[House Hearing, 116 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] WHAT'S NEXT FOR LEBANON? EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT PROTESTS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ November 19, 2019 __________ Serial No. 116-81 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, or http://www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 38-448 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi JIM COSTA, California JUAN VARGAS, California VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina, DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member TED LIEU, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio COLIN ALLRED, Texas ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey LEE ZELDIN, New York DAVID TRONE, Maryland BRIAN MAST, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania JUAN VARGAS, California STEVE WATKINS, Kansas Casey Kustin, Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page WITNESSES Humud, Ms. Carla E., Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service................................. 8 Yacoubian, Ms. Mona, Senior Advisor for Syria, Middle East and North Africa, United States Institute of Peace................. 20 Feltman, Amb. Jeffrey, John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution.................................................... 28 Ghaddar, Ms. Hanin, Friedmann Visiting Fellow, Geduld Program on Arab Politics, The Washington Institute........................ 39 APPENDIX Hearing Notice................................................... 63 Hearing Minutes.................................................. 64 Hearing Attendance............................................... 65 INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD Information submitted for the record from Representative Chabot.. 66 WHAT'S NEXT FOR LEBANON? EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT PROTESTS Tuesday, November 19, 2019 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E. Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Deutch [presiding]. This hearing will come to order. Welcome, everyone. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the political, economic, and security environment in Lebanon in light of the ongoing public protests and calls for reform. I thank our witnesses for appearing here today. I note we are expecting further votes this afternoon. We are going to do our best to have as robust a hearing as we can, get to as many member questions as possible. I will now recognize myself for purposes of making an opening statement before turning it over to the ranking member for the same purpose. Since mid-October, massive protests have spread throughout Lebanon and brought more than a million people into the streets. Although triggered by a proposed tax on the messaging service WhatsApp, the demonstrations rapidly expanded to criticize government corruption and to question the pillars of the Lebanese political system. In the last few months, major protests have also developed in Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, and Iran. Although driven by country- specific and local issues, these demonstrations share a common theme--frustration with unemployment, corruption, and a lack of political and economic opportunity. In Iran, the regime has responded with violence, reportedly killing at least a dozen people and injuring approximately a thousand and by shutting down the internet. This repression is shameful, and Congress stands with all of those peacefully protesting in Iran and throughout the region and condemns violent crackdowns on peaceful free expression. The peaceful leaderless protests in Lebanon are largely driven by youth and women. Unlike the 2005 demonstrations that launched the Cedar Revolution, the current demonstrations transcend sectarian divisions and are animated by unifying national themes. They are larger and more comprehensive than the 2015 protests that focused on the Lebanese government's inability to provide basic services, like trash collection. Amid these protests, Lebanon faces a dire economic crisis which prompted government officials to declare an economic State of emergency in September. Lebanon's debt-to-GDP ratio is more than 150 percent, one of the highest in the world. Lebanese banks have been intermittently closed for weeks and place limits on customer withdrawals. The government has been unable to implement reforms that would allow it to access the nearly $11 billion in economic assistance promised by the international community in 2018. Economic stagnation in Lebanon helped spark the protests last month, and the deteriorating economy could compound public frustrations in the coming weeks. Faced with this fluid situation, the United States should refrain from any actions that could destabilize Lebanon. Yet, on October 31st, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget placed an indefinite and unexplained hold on $105 million in critical security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. They did so against the recommendations of both the State Department and the Defense Department, and in opposition to the explicit direction of Congress. I share serious concerns about Hezbollah's massive rocket and missile arsenal in Lebanon and the LAF's inability to prevent Hezbollah's military buildup and dangerous activities on Lebanon's borders that threaten our partners. Rather than protect Lebanon, Hezbollah, with Iranian support and direction, and its advanced weapons, make the Lebanese people less safe. But I am also concerned when wholesale generalizations of LAF collaboration with Hezbollah are made. Pentagon officials claimed, and I quote, ``The Lebanese Armed Forces have consistently had the best end-use monitoring reporting of any military that we work with, meaning that the equipment that we provide to the Lebanese Armed Forces, we can account for it at any given time.'' Closed quote. Former CENTCOM Commander, General Joseph Votel, testified before Congress in February 2018 that, ``Since our security assistance began, Lebanon has maintained an exemplary track record for adhering to regular and enhanced end-use monitoring protocols. We are confident the LAF has not transferred equipment to Hezbollah.'' The United States must continue to vigorously enforce mechanisms to ensure that no equipment provided to the LAF winds up in Hezbollah hands. U.S. training to help professionalize the Lebanese Armed Forces provides a bulwark against rogue individuals who might be persuaded to turn a blind eye to Hezbollah. On November 8th, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Engel and I sent a letter to the administration raising concerns about the pause in assistance and requesting details by November 15th. The administration has not provided a response. A continued freeze on assistance threatens to undermine the LAF, a non-sectarian, national institution that is strongly supported by the Lebanese public. It also weakens the LAF's ability to counter threats to Lebanon's security, including extremist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda. It also sends the wrong message at a time when many of our partners are questioning our commitment to the region after President Trump's reckless withdrawal from Syria. Slowing the delivery of assistance allows adversaries, like Hezbollah and Iran and Syria and Russia, to make inroads in Lebanon by raising doubts about U.S. credibility. The administration should release its hold and resume assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, ensuring accountability and a continuation of comprehensive end-use monitoring protocols which will prevent our rivals from establishing a foothold in Lebanon. Looking ahead, the demonstrators in Lebanon are demanding wholesale political reform, a technocratic and non-sectarian cabinet, a new electoral law, and early elections. The United States should support these goals and discourage any violence against the protesters. However, we must refrain from intervening directly. Protesters have broadly rejected outside support, and given Lebanon's history, remain skeptical of external intervention. We should be clear that these are Lebanese protests driven by a wide array of Lebanese people who want transparent governance, accountable institutions, and a peaceful, prosperous future. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, their assessment of the protests, and suggestions for the way forward in Lebanon. And with that, I will yield to Mr. Wilson for his opening statement. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Ted Deutch, for calling this important and timely hearing. For over a month now, the courageous people of Lebanon have taken to the streets demanding an end to the endemic corruption and sectarianism that have paralyzed their country for far too long. In a country like Lebanon, which has been divided, sadly, socially and politically along strict sectarian lines, these recent protests are historic. It is not just a protest of one community against another or one political interest over another. Citizens from all sects, from every corner of the country, have joined in these protests. They are a rejection of the entire political establishment and class. These protests are, in effect, a popular vote of no confidence, not just in the current government, but in the entire Lebanese political system writ large. These unprecedented, countrywide protests ultimately led to the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri last month, but this announcement did not quell the protesters. In line with their now famous slogan of, quote, ``All of them means all of them,'' end of quote, the people of Lebanon have continued their demands that all of the country's sectarian party leaders resign. What they want is an overhaul of the entire political structure, not the resignation of a single individual. The ongoing protests in Lebanon present both challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy. On the one hand, it is difficult to assess exactly what kind of Lebanese government will emerge out of these largely leaderless, grassroots protests. What political solution will be acceptable to the people in the streets? How will that affect the U.S.-Lebanon bilateral relationship? How can we guarantee that the malign actors, including Hezbollah, will not exploit a potential political transition to come? On the other hand, these protests offer a major potential opportunity for the United States. The energy behind these protests signals a real desire among Lebanese of all ages to see a Lebanon free of many of the burdens of sectarianism that have held it back so long. They offer a momentum for change in Lebanon that has not been seen since its establishment. These protests also are very troubling for the Iranian oppressors. Taken together with the ongoing protests in neighboring Iraq, and also in Iran, it appears the people of the Middle East are beginning to chafe under the yoke of their Iranian oppressors. For the first time ever, we see Shiites in southern Lebanon openly protesting Hezbollah and criticizing its political leaders and allies. Hezbollah is always trying to paint itself as separate from the political class over which it has maintained a stranglehold in recent years. Its leaders and propaganda have, instead, made efforts to identify the terrorist group with the Lebanese people, not the defunct political establishment. But these protests have put a wrench in the Iranian proxy's designs. Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, played the wrong hand-- dismissing protests as a hostile plot by Western and Israeli governments, instead of supporting the public outcry. This confirmed to many that Hezbollah is, in fact, part and parcel of the Lebanese political establishment that cannot be trusted. We can only hope that as this movement progresses more and more support for Hezbollah diminishes in Lebanon. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses today about how the United States can facilitate a positive outcome for the people of Lebanon, and specifically, what Congress can do in a bipartisan manner. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and with that, I yield back. Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. I will now recognize members of the subcommittee for 1- minute opening statements, should they choose to make one. Mr. Sherman, you are recognized. Mr. Sherman. We stand with the people of Lebanon. We stand with the people of Iran. I look forward to working with members of the subcommittee on legislation I am working on, which I have tentatively titled, ``the Hezbollah Leadership Corruption Disclosure Act,'' which would use the intelligence community's capacities to determine what assets are owned around the world by Hezbollah leadership and disclose that. Because every villa disclosed, every French chalet disclosed is a nail in the coffin of a violent and corrupt terrorist organization. I yield back. Mr. Deutch. All right. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chabot is recognized for 1 minute. Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a former chairman of this committee myself, I have followed Lebanon very closely for some time now. The protests over the last several weeks show that the Lebanese people are fed up with the systematic corruption by the Lebanese government, to the point that protests have transcended sectarian differences. To date, Lebanon has been unable to enact necessary, and now urgent, if politically difficult, economic reforms, even with the generous international aid package waiting. Now is an excellent opportunity for Lebanon to actually make those reforms and get its fiscal house finally in order. The protests referred to by our chairman are also a sign that the Lebanese people have had enough of Hezbollah, a completely corrupt organization, which, hopefully, 1 day will be cast out by the Lebanese people. They deserve so much better. I yield back. Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Mr. Pence, you are recognized for 1 minute, should you wish. Should you wish, or we can go to the witnesses. All right. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitations of the rules. And I will now introduce the witnesses. Ms. Carla Humud is an analyst in Middle Eastern affairs at the Congressional Research Service. She covers Syria, Lebanon, and the Islamic State for the Middle East-Africa section of CRS's Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Ms. Mona Yacoubian is the senior advisor for Syria, Middle East, and North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace. Prior to joining USIP, she served as Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Middle East Bureau at the United States Agency for International Development, from 2014 to 2017, where she had responsibility for Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. She previously worked on Middle East and North Africa issues at the Stimson Center at USIP and at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Her current research focuses on conflict analysis and prevention in the Middle East. Ms. Yacoubian earned an MPA from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and a BA from Duke University. Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman is the John C. Whitehead Distinguished Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy in the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution and a senior fellow at the U.N. Foundation. From July 2012 until his April 2018 retirement, Ambassador Feltman has served as United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Before joining the United Nations, Mr. Feltman was a U.S. Foreign Service Officer focusing largely on the Middle East and North Africa. Ambassador Feltman served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, and a variety of posts across the Middle East. He is the recipient of two Presidential Service Awards and several State Department Superior Honor Awards. And finally, Ms. Hanin Ghaddar is the Inaugural Friedmann Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policies, Geduld Program on Arab Politics, where she focuses on Shia politics throughout the Levant. She is the long-time managing editor of Lebanon's NOW News website, and has also contributed to a number of U.S.-based magazines and newspapers, including The New York Times, on foreign policy. Prior to joining NOW, Ms. Ghaddar wrote for several Lebanese newspapers. Thanks to our really esteemed panel for being here today. And let me remind the witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Without objection, your prepared written statements will be made part of the hearing record in their entirety. We are really grateful for all of you taking the time to join us. Ms. Humud, you are recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF CARLA E. HUMUD, ANALYST IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE Ms. Humud. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, members of the committee, for inviting me to testify today about the situation in Lebanon on behalf of the Congressional Research Service. I will summarize my written statement by speaking briefly about the domestic issues that have sparked the protests, the challenges faced by the main actors in Lebanon, and policy questions for the United States. The resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri on October 29th followed nearly 2 weeks of nationwide mass protests, described as potentially the largest in Lebanese history. The movement reflects broad dissatisfaction with what protestors describe as government corruption, ineptitude, and economic mismanagement. Protestors have cited the State's failure to consistently provide basic goods and services, including water, electricity, garbage collection, as well as fair access to jobs and educational opportunities. Protestor demands include the appointment of a new government of independent technocrats, early elections, a new electoral law, the return of what they describe as looted public funds, and a fundamental change to Lebanon's sectarian-based political system. The outcome of the protest movement will be shaped by decisions made by four players, including the protestors, the political elite, the army, and Hezbollah. The protestors face the challenge of sustaining momentum as government formation is delayed potentially for weeks or months. While the movement has been leaderless thus far, protestors must decide whether to risk fragmentation, but potentially gain greater influence by selecting representatives that can negotiate with the government on specific policy issues. Lebanese political elites face the task of appearing responsive to widely held political grievances while avoiding concessions that could significantly undermine their hold on power. They may consider the possibility of co-opting or waiting out the movement. They could also attempt to divide it by using loyalist groups to cause disruption and introduce a sectarian element, some of which we have already seen. The Lebanese army must balance pressure from political elites to clear protestors from key roadways and infrastructure against its longstanding reputation as a neutral body and its policy of non-interference in political disputes. Hezbollah has expressed support for some protestor demands while also working to preserve the political status quo from which it benefits. Hezbollah, like other key players, is not necessarily a unitary actor in this conflict. Some Hezbollah supporters have participated in protests while others have deployed to the streets and targeted demonstrators. Hezbollah seeks to focus the debate around issues such as State corruption and away from core issues such as whether Hezbollah should preserve weapons outside of State control. These actors are operating against the backdrop of a major economic crisis and the risk of the government defaulting on its debt, adding additional urgency to the cabinet-formation process. All of this raises questions for the United States regarding how the U.S. should prioritize different, potentially competing policy goals, at a time of domestic uncertainty in Lebanon. Successive U.S. administrations have identified several core policy goals for Lebanon. These have included: One, reducing the influence of Hezbollah and Iran via efforts to strengthen Lebanese State institutions. This includes supporting the LAF's ability to extend State control throughout the country, especially in Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon. Two, strengthening Lebanon's border security and counterterrorism capabilities, in light of spillover from the conflict in neighboring Syria and the movement of fighters linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic state. Finally, preserving stability in Lebanon and, in particular, alleviating the impact of the more than 1 million Syrian refugees currently residing in the country. Congress has appropriated funds aimed at the policy objectives outlined above while also placing certification requirements on U.S. assistance funds to prevent their misuse or transfer to Hezbollah or other designated terrorist groups. Until now, Hezbollah operations targeting Israel, the infiltration of Sunni extremist groups from neighboring Syria, and social tensions between refugees and host communities had been the primary potential sources of instability in Lebanon. The domestic protest movement which calls for a fundamental shift in Lebanon's political system adds a new element. In light of the fluid situation in Lebanon, U.S. policymakers may debate how to best strike a balance between encouraging broad reform, preserving stability, and countering Hezbollah, and how to prioritize these objectives, if and when necessary. This concludes my brief remarks, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Humud follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Humud. Ms. Yacoubian, you are recognized. STATEMENT OF MONA YACOUBIAN, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR SYRIA, MIDDLE EAST, AND NORTH AFRICA, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE Ms. Yacoubian. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, and members of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the implications of the current protests in Lebanon. The timing for this hearing is especially important, given the dramatic nature of the protests and the challenges and potential opportunities they pose to U.S. interests. I have followed developments in Lebanon over many years, and currently, I am a senior advisor at the United States Institute of Peace. Please note that the views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of USIP. Since October 17, Lebanon has witnessed historic mass protests bringing more than 1 million people to the streets across the country. The largest peaceful uprising comes amidst the mounting financial crisis that could bring about a total collapse of the economy. The economy's warning lights have been blinking red for some time. Stagnant growth has prompted mounting unemployment, especially among youth. Lebanon's debt- to-GDP ratio is among the highest in the world. Its fiscal deficit is ballooning, and the country has a severe foreign exchange shortage. Limits on bank withdrawals and concerns over fuel and even food shortages have contributed to a growing sense of panic. In short, Lebanon is on the verge of a catastrophic economic meltdown. The current protests are different from past demonstrations in precedent-setting ways. The protests are decidedly anti- sectarian. Previously, protest movements have been captured by sectarian interests, leading to their demise or provoking greater polarization. Thus far, demonstrators have resolutely rejected efforts to inject sectarian demands or rhetoric into the protests. They are geographically diverse. Marches and demonstrations continue to occur across Lebanon from the north to the south, from the Beqaa Valley to the coast. Women and youth are at the forefront, playing an outsized role. Themes of civic engagement resonate across the protests. Discussion circles and debates on a broad range of issues occur daily across the country. However, the early optimism of the protest has given way to fears about darker scenarios unfolding. Two looming, dangerous dynamics, if unchecked, can quickly engulf Lebanon in widespread chaos and violence--an impending financial collapse or agitators turning the protests violent. Lebanon's revolutionary moment holds important implications for U.S. national security interests which are predicated on maintaining Lebanon's security and stability. Should the current protests be overwhelmed by financial collapse, a turn to violence, or both, U.S. national security interests would, likewise, come under significant threat. Given the stakes, it is critical that the United States proceed wisely and cautiously at this sensitive and potentially dangerous juncture for Lebanon. U.S. engagement should be guided by two key principles. One, engage where the U.S. has a comparative advantage, cultivating institutions that serve as a foundation for vibrant democracy. And two, refrain where the U.S. presence does more harm than good, in particular, resisting the temptation to support the protestors directly or transform the protests into a cudgel to use against Hezbollah and Iran. Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah has been unnerved by the demonstrations which have occurred in Hezbollah strongholds, signaling its constituency's deep discontent over socioeconomic issues. The Shiite militant group has expertly navigated Lebanon's sectarian system to accrue more power with little accountability, raising the slogans of resistance while engineering and manipulating the Lebanese governing system behind the scenes. As a prime beneficiary of the current status quo, Hezbollah would lose significantly, should the protestors' demands be fulfilled. A new governance system in Lebanon based on strong civic ideals and responsive, accountable, and inclusive institutions would dramatically undercut Hezbollah's influence. To conclude, I would like to highlight four key U.S. policy recommendations. One, work with key countries to pressure Lebanon's sectarian power brokers for the urgent appointment of a cabinet of independent technocrats to address the impending financial collapse. Two, engage international financial institutions to develop an emergency financing package conditioned on appropriate and necessary reforms. Three, maintain U.S. economic assistance to Lebanon. Lebanon hosts the highest number of per capita refugees in the world, and U.S. economic assistance has played an important role in supporting local communities. And four, unfreeze the $105 million in U.S. security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, the most respected State institution in Lebanon with strong popular support. Thank you, and I am happy to take your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Yacoubian follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Yacoubian. There is one vote on the floor, and there is about 10 minutes left on the vote. So, I think we are going to, if the witnesses can sit tight, we are going to break for a moment, head off to the floor, cast our one vote, and come back for the rest of your testimony and questions. And with that, we will temporarily adjourn. [Recess.] Mr. Deutch. The hearing will come back to order. Thanks so much to the witnesses for indulging us as we do our other important work, casting votes on the House floor. And with that, Ambassador Feltman, you are recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF JEFFREY FELTMAN, JOHN C. WHITEHEAD VISITING FELLOW IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Ambassador Feltman Thank you for inviting me. I will summarize my written testimony submitted for the record. I note that I represent only myself; the Brookings Institution does not take any institutional position on policy positions. Lebanon's current protests are not about the United States, but the protests can affect our interests. Congressional attention at this pivotal moment, therefore, is most welcome. In my view, a realistic U.S. policy for Lebanon has three elements. First, undermine Hezbollah's resistance, clean and anti- establishment narrative, most importantly among the Shia. Second, support the capability, credibility, and transparency of national institutions like the Lebanese Armed Force vis the sectarian ones represented by Hezbollah. Three, prevent Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, or Russia from filling the space, from controlling strategic Mediterranean ports and hydrocarbons. Successful implementation of these elements would help discredit the nonsense that Hezbollah's rockets defend Lebanon, when Hezbollah's rockets are what put Lebanon at risk of war. The current demonstrations by Lebanese disgusted with the status quo politics are more significant, as the other speakers have noted, than the 2005 protest movement against the Syrian occupation. This time, the Shia have joined. Hassan Nasrallah's red line against the resignation of President Aoun or early parliamentary elections ties Hezbollah tightly to the corruption and the cronyism that enrages the protestors. The demonstrators will not forget that Hezbollah deployed thugs on motorcycles to break up the protests by force. Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, who enabled the expansion of Hezbollah's power by handing the terrorist organization a veneer of Christian cover, is now discredited as the symbol of everything that ails Lebanon. In other words, the Lebanese themselves are now undermining Hezbollah's once untouchable status. Regarding support for national institutions, my second point, U.S. support has contributed to the Lebanese Armed Forces mostly, but not entirely, restrained professional reaction to these demonstrations. Compare this with how Egyptian or Iraqi or Syrian or Iranian armed forces deal with protests. Among the Lebanese, confidence in the LAF, in general, is rising, and our assistance made this possible. It is in our interest that this continues. Does this mean that the Lebanese Armed Forces should try to disarm Hezbollah by force? That would spell civil war. And as we have seen in Lebanon, in Iraq, in Syria, and Yemen, Iran uses civil wars to implant terrorist proxy organizations, and Al-Qaeda and ISIS and their affiliates also exploit the chaos of civil war. Civil war is not in our interest. The U.S. has some legitimate concerns about the Lebanese Arm Forces' performance, but the FMF should resume quickly and publicly, both because of the program's merit in terms of improving the LAF's counterterrorism performance, but also to undermine the Hezbollah, Iranian, Syrian, Russia narrative that the U.S. is unreliable. Mr. Chairman, the Lebanese face choices regarding government formation and policies, and it is happening, as my fellow panelists noted, in the middle of a financial crisis, a severe financial crisis. The United States cannot make decisions for the Lebanese. But, given how our interests will be affected by how this evolves, we can clarify the implications of the directions that the Lebanese might be considering. Our message, in my view, should be twofold: that, first, the United States can help mobilize the international support that Lebanon needs, but that, second, we could only do so if a credible, incoming government adopts the effective reforms and anti-corruption measures that are demanded by the protestors; and to attract the investment and the financial deposits that Lebanon needs to prosper and to avoid economic collapse, Lebanese officials will have to at last satisfactorily resolve the longstanding contradiction between a citizenry that largely identifies with the West with policies that tolerate harboring an Iranian terrorist organization and that lean toward an Iranian-Syrian axis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ambassador Feltman. Ms. Ghaddar, you are recognized. STATEMENT OF HANIN GHADDAR, FRIEDMANN VISITING FELLOW, GEDULD PROGRAM ON ARAB POLITICS, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE Ms. Ghaddar. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me today to speak about my country, Lebanon. This is a summary of a longer statement that I submitted. The core of the protests are the failing economic conditions and the persistent corruption of the ruling class, but they evolved to target the fundamental issues such as the sectarian system. The bleak economic situation is evident in the fact that Lebanon's readily available foreign reserves are now valued at less than $10 billion, which are not expected to last more than three or 4 months. And economic collapse is likely. Only a government made up of independent technocrats can gain the confidence of the Lebanese people and allow the international financial assistance. However, the current parliament with the pro-Hezbollah majority and the current President are not allowing it. Hezbollah is worried that a new, independent government would be the first step in isolating the party. Successful protests mean that Hezbollah will lose state entities through which they control the country's main security and financial decisions. As Hezbollah is going through its own financial crisis, thanks to the U.S. sanctions on Iran, Hezbollah's reaction has been intimidation of the protestors. But to avoid an Iraqi scenario, Hezbollah is using its influence within State institutions, mainly certain units within the Lebanese army, to quell the protests. The United States has so far provided the Lebanese army with $2 billion since 2006 in military equipment and international military education and training. This aid is the most significant leverage the U.S. has in Lebanon. However, it is not the equipment that Hezbollah needs. It is the LAF security decisions. Today, the LAF stands at a critical juncture, and three main issues are troubling. First, the LAF withdrew from portions of the south and the Beqaa, known to be Hezbollah's core areas. It is important to note that the Shia community that is Hezbollah's main constituency has joined the protests, which makes Hezbollah extra-anxious about losing its support base. As they intimidate the Shia protestors, the army was asked to leave. Second, the LAF started unblocking roads using excessive force under enormous pressure by the authorities. Three, factions within the LAF known to be affiliated with Hezbollah started a wave of unlawful arrests of activists. Some are still detained while others were released with clear signs of torture on their bodies. One has died. You can clearly see the contradicting affiliations within the LAF units. For example, parts of the military intelligence and the Republican Guards that are close to the President are acting to fulfill Hezbollah's agenda. However, there are many army units that are not. These elements will be much needed if violence escalates and the economic crisis deepens. So, what can the U.S. do? On the aid for the LAF, continue urging the LAF to protect non-violent protestors. The United States should reiterate that continued U.S. assistance to the LAF is contingent on safeguarding the protestors. Urge the LAF to protect all Lebanese citizens, including the Shia. Condition military aid to the LAF to ensure that the units within the army which are using excessive force do not benefit from it. It is vital that the U.S. aid to the army does not help units that are violating basic human rights. Eventually, maybe redesign the aid package itself. My reading of the FMF authority is that it is for purchase by foreign governments of defense material, training, and related services. However, the most serious challenge facing the LAF will be salary payments. As the State goes bankrupt very soon, implications of absentee LAF members include security and ensuring integrity of U.S.-origin equipment, making sure equipment does not fall into the wrong hands. Therefore, I would recommend that the committee explore with the State and Defense Departments a short-term program to cover salary payments for certain units in the case of economic collapse. Domestically, exert pressure on President Michel Aoun to call for immediate parliamentary deliberations and early elections. This current parliament cannot and will not lead required reforms. Sanction Hezbollah's allies. President Aoun, Speaker Nabih Berri, and Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil are not only Hezbollah's main allies, they are also the most corrupt political figures in Lebanon. They need to be held responsible for the country's dire economy and instability. Internationally, work closely with the Europeans to ensure that any stability-related financial aid to Lebanon is not provided unless early elections are called and reforms begin. Finally, address Iran's regional operations. From Iran to Iraq and Lebanon, it has become very clear that Iran is not a factor of stability. Accordingly, any future negotiations with Iran need to address its regional presence and influence. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. Ghaddar follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Ghaddar. Thanks to all the witnesses. We will turn to questioning by the members, and I will actually defer to Mr. Wilson to start us off. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you. Each one of you were very perceptive and show a deep concern for the people of Lebanon, with which many of us associate because Lebanese-Americans are so enterprising and well-thought-of in our local communities. And so, it is particularly distressing to see what should be such a vibrant country have such a dire economic future. With that in mind, Ms. Ghaddar, there have been attempts to reform the economy and address Lebanon's phenomenal financial distress of a debt service equal to half of the government's revenues. Why have these efforts failed? What reforms should be promoted? Ms. Ghaddar. Thank you very much for this is a very important question. The CEDRE aid which was dedicated to Lebanon in 2018 addresses many of these reforms, especially reforms of the electricity sector which takes a huge number of Lebanon's budget and, also, the augmented public sector. It is very clear what reforms should be implemented. It is all listed in the aid. I think the problem is that, because the political class are so corrupt, they are benefiting from the electricity sector and the augmented public sector. For example, they use the public sector to employ their own supporters who do not do anything. So, this is a big deal. These are some of the reforms that can be done. However, the current authorities failed since the CEDRE aid in Paris was announced to implement these reforms because they will not benefit from them. On the contrary, they will lose. So, that is why they, themselves, cannot implement these reforms. And CEDRE aid is there. It is $11 billion US dollars that are ready to be given to the Lebanese State on condition of these reforms. Mr. Wilson. Thank you. And, Ms. Yacoubian, what do the current protests mean for Iran's primary proxy Hezbollah? Is there a way that the U.S. can leverage the momentum of these protests to drive a further wedge between Hezbollah and the people of Lebanon? Ms. Yacoubian. Thank you. Clearly, as I noted in my oral satement and as well in my written testimony, Hezbollah has also been impacted by these protests. Shia communities have taken part in the protests. There have been demonstrations in areas that are considered Hezbollah strongholds. As I note in my written testimony, what was once called ``the wall of fear'' surrounding any sort of open criticism of Hezbollah, of Hassan Nasrallah, there are cracks in that. So, that is significant. I would argue that this movement is powerful because it is Lebanese, because it is organic. And as I note in my testimony, I think the most important thing the United States can do with respect to the protests themselves is step back, is continue to provide the sort of very important assistance we provide and have provided, whether to the Lebanese Armed Forces or our economic assistance to Lebanon, which is also significant. But I think the extent to which the United States attempts to put itself frontally into these protests will only backfire, will serve to discredit the protests. And, in fact, the protestors themselves have been quite clear that they are not interested in support from any foreign power, from any sort of foreign interference. At the same time, as I noted, I think if we see the protests, if we can allow for an environment that enables not only the protests to continue, but, more importantly, their demands to be fulfilled for responsive governance, for an end to corruption, for strong State institutions, that, to my mind, is the most important counterweight to Hezbollah. That kind of transition in Lebanon will do more, in my view, to undermine Hezbollah than an attempt to, sort of in a ham-handed way, manipulate the current protests as a cudgel against Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. And, Ms. Humud, with the current protests underway in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran--and there were reports today of deaths across Iran in the past couple of days--is this part of a bigger movement? Or how do you contextualize this? Ms. Humud. I think in some ways this is part of a broader trend of societies and populations demanding fundamental reforms and dissatisfaction with corruption. That being said, there are specific elements that are particular to Lebanon. The sectarian element is one that is particular to Lebanon, and that has really been a unique factor of this movement. Mr. Wilson. Thank you. My time is up, and I appreciate the chairman being so magnanimous to let me go first. Thank you. Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Before going to Mr. Watkins, can I just ask--Ms. Humud, we have heard throughout the day, throughout this hearing, that one of the key demands is an end to a sectarian political system. Can you just give us some perspective on what that system is now that they are protesting against? And then, we will go to you, Mr. Watkins. Ms. Humud. Sure. The Taif Accords that ended Lebanon's civil war mandated a sectarian system that divides or distributes political power based on religious or sectarian identity. So, Lebanon's parliament is evenly divided between Muslims and Christians, and that division filters its way down to the cabinet and into other State institutions. And so, what this means is that Lebanese citizens in some ways organize and are mobilized based on their religious or sectarian identity rather than on an issues-driven basis. And that is primarily what the protestors are seeking to address, rather than a system whereby politicians are able to divide citizens based on identity, that they can identify these sort of cross-sectarian issues that really are common to all citizens, primarily the economy at this point. Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Ultimately, the desire to be viewed as Lebanese citizens rather than Sunni and Shia or---- Ms. Humud. Yes. Mr. Deutch [continuing]. Hezbollah? Ms. Humud. Yes. Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Mr. Watkins, you are recognized. Mr. Watkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the panel for being here. I would like to ask about the international response. And I am going to throw these questions to anybody. Particularly European, Russian, Iranian response to the protests, what have those been like? Ms. Ghaddar. On the Iranian part, I have been following very closely the Iranian responses. Obviously, it was exactly as Hezbollah's responses, that these protests are rightful in their demands. But that they have been penetrated by the Mossad and CIA and all the Western intelligence to direct them. That it is not about reforms anymore. It is about fighting the axis of resistance, et cetera, et cetera; discrediting the protests, and siding with the authority. At the beginning of the protest, the Iranians and Hezbollah together, at the very beginning they said that this government is not going to fall. And for the first time, Hezbollah was wrong; the government resigned. The first speech of Hassan Nasrallah was siding with the authorities against the protests. In his second speech Hassan Nasrallah was becoming the authority against the protests. He now is the authority. The people in the streets see him as the authority. They all see an Iranian influence in Lebanon. And that is why, for the first time, you see people turning against Hassan Nasrallah himself. Now it is very obvious; Hezbollah is blocking the formation of a new, independent government. The Iranians and Hezbollah's position has been, with the authority, against the people. Mr. Watkins. Let me actually jump over to the economy and corruption, please. What can the U.S. do to help the people of Lebanon counter corruption? Anybody? Ms. Ghaddar. As I mentioned in my recommendations, it is to stress on the early elections and independence. Mr. Watkins. Thank you. Go ahead, sir. Ambassador Feltman Thanks for the question. I think, in general, many of the Lebanese status quo leaders, the ones that the protestors are demanding be ousted, probably believe they can wait out the protests, that the protests cannot go on forever. And then, they can go back to their normal way, business as usual, and avoid any kind of accountability or scrutiny of what has happened. But what is different this time is the financial crisis that people have mentioned. The financial crisis is basically a ticking bomb. And that gives the protestors and the outside supporters of the idea of an independent, sovereign Lebanon some leverage. The United States showed leadership back in 2006 after the war between Hezbollah and Israel in helping to shore up Lebanese finances at that time, helping to persuade Gulf Arab States to put money into the central bank, deposits to shore up the currency, come up with the international assistance package, bring in investors. All these things can be done again. But I think it should be clear to the Lebanese that we are not going to exercise our leadership or our political investment in these types of initiatives unless they make the fundamental changes, that this will have a long-term impact. Those privatization ideas dealing with the telecom, with the electricity, with offshore hydrocarbons, right now no one on the street would trust those as actually benefiting the people or providing various services over the long term. So, I think you could put together a package, but the package needs to be linked with fundamental changes inside Lebanon about how Lebanon is going to be governing going forward and how do you resolve that contradiction between a Western ally of Lebanon and the fact that they are harboring an Iranian terrorist organization? Mr. Watkins. Understood. One last question. The Lebanese institution, the military, how is the army viewed by the Lebanese people? Ms. Yacoubian. I will take an initial stab. I think the army is the institution that is most respected by the Lebanese public. It is a cross-sectarian institution. I think my colleagues have rightly pointed out ways and areas in which there are elements of the Lebanese army that have not behaved properly. For the most part, the Lebanese army has, in fact, conducted itself professionally. It is very well regarded by the Lebanese in polling and other types of instruments to indicate popular support, or lack thereof. Mr. Watkins. Understood. Thank you. Ms. Ghaddar. Can I just add one little thing? Mr. Watkins. Yes, sure. Ms. Ghaddar. It is really the army intelligence. There is a huge difference between the army intelligence and the rest of the army units. The people today see the difference and the Lebanese still respect the army, but they do not respect the army intelligence. Mr. Watkins. Understood. Thank you. I yield. Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Watkins. I would just like to followup on much of this discussion about reforms to the corruption in the political system. There have been calls from the international community which have offered assistance to national reforms of Lebanon's government. Are these protests sufficient to bring about the reforms? And how much does it matter that the perception is that these protests are essentially leaderless? How can we get to make it stick? I guess, Ms. Ghaddar, we will start with you. Ms. Ghaddar. The protests are leaderless for a very good reason. The authorities have been looking for leaders to discredited them. They have been looking for leaders to arrest. They have been looking for leaders to intimidate. And that is why the protests are leaderless. One, for people to be safe, to protect themselves. And two, because it is really not about leadership this time. This is a real movement. It is not like the 2015 Uprising that started with civil society. It is not like the 2005 Cedar Revolution which was led by the March 14 political camp. This is organic. This is pure Lebanese. And a lot of people try to represent themselves as representatives of the protests, the representatives of the revolution. They were all shunned. It is very important that we need to keep it leaderless because the objective is not to negotiate with authorities. The objective is to bring down the authorities. The next step, I think for the protestors themselves, and for a lot of people following Lebanon, is the following: the protest itself cannot change anything in terms of avoiding the economic collapse. The protests can push for change. The first achievement is that the government resigned. The second step is the small sample of elections that we had, which is the syndicates of the lawyers, the independent candidate won. For the first time ever, an independent candidate won. This tells you that elections can change things. It made people realize that the next step is actually beyond the government formation. It is really about early elections, based on a non-sectarian electoral law that would produce a new parliament, a new government, and a new President. And this is how we can actually move things forward. Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Ambassador Feltman, what can the United States and the international community do to help with both the call for early elections and the anti-corruption efforts? Ambassador Feltman I do think that the U.S. needs to release the FMF right away to show that we are supporting the national institution that, as Dr. Yacoubian said, is most respected in Lebanon. So, the FMF needs to go. But, beyond that, the fact that there is a financial crisis, the fact that everyone knows there is a financial crisis that needs to be avoided because of the risk that chaos just enables Iran and Al-Qaeda-type things, gives us some leverage. We have talked about the 2005 demonstrations and how these are different, but there is a lesson in the 2005 demonstrations that I think we need to keep in mind. Had the Lebanese themselves gone out, and the international community was paying no attention, and called for the Syrian occupation to end, those Lebanese protests would have been broken up brutally by the combination of the Syrian army and intelligence services. Had the international community been calling for the Syrian occupation to end, but the Lebanese were home and not paying any attention, nothing would have happened. It was the combination of the street protests in 2005 and the attention by the international community working in tandem that forced the Syrians out. We could have the same formula now. We do not know who the protest leaders are. They do not want us to know who their leaders are. There are not any leaders. But we know what their basic demands are. Those would be the same demands we would have, as the international supporters of Lebanon, for transparency and end to corruption, new electoral law. If we make it clear that the only escape from the financial crisis is implementing what the protestors are demanding, we have bottom- up pressure from the street, outside pressure, multiplied by that financial crisis. I think we could make a difference. Mr. Deutch. Ms. Yacoubian, we hope that this hearing will help make a difference. How else can we contribute to this? What is your sense of how to strengthen the movement that is trying to accomplish these goals? Ms. Yacoubian. Again, first, I would underscore I think the movement, in and of itself, demonstrates the creativity, the ingenuity, sort of the talent, quite frankly, of the Lebanese. If you go online and watch Twitter and look at some of the things that they are doing, it is quite impressive. So, I do not know that they need help from us in that regard. I would sort of underscore Ambassador Feltman's point. I think this impending economic meltdown--and that is really what we are looking at--is a real forcing mechanism for action. The protestors have been quite clear about what they want. And again, it is very much, I think, about early elections, in particular. The U.S. has a lot that we can contribute in that regard. In my written testimony, I underscore the need to provide, for example, and to renew our assistance with regard to elections, observations, et cetera. I think that this is a moment where the international community quietly--France, the United States, other key powers--can really push and pressure the need to fulfill the demands of the protestors, and then, ideally, follow in with appropriate assistance to help Lebanon pursue free and fair elections going forward. Mr. Deutch. And finally, Ms. Humud, can you just give us a bit of historical perspective here on what these demands are and why, given Lebanon's history, the demands are not only not unreasonable, they are consistent with what we have seen before? Ms. Humud. The demands are definitely consistent with what we have seen before. As my colleagues have mentioned, the U.S. could respond in some ways by supporting protestor demands for change and conditioning U.S. assistance on reform; potentially targeting corrupt leaders, regardless of sect. There would be tradeoffs to this approach, of course. It could require severing ties with some of our traditional political allies in Lebanon. That, in turn, could push them toward external power brokers such as Iran, who share their goal of preserving the status quo. So, regardless of the approach the U.S. chooses to take, there will always be a tradeoff. In terms of Congress' role specifically, Congress could always pass legislation directing U.S. representatives at multilateral banks, development banks, to advocate for specific economic policies vis-a-vis Lebanon. Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much. We do not want to push them toward outside actors like Iran. And I will circle back to that, Ambassador Feltman. But, Mr. Vargas, I would like to recognize you for 5 minutes. Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member, and, of course, the witnesses here. Back in April 2017, I was able to take a codel with Darrel Issa to Beirut and other parts of Lebanon and got a chance to meet with a number of people while we were there. Of course, there was great concern about Hezbollah in the southern part of Lebanon. And I continue to have, of course, that great concern of what is going to happen there. I apologize, I had to miss part of the meeting earlier. So, I apologize for that. That is what happens when you have two meetings at the same time, two hearings. But I have great concern about that and the military buildup. And I would like to hear from you what you think is going to happen in the next few years because of that military buildup. Who would like to take that? Ambassador, why don't you handle that first? Ambassador Feltman I think that, as we saw in 2006, the risk of unanticipated war between Lebanon and Israel, between Hezbollah and Israel, is always there. It was a devastating war in 2006. At least on the Lebanese side--I was Ambassador at the time--it was not anticipated, and that risk is always there. I think that my view is that, because of its exposure in Syria right now, because of the exposure to domestic criticism, Hezbollah is not interested in a war with Israel at the moment. But that does not mean that a war with Israel will not happen. There could always be a miscalculation. But what I do think is encouraging, though, is the increased capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. When I was Ambassador in Lebanon in 2007, the Lebanese army struggled for 5 months, from May to September, to take out a Sunni terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda affiliate called Fatah al-Islam. It took 5 months and there were 158 LAF soldiers killed, along with 50 civilians and an entire Palestinian refugee camp. Nahral-Bared was completely destroyed, the home of 30,000 civilians. Fast forward to 2017. The Lebanese Armed Forces had an anti-terrorist operation on the eastern border with Syria where they were able to capture over 700 ISIS fighters with only seven LAF officers killed in only 10 combat days. That is in our interest, to see the Lebanese Armed Forces be combating terrorism. And the capabilities have improved because of the assistance, mentoring, FMF that we have provided. Mr. Vargas. I appreciate it. But one of the concerns from some of the people that we spoke to was that the LAF, in fact, was not going to be too involved in things that happened in the southern part of the country when it came to questions of Hezbollah and the fact that they would not be involved in that. I mean, I do not know if that is common thinking for everybody, but that certainly was the case with a number of people. Ambassador Feltman I mean the Lebanese Armed Forces does reflect the Lebanese society. Mr. Vargas. Right. Ambassador Feltman Every family has relatives at some level in the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces basically operates, tries to stay apolitical in a country where there is very little political consensus about how to move forward. I would argue that, if our benchmark for success with the Lebanese Armed Forces military assistance is that they take on Hezbollah frontally, that that is a mistaken benchmark; that that causes civil war. And Lebanon civil war is what gave Hezbollah the opening to begin with. Mr. Vargas. Right. Ambassador Feltman Hezbollah civil war---- Mr. Vargas. You are right. That was my question. Because it seems like, when you are talking about the LAF, and I am asking, what do you think is going to happen in the south, well, the LAF. I thought, well, the LAF is kind of non- existent; they are a non-issue in the south. Yes, go ahead. Ambassador Feltman I will turn it over to Dr. Ghaddar. Mr. Vargas. Doctor, go ahead. Ms. Ghaddar. I do not think Hezbollah would want the LAF to be involved in the south in case of any war with Israel or others. They do not need the LAF. Hezbollah does not need the LAF fighting capacities. They do not need their equipment. They do not need their training. They have more than that. So, this is not the issue for Hezbollah. What they need from the LAF, actually, is the security and military decisions. Their access to certain units and commanders is what they need. It is not the LAF itself. So, looking forward, we need to think about Hezbollah's access to these decisions. What I am worried about, looking forward, is that there is a potential split between the units because, as the crisis deepens and the economy crisis deepens, we will see more units moving in different directions, some closer to Hezbollah's agenda, some not. And eventually, when the economy collapses, who is going to pay salaries? The military equipment and training provided by the U.S. is going to be useless when they do not have salaries. So, this is something to think about. Mr. Vargas. My time has expired. Could I take 30 seconds? Thank you very much for that answer. And the last thing I would say is this, though: the issue of sectarian identity and the notion that there could be free and fair elections without taking into account sectarian identity, that certainly would go against what I saw while I was there. And again, I do not pretend to be an expert. I did get a chance to meet with different groups, and there is a very, very strong sectarian identity. And I do not know that having an election where some of those groups did not hold onto some sort of power would actually be beneficial. It probably would cut the other way, I would assume, but I do not know. Again, I am not an expert, but that did concern me when I heard, you know, to have early elections and have one group win and sort of dominate the politics, I thought, well, that is the old civil war that they had from 1975 to 1990, and we certainly do not want to go back to that. Ms. Ghaddar. Just one thing I should say. Since then, much has changed. I do not think the issue today is the sectarian identity. When you see the Lebanese protestors today, how united they are, and how the small elections that we had 2 days ago at the syndicates of the lawyers, what it means, I am not worried about that. Mr. Vargas. OK. Ms. Ghaddar. I think things have changed, and it also depends on the nature of the electoral law. Mr. Vargas. Yes. OK. Thank you very much. And, Mr. Chair, thank you very much. Ranking Member, thank you. Thank you, witnesses. Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. We have got just a few more questions if the witnesses will indulge us. Mr. Wilson, you are recognized. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, I appreciate the point of view of providing for economic reforms. And then, in terms of reforms to the government, technocrats, how do you identify corruption? What would be the definition of corruption? And we will begin with Ms. Humud and proceed all over. But how do you identify what the definition is of corruption? What are some examples of corruption? And who would you report the corruption to? And is there any independent judiciary or body to which corruption can be reported? Ms. Humud. Sure. Prime Minister Hariri, before his resignation, did float the idea of an anti-corruption committee. That is something that has been floated before, and we have not seen a lot of progress on there. One thing that various government officials before their resignation tried to do is this issue of financial disclosure and of lifting banking secrecy on their accounts to show greater transparency on the funding that they have, where it goes. I think there is also an additional issue of the budget, oversight of the budget, and budget auditing that has not been fully transparent in the past. Ms. Yacoubian. I would just add, very briefly, I think identifying corruption will not be difficult. It is pervasive; it is endemic. It is interesting to note that, in a recent Gallup poll, 93 percent of Lebanese believe that there is corruption around them. The country ranks 138th in the Transparency International poll. So, I think the issues really have to do with the ways in which this sectarian system that undergrids things_the families_and the ways in which, for example, contracts are guided toward particular families. This is why the garbage crisis came to what it came to with literally rivers of trash flowing in Lebanon. There has been some interesting research done on the extent to which, even down to the municipalities--that is where the rubber meets the road in terms of addressing everyday problems--that the corruption is so pervasive that it impedes effective solutions, because, again, it is about contracts and business and other things being steered toward favorites. So, there is quite a bit of cronyism. And I think, from my perspective, we have to be clear. This is an issue and a challenge in Lebanon that we are not going to be able to solve, that the Lebanese will not be able to solve, even despite the immediacy of the current problem. This is a generational challenge that is going to take quite some time to address. Mr. Wilson. Ambassador. Ambassador Feltman I think our interest is to prevent a collapse in Lebanon that would enable Iran to deepen its roots, Al-Qaeda affiliates to rise up again in the chaos of civil war or financial economic collapse. That is our interest. And that is linked to the anti-corruption, because the only way you are going to be able to prevent the crisis is to be seen by the population, by investors, by those would be supporting Lebanon from outside, that you are starting to address the corruption. But our interest is to prevent that collapse in order to prevent the chaos that benefits others. If there is an economic collapse in Lebanon, everybody hurts, but I think Hezbollah probably hurts a little bit less because of their own independent resources and things, and that is not in our interest. So, our interest is in anti-corruption more generally, but it is specifically linked to that desire not to see Lebanon collapse. And that is where I think that the financial crisis gives us the opportunity to reinforce and amplify the voices on the street calling for the type of government that would have the credibility and confidence to start to tackle this. As my colleague said, it is not going to be able to be rooted out overnight. But if you have a government that is seen as credible, competent, independent, you can start to attract the type of investment, the type of return of tourism and businesses that will buy time to allow those reforms to take place. Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Ms. Ghaddar. Ms. Ghaddar. Thank you. The general definition of corruption is, when political figures abuse the State's institutions and resources, and create followers instead of citizens. So, what the protests are about today is regaining citizenship and national identities rather than sectarian identities. And that is what the Lebanese are actually trying to do. The moment they become citizens, they are no longer followers, then the corrupt system will be shaken. For example, that is how Iran took over the State institutions, because Hezbollah protected the cronies and, in return, they got their allegiance. So, the President today is Hezbollah's ally and his son-in-law, the Foreign Minister, is also Hezbollah's main ally, in addition to the Speaker. And it is not a coincidence that the three of them are actually the most corrupt politicians in Lebanon. So, basically, when you target corrupt politicians, you automatically and indirectly contain Hezbollah. Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much to each of you. Ms. Yacoubian. Could I add one point? Mr. Wilson. Yes. Ms. Yacoubian. I think one other issue that we have not discussed is the need for oversight and the fact that this is a system in Lebanon that is without any sort of oversight and any sort of accountability to citizens. So, even things as basic as demanding transparency with respect to government spending and ensuring that parliamentary votes are public and known, there are a number of practices that can be undertaken to begin to shine light, to begin to open up, to begin to allow for more transparency, which is the best antidote to corruption. Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Mr. Deutch. Again, thanks to all the witnesses. Ambassador Feltman, public support for the Lebanese Armed Forces is soaring. Why is that the case? How are they perceived by the public? And what would be the consequences if our assistance to the LAF is significantly delayed or terminated? Ambassador Feltman Thank you. I think I probably would use a different term today than I used in that piece I wrote a few weeks ago because the army's records since the initial days is a little bit more mixed. But I believe strongly that the FMF, the assistance that we have given to the Lebanese Armed Forces over the years, particularly in the increases after the 2006 war, is in our interest. This is not a gift to the Lebanese. This is something that is in our mutual interest, the partnership. And it is also not unconditional. The improvements that I cited on their counterterrorism measures is directly related to the assistance, the training, the mentoring that we have given them. As my colleague to my right said, the Lebanese Armed Forces is probably the No. 1 most respected institution in the country. That does not mean that it is above criticism. It does not mean it is a perfect institution. We have seen evidence, we have seen units in these protests that have performed very well protecting protestors in Beirut. We have seen them stand away/ withdraw as thugs beat up protestors in Nabatieh in the south, as Ms. Ghaddar mentioned. But the FMF gives us the ability to build the type of partnership, to continue to cultivate the type of partnership where we can have influence on how the Lebanese Armed Forces develops over the longer term. And we have seen that in counterterrorism already. Our message now should be we expect professional, equivalent treatment by the Lebanese Armed Forces of the protestors across the entire country. But the most important thing is we are undermining Hezbollah's argument that only Hezbollah can protect Lebanon by helping the Lebanese build a credible national institution in which all Lebanese can be proud. It is undermining Hezbollah's narrative. Hezbollah's rockets, as I said earlier, do not defend Lebanon. They put Lebanon at risk of war. The Lebanese Armed Forces is the long-term defense for Lebanon, and I think it is in our interest that we remain partners with them. The other thing is, the Russians want to be there. The Russians will move into a vacuum if we aren't there. The Russians are already supporting General Haftar in Libya. The Russians are already deeply embedded in Syria. Do we really want the Russians to take over the entire Eastern Mediterranean? I would say no. And that reinforces my point, let the FMF flow now, but flow with a message. Flow with a message about what we expect of the LAF performance during this tense time. Mr. Deutch. I appreciate that, Ambassador Feltman, and I appreciate the impassioned plea. As we await response from the administration, I hope they are listening to you. The answer to your question is a resounding, no, we do not want Russia to have full control of yet another country in the region. And I hope that we will hear from the administration soon. Let me finish with something that we have alluded to, the witnesses have alluded to, but I just want to address straight on. And, Ambassador Feltman, I am going to direct this to you, given your experience as a high-level official at the United Nations. And I wanted to just refer to a letter that was led by Congresswoman Luria, Congressman Zeldin, Congresswoman Stevens, and Congressman Waltz to the Secretary General about U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. The point, it has been 13 years now, and 1701 called upon the Lebanese government to extend its sovereignty over all of Lebanon and disarm all armed groups in Lebanon, so there will be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese State. UNIFIL was called upon to enforce this. And 13 years later there are 150,000 rockets pointed at Israel and construction of massive terror tunnels recently discovered as well. By any definition, this has been a failure. So, the question is, does it need to be reformed? Does the Lebanese government need more tools? How do you respond? This has been such a productive hearing about the need for us to support the protestors and strengthen the Lebanese government. And then, in southern Lebanon we have house after house after house housing rocket after rocket after rocket, 150,000, when there should be zero, when the Security Council spoke clearly that there should be zero. Do you have thoughts, Ambassador Feltman, on what can be done? Ambassador Feltman I apologize if I sound cynical after my 6 years at the United Nations. But when I look at Security Council resolutions, I realize that the resolutions may have some value into establishing what is a theoretical objective. But if there is no political will for implementation, they count for little. Look at the Libya arms embargo. The Libyan arms embargo was renewed unanimously in June. All 15 Security Council members supported it. And now, many Security Council members are actually shipping arms to warring parties. Resolution 1701, and earlier 1559, which was a few years earlier, which called for the dismantlement of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, also has not been implemented. There has been no political will demonstrated not only by the Lebanese, but by others on the Council to hold the Lebanese's feet to the fire. There is a briefing on Monday at the Security Council. I thanks Ms. Ghaddar for telling me that this is on Monday. And I am sure that there will be lots of members that will ask the U.N. Special Coordinator about 1701. But it requires political will from the outside that this is not just important on the days when the Security Council is meeting; it is important every day. And it requires the Lebanese themselves to start understanding the risks that their country is under because of Hezbollah's weaponry. And I think that that is something these protests have started to underscore. When you have the Shia starting to criticize Hezbollah, you have a whole new situation and a better opportunity to get this message across. Mr. Deutch. I acknowledge, and I am not surprised by, your cynicism. I would just finish by pointing out, I mean, UNIFIl, it is important to remember is the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. This is not just a question of pass a resolution and hope things happen. There is a process put in place to do it. The process has failed. And as you point out, Ambassador Feltman--and you have now pointed out twice, and I appreciate it--Hezbollah's rockets do not defend Lebanon; they put Lebanon at risk of war. They put the entire country at risk of war. It is a really important point. And you would like to make one more? Ambassador Feltman Yes, if I may, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, make one more point on UNIFIL. I was Ambassador in Lebanon during old UNIFIL, pre-2006 UNIFIL, little UNIFIL. I was, then, Ambassador and Assistant Under-Secretary-General at the United Nations watching big UNIFIL. And certainly, just like with the LAF, we could have a lot of questions on performance, on is UNIFIL or the LAF being aggressive enough in implementing its mandate. But there is something I want to point out. The type of operation that Hezbollah launched in 2006, a very sophisticated operation where they used the Israeli military communications channels, they had what sounded like native Hebrew speakers sounding as though that they were Israeli soldiers talking. They went across the border into Israel and kidnapped and killed Israeli soldiers. That would be very difficult to pull off today because of larger UNIFIL. UNIFIL is not perfect, but UNIFIL, by being in the south, has changed the rules of the game that I think reduce the risks of the accidental war. Before 2006, there was this regular back-and-forth between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah, to show its resistance credentials, would have these ridiculous firing of mortars into unoccupied parts of Shebaa Farms, part of Syria that Israel occupied after the 1967 war. And Israel would respond by launching something into Lebanon, or vice versa. But there was always a risk that any of these could go haywire, that any of these could lead to a devastating war. Because UNIFIL is so big and so present, even if they are not doing what you and I think they should be doing, they are preventing that type of accidental war. Ms. Ghaddar. Can I say something about this? Mr. Deutch. Yes, Ms. Ghaddar. Ms. Ghaddar. I am from the south of Lebanon. I have lived there until I was 18. And things have changed drastically since then. The Shia today joining the Lebanese and starting to criticize Hezbollah is not new. It has been going on since 2006, actually, and Hezbollah has been challenged by the Shia community for a very long time. This is new in terms of becoming public, and that is the main issue. And one of my main arguments since then is that the rhetoric of the resistance is gone. The people do not want a war anymore. The Shia mainly do not want a war anymore. What they want is actually alternative economic plans. Therefore, I always feel that one of the best ways to counter Hezbollah is to work with the Shia, not work with municipalities governed by Hezbollah. Today, the Shia are coming out and saying, ``We are Lebanese citizens,'' and we need to hear that. We need to know that they really want to join the rest of Lebanon. Working with local municipalities is ineffective because these are governed by Hezbollah. Work with the Shia, the business community, the civil society. And that is what will challenge Hezbollah the most. Mr. Deutch. And I appreciate it. I appreciate your insight very much. The fact that there has been so much discussion about the frustration with Hezbollah, the concern by Nasrallah about what is happening, is very hopeful. This last point I raised because, even as we go through all the rest of this, standing with the people of Lebanon as they make these peaceful demands, there are still 150,000 rockets that I think it is fair for us to continue to worry about, whether in the context of a Security Council resolution or these broader conversations. This has been an extraordinary hearing. I am grateful to all four of you for appearing with us today. The members may have some additional questions which they will submit for the record. And I ask they submit any questions within five business days. Mr. Deutch. And with that, and without objection, the meeting is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]