[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-38]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2020 PRIORITIES
FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND
MISSILE DEFEAT PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 8, 2019
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-514 WASHINGTON : 2020
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JACKIE SPEIER, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts MO BROOKS, Alabama
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma, Vice
Chair
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Sarah Mineiro, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
WITNESSES
Anderson, James H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy,
Plans and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense............. 5
Behler, Robert F., Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
Office of the Secretary of Defense............................. 4
Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A., USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency 7
Kriete, VADM David, USN, Deputy Commander, United States
Strategic Command.............................................. 9
O'Shaughnessy, Gen Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United States
Northern Command............................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Anderson, James H............................................ 55
Behler, Robert F............................................. 26
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 25
Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A..................................... 61
Kriete, VADM David........................................... 106
O'Shaughnessy, Gen Terrence J................................ 38
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 133
Mrs. Davis................................................... 135
FISCAL YEAR 2020 PRIORITIES FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 8, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:14 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will come to order.
The hearing today is to receive testimony on the 2020
budget request for missile defense and to discuss the
implementation of the 2019 Missile Defense Review.
I appreciate all the witnesses being here. I will ask
unanimous consent that your full testimony can be submitted for
the record, so I hope you will summarize in about 5 minutes. I
know that is going to be a challenge, because just General
Greaves alone was 42 pages, so it is a bigger challenge for him
than for the others.
But we are honored to have Mr. Behler here, General
O'Shaughnessy, Dr. Anderson, Lieutenant General Greaves, and
Vice Admiral Kriete. Did I pronounce that correctly?
Admiral Kriete. Kriete.
Mr. Cooper. Kriete. Excuse me.
Thank you all for coming today to provide your views.
I would like to single out General Greaves because it is my
understanding this is your last hearing, at least on the House
side. So I want to express my deep appreciation to you, not
only as a general officer in the Air Force, but as a personal
friend; your fantastic 37 years of service to the Nation. We
appreciate the high quality of your work and your extraordinary
service. So I am sorry this will be your last hearing, but you
are always welcome to come back and visit us any time you would
like. But thank you, General.
General Greaves. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Those are very
kind words. It has been an honor. Thanks.
Mr. Cooper. Our ranking member----
Mr. Turner. Sorry, I am not used to the hearing beginning
without me. We all just came from votes, so it is not as if we
didn't have a direct line.
Mr. Cooper. Well, you have perfect timing. Perfect timing.
Mr. Turner. Great. So you are passing it to me?
Mr. Cooper. Yes. The ranking member, Mr. Turner, for his
remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. Well, thank you all. I appreciate your
expertise and your work. Obviously, with missile defense, we
don't have a margin of error. And your work to try to give us
the technological edge to be able to protect the American
population is incredibly important. We have been through a lot
of starts, stops, and shifts into what our mix would be in
order to look to protect the continental United States. And I
greatly appreciate that you have been part of that overall
discussion.
I think the Missile Defense Review does start addressing
some of our emerging missile threats. The budget request for
Missile Defense Agency [MDA] is actually lower, though, about
$1 billion than fiscal year 2019, which is about 10 percent of
MDA's budget. So it startles, I think, all of us on how the
administration thinks it can address these increasing missile
threats, including hypersonic, at the same time that we have
that decrease.
Second, in space-based sensing, last year, on a bipartisan
basis and bicameral basis, in recognition of the threat of
hypersonic weapons being developed by Russia and China,
Congress increased funding to an MDA program that would have
provided a space-based sensing capability. We need that
capability to detect and track hypersonic threats coming to the
U.S. homeland.
This year, that program is zeroed out and does not appear
anywhere in the President's budget. Instead, this program
appears as MDA's number one priority on its unfunded priorities
list. And I look forward to hearing from General Greaves about
his perspectives on the future of this capability. And I also
note that the commander of the United States Strategic Command
mentioned this program as an area of concern in his letter to
the committee on unfunded mandates.
Lastly, over the past year, the ground-based midcourse
defense system has experienced numerous significant issues that
are adequately addressed in the budget submission.
An issue with the redesigned kill vehicle has caused at
least a 2-year delay in its fielding. I want to say that again,
because I keep hearing some of the comments on the response to
this as it is going to have minimal impact or we are dealing
with the issue or we think we found a path forward. It is at
least a 2-year delay in fielding, that is because we don't
really actually yet even have the answer as to what the
solution is going to be, that is what the projections are. I am
obviously very concerned, when I look at missile defense as
having no margin of error, that that error also should not be
significant slips.
This means we will not be able to get all of the ground-
based interceptors emplaced in Fort Greely by 2023.
Additionally, the Department has significantly decreased
funding for the multi-object kill vehicle, reducing funding to
keep the program on life support through low-level technology
maturation efforts. The Department has once again failed to
make a designation on an east coast missile defense site, which
Congress has carried supportive language on the NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act] in its passage since fiscal year
2013.
Working with my colleague Elise Stefanik, we have called on
the Department to publicly announce location of such a site.
The environmental impact statement is complete, and it is
imperative that the agency lean forward on the emerging missile
capabilities of our adversaries that serve to threaten our
homeland and move forward on designating the site to enhance
our homeland missile defense capability.
Another aspect as to why this is important is you have
three communities that are vying for this. Two need to be let
go. Two need to be able to be told that they can stand down and
that their communities and their chambers of commerce and
everybody else who is working to advocate for their community
needs to understand that actually a decision has been made
because you have completed all the data work necessary for that
decision, it just needs to be announced.
Now, on two occasions, Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan
has committed on the record to fulfilling Congress' intent on
this important matter. On March 26, in an open hearing of our
full committee on the fiscal year 2020 national budget, the
Acting Secretary stated to Congresswoman Stefanik that we can
count on him sharing the site designation with our committee.
Again, then on May 1, before a House Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee hearing on DOD's [Department of Defense's] budget
request, the Acting Secretary promised Congressman Tim Ryan, in
an answer on the site selection within hours of the hearing's
conclusion. He actually said, I will give you an answer today.
Well, that day has passed. To my knowledge, this promise has
not yet been fulfilled either. And so now is the time for the
Department to make good on its commitments.
The GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] program is at a
central element of missile defense. It is the only pure
homeland defense element of our missile defense architecture.
But with multiple delays, failures, and willful disregard of
congressional intent, I am left worrying about the fate of
homeland missile defense of the future.
There is no doubt the missile defense--that missile threats
are increasing quantitatively and qualitatively. More countries
have ballistic missiles. All of those missiles are increasing
in their integration of countermeasures to evade our current
missile defense capability. But this budget submission, the
reduction of MDA's budget and the inability of the enterprise
to fulfill basic congressional intent all increased the
uncertainty that we can meet these challenges in the future.
I look forward to all the witness testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the ranking member.
Before we hear from the witnesses, let me remind all
subcommittee members that there will be a classified hearing
after this that is extremely important to attend, so I hope
that your schedules will allow you to be there.
As I mentioned earlier, your testimony is submitted for the
record. So if you would summarize, starting with Mr. Behler.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. BEHLER, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND
EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Behler. Thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member
Turner, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am
honored to be here, along with the other distinguished panel
witnesses here, to discuss missile defense testing and my
independent assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
as the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation [DOT&E].
On March 25 of this year, I witnessed the Missile Defense
Agency's most operationally realistic flight test of the
ground-based intercept midcourse defense system, which is
designed to protect the U.S. homeland against an ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] attack.
During that test, the salvo of two ground interceptors were
employed against an ICBM target that was launched 5,000 miles
away. Preliminary indications are that the system worked as
designed and intercepted the target. My office was heavily
involved in designing this test, reflecting the strong
relationship between DOT&E and the Missile Defense Agency.
Testing conducted to date demonstrates that the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense system is capable of defending the U.S.
homeland from small numbers of intermediate-range missiles and
ICBM threats with simple countermeasures when BMDS [Ballistic
Missile Defense System] employs its full architecture of
sensors and its command and control system.
Testing also demonstrates the capability to defend U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Central
Command from short-range ballistic missiles and from small
numbers of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
Missile defense system flight testing is constrained by
many, many factors. Most notably, range safety considerations
and cost. Independently accredited modeling and simulation
instantiated by flight test data is necessary to adequately
assess the effectiveness of the missile defense system in
complex realistic scenarios.
The following key challenges effectiveness--it affects the
missile defense capabilities and my ability to assess its
capabilities. First, the need for accredited modeling and
simulation to adequately assess the BMDS effectiveness.
Susceptibility of BMDS to cyberattacks. Third, reliability and
sustainment. Fourth, interoperability and automated engagement
deconfliction. And fifth, discrimination of threat reentry
vehicles.
In closing, I would like to echo the chairman's comments:
General Greaves transitioning out of the Air Force after a very
distinguished military career. I pause to commend General
Greaves for his steadfast leadership of the Missile Defense
Agency and how professionally he has coordinated with me and my
staff during his tenure.
I thank the subcommittee for your attention and look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Behler can be found in the
Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
General O'Shaughnessy.
STATEMENT OF GEN TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Chairman Cooper, and
Ranking Member Turner, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. I am truly honored to appear today as the
commander of the United States Northern Command [USNORTHCOM]
and North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD]. And while
I am honored to be here with all of my colleagues, I too want
to recognize Lieutenant General Sam Greaves and all the members
of MDA for their incredible support to the warfighter. Both now
and looking into the future, I know we are in good hands with a
great partner.
And I will keep my remarks brief to allow more time for
your questions, but I do want to start by thanking you for the
opportunity to testify today.
As a warfighter responsible for defending the homeland from
attack, I am truly grateful for the steadfast support of this
subcommittee. That support is vital as revisionist powers of
Russia and China have given every indication that their own
security strategies are based on holding the United States at
risk with both conventional and nuclear weapons. And they have
signaled that we must anticipate attacks against our civilian
and defense infrastructure in the event of a conflict. And as a
result, it is clear to me that the homeland is not a sanctuary.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's mission to deter our adversaries is
clearly dependent on our ability to detect and defeat potential
threats to the homeland. And to help pace our adversaries, we
must take prudent steps now to ensure our next-generation
defensive capabilities, to include a space-based sensing layer,
are not late to need. We must also act now to improve our
ability to see and defeat the advanced long-range cruise
missiles already fielded by our adversaries.
And I am grateful to the subcommittee for your strong
support of USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities along these line of
effort. And no matter the threat, the men and women of
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are deeply committed to defending our
nations. And I am honored to represent them today.
Gentlemen, we have the watch. And thank you, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Shaughnessy can be
found in the Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Dr. Anderson.
STATEMENT OF JAMES H. ANDERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR STRATEGY, PLANS AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Anderson. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on the Department's missile defense policy, posture,
and budget. The MDR [Missile Defense Review] articulates a
comprehensive approach to address the missile threat through
strength and deterrence and active missile defense systems for
both homeland and regional defense.
Over the past decade, North Korea and Iran have accelerated
efforts to develop and field missiles capable of threatening
U.S. strategic interests. North Korea possesses a range of
systems, including road-mobile intercontinental ballistic
missiles, solid propellant medium-range ballistic missiles, and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
For its part, Iran already possesses the largest stockpile
of regional missile systems in the Middle East. Iran continues
to improve its missile capabilities and develop space launch
vehicles which provide knowledge to develop an
intercontinental-range ballistic missile if they decide to
pursue that path.
We also see the reemergence of long-term strategic
competition by revisionist powers in Russia and China. Russia
and China are expanding and modernizing a wide range of
offensive missile capabilities.
As highlighted in the MDR, a comprehensive layer of defense
is needed to address today's complex threats. Within the MDR
framework, the key roles for missile defense include protecting
the United States homeland, our forces abroad, and allies and
partners; diminishing the benefits of adversary coercive
threats and attacks; assuring allies and partners that we will
stand by our security commitments; preserving our freedom of
action to conduct military operations; and hedging against
future unanticipated missile threats.
Let me now turn to missile defense capabilities, posture,
and budget that flow from our policy in the MDR to counter
these threats. Regarding the first priority to protect the
United States homeland today, the United States is protected by
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, GMD, system. The budget
requests $1.8 billion for the system, which includes a number
of improvements, such as adding 20 ground-based interceptors in
Alaska, bringing the total to 64, continuing development of the
Redesigned Kill Vehicle for improved reliability, and
continuing to build a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska.
The budget also requests funding to field new
discrimination radars in Alaska and Hawaii and extend
operations for a sea-based X-band radar.
To address the regional missile threat, our efforts focused
on an integrated air and missile defense to defend U.S. forces
abroad, allies, and partners against missile threats from any
source. We are strengthening our regional missile defense
posture by funding several programs. For instance, we are
enhancing the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System by
procuring the Standard Missile-3 [SM-3], Block IB and Block IIA
missile and integrated SPY-6 radar.
The Department will also procure additional Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense, THAAD, interceptors, Patriot
interceptors, and Army Indirect Fire Protection Capability
command and control system.
In addition to improving our legacy systems, the 2019 MDR
calls for pursuing a range of technologies and examining
advanced concepts and breakthrough technologies. We are
requesting funding for additional sensors; integrated Space-
based Kill Assessment into the Ballistic Missile Defense
System; operating and sustaining the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System; developing defenses against hypersonic
missiles; testing the SM-3 Block IIA capability against an
ICBM-class target; kinetic boost phase intercept using a
tactical air platform; technology maturation initiatives,
including initiating a neutral particle beam technology
demonstration program; and a study of space-based interceptors.
The MDR stresses the importance of working with allies and
partners and encouraging them to invest in their own air and
missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with U.S.
capabilities. Interoperable integrated air and missile defense
systems can take advantage of cost sharing and help distribute
the burden of the common defense.
In closing, our missile defense investments and priorities
focus on concepts and advanced technologies to ensure the
continuing effectiveness of our missile defenses against
capabilities of potential adversaries. By so doing, we will
strengthen our ability to protect the homeland, enhance
deterrence, stabilize crises, and better control escalation,
protect and assure allies and partners, and hedge against
future threats.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Anderson can be found
in the Appendix on page 55.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
General Greaves.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN SAMUEL A. GREAVES, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
General Greaves. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon, and
thank you for this opportunity to testify on the Missile
Defense Agency's budget request for fiscal year 2020.
I first wish to thank the subcommittee for its continued
support of this very important mission area. I would also like
to thank the thousands of men and women across government and
industry who tirelessly work every single day in support of our
Nation's Ballistic Missile Defense System. Without question,
they are the source of our strength and one of the reasons the
Armed Forces of the United States remain unparalleled in the
world.
Our budget request of $9.4 billion, which supports the
President's commitment to sustain, expand, and improve the
performance and reliability of the Nation's missile defense
systems and reflects what was broadly articulated in the 2019
Missile Defense Review.
This funding request will continue development, rigorous
testing, and fielding of reliable, increasingly capable, and
advanced defenses for the protection of the United States, our
deployed forces, allies, and partners against current and
projected missile threats.
The Agency is also taking significant steps in improving
the cybersecurity posture of the ballistic missile defense
operational and developmental systems in defending against
emerging cyber threats. We will continue to work closely with
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the
combatant commanders in such things as persistent cyber
operations testing to enhance our cyber defense posture.
On GMD. Program plans for the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system included the continued construction of 22
missile silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the procurement of an
additional 20 ground-based interceptors for homeland defense
upon completion of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle development
program. However, during the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program's
design phase, I assessed that we were unable to meet a key set
of critical entrance criteria for our critical design review,
the result of which is a projected delay in the program of up
to 2 years.
On sensors. With the addition of the long-range
discriminating radar, the homeland defense radar in Hawaii, and
in the future, the Pacific radar, we will have in place a
diverse sensor architecture in the Pacific to provide and
improve a persistent midcourse tracking and discrimination
capability against future threats.
The combination of high speed, maneuverability, and
relatively low altitude of some of the emerging advanced
offensive capabilities makes them challenging threats for our
missile defense systems. A space sensor layer is needed because
we cannot populate the Earth and the oceans with enough
terrestrial radars to meet this need to track these threats.
The birth-to-death tracking that space sensors can provide
when integrated with terrestrial sensors will make it possible
to maintain custody of missile threats from launch through
intercept, regardless of launch location.
On regional defenses. For regional defense, we are
increasing a number of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
interceptors and Standard Missile-3 Block IBs and Block IIAs,
investing in the modernization and upgrade to enhance our Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities.
Additionally, through incremental upgrades to our command
and control battle management and communication system, we will
continue to integrate homeland and regional missile defense
capabilities, improving the global missile defense battle
management tools of the combatant commanders.
Finally, projected missile threats include new ballistic
missile systems, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic
missile capabilities that are now being actively tested by
other nations.
We continue to advance the state of the art for scaling
electric laser power and pursue competing technologies to
reduce their development risk. Such efforts as distributed
gain, diode-pumped alkali lasers, and fiber combining laser
technology have the potential to meet missile defense
requirements.
With this budget, we would also fund software modifications
to the Ballistic Missile Defense System and further define the
architecture for future hypersonic defense demonstrations.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, members of the
subcommittee, in closing, our fiscal year 2020 budget funds
missile defense development efforts, including several critical
capabilities required by the warfighter.
We will continue to increase the liability as well as the
capability and capacity of fielded homeland and regional
missile defense systems and make measured investments in
advanced technology to counter the adversary missile threat.
Thank you once again, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Greaves can be found in
the Appendix on page 61.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General.
Vice Admiral Kriete.
STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID KRIETE, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
Admiral Kriete. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
distinguished committee members, good afternoon. I am honored
to appear before you today on behalf of General John Hyten, the
commander of U.S. Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM], and the
162,000 Americans who are accomplishing our missions every day.
As the warfighter advocate for missile defense, it is my
privilege to sit alongside our missile defense partners,
General O'Shaughnessy, Mr. Behler, Mr. Anderson, and Lieutenant
General Greaves, because we cannot do our missions alone. The
defense of our Nation against missile threats is certainly a
team effort, requiring each of us sitting before you today to
work together in defense of the homeland, our allies, and our
partners.
I want to begin by thanking this committee for your
enduring support to national defense. The stability afforded
through this year's on-time budget came at a critical time for
us, and I cannot overstate the enormous impact it has had on
improving our force readiness and modernization efforts.
I would also like to express my gratitude to the
subcommittee for broadening the strategic deterrence discussion
and bringing this issue back to the forefront of our national
dialogue.
Today we are here to discuss missile defense. Although this
is one single mission from the broad portfolio assigned to
USSTRATCOM, missile defense remains a central tenet of our
overall strategic deterrence mission.
As stated in the National Security Strategy, the United
States has a robust and credible layered missile defense
system, which when paired with offensive capabilities, this
combination sends a strong message allowing us to deny benefits
and impose costs against any potential adversary. Although we
rely on nuclear capabilities to deter near-peer strategic
threats, missile defense endures as a critical component of
comprehensive, strategic, and tailored regional deterrence
strategies.
Today, the United States, our allies, and partners face
potential adversaries who are investing in additional capacity
and new technology specifically designed to defeat current
missile defense systems. If left unaddressed, this expanding
missile threat could embolden our adversaries into mistakenly
believing that they can coerce us, inhibit our freedom of
action, or undermine our security alliances.
So out of necessity and prudence, we must adapt to the new
threats as well. We must adapt faster than our adversaries to
ensure we never fail at our highest priority. Above all else,
we will provide strategic deterrence.
In order to stay ahead of these threats, we must field
adaptable systems capable of meeting the changing security
environment. Our missile defense approach must integrate active
missile defenses to intercept adversary missiles, passive
defenses to mitigate their effects, and options during a
conflict to neutralize missile threats prior to launch.
There will not be a silver bullet or a single exquisite
capability that will provide a perfect solution, so we must be
vigilant in our efforts to outpace emerging threats and not
cede our current advantage. We must also do so in a cost-
effective manner.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Kriete can be found in
the Appendix on page 106.]
Mr. Cooper. I thank the witnesses for their testimony.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee
members also be able to ask questions at the end of the
questioning. And I would like to hold all members, myself
included, to the 5-minute rule so that we can get to the
classified session in a more rapid manner.
Hearing no objection, nonsubcommittee members will be able
to ask questions as well.
If I had to summarize all the testimony, I would say that
the single most important line, at least the most surprising
line to the average citizen, would be from General
O'Shaughnessy when he said on page 10 that he views the Arctic
as the front line of defense for North America, for U.S. and
Canada.
I think most Americans would be surprised by that. Can you
elaborate?
General O'Shaughnessy. Chairman, thanks for highlighting
that. And we do view as the threat that we see today both of
the cruise missile threat, the bomber threat, and ultimately
potentially the hypersonic threat as it continues to be
developed, that we have a capability gap developing if we don't
take action now. We see that as an avenue of approach that,
clearly, if you were, for example, putting yourself in the
Russian position, that if you were going to attack North
America, that would be the avenue that you would likely choose.
As such, we are advocating for increased domain awareness,
increased ability to operate in that environment, and
ultimately to make sure that we stay ahead of the threats that
we feel are coming from that direction.
Mr. Cooper. The ranking member quite properly mentioned the
missing funding for space-based sensors. Can anybody explain
where that funding will come from?
Secretary Anderson. So I would be happy to start on that.
It is true in the MDA budget there is not requested funding,
although it does appear on the unfunded list. Space sensor
efforts related do appear, however, in the Space Development
Agency's budget. As you know, the Space Development Agency is
just getting started. It has hired a director, has a small
staff, but there are certain lines in that requested budget
related to space sensor efforts.
And those--for example, there is a proliferated low Earth
orbit [pLEO] sensor technology, $20 million for that. There is
what is known as the data transport layer architecture
standards, there is $15 million for that. There is ground
integration for pLEO as well, another $30 million, as well as a
space-based discrimination study, $15 million.
So there is money, but it is in a different place this
year. And the big reason for that is, over the past year, there
has been kind of a change in the Department's approach in terms
of thinking about where to put future satellites, and the
essential shift, and perhaps General Greaves can elaborate, is
moving from kind of a midlevel orbit to the low Earth orbit and
having a more distributed architecture leveraging work that
both the Air Force has done and DARPA [Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency] has done in a distributed approach.
So that is where we are headed going forward.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Mr. Behler mentioned that we face a deficit in cross
training or joint training for our THAAD and Patriot cruise so
that we can operate in a truly layered defense, because there
won't be very good layers if they are not communicating with
each other.
Mr. Behler. That is exactly right. I said that in my
written testimony. And we found that when we want to look at
deconfliction using THAAD and Patriot, the training is not
there, and we have no automated way of doing deconfliction. So
training is really important, I think, for the soldiers
operating these systems.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. And, Mr. Behler, can you explain why
the recent and thankfully successful test cost $300 million?
Mr. Behler. Well, I can attempt to, sir. There is a lot of
assets being used there. We launched--I am sorry, Missile
Defense launched three ICBMs that crossed five different
ranges. Range safety is a big cost associated with that, making
sure it is all clear, all the assets required to keep it clear.
And the missiles themselves, the interceptor, the ground-based
interceptors, they cost upwards to $80- to $90 million apiece
also. We launched two of those. So if you add all that up, I
think the biggest cost is range safety.
Mr. Cooper. Finally, Admiral Kriete, General Hyten in his
testimony, which you delivered very well, urges us to take more
risk, to be more entrepreneurial. Can you explain that
statement?
Admiral Kriete. Yes. Thank you, Chairman Cooper. General
Hyten has remarked on many occasions about the urgent need for
us as a department to be able to go faster, to set requirements
to develop capabilities, put them in the field of our
warfighters faster than we have been doing in recent years. And
it is really all based on the threat. And as we see,
particularly in this missile defense area, the range of missile
capabilities that are being developed by a number of our
adversaries both in increased capability and capacity in ways
that are used to either coerce or provide aggressive means to
our adversaries, they are doing that at a pace that makes it
more and more challenging for us to stay ahead of it.
Make no mistake, as the combatant commander responsible for
coordinating missile defense, General Hyten firmly believes
that we are ahead of the threat today. But they are closing the
gap quickly, and that is why we need to go fast.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. My time has expired.
The ranking member.
Mr. Turner. Well, thank you.
To each of you, as you recall, 10 years ago missile defense
was viewed as provocative, that it costs too much and that it
wasn't going to work. Through your work and the accomplishments
of Israel and the actual application that they have had to
deploy, the conversation has changed. No longer do people look
at it as provocative. They actually know that it doesn't cost
too much. It saves lives. It actually reduces the risk. It
deescalates, and, in fact, it works. But in some instances, we
still have a tremendous amount of work to do. I want to thank
you for the work that you are doing.
General Greaves, you were in my office, though, and we were
talking about the issue of structure, how do we make all of
these things work. And there is a lot of talk about Space
Force, Space Corps, Space Command. And one of the concerns that
you were discussing was how all these fit together. And you
gave an excellent description of how the Space Development
Agency might assist and not compete with the Missile Defense
Agency. I thought you might share that for us here.
General Greaves. Thank you, Congressman Turner. Getting
right to the answer of the question, is the way I would look at
this entire mission area is what is the mission? The mission is
missile defense, the mission is hypersonic defense, the mission
is defense against dim targets and other challenging targets.
So the answer to that is not a specific element, such as a
satellite or a radar or a ship. The answer is an integrated
architecture that is layered as in resilient, that can respond
to the threat and meet the threat.
So the current Ballistic Missile Defense System is
composed, as you know, of ground radars, it is composed of such
elements as the space-based infrared system that the Air Force
flies, it is composed of the Navy ships, it is composed of the
THAAD system. And those are all elements, but they are only
important because they feed into an integrated command and
control ballistic missile defense architecture that then picks
out specific interceptors to go execute the mission.
So why do I not feel that the Space Development Agency is
competing with missile defense? Because the mission of missile
defense resides within the Missile Defense Agency. The ability
to take disparate sensors and capabilities from wherever they
may occur, whether they are organic or nontraditional missile
defense sensors, and integrate them, that is what is important,
into the architecture is what makes it very powerful. And that
is how I would answer the question, sir.
Mr. Turner. General, as you know, the east coast missile
defense site, as it is called, even though two of the sites
that are being considered are in the Midwest, not the east
coast, was congressionally mandated for the beginning of the
assessment process. The Missile Defense Review states that no
work will be done on this site until there is actually a
maturation of the threat. I don't think anybody is arguing with
that. We are, though, very concerned about the designation of
the site. It was congressionally mandated, the work is done. If
you tell the sites, then obviously as I have indicated, two
communities would be released, wouldn't require that you move
forward.
Is there anything that happened--is there any prejudice to
you that--because when you and I were having this conversation,
it didn't seem like there was any. Is there any prejudice to
you to complete that designation, as long as it is clear that
we are not proceeding until the threat is mature?
General Greaves. Congressman, I will say, first of all,
that I am not the decision maker. However, since you have asked
the question, I have made the recommendation to proceed with
that, and it is being debated and deliberated within the
Department up through the SECDEF's [Secretary of Defense's]
level and other places. And my hope is that we come to a
conclusion and make a decision.
Mr. Turner. I appreciate both your recommendation in favor
but also your answer, and I want to give my last minute to
Elise Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Just a follow-up on this. I appreciate my
colleague and friend Mr. Turner's focus on this. Our
congressional intent was very clear. The environmental impact
study was funded, was authorized by Congress. That has been
completed. We had language in previous NDAAs that would require
an announcement of the preferred site.
And to your point, General Greaves, about the decision-
making process, the Secretary of Defense sat in this very
committee room and said on record, under oath, that he intended
and had no problem and would meet our request to voluntarily
provide that information to Congress. Not only did he say that
to me in answering my questions, but he also said that to Tim
Ryan.
So our expectation, on the record, let me make it perfectly
clear, is that our expectation that we will hear from the
Secretary of Defense what the preferred site is.
Just to reiterate Mr. Turner's point, you have three
communities who have worked incredibly hard to advocate on
behalf of this. One of mine is Fort Drum, which I believe is
the strongest community to be the preferred site. But we expect
to hear that from the Department of Defense, and I look forward
to hearing feedback today from the Department in response to
this test--to my question or my comment.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
the witnesses that are here today.
General Greaves, how many ground missile defense tests have
been conducted to date? And how many and what percentage of
these tests have been successful?
General Greaves. Congressman, I should know the number; I
do not at hand. The main message I leave you with is that I
absolutely believe it is wrong to compare testing and test
results done at the beginning of any developmental program with
testing that is done as a product of learning from those
failures and successes, but are done more recently. I see--I
see--it disturbs me quite a bit. I see straight math done on 10
launches and 3 failures. So, you know, you have got a 30
percent failure rate; math in public.
But I would ask you to look at the testing record of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System since 2010, there were two
failures back then, but what was done to recover from those
failures to improve the system and test against ever more
challenging targets and threats and the successes we have. The
devil is in the details, and that is where I think we need to
go, as opposed to looking at the straight math comparing
testing done in 2005 to testing done in 2019. They are not
similar at all.
Mr. Carbajal. Well, let me ask you a different way. You
can't have it both ways. You can't have it--we can't look at it
that way and then look at it that way.
Recently, a statement was made that our missile defense
system would be 97 percent effective against North Korean
missiles. Is that an accurate statement?
General Greaves. Yes, it is. And I can discuss that further
in a classified session.
Mr. Carbajal. Okay. When planning and developing these test
scenarios, how do you ensure these tests are not using outdated
threat representations?
General Greaves. In this forum, I can say that all test
scenarios begin with input from the intelligence community to
assess what that threat is. And then we work very closely with
the developmental testers and the operational testers to design
the test. The objectives of the test, it is approved by--in an
operational test as an example--approved by the operational
testers to say these are the goals, these are the parameters,
this is pass/fail, and then we go off and execute it. So it is
as realistic as we can get it.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Just going back, on one hand you
are telling me that it is 97 percent effective; but on the
other hand, you didn't give me any specifics about the
percentage of tests, the success rate we have had. Is it 97
percent?
General Greaves. It is 97 percent capable against the
threat that we foresee. The testing, as I might say, we had
failures early on, but the record since 2013, I believe has
been, if not 100 percent successful, very successful. So on the
record, sir, I can get you those numbers.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
General O'Shaughnessy, if North Korea launched a missile or
multiple missiles at the homeland today, would you be confident
that the current GMD system would be successful in intercepting
these attacks?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, I am highly confident that we
would be able to intercept a set attack from North Korea.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
One major concern I have in regards to the GMD program is
the lack of reporting and the availability of unclassified
information on the GMD testing and development. There has been
less transparency specifically on the testing front. This is a
problem because it inhibits us from effectively conducting the
oversight that is our responsibility.
It is my understanding that DOT&E used to provide
unclassified reports on the GMD program, but this has not
happened in recent years. Mr. Behler and General Greaves, can
you both commit to resuming these practices in the future?
Mr. Behler. I think there is an issue of operational
security that I am concerned with. I would be happy to, in the
right venue, to talk about the classified details, the
reliability rates. I have them with me now, we can talk about
them when we go closed. But to publish an open document that
talks about that kind of information, I feel as my
responsibility to the American people, I am very uncomfortable
putting that data out that is right now classified.
Mr. Carbajal. But you would put that in a classified
setting for us?
Mr. Behler. Right. And as a matter of fact, I also
published a classified annual report on missile defense, and
that information is also in the document that I send you every
year.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Greaves, once again, thank you for your service to
our country. I think you would agree that a key piece to the
future of sensor architecture, specifically for hypersonic
defense, is deployment of a space sensor, but I didn't see it,
and perhaps I just didn't read it right, in the President's
budget submission for 2020 that MDA was requesting any funds
for that effort.
Did I miss something or is there somebody else that is
going to do that, or can you enlighten me on that?
General Greaves. Congressman, it was not missed. The
decision was made to put that money, that funding into the
Space Development Agency's budget. I think it was $20 million
to initiate that study.
Mr. Byrne. So the Space Development Agency will do it.
General Greaves [continuing]. To initiate that study. I
will add that the Congress funded the Missile Defense Agency in
fiscal year 2019 to continue work on the payload in a sensor
capability. And what the Space Development Agency is initially
working on is the spacecraft bus, the host for the sensor
itself, as well as the overall architecture, you know, and the
transport layer. That is not what we are doing. We are focused
on the sensor capability to detect the target and pass on any
information.
Mr. Byrne. Okay. Thank you for that clarification. It is
good.
Just sort of getting at it a little bit more generally,
what are your greatest challenges of defending against
hypersonic missiles at this point in time?
General Greaves. Thank you, sir. Very good question. In my
mind, it is their speed, it is their maneuverability, and the
altitudes at which they fly, which are relatively low when
compared to ballistic missile defense systems. So unlike the
predictability of a ballistic threat which, essentially, comes
from the point its originating to where it is going, we have to
ensure that we maintain custody from the time it is launched to
the time we intercept it. And with speed, maneuverability, and
lower altitude, that becomes more challenging.
Mr. Byrne. So what solutions have you identified? And how
much would those solutions cost?
General Greaves. We have identified that there are two
distinct phases of mitigating that threat. The less preferable
case for us is in the terminal phase, the last phase. The area
where it is most susceptible is in the glide phase, and that is
where we are focusing our attention. And we can talk more about
that in the classified section.
Mr. Byrne. Can you speak to the cost in a nonclassified
setting?
General Greaves. I prefer to wait.
Mr. Byrne. Okay. I understand. Thank you.
Well, I just want to register my concern about where we are
versus some of our adversaries on hypersonics. I know that you
are well aware of that; you know far more about it than I do.
But the more I learn about it, the more I am concerned about
it. And I hope during the classified briefing you can give us a
little more detail about it.
General Greaves. Yes, sir. And I will leave you with this
thought, that the hypersonic defense mission, the hypersonic
concern, the hypersonic mission is either at the top or very
near one or two in Dr. Griffin's priority list of areas we need
to address, and it flows down from there.
Mr. Byrne. Well, I am glad to hear that. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think most of my questions are going to wind up in the
classified, so I will let them go. But I do have one that would
be probably in the unclassified.
Iron Dome. Recently, two systems to be acquired by the
Army. It seems to have been successful. There are 1,700
successful intercepts by the Iron Dome, about 90 percent
success rate. The cost of it seems to be significantly less
than our systems, something around $40,000 a shot. I think the
Patriot is about $6 million a shot.
Mr. Behler, I see you are nodding your head, so that must
be about right. I will just assume that it is right, given the
nod of your head.
Mr. Behler. Well, I would not go to the bank on that
number, but I think it is in that range. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. I count by 10.
The question here is how does this fit into our missile
defense systems? And I guess, General Greaves and General
O'Shaughnessy, with regard to the NORTHCOM, General Greaves
with regard to the overall.
General Greaves. Congressman Garamendi, I will first start
by saying that the threat against which the Iron Dome is
deployed is a very different threat, projectiles essentially in
close-range missiles, than what Patriot or THAAD or the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense.
When I talk about the successful GBI [ground-based
interceptor] test that we just did, we are talking closing
speeds of 22,000 miles an hour at various altitudes.
Mr. Garamendi. Understood.
General Greaves. So the complexity of the threat has a
significant factor--is a significant factor in the ultimate
cost of the intercept system.
Mr. Garamendi. You used the word layered defense. It has
been used by several of you here. And from Mr.--General
O'Shaughnessy, specifically, is Iron Dome part of a layered
defense for your mission? And then more generally, I guess that
should be for Mr. Behler or Dr. Anderson for the general
military purposes.
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, we absolutely do support the
layered defense mentality. That is, I think as we look at the
future against all threats, against ballistic missiles, against
cruise missiles, and against the future hypersonic missiles,
the end state needs to be a layered defense capability capacity
throughout North America.
As we look at the particulars of the Iron Dome
specifically, to Lieutenant General Greaves' point, it is a
slightly--it is a different nature of the threat there.
What I do absolutely agree with is we have to flip the cost
curve. Right now, if you look at the cost per shot that we are
taking against anywhere from ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, and eventually hypersonics, we are on the wrong end
of that cost curve. So to your point, I absolutely support and
agree that we do need to flip that cost curve so we can have a
high rate of fire, a large magazine at a much lower cost if we
are going to be able to truly defend North America.
Mr. Garamendi. Presumably, the Iron Dome is good for cruise
missiles?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, again, it depends on the
specifics of the type of missiles that we are talking about.
For example, we have some capability capacity within the
National Capital Region that is similar in nature, but it is of
a different nature of the threat that we would necessarily want
to apply across all of North America.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. In a larger context, with regard to
the U.S. Army acquiring two batteries, I guess, Mr. Behler or
Dr. Anderson, the utility of it there?
Secretary Anderson. So my understanding is the Army is
requiring this as kind of an interim solution. It may end up
being a permanent solution for them to be used in a deployed
context, whether that be in the European theater or perhaps in
the Indo-Pacific theater. It is--as your question suggested, it
is a proven system, highly effective. And it is something that
the Army has decided to at least start with as part of their
ability to defend themselves.
And this is important because, as indicated in the Missile
Defense Review, which does obviously talk about homeland
defense, but it also talks about supporting our friends and
allies and being able to preserve our freedom of movement
abroad of U.S. forces. And in the particular context of the
European theater and also the Indo-Pacific theater, now we face
some pretty tall military challenges. And having an ability to
protect ourselves from shorter range projectiles is very
important, and that is part of this equation.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Behler, I will take it offline since we
are out of time, and we have been held to 5 minutes. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Ms. Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you to all of our witnesses.
General O'Shaughnessy, could you talk about whether or not
you agree with some of the assessments we have seen,
particularly from General Hyten, based on reports that China
has got the capability now and they have numerous successful
tests of hypersonic missiles? General Hyten has talked about
our inability currently to have any defense that would deny an
adversary the capability of employing such weapons against our
country. Would you agree with that assessment?
General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, I do agree with General
Hyten's assessment.
Ms. Cheney. And given that, would you agree that our
strategic triad is currently the only form of defense that we
have of deterrence against hypersonic threats from our
adversaries?
General O'Shaughnessy. Obviously, the triad is incredibly
important. In respect to a threat that is advancing, making it
very challenging, the defense against the triad gives us the
ability of that assured use.
Ms. Cheney. And is it your best military advice that the
current triad is both adequate and necessary to defend against
the threat of hypersonics?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. I am a strong advocate
for the triad and keeping the triad as we see it today.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much.
Let me ask, General Greaves, if you could talk a little bit
about specifically why the space-based sensors are so important
in terms of missile defense against hypersonics in particular.
General Greaves. Yes, ma'am. I will start by saying that
the nature of a ballistic threat is that, if I am sitting here,
I throw a baseball in your direction, it goes in a straight
line and it goes in a parabolic shape, unless I throw a
fastball directly at you. The hypersonic threat operates at
much lower altitude, starts off at a higher altitude, then uses
that energy it gains to bleed it off to accomplish maneuver, as
well as fly at or right above the atmosphere.
So unlike a ballistic threat where you can accept some gaps
in your sensing capability, because you know if it starts here
and it is aimed at your direction, it will end up in your
direction, the ability to maneuver, which is dependent again on
the boost vehicle that the hypersonic threat is using, and the
energy that it is given, allows it to maneuver out of that
space. And custody is absolutely critical, because we need to
ensure we know where it is going, what it is doing, and the
type of mitigation--mitigating defensive capability we need to
deploy against it, whether it be kinetic, you know, or in the
future, potentially directed energy or some other capabilities.
So that is the major difference and that is what causes the
concern.
The ability to sense the hypersonic threat because it is
flying lower at or above the atmosphere, sometimes in the
atmosphere, depending on where it is going, proposes specific
challenges to overhead sensors. We can talk more about that in
the classified session. But we need an architecture which will
maintain custody from birth to death of that very dynamic and
challenging target. That, in essence, is what it is.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And let me add my concern to the
concern you have heard from I think just about everybody on the
subcommittee on both sides, that this was zeroed out in the
budget, and our commitment to making sure that we do everything
we can to provide the resources necessary in that regard.
This is also for General Greaves. The 2019 Missile Defense
Review talked about the need to consider all operational
options, including offensive strikes, as part of our strategy
for ballistic missile defense. I am wondering if you can
address who is responsible across the Department and the
combatant commanders with respect to policy and capability
development to integrate these offensive strike capabilities to
deny adversaries the ability to launch ballistic missiles
against the United States.
General Greaves. Yes, ma'am. I will begin with the policy
end of it, and that is in Dr. Anderson's office led by
Secretary Rood. And the remaining portions of that task is an
integrated approach across the Department, beginning with the
intelligence community supplying the requirements with the
combatant commander, in the case of missile defense, the
Strategic Command, after coordinating across all the combatant
commanders, and to include General O'Shaughnessy.
And then within the acquisition portion of it, it could be
led or would be led by agencies such as the Missile Defense
Agency, working with the services. It is never one thing, for
instance, that the Defense Agency does by itself; it is always
in concert with the services. And supporting all of that is a
rigorous and robust process that ensures interaction between,
in my case, the Missile Defense Agency and each of the
services, as well as each of the COCOMs [combatant commands]
led by Vice Admiral Kriete and his team up at STRATCOM.
So it is an integrated approach, and I think that that is a
very beneficial approach because it ensures that we receive
various perspectives on what may or may not be the best
approach, and then a decision maker, if it is an acquisition
and if it is in my lane with my mouse on the decision
authority, it is me. If it is initial production and on, it is
Ms. Lord. And if it is research and engineering, it is Dr.
Griffin. So we all know who the responsible entity is within
the Department.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you.
I will have some additional questions in the closed
hearing, but I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Greaves, a DOD IG [Department of Defense Inspector
General] report was issued in January of this year on DOD
cybersecurity. And it stated that while some actions had been
taken by DOD to improve its cybersecurity posture, you still
had some challenges managing cybersecurity risks in your
networks. And as I understand it, it was the contractor
locations where they felt the most exposure.
What are your thoughts about that IG report?
General Greaves. Thank you, Congressman. I thank the IG for
the time they spent assessing our capabilities. During that
process, I will be frank, I learned quite a bit between
auditors and capability assessments, you know. An audit is very
different from a capability assessment.
When an audit is done, unless all the boxes are checked, if
there is one that is unchecked, then there is an assumption
that there is a problem throughout the system.
What is important for the Ballistic Missile Defense System,
and in this case it was the developmental architecture that we
got, not the operational architecture. That is not the issue or
the concern here.
We have a layered defense system which is actively
monitored, not only within the agency but across the
Department, up through the CIO [Chief Information Officer]
within the Department. And for everything such as
authentication of people who try to access the weapon system or
the development part of the weapon system, those are strictly
controlled.
So we had a very robust--I personally went down to see the
IG staff, with my staff. We talked with them at length
regarding their findings. And we are at the point now where
they have responded to us that the issues that they identified
are on their way to being resolved if we can sign off on a few
things.
So it is a real threat. We have a layered defense system
against that threat. It is not the operational system. It is
the developmental system that they were concerned about. And I
think the IG learned quite a bit about defense in depth as
opposed to an audit.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
That is all I have got. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the subcommittee members for their
questions. I can tease the classified session by saying there
will be an excellent home movie shown, so I know no one will
want to miss that. So why don't we start that session at 3:20,
upstairs in 2212.
This public portion of the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
May 8, 2019
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 8, 2019
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 8, 2019
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. Along with the DODIG findings on cyber vulnerabilities
of government networks hosting BMDS data, DOT&E has historically been
critical of MDA's willingness to test operational configurations of the
BMDS against cyber threats. Can you please provide the committee a
summary of how DOT&E is working with MDA to ensure both operational and
developmental systems are being tested against cyber threats? Further,
can you detail how implementing persistent cyber operations would be
beneficial in ensuring our critical technology and infrastructure for
missile defense is protected?
Mr. Behler. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working on
multiple, parallel fronts to characterize the cybersecurity posture of
critical developmental and operational Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) assets. DOT&E continues to participate in the planning of
operational cybersecurity assessments and monitor test conduct to
inform MDA efforts to improve BMDS cyber resilience. We intend to work
with the MDA and USD(R&E)/DT&E to finalize an overarching cybersecurity
assessment strategy that includes robust developmental test and
evaluation to enable discovery and remediation of cybersecurity
vulnerabilities prior to operational test and evaluation (OT&E), while
ensuring that operational cybersecurity assessments inform critical
fielding decisions. DOT&E is also championing a more deliberate and
detailed element planning cycle to ensure that cybersecurity findings
are applied to future engineering updates. DOT&E will work with
USD(R&E)/DT&E and MDA to develop and implement a robust element-level
cybersecurity DT&E plan to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities
earlier. Currently, many vulnerabilities identified during
cybersecurity OT&E should have been found in DT&E. BMDS mission assets
and MDA networks remain subject to exploitation by adversarial threat
actors. Persistent Cyber Operations (PCO) are a continuous means by
which the MDA can characterize system vulnerabilities induced by the
operational environment and train warfighters and net defenders against
a cyber threat emulation that has the time to stealthily employ both
physical and cyber means of exploitation. If employed properly, PCO
will help improve the cyber resilience of critical BMDS mission assets
and MDA networks against advanced cyber threats. Although the MDA has
significantly increased the amount of cybersecurity OT&E conducted over
the last two years, cybersecurity DT&E is lacking and the overall test
activity remains constrained by short test windows, limited access to
critical BMDS components, and test artificialities that a realistic
cyber threat does not encounter. Robust cybersecurity DT&E and PCO help
to remove these limitations. However, the PCO's human element alone is
unable to scale to the magnitude of the cyber challenges. Therefore, a
robust effort to develop autonomous tools to identify cyber
vulnerabilities and patching should be pursued.
Mr. Cooper. Congress mandated that MDA conduct an SM-3 Block IIA
intercept against an ICBM-range target by 2021, which is outside of the
systems designed threat space. Since that mandate, the SM-3 IIA has
experienced several flight test failures. Would you assess the system
has been adequately tested against its designed-to threat? Would DOT&E
assess the system to be ``operationally suitable and effective''
against IRBM threats based on the testing done to date?
Mr. Behler. Aegis Baseline 9.2 and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
Block IIA guided missile have not yet been adequately tested against
the designed-to battlespace and threat set. To date, the weapon system
and missile have successfully completed one end-to-end operational
Engage on Remote (EOR) engagement in a flight test mission. EOR is
fundamental to the system's ability to defend against a larger
battlespace and threat set. A second end-to-end EOR engagement is
planned for Flight Test, Operational-03 Event 2 and will qualitatively
demonstrate the repeatability of that capability. System performance
across the battlespace has not yet been assessed using accredited high-
fidelity modeling and simulation (M&S) tools. A subset of the planned
high-fidelity M&S runs will be delivered by June 2020, with the
remainder being delivered by June 2021. Completion of these accredited
M&S runs, coupled with additional flight testing, will enable DOT&E to
make an assessment of operational effectiveness for this system against
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). Additional flight
testing and data from flight-like, high-fidelity ground testing of the
missile in its production-representative configuration, will enable
DOT&E to assess the operational suitability of the system against IRBM
threats.
Mr. Cooper. Can you please provide the committee a summary of what
the ``Neutral Particle Beam'' effort being initiated in PB20 is, and
the underlying policy decisions that have been made, or will be made,
about deploying this type of capability in space?
Secretary Anderson. The Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) is a technology
demonstration effort to assess the feasibility of a space-based,
directed-energy intercept layer. This effort would leverage past and
current work on particle beam and related enabling technologies, as
well as laser scaling, pointing, and stability to inform future
decisions. The 2019 Missile Defense Review articulates the policy to
pursue new missile defense concepts and technologies, including
disruptive capabilities such as boost-phase intercept, to provide
protection against evolving missile threats. The policy for any
potential future decisions regarding space-based capabilities would be
informed by factors such as technical maturity, threat, feasibility,
and cost, as well as pertinent political-military considerations.
Mr. Cooper. Can you please provide the committee a summary of what
the ``Neutral Particle Beam'' effort being initiated in PB20 is, and
the underlying policy decisions that have been made, or will be made,
about deploying this type of capability in space? To employ a Neutral
Particle Beam in space, would you need a space sensor to provide data
to that weapon? What are the estimated total costs for an operational
system? What other technologies and/or solutions were looked for boost-
phase defense prior to moving forward with the Neutral Particle Beam?
General Greaves. Missile Defense Agency defers to Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E).
Mr. Cooper. Congress mandated that MDA conduct an SM-3 Block IIA
intercept against an ICBM-range target by 2021, which is outside of the
systems designed threat space. Since that mandate, the SM-3 IIA has
experienced several flight test failures. Would you assess the system
has been adequately tested against its designed-to threat?
General Greaves. The SM-3 Blk IIA has been adequately analyzed and
tested against the designed-to threat. Analysis and testing included
modeling and simulation, ground testing, and flight testing. Given the
large number of threat and engagement variables the modeling and
simulation testing is the primary means to verify performance against
the designed-to threat set. Ground and flight testing provide the
evidence necessary to anchor the models and simulation to predict
performance in real world scenarios. All models used are accredited for
the intended use of performance assessment. High fidelity missile
performance models are accredited via comparison to independently coded
government models. Following flight test, the data gathered is used in
post flight reconstruction of the event utilizing both models
supporting continued improvement in fidelity for the models. Specific
to flight testing, the SM-3 Blk IIA has been successfully tested
against Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) (FTM-45 in fiscal year
2019 (FY19)) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) (FTI-03 in
FY19) threats in both organic and Engage-on-Remote (EoR) engagement
scenarios. MDA's President's Budget 2020 Integrated Master Test Plan
version 20.1 includes future flight tests for SM-3 Blk IIA against MRBM
(FTM-30 in FY20), IRBM (FTO-03 in FY20) and ICBM (FTM-44 in FY20) that
include additional complexity to further refine and validate the Aegis
Weapon System/SM-3 Blk IIA performance capability. The flight test
failure in Flight Test Aegis Weapons System-29 (FTM-29) on January 31,
2018 was traced back to a manufacturing flaw and improper firing
sequence of the Arm Fire Device that has since been corrected and
validated in FTM-45 on October 26, 2018 and again in Flight Test
Integrated-03 (FTI-03) on December 11, 2018. The SM-3 Blk IIA flight
test program was established to incrementally learn from test to test,
with each test serving as a graduation exercise and risk mitigation for
the next one. Starting with the Controlled Test Vehicle-01 flight test
on June 6, 2015 that demonstrated the propulsion stack, and eventually
progressing to the recent FTl-03 test demonstrating EoR in a simulated
European Phased Adaptive Approach architecture, each test provided
incremental refinement and validation of the Aegis Weapon System/SM-3
Blk IIA models. This learning extends not only for the successful
intercept flights, but those with failed intercepts like FTM-29. Based
on a continuously evolving and increasingly relevant threat, testing
our systems at or beyond the limits of their designed specifications
will serve to build confidence in the system to the warfighter.
Mr. Cooper. What would the concept for operation be for a ``Neutral
Particle Beam''?
Admiral Kriete. The Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) is a promising
technology with the potential to expand our layered defense abilities
enabling early ascent/boost phase engagement opportunities. However NPB
is very early in development. Formulation of a future CONOPs, is
dependent on a better understanding of the capabilities available when
the technology is mature and employment size, weight and power
requirements are known.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
Mrs. Davis. How close is MDA to maturing directed energy technology
to where it is suitable and effective for missile defense? What are the
deliverables in FY20 and in the FYDP?
Mr. Behler. All directed energy efforts being explored by the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) are in the basic technology maturation
phase of development. Potential platforms for directed energy
applications have not yet been determined, and there are no platform
integration activities currently being pursued. The MDA's directed
energy maturation is centered on scaling electrically-driven High
Energy Laser (HEL) power by a factor of ten, to the megawatt class,
which is the minimum required for effective missile defense. While
chemical laser technology has demonstrated higher optical output power
than electrically-driven lasers, chemical-based lasers were previously
found to be larger, heavier, harder to operate, and had significantly
more logistical challenges when deployed. The MDA is currently pursuing
multiple technologies in parallel, both in industry and at national
laboratories, with the common goal of increasing laser power with
adequate beam control. The MDA's FY20 goal is to achieve 100 kilowatt-
class performance in the laboratory with several selected approaches.
The MDA's maturation strategy is to increase power levels to 300
kilowatts, then to 500 kilowatts, and then finally to megawatt-class
power levels. MDA is coordinating its effort and its goals with
OUSD(R&E) in a Department-wide laser scaling effort. OUSD(R&E) and MDA
are pursuing four different electrically-driven high energy laser
technologies, with the goals of increasing output optical power,
increasing efficiency, and reducing size and weight. OUSD(R&E)
anticipates that, with its projected funding level in concert with MDA,
a 500 kilowatt optical power level laser could be reached in FY24. The
MDA is also developing tracking and sensing technologies that use a
low-power non-lethal laser. In FY20, two developers will pursue this
advanced sensor with a precision tracking test anticipated by the end
of FY21. Results of the test will inform future years' efforts on this
sensor.
Mrs. Davis. MDA established a hypersonic defense program in fiscal
year 2018 to develop and deliver a series of material solutions to
defeat hypersonic threats. In the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget
submission, MDA plans to spend over $650 million over the next 5 years
on hypersonic defense.
What are the challenges of defending against hypersonic missiles
from a technological and organizational standpoint? What solutions has
MDA identified that are needed to defend against hypersonic missiles
and how much will they cost? Is it technically feasible? What
deliverables are planned in the FYDP?
General Greaves. Hypersonic threats fly at speeds and altitudes
above traditional air defense systems and below the altitude of
traditional missile defense systems, creating technical challenges for
either system if they attempt to defeat the threat. Challenges for the
missile defense system include threat maneuvers, low altitude, and
hypersonic speeds that make the target unpredictable while also
compressing the available battlespace. These characteristics impact all
aspects of the missile defense system's operation, including threat
detection, tracking, engagement planning, engagement, and assessment of
the engagement's outcome. These challenges led MDA to identify required
capabilities for hypersonic missile defense, including persistent
tracking of an unpredictable threat, improved communications, fire
control strategy changes (compared to ballistic threats), and very high
interceptor agility in a harsh aerothermal environment. Since
hypersonic threats fall between the traditional air defense mission of
the services and the missile defense mission of the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA), any solution will be coordinated accordingly. MDA is
awarding multiple contracts for several HD component technology
solutions to include: seeker technology; new propulsion techniques;
guidance technologies in a high stress environment; sensor technologies
and testing to support detection and tracking; and non-kinetic
technology solutions to address the hypersonic threat. MDA is also
utilizing its existing Small Business Innovation Research Program funds
to identify and support aspects of the kill chain and weapon system
design for expansion of hypersonic missile defense capabilities in the
near-future (outside the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)). The PB20
submission includes $109.2 million across the FYDP to leverage and
upgrade existing command and control systems and sensors for improved
hypersonic tracking and reporting. The weapon system concept
exploration precedes development of specific weapons solutions; MDA
will estimate costs for those solutions as part of the selection
process. Deliverables planned across the FYDP include:
1. Engineering Enablers: System-level engineering products include
future architecture definition, test and analysis infrastructure,
requirements, interface definitions, ground/flight test assessments,
and core lethality test results.
2. Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications
(C2BMC) Upgrades: C2BMC upgrades include capabilities for hypersonic
threats delivered in FY21 and FY23; other details classified.
3. Weapon Concept Definition and Risk Reduction: Deliverables
include glide phase weapons system technology development and testing
data that demonstrates technologies needed for a HD capability.
4. Radar Upgrades: Current BMDS sensor deliverables include Army
Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control (AN/TPY-2) radar and
Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) software upgrades (FY23).
5. Sensor Technology Improvements: Improvements include development
of new high resolution sensors and a state of the art testbed needed to
demonstrate capabilities against hypersonic threats.
6. Partner Flight Test Participation: Data collected from two
partner flight test events will support Weapons Concept Definition and
Risk Reduction activities. In both events, MDA will collect data to
shape future defensive capability and assess current capability to
inform incremental missile defense updates.
Mrs. Davis. How close is MDA to maturing directed energy technology
to where it is suitable and effective for missile defense? What are the
deliverables in FY20 and in the FYDP? Does MDA's PB20 request include
any funding to begin integrating into an airborne platform? At this
stage, for each of the candidate technologies, can you tell us what the
assumed platform would be (i.e. UAV, space, other)?
General Greaves. How close is MDA to maturing directed energy
technology to where it is suitable and effective for missile defense?
All directed energy efforts being explored by the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) are in the basic technology maturation phase of
development. MDA has developed knowledge points over the Future Years
Defense Program to track technical progress supporting knowledge based
decisions. Potential platforms for directed energy applications have
not been determined, and there are no platform integration activities
currently being pursued. Our strategy is synchronized with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense Laser Roadmap.
MDA's directed energy maturation is centered on scaling
electrical-based high energy laser power by a factor of ten to the
megawatt class that is required for effective missile defense. While
chemical technology is more mature, chemical-based lasers were
previously found to be larger, heavier, harder to operate, and had
significantly more logistical challenges when deployed.
What are the deliverables in FY20 and in the FYDP?
MDA is currently pursuing multiple technologies in
parallel, both in Industry and at National Laboratories, with the
common goal of increasing laser power with adequate beam control (i.e.,
MDA's Laser Component Technology and Beam Control program). The Fiscal
Year (FY) 2020 goal is to achieve 100 kilowatt class performance in the
laboratory. The maturation strategy is to increase power levels to 300
kilowatts, then 500 kilowatts, and finally megawatt class power levels.
MDA anticipates that with the President's Budget 2020 (PB20) funding
level, it will be approximately FY 2025 before the 500 kilowatt power
level could be reached.
MDA is also developing tracking and sensing technologies
that use a low-power non-lethal laser. Electrical-based lasers are
available today for use as low-power tracking devices. In FY 2020, two
developers will pursue this advanced sensor with a precision tracking
test anticipated by the end of FY 2021. Results of the test will inform
future year efforts on this sensor.
Does MDA's PB20 request include any funding to begin integrating
into an airborne platform?
There is no funding in the 2020 President's Budget for
any platform integration. The efforts will be focused on the critical
technology maturation needs and scaling laser power to levels required.
At this stage, for each of the candidate technologies, can you tell
us what the assumed platform would be (i.e. UAV, space, other)?
Laser scaling work is platform agnostic. Sufficient laser
power levels need to be demonstrated before investing in a specific
platform.