[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM PRIORITIES
AND CHALLENGES IN AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 17, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-79
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: http://www.govinfo.gov,
house.oversight.gov or
docs.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-739 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Jim Jordan, Ohio, Ranking Minority
Columbia Member
Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Jim Cooper, Tennessee Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Mark Meadows, North Carolina
Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Jody B. Hice, Georgia
Jamie Raskin, Maryland Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin
Harley Rouda, California James Comer, Kentucky
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Michael Cloud, Texas
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Peter Welch, Vermont Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Jackie Speier, California Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Chip Roy, Texas
Mark DeSaulnier, California Carol D. Miller, West Virginia
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Mark E. Green, Tennessee
Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Kelly Armstrong, North Dakota
Ro Khanna, California W. Gregory Steube, Florida
Jimmy Gomez, California Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Rashida Tlaib, Michigan
David Rapallo, Staff Director
Dan Rebnord, Subcommittee Staff Director
Matthew Patane, Professional Staff
Amy Stratton, Assistant Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
Christopher Hixon, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Chairman
Jim Cooper, Tennesse Jody B. Hice, Georgia, Ranking
Peter Welch, Vermont Minority Member
Harley Rouda, California Paul A. Gosar, Arizona
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Mark Meadows, North Carolina
Mark DeSaulnier, California Michael Cloud, Texas
Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Mark E. Green, Tennessee
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Clay Higgins, Louisiana
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on December 17, 2019................................ 1
Witnesses
Judd Devermont, Director, Africa ProgramCenter for Strategic &
International Studies
Oral statement............................................... 5
Adotei Akwei, Deputy Director for Advocacy and Government
RelationsAmnesty International
Oral statement............................................... 7
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African AffairsCongressional
Research Service
Oral statement............................................... 9
Joshua Meservey, Senior Policy Analyst, Africa and the Middle
EastThe Heritage Foundation
Oral statement............................................... 10
*Written opening statements, and the written statements for
witnesses are available at the U.S. House Repository: https://
docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
There were no additional documents entered into the record for
this hearing.
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM PRIORITIES
AND CHALLENGES IN AFRICA
----------
Tuesday, December 17, 2019
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Oversight and Reform
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m., in
room 2157, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Lynch, Welch, Hice, Gosar, Cloud,
and Higgins.
Mr. Lynch. The subcommittee will come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any time.
This hearing is entitled U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities
and Challenges in Africa. I now recognize myself for five
minutes to give an opening statement.
Today we will examine how various terrorist organizations
across the African continent continue to threaten U.S. national
security interests as well as exploring efficacy of U.S. and
international counterterrorism efforts to contain, degrade, and
ultimately defeat these terrorist threats.
On October 4, 2017, four U.S. Special Ops soldiers,
Sergeant First Class Jeremiah Johnson, Staff Sergeant Bryan
Black, Staff Sergeant Dustin Wright, and Sergeant La David
Johnson were tragically killed in an ambush in the western part
of Niger. At the time, many Americans did not know that U.S.
forces were deployed in that part of Africa, and the tragedy
generated significant interest in the U.S. counterterrorism
mission there.
Since then, the security and situation in many parts of
Africa, especially the Sahel, has continued to deteriorate. In
early 2017, three militant organizations, including Al Qaeda
and the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM, merged to create Jama'at Nasr
al-Islam wal Muslimin or JNIM, which the State Department has
designated as a foreign terrorist organization in September
2018.
Meanwhile, ISIS Greater Sahara, an affiliate of ISIS core
in Iraq and Syria, remain active and continues to target local
military and police forces in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, as
well as U.S. French and U.N. peacekeeping forces. Just last
week, militants killed 71 soldiers in an Army camp in western
Niger, about 115 miles from where the assault on U.S. forces
took place in October 2017.
In the Lake Chad basin region, Boko Haram, which in local
dialect means western education is forbidden, has carried out
hundreds of deadly attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and
Chad. In 2016, ISIS West Africa broke away from Boko Haram and
created a splinter group which continues to wage guerilla war
across northeastern Nigeria. According to the International
Crisis Group, and I quote, "has cultivated a level of support
among local civilians that Boko Haram has never enjoyed and has
turned neglected communities into the area and islands in Lake
Chad into a source of economic support," closed quote.
In Somalia, Al-Shabaab is fighting to replace the Somali
Government with a strict interpretation of Sharia law but also
carries out attacks in neighboring countries, including Kenya
and Uganda, and maintains a close relationship with al-Qaeda.
Meanwhile, ISIS maintains affiliates in the Sinai, Libya, and--
why don't I yield to you for five minutes?
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome our
panelists who are here today. You know, there's nothing
partisan about eradicating terrorism from every part of our
globe, and this is just another example as to how this
subcommittee can work together for the American people. This
hearing is important to draw attention to not only what is
occurring in the Sahel region of Africa but also the rest of
the continent.
To date, there are more than four major active terrorist
organizations fighting to gain a stronghold in the fragile
states throughout Africa. One militant Islamic terrorist group,
Boko Haram, has horrifically killed over 20,000 people and
displaced more than 2 million during their reign of terror
throughout Nigeria and West Africa.
The U.S. has played an important role in supporting
partners and allies in the region to combat Islamic terrorist
organizations. Despite these efforts, the number of terrorist
attacks in the region, like the Sahel, nearly doubled in 2018,
and attacks in the Sub-Saharan area have also increased
dramatically.
By historical standards, the U.S., under the Trump
administration, is providing a record high number of
counterterrorism resources to African countries. U.S.
counterterrorism efforts in the region include things like
foreign assistance, public diplomacy efforts, military
assistance, and intelligence programs.
The U.S. Department of Defense and State Department are
actively engaged in these counterterrorism efforts. The State
Department provides nearly $280 million of funding for Africa
counterterrorism efforts each year. Additionally, the
Department of Defense spends at least $500 million a year for
counterterrorism efforts in the area.
And the U.S. taxpayer is not the only ones involved. The
U.S. has deployed thousands of brave American servicemen and
women to Africa for a variety of important missions. At the end
of 2018, it has been reported that nearly 7,200 Department of
Defense personnel were assigned to U.S. Africa Command.
Additionally, Special Operation forces in Africa had over a
thousand of our finest troops operating in 12 African
countries. Their mission is, quote, "advise local forces
battling a variety of terrorist groups," unquote. It is a great
mission.
With that, let's never forget people like Sergeant First
Class Jeremiah Johnson, Staff Sergeant Bryan Black, Staff
Sergeant Dustin Wright, and Sergeant La David Johnson. These,
on October 4, 2017, gave their life, and there were others who
were severely injured during that ambush in the area of Niger
near the Mali border.
I will conclude my remarks by saying this: The Trump
administration prioritized developing a plan for U.S. security
assistance to Africa because, and I quote, "we understand that
lasting stability, prosperity, independence, and security on
the African continent are in the national security interests of
the United States," unquote.
There is a lot of work to be done on this topic. Mr.
Chairman, I look forward to working with you on this serious
issue of combating terrorism in Africa.
I further look forward to hearing from each of our
panelists, and again, I welcome you and thank you for being a
part of this hearing today.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields. I am going to reclaim my
time.
ISIS maintains affiliates in the Sinai, Libya, and there is
a small but troubling ISIS-linked cell growing now in
Mozambique. The nonpartisan Africa Center for Strategic Study
reports that overall, in 2018, witnessed a, quote, "record
level of activity as terrorism on the continent continues its
steady upward trend."
Over the past decade, violent events in Africa increased
tenfold from 288 attacks linked to militant groups in 2009 to
3,050 in 2018. The center also estimates that there are
currently two dozen active militant groups operating in Africa,
more than double the number from 2010.
U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa to date have
focused on enhancing the military and security capabilities of
regional partners through training, equipment support, and
operational support and bilateral assistance. I have personally
led several bipartisan congressional delegations to examine key
aspects of capacity building and security activities in the
region, including a visit to Nigeria to review operations
conducted by the Multinational Joint Task Force consisting of
military units from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and other nations.
The U.S.-backed MJTF seeks to counter the threat of Boko
Haram and ISIS West Africa. We have also visited Camp
Lemmonier, a forward operating base in Djibouti, where more
than 4,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are deployed in
support of regional stabilization, security cooperation,
antipiracy, and crisis response operations in the Horn of
Africa.
Most recently, we visited Algeria to examine the progress
of trans Sahara counterterrorism partnership, a multinational
program that is led by the State Department to prevent the
spread of violent extremism in west and north Africa and
reviewed the allocation of $1.3 million in U.S. bilateral aid
that Algeria recently received for military education and
training.
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, our
national counterterrorism strategy has prioritized the
degradation of terrorist threats originating and operating in
the Middle East. However, U.S. national security demands that
we also maintain sustained pressure on terrorist networks in
Africa. As noted by Grant Harris, the former Senior Director
for African Affairs at the National Security Council under
President Obama, the misconception that Africa is optional or
irrelevant to U.S. national security is, quote, "dangerous
given the boon to terrorist recruitment and operations
generated by unstable, weak, and failed governments."
African Nations currently occupy 17 of the top 25 slots on
the fragile states index issued by the independent Fund for
Peace earlier this year. Moreover, it is critical for the U.S.
to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism approach in the
region that optimizes American military support, security
cooperation, and assistance while advancing diplomatic
solutions, civil society reforms, and economic initiatives to
promote regional stability in the long term.
In his 2019 posture statement to Congress, General Thomas
Waldhauser, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, stated that,
quote, "very few, if any, of America--of Africa's--challenges
can be resolved using only military force," closed quote. But
to the detriment of enduring regional stability, President
Trump has consistently proposed massive cuts to international
development funding, including a Fiscal Year 2020 budget
proposal that recommends a 24 percent or $40 billion cut of the
State Department and U.S. agencies for international
development.
The current administration has also been slow to fill the
Africa policy vacancies, and according to the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, quote, "shows no signs of
mounting a vigorous, civilian-oriented strategy to address the
challenges that do exist," closed quote.
Continued oversight of U.S. counterterrorist efforts in
Africa will be critical to addressing threats to U.S. national
security emanating from the region. To this end, I look forward
to discussing these issues with today's witnesses, and I will
now introduce our witnesses.
Mr. Judd Devermont, Director of the African Program, Center
for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Adotei Akwei,
Deputy Director for Advocacy and Government Relations for
Amnesty International. Ms. Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African
Affairs for the congressional Research Service. Mr. Joshua
Meservey, Senior Policy Analyst, Africa and Middle East with
The Heritage Foundation.
Also, in addition to the witnesses we have today, the
subcommittee also invited Dr. Joseph Siegle, Director of
Research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, to testify
during today's hearings. Unfortunately, despite our repeated
requests, the Department of Defense never responded to confirm
Dr. Siegle's ability to attend. And I know that he expressed
some interest in attending, but we did not get the approval
from the Defense Department to allow that to happen which is
unfortunate.
So, with that, and with our witnesses in attendance, would
you all please rise and raise your right hand.
Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to
give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Let the record show that all the witnesses have answered in
the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated.
The microphones are sensitive, so please hold them close
and speak directly into them. Without objection, your written
statements will be made part of the record, and with that, Mr.
Devermont, you are now recognized to give an oral presentation
of your testimony for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF JUDD DEVERMONT, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Devermont. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Hice, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
testify on this important topic.
Today I will discuss the current extremist and security
landscape across Sub Saharan Africa, explain why ISIS, al-
Qaeda, and other extremist groups pose a significant threat to
U.S. strategic and foreign policy interests, and present some
recommendations to counter violent extremism in the region.
Sub Saharan Africa has experienced a rise in terrorism over
the past two decades. The threat has become more sophisticated,
lethal, and geographically dispersed. While Africa's homegrown
extremist groups have local objectives and disproportionately
target regional governments and civilians, their affiliation
with global terrorist networks have contributed to more
efficient operations, slicker media propaganda, and in some
cases, increased financial resources. The terrorist networks,
their affiliates, and other extremist groups now operate in
west, east, central, and southern Africa, having conducted
operations in approximately 17 Sub Saharan African countries.
I believe that terrorism in Sub Saharan Africa endangers
U.S. citizens and economic interests abroad, entangles the
United States in expensive peacekeeping and humanitarian relief
efforts, and weakens U.S. standing in strategic alliances
around the world while our foreign adversaries grow in strength
and influence.
While it's unwise to fully discount an attack on the
homeland, there has been limited open source reporting to
indicate the possibility of such a high impact scenario.
Indeed, it has been almost a decade to the day since the
Nigerian attempted to detonate explosives on a flight to
Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.
Let me discuss these threats in greater detail. First,
ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other extremist groups have targeted U.S.
persons and U.S. facilities. There have been plots to attack
U.S. embassies, and this year a car bomb was detonated at the
gates of Baledogle Air Force where U.S. troops train Somali
soldiers. These groups have also attacked soft targets where
expatriates congregate, including the Westgate Mall in Nairobi,
Kenya, in 2013 and the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, in
2015.
Two. The U.S. funds peacekeeping and humanitarian relief
efforts to respond to the devastation wrought by extremism. The
U.N. mission in Mali has an annual budget of $1.18 billion, and
USAID provided more than $130 million in humanitarian
assistance to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in the Fiscal Year
2019.
And third. The persistence of terrorism, coupled with the
perception that the United States is reducing its terrorism
engagement, threatens to undercut U.S. leadership. Our European
and African partners have expressed fears about Washington's
wavering commitment. Our adversaries, especially Russia, have
exploited this perceived vacuum, signing defense agreements
with Sahelian countries to assist in counterterrorism
operations.
I think the key study of Mozambique really illustrates the
threats posed by extremism and the implications for U.S.
national security interests. In October 2017, armed men
attacked three police stations in the oil rich Cabo Delgado
region. From that first attack to August 2019, there was more
than 178 attacks leaving over 150 people dead, including a
contractor who worked for a U.S. oil company.
These terrorism activities threaten U.S. investments in
what is described as one of the largest LNG finds in the world.
In June 2019, ISIS claimed this group as an affiliate and part
of its central African province. The Mozambican Government,
increasingly alarmed by the threat, appealed to Moscow for
assistance, precipitating the brief entrance of Russian private
military contractors. The Mozambique case study in sum shows
how local extremist groups leverage local grievances, forge
ties with global extremist networks to sow violence and
threaten U.S. economic interests. It also demonstrates how U.S.
adversaries exploit these developments, proffering security
assistance as an alternative to U.S. engagement.
In my view, we need to rethink our investments,
interventions, and partnerships. While it's dangerous to
withdraw and disengage, it's also ill advised to continue as we
have for the past two decades. Failure to remain active and to
innovate will provide space for extremist groups to plan and
execute attacks.
I just have a couple of recommendations. First, we need to
invest in defense institution building. Many African militaries
need capacity but training, but they also need to create a
larger national security infrastructure. We have some
initiatives such as the security governance initiative that was
a step in the right direction, but I believe there's more that
we can do.
I also think it's critical that we invest in police.
Currently, according to the security systems monitor, police
receive less than two percent of U.S. funding allocated for Sub
Saharan African security forces.
Two, we need to make state fragility and politics a
priority. There's a consensus that preventative measures that
address underlying drivers of extremism are more effective and
less expensive than a counterterrorism only approach. It's also
important that we address the political obstacles to having a
domestic response to terrorism. This is particularly relevant
in Nigeria and Mali.
Third, we need to stand up for human rights and democracy.
This isn't just a feel good policy. It's about an effective
counterstrategy, counterterrorism strategy. If a government is
guilty of gross human rights violations, it's in the U.S.
interests to first withhold assistance and then take all
necessary measures to resume engagement.
Finally, we need to broaden our international and domestic
coalition. The United States is neither capable nor suited to
be all response to every extremist and security challenge in
the region.
We should recruit more foreign partners, more domestic
partners to contribute to this counterterrorism effort,
including Africa media, legislators, judges, and civil society
stakeholders to do burden sharing but also to increase local
ownership.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Akwei, you are now recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF ADOTEI AKWEI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ADVOCACY AND
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Akwei. Thank you, chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Hice,
for this opportunity to testify in front of you. My comments
will focus on the impact of counterterrorism efforts on the
respect and protection of human rights. As my colleague has
just noted, this is not just about feeling good or doing the
right thing. It's actually in the United States' best
interests. I am going to focus on the initiatives in the Sahel
and in Somalia.
I think the first thing to say is U.S. counterterrorism
efforts and those of their allies are resulting in grave human
rights violations that may constitute war crimes and are
arguably having a negative impact on counterterrorism efforts.
Congress can and must play a role in the strategic rebalancing
and rethinking of the counterterrorism strategy, first, by
ending the false argument that to ensure security, it is
necessary to sacrifice human rights. The two are linked and are
dependent on each other.
Congress must press for the prioritization of human rights
in future national counterterrorism strategies. It must also
press for the rebalancing of a highly militaristic focused
strategy at the moment which has only created a bigger
battlefield and dependency on arms that has been shown to be
unsustainable in other regions of the world.
There must also be more comprehensive holistic approaches
such as those that are espoused in the Global Fragility Act of
2019 as well as the Women Encountering Violent Extremism Act of
2019, all of which focus on building the capacity of civil
society, in particular, of women, and also of taking--looking
at the drivers of fragility which Mr. Devermont has also
mentioned.
Another area must be accountability for U.S. partnerships
and for U.S. partners. This includes credible, transparent
investigations into rights violations and ensuring that those
responsible for those violations are held accountable.
I'd like to acknowledge Congress' leadership already in
this area in this year's NDAA where there are provisions on the
State Department making--mandating it to do a better job
receiving reports on civilian casualties of air strikes and
also on creating a fund for victims and survivors of
inadvertent military strikes.
Finally, I would say that the U.S.--that Congress must
press the executive branch to work with African partner
governments and civil society to review and reform problematic
antiterrorism legislation and policies that violate
international and regional human rights standards. For example,
the practice of using military courts to try civilians,
something that should never happen.
I'm going to look at two particular areas, the role of
antiterrorism legislation and the erosion of the rule of law
and abuses by security forces that are partners to the United
States. There are numerous African countries that have passed
antiterrorism or prevention acts that have vague definitions of
terrorism. I would add that that term has not actually been
defined under international law and that many of these laws
greatly expand police powers and the role and the ability of
the military to create lists of suspected terrorists, to freeze
bank accounts of organizations, to shut down media houses, and
to harass and arrest members of the media. This includes Kenya.
It includes Ethiopia. It includes Nigeria. These laws are also
combined with others that reduce political space and civil
space and also create a repressive environment.
The impact of Nigeria's laws, for example, has resulted in
the case of over 20 journalists and media operations being
attacked verbally as well as facing arbitrary arrest and
detention. Similar type legislation has been used in Tanzania--
in Cameroon to great, great effect. The Cameroonian legislation
actually allows military courts exclusive jurisdiction to try
civilians and the Minister of Defense to appoint and assign
military judges. This raises serious concerns about due process
and independence of the judicial process.
We at Amnesty gained firsthand knowledge of the lengths to
which the Cameroonian Government would use this antiterrorism
law when we began working on the case of Ivo Feh in 2014, a 27-
year-old student who was jailed for 20 years for sending a text
to his friends where he joked that getting a job in Cameroon
was harder--was so hard that it was probably easier to get into
the armed group Boko Haram. His message was read by a teacher.
His two friends were arrested, and he, along with them, were
charged with trying to organize a rebellion against the state.
He remains in jail.
The security force abuses that Amnesty has documented since
2015 are alarming. They include mass killings, torture,
arbitrary detention, and malnutrition, denial of food. This
directly contributes to recruitment opportunities for armed
extremist organizations, and it should be of alarm to almost
anyone trying to stop those kinds of organizations.
This is not only against the people that the military
considers to be threats. It's, unfortunately, also against
victims of Boko Haram attacks.
Amnesty is working with a group of 2,000 women who survived
years of kidnapping by Boko Haram only to face sexual violence
and rape by the Nigerian military guards in exchange for food
and water and even healthcare. Thousands have died. These women
have bravely gone on to make a list of their husbands and sons
who were separated from them when they were liberated and have
not been seen since.
I'll end, I know I'm over my time, by saying again that
these are the kinds of abuses that do not help counterterrorism
efforts. They're not in the national interest of the United
States, and of course, they also tend to alienate the
populations of the impacted communities. We now need a more
balanced approach which is holistic and advice-oriented. I'll
stop there.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The gentleman yields.
Ms. Arieff, you are now recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF ALEXIS ARIEFF, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. Arieff. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Hice, members of
the subcommittee, thank you for inviting the congressional
Research Service to testify today. I will focus particular
attention on current trends in west Africa's Sahel region which
falls within my area of specialization at CRS, along with U.S.
responses and considerations for congressional oversight. My
testimony draws on the input of CRS colleagues who cover other
parts of the continent and related issues.
Islamist militants are part of a conflict ecosystem in the
Sahel that also involves ethnic separatists, communal defense
militias, and criminal actors. Mali, and increasingly Burkina
Faso, are epicenters. As is the case in other parts of Africa,
Islamists armed groups in the Sahel do employ terrorist tactics
and several have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda or the Islamic
State. In some cases, their attacks have targeted and killed
western nationals including several American civilians and
military personnel as you mentioned. Most, however, operate
primarily as local insurgent movements that seek to undermine
and attack state presence and control.
In several areas of the Sahel, Islamist armed groups
reportedly perform parallel state functions, including as
security providers, tax authorities, and justice and mediation
figures. To be clear, local civilians and local security forces
have endured the overwhelming brunt of fatalities attributed to
these groups, as well as the devastating humanitarian impact of
conflicts involving them.
Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced.
Millions are facing food insecurity. Nonetheless, some local
communities may appreciate some of the services these groups
provide, particularly in the context of an absent or predatory
state.
As I describe in further detail in my written testimony,
the conflicts involving Islamist armed groups in the Sahel
exemplify several attributes that pose particular challenges to
U.S. and other international response efforts. I'd like to
highlight four of them here.
First, Islamist militancy in the Sahel is locally led and
resilient. These groups appear to rely primarily on local
sources of funding, including criminal activities which can
pose challenges to sanctions enforcement and effectiveness.
Second, western and African-led military interventions can
curtail armed groups' territorial control, but they have not
translated into durable security gains on the ground.
Third, affected governments face competing policy and
security priorities which may not align with those of the
United States.
Finally, abuses by state security forces and state-backed
militias appear to be driving recruitment in some areas.
I'd like to close by identifying a key challenge and
related consideration for congressional oversight efforts.
Notwithstanding ongoing U.S. direct counterterrorism strikes in
Libya and Somalia, successive U.S. administrations have stated
the desire to maintain a light U.S. military footprint in
Africa. Capacity building efforts and cooperation with local
partners, what DOD officials refer to as working by, with, and
through, are thus at the forefront of the U.S. counterterrorism
tool kit in Africa along with development assistance aimed at
addressing the drivers of violent extremism. Yet almost by
definition, the partners whose capacities the United States
seeks to develop are likely to be weak and/or problematic for
other reasons.
If local political conditions, abuses by state actors, and
perceived impunity play a key role in driving Islamist
extremists mobilization in Africa as multiple studies suggest,
then additional security assistance and/or development aid, for
that matter, may not effectively reverse negative trends absent
significant changes and approach on the part of local
authorities.
Such changes might include, for example, putting an end to
militias that engage in torture and extrajudicial killings,
punishing abusive or corrupt soldiers, officials, and judges,
and making concessions to minority communities that may be
politically painful.
From an oversight perspective, it is not always possible
for Congress to obtain a comprehensive view of all U.S.
financial, operational, and personnel commitments to
counterterrorism efforts in Africa. There are some fair reasons
for this, including the difficulty of untangling funding and
personnel dedicated to broader security governance or
stabilization aims.
At the same time, regarding security assistance
specifically, Congress has imposed varying notification and
reporting requirements on different types of U.S.
counterterrorism aid that are provided to African countries.
For example, the notification and reporting requirements that
Congress has attached to State Department security assistance
accounts are not nearly as detailed as for DOD's global train
and equip program.
Insofar as a lack of precision in the information provided
to Congress can obscure the country and unit recipients of U.S.
security assistance such as training and equipment, this
renders oversight related to human rights and other policy
concerns more challenging. It can also impede efforts to
measure and gauge the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism
aid and the ability of partner countries to absorb it.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Meservey, you're now recognized for five minutes.
JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE
EAST, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Meservey. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Hice, and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. My name is Joshua Meservey. I'm the Senior
Policy Analyst for Africa and the Middle East at The Heritage
Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own
and do not necessarily represent the official position of The
Heritage Foundation.
The current African terrorism landscape is grim. Islamist
terrorist groups have proliferated in the Sahel region, and
many operate at a high tempo. There are now at least 10
Islamist terrorist groups active in that region. Traditionally,
only al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb was active there.
Groups in regions we do not usually associate with Islamist
terrorism have emerged and are among the most brutal of all
African terrorist organizations. Al-Shabaab in northern
Mozambique, a group distinct from Somalia's Al-Shabaab, is
capable enough to have recently killed a number of Russian
mercenaries.
The ISIS linked allied democratic forces that operates
primarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo razes villages
and executes civilians in appalling fashion. Even relative
success stories are showing warring sides, Al-Shabaab in
Somalia lost most of its major strongholds years ago, but it
maintains its operational capacity, controls significant
territory, and benefits from stalemates into which the conflict
there has descended.
Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria is resurgent after losing
most of its territory five years ago, and its splinter group,
Islamic State West Africa Province or ISWAP, conquered hundreds
of square miles of territory earlier this year alone and
frequently overruns Nigerian military bases.
The Nigeria and Somalia examples in particular highlight
the importance of good governance for achieving any sustainable
successes against African terrorist groups. In Somalia,
politicians spend too much time and energy struggling for
political power rather than delivering security and justice
sufficient to give their citizens reason to resist Al-Shabaab.
In Nigeria, corruption enervates the security services, and
the government has failed to address the environment in the
northeast that makes groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP appealing
to some. This enabling environment, characterized by people
within it feeling a sense of marginalization and injustice, is
one pillar of the terrorist phenomenon in Africa.
The U.S. can help address this element of the problem,
though African partners have to lead the way. Military
operations are a part of the right approach as judicious
military action can degrade terrorist groups enough to provide
governments time and space to address the enabling
environments. The U.S. can also increase its support for civil
society organizations which are critical to the development and
maintenance of responsive and honest government.
The other pillar of the Islamist terrorist problem is the
fundamentalist literalist interpretation of Islam that
motivates the hard core of these groups. This problem is more
difficult for the U.S. to address as it is a battle that has to
be won by the many Muslims who interpret their faith in a
tolerant way. The U.S. can ask Muslim countries and
organizations that are proactively battling the extremist
ideology what help it can give them.
Progress in the fight against African terrorism will
require committed, wise, and persistent action in concert with
like-minded Nation. Specifically, here are some steps the U.S.
can take. Lead the diplomatic efforts in Libya. Libyan
instability fuels terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel.
Getting the many states involved in Libya working together to
stabilize the country will be hard, but the U.S. is the only
power with sufficient diplomatic heft to have a chance of
success.
Advocate for reforming MINUSMA, the U.N. peacekeeping
operation in Mali. MINUSMA is currently inefficient and
terribly dangerous to serve in, and its mandate does not
reflect the reality that it is fighting a war. MINUSMA's non-
war fighting element should be stripped away, and its mission
must be integrated into a broader regional strategy.
Pressure countries that export extremist ideologies. It is
incumbent upon countries to stop any remaining exports of
radical Islamist ideologies such as Salafism. They must also
actively undertake the long and difficult work of undoing the
damage proselytizing Salafism has done across the world,
including in Africa.
Work with affected countries to create a strategy for
managing returning foreign fighters. Many of the thousands of
captured ISIS fighters will likely be repatriated to their home
countries, including to African countries that do not have
sufficient capacity for rehabilitating or prosecuting them as
appropriate. Other terrorists who avoided capture will, as some
already have returned spontaneously as well.
Thank you again for allowing me to present my thoughts
today and for your interest in a difficult problem that hurts
American interests.
I look forward to any questions you may have.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much. I now yield myself five
minutes for questions.
Just the landscape across Africa, I mean, it's such a huge
place. It's been very difficult for us, even with a
considerable level of resources, to really move the needle at
all in terms of strengthening the rule of law, establishing
independent judiciaries, and creating conditions where some of
the other more traditional or more military sponsored programs
can actually succeed.
Given the fact that we have a limit on resources that we
can dedicate to this, you know, and I acknowledge that, you
know, the current administration may be frustrated with certain
allocations and doesn't see the progress that we've been--in
the programs that we've been funding thus far.
Where are the areas where you think we could plus up, you
know, our appropriations and target areas that have a greater
chance of success and more meaningful success? Not just trying
to eliminate existing terrorist organizations, but also
creating conditions that would give us some resilience in these
countries like Mali, like Burkina Faso, that would prevent
those organizations from reemerging once we defeat them?
Ms. Arieff.
Ms. Arieff. Far be it from me or CRS to advise Congress on
appropriations. What I can say----
Mr. Lynch. Well, how about where would we be best in
focusing and trying to make a difference?
Ms. Arieff. What I can say is that it's--U.S. support to
rule of law programming and judicial sector support, there are
programs like this in Africa, including in places like Mali and
Burkina Faso where those programs may show more success. There
seems to be greater political will on the ground among local
authorities to make structural changes and to hold their own
judicial actors and security forces accountable.
So, there is sometimes a disconnect between the areas where
there is clearly greatest need for change and the areas where
there's the greatest willingness to change, and thus, where
U.S. assistance may find a willing partner.
Mr. Lynch. I see.
Mr. Akwei, anything further on that?
Mr. Akwei. Yes. I think there are two different channels, I
think, that should be focused on. One, of course, is what you
mentioned at the beginning of your statement which was
increasing the international affairs budget and protecting that
because that's where the investment in civil society as well as
national institutions will happen. Those kinds of programs
can't just be flatlined which is still progress. They need to
be increased because that shows where the United States
considers its priorities to be.
The other is that, while I do agree with Alexis about
finding the areas where reform is most likely to be well
received, there are a couple--there are two countries, I think,
that cannot be allowed to fail, and that's Nigeria and Cameroon
because they're so large. Victory or, shall I say, the failure
of the counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram in both of
those countries will have irreparable effect on the region.
Those are the most problematic in terms of the security forces,
in terms of the ability of the judiciary to hold anyone
accountable, and unfortunately, in Cameroon, political
willingness to even engage in a dialog about what they're doing
on counterterrorism.
But those would be the two countries that I would say there
needs to be hard-nosed, U.S. high level diplomacy about
changing tactics and direction.
Mr. Lynch. Great.
Mr. Devermont.
Mr. Devermont. Thank you. I want to reinforce something
that my colleagues on the panel have said in terms of that in
countries where the security problems are viewed as urgent and
existential where you have civil society, the political
opposition putting pressure on the Federal Government or the
government to react, I think we see better outcomes. So, I
would make a couple of suggestions around that.
First, that we tend to as a U.S. Government spend a lot of
time on critiquing governments that aren't doing well and not
enough on the countries that are doing well and creating some
sort of demonstrative effect over highlighting countries or
individual actors who are taking these problems seriously.
Two, I think that the media is under-resourced, over-
stretched, sometimes politicized, but in African countries when
there's media pressure on their governments, when they shed
light on abuses, I think that that's probably the most
effective anecdote to the problem set than necessarily the
international community wagging their finger.
And third, all of this, I think, comes down to community
policing and local governance, and it is historically not where
we have put our resources in into African police, and it's not
where African governments put their resources in. I'd like to
see more policing efforts that are successful, that have leased
the community, that can provide law and order so they don't
create openings for extremists to enter in.
Mr. Lynch. My time has expired.
I now yield five minutes to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Hice, the ranking member.
Mr. Hice. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meservey, is it accurate to say that Islamic-linked
violent acts and fatalities and so forth have doubled each year
since 2016?
Mr. Meservey. Yes. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies
has--there was a recent paper that made that claim, and I think
it's correct based on the data we have.
Mr. Hice. So, how many terror groups are we talking about
that are operating in West Africa?
Mr. Meservey. It depends how you count a little bit, but
it's around 10 discrete organizations.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Has that increased since 2016?
Mr. Meservey. Yes. I think there's been a few new ones.
It's--they split and merge and morph----
Mr. Hice. Right.
Mr. Meservey [continuing]. So, it's--it is difficult
sometimes to track.
Mr. Hice. Does that contribute to the increase that
there's--obviously, I would think it would--with the increase
in terror groups? But doubling every year since 2016, that's an
alarming number. Has international intervention in the region
helped to curb any of the violence?
Mr. Meservey. So, the primary international intervention in
that region are the French forces who have been there for some
years. My assessment of that initiative is that they are very
good at taking out high level targets. They've had some
successes in killing a number of leaders which is important,
but it's not part of a holistic solution, and they're
overstretched. I think they have about 2,500 personnel there in
a vast area, so there's some local initiatives and regional
initiatives, primarily G5 Sahel. That's nascent. It's made up
of five Sahelan countries, and early returns have not been very
positive on their effectiveness.
Mr. Hice. Ms. Arieff, you're nodding. You obviously agree
with that. You alluded to it in your opening statement as well.
Ms. Arieff. Yes.
Mr. Hice. You do. Okay.
Ms. Arieff. I agree with the statement that the early
returns on G5 Sahel initiatives have not been promising.
Mr. Hice. Okay. So, what are the--I'll come back, Mr.
Meservey. What are the economies like in these regions?
Mr. Meservey. Well, these are--some of these countries are
desperately poor, frankly. Niger is one of the poorest
countries on earth. If you look at the U.N. human development
index, none of them would be even middle income. These are all
very under-resourced economies.
Mr. Hice. So, are young people joining these groups because
it, in itself, is an opportunity, an economic opportunity? Does
the economy drive some of the growth of the terror groups?
Mr. Meservey. Some of it. So, people join terrorist
organizations for a whole host of reasons. Some are truly
ideological in that they believe--they subscribe to this
radical Islamist ideology that says we must kill infidels----
Mr. Hice. Right.
Mr. Meservey [continuing]. Which are primarily Muslims who
don't agree with them, but some, yes, join for tribal reasons,
for instance, for a paycheck.
Mr. Hice. So, I want to focus on the economic side. Ms.
Arieff, would you--do you agree that--or what's your position
on the role of the economy in some of these poor areas?
Ms. Arieff. Poverty and a sense of desperation, no doubt,
help explain why people might be motivated to join an
insurgency, but it doesn't seem to be enough. What seems to
really be the trigger is a coherent political narrative that
says you're poor because your community has been excluded from
the fruits of the economy or the fruits of political
participation in this country or sector.
Mr. Hice. Right. So, I mean, I understand that there's
multiple factors involved, all right. We can't solve all of it.
But just from an economic perspective, if the economy were
improved, the things, avenues that we could take in the United
States to help improve the economies of some of these countries
that would potentially at least to some degree help with the
growth of terrorist organizations?
Mr. Meservey?
Mr. Meservey. Yes. I think that's true. I think the biggest
factor is for people to have hope and to feel like they have
some sort of say in the political process, for instance, and
some sort of autonomy in deciding their own fates.
So yes, absolutely having a job as a young person, for
instance, can ameliorate that sense of hopelessness and
marginalization and injustice, as Alexis was saying,
contributes or appears to be the trigger for radicalization in
a lot of these places.
Mr. Hice. Okay. One other question along these lines. What
has been more successful, the presence of military presence or
providing financial aid to countries? What is most effective?
Mr. Meservey. In countering terrorism?
Mr. Hice. In countering terrorism.
Mr. Meservey. It's really hard to measure. Military
operations are easier to measure in the sense that you can
count dead bodies, more or less, in the sense of terrorists
you've killed.
I think humanitarian development aid, as it's currently
structured, has never proven to be effective in alleviating
poverty. It's good in crisis situations sometimes, things like
that, but sustainable poverty alleviation has to be based on a
free market intervention and a free market model which goes
back to the governance issue. You need a requisite level of
competent governance in order to create an environment where
people can enjoy the benefits of a free market, and then that
will help alleviate that poverty.
Mr. Hice. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Gosar, for five minutes.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meservey, I'm going to go along that same line in
regard to economics, and you made some important assertions.
So, let's talk about China. You know, China's One Belt, One
Road initiative is undermining a lot of the economies within
Africa. Not only do they take an extorsive repayment by
utilizing that resource, but they use their own labor. So, the
host countries actually see this actually being done, that
they're actually being stolen from in a manner of aspects, and
then they see that they don't even get to reap a job out of
that to create this infrastructure.
So, what kind of implications do you see with the
involvement and the continuation of the One Belt, One Road
initiative with China's complicity to undermining these stable
governments?
Mr. Meservey. I think One Belt, One Road is clearly a
challenge for U.S. national interests around the world
including in Africa. I think it's an attempt to replace the
U.S.-led international order with a Chinese centric one. And
specific to infrastructure in Africa, it's a mixed bag,
actually, Chinese-provided infrastructure. I think some of
these infrastructure projects are white elephants, essentially,
but others actually could provide some sort of economic
benefit.
The problem is that there's opacity around virtually all of
these transactions, so we're not even sure what the terms of
the contracts state, for instance, so we don't know what the
interest rate is. We don't know the terms of repayment, things
of that nature.
I think there's a lot of corruption involved in the signing
of these contracts where the Chinese have a clear model of
engaging at the most senior possible levels and lavishing those
people with various blandishments, including outright bribery,
and then that facilities landing these sorts of contracts.
Then, of course, there's this tide loan model where they
will offer financing on the condition that a Chinese company
execute the project. So, you can have an African government
take on $4 billion of debt, and none of that money actually
ever passes through that government's treasury, for instance.
So, as I say, I have deep concerns about One Belt, One
Road. Some of the infrastructure I actually think is helpful in
Africa. Some, I think, is again, a white elephant and
essentially an excuse for leadership of an African company to
line its own pockets and the Chinese company to make a fat
profit.
Mr. Gosar. So, you know, going back to the one the speaker
talked about, we don't do enough about the nations that are
doing good, so you're isolating this problem. That's kind of
where I'm focusing on: that is how do we involve ourselves in
that dichotomy? Because if there's no economic--as you said, if
you give foreign aid, it's got a mixed bag. It doesn't really
help. But if you empower people to have a job, to be involved
in the upright building of their country, you get a lot of
extra benefits because of that. So, what--how do we handle
that, and on the vast expanses of Africa?
Mr. Meservey. Yes. I--to be clear, I do think there are
some uses for foreign aid. I don't think it's all negative, of
course, but vis-a-vis how do you develop or help countries to
develop these sorts of environments where entrepreneurs can
flourish. I think incentivizing U.S. businesses to get more
involved in Africa is part of this equation. Africa remains a
bit of a scary word for some American companies, but trying to
educate them on the opportunities there is just part of it.
I think working with government--identifying governments
that we have a chance to have an impact with. Honestly, I think
some African governments, the problems are so entrenched that
the U.S. isn't going to make much headway, but others we do
have an opportunity to work with them on improving their
governance.
So, you know, we've talked about civil society here. I
think that's a critical part. We can be creative around
anticorruption measures which, again, is a critical part of
good governance. Technology gives us all sorts of possible not
solutions but tools to attack this problem.
So, I think--I actually think Prosper Africa, the Trump
administration's--the pillar of its Africa strategy, has the
right idea where, you know, focusing on the economic aspect,
focusing on trade, things of that nature. But fundamentally,
these governments themselves have to reform and do better, and
the U.S. is limited in the sorts of tools we can bring to bear.
So, we can provide an example. We can make the case for
rule of law. We can incentivize our companies and encourage
them to get involved, but fundamentally, the African
governments themselves have to decide that this is the route
they want to go.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins for five
minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meservey, by historical standards, the United States is
providing record levels of counterterrorism resources to
African countries. Despite this investment of American treasure
and resources, the number of terrorist attacks has greatly
increased as some terrorist organizations--several--fight to
gain influence across the continent.
You have stated you believe that the U.S. needs to
coordinate closely with our European allies to curb the
violence perpetrated by terrorists. Is that correct, you stated
that?
Mr. Meservey. Yes.
Mr. Higgins. And what exactly do you believe--explain to
the American people what you believe the international
community must do to help in this effort.
Mr. Meservey. I think there is a host of things. One is
coordinate with one another. So, there is a variety of
countries working on----
Mr. Higgins. For instance, France is greatly involved.
Perhaps make an example of the French and American effort and
investment of treasure and assets in the African continent to
fight terrorism. And what would our other European allies need
to contribute?
Mr. Meservey. Yes, they would need to contribute some of
the same. So, different--one specific area I will talk about is
paramilitary police. I think Judd talked a bit about police.
But the U.S. doesn't actually have a paramilitary police force;
that is not our model. There are countries--France, for
instance, or the Italians or the Carabinieri--who do. And that
sort of force is really useful in a counterterrorism operation
because they provide the civil policing but they can also carry
out essentially military operations.
So, that is one area where you can have a division of
labor. And that requires coordination, where the U.S. needs to
be talking with the French or the Italians or other countries
that can provide that sort of support and say, ``Look, we are
handling ISR, we are handling lift, we are handling other types
of logistics and training. You can provide paramilitary police
training, for instance, and we can facilitate that in, you
know, various ways.'' So, that sort of coordination I think is
the start.
And, more generally, you know, when I say ``coordination,''
what I really mean, I guess, is a larger strategy, where all
the involved countries--and there are many of them--sit down
and talk to one another and decide, ``This is the way forward
for this collective effort.'' Because the Sahel problem, alone,
is far too difficult and too large for any one country,
including the United States, to handle.
Mr. Higgins. You described it as a collective effort.
Recently, our administration, at the executive level, has
encouraged our NATO allies to shoulder a greater burden with
the expense and the overall endeavor of the NATO mission. Would
you equate this as parallel? And why would our other European
allies not be invested in Africa?
Mr. Meservey. Yes, I think the Europeans actually have
greater interests in the Sahel region than the United States
does, because it produces so many of the immigrants that they
are worried about----
Mr. Higgins. So, do you agree that greater pressure should
be brought to bear upon our European allies to highlight their
obligation to join in the struggle against terrorist activities
in Africa and to share the burden of treasure invested and
assets invested?
Mr. Meservey. It depends which ally we are talking about.
So, the French are doing a lot, for instance. They lose
soldiers and that sort of thing. But, yes, I think other
European countries need to be encouraged to look at their own
interests.
I would include Middle Eastern countries is this as well.
So, the Saudis, for instance, have pledged money to this
effort, but they haven't actually delivered, so that----
Mr. Higgins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meservey. Yes.
Mr. Higgins. Let me ask you, what positive outcomes--let's
just try and close on a positive note here. What positive
outcomes have you seen? And, ultimately, why do you believe the
United States must remain engaged in fighting terrorist
organizations in Africa?
Mr. Meservey. Yes, I think the greater lesson of 9/11 was
that, if you allow these groups to have a safe haven even
halfway across the world, they will eventually turn their
attention to the United States. I think in Africa most of the
groups are locally focused, absolutely, but they still have a
hardcore who subscribe to this transnational ideology that
believes the United States is one of its absolute primary
enemies.
And beyond that, beyond that potential threat to the
homeland, is the attacks on American interests in those
regions, the large-scale humanitarian disasters that result
from attacks, the movement of people, the unmanaged movement of
people across borders and up into Europe and elsewhere. These
are all problems for the United States that needs to focus our
attention.
And I think, unfortunately, African terrorism has gotten a
bit of short shrift because of the problems in the Middle East,
but all the trends are in the wrong direction in Africa--oh,
you asked for something positive. Sorry.
You know, I have said that Somalia is of concern, and it
is, but I will say, Al Shabaab has not been able to retake
significant amounts of its territory that it lost five or six
years ago. Boko Haram is making a comeback, but it still
doesn't control nearly as much territory as it once did----
Mr. Higgins. I thank you for your clarification.
Mr. Meservey. Yes.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that your
leadership in holding this hearing is a positive sign. It
heightens the awareness that the children of God in Africa face
and our commitment as a Nation to join the world's forces to
stand against the oppression that the people there face every
day. So, thank you for holding this hearing.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
Let me ask--I certainly support this whole-of-government
counterterrorism approach, right? But, as the gentleman from
Louisiana points out, you have situations where--let's use
Nigeria as an example--where you have a huge population, great
growth there, a lot of natural resources. They have oil. They
have a lot of the elements that you would need to have a stable
and productive country.
Then you have other areas, I would say in western Niger,
maybe some areas of Mali, that are so remote they have really
become lawless regions, where there is no government capacity
there that we can support, right? It is just a lawless region.
How do we strike the right balance? You know, that is what
I am struggling with, Mr. Devermont, in terms of getting the
right balance to, you know, recognizing that--you know, on this
committee, we generally visit countries that are not doing
well. That is the nature of our job, right? And the common
denominator is usually a lack of an independent judiciary and a
weak rule-of-law regime. That is, like, the recipe for a failed
state. We have grappled with our ability to create that. It is
great when you have something to work with, you have maybe a
couple of strong leaders and, you know, a recognition for
individual rights and respect, you know, for basic rights,
basic human rights. But, in other cases, we have nothing to
work with.
You know, we have budgetary restraints here. We can't fund
every single thing we would like to fund. We have to spend our
money wisely. You know, if we are going to invest the
taxpayers' money, we have to make sure that we have a
reasonable opportunity for success, and we have a duty to make
sure that we invest that money wisely.
What is the balance, you know, in terms of, should we look
at places like Nigeria and try to help them take that next
step? Or, you know, do we look at, sort of, the military
solution that we are confronted with in some of these lawless
spaces? How do you, you know, strike the right balance?
Mr. Devermont. Thank you for that question, sir.
I think that you have to look at will, capacity, and what
are the stakes. And I think that you provided two very good
examples to show that.
So, my argument would be, in Nigeria, this is largely an
issue of will. I just returned from the region on Saturday, and
what is happening in the northeast, where Boko Haram and ISWAP
operate, is not on the front pages of the newspaper. It is not
a part of the political discourse. There is a general checking
out of this conflict. I think, unfortunately, the stakes are
too high for both us and the Nigerians to do that.
Our investments in Nigeria should not be around capacity,
at least at first. It should be about creating some political
will to address these problems seriously. Then we can talk
about building capacity so they use those resources in an
appropriate way and so that we can be accountable to our
taxpayers.
Niger is a different story, because I believe that
government has significant will to address this problem and
very little capacity. Even when in periods over the last couple
years where they have, I think, dipped in probably the wrong
approach, in terms of supporting ethnic militias, they then
course-correct.
And given the recent attack that left 71 of their soldiers
dead, you can see that they both feel the urgency of this
problem set and are looking to do better. So, I would be
focused, in the Niger case, on capacity-building.
That is how I would break it down when I look across the
continent: Who has the will and not the capacity? Who has the
will and the capacity? And who has neither?
Mr. Lynch. Mr. Akwei, do you want to add anything to that?
Mr. Akwei. I think I agree with Judd. The only thing I
would add would be that--I think my colleague from The Heritage
Foundation said the key thing, that for sustainable, successful
CT, this has got to be owned by African governments but not
just African governments. It has to be the general population.
That has to drive this political will.
I think one of the things that is really disappointing is
just what Judd said about the lack of intensity about what is
going on in the north and the erosion of the whole nation-state
in the northwest and northeastern provinces in Nigeria.
The other thing I would also argue is that the messaging
from the United States can be much stronger about the
importance of good governance--and that has taken a big hit--in
terms of respect for rule of law and respect for rights.
Because the closing space is shutting down the voices that
would amplify that our troops have to do the right thing, that
our military, that our police have to respect the--and that
there is actually a justice system that people can trust.
It is not a question of not having resources. It is a
question of justice----
Mr. Lynch. Right.
Mr. Akwei [continuing]. And hope, and that they are going
to be treated fairly. That is where we are losing this battle,
on the ideas and the values.
Mr. Lynch. Very good.
I am now going to yield to the gentleman from Louisiana,
Mr. Higgins, for five minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akwei, I would like to ask you, because of your
background and your service to Amnesty International--and we
thank you for that. All of us in this body support individual
rights and freedoms and protections across the globe. It should
be in our nature, and I believe it is.
But you have stated, I believe, that you oppose what you
refer to as the militarization of U.S. policy in Africa. So, I
would just ask you to clarify for us, how shall we accomplish
stability across the densities of population in Africa? How can
we help these communities stand up and embrace economic
prosperity, religious freedoms, protections, even basic access
to clean water and healthy food, decent education, improved
infrastructure, control over their own destiny?
If they cannot be safe, which--if you have an opposing
military presence, then we must have a supportive military
presence, a defensive military presence. That is my opinion.
So, how would you clarify your own posture regarding the United
States' policy there, sir?
Mr. Akwei. Sir, I completely--I want to clarify, Amnesty is
not a pacifist organization. We fully understand and respect
that there is an urgent threat and that there is an urgent
need. So, we are not talking about throwing away all of the
support and assistance that the United States provides.
What we are saying is that there is an imbalance and that
the investments that need to happen in terms of improving
governance for all of the things that you listed are being
shortchanged and that those are the only things that are going
to make a sustainable type of response to CT.
Mr. Higgins. I think that is an intelligent clarification,
and I thank you for that. Let me interject at that point in
your statement. Is that lack of balance being driven by United
States mandated policy, or is that imbalance, as you call it,
being driven by requests from the nation-states and the
officials thereof, based upon what they are asking for?
Mr. Akwei. I think it is being driven by both. I certainly
would say that the difference between what the nation-state
governments are asking for is not always the same thing as all
of the people in the country.
Mr. Higgins. Ah, so there we go to my point. How do we
determine this, good sir? As an American policy driven by the
best of intentions, how do we determine what is actually and
truthfully righteous and in the best service of the citizens--
--
Mr. Akwei. Sir, I think that----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Of Africa that are suffering?
Mr. Akwei. And that is really the result of a dialog that
is inclusive coming from these African countries. Our problem
has been that we have been listening to only one voice, and
that makes sense because it is government talking to
government. But, unfortunately, in many of these countries, it
is not representative government that you are talking to.
Mr. Higgins. What about the voice of nongovernment
organizations? Because they certainly have a voice that is
heard----
Mr. Akwei. But not in those countries.
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. On Capitol Hill. They have a
constant presence in my office. I don't know about the
chairman's.
Mr. Akwei. No, no, sir. Here in the United States,
absolutely, you are giving us this great honor of having a
dialog with us. My colleagues in African countries don't get
that kind of dialog.
Mr. Higgins. Ah.
Mr. Akwei. So, this is where this silence and this lack of
engagement then feeds this potential pool of recruitment for
these organizations.
Mr. Higgins. Do you believe that our European allies can
help us to bridge that lack of access to communications?
Mr. Akwei. I don't think we have a choice. They have to be
involved. I think my colleague from The Heritage Foundation
said that, that this is not the job of one country. It is not
the job of even a group of countries. It is basically a
holistic--it is inclusive. This is going to need real a hearts-
and-minds type of approach where everybody benefits from and
owns the response.
Mr. Higgins. All right. Thank you, sir, for your answers.
Mr. Chairman, we have a rather historic moment here where
Amnesty International and The Heritage Foundation are on the
same page for the betterment of mankind.
I yield.
Mr. Lynch. I duly note the gentleman's observation. I
agree.
Look, I would like to thank the gentleman. I would like to
thank our witnesses for their testimony today.
Without objection, all members will have five legislative
days within which to submit additional written questions for
the witnesses to the chair, which will be forwarded to the
witnesses for response. I ask our witnesses to please respond
as promptly as you are able.
Mr. Lynch. Again, I want to thank you for your thoughtful
observations. We are still searching for a way, how best to
address this issue, and I think that your comments today were
instructive and very thoughtful and helpful. So, I thank you
for your attendance here today.
This hearing is now adjourned. Thank you.