[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG INTERDICTIONS: WHY MAINTAINING COAST GUARD
OPERATIONS MATTER
=======================================================================
(116-19)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 4, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
39-475 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, SAM GRAVES, Missouri
District of Columbia DON YOUNG, Alaska
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD,
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland Arkansas
RICK LARSEN, Washington BOB GIBBS, Ohio
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
JOHN GARAMENDI, California RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., ROB WOODALL, Georgia
Georgia JOHN KATKO, New York
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana BRIAN BABIN, Texas
DINA TITUS, Nevada GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
JARED HUFFMAN, California MIKE BOST, Illinois
JULIA BROWNLEY, California RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida DOUG LaMALFA, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania
MARK DeSAULNIER, California PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Chair BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York Puerto Rico
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
GREG STANTON, Arizona ROSS SPANO, Florida
DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas GREG PENCE, Indiana
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
ABBY FINKENAUER, Iowa
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
HARLEY ROUDA, California
------ 7
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York, Chair
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BOB GIBBS, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
JOHN GARAMENDI, California BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire, Vice SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)
Chair
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation:
Opening statement............................................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation:
Opening statement............................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure:
Opening statement............................................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, prepared statement............................. 47
WITNESSES
Vice Admiral Daniel B. Abel, Deputy Commandant for Operations,
U.S. Coast Guard:
Oral statement............................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Rear Admiral Steven D. Poulin, Director of Operations, U.S.
Southern Command
Oral statement............................................... 11
Prepared statement \1\....................................... 13
Thomas W. Padden, U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, Office of
National Drug Control Policy
Oral statement............................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
U.S. Southern Command Graphics Illustrating Growth and Influence
of China and Russia in Western Hemisphere, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Maloney......................................... 47
APPENDIX
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Vice Admiral Daniel
B. Abel, Deputy Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard.... 51
Questions from Hon. Bob Gibbs for Vice Admiral Daniel B. Abel,
Deputy Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard............. 51
Questions from Hon. Randy K. Weber, Sr., for Rear Admiral Steven
D. Poulin, Director of Operations, U.S. Southern Command....... 53
Questions from Hon. John Garamendi for Thomas W. Padden, U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator, Office of National Drug Control
Policy......................................................... 53
----------
\1\ Rear Admiral Poulin submitted the prepared statement of Admiral
Craig S. Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, as the statement for
the U.S. Southern Command.
Questions from Hon. Randy K. Weber, Sr., for Thomas W. Padden,
U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, Office of National Drug Control
Policy......................................................... 54
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
May 30, 2019
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: Members, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation
FROM: Staff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation
RE: Hearing on ``Western Hemisphere Drug
Interdictions: Why Maintaining Coast Guard Operations Matter''
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
will meet on Tuesday, June 4, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in 2167
Rayburn House Office Building to examine the federal
government's efforts to confront transnational drug smuggling
and stem the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. The
Subcommittee will hear from the United States Coast Guard
(Coast Guard or Service), United States Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
BACKGROUND
Illegal drug trafficking continues to threaten the safety,
security, and public health of U.S. citizens and destabilize
foreign governments. Such trafficking places significant strain
on our Nation's health care and criminal justice systems,
costing U.S. taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars
annually. The ability to intercept these drugs before they
enter the U.S. enables agencies responsible for interdiction,
like the Coast Guard, to leverage assets and seize drugs in
bulk before they are broken into smaller packages inside the
United States. Such seizures use drug law enforcement assets
much more efficiently than trying to pursue smaller, less pure
drugs closer to the end user.
In an effort to combat the adverse impacts of drugs and
coordinate the federal government's drug control activities,
Congress established the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-
690). Section 1705 of title 21, United States Code, requires
the ONDCP to submit to Congress a National Drug Control
Strategy (NDCS) on an annual basis. The latest NDCS, released
in May 2019, focuses on reducing the use, production, and
trafficking of illegal drugs, as well as lessening drug-related
crime, violence, and health consequences.
INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES
The majority of illegal drugs entering the United States
originate in South America. The Coast Guard primarily
confiscates cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamine with cocaine
being the most commonly confiscated substance.\1\ Other drugs
such as Opiates, Fentanyl and similar substances that are
smuggled into the country move primarily on land, air, or by
commercial maritime conveyances whose cargos are regulated by
Customs and Border Protection (CBP).\2\ According to the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Colombia is the source of 93% of
the cocaine in the United States.\3\ The drugs pass through a
seven million square-mile area called the Transit Zone. Roughly
twice the size of the continental United States, the Transit
Zone includes the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the
Eastern Pacific Ocean.
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\1\ U.S. Coast Guard, Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Year 2017.
https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/
FY17%20APR%2015%20May%2018%20-%20Final%20-%20POSTED.pdf
\2\ Ibid. Page 14, paragraph 4.
\3\ See page 41 https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/
DIR-032-18%2020
18%20NDTA%20%5Bfinal%5D%20low%20resolution11-20.pdf
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Typically, in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, fishing vessels
carrying multi-ton loads of cocaine depart Colombian and
Ecuadorian ports for delivery points along the Central American
or Mexican coasts. In the Caribbean, high-speed ``go-fast''
vessels haul as much as two metric tons of cocaine at a time.
These vessels generally leave Colombia's north coast heading
for points along the Central American and Mexican coastlines,
or leave Venezuela's north coast to island nations such as the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Lesser Antilles.
Smugglers have also turned to semi- and fully-submersible
vessels to move large shipments of cocaine from South America
to distribution points in Central America. These vessels are
effective tools to move large quantities of illegal drugs and
other illicit goods because their low profile makes them
difficult to detect.
Once the drugs land in Central American nations, they are
broken down into multiple smaller packages for transshipment to
the United States. Mexican drug cartels have recently been
using panga boats (e.g., small, open-air, outboard-powered
fishing boats) to move drugs into the United States. While
illegal drugs can enter the United States through the southern
land border, a majority of those drugs are transported at some
point via boats. Consequently, the NDCS focuses on interdicting
bulk shipments of drugs in the Transit Zone prior to reaching
the United States.
FIGURE 1. FISCAL YEAR 2017 DRUG SEIZURES AND MOVEMENT \4\
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\4\ See page 51 of https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/
DIR-032-18%202018%20NDTA
%20%5Bfinal%5D%20low%20resolution11-20.pdf.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
FIGURE 2. COCAINE PRODUCTION ESTIMATES IN COLOMBIA
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
AGENCY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years
1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-189) designated the Department of
Defense (DoD) as the lead agency for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime trafficking of illegal drugs
into the United States. The U.S. Coast Guard is designated as
the lead agency for the interdiction and apprehension of
illegal drug traffickers on the high seas.
Detection and monitoring activities in the Transit Zone are
coordinated by the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South (JIATF-
South). A subordinate command of SOUTHCOM, JIATF-South is led
by a Coast Guard Rear Admiral (currently RADM Pat DeQuattro)
and composed of representatives from DoD and other departments
of the federal government, including the Departments of
Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, and State. Canada, the United
Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Spain provide ships,
aircraft, and liaison officers to JIATF-South. A number of
Central and South American countries also have assigned liaison
officers to JIATF-South. To provide JIATF-South and the Coast
Guard with the ability to conduct its mission effectively, the
State Department has negotiated maritime counterdrug bilateral
agreements or operational procedures with 43 foreign nations to
coordinate detection, monitoring, interdiction, and
apprehension activities.
The interdiction continuum (Figure 3) depicts how joint
interdiction operations have been used to reduce the supply of
cocaine to the United States. A typical operation begins with
the collection of actionable intelligence on drug trafficking
activities. This is used to help cue or tip the operational
unit to narrow its patrol area and decrease response time.
Next, CBP, Coast Guard, DoD, or allied nation Maritime Patrol
Aircraft (MPA) are launched to detect drug smuggling
activities, sort through potential targets, and monitor the
suspect vessel(s). The MPA will then contact a nearby Coast
Guard, Navy, or allied nation's surface asset (e.g., a cutter,
frigate, etc.) and hand-off the vessel. The surface asset will
launch a small boat or an armed Coast Guard helicopter manned
with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) personnel
to disable the vessel. The vessel is then interdicted, the
drugs are seized, and the crew is apprehended. Final
disposition of the vessel, drugs, and crew is coordinated
between the U.S. State and Justice Departments and the flag
state of the vessel who handles the prosecution.
FIGURE 3. THE INTERDICTION CONTINUUM
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Operation Martillo (Hammer) is the name of the current
JIATF-South counter-drug operation which brings together 14
countries to disrupt drug smuggling in the Transit Zone,
including Belize, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
France, Guatemala, Honduras, the Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Panama, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Chile has
also assisted Operation Martillo. Since its launch on January
15, 2012, Operation Martillo has supported the seizure of 693
metric tons of cocaine, $25 million in bulk cash, 581 vessels
and aircraft detained and the arrest of 1,863 detainees.\5\
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\5\ See https://www.southcom.mil/Media/Special-Coverage/Operation-
Martillo.
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GOALS AND PERFORMANCE
In the 2019 NDCS released in May, ONDCP calls for a
significant reduction in the availability of illicit drugs in
the U.S. with a goal of increasing the amount of cocaine
removals (in metric tons) in the transit zone by 10 percent
within 5 years.\6\ In his May 1, 2019, testimony to the U.S.
House Committee on Armed Services, SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral
Craig Faller stated that last year JIATF-South was only able to
disrupt about 6% of known drug movements.\7\ He also stated
that ``doing more would require additional ships and maritime
patrol aircraft and greater participation by interagency and
international partners . . .'' \8\ While the Coast Guard may
have resources to interdict up to 20-30% of drugs flowing
through the Transit Zone, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) noted that for the period of FY 2009-FY 2013, the
Coast Guard deployed cutters (used for drug interdiction) for
fewer days than planned and that maritime patrol aircraft hours
were below target levels. These factors likely contributed to
the lower actual percentage of cocaine removed.\9\ In addition
to the nearly 224 metric tons of cocaine removed in FY 2017,
the Coast Guard also removed 31,190 pounds of marijuana, 6
kilograms of heroin and other opiates, and 168 kilograms of
methamphetamines. Estimates of cocaine moving through the
Transit Zone toward the United States come from the
Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB).\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
ONDCP_PRS.pdf.
\7\ See https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/
Posture%20Statements/SOUTHCOM_
2019_Posture_Statement_HASC_Final.pdf?ver=2019-05-01-095639-453.
\8\ Ibid.
\9\ Christopher Woody, ``Billions of Dollars of Cocaine are
Smuggled into the US by Sea Every Year, and the Coast Guard Says It Can
Only Stop One-Quarter of It,'' Business Insider, November 19, 2018;
also remarks by Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant of the Coast Guard,
at Center for Strategic & International Studies, ``A Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,'' March
13, 2015. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Resources
Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone, Puerto
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, GAO-14-527, June 2014.
\10\ U.S. Coast Guard, Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Year 2017.
https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/
FY17%20APR%2015%20May%2018%20-%20Final%20-%20POSTED.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since FY 2009, the Coast Guard has set its own internal
annual performance target for cocaine removal from
noncommercial vessels in the Transit Zone. The annual target
varies from year to year based on the Coast Guard's own review
of intelligence, logistics, policy, capability, emerging
trends, and past performance. The Service has achieved its
performance target only once since FY 2009. For FY 2018, the
Coast Guard set its annual performance target for cocaine
removal at 10.0%. This is the lowest the Coast Guard has set
its performance target since FY 2010 and has remained as the
target for FY 2019 and FY 2020. The lowered target rate could
be due to an increase in the flow of cocaine or the enhanced
awareness of the quantity of cocaine flowing thru the Transit
Zone; as the flow of cocaine increases, the Coast Guard
interdiction rate can decrease since tonnage increased over
time.
TABLE 1. COAST GUARD PERFORMANCE TARGET AND RESULTS FOR COCAINE REMOVAL
IN RELATION TO NON-COMMERCIAL MARITIME MOVEMENT OF COCAINE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020
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Target.......................... 13.8%............. 11.5%............. 11.5%............. 10.0%............. 10.0%............. 10.0%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual.......................... 11.5%............. 7.1%.............. 8.2%.............. 7.4%.............. TBD............... TBD
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 2. NON-COMMERCIAL MARITIME COCOAINE FLOW AND TONNAGE REMOVED (IN
METRIC TONS) \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-
03/OIG-19-27-Mar19.pdf.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018
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Flow............................ 577............... 945............... 1,254............. 2,834............. 2,738............. 2,827.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Removed......................... 88.4.............. 90................ 144.8............. 201.3............. 223.8............. 209.6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard has committed to increasing capabilities in
the Transit Zone. Their FY 2020 Congressional Budget
Justification proposed the expansion of Counter Transnational
Criminal Organizations Initiatives requesting funding for 48
positions, 26 FTE, at a cost of $6.5M, to expand the Coast
Guard's capacity to execute a multi-layered approach in the
Western Hemisphere maritime transit zone, and dismantle
TCOs.\12\ Currently, Coast Guard personnel are posted as
attaches, liaisons and drug interdiction specialists at several
U.S. embassies in the Western Hemisphere.
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\12\ See page USCG-O&S-24. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/
documents/budget/FY_2020_
CJ_Combined_Chapters_FINAL.pdf.
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FACTORS IMPACTING PERFORMANCE
Several factors impact the ability of JIATF-South and the
Coast Guard to meet drug interdiction performance targets,
including continuously changing modes, tactics, and routes by
drug smugglers; the inability of allied nations to consistently
commit assets; and the availability, quality, and timeliness of
actionable intelligence. However, according to the leaders of
the Coast Guard and SOUTHCOM, the largest factor in the recent
decline and ongoing inability to meet drug interdiction
performance targets has been the insufficient inventory of
vessels and aircraft available to support operations.
The Coast Guard is a multi-mission branch of the military
where many of their assets oversee multiple missions. In
September 2013, the DHS Inspector General (IG) reported that
the primary cause of the failure of the Service to meet its FY
2012 drug interdiction performance target was due to decreased
asset availability from aging and deteriorating assets (OIG 13-
122). The DHS IG again reported that the Coast Guard failed to
meet its drug removal rate in FY 2014 (OIG 15-27). In a June
2014 report to Congress entitled ``Coast Guard: Resources
Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands'' (GAO 14-527), GAO
reiterated the Coast Guard's challenge in maintaining and
operating legacy cutters and cited concerns in the timely
replacement of these vessels. Despite years of Congressional
questioning, the Service is only now undertaking work to extend
the useful life of 270 foot Medium Endurance Cutters.
The Coast Guard's program of record (POR) calls for
procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore
Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as
replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high-endurance cutters,
medium-endurance cutters, and patrol craft. While the
procurement of these 91 cutters will replace the aging fleet,
Coast Guard studies have concluded that they would only provide
61% of the cutters needed to fully perform the service's
statutory missions in the coming years.\13\ Congress has funded
11 NSCs; 7 of which are now in service with 3 more under
construction. Funding and contracts have been awarded for 2
OPCs while procurement funding for additional OPCs was included
in the Coast Guard FY 2020 budget request. At the end of May, a
report is due to the Coast Guard from the contract building the
OPC's detailing whether the contractor can meet the terms of
the contract. 56 FRCs have been funded through FY 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ R. O'Rourke. CRS R42567 Coast Guard Cutter Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNMANNED SYSTEMS
In addition, the Coast Guard Research and Development
Center has agreements with certain private companies to help
evaluate the use of small unmanned aircraft systems for a
variety of missions, including law enforcement. They are
actively looking into the use of unmanned aerial systems for
counter-drug and smuggling surveillance operations as it
expands maritime domain awareness.\14\ The Coast Guard has used
the ScanEagle--an unmanned aircraft manufactured by Insitu
Inc.\15\--to help detect illicit drug smuggling. Unmanned
aircraft have been used on the National Security Cutter (NSC)
Stratton, where they have ``provided real-time imagery of
suspected smuggling vessels, which helped minimize safety
concerns for interdiction assets and allowed the Stratton crew
to better track jettisoned material.'' \16\ While Coast Guard
officials have noted successes in having this system aboard an
NSC to aid in drug interdiction, they have noted challenges in
acquiring other unmanned aircraft systems.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Sean T. Pribyl, ``Drones: Is the Maritime Industry Ready?,''
MarineLink, July 27, 2016.
\15\ https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-systems/scaneagle/
index.page.
\16\ U.S. Coast Guard, Acquisition Directorate, Small Unmanned
Aircraft System Assists National Security Cutter Drug Interdictions,
January 29, 2018.
\17\ U.S. Coast Guard, Acquisition Directorate, Unmanned Aircraft
System, https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-
Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Air-Programs/UAS/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WITNESS LIST
Vice Admiral Daniel B. Abel, Deputy Commandant
for Operations, United States Coast Guard
Rear Admiral Steven D. Poulin, Director of
Operations, United States Southern Command
Mr. Thomas W. Padden, United States Interdiction
Coordinator, Office of National Drug Control Policy
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG INTERDICTIONS: WHY MAINTAINING COAST GUARD
OPERATIONS MATTERS
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sean Patrick
Maloney (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Maloney. The committee will come to order. I will start
by asking unanimous consent that members not on the
subcommittee be able to participate for the purpose of today's
hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
Welcome to this morning's hearing. Today we are here to
learn more about the Coast Guard's 11 statutory missions, with
a focus on drug interdiction in the Western Hemisphere, what we
call the transit zone.
Every day members of our Coast Guard coordinate and execute
this critical mission to stem the flow of illicit drugs into
the United States. Through partnerships with other Federal
agencies and international allies, our Coasties intercept drug
cartel operations, interdicting more cocaine than all other
Federal agencies combined. Notwithstanding its performance, the
Coast Guard remains underresourced, and is asked to do more
with less. And regrettably, their work in drug interdiction is
no exception.
For example, the Service's aged fleet of legacy cutters can
only muster an interdiction rate of roughly 6 percent of known
illegal drug movements. If the Coast Guard had a recapitalized
fleet of new offshore cutters on hand, however, they could
interdict 20 to 30 percent of known drug movement in the
transit zone. So unless we are happy to sustain this inadequate
interdiction rate, it remains imperative that this committee
and Congress continue to support funding increases to
recapitalize Coast Guard fleets of surface and air assets.
If anything, our hearing last month on the Coast Guard's
budget request and acquisition activities further corroborates
my belief that the Coast Guard is going to be extremely hard-
pressed to maintain its existing capabilities, much less
increase its operational readiness to police a transit zone
that is twice the size of the continental United States.
We might ask how can we reasonably expect the Coast Guard
and other Federal agencies, for that matter, to accomplish
their vital missions in this context. How can we demand the
only military service left unpaid during the recent Government
shutdown to be asked once again to do more with less?
If we want to succeed in our efforts to prevent illegal
drugs from entering our country, we can no longer ignore the
fact inadequate Coast Guard budgets have left the Service with
crumbling shoreside infrastructure, aged or obsolete surface
assets, and other glaring operational needs. Until we have
resolved this issue, we are far more likely to see more illicit
drugs and other harmful contraband crossing our shores, not
less: a truly ironic outcome that would be devastating to both
the Coast Guard and to the country.
[Mr. Maloney's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney, a Representative in
Congress from the State of New York, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation
Welcome to this morning's hearing. Today, we're here to learn more
about one of the Coast Guard's eleven statutory missions, drug
interdiction in the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone.
Every day, members of our Coast Guard coordinate and execute this
critical mission to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the Unites
States. Through partnerships with other federal agencies and
international allies, our Coasties interrupt and intercept drug cartel
operations, interdicting more cocaine than all other federal agencies
combined.
Notwithstanding its performance, the Coast Guard remains under-
resourced and is asked to do more with less, and regrettably, their
work in drug interdiction is no different.
For example, the Service's aged fleet of legacy cutters can only
muster an interdiction rate of roughly 6 percent of known illegal drug
movements (due to unexpected maintenance). If the Coast Guard had a
recapitalized fleet of new offshore cutters on-hand, however, they
could interdict 20 percent to 30 percent of known drug movement in the
Transit Zone.
Unless we are happy to sustain this mediocre interdiction rate, it
remains imperative that this committee and the Congress continue to
support funding increases to recapitalize Coast Guard fleets of surface
and air assets.
If anything, our hearing last month on the Coast Guard's budget
request and acquisition activities further corroborates my belief that
the Coast Guard is going to be extremely hard pressed to maintain its
existing capabilities, much less increase their operational readiness
to police a transit zone that is twice the size of the continental
United States.
Moreover, while the sheer size of the Transit Zone is a daunting
enough challenge, the Department of Homeland Security continues to
disproportionately reallocate and siphon resources from the Coast Guard
and other agencies to reinforce operations at the Southern Border.
In the face of data demonstrating that the maritime environment is
increasingly the preferred route for Transnational Criminal
Organizations to operate, it makes absolutely no sense for the
Administration to divert critical resources from an already
overburdened Coast Guard in the face of a genuine, documented threat to
the security and safety of the American people.
We might ask: How can we reasonably expect the Coast Guard and
other Federal agencies, for that matter, to accomplish their vital
missions in this context? How can we demand the only military service
left unpaid during the recent government shutdown, to be asked, once
again, to do more with less?
If we want to succeed in our efforts to prevent illegal drugs from
entering our country, we can no longer ignore the fact: inadequate
Coast Guard budgets have left the Service out to dry with crumbling
shoreside infrastructure, aged or obsolete surface and air assets, and
other glaring operational needs.
Until we have resolved the issue of this reality in full, we are
far more likely to see more illicit drugs and other harmful contraband
crossing our shores, not less--a truly ironic outcome that would be
devastating to both the Coast Guard and to our country.
Mr. Maloney. Now I would like to recognize Mr. Gibbs, the
ranking member of the subcommittee, for any opening remarks.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman, and I also want
to thank our witnesses for being here today, and for their
service to our country.
The United States Coast Guard carries out a broad array of
law enforcement, including drug interdiction in U.S. waters and
on high seas. The Service works as part of the Joint
Interagency Task Force South to remove drugs from the transit
zone. Removing drugs in the transit zone closest to the source
in their purest form not only keeps those drugs off the streets
and out of our schoolyards in the United States, but also makes
much more efficient use of law enforcement assets. Capturing
bulk shipments of cocaine in this manner takes less time and
effort than following smaller packages of less pure product
being moved to users.
Looking at the falling targets for cocaine removal and the
consistent failure to meet even those falling targets, I want
to hear from the Coast Guard how the falling targets relate to
the surface fleet recapitalization and the failure to implement
the intended communication goals originally set out for the
Service's new assets.
I am particularly concerned to know why, despite a decade
of congressional questioning, the Coast Guard has still failed
to undertake a ship life extension program for its workhorse
Medium Endurance Cutters, especially given potential further
delays in the construction of the new Offshore Patrol Cutters.
In addition to Coast Guard assets, I also look forward to
learning what other agencies can contribute to and participate
in the transit zone drug interdiction efforts.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the hearing today and
hearing the witnesses' testimony, and I yield back.
[Mr. Gibbs's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation
The United States Coast Guard carries out a broad array of law
enforcement, including drug interdiction in U.S. waters and on the high
seas.
The Service works as part of the Joint Interagency Task Force South
to remove drugs from the Transit Zone. Removing drugs in the Transit
Zone, closest to the source and in their purest form, not only keeps
those drugs off the streets and out of schoolyards in the United
States, but also makes much more efficient use of law enforcement
assets. Capturing bulk shipments of cocaine in this manner takes less
time and effort than following smaller packages of less-pure product
being moved to users.
Looking at the falling targets for cocaine removal, and the
consistent failure to meet even those falling targets, I want to hear
from the Coast Guard how the falling targets relate to surface fleet
recapitalization, and the failure to implement the intended
communication goals originally set out for the Service's new assets.
I am particularly concerned to know why, despite a decade of
Congressional questioning, the Coast Guard has still failed to
undertake a ship life extension program for its workhorse Medium
Endurance Cutters, especially given potential further delays in the
construction of the new Offshore Patrol Cutters.
In addition to Coast Guard assets, I also look forward to learning
what other agencies can contribute to and participate in Transit Zone
drug interdiction efforts.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. I would like to
recognize the full committee chairman, Mr. DeFazio.
Before doing so I just want to acknowledge someone I failed
to mention. I am honored to be accompanied today by a foster
youth shadow. If you see a number of young people following
Members of Congress around today, it is the day when we welcome
young people from the foster care system who have gone on to do
extraordinary things to accompany us in our daily routine. I am
joined by Raven Profit, here behind me, from the great State of
New York. And she has already brightened my day and reminded me
of why we do this important work.
Mr. Chairman, without further delay.
Mr. DeFazio. Great. It sounds like a great program, and
hopefully it will be an interesting day for her to shadow.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you scheduling this
hearing, because we need to continue to emphasize the critical
role the Coast Guard is playing.
I have here a poster. [Poster is displayed.] This is a
number of Coast Guard personnel assembled in front of one of
our aging helicopters. But you see in front of them an
extraordinary display of intercepted drugs. Thanks, that is
great [indicating poster can be removed].
And, you know, there is a lot of talk about drug smuggling
on the southern border, building a wall, and all sorts of other
ineffective measures, yet we have testimony from the former
Commandant of the Coast Guard before the Senate about 2 years
ago that we have actionable intelligence on a large number of
drug shipments coming in in semi-submersibles, fast boats,
being smuggled aboard fishing boats and other vessels, in the
extraordinary area that the Coast Guard has to observe and
patrol.
The Western Hemisphere transit zone is twice as big as the
continent of the United States, a heck of a lot bigger,
obviously, than the border. And we are only intercepting 20
percent of the known shipments, because of a lack of assets
personnel. Airborne assets and/or better and new cutters,
Medium Endurance Cutters, and others.
For too long the Coast Guard has been making do, and it is
time that we moved ahead with the acquisition of new assets for
the Coast Guard, since they intercepted more drugs than every
other agency of the Federal Government, combined. And
investment in assets for the Coast Guard, both personnel and
equipment, would be a heck of a lot better than a static wall
that people can go around, under, or through--not also to
mention that on the land border most drugs are coming in
through our ports of entry.
According to testimony in ``El Chapo'' Guzman's trial in
New York, the preferred method is to come through legal points
of entry in converted semi-tractor trailers, pickup trucks, and
other things. If they lose a semi-trailer or pickup truck, so
what? In a multibillion-dollar-a-year enterprise, it is the
cost of doing business.
We need to enhance our maritime interception, and the Coast
Guard is the first line of defense there, and they need better
assets. And I hope to highlight that today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you Chairman Maloney. I commend you for scheduling this
morning's hearing to shine a bright light on one reason why the Coast
Guard is indispensable to our Nation--the Service's essential role in
interdicting illicit drugs at sea.
With all the talk about the Southern Border in the past two years,
a person might assume that the border is awash in illegal drugs, among
other threats, perceived or real. That characterization, however, is
not the case.
In fact, due to our concerted efforts over the past ten to twelve
years to ratchet up security operations along our Southern Border,
transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, have adjusted to the
higher risks of attempting to run drugs across the border. Moreover,
how have they adapted? They have taken to sea.
Whether through their use of ``fast boats'', fishing boats, or even
semi-submersible vessels, TCOs are now utilizing the broad expanse of
the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone--an area over twice the size of the
continental United States--as a preferred route for moving contraband
of all types, but especially illegal drugs such as cocaine and
marijuana.
This change in tactics has forced the Coast Guard and other federal
agencies and international partners to adapt as well. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses this morning on how operations continue to
evolve in order to keep one-step ahead of the TCOs.
Yet, as much as the Coast Guard can improve its maritime domain
awareness to produce actionable intelligence to put ``steel on
target,'' one fact remains. The Coast Guard simply does not have
sufficient cutters and other assets to improve substantially its
interdiction rate in the Transit Zone. In fact, the Coast Guard only
has the capacity to attempt to target, detect, and disrupt 20 percent
of known drug movements.
For too long the Coast Guard has been relying on its aged fleet of
legacy Medium Endurance Cutters, which become less reliable, more
expensive to repair and maintain, and worse, provide fewer days at sea.
Perhaps belatedly, at least the Coast Guard and the administration
have now come to the realization that a service life extension program
(SLEP) for these cutters is way past due, and the Service has at least
worked that into their budget request. I will definitely want to hear
from Admiral Abel on the status of this critical initiative.
I am also reminded that even with its deficiency in cutters, and
even considering the vastness of the Transit Zone, the Coast Guard
still interdicts at sea more illegal drugs than all other agencies
combined interdict at land crossings, seizing more than $6.6 billion in
drugs in fiscal year 2017 alone. That fact is remarkable.
It also demonstrates, again, why it was deplorable for the Coast
Guard to go unpaid during the recent Federal Government shutdown.
To their credit, and as testament to their commitment to serve our
Nation, the men and women of the Coast Guard continued to undertake
this hazardous, if not downright dangerous, mission, all to protect the
health, safety and security of the American people, even while not
getting paid.
So this morning, as we delve into better understanding the scope
and complexity of maritime drug interdiction, I hope we all keep in
mind how important our Coast Guard is to that initiative, and the
importance of our obligation to ensure that the Coast Guard never again
is forced to operate without a paycheck. Thank you.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. I would now like to
welcome our witnesses.
We are joined today by Vice Admiral Daniel B. Abel, Deputy
Commandant for Operations for the United States Coast Guard;
Rear Admiral Steven D. Poulin, Director of Operations for the
United States Southern Command, also a Coastie; and Mr. Thomas
W. Padden, United States Interdiction Coordinator for the
Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included for the record. Since we have your written statement,
gentlemen, we ask you to limit your oral testimony to 5
minutes.
I just point out, in the case of Admiral Poulin, I would
encourage you to make any remarks in addition to the submitted
testimony, since it is not yours. As much as I enjoyed reading
the testimony of Admiral Craig Faller, who is the commander of
the United States Southern Command, it would be wonderful to
have testimony delivered to this committee that is intended for
this committee, and not for another purpose.
So thank you all for being here. I would like to proceed
with you, Admiral Abel. Go ahead, sir.
TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL DANIEL B. ABEL, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR
OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; REAR ADMIRAL STEVEN D. POULIN,
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND; AND THOMAS W.
PADDEN, U.S. INTERDICTION COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL POLICY
Admiral Abel. Good morning, Chairman DeFazio, Chairman
Maloney, and Ranking Member Gibbs. Thank you for an opportunity
to speak today about the Coast Guard's interdiction operations
in our hemisphere. I am particularly pleased to testify
alongside two key shipmates in our Nation's fight against
transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs.
In June of 1983, as a new ensign, I reported aboard Coast
Guard cutter Dauntless in Miami, Florida. As such, 36 years ago
I joined the Nation's fight against those seeking to traffic
drugs across our shores. With this perspective, I can assure
you that the tactics and resources our Service employs to
confront the flow of this corrosive element has evolved
significantly over the last three decades.
Concurrently and regretfully, drug runners of the 1980s
have matured into transnational criminal organizations,
multinational enterprises that are, unfortunately, adaptive,
business-savvy, wield the influence of seemingly unlimited
funds, and are proving to be highly effective.
We confront threats far from our land border, where
traffickers are most vulnerable, and efforts net wholesale or
Costco-styled size versus retail-size loads that could prove
vexing for local police.
Since success requires the convergence of three essential
elements--intel cueing to focus maritime operations on the size
of twice the continental United States; patrol aircraft that
help pinpoint targets; and finally, an afloat presence with
pursuit boats and helicopters, from which use of force can be
employed to compel compliance--we are getting results.
Coast Guard is on track for a fourth consecutive year of
200-plus metric tons of cocaine seized. These efforts likewise
diminish the ability of criminals to fuel violence that
destabilizes partner nations and create that migration push
factor in these trafficking corridors.
Regarding our on-scene presence, I cited my first
assignment cutter Dauntless. She remains on watch today. She is
over 50 years old. She and her sister Medium Endurance Cutters
are truly the patrol cars of this mission: 70 percent of our
offshore presence. However, this fleet is increasingly
expensive to keep in service, unreliable, and lacks the
capability of modern patrol vessels.
Last year alone unplanned maintenance yielded the loss of
two major cutters in the fight. Like our National Security
Cutter, our Service is grateful to Congress' efforts to
recapitalize our aging multimission Medium Endurance Cutters.
Over 90 percent of 2018 interdictions were intel cued.
However, it is difficult to locate targets in a massive West
Hemisphere transit zone. Small unmanned aerial systems game
changes are being added aboard our National Security Cutters
and augmenting manned aircraft. In a single deployment Coast
Guard cutter Stratton's small UAS was key to removing nearly 9
metric tons of cocaine and 23 suspects.
Just as today's Coast Guard has matured, the TCOs have
evolved in response. We now confront self-propelled semi-
submersible, special-built, low-profile vessels, along with a
typical go-fast. But it takes a network to defeat a network. We
partner with Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, other Central and
South American and Caribbean nations. Likewise, Dutch, British,
French, and Canadian ships, at times with embarked U.S. Coast
Guard teams, are complementing multinational counterdrug
results.
Within our own Department, DHS, full-court press is
harmonizing cross-component capabilities and getting results
off Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
Now, I have cited my observations as a three-decades-plus
veteran in our Nation's counternarcotics fight. One constant
remains: the unwavering resolve of Coast Guard crews to take
all measures. In fact, at times, risking their own lives to
keep this poison from the streets of our Nation and,
ultimately, our citizens.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to your questions, and I greatly appreciate your
support of the women and men who are the United States Coast
Guard. Semper paratus.
[Admiral Abel's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Daniel B. Abel, Deputy Commandant
for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard
introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of this
committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the United
States Coast Guard's drug interdiction mission and our role in
combating Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs).
Drug trafficking has destabilized regional states, undermined the
rule of law, terrorized citizens, and driven both families and
unaccompanied children to migrate to the U.S. To be clear, the flow of
illicit drugs funds TCOs, which, in turn, pose a significant and
growing threat to national and international security.
The Coast Guard leverages 229 years of experience addressing a full
range of national security and safety concerns. The Coast Guard is a
unique branch of the nation's five armed services, and serves as the
United States' premier agency for maritime law enforcement, whose broad
array of authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships are
vital to successful mission execution. The Coast Guard is the lead and
only federal maritime law enforcement agency with both the authority
and capability to enforce national and international law, including
drug interdiction, on the high seas. The Coast Guard shares the lead
for U.S. territorial seas interdiction and enforcement responsibilities
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
Additionally, the White House's Director of National Drug Control
Policy designated the Coast Guard Commandant as the Chairman of The
Interdiction Committee (TIC). TIC is a senior interagency forum, with
drug control representatives from twenty-six different departments and
agencies, which meets to discuss and resolve issues related to the
coordination, oversight, and integration of international, border, and
domestic drug interdiction efforts countering networks in support of
the President's National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS).
TIC supports the NDCS by developing interagency recommendations to
promote information sharing and integrating detection, monitoring, and
law enforcement activities with interdiction efforts to more
effectively disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking transportation and
distribution systems.
In addition to national interagency partners, the Coast Guard
maintains an extensive array of bilateral and multilateral agreements
with nearly every coastal state in the Western Hemisphere. These
agreements support the Coast Guard in effectively and efficiently
leading maritime interdiction efforts in the region including a
collaborative approach to the mutually beneficial fight against TCO
networks.
For over two centuries, guided by the Coast Guard's motto, Semper
Paratus--Always Ready, the Service has built a reputation as one of the
most agile and adaptive agencies within the Federal Government. These
qualities have served the Nation in the Coast Guard's efforts to combat
smugglers' ever-evolving conveyances and tactics. Coast Guard
interdictions routinely uncover linkages to drug trafficking
organizations operating throughout South and Central America, including
the Mexico-based Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation (CJNG) cartels and
the Colombia-based Clan del Golfo cartel, with numerous criminal
networks identified that operate independently of other named
organizations. We have identified hundreds of actionable targets, from
ground based coordinators, facilitators, financiers, recruiters, and
others who facilitate the maritime transportation of narcotics to the
United States and partner nations. Even the recent conviction of ``El
Chapo'' links to evidence gathered through Coast Guard maritime
interdictions. Over the last three years, over 1,800 smugglers
apprehended at sea by the Coast Guard were delivered to the U.S.
Department of Justice for their roles in enabling criminal activity and
drug smuggling efforts. In fiscal year 2018, Coast Guard interdictions
were instrumental in disrupting 82 percent of detected Consolidated
Priority Organizational Targets, or drug kingpins, in support of Joint
Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South). The Coast Guard also
partners with the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force's
(OCDETF's) Maritime Strike Forces to combat national and international
drug trafficking organizations, and has representation at the Associate
Director level at the OCDETF Executive Office.
From 1973 through 1991, the Coast Guard removed over 26 million
pounds of marijuana, targeting and interdicting a variety of smuggling
conveyances including commercial fishing vessels, ocean-going cargo
freighters, and pleasure craft. Beginning in the late 1990s through
today, cocaine has been the predominant drug trafficked via maritime
routes. During this time, drug traffickers have continued to find
innovative yet increasingly risky ways to subvert Coast Guard counter-
narcotics tactics. Cocaine cartels initially used some of the very same
conveyances used by marijuana smugglers; they transported multi-ton
loads of cocaine on slow vessels with high cargo capacity that were
vulnerable to interdiction. These cartels quickly adapted to Coast
Guard interdiction efforts and expanded tactics to include the
ubiquitous ``go-fast vessel,'' as well as more modern conveyances,
including the purpose-built Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS) and
``low profile vessel'' (LPV) to disperse loads onto conveyances that
are even more difficult to detect.
According to multiple U.S. Government reports, Colombia is the
number one coca producing country in the world. Following the end of
Colombian aerial eradication efforts in 2015, cocaine production
increased significantly leading to three straight years of 200+ metric
ton maritime cocaine removals, the highest three years in Coast Guard
history. Catching this toxic drug in bulk in the maritime environment
proves much more efficient and effective than attempting to detect and
seize that same cocaine when it is broken up into smaller loads coming
across the land border or being sold on our city streets. To meet this
growing threat and prevent these drugs from reaching the United States,
the Coast Guard has dedicated additional attention and assets to the
Transit Zone, invested in the people and platforms necessary to carry
out an aggressive interdiction effort, and helped to build regional
partner capabilities.
current threat: transnational criminal organizations, violence, and
instability
One of the goals of the Coast Guard's drug interdiction program is
to interdict illicit traffic as close to the source as possible. This
helps to stem the flow of drugs reaching Central America, Mexico, and
the United States. Over the past five years, Coast Guard cutters and
aircraft have removed more than 871 metric tons of high-purity cocaine
from at sea, with a wholesale value of approximately $26 billion \1\.
That equates to tremendous social and economic impacts, potentially
preventing as many as 5,200 to 9,500 cocaine-related overdose deaths,
480,000 to 9.9 million new U.S. cocaine users, and the introduction of
up to 67,000 U.S. drug-related offenders to the penal system, saving up
to $2 billion in costs of inmate care, and potentially preventing as
many as 33,000 violent murders in Mexico and Central America. Despite
these successes, TCO networks operate throughout Central America, vying
for power through drug-fueled violence and corruption of government
officials; in fact, eight of the ten countries with the highest per
capita rates of homicide are along the cocaine trafficking routes in
the Western Hemisphere.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ US Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 2013
United States Illicit Drug Prices, DEA Intelligence Report, DEA-DCW-
DIR-012-15, January 2015.
\2\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNODC
Research and Trend Analysis Branch, Global Study on Homicide 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response, the Coast Guard's Western Hemisphere Strategy
identifies three priorities for the maritime domain in the Western
Hemisphere: combating networks, securing borders, and safeguarding
commerce.
combating tcos--a layered approach to drug interdiction
The Coast Guard uses a ``maritime trident'' of cutters, boats, and
aircraft in a layered approach to combatting TCOs as they transport
illicit goods from the source zone, through Central America, Mexico,
the Caribbean, and into the United States. This approach confronts the
threat beyond our land borders, on the high seas where traffickers are
most exposed and drugs are most vulnerable to interdiction. This
layered approach begins overseas, spans the offshore regions, and
continues into our territorial seas and our ports of entry.
In the offshore transit zone, the Coast Guard is the major maritime
interdiction asset provider to U.S. Southern Command through JIATF-
South, which executes U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) statutory
responsibility for the detection and monitoring of illicit drug
trafficking in the air and maritime domains bound for the United
States. The fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft, provided by the Coast
Guard, CBP, DoD, and partner nations, coupled with sophisticated
intelligence cueing capabilities provided through JIATF-South, enables
Coast Guard interdiction efforts. The most capable Coast Guard
interdiction platforms include flight deck-equipped major cutters,
embarked armed helicopters, deployable pursuit-capable boats, and Coast
Guard law enforcement detachments embarked on U.S. Navy and allied
ships.
In Fiscal Year 2018, the Coast Guard provided 17 percent of total
maritime patrol aircraft, 74 percent of ships, 94 percent of armed
helicopters, and all law enforcement detachment support to JIATF-South.
Coast Guard collected interdiction data is then fed back to the
apprehension effort to cue additional interdiction success. In Fiscal
Year 2018, assets coupled with both intelligence targeting and
dedicated maritime patrol aircraft support had nearly double the
interdiction rate as opposed to those patrolling ships that had only
one or neither of these supporting elements.
New assets are proving increasingly effective in this fight. During
a 2018 deployment, the National Security Cutter (NSC) STRATTON, in
support of JIATF-South, removed nearly nine metric tons of cocaine and
apprehended 23 suspected smugglers as a direct result of their embarked
small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS). The sUAS capability is a force
multiplier--it expands the NSC's detection radius, can provide
persistent presence awaiting the Coast Guard's arrival on scene, and
provides situational awareness to boarding and helicopter teams. This
fiscal year we will continue to deploy sUAS on NSCs, further increasing
the effectiveness of our most-capable offshore patrol assets. This
ability to organically target, detect, and interdict drug smuggling
vessels is critical in an operating area greater than the size of the
continental U.S. Since Fiscal Year 2017, interdictions from five NSCs
alone have netted over 300 suspects to U.S. prosecution and removed
over 123 metric tons of cocaine with a street value of $3.7 billion,\3\
accounting for nearly 25 percent of all cocaine removals that year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ US Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 2013
United States Illicit Drug Prices, DEA Intelligence Report, DEA-DCW-
DIR-012-15, January 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of our newest assets, the near-coastal Fast Response Cutter
(FRC), is also a critical tool in our border security and interdiction
posture. In 2017, the Coast Guard Cutter JOSEPH NAPIER, newly
homeported in Puerto Rico, interdicted 4.2 metric tons of cocaine, the
largest interdiction of any FRC.
Our interdiction capabilities continue to prove their value against
TCO's conveyance of choice: the go-fast vessel. In Fiscal Years 2017
and 2018, our Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) of
armed helicopters--along with partner aircraft from the U.S. Navy, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, operating under the Coast Guard's
law enforcement authority--set a record of 126 at-sea interdictions,
with over 115 metric tons of cocaine removed; more than any other two-
year total in Coast Guard history.
In addition, the Coast Guard began providing high-speed pursuit
boats and crews to U.S. Navy Patrol Coastal class ships operating in
the transit zone in 2016 to increase interdiction opportunities.
Coupled with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments and other
deployable specialized forces personnel, this innovative force package
capability has netted 21 interdictions and removed over 14 metric tons
of cocaine since its inception.
The importance of interdictions transcends the direct removal of
drugs from the high seas; when the Coast Guard apprehends suspects from
drug smuggling cases, the suspects disclose information during
prosecution and sentencing that is used to help indict, extradite, and
convict key criminal leaders and further disrupt and dismantle TCOs.
Interdictions also take profits out of the pockets of criminal networks
by denying them financial resources. The Coast Guard has recently
refined its interdiction analytics to examine several measures of
success to include the seizure rate of valuable non-drug evidence.
In Fiscal Year 2018, 70 percent of U.S. Coast Guard drug
interdictions resulted in the collection of non-drug evidence that
provide links between individual smugglers and related TCO activity.
These critical elements contribute to actionable intelligence for
future events, producing follow-on investigative leads, seizures, and
arrests.
In total for Fiscal Year 2018, the Coast Guard removed 209 metric
tons of cocaine and 25,200 pounds of marijuana from the transit zone,
worth an estimated wholesale value of $6.2 billion, with 602 suspected
smugglers apprehended. This marked the third consecutive year the
Service exceeded 200 metric tons of cocaine removed. Despite the
tremendous quantity of cocaine removed in Fiscal Year 2018, the Coast
Guard estimates that it, along with our entire domestic and
international partners, were able to remove only 9.4 percent of the
suspected non-commercial maritime cocaine flow in the transit zone.
Interagency analysis shows a continued elevated flow of cocaine in the
transit zone, and the subsequent maritime smuggling threat is projected
through at least 2020. Increased flow, coupled with evolving
conveyances and concealment tactics, this will continue to stress our
ability to respond adequately to this threat.
While more than 90 percent of our 2018 interdictions were cued by
intelligence, the limited availability of Coast Guard's aging major
cutters and the number of limited assets available to detect all the
cued drug events, ultimately restricted our ability to interdict more
targets. Critical acquisitions like the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)
are essential to the long-term success in the Coast Guard's fight
against TCOs. Medium endurance cutters, some that were commissioned in
the 1960s, are the critical ``patrol cars'' in maritime interdiction
efforts and are desperately in need of replacement. Additionally,
whole-of-government commitment of additional detection capability,
particularly long-range patrol aircraft, remains critical to increasing
the number of identified targets that can be interdicted.
international cooperation
In coordination with JIATF-South, the Coast Guard is engaged with
partner nations, including key partners Colombia, responsible for 60
percent of critical movement alerts to JIATF-South, and Mexico, as well
as countries throughout Central and South America, leveraging their
capabilities and local knowledge to improve maritime governance in the
littoral regions being exploited by TCOs. Among the efforts to foster
international cooperation and build partner capacity, Coast Guard
personnel are posted as attaches, liaisons, and drug interdiction
specialists at several embassies in the Western Hemisphere. These
personnel develop strategic relationships with partner nations that
facilitate the coordination of real-time operations. The Coast Guard's
law enforcement, legal, and regulatory expertise are in high demand
from Central American partners, whose navies more closely resemble the
U.S. Coast Guard, focusing primarily on maritime law enforcement rather
than force projection. Coast Guard International Training Teams, as
well as cutters deployed in the region, increase professional
interaction, training in conjunction with operations, and maritime
exercises.
Highlighting international cooperation and success, over the past
year, the Coast Guard leveraged the U.S./Costa Rica Bilateral Agreement
through a joint shiprider operation with Costa Rica from December 2018
through April 2019. Costa Rican Maritime Interdiction Units, supported
by U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement personnel, enhanced their country's
ability to conduct interdiction operations from the newly acquired
Libertadors (former US Coast Guard 110-foot patrol boats), resulting in
the removal of over four metric tons of cocaine. More importantly, the
training provided by U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement personnel,
coupled with a bolstered surface fleet, enabled Costa Rica to emerge as
a powerful force multiplier in the Transit Zone.
Increased cooperation with Panama and Costa Rica over the last few
years have garnered substantial results in each country's role in the
multi-national fight against TCOs. Over the past two years, Panama and
Costa Rica have ranked one and two, respectively, in partner nation
support to JIATF-South interdictions and cocaine removals, netting a
total of more than 65 metric tons of cocaine spanning 83 interdictions.
Furthermore, the Coast Guard has supported the strengthening of each
country's systems to advance legal consequences, providing boarding
officer testimony in six in-country trials, collectively enforcing rule
of law in the Western Hemisphere.
Working in conjunction with the U.S. Departments of State and
Justice, the Coast Guard negotiated, concluded, and maintains over 40
counterdrug bilateral agreements and operational procedures with
partner nations throughout the world, the majority of which are in the
Western Hemisphere. These agreements enable the Coast Guard to board
suspect vessels, facilitate interdictions in under-patrolled
territorial waters of partner nations, and coordinate interdiction and
apprehension operations in the transit zone. Highlighting their
importance to Coast Guard counterdrug efforts, 66 percent of all Coast
Guard interdictions in fiscal year 2018 involved the use of a bilateral
agreement or operational procedures agreement.
the arrival zone
Closer to the shores of the United States, Coast Guard operational
commanders work with the other operational components within the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and across the Federal Government
to provide a robust presence in the U.S. maritime approaches by
deploying FRCs, high speed pursuit boats and aircraft. To achieve unity
of effort, the Coast Guard is a major contributor to DHS' Southern
Border and Approaches Campaign. The Coast Guard Atlantic Area Commander
serves as the Director of Joint Task Force East, overseeing
coordination efforts for DHS components operating in the maritime
approaches in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern Pacific
Ocean. This component of DHS is instrumental in the aggressive posture
aimed at securing our maritime borders surrounding Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands, including the approaches from South America,
Hispaniola, and the Leeward Islands. Surge operations such as FULL
COURT PRESS continue to leverage DHS targeting, detection, and
interdiction capabilities, resulting in the removal of 44 metric tons
of cocaine and apprehension of 156 suspected smugglers over the past
two years.
conclusion
The Coast Guard endeavors to secure our vast maritime border by
identifying emergent threats and combatting them in a layered approach,
utilizing strong international relationships and maximizing domestic
and regional partnerships. The Coast Guard stands ready to meet
offshore and coastal drug trafficking threats in the maritime domain
posed by TCOs operating throughout the transit zone.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and thank you for
your continued support of the U.S. Coast Guard. I would be pleased to
answer your questions.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Poulin?
Admiral Poulin. Good morning, Chairman DeFazio, Chairman
Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the committee. It
is an honor for me to appear before you today. And I would like
to note that, although I sit here wearing a Coast Guard
uniform, I testify before you as the Director of Operations for
the United States Southern Command, one of six DoD regional
combatant commands responsible for all U.S. military operations
in a region comprising Central and South America and the
Caribbean.
I note that I was privileged to follow Vice Admiral Abel in
this position at Southern Command, as he departed for his new
responsibilities, his current responsibilities, as the Deputy
Commandant for Operations. Thank you for inviting me to
participate in this hearing on behalf of Admiral Faller, the
commander of the United States Southern Command.
Having a coastguardsman in this position is unique among
combatant commands, and it demonstrates the vital partnership
between the U.S. Southern Command and the Coast Guard, with the
Coast Guard providing almost all of the maritime assets in the
U.S. Southern Command region. These Coast Guard assets conduct
a full suite of missions supporting United States Southern
Command, ranging from counternarcotics detection and
monitoring, national defense, humanitarian assistance, security
cooperation, and training exercises.
The Coast Guard also conducts critical maritime force
protection for our Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay that is
responsible for the safe, legal, and humane treatment of
detainees. Simply put, the Coast Guard is U.S. Southern
Command's maritime service provider.
Although our partnership with the Coast Guard is most
relevant to today's hearing, I would be remiss if I didn't
highlight the incredible partnerships we enjoy with other U.S.
Government agencies, as well as with willing and capable
partner nations throughout the Western Hemisphere. These
partnerships are particularly strong with respect to the
detection and disruption of illegal narcotics. Nowhere are
these partnerships on greater display than at Joint Interagency
Task Force South, JIATF South, and Key West. Twenty partner
nations and representatives from 16 agencies sit side by side
in what has become the model for cooperation toward the common
goal of stemming illicit trafficking.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you personally for taking the
time to visit JIATF South recently to see firsthand how
effective we are in pulling together all of our strengths. I
invite all members of the committee to come down and see what a
great collaborative international and interagency work that
JIATF South is, and the great work that is being done in
collaboration.
I would also invite and encourage you to visit our partner
nations to get an indepth understanding of the importance of
the region. I can tell you that others recognize its
importance. China and Russia are here in a big way, and I say
``here'' purposely. The Western Hemisphere is our shared
neighborhood. We are connected with our regional partners in
every domain: land, air, sea, space, cyber, and values. The
challenges that threaten our neighborhood are the same
challenges that directly threaten our homeland, and the
opportunities in this hemisphere are all of ours to foster and
share.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps said it best and most
powerfully, I think. As the Chinese establish presence in
countries throughout this hemisphere, he noted--and I quote--
``They are inside our interior lines.''
So how do we counter that? We have to be good partners, and
that includes being good partners in the counterdrug arena. The
drug trade is connected to all facets of security. It creates
instability in the region, undermines the rule of law, and
corrupts governments and institutions. It creates a permissive
environment that allows state and nonstate actors to conduct
malign activities that threaten the peace and prosperity of the
region.
The Coast Guard regularly commits more assets to the
counterdrug mission than is required through our annual force
allocation effort. The Coast Guard's commitment really enables
the successes that you will hear about today.
Our partner nations are also in this fight with us.
Colombia has increased its eradication efforts by over 50
percent since last August. They prevent coca from ever reaching
the transit zone--from ever starting its journey north.
Partners in the transit zone like Panama, Costa Rica, and
Guatemala are taking the equipment and the training the U.S.
provided them, and are taking cocaine off the high seas by the
ton. Last year partner nations directly contributed to 700
American lives saved. Not only is this our neighborhood, but it
offers a high return on investment that directly impacts our
own national security.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I look
forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
[Admiral Poulin submitted the prepared statement of Admiral
Craig S. Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, as the
statement for the U.S. Southern Command:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern
Command, as delivered to the House Armed Services Committee on May 1,
2019
introduction
I want to thank the Congress, and especially this Committee, for
your support to United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The men
and women of our team work every day to earn the trust of partners in
Latin America and the Caribbean. We are friends and neighbors, bound
together by shared values and a shared stake in our common future. The
nations of this neighborhood are connected in every domain--sea, air,
land, space, and cyberspace. Our partnerships are vital to security and
prosperity in this hemisphere, and to our collective ability to meet
complex global challenges. We recognize that the success and security
of future generations depend on how effectively we build trust with
allies and partners in the hemisphere today, working with and through
interagency partners like the Department of State, U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Ultimately, we want enemies to
fear us, friends to partner with us, and the Western Hemisphere to
shine as a beacon of peace, prosperity, and potential.
The strengths and opportunities of our hemisphere--democracy,
respect for human rights and rule of law, and military-to-military
relationships rooted in education, culture, and values--are matched
with a troubling array of challenges and threats to global security and
to our homeland. These include natural and man-made disasters, weak
government institutions, corruption, under-resourced security
organizations, violent crime, criminal organizations, and violent
extremist cells. China has accelerated expansion of its One Belt One
Road Initiative at a pace that may one day overshadow its expansion in
Southeast Asia and Africa. Russia supports multiple information outlets
spreading its false narrative of world events and U.S. intentions. Iran
has deepened its anti-U.S. Spanish language media coverage and has
exported its state support for terrorism into our hemisphere. Russia
and China also support the autocratic regimes in Venezuela, Cuba, and
Nicaragua, which are counter to democracy and U.S. interests. We are
monitoring the latest events in Venezuela and look forward to welcoming
that country back into the hemisphere's community of democracies. Where
threats are transregional, multi-domain, and global, the United States
must renew focus on our neighbors and our shared Western Hemisphere
neighborhood.
partnerships
Modest, smart, and focused investments in U.S. forces and security
assistance continue to yield meaningful returns in the form of partners
who are ready to address threats shoulder-to-shoulder with us.
Strengthening partnerships is at the heart of everything we do.
USSOUTHCOM's mission is about the smart, focused use of force--not
economy of force.
Working from a foundation of mutual respect and shared interests in
regional cooperation and interoperability, we are enhancing our
partnerships with Brazil, Colombia, and Chile, which are forces for
regional and global security. Argentina has reinvigorated military-to-
military interaction, and co-hosted our annual South American Defense
Conference. Peru continues a tradition of strong liaison officer
exchanges with USSOUTHCOM and recently conducted training with a
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF). We reinitiated
security cooperation with Ecuador, and are moving forward with a
renewed military-to-military partnership.
In Central America, partners like El Salvador and Panama have
stepped up cooperation in the area of counter-narcotics (CN); in
addition, El Salvador co-hosted our Central American Security
Conference last year. Honduras hosts our Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo
at Soto Cano, providing a regionally-based security cooperation
platform, the presence of which allows a rapid response capability. Our
support to Guatemala's defense institution building efforts has helped
its Ministry of Defense increase efficiency, transparency, and
sustainability of its investments.
Across the Caribbean, our partners continue to look at USSOUTHCOM
as their security partner of choice. Trinidad and Tobago co-hosted our
annual Caribbean Nations Security Conference, and thwarted a terror
attack with the support of U.S. special operations forces (USSOF).
Jamaica has stepped up its CN efforts, recently purchasing a maritime
patrol aircraft that will support regional drug interdiction
operations.
We continue to expand our cooperation with allies and partners in
humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) missions and counter-
threat efforts, such as drug detection and monitoring, and support to
interdiction operations in Central America and the Caribbean. Allies
and partners contributed to nearly half of the successful drug seizures
credited to Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) last year. In
addition to continuing cooperation in traditional areas like
peacekeeping and drug interdiction, we are building interoperability
for high-end expeditionary operations and in the space and cyber
mission sets. In the past year, Brazil became the first Latin American
country to sign a Space Situational Awareness Agreement, Colombia
became NATO's first global partner in Latin America, and Chile led the
maritime component of the world's largest international naval exercise,
Rim of the Pacific--a first for a Latin American sea power. Later this
year, Brazil will send a Major General to serve as U.S. Army South's
next Deputy Commander for Interoperability, the first Brazilian officer
to serve in this role.
The majority of nations in this hemisphere share democratic
values--including respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of
law--and interests in advancing democracy and countering radical
ideologies. These shared values and interests are the foundation of our
military-to-military relationships. We reinforce and build on these
shared values and interests through institutional capacity building
efforts, information and intelligence sharing, education, personnel
exchanges, and exercises. In the past year, we have improved the
quality, depth, and frequency of information and intelligence exchanges
with partners, producing joint products on transnational issues of
mutual concern.
We also build on those shared values by working with our partners
to elevate and integrate all elements of professionalism as a
foundational component of every security conference we conduct. The
professionalism of U.S. armed forces is the bedrock of our legitimacy,
both as a fighting force and in our ability to build trust with our own
people. Professionalism encompasses human rights, jointness, gender
integration, and non-commissioned officer development.
Education and training--funded by the Department of Defense's
William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and the
Department of State's International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program--and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases made
possible by Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants are force
multipliers. Our partners prefer U.S. education and training, and these
exchanges facilitate mutual understanding of values, doctrine, and
culture that enable us to operate together more effectively. Our
participation in multinational exercises like UNITAS (a naval
integration exercise), PANAMAX (defense of the Panama Canal), and
Brazil's CRUZEIRO DO SUL (regional air exercise) is another important
way we increase mutual understanding, interoperability, and collective
readiness.
In the absence of an enduring U.S. military presence in most of
Latin America and the Caribbean, recurring rotations of small teams of
USSOF, soldiers, Marines, and National Guard personnel \1\ play central
roles in building trust and enabling the exchange of critical
expertise. By carefully tailoring these rotations, we ensure they build
the readiness of U.S. forces as well as building partner nations'
capabilities. On any given day, small USSOF teams conduct over 30
missions in support of about 12 partner nations throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean. Many live and work alongside regional
forces, building the trust, confidence, and lasting relationships that
reinforce our status as the partner of choice and enhance our ability
to respond quickly to contingencies.
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\1\ The State Partnership Program (SPP) links a unique component of
the Department of Defense--a state's National Guard--with the armed
forces or equivalent of a partner nation, leveraging National Guard
capabilities for engagements that build enduring relationships and
advance mutual defense and security goals. 24 of the SPP's 75
partnerships worldwide are in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility,
including a partnership with Venezuela that is currently inactive.
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Humanitarian support efforts like medical engagements, civil
affairs activities, and the recent deployment of the hospital ship USNS
COMFORT demonstrate our enduring solidarity and friendship with
neighbors, while countering negative messaging by adversarial nations.
The international medical team aboard COMFORT treated more than 26,000
patients in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Honduras. This team conducted
more than 100 training engagements, relieving pressure on regional
health systems caused by the Venezuelan migration crisis and giving
local medical providers more flexibility to deliver care. The
integration of more than 100 military and non-governmental organization
(NGO) personnel from 10 other nations helped us build trust, tell our
story effectively, and enhance regional perceptions of the United
States. The U.S. military medical and command staff also returned from
the deployment more ready, able to operate with foreign partners, and
prepared to provide critical care to U.S. warfighters. These impacts
will far outlast COMFORT's 70-day deployment.
Strengthening our partnerships is our best bid for addressing
regional and global threats. We work by, with, and through partners to
enhance the security of both the United States and our partners, and to
help grow bilateral security relationships into regional and global
security initiatives. Our networked approach to countering threats
recognizes that nothing happens without robust and enduring
partnerships across the U.S. interagency, region, and civil society.
Our ultimate advantage is using the power of our ideals, ideas, and
people to build trust with friends and create dilemmas for competitor
nations. This is the primary dimension in which we expand the
competitive space.
threats
Six state actors (Russia, China, Iran, and their authoritarian
allies in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) and a system of interrelated
threats challenge the security of our partners and the region. Threats
like natural and man-made disasters and criminal networks feed and fuel
drivers of instability, including weak institutions, poverty,
corruption, and violent crime. Addressing these challenges requires
whole-of-government efforts, led by partner nations at a pace they can
sustain, to strengthen democratic institutions and expand economic
opportunity. Often, improving security is the first step.
Nation State Competition and Malign Actors
Russia and China are expanding their influence in the Western
Hemisphere, often at the expense of U.S. interests. Both enable--and
are enabled by--actions in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba that threaten
hemispheric security and prosperity, and the actions of those three
states in turn damage the stability and democratic progress across the
region. As the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world, Iran's
activities in the region are also concerning.
Russia continues to use Latin America and the Caribbean to spread
disinformation, collect intelligence on the United States, and project
power. Russia's deployment of two nuclear capable bombers to the
Western Hemisphere was intended as a demonstration of support for the
Maduro regime and as a show of force to the United States. Russia has
also deployed intelligence collection ships to the region, as well as
an underwater research ship to Latin America capable of mapping
undersea cables--information it could use to cut critical lines of
communication during a future crisis. Additionally, Russia is
establishing joint space projects with partners in the region, which it
could eventually leverage for counter-space purposes in the event of a
global conflict.
China utilizes the same predatory, non-transparent foreign lending
practices it has implemented around the world to exert political and
economic leverage in certain countries. China has pledged at least $150
billion in loans to countries in the hemisphere,\2\ and 17 nations now
participate in the One Belt One Road Initiative. However, many
countries are beginning to recognize the long-term consequences of
mortgaging their future to China, as we've seen in Sri Lanka, Malaysia,
Sierra Leone, Djibouti, and the Maldives. In the future, China could
use its control of deep water ports in the Western Hemisphere to
enhance its global operational posture. Particularly concerning is
China's effort to exert control over key infrastructure associated with
the Panama Canal.
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\2\ Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2017) ``China-Latin
America Finance Database.'' Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue
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China's presence and activities at Argentina's deep space tracking
facility is also concerning. Beijing could be in violation of the terms
of its agreement with Argentina to only conduct civilian activities,
and may have the ability to monitor and potentially target U.S.,
Allied, and partner space activities. Additionally, Chinese firms like
Huawei and ZTE have aggressively penetrated the region, placing
intellectual property, private data, and government secrets at risk. If
governments in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to gravitate
toward using Chinese information systems, our ability and willingness
to share information over compromised networks is likely to suffer.
Russia and China aggressively court students from Latin America and
the Caribbean to attend their military schools, offering free training
in cyber, policing, and CN. Since 2012, security officials from nearly
all Central American countries and nearly half of South American
countries have received Russian CN training. These engagements,
combined with Russia's Counter Transnational Organized Crime Training
Center (CTOC) in Nicaragua, potentially provide Moscow with a regional
platform to recruit intelligence sources and collect information.
Russia and China also support their authoritarian partners in Cuba,
Venezuela, and Nicaragua, often through propaganda and other
information-related tools. Moscow, for example, provides positive media
coverage of its authoritarian allies, papering over repression and
socioeconomic inequity in Nicaragua. Moscow also seeks to undercut U.S.
policies and regional relationships through information operations and
intelligence collection, and by influencing political systems, public
opinion, and decision makers. Russia published hundreds of articles
last year in its Spanish and Portuguese-language media that
deliberately distorted our defense engagements.
The linkages between these malign actors are negatively
reinforcing. Emboldened by Russian and Chinese \3\ support, Venezuela
is engaging in increasingly provocative actions, threatening Guyana's
sovereign rights and jurisdiction and providing sanctuary for National
Liberation Army (ELN) fighters that threaten Colombian stability.
Russia and Cuba are both complicit in Venezuela's descent into
dictatorship, but Cuba is particularly influential in supporting
Maduro. Following the Cuban government's advice and assisted by its
intelligence machinery, Maduro is adhering to the autocratic blueprint
Cuban leaders have ruthlessly executed for over six decades. Nicaragua
appears to be going down a similar path following Cuba's playbook, with
Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela enabling President Ortega's repression of
his political opposition. These relationships give Russia, in
particular, a foothold close to our homeland. As tensions increase with
Russia in Europe, Moscow may leverage these longstanding regional
partners to maintain asymmetric options, to include forward deploying
military personnel or assets.
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\3\ For example, China is Venezuela's single largest state
creditor, saddling the Venezuelan people with more than $50 billion in
debt, even as their democracy vanishes.
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Iran is also looking to reenergize its outreach after reducing its
efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years. It has
deepened its anti-U.S. influence campaign in Spanish-language media,
and its proxy Lebanese Hezbollah maintains facilitation networks
throughout the region that cache weapons and raise funds, often via
drug trafficking and money laundering. Last September, Brazil arrested
a Hezbollah financier in the tri-border area near Paraguay and
Argentina, and in recent years Paraguay, Peru, and Bolivia have
arrested multiple Hezbollah-linked suspects.
What We're Doing
We are increasing cooperation with partners to better understand,
expose, and counter the malign activities of Russia, China, and their
authoritarian allies. We are also working more closely with other U.S.
combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure that globally
integrated plans and operations are informed by threats and
opportunities in this hemisphere. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff's globally integrated planning is exactly the right approach for
addressing the transregional, transnational nature of today's threat
environment.
Within the region, we have to be on the playing field to compete.
The same presence that strengthens our partnerships sends a powerful
signal to Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua (the six
negative state actors) that the United States is committed to the
region and to the security of our neighborhood.
Strong partnerships--founded in effective and transparent
institutions, intelligence and information exchanges, institutional
capacity building, education, exercises, and presence--are our primary
bulwark against the influence of malign actors in the hemisphere and
are bolstered by our work together on military professionalism. Our
work with partners to reinforce the hemisphere's substantial, but
incomplete, progress in human rights is even more critical in light of
Russia and China's own disregard for human rights. USSOUTHCOM's Human
Rights Initiative--which just celebrated its 20th anniversary--has
conducted more than 200 human rights engagements that have enhanced the
ability of partner nations to build professional forces that have
legitimacy in the eyes of their populations.
As I have discussed in previous testimony, the Department of
State's security assistance programs--like IMET and FMF--are strategic
game changers. Since 2009, IMET has provided opportunities for over
55,000 students from the region to attend schools like the Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), the Inter-
American Air Force Academy (IAAFA), and the Inter-American Defense
College (IADC). These numbers aren't just seats in a classroom. They
represent lifelong relationships with future leaders \4\ who trust us,
understand our culture and doctrine, and are prepared to work with us
on a range of challenges.
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\4\ IMET has trained numerous individuals who have gone onto serve
in key leadership positions, including the former President of Chile,
Trinidad and Tobago's Chief of the Defense Staff, and Argentina's
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who helped foster our
reengagement with the Argentine military after the political dynamics
changed.
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In addition to strengthening partnerships, we support interagency
efforts to hold individuals accountable for supporting the activities
of negative actors. For example, in collaboration with the Department
of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), we provided
information that supported the development of sanctions against
Venezuelan government officials involved in drug smuggling, money
laundering, corruption, and serious human rights abuses.
Drugs and Transnational Criminal Organizations
Drug trafficking threatens our national security and that of our
regional partners. Drug overdoses killed more than 70,000 Americans
last year, and nearly half a million people across the world in
2017.\5\ Fueled by drug demand--especially ours--drug traffickers
transported enough metric tons of cocaine (that we know of) from South
America by air, land, and sea last year to cover four football fields--
and the majority of it was headed for our streets. Upon landfall, this
bulk cocaine is broken down into multiple smaller loads and smuggled
into the United States, making large interdictions exponentially more
difficult. In addition to cocaine, traffickers also transport heroin,
synthetic opioids like fentanyl, and precursor chemicals from China.
While Mexico remains the primary source for heroin smuggled into the
U.S. (and China the prime source of fentanyl), the Dominican Republic
is emerging as a regional transit point for opioid trafficking into
major U.S. cities like Philadelphia, Boston, and Miami.
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\5\ Centers for Disease Control, National Health Statistics; United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2018 World Drug Report.
Geneva.
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Established drug trafficking routes and techniques provide
opportunities for the illegal movement of other commodities and
people--including terrorists. Several years ago, the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) dedicated an article to a scenario in which its
followers could leverage established trafficking networks to make their
way to our border. This remains a potential vulnerability we watch as
closely as we can.
Drug trafficking comes with significant costs, in more ways than
one. After marijuana, cocaine remains the second most valuable
commodity in the global drug trade,\6\ generating dirty money that
flows directly into the hands of criminal groups. In many cases, these
groups are better funded than the security organizations confronting
them. Dirty money fosters corruption and insecurity that tear at the
fabric of communities, erode institutions of governance, and drain the
region's potential. The vicious side effects of illicit trade also cost
American taxpayers billions of dollars every year. This is more than a
national security threat; it's also an economic one that affects every
nation in our neighborhood.
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\6\ Global Financial Integrity, ``Transnational Crime and the
Developing World.'' March 2017.
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What We're Doing
Leveraging capabilities like information-sharing, network analysis,
and the Department of Defense Rewards Program, we support operations by
DHS and the DOJ's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF)
and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to interdict drug shipments
and disrupt transnational criminal networks. For example, our
intelligence support--enabled by our Army Military Intelligence
Brigade--to operations by Homeland Security Investigations and other
interagency partners helped dismantle one of the largest maritime
illicit smuggling networks in Central America last year.
At the tactical level, JIATF-S continues to deliver steady returns
on investment and improve its efficiency in targeting drug movements.
Last year, it helped keep the equivalent of 600 minivans full of
cocaine off U.S. streets. But even this isn't enough to keep pace with
the increasing demand and the volume of drugs flowing north through the
Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. While improving efficiency, we still
only successfully interdicted about six percent of known drug
movements.\7\ Doing more would require additional ships and maritime
patrol aircraft and greater participation by interagency and
international partners that form the backbone of JIATF-S. The U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provide
the bulk of JIATF-S's maritime and air capabilities. The United
Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Netherlands lead multiple interdiction
operations in the Caribbean, while we focus U.S. assets on the Eastern
Pacific. Last year, 17 international partners conducted nearly half of
the interdictions supported by JIATF-S. U.S. Northern Command remains
our closest and best Department of Defense partner and we continuously
look for ways to enhance our teamwork, recognizing that threats exploit
our geographic combatant command boundaries.
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\7\ Figure based on JIATF South utilization of Consolidated
Counterdrug DataBase (CCDB) data.
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Our capacity-building activities, whether at the tactical,
operational, or institutional level, play a key role in this fight. For
example, after years of USSOF training, Guatemala's Fuerzas Especiales
Navales (FEN) is now among Central America's most competent and
responsive maritime interdiction units. U.S. training, equipment, and
interagency teamwork have also enabled Costa Rican and Panamanian
forces to partner seamlessly with the USCG in interdiction operations.
Partners are also working with us to address their ability to sustain
capabilities that we have developed together. For example, Colombia has
increased its eradication and interdiction efforts while also
conducting increased operations against the ELN.
Drivers of Migration
Violence, unemployment, corruption, poverty, and impunity for gangs
and transnational criminal organizations are some of the main drivers
of insecurity that fuel migration to our southern border. 14 of the top
20 most violent countries in the world are in Latin America and the
Caribbean.\8\ Migration challenges are exacerbated by weak
institutions, corruption, violence and instability wrought by
authoritarian governments. Migration from Venezuela is on track to
approach the scale of the Syrian refugee crisis, straining the capacity
and resources of its neighbors. The United Nations estimates that 5.3
million Venezuelans will have fled their country by the end of 2019--
with over 2 million leaving this year alone.\9\ Last year, thousands of
Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica and other neighboring countries to seek
protection, a number that will likely grow as President Ortega keeps a
tight grip on power. Many Haitians continue to leave their country in
hopes of finding economic opportunity elsewhere.
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\8\ Igarape Institute (Regional think tank), ``The World's Most
Dangerous Cities.'' March 31, 2017 (available at https://
igarape.org.br/en/the-worlds-most-dangerous-cities/)
\9\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
International Organization for Migration (IOM), December 14, 2018.
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What We're Doing
We are working closely with Central American and other partners to
share information and provide training and equipment that enhance their
ability to secure their borders. We assist partners in developing
strong institutional foundations needed for legitimate, effective, and
sustainable defense sectors through organizations like the William J.
Perry Center \10\, the Center for Civil Military Relations, and the
Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, which help our
partners build trust and confidence with their citizens. Through
collaboration with the Department of State, USAID, and non-governmental
partners, our civil affairs teams execute low cost, high impact civic
action projects that help partner nations and extend governance to
vulnerable communities.
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\10\ The Washington, DC-based William J. Perry Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, one of DoD's five regional centers,
develops and engages the Western Hemisphere's community of defense and
security professionals to seek mutually supportive approaches to common
challenges in order to develop effective and sustainable institutional
capacity, and promote a greater understanding of U.S. regional policy.
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terrorism
As Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan recently noted,
transnational terrorism poses an immediate threat to the Western
Hemisphere.\11\ Groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, ISIS, and al-Qaida
operate wherever they can garner support, raise funds, and pursue their
terrorist agendas. ISIS and other groups have demonstrated their
ability to inspire and recruit violent extremists to plan attacks in
South America and the Caribbean. While the travel of foreign fighters
from Latin America and the Caribbean to Iraq and Syria has diminished,
the potential return of battle-trained extremists remains a threat.
Another potential threat is posed by smuggling networks that move
Special Interest Aliens from East Africa, the Middle East, and
Southeast Asia through the hemisphere to attempt entry into the United
States.
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\11\ Remarks at the Western Hemisphere Ministerial on
Counterterrorism, December 11, 2018.
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What We're Doing
USSOUTHCOM leads several annual exercises with interagency partners
and partner nations to improve interoperability, preparedness, and
response for a possible terrorist attack. Our neighbors are taking
increasing steps to address the threat of terrorism in the hemisphere,
as evidenced by the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) development of a
regional counter terrorism strategy in collaboration with the U.S.
Department of State and USSOUTHCOM. In addition to these efforts, we
work with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to help regional partners
build their capacity to combat weapons of mass destruction, another
issue of growing interest to several partners.
We work closely with lead federal agencies and regional partners to
detect and disrupt terrorist activity and strengthen counter-terrorism
(CT) legislation. Trinidad and Tobago recently strengthened its CT
legislation (including the creation of several new terrorism-related
criminal offenses), and other countries are also updating theirs. In
collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, and
other interagency partners, we work with Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
Chile, and others to share information and strengthen regional capacity
to manage extremist threats. U.S. training and biometrics equipment are
improving the ability of partners to control their borders, and in the
past two years, we've helped interagency partners stop individuals with
known or suspected ties to terrorism. Additionally, our small civil
affairs teams work closely with U.S. embassies and USAID to counter
radicalization and recruitment and amplify moderate voices in local
communities.
Detention operations also play an important role in the global
fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy combatants off the
battlefield. The medical and guard teams at Joint Task Force Guantanamo
(JTF-GTMO) continue to conduct safe, legal, and humane detention
operations. In line with Executive Order 13823, we are examining ways
to address medical support, capacity, and infrastructure issues
associated with continued detention operations.
Natural Disasters
Our ability to respond rapidly in crisis is an important aspect of
USSOUTHCOM's mission. Our neighborhood experiences approximately 50
natural disasters every year, of almost every type--from hurricanes to
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, mudslides, and more.
Protecting citizens before and after disaster strikes is a core mission
for every military in our hemisphere. The question is not whether, but
when, we will face the next disaster, and we must be ready.
What We're Doing
Last October at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas
in Cancun, Mexico, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and his counterparts
from across the hemisphere committed to strengthening regional military
cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in support
of lead civilian agencies. In support, USSOUTHCOM works closely with
partner nations, Department of State, USAID, NGOs, and multinational
organizations like CARICOM's Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management
Agency (CDEMA) and the Regional Security System (RSS) to build national
and regional response capacities. Our training, exercises, and low-cost
humanitarian projects have helped our partners to be more prepared to
respond to emergencies in their own countries, and more able to assist
their neighbors in crisis. As an example, last year the Jamaican
Defense Force deployed a team to Dominica for 60 days to provide
medical aid and other emergency assistance in the wake of Hurricane
Maria. We are assessing our authorities to ensure we can provide the
necessary support for our partners to take on increasing responsibility
for disaster responses.
When U.S. military support is required, our forward-deployed JTF-
Bravo in Honduras, along with our annual SPMAGTF deployment, provide
operational flexibility and agility. I'm proud to note that last year
we integrated Chilean and Colombian officers into the SPMAGTF
leadership team for the first time. Brazil will join the SPMAGTF this
year, in addition to co-leading our UNITAS AMPHIB multinational naval
exercise. This iteration of UNITAS will practice the establishment of a
multinational task force to support humanitarian response, a capability
we haven't employed since the Haiti earthquake in 2010. Building on
this initiative, we are working with allies and partners to develop a
concept for a scalable multinational task force that works within
existing security cooperation frameworks to enhance our collective
ability to respond rapidly to crises.
congressional support for ussouthcom's mission and this neighborhood
I invite you to visit our neighbors and reinforce the message that
we value this region--the only region that is tied to our homeland by
all domains--and the role our partners play in keeping our neighborhood
safe.
I also thank the Congress for providing the Department's FY 2019
appropriations prior to the start of FY 2019, which minimized the
impacts of the current partial government shutdown to the Department of
Defense. As we look ahead, confidence in stable budgets and ensuring
all of our U.S. government security partners, like our USCG, are open
for business will reassure friendly nations that we are reliable
security partners.
Support for our People
After several years of running the detention facility at JTF-GTMO
as a temporary mission, we have been directed to keep the facility
open. Much of the current infrastructure used by the JTF has long
outlived its useful lifespan. We are undertaking a comprehensive review
of the existing facilities to determine requirements for mission
success, the safety of our forces, and operational efficiency. Closer
to home, we are working to find ways to better support our personnel,
including exploring ways to mitigate the limited military support
services in the Miami area. I will keep this Committee informed of our
progress.
Capabilities to Defend our Homeland
We appreciate the support of the Congress to ensure the continued
operations of the USCG, which provides the majority of U.S. maritime
assets supporting JIATF-S operations. The new National Security Cutters
have proven very effective in the drug detection and monitoring
mission, leveraging increased intelligence collection capability and
on-scene endurance. Maritime patrol aircraft are also crucial to
detection, monitoring, and interdiction by the USCG and partner
nations. Continued congressional support for the new Offshore Patrol
Cutter will enable the USCG to maintain its capacity in the hemisphere.
While those new ships are beginning construction, maintenance funding
is essential to keep the aging Medium Endurance Cutters--some of which
are close to doubling their planned 30-year service lives--hard at work
supporting JIATF-S. We also appreciate the support of the Congress to
resource our intelligence capabilities like human intelligence (HUMINT)
and innovative analytic tools utilized by the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency's (DTRA) Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) that
allow us to exploit publicly available information and intelligence.
Thanks to congressional support, we contracted a Multi Mission
Support Vessel (MMSV) to help fill capability gaps. True to its name,
the MMSV was used for SOF training exercises and will now be employed
to support U.S. and partner nation law enforcement in CN and CT
operations. Increased U.S. joint and naval presence in regional
operations and exercises will encourage partner forces, to include
navies, to participate in regional security efforts such as HA/DR, CN,
and CT. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is mission fit for this region
and we welcome its deployment this year. We are also leveraging our
growing science and technology portfolio--including innovative projects
like small-satellite and aerostat surveillance programs--to mitigate
our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance gaps, and help the
Services to test new capabilities that hone the U.S. military's
technological advantage.
Capabilities to Strengthen our Partnerships
We appreciate congressional support for initiatives that streamline
security cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security
partner of choice. Your continued support to programs and capabilities
that help build trust and long-term relationships with partners
enhances our ability to defend the homeland by providing more capacity
for defeating threats and sending a visible signal to our partners (and
our competitors) about the depth of our commitment.
conclusion
Partnership goes a long way in this part of the world. The right
focused and modest investments in this hemisphere yield a solid rate of
return for the United States and our partners. Our competitors benefit
when we don't invest in our neighborhood.
Our partners share our vision of a hemisphere that is a beacon of
peace, prosperity, and opportunity. They want to work with us to
achieve this vision. It is in our national interest to work with them.
Thank you.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Padden?
Mr. Padden. Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
the Coast Guard's significant role in drug interdiction in the
Western Hemisphere.
As the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator at ONDCP, it is my
privilege and honor to work with our interdiction and law
enforcement communities to reduce the availability of illicit
drugs inside the United States.
Mr. Maloney. Mr. Padden, excuse me, if I could just ask you
to speak more directly into the microphone so that Members can
hear you. If you just pull it--you can pull that box right
towards you, if you want, that box will move, too. Go ahead,
sir. Excuse me for interrupting.
Mr. Padden. Got it.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you.
Mr. Padden. Our Coast Guard plays a primary role in the
interdiction of drugs shipped by maritime means, and it is an
integral part of the layered interdiction strategy aimed at
intercepting drugs at all points in the smuggling routes.
Seven weeks ago, I was privileged to begin serving as the
U.S. Interdiction Coordinator under the leadership of our drug
czar, James Carroll. As USIC, my responsibilities include
coordinating the interdiction activities of the National Drug
Control Program agencies and developing the National
Interdiction Command and Control Plan in coordination with The
Interdiction Committee.
As we develop our interdiction planning and operations, we
must ensure that we are reducing the availability of all types
of drugs that are smuggled from all sources. The Coast Guard's
maritime interdiction mission remains a principal means of
intercepting drugs, and an integral part of the overall drug
interdiction effort.
The administration's National Drug Control Strategy focuses
on saving lives and protecting our citizens by reducing both
the demand for and availability of illicit drugs. It presents
clear guidance that is focused on the President's drug control
priorities, which are preventing drug abuse before it starts;
providing treatment that leads to long-term recovery; and
reducing the availability of drugs in the United States.
Availability reduction plays an important role in
supporting the prevention of drug abuse and the treatment of
drug addiction. Reduced availability enables public health
efforts to take hold and increases the potential for successful
prevention and treatment efforts. Drug availability is reduced
through eradication, interdiction, and the dismantlement of
criminal organizations that traffic drugs.
The strategy maximizes our reduction efforts across the
spectrum of drug threats. It maintains continued focus on drug
interdiction at our borders, where drug cartels attempt to
smuggle methamphetamine, cocaine, opioids, and other drugs
every day. Strategic emphasis is maintained on Coast Guard and
partner nations' efforts to interdict multiton quantities of
cocaine that are shipped by sea from South America to our
country.
Following the strategy's guidance, the National
Interdiction Command and Control Plan coordinates the
activities of our agencies. The current plan guides our efforts
across three broad geographic zones: beyond the border; the
border region; and within the border. The plan emphasizes
information-sharing between agencies to provide fused
intelligence that guide our interdiction efforts. Shared
information and intelligence between our law enforcement,
defense, and intelligence agencies will continue to drive
effective interdiction and the dismantlement of criminal
organizations.
Coast Guard interdictions provide actionable investigative
information and evidence to support Federal and State
conspiracy prosecutions that more fully disrupt and dismantle
these transnational criminal organizations. The Coast Guard
investigative service is a significant partner in the joint law
enforcement programs tasked with this mission.
The maritime drug threat within the Western Hemisphere
continues to evolve as drug traffickers travel farther out to
sea to avoid Coast Guard and partner nation interdictions.
Traffickers employ semi-submersible and low-profile vessels, as
well as encrypted communication technologies to avoid
detection.
The increased use of containerized shipping to smuggle
large quantities of drugs must also be addressed in our
planning. Additionally, there has been an increase in the
smuggling of opioids and other drugs at postal and express
consignment ports, at ports of entry, and domestic facilities.
Given the changes in the drug interdiction environment
since we last issued the plan, we are working to update it. As
we update the plan we will ensure that our State interdiction
agencies have a voice in the process through the HIDTA program
to more effectively plan interdiction efforts inside our
borders.
The maritime interdiction mission remains a primary element
of the beyond-the-border line of effort. Coast Guard maritime
interdictions in the Western Hemisphere keep multiton
quantities of cocaine and other illicit drugs from reaching our
borders. However, the United States is not the only country
affected by the surge of illicit drugs, as all nations in the
region face this threat. We must continue to work hand-in-hand
with our partner nations to meet the magnitude of the threat
that we collectively face.
It is an honor to support the dedicated and courageous
coastguardsmen who expertly execute the maritime interdiction
mission every single day. I appreciate the subcommittee's
attention to the Coast Guard's critical role in the
interdiction strategy, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[Mr. Padden's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas W. Padden, U.S. Interdiction Coordinator,
Office of National Drug Control Policy
introduction
Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the U.S. Coast
Guard's significant role in drug interdiction in the Western
Hemisphere. As the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) at the Office
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), it is my privilege and honor
to work with our interdiction and law enforcement communities to reduce
the availability of dangerous and illicit drugs in the United States
under the leadership of our U.S. Drug Czar, James W. Carroll. Our U.S.
Coast Guard plays a primary role in the interdiction of drugs shipped
by maritime means, and it is an integral part of the layered
interdiction strategy aimed at intercepting drug shipments outside our
borders, at our borders, and inside our borders.
the u.s. interdiction coordinator
Protecting our citizens from the threat of dangerous and addictive
drugs is a mission to which I have dedicated much of my professional
career. Seven weeks ago, I was privileged to begin serving as the USIC.
In this role, I coordinate the drug interdiction mission as a part of
the National Drug Control Strategy (Strategy), and I bring experience
from 37 years of combined military and civilian Federal service. As a
career prosecutor for the past 25 years, my civilian service has been
primarily focused upon the counter-narcotics and organized crime
mission.
The USIC's responsibilities, established by 21 U.S.C. 1710(a),
include: coordinating the interdiction activities of the National Drug
Control Program (NDCP) agencies; developing the National Interdiction
Command and Control Plan (Plan) in coordination with The Interdiction
Committee (TIC); assessing the sufficiency of assets committed to the
drug interdiction mission by the NDCP agencies; and advising the ONDCP
Director on the relevant agencies' efforts to implement the Plan.
As I begin my tenure as USIC, I understand the critical importance
of working with the Interagency, including the U.S. Coast Guard and
TIC, to coordinate the evolution of our interdiction planning and
operations. We must ensure that we are fully reducing the availability
of illicit drugs of all types and from all sources. The U.S. Coast
Guard's maritime interdiction mission remains a principal means of
intercepting drug shipments within the Western Hemisphere and is an
integral part of the overall drug interdiction effort.
the national drug control strategy
The Trump Administration's National Drug Control Strategy that
ONDCP issued in January 2019 focuses on saving American lives and
protecting our citizens from the threat of dangerous, addictive, and
potentially lethal illicit drugs by reducing both the demand for, and
availability of, these substances. The Strategy presents clear
strategic guidance to our 16 NDCP agencies by focusing on President
Trump's drug control priorities. These priorities are: (1) preventing
drug abuse before it starts; (2) providing treatment that leads to
long-term recovery for people with substance use disorders; and (3)
reducing the availability of dangerous and addictive illicit drugs in
the United States.
Under the Strategy, reducing the availability of illicit drugs
plays an important role in supporting the prevention of drug abuse and
the treatment of drug addiction. Reducing the availability of illicit
drugs enables public health efforts to take hold and thereby increase
the potential for successful prevention and treatment efforts. If it is
easier to get drugs than it is to get treatment, our public health
efforts become additionally challenged. Accordingly, our availability
reduction efforts directly facilitate our prevention and treatment
programs. The Strategy emphasizes that drug availability is reduced
through eradication, interdiction, and the dismantlement of the
criminal networks that traffic these illicit drugs.
The Strategy is structured to maximize our reduction efforts across
the spectrum of drug threats. It maintains a continued focus on drug
interdiction at our borders where drug cartels attempt to smuggle
marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, opioids, and other drugs every
day. Additionally, strategic emphasis is maintained on U.S. Coast Guard
and partner nations' efforts to interdict multi-ton quantities of
cocaine and other illicit drugs and precursor chemicals used to produce
illicit drugs, as well as drug profits being returned to the drug
producing countries, that are shipped via maritime and other means from
South America and intended for the illicit drug market in the United
States.
the national interdiction command and control plan
In accordance with 21 U.S.C. 1710, as amended, a responsibility of
the USIC is to develop a plan for coordinating the interdiction
activities of the NDCP agencies, the National Interdiction Command and
Control Plan (Plan). The existing Plan emphasizes that our interdiction
lines of effort span three broad geographic zones: (1) Beyond the
Border; (2) the Border Region; and (3) Within the Border. The Plan's
emphasis on information sharing between agencies recognizes the
importance of fused intelligence to guide our interdiction efforts, and
its emphasis on dismantling and disrupting drug trafficking
organizations. The Plan also recognizes the importance of coordinated,
multi-agency investigations and prosecutions. Given the changes in the
drug interdiction environment since we last issued the Plan in 2015, we
believe it is essential to update this Plan, which we are developing.
The U.S. Coast Guard's maritime interdiction mission is a primary
element of the Plan's Beyond the Border line of effort. Within the
Western Hemisphere, U.S. Coast Guard maritime interdictions in the
Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern Pacific Ocean are
responsible for keeping multi-ton quantities of cocaine and other
illicit drugs from reaching our borders. In Fiscal Year 2017, the Coast
Guard removed over 223 metric tons of cocaine, and apprehended over 700
smugglers and referred them to prosecution. As the President has also
stated, we need to continue working with our partners in the region to
ensure they are increasing their interdiction efforts. The United
States is not the only one affected by the surge of illicit drugs. It
also affects transit countries as well. The United States and partner
nations must work hand-in-hand to meet the magnitude of the threat we
face.
It is important to note that maritime interdictions significantly
reduce the volume of drugs that U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) officers must interdict at our borders and ports of entry.
Furthermore, these maritime interdictions reduce the volume of drugs
that other Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies
must seize inside the United States.
Consistent with the Strategy's approach to drug availability
reduction, the existing Plan includes emphasis on dismantlement and
disruption of drug trafficking criminal networks. U.S. Coast Guard
maritime interdictions provide actionable investigative information and
evidence to support Federal and state conspiracy prosecutions that more
fully disrupt and dismantle these transnational drug trafficking
organizations. The Plan's Within the Border line of effort emphasizes
the importance of participation in the multi-agency task forces charged
with attacking criminal organizations. For example, the U.S. Coast
Guard and its Coast Guard Investigative Service are active and
significant partners in ONDCP's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
program and the Department of Justice's Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces program and its Maritime Strike Forces.
As we update the Plan, we must ensure that it includes and
emphasizes interdiction of illicit opioids and other drugs at postal
and express consignment ports of entry and at domestic facilities, and
that it provides guidance to NDCP agencies to adapt our interdiction
efforts to address the evolving methods that transnational criminal
organizations use. These organizations use the dark web,
cryptocurrency, and other technologically advanced means to traffic
drugs and hide illicit profits. Given this increasing level of
technological sophistication, it is important we include our domestic
interdiction agencies as part of our Within the Border line of effort
in order to attack the availability of illicit drugs at every point
along the smuggling routes.
conclusion
The maritime drug threat within the Western Hemisphere continues to
evolve, as drug trafficking organizations travel farther out to sea to
avoid U.S. Coast Guard and partner nation interdictions. Transnational
criminal organizations employ semi-submersible and low profile vessels,
as well as encrypted communications technologies, to avoid detection.
Additionally, the increased use of containerized shipping to smuggle
large quantities of drugs must also be addressed in our planning.
Shared information and intelligence between our law enforcement,
defense, and intelligence agencies will continue to drive effective
interdiction and the dismantlement of criminal organizations. Our
interdiction planning must be guided by the need to continually advance
our ability to effectively share relevant information to better
coordinate multi-agency efforts.
In my role as USIC, it is an honor to support the dedicated and
courageous men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard who expertly execute
the maritime interdiction mission in support of the Strategy. U.S.
Coast Guard efforts prevent multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs from
reaching the U.S. user population, and produce the evidence necessary
to dismantle and disrupt criminal organizations that threaten our
citizens. I appreciate the Subcommittee's attention to the importance
of the U.S. Coast Guard's drug interdiction mission.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman and we will now proceed
to Member questions. Operating under a 5-minute rule, I begin
by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
Admiral Abel, Admiral Poulin, I did have an opportunity to
visit with you all on the JIATF Operation Center down in Key
West. Very impressive. Terrific international cooperation. It
is amazing, the missions your Coasties perform, and all the
partnerships involving other elements of the U.S. military.
One of the things that strikes me is the fact--you know,
the vast area that you have responsibility for, twice the size
of the continental U.S.--including parts of the Eastern Pacific
is, I think, much more vast than people realize, and much more
important than the Caribbean, in the scheme of things, in terms
of interdiction. I am particularly interested in the fact that
we are finally moving towards some new systems to assist you in
your mission.
I know in 2018 is the first time the Coast Guard was able
to contract for some unmanned aerial systems. Can you tell me
how that is going? I know it was about a $117 million contract.
I had the opportunity to serve on the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence in another capacity, and therefore, I
have a pretty good understanding of our country's extraordinary
capabilities and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, our
ability to persist in surveillance, to identify meaningful
targets from less meaningful ones.
What is the opportunity for us to be more efficient, given
that we are only interdicting 6 percent of known drug
movements? And can you tell me how that is going, particularly
on UASs?
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. So I am very proud of the fact that
we have awarded the contract. Every one of our National
Security Cutters will have embarked a contractor-owned/
contractor-operated system aboard. And our experience is
typically they bring three or four platforms aboard to make
sure they meet the availability.
We are contracting for 180 days, which is what the ship
typically is underway for. Every single day she is underway she
will have the ability of the small UAS to do that. That puts
the technology risk and the tech refresh on the contractor to
meet our requirements. That is seeing huge advantages. Like I
mentioned, on cutter Stratton they got 24 interdictions using
the UAS--not a substitute for manned aircraft, but it certainly
can complement that.
We also have a joint customs Coast Guard MQ-9, or predator
unit, in San Angelo, Texas, that is flying to the gulf coast.
And right now she is actually deployed along the east coast of
the United States. We offer pilots and operators--CBP offers
platforms and the support, and we are both seeing the advantage
of using those types of systems in the war on narcotics, sir.
Mr. Maloney. I want to give Admiral Poulin an opportunity,
as well, but I am curious. Are you tracking--is there a metric
that we are following on that, in terms of the efficiency per
interdiction, or per pound of drugs seized? Common sense will
tell you that they are going to be a more efficient bang for
the buck once you get that stuff fully deployed, won't it?
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. So we are just sticking our toe
into this business, and so we are going to collect just that.
Because the question would be, the so what, are we a better
Coast Guard because--are we catching more drugs? Anecdotally,
we would say the answer is yes. But we will look for data to
support that, sir.
Mr. Maloney. Admiral Poulin, do you want to comment on
this?
Admiral Poulin. Mr. Chairman, having overhead surveillance
and reconnaissance aircraft is absolutely critical to the
detection and monitoring mission, and end-game interdiction.
About one-third of all cases involve overhead Maritime Patrol
Aircraft. The challenge is Maritime Patrol Aircraft have some
limited duration and dwell time, and they have to return to
base. There are crew risk factors and so forth.
So JIATF South is also looking at expanding into land base
UAS with the MQ-9s. We have got a proposal on the Hill right
now looking at MQ-9s, likely having two MQ-9s, forward-based in
AOR, and that is going to provide the persistent coverage that
we need. We think that we can get those up 24 hours to provide
persistent coverage----
Mr. Maloney. And as a percentage of that transit zone, what
are you going to be able to cover with those? Is it still a
small percent?
Admiral Poulin. Well, it will still be a small percentage,
Mr. Chairman. And I will tell you the playing field has almost
doubled. So, from what you saw, now we are seeing an increase,
almost a 60-percent increase in traffic going further south----
Mr. Maloney. Is it moving----
Admiral Poulin [continuing]. Past the Galapagos.
Mr. Maloney. Past the Galapagos?
Admiral Poulin. So what we thought was the playing field
has now doubled in size.
Mr. Maloney. Can I----
Admiral Poulin. So the persistent ISR becomes even more
critical.
Mr. Maloney. So--because I only have less than 1 minute
left, how about it, Mr. Padden? I read the 2019 Drug Control
Strategy, all 20 pages of it. I didn't see a lot about UAS in
there. What do you think?
Mr. Padden. No, sir. It didn't get specific about UASs, but
sets the broader strategy that allows for our drug control
agencies like the Coast Guard to employ the means and methods
that they think are most effective. UASs would be among those
ways and means.
Mr. Maloney. I guess question, sir, would be whether the
White House and ONDCP is going to push budget resources towards
that kind of system in the Coast Guard budget. You would be
hard pressed to find it if you looked in the budget that was
sent up here a couple of weeks ago.
Mr. Padden. Yes, sir. We support the President's budget,
and we support a multipronged and layered effort to interdict
drugs, which would include UASs in our maritime interdiction
effort, which is clearly a large piece of our interdiction
effort.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Gibbs?
Mr. Gibbs. I thank the chairman.
All three of you, in your testimony, you talk about how
important it is to get this in the transit zone and interdict
these drugs. And it makes a lot of sense.
And I know Admiral Abel has talked about a 10-percent
interdiction rate, saves 9,500 cocaine-related deaths in the
United States, and 67,000 drug-related offenders in U.S.
prisons. And it goes on.
Mr. Padden talks about maritime interdiction produces the
evidence necessary to dismantle and disrupt criminal
organizations that threaten our citizens. We are all in
concurrence that this is a very worthwhile project and
initiative.
But the budget requests don't seem to reflect that. We see,
you know--I guess the question to the admiral is why does the
Coast Guard continually not request to get funding for assets
to have more interdiction capabilities, higher than 7.4 percent
that is out there in noncommercial vessels?
And then, for Mr. Padden, the administration is trying to
fight this war on drugs. Why is the request essentially $1
billion less than appropriated levels from a year ago?
And so I would just comment. Admiral, you go first, and
then Mr. Padden.
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. The Coast Guard's budget for 2020,
the President's budget, does include a couple of initiatives to
get after this.
Number one is the Offshore Patrol Cutter. Hull number 3,
long lead time for hulls number 4 and 5. There is some money
for the ScanEagle--that is the small UAS that is on National
Security Cutters.
Also there is some innovative stuff in there: a support to
interdiction and prosecution. These are three-person teams that
we put in-country to help that country exploit a crime scene
and make sure there is a rule of law and a consequence within
their own country. One more of those. We are adding more in
DOMEX, which is where we exploit the electronics, the cell
phones, the GPSs, the laptops. Turn that around, that becomes
the intel, that becomes the 90 percent that feeds the next
interdiction case.
So all of that is in there. And finally, we are also adding
more intel analysts in our commands--in our intel centers to
get after it, as well. And two more Fast Response Cutters, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. Just a second, Mr. Padden, I just want to follow
up a little bit. In your testimony you talked about the
partnerships you have with these other countries, especially in
the transit zone. The numbers we are looking at, the
interdiction, would that partnership--what you just said--could
we anticipate those levels of interdiction going up? You know,
because we are well under 10 percent. Could we get up to
numbers that really make more sense?
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir, Ranking Member. So the struggle we
have, of course, is the denominator keeps getting bigger and
bigger. I mean we are on par this year for our fourth
consecutive year of 200 metric tons of cocaine. So we are
catching on a par of what we have caught. We are squeezing
every efficiency we can out of the existing assets that we have
on scene.
But the struggle we have is there is just more and more
that is coming out there. And like Admiral Poulin mentioned,
the area of responsibility gets bigger.
Mr. Padden. Yes, sir. To your question regarding the
allocation of resources, again we have a multilayered
interdiction plan interdicting outside of our borders, beyond
our borders, with the Coast Guard and maritime interdictions
playing a primary role at our borders and inside of our
borders. So we support resourcing the interdiction mission in
all three of those locations, because they are intertwined and
very, very necessary.
With regard to our maritime interdictions, as my colleague
has said, as Admiral Abel has said, we are working to make sure
that those interdictions that we are making provide the most
squeeze, or the most juice for the squeeze, to lead us to
prosecutions that are successful against criminal networks,
working on targeting those priority criminal networks and
developing all the evidence that we can for every interdiction.
Mr. Gibbs. I guess the followup, Admiral, and a thought,
you just said your--it is exponentially growing, the amount of
drugs coming. We have made--I know a lot of work, good work in
Colombia. So where is this increased coca products all coming
from, then? Is it going--yes, go ahead.
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. So Colombia. Colombia made some
choices on eradication a few years ago, and we are seeing the
results of that, of--the plants are mature, they are at their
max production. And therefore, it is almost predictable that
you would have this amount of production coming from Colombia.
Colombia is very good partners with us. Sixty percent of
our critical movement alerts----
Mr. Gibbs. But the amounts are still increasing from
Colombia? Is that what I am hearing you saying, that the amount
of cocaine or coca coming from Colombia is increasing? Is that
what you are saying?
Admiral Abel. It is on the rise, sir. Yes, sir. We can get
you some statistics for the record, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. OK. I just--that was interesting. Because, you
know, I thought--I know we are making good work there, but
apparently we are not winning there still.
OK, I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Pappas?
Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much to
the panel for answering these questions, and for your testimony
today, and for all the work that you do to keep us safe and to
interdict drugs.
Critically important to my State--we are experiencing the
opioid crisis about as bad as anywhere else in the United
States. We have a death rate that is three times the national
average right now. I was interested in Mr. Padden's comments
about opioids and the increasing trafficking by boat. I am
wondering if you could unpack that a little bit and let us know
what you are observing, and if that also has to do with
synthetic opioids coming from China.
Mr. Padden. Yes, sir, great question, sir. The trafficking
that we are seeing with opioids, especially the synthetics,
fentanyl and so forth, it is less on the water.
While there has been an incident or two where fentanyl has
been seized as part of a maritime interdiction, it is really
not coming to the United States that way. It is coming across
our southern border in both powder and pill form, and it is
coming through our postal and express consignment package
facilities. And there is increased efforts to work in a
multiagency manner to target those entry points, particularly
at the postal and parcel facilities, working with our express
consignment carriers to help better target those packages
coming in.
That is going to be a change in focus and emphasis in the
upcoming national interdiction plan, as this threat has really
evolved since the last time that the plan was issued.
Mr. Pappas. As we focus on the transit zone in terms of
interdiction efforts, are we missing smaller crafts that are
bringing shipments of synthetic opioids directly from Mexico to
the U.S.?
Admiral Poulin. Sir, if I could take that one, we are not
seeing increased maritime shipments of synthetic opioids from
the transit zone. As Mr. Padden said, that is just not the way
it is shipped. It is usually coming in as a precursor into
Mexico, synthesized, and then transited or trafficked in other
ways.
But I think there is an important point here, sir. Cocaine
has become the delivery vehicle of choice for synthetic
opioids. Over 70 percent of cocaine overdose deaths involve
fentanyl. So cocaine laced with fentanyl, cocaine used with
fentanyl, et cetera. So it is not easy to just divorce the two
problems. I think the two problems are inextricably linked. So
even though we are not seeing any kind of movement of opioids
by sea, we have got to remain in the cocaine fight.
Mr. Pappas. I was recently with the captain and crew of the
cutter Tahoma in Portsmouth Harbor, New Hampshire. And they
were sharing some of their observations about the increasing
technology of the cartels, and how it has been difficult to
keep pace.
Could you comment a little bit about what we are seeing out
there with respect to their advancing technology? You mentioned
UAS and some other innovations that you hope to deploy. But how
are we going to keep pace over time?
Admiral Abel. Sir, so these multinational corporations that
are TCOs are going to leverage every technology they can: GPS
trackers on their vessels, the drugs, encrypted comms. The good
news is what they rely on can become a vulnerability.
So I mentioned DOMEX, which is document and media
exploitation. We are getting more and more into that business,
which is taking everything we can off the electronics, turning
that back around, feeding that in with basically what we get
from the interviews with the folks, the suspects that we have
collected. And then that drives what our tactics are for the
next takedown. So we are using technology to find them, and we
are using technology against them.
Admiral Poulin. Sir, if I could just offer that----
Mr. Pappas. Yes, sir.
Admiral Poulin. We face a very agile adversary with these
drug trafficking organizations. They will make adjustments as
we make adjustments.
One of the things that we are seeing is a change in tactics
moving from go-fast to low-profile go-fast vessels, and the
increased use of semi-submersibles, which are harder to detect.
And it goes back to the chairman's point, that we are only able
to detect a small percentage of movement, only target about 20
percent of movement.
Mr. Pappas. Well, thank you. I know this committee stands
ready to work with you to try to get a step ahead and try to
improve those numbers. So let us know how we can help. Thank
you.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Weber?
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Abel, in your comments earlier you talked about
three things that were necessary. And you said intel cueing,
patrol aircraft, and afloat presence. Do you have those divided
out in the budget, how much money is allocated to each of
those?
Admiral Abel. Sir, we can certainly get that for you. I
know that our aircraft, the helicopters, there is an investment
this year with our acquisition money to upgrade the
helicopters. The patrol aircraft, both the C-27s and the C-
144s, are getting sensors and increased capability to do that.
We are also, on the operating side, we are going to go one
more helicopter presence with the helicopter that shoots from
the back of the cutter. We have increased that, as well. And we
have more intel folks that we are going to be adding on to that
particular--so we are adding onto the intel side, document and
media exploitation, helicopters, and then, of course, the
Offshore Patrol Cutter is the platform that carries them all.
Mr. Weber. OK, if you don't mind getting me those numbers,
get with my office a little later.
You said that the Guard was on track to interdict 200-plus
metric tons of cocaine seizures. When you do that, if--and you
also mentioned, I think, cash, and one of you mentioned getting
the sums of cash, or whatever it was. Where does that money go?
In other words, if you interdict a drug trade, and the guy
has got a $100,000 in cash, whatever, where does that money go?
Admiral Abel. I think Mr. Padden is going to take that one.
Mr. Weber. OK. He has it in his back pocket, does he?
Mr. Padden. Yes, sir. Whenever cash is seized, bulk
currency is seized, whether it is through a maritime
interdiction, or at our borders, or within the country, it is a
law enforcement seizure, and it goes through forfeiture
proceedings. If it is coming from a Department of Homeland
Security agency, it will go to the Treasury Asset Forfeiture
Fund. If it comes from a Department of Justice seizure, it will
go to the Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture Fund.
Mr. Weber. I am aware--and I didn't get to shake your hand,
Mr. Padden, I apologize, I thought we were running shorter on
time.
But I am aware of at the local level, for example--I am
from Texas--when a lot of that money is seized it can go back
to the different agencies. Do we get that money back to the
Coast Guard for investment in those kinds of assets? Do you
know?
Mr. Padden. Sir, I will find out the answer to that and get
back.
Mr. Weber. I mean it would make sense to me. I mean, if we
are getting--if we are interdicting drugs, and we are getting
the fruit of their efforts, however small or large that might
be, it ought to go back to the agency. So you can find that and
get back to my office?
Mr. Padden. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weber. OK. And then, Admiral Poulin, you said--I have
been to JIATF South. I went--I think it was 1 or 2 years ago
with the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology on the way
down to look at some telescopes and stuff down in South
America. We stopped there on Key West. We went through
Colombia. And I remember seeing a map of--it looks like the
targets all around, and you--and they were being tracked.
So two questions. Have you--do you know the percentages--of
the governments that are helping us, Colombia, and you can go
right down the list, and it was quite impressive, by the way,
the coordination and cooperation as we viewed it--are they
spending an inordinate amount of money in helping support this
drug interdiction? Or are we spending the most of it? Do we
know those percentages from those different countries?
Admiral Poulin. Sir, we have data on that and I will get
back to you. But let me answer the question this way. Colombia
is our strongest partner in the region.
I recently visited Colombia, I met with the head of the
Caribbean fleet and also the Pacific fleets. And I tell you
that the sailors there are fully committed to the counterdrug
mission. As I mentioned in my opening statement, President
Duque has increased eradication by over 50 percent.
And I think there is another point to emphasize here.
Colombia is just not all in with their treasure and their
assets. They are in with their blood. Just this past year there
have been a number of deaths involved with IEDs for those that
are trying to eradicate the cocaine. I think the number is 8
deaths and upwards of almost 30 injured, some of those
permanently disabled because they are amputees. Not only that,
Colombia is bringing the fight to the ELN, FARC dissidents, and
drug trafficking organizations, and they are taking casualties,
sir. So they are a strong partner and they are all in on this
counterdrug fight.
Mr. Weber. OK, that is good to hear.
And then, Admiral Abel, you said also that they are
starting to rely on more and more electronics. And by doing
that, it is becoming a liability because we are able to take
advantage of--explain that. Elaborate on that.
Admiral Abel. Well, sir, I really can't get into too much
of that in the unclassified level. I would be happy to give you
a brief on how we can certainly use it at sea. But then it is
exploited when it is collected as evidence after the
interdiction.
Mr. Weber. Do they get tracking devices on their semi-
submersibles?
Admiral Poulin. I am sorry. The question again, sir?
Mr. Weber. Do they get tracking devices on their semi-
submersibles when--you know, semi-submerged?
Admiral Poulin. Sir, the drug trafficking organizations
will use whatever technique they can to avoid detection,
leverage technology. We are trying to leverage technology, as
well.
Mr. Weber. OK. Well, I appreciate you all, wish you all the
best, and we are glad to be somehow able to help. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Brown?
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for being here today, and your
testimony. And let me start by just saying that I truly
appreciate the work of the men and women in the United States
Coast Guard, and the men and women of the U.S. Southern
Command, and the work that you are doing on behalf of our
Nation.
But this will be the second time in the same number of
hearings with the Coast Guard where I have expressed grave
concerns about the extent of what we, as a nation, ask you to
do. I think you are spread much too thin.
We heard testimony in the last hearing before this
subcommittee about your participation in freedom of navigation
missions to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. I just came
from a National Security Conference in Singapore. I get the
importance of that mission, but I question whether or not the
Coast Guard should be in the Strait of Taiwan in the South
China Sea, when the Navy, which has a budget 200 percent of
your budget, ought to be doing that.
Earlier this year Admiral Schultz, in his State of the
Coast Guard, recognizing that you are a modestly funded
organization, stated that you are approaching a tipping point,
and not only because of an aging fleet, but also because of a
very small operating budget.
So, while the Coast Guard may have resources to interdict
20 to 30 percent of drugs flowing through the transit zone, the
GAO noted that, for the period in fiscal years 2009 to 2013,
the Coast Guard deployed cutters used for drug interdiction for
fewer days than planned, and that Maritime Patrol Aircraft
hours were below target levels. These factors likely
contributed to the lower actual percentage of cocaine removed.
Since fiscal year 2009 the Coast Guard has set its own
internal annual performance target for cocaine removal from
noncommercial vessels in the transit zone. The Service has
achieved its performance target only once since fiscal year
2009. And for fiscal year 2018 the Coast Guard set its annual
performance target for cocaine removal at 10 percent. This is
the lowest the Coast Guard has set its annual performance
targets since fiscal year 2010.
Several factors impact the ability of the task force to
meet the drug interdiction performance targets. One of them is
the inability of allied nations to consistently commit assets,
and the other is the insufficient inventory of vessels and
aircraft available to support operations.
So my question, Admiral Abel and whoever would like to join
in the response, can you talk a little bit about the allied
nations' inability to consistently commit assets? And can you
speak to--and that is probably where I would really like you to
focus, because I think you have already begun to address the
insufficient inventory of vessels. But tell us about our allied
partners.
Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. I will go ahead and start.
We have tremendous partnerships in the region. As I
mentioned in my opening statement, Interagency Task Force South
has up to 20 partner nations that are participating with
representatives in JIATF South, helping us with detection and
monitoring. We have great relationships with almost all the
countries in the region that are in some way affected by
illegal narcotics.
I will give you a couple of vignettes. Guatemala has made
maximum use of some of the 37-foot Boston Whalers that the U.S.
helped them procure. They are taking those Boston Whalers out
200 miles to interdict illegal narcotics. And we have seen the
interdiction rates for Guatemala skyrocket. They are being very
effective. Same with Costa Rica. Costa Rica just participated
in a joint international operation run by JIATF South. That
operation, a 45-day operation, interdicted 36 metric tons.
Costa Rica was involved in 10 of those metric tons.
Mr. Brown. So let me just jump in here, and I definitely
appreciate the illustrations of where they are doing well. But
is it accurate to say that the inability of allied nations to
consistently commit assets is what is one of the contributing
factors to our inability to meet performance goals for drug
interdiction?
Admiral Poulin. Sir, many of our partner nations have
limited capacity, just as we have limited capacity to only
target 20 percent of known movement. So there is a limited
capacity throughout the region.
Mr. Brown. OK. You know, I am not trying to get into the,
like, are they doing 2 percent of the GDP, like we do, you
know, with our NATO allies in Europe. But if our allies in the
region aren't doing it, and you guys are spread way too thin--
you are doing a wonderful job, but we are asking you to do a
little bit too much. We need to get our allies to step up a
little bit more.
Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. And maybe the best way to answer
the question is that JIATF South is sourced at about 29 percent
of their ship requirements and about 21 percent of their
aviation requirements. We need more ships and we need more
planes. Those can be U.S. ships, U.S. planes, partner nation
planes, and partner nation ships.
Mr. Brown. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
Mrs. Miller?
Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Chairman Maloney and Ranking Member
Gibbs. And I want to thank you all on the panel for being here
today. And I also want to thank you sincerely for the hard work
you do to protect all of us from this terrible thing that is
happening.
Like many communities in the country, my district has been
ravaged by illegal drugs from the foreign countries. While the
panel is focused more on cocaine smuggling, I worry about the
opioids and fentanyl that I feel may soon be entering the
country in a very similar manner. As President Trump and many
of us here in Congress work to secure the southern border and
improve detection technology at the ports of entry, opioid
smugglers may turn to tactics used by the cartels to traffic
these dangerous drugs in our communities.
So my question is very similar to ones that have been asked
before. Currently, the main illegal drug seized by the Coast
Guard is cocaine. In my district in southern West Virginia,
which is ground zero of the opioid epidemic, as the President
fights to secure the southern border and stop the flow of
dangerous drugs, is it possible that smugglers of opioids and
fentanyl will turn to those tactics used by cocaine smugglers
to transport opioids through the transit zone to the United
States? And is there anything that Congress can do to help? Any
one of you.
Mr. Padden. I will start, ma'am--a great question. As I
think we said previously, and as you note, we are not currently
seeing it come by the water, but it certainly is a means that
could be employed. I think currently what we are seeing--and I
would defer to my colleagues, my shipmates up here on the panel
more specifically about the Coast Guard efforts in the Pacific
side of INDOPACOM. But I think we are seeing precursor chemical
movements by sea coming from China and the Western Pacific
region to places like Mexico, where fentanyl is being produced.
However, the smuggling route of finished fentanyl coming to
the United States is currently dominantly the U.S.-Mexico
border. So our efforts to interdict finished fentanyl are
properly placed along the southern border. And we are
increasing our efforts at postal and parcel facilities, because
we are seeing direct shipments from China coming by those
means.
I think we do need to keep in mind the potential for the
sea lanes to be used to move finished fentanyl; we are just not
seeing it right now.
Admiral Abel. And we do have a joint task force, Joint Task
Force West, that is out in Hawaii that looks at precursor
chemicals coming from Asia. So that pretty much is their focus.
But, as Mr. Padden said, these smuggling networks, they
will seek a profit. And if there is a profit in it, and they
get into this business, then they may be in the business. But
we are not seeing it right now.
Admiral Poulin. Yes, ma'am. I, obviously, agree with Mr.
Padden and Vice Admiral Abel. These drug trafficking
organizations will take advantage of any opportunity that they
can, and they will take advantage of the permissive
environments that exist. So we are watching this very closely.
Joint Interagency Task Force South has a great relationship
with Joint Interagency Task Force West, which Vice Admiral Abel
mentioned. So we are in close collaboration, watching trends.
We are watching the problem very, very closely, ma'am.
Mrs. Miller. Vice Admiral Abel, I want to thank the brave
men and women of the Coast Guard for their tireless efforts to
stop the flow of the dangerous drugs in our country.
What are the biggest hurdles that the Coast Guard faces in
meeting the performance targets for cocaine removal in the
close future?
Admiral Abel. Well, probably both--we are looking at
readiness and recap, which is both of what we need right now.
Our aging fleet that I mentioned, the fact that cutter
Dauntless is my age, and I know what my age is, and I am in my
fifties, and so is she. We need to get on--that is--those are
the patrol cars of this fight.
Also, the Coast Guard, on the readiness side, is on the
operating expenses. As a branch of the Armed Forces we have not
benefitted from some of the rise in operating budget that we
would hope. Our fellow services have seen about a 12 percent,
and the Coast Guard has been about 4 percent.
We appreciate the recent hurricane supplemental that was
passed last year, last year's budget. We understand there is a
supplemental that may get passed soon. We appreciate the House
and the Senate working on that, as well.
And I would say the last thing that we are struggling with,
candidly, is we are still restocking and we are still getting
dry docks and port side availabilities and parts that we need
from a 35-day lapse of appropriation. We took a major hit. Our
goal is to be hurricane-ready this summer, based on the impact
of that lapse of appropriation.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you so much.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentlewoman. Before I proceed to
Mr. Garamendi, I just want to point out for the record my
colleague from Maryland, Mr. Brown, mentioned that the Coast
Guard budget--that the Navy budget is 200 percent of the Coast
Guard budget. I think he meant that it is 20 times the Coast
Guard budget, north of $200 billion when you factor in OCO
funding, the base budget of about $170 billion, I believe, in
the Navy. Yours is about $11 billion requested, so I am sure
you would appreciate having half the Navy's budget.
But, excuse me, Mr. Lowenthal has returned. Welcome back,
sir.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. I appreciate that. It is good to
be back.
Admiral Abel, you know, thank you for your testimony, and
also for the Coast Guard's continued efforts, as we have heard
here today, to combat drug trafficking and criminal activity on
the high seas.
And I am pleased that in March, Admiral Schultz announced
that the first two Offshore Patrol Cutters will be home-ported
at Base Los Angeles-Long Beach, which is immediately adjacent
to my district. And I thank you for that. And I know these
cutters will provide the capability that the Coast Guard needs
to continue this important mission.
What you have mentioned today and also in your testimony,
you highlight the importance of partnerships, especially with
our Central American neighbors, to carry out the Coast Guard's
drug interdiction mission. As you note, two-thirds of the
interdictions in fiscal year 2018 were facilitated by an
agreement with our international partners.
So I have a question with two parts. First part is what can
Congress do to support the Coast Guard's efforts to strengthen
these relationships that you have with our partner countries?
And I am also concerned about our foreign aid to the Northern
Triangle countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Has
the President's plan to suspend payments to these countries
affected the Coast Guard's ability to build partnerships? So
the first one is what can we do, and has the potential shutting
off of foreign aid to these countries, how will that affect
your partnerships?
Admiral Poulin. Sir, let me maybe start responding to that
question.
Mr. Lowenthal. Which part?
Admiral Poulin. The issue of partnerships, sir.
Mr. Lowenthal. They were all--both partnerships. One is
what we can do to strengthen them, and the other one is have we
seen now, with cutting off of foreign aid, going to affect----
Admiral Poulin. So with respect to what Congress can do, as
I mentioned in my opening statement, sir, I think it is
important for Members to get down and meet with our partner
nations, see what they are doing, get an appreciation, a more
indepth appreciation for how committed our partner nations are.
With respect to the second question, sir, about our
partnerships with Central American nations----
Mr. Lowenthal. And the cutting off of aid, foreign aid.
Admiral Poulin. Sir, what I can say is that we maintain
strong military-to-military relationships with our South
American and Central American partners.
I mentioned some of the successes with Costa Rica, the
successes with Guatemala. We have a forward operating base in
Soto Cano in Honduras that is critical for us to do all of our
missions in the SOUTHCOM AOR: humanitarian assistance, disaster
relief, attacking transnational organized crime. We have got a
cooperative security location in Comalapa, El Salvador. So our
partnerships with the militaries in the region are very, very
strong, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. I would like to ask now Admiral
Abel. Can you tell me how cutting off our foreign aid
potentially could impact these partnerships? And what should we
do, here in Congress?
Admiral Abel. Well, sir, as far as what Congress can do to
help these partnerships, the first part of your question, step
one would be presence matters in these countries, which means
the Coast Guard needs the aircraft, the small boats, the larger
ships to do that.
Also, the fact that, as we recap, we are finding with Costa
Rica excess defense articles--which is a nice way of saying our
retired cutters--become a major force multiplier for these
countries. So, as we recap, we can hand down these assets and
the support with that, as well, sir.
So Steve mentioned the mil-to-mil relationship we have with
these countries. That is still very tight, and we still see a
unity of effort----
Mr. Lowenthal. I just have 1 minute left, so I want you to
follow--have you noticed anything with the President saying
that we are going to cut off foreign aid to the Northern
Triangle countries--has that impacted our relationships? And
that is to Admiral Abel.
Admiral Abel. Sir, I don't work with these countries on a
daily basis. I do not know of any change in our relationship
with them. Admiral Poulin certainly is a lot closer with them.
Mr. Lowenthal. Well, I would like to follow that in the
future.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. Mr. Larsen, do you have any questions, or are
we proceeding to Mr. Garamendi?
Mr. Larsen. I will pass. I have got a markup at 11 o'clock.
So I will pass and follow up with QFRs.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
California is recognized.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Larsen, thank you very much. I owe you
one. And I know you will collect an additional one.
I want to get at this issue that was just raised by Mr.
Lowenthal. There is a very serious question of priorities. In
fact, Mr. Lowenthal, we do make choices here. And we make those
choices in conjunction with the President. The President
intends to spend some $8 billion building a wall. And the
question really revolves how best to spend our taxpayer
resources. Is it best to spend it on a wall?
So therefore, the question of cocaine into the United
States, does it come via the ocean, the water, or does it come
via the land? And if it comes via the land, how does it get
here? This is a question for Mr. Padden.
Mr. Padden. Yes, sir. Thank you. Cocaine is flowing to our
country, both on the water and across our borders. So it is not
exclusively----
Mr. Garamendi. When it comes across the borders does it
come through the ports of entry, or does it come through a
trail across a desert?
Mr. Padden. It comes predominantly through the ports of
entry. But it does come from all points across the border.
Mr. Garamendi. What does predominantly----
Mr. Padden. Organizations do----
Mr. Garamendi. What does predominantly mean? Is that 70,
80, 100, 90 percent?
Mr. Padden. I am sorry, sir. Could you repeat the question?
Mr. Garamendi. You used the word ``predominantly'' through
the ports of entry. Put a percentage to that.
Mr. Padden. I will need to get back to you with a more
accurate percentage, but it is----
Mr. Garamendi. Take a shot. You used ``predominantly.'' I
suppose that is more than 50 percent.
Mr. Padden. More dominantly, I would say over 80 percent is
coming through the ports of entry.
Mr. Garamendi. Ports of entry. So if we are going to deal
with drugs entering the United States through the land, then it
is really the ports of entry that we need to spend the money
on. Is that correct?
Mr. Padden. Sir, as I have testified before----
Mr. Garamendi. Let me just say my view is that is correct.
If it is 80 percent of the drugs are coming through the port of
entry, spend your money--spend 80 percent there, not 100
percent or 80 percent on the walls.
Secondly----
Mr. Padden. Sir?
Mr. Garamendi. With regard to the oceans, it was said that
some 20 percent--the Coast Guard is able to interdict some 20
percent. That was 19, 17, 20 percent, in that range. Let's just
say 20 percent. Is that OK, about right?
Admiral Abel. Sir, right now we intercept and action 20
percent of the known drug flow that we know about.
Mr. Garamendi. And then there is more that you don't know
about. But OK, let's just say 20 percent. So that means you are
doing some 200 metric tons--so we have some 800 to 1,000 metric
tons of cocaine coming into the United States through the
oceans. Is that correct?
Admiral Abel. Sir, every day JIATF South has to make trade-
off decisions. They have five or six vessels that they can
action, and they have probably got 20 to 25 known targets with
intel that they are moving in the transit zone.
Mr. Garamendi. So, once again, this is about choices. And
we make those choices, as well as the President. The President
has chosen to spend some $8 billion on border walls, some
smaller amount on enhancing the ports of entry. And yet we have
some 800 metric tons of cocaine that is not interdicted that
enters over the water. I think that is about the way the
percentages work out.
So if we are interdicting 200 metric tons, and that is 20
percent, then we ought to multiply by 5, which would give us
something near 1,000 metric tons. Correct?
Admiral Poulin. Well, sir, we----
Mr. Garamendi. Well, that----
Admiral Poulin. I want to be careful on the statistics,
because about 60 percent of movement out of the Andean Ridge
lands first in Mexico or Guatemala. So there aren't direct
shipments, per se, to the United States. There are some, but
most of it first lands in either Mexico or Central America.
Mr. Garamendi. And then you interdict both after it leaves
Guatemala, as well as when it gets to Guatemala. You interdict
both sides of it. So the point is still there is about 800
metric tons of cocaine that you don't interdict. And we have
already heard testimony that your budget is insufficient.
It is just a matter of choices. What I am making here is an
argument that we are spending the money in the wrong place.
Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. I want to----
Admiral Poulin. To be clear on that, the statistics, we
target--we can only target 20 percent of known movement. The
interdiction is 6 percent.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, that makes my numbers even more--in
any case, it is a question of choices. And what is going on
here is the U.S. Government is making the wrong choice. It is
spending the money in the wrong place. If it is about drugs
then we have got to spend the money with the Coast Guard, and
we have got to spend the money helping those countries--
Guatemala, Colombia, and the Central American countries--beef
up their own police, which you have made the argument already.
My time is up. Thank you very much, and I appreciate Mr.
Larsen's----
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. We have time for a
second round of questioning, so I would proceed to that round,
5 minutes each. I would recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Gentlemen, just following up on that point, how many Coast
Guard personnel are currently deployed to the southern border
as part of recent border security operations?
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. As of this morning we had 155 Coast
Guard members that are down there: medical team, general
purpose, helping on the border. We have a helicopter that is
occasionally flying from Corpus Christi, and some small boats
that are running up and down the Rio Grande, sir.
Mr. Maloney. And what would that typically be? What does
that represent, in terms of what would normally be deployed? Is
anything normally deployed from the Coast Guard?
Admiral Abel. No, sir. This is unique, but----
Mr. Maloney. So that is a new mission for the Coast Guard.
Admiral Abel. This is why there is a Department of Homeland
Security. We are helping our shipmates in CBP and Border
Patrol, just as their P3s helped us in the hurricane last fall
and last summer. We are helping them. Out of a force of 42,000
active, 8,000 civilian, and 6,600 Reserves, I think 155 is a
reasonable number, sir, and we are not seeing a huge impact on
our operations.
Mr. Maloney. I understand. What would those personnel
normally be doing?
Admiral Abel. Sir, the helicopter crews are deploying out
of Corpus Christi; that is their home. The boat crews are from
maritime safety and security teams from all around the Nation.
They are bringing boats and bringing their capacity down there.
As far as the general purpose that are helping in the actual
processing centers, those are volunteers from around the Coast
Guard.
Mr. Maloney. And let me ask you a different version of Mr.
Garamendi's question, because I don't want to put you on the
hook for making policy decisions that aren't yours to make, or
that you are simply in the position of having to implement--and
quite properly so, that is your job. But if I gave you $1
billion in addition to the $11 billion you have requested, what
would we do with that $1 billion?
Admiral Abel. Sir, it would have to be a mix of operations
and recap, because both of those are what we are struggling
with right now. The day-to-day maintenance of aging assets,
getting what we need for our workforce, as well as buying the
future of the Coast Guard. So it would be recap, as well as
operations.
Mr. Maloney. And if I gave you $1 billion simply for drug
interdiction efforts specifically--so forget the Polar Security
Cutter and the other things that we all care about up here, as
well. But if we were just talking about drug interdiction, if
we were talking about border security more broadly, what would
the Coast Guard do with $1 billion?
Admiral Abel. Sir, I mentioned the Offshore Patrol Cutters.
We have got to get after that. That is--those Medium Endurance
Cutters, 70 percent of the presence, they are aging, they are
expensive. We are losing the operational days on those. We have
to get after that.
Aircraft, I mentioned the triangle. Intel aircraft, patrol
aircraft, and then the helicopters on the back of the cutter,
as well as the small boats on the back of the cutter. All of
those need investment.
Mr. Maloney. Well, your entire drone program is $117
million, isn't that correct? The entire drone program, the UAS
we were speaking about earlier, it is $117 million at this
point, right?
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. That is a multiyear contract,
though. That is not just this year. But it is an investment in
the future. Yes, sir.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you, great point. So how many years is
that over?
Admiral Abel. I can get back with you. I believe it is a 7-
year contract, but I can get back with you on the terms of the
contract. I am not----
Mr. Maloney. We could increase our unmanned aerial
capability by an order of magnitude with several hundred
million dollars, let alone $1 billion. Fair to say, right?
Admiral Abel. We would need the platforms that they operate
from, though. We--the smaller cutters don't have the room to
have a UAS and a helicopter. And certainly the armed helicopter
is part of the----
Mr. Maloney. I understand the complexity, Admiral. I am
talking about $1 billion. We could have contractor-owned-and-
operated systems that don't even involve Coast Guard ships,
right? We could have a series of platforms out there, or
barges, or contractor-operated vessels that were operating
drones that were just feeding intelligence to the Coast Guard
operation center JIATF, right?
You would be happy to have the data, right? And if we were
better at distinguishing it, we could increase the number that
Admiral Poulin has talked about if we also had the assets to go
get them. Isn't that fair to say?
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. And, as I mentioned, we already
have experience with the MQ-9 with the joint unit that we have
with Customs.
Mr. Maloney. In fact, one of the great capabilities you
have are those kids who run those boats out and shoot the
motors out of those drug vessels. I got to meet some of them.
But when you think about it, there is no reason we couldn't do
that with an unmanned platform in the future, isn't that
correct? With the right eyes-on, human operator, but remotely
operating an unarmed drone, we could do that, too, couldn't we?
Admiral Abel. Sir, I really don't want to speculate about
use of force. It took a lot to get Department of Justice
approval for the armed aircraft that we have, and the accuracy
of our marksmen, and to make sure that there is no collateral
damage when we do employ use of force.
Mr. Maloney. Yes, that is right. But a kid in the back of a
boat with a gun shooting out a motor is not a lot different
than a kid with a joystick operating a gun on a drone, just for
the record. Because they are both highly trained and highly
capable and follow extraordinarily rigid procedures around use
of lethal force.
So Mr. Padden, just put in a plea for the fact that--the
point Mr. Garamendi, I believe, was trying to make is that
these dollars we are throwing at border wall construction that
are coming out of other military priorities are desperately
needed in the drug war that is being fought right now by the
gentlemen to your left.
But I see my time is expired. Mr. Gibbs?
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you. One thing I would just say, we have
heard a lot about how you are increasing your capabilities to
gather intelligence and everything. That is good. But the
problem is if you don't have the assets to go on and interdict
before you get the intelligence, it is counterproductive.
The Offshore Patrol Cutters, there was the 2019 budget
hearing for recapitalization--awarded a contract for the OPC.
And there was supposed to be a report last Friday--because we
had the hurricane go through there, it was being--and the
surrounding area was being built--and the report was supposed
to talk about the delays and the cost overruns. Did that
report--is it finalized?
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. I am not the acquisition expert
here. But as the operator I can tell you we do need the OPC.
The material was submitted from Eastern Shipbuilding. It is
being reviewed by the United States Coast Guard, and we will
make the decision that is in the best interest of the United
States Government, based on the material we have received.
Mr. Gibbs. Will that report be submitted to the committee,
the report that was supposed to be due last Friday?
Admiral Abel. Sir, it has some contract-sensitive material.
We certainly can consider such.
Mr. Gibbs. OK. I got other--I am trying to get through
this, but we had the High Endurance Cutters, mostly at the end
of their useful life, right? And then the OPCs are going to
replace them, if I got that right. And then the Medium
Endurance Cutters. And then we have the question about
maintenance on them to extend their life for them while we
wait. And so there are all these other vessels.
I guess my question is on the medium cutters, close that
gap--the OPCs are built, you know, what are we doing to help
close that gap, and how many days conducting those missions are
currently lost each year--the unavailability of the Coast Guard
assets planned and mission days?
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. As I mentioned, last year we lost
300 cutter days. That is equivalent to two cutters.
The two dozen vessels that constitute the Medium Endurance
Cutter fleet, the 210-foot cutters circa 1960s, we don't see a
need to recap or do any service-life extension on them.
The 270s, which are circa 1980s, we do have a plan to do a
service-life extension program. In fact, in our 2020 budget it
is about $11 million to start that program. The goal was the
first one of those hulls will go into that program in 2023. We
are dovetailing it closely with when the OPCs should be showing
up, so we don't see too much of a dip in capacity. And we
anticipate the Coast Guard yard in Curtis Bay will do the work
on major systems of the 270s that need to have a recap. That is
our plan at this point, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. OK, because I am just trying to drive home the
fact that we need to get more assets out there, so we got to
have--I think one of the criticisms that can be made--the Coast
Guard's long-term planning issue--hasn't been any long-term
planning where it really should be.
Is there any capability from contracting or leasing vessels
from the private sector? Like, for example, the oil and gas
industry, if there is a little bit of downturn there, to help
the Coast Guard get more assets out there with Coast Guard
crews to get the vessels that--to kind of fill a void? Is there
any consideration of that, or is that a possibility?
Admiral Abel. Sir, we certainly could take a look at that.
There are some issues, being a warship, a law enforcement
vessel from which you do use of force and things like that. I
know our friends in JIATF South do have a leased vessel that is
doing logistics to enable the Coast Guard cutters to remain on
station and be more effective.
Admiral Poulin. Sir, if I could just add to that, the naval
combatants are absolutely essential to the detection and
monitoring and end-game mission. I mentioned before that we
need more ships and aircraft.
Mr. Gibbs. Yes.
Admiral Poulin. We need more Navy ships and we need more
Coast Guard ships. We are very pleased that we will likely get
a littoral combat ship working for the SOUTHCOM in the SOUTHCOM
AOR this year. I was just up in Mayport, I got a chance to tour
the littoral combat ship with Admiral Faller. I think that is
going to be an incredible capability. Still not enough, but,
again, we are looking for ways to shore up those gaps that we
have in maritime assets.
Mr. Gibbs. OK. Just one quick question. We talked about the
communication systems, the deepwater legacy. What is the status
of that? There was talk previously in previous hearings about
that, and I didn't know if it had really been implemented, or
what is the status----
Admiral Abel. You are saying as far as communication
systems to and from our cutters?
Mr. Gibbs. Yes, the whole integrated system.
Admiral Abel. Yes, sir. Obviously, like any modern
organization, you know, IT is your spinal cord. And if you
can't connect, you can't play.
Mr. Gibbs. That is right.
Admiral Abel. This budget, our 2020 budget, is the first
time the Coast Guard has put dedicated acquisition money in
there to recap our mission enterprise, which is how we can act,
how the system works, the backroom stuff. We are looking at
using the cloud, all these various ways of doing it. But we are
going from just repairing the existing software and hardware we
have to recapping and looking the next generation forward to
make sure that spinal cord is well connected amongst our
assets.
Mr. Gibbs. Which I think would be really essential in the
interdiction efforts, correct?
I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. Thank you. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Lowenthal?
Mr. Lowenthal. Yes, I will be brief. I think we have done
an excellent job, the panel, in terms of talking about the
needs of the Coast Guard, unmet needs, what the budget will
entail.
Also, on the importance--I think Admiral Poulin and also
Admiral Abel talking about the importance of relationships with
our Central American neighbors. I want to--and I think we have
done--adequately covered that.
But I want to switch the topic a little bit, because I
think, Admiral Poulin, you mentioned in your testimony the
expanding influence of Russia and China in our hemisphere. And
we really haven't talked that much--and I am particularly
concerned, as one who represents the port area of Long Beach,
and--China's investments in ports and maritime infrastructure,
especially around the Panama Canal.
Can you tell us what you are doing to combat this, what
SOUTHCOM is doing to promote transparency, and how you are
dealing with this growing presence of both Russia and
especially China in our region? Explain that to us.
Admiral Poulin. Thank you for the question, sir. We are
very concerned with the growing influence of both China and
Russia in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, the Western
Hemisphere.
Mr. Lowenthal. Yes.
Admiral Poulin. I did bring with me two placemats that
capture what we see as the growth and influence, and I am happy
to share these with the committee, and I will leave these
behind.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you.
Admiral Poulin. But what we are seeing is an increased
intent to sort of crowd out the United States as a partner of
choice in this region.
If you look at China alone, to your point about port
investments, they have invested in about 60 port projects in
the region. That is significant. They are----
Mr. Lowenthal. How many projects have we supported?
Admiral Poulin. What I can tell you is 60 port projects is
a lot, and they are on both sides of the Panama Canal, sir.
Mr. Lowenthal. Got it.
Admiral Poulin. So it is a great concern to us. The amount
of investment that they are doing in infrastructure, the IT
investment from Huawei and ZTE, which creates complications for
us because that is now becoming a backbone of the IT
infrastructure for many of our partner nations, compromises our
ability to get in there and work with them about security
concerns.
Russia's malign influence is growing, as well. They are
mounting a huge disinformation campaign, changing the narrative
about the goodwill and the good work that the United States is
doing.
China is supporting the Venezuelan regime. They are the
largest creditor of Venezuela, $20 billion in loans and about
$1 billion in providing military equipment.
Russia and Cuba are malign actors, as well, that are
propping up the illegitimate Maduro regime.
So those are just some small examples of how concerned we
are about their influence. What we can do about it, sir, is we
become good partners. Presence matters. Presence matters a
whole lot. We need to continue to do international military
education and training to make enduring partnerships in the
region. We need to continue to be present with assets. We need
to continue to be present with our special operations forces
doing training. Military-to-military engagement and persistent
presence is absolutely essential to making sure that we retain
our status as a partner of choice and limit opportunities for
malign influence by Russia and China.
Mr. Lowenthal. I want to ask Admiral Abel--I say again
that, as I said before, the cutting off of foreign aid at a
time when we are watching our enemies investing tremendously in
this region is very frightening to me.
Admiral Abel, do you have anything else to add?
Admiral Abel. So just to add on to what Admiral Poulin
mentioned, the Coast Guard offers a very good model for these
partner countries. If we have some excess defense articles that
we can transfer to them, we can teach them on the maintenance,
and if they model their coast guards or their navies like the
United States Coast Guard, that is a good fit. The United
States Navy, with large ships, is pretty intimidating. It is
not a model that fits well with many of these Central and South
American countries.
So the nation-building that our Coast Guard can do is just
that, a force that is a little law enforcement, a little search
and rescue, a little marine environmental protection. And the
goal would be let's model that kind of a service for these
countries, a maritime protection service.
Mr. Lowenthal. But you are also seeing the rise of China
and Russia in the region. Is that not true?
Admiral Abel. Absolutely, sir. I think Admiral Poulin
characterized it well, which is checkbook diplomacy, as well as
trying to squeeze out the United States. We need to be the
partner of choice in this hemisphere.
Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. And if I could just add, the
predatory lending practices of China are profound. About 19 of
33 countries in the region have joined their Belt and Road
Initiative. That is a huge concern of ours.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. Are there any further
questions from members of the subcommittee?
Seeing none, I would like to thank the witnesses for their
testimony.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that the two
placemats provided by Admiral Poulin be made part of the record
of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information is on pages 47-49.]
Mr. Maloney. I would also point out to the members of the
subcommittee and to others that the subcommittee will be
holding a hearing on China and the One Belt, One Road
Initiative, particularly in the region, and the relevance for
the issues of concern to this committee, which are many. But I
appreciate the gentleman's comments very much.
I would also ask unanimous consent that the record of
today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses
have provided the answers to any questions that may have been
submitted to them in writing.
And further, unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments or information
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record
of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
If no other Members have anything to add, I would like to
thank the witnesses again for their service, for their
extraordinary contributions to our country, to our Nation's
security, to the war on drugs. I appreciate the participation
of Mr. Padden, as well, of ONDCP.
And with that, the hearing stands adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chairman Maloney.
The Coast Guard, working through SOUTHCOM, leads the U.S. effort to
remove drugs from the Transit Zone between the United States and South
America.
Seizing drugs in the Transit Zone--in their purest form and closest
to the source--is the most cost effective and efficient way to use U.S.
law enforcement assets. The Coast Guard is the only Armed Service with
law enforcement authority.
Unfortunately, the Coast Guard and its SOUTHCOM partners act on
only a small percentage of known drug movements. This is part of the
Coast Guard's overall challenge of carrying out an expansive number of
missions with very limited resources.
In recent years, both the Service's target rates and actual rates
for cocaine removal have been dropping, which is disheartening. In FY
2018, they dropped their target to 10 percent, and removed only 7.4
percent of cocaine from the transit route.
These drugs are eventually making their way into communities across
the U.S. and devastating families and lives in the process.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. I yield back.
U.S. Southern Command Graphics Illustrating Growth and Influence of
China and Russia in Western Hemisphere, Submitted for the Record by
Hon. Maloney
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix
----------
Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Vice Admiral Daniel B.
Abel, Deputy Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard
Question 1. At the hearing on June 4th, we discussed the Coast
Guard's drone program consisting of a contract of $117 million over 7
years. Could you describe how this program compares with the other
branches of the military as well as elaborate how the service could
better utilize UAS?
Answer. The Coast Guard's UAS program is similar to the US Navy's
in that it utilizes a service contract for contractor-owned and
contractor-operated UAS. This model has proven efficient for the Coast
Guard's smaller fleet size as compared to the Air Force or Army's
larger government-owned and government-operated programs, which have
additional personnel and logistics requirements.
The Coast Guard is having very positive initial results with the
Service's National Security Cutter (NSC) UAS operations and is looking
at ways to leverage a similar capability on the Polar Security Cutters
and Offshore Patrol Cutters. These new Cutters are being designed with
the necessary space, weight, and power capacity to support UAS
platforms. The Coast Guard has also initiated a proof of concept
operation to determine how the UAS capability could be utilized
operating from land-based facilities.
Questions from Hon. Bob Gibbs for Vice Admiral Daniel B. Abel, Deputy
Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard
Question 2. Following up from the hearing, you mentioned that you
would provide statistics behind the increase of cocaine coming from
Colombia. Please provide that information.
Answer. The data provided by VADM Abel during his testimony on June
4, 2019, reflected the continued increase in coca cultivation /
production potential from 2012 through 2017 as reported by the White
House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Three weeks after
VADM Abel's testimony, ONDCP released a report on 2018 data, stating
that coca cultivation, while remaining at historically high levels,
leveled off slightly in 2018, as stated in the report excerpt below:
``The estimate states coca cultivation in Colombia saw a minor
decrease in 2018 to 208,000 hectares from 209,000 hectares in 2017.
Similarly, potential pure cocaine production also saw a minor decrease
in 2018 to 887 pure metric tons from 900 pure metric tons in 2017.
Although coca cultivation in Colombia remained at historically high
levels in 2018, it was the first year the crop did not increase since
2012.''
This data shows a 0.5% decrease in estimated coca cultivation and a
1.4% decrease in production potential from 2017 to 2018.
Colombia consistently ranks atop three coca-producing countries.
According to the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), Colombia
produces about twice the amount of cocaine than Peru produces and
triples Bolivian production. ONDCP expects to complete official 2018
production analysis for Peru and Bolivia later this month, which ICC
expects, will be in alignment with previous years' analysis and confirm
production estimates.
ONDCP's full breakdown of Colombia data analysis is below:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Culti 119,000 116,000 100,000 83,000 78,000 80,500 112,000 159,000 188,000 209,000 208,000
vati
on
(Hect
ares
)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Produ 320 315 280 220 210 235 324 545 776 900 887
ctio
n
Poten
tial
(Metr
ic
Tons)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard assesses Colombia is the coca source for the vast
majority of its cocaine removals. The Drug Enforcement Administration's
Cocaine Signature Program conducts in-depth chemical analysis of
cocaine exhibits obtained from bulk seizures. According to the DEA CSP
2019 report, the CSP assesses, with 96% accuracy that 90% of domestic
cocaine seized and tested in 2018 originated in Colombia. JIATF-S
analysis of known cocaine flow supports this figure. Approximately 94%
of JIATF-S known flow (trafficked via maritime and air routes)
originates from, or in close proximity to Colombia, via the eastern
Pacific, western and central Caribbean.
To date, the Colombian bilateral agreement has been enacted 33
times resulting in removal of 36MT of cocaine. Of the 522 suspected
smugglers detained by the USCG in 2019, 26 percent were Colombian
nationals.
Questions from Hon. Randy K. Weber, Sr., for Rear Admiral Steven D.
Poulin, Director of Operations, U.S. Southern Command
Question 1. At the hearing on the 4th of June, I asked if you knew
the percentages of what other countries are contributing to
interdiction efforts as well as whether they are spending an inordinate
amount of money in helping drug interdiction efforts or if the United
States is spending most of it. You indicated that you would get back to
us with that information. Please provide that information.
Answer. Unfortunately, I cannot give you the amounts that each
individual country is spending out of their own budgets toward drug
interdiction, as that information is proprietary to each nation.
However, I can tell you that we have very willing partners in this
region, especially as the drug crisis directly impacts their own
national security. The drugs that eventually end up on the streets of
Texas, burn a path of violence and corruption through our partner
nations (PNs), making this an existential threat for them. Our partners
are committed to addressing this threat with support from the United
States.
I can, however, give you an idea of what US Southern Command is
spending to build our partners' capacity to counter the drug threat.
The majority of our programs are designed to provide mitigation against
one of our primary shortfalls--lack of maritime assets (both ships and
planes). In the execution of our statutory mission to detect and
monitor illicit drug traffic, we identify targets, but have limited
capability to respond and interdict them. Our PN programs help fill
that gap by building their capacity to interdict the targets that we
identify. In calendar year 2018, PN participation was critical to 40%
of all interdiction/disruption cases, stopping almost 120MTs of cocaine
worth $1.8B from reaching our streets. That translates into
approximately 840 lives saved.
Below is information on our FY19 counterdrug programs:
In Central America, the total funding directly supporting PN
interdiction efforts is $41,818,000. The focus areas for these
countries are border security, maritime and ground interdiction;
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); and Command and
Control (C2).
In South America, the total funding directly supporting PN
interdiction efforts is $23,947,000. The focus areas for these
countries are ground and maritime interdiction, ISR, information
sharing, and riverine interdiction.
In the Caribbean, the total funding directly supporting PN
interdiction efforts is $5,947,000. The focus areas for these countries
are ground and maritime interdiction and border security.
Questions from Hon. John Garamendi for Thomas W. Padden, U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator, Office of National Drug Control Policy
Question 1. At the hearing on June 4th, you stated that when
cocaine crosses the border, it predominantly does at points of entry
but were unable to give an accurate percentage. Please provide an
accurate percentage of cocaine entering at points of entry at the U.S.-
Mexico border in comparison to cocaine entering elsewhere along the
border.
Answer. It is important to distinguish between the seizure of a
drug and the flow of the drug. Seizure data do not reflect the actual
flow of drugs into the United States, however, it is the only flow-
related data that can be collected. Given the unknown amounts of drugs
that are not seized, either at the border Ports of Entry (POEs) or
between them, only an estimated picture of border drug flows is
possible by using seizure data that is currently collected.
Additionally, the data collected regarding seizures between POEs are
not specifically limited to seizures made between POEs along the
border, as seizures from Border Patrol checkpoints inside the United
States are also included in this data.
Accordingly, data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) can
be provided on drugs that are seized at and between all POEs by
drug,\1\ but this is not the same as the amount of that drug crossing
the border.
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\1\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics
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CBP seizure data show that for the period from FY 2016 to FY 2018:
approximately 89 percent of border cocaine seizures were
made at the POEs, and approximately 11 percent outside the POEs;
approximately 86 percent of heroin seizures were made at
the POEs, and approximately 14 percent were made outside the POEs;
approximately 82 percent of methamphetamine seizures were
made at the POEs, and approximately 18 percent were made outside the
POEs; and
approximately 86 percent of the fentanyl seizures were
made at the POEs, and 14 percent were made outside the POEs.
It also should be noted that the largest concentration of CBP
personnel and detection technology is deployed to the POEs, so more
drugs are able to be detected and interdicted at the POEs.
Questions from Hon. Randy K. Weber, Sr., for Thomas W. Padden, U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator, Office of National Drug Control Policy
Question 2. Following up from the hearing, when money is seized
from vessels, does the money go back to the Coast Guard for investment
in assets?
Answer. USCG does not have forfeiture authority, so the proceeds of
all their seizures, including currency seizures, are turned over for
processing to law enforcement agencies with forfeiture authorities,
such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), DHS Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), or CBP. If
the seized assets are connected to an ongoing DEA investigation, they
are turned over to DEA for processing and deposit into the Department
of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF). The Attorney General is
authorized to use AFF funds to finance expenses associated with the
execution of asset forfeiture functions and, with specific limitations,
certain general investigative costs. If the seized assets are not
connected to an ongoing DEA investigation, then they are turned over to
a DHS agency with forfeiture authority, such as HSI or CBP. Forfeitures
processed by HSI or CBP are deposited into the Treasury Forfeiture Fund
(TFF). Judicial forfeitures are deposited into the lead federal
agency's corresponding forfeiture fund.
The Department of the Treasury's Treasury Executive Office for
Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF) administers the TFF. The TFF is the receipt
account for deposit of non-tax forfeitures made pursuant to laws
enforced or administered by its participating Treasury and Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies. DHS participating agencies include
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Secret Service.
The TFF is a special fund. Special funds are Federal fund accounts
for receipts that are earmarked by law for a specific purpose. The
enabling legislation for the TFF (31 U.S.C. 9705) sets out those
purposes for which Treasury forfeiture revenue may be used. Among other
things, TEOAF, as the administrator for the TFF, promotes the
consistent and strategic use of asset forfeiture by law enforcement
bureaus that participate in the Fund to disrupt and dismantle criminal
enterprises.
All forfeiture revenue deposited into the TFF composes the budget
authority utilized to fund the costs of operating the forfeiture
programs of Treasury and DHS law enforcement agencies. Funding is
allocated based on priority needs, regardless of which agency
contributed each specific forfeiture.
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