Other nations
have pursued their ambitious agendas. Congress should articulate a
multi-year budget to enhance U.S. capabilities in the Arctic beginning
with modern and multi-use icebreaking capabilities, enhanced satellite
communications, and a deep-water port. This ``bare minimum'' investment
should allow the U.S. to protect its most essential interests in the
Arctic.
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Abbie Tingstad, Ph.D.,\1\
Senior Physical Scientist, The RAND Corporation \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this addendum are the
author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of
the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
\2\ The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops
solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities
throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more
prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public
interest.
Following the hearing on May 8, 2019, the congressional committee
sought additional information and requested answers to the questions in
this document. The answers were submitted for the record. An important
caveat to the answers presented herein is that these do not address
some of the major relevant policy and fiscal questions surrounding U.S.
Arctic strategy that remain unanswered. The research that I discussed
during the subcommittee hearing and that informs the answers to the
questions posed below primarily addresses operational issues and the
capabilities needed to address them. Therefore, the responses here do
not constitute policy recommendations. I have followed the policy
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
context in cases where the questions posed presume one.
Question 1. Has the Administration's refusal to acknowledge climate
change hindered our efforts in the Arctic?
Answer. My research has not explicitly examined the current
administration's positions on the Arctic. What I can say is that
awareness of the Arctic and appreciation for the significance of
climate change impacts (on sea ice especially but also, for example, on
permafrost melt) among planners and operators concerned with the region
appears to have endured (e.g., in the U.S. Coast Guard's and U.S.
Navy's Arctic strategy documents), based on my continued engagement
with this community. According to the analysis that my colleagues and I
conducted on Arctic cooperation mechanisms, the Secretary of State's
discussion of security issues at the May 2019 Arctic Council
Ministerial Meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland, and the lack of a joint
declaration at the conclusion of this event appear to be departures
from the historical pattern of engagement at this venue.
Question 2. What role could port and maritime transportation
infrastructure play in facilitating international cooperation and
regional economic development?
Answer. Because of the confluence of change drivers, such as
climate and economic opportunity, in the Arctic surface maritime
environment, nation-states and other stakeholders (e.g., commercial
companies, indigenous populations) may increasingly interact there.
Port and maritime transportation infrastructure is needed to contribute
to the region's economic growth, as well as to enable regional search
and rescue, environmental response, and law enforcement activities.
Without these support functions, Arctic economic growth will be
limited, or the region will face high risks of experiencing safety,
environmental hazards, or other significant incidents that could
undermine prosperity. Port and maritime infrastructure will help
operationalize international agreements (e.g., for search and rescue)
and further enable opportunities for international economic partnering.
Before making major infrastructure investment decisions, stakeholders
should consider the possible political implications (e.g., Arctic
populations' negative reactions to recent Chinese efforts to invest in
their territories), as well as potential negative consequences to local
communities.
Questions from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Abbie Tingstad, Ph.D., Senior
Physical Scientist, The RAND Corporation
Question 1. What types of oversight might reduce the likelihood of
an oil spill in this region?
Answer. Oil spills are not an explicit focus of my research.
Generally speaking, however, stakeholders express concern about
appropriately shaping regulations and enabling the enforcement of those
regulations through organizing, training, and equipping the right
people, particularly those with oversight responsibilities (e.g.,
personnel at the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of the Interior, and
the Environmental Protection Agency). International cooperation on oil
spill prevention and mitigation through the auspices of the Arctic
Council, construction of the Polar Code, and other means have been
promising. In our research on potential U.S. Coast Guard Arctic gaps,
we assessed that the following steps, among others, would better enable
oil spill prevention and response:
Review requirements for industry ``self-help'' or organic
response mechanisms.
Pre-position response supplies in local communities.
Develop additional mechanisms to leverage autonomy.
An additional area of concern is the lack of information about the
potential for large spills in the region, the current capability and
capacity among partners to remedy any spills, and the variety and
severity of environmental impacts that large spills could have. Much
remains to be learned about Arctic ecosystems and the environment.
Question 2. What impacts will an increase in maritime traffic have
on communities that subside on ocean mammals like bowhead whales?
Answer. This is an important question for Arctic community
resilience. My research has not looked at this issue. However, the
immediate and higher-order impacts of maritime infrastructure
development and traffic on ecosystems is undoubtedly a key
consideration for future planning and an important area for continued
discussion and research with international and other partners, given
the high level of physical connectivity in the Arctic.
Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Abbie Tingstad, Ph.D., Senior
Physical Scientist, The RAND Corporation
Question 1. What infrastructure investments can we make now to
lower the ``cost of doing business'' in the Arctic in the long-run?
Answer. From the perspective of enhancing Arctic safety, security,
and stewardship, key investments must be made in redundant Arctic
communications (voice, data), domain awareness (via space, air, ground,
maritime surface, maritime subsurface, and cyber), and response
capability (including immediate on-scene capability, as well as longer-
term sustainment of operations). The types of capabilities that might
be useful to a future U.S. Coast Guard operating in the Arctic include
the following:
installing additional communications infrastructure and
leveraging the growing number of commercial communications satellites
in polar orbits
exercising communications tactics, techniques, and
procedures to train servicemembers in overcoming decisionmaking
challenges associated with attenuated communications channels
investing in remotely controlled air, sea, and amphibious
craft for providing persistent wide-area surveillance, especially if
these assets are networked together and to sensors on other assets to
provide a common operating picture
updating data-gathering and database construction
processes to enhance the role of automation and thus improve data
quality, make data accessible, and fuse information into a common
operating picture
developing operating concepts, plans, and investment
strategies that recognize the need for agile, first-response assets;
infrastructure; and logistics to sustain longer-term operations and
conduct heavy lifting
investigating remotely controlled airlift and oil-spill
response capability
adding small-boat landing capability to icebreakers
increasing the number of forward operating locations and
resources, including local and mobile elements pre-positioning key
response items in partner communities
enforcing new industry self-help regulations.
Question 2. What is a reasonable timetable to initiate broad
infrastructure investments that will enable a ready Federal presence?
Answer. There is urgency for better enabling inherently intertwined
safety, security, and stewardship activities in the Arctic. A big
concern is that it will take one or more major disasters to motivate
needed capability investments in communications, domain awareness, and
response. Furthermore, many helpful assets (e.g., satellite
communications, visualization tools, helicopters, trained personnel)
can, in theory, be obtained or developed in the near term. Thus,
certain investments can and should be made in the near term before a
disaster occurs. There are several factors other than capability level
to consider. Two of the most important include implications for
indigenous and other local activities and the messaging to
international stakeholders (e.g., to avoid the perception of an
aggressive buildup of military capabilities that might elevate
geopolitical tensions, which would be counterproductive to safety,
security, and stewardship goals).
Uncertainty in the speed and precise nature of Arctic physical
environment, economic, and other changes makes it difficult to assign
precise investment timetables. However, it is important to be mindful
of the multi-year process for bringing these types of investments to
the point of providing utility for operations. Starting sooner rather
than later will help avoid a reactive rather than proactive response to
Arctic change.
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Hon. Mead Treadwell,
Cochair, Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center
Question 1. Has the Administration's refusal to acknowledge climate
change hindered our efforts in the Arctic?
Answer. Since 2017, the Trump Administration has been an active
participant at the Arctic Council. The eight nations of the Arctic have
continued--with U.S. leadership--to advance working group projects and
coordinate measures to protect the ecosystems of the north. Included in
that ongoing activity are efforts to eliminate methane releases and
black carbon emissions, both of which are short term forcers of sea ice
retreat in the north (President Trump and the President of Finland
spoke personally about these issues at several meetings, including as
recently as October 2019).
The size of the U.S. Arctic delegation has not decreased, and the
U.S. remains committed to collaboration and engagement with member
nations and observers. For example, in 2017 the U.S. hosted the 10th
Ministerial in Fairbanks and signed the Fairbanks Declaration, which
acknowledged climate change in the region and created a best-practices
working group for Arctic shipping within PAME; in 2018, it negotiated
and signed the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in
the Central Arctic Ocean.
As the Administration reconciles U.S. Arctic policy with the
National Security Strategy (NSS)/National Defense Strategy (NDS), I
assess the U.S. will remain committed to upholding a stable regional
order in the Arctic over the long-run.
Question 2. What role could port and maritime transportation
infrastructure play in facilitating international cooperation and
regional economic development?
Answer. Other nations in the Arctic, specifically Russia but also
Finland, Norway, and Iceland, have spent billions of dollars over the
last twenty-five to fifty years building ports and maritime
transportation systems in their Arctic waters. The U.S. has lagged
behind. Now, we lack the capabilities needed to sustain a robust
presence in the region. This harms our interests in three ways.
First, it poses a direct threat to personal safety in the region.
Without ports, airports, roads, and other critical infrastructure,
search and rescue, law enforcement, and commercial services cannot
operate as they do elsewhere in the U.S.
Second, it undercuts diplomatic efforts to advance U.S. interests
in the region. With its limited presence in the Arctic, the U.S. lacks
the civil, political, economic, or military power and influence it
exerts elsewhere.
And third, it invites challenges to U.S. influence and to the
influence of the other seven Arctic states by outside powers,
specifically China.
By investing in critical maritime transportation infrastructure
over the next one to three years, Congress would send a message not
only to our friends in the Arctic but to the world at large that the
U.S. is committed to securing its own backyard.
Question from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Hon. Mead Treadwell, Cochair,
Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center
Question 1. What types of oversight might reduce the likelihood of
an oil spill in this region?
Answer. Congress should look at whether the Alternative Plans of
Compliance (APC) provisions of OPA90, only recently put into effect,
are sufficient to meet spill prevention risks. Congress should also
review the series of studies that followed the 2004 Selendang Ayu
disaster, particularly the Aleutian Island Risk Assessment published in
February 2015. It is time for a better, fee-based spill prevention and
response system in the Aleutians, Bering, and Arctic Regions, and for
more robust tug and icebreaker capacity.
Additionally, Congress must ensure the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Coast Guard (USCG), and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have the resources required to
enforce vessel compliance with the International Maritime
Organization's Polar Code, as mandated by the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).
To do so, USCG will need to field and sustain an active presence in
the region. That will require more than one new polar security cutter.
Congress should also increase funding for the Alaska Ocean Observing
System (AOOS), an affiliate program of NOAA's Integrated Ocean
Observing System (IOOS), so that it can install the equipment needed to
ensure safe navigation and maritime operations in the region. This
equipment includes high-frequency radars and power modules, X-band
radars for monitoring sea ice, wave and ice buoys, AIS stations, and
other ecosystem monitoring devices.
Questions from Hon. Anthony G. Brown for Hon. Mead Treadwell, Cochair,
Polar Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center
Question 1. What infrastructure investments can we make now to
lower the ``cost of doing business'' in the Arctic in the long-run?
Answer. Investing in Arctic infrastructure today is critical to
developing a maritime transportation system that generates revenues in
the future. To get the ball rolling, Congress should take a strategic
approach. Public funds should be allocated for what might be called
Tier 1 projects--deep draft ports, airports, icebreakers, and roads--
while a mixture of public and private funds are used for Tier Two
projects--shoreside facilities, fuel bunkering, communications
equipment, etc. In this way, public funds are used to construct the
``skeleton'' of infrastructure--the large, expensive projects that
often have complex permitting, design, and construction requirements--
while private funds fill in the gaps. To encourage private investment,
Congress should recognize the ``developing'' nature of the Arctic and
offer tax and other financial incentives for investors and businesses
that choose to invest in the region.
Question 2. What is a reasonable timetable to initiate broad
infrastructure investments that will enable a ready Federal presence?
Answer. One to three years. If Congress waits any longer, it will
bear the cost of doing nothing.