[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-31]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2020 PRIORITIES
FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE,
NONPROLIFERATION, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 9, 2019
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-498 WASHINGTON : 2020
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JACKIE SPEIER, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts MO BROOKS, Alabama
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma, Vice
Chair
Grant Schneider, Professional Staff Member
Sarah Mineiro, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Gordon-Hagerty, Hon. Lisa E., Administrator, National Nuclear
Administration; accompanied by ADM James Caldwell, USN,
Director of Naval Nuclear Reactors, and Dr. Charles Verdon,
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs...................... 2
Hamilton, Hon. Bruce, Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board.......................................................... 5
White, Hon. Anne Marie, Assistant Secretary for the Office of
Environmental Management, United States Department of Energy... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces........................... 37
Gordon-Hagerty, Hon. Lisa E.................................. 41
Hamilton, Hon. Bruce......................................... 64
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces................... 39
White, Hon. Anne Marie....................................... 55
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 77
Mrs. Davis................................................... 80
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 82
Ms. Horn..................................................... 82
Mr. Larsen................................................... 81
FISCAL YEAR 2020 PRIORITIES FOR ATOMIC ENERGY
DEFENSE, NONPROLIFERATION, SAFETY,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 9, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:15 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will come to order. Let us
first ask for the Lamborn unanimous consent to allow full
committee members to ask questions at the end. Hearing no
objection, so moved.
You are close there. Larsen nearly objected.
Second, I would like to ask unanimous consent that both
opening statements and member, witness testimony be inserted
for the record. Hearing no objections, so moved.
I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing on the
fiscal year 2020 budget request for atomic energy defense,
nonproliferation, safety, and environmental management.
Here today, we have Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty,
Assistant Secretary Anne White, and Chairman Bruce Hamilton.
We also have backup experts in the audience such as Admiral
James Caldwell, Director of Naval Nuclear Reactors; Dr. Charles
Verdon, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs; and Brent
Park, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation.
Any of these folks may be called to provide the
subcommittee more information if members request it. Rather
than continue with my opening statement, I will just ask that
it will be inserted for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Cooper. And I would like to turn to the ranking member
for his opening statement.
Mr. Turner. I will do the same, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Submit my statement for the record. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
I want to apologize to the witnesses for the late start due
to votes--unavoidable. But why don't we start by hearing Lisa
Gordon-Hagerty.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY ADM JAMES
CALDWELL, USN, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL NUCLEAR REACTORS, AND DR.
CHARLES VERDON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to present the President's fiscal year 2020
budget for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration [NNSA].
It is an honor to appear before you today, proudly
representing an extraordinary team at NNSA, a team that is
indispensable for our Nation's nuclear security. I am also
delighted to be sharing this hearing with my friend and
colleague, Assistant Secretary Anne Marie White.
A written statement has been provided to the subcommittee,
and I respectfully request that it would be submitted for the
record.
Mr. Cooper. So moved.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you. Since I last testified
before the committee, NNSA has been diligently working to
execute our three enduring missions. One, ensuring the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the U.S nuclear weapons
stockpile; two, reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation
and nuclear terrorism around the world; and three, providing
nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft
carriers and submarines.
The President's fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA is
an investment in these missions and in our infrastructure and
people. My priorities with this crucial funding are to
revitalize the United States defense plutonium capabilities and
other essential infrastructure, to keep our stockpile life
extension programs on schedule and on budget, and to recruit
the workforce of the future.
My focus is to set these conditions today for a resilient
and responsive nuclear security enterprise for the next 50
years and beyond. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review [NPR]
provided a realistic view of the world. With an evolving and
uncertain geopolitical landscape, the NPR states that there is
no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the nuclear
security enterprise, an enterprise comprised of eight
laboratories, plants, and sites and a dedicated workforce of
almost 44,000 employees.
NNSA's $16.5 billion request is a necessary investment when
you consider the stakes. Russia and China are pursuing entirely
new nuclear weapons capabilities. North Korea's intentions
remain unclear. And we face the most complex and demanding
global security environment since the end of the Cold War.
Accordingly, the fiscal year 2020 budget request represents
the largest increase for our nonproliferation,
counterproliferation, and nuclear counterterrorism program in 5
years. The NPR reaffirmed the need for effective arms control
measures and treaty verification and with this funding, NNSA
will continue to apply its technical expertise to reduce
nuclear threats around the world.
During my nomination hearing last year, I stated that my
highest priority was plutonium pit manufacturing. That has not
changed. For the next several decades, NNSA will rely on a
combination of newly manufactured pits and a judicious reuse of
existing pits to modernize the existing U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile.
A modest pit manufacturing capability is necessary to
ensure the safety and security of refurbished warheads while
maintaining high confidence in stockpile effectiveness.
Consistent with the NPR, NNSA is committed to producing no
fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030 to meet military
requirements.
Last May, the Nuclear Weapons Council endorsed NNSA's path
forward to recapitalize a production capability that was
shuttered in the early 1990s. Our two-site approach calls for
pit production at both the Los Alamos National Laboratory in
New Mexico and at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.
Following this strategy, the fiscal year 2020 budget
request includes $410 million for conceptual design activities
at Savannah River plutonium processing facility and our request
also calls for a nearly $500 million investment in the
plutonium pit production capabilities at Los Alamos.
NNSA is not only investing in plutonium pit mission. Thanks
to the strong support of Congress, we are making significant
progress in modernization across our enterprise. We have
started construction of the main buildings of the Uranium
Processing Facility [UPF] at the Y-12 National Security
Complex. And I am proud to report that this vital undertaking
has been on budget and on schedule for the last 6 years. We
remain on track to deliver UPF by the end of 2025 for not more
than $6.5 billion.
All of NNSA's enduring missions are underpinned by state-
of-the-art scientific capabilities. As these capabilities
become more important during this time of renewed great power
competition, NNSA is working to stay ahead of the technology
curve.
A future gap in high performance computing is being
addressed through a joint effort between the Department of
Energy's Office of Science and NNSA. Our contribution to that
effort will be undertaken at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and we will deliver an exascale computing platform
to the enterprise in 2023. NNSA is also moving forward with a
project to enhance the experimental capabilities at the Nevada
National Security Site, which is a crucial element for our
stockpile stewardship mission.
From the earliest days of the Manhattan Project, the
dedicated men and women of the nuclear security enterprise have
answered our Nation's call. What our team has accomplished
today is remarkable. We completed the W76-1 Life Extension
Program under budget and ahead of schedule. We have five
warhead modernization programs underway, all of which are on
budget and on schedule.
We have helped 33 countries plus Taiwan to become free of
highly enriched uranium. We routinely deploy nuclear security
experts to major public events like the Super Bowl to keep the
public safe from a radiological threat.
And we are lending unparalleled expertise to the U.S.
Navy's new Columbia-class program to ensure sea-based
deterrence capabilities for decades to come. Finally, I would
like to emphasize that regardless of the investments we make in
modernizing our infrastructure, the United States must continue
its investment in our world-class workforce as requested in the
President's 2020 budget.
We face stiff competition from the private sector for top
talent in highly technical fields. With an aging workforce,
NNSA has launched an integrated effort to recruit the next
generation of scientists, engineers, and technicians, so that
we can continue to answer the Nation's call and meet tomorrow's
challenges.
No other government or civilian agency can accomplish these
unique missions on behalf of the American people, and I could
not be prouder to represent NNSA today.
Thank you for your strong and consistent support and the
opportunity to testify before you today. And I look forward to
answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gordon-Hagerty can be found
in the Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Ms. White.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE MARIE WHITE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
Secretary White. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to appear today. And I share your sentiment as well. It is good
to be here with you today.
The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $6.5 billion
demonstrates the administration's commitment to tackling the
environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production that helped
end World War II and the Cold War.
Mr. Chairman, this year marks the 30th anniversary of the
EM [Environmental Management] program. Since its inception our
dedicated workforce has cleaned and closed sites, dramatically
reducing EM footprint from 107 sites to just 16.
Progress continues at every EM site. Last year alone, we
took another significant step towards large-scale cleanup at
the Y-12 site at Oakridge by removing over 3 tons of mercury
from equipment and completing all of the site preparation
required for construction of the mercury treatment facility.
Workers in South Carolina consolidated more than 400,000
cubic yards of coal ash and ash-contaminated soil at the
Savannah River Site. They got it done safely and 14 months
ahead of schedule, saving $9 million and earning them the
Project Management Institute award for project excellence.
And at Hanford, workers began installing equipment to
excavate highly contaminated soil under the 324 Building. Even
with great work and significant budgets, cleanup progress is
being significantly outpaced by environmental liabilities.
Mr. Chairman, during my confirmation hearings, I committed
to enhance safety through risk mitigation and cleanup and to
eliminate overall taxpayer liability. That is precisely what I
have been focused on during my first year on the job.
We are getting a clear picture of EM liabilities for the
first time, using accurate up-to-date cost and schedule data,
something I prioritized immediately. We are shifting to a
sustainable cleanup approach that uses the latest scientific
knowledge in waste composition, risks, and attainable end
states.
And we are increasing accountability to Congress and to the
American people through stronger project management and
oversight. There are some opportunities with the real potential
to get cleanup projects done and off the books safely, sooner,
and at a reasonable cost.
The Department is evaluating these opportunities, including
new technologies, treatment options, and disposal capabilities,
in a comprehensive way. We look forward to engaging with
Congress as well as the greater cleanup community on the best
ways to move forward with site options assessments currently
underway.
Following on recommendations from wide-ranging and
nonpartisan groups, the Department is also evaluating its
interpretation of the statutory term, high-level radioactive
waste. EM is also taking steps to get the best value out of
every cleanup dollar that Congress and the American people
provide.
That includes identifying impactful regulatory reforms and
improving procurements through a new end state contracting
model. As EM is put in a sustainable path forward, the budget
request provides the resources to build upon recent successes
and bring a renewed sense of urgency to the program.
The request enables meaningful progress throughout the
cleanup complex, including ramping up efforts to address
radioactive tank waste at the Savannah River Site and at
Hanford. At Oakridge, the request advances construction on the
Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility, continues D&D
[deactivation and decommissioning] at the East Tennessee
Technology Park, and continues preparations to support
processing the remaining U-233 material at the Oakridge
National Laboratory.
In the interest of time, I will stop there and just note
that more details about the work we have planned next year are
provided in my written testimony. Mr. Chairman, EM's historical
successes have been achieved through the dedication of leaders
on both sides of the aisle, determined to drive the cleanup
mission toward completion.
I want to express my desire to work with Congress towards a
future that delivers results for cleanup communities and all
U.S. taxpayers. I appreciate this opportunity and the
subcommittee's support of the EM mission.
[The prepared statement of Secretary White can be found in
the Appendix on page 55.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Ms. White.
Mr. Hamilton.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE HAMILTON, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE NUCLEAR
FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member
Turner, distinguished members of the committee, it's an honor
to be here before you today as the chairman of the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to share my observations on the
challenges that the Board has associated with providing
oversight to the Department of Energy's defense nuclear
facilities.
As I believe has been the past practice, I have submitted
extensive written remarks for the record. Those were
unanimously approved by my Board. In the interest of time, I
will limit my oral comments to only those topics you, Mr.
Chairman, specifically mentioned in your invitation letter to
this hearing.
I, not the Board as a whole, are responsible for any
deviations from the written remarks as well as for any
responses to questions you might have. For those members of the
subcommittee who may not be familiar with the work of the
Board, our mission is to conduct independent oversight of
defense nuclear facilities and to inform the Secretary of
Energy when we find issues that challenge the adequate
protection of the public.
The President's fiscal year 2020 request for the Board is
$29.45 million for 100 full-time equivalent employees. This is
a 5 percent decrease from the agency's fiscal year 2019
appropriation level of $31 million. The Board's foundation is
built on the expertise of the Board members and our staff, and
approximately two-thirds of our annual budget is dedicated to
salaries and benefits.
Mr. Chairman, you specifically asked me to address any
recent recommendations to the Secretary of Energy. There is one
recommendation, 2019-1 entitled Pantex Uncontrolled Hazard
Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation. It was issued on
February the 20th.
This recommendation focuses on three main topics at Pantex.
First, the lack of adequate controls for high-consequence
hazard scenarios; two, deficiencies in portions of the safety
basis for the nuclear explosive operations; and three,
deficiencies within the Pantex Special Tooling Program. The
Board is currently awaiting a response from the Secretary of
Energy of whether he accepts that recommendation and whether or
not there will be an implementation plan.
In your letter, Mr. Chairman, you asked about Department of
Energy Order 140.1, Interface with the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, issued in May of last year to replace
a prior DOE [Department of Energy] directive.
Order 140.1 incorporated major changes, including new
restrictions and protocols regarding the Board's access to
information, facilities, and personnel. It is the unanimous
view of the Board that DOE Order 140.1 is in direct conflict
with a plain reading of the Atomic Energy Act in several ways.
For instance, the order defines the public as existing only
outside geographical site boundaries. Such an interpretation
could preclude the Board from oversight for workers, collocated
workers, and general members of the public who happen to be
inside that site boundary.
Notably, and this is particularly important for places like
Y-12 in Tennessee, notably it could also prevent Board
oversight for important programs such as criticality safety.
Not only is this inconsistent with the Atomic Energy Act, but
this would be a clear departure from well-established past
practices.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, you asked me to address my proposal
to reduce our staff size. On August 14th of last summer, the
Board approved in a vote of three in favor, one opposed on a
motion made by me to improve effectiveness in conducting our
mission through more robust field oversight and a leaner,
nimbler headquarters staff.
The motion would have established an executive director of
operations, restructured the agency's organization primarily by
adding two new field offices and by assigning resident
inspectors for facilities which currently don't have them, and
by reducing employee headcount through attrition to about 79.
Our congressional appropriators did not support this plan
and they included language in the Energy and Water Development
and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2019 which preempted
its implementation.
Consequently, I have made no structural changes to our
organization. I have directed the hiring of employees to
backfill specific positions, and although we remain below our
fiscal 2019 funded 117 employees, we will hire in order to
achieve the 100 employees that are proposed in the 2020 budget.
This concludes my oral remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamilton can be found in the
Appendix on page 64.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
I will begin the questioning and I will try to just use my
5 minutes.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, I have a number of things I want to ask
you. Let me begin by, if you are familiar with the role that
the Jasons have played and possibly also the Naval
Research Advisory Committee in terms of nuclear and other forms
of scientific expertise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JASON is an independent scientific advisory group that has
since 1960 provided consulting services to the U.S. Government on often
sensitive scientific and defense issues. Its members are known as
``Jasons.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I am.
Mr. Cooper. You are familiar?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
Mr. Cooper. How would you categorize their performance over
the last 60, 70 years?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I can speak to two recent studies----
Mr. Cooper. We can't quite hear you. Can you pull the
microphone closer?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Is that any better?
Mr. Cooper. Yes.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. My apologies. So I can express to you
my opinion on the two recent studies that were undertaken by
Jasons, one of which was the Tritium study. I found their
reports to be fulsome and very--the members of JASON being very
knowledgeable about issues associated with our programs at
NNSA. I can't speak to the history or the 60, 70 years of
Jasons, but I can tell you that they are rich in history and
their technical expertise is sound.
Mr. Cooper. Were you aware that their contract has been
summarily terminated by the Pentagon?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. My understanding is that the Pentagon
is doing something with their contract. They do manage the
contract or administrate the--administer the contract for
JASON.
Mr. Cooper. Doing something with the contract is a
euphemism for termination?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. My understanding, again, I haven't
looked into it. I have actually asked my staff, Chairman, to
look into it to see what is happening, because we do have some
studies that we are undertaking with JASON, so we want to make
sure that if there are some issues associated with contract
management that somebody handles that, because we do have some
ongoing studies with Jasons.
Mr. Cooper. Another topic, it seems like one of the largest
future expenditures, if not the largest, that you have
jurisdiction over will be whether we have a second a site for a
plutonium sustainment program, that second site being Savannah
River. It is my understanding that the lifecycle cost of that
would be an additional $13, $14 billion if we undertake that
second site. So that is a large sum of money, especially given
the size of your budget, that is roughly the size of your
annual budget for your entire NNSA.
So it seems like this decision is really not being
presented to Congress as a decision, but more as a fait
accompli, because in this budget as you stated in your oral
testimony, you are asking for $410 million for advanced design
work on repurposing the MOX [mixed oxide fuel] facility.
In my lay terms, that would be two luxury skyscrapers in
Nashville, Tennessee. And this is just for blueprint work for a
proposed rehab of a building. But it seems like if we invest
that money, then we will be well into the $14 billion
expenditure for a second site.
So I would find it more useful for the subcommittee for all
the members to try to make a decision on that instead of being
forced into a decision by spending a little bit money here, a
little bit money there. Pretty soon, you are a little bit
pregnant and then we have the whole $14 billion. So are you
aware of another area in which we could save $14 billion?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. In a word, no. There is not another
place where I can see that happening. However, we are working
to advance the Department of Defense requirements as directed
by Nuclear Weapons Council to produce not less than 80 pits per
year for our nuclear weapons stockpile, to maintain our
existing nuclear weapon stockpile with the life extension and
modernization programs.
To that end, again, to recall for the members of the
subcommittee, we haven't had a plutonium production capability
since the early 1990s.
The last time we produced 11 ``war reserve,'' what we call
diamond-stamped pits for the United States, was over two
decades ago. We are trying to modernize and recapitalize that
capability at Lawrence, excuse me, Los Alamos National
Laboratory. We have them on a path forward and progress to
produce not less than 10 pits per year in 2024, 20 pits in
2025, and in 2026, maintain 30 pits per year. That is really
stretching their capabilities. After all, Los Alamos National
Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are known
to be nuclear weapon design agencies, not production sites.
And, again, we shuttered our production capabilities in the
early 1990s. We are modernizing an existing stockpile and in
order to do so we need nuclear weapons or the pits for those
nuclear weapons. And in order to get to that 80 pits per year
and recognizing the challenges we have ahead of us in 11
years--in 11 years, we are going to have to produce not less
than 80 pits per year.
We conducted an analysis of alternatives and an engineering
assessment. And the best way to get there given the risk and
risk mitigation factors is to repurpose the facility at
Savannah River Site and produce the remaining 50 pits per year
starting in 2030 at Savannah River Site.
And we believe that that is good investment of taxpayer
resources, because otherwise we will not be able to get to that
80 pits per year if we looked at the plan of going forward at
Los Alamos, which would consider major new construction
activities.
Mr. Cooper. Well, you have used most of my time. I would
like more information on your May 2018 plutonium pit production
engineering assessment results, because I----
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I would be pleased to do so.
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. Think that you are reaching more
of a conclusion than perhaps they did. I have rarely heard of a
competitive bid situation in which one bidder is twice as
expensive as the other bidder, and yet there is such enthusiasm
for bidding--awarding the bid to the by far, the highest
bidder. I have nothing against South Carolina or Savannah
River, but $14 billion is $14 billion.
You stated earlier you didn't know of another way to save
that money. And let us see if we can't save a bit here. So I
would at least like detail on this study, not just raw
conclusions.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Fair enough. And those are lifecycle
costs.
Mr. Cooper. I understand that.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you. And I will be pleased to
come by and brief you specifically about these----
Mr. Cooper. Our taxpayers back home are concerned about
their life cycle, and we are spending a lot of their money,
sometimes for very little result. I see that my time is
expired. I will turn to the ranking member.
Mr. Turner. Miss Gordon-Hagerty, the goal of 80 pits per
year, is that arbitrary or is that based upon our needs for a
modernization?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. That is based on needs set forth by
STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] and Nuclear Weapons Council
to produce not less than 80 pits per year, and that is for our
future nuclear weapons needs.
Mr. Turner. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Hamilton, when you began
your opening statement--and I don't have a question for you
yet, I just wanted to make a comment on your, in true oversight
fashion, you gave what I think may be the first time I have
heard an opening statement that had a disclaimer in front of
it, but I really appreciate what you do, because what you do is
go around and identify things that could be an issue that
everyone needs to address and be concerned with. I am going to
bring up one of those.
Miss Gordon-Hagerty, so you have such unbelievable depth of
responsibility, because you are dealing with nuclear material,
nuclear weapons, it is enormous really the complexity of what
has to be done to ensure safety and ensure compliance.
My understanding that you have received a letter, which I
have a copy of, from Mr. Hamilton, March 21st, the Defense
Nuclear Facility Safety Board, that raised a concern about the
Nevada National Security Site, stating the facility continues
to operate without accounting for the increase in seismic
hazard and without evaluating whether the accredited structure,
systems, and components can perform their safety function
during and after a seismic event.
Could you do us a favor? First, could you describe the
importance of the Nevada National Security Site, some of the
concerns and issues that you must deal with there? And then,
could you comment on Mr. Hamilton's letter?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you. I will be happy to.
First of all, the Nevada National Security Site is a
profoundly important site, one of the eight labs, plants, and
sites that makes up the National Nuclear Security
Administration. It provides a profoundly important role and it
has got a storied history. For 70 years now it was the Nevada
Proving Grounds, where we conducted 100 atomic tests above
ground and 828 underground nuclear weapons tests to certify our
nuclear weapons stockpile.
We have not conducted an underground nuclear weapon test
since 1992, where we voluntarily committed to no more nuclear
explosions. However, the programs that are there are unique. We
continue to certify our nuclear weapons stockpile by conducting
critical experiments called subcritical experiments at the U1a
Tunnel at Savannah--excuse me, at the Nevada Nuclear Security
Site. We also conduct a number of other programs.
We have trained over 200,000 first responders in nuclear
and radiological first responder response capabilities at the
Nevada National Security Test Site--Nevada National Security
Site. Excuse me. I am from the old school. I still call it the
Nevada Test Site.
So nonetheless it plays a critically important and unique
role in assessing and certifying our nuclear weapon stockpile.
To the extent at the DAF or the Device Assembly Facility to
which you alluded and the Defense Board had made--had cited
their concerns, the scenario that they have described actually
is a resulting, is a nuclear detonation or, excuse me, concerns
expressed are resulting from an explosion as a result of an
earthquake that induces uncontrolled release of radioactive
materials as a result of nuclear explosions.
Unfortunately, we do not even conduct nuclear explosive
testing or evaluation of nuclear explosive operations. That is
neither authorized or do we conduct those kinds of operations
at the Device Assembly Facility.
So the scenario that they have drawn out is not something
that could occur, since we don't conduct nuclear explosive
operations at the DAF.
Mr. Turner. Two more questions for you, and then I will get
to Mr. Hamilton on the same letter. The 76-2, great interest as
a result of Russia's change in nuclear doctrine to escalate to
de-escalate, low-yield nukes have become a considerable issue.
Could you please tell us why we need this for our
deterrence strategy and does it make the use of nuclear weapons
more likely or less likely?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. First of all, we are in--I am sure
everybody would agree, we are in an era of renewed strategic
peer competition and evolving threats. The 76-2 is not a new
nuclear weapon. It is a low-yield nuclear weapon that is a
modification of the 76-1 that was just completed. And it does
not either increase or decrease the likelihood of war or
nuclear war. What it does is it provides the President and
provides our military planners with a diversity in the nuclear
weapon stockpile.
Mr. Turner. At the same time, isn't there some concern that
if we only have high-yield nuclear weapons and Russia has low-
yield and they use one that they would think we would be less
reticent or more reticent to respond, and therefore we have a
lessened deterrence against Russia's actions?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. That is the ongoing argument. However,
we have had low-yield nuclear weapons in our stockpile and
currently do.
Mr. Turner. And so far we have deterred everyone.
Mr. Hamilton, first off, thank you for what you do because
you have the technical expertise to take a look at--you are the
what-could-go-wrong scenario guy. And I appreciate that because
everybody else then has to take a look and say, Okay, could
this go wrong, could this not go wrong, what do we need to fix?
With respect to this letter and her response, what are your
thoughts?
Mr. Hamilton. I concur with everything I just heard
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty say. The facility was designed for
much larger quantities of material at risk than are currently
in the facility because we suspended but did not eliminate all
future possibility of testing.
The standards to which that facility are designed and built
are based on the largest amounts of MAR [material at risk] that
could happen in a testing scenario. They don't do that right
now.
So our letter was specifically addressing, given the set of
parameters that you are designed for, you have some new seismic
information that needs to be added to the calculation.
I would also like to point out that we were developing this
information for this letter late last calendar year and early
this spring, and it was issued well before we even knew that
NNSA was going to ship plutonium from Savannah River to the DAF
in Nevada. So we didn't know about any of that and we didn't
care about any of that. It was irrelevant to us.
The plutonium that was shipped there from Savannah River
is--does not affect our calculations at all.
And I would like to just say the bottom line is that our
concern was the NNSA's documentation needs to be refined based
on new information, but there is an erroneous perception in the
press that the DAF is not, is unsafe. The press even called it
a ticking time bomb.
This hyperbole could not be further from the truth. For its
current mission, as what Administrator Gordon-Hagerty defined,
for its current mission, DAF is unequivocally not a challenge
to the adequate protection to the public health and safety. If
it were, the Board would have issued a formal recommendation,
which we did not.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Hamilton, I greatly appreciate your
expertise and your clarification of that. Thank you both for
what you do because you help keep us safe.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Secretary White, the budget cuts Hanford
cleanup by about $400 million. And I am wondering what
assessment you have of the lower budget--the impact of cleanup
operations and timelines at Hanford as a result of the lower
budget.
Secretary White. So we believe that the budget is adequate
for our needs in 2020, and we are moving forward. We also had
an update in our lifecycle baseline cost estimate and we are
moving out quickly to address that by developing, as required
by our project management orders, an analysis of alternatives,
which is due at the end of the fiscal year. So we are confident
that we can move out and accomplish what we need to at Hanford
for 2020.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. So your new lifecycle report estimates the
cleanup from--costing between $323 billion and $677 billion, is
that about right?
Secretary White. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. So--I could have given you that estimate. That
estimate is a $354 billion difference. And we are frustrated in
Washington State with having to clean this up. We are
frustrated with the Federal Government and you are not alone in
our ire in terms of being a target of our ire.
Why is there a $354 billion difference in the high- and
low-end estimate? Why isn't it any closer given everyone's past
experience at Hanford?
Secretary White. So the higher number is what we call an 80
percent probability number. And what it does, is it realizes
some risks that we are very likely to encounter. It also takes
into account updated operational costs that involve operating
multiple facilities at the same time. And further, the cost
estimate had not been, the lifecycle cost estimate had not been
updated since 2009.
So in order for us to work with you all in the State of
Washington and really progress cleanup, we have to be
transparent and we have to know what we are dealing with, so
that we can have fruitful discussions about the go-forward
because we are committed to Hanford cleanup.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks. It almost seems like a function of new
people coming in and wanting to get up to date, but there
isn't--I mean there is a lot not to know. But given our
collective experience there, there is a lot we already know.
What don't we know, that resulted in a 25 percent cut to
the Richland operations and a 12 percent to the ORP [Office of
River Protection] in this proposed budget?
Secretary White. So I don't think the--in fact, I know the
lifecycle baseline was not related to that and----
Mr. Larsen. Yes, right. I understand.
Secretary White. As we go forward, as I say, we need to
drive some innovations and as Chairman Cooper mentioned,
budgets are a big deal and we need to be mindful of the cost.
So I am just looking forward to working with you and others
of the Washington delegation to move things forward, because we
have a moral, legal, and ethical responsibility to do so.
Mr. Larsen. So in the Federal Register of 2018, in your
testimony, you noted that the Department is seeking public
comment on this interpretation about reclassifying high-level
radioactive waste. A frightening proposal and my--so if you
want my public comment, it is a frightening proposal.
You also note the Department's consideration of a new
interpretation does not alter or abrogate responsibilities or
policies under existing regulatory requirements or agreements.
How am I supposed to read that comment? Is it that you--it
doesn't impact your existing regulatory requirements or
agreements forever, or until a new, until a new rule is in
place?
By the way, I assume that new rule would actually
reclassify high-level to something less than high-level and we
would be sitting on high-level radioactive waste that you, the
Federal Government would consider not as high-level radioactive
waste.
Secretary White. So what we are doing is an interpretation,
not a reclassification and we----
Mr. Larsen. I don't know if there is a legal difference in
that, but there is a common sense difference in that there is
no difference to a lay person.
Secretary White. So the issue with the high-level waste
definition is that traditionally high-level waste is based on
the source that created it. What we are doing is we are saying,
okay, we want to determine what is and is not high-level waste
based on the actual radionuclide content of the waste.
And that is a sound technical decision. It is a sound way
to look at this problem. And it is not just for a minute that
this definition won't abrogate our responsibilities.
We have consent orders. We have got the TPA [Total-system
Performance Assessment]. There is NEPA [National Environmental
Policy Act]. There is RCRA [Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act]----
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
Secretary White. So we completely understand that.
Mr. Larsen. I will continue to be very curious about how
this goes forward, and I think I speak for the Democrats and
Republicans in the delegation in Washington State as well, at
least how this impacts Washington State.
Secretary White. Can I come over and brief you in more
detail at some point in the future?
Mr. Larsen. I would welcome that.
Secretary White. I would like----
Mr. Larsen. Probably wouldn't be just me, if you don't
mind----
Secretary White. All right.
Mr. Larsen. Great. Thanks.
Secretary White. Thanks.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Miss Gordon-
Hagerty, I thank all you of you for being here today.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, currently the Savannah River Site has
excess weapons-grade plutonium; 34 metric tons were to be
turned into fuel through the MOX program, the mixed oxide fuel
fabrication facility. Now, the NNSA is using the dilute and
dispose method.
During your Senate hearing, you promised another half
metric ton of plutonium would be removed by the year 2020.
What is the plan to relocate the direct shipment of the
half metric ton of plutonium? And what is the planned timeline
cost for the dilute and dispose method over the next 5 years to
remove the excess plutonium out of the site?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Representative Wilson, we are under
court order to remove not less than one metric ton of weapons-
grade plutonium from the Savannah River Site by the end of
2019, so by January 1st, 2020.
As you are aware, we have already removed and it has been
noted in the newspaper, we have removed a half a metric ton of
the material. We will remove or have already removed, one or
the other.
Because our class, our shipments of nuclear weapons, of
nuclear materials obviously require the utmost operational
security, so I am not at liberty to discuss the movements, the
shipments, the dates, the times, the locations, the routes of
those materials.
But we are under court order and we will make the date by
the end of December 2019.
Mr. Wilson. And then as to the dilute and dispose, what is
the timetable?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. In the dilute and dispose, we are--we
thank Congress for the support that we received last year of
$25 million to continue with the design of the glove boxes.
This is a planned path forward where we know we will be able to
do so for less than 50 percent of the cost of the MOX facility.
We will move the dilute and dispose, and we will be
undertaking those operations in the mid-2020s. We will start to
do the dilute and dispose--a known technology. And we have used
that technology for more than 5 metric tons of radioactive
waste.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. And Ms. White, the H Canyon at
Savannah River Site is the only operating production-scale
radiologically shielded chemical separations facility in the
United States.
Are the appropriate investments at H Canyon in both
infrastructure and staffing being made for it to be fully able
to process fuel that is now stored at site and additional
materials the site continues to receive?
Secretary White. Yes. So H Canyon continues to be a
somewhat of a maintenance challenge. We are working through
those issues and we have actually launched an independent
project team [IPT] to determine in what ways we could maybe
increase operational efficiency and address raising production
rates out of H Canyon.
So it is an extremely important facility to the United
States and as you note duly, it is the only one of its kind. So
it is a very precious resource.
Mr. Wilson. And are there existing or new processing
technologies that you are exploring that could be located
within H Canyon to enhance its capabilities to complete its
missions?
Secretary White. Yes. We are looking at different types of
technology. There is discussions about a hub and spoke where we
would slowly but surely build on, different technologies, and
the IPT is also looking at that.
So we will have a lot to brief you on when that team gets
done with its work.
Mr. Wilson. Well, we appreciate it again. H Canyon is just
so critical for our country and we want to make sure that it is
properly used, and any missions that can be provided.
Additionally, back again, for the design work on the
repurpose of MOX, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, it requires a skilled
workforce for the success of the mission.
What are the training recruitment incentives and programs
that have been implemented to achieve related to the pit
production? Are you working with local universities and
technical colleges?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. Well, not only at the Savannah
River Site do we have the challenges with our workforce. In the
next 5 years, 40 percent of our workforce throughout our entire
nuclear security enterprise is retirement-eligible. So that is
a challenge across our entire space of our eight labs, plants,
and sites, and our field offices and our headquarters.
We are taking on what I would consider an unorthodox, very
challenging way of looking at hiring practices. We are actually
going--looking at a corporate-wide approach across all of our
labs, plants, and sites. In fact, this week we had a hiring
team at Georgia Tech--excuse me, last week; Texas A&M this
week; Purdue on Thursday; and then next week at University of
California at Merced. So we are looking at different ways of
hiring a robust workforce for our entire enterprise.
Specifically the Savannah River Site, we are working with
Aiken Technical College and other places around the communities
to try to figure out what we need for our workforce strategies
for now and in the future.
So we are absolutely working closely with the City of Aiken
and with the surrounding communities.
Mr. Wilson. Well, Aiken Tech is an extraordinary facility.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And for the
witnesses, thank you for being here and your testimony.
I want to go to a question that Mr. Hamilton, you raised.
And my question really goes to Ms. Gordon-Hagerty.
Why are you limiting the ability of the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board to do its work?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Representative Garamendi, I would
interpret our update of the 140 order as an update. It has not
been updated within the Department of Energy for more than a
decade.
What we are doing is trying to make sure that we understand
within the Department of Energy, and I hope Assistant Secretary
White would agree with me, that what we are trying to do is
ensure that we articulate our roles and responsibilities and
authorities and accountability within the Department of Energy,
because if there is an accident or significant incident, we
will be the ones held responsible.
So it is our obligation to ensure our health and safety is
sacrosanct at all of our defense nuclear facilities.
Mr. Garamendi. But you don't want anybody looking over your
shoulder?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. No, sir. That is not the case
whatsoever. In fact, we have the Defense Board staff.
Mr. Garamendi. But that is exactly what you are doing by
limiting their authority and their opportunity to inspect the
various facilities.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I would respectfully----
Mr. Garamendi. You are limiting their authority and their
ability to oversee your work. Why do you want to do that?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I would respectfully disagree. We
absolutely do not. We welcome the opportunity to work with the
Board. We continue to work with the Board closely on every
single opportunity where it is appropriate.
Mr. Garamendi. Do you agree with the Board's assessment
that your letter and your order is contrary to law?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. No, sir. I do not.
Mr. Garamendi. Why do you think it is not contrary to law?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Because we believe that the Atomic
Energy Act expressly states what the roles and responsibilities
of the Department of Energy is.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Hamilton, why do you think it is
contrary to law?
Mr. Hamilton. There are four specific things in the order
that I believe are contrary to a plain reading of the Atomic
Energy Act, and the bulk of the order is non-controversial and
I agree with Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. I would also say
that we have had three hearings on this topic, and we have
heard from the Department of Energy that they don't intend to
use these restrictions, but they are in the order and let me
tell you what they are.
The first one----
Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me, did I hear you correctly, they
tell you they do not intend to use the restrictions, but they
are in the order, is that what you said?
Mr. Hamilton. That is correct.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay, please continue.
Mr. Hamilton. And that is a matter of public record, we
have those in hearings. The four items that are in my view
offensive to the Atomic Energy Act are--the first one, which
exempts DNFSB oversight from hazard category three in
radiological facilities. Hazard category three in radiological
facilities are something that the Department of Energy defines;
they are not in the Atomic Energy Act.
Secondly, the order claims to exempt the Board's oversight
in situations where the Department of Energy determines that
the adequate protection of the public health and safety is not
adversely affected.
Mr. Garamendi. So they are watching themselves.
Mr. Hamilton. That is a specious and circular argument
because the Atomic Energy Act gives the Board that
responsibility.
Third, the order directs the Department of Energy employees
cooperate with DNSFB and provide the DNSFB with ready access to
facilities, personnel, and information as necessary to carry
out its statutory responsibilities. The language in the order
leaves out the words, ``as the Board considers.'' Again, it is
allowing the Department to determine where we can look.
And lastly, the one I already mentioned in my opening oral
remarks, about site boundaries. Those four items are the ones
that we object to.
Mr. Garamendi. I haven't been around forever on this issue,
but the years I have been around, the Board has brought to our
attention significant lapses within the NNSA and I am very,
very concerned about this limitation on the ability of the
Board to review the work of the NNSA in its entire operation.
So I will let it go with that. In my remaining 45 seconds, back
to the 80 pits. You said that the 80 pits are required by the
Department of Defense [DOD], is that correct?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Correct.
Mr. Garamendi. For what purpose?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. To maintain and modernize the current
nuclear weapons.
Mr. Garamendi. No. Specifically, for what weapons, for what
delivery systems?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. For currently the W87-1 which is the 78
replacement and for a number of other systems that we are
working on right now. So it is specifically the 87-1, which has
an FPU [first production unit] of 2030 that we have to produce
the pits for that weapon system.
Mr. Garamendi. And how many for that purpose?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. That number is classified, but I am
happy to go into a closed session with you and explain and have
DOD with me.
Mr. Garamendi. I would be happy to learn specifically all
the way down why you need 80 per year; as simply noted in my
seconds that are gone, that this number has expanded over the
years without a clear explanation of why the number has
expanded. I would appreciate a clear, fulsome explanation. I
yield back.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I look forward to that. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, the budget for NNSA's international
nuclear security program which is most responsible for
supporting security upgrades around the world is at its lowest
levels since its nascent days in the 1990s. What could you do
with $80 million more, $80 million more in funding for programs
to secure nuclear material around the globe?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Eighty million dollars is a specific
number, but I will take $80 million to secure more nuclear
materials around the world, because that is nuclear materials
that are less likely to fall in the hands of terrorists or
adversaries.
Mr. Carbajal. Yes. But what else can you do with it?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. There are opportunities we can
undertake. We can secure additional blood irradiators, some
Cesium sources where we are doing change outs with different
hospitals and medical-care facilities that do blood
irradiation. We can take those materials off the street and
help facilitate the removal of those potential radiological
dispersal devices.
We can do additional training around the world. We can
encourage others and help them with security installations.
There are a number of different things we can do around the
world.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, new technologies are reducing the
footprint and the detectability of proliferators in their
attempts to acquire nuclear and radiological weapons.
What type of technologies such as 3D printing worry you the
most? How can NNSA and other agencies work together to combat
these new threats?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. 3D printing is, in fact, one of our
biggest concerns as well as other things associated with
electronic signatures and some other issues. And we can talk
about those in a classified environment, too.
We are working very closely with our interagency partners
because of course the foundation of the NNSA enterprise is
where most of the laboratories and plants throughout the NNSA
enterprise is where the Department of Defense and the
intelligence communities come for the technical expertise
resident in our labs, plants, and sites and throughout the
Department of Energy.
So we have a very robust program with them. And again, 3D
printing and some other efforts are very alarming. And because
they are available publicly, they present us with some
challenges. So therefore what we are trying to do is also
develop countermeasures against different types of challenges
that we are encountering.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. And lastly, in today's world where
the cooperation with Russia on nuclear security is difficult,
what is NNSA doing to ensure we do not backtrack on global
progress in nuclear security and counterterrorism since the
advent of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Program of the
1990s?
What new thinking or initiatives are you considering
nationally, bilaterally, or multilaterally to build on past
progress and focus on new threats?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. We have made a great deal of progress
since the 1990s with the Nunn-Lugar initiatives. However, we
are limited in our interactions with our Russian counterparts,
but we do continue to have technical exchanges with them. And
if and when the situation presents itself, we will also
continue to do things just as you described like the material
security, ensuring that they continue with robust programs that
we have helped them initiate and put into place.
At the present time, however, we are limited with the kinds
of cooperations that we can undertake on a bilateral or
multilateral position with the Russians.
Mr. Carbajal. So are you saying there is really limited
initiatives that----
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. At the present time, we are limited in
our cooperation with them.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman Cooper and I thank the
witnesses for being here today. Special thanks to our guests
from Tennessee who made the trip up. I appreciate your
expertise and for you being here.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, you touched upon quite a bit of this in
your opening statement, but I want to give you a chance to
expand your testimony if you desire. What is included in this
year's budget request for Y-12 specifically regarding the
uranium production facility and investment in lithium
production?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Our present request for the Y-12
complex is $1.9 billion and that will be to continue operations
mostly in canned subassemblies and the uranium work that is
undertaken exclusively at Y-12.
With regard to our request for additional resources for the
UPF, or the Uranium Processing Facility, that program has
expended $2.5 billion of a planned, projected $6.5 billion
budget.
We are requesting $795 million for that request this year
to continue construction. And I am glad to say that yesterday I
was at Y-12, and I walked the site itself and we started the
nuclear construction, the actual activities of the actual
process building.
So I was actually on the site yesterday, looking at the
facility and continuing with and seeing the great progress that
our team is making there. And we have got some other monies and
resources going into the efforts that they provide in
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, counterterrorism.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So having just been there, you are
pretty confident that the UPF program will get completed on
time and on budget?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. What are the biggest risks to
finishing the program?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The biggest risk there are actually the
current and sustained funding that we require to, in order to
be able to accomplish this and complete this mission. So it is
really about the sustained funding that is necessary for us to
complete this huge operation.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. What is the NNSA doing to
support increasing the capacity for tritium production?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. We are undertaking a program at the
Savannah River Site to complete the tritium finishing facility,
for which we are asking for, requesting $27 million for
modernization and recapitalization of that facility.
The tritium--tritium, a vital component in our nuclear
weapon systems, decays as--radiologically decays, radioactively
decays 5.7 percent per year. And so, therefore, we need to
refurbish and to update the limited life components in our
nuclear weapons. And in order to do so, in the weapons that we
are retiring or modifying or bringing back for surveillance,
we'll change out those, recapture the tritium, and then also
produce new tritium.
We are doing that also with TVA [Tennessee Valley
Authority]. And we have a great relationship with TVA which is
running our tritium bars, at which point they will irradiate
the tritium bars. We will bring them back to the Savannah River
Site. They will extract the tritium. We will process the
tritium and then take it to Y-12, where they will be inserted
into the weapons.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Similar to Rep. Wilson's questioning
earlier, I also have concerns about how NNSA is attracting and
maintaining and growing the entire range of skilled workers
necessary for NNSA's mission.
Can you explain what kind of workers you need to ensure the
viability of the mission back home in Tennessee? Are they all
nuclear physicists? Or are they welders, machinists, et cetera?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir. They are all of the above.
They are welders. They are machinists. They are wrench turners.
They are project analysts. They are project managers. They are
secondary designers, so they are weapons physicists. They are
scientists. They are engineers. They are across the board.
And that is not exclusive to Y-12 or Savannah River. It is
at every one of our labs, plants, and sites. And like I said,
we have undertaken an aggressive hiring strategy, not only for
near term but for long term, for the next 20, 30, 50 years. We
need to build the workforce of the future now.
Dr. DesJarlais. Right. Thank you for your testimony.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Horn.
Ms. Horn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, all.
Chairman Hamilton, I want to circle back to the DOE's
recent Order 1401, I have some more questions around that. In
your testimony and subsequent questions, you have noted that
this order substantially circumscribes the Board's ability to
do your legally mandated safety oversight of the nuclear
complex.
My first question is, do you believe that your concerns
which you have articulated here have been taken into
consideration by the Department?
Mr. Hamilton. We have had three hearings and provided two
direct letters of correspondence to the Secretary of Energy on
this topic. We received one letter back after this first
letter.
And so we have dialogue ongoing. I believe, though I don't
know and perhaps one of the other panelists might be able to
answer the question, I believe that there is an annual first
year review of that order coming up.
And I am hopeful, although I don't know this in fact, that
that will be the opportunity to correct what I see are those
four egregious statements in the order. I am out----
Ms. Horn. So I take it by that last part of your statement
that you think the DOE might reconsider those sections of the
proposal?
Mr. Hamilton. I am hopeful they will. We have certainly
made it clear what we object to, those things I just listed.
And we have made that crystal clear. I know that they are
coming up with the annual review and again, I don't know that
they are going to fix it, but this will be a natural
opportunity to fix it.
Ms. Horn. So if it is not changed, if these concerns are
not addressed, what risks and impacts to the safety and
oversight of NNSA programs do you foresee if these aren't
addressed?
Mr. Hamilton. That is a great question. Thank you. I see
actually very little direct risk to having our ability to
access facilities and information and people, because I do not
fall under DOE orders. I fall under the Atomic Energy Act as
amended. And the tools in the Atomic Energy Act including
recommendation tools, advice letters, subpoena powers, hearing
powers, all of those tools I have, and specifically the
statutory right to ask for reports from the Department of
Energy.
I have all those tools in my statutory tool kit. The
concern is not that I can't get access from information, for
information. The concern is that I may have to use some of
those more tough tools, which slows down the process.
Ms. Horn. Understood. Following on related but not directly
to the budget and the resources that are needed to conduct this
critical oversight that the Board performs. From last year's
notes in the budget request, you talked about maintaining the
workforce at approximately 100 full-time employees.
And it appears to be similar to last year's, the proposal
to cut the workforce by a third; and given the ramp-up of
activity, I would like to know how you justify this decrease in
the planned workforce from the previous year's budget request
given the increased ramp-up in activity.
Mr. Hamilton. The increased ramp-up of activity is I think
and particularly the amount of budget, increased budget the
Department has and NNSA specifically has, is counterintuitive.
The money that is being spent is for higher quality facilities,
replacing old Manhattan Project era buildings that are
crumbling, adding new equipment that is of higher technical
capability.
So all of those things that the Department is spending
money on are actually enhancing what is already a very safe set
of facilities. So I see that as actually counterintuitive. The
more money that the Department is spending on enhancing
facilities and modernizing them actually makes my job easier.
Ms. Horn. And just one final question as my time is about
to expire. In this oversight, if you are saying that it makes
it easier; do your concerns with the Order 140 remain if it
stays as it is?
Mr. Hamilton. My concern with DOE Order 140.1 is not so
much that it will limit my ability to do my job. It will slow
my ability a little bit. But I have the statutory tools to plow
through that if I have to.
My real concern is that it is a, the wording, those four
things that I talked about are a direct, in my view, a direct
contradiction from the plain language of the Atomic Energy Act.
Ms. Horn. Yes.
Mr. Hamilton. That is my real concern. I can get through
this. It might slow me down a little bit but I have the
statutory authority to get all that information.
Ms. Horn. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you for that question.
Mr. Cooper. Thanks.
Let us have a second round of questions. To follow up on
what Mr. Hamilton was just saying, do your powers under the
Atomic Energy Act include things like subpoena powers?
Mr. Hamilton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. That's impressive. Good. Glad to know that. I
didn't know that.
Mr. Hamilton. We try not to use it.
Mr. Cooper. Yes. It is much better to be friendly. Now, I
would like to do a quick shout-out for Naval Reactors. I don't
know a part of NNSA or government that does more more
efficiently or complains less.
And for them to even be happy now with a slight budget cut
is pretty awesome. I hope all the government agencies can learn
from that.
Next, regarding A10 filings under the export compliance
assistance program, I wanted to ask Ms. Gordon-Hagerty when the
subcommittee can get access to those filings.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The Department is moving aggressively
to provide that information, and I guarantee you that it will
be done in the very near term, so, and then that is what the
team is actually pulling together.
I believe that some of the staff have already been briefed
on the part A10s to date, but we will be providing and being
very responsive, as responsive as we can be to the committee.
Mr. Cooper. I was also wondering if you had any opportunity
to check the beneficial ownership of any of the entities that
were involved in those filings.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I have made that request. And the
lawyers are looking at that right now, as we discussed they
are, and I take your point and we are looking into it right
now.
Mr. Cooper. Right. Then, Ms. White, you were talking about
thrift and saving money, cutting Hanford and how that needed to
be done but I noted there was an increase at Savannah River.
Why is that $90 million increase necessary?
Secretary White. So as you are well aware, the budget
process is a process. We also have a big increase in our
production rate of treating tank waste out of Savannah River
due to the fact that our new treatment facility SWPF [Salt
Waste Processing Facility] will be coming online.
Mr. Cooper. So that is the reason for the $90 million.
Secretary White. Yes. And what that ultimately does is that
it will greatly increase the rate at which we can remove that
waste from those tanks, which ultimately decreases overall
baseline.
Thanks.
Mr. Cooper. Unless Ms. Davis would like to ask a question
right here. You are welcome to.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sir, I am doing
double-duty back and forth there. Unless this is, has already
been asked, but I wanted to thank you, all, of course, for
being here.
And anyone can add on to this question. If New START
[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] is not extended in 2021 and
Russia started building past the limits of the treaty, how
would this impact the requirements, the schedule, and the cost
for NNSA's nuclear modernization efforts, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. At the present time, we are supporting
New START and will continue to do so and at some point in the
future decision were made whether or not we are going to
continue with New START.
That said, I would say that it is not possible to actually
determine what the modernization costs would be if we chose to
increase our nuclear weapon stockpile, which is not in
discussion at the present time.
I would also defer, I guess, respectfully to the Department
of Defense to find out what, if any, requirements they are
considering.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. If I could then go to your testimony
where you were arguing that the W76-2 low-yield nuclear weapon
gives the U.S. a credible response option and deters
adversaries who might think the U.S. would be deterred from
responding to a low-level nuclear attack.
I think that this type of language actually, the low-level
nuclear attack, suggests that the United States does not have
credible response options. I don't find that terribly helpful.
And I really wonder whether it could be interpreted in a way
that is far more dangerous.
Senior administration officials should not use this type of
language. It weakens the credibility of the U.S. deterrent.
There are low-yield weapons no doubt, but they are not low-
level nuclear attacks.
So, I hope that if you would like to respond to that.
General Hyten said before this committee last month that he is
``ready to respond to any threat, anywhere.''
So, can you define for me what you believe a low-level
nuclear attack would be? Is there a threshold of nuclear attack
at which you believe the current stockpile is not credible, as
your testimony suggests?
And can you describe how existing non-strategic nuclear
weapons in the U.S. arsenal impact the existing credibility? In
other words, are the B61 and ALCM [Air-Launched Cruise Missile]
credible?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. All of our nuclear weapons in our
existing stockpile are credible based on different threat
scenarios. However, the use of or the insertion of a low-yield
ballistic missile, the W76-2, provides the Department of
Defense and the President with a diverse type of capabilities
against potential adversaries.
And that is the reason why and the rationale behind the
introduction, or I should say the reintroduction of a low-yield
ballistic missile. We have had them in our stockpile in the
past and we presently have them.
This provides the Navy with the use of a submarine-launched
ballistic missile, a capability that we don't currently have.
Mrs. Davis. Could you go back just to my first question
about what you believe a low-level nuclear attack would be.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I think I would defer to the Department
of Defense on what describes a low-yield nuclear attack.
Mrs. Davis. Low-level.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Low-level nuclear attack. In terms of
the escalate to de-escalate, that is where the, an adversary
perhaps attacks us and doesn't think that we have a capability
to attack on a lower level, or if you will, or with low-yield
in-kind nuclear weapons.
But that is not a scenario that we envision now that we
have, we will be reintroducing the W76-2 into the stockpile. It
provides the Department of Defense with different capabilities
that we didn't necessarily have.
Mrs. Davis. Yes. I think what is difficult here is that if
we were to make clear to our adversaries that there is no such
thing as a low-level nuclear attack as was stated here and it
seems as if the--our allies would certainly read that as
enormously as escalatory and respond to us on that very basis
if we think that is where we are starting.
So, I guess going back to is there a threshold of nuclear
attack of which you believe the current stockpile is not
credible as your testimony suggests?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. As I have suggested, based on the
Nuclear Posture Review, the reintroduction of a low-yield
ballistic missile into the stockpile will provide us with
credibility and a robust nuclear deterrent not only for the
United States but for our friends and our allies.
Mrs. Davis. And what would you call the next level after
low, what would you call the next level?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Deterrence.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Does the ranking member have an additional
question?
Mr. Turner. Yes. Thank you. So from low-yield nuclear
weapons, I am changing the topic to nuclear reactor, so I want
to make sure that it is not confused.
So, on nuclear reactors, low-enriched nuclear capacity for
nuclear, for naval reactors, could you speak about that for a
moment, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty--benefits, pros, cons, cost, and the
like.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. So to the extent that we would be
using, I am presuming you are referring to low-enriched
uranium.
Mr. Turner. Low-enriched uranium.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. We have continued to study the
capabilities to consider for naval reactors low-enriched
uranium fuel. Highly enriched uranium provides us with military
advantage.
I defer to Admiral Caldwell, the Deputy Administrator for
Naval Reactors, that can speak more to the complexities about
using low-enriched uranium vice high-enriched uranium.
Mr. Turner. Thanks for that, and I apologize for the
transition of low and low because they are very, very different
topics, but thank you.
Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. Again, James Caldwell, Director
of Naval Reactors.
Sir, we have a long history of using highly enriched
uranium in our program. It has allowed us to build reactor
cores that have long lives.
In fact, today, our aircraft carriers are refueled about
the 23-, 25-year point and then last for a total of 50 years.
All the submarines we are building today have life-of-the-ship
reactors.
Everything we do in our program is designed around the use
of highly enriched uranium, from the design of the core to the
procedures for defueling and refueling, to the procedures for
shipment and the procedures for packaging.
Low-enriched uranium would be a completely different
approach. Essentially, it would mean you would be loading less
energy into a reactor core, which means that you would have
either, you would have to refuel the vessel more frequently or
have a larger reactor so you could load more energy into that
core, or potentially you have to build more ships to be able to
achieve the same amount of deployed operations that you have
today.
In 2018, the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of the Navy
signed a joint letter determining that we should not pursue a
low-enriched uranium core for naval applications.
Mr. Turner. Is there an issue with the aggregate of waste
produced, even though the waste would have different----
Admiral Caldwell. The waste would have different
characteristics and we would have to deal with that. We would
have to engineer that. And that would require some change. The
real issue is whether you are not able to load the amount of
energy in the core and the same configuration and get the same
amount of lifespan out of it.
So you would have to make significant additional
investments in refueling reactor plants to keep that ship
operating for longer periods of time. The cost to go after a
program to develop such a capability, we determined that in a
2016 study, directed study that said it would be about a $1
billion and it would take 10 to 15 years to just develop that
capability.
That does not include the amount of money it would take to
deploy, in other words to actually build the reactor and tune
all of those systems I talked about from refueling, to
transport, to storage. And that could be literally billions of
dollars on top of that.
Mr. Turner. Thank you for the clarification.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I am not certain if Mr. Wilson, Mr. Garamendi?
Mr. Garamendi. I want to go back to the pit production.
Perhaps this would have to be done in a classified setting. But
it was argued earlier that the pits were required for a new
nuclear weapon, the IW2.
That is no longer in play, I understand, instead we are now
building new pits for the W78. Is that correct?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, that is correct. And that is based
on the fact that we have seen plutonium aging. There are
systems in the current 78 that don't lend itself to a life
extension program as we have traditionally done, such as with
the 76-1 that we have just completed.
So in order to ensure that we can extend the life of that
required system, we are going to use the current 87 and turn it
into an 87-1, which will be the, what we are calling the 78
replacement, which is the 87-1.
In order to do so, it will provide us with the more robust
system. These are not new nuclear weapons. They are just
modernizing our existing nuclear weapons.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, that could be debated, but not
particularly useful at this moment. What is that new, excuse
me, modernized nuclear weapon for?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. It is for the 78 replacement for the
system for the Ground-Based, the GBSD, the Ground-Based
Strategic [Deterrent].
Mr. Garamendi. For the new multi-, tens-of-billion-dollar
ground-based replacement for the Minuteman II and III.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Minuteman III.
Mr. Garamendi. What is the total cost of that?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. That program will be, do you have total
lifecycle cost, Charlie?
One second.
Mr. Garamendi. Added that you are not responsible for the
missiles or the missile silos or the command and control system
and all the rest.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. No, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. What is the cost of the W78 replacement
which I guess we now call the W87-1?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. W87-1 modernization program, this year
we are requesting $112 million for a total of--Charlie, you
want to come up to the table?
This is Dr. Verdon, if I may. Dr. Verdon is the Deputy
Director for--Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs.
Mr. Verdon. So right now, sir, it is in its very early
stages. We have a range of designs that the cost would range
from $12 billion to an upper end of $15 billion, but that we
will be backing down and choosing the options that we actually
implement on it right now.
Mr. Garamendi. So we are really starting on something new
here even though it is not a new weapon, it is a replacement
weapon, a modernized weapon, but yet it is new.
Mr. Verdon. It is a modification to the Legacy 87 system.
Mr. Garamendi. Oh, we're the ones that play games with
words [inaudible].
Mr. Verdon. No. That is officially what it is--it is called
modification because it is based on the Legacy 87 system.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. We won't get any further on that one.
The Savannah River plutonium program is in abeyance. The
disposition of the plutonium at Savannah River is in abeyance,
it is not moving forward, is that correct?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. That would be the MOX facility, yes.
That was terminated on May 10th of 2018.
Mr. Garamendi. And what is the plan for the disposition of
the----
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The planned path forward is to use what
we call our surplus plutonium disposition plan, which will cost
much less than the planned MOX facility, in fact, much less, 40
percent of the total cost and it will be faster, cheaper, and
quicker, more safe to remove the 34 metric tons of excess
plutonium.
Mr. Garamendi. And what is that?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Total lifecycle cost is $18 billion
over the entire life cycle.
Mr. Garamendi. And what is it that you are doing?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. It is actually taking the materials. It
is a very simple process actually. You are taking the plutonium
waste, mixing it with a material where it cannot be reused, and
then we will permanently place it at WIPP, at the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant.
Mr. Garamendi. Use your language correctly.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I am sorry.
Mr. Garamendi. Carefully. You are spiking it so that it
cannot be used as a weapon, is that correct?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir, so that we cannot--no longer
use it.
Mr. Garamendi. But can it be reprocessed? The answer is
yes, it can. And how will you then ultimately dispose of this
spiked plutonium?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. This material will be emplaced at the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant at--in New Mexico.
Mr. Garamendi. Retrievable? Yes.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. It is put in salt in--1,950 feet below
ground in salt caverns.
Mr. Garamendi. In a facility that has had some problems.
Yes, it has had some problems. So you are spiking it, you are
putting it in the WIPP facility, and there it sits.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir, like----
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Why are you not using any of the 34
tons of plutonium that now exist? And why are you then
developing new pits?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Sir, we are using our materials for
defense-related needs for the pits, for the remanufactured pits
for the 87 program. So that is actually what we are doing when
we are making these not less than 80 pits per year.
We are actually using some of defense programs material
that we have set aside. In fact, the half a metric ton that is
currently staged at the Nevada National Security Site will
ultimately make its way to Los Alamos for use in the 87 pits.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I see I am past my time. Thank
you.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, what is your assessment of the need to
repurpose the MOX facility for the plutonium pit production?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The Department of Defense and the
Nuclear Weapons Council stated that the Department of Defense
requirements are for not less than 80 pits per year beginning
in 2030. And at which point several years ago, we conducted an
analysis of alternatives, and then eventually followed on by an
engineering assessment that stated the different approaches
under which we could produce that not less than 80 pits per
year were several options. We skinnied those down to
approximately four options of which three were at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory which would undertake significant
resources to be--to build out additional facilities there. Or
because we were approaching the plan to terminate the MOX
facility, we could repurpose that partially constructed
facility which we thought was the most appropriate way to go.
It would also provide us with a resilient and redundant
capability, a capability that we have not had in this United
States since the late 1980s, early 1990s.
Mr. Wilson. And so the justification for the two-pronged
approach is, you feel, very clear.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Very clear that clearly our United
States needs a redundant and resilient capability for future
nuclear weapons stockpile requirements. And the time is long
past that we have maintained--that we retain or obtain a
capability to produce nuclear weapon pits. And doing it at Los
Alamos will not get us to achieve, to the required 80 pits per
year.
Mr. Wilson. And you've done the cost analysis of Los
Alamos, Savannah River Site, as to not have a two-pronged
approach?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir, we have. And we will not meet
the, it is challenging as it is. Let us be frank, 2030 is only
11 years away. And that is challenging in and of itself.
To try to then identify other needs and start to build new
facilities and additional facilities to our current operations
at Los Alamos while we are maintaining or getting to a place
where we will be producing 30 pits per year in perpetuity
starting in 2026 makes it even more challenging. And we will
not be able to get to that 80 pits per year required by the
Nuclear Weapons Council.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate your clarity on this.
And, Ms. White, thank you for including in the budget the
funding to the Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative [AMC] to be
located very likely at the University of South Carolina Aiken.
The AMC will not only allow experts in emerging
technologies to collaborate with industry, academia, and
government to improve the manufacturing, but also assist the
DOE complex by accelerating technology development for the
cleanup mission.
Can you comment on the importance of this facility and the
success of similar facilities across the DOE complex?
Secretary White. Yes. So the AMC project is very exciting
and it is allowing us to make some investments in Savannah
River National Lab, which will be very important, that is EM's
only lab and EM operates it. And also too, when I looked at
some of mock-ups at that facility, one thing that I think will
be very important about its future is that is exactly the kind
of facility that is going to attract next-generation workers.
And there is going to be, I believe, a lot of excitement around
it and that is something we need in EM just as in NNSA.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
I wanted to ask Mr. Hamilton quickly. On page 5 of your
testimony, you talk about four waste drums at the Idaho
National Laboratory that underwent over-pressurization,
ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste. You go
ahead and call it the potential for a deflagration, a word I
have never heard of before.
It would seem like by 2018, we should know how to store
nuclear wastes. I know WIPP had a problem with the kitty
litter, organic versus inorganic.
But why can't we get this right?
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The four drums that
you are talking about at the Idaho Advanced Retrieval Project
that essentially exploded and were inside of a containment, was
a near miss. The building that it was inside was not occupied
at the time because it happened at night. So there was some
degree of luck that nobody was there to get hurt.
The specific answer to your question is, all of that waste
that is in those fields, that came, most of that came from the
decommissioning of the prior plutonium facility that we had in
Colorado, Rocky Flats.
When that was done, there were, what I would say is,
marginal records kept of what was in which drums that were
buried. And so there is some degree of uncertainty in what is
being dug up as regards to what came from Rocky Flats and when
it came. As best as can be done, the project uses the records
they have, but it is not a perfect science.
One thing I will tell you, and this is why I am not
personally losing a lot of sleep over this particular event,
90-plus percent of the drums that are being unearthed and
reprocessed, over 90 percent are complete. This is the first
event that occurred like this. So there is some risk in every
operation that you are going to get a mix of the wrong things.
I will tell you that I personally am convinced that what
Ms. White and her team have done to mitigate problems with
future repackaging is an appropriate and reasoned approach to
prevent this happening.
We are actually having a hearing on this in May to probe a
little bit more deeply and we have some of our top talent in
our staff digging into some of the details; but it is a very
complex mix of unknowns, and there is just some random
opportunities in there for this kind of thing.
It is not a very satisfactory answer, but the reality is,
like I said, 90-plus percent of this has been done. We haven't
had an event. So we had this one event and they put the things
in place, the process in place they think will mitigate it. And
I think that--I think it will.
Did I answer your question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Cooper. Well, since in your response you used the word
explosion and this involves nuclear waste, I don't think the
public would find your answer to be very persuasive, because
the folks I talk to back home want zero defect handling of
nuclear material----
Mr. Hamilton. Just----
Mr. Cooper. Zero----
Mr. Hamilton [continuing]. For clarity, what happened was
that there was material in those four drums that overheated and
caused the lids of those drums, caused pressure inside the
drums and caused those lids to pop open. And when that happened
the material inside there came out into the space.
I call that an explosion but maybe that is a politically
charged word that is not a good one to use, but it did pop out
into that space.
Mr. Cooper. We are here to do the best possible job for the
taxpayer and when it involves nuclear, that usually means zero
defects. WIPP, as you know, was shut down for years as result
of a mistake.
As I was saying, this is 2019, we should be able to get
this right. There should be a process with quality controls in
place so that no mistakes are made. Am I asking too much?
Mr. Hamilton. My charter under the Atomic Energy Act and
specifically under the legislative history is a recognition
that zero risk is unattainable. That is in the history of the
legislation that created my Board. So my approach to the
adequate protection of the public health and safety is not zero
risk. It is something approaching as good as we can get.
And it is a subjective term, but I am not chartered to
establish zero risk. That is clear from my reading of the
legislative history, and I think the only way to have zero
risk, Mr. Chairman, is not to do anything and that is certainly
not an option. So there is risk involved in everything we do.
The question is, are we doing what is enough to adequately
protect the public health and safety? And in my view, we are.
Mr. Cooper. I think the real answer is somewhere between
the 90 percent figure that you mentioned in your response and
99.9999----
Mr. Hamilton. My 90 percent was how much has been
processed.
Mr. Cooper. Okay. Okay. Well, I think the public wants to
see the best that we can possibly do is the best that can be
done by human beings, that we are not trying to cover up our
own inadequacies, that we are not hiding the ball, and I was
just surprised reading this in your testimony.
I think your Board does an excellent job. We want to keep
you in business. But I was just kind of struck, 2018, stuff
like this happens.
Mr. Hamilton. I don't think there has been any effort or
intent to minimize this. As far as I am concerned----
Mr. Cooper. But what if WIPP gets shut down again for
several years? You know, these are problems we--Ms. White, you
have been itching to talk?
Secretary White. Sorry, I just, we take these things very,
very seriously in EM. And as someone who actually worked in the
field and benefited from the safety culture throughout my
career, I can assure you we take every effort to absolutely
understand every piece and part of the process, and as Mr.
Hamilton noted, it can never go to zero, although I really wish
it could. And we----
Mr. Cooper. Yes. But we can solve the kitty litter problem.
Like if inorganic kitty litter works, let us stick with that,
not go with the organic kitty litter.
Secretary White. Right. Yes. So we have very detailed
information on both this event and our response to it. And I
would be very, very happy to come and give a more detailed
briefing, because I think you would find our efforts are
substantial and we take these things very seriously.
Mr. Cooper. The ranking member.
Mr. Turner. I just want to say, first off, thank you for
all of the expertise that you guys bring to bear in all aspects
of our review and decision making and discernment as to what
paths we need to go in, how we need to correct what we are
doing.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, you said your workforce, it is not just
your testimony today, it is the workforce that stands behind
you that goes to great lengths to ensure safety.
So having said that, I just want to say I absolutely agree
with the chairman, there is no margin of error here.
Mr. Hamilton, I greatly appreciate your reality check of
the statement of the mission that you have, and that in part we
look to you guys to be ingenuity, to create, to invent. As you
are looking to our safety, you have to invent ways to create
that safety. So I--but at the same time, I commend you and I am
great appreciative of what you are doing.
I must agree with the chairman here in that I think
everybody views this as no margin of error even though that,
Mr. Hamilton, I recognize is an impossible task.
So thank you all for trying to rise to that impossible
task.
Mr. Cooper. Concluding note unless the ranking member has a
response to this. Just look behind you, naval reactors, there
is a problem on a submarine, people die. The Navy has done a
superb job of making the risk as close to zero as any human
being could possibly imagine. So why don't we follow that
sterling example?
Mr. Garamendi, back in time for the third round of
questions if you would like.
Mr. Garamendi. You were just raising the hammer.
Mr. Cooper. I was poised. The witnesses are hoping that I
will hit the block.
Mr. Turner. I am hoping that you will hit it.
Mr. Garamendi. I want to go back to the W87 and it is to be
used as a replacement for the W78 for the new ground-based
deterrence system.
Well, let me put it this way.
Has an AOA [analysis of alternatives] been conducted to
determine that you need a new, excuse me, you used the word
modified weapon to replace the W78 on what is essentially a
missile for the same purpose. Has an AOA been done to determine
that you need that?
Mr. Verdon. Yes, sir. An AOA has been done and it folded in
both the military's requirements which were to improve the
safety and security of the warhead, as well as NNSA's
requirements which has an overarching whenever we get the
opportunity to improve the safety and security.
It was also that the Air Force desire is to move to a
single air shell fleet called the Mark 21. And so that was the
warhead that emerged as to address the military's requirements
both from STRATCOM and the Air Force as well as NNSA's
requirements.
Mr. Garamendi. In the appropriate forum, I want to go into
that in much more detail if you would. We will have that, I am
sure, at some time in the future.
Also, my understanding is there never, never has been a
low-yield warhead on an SSBN [ballistic missile] submarine.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. That is correct.
Mr. Garamendi. That is correct.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. That is correct. I think I stated that
we had a low-yield--we had a low-yield weapon in our stockpile.
Mr. Garamendi. Yes, you do.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. It is the 21. However, there has never been
a low-yield ballistic missile or warhead on an SSBN. Is that
correct?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, correct.
Mr. Garamendi. So this would be the first time.
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. And that raises another set of questions for
another day. I have kept you too long, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Cooper. It looks like there will not be a fourth round
of questions. Let the panelists rejoice. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 9, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 9, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 9, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. The MOX facility cancellation and subsequent
repurposing for plutonium pit production has been done without a
competitive bid process. The President's Budget requests $410 million
for plutonium activities at the Savannah River site. This request
includes design activity and a plan for a Critical Decision (CD)-1 in
FY 2020 for the plutonium pit production facility. Given the lifecycle
costs that DOE has identified for plutonium pit production at Savannah
River (at least $14 billion), and the complexity in repurposing a
facility designed for a different purpose, how can the NNSA assure
Congress and the taxpayer that design and subsequent construction will
be done properly, in a cost-effective manner without a competitive bid
process? Why hasn't NNSA allowed for competitive bidding process for
the design of this facility? Does NNSA plan to consider competitively
bidding this project at any point? If so, when?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA utilized the current Savannah River
Nuclear Solutions contract for the conceptual design that is underway.
This conceptual design effort is within the scope of the existing
contract. The lifecycle costs were estimated in the Engineering
Assessment Report to support the Analysis of Alternatives for
comparison purposes only. A lifecycle estimate and an Acquisition
Strategy are required by DOE O 413.3B (Program and Project Management
for the Acquisition of Capital Assets) at Critical Decision-1. NNSA
will develop this Acquisition Strategy to detail procurement plans for
the remainder of the project. Further, NNSA is required to follow DOE O
413.3B which defines management for a DOE nuclear project and provides
a set of requirements to provide maximum confidence for the proper
execution of a project.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Hamilton, in your testimony you noted that the four
waste drums at the Idaho Advanced Retrieval Project which exploded were
a ``near miss,'' and that there was ``some degree of luck that nobody
was there to get hurt.'' Yet you were the one Board Member to vote
against the Board's recommendation, which simply requested additional
information from the Department. Why? Further, you note that there is
uncertainty around what is in the last 10% of drums left for
processing. What gives you confidence that this--or something worse--
will not occur again, particularly given the uncertainty around the
material in the remaining drums and poor record keeping at Rocky Flats,
where the drums originated?
Mr. Hamilton. On April 11, 2018, four waste drums at the
Idaho National Laboratory underwent over- pressurization, ejecting
their lids and spreading radiological waste inside the Advance
Retrieval Project (ARP-V) structure. The event occurred at night when
the facility was unoccupied and no workers were present; a near-miss,
but nevertheless an event to be taken seriously. The Department of
Energy subsequently determined that waste in the drums generated
methane gas, causing the event, and additional controls were placed in
effect to address the underlying cause. It is my view that the
additional controls, coupled with the fact that over 90% (the more
precise figure is 97%) of the targeted waste had already been process
without a similar incident, demonstrates adequate protection of the
public health and safety.
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Mr. Hamilton sent his answers with a May 7, 2019, cover
letter that read, in part: ``Since your correspondence and the three
enclosed questions were addressed directly and specifically to me and
not to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board as a whole, I have
provided my responses only from my perspective. The answers may not
reflect the views of my fellow Board Members or the collective view of
the Board.''
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On March 4, 2019, the Board approved sending correspondence to the
Secretary of Energy (subsequently transmitted on March 12, 2019)
opining that DOE does not have effective controls to prevent or
mitigate such deflagrations, a position on which I disagree. More to
the point, the correspondence invoked the statutory authority of the
Atomic Energy Act (as Amended), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286b(d). It required
that DOE provide a briefing with analysis or supporting data to address
six detailed questions related to this event as well as to
programmatical concerns pertaining to the complex-wide environmental
cleanup. I did not concur with the majority who voted to approve this
correspondence.
In my dissent, I noted the following:
``42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286b(d) authorizes the Board to, ``. . .
establish reporting requirements for the Secretary of Energy. .
. .'' The Board should generally practice a narrow
interpretation of its statutory authority to require reports.
This authority should be used with discretion, such as when
information has been difficult to obtain through informal
staff-to-staff interaction or when periodic recurring reports
on program status are warranted. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286b(d)
authority should not be used as a mechanism to convey either an
explicit or an implied suggestion for the Secretary to carry
out an activity. In this case, that appears to be the message.
``Likewise, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286b(d) should not be used as a
surrogate for a formal Recommendation. In the event the issues
identified in the Staff Issue Report, either individually or in
their totality, challenge the '' adequate protection of the
public health and safety, '' the statutorily appropriate path
would be to recommend action to the Secretary of Energy. In
this case, there is no indication that this threshold has been
reached.''
In other words, I believed the Board already had sufficient
information to evaluate the risk associated with this event as well as
the broader complex-wide related question. Further, I evaluated that
risk as not rising to the threshold of challenging the adequate
protection of the public health and safety. Even so, I did not vote
against a subsequent motion made before the Board to hold a public
hearing in May 2019 on safety management of waste storage and
procession in the defense nuclear facilities complex.
In my view, DOE has in fact put in place the additional controls
needed to ensure the adequate protection of the public health and
safety. That adequate protection persists is further informed by the
fact that most of the targeted waste was already processed event-free
even without those controls. There will always be a chance that another
event of this or of a different nature may occur, particularly given
the uncertainty around the material in the remaining drums and the poor
record keeping at Rocky Flats, where the drums originated. That said,
confidence that something won't occur is not the standard specified in
the Atomic Energy Act (as Amended). Rather, the standard to which I am
obliged is that of adequate protection of the public health and safety.
In the spirit of your question, I offer the following additional
thoughts on just what I consider ``adequate protection'' means.
The Atomic Energy Act (as amended), at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286a(a),
states that, ``The mission of the Board shall be to provide independent
analysis, advice, and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy . . .
in providing adequate protection of public health and safety at . . .
defense nuclear facilities.'' The AEA does not further define the term
``adequate protection,' and the legislative history of the Board
[Congressional Record vol. 134, House Conference Report No. 100-989,
Sept. 28, 1988] at p. 488 explains why:
``Adequate protection'' is the level of safety required of
commercially licensed nuclear facilities. . . . The conferees
believe that it is appropriate to require the same general
level of safety from DOE nuclear facilities as is required of
commercial facilities. The conferees recognize that specific
standards recommended by the Board for achieving adequate
protection may not necessarily be the same as those applied to
commercial facilities, to the extent that DOE and commercial
facilities are significantly different.
As applied to commercial facilities, the standard of adequate
protection means ``reasonable assurance that the health and
safety of the public will not be endangered by the operation of
the facility. . . . Absolute certainty or perfect safety is not
required. What constitutes ``reasonable assurance of adequate
protection'' is subject to change as the state of the nuclear
safety art advances. The Board will be responsible for weighing
such factors as technical feasibility, the risk of accidents,
the record of past performance, the need for further
improvement in nuclear safety, and other considerations. The
conferees believe that such factors should be balanced by the
Board when the adequate protection standard is applied.
This Report also quotes, at p. 489, from a case heard by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Union of Concerned
Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1987) which states:
NRC need ensure only an acceptable or adequate level of
protection to public health and safety; the NRC need not demand
that nuclear power plants present no risk of harm
The level of adequate protection need not, and almost certainly
will not, be the level of ``zero risk.'' This court long has
held that the adequate-protection standard permits the
acceptance of some level of risk.
Additionally, the Committee on Armed Services Report to accompany
S. 1085, the Nuclear Protections and Safety Act of 1987, Report 100-232
at p. 20 states:
It is important that the Board be supplied with a sense of
priority, and be focused on significant risks and consequences
to public health and safety. . . . The Committee intentionally
declines to go beyond establishing an adequate protection
standard as a matter of policy and legislative intent, and
renders no judgment as to the appropriateness of requiring
``comparability'' with particular commercial standards imposed
by NRC.
From this background, there emanate several key elements in
understanding ``adequate protection'' as it applies to defense nuclear
facilities. First, the ``adequate protection'' criterion does allow for
risk. Lawmakers understood that there would always be some risk present
in the nuclear enterprise and that absolute certainty or perfect safety
is an unobtainable standard. Second, what constitutes ``adequate
protection'' will change with time, as the technology and our knowledge
base change. Third, Congress established the Board (just as it did the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission) using an informed and experienced group
of nuclear field experts for the very purpose of weighing their
differing views on what constitutes ``adequate protection'' in order to
come to a balanced conclusion. In the final analysis, Congress declined
to provide an objective definition of ``adequate protection,'' instead
deferring to the collective and subjective wisdom of the Board.
Every human endeavor involves risk. The only way to ensure no risk
in an endeavor is to do nothing. But even the absence of such action
brings with it risk. Not having a nuclear arsenal would guarantee zero
risk to the public from that program, but what would be the national
security risk to our republic without nuclear weapons in a world where
others have them? Certainly not zero.
If we decision-makers accept the premise that we need a weapons
program, even if it does bring with it some risk to public health and
safety, then the next question we must answer is, ``How much risk do we
accept?'' We aspire to use all of our scientific and mathematical tools
of analysis and statistics to find an objective answer, but an
objective answer always remains elusive, beyond our grasp. That means
we must eventually be subjective, accepting that each human being has a
different risk profile, and that every American places a different
value on the importance, or even existence, of our nuclear weapons
program.
We also know that there will always be a chorus of critics
insisting that if the regulator, or in our case independent overseer,
simply prevents engagement in risky behavior then no one will be
harmed. We know that should something go wrong, we will receive blame.
That creates concern on our part which can, and frequently does, lead
to a regulatory mindset that too often results in our coming down on
the side of less and less risk, with little concern for cost, both in
dollars and in the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent.
Congress long ago came to the conclusion that there is no easy
answer to the question, ``Is it safe enough?'' That's why Congress, in
its wisdom, established a five-Member Board: to provide a balance in
competing views on an issue which addresses relative values, and is
therefore as much a political question as it is a technical one. While
all Board Members should have in common a technical background in the
field, Congress expects that each Member will bring to the table his or
her independent views in order to balance competing risk profiles.
Coming to a conclusion on what is ``safe enough'' starts out as an
objective analytical exercise, but in the end it includes the
subjective balancing of the ``gut feel'' of the individuals on the
Board. This is as it should be, for if adequate protection could be
defined in strictly objective terms, Congress would have long ago done
so and would have dispensed with the Board in favor of a single
Administrator.
I support a strong national defense; one of the plainly
Constitutional functions of our Republic's government. A key component
of our defense is a strong, safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons
arsenal. I have also sworn an oath to our Constitution to abide
faithfully by and execute the laws of the land. In my role on the
Board, the specific statutory language at play is to ensure the
Secretary of Energy is informed when the public is not adequately
protected from activities and accidents within the DOE's weapons
complex. I take that obligation most seriously. At the same time, I am
sensitive to the reality that safety can be used as an excuse to
constrain operations. I also know that humans, when given the power to
regulate, or in the Board's case to advise, tend in the direction of
more rather than less.
The Department of Energy's safety posture today is both excellent
and in continuous improvement. I am convinced that the leadership and
the workforce in DOE, both federal and contracted, actively embrace
safety. I know from personal dialog and observations of their words and
actions that the DOE political appointees and senior executives with
whom I have had the most frequent contact hold nuclear safety
sacrosanct and that they consider it their ultimate professional
responsibility. I am completely confident that they not only believe
that safety is vital to their operations, but that they have
internalized and fully accepted that obligation. This is not a
politically partisan characteristic. I have observed the same passion
for safety in both the Obama and Trump Administrations. I consider that
the nuclear weapons complex today, including both active and legacy
activities, is one of the safest industrial undertakings in our modern
world. But compared to what?
We are surrounded by risk. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, in 2017 there were 5,147 fatal work injuries, 887 from
falls alone, and 123 from exposure to harmful substances in U.S.
industry. Amtrak accidents killed 1 in 2018, 3 in 2017, and 8 in 2015.
A 2016 train derailment of 14 cars just 2 miles from the Capital at
Rhode Island & 9th dumped toxic Sodium Hydroxide, ethanol and other
substances into the city, another near-miss with no fatalities. A 2013
explosion at an ammonium nitrate fertilizer plant in West, TX killed
15. The BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, Deepwater Horizon,
killed 11 in 2010. A 2008 explosion in a sugar refinery killed 13. A
2005 Texas City refinery explosion killed 15. While not occurring in
the United States, the two recent crashes of American-manufactured
Boeing 737MAX aircraft killed 189 in Indonesia and 157 in Ethiopia.
Last year's Camp Fire in the Sierra Nevada foothills razed 14,000 homes
and killed 85 people. Credit for this tragedy can be directly
attributed to risks incurred by not implementing wildfire-prevention
projects because they were contrary to environmental regulations. And
of course, most horribly, auto fatalities on U.S. highways killed
37,133 in 2017, which is a typical annual number. These are the tragic
outcomes of real risks in America today.
Comparisons across industries are imperfect and metrics are
elusive. While they don't directly cross-compare to threats to the
adequate protection of the public from defense nuclear facilities, they
subjectively help to inform my determination of relative risk. In the
entire history of the DOE/AEC/Manhattan Project activities spanning
over 75 years, there have been six fatalities which were unambiguously
attributed to radiation exposures or traumas from accidental
criticalities. The most recent of these occurred over a half-century
ago. That is an exception record of safety.
Granted, I am only considering clear-cut acute fatalities, not
other health effects from environmental challenges and low-level
exposures that could possibly contribute to premature deaths. Doing so
would quickly overwhelm us with subjective data and would embroil us in
controversies such as the scientifically dubious linear no-threshold
hypothesis. That notwithstanding, the orders of magnitude comparisons
in non-acute health challenges are similar. The fact of the matter is
that, for all of the fear and misunderstanding in the public domain,
America's nuclear weapons complex has always been extremely safe when
placed in the context of other hazards in our modern world, and today
it is even safer than ever.
Please do not misunderstand me. The stellar nuclear safety record
of the Department of Energy must never be taken for granted. Continual
vigilance is the price paid for that record, and the Board's mission in
that vigilance is as important as it ever has been. The superlative
staff supporting the Board, the seriousness which I have observed that
my fellow Board Members take their jobs, and my personal dedication,
are indicative of that vigilance, even as in final decisions we come to
differing conclusions on the threshold of adequate protection of the
public health and safety.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
Mrs. Davis. During your testimony, when asked what the next level,
above ``low-level,'' of nuclear attack would be, you stated
``deterrence.'' Can you clarify what you meant in drawing a distinction
between ``low-level nuclear attack'' and ``deterrence''? Are you
suggesting deterrence only exists above a certain threshold of
``nuclear attack?''
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Given the complexities of today's evolving
security environment, nuclear deterrence is more important now than at
any time since the end of the Cold War. Any potential nuclear attack
against the United States and its allies is the most serious threat to
our national security and is unacceptable. Low-yield nuclear weapons
bolster deterrence by signaling to potential adversaries that there is
no possible advantage in limited nuclear weapon use against the United
States. This does not lower our threshold for nuclear weapons use, but
rather raises it for our adversaries. Maintaining diversity in weapon
platforms' range and survivability is prudent to sustaining a tailored
deterrence approach.
Mrs. Davis. In your testimony before the committee, you noted: ``In
terms of the escalate to deescalate, that's where the--an adversary,
perhaps, attacks us and doesn't think that we have a capability to
attack on a lower level, if you will, or with low-yield inclined
nuclear weapons. But that is not a scenario that we envision.'' If this
is not an envisioned scenario, why did the NNSA develop the W76-2
warhead? Why is there a need to place low-yield nuclear weapons on the
Ohio-class submarine force for the first time in the strategic
submarine force's history?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. In an era of renewed peer competition, the
Department of Defense has identified the W76-2 as important to
prudently sustain our nuclear deterrent capabilities by providing
additional diversity in weapon platforms' range and survivability. The
W76-2 is not a new nuclear weapon. It is a modification of the W76
warhead using existing components and will utilize the same delivery
platform as the W76, a Trident II D5 missile.
Mrs. Davis. Do you see risks in increasing the likelihood of
nuclear use by an adversary by drawing distinctions in levels of
``nuclear attack''? Would it not be more prudent for our national
security to make clear the United States does not consider any nuclear
use ``low-level''?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Any potential nuclear attack against the United
States and its allies is the most serious threat to our national
security and is unacceptable. The majority of weapons in today's
stockpile have surpassed their intended design life, thereby
accumulating increasing risk. The United States has reduced its
stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while potential adversaries have
increased their numbers of nuclear weapons and significantly modernized
their nuclear capabilities. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been the
cornerstone of our national security and global stability for more than
70 years, and its credibility serves as the ultimate insurance policy
against a nuclear attack. Increasing the flexibility of the deterrent
by providing additional options serves to increase our adversaries'
nuclear thresholds. For more detail on questions about nuclear policy,
NNSA defers to the Department of Defense.
Mrs. Davis. Given the information you currently have with respect
ongoing life extension programs such as the B61 or W88, are you
expecting any delays in First Production Units?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Currently in Phase 6.4, Production Engineering,
the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) has demonstrated system
performance in over 60 integrated ground and flight tests, including
eight joint flight test drops. NNSA notified your committee of a
technical issue with the B61-12 LEP that we estimate will delay the
First Production Unit (FPU). NNSA is aggressively working to minimize
the delay and are working with the Department of Defense to coordinate
any possible impacts.
The W88 Alt 370 is currently in Phase 6.4, Production Engineering.
NNSA is aggressively managing the FPU for this program, which was
scheduled for December 2019. NNSA also notified your committee that the
same technical issue impacting the B61-12 LEP will impact the W88
Alteration 370. The delay to FPU is still being assessed and a number
of mitigation plans are being executed at this time, in coordination
with the Department of Defense, to minimize schedule impacts to FPU.
The remaining three weapons modernization programs (the W76-2
Modification Program, the W80-4 LEP, and the W87-1 Modification
Program) remain on schedule and on budget.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. In fall 2018, DOE put forth a proposal to reconsider
its interpretation of high-level radioactive waste under the Atomic
Energy Act as amended and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 as
amended.
a. Why didn't the proposal include a role for the States or the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission? Does DOE have concerns about involving
NRC and the States in such critical decisions?
b. What is the status of DOE's consideration of this new
interpretation?
Secretry White. The Department sought public comments on its high-
level radioactive waste (HLW) interpretation through its Request for
Public Comment on the U.S. Department of Energy Interpretation of High-
Level Radioactive Waste. DOE received a total of 5,555 comments,
roughly 360 of which were distinct, unrepeated comments, from a variety
of stakeholders, including states and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).
DOE appreciates the comments received from the NRC and the states
and is taking their input very seriously. The DOE places significant
weight on the NRC and state views of matters relating to the safe
management and disposal of radioactive waste, including their views on
the HLW interpretation.
The Department fully supports the NRC in its statutory and
regulatory role with respect to regulating commercial nuclear
activities (including licensing disposal facilities), as well as its
historical and established consultative role to DOE on the disposal of
certain reprocessing wastes. DOE intends to maintain its strong
relationship with the NRC and will engage with the NRC on the best way
to continue that relationship in the future. In addition, DOE currently
works with states to satisfy existing regulatory agreements, and will
continue that practice in regard to the HLW interpretation. The
Department will work closely with state and local officials,
regulators, tribal governments, and stakeholders, on a site-by-site
basis, to ensure compliance with applicable programmatic requirements
and regulatory agreements.
DOE is in the process of evaluating public comments, and has not
made any decisions at this time on the HLW interpretation.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Given the cancellation of the MOX facility and the
plan to repurpose the facility, what role do you envision for the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board throughout design,
construction, and operation? What is the plan and timeline for DNFSB
oversight?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The DNFSB provides analysis, advice, and
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy in order to assist the
Department in providing adequate protection of the public health and
safety at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. The Board's advisory
functions under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended,
include review of the design of new Department of Energy defense
nuclear facilities before construction begins and periodic review and
monitoring of the construction as it progresses. DOE/NNSA anticipates
timely engagement with the DNFSB, as governed by the AEA and DOE/NNSA
directives, to strengthen early integration of safety-in-design and
reduce project schedule risks by identifying and addressing nuclear
safety issues as early as possible.
Mr. Garamendi. Does NNSA anticipate conducting a Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act on its plan to expand plutonium pit production
at two sites? If so, when does it plan to begin this process?
Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Thorough evaluations of potential environmental
impacts associated with any proposal to produce plutonium pit at two
sites will be conducted in accordance with the National Environmental
Policy Act. NNSA notes that compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act is built into our acquisition process and we will implement
an environmental compliance strategy.
Mr. Garamendi. Given the cancellation of the MOX facility and the
plan to repurpose the facility, what role do you envision for the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board throughout design,
construction, and operation? What is the plan and timeline for DNFSB
oversight?
Mr. Hamilton. The Atomic Energy Act obliges the Board to review the
design of the repurposed MOX facility before construction begins and to
recommend to the Secretary of Energy any modifications of the design
that the Board considers necessary to ensure adequate protection of
public health and safety. During construction, I expect the Board will
periodically review and monitor construction and will provide further
recommendations and/or advice. During startup and operations, I
anticipate that the Board will continue to monitor the facility and
make any necessary recommendations and/or advice. No plan is yet in
place for each of these steps because the facility construction
authorization, funding and timeline are just in development. I predict
that oversight will begin at some point between the Department's
establishment of Critical Decision 2 (Approve Performance Baseline) and
Critical Decision 3 (Approve Start of Construction or Execution).
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HORN
Ms. Horn. Mr. Hamilton, in your testimony before the committee you
stated that the Board's work during the ramp up of activity in the
nuclear complex will make your job easier due to newer facilities
coming on line to replace older Manhattan Project-era ones.
1. Please detail the specific facilities, including planned
facility start dates, that are coming online that you believe will make
the Board's work easier.
2. Is there not an increased Board workload from doing both safety
oversight of current facilities, and ensuring future facilities are
designed, built, and operated in a safe manner?
3. Further, with regard to DOE's Environmental Management work, how
does the Board plan to do safety oversight as new facilities at
Savannah River and Hanford come online?
4. How do you plan to incorporate all this additional work while
reducing the planned number of Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) from your
FY2019 request of 117 to 100 FTEs for FY20?
Mr. Hamilton. At Los Alamos National Laboratory: The Transuranic
Waste Facility (TWF), operational as of October 2017, partially
replaces waste storage on outdoor pads, leaving enduring missions in
Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility (WCRR) and
Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility (RANT); The Radiological
Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB, started chemical operations
January 2014, started radiological operations August 2014, partially
replaces Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (CMR), leaving some
enduring missions to be relocated to Plutonium Facility; The Low-Level
Liquid Waste Facility (LLLW), start operations November 2018, partially
replaces The Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF),
leaving the remaining mission to be relocated to another planned
facility (Transuranic Liquid Waste Project); The Transuranic Liquid
Waste Project (TLW), solicitation of bids for design and construction
issued April 2019, to replace RLWTF functions not already transitioned
to new LLLW Facility; Plutonium Modules, CD-0 approved in 2015 but the
project was removed from the FY2019 Stockpile Stewardship Management
Plan, if pursued, some activities from Plutonium Facility would be
relocated to module(s).
At Pantex: The Material Staging Facility (MSF), planned to be
Operational by 2040, or by 2030 if scope is reduced, would replace Zone
4 storage magazines for nuclear explosives and nuclear materials.
At The Savannah River Site: SRS Plutonium Processing Facility,
retrofit of the unfinished MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, planned to be
operational at full capacity by 2030; The Salt Waste Processing
Facility (SWPF), construction complete April 2016, currently undergoing
testing and cold commissioning, start of operations projected by March
2020, based on the pilot projects Actinide Removal Process (ARP) and
Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) Unit (MCU), which have
operated for over 10 years.
At Y-12: The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), construction
started June 2016, partially replaces B9212, leaving enduring missions
in B9215 and B9240-2E.
At Hanford: The Waste Treatment & Immobilization Plant (WTP)
Pretreatment Facility, under design and under construction but activity
was suspended 2012, start of construction July 2002; The WTP Low-
Activity Waste (LAW) Facility, construction complete June 2018;
currently undergoing testing and cold commissioning, start of
operations projected by 2023, WTP High- Level Waste (HLW) Facility,
under design and construction; all activity suspended 2012, start of
construction July 2002; WTP Analytical Laboratory Facility, under
construction, start of construction July 2002; WTP Low-Activity Waste
Pretreatment System (LAWPS), design work suspended.
At Idaho National Laboratory: The Integrated Waste Treatment Unit
(IWTU), construction complete; currently undergoing testing and cold
commissioning, start of operations projected by 2020.
I do not agree with some who correlate the steep budgetary increase
for DOE with increased challenges to the adequate protection of the
public. This includes the new facilities at Savannah River and Hanford.
In fact, I believe it to be just the opposite . . . an inverse
correlation. Increased funding for the weapons complex and the legacy
environmental management means more built-in safety, not less. The
increase funding goes to correcting maintenance backlogs, tackling
aging infrastructure, replacing Manhattan Project-era buildings with
modern construction, and replacing equipment which is worn out and has
dated technology with modern, safer components. Those things come at a
cost, but they make the complex even safer than it already is. This
counter-intuitive situation is further enhanced as rising operational
intensity increases learning. As production increases, for example, the
workforce learns what does and doesn't work, improves the processes,
procedures, and techniques, and develops much higher skill
competencies. Consequently, it's my view that higher levels of
production will be even safer than the current situation, which is
already profoundly safe.
Board and Board staff oversight of existing facilities and the
statutory mission to review facility design and construction is managed
through the annual technical staff work plan. The plan allows the work
load to be levelized through a timing, prioritization and ranking
process which can be modified by the Board from time-to-time throughout
the year. While the Board is directed through statute to review design
and construction, the level to which those reviews are conducted is
left to the decision of the Board. The contemporary design and
construction process is defined by modern and detailed codes and
regulations, which means that the quality of the products are superior
to the previous generation. As a result, I believe that the Board and
Board staff reviews need not be as invasive as in the past. How much
oversight is prudent will always be a subjective decision, but recent
years indicate that the combined level of effort required to ensure
adequate protection of the public health and safety for both existing
and new defense nuclear facilities is well within the capacity of
current agency size. Given that current staff (not including contract
employees) consists of 88 full-time equivalents, a staff of 100 will be
more than adequate to achieve the statutory mission.
[all]