[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT FROM BREXIT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
October 22, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-71
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-072PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and The Environment
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois, Ranking
GREGORY MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
DAVID TRONE, Maryland RON WRIGHT, Texas
JIM COSTA, California MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
Gabrielle Gould, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Sloat, Dr. Amanda, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the
United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution............ 8
Farrell, Dr. Henry, Associate Professor of Political Science and
International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs,
The George Washington University............................... 18
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 37
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 38
Hearing Attendance............................................... 39
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Additional materials submitted for the record from Reprrsentative
Cicilline...................................................... 40
PROTECTING THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT FROM BREXIT
Tuesday, October 22, 2019
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
Energy, and the Environment
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Keating. I call the meeting to order.
I thank our witnesses for being here.
A brief announcement that I have been asked to convey for
anyone that might be in the room, that might not know
otherwise, the Foreign Affairs Asia Subcommittee hearing, Human
Rights in South Asia: Views from the State Department and the
Region, that hearing is occurring in 2318 Rayburn.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on how
we can protect the Good Friday Agreement and uphold the peace
and stability in Northern Ireland.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
I will now make a brief opening statement and then turn it
over to the ranking member for his opening statement.
The focus of our hearing today is how we can help maintain
peace and stability in Northern Ireland in the face of the
United Kingdom's potentially imminent exit from the European
Union. Brexit has been a long and challenging process full of
difficult negotiations, and fair to say a lot of twists and
turns. Even as we sit here, a new proposal to address the issue
of Northern Ireland is under consideration by U.K. Parliament.
For many of us, Northern Ireland is a deeply personal
issue. My generation grew up bearing witness to the Troubles
during which 3,500 people approximately lost their lives. We
mourn their loss. We celebrated alongside our compatriots when
the Good Friday Agreement was reached in 1998. Now, 21 years
later, the Good Friday Agreement remains invaluable to peace
and stability on the island of Ireland.
Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, George Mitchell, played
a crucial role as chairman of the peace talks, and the United
States is still viewed as a neutral broker in maintaining good
relations between the United Kingdom and Ireland.
I would say every time I speak to some of my peers in
Ireland they will remind me time and time again that there
would have been no peace if it had not been for the U.S.
intervention.
I would like to recognize Chairman Neal of Massachusetts,
and Representative King of New York, who served as co-chairs of
the Friends of Ireland Caucus and have long committed to
ensuring the success of the Good Friday Agreement.
It is not to say the situation is perfect today, as
Northern Ireland continues to deal with the past and the
legacies of the Troubles. Most Protestants and Catholics in
Northern Ireland, they largely coexist, still live separate
from one another. Northern Ireland still struggles with
governance and economic inequality.
Pockets of parliamentary activity still exist. Just a few
months ago, journalist Lyra McKee was shot by a new IRA
dissident Republican group, yet due in large part to the Good
Friday Agreement, these challenges are neither pervasive or
insurmountable.
Today Brexit is poised to threaten those 21 years of
relative calm. Good Friday Agreement achieved the
demilitarization of Northern Ireland with the removal of the
security installations at the border, and the conflicts and
violence that often accompanied them are gone as well.
After Brexit, Northern Ireland will be the only part of the
U.K. that shares a land border with the EU, and many fear those
border controls could once again result in a new reality. The
return to a hard border would not only symbolize a divided
Ireland, it would create enormous problems for the people of
Northern Ireland and Ireland who, for the last two decades,
have been able to work, trade, and move freely across the
border, a reality that has been fundamental to a lasting piece.
It is no surprise that Northern Ireland remains a main
sticking point in the negotiations between U.K. and the EU This
is not an issue that should be taken lightly, nor should Brexit
be permitted to threaten the decades of gains made under the
Good Friday Agreement.
I stand with Speaker Pelosi and other Members of Congress,
including Chairman Neal, in pledging not to engage in bilateral
U.S./U.K. trade deals, should Brexit undermine the Good Friday
Agreement, including the seamless border between the Irish
Republic and Northern Ireland.
I am pleased to join Representatives Suozzi and King in co-
sponsoring House Resolution 585, reaffirming the support of the
Good Friday Agreement and other agreements geared at a lasting
peace in Northern Ireland.
As we know, the possibility of a Brexit deal is changing
from moment to moment. That is one of the things that concerned
us with this. We had to check in before the hearing started,
just to be sure. And we are pleased that the U.K. and EU have
attempted to make progress toward a deal. And I commend the
commitment to honoring the Good Friday Agreement, particularly
one that does not impose a hard border between Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland.
We know that there are many details that still have to be
addressed, and we know that everyone is not entirely happy with
the potential deal. But we appreciate the commitment by the EU
and U.K. government to peace for Northern Ireland and for the
Good Friday Agreement.
Regardless of what happens with this deal, or any other
developments that may transpire before October 31st, Brexit
will not be an easy transition. It is still a long road ahead
for the EU, the United Kingdom, and the Island of Ireland as
they deal with the reality of a post-Brexit world. And I hope
there is shared commitment to the Good Friday Agreement and
peace in Northern Ireland will remain as the highest priority.
I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us today. I
hope your testimony today will help us better understand
Brexit's consequences for Northern Island and the Good Friday
Agreement, and especially the deal that is being currently
discussed.
As Members of Congress, we must continue to work toward
lasting peace, stability, and prosperity in Northern Ireland.
Thank you, and I now turn it over to the ranking member for
his opening remarks.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here today. I very much appreciate it.
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU
by a narrow margin of 52 to 48. This historic moment resulted
in endless hours of debates, two prime ministers' resignations,
snap elections, and a suspended Parliament that makes us look
like we have got it together here, so thank you.
Now, after numerous failed attempts to pass withdrawal
agreements through the House of Commons, we may finally be
nearing the Brexit that millions of U.K. citizens voted for
over 3 years ago. However, there is a lot of concerns.
Many still worry about the possible unintended consequences
of Brexit on the Good Friday Agreement, which ended the war in
Ireland and brought peace to the island.
During the 30 years known as the Troubles, roughly 3,600
men, women, and children were killed in Northern Ireland as
feuding political factions terrorized one another. That is why
I believe that any Brexit deal must protect the Good Friday
Agreement and ensure that no hard border be constituted.
Additionally, the agreement must protect Northern Ireland's
economy. We cannot let unemployment drive a resurgence of
terror on the Irish island. No one in the U.K., no one in this
room, wants to see the situation devolve to those darker days.
Luckily, I do not think the Brexit deal struck by Prime
Minister Johnson will result in that.
Last week negotiations for both the U.K. and the EU came to
an agreement on a Brexit deal that would honor the Good Friday
Agreement.
President Juncker of the European Commission has come out
in support of this agreement, and it benefits both EU and the
U.K., while lasting peace and stability on the--while ensuring
peace and stability on the island. Likewise, the EU's chief
negotiator stated that this deal will avoid a hard border
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, a key
provision of the Good Friday Agreement, and would benefit
businesses across the north.
I am thankful that the latest negotiated deal between the
U.K. and the EU emphasized the importance of this agreement.
Whatever deal that is eventually voted on and enacted must
avoid a return to violence of the late 20th century. Prime
Minister Boris Johnson, who was unable to pass this deal
through the House of Commons over the weekend, has now asked
the EU for a Brexit extension.
In the meantime, the House of Commons is debating right now
on whether or not to vote on the Prime Minister's withdrawal
agreement bill. If this is passed, they will have 3 days to
consider this legislation.
While passage of Brexit is not guaranteed at this point,
one thing I warn all of my colleagues to avoid is vowing to
block any potential U.S./U.K. bilateral trade deal. Not only is
this dangerous message sent to the millions of British citizens
who voted in favor of leave, but this mentality could also have
unintended consequences on our own economy.
Trade is good. Trade with one of our oldest allies is even
better. A bilateral deal with the U.K., should they eventually
leave the EU, would benefit both economies and our
constituents.
I look forward to hearing from both of you today, and with
that I will yield back to the chairman.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. And consistent with my
opening statement, I will note that the U.K. Parliament has
just started voting on the second reading of the withdrawal
agreement as we are hearing testimony right now.
Now I will call on Representative Cicilline for an opening
statement.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Congressman
Kinzinger, for holding this hearing today, which, as you just
mentioned, could not be more timely on the subject of Brexit's
impact on Northern Ireland. I appreciate especially the efforts
of my good friend, the chair of our subcommittee, on the issue
of Brexit's impact on the Republic of Ireland and Northern
Ireland.
Over the past 3 years, I have worked with him, Chairman
Richie Neal, and many other members from both sides of the
aisle to reinforce to our friends in the U.K., Norther Ireland,
and Ireland that any Brexit deal must preserve the Good Friday
Agreement.
Along with Chairman Keating, Chairman Neal, and our friend
and colleague, Congressman Kennedy, we recently published an
op-ed in The Boston Globe on the importance of a Brexit deal
that maintains the Good Friday Agreement, and I would ask
unanimous consent to have that placed in the record.
Mr. Keating. Any objection? I hear none.
Mr. Cicilline. I was pleased to learn last week that the
U.K. and the EU had reached an agreement, which is supported by
the government of Ireland, that would preserve free movement of
goods and people between Ireland and Northern Ireland.
Unfortunately, as has so often been the case with Brexit, there
appear to be some roadblocks moving this forward.
I very much look forward to the testimony today and to
hearing how U.S. policymakers can continue to play a role in
pushing for a resolution that will preserve this very important
Good Friday Agreement.
I thank our witnesses for being here, and I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you.
I will now introduce our witnesses. Dr. Amanda Sloat is a
Robert Bosch Senior Fellow in the Center on the United States
and Europe at The Brookings Institution. Dr. Sloat is also a
fellow with the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic
Relationship at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, and
former Deputy Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia.
You will notice when I say ``Harvard'' or ``Ireland'' there
is a little bit of an accent there. I apologize for that, but
it is hard to control.
We also have joining us Dr. Henry Farrell. He is a
professor of political science and international affairs at
George Washington University's Elliott School of International
Affairs. He was previously a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson
Center for International Scholars and assistant professor at
the University of Toronto.
We appreciate you being here today. It is a busy time, and
I know your schedules were very challenging. And we would like
to call on you to give your opening statements; ask you to
limit it to 5 minutes. Without objection, your prepared written
statements will be made part of the record.
I will now go to Dr. Sloat for her statement.
STATEMENT OF AMANDA SLOAT, PH.D., ROBERT BOSCH SENIOR FELLOW,
CENTER ON THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
Dr. Sloat. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for your
invitation to discuss the importance----
Mr. Keating. Is your microphone, is that--is your
microphone on?
Dr. Sloat. There we go. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member
Kinzinger, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for the invitation to discuss the importance of protecting the
Good Friday Agreement from Brexit. As a former HFAC staffer
with Chairman Lantos, it is a pleasure to be on this side of
the dais.
Although Northern Ireland was rarely discussed during the
2016 Brexit referendum campaign, the challenge of addressing
the region's unique status has become the biggest obstacle to
finalizing the U.K.'s withdrawal from the EU, yet there have
been insufficient consideration of how these contentious
debates have already affected the region.
I would like to submit my testimony for the record and will
limit myself to a few brief points now. The April 1998 signing
of the Good Friday Agreement enabled a comprehensive approach
to governance and security in Northern Ireland. It took
constitutional debates off the table. The U.K. government
reduced its military presence, and paramilitary groups
decommissioned their weapons.
An assembly with a power-sharing executive ensured both
communities were represented in decisionmaking, and the EU
membership of the U.K. and Ireland made the fragile peace more
viable. The agreement did not fully resolve all tensions, but
the region slowly began moving in the right direction.
Unfortunately, Brexit debates have hindered this progress.
Much of the debate, as all of you have noted, has focused on
the economic implications of Brexit, including the need to
protect the EU single market, while at the same time preventing
the establishment of customs infrastructure on the Irish
border.
In my limited time, I want to highlight a few other
consequences of these debates. One of the most tragic
consequences of Brexit is that it has destabilized local
politics by forcing people to choose sides between the British
and the Irish governments. The clever compromise at the heart
of the Good Friday Agreement enabled people to take a break
from identity politics.
Unionists remained part of the U.K. and felt reassured the
province's status could only be changed at the ballot box,
while Nationalists felt Irish and had a greater say in local
affairs. Brexit has brought back the old polarization,
including questions about the region's constitutional future.
On governance, Northern Ireland has been without a
government since January 2017, actually breaking the Guinness
World Record for the longest period without a government
anywhere. The power-sharing executive collapsed over a domestic
political dispute, while repeated efforts to restore the
government have failed.
Civil servants keep the light on, but they are reluctant to
make politically sensitive decisions without ministerial
oversight. The U.K. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has
nominal oversight, and Westminster has passed a budget to keep
the region solvent. If there was a no-deal Brexit, civil
servants in London have recommended reimposing direct rule to
manage the consequences.
There have also been concerns that Brexit could adversely
affect numerous rights, including equality rights enshrined in
the Good Friday Agreement, fundamental rights deriving from EU
membership, and labor and employment rights deriving from EU
law.
The most prominent concern has been the handling of the
agreements provision that allows those born in Northern Ireland
to hold British passports, Irish passports, or both.
Finally, on the security front, it can be easy to forget
that Northern Ireland remains a post-conflict society. Less
than 7 percent of children attend integrated schools.
Punishment beatings by paramilitary organizations increased 60
percent from 2013 to 2017. And there are more peace walls now
than in 1998.
There is continued instability, including the death of a
journalist in April as the chairman mentioned, and continued
threats from dissident groups. Although people there do not
expect a return to the large-scale violence we saw during the
Troubles, police chiefs have warned that customs infrastructure
could be attacked.
Turning to U.S. engagement, for decades there has been a
bipartisan consensus in Washington about the importance of
promoting and preserving the peace process in Northern Ireland.
This dates back to Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan,
who expressed support for a peaceful resolution to the
conflict.
In recent years, the U.S. administration has provided
envoys to help facilitate the peace process. George Mitchell
helped broker the Good Friday Agreement, Richard Haass helped
save the agreement by pushing the IRA on decommissioning, and
Gary Hart supported talks that prevented the collapse of the
institutions.
The Trump Administration has declined to fill this
position, with former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
informing Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob
Corker that it was retired. Beyond benign neglect, the Trump
Administration has actively cheered for extremists in Britain
who want a no-deal exit from the EU, no matter the cost to
Northern Ireland.
The President has encouraged the U.K. to abandon divorce
talks with the EU, which he views as a foe, in favor of a trade
deal with the U.S.
Some congressional leaders, as has been noted, have already
flagged the costs of a no-deal Brexit for Northern Ireland,
including the speaker and the co-chairs of the Friends of
Ireland Caucus. The U.S. could accept any Brexit deal apart
from no deal. In an ideal world, we would have helped
facilitate dialog among the parties as we have in the past.
At this stage, interventions from the Administration that
champion one side to its own advantage are seen as disruptive
rather than helpful. At a minimum, we should refrain from
advocating a disastrous no-deal Brexit that the British
government's own contingency plans show would have a
significant negative effect.
Peace should not be a partisan issue, nor should this be a
zero-sum exercise in which political leaders feel compelled to
back either the British government or the Irish government. As
conflict rages across the globe, all sides should be united in
protecting the hard-earned peace dividends of Northern Ireland.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sloat follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Dr. Farrell.
STATEMENT OF HENRY FARRELL, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Dr. Farrell. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much
for inviting me to be here today. Like Dr. Sloat, I will
confine myself to a few relatively brief points.
First of all, it should be clear that Brexit was inevitably
going to stress the Good Friday Agreement. The European Union
has played a very important role in the lead-up to the Good
Friday Agreement.
And it, first of all, helped to drain some of the political
tensions between the United Kingdom and Ireland when both were
members. The tensions over the border issue and over
territorial issues became less relevant. It created a context
in which Northern Ireland politicians could come together in
Brussels and in Strasbourg in order to try and fight for their
constituents.
And, quite importantly, the fact that there was a Customs
Union meant the abandonment of customs posts between Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, hence making the border a
less physically visceral thing.
So when the Brexit problems began to emerge, there was a
lot of fear, which continued until the last couple of weeks,
that we might be a no-deal Brexit. And if we saw a no-deal
Brexit, this would have had extraordinarily negative
consequences for the peace in Northern Ireland. We would have
seen the emergence of a hard border between Northern Ireland
and the Republic, which inevitably would have become a target
for Republican dissidents and given them a cause to organize
around.
We also would have seen substantial economic hardship on
both sides of the border, which would have, in turn, very
likely generated political pressures that might have led to an
increase in tension and perhaps helped push toward increased
violence.
And, most importantly perhaps, we would have seen a very
undefined set of relations between the islands of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, and between Northern Ireland and the
Republic, which would have generated the sense that there were
possibilities open there that were up for grabs, which are a
variety of parties, some of them well-intentioned, some of them
definitely less well-intentioned, might have sought to seize
upon for their own particular purposes.
So the belief that there was a high likelihood up until the
last couple of weeks of a no-deal Brexit caused a lot of worry
and fear and angst. The deal that we have at the moment that is
currently being considered by the House of Commons, from the
perspective of Northern Ireland peace, it is not perfect by any
stretch of the imagination, but it is far better than the
alternative, which drew a lot of attention.
So if we see what is happening in the deal, the two key
arrangements from the perspective of peace in Northern Ireland
are as follows.
First, there is a very, very complex customs arrangement
under which Northern Ireland would still be nominally part of
the United Kingdom from the perspective of doing international
trade deals, but in practice would be effectively
subcontracting out the administration of European Union customs
arrangement within the Northern Ireland space. This would be
extremely hard to administer.
There are a lot of complex questions about how it will be
administered, but it would at least mean that the key border
will be a border between the island of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, rather than between the Republic and Northern
Ireland, hence making it less likely that there is going to
be--going to be things for Republican dissidents to organize
around.
And also, there is an assent process by which the Northern
Ireland Assembly as a whole, through a majority vote, or
ideally through a vote of both communities, can effectively
pass judgment upon the arrangement.
So this is a lot better, but it is far from perfect. The
unionist community is extremely unhappy, especially the
Democratic Unionist party, which feels that it has been
betrayed, and we see the possibility of stress on the
institutions. As Dr. Sloat mentioned, the Assembly has
effectively been out of action, as has been the government of
Northern Ireland for the last 2 years. And bringing the
Assembly together to vote upon this may create a set of future
stress points, which may be problematic.
What the United States can do is what it has been
continuing to do, at least on the House and the Senate side,
which is to continue to express strong support for the peace
process in Northern Ireland. The U.S. role, as has been noted
already, has been extremely positive, and there may be some
scope for reaching out to and reassuring the Unionist
community.
Effectively, there is a lot of angst and tension in the
Unionist community, and a lot of fears that they are going to
be bumped into a united Ireland, that there is now a majority,
or close to a majority, for support for a united Ireland, and
that the Republic of Ireland is looking to maneuver in order to
make this happen.
This is, frankly, not at all a likely prospect. The
Republic of Ireland, if it has learned anything from the Brexit
debacle, it is that having a narrow majority and a referendum
is not a recipe for political stability and, hence, the
Republic of Ireland is not particularly interested in pushing
forward toward any short-term destabilizing arrangements.
And to the extent that the United States can help to
reassure the unionist community that the principle of consent
of both communities is still important and is still the
cornerstone of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, this would plausibly
help perhaps to at least alleviate some of the tensions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Farrell follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. This is an unusual set of
events. I am now going to report that the vote passed 329 to
299 on the second reading to the withdrawal agreement bill,
which means it will advance for further consideration, and we
will learn shortly the results of the next vote on the
timetable for consideration.
I do want to just start asking a couple of questions, and I
think Dr. Farrell really touched this. But if you both could
maybe expand on it a little bit, and that is, you know,
regardless of what agreements may or may not be made, you know,
the people of Northern Ireland voted not to leave the EU in the
2016 referendum, and many citizens and political leaders feel
they have not had a voice in the Brexit negotiations.
So if you could, you know, we see a lot of the officials
moving, but what effect do you think, you know, the sentiment
behind that vote has on success perhaps going forward? Or it is
very important what the people have felt themselves, and there
are reports that many of those people feel left out of that
process.
Dr. Sloat. I thank you very much for the question, as well
as for the play by play updates on what is happening in London.
I would make two broad points. One, Brexit has certainly
polarized politics across the U.K. You are absolutely right
that there was a majority in Northern Ireland that voted to
remain in the European Union. It was the same in Scotland, the
same in London, and so you have got a certain amount of
unhappiness across the country at being forced to go along with
something that they, within their nations and regions, did not
necessarily support.
The broader problem I think with people being left out of
this is the fact that you have not had a government sitting in
Northern Ireland for almost 3 years. Northern Ireland certainly
has elected representatives to the British Parliament.
Sinn Fein, for historical principled reasons of not
supporting/recognizing the Queen, or recognizing the British
government, do not take up those seats in Westminster, which
means that those from the Nationalist community that voted for
Sinn Fein do not have a voice in these debates, and you have
the Democratic Unionist party playing almost an oversized role
in these debates in London, given their role in supporting the
Conservative government.
So, really, I think the biggest factor in excluding the
voices of the people has been the lack of localized governance
in Northern Ireland for so many years.
Dr. Farrell. Just to reinforce what Dr. Sloat has said, the
other question that I think maybe is not as clear from this
side of the Atlantic is how much there is a set of pragmatic
costs to the current situation, as well as the tensions between
the two communities.
So if, for example, one looks to the business community in
Northern Ireland, if ones looks to farmers in Northern Ireland,
you will see there that there is certainly some--there has been
some concern about the bigger political consequences, but there
also have been real fears about the ways in which the chaos and
the tension and the possibility of a no-deal might have led to
economic crisis, might have led to supply chains between
Northern Island, the Republic of Ireland being disrupted, might
have led to what has become effectively a single antiquated
agricultural economy, suddenly finding that the crucial
connections have been severed and trying to figure out how to
reweave the threads.
So there has also been a very pragmatic sense that a deal
has to be done, and this also has consequences for the
Democratic Unionist party, many of whose supporters are
probably a little bit more pragmatic than some of the leaders
might suggest in their public comments.
Mr. Keating. You know, I have really been impressed talking
to Ireland officials. You know, many of them just use the
scenario that things have gone so smoothly generally with what
has occurred in the border area that it is almost like starting
from scratch.
And they impressed on me how dealing with, as you said, Dr.
Farrell, the practical side of this, there are so many
situations that are not even anticipated. How long could this
stretch out? Even if there is a negotiation, even if things are
worked out, this is extremely complex, and I do not think
people here fully realize that.
Dr. Farrell. For a very long time is the answer. So we have
a transition period of another 2 years. We also have a lot of
arrangements, and I should stress here I am a political
scientist. I am not a lawyer.
But there are a lot of arrangements in the text which are
going to be extremely difficult to work out in practice, and
very, very complex arrangements, in particular, around the
application of customs, the application of value-added tax, to
try and create this--to turn a complicated political fudge into
something which business people can practically deal with in a
daily sense.
And so the political solution is extremely important for
peace. The pragmatic consequences are going to take a lot of
further work.
Dr. Sloat. I would just add that even if we do get a deal
in the near term, we really are only at the end of the
beginning. We have essentially finalized the divorce. We now
need to work out what the future relationship is going to look
like, and there are lots of different permutations, some of
which see the U.K. more closely aligned with the EU, and others
seeing it much further apart.
And the reality of these provisions for Northern Ireland,
as Dr. Farrell mentioned, is that the more closely aligned the
U.K. stays with the EU, the less friction there is going to be
on the border, and the less separation from Northern Ireland
with the rest of Great Britain.
The more deviation, the easier it is going to be for the
U.K. to negotiate free trade agreements with the United States
and others, it will have greater challenges with Northern
Ireland. So it is going to be very difficult for the U.K. to
have it both ways, and they are ultimately going to need to
make a fundamental decision about how they want to align
themselves, especially in regulatory terms.
Mr. Keating. I would just remind everyone that 80 percent
of our trade activity is with EU in that regard, so it is
something our country is not going to take too lightly or in a
bilateral sense.
I now yield to the ranking member Mr. Kinzinger, for his
questions.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, there is
a lot we do not know, so I think you guys both did a great job
of kind of explaining the situation and the difficulties and
the unknowns, and we do not know until we know. So maybe the
chairman will get us some more information in the next 12
seconds. Who knows?
But I do want to ask on a couple of things, and I will ask
both of you. Talking about the lack of a government in Northern
Ireland, can you go into maybe some of the reasons of why, what
are the disagreements, and also, has that been complicated by--
specifically because of this negotiation and because of Brexit?
I will start with whoever wants to go first.
Dr. Sloat. The short answer is yes. So the Assembly
initially collapsed over a domestic dispute. There were
criticisms of the way a domestic green energy scheme had been
handled, and so that was the thing that precipitated the
initial crisis. The institutions have always been very
precarious. There is narrow trust between the two parties, and
so once the trust fell apart it was very difficult to get it
back together.
You then started to have disputes over interest by the
Nationalist community in bringing the Irish Language Act into
effect in Northern Ireland, which was something that the
Unionist side had objected to. So that was the dispute on the
ground, but certainly the broader tensions over Brexit ended up
making politics there much more polarized and ended up
increasing the difficulty of getting the Assembly stood back
up.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK.
Dr. Farrell. This is further likely to be magnified by the
current arrangement under which the Assembly would have to be
brought back in, and would have to effectively vote upon
whether or not it approves the current arrangement. So if you
want to be optimistic, you could see this as being a possible
reason and rationale to bang heads together and to get both
sides to agree.
If you want to be pessimistic, you could look at the stakes
at play, at the way that the Democratic Unionist party says
that it has been betrayed, and you might see this as becoming
yet another reason why it is difficult to get the Assembly back
working and get back to a situation of normality or whatever
approximates best to normality in Northern Ireland.
Mr. Kinzinger. Dr. Sloat, you said--you were talking about
the unfilled envoy position. Dr. Farrell addressed Congress'
role, but the United States played an important role in the
peace talks and the Good Friday Agreement and in the violent
war. Can you tell me what we are doing now to preserve it, or
are we just absent on it? I guess executive branch specifically
because Congress is--we are doing this.
Dr. Sloat. Right. That would be an executive branch role,
and I do not want to speak on behalf of the State Department.
My understanding is that officials within the State Department
have continued to have conversations with the British
government, with the Irish government. Certainly, at an
official level, their policy is to continue to support the Good
Friday Agreement, and to have an agreement on a deal between
both sides that preserves economic stability.
But there certainly does not seem to be any effort the way
there had been in previous administrations of both political
parties that has a designated figure that essentially does a
lot of shuttle diplomacy on the ground between the two
governments as well as between the political parties in
Northern Ireland itself.
Mr. Kinzinger. Is your sense that they are just waiting
until there is an agreement or that it is just a lack of
interest?
Dr. Sloat. Well, what I have to go by is, the letter that
Secretary Tillerson provided to Chairman Corker, which made a
case for saving the money that had been spent on the envoy and
having that role fulfilled by the Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs in the State Department instead, and also
indicating that when the Assembly had been stood up, which was
the point at which the letter had been submitted, the
Administration did not see a reason to have an envoy in place.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK. Dr. Farrell, we know that the
installation of barriers along the Irish border could possibly
lead to instability. In the event of a no-deal Brexit, which we
obviously hope is not the case, could an open border that
deploys new technology be maintained?
Dr. Farrell. So certainly there has been discussion of new
technology. This was a major topic during the negotiations
where the United Kingdom effectively said that it should be
possible with new technologies to create a seamless and
invisible border.
However, the United Kingdom never produced anything in the
way of specific plans to show how this could be plausibly
implemented, and hence the strong belief on the European Union
negotiator side, and also I believe among many political people
in Ireland, was that this was effectively an effort to see if
they could get a fudge created, which would not provide an
actual border but which would instead sort of provide a
political deal which would allow both sides to say that the
problem had been resolved, even while the prospect of smuggling
and other things across the border went more or less sort of
unacknowledged.
And the European Union was particularly strongly against
this because, as has been mentioned already, this is the only
land border that would exist between the United Kingdom and the
European Union, and hence they did not want this to be a source
of significant economic abuse of the system.
And the final thing that should be noted here is that there
has been a lively underground economy on both sides of the
border, which has sought to finesse various differences between
regulation, for example, of gasoline for industrial uses. This
has been one of the things that helped keep the Troubles going
for along period of time, so that the issue of cross-border
smuggling has security as well as economic consequences.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you both. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Latest news, the vote on the timetable has
failed, so it looks like we may be waiting to hear from the EU
on the extension.
The chair recognizes Representative Cicilline. Good luck,
Representative Cicilline, with that.
Mr. Cicilline. Our entire committee is in your debt for
those updates, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses. Obviously, this cross-border
cooperation is one of the most important parts of the Good
Friday Agreement, and I wonder if you would speak for a moment
about the potential reestablishment of border controls and
whether or not in any important way that would undermine the
Good Friday Agreement, and how in particular the populations
that are living near the border are likely to respond to any
additional border controls.
Dr. Farrell.
Dr. Farrell. At the moment, it appears under the current
deal, if it does get through whatever hurdles--and I am very
grateful to be informed on a moment-by-moment basis--the
current deal would not involve any formal border controls at
all. The idea, then, would be that whatever border controls
would exist would exist in the Irish Sea between Great Britain
and Northern Ireland. So that effectively there will be
controls of material coming in and out.
So the arrangements are extremely complex, but the idea is
that there will be specific controls that would seek to ensure
that material or goods which came into Northern Ireland, and
which were destined for elsewhere in the European Union, would
then sort of be taxed at the relevant rates.
And if you were importing something which had a tariff on
it, purely for use in Northern Ireland, you would be able to
apply for a rebate of the tariff. Obviously, how this would
work in practice is open to question. There are a lot of
details to be ironed out, to put it mildly, but what it does do
is to ensure that the risk of a physical border between
Northern Ireland and the Republic, which could become a magnet
for various forms of dissident activity, that this risk appears
to have been avoided, assuming that the current deal actually
goes through and sticks.
Mr. Cicilline. Dr. Sloat, do you agree? Assuming that that
deal is approved and sticks, and all of those logistics can be
worked out, that none of the provisions will undermine the Good
Friday Agreement?
Dr. Sloat. Well, I think----
Mr. Cicilline. There is a lot of conditionality, I
recognize----
Ms. Sloat [continuing]. As well, and to the chairman's
update, the British Prime Minister had indicated that if this
was the outcome that he was likely to move to early elections
and an extension. So we will see how this plays out.
As to the question of whether or not infrastructure would
be disruptive, it would be hugely disruptive. I mean, it would
create practical and economic challenges. You have farms that
literally straddle the border, and so what will you do about
sheep that are wandering across the border.
You have hundreds of crossings on the border, which would
be extremely difficult to police. You have the psychological
aspect of people that lived through decades of violence and saw
in recent years these checkpoints coming down. And as Dr.
Farrell said, the police in Northern Ireland had been very
clear that any checkpoints would be a magnet for attack by
dissidents.
There does seem to be an indication that the mechanisms
that have been developed in this protocol do eliminate the need
to have physical checks on the border. However, there are
concerns about the potential for a border in the Irish Sea, and
what this is going to mean for regulatory provisions in
Northern Ireland, to the extent to which the U.K. ends up
deviating from the EU in some of these economic and regulatory
terms.
There are also broader questions about how political
figures in Northern Ireland will be involved in various
mechanisms that will be overseeing these new institutions that
have been created. So I think if the deal goes forward with the
current protocol, it will at least address the situation on the
border, but there are still going to be a number of
complexities that are going to have to be addressed.
Mr. Cicilline. And, Dr. Sloat, you mentioned part of this
outcome will be determined on the nature of the relationship
between the U.K. and the EU There are some who are suggesting
that the United States should begin discussing a bilateral
trade deal with the U.K. before a final Brexit deal is reached.
Do you think that is a good idea? And what are the implications
for Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the Good Friday Agreement,
if any?
Dr. Sloat. Well, in technical terms, the U.K. is not going
to be able to sign free trade agreements with third countries
until it is fully out of the European Union. If this current
deal goes through, there is currently expected to be a
transition period. At the moment, that would run until December
2020. It is possible both sides could decide--or to extend
that, so you certainly could have talks starting on a free
trade agreement, but the U.K. is not going to be able to sign
anything until the divorce is completely final.
I think the U.K. is also going to have to make some broader
decisions about how it wants to align itself, because it is
going to be very difficult for the U.K. to be aligned with both
the U.S. and the EU on things like agriculture, for example, on
things like tech standards and data privacy.
And so the challenge for Northern Ireland is that the
further the U.K. deviates from EU standards, the greater the
challenge that you are going to have with Northern Ireland
being treated differently from the rest of Great Britain.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you so much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Representative Pence.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member
Kinzinger, and Cicilline for asking my question. Thank you very
much. That was perfect.
My grandfather actually left during the Troubles because
the north and the south could not get along back in 1921, I
believe. So my heart is in Ireland, as are still many of my
relatives.
Thank you for being here today. Indiana Hoosiers conduct
business all over the world exporting products and services
from the Hoosier State to everywhere. This includes the United
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland
represents the Hoosier State's 8th and 14th largest export
markets, respectively, the United Kingdom and Ireland.
Both of you make references to the effects Brexit, more
broadly and specifically the situation we are discussing here,
could have on trade relations with the United States. In your
view, what is the ideal resolution, given the votes and the
things that are happening immediately today, changing
situation, that could result in the best possibility of the
U.S./U.K. free trade agreement? And how can the United States
be most supportive of this result right now focusing on trade?
Dr. Farrell. As Dr. Sloat says, there is a set of tradeoffs
here. If you are primarily concerned about peace in Northern
Ireland, then the closer that the United Kingdom and the
European Union are aligned with regard to regulation, with
regard to a possible customs union, with regard to the kinds of
machineries of the single market, this extraordinarily
complicated set of regulations, the better.
So these things, the closer that the United Kingdom and the
European Union are, the better it is for peace in Northern
Ireland. Obviously, that means that the closer that the EU and
U.K. are, the more difficult it is to create a kind of a deal
with the United States on many of the issues that the United
States is concerned with. So that I think is an important
tradeoff that ought to be acknowledged.
Dr. Sloat. I agree with all of that. I would just add that
the worst outcome I think from the perspective of the peace
process in Northern Ireland is for the U.K. to leave the
European Union without a deal. I think while there are
certainly tradeoffs and complexities in the deal that is
currently on the table, it at least would go some ways toward
addressing the situation in Northern Ireland.
What I think is particularly harmful is encouraging the
U.K. to leave the EU with no deal and simply to walk away,
because under those conditions none of these provisions that we
have been discussing would apply. And, in theory, the British
and Irish governments would need to reimpose border controls on
the island of Ireland. That would be very damaging for all of
the reasons that we have been discussing.
So certainly continuing to encourage the sides to reach an
agreement and to have an orderly departure by the U.K. from the
European Union would be the most satisfactory outcome.
Mr. Pence. And if I can just add on to what Dr. Sloat says,
in that situation, it would be actually quite likely that the
United Kingdom would find itself being forced to submit itself
to many European Union regulations without very much voice in
the process.
So, effectively, the U.K. and the European Union are
already so closely and so tightly and intimately connected that
it is going to be very, very hard for the United Kingdom to
extract itself without a formal and orderly process of
negotiation in a situation where the United Kingdom rockets out
at the belief among many commentators is that the aftermath,
the hangover, would be quite extreme for the United Kingdom,
and that would effectively find itself having to accept as
dictates from the European Union many of the things that it
believes that it will be able to get away from.
Mr. Pence. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Representative Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this
hearing. It is timely, obviously.
Given the vote that was just announced today, do either of
you care to speculate on what scenarios you think may now
develop as a result of the loss of today's vote by the Prime
Minister?
Dr. Sloat. So just to summarize briefly, what it sounds
like happened today, and where that leaves us, Boris Johnson
renegotiated the Brexit deal that his predecessor, Theresa May,
had negotiated with the European Union, removing the backstop
for Northern Ireland, which was very unpopular, and replacing
it with this protocol for Ireland.
Boris Johnson tried to bring that for a vote in Parliament
on Saturday. Parliament made the decision not to vote on that
and instead to introduce an amendment that would force the
government to ask the EU for an extension and prevent there
from being a no-deal outcome.
So today he ended up bringing the implementing legislation
to a vote in Parliament. It was the second reading today, which
it sounds like Parliament passed. It is then expected that it
would open up a whole raft of amendments on things like a
customs union and a referendum.
The second vote was the program motion, which was
essentially the timetable for passing this legislation. Members
only got the 115-page bill yesterday. There has been a lot of
concern that they have not been able to scrutinize it. You
would not be able to have committee hearings.
Boris Johnson wanted them to complete the process on the--
--
Mr. Costa. He was forcing the issue.
Ms. Sloat [continuing]. By Thursday. Absolutely. Because he
wants to be able to say that the U.K. is leaving by the 31st.
What he previously indicated was that if this program motion
was not supported, his timetable was not supported, that would
make it very difficult for him to leave on time and he was
likely to call for general elections. So if I had to predict
what was going to happen, I suspect that we will now see the EU
grant some sort of extension, potentially until the end of
January, if not longer, and the U.K. will move to general
elections, and this Brexit debate will get punted for longer.
Mr. Costa. Do you concur, Dr. Farrell?
Dr. Farrell. I do, yes.
Mr. Costa. Well, and then obviously that potentially sets
up a situation in which--do you believe under any circumstances
that a part of a call for new elections might include a new
referendum on Brexit? I know that has been discussed by some.
Dr. Sloat. The second referendum would entirely depend on
who won the election. Boris Johnson and the Conservative Party
do not support a second referendum. The Liberal Democrats have
argued that if they are elected, they would revoke the Article
50 notification to leave the EU and not even have a second
referendum. And the Labour Party has tended to prevaricate on
this. Its leader----
Mr. Costa. Yes.
Ms. Sloat [continuing]. Jeremy Corbyn----
Mr. Costa. That is a nice term.
Ms. Sloat [continuing]. Has indicated that he would want to
negotiate a better Brexit deal than Johnson's, and he would
then bring that to a referendum where people could choose
between his new deal and staying in. So it really is going to
depend on the outcome of the election, and you would need to
have either a Labour government or a Labour-Liberal coalition
for a second referendum to be possible.
Mr. Costa. But both within the Labour government and within
the Tory government, we have seen an erosion of confidence
among MPs within both parties. And what that portends in terms
of new elections, I do not know that anyone can speculate at
this time. Is that correct?
Dr. Farrell. That is reasonably correct. What I would say
as well is that one of the things that has changed over the
last couple of years, is increasing in patients in the European
Union's other member States----
Mr. Costa. Yes.
Mr. Farrell [continuing]. About the process, and there is a
distinct--there will be a distinct reluctance I think among
some European Union member States to have the United Kingdom
come back into the club, you know, given the political chaos
that would likely accompany.
Mr. Costa. Well, as the chair of the Transatlantic
Legislators Dialogue, we are scheduled to meet again in Finland
in the first of November, and I believe this should be a focus
of our agenda in terms of discussion.
The comments that I have gotten from our European allies,
those in the EU, is that their impatience and their frustration
just continues to grow, and they are preparing for an EU
without the U.K. But the impacts on the economies I think are
going to be greater felt by the United Kingdom than they will
be by the European Union. What do you think?
Dr. Farrell. With the exception of Ireland--Ireland is the
other country which, unsurprisingly, is going to be directly
affected by a Brexit, especially a hard Brexit, because many of
the transport and logistic routes through which products reach
Ireland effectively go through the United Kingdom.
So this was one of the last gasp efforts of the United
Kingdom to try and push Ireland--the Republic to weaken, was
effectively to suggest that Ireland would be dragged down in
the chaos, if it did not agree to significant concessions. But,
in general, the United Kingdom, the consensus seems to be that
it is going to be significantly worse affected than pretty well
any other member State in the situation of a hard Brexit.
Mr. Costa. Yes. Well, my time has expired, but I am very
interested in, obviously, whether or not a Finnish-type
resolution to this might be in the asking.
Mr. Keating. Well, all right.
Mr. Costa. It is like trying to predict the future, right?
Mr. Keating. All right. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Costa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. Has expired.
Representative Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sloat, in your written testimony on page 4 under
Consequences of Brexit, dealing first with the economy, you
state ``A no-Brexit deal would create significant economic
risk, including the projected loss of 40,000 jobs and an
estimated decline in exports to Ireland of 11 to 19 percent.''
My question to you is, what impact would an Irish Sea
customs border have on Norther Ireland's economy? If you can
speak on that.
Dr. Sloat. I do not have a detailed answer on that. This
was something that was just agreed between the two sides in the
last couple of days, and so there are a lot of economists in
the U.K. and Ireland who are smarter than I am on trade things
who are looking into this. I would be happy to take the
question and try and find some analysis on that to provide, but
I do not have a good sense off the top of my head.
The one thing that I will say is that the risk of a no-deal
Brexit would be the most economically disastrous for Ireland in
particular, as Dr. Farrell was discussing, as well as for
Northern Ireland. And so certainly any sort of negotiated
agreement that leads the U.K. to leave the EU with a deal is
going to be less damaging economically than a no-deal scenario
would be.
Mr. Guest. And, Dr. Farrell, do you believe that, that the
worst-case scenario is a no-Brexit deal as far as effect on the
economy and any sort of deal, including an Irish Sea customs
border would not adversely--would not as adversely affect the
Irish economy as a no-Brexit?
Dr. Farrell. That is entirely correct, sir. So as Dr. Sloat
says, we do not have any very good estimates of what the
current deal is. But what we can say is that the Northern
Ireland business community, while concerned about many of the
fuzzy areas and how easily it is going to be to implement some
of the complex arrangements, it is at the stage of talking
about details, trying to get the government to commit to
specifics, rather than as with a no-deal Brexit, telling the
governments on both sides and, indeed, the European Union
negotiators as well that this was potentially going to be
disastrous.
So I think that we are in a situation where we have moved
from a situation of potential dire harm to the economy to messy
and painful and difficult-to-understand regulations, which are
probably going to have some significant consequences and may
have long-term political consequences in terms of making the
island of Ireland into a more robust and more unified economy,
but which is not going to be an economic disaster under I think
any plausible read, at least that I have seen, of what is the
likely future scenario.
Mr. Guest. And, Dr. Sloat, one other thing that you
mentioned in your report as talking about--you categorize as
polarized attitudes. It says Brexit has brought back the old
polarization, including questions about the region's
constitutional future.
A September poll by Lord Ashcroft found 51 percent in favor
of joining Ireland with results divided among community lines.
More than half of those surveyed believe Brexit strengthens the
case for Irish unification.
My question to both of you is, what do you see as the
likelihood of Irish unification in the near future?
Dr. Sloat. Part of that I think ends up depending on the
way Brexit plays out. I think if you had a no-deal Brexit that
resulted in a hard border, there probably would be growing
support for reunification, due in part to the logistical and
the psychological complexities that would be caused by the
reimposition of a border.
Certainly, all of the talk about the constitutional status
of the border has unsettled politics there, and so you have
discussion about the possibility of having a border poll a
referendum on unification, which is an issue that had been
largely quiet for the last 20 years since the Good Friday
Agreement was signed. So I think that question is going to
depend in large part on how Brexit plays out.
Also, as we have been discussing, there are concerns about
this new protocol for Ireland, the imposition of a border in
the Irish Sea. And if you end up seeing significant deviation
by Great Britain from EU regulations, that is going to end up
creating more difference between Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. It is also possible that that could contribute to a
greater call for unification as well.
Mr. Guest. And, Dr. Farrell, do you have anything you would
like to add or anything that you--any disagreement you may
have?
Dr. Farrell. So I would say that the likelihood in the next
number of years is low. I would also say that there is an
important gap between Nationalist in Northern Ireland and most
parties in the Republic of Ireland.
So Sinn Fein very certainly would like to see Irish
unification and has a strategy of becoming a political party
and a player on both sides of the border, but the Irish
government and the major Irish parties are I think quite
opposed to the idea, although they will not say so publicly, of
any Irish reunification in the near future.
This is partly because the Republic has always been more
ambivalent about unification in private than it has been in
public. It has always viewed with some concern the likelihood
of importing a new set of political instabilities and problems,
and this has been reinforced, if anything, by the Brexit
referendum and by looking at the island next door where you see
a constitutional vote that was won by a very narrow majority,
which has plunged the United Kingdom into an ongoing political
crisis.
And I think that the Republic of Ireland has no particular
enthusiasm for any similar kinds of votes which would see a
united Ireland happening, except with a quite broad degree of
assent, including at least passive and grudging asset from the
Unionist community.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Representative Wilson.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Chairman Keating,
and thank both of you for being here today. I particularly
appreciate you being here. I am very grateful. I grew up in the
most British city of North America, Charleston, South Carolina.
And I am very grateful for that heritage. And then we are also
equally grateful for our Irish heritage. The Hibernian Society
has always had a remarkable impact on our community, and so we
just wish the best somehow for our British and Irish cousins.
And I cannot wait for you to figure out how to get them back
together.
And with that in mind, both of you, what aspects of a new
U.S./U.K. trade deal would be most beneficial to Northern
Ireland's economy? What are the principal tenets of a deal that
Congress should support in any implementing legislation?
Dr. Farrell. Well, so the tradeoff here--and I think both
of us discussed this to some extent in our written testimony--
is the question of whether--to the extent that Ireland--that
the--sorry. Let me begin again.
To the extent that Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom
are closely aligned with the European Customs Union, this makes
peace easier to accomplish. It means that the complicated new
arrangements become less politically salient than they would be
otherwise. To the extent that the United Kingdom breaks away
from the European Union, this makes it easier to do a deal with
the United States.
So there is, in a sense, an important tradeoff there
between U.S. interests in doing a deal, doing a commercial
trade deal with the United Kingdom, and U.S. interests in
encouraging continuing peace within Northern Ireland.
Dr. Sloat. I think that is right. I mean, just to take a
very specific example, if you take something like genetically
modified foods, or, things within the agriculture industry,
those are things that I would presume the U.S. Government is
going to look for concessions from the British government on in
agreeing a free trade agreement with the United States.
If the U.K. agrees to make those concessions, it is likely
to cause it to deviate from the European Union, and that is
going to end up creating more complexities with the situation
in Northern Ireland. So it is certainly not to say that the
U.S. and U.K. should not have a free trade agreement, I do not
think this should be a zero-sum negotiation. I do not think we
should have to pick sides.
But I think there is the reality, as Dr. Farrell was just
laying out, that the further the U.K. deviates from EU rules,
especially to make free trade agreements with third countries,
the more complexity it is going to create in terms of the
alignment in Northern Ireland.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. I look forward to working
with Chairman Keating on any legislation that might be
appropriate to be of assistance. And, again, for each of you,
how can the U.S. increase economic ties with Northern Ireland
and support investment opportunities to help mitigate any
negative impacts of the no-deal Brexit?
Dr. Sloat. Well, hopefully we will not have a no-deal
Brexit, and things at least have been moving in a closer
direction to being able to do that. I think if we have a no-
deal Brexit, it is going to be very economically
disadvantageous for Northern Ireland, and potentially is going
to be very politically destabilizing and raise some security
concerns.
I think if there is a Brexit deal, certainly continuing to
have American investment in Northern Ireland is going to be
incredibly important. In my testimony, I cited a study by
Invest Northern Ireland that had counted nearly 900
international companies employing around 100,000 people in
Northern Ireland.
And so certainly the message from the region in the last
couple of years had been that they were open for business. You
have an educated population. They speak English. You have had
call centers there. You had Game of Thrones and other TV and
movies that were filmed there.
So I think there is enormous economic and investment
potential in Northern Ireland. And hopefully, if we are able to
get to a place where Brexit is resolved, we will be able to
have continued investment there.
Dr. Farrell. And to add to what Dr. Sloat said, it is clear
that the current deal has many complexities, many regulatory
complexities, which will make life more complicated in Northern
Ireland. But given I think the native Irish ability to figure
out an angle on stuff, I would suspect that there are going to
be also some interesting opportunities from being the part of
the United Kingdom that is directly aligned with the European
Union. That may also have some important implications in terms
of inward investment and other possible ways to play the rules
so as to advantage the local economy.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I thank you, and I
believe, indeed, the Irish people have overcome many obstacles
in the past and can do that in the future.
Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. All right. I thank the gentleman. I thank our
witnesses today.
I cannot think of many days in maybe months, going back
months, that are more challenging for members than today with
everything that is going on in Congress on the House side than
today, and I not only thank the witnesses but I thank the
members of the committee, Chairman Engel of the full committee,
in working his way here, but it is difficult today.
But just as a note of conclusion, which just seems like the
wrong word dealing with this subject in any respect. I think
the witnesses today and the questions from our members brought
forth the idea that there are many contingencies in front of
us, many results from that. Some of them are foreseeable.
I think many of them are completely unforeseeable because
they are so complicated, and the more you bear down, the more
that problems will surface. So this will not be the end of the
discussion that we have on this.
I do think, generally speaking, that from an economic
standpoint the enemy of business is uncertainty, and this is a
whole new level of uncertainty, not just for the U.K., not just
for the EU, but globally as well and back here.
We can see how investments and future trade issues and how
financing all can be compromised in an environment of
uncertainty. And so I hope that we move forward. I hope that
the U.K. can move forward, hope the EU can move forward in that
respect.
There is one thing I am certain about, and that is the fact
that despite not having an envoy in place that this committee,
the Foreign Affairs Committee, is deeply interested and
concerned on this issue. We have a history, as I mentioned in
my opening remarks, as a country that I think was vitally
involved in the Good Friday Agreement.
Our best allies come from U.K. and the European Union and
Ireland. So we have a lot at stake right here in our own
country. So we shall hope for the best, keep track, and make
sure that our own constituencies, many of them with very
strong, as Representative Wilson mentioned, British diaspora,
many, like my own, with very strong Irish diaspora, and as
members of the committee and myself having parents and
grandparents from Ireland and from Europe as well.
So we are deeply invested in this. We clearly want to see
progress. The U.S. has much at stake itself.
And thanks for taking the time, under a very difficult and
changing landscape, one that changed by the minute, for being
available and really helping us move forward. If this committee
you think can somehow advance, you know, progress in this area,
feel free, not just with your statements today but reaching out
to us for anything that you think we can be helpful with.
So with that, I will adjourn the hearing, and thank you
all.
[Whereupon, at 3:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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