[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW START TREATY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 4, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-83
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-543PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mullen, Admiral Michael G., USN (Ret.), Nuclear Threat
Initiative, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff....... 7
Gottemoeller, Rose, Former NATO Deputy Secretary General and
Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs................................. 20
Vaddi, Pranay, Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace........................................ 29
Myers, Kenneth, Former Director of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency and U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons
of Mass Destruction............................................ 42
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 70
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 71
Hearing Attendance............................................... 72
STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED FROM COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Statement for the record sumbitted from Representative Connolly.. 73
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record from Chairman
Engel.......................................................... 74
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Guest........................................... 76
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Allred.......................................... 77
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW START TREATY
Wednesday, December 4, 2019
House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room
2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Engel. The committee will come to order.
Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit
statements, extraneous material, and questions for the record
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
We have a major operation here to do. We have got to put a
pillow here.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Engel. Without objection, all members will have 5
days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions
for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules.
We are here this afternoon to discuss the importance of the
new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, what we call New START, as
a tool for limiting the most destructive weapons ever created
as well as the implications of that treaty expiring, which is
set to happen in just over a year.
To our panel of distinguished witnesses, welcome to the
Foreign Affairs Committee. Welcome to members of the public and
the press as well.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Since a strong bipartisan majority in the Senate ratified
New START in 2010, the treaty has served American interests
well.
It put in place tough limits on Russia's nuclear arsenal.
Its strong verification measures have allowed us to make sure
Putin does not cheat, as he has done on other agreements, and
the treaty gave us the flexibility to maintain an effectively
safe nuclear deterrent to allow us to deal with any threats
America faces.
But to understand the full importance of New START, we have
to go back to the start of the cold war. Roughly a quarter
century after the end of World War II the standoff between the
United States, along with our allies, and the Soviet Union was
marked by an arms race.
Both sides stockpiled enough devastating weapons to destroy
the world many times over. My age is the age where we thought
the Soviet Union would live forever and be our enemy forever.
Then 50 years ago, the Nixon Administration launched the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT. These talks were
based on the notion that arms control rather than an arms race
is the best way to keep the Soviet Union, now known as Russia,
in check while avoiding a calamitous nuclear war.
The SALT talks produced two groundbreaking agreements that
were ratified in 1972 and in the years that followed. A
bipartisan consensus formed around prudent arms control
agreements as a key tool in advancing American security and
keeping the Soviets at bay.
Virtually every president since then has recognized the
importance of arms control. President Carter signed the SALT II
agreement, the first President Bush signed the original START
treaty with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, and President Obama
negotiated its successor, the New START treaty.
At the time New START was signed, that strong bipartisan
consensus supporting arms control still prevailed. Seventy-one
senators voted to ratify. Former secretaries of State of both
parties spoke out in favor of it.
It was a clear reflection of the old adage that guides our
committee's work, and Mr. McCaul and I have said this many
times, that politics should stop at the water's edge.
But in the years since then, we have seen a few strains of
criticism. Some people just do not like arms control for
ideological or political reasons.
Some would welcome a new arms race and some just seem
intent on undoing anything that President Obama touched. If the
treaty's opponents get their way, it will draw its last breath
in February 2021.
At that point, absent some extension, Russia's nuclear
forces would be completely unconstrained for the first time
since 1972.
Some of us here remember those days I mentioned before. We
remember air raid drills and duck-and-cover. We remember Soviet
nuclear weapons based 90 miles off the coast of Florida in
Cuba.
We remember when the threat of nuclear annihilation loomed
over our lives. And when I look at Russia today, I see an
unpredictable adversary. I see an autocratic leader in Vladimir
Putin, hell bent on undermining democracy, splintering the
West, and restoring some 21st century version of the Soviet
empire.
The president suggested yesterday that Russia might not be
a foe. Well, guess what? I believe he is wrong. The last thing
that we should want is for Vladimir Putin to massively expand
his nuclear arsenal without any limits.
No treaty is perfect. But with the clock ticking on New
START, we need to ask whether we are better off with or without
it. The answer is obvious to me and I hope the Trump
Administration does the right thing and extends the treaty.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these
issues. I look forward to their testimony, pending which I
recognize my friend, the ranking member, Mr. McCaul of Texas,
for any opening remarks.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing. This committee and you and I personally have
worked extensively in a bipartisan manner over the years to
highlight the continued threat that Vladimir Putin poses to the
United States and to our interests abroad.
Under the Putin regime, Russia has invaded Georgia and
Ukraine, leveled devastating cyber-attacks and disinformation
campaigns against our Western allies and meddled in our last
Presidential election.
The Kremlin has also imprisoned and assassinated political
opponents like Boris Nemtsov, attacked protestors, propped up
the bloodthirsty Assad regime in Syria, sent submarine warfare
capabilities to spy off of our coasts, and aided socialist
dictator Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela.
In addition to all this, Putin is developing new weapons
systems that violate international agreements that Russia
claims to adhere to.
In light of this, I agreed with President Trump's decision
to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
earlier this year after Russia's longstanding and clear
violations.
Arms control treaties are some of the most important
international agreements that Congress is called upon to
consider. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New
START, is the latest of these agreements, having entered into
force in 2011.
Unless extended in some manner, it is set to expire in
February 2021. New START is not perfect. It only considers
deployed nuclear weapons and does not limit or reduce the
number of non-deployed warheads.
In addition, it has not stopped Russia from modernizing its
weapon delivery systems or prevented China from building up its
nuclear stockpile.
However, the treaty has been successful, resulting in a 30
percent reduction in deployed nuclear warheads and a 50 percent
reduction in deployed launched vehicles.
Jointly, the United States and Russia have exchanged more
than 16,000 notifications about the movement of launchers and
conducted close to 300 onsite inspections in both countries.
According to the State Department's most recent New START
implementation report, with the treaty there, quote, ``would be
a decrease in our knowledge of Russia's strategic forces,'' end
of quote, and I find that very instructive here today.
It also contributes to the national security of the United
States. Yesterday, the lead arms control official at the State
Department confirmed that Russia remains in compliance with the
treaty.
Despite these successes, we must be realistic about the
future. Putin has proudly announced weapons systems that
Russia's developing and deploying, such as the SS-30, Satan 2
ICBM, and the Avangard hypersonic reentry vehicle that will be
included under the rubric of the treaty.
But Russia's advances in hypersonics and other so-called
exotics have also resulted in new weapons systems that were not
feasible when New START was negotiated and, thus, would not be
subject to the treaty's restrictions.
I know that a few of my colleagues have strong concerns
about extending New START. I understand and share some of these
concerns and, as they have noted, the treaty places no limits
on the deployment or stockpile of Russian tactical nuclear
weapons or some of their new hypersonic missiles which would--
may not be covered by the treaty itself.
I also understand the concern that China is not part of the
New START or any similar treaty restricting its nuclear
hypersonic weapons.
And while I would like to examine the feasibility of
expanding New START to address China's nuclear arsenal and
Russia and Chinese exotic weapons, they have made it clear that
they are not interested in doing so.
And so because of this, we need to ensure that New START is
extended in a responsible manner and that a strategic dialog
begin as soon as possible to negotiate a new arms control
agreement with Russia and possibly China that addresses these
outstanding issues.
Mr. Chairman, I know our offices have had extensive
discussions about the future of New START and I understand that
portions of your amendment and the amendment I helped to co-
sponsor have now been included in the NDAA Conference Report,
which is good news, and I look forward to seeing what comes out
of that and continuing our conversations as we move forward.
And with that, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
I will now introduce our witnesses before asking them to
summarize their testimony. Everything will be submitted for the
record.
Admiral Michael Mullen served in the United States Navy for
more than four decades, having a distinguished career by
serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2007 to
2011 and chief of Naval Operations from 2005 to 2007.
Last year, he joined the Board of Directors of the Nuclear
Threat Initiative, and since his retirement he also has taught
national security decisionmaking and policy at Princeton's
Woodrow Wilson School and is president of MGM Consulting.
Rose Gottemoeller recently completed 3 years as the Deputy
Secretary General of NATO, where she devoted significant
attention to NATO's relations with the EU, United Nations,
Russia, and China.
Prior to that, she served at the State Department as the
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,
and as the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Verification
and Compliance, in which position she was the chief U.S.
negotiator of the New START Treaty.
Pranay Vaddi is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Previously,
Vaddi was a civil servant in the Office of Strategic Stability
and Deterrence Affairs, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification,
and Compliance at the State Department.
He served at the Interagency New START Treaty Bilateral
Consultative Commission, backstopping policy committee chair,
and on the New START Treaty BCC delegation, and worked on the
suite of U.S.-Russian arms control and deterrence issues.
Kenneth Myers is the former director of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and U.S. Strategic Command Center for
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, an agency charged with
providing the military and combatant commands with expertise
acknowledging capabilities to prevent the use of weapons of
mass destruction.
Prior to that, he served on the staff of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and worked for Senator Richard
Lugar, whom we all remember warmly as the leading Statesman on
these issues. Mr. Myers now works as Senior Vice President for
Defense and Security at PAE.
I will now recognize our witnesses for 5 minutes each,
starting with you, Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN (RET.), NUCLEAR
THREAT INITIATIVE, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul,
members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today on a vital issue that affects the lives
of every American and, indeed, I think, the security of the
world.
I would like to submit for the record my full statement in
support of extending the New START Treaty and, in addition,
highlight for you now what I see as the key points in favor of
extending New START.
Chairman Engel. Without objection, so ordered.
Admiral Mullen. Based on my firsthand knowledge of the
treat and its successful implementation today, my belief that
the strategic arms control agreements are an integral element
of our overall nuclear policy and posture. I want to make six
key points today.
First, the New START Treaty contributes substantially to
the U.S. national security by providing limits, verification,
predictability, and transparency about Russian strategic
nuclear forces.
New START limits the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear
warheads and delivery systems and contains a robust
verification and transparency set of measures including
extensive exchanges of data, notifications regarding the number
and status of each side's strategic offensive arms and
facilities, and onsite inspections to confirm that data.
As of August 2019, the U.S. and Russia have exchanged
approximately 18,500 notifications and U.S. inspectors have
conducted more than 150 onsite inspections in Russia, providing
us a high confidence that Russia is complying with the treaty's
limits and other provisions, and vice versa.
New START also contains provisions to facilitate the use of
national technical means for treaty monitoring. Indeed, without
the treaty and its verification provisions, we would be flying
blind.
Second, it is strongly in the U.S. national interest to
extend New START for 5 years so that the United States and
Russia can continue to realize the mutual benefits and
stability it provides.
I support a straightforward extension of the treaty.
Measures that change or add new obligations to the treaty such
as bringing in another country like China or new categories of
weapons such as nonstrategic nuclear weapons cannot, as a legal
matter, be pursued through the extension. Such measures would
require a new agreement and a new Senate advising consent
process.
That said, it is certainly appropriate for the United
States to seek an understanding with Russia about how the
treaty will apply to any new strategic systems it deploys while
the extended treaty is in force.
This can be done in the treaty's Bilateral Consultative
Commission, or BCC.
Let me now address some of the specific concerns that have
been raised in the United States in the debate over the
extension of New START, Russia's new systems, and bringing
China into the negotiations.
New START will apply to the new strategic weapons systems
Russia is most likely to deploy during the treaty's extended
lifetime and it provides the best means for discussing Russia's
novel and emerging systems that could be deployed later.
In the near term, we have very effective means to address
the new Russian strategic systems that are most likely to be
deployed in the next 5 years and that is to extend New START.
Both the Sarmat heavy ICBM and the Avangard hypersonic
vehicle deployed on a Russian ICBM will be accountable under
the treaty, as recently confirmed by Russian Foreign Minister
Lavrov and by the Russian commissioner of the New START
Bilateral Consultative Commission.
Getting that commitment in writing in the context of
extension would be a great accomplishment for the
administration.
With respect to other strategic systems that are much less
likely to be deployed during a lifetime of an extended New
START, the treaty includes a provision stating the party can
raise in the BCC questions about the emergence of a new kind of
strategic offensive arms.
If New START lapses we will lose the limits and
verification we have on our Russian--Russia's existing
strategic systems as well as the only available vehicle for
subjecting limits and verification to the two new systems most
likely to be deployed.
The alternative to New START extension is a nuclear free
for all--no limits, no verification, and no predictability
regarding Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Any additional steps or agreements the United States wants
to pursue with Russia or other countries like China will have a
better prospect for success if the foundation of New START
remains in place.
It is critical to conduct a strategic stability dialog with
China, pursue transparency and confidence-building measures,
and lay the groundwork for future arms control measures.
But it would be an unconscionable mistake to sacrifice the
benefits to national security of mutual restraints with Russia
to the pursuit of an unlikely near-term arms control agreement
with China.
Regular and sustained bilateral nuclear dialog between the
United States and China is also essential for building
transparency and trust and reducing risk of miscalculation and
blunder.
Robust U.S.-Russia dialog on strategic stability and
bilateral and multilateral crisis management mechanisms with
Russia are essential and should be reinvigorated.
Congress should encourage and support this. I urge you to
support and encourage the expansion and deepening of these
channels of communication with Russia to enhance the security
of the American people and our allies.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Gottemoeller.
Am I butchering your name? If I am, please correct me.
No? Okay.
Ms. Gottemoeller. No, sir. Just perfect. I have been called
a lot of things but you are pronouncing my name right.
So thank you very much indeed.
STATEMENT OF ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, FORMER NATO DEPUTY SECRETARY
GENERAL AND FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Ms. Gottemoeller. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify before you today on the importance of
the New START Treaty as well as broader arms control issues of
importance to NATO allies.
Having departed the position of NATO deputy secretary
general only in October, I am very aware of the interest and
concerns of the allies in this strategically significant arena.
I will give a few highlights of my testimony and ask,
please, that the whole of it be placed on the record.
Today, I would like to focus on two aspects of contemporary
arms control. First, one that Admiral Mullen has already
introduced, the importance of the New START Treaty.
I will focus on its importance in regulating parity. That
is, the equivalence of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear
forces.
The second issue I would like to tackle is the problem of
dual and nuclear and conventional capability in ground-launched
intermediate range missiles, an issue that has become
especially acute in Eurasia with the demise of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty--INF--and, thus,
affects U.S. allies in both Europe and in Asia.
First, on New START, I know and, as Admiral Mullen has just
discussed, a debate has been underway as to whether to extend
the New START treaty for 5 years from February 21 to February
26, as is permitted by the treaty.
A number of arguments have been advanced against this step,
including that the treaty does not control the new nuclear
systems that Russian President Putin has announced on several
occasions, most prominently in his speech on March 1, 2018.
I do not find these arguments convincing, in part because,
in fact, New START can play a role in regulating these systems,
as Admiral Mullen has described.
More importantly, we need to take a bold look at the
question of whether New START benefits U.S. national security
and what blows to U.S. national security would accrue, should
New START abruptly go out of force on February 5 of 2021.
Without the treaty, let me just underscore the answer is
clear to me. During the coming decade, the United States will
be modernizing its nuclear forces.
If the treaty is extended until 2026, it will continue to
cap Russian-deployed warheads at 1,550, and delivery systems--
missiles and bombers--at 700, giving the United States a stable
environment in which to carry out the modernization of our
nuclear forces.
Without the treaty, things could change drastically and
quickly. There is no faster way for the Russians to outrun us
than to deploy more nuclear warheads on their missiles.
This is not a new issue. Starting in the 1970's, the
Soviets and now the Russians have built larger and heavier
intercontinental ballistic missiles on which they can load more
warheads at will and they have plenty of them in storage.
If released from the current 1,550 limit on deployed
warheads, the Russians could readily add several hundred, by
some account 1,000 more warheads to their ICBMs, forcing the
United States into a difficult targeting problem at best and a
strategic crisis at worst.
The Russians, with their highly capable missiles might be
tempted to try to knock out the strategic command and control
systems of the United States.
Stability depends on such a temptation never taking shape.
As farfetched as it seems, that very scenario drove both sides
in the arms reduction negotiations of the 1980's and 1990's to
acknowledge that we must ensure parity in numbers of deployed
warheads and delivery vehicles.
We cannot afford to lose this parity or to cease regulating
it. But if New START lapses, that outcome could happen fast, an
outcome dangerous for U.S. national security.
Therefore, I believe it is in our national security
interest to extend the treaty to February 2026.
Before I leave the New START Treaty, I would just like to
mention that the NATO allies, as well as our allies in Asia, do
support extension of the New START Treaty.
Now, I would like to speak briefly to the dual capability
challenge. The problem of dual nuclear and the conventional
capability and intermediate-range systems is an issue that has
become especially acute in Eurasia with the demise of the
intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF.
It does affect allies in both Europe and Asia. NATO allies
have been clear in voicing their concerns about it and Tokyo
and Seoul have also begun to do so.
To begin, the unique difficulty that emerges from dual
capable intermediate-range missiles that are ground lodged is
that they have either very short flight time to target, as in
ballistic systems, or operate in a stealthy mode difficult for
radar to detect as in cruise missiles.
Warning time for those under attack is either very short or
totally lacking. The missiles, thus, face decisionmakers with
the nightmarish dilemma of a no-warning attack that could be
either nuclear or conventional.
This is the very dilemma that led Soviet and U.S.
negotiators to reach the INF treaty in the period of 1987 and
it did sustain stability by banning all intermediate-range
ground-launched deployed by the parties.
Now the dilemma remains but the INF treaty does not and I
know this hearing is not about reversing the U.S. withdrawal
from the INF.
But I want to state clearly that I supported it, having
personally been involved in 4 years of diplomacy to try to get
the Russians back into compliance with the treaty.
So I am not condoning Russian behavior but I do want to say
that the Russians have spoken out to say, from a leadership
aspect, both their minister of defense, Sergei Ivanov, and also
President Putin that they see the proliferation of these kinds
of systems across Eurasia in the hands of the Chinese, the
Indians, the Pakistanis, the North Koreans, and then the
Iranians as being destabilizing for them. Why they never
attempted to resolve it at the negotiating table I do not know.
But we saw them violating the treaty and so have withdrawn.
So I think it will be important to get China to the table
and I think we can--we can pursue a phased approach with them,
with China and Russia together, pursuing, for example, early
talks on the issues and dilemmas that these systems represent,
then moving on to statements of restraint and, finally, moving
in the direction of actual limitations and reductions on these
systems.
But I see the necessity of a phased approach to bring China
to the table and to make it clear to them that their interests
too will be served by constraints and restraints on these kinds
of weapons systems.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience. I
look forward to further discussion.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Vaddi.
STATEMENT OF PRANAY VADDI, FELLOW, NUCLEAR POLICY PROGRAM,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Vaddi. Thank you, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member
McCaul, and esteemed members of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
I have submitted detailed written testimony for the record
and will summarize my main points now.
I hope to leave you with two main conclusions today. First,
New START expiration exacerbates security threats facing the
United States.
Chairman Engel. Could you pull your mic a little closer?
Yes.
Mr. Vaddi. It risks an increase in Russia's strategic
nuclear forces and losing insights into Russia's nuclear
operations. Further, treaty expiration will not address Stated
U.S. goals, like limiting Russia's tactical nuclear weapons
stockpile or bringing China into an arms control process. These
problems will remain unresolved after expiration of New START.
Second, extending New START is valuable to U.S. security.
Extension continues limits on Russia's strategic nuclear
arsenal, which is modernizing as we speak. It also enhances
U.S. allied relations. Extension will not create any new
security problems for the United States.
New START provides information on Russia's nuclear weapons
for the U.S. intelligence community and military that is
unlikely to be otherwise obtained. This information comes from
data exchanges, notifications, and onsite inspections, which
all show that Russia is complying with the treaty today.
Under New START, the United States and Russia exchange a
full accounting of their strategic nuclear forces an facilities
through major data exchanges twice per year.
They also exchange notifications, by latest count by the
State Department over 19,000 to date. Any time a missile moves
from one base to another, a new missile is produced or flight
tested or additional warheads are deployed on a system within
days of that event occurring.
Of course, the U.S. Government simply does not take
Russia's word of these data exchanges. Onsite inspections
provide short notice spot checks with just over 1 day of
advanced notice.
Russia is left with some uncertainty regarding what nuclear
base may be inspected when an inspection is announced, which
helps promote Russian compliance.
These measures help U.S. defense planners design the
appropriate sized nuclear posture to deter Russia, which is by
far the largest nuclear power of any potential U.S. adversary.
Verification also deters future compliance challenges and
provides information not based on sensitive U.S. intelligence
sources. This is useful information to have when engaging
Russian diplomats on nuclear weapons issues.
Russia's novel or exotic nuclear weapons have been in the
news recently. I cover these systems in detail in my written
testimony and welcome any additional questions you may have on
them.
I want to make clear that New START is actually a good
story in this respect. Only two new long-range nuclear
systems--the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, and the
Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle--will likely be deployed
before the treaty expires.
Russian officials have agreed to bring both weapons into
New START accountability, which is a credit to the
administration's experts who pushed for their inclusion in the
treaty.
Already Russia has shown the Avangard hypersonic glide
vehicle to U.S. inspectors. Thanks to New START, U.S. personnel
have laid eyes on the very first known deployed strategic range
hypersonic glide vehicle Russia has ever fielded.
They will do the same with the Sarmat ICBM once it is
deployed. The bottom line is the new Russian weapons that
matter most to U.S. security between now and 2026--the furthest
expiration date should New START be extended for 5 years--will
be constrained.
Failing to extend New START will undo the limits achieved
by the Trump Administration on these two new systems.
Yes, there are yet to be deployed nuclear weapons, which do
not neatly fit into the treaty's definitions. However, it makes
little sense to release constraints on the bulk of Russia's
strategic nuclear force to try and limit a few developmental
systems which are unlikely to be relevant to the United States
before New START ever expires.
Additionally, the Trump Administration has argued that
China should be brought into the arms control process. This is
a worthy long-term goal.
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China's
warhead stockpile is in the low couple of hundreds, compared to
the thousands of warheads that the U.S. and Russia maintain.
Instead of attempting to limit China with the New START
treaty, U.S. diplomats should prioritize keeping China from
building up its currently small nuclear arsenal to challenge
the United States numerically.
This is not what New START was designed to do. Our
differing goals with respect to China and Russia and their
respective nuclear forces can be pursued more effectively after
New START is extended.
To conclude, let me state unambiguously that New START
extension is in U.S. interests. Letting New START expire will
undermine U.S. security. Extending New START will not create
any new security problems.
The treaty will continue to support U.S. national security
goals, constrain Russia's nuclear arsenal and provide a stable
basis for the planned U.S. nuclear modernization, which will
shift from development to producing new U.S. nuclear systems
after the treaty expires.
In addition, expiration would harm U.S. relations with its
allies.
For members here today, Congress has an important role to
play in arms control policy. I encourage Congress to look
seriously at the U.S. government's arms control work force.
Promoting diplomacy in this area and hiring and retaining the
next generation of arms control experts are important missions
the committee can embark on.
The president can extend New START with the stroke of a
pen. I hope that today's hearing will move the House and Senate
to take up bipartisan legislation and further messaging to
signal Congress's strong interest in New START extension.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward
to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vaddi follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Myers.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH MYERS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE
THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR
COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Mr. Myers. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, and members
of the committee, it is an honor to testify on the future of
the New START treaty. I would like to summarize my written
statement and have it submitted for the record.
The views I will express here today are my own and not
necessarily those of my company, PAE. I believe the New START
treaty should be extended before it expires in 2021.
I reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, while the
New START treaty is not perfect, it limits Russia's ability to
deploy nuclear weapons and as long as Russia remains in
compliance, it is in U.S. national interest to prevent Russian
expansion of its nuclear arsenal.
Second, the 5-year extension can and should be used to
address recent technological developments and it will include
China in expanded negotiations and commitments.
The Russians are testing nuclear delivery systems not
captured by the New START treaty and the Chinese are making
significant investments to expand and modernize their nuclear
weapons capabilities.
As a result, I believe it is necessary to extend in order
to expand.
On a personal note, I would like to thank the chairman and
ranking member for naming the bill after Senator Richard Lugar
and Representative Ellen Tauscher. I had the privilege to serve
on Senator Lugar's staff for 15 years and I am thankful to have
worked for a true American Statesman who made the United States
more secure and the world a safer place.
Mr. Chairman, treaties will never be perfect and they are
not panaceas. By their very nature they are compromises between
governments.
As a result, they alone cannot ensure American security.
During my time in the Senate, I participated in the
consideration of many treaties. The concern heard most often
was a level of certainty to detect cheating.
President Reagan's famous dictum of trust but verify is
heard regularly, and rightfully so. In large part, the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, or DTRA, is the entity charged with
responding to President Reagan's challenge.
DTRA conducts the inspections in Russia and escorts Russian
inspectors in the U.S. The treaty and technical weapons experts
at DTRA are the very best in the world. They train and exercise
regularly to maximize the verification opportunities under New
START and other treaties.
After leaving the Senate, I had the pleasure to serve as
the director of DTRA for 7 years and testified in support of
the New START treaty in 2010.
The agency supported the New START treaty negotiations,
providing analytical, technical, and linguistic support to then
Under Secretary Gottemoeller and her team of negotiators to
then Chairman Mullen and the Department of Defense and the U.S.
interagency.
Of the 56 members of Dr. Gottemoeller's negotiating team in
Geneva, 18 were DTRA personnel. It provided decades of
experience and expertise to the delegation and played a
critical role in the development of the treaty.
DTRA was confident in and ready to make full use of the
treaty provisions because they helped develop them.
Mr. Chairman, I believe a rigorous verification regime is
crucial to a treaty's success. I have no doubt that Russia will
seek to ensure weapons, such as the boost glide missile system,
remain outside the treaty while also seeking to make it harder
for the U.S. to verify compliance.
I will defer to my colleagues as to the best negotiating
strategy. But the technical skills of DTRA will be required to
successfully capture the necessary delivery systems and avert
loopholes that could be utilized by Russia and China.
Engaging China will also complicate negotiations. But I
believe their inclusion is necessary. Beijing's nuclear
modernization and expansion cannot be ignored.
The U.S. must not allow Moscow and Beijing to negotiate us
into a corner or leverage gaps in the treaty's verification
regime.
U.S. national security will benefit from an expanded treaty
that includes newly developed delivery systems, a growing
nuclear-capable China, and a verification regime that ensures
our ability to determine compliance.
Reasonable people can disagree on what compromises need to
be struck to achieve an agreement. But I believe a treaty that
limits the threats to the U.S. to be inherently in our
interests.
Mr. Chairman, I fully support the ongoing nuclear
modernization process here in the United States. But we must
also understand that Russia and China are doing the same.
Our deterrence and defense strategies are supported not
only by aggressive modernization and continued investment in
missile defense but also by reducing the number of threats
facing the United States.
It is time that the U.S. get to work to extend New START in
order to expand it.
I want to thank the committee for the invitation to appear
today. I applaud your leadership and I stand ready to support
the committee in the future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Well, thank you all very much.
I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. All time
yielded is for purposes of questioning our witnesses and I will
start by recognizing myself.
Let me start with you, Admiral. You held the most senior
position in our armed forces and dealt with countless threats
to our Nation's security throughout your career.
On the topic of arms control, we often hear people suggest
that negotiating with an adversary is somehow a sign of
weakness.
Can you address this question? Do you think arms control
negotiations can help strengthen our position vis-a-vis
adversaries like Vladimir Putin's Russia?
Admiral Mullen. Chairman, certainly the evidence in the
last decade or two indicates that the relationship with--our
relationship with Russia is a very difficult relationship.
I do not think that is going to change. One administration
after another has tried to establish it and it is very tough.
What is striking to me is that in this regime, though, it
has actually been pretty strong over a long period of time.
Sometimes it is difficult to really understand why that happens
at a very high level.
I think actually both sides, going back to the beginning of
SALT, do not want to destroy the world and that continues.
So I actually think we are in a position of strength with
respect to these capabilities. We both possess--still possess
the weapons which could, in great part, destroy the world and I
think there is underlying, beneath all this, the desire to make
sure that that never happens.
We have--we have had strong negotiations with them before.
They are difficult. They call for compromises, but not so far,
at least the one I negotiated, not so much that we would
compromise our security or the security and stability of the
world with respect to these weapons.
The worry that I have is outside those negotiations or
outside these requirements we have no way of understanding what
they are doing and we sort of opened the door to a new arms
race.
In addition to, and it has been brought up several times,
how do we get China into this, when I negotiated this in 2010
along with Rose, China was obvious at that time and the
question was at what point in time do we bring them in. We did
not try to answer it back then.
At some point, we need to do that in a very structured way.
The fact that we've been able to control these weapons in this
way indicates we can in the future, and as China continues to
emerge, be a player on the global stage, there is an
opportunity to do that.
But that is long, detailed. It takes expertise and there is
no way that we could bring them in in the short period of time
that we have right now before this expires.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Admiral.
Ms. Gottemoeller, you recently returned from Brussels after
years of working directly with our closest allies. I would like
to explore the importance our allies place on arms control.
New START is, of course, a bilateral treaty with Russia.
But does it have an impact on NATO security, more broadly?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it does because it
provides for predictability and mutual stability with the
Russians, and right at the heart of NATO defense ultimately are
the central strategic systems of the United States of America.
So it is the ultimate guarantee of the security of the
alliance. And so to the degree to which there is stable
predictability to which we know what the Russians are doing,
and vice versa, I want to stress that this is mutual.
These are reciprocal arrangements. This kind of
predictability is seen of great benefit by the allies and, as I
mentioned in my remarks, they fully support the extension of
the New START treaty.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Vaddi, let me ask you this question about China because
members of our committee are concerned about China, and we
understand the Trump Administration is anxious to include China
in future arms control talks.
Can you go into more detail on the state of China's nuclear
arsenal? How concerned should we be about China's nuclear
weapons at this stage as compared to Russia's?
Mr. Vaddi. Thank you for your question, Chairman Engel.
So China has a nearly tenfold smaller nuclear arsenal than
the United States and Russia.
Chairman Engel. Can you pull your microphone a little
closer please? Yes.
Mr. Vaddi. China has a nearly tenfold smaller nuclear
arsenal than the United States and Russia. Estimates from the
U.S. Government and nongovernment organizations put the Chinese
stockpile number between 200 and 300.
China has a declared no first use policy, meaning they
would not--they have stated a commitment not to use nuclear
weapons first, and they are satisfied with the purely
retaliatory nuclear posture.
China does not have any alert nuclear weapons. It keeps
warheads de-mated from its ICBMs, though there is a debate in
Beijing whether that should change based on actions by the
United States as the relationship grows more competitive.
In contrast to China, Russia is a nuclear peer of the
United States. They, roughly, have the same numbers and types
of nuclear weapons as the United States, especially in their
strategic nuclear force, a greater overall number of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons but a lesser stockpile of
strategic nuclear weapons.
Beyond the numbers, the U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons
relationship is a relatively stable one. Each country has the
means to annihilate the other through a survivable retaliatory
strike.
And the size of Russia's arsenal it is interested in
qualitative improvements and its offensive capabilities, its
commitment to funding nuclear weapons development even while
its economy is in a weak state. It is not a problem that is
going away. The United States should and will continue to treat
Russia as the preeminent driver of U.S. nuclear policy.
I think we should ask ourselves what could drive China to
perceive a need to increase its nuclear arsenal and that should
be the driving element of U.S. arms control policy toward
China.
If this is a core tenet of the U.S. arms control approach
to China, that is to say, not to spook Beijing and raising to
parity, abandoning all first-use, alerting its ICBMs, then
signalling that the United States and Russia are going to
maintain an arms control relationship is especially important
to engaging China in arms control.
We should not allow New START to expire and potentially
invite China to raise to parity with the United States because
they have the capability to do so and they have the financial
means to do so because that will make China a much larger
challenge down the road.
Chairman Engel. Thank you. My time has expired so I will
call on Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, to Admiral Mullen, thank you for your service to our
Nation over the many years. We all have a great deal of respect
for you, sir.
And I just want to ask you first, there are many who say,
you know, you cannot trust the Russians and I do not. But our
State Department did say that they are in compliance with New
START.
What would be the negative consequences of pulling out of
the New START agreement?
Admiral Mullen. If I were to go back to the negotiations,
and Ms. Gottemoeller here has spent most of her life in these
kind of negotiations, this was really my first.
But the difficulty of the negotiations were the technical
details--you know, how many inspections, what were the national
technical means, we need you to leave a certain site that you
have been able to inspect alone in the future.
They were really hard-nosed negotiations. That said, once
we reached agreement on the details, they have been very,
very--seemingly, very, very compliant.
Certainly, all the evidence seems to speak to that. We lose
all that, quite frankly. We lose the opportunity to, basically,
you know, do the verify side of trust but verify and if we
cannot verify it there's no way we can know, and I think in the
opening--some of the opening statements from--in Rose's opening
statement what Russia is doing in terms of developing new
capability, you know, larger warheads, larger missiles, what
they could actually put to use beyond these limits very
quickly--it is pretty scary.
And then we are in a position where are we back in the arms
race that we thought we sort of up through, you know, the end
of the cold war we sort of left behind and we are not--we are
much closer to that than I thought we ever would be again and
that is why this treaty in particular is so critical. We just--
we are in the dark, basically, if we walk away.
Mr. McCaul. And that was exactly the point I was going to
make. It seems to me we do get intelligence out of this and
without this we would go dark and, potentially, an arms race
would start.
Admiral Mullen. We do get it and everybody knows it. They
also get intelligence out of this. That's part of the
negotiations of how much of that are you going to give away.
But we, clearly--we, clearly, had visibility in these systems
into what they are doing.
Mr. McCaul. So the other arguments we hear is, you know, as
you talked about China, I agree that we need to look at China
and but the fact is, as you point out, Admiral, they are not
part of this agreement and they are not a signatory to this
agreement, although I do think we need to look at China and
these other expansive weapons that are not part of the
agreement but more the exotic, the hypersonic weapons, for
instance.
Secretary Gottemoeller and, perhaps, to the three of you,
how can we accommodate those critics? In other words, would it
make some sense to have as maybe a precondition to an extension
of New START to have conversations and a strategic dialog with
Russia and China on these new weapons and also on China's
nuclear capability?
Ms. Gottemoeller. The biggest issue now, I think, sir, is
to look for ways to incentivize China to come to the
negotiating table and to my mind that kind of strategic
stability discussion on trying to exercise some kind of
leverage out of the extension of New START on China they will
simply not be levered in that way, in my mind.
And so I think it is more important to look for what will
incentivize them to come to the negotiating table and, to my
mind, they are in a position where they could--they could be
essentially convinced that they are facing a major
proliferation of particularly intermediate-range missile
systems in Eurasia and they are going to have to, if they want
to address that, what will be a severe threat to Beijing over
time.
They are going to have to come to the negotiating table. So
it is a bit of a long game with China and I think there is a
role for a strategic stability type discussion with them. But I
do not think they will be levered by extension of New START.
I think what they will be levered at is that they are going
to be scared at the notion that they will facing more missiles
pointed at them.
Not only they are worried about the United States, of
course, and I do not know what the plans are by the United
States to deploy intermediate-range systems in Asia
particularly but Russia, their nemesis in South Asia, India.
These are countries who have very capable missiles and that
is what is going to bring them to the table, thinking about
what the threats to them are.
Mr. McCaul. And Mr. Vaddi and Mr. Myers?
Mr. Vaddi. I will be brief.
I think there are actually some things the administration
has done that it can take credit for that have not been tied to
the New START extension question.
So, you know, I believe the United States has approached
China about a strategic dialog in this administration. The
United States has engaged in the permanent five strategic
stability process. That's the five permanent nuclear powers of
the U.N.--U.K., France, United States, Russia, and China.
So there have been--there has been some importance placed
on discussing multilateral strategic stability in that way.
Now, as far as making it a precondition to extension, I
find it hard to believe that Russia would refuse to extend the
treaty if it is based on needing to engage China in some kind
of diplomatic dialog. So I think it is completely appropriate.
If that is something that the administration can take
credit for and then extend the New START treaty as well, that
is, to me, an appropriate policy decision.
Mr. McCaul. I think that is a great idea.
Mr. Myers.
Mr. Myers. Let me be very clear. I am not suggesting that
engaging the Chinese is a precondition to extending New START.
In fact, just the opposite.
I think we need to extend and use that opportunity to
engage not only on the new delivery systems but, potentially,
on China. Whether or not they become a member of the New START
treaty or its extension or what have you is almost immaterial.
The engagement in the negotiations, whether that comes out
as part of a trilateral or a separate bilateral, to me, it
makes no difference.
But extension has to happen for us to be in a position to
accomplish those additional goals. That is why I really believe
we have to extend first before we really get into a serious
discussion----
Mr. McCaul. And I think this president he likes bilateral
talks, not multilateral, and that would fall in line with what
you are saying.
Mr. Myers. Correct.
Mr. McCaul. This would be a separate--and he is having
separate negotiations with President Xi as we talk, this week
anyway. Yes.
Mr. Myers. Certainly. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. I yield whatever time I have left, which
is none.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank our witnesses for being here.
About 4 months ago in the subcommittee of this committee
dealing with Europe and Eurasia, we did have a similar hearing
on whether to, you know, extend START or start over, and I
think it is important to note that the witnesses we had at that
hearing underscored absolutely everything you are saying here
today.
The former State and former defence officials--you all know
them--people like Tom Countryman and Madelyn Creed on and folks
like Brian McKeon.
So that much we know. But they mentioned, as you mentioned,
the issue that Russia has not cheated on this. They have been
in compliance.
And I would like to ask you all why do you think Russia has
done this with this treaty, which it did not do with INF and
other treaties. What is in it for them that they have not
violated this treaty?
Admiral Mullen. I do not have a better answer than the one
I already gave. They have been--they have negotiated these
treaties for decades. They have by and large been very
compliant.
I am, obviously, very familiar with the details of this,
which they have, as far as I can tell, complied with, and they
have committed, in effect listening to some of their public
statements they have committed that they had agreed to continue
it.
It is hard, very difficult for me to understand the Russian
mind in that regard, why they are that way and then why they
were cheating on the other ones. But they have not--as best we
can tell, they have not cheated on this and I think we have to
assume, at least based on what we know, that they are not, even
though it is always possible. But they have been--if I
regressively look at this over decades they have, basically,
complied.
Mr. Keating. Ms. Gottemoeller.
Ms. Gottemoeller. So the Russians have an enormous regard
for our strategic nuclear arsenal. They see it as a potent
force, one that is targeted at them, and that at the heart of
it is the same reason why we engage in these negotiated
strategic arms limitations and reductions in order to ensure
that we keep under control that most significant threat of
weapons of mass destruction attack.
So I think that is right, front, and center in what
motivates the Russians to engage in these kinds of treaties and
to continue to implement them.
But, furthermore, there are some really bread and butter
issues. We have talked about the notification regime providing
us a real-time look at the Russian nuclear arsenal.
These notifications provide them a real-time look at our
strategic nuclear arsenals. So they know when our submarines
are getting ready to deploy.
They know when our ICBMs are getting ready to go into
maintenance. This kind of mutual predictability has been
mutually stabilizing. And so I think they have an important
reason and rationale in that realm as well.
Mr. Keating. Could I followup with one of your other
statements that you said in your opening remarks? You mentioned
our NATO allies.
After the INF treaty moved away from that, which NATO did
agree with, although they agreed--I could tell you that there
were great concerns and disappointments with our allies that we
did not consult with them during that process and bring them in
the loop more than we did, how important--hopefully, as we
begin these discussions, how important is it to bring those
allies of ours into the loop and make sure they know what is
going on from our perspective.
Ms. Gottemoeller. I want to begin my remarks, sir, by
giving some good credit to this current administration who did
provide a significant amount of information including
intelligence information that enabled our allies to determine
that Russia independently that the Russians indeed are in
violation of the INF treaty with this new SSC-8 missile.
So there was a good deal of consultation. It took some time
and there were some frustrations just as you have said. But in
the end of the day, a good deal of information was provided and
the allies did independently determine the violation.
That said, going forward, New START, obviously, is a
bilateral treaty between the Russian federation and the United
States.
But, as I mentioned a few moments ago, allies see it as
part and parcel of their deterrence and defense agenda as well
and so they will be very keen to have tight consultations both
on the extension of the treaty and what goes forward as well in
terms of further reduction negotiations.
Mr. Keating. Any other comment?
Mr. Vaddi. Sure, I will agree with the previous two
witnesses' statements.
The one thing I will add is New START has a effective
operational verification regime, which sets it apart from the
INF treaty.
The INF treaty's verification regime expired in 2001. New
START, meanwhile, inspectors from Mr. Myers' former
organization have the opportunity to crawl over Russian nuclear
bases 18 times a year.
They are confirming data that Russia provides to the United
States through the data exchanges and notifications, and making
sure that the warhead counts, the locations of missiles on a
system-by-system basis are where the Russians are saying they
are.
As a result, I think Russia is deterred from cheating on
the New START treaty. The broader point is that I think, as Ms.
Gottemoeller said, Russia would be scared to death of a
strategic arms race with the United States. They cannot keep
pace financially or technologically with the United States on
these types of technologies.
Mr. Keating. I agree.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to the panel for your expertise and your leadership for
decades.
You know, the 18 short-term--short notice onsite
inspections each year, maybe you can give us a little further
insight what the approximate causes is when we decide, on a
short-term basis we are going to go and we are going to look at
this, what often triggers that, how sure are we and what's the
degree of confidence that somehow we are seeing what we think
we are seeing--I mean, are very adept at hiding and concealing.
Let me ask you too, if the U.S. were to push China's
inclusion, how serious would Russia's demands be that France,
with its 300 nuclear weapons and the U.K. with 200 or so
nuclear warheads be included as well?
Would that become like a make or break and the next thing
you know the whole thing implodes because of that expansion?
The mega tonnage--when warheads are being replaced is that part
of this as well?
Is it just not the number of MIRV nuclear weapons going on
ICBM or is it how big are they, how lethal they are?
And then when it comes to modernization, how does extending
or not extending New START affect each nation's modernization
plans?
I know from everything I have read and have been following
and you have kind of said it today, you know, they would be
unleashed to do even more. So would we be in like fashion.
But, to me, modernization means more lethal, more accurate,
maybe safer and that is a good component, but more lethal.
I mean, again, getting back to the mega tonnage, if we are
looking at something that just manages the old MAD theory or,
you know, and what has ever happened to that. We know the
mutual assured security concept during Carter and into Reagan
became very much, you know, a better talking point than just
obliterate both sides.
And where are we on that? How does that factor into all of
this? But, again, those first questions, if you could.
Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. Actually, what I would like to do is just
get at the modernization issue because that became such a big
part of the last negotiation, although as far as I know,
basically it was were we going to be able to carve out enough
money to commit to the modernization of our systems, which was
badly in need at the time, and it was about more capability. It
was about technically--it was also about upgrading them and
being able to test them, obviously, in a nonexplosive way to
make sure that actually the systems could respond.
And there was an awful lot of that which was in play, a lot
of money that was set aside in the budget to be able to do
that.
I know that that has been in great part invested but I
could not tell you today that we are where we want to be. I
know we are very committed to that, and that was part of what,
in listening to General Mattis or to Secretary Mattis's
testimony, I know he was committed to that as well.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Myers.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. With regard to the inspections, the
first part of your question, I am going to be a little bit
careful here in terms of how we pick targets because that is
done by an interagency process.
But let me make two points. First and foremost, everything
is done very, very deliberately. Everything is done in a very
informed way, whether that is being informed by national
technical means or whether it is being done by the very data
exchanges and notifications that we have discussed.
The data exchanges and the notification give us kind of a
basis of evidence that we try to prove or disprove. But the
goal, obviously, is whatever you do under these inspections you
are going to try to accomplish multiple things all at the same
time, whether it be verifying a data exchange, a notification,
an inspection--whatever the case might be.
And the way the treaty provisions are written up the team
goes in and does not have to announce where they want to go in
Russia and to a considerable amount of time has gone by, and we
are able to watch what happens as a result of that and we are
able to adjust and we are able to make an awful lot of
decisions on the fly, if you will.
And the one thing I want to assure you is none of that is
haphazard. None of it. The teams train, the teams exercise, and
the teams deploy in a very, very militaristic way, if you will.
They train like a military unit to carry out these events.
And as a result, I have no doubt whatsoever that the quality of
the information that we are getting is head and shoulders above
what others are doing.
But if I could take one second, going back to one of the
earlier questions, the Russians do not have the national
technical means that we do.
They are relying on these inspections even more than we
are. But I will tell you, even with that in mind, we are
bringing back, because of the quality, because of the
investment, because of the training exercise, better
information to our decisionmakers.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Bera.
Mr. Smith. If at some point, Mr. Chairman, if they could
speak whether or not the U.K. and France, is that something
Russia would require as part of an expansion of China.
Chairman Engel. Mr. Bera.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I agree with and associate myself with a lot of the
comments that have already been discussed and the importance of
and extension of New START.
But if we look backward, when the START treaty expired in
2009 without a replacement there was a close to 1 year gap
between the expiration of START and the coming into force of
New START.
Maybe, Ms. Gottemoeller, what did we lose in that gap and
what lessons can we learn from looking back at that 1-year gap?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, sir. That is a good question.
We were concerned about it at the time.
We were engaged in a very active negotiation. We were
pushing hard, both Moscow and Washington, with clear political
guidance to get this treaty done.
And so there was a real incentive during that hiatus year
between December 2009 and when New START entered into force in
February 2011. There was a real incentive not to undermine the
principles that were inherent in START.
So we did take care to ensure that, for example, one of us
did not rush to deploy a lot of new warheads which is what I
mentioned in my testimony I am concerned about.
The question in my mind comes not when we are engaged in
active negotiations when we are pressing forward. There is
clear political guidance. We know both sides want to get this
treaty done.
It is if, you know, there is nothing replacing it and no
process replacing it, and then do we descent into an arms race.
So that is the real worry in that case.
If I may address very quickly the question about U.K. and
France, in fact we have always been assiduous at the
negotiating table not to allow the independent nuclear arsenals
of the U.K. and France to fall onto the table and that has been
a clear and really unrelenting position of the United States at
the negotiating table now for several decades.
And so we would want to keep them off the table. I do have
some concern, frankly, of China's in the mix, that all of a
sudden, Okay, why do not we bring U.K. and France into the mix
as well. So that is a concern but it has not been our policy up
to this point.
Mr. Bera. So, you know, going back to my original question,
circumstances have changed between 2009 and 2010 and if we fast
forward to U.S.-Russian relations in 2020 timeframe, would you
say Russia still has that same posture where if New START were
to expire that there would be an urgency of continuing
negotiation to come up with a new agreement?
Or is Russia looking at this scenario differently today?
Ms. Gottemoeller. From what I hear from Mr. Putin, sir, I
would not be confident of that. I would think more that they
would be enthusiastic about continuing to develop a pace new
nuclear capability unconstrained by any treaty.
Mr. Bera. So they would be--again, circumstances have
changed. Russia would be in favor of seeing an expiration here?
Ms. Gottemoeller. At this moment, they too are concerned
about the U.S. arsenal modernization. So I think there is an
interest in Moscow in New START extended. We hear that time and
again from the Russians.
They see an interest--a security interest--in the treaty.
But should the treaty go away, my only point is that, as my
colleague Mr. Vaddi said, they will put the necessary resources
into doing what they think they need to do to maintain a
nuclear edge and even perhaps some nuclear--beyond the nuclear
edge, some nuclear superiority.
Mr. Bera. Right, and the danger there is if we see that
they are advancing that prompts us to then redeploy. So there
is a necessary urgency right now to have that negotiation start
moving forward, et cetera.
If--I am an optimist and to work in this body at this
particular moment in time you have to be an optimist and think
about what that future looks like.
Obviously, it is not in China's interest to see a nuclear
arms race taking place between the United States and Russia
intermediary strategic assets.
When I think about India, and we do not have an accurate
number of what their capabilities are but what I can find on
the internet is anywhere from 130 to 140 nuclear weapons.
Whether that's accurate or not, I imagine China has concerns
about India's expansion. I know, certainly, India and Pakistan
have their intentions there.
What are the possibilities of, you know, getting--making
sure there's not a nuclear arms race between India and
Pakistan? And maybe, Mr. Vaddi, you could touch on that
briefly.
Mr. Vaddi. Sure, and I won't be--I won't pretend to be an
expert on South Asia nuclear affairs. But I think to relate it
back to the U.S.-China arms control policy debate, one of the
issues that we will face in approaching China once you get past
this argument that China has so many fewer nuclear weapons is
going to be China taking a look at its own regional security
situation and that will necessary drag in China's worries about
India, China's concerns about our allies in East Asia.
And what I am trying to convey is that this is--this
becomes a very, very complicated negotiation very quickly as
opposed to this question of extension between the U.S. and
Russia for a bilateral agreement which, again, has the two
largest nuclear powers. It just makes sense to continue to have
that process in place.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mast.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate it.
As I am sitting here trying to think about and analyze
what's going on with New START I want to ask a question a
little bit outside of that, that however feels they are most
apt, most educated, can offer the most profound statements on--
whoever wants to answer this answer it.
As we sit here and think about China and Russia and we
think about our history of nuclear policy, whether it be
mutually assured destruction or letters of escalation or
selective ambiguity, can you explain to us right now what is
the--what is the posture of Russia and of China today?
And, obviously, this does not exist in a vacuum where we
are only talking about unconventional weapons. They have
conventional weapons as well and, you know, totally different
world now, what we deal with China compared to the cold war
with Russia and the engagement in the global economy and what
is going on out there with global militaries or regional
militaries.
Can you talk a little bit about that? So as we think about
New START we think a little bit about how did they think of
nuclear weapons, defensively, offensively, not just as a first
use weapon or not, but more broadly?
Admiral Mullen. it is a great question. I mean, I have come
to believe that in this century the most important
relationship--bilateral relationship is going to be between the
U.S. and China and that is principally driven by the economy
and everything that sort of follows to that.
What I have been most--one of my biggest concerns with our
relationship with Russia is it has gotten so bad that it has
actually pushed Russia and China together in a way that I could
not normally or have ever imagined.
They have got, you know, I think it is 1,100 kilometers
that they have been fighting across for a long time. They are
not natural friends.
And yet, in this environment that I find ourselves with--
struggling with our relationship with China for lots of reasons
and I do not--I am not critical of that. They are tough--they
are going to be a tough country to engage and move forward
constructively.
But I see Russia more and more aligned with China. Just the
other day there was a--I think they signed a contract for, you
know, an energy bill that was unimaginable just a few years ago
as a relationship.
I do not know how far that's going to go. That, to me,
speaks to the vital requirement to figure out to work with
Russia in a way that does not cement that relationship for the
better part of the century, which I think would be bad for us
and bad for the world.
Ms. Gottemoeller. If I may, I will just add that Admiral
Mullen is quite right. There has been a long history of
conflict between Russia and China. We do not see it at the
moment.
They are in a significant, I would say, more than a
marriage of convenience at the moment and it is related to
economic cooperation also because Russia is under a lot of
sanctions and so it deals with China instead of with Europe and
the United States and the rest of the world. So there are a lot
of reasons for them to be close together now.
My view, though, of the intermediate-range nuclear weapon,
the 9M729 that the Russians have now built and deployed, is
that it had an aspect to it of being a response to the
deployment of these systems in Asia.
And so it is if, although the Russians will never say this
outright--they will never admit it--but they have talked about
the proliferation of these systems across Eurasia beginning
with China as being a reason why they themselves need these
missiles.
So there is that aspect, I think that we need to keep in
the back of our minds even as we watch a strong marriage at the
present moment.
Mr. Vaddi. I will just add one fact to that point. When
Russia first started modernizing its cold war era short-range
ballistic missile systems with the new Iskander system it
deployed in the mid-2000's the first areas of deployment were
actually in East Asia.
It was not that long ago in that 2005 to 2007 timeframe
that a former Russian defense minister complained publicly
about there being more Chinese-speaking citizens in Siberia in
the east of Russia than there were Russian-speaking citizens.
So they are very aware of the threat that China posed as its
defense military capabilities were growing over time.
So for now the relationship to be warming, to me, is both
good for them and international bodies because they are
presenting a front against the United States in playing
spoiler, more often than not, but also complicates U.S. arms
control policy and U.S. arms control thinking when it applies
to East Asia.
Mr. Myers. Not to be overly dramatic, but both want them--
both want to end the American century. They want a multi-polar
world. They want their own spheres of influence and they want
to make sure they keep the United States out.
To me, I know it is rather brusque to say it that way, but
at the end of the day I think that's the basis.
Mr. Mast. Thank you all for your analysis.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very--thank you very much.
Ms. Wild.
Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is really directed to any of you who feel that you are
able to help me out and I am going to ask you a few different
questions.
I am very, very concerned about what appears to be an
implicit coordination or approval of a new arms race. On
December 22d of 2016, President Trump tweeted that the United
States--this is a quote--quote, ``United States must greatly
strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as
the world comes to its senses regarding nukes,'' end quote.
On that very same day during a defense ministry board
meeting Vladimir Putin said that, quote, ``There is a need to
strengthen Russia's strategic nuclear forces and develop
missiles capable of penetrating any current and prospective
missile defense systems,'' end quote.
I guess my first question is whether you would agree with
me that that--those two statements taken together almost appear
to imply steps toward a 21st century nuclear arms race between
the United States and Russia.
Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. I mean, tied specifically to the purpose of
this hearing and whether we should renew--sorry, extend New
START, I think the chances of igniting that kind of race go up
exponentially if we do not extend, first point.
Second, actually--and I think you were talking about 2016--
I've seen reports in the media as recently as this morning that
Putin and President Trump have actually talked in a
constructive positive way about getting together on this
treaty.
So it is difficult to know, as in--as it oftentimes is, you
know, what is real here. I am encouraged by that, quite
frankly, because if they send that signal I think it will be
relatively easy to do that.
So I am--maybe I am more optimistic than pessimistic at
this point because of their recent public statements about
where they should go.
Ms. Wild. Assuming that they maintain those positions?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Wild. Anybody else care to comment?
Mr. Vaddi.
Mr. Vaddi. Sure. Thank you for your question.
Ms. Wild. Thank you.
Mr. Vaddi. I think that there has been and maybe always
will be an incipient qualitative arms race, even when the U.S.-
Russia nuclear relationship is governed by a treaty.
You know, past arms control treaties such as the START
treaty banned specific types of technologies like air-launched
ballistic missiles, strange basing arrangements for ICBMs. New
START permits a little bit more flexibility on both sides
because both parties are modernizing their nuclear forces.
What is important about New START is it caps the
quantitative arms race. Each country can only deploy so many
operational readily available for use nuclear weapons at a
given moment and that's why continuing New START is important
to curbing the arms race where possible.
I mean, again, going back to my previous comments, the U.S.
has technological capabilities and know-how that Russia does
not, and I find it hard to believe that the U.S. would not
approach a negotiation for a new arms control agreement,
whether that is bilateral or multilateral, without seeking to
preserve some of those advantages.
Ms. Wild. Thank you. Anybody else want to comment on that?
Ms. Gottemoeller. If I may, I will just briefly comment.
Ms. Wild. Thank you.
Ms. Gottemoeller. I have been--I have been concerned that
there is, clearly, a--well, there are competing budgetary
demands and Admiral Mullen already referred to how we have had
to think carefully about how we will get the right support, the
degree of support needed for the modernization of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal over the next decade. Very important debates in
this country about that, budgetary concerns to focus on.
I begin to worry that Mr. Putin does not face any of those
same constraints and if he chooses to put in place an continue
a pretty irrational program like the so-called Burevestnik, the
nuclear arms cruise missile that is so dangerous because it is
highly radioactive--the propulsion system is highly radioactive
so difficult to operate.
We abandoned these kinds of systems in the 1950's because
they were so dangerous to operate. So there--here we have a
certain discipline that the budgetary process applies, which I
fear does not apply in the Russian Federation.
Ms. Wild. And if I could just stay with you--is mutual
assured destruction still a legitimate deterrent?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think the importance we have now is
that we have the parity, the balance of forces, and that we
both have a good reliability and redundancy in our forces and
so they know that they cannot get away with a first strike,
that in fact they would suffer a devastating retaliatory
strike. So in that way they are deterred. And it is the same
for us.
Ms. Wild. Thank you. With that I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mrs. Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over here.
Russian officials have said they agree that arms control
treaties should include other nuclear arms nations. Although
the statement seemed to have been aimed at the inclusion of
U.S. allies like the U.K. and France.
Ms. Gottemoeller, given Russia and China's fraught recent
history and physical proximity, does Russia have a national
security interest in drawing China into New START and other
arms control treaties and can we expect Russia to take an
active role in bringing China to the table?
Ms. Gottemoeller. it is a good question, ma'am. They have
taken China's part in these periods while China has been
holding everyone at arm's length in this administration and
saying, we do not want to participate.
Mrs. Wagner. Right.
Ms. Gottemoeller. And the Russians have essentially said,
well, you hear what China says. They do not want to
participate.
So up to this point, they have not in any way tried to
press China to come to the negotiating table. I do think, just
as you say, that there are certain incentives on the Russian
side for them to help get the Chinese into a process.
The Chinese have never had to negotiate on limits or
reductions of any kind in this sphere. So I can see the
rationale there. But at the moment, they have not been pressing
them.
Mrs. Wagner. Admiral Mullen, has the United States nuclear
force posture been based on the treaty's extension and
certainty that it provides and, if so, how would a failure to
extend New START impact the military's strategic stability
planning? How much effective existing nuclear modernization
plans and such?
Admiral Mullen. I would--first of all, I literally do not
have the details because I am not on the inside anymore. But my
expectation would be that we've been very much in compliance,
first of all.
Second, and it is come up a couple times, I think it is
really important to make sure that we have the resources
dedicated to the upgrading of our--and modernizing of our
industry--of our nuclear arsenal, if you will.
I really do not know where that stands. That was actually
negotiated as a part of the ratification process so it is not
cemented into the treaty itself and it was a commitment on both
sides to provide the resources. And so committing to that would
put us in a position, and I think as Ms. Gottemoeller has
Stated, put us in a position--any other witnesses--to actually
move ahead if this thing just--if this stopped.
I do not advocate for that because I think there are lots
of down sides associated with that. So I think we are fully in
compliance. We are as ready as we are required to be and I
wouldn't be overly concerned about that. If I were concerned
about one thing, it'd be where we stand in the modernization
and upgrade.
Mrs. Wagner. Yes. That--I am just wondering how does it
affect our existing nuclear modernization plans.
Admiral Mullen. You mean if we walk from this?
Mrs. Wagner. Yes.
Admiral Mullen. I think--I mean, it is, quite frankly,
going to depend on the priority for the administration. it is a
lot of money. I think my recollection was back in 2010 the
number was about $5 billion that we needed to put into it to
commit to in the FIDP at that particular point in time. So it
is billions.
How much of it is--and I know we have invested a lot. It
would be based on the status and the priorities for the
administration to upgrade and commit--continue to commit
resources to the entirety of the nuclear capability.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Admiral Mullen.
Mrs. Wagner. Mr. Myers, do you believe there are any gaps
in the verification regime and, if so, what can we do to
improve them as part of the talks more and extension?
Mr. Myers. Well, thank you for the question.
it is a hard question to answer because you do not know
what you do not know. But the level of confidence here in the
United States on our ability to detect noncompliance on the
Russian side is very, very high. That's No. 1.
No. 2, over the life of the New START treaty we have no
evidence of cheating on their part.
Three--and to me this is the most important--the
individuals charged with carrying out the verification missions
were also involved in the drafting of the verification
procedures and the language.
I commend Under Secretary Gottemoeller at the time and
Chairman Mullen at the time for having the DTRA inspectors at
the table with them because it was not an issue of some things
negotiated and it is delivered to the inspectors and say, now
go do it. They were actually----
Mrs. Wagner. Verifiers were there at the table during----
Mr. Myers. Absolutely. So at the end of the day, treaties
are compromises. You never get everything you want. But I will
tell you, having talked and walked and watched these
individuals do their job and exercise, they were very
confident.
Mrs. Wagner. Right. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you
and ranking member for your leadership on this issue for
holding this hearing and for doing it in a bipartisan way.
I want to followup on my good colleague from Missouri's
questions--Mrs. Wagner--about what if this goes away. I mean,
if New START went away, if we, for whichever reason, we would
have no limits on Russia's nuclear forces for the first time
since 1972 and this would come at a time when Russia has been
modernizing its nuclear forces.
So what would happen if either New START expires without it
being extended or if the U.S. withdraws from the treaty? I am
asking you in a broader sense and, in particular, about, you
know, what Russia would do, in your estimation.
Mr. Vaddi.
Mr. Vaddi. Sure. Thank you for your question.
Maybe I will focus my remarks on what we lose in terms of
information----
Mr. Levin. Yes.
Mr. Vaddi [continuing]. And I am happy for others to,
hopefully, chime in on the broader Russia strategic intentions
question. So as I mentioned before, New START verification and
monitoring works hand in hand with the intelligence community.
You know, Admiral Richard, who is the new incoming
strategic command commander, mentioned in responding to hearing
questions that the intelligence community would likely have to
adjust its collection priorities and capability investments to
compensate for the loss of information provided by data
exchanges and inspections if New START were to go away.
In reality, it is unlikely that the intelligence community
could replicate the information gained through New START and,
you know, we are not talking about the U.S. Government, which
publicly declares information related to its strategic nuclear
forces.
In 2014, the U.S. military put on the DoD website our plan
for a New START force structure. We are talking about the
Russian government and it is unlikely the Kremlin is going to
publicly share information regarding its nuclear forces. Right
now, it is forced to share that information with U.S.
Government experts as part of the New START treaty.
The effects may not be immediate. It may not be February
6th or 7th of 2021. We see the problem, the lack of confidence
that starts to emerge. It will be in the years afterwards and
as others have spoken about, and Ms. Gottemoeller made this
comment specifically, we do not necessarily know what Russia
may do if the treaty is allowed to expire.
But given Vladimir Putin's behavior over the past decade
plus, one, we can be sure that there is some contingency plan.
I think the Russians are long-term planners.
And two, what that will likely result in is the U.S. having
to take another look at its own modernization planning, its own
intelligence collection assets, and moving priorities away from
other collection targets like North Korea, Iran, China, and
other countries that have missile programs.
Mr. Levin. Admiral Mullen, you have been--I know you are
not on the inside anymore but, you know, I just wonder--I just
have grave concern about the situation for nuclear
proliferation and for what happens between our country and
Russia if this goes away. What are your thoughts?
Admiral Mullen. This is almost a signal that it is okay to
increase--around the world, quite frankly--anybody that's got
nuclear weapons to increase the size of their arsenal, one.
The other is strategically in could not tell you the exact
year but 2002, 2003, 2004 Putin made a very conscious decision
to invest in this strategic forces and he continues to do that.
And yes, he's got limited resources. We know that.
But he's been very consistent here over what is now almost
two decades to continue to make that investment and there is--I
mean, we do not know for sure what would happen. But,
certainly, based on--based on what I know or what I think I
know about him, he would continue to invest and, quite frankly,
can we take the risk that leaving the New START would generate
in terms of a future arms race and then try to get a handle on
that.
I think the risk of that is far too high, despite the fact
we wouldn't know for sure what he would do.
Mr. Levin. And what does it do to our ability to get China
and others to the table to reduce nuclear arsenals, you know,
across the board?
Ms. Gottemoeller?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I do not--oh, I am sorry.
Mr. Levin. No, go ahead. Go ahead.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I do not see any impetus or leverage
for the Chinese to join in a negotiation should New START go
away.
And furthermore, I wanted to stress the point I made in my
opening remarks that the Russians have a capability to upload
warheads and do it rather quickly. So without deploying a
single additional missile they could go from 1,550 deployed
warheads possibly to as many as 2,550 deployed warheads. That's
a big targeting problem for our strategic command and could
result in some significant difficulties and crises in terms of
stability.
Mr. Levin. My time has--go ahead, Mr. Myers.
Mr. Myers. Yes.
Mr. Levin. Briefly, I guess, since my time has expired.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. So--yes, sir. One of my concerns, to
add on to everything else that was said, the longer gap would
extend the greater chances for miscalculation because we--you
have heard already about our concerns about how much we would
see, how much we would know without the data exchanges----
Mr. Levin. Right.
Mr. Myers [continuing]. Without the inspections. The
Russians do not have anywhere near the capabilities that we do
beyond those things to make any kind of determination on intent
and without those types of things the chances of
miscalculations inevitably go higher as time goes on.
Mr. Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Perry?
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel for
their attendance today. Just listening to my good friend and
his questions, Ms. Gottemoeller, I was going to ask a question
about China.
Assuming that we do a New START treaty which encumbers the
United States and Russia, what is the--what is the impetus for
China to constrain themselves? What is the impetus for Pakistan
to constrain or anybody?
And you said that without this that--without the treaty
there would be constraint. There would be no leverage. But what
is--what is the leverage if those other countries aren't
included but America and Russia are constrained?
Ms. Gottemoeller. As my colleague, Mr. Vaddi, pointed out,
sir, the Chinese have so many fewer strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles, very much smaller strategic nuclear arsenal.
I really think the incentive for the Chinese can be
developed in the near-term period. Getting a handle on their
intermediate-range systems, which are the ones that are the so-
called carrier busters, they are the ones that really concern
our military as well.
So if we can create an incentive for the Chinese to start
to constrain those systems because they are worried about
proliferation--Russian proliferation of such systems, perhaps
the United States, India, Pakistan, et cetera, that is where I
think we could begin to get some traction with the Chinese on
limitations and constraint.
But because their arsenal is so much smaller in terms of
strategic nuclear weapons it is very hard to think about how
they would agree to constrain when the U.S. and Russia are up
at 700 delivery vehicles and they are way, way down in terms of
numbers of ICBMs.
Forgive me, sir. I do not have the numbers at my
fingertips. But very, very few numbers by comparison with ours.
Mr. Perry. does not it give them kind of a blank check if
we are constrained and they do not have to be concerned with
any constraints at all? does not it give them kind of a blank
check to work on both?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think we have to be very alert to them.
We call it rushing to parity, that they would try to rush to
parity with----
Mr. Perry. What would stop them? I do not see anything that
would stop them except resources.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes. Well, at the time their doctrine
stops them. They say they are committed to only no first use
and a second strike, you know, capability and that is it. But
we have to keep a very sharp eye to see if they are changing
that policy.
Admiral Mullen. Sir, if I could----
Mr. Perry. Yes, sir.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. Just make a quick comment
because Pakistan has come up a couple times. I mean, the
deficit that Pakistan has militarily with respect to India, and
India is their existential threat, can only be made up to some
extent with their nuclear arsenal.
That is their ticket to the future and that's how they see
it, and getting at that long term. That's not going to happen
quickly. I spent--I spent a lot of time in Pakistan tied to the
Afghan war specifically. And so it is a huge challenge.
My own view of that is this is the responsibility of a
country like India to figure out how they are going to make
that work and until we see them starting to work together in a
way that incentivizes both of their future, Pakistan is going
to continue to build them just to take care of itself.
Otherwise, and it is a deterrent for them because on the
conventional side India could overwhelm Pakistan just like
that.
Mr. Perry. So it seems to me, based on the conversation--
and I am trying to figure out what the right answer is on New
START because I hate to constrain ourselves and I understand
from Mr. Myers and from others that there have not been
infractions on the current treaty that we know of, which is--
which is curious but good.
But I am concerned about leaving some of the other actors
out while we pursue this--constrain ourselves and do not engage
them at all and I wonder if this is an opportunity that we
should take to maybe they are not included in New START but
maybe they are engaged in something separately at the same time
since it is going to be topical.
They are going to--everybody is going to be watching and it
is an opportunity to say, you know, we are not absolving you
folks either.
And I agree, Ms. Gottemoeller, they are not going to--they
might rush to parity and they are certainly not going to want
to be constrained where they are knowing--China, in
particular--where we are.
But I am not sure we see the entire picture--we are looking
at the entire picture right now and I think that that's a
little concerning.
Just out of curiosity, because there have been infractions
from Russia on other--on other agreements, why do you suppose
that we--there either are none or we have found none and we, I
think, generally the consensus is we feel they have been good
actors.
Why is that? Because they put their attention elsewhere?
Because they--I just--I do not believe it is all good will.
Sorry, I just do not.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Myers. I will get us started. I know the admiral has
discussed this a little bit earlier and I will leave time for
him to respond. But they were--they have as much to gain from
this arms control process as we do. They truly do.
They are extremely worried and concerned about our
strategic systems. They understand and, I think, make a
differentiation between intermediate and strategic. I also
think that there is a level of recognition that, given our
capabilities, that we would catch them.
None of these are definitive and none of these are the
exact--you know, no questions asked. That's the answer to the
question. But I think these all make up part of the Russian
psyche.
I think it is all part of their decisionmaking. I think, at
the end of the day, they also understand the benefit of the
United States being constrained and having that helps them.
No matter how they are always trying to get the edge just
like we are, no matter how they are always trying to come up
with a new, improved, better, what have you, I think at the end
of the day they have as many benefits of this as we do and they
do not want to see it go, either.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Ms. Spanberger?
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you so
much to our witnesses today for being here.
And I would like to start with a question for you, Ms.
Gottemoeller. Former National Security Advisor John Bolton
suggested that if there were political will on both sides the
United States and Russia would be able to extend New START or
even negotiate a new treaty before the February 2021 deadline.
So my question is actually a feasibility question, because
recent press reports indicate that the State Department's
Office of Strategic Stability and Deterrence Affairs has
declined from 14 staffers in 2017 to four currently, and this
is the office that is generally considered to house much of
State Department's expertise regarding U.S.-Russian arms
control agreements.
Similarly, many of the remaining senior leadership members
and political appointees at the State Department do, in fact,
not have the same level of experience in arms control
negotiations that we have seen over the years.
So my question is do you believe that if the administration
at this time decided to renegotiate New START that the State
Department would, in fact, have the necessary resources and
personnel and background of experience to restart these
discussions--sorry, no pun intended there--and to best
represent U.S. interests?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Ma'am, I have taken note of comments of
this type in the press and in speaking with people in the
administration I know that there is a view that there has to be
a rebuilding of some of those capabilities and capacities,
particularly in the State Department, because they have--they
have been whittled away in recent years.
I will emphasize, though, and I want to refer to a point
that Mr. Myers has made several times. The degree to which I
benefited, we benefited, during the New START negotiations and
having a huge amount of basic expertise among our inspectors,
who have worked now not only on New START but back into the INF
period from the last 1980's so years of experience accumulated
there, and also weapons operators. They turned out to be some
of the finest diplomats we had working on the negotiations.
Those guys would have been--and gals--who have been down in
the ICBM silos or operating the submarines, the bombers. So we
have a lot of natural diplomats in our government.
So in the end of the day I do agree and believe that the
rebuilding of the State Department capacity in this regard
should be effected, should be carried forward. But we also have
a lot of natural talent in the government.
Ms. Spanberger. And if you were to go about beginning to
renegotiate or begin these discussions, what sort of buildup--
and if this is something you can estimate--do you think that it
would require to put the necessary personnel in place to begin
really meaningful discussions?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, as I recollect from my time as
under secretary, that there is a certain amount of authority
that is invested in the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security and that I think that that authority to
hire on a rather expedited basis could be put to good use in
this regard.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, ma'am.
Mr. Myers, would you like to comment or add anything to
that?
Mr. Myers. No, ma'am, other than to confirm what Ms.
Gottemoeller just said. The under secretary--harkening back to
my days as a staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
the under secretary does have significant amount of authority.
it is a brilliantly written piece of legislation and she--
he or she would have the ability to staff up quickly if needed.
Ms. Spanberger. And Mr. Myers or to anyone else who is
serving as a witness today, are there any additional
authorities or anything else from a brilliant legislative
perspective that you might recommend for the future for things
for us to consider, those of us with oversight over the State
Department, that would be helpful to either these sorts of
negotiations in the future or others?
Admiral Mullen. I think the question on people is a great
question and I would stay with that. I agree that if this were
to happen the people are out there.
They may not be working for the government right but there
are incredible professionals and many of them would come back
if they knew this was going to be a very viable negotiation and
with the potential outcome.
The other thing I would--it is not--it is legislation but
it isn't, is, you know, where is the money and that is always
an interesting question, and where is it being spent, what are
the priorities for in the Pentagon, quite frankly, for the
arsenal overall and where do we stand in getting a chalk line
drawn on exactly where we are right now I think is really key
and there is an opportunity with the discussion of this to be
able to understand that a whole lot better.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of
your participation today. Thank you so much for your comments
and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Malinowski?
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Gottemoeller, you spoke in your testimony about
the importance of the principle of parity in past and present
arms control agreements between the United States and Russia,
or the Soviet Union, in those days.
How would that principle even begin to apply to United
States bringing China into this kind of an arms control
agreement. I mean, would they have to come up to our level? I
cannot imagine us going down to their level very quickly. Does
the principle apply?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Parity was very much a decision that was
made--Soviet Union and the United States--in earlier phases of
negotiation, about two equals who are deterring each other and
deterring each other from a first strike on their--on their
forces on their country.
And in the case of China, we have not, as the United States
of America, had that same approach or policy. In fact, Chinese
doctrine supports a so-called retaliatory approach where they
want to have an assured second strike and they say they have a
no first use policy.
But they do not seek in the same way to, so to say,
threaten us as nuclear equals in the way the Soviet Union did
historically and now Russia does.
So we are locked in this kind of nuclear embrace with the
Russian Federation in the way we have not ever been with China
before. So I, at the moment, would look for ways to avoid that.
Mr. Malinowski. So this would be one of, potentially, many
complicating factors in bringing China into this framework,
which I think brings me back to the question of time. We only
have a few months here.
Are you or any other witnesses aware that the
administration has actually done the ground work either with
China or if our goal is to renegotiate the agreement with
Russia to actually begin to be--have any chance of completing
this process in that timeframe?
Mr. Myers. Congressman, I am aware of several comments that
members of the administration and I think the president have
indicated. I do not--I do not believe there have been any cold
hard negotiations or deep discussions and I--again, just to be
clear, I think not to speak for the whole panel but I think
most of us are trying to say extension has to come first and
only then can you create the conditions to bring in additional
systems or bring in additional countries.
So I think it is not a is there time to do--to bring in
China or include X, Y, and Z. Extend and then use that time
period to expand.
Mr. Malinowski. When you say it has to, it is not just a
preference. it is a necessity. it is a practical necessity. I
mean, there is really no other alternative other than the
treaty lapsing.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir.
Mr. Malinowski. Right. Okay. And were it to lapse, Admiral
Mullen, you said essentially we would be left with a free for
all between the United States and Russia.
When was the last time there were no treaty constraints on
the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I mean, Rose is the expert here. But
when we get to the first ones in 1972, you know, pretty much
everything before that was some version of a free for all and I
do not have to--you are a young guy. I do not have to remind
you of 1962----
Mr. Malinowski. I want you to. Actually, that was my next
question.
Admiral Mullen [continuing]. And what happened.
Mr. Malinowski. We have a broader audience. Say a little
bit about the world before we had these treaty--those
constraints.
Admiral Mullen. Yes. I mean--I mean, back--and I was a
relatively young lad at the time but, you know, there are--many
people believe that we came very, very close to destroying each
other and then you could argue how much of the world--that we
almost went to nuclear war without any--obviously, without any
constraints and there's no guarantee it going in either
direction.
it is just that if we let this go I think the risk goes up
enormously if we cannot get it right for the future and the
danger that's associated with that. From my perspective, it is
not worth it.
Mr. Malinowski. And we, therefore, chose to make these
kinds of agreements with a Soviet Union that was our sworn
enemy, rightly so, and it did not actually in any way constrain
us from confronting the Soviets on other issues. Arguably, it
actually freed us to confront them more safely. Isn't that
correct?
Admiral Mullen. It is, and what's important is they chose
as well to do the same thing.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Omar?
Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to our panellists
for coming and being part of this important discussion.
It is my understanding that every president since Kennedy
has started or completed an arms control agreement in their
first term and our current president is on track to break that
streak.
So I am curious if you all would talk to, I think--talk to
us about what are the implications of this particular
agreement, the New START, for allowing it to expire.
What are--what are the implications? Is it nuclear war? Is
there a narrative implication for arms control around the
world? And please chime in. I would love to hear from all four
of you.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Perhaps I will start, ma'am.
I think this is the year when a non-proliferation treaty is
being reviewed--2020. This--we were discussing a moment ago the
Cuban Missile Crisis. It started entering a number of both
multilateral and bilateral negotiations involving the Soviet
Union.
The NPT was a signal accomplishment that entered into force
in the early 1970's and has kept a number of nuclear weapons
States sharply constrained in that time.
So I think that this is a very important year to send a
signal to the whole NPT family that nuclear arms control and
reduction still matters.
I am concerned, frankly, if New START goes out of force or
is seen as unlikely to be extended that this will deal a
significant blow to this larger non-proliferation system that
keeps an explosion of nuclear weapons States from occurring on
a global basis.
So that's the point we have not gotten to yet today but I
thank you for the opportunity to make it. Extending New START
will be a good signal to the international community that we
and the Russians still mean business about nuclear arms
reduction.
Mr. Vaddi. Just one brief comment to add on. Thank you for
your question.
I think long term if the United States signals it is not
going to use arms control as a security tool any more as a way
to sort of peacefully manage relations with adversaries, the
intention that signals to adversaries today and potential
adversaries tomorrow is that the United States is going to
favor freedom of movement for its military and unilateralism as
opposed to security cooperation to resolve some of these
security challenges that face the U.S. and other countries
together.
And as Ms. Gottemoeller pointed out, with the review
conference next year for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
where there is already an impatience among several non-nuclear-
armed States that the United States is not doing enough--that
other nuclear powers is not doing enough to reduce their
stockpiles.
There is always potential that countries that are facing
regional stability and security issues, such as in the Middle
East or in South Asia, will take this as a sign that in fact
nuclear weapons are going to be around for a very, very long
time and we need to also take steps to increase our own
arsenals. That is always the worry.
Ms. Omar. Admiral--Mr. Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. I do not have a lot to add with respect to
that. I worry a great deal that sort of the race is on. You do
not know for sure, but the risk of that happening goes up
enormously. This has been a very extensive long-term controlled
regime to control the most devastating weapons man has ever put
on Earth and we need to continue to do that, and then send the
signals.
And it is really complex stuff, but send the signals we
continue to reduce them. And in that, because this was part of
my mind set in 2010 when I negotiated this, with China coming
we are going to have to figure that out.
That is a great question, because they are going to
continue to build and they are policy limited right now. And
then what happens to the other countries--U.K., France, et
cetera.
Those things need to be--need to be negotiated or figured
out in the future. But the centerpiece for this for decades for
safety in the world have been the Soviets, now Russians, and us
in a very stable agreement over an extended period of time to
handle these most dangerous devastating weapons.
Ms. Omar. So control through negotiations and making sure
that these deals are implemented is important because I think
for a lot of the public who might be watching today--hopefully,
they are tuning in--they are not easily following this
conversation, right.
They do not understand that this is a deal that just needs
to be extended and it is one that needs to happen only between
the presidents. it is not that Congress is an obstacle to this
deal taking place.
And so when we hear the president talk about how he is
capable of making deals, this is one of those really simple
situations where he can make a deal and he's choosing not to
because, you know, these are deals that are made by Obama and
in many cases we are getting out of international deals because
the previous president is not one that this current president
likes to follow, and our world is being placed in danger
because of a political spat.
And so I thank you all for urgently talking about the need
to not allow for this to expire and for the chairman for
allowing this conversation to take place.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Well, this is the moment you have all been waiting for. We
have--as you can tell, there was enormous interest in this
subject and I want to thank the four of you for being excellent
witnesses. I know I learned a great deal and I know others did
as well.
And with all the things going on in Washington today we
certainly had a lot of members here listening to what you have
to say.
So I thank you for all the work you have done in the past
and the work you will be doing in the future, and I am always
amazed at the wonderful talent we have. I guess that's why
things keep working well, despite us raising our hands
sometimes and fretting.
But we have nothing to fret about because what I heard
today was a lot of clarity and a lot of common sense, and I
just hope that we will heed the suggestions and the discussions
that you had today. So thank you so much for coming.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM COMMITTEE MEMBERS
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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