[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WHAT'S NEXT FOR LEBANON? EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT PROTESTS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
November 19, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-81
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-448 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
Terrorism
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
COLIN ALLRED, Texas ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey LEE ZELDIN, New York
DAVID TRONE, Maryland BRIAN MAST, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
JUAN VARGAS, California STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
Casey Kustin, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Humud, Ms. Carla E., Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs,
Congressional Research Service................................. 8
Yacoubian, Ms. Mona, Senior Advisor for Syria, Middle East and
North Africa, United States Institute of Peace................. 20
Feltman, Amb. Jeffrey, John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in
International Diplomacy, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings
Institution.................................................... 28
Ghaddar, Ms. Hanin, Friedmann Visiting Fellow, Geduld Program on
Arab Politics, The Washington Institute........................ 39
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 63
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 64
Hearing Attendance............................................... 65
INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD
Information submitted for the record from Representative Chabot.. 66
WHAT'S NEXT FOR LEBANON? EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT PROTESTS
Tuesday, November 19, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East,
North Africa, and International
Terrorism,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E.
Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Deutch [presiding]. This hearing will come to order.
Welcome, everyone.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
political, economic, and security environment in Lebanon in
light of the ongoing public protests and calls for reform.
I thank our witnesses for appearing here today.
I note we are expecting further votes this afternoon. We
are going to do our best to have as robust a hearing as we can,
get to as many member questions as possible.
I will now recognize myself for purposes of making an
opening statement before turning it over to the ranking member
for the same purpose.
Since mid-October, massive protests have spread throughout
Lebanon and brought more than a million people into the
streets. Although triggered by a proposed tax on the messaging
service WhatsApp, the demonstrations rapidly expanded to
criticize government corruption and to question the pillars of
the Lebanese political system.
In the last few months, major protests have also developed
in Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, and Iran. Although driven by country-
specific and local issues, these demonstrations share a common
theme--frustration with unemployment, corruption, and a lack of
political and economic opportunity.
In Iran, the regime has responded with violence, reportedly
killing at least a dozen people and injuring approximately a
thousand and by shutting down the internet. This repression is
shameful, and Congress stands with all of those peacefully
protesting in Iran and throughout the region and condemns
violent crackdowns on peaceful free expression.
The peaceful leaderless protests in Lebanon are largely
driven by youth and women. Unlike the 2005 demonstrations that
launched the Cedar Revolution, the current demonstrations
transcend sectarian divisions and are animated by unifying
national themes. They are larger and more comprehensive than
the 2015 protests that focused on the Lebanese government's
inability to provide basic services, like trash collection.
Amid these protests, Lebanon faces a dire economic crisis
which prompted government officials to declare an economic
State of emergency in September. Lebanon's debt-to-GDP ratio is
more than 150 percent, one of the highest in the world.
Lebanese banks have been intermittently closed for weeks and
place limits on customer withdrawals.
The government has been unable to implement reforms that
would allow it to access the nearly $11 billion in economic
assistance promised by the international community in 2018.
Economic stagnation in Lebanon helped spark the protests last
month, and the deteriorating economy could compound public
frustrations in the coming weeks.
Faced with this fluid situation, the United States should
refrain from any actions that could destabilize Lebanon. Yet,
on October 31st, the National Security Council and the Office
of Management and Budget placed an indefinite and unexplained
hold on $105 million in critical security assistance to the
Lebanese Armed Forces. They did so against the recommendations
of both the State Department and the Defense Department, and in
opposition to the explicit direction of Congress.
I share serious concerns about Hezbollah's massive rocket
and missile arsenal in Lebanon and the LAF's inability to
prevent Hezbollah's military buildup and dangerous activities
on Lebanon's borders that threaten our partners. Rather than
protect Lebanon, Hezbollah, with Iranian support and direction,
and its advanced weapons, make the Lebanese people less safe.
But I am also concerned when wholesale generalizations of
LAF collaboration with Hezbollah are made. Pentagon officials
claimed, and I quote, ``The Lebanese Armed Forces have
consistently had the best end-use monitoring reporting of any
military that we work with, meaning that the equipment that we
provide to the Lebanese Armed Forces, we can account for it at
any given time.'' Closed quote.
Former CENTCOM Commander, General Joseph Votel, testified
before Congress in February 2018 that, ``Since our security
assistance began, Lebanon has maintained an exemplary track
record for adhering to regular and enhanced end-use monitoring
protocols. We are confident the LAF has not transferred
equipment to Hezbollah.''
The United States must continue to vigorously enforce
mechanisms to ensure that no equipment provided to the LAF
winds up in Hezbollah hands. U.S. training to help
professionalize the Lebanese Armed Forces provides a bulwark
against rogue individuals who might be persuaded to turn a
blind eye to Hezbollah.
On November 8th, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Engel
and I sent a letter to the administration raising concerns
about the pause in assistance and requesting details by
November 15th. The administration has not provided a response.
A continued freeze on assistance threatens to undermine the
LAF, a non-sectarian, national institution that is strongly
supported by the Lebanese public. It also weakens the LAF's
ability to counter threats to Lebanon's security, including
extremist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda.
It also sends the wrong message at a time when many of our
partners are questioning our commitment to the region after
President Trump's reckless withdrawal from Syria. Slowing the
delivery of assistance allows adversaries, like Hezbollah and
Iran and Syria and Russia, to make inroads in Lebanon by
raising doubts about U.S. credibility. The administration
should release its hold and resume assistance to the Lebanese
Armed Forces, ensuring accountability and a continuation of
comprehensive end-use monitoring protocols which will prevent
our rivals from establishing a foothold in Lebanon.
Looking ahead, the demonstrators in Lebanon are demanding
wholesale political reform, a technocratic and non-sectarian
cabinet, a new electoral law, and early elections. The United
States should support these goals and discourage any violence
against the protesters.
However, we must refrain from intervening directly.
Protesters have broadly rejected outside support, and given
Lebanon's history, remain skeptical of external intervention.
We should be clear that these are Lebanese protests driven by a
wide array of Lebanese people who want transparent governance,
accountable institutions, and a peaceful, prosperous future.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, their
assessment of the protests, and suggestions for the way forward
in Lebanon.
And with that, I will yield to Mr. Wilson for his opening
statement.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Ted Deutch, for calling
this important and timely hearing.
For over a month now, the courageous people of Lebanon have
taken to the streets demanding an end to the endemic corruption
and sectarianism that have paralyzed their country for far too
long. In a country like Lebanon, which has been divided, sadly,
socially and politically along strict sectarian lines, these
recent protests are historic. It is not just a protest of one
community against another or one political interest over
another. Citizens from all sects, from every corner of the
country, have joined in these protests. They are a rejection of
the entire political establishment and class. These protests
are, in effect, a popular vote of no confidence, not just in
the current government, but in the entire Lebanese political
system writ large.
These unprecedented, countrywide protests ultimately led to
the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri last month, but
this announcement did not quell the protesters. In line with
their now famous slogan of, quote, ``All of them means all of
them,'' end of quote, the people of Lebanon have continued
their demands that all of the country's sectarian party leaders
resign. What they want is an overhaul of the entire political
structure, not the resignation of a single individual.
The ongoing protests in Lebanon present both challenges and
opportunities for U.S. policy. On the one hand, it is difficult
to assess exactly what kind of Lebanese government will emerge
out of these largely leaderless, grassroots protests. What
political solution will be acceptable to the people in the
streets? How will that affect the U.S.-Lebanon bilateral
relationship? How can we guarantee that the malign actors,
including Hezbollah, will not exploit a potential political
transition to come?
On the other hand, these protests offer a major potential
opportunity for the United States. The energy behind these
protests signals a real desire among Lebanese of all ages to
see a Lebanon free of many of the burdens of sectarianism that
have held it back so long. They offer a momentum for change in
Lebanon that has not been seen since its establishment.
These protests also are very troubling for the Iranian
oppressors. Taken together with the ongoing protests in
neighboring Iraq, and also in Iran, it appears the people of
the Middle East are beginning to chafe under the yoke of their
Iranian oppressors. For the first time ever, we see Shiites in
southern Lebanon openly protesting Hezbollah and criticizing
its political leaders and allies. Hezbollah is always trying to
paint itself as separate from the political class over which it
has maintained a stranglehold in recent years. Its leaders and
propaganda have, instead, made efforts to identify the
terrorist group with the Lebanese people, not the defunct
political establishment. But these protests have put a wrench
in the Iranian proxy's designs.
Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, played the wrong hand--
dismissing protests as a hostile plot by Western and Israeli
governments, instead of supporting the public outcry. This
confirmed to many that Hezbollah is, in fact, part and parcel
of the Lebanese political establishment that cannot be trusted.
We can only hope that as this movement progresses more and more
support for Hezbollah diminishes in Lebanon.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses
today about how the United States can facilitate a positive
outcome for the people of Lebanon, and specifically, what
Congress can do in a bipartisan manner.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and with that, I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
I will now recognize members of the subcommittee for 1-
minute opening statements, should they choose to make one.
Mr. Sherman, you are recognized.
Mr. Sherman. We stand with the people of Lebanon. We stand
with the people of Iran.
I look forward to working with members of the subcommittee
on legislation I am working on, which I have tentatively
titled, ``the Hezbollah Leadership Corruption Disclosure Act,''
which would use the intelligence community's capacities to
determine what assets are owned around the world by Hezbollah
leadership and disclose that. Because every villa disclosed,
every French chalet disclosed is a nail in the coffin of a
violent and corrupt terrorist organization.
I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. All right. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Chabot is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As a former chairman of this committee myself, I have
followed Lebanon very closely for some time now. The protests
over the last several weeks show that the Lebanese people are
fed up with the systematic corruption by the Lebanese
government, to the point that protests have transcended
sectarian differences.
To date, Lebanon has been unable to enact necessary, and
now urgent, if politically difficult, economic reforms, even
with the generous international aid package waiting. Now is an
excellent opportunity for Lebanon to actually make those
reforms and get its fiscal house finally in order.
The protests referred to by our chairman are also a sign
that the Lebanese people have had enough of Hezbollah, a
completely corrupt organization, which, hopefully, 1 day will
be cast out by the Lebanese people. They deserve so much
better.
I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Pence, you are recognized for 1 minute, should you
wish. Should you wish, or we can go to the witnesses.
All right. Without objection, all members may have 5 days
to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for
the record, subject to the length limitations of the rules.
And I will now introduce the witnesses.
Ms. Carla Humud is an analyst in Middle Eastern affairs at
the Congressional Research Service. She covers Syria, Lebanon,
and the Islamic State for the Middle East-Africa section of
CRS's Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
Ms. Mona Yacoubian is the senior advisor for Syria, Middle
East, and North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace.
Prior to joining USIP, she served as Deputy Assistant
Administrator in the Middle East Bureau at the United States
Agency for International Development, from 2014 to 2017, where
she had responsibility for Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.
She previously worked on Middle East and North Africa issues at
the Stimson Center at USIP and at the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. Her current research focuses on
conflict analysis and prevention in the Middle East. Ms.
Yacoubian earned an MPA from Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government and a BA from Duke University.
Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman is the John C. Whitehead
Distinguished Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy in the
foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution and a
senior fellow at the U.N. Foundation. From July 2012 until his
April 2018 retirement, Ambassador Feltman has served as United
Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Before
joining the United Nations, Mr. Feltman was a U.S. Foreign
Service Officer focusing largely on the Middle East and North
Africa. Ambassador Feltman served as Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, and
a variety of posts across the Middle East. He is the recipient
of two Presidential Service Awards and several State Department
Superior Honor Awards.
And finally, Ms. Hanin Ghaddar is the Inaugural Friedmann
Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policies, Geduld Program on Arab Politics, where she focuses on
Shia politics throughout the Levant. She is the long-time
managing editor of Lebanon's NOW News website, and has also
contributed to a number of U.S.-based magazines and newspapers,
including The New York Times, on foreign policy. Prior to
joining NOW, Ms. Ghaddar wrote for several Lebanese newspapers.
Thanks to our really esteemed panel for being here today.
And let me remind the witnesses to please limit your
testimony to 5 minutes. Without objection, your prepared
written statements will be made part of the hearing record in
their entirety.
We are really grateful for all of you taking the time to
join us.
Ms. Humud, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CARLA E. HUMUD, ANALYST IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. Humud. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member
Wilson, members of the committee, for inviting me to testify
today about the situation in Lebanon on behalf of the
Congressional Research Service. I will summarize my written
statement by speaking briefly about the domestic issues that
have sparked the protests, the challenges faced by the main
actors in Lebanon, and policy questions for the United States.
The resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri on
October 29th followed nearly 2 weeks of nationwide mass
protests, described as potentially the largest in Lebanese
history. The movement reflects broad dissatisfaction with what
protestors describe as government corruption, ineptitude, and
economic mismanagement.
Protestors have cited the State's failure to consistently
provide basic goods and services, including water, electricity,
garbage collection, as well as fair access to jobs and
educational opportunities. Protestor demands include the
appointment of a new government of independent technocrats,
early elections, a new electoral law, the return of what they
describe as looted public funds, and a fundamental change to
Lebanon's sectarian-based political system.
The outcome of the protest movement will be shaped by
decisions made by four players, including the protestors, the
political elite, the army, and Hezbollah. The protestors face
the challenge of sustaining momentum as government formation is
delayed potentially for weeks or months. While the movement has
been leaderless thus far, protestors must decide whether to
risk fragmentation, but potentially gain greater influence by
selecting representatives that can negotiate with the
government on specific policy issues.
Lebanese political elites face the task of appearing
responsive to widely held political grievances while avoiding
concessions that could significantly undermine their hold on
power. They may consider the possibility of co-opting or
waiting out the movement. They could also attempt to divide it
by using loyalist groups to cause disruption and introduce a
sectarian element, some of which we have already seen.
The Lebanese army must balance pressure from political
elites to clear protestors from key roadways and infrastructure
against its longstanding reputation as a neutral body and its
policy of non-interference in political disputes.
Hezbollah has expressed support for some protestor demands
while also working to preserve the political status quo from
which it benefits. Hezbollah, like other key players, is not
necessarily a unitary actor in this conflict. Some Hezbollah
supporters have participated in protests while others have
deployed to the streets and targeted demonstrators. Hezbollah
seeks to focus the debate around issues such as State
corruption and away from core issues such as whether Hezbollah
should preserve weapons outside of State control.
These actors are operating against the backdrop of a major
economic crisis and the risk of the government defaulting on
its debt, adding additional urgency to the cabinet-formation
process. All of this raises questions for the United States
regarding how the U.S. should prioritize different, potentially
competing policy goals, at a time of domestic uncertainty in
Lebanon.
Successive U.S. administrations have identified several
core policy goals for Lebanon. These have included:
One, reducing the influence of Hezbollah and Iran via
efforts to strengthen Lebanese State institutions. This
includes supporting the LAF's ability to extend State control
throughout the country, especially in Hezbollah strongholds in
southern Lebanon.
Two, strengthening Lebanon's border security and
counterterrorism capabilities, in light of spillover from the
conflict in neighboring Syria and the movement of fighters
linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic state.
Finally, preserving stability in Lebanon and, in
particular, alleviating the impact of the more than 1 million
Syrian refugees currently residing in the country.
Congress has appropriated funds aimed at the policy
objectives outlined above while also placing certification
requirements on U.S. assistance funds to prevent their misuse
or transfer to Hezbollah or other designated terrorist groups.
Until now, Hezbollah operations targeting Israel, the
infiltration of Sunni extremist groups from neighboring Syria,
and social tensions between refugees and host communities had
been the primary potential sources of instability in Lebanon.
The domestic protest movement which calls for a fundamental
shift in Lebanon's political system adds a new element.
In light of the fluid situation in Lebanon, U.S.
policymakers may debate how to best strike a balance between
encouraging broad reform, preserving stability, and countering
Hezbollah, and how to prioritize these objectives, if and when
necessary.
This concludes my brief remarks, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Humud follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Humud.
Ms. Yacoubian, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MONA YACOUBIAN, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR SYRIA, MIDDLE
EAST, AND NORTH AFRICA, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Ms. Yacoubian. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, and
members of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify on the implications of the
current protests in Lebanon. The timing for this hearing is
especially important, given the dramatic nature of the protests
and the challenges and potential opportunities they pose to
U.S. interests.
I have followed developments in Lebanon over many years,
and currently, I am a senior advisor at the United States
Institute of Peace. Please note that the views expressed here
are my own and not necessarily those of USIP.
Since October 17, Lebanon has witnessed historic mass
protests bringing more than 1 million people to the streets
across the country. The largest peaceful uprising comes amidst
the mounting financial crisis that could bring about a total
collapse of the economy. The economy's warning lights have been
blinking red for some time. Stagnant growth has prompted
mounting unemployment, especially among youth. Lebanon's debt-
to-GDP ratio is among the highest in the world. Its fiscal
deficit is ballooning, and the country has a severe foreign
exchange shortage. Limits on bank withdrawals and concerns over
fuel and even food shortages have contributed to a growing
sense of panic. In short, Lebanon is on the verge of a
catastrophic economic meltdown.
The current protests are different from past demonstrations
in precedent-setting ways. The protests are decidedly anti-
sectarian. Previously, protest movements have been captured by
sectarian interests, leading to their demise or provoking
greater polarization. Thus far, demonstrators have resolutely
rejected efforts to inject sectarian demands or rhetoric into
the protests.
They are geographically diverse. Marches and demonstrations
continue to occur across Lebanon from the north to the south,
from the Beqaa Valley to the coast. Women and youth are at the
forefront, playing an outsized role. Themes of civic engagement
resonate across the protests. Discussion circles and debates on
a broad range of issues occur daily across the country.
However, the early optimism of the protest has given way to
fears about darker scenarios unfolding. Two looming, dangerous
dynamics, if unchecked, can quickly engulf Lebanon in
widespread chaos and violence--an impending financial collapse
or agitators turning the protests violent.
Lebanon's revolutionary moment holds important implications
for U.S. national security interests which are predicated on
maintaining Lebanon's security and stability. Should the
current protests be overwhelmed by financial collapse, a turn
to violence, or both, U.S. national security interests would,
likewise, come under significant threat.
Given the stakes, it is critical that the United States
proceed wisely and cautiously at this sensitive and potentially
dangerous juncture for Lebanon. U.S. engagement should be
guided by two key principles. One, engage where the U.S. has a
comparative advantage, cultivating institutions that serve as a
foundation for vibrant democracy. And two, refrain where the
U.S. presence does more harm than good, in particular,
resisting the temptation to support the protestors directly or
transform the protests into a cudgel to use against Hezbollah
and Iran.
Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah has been unnerved by the
demonstrations which have occurred in Hezbollah strongholds,
signaling its constituency's deep discontent over socioeconomic
issues. The Shiite militant group has expertly navigated
Lebanon's sectarian system to accrue more power with little
accountability, raising the slogans of resistance while
engineering and manipulating the Lebanese governing system
behind the scenes.
As a prime beneficiary of the current status quo, Hezbollah
would lose significantly, should the protestors' demands be
fulfilled. A new governance system in Lebanon based on strong
civic ideals and responsive, accountable, and inclusive
institutions would dramatically undercut Hezbollah's influence.
To conclude, I would like to highlight four key U.S. policy
recommendations.
One, work with key countries to pressure Lebanon's
sectarian power brokers for the urgent appointment of a cabinet
of independent technocrats to address the impending financial
collapse.
Two, engage international financial institutions to develop
an emergency financing package conditioned on appropriate and
necessary reforms.
Three, maintain U.S. economic assistance to Lebanon.
Lebanon hosts the highest number of per capita refugees in the
world, and U.S. economic assistance has played an important
role in supporting local communities.
And four, unfreeze the $105 million in U.S. security
assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, the most respected
State institution in Lebanon with strong popular support.
Thank you, and I am happy to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Yacoubian follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Yacoubian.
There is one vote on the floor, and there is about 10
minutes left on the vote. So, I think we are going to, if the
witnesses can sit tight, we are going to break for a moment,
head off to the floor, cast our one vote, and come back for the
rest of your testimony and questions.
And with that, we will temporarily adjourn.
[Recess.]
Mr. Deutch. The hearing will come back to order.
Thanks so much to the witnesses for indulging us as we do
our other important work, casting votes on the House floor.
And with that, Ambassador Feltman, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY FELTMAN, JOHN C. WHITEHEAD VISITING FELLOW
IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
Ambassador Feltman Thank you for inviting me.
I will summarize my written testimony submitted for the
record. I note that I represent only myself; the Brookings
Institution does not take any institutional position on policy
positions.
Lebanon's current protests are not about the United States,
but the protests can affect our interests. Congressional
attention at this pivotal moment, therefore, is most welcome.
In my view, a realistic U.S. policy for Lebanon has three
elements.
First, undermine Hezbollah's resistance, clean and anti-
establishment narrative, most importantly among the Shia.
Second, support the capability, credibility, and
transparency of national institutions like the Lebanese Armed
Force vis the sectarian ones represented by Hezbollah.
Three, prevent Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, or Russia from
filling the space, from controlling strategic Mediterranean
ports and hydrocarbons.
Successful implementation of these elements would help
discredit the nonsense that Hezbollah's rockets defend Lebanon,
when Hezbollah's rockets are what put Lebanon at risk of war.
The current demonstrations by Lebanese disgusted with the
status quo politics are more significant, as the other speakers
have noted, than the 2005 protest movement against the Syrian
occupation. This time, the Shia have joined.
Hassan Nasrallah's red line against the resignation of
President Aoun or early parliamentary elections ties Hezbollah
tightly to the corruption and the cronyism that enrages the
protestors. The demonstrators will not forget that Hezbollah
deployed thugs on motorcycles to break up the protests by
force.
Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, who enabled the expansion
of Hezbollah's power by handing the terrorist organization a
veneer of Christian cover, is now discredited as the symbol of
everything that ails Lebanon. In other words, the Lebanese
themselves are now undermining Hezbollah's once untouchable
status.
Regarding support for national institutions, my second
point, U.S. support has contributed to the Lebanese Armed
Forces mostly, but not entirely, restrained professional
reaction to these demonstrations. Compare this with how
Egyptian or Iraqi or Syrian or Iranian armed forces deal with
protests. Among the Lebanese, confidence in the LAF, in
general, is rising, and our assistance made this possible. It
is in our interest that this continues.
Does this mean that the Lebanese Armed Forces should try to
disarm Hezbollah by force? That would spell civil war. And as
we have seen in Lebanon, in Iraq, in Syria, and Yemen, Iran
uses civil wars to implant terrorist proxy organizations, and
Al-Qaeda and ISIS and their affiliates also exploit the chaos
of civil war. Civil war is not in our interest.
The U.S. has some legitimate concerns about the Lebanese
Arm Forces' performance, but the FMF should resume quickly and
publicly, both because of the program's merit in terms of
improving the LAF's counterterrorism performance, but also to
undermine the Hezbollah, Iranian, Syrian, Russia narrative that
the U.S. is unreliable.
Mr. Chairman, the Lebanese face choices regarding
government formation and policies, and it is happening, as my
fellow panelists noted, in the middle of a financial crisis, a
severe financial crisis. The United States cannot make
decisions for the Lebanese. But, given how our interests will
be affected by how this evolves, we can clarify the
implications of the directions that the Lebanese might be
considering.
Our message, in my view, should be twofold: that, first,
the United States can help mobilize the international support
that Lebanon needs, but that, second, we could only do so if a
credible, incoming government adopts the effective reforms and
anti-corruption measures that are demanded by the protestors;
and to attract the investment and the financial deposits that
Lebanon needs to prosper and to avoid economic collapse,
Lebanese officials will have to at last satisfactorily resolve
the longstanding contradiction between a citizenry that largely
identifies with the West with policies that tolerate harboring
an Iranian terrorist organization and that lean toward an
Iranian-Syrian axis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ambassador Feltman.
Ms. Ghaddar, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HANIN GHADDAR, FRIEDMANN VISITING FELLOW, GEDULD
PROGRAM ON ARAB POLITICS, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
Ms. Ghaddar. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me today to speak about my country, Lebanon. This is a summary
of a longer statement that I submitted.
The core of the protests are the failing economic
conditions and the persistent corruption of the ruling class,
but they evolved to target the fundamental issues such as the
sectarian system. The bleak economic situation is evident in
the fact that Lebanon's readily available foreign reserves are
now valued at less than $10 billion, which are not expected to
last more than three or 4 months. And economic collapse is
likely. Only a government made up of independent technocrats
can gain the confidence of the Lebanese people and allow the
international financial assistance.
However, the current parliament with the pro-Hezbollah
majority and the current President are not allowing it.
Hezbollah is worried that a new, independent government would
be the first step in isolating the party. Successful protests
mean that Hezbollah will lose state entities through which they
control the country's main security and financial decisions.
As Hezbollah is going through its own financial crisis,
thanks to the U.S. sanctions on Iran, Hezbollah's reaction has
been intimidation of the protestors. But to avoid an Iraqi
scenario, Hezbollah is using its influence within State
institutions, mainly certain units within the Lebanese army, to
quell the protests.
The United States has so far provided the Lebanese army
with $2 billion since 2006 in military equipment and
international military education and training. This aid is the
most significant leverage the U.S. has in Lebanon. However, it
is not the equipment that Hezbollah needs. It is the LAF
security decisions. Today, the LAF stands at a critical
juncture, and three main issues are troubling.
First, the LAF withdrew from portions of the south and the
Beqaa, known to be Hezbollah's core areas. It is important to
note that the Shia community that is Hezbollah's main
constituency has joined the protests, which makes Hezbollah
extra-anxious about losing its support base. As they intimidate
the Shia protestors, the army was asked to leave.
Second, the LAF started unblocking roads using excessive
force under enormous pressure by the authorities.
Three, factions within the LAF known to be affiliated with
Hezbollah started a wave of unlawful arrests of activists. Some
are still detained while others were released with clear signs
of torture on their bodies. One has died.
You can clearly see the contradicting affiliations within
the LAF units. For example, parts of the military intelligence
and the Republican Guards that are close to the President are
acting to fulfill Hezbollah's agenda. However, there are many
army units that are not. These elements will be much needed if
violence escalates and the economic crisis deepens.
So, what can the U.S. do?
On the aid for the LAF, continue urging the LAF to protect
non-violent protestors.
The United States should reiterate that continued U.S.
assistance to the LAF is contingent on safeguarding the
protestors.
Urge the LAF to protect all Lebanese citizens, including
the Shia.
Condition military aid to the LAF to ensure that the units
within the army which are using excessive force do not benefit
from it. It is vital that the U.S. aid to the army does not
help units that are violating basic human rights.
Eventually, maybe redesign the aid package itself. My
reading of the FMF authority is that it is for purchase by
foreign governments of defense material, training, and related
services. However, the most serious challenge facing the LAF
will be salary payments. As the State goes bankrupt very soon,
implications of absentee LAF members include security and
ensuring integrity of U.S.-origin equipment, making sure
equipment does not fall into the wrong hands. Therefore, I
would recommend that the committee explore with the State and
Defense Departments a short-term program to cover salary
payments for certain units in the case of economic collapse.
Domestically, exert pressure on President Michel Aoun to
call for immediate parliamentary deliberations and early
elections. This current parliament cannot and will not lead
required reforms.
Sanction Hezbollah's allies. President Aoun, Speaker Nabih
Berri, and Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil are not only
Hezbollah's main allies, they are also the most corrupt
political figures in Lebanon. They need to be held responsible
for the country's dire economy and instability.
Internationally, work closely with the Europeans to ensure
that any stability-related financial aid to Lebanon is not
provided unless early elections are called and reforms begin.
Finally, address Iran's regional operations. From Iran to
Iraq and Lebanon, it has become very clear that Iran is not a
factor of stability. Accordingly, any future negotiations with
Iran need to address its regional presence and influence.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ghaddar follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Ghaddar.
Thanks to all the witnesses.
We will turn to questioning by the members, and I will
actually defer to Mr. Wilson to start us off.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank each of you. Each one of you were very perceptive
and show a deep concern for the people of Lebanon, with which
many of us associate because Lebanese-Americans are so
enterprising and well-thought-of in our local communities. And
so, it is particularly distressing to see what should be such a
vibrant country have such a dire economic future.
With that in mind, Ms. Ghaddar, there have been attempts to
reform the economy and address Lebanon's phenomenal financial
distress of a debt service equal to half of the government's
revenues. Why have these efforts failed? What reforms should be
promoted?
Ms. Ghaddar. Thank you very much for this is a very
important question.
The CEDRE aid which was dedicated to Lebanon in 2018
addresses many of these reforms, especially reforms of the
electricity sector which takes a huge number of Lebanon's
budget and, also, the augmented public sector. It is very clear
what reforms should be implemented. It is all listed in the
aid.
I think the problem is that, because the political class
are so corrupt, they are benefiting from the electricity sector
and the augmented public sector. For example, they use the
public sector to employ their own supporters who do not do
anything. So, this is a big deal.
These are some of the reforms that can be done. However,
the current authorities failed since the CEDRE aid in Paris was
announced to implement these reforms because they will not
benefit from them. On the contrary, they will lose. So, that is
why they, themselves, cannot implement these reforms. And CEDRE
aid is there. It is $11 billion US dollars that are ready to be
given to the Lebanese State on condition of these reforms.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
And, Ms. Yacoubian, what do the current protests mean for
Iran's primary proxy Hezbollah? Is there a way that the U.S.
can leverage the momentum of these protests to drive a further
wedge between Hezbollah and the people of Lebanon?
Ms. Yacoubian. Thank you.
Clearly, as I noted in my oral satement and as well in my
written testimony, Hezbollah has also been impacted by these
protests. Shia communities have taken part in the protests.
There have been demonstrations in areas that are considered
Hezbollah strongholds. As I note in my written testimony, what
was once called ``the wall of fear'' surrounding any sort of
open criticism of Hezbollah, of Hassan Nasrallah, there are
cracks in that. So, that is significant.
I would argue that this movement is powerful because it is
Lebanese, because it is organic. And as I note in my testimony,
I think the most important thing the United States can do with
respect to the protests themselves is step back, is continue to
provide the sort of very important assistance we provide and
have provided, whether to the Lebanese Armed Forces or our
economic assistance to Lebanon, which is also significant. But
I think the extent to which the United States attempts to put
itself frontally into these protests will only backfire, will
serve to discredit the protests. And, in fact, the protestors
themselves have been quite clear that they are not interested
in support from any foreign power, from any sort of foreign
interference.
At the same time, as I noted, I think if we see the
protests, if we can allow for an environment that enables not
only the protests to continue, but, more importantly, their
demands to be fulfilled for responsive governance, for an end
to corruption, for strong State institutions, that, to my mind,
is the most important counterweight to Hezbollah. That kind of
transition in Lebanon will do more, in my view, to undermine
Hezbollah than an attempt to, sort of in a ham-handed way,
manipulate the current protests as a cudgel against Hezbollah
and, by extension, Iran.
Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. And, Ms. Humud, with the current protests
underway in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran--and there were reports
today of deaths across Iran in the past couple of days--is this
part of a bigger movement? Or how do you contextualize this?
Ms. Humud. I think in some ways this is part of a broader
trend of societies and populations demanding fundamental
reforms and dissatisfaction with corruption. That being said,
there are specific elements that are particular to Lebanon. The
sectarian element is one that is particular to Lebanon, and
that has really been a unique factor of this movement.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. My time is up, and I appreciate the
chairman being so magnanimous to let me go first. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Before going to Mr. Watkins, can I just ask--Ms. Humud, we
have heard throughout the day, throughout this hearing, that
one of the key demands is an end to a sectarian political
system. Can you just give us some perspective on what that
system is now that they are protesting against?
And then, we will go to you, Mr. Watkins.
Ms. Humud. Sure. The Taif Accords that ended Lebanon's
civil war mandated a sectarian system that divides or
distributes political power based on religious or sectarian
identity. So, Lebanon's parliament is evenly divided between
Muslims and Christians, and that division filters its way down
to the cabinet and into other State institutions. And so, what
this means is that Lebanese citizens in some ways organize and
are mobilized based on their religious or sectarian identity
rather than on an issues-driven basis. And that is primarily
what the protestors are seeking to address, rather than a
system whereby politicians are able to divide citizens based on
identity, that they can identify these sort of cross-sectarian
issues that really are common to all citizens, primarily the
economy at this point.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Ultimately, the desire to be viewed as
Lebanese citizens rather than Sunni and Shia or----
Ms. Humud. Yes.
Mr. Deutch [continuing]. Hezbollah?
Ms. Humud. Yes.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Mr. Watkins, you are recognized.
Mr. Watkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the panel for being here.
I would like to ask about the international response. And I
am going to throw these questions to anybody. Particularly
European, Russian, Iranian response to the protests, what have
those been like?
Ms. Ghaddar. On the Iranian part, I have been following
very closely the Iranian responses. Obviously, it was exactly
as Hezbollah's responses, that these protests are rightful in
their demands. But that they have been penetrated by the Mossad
and CIA and all the Western intelligence to direct them. That
it is not about reforms anymore. It is about fighting the axis
of resistance, et cetera, et cetera; discrediting the protests,
and siding with the authority.
At the beginning of the protest, the Iranians and Hezbollah
together, at the very beginning they said that this government
is not going to fall. And for the first time, Hezbollah was
wrong; the government resigned. The first speech of Hassan
Nasrallah was siding with the authorities against the protests.
In his second speech Hassan Nasrallah was becoming the
authority against the protests. He now is the authority. The
people in the streets see him as the authority. They all see an
Iranian influence in Lebanon. And that is why, for the first
time, you see people turning against Hassan Nasrallah himself.
Now it is very obvious; Hezbollah is blocking the formation
of a new, independent government. The Iranians and Hezbollah's
position has been, with the authority, against the people.
Mr. Watkins. Let me actually jump over to the economy and
corruption, please. What can the U.S. do to help the people of
Lebanon counter corruption? Anybody?
Ms. Ghaddar. As I mentioned in my recommendations, it is to
stress on the early elections and independence.
Mr. Watkins. Thank you.
Go ahead, sir.
Ambassador Feltman Thanks for the question.
I think, in general, many of the Lebanese status quo
leaders, the ones that the protestors are demanding be ousted,
probably believe they can wait out the protests, that the
protests cannot go on forever. And then, they can go back to
their normal way, business as usual, and avoid any kind of
accountability or scrutiny of what has happened.
But what is different this time is the financial crisis
that people have mentioned. The financial crisis is basically a
ticking bomb. And that gives the protestors and the outside
supporters of the idea of an independent, sovereign Lebanon
some leverage.
The United States showed leadership back in 2006 after the
war between Hezbollah and Israel in helping to shore up
Lebanese finances at that time, helping to persuade Gulf Arab
States to put money into the central bank, deposits to shore up
the currency, come up with the international assistance
package, bring in investors. All these things can be done
again.
But I think it should be clear to the Lebanese that we are
not going to exercise our leadership or our political
investment in these types of initiatives unless they make the
fundamental changes, that this will have a long-term impact.
Those privatization ideas dealing with the telecom, with the
electricity, with offshore hydrocarbons, right now no one on
the street would trust those as actually benefiting the people
or providing various services over the long term.
So, I think you could put together a package, but the
package needs to be linked with fundamental changes inside
Lebanon about how Lebanon is going to be governing going
forward and how do you resolve that contradiction between a
Western ally of Lebanon and the fact that they are harboring an
Iranian terrorist organization?
Mr. Watkins. Understood.
One last question. The Lebanese institution, the military,
how is the army viewed by the Lebanese people?
Ms. Yacoubian. I will take an initial stab. I think the
army is the institution that is most respected by the Lebanese
public. It is a cross-sectarian institution. I think my
colleagues have rightly pointed out ways and areas in which
there are elements of the Lebanese army that have not behaved
properly. For the most part, the Lebanese army has, in fact,
conducted itself professionally. It is very well regarded by
the Lebanese in polling and other types of instruments to
indicate popular support, or lack thereof.
Mr. Watkins. Understood. Thank you.
Ms. Ghaddar. Can I just add one little thing?
Mr. Watkins. Yes, sure.
Ms. Ghaddar. It is really the army intelligence. There is a
huge difference between the army intelligence and the rest of
the army units. The people today see the difference and the
Lebanese still respect the army, but they do not respect the
army intelligence.
Mr. Watkins. Understood. Thank you.
I yield.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Watkins.
I would just like to followup on much of this discussion
about reforms to the corruption in the political system. There
have been calls from the international community which have
offered assistance to national reforms of Lebanon's government.
Are these protests sufficient to bring about the reforms? And
how much does it matter that the perception is that these
protests are essentially leaderless? How can we get to make it
stick?
I guess, Ms. Ghaddar, we will start with you.
Ms. Ghaddar. The protests are leaderless for a very good
reason. The authorities have been looking for leaders to
discredited them. They have been looking for leaders to arrest.
They have been looking for leaders to intimidate. And that is
why the protests are leaderless. One, for people to be safe, to
protect themselves. And two, because it is really not about
leadership this time. This is a real movement. It is not like
the 2015 Uprising that started with civil society. It is not
like the 2005 Cedar Revolution which was led by the March 14
political camp. This is organic. This is pure Lebanese.
And a lot of people try to represent themselves as
representatives of the protests, the representatives of the
revolution. They were all shunned. It is very important that we
need to keep it leaderless because the objective is not to
negotiate with authorities. The objective is to bring down the
authorities.
The next step, I think for the protestors themselves, and
for a lot of people following Lebanon, is the following: the
protest itself cannot change anything in terms of avoiding the
economic collapse. The protests can push for change. The first
achievement is that the government resigned.
The second step is the small sample of elections that we
had, which is the syndicates of the lawyers, the independent
candidate won. For the first time ever, an independent
candidate won. This tells you that elections can change things.
It made people realize that the next step is actually beyond
the government formation. It is really about early elections,
based on a non-sectarian electoral law that would produce a new
parliament, a new government, and a new President. And this is
how we can actually move things forward.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks.
Ambassador Feltman, what can the United States and the
international community do to help with both the call for early
elections and the anti-corruption efforts?
Ambassador Feltman I do think that the U.S. needs to
release the FMF right away to show that we are supporting the
national institution that, as Dr. Yacoubian said, is most
respected in Lebanon. So, the FMF needs to go.
But, beyond that, the fact that there is a financial
crisis, the fact that everyone knows there is a financial
crisis that needs to be avoided because of the risk that chaos
just enables Iran and Al-Qaeda-type things, gives us some
leverage.
We have talked about the 2005 demonstrations and how these
are different, but there is a lesson in the 2005 demonstrations
that I think we need to keep in mind. Had the Lebanese
themselves gone out, and the international community was paying
no attention, and called for the Syrian occupation to end,
those Lebanese protests would have been broken up brutally by
the combination of the Syrian army and intelligence services.
Had the international community been calling for the Syrian
occupation to end, but the Lebanese were home and not paying
any attention, nothing would have happened. It was the
combination of the street protests in 2005 and the attention by
the international community working in tandem that forced the
Syrians out.
We could have the same formula now. We do not know who the
protest leaders are. They do not want us to know who their
leaders are. There are not any leaders. But we know what their
basic demands are. Those would be the same demands we would
have, as the international supporters of Lebanon, for
transparency and end to corruption, new electoral law. If we
make it clear that the only escape from the financial crisis is
implementing what the protestors are demanding, we have bottom-
up pressure from the street, outside pressure, multiplied by
that financial crisis. I think we could make a difference.
Mr. Deutch. Ms. Yacoubian, we hope that this hearing will
help make a difference. How else can we contribute to this?
What is your sense of how to strengthen the movement that is
trying to accomplish these goals?
Ms. Yacoubian. Again, first, I would underscore I think the
movement, in and of itself, demonstrates the creativity, the
ingenuity, sort of the talent, quite frankly, of the Lebanese.
If you go online and watch Twitter and look at some of the
things that they are doing, it is quite impressive. So, I do
not know that they need help from us in that regard.
I would sort of underscore Ambassador Feltman's point. I
think this impending economic meltdown--and that is really what
we are looking at--is a real forcing mechanism for action. The
protestors have been quite clear about what they want. And
again, it is very much, I think, about early elections, in
particular.
The U.S. has a lot that we can contribute in that regard.
In my written testimony, I underscore the need to provide, for
example, and to renew our assistance with regard to elections,
observations, et cetera. I think that this is a moment where
the international community quietly--France, the United States,
other key powers--can really push and pressure the need to
fulfill the demands of the protestors, and then, ideally,
follow in with appropriate assistance to help Lebanon pursue
free and fair elections going forward.
Mr. Deutch. And finally, Ms. Humud, can you just give us a
bit of historical perspective here on what these demands are
and why, given Lebanon's history, the demands are not only not
unreasonable, they are consistent with what we have seen
before?
Ms. Humud. The demands are definitely consistent with what
we have seen before. As my colleagues have mentioned, the U.S.
could respond in some ways by supporting protestor demands for
change and conditioning U.S. assistance on reform; potentially
targeting corrupt leaders, regardless of sect. There would be
tradeoffs to this approach, of course. It could require
severing ties with some of our traditional political allies in
Lebanon. That, in turn, could push them toward external power
brokers such as Iran, who share their goal of preserving the
status quo. So, regardless of the approach the U.S. chooses to
take, there will always be a tradeoff.
In terms of Congress' role specifically, Congress could
always pass legislation directing U.S. representatives at
multilateral banks, development banks, to advocate for specific
economic policies vis-a-vis Lebanon.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much.
We do not want to push them toward outside actors like
Iran. And I will circle back to that, Ambassador Feltman.
But, Mr. Vargas, I would like to recognize you for 5
minutes.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and Ranking
Member, and, of course, the witnesses here.
Back in April 2017, I was able to take a codel with Darrel
Issa to Beirut and other parts of Lebanon and got a chance to
meet with a number of people while we were there. Of course,
there was great concern about Hezbollah in the southern part of
Lebanon. And I continue to have, of course, that great concern
of what is going to happen there.
I apologize, I had to miss part of the meeting earlier. So,
I apologize for that. That is what happens when you have two
meetings at the same time, two hearings.
But I have great concern about that and the military
buildup. And I would like to hear from you what you think is
going to happen in the next few years because of that military
buildup. Who would like to take that? Ambassador, why don't you
handle that first?
Ambassador Feltman I think that, as we saw in 2006, the
risk of unanticipated war between Lebanon and Israel, between
Hezbollah and Israel, is always there. It was a devastating war
in 2006. At least on the Lebanese side--I was Ambassador at the
time--it was not anticipated, and that risk is always there.
I think that my view is that, because of its exposure in
Syria right now, because of the exposure to domestic criticism,
Hezbollah is not interested in a war with Israel at the moment.
But that does not mean that a war with Israel will not happen.
There could always be a miscalculation.
But what I do think is encouraging, though, is the
increased capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. When I was
Ambassador in Lebanon in 2007, the Lebanese army struggled for
5 months, from May to September, to take out a Sunni terrorist
organization, Al-Qaeda affiliate called Fatah al-Islam. It took
5 months and there were 158 LAF soldiers killed, along with 50
civilians and an entire Palestinian refugee camp. Nahral-Bared
was completely destroyed, the home of 30,000 civilians.
Fast forward to 2017. The Lebanese Armed Forces had an
anti-terrorist operation on the eastern border with Syria where
they were able to capture over 700 ISIS fighters with only
seven LAF officers killed in only 10 combat days. That is in
our interest, to see the Lebanese Armed Forces be combating
terrorism. And the capabilities have improved because of the
assistance, mentoring, FMF that we have provided.
Mr. Vargas. I appreciate it. But one of the concerns from
some of the people that we spoke to was that the LAF, in fact,
was not going to be too involved in things that happened in the
southern part of the country when it came to questions of
Hezbollah and the fact that they would not be involved in that.
I mean, I do not know if that is common thinking for everybody,
but that certainly was the case with a number of people.
Ambassador Feltman I mean the Lebanese Armed Forces does
reflect the Lebanese society.
Mr. Vargas. Right.
Ambassador Feltman Every family has relatives at some level
in the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces
basically operates, tries to stay apolitical in a country where
there is very little political consensus about how to move
forward.
I would argue that, if our benchmark for success with the
Lebanese Armed Forces military assistance is that they take on
Hezbollah frontally, that that is a mistaken benchmark; that
that causes civil war. And Lebanon civil war is what gave
Hezbollah the opening to begin with.
Mr. Vargas. Right.
Ambassador Feltman Hezbollah civil war----
Mr. Vargas. You are right. That was my question. Because it
seems like, when you are talking about the LAF, and I am
asking, what do you think is going to happen in the south,
well, the LAF. I thought, well, the LAF is kind of non-
existent; they are a non-issue in the south.
Yes, go ahead.
Ambassador Feltman I will turn it over to Dr. Ghaddar.
Mr. Vargas. Doctor, go ahead.
Ms. Ghaddar. I do not think Hezbollah would want the LAF to
be involved in the south in case of any war with Israel or
others. They do not need the LAF. Hezbollah does not need the
LAF fighting capacities. They do not need their equipment. They
do not need their training. They have more than that. So, this
is not the issue for Hezbollah.
What they need from the LAF, actually, is the security and
military decisions. Their access to certain units and
commanders is what they need. It is not the LAF itself. So,
looking forward, we need to think about Hezbollah's access to
these decisions.
What I am worried about, looking forward, is that there is
a potential split between the units because, as the crisis
deepens and the economy crisis deepens, we will see more units
moving in different directions, some closer to Hezbollah's
agenda, some not. And eventually, when the economy collapses,
who is going to pay salaries? The military equipment and
training provided by the U.S. is going to be useless when they
do not have salaries. So, this is something to think about.
Mr. Vargas. My time has expired. Could I take 30 seconds?
Thank you very much for that answer.
And the last thing I would say is this, though: the issue
of sectarian identity and the notion that there could be free
and fair elections without taking into account sectarian
identity, that certainly would go against what I saw while I
was there. And again, I do not pretend to be an expert. I did
get a chance to meet with different groups, and there is a
very, very strong sectarian identity. And I do not know that
having an election where some of those groups did not hold onto
some sort of power would actually be beneficial. It probably
would cut the other way, I would assume, but I do not know.
Again, I am not an expert, but that did concern me when I
heard, you know, to have early elections and have one group win
and sort of dominate the politics, I thought, well, that is the
old civil war that they had from 1975 to 1990, and we certainly
do not want to go back to that.
Ms. Ghaddar. Just one thing I should say. Since then, much
has changed. I do not think the issue today is the sectarian
identity. When you see the Lebanese protestors today, how
united they are, and how the small elections that we had 2 days
ago at the syndicates of the lawyers, what it means, I am not
worried about that.
Mr. Vargas. OK.
Ms. Ghaddar. I think things have changed, and it also
depends on the nature of the electoral law.
Mr. Vargas. Yes. OK. Thank you very much.
And, Mr. Chair, thank you very much. Ranking Member, thank
you.
Thank you, witnesses.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Vargas.
We have got just a few more questions if the witnesses will
indulge us.
Mr. Wilson, you are recognized.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Indeed, I appreciate the point of view of providing for
economic reforms. And then, in terms of reforms to the
government, technocrats, how do you identify corruption? What
would be the definition of corruption? And we will begin with
Ms. Humud and proceed all over. But how do you identify what
the definition is of corruption? What are some examples of
corruption? And who would you report the corruption to? And is
there any independent judiciary or body to which corruption can
be reported?
Ms. Humud. Sure. Prime Minister Hariri, before his
resignation, did float the idea of an anti-corruption
committee. That is something that has been floated before, and
we have not seen a lot of progress on there.
One thing that various government officials before their
resignation tried to do is this issue of financial disclosure
and of lifting banking secrecy on their accounts to show
greater transparency on the funding that they have, where it
goes. I think there is also an additional issue of the budget,
oversight of the budget, and budget auditing that has not been
fully transparent in the past.
Ms. Yacoubian. I would just add, very briefly, I think
identifying corruption will not be difficult. It is pervasive;
it is endemic. It is interesting to note that, in a recent
Gallup poll, 93 percent of Lebanese believe that there is
corruption around them. The country ranks 138th in the
Transparency International poll.
So, I think the issues really have to do with the ways in
which this sectarian system that undergrids things_the
families_and the ways in which, for example, contracts are
guided toward particular families. This is why the garbage
crisis came to what it came to with literally rivers of trash
flowing in Lebanon.
There has been some interesting research done on the extent
to which, even down to the municipalities--that is where the
rubber meets the road in terms of addressing everyday
problems--that the corruption is so pervasive that it impedes
effective solutions, because, again, it is about contracts and
business and other things being steered toward favorites. So,
there is quite a bit of cronyism.
And I think, from my perspective, we have to be clear. This
is an issue and a challenge in Lebanon that we are not going to
be able to solve, that the Lebanese will not be able to solve,
even despite the immediacy of the current problem. This is a
generational challenge that is going to take quite some time to
address.
Mr. Wilson. Ambassador.
Ambassador Feltman I think our interest is to prevent a
collapse in Lebanon that would enable Iran to deepen its roots,
Al-Qaeda affiliates to rise up again in the chaos of civil war
or financial economic collapse. That is our interest. And that
is linked to the anti-corruption, because the only way you are
going to be able to prevent the crisis is to be seen by the
population, by investors, by those would be supporting Lebanon
from outside, that you are starting to address the corruption.
But our interest is to prevent that collapse in order to
prevent the chaos that benefits others.
If there is an economic collapse in Lebanon, everybody
hurts, but I think Hezbollah probably hurts a little bit less
because of their own independent resources and things, and that
is not in our interest. So, our interest is in anti-corruption
more generally, but it is specifically linked to that desire
not to see Lebanon collapse. And that is where I think that the
financial crisis gives us the opportunity to reinforce and
amplify the voices on the street calling for the type of
government that would have the credibility and confidence to
start to tackle this.
As my colleague said, it is not going to be able to be
rooted out overnight. But if you have a government that is seen
as credible, competent, independent, you can start to attract
the type of investment, the type of return of tourism and
businesses that will buy time to allow those reforms to take
place.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Ms. Ghaddar.
Ms. Ghaddar. Thank you.
The general definition of corruption is, when political
figures abuse the State's institutions and resources, and
create followers instead of citizens. So, what the protests are
about today is regaining citizenship and national identities
rather than sectarian identities. And that is what the Lebanese
are actually trying to do.
The moment they become citizens, they are no longer
followers, then the corrupt system will be shaken. For example,
that is how Iran took over the State institutions, because
Hezbollah protected the cronies and, in return, they got their
allegiance. So, the President today is Hezbollah's ally and his
son-in-law, the Foreign Minister, is also Hezbollah's main
ally, in addition to the Speaker. And it is not a coincidence
that the three of them are actually the most corrupt
politicians in Lebanon. So, basically, when you target corrupt
politicians, you automatically and indirectly contain
Hezbollah.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much to each of you.
Ms. Yacoubian. Could I add one point?
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Ms. Yacoubian. I think one other issue that we have not
discussed is the need for oversight and the fact that this is a
system in Lebanon that is without any sort of oversight and any
sort of accountability to citizens. So, even things as basic as
demanding transparency with respect to government spending and
ensuring that parliamentary votes are public and known, there
are a number of practices that can be undertaken to begin to
shine light, to begin to open up, to begin to allow for more
transparency, which is the best antidote to corruption.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Again, thanks to all the witnesses.
Ambassador Feltman, public support for the Lebanese Armed
Forces is soaring. Why is that the case? How are they perceived
by the public? And what would be the consequences if our
assistance to the LAF is significantly delayed or terminated?
Ambassador Feltman Thank you.
I think I probably would use a different term today than I
used in that piece I wrote a few weeks ago because the army's
records since the initial days is a little bit more mixed. But
I believe strongly that the FMF, the assistance that we have
given to the Lebanese Armed Forces over the years, particularly
in the increases after the 2006 war, is in our interest. This
is not a gift to the Lebanese. This is something that is in our
mutual interest, the partnership.
And it is also not unconditional. The improvements that I
cited on their counterterrorism measures is directly related to
the assistance, the training, the mentoring that we have given
them.
As my colleague to my right said, the Lebanese Armed Forces
is probably the No. 1 most respected institution in the
country. That does not mean that it is above criticism. It does
not mean it is a perfect institution. We have seen evidence, we
have seen units in these protests that have performed very well
protecting protestors in Beirut. We have seen them stand away/
withdraw as thugs beat up protestors in Nabatieh in the south,
as Ms. Ghaddar mentioned.
But the FMF gives us the ability to build the type of
partnership, to continue to cultivate the type of partnership
where we can have influence on how the Lebanese Armed Forces
develops over the longer term. And we have seen that in
counterterrorism already. Our message now should be we expect
professional, equivalent treatment by the Lebanese Armed Forces
of the protestors across the entire country.
But the most important thing is we are undermining
Hezbollah's argument that only Hezbollah can protect Lebanon by
helping the Lebanese build a credible national institution in
which all Lebanese can be proud. It is undermining Hezbollah's
narrative.
Hezbollah's rockets, as I said earlier, do not defend
Lebanon. They put Lebanon at risk of war. The Lebanese Armed
Forces is the long-term defense for Lebanon, and I think it is
in our interest that we remain partners with them.
The other thing is, the Russians want to be there. The
Russians will move into a vacuum if we aren't there. The
Russians are already supporting General Haftar in Libya. The
Russians are already deeply embedded in Syria. Do we really
want the Russians to take over the entire Eastern
Mediterranean? I would say no.
And that reinforces my point, let the FMF flow now, but
flow with a message. Flow with a message about what we expect
of the LAF performance during this tense time.
Mr. Deutch. I appreciate that, Ambassador Feltman, and I
appreciate the impassioned plea. As we await response from the
administration, I hope they are listening to you. The answer to
your question is a resounding, no, we do not want Russia to
have full control of yet another country in the region. And I
hope that we will hear from the administration soon.
Let me finish with something that we have alluded to, the
witnesses have alluded to, but I just want to address straight
on. And, Ambassador Feltman, I am going to direct this to you,
given your experience as a high-level official at the United
Nations. And I wanted to just refer to a letter that was led by
Congresswoman Luria, Congressman Zeldin, Congresswoman Stevens,
and Congressman Waltz to the Secretary General about U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1701.
The point, it has been 13 years now, and 1701 called upon
the Lebanese government to extend its sovereignty over all of
Lebanon and disarm all armed groups in Lebanon, so there will
be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese
State. UNIFIL was called upon to enforce this. And 13 years
later there are 150,000 rockets pointed at Israel and
construction of massive terror tunnels recently discovered as
well.
By any definition, this has been a failure. So, the
question is, does it need to be reformed? Does the Lebanese
government need more tools? How do you respond? This has been
such a productive hearing about the need for us to support the
protestors and strengthen the Lebanese government. And then, in
southern Lebanon we have house after house after house housing
rocket after rocket after rocket, 150,000, when there should be
zero, when the Security Council spoke clearly that there should
be zero. Do you have thoughts, Ambassador Feltman, on what can
be done?
Ambassador Feltman I apologize if I sound cynical after my
6 years at the United Nations. But when I look at Security
Council resolutions, I realize that the resolutions may have
some value into establishing what is a theoretical objective.
But if there is no political will for implementation, they
count for little.
Look at the Libya arms embargo. The Libyan arms embargo was
renewed unanimously in June. All 15 Security Council members
supported it. And now, many Security Council members are
actually shipping arms to warring parties.
Resolution 1701, and earlier 1559, which was a few years
earlier, which called for the dismantlement of all Lebanese and
non-Lebanese militias, also has not been implemented. There has
been no political will demonstrated not only by the Lebanese,
but by others on the Council to hold the Lebanese's feet to the
fire.
There is a briefing on Monday at the Security Council. I
thanks Ms. Ghaddar for telling me that this is on Monday. And I
am sure that there will be lots of members that will ask the
U.N. Special Coordinator about 1701. But it requires political
will from the outside that this is not just important on the
days when the Security Council is meeting; it is important
every day. And it requires the Lebanese themselves to start
understanding the risks that their country is under because of
Hezbollah's weaponry.
And I think that that is something these protests have
started to underscore. When you have the Shia starting to
criticize Hezbollah, you have a whole new situation and a
better opportunity to get this message across.
Mr. Deutch. I acknowledge, and I am not surprised by, your
cynicism. I would just finish by pointing out, I mean, UNIFIl,
it is important to remember is the United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon. This is not just a question of pass a resolution
and hope things happen. There is a process put in place to do
it. The process has failed. And as you point out, Ambassador
Feltman--and you have now pointed out twice, and I appreciate
it--Hezbollah's rockets do not defend Lebanon; they put Lebanon
at risk of war. They put the entire country at risk of war. It
is a really important point.
And you would like to make one more?
Ambassador Feltman Yes, if I may, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
Member, make one more point on UNIFIL. I was Ambassador in
Lebanon during old UNIFIL, pre-2006 UNIFIL, little UNIFIL. I
was, then, Ambassador and Assistant Under-Secretary-General at
the United Nations watching big UNIFIL.
And certainly, just like with the LAF, we could have a lot
of questions on performance, on is UNIFIL or the LAF being
aggressive enough in implementing its mandate. But there is
something I want to point out. The type of operation that
Hezbollah launched in 2006, a very sophisticated operation
where they used the Israeli military communications channels,
they had what sounded like native Hebrew speakers sounding as
though that they were Israeli soldiers talking. They went
across the border into Israel and kidnapped and killed Israeli
soldiers. That would be very difficult to pull off today
because of larger UNIFIL.
UNIFIL is not perfect, but UNIFIL, by being in the south,
has changed the rules of the game that I think reduce the risks
of the accidental war. Before 2006, there was this regular
back-and-forth between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah, to show
its resistance credentials, would have these ridiculous firing
of mortars into unoccupied parts of Shebaa Farms, part of Syria
that Israel occupied after the 1967 war. And Israel would
respond by launching something into Lebanon, or vice versa. But
there was always a risk that any of these could go haywire,
that any of these could lead to a devastating war.
Because UNIFIL is so big and so present, even if they are
not doing what you and I think they should be doing, they are
preventing that type of accidental war.
Ms. Ghaddar. Can I say something about this?
Mr. Deutch. Yes, Ms. Ghaddar.
Ms. Ghaddar. I am from the south of Lebanon. I have lived
there until I was 18. And things have changed drastically since
then.
The Shia today joining the Lebanese and starting to
criticize Hezbollah is not new. It has been going on since
2006, actually, and Hezbollah has been challenged by the Shia
community for a very long time. This is new in terms of
becoming public, and that is the main issue.
And one of my main arguments since then is that the
rhetoric of the resistance is gone. The people do not want a
war anymore. The Shia mainly do not want a war anymore. What
they want is actually alternative economic plans.
Therefore, I always feel that one of the best ways to
counter Hezbollah is to work with the Shia, not work with
municipalities governed by Hezbollah. Today, the Shia are
coming out and saying, ``We are Lebanese citizens,'' and we
need to hear that. We need to know that they really want to
join the rest of Lebanon. Working with local municipalities is
ineffective because these are governed by Hezbollah. Work with
the Shia, the business community, the civil society. And that
is what will challenge Hezbollah the most.
Mr. Deutch. And I appreciate it. I appreciate your insight
very much. The fact that there has been so much discussion
about the frustration with Hezbollah, the concern by Nasrallah
about what is happening, is very hopeful.
This last point I raised because, even as we go through all
the rest of this, standing with the people of Lebanon as they
make these peaceful demands, there are still 150,000 rockets
that I think it is fair for us to continue to worry about,
whether in the context of a Security Council resolution or
these broader conversations.
This has been an extraordinary hearing. I am grateful to
all four of you for appearing with us today.
The members may have some additional questions which they
will submit for the record. And I ask they submit any questions
within five business days.
Mr. Deutch. And with that, and without objection, the
meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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