[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATUS OF THE BOEING 737 MAX: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
=======================================================================
(116-22)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 19, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-467 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, SAM GRAVES, Missouri
District of Columbia DON YOUNG, Alaska
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD,
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland Arkansas
RICK LARSEN, Washington BOB GIBBS, Ohio
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
JOHN GARAMENDI, California RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., ROB WOODALL, Georgia
Georgia JOHN KATKO, New York
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana BRIAN BABIN, Texas
DINA TITUS, Nevada GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
JARED HUFFMAN, California MIKE BOST, Illinois
JULIA BROWNLEY, California RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida DOUG LaMALFA, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania
MARK DeSAULNIER, California PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Chair BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York Puerto Rico
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
GREG STANTON, Arizona ROSS SPANO, Florida
DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas GREG PENCE, Indiana
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
ABBY FINKENAUER, Iowa
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
HARLEY ROUDA, California
(ii)
Subcommittee on Aviation
RICK LARSEN, Washington, Chair
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands DON YOUNG, Alaska
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
District of Columbia SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois ROB WOODALL, Georgia
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JOHN KATKO, New York
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
Georgia LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania
DINA TITUS, Nevada PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
JULIA BROWNLEY, California BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
GREG STANTON, Arizona BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois ROSS SPANO, Florida
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation:
Opening statement............................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 7
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure:
Opening statement............................................ 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
WITNESSES
Sharon Pinkerton, Senior Vice President, Legislative and
Regulatory Policy, Airlines for America:
Oral statement............................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Captain Daniel Carey, President, Allied Pilots Association:
Oral statement............................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Captain Chesley B. ``Sully'' Sullenberger III, Pilot, US Airways
(Retired):
Oral statement............................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Sara Nelson, International President, Association of Flight
Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO:
Oral statement............................................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Hon. J. Randolph Babbitt, Former Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration:
Oral statement............................................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 36
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Letter from Nadia Milleron and Michael Stumo, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Larsen.......................................... 6
Statement of Lori L. Bassani, National President, Association of
Professional Flight Attendants, Submitted for the Record by
Hon. Larsen.................................................... 6
Prepared Statement of Paul Hudson, President, FlyersRights.org,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen........................ 73
Photos of 89 of the 157 Victims of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight
302 Crash, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen............. 74
APPENDIX
Responses from the following witnesses to questions for the
record from Hon. Garret Graves:
Sharon Pinkerton, Senior Vice President, Legislative and
Regulatory Policy, Airlines for America.................... 75
Captain Chesley B. ``Sully'' Sullenberger III, Pilot, US
Airways (Retired).......................................... 76
Hon. J. Randolph Babbitt, Former Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration.................................... 77
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
June 14, 2019
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: Members, Subcommittee on Aviation
FROM: Staff, Subcommittee on Aviation
RE: Subcommittee Hearing on ``Status of the Boeing 737
MAX: Stakeholder Perspectives''
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Aviation will meet on Wednesday, June
19, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building
to hold an hearing titled, ``Status of the Boeing 737 MAX:
Stakeholder Perspectives.'' The hearing is intended to gather
views and perspectives from aviation stakeholders regarding the
Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302
accidents, the resulting international grounding of the Boeing
737 MAX aircraft, and actions needed to ensure the safety of
the aircraft before returning them to service. The Subcommittee
will hear testimony from Airlines for America, Allied Pilots
Association, Association of Flight Attendants--CWA, Captain
Chesley (``Sully'') Sullenberger, and Randy Babbitt.
BACKGROUND
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) mission is to
provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the
world. According to the FAA, the risk of a fatal commercial
aviation accident in the United States has been cut by 95
percent since 1997. There has only been one commercial airline
passenger fatality in the United States in more than 90 million
flights in the past decade.\1\ Prior to that single passenger
fatality in April 2018, the last fatal domestic commercial
airline accident occurred in February 2009, when Colgan Air
Flight 3407 crashed near Buffalo, New York, killing all 49
onboard and one person on the ground.\2\ However, in a span of
five months, there have been two fatal commercial airline
accidents involving the new U.S.-designed and manufactured
Boeing 737 MAX aircraft operated by foreign air carriers
outside the United States, raising safety concerns. According
to the Flight Safety Foundation, worldwide, there were more
than 50 fatal airline accidents each year through the early and
mid-1990s, claiming more than 1,000 lives annually.\3\
Fatalities dropped from 1,844 in 1996 to just 59 in 2017, then
rose to 561 last year and 209 already this year (primarily due
to the two 737 MAX accidents).\4\
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\1\ On April 17, 2018, Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 experienced
an engine failure, resulting in loss of an engine inlet and cowling.
Fragments struck the airplane's fuselage and damaged a cabin window,
killing one passenger onboard.
\2\ NTSB, Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc., Operating
as Continental Connection Flight 3407, Bombardier DHC 8 400, N200WQ,
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AAR1001.aspx.
\3\ David Koenig and Tom Krisher, Recent Airline Crashes Run
Against Trend Toward Safer Flying, U.S. News and World Reports and
Associated Press, May 6, 2019, available at https://www.usnews.com/
news/business/articles/2019-05-06/recent-airline-crashes-run-against-
trend-toward-safer-flying/.
\4\ Id.
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I. FOREIGN AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE BOEING 737 MAX
A. LION AIR FLIGHT 610
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610)--a Boeing
737 MAX--an Indonesian domestic flight en route to Pangkal
Pinang from Jakarta, crashed into the Java Sea at 450 miles per
hour approximately 11 minutes after takeoff, killing all 189 on
board (184 passengers and 5 crew).
According to the preliminary accident report by Indonesia's
Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi (KNKT),\5\ prior to
departure, the aircraft's left and right angle of attack (AoA)
sensors, which measure the angle between the airplane's wings
and the oncoming air, provided the pilots inaccurate readings
(a 20-degree difference between left and right sensors). This
faulty data made the accident aircraft believe it was in a
stall and therefore activated a Boeing system on the 737 MAX
called the ``maneuvering characteristics augmentation system''
(MCAS). The MCAS was designed to adjust the handling of the
aircraft so that it operates similarly to previous 737 models
by pushing the nose of the aircraft down based on certain data
inputs. However, due to erroneous AoA data, the MCAS on JT610
activated (i.e., pushed the nose of the aircraft down) more
than two dozen times during the 11-minute flight. The pilots'
manual attempts to counter the MCAS were ultimately
unsuccessful.
The preliminary report provides information on the flight
crew, including: \6\
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\5\ Translated means ``Transportation Safety National Committee''
or ``National Transportation Safety Committee.''
\6\ Lion Air 601 Preliminary Report available at https://
reports.aviation-safety.net/2018/20181029-0_B38M_PK-
LQP_PRELIMINARY.pdf.
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Pilot in Command: 6,028 hours (including 5,176
hours in the Boeing 737; the number of hours in the Boeing 737
MAX is not provided).
First Officer: 5,174 hours (including 4,286 hours
in the Boeing 737; the number of hours in the Boeing 737 MAX is
not provided).
According to the preliminary report, there were problems
reported by flight crews operating the aircraft on October 26,
27, and 28. The pilots of the flight immediately preceding the
accident flight (on October 28) experienced similar problems to
the accident flight on October 29. On the October 28 flight,
despite experiencing problems, the pilots continued flying with
manual trim, with the stick shaker activated, and without auto-
pilot until safely landing at Jakarta more than one hour later.
They reported certain problems to the airline but not the stick
shaker activation. The aircraft was serviced, tested, and
determined ready for flight.
On November 7, 2019, the FAA issued an Emergency
Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring operators of the 737 MAX
to ``revise their flight manuals to reinforce to flight crews
how to recognize and respond to uncommanded stabilizer trim
movement and MCAS events.'' \7\ Specifically, the AD stated
that in the event of an ``erroneously high [AoA] sensor input .
. . there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands
of the horizontal stabilizer. This condition, if not addressed,
could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the
airplane, and lead to excessive nose-down attitude, significant
altitude loss, and possible impact with terrain.'' \8\ The AD
identified existing flight crew procedures to be used in such
circumstances.
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\7\ Daniel K. Elwell, FAA, Testimony before for the Senate Commerce
Committee, Aviation and Space Subcommittee, hearing on State of Airline
Safety: Federal Oversight of Commercial Aviation, at 7 (Mar. 27, 2019).
\8\ FAA Emergency Airworthiness Directive, AD 2018-23-51 (Nov. 7,
2018), available at http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgad.nsf/0/83ec7f95f3e5bfbd8625833e0070a070/$FILE/2018-23-
51_Emergency.pdf.
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Indonesia's KNKT is leading the ongoing accident
investigation. As mentioned previously, on November 27, 2018,
the KNKT issued a preliminary report on the Lion Air crash. The
preliminary report was compiled prior to the recovery of the
cockpit voice recorder and does not contain analysis. The final
report, which will include the probable cause(s) of the
accident, is expected later this year. The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is assisting with this
investigation.
B. ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 302
On March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302)--a
Boeing 737 MAX--en route from Bole International Airport in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to Nairobi, Kenya, crashed approximately
six minutes after takeoff. The accident resulted in the death
of all 157 people on board (149 passengers and 8 crew members).
According to the Ethiopian Ministry of Transport's
preliminary accident report, erroneous AoA data from one sensor
triggered the MCAS during flight, pulling the nose of the
aircraft down, before it ultimately crashed into terrain.
Unlike the Lion Air pilots, the Ethiopian Airline pilots hit
the ``STAB TRIM CUTOUT'' switches (disconnecting the electric
portion of the plane's stabilizer), in accordance with Boeing's
emergency checklist described in the FAA's Emergency AD issued
months prior. The pilots did not reduce the throttle after
takeoff and the aircraft accelerated to between 450 and 500
knots. The maximum design speed of the aircraft is 340 knots.
As depicted in the image included in Appendix 1, using the
manual trim wheel at excessive airspeed can be difficult or
nearly impossible due to the downward force on the plane's
tail. According to the preliminary accident report, the pilots
reactivated the motor on the stabilizer, allowing MCAS to push
the nose down again. The pilots were unable to recover.
The preliminary report provides information on the flight
crew, including \9\:
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\9\ ET302 Preliminary Report available at http://www.ecaa.gov.et/
documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+B737-800MAX+%2C%28ET-AVJ%29.pdf/
4c65422d-5e4f-4689-9c58-d7af1ee17f3e.
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Pilot in Command: 8,122 flight hours (including
1,417 hours in the Boeing 737, and 103 hours in the Boeing 737
MAX).
First Officer: 361 flight hours (including 207
hours in the Boeing 737, and 56 hours in the Boeing 737 MAX).
Immediately following the accident, foreign civil aviation
authorities began grounding the Boeing 737 MAX planes. On March
11, 2019, the FAA issued a Continuous Airworthiness
Notification to the International Community (CANIC) for 737 MAX
operators, describing the FAA's activities following the Lion
Air accident in support of continued operational safety of the
737 MAX fleet. On March 13, two days later, the FAA ordered a
temporary grounding of the fleet operated by U.S. airlines or
in U.S. territory. The Boeing 737 MAX remains grounded today.
The Ethiopian government is leading the accident
investigation. As mentioned previously, on April 4, 2019,
Ethiopia's Ministry of Transport's Aircraft Accident
Investigation Bureau issued a preliminary report on the
Ethiopian Airlines crash. A final report detailing probable
cause(s) of the accident is expected within the year. The NTSB
is assisting with this investigation as well.
C. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN 737 MAX ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
An aviation accident rarely has one probable cause. Rather,
accident investigators consider a number of factors, including:
operations, weather, human performance, survival factors, and
aircraft structures, power plants, and systems, to name a few.
In terms of the two 737 MAX accidents, as the United States
is the state of design and manufacture of the accident
aircraft, the FAA and NTSB are serving as technical experts to
examine aircraft design and certification. In accordance with
Annex 13 to the U.N. Chicago Convention of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Indonesia and Ethiopia will
(respectively) be responsible for examining a number of
factors, including: pilot experience, pilot training,
operational factors, and aircraft maintenance.
International Pilot Training Standards. According to ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices, the pilot-in-command
requires an Airline Transport Pilot License (ATP). An ATP
requires a pilot have ``completed not less than 1,500 hours of
flight time.'' Further, ``[t]he Licensing Authority shall
determine whether experience as a pilot under instruction in a
flight simulation training device is acceptable as part of the
total flight time of 1,500 hours. Credit for such experience
shall be limited to a maximum of 100 hours, of which not more
than 25 hours shall have been acquired in a flight procedure
trainer or a basic instrument flight trainer.'' \10\
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\10\ See ICAO Annex 1, Personnel Licensing, at section 2.6
(regarding airline transport pilot (ATP) license).
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ICAO also provides standards to obtain a Multi-Crew Pilot
License (MPL), which ``allows a pilot to exercise the
privileges of a co-pilot in a commercial air transportation on
multi-crew aeroplanes.'' \11\ ICAO Standards for an MPL are set
at a minimum of 240 hours ``as the minimum number of actual and
simulated flight hours performing the functions of the pilot
flying and the pilot non-flying.'' \12\ The ICAO Standard
``does not specify the breakdown between actual and simulated
flight hours and thus allow part of the training curriculum
that was traditionally conducted on aeroplane to be done on
flight simulation training devices.'' \13\ The applicant pilot
is required to meet ``all the actual flying time for a private
pilot license plus additional actual flying time in instrument,
night flying and upset recovery.''
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\11\ See ICAO, Multi-Crew Pilot License, https://www.icao.int/
safety/airnavigation/Pages/peltrgFAQ.aspx#anchor24.
\12\ Id.
\13\ Id.
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FAA Certification and Delegation of Authority. All aircraft
and aviation products are subject to FAA certification prior to
their sale and use in the United States. The FAA is responsible
for regulating aviation safety, which includes approving the
design and manufacture of new aircraft and aviation products
before they enter the National Airspace System (NAS).\14\
Therefore, the FAA will need to review and approve any software
fix proposed by Boeing and determine whether changes to the 737
MAX training program are needed to get the aircraft back into
commercial service.
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\14\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 44702, 44704; GAO, Aviation
Manufacturing: Status of FAA's Efforts to Improve Certification and
Regulatory Consistency (July 31, 2014), GAO-14-829T, at 1.
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Since even before the FAA was formed over 60 years ago, the
Federal government has delegated some safety certification
responsibilities to technical experts in the industry. As
airplanes, engines, and their constituent systems became
increasingly complex, Congress authorized the FAA to leverage
the product-specific knowledge among appropriately-qualified
employees of manufacturers to determine a new product's
compliance with the applicable provisions of the Federal
Aviation Regulations. A designee may receive authority to
examine, inspect, and test aircraft and persons for the purpose
of issuing certificates.\15\
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\15\ GAO-14-829T at 4.
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The delegation program allows the FAA to leverage limited
resources to focus on the areas of highest-risk and make timely
certification decisions. According to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), in terms of the breadth or scope
of activities performed by FAA designees, designees perform
more than 90 percent of FAA's certification activities.\16\
However, the FAA has ultimate responsibility to ensure
appropriate oversight is taken and aircraft are certified in a
safe manner.
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\16\ GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA Efforts Have Improved Safety, but
Challenges Remain in Key Areas (Apr. 16, 2013), GAO-13-442T, at 3-4. In
a May 7, 2019, email to Committee staff, the GAO clarified that the 90
percent number refers to the breadth or scope of FAA activities on
which designees can do rather than the amount of certification work
done by designees.
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Since the original 737 aircraft was certified in the 1960s,
there have been more than a dozen new models of the aircraft
approved for flight. The 737 MAX is the latest version of the
737 aircraft. With regard to the FAA certification of the 737
MAX, the process to issue a type-certificate, from initial
application to final certification, took five years, according
to the FAA.\17\ The process included 297 certification flight
tests, including tests of the MCAS functions. The final type
certificate was issued in March 2017. The FAA reports it was
``directly involved'' in the System Safety Review of the
MCAS.\18\
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\17\ See Koenig, supra note 3 at 6.
\18\ Id.
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II. REVIEWS OF THE BOEING 737 MAX
Subsequent to the two fatal foreign airline Boeing 737 MAX
accidents, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), FAA,
and Boeing have stood up various panels, including those
explained below.
A. SAFETY OVERSIGHT AND CERTIFICATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SOCAC)
On March 25, 2019, as mandated by Congress in the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018, DOT announced it will stand up the
Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee. The
SOCAC is required to advise the Transportation Secretary on
policy-level issues related to FAA safety certification and
oversight programs, including efforts to streamline aircraft
and flight standards certification processes, utilization of
delegation authorities, risk-based oversight efforts, and
training programs. The SOCAC will develop training and
continuing education objectives for FAA engineers and safety
inspectors. While not directly tasked with Boeing
certification, aircraft certification is a key tasking of the
committee.
B. SAFETY OVERSIGHT AND CERTIFICATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE
On March 25, 2019, DOT announced it would create a Special
Committee to review the FAA's Aircraft Certification Process
(Special Committee) within the structure of the SOCAC,
described previously.\19\ The Special Committee is tasked with
reviewing the procedures of the FAA for the certification of
new aircraft, including the Boeing 737 MAX.\20\ The Special
Committee's review of the certification process includes the
``FAA certification process workplan, process timeline,
Organization Designation Authorization, Designated Engineering
Representatives Authorization/Certification, Authorized
Representation Certification and oversight thereof.'' \21\ The
Special Committee will focus primarily on the Boeing 737 MAX 8
certification process from 2012 to 2017 and make
recommendations for how the process could be improved.\22\ Its
findings and recommendations will then be presented directly to
the DOT Secretary and the FAA Administrator for their
consideration.\23\
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\19\ FAA, DOT Announces Special Committee to Review FAA's Aircraft
Certification Process (2019), available at https://
www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot1619.
\20\ Id.
\21\ DOT, Letter to General McDew (2019), available at https://
www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/briefing-room/337281/
gen-darren-mcdew.pdf.
\22\ Id.
\23\ Id.
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C. JOINT AUTHORITIES TECHNICAL REVIEW
On April 2, 2019, the FAA established a Joint Authorities
Technical Review (JATR) \24\ to conduct a comprehensive review
of the certification of the automated flight control system
(MCAS) on the Boeing 737 Max, including evaluating aspects of
its design and pilots' interaction with the system, determining
its compliance with all applicable regulations and identifying
future enhancements that might be needed.\25\
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\24\ FAA, FAA Updates on the Boeing 737 MAX: FAA Establishes Joint
Authorities Technical Review (JATR) for Boeing 737 MAX (2019),
available at https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=93206.
\25\ On March 26, 2019, Chair of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Chair of the
Subcommittee on Aviation Rick Larsen (D-WA) sent a letter to FAA Acting
Administrator Daniel K. Elwell, urging the agency to engage an
independent, third-party review composed of individuals with the
technical skills and expertise to objectively assess the corrective
measures proposed for the 737 MAX by Boeing.
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The JATR is chaired by former NTSB Chairman Chris Hart and
comprised of a team of experts from the FAA, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and international
aviation authorities, including China, Indonesia, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and
the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).\26\ The JATR
had its first meeting on April 29, 2019, and is expected to
last three months from the date it was established.\27\ The
JATR is not tied to the FAA's decision for return to service of
the 737 MAX. That decision will be based upon FAA's assessment
of the sufficiency of the proposed software updates and pilot
training to address known issues for grounding the aircraft.
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\26\ FAA Establishes JATR, supra note 24.
\27\ Id.
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D. TECHNICAL ADVISORY BOARD
On May 6, 2019, the FAA launched the Technical Advisory
Board (TAB). The TAB is tasked with conducting an independent
review of Boeing's proposed software change and its integration
into the 737 MAX flight control system. The review, which will
run parallel to FAA's software reviews and flight tests, will
include experts from the FAA, U.S. Air Force, the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center and NASA. The TAB is
distinct from the JATR, in that the JATR focuses broadly on the
earlier certification of the automated flight control system.
E. BOEING BOARD OF DIRECTORS REVIEW COMMITTEE
On April 5, 2019, Boeing announced it was creating a panel
that will examine the design and development of its
aircraft.\28\ According to Boeing's statement, the panel will
examine ``company-wide policies and processes for the design
and development of its aircraft'' and will also ``confirm the
effectiveness of [its] policies and processes for assuring the
highest level of safety on the 737-MAX program, as well as
[its] other airplane programs, and recommend improvements to
[its] policies and procedures.'' \29\
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\28\ Boeing, Statement from Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg: We Own
Safety--737 MAX Software, Production and Process Update (2019),
available at https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-04-05-Statement-from-
Boeing-CEO-Dennis-Muilenburg-We-Own-Safety-737-MAX-Software-Production-
and-Process-Update.
\29\ Id.
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III. ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS
A. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
On March 13, 2019, Chairman Peter A. DeFazio and
Subcommittee on Aviation Chairman Rick Larsen launched an
investigation by the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure into the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX.
B. DOT INSPECTOR GENERAL
On March 19, 2019, Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao
requested the DOT Inspector General (DOT IG) conduct an audit
``to compile an objective and detailed factual history of the
activities that resulted in the certification of the Boeing
737-MAX 8 aircraft.'' \30\
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\30\ The DOT IG reports similar audit requests from the Chairman
and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and
Related Agencies; and Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT). See DOT OIG,
Audit Announcement: FAA's Oversight of Boeing 737 MAX Certification,
available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/
Audit%20Annoucement%20-%20FAA%27s%20Oversight
%20of%20the%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20Certification.pdf.
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On March 19, 2019, Chairman DeFazio and Aviation
Subcommittee Chairman Rick Larsen asked DOT IG to investigate
the certification process for the Boeing 737 MAX, including how
each of the new features on the plane, including the AoA
sensors and the MCAS, were tested and certified. The request
also seeks investigation of the FAA's decision not to revise
pilot training programs and manuals to reflect flight critical
automation systems; how new features of the aircraft were
communicated to airline customers, pilots and foreign civil
aviation authorities; whether ODA authority contributed to any
of the factors FAA considered in its decision-making; and a
status report on how corrective actions have been implemented
since the Lion Air crash in October 2018.
On March 29, 2019, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Sam
Graves, Aviation Subcommittee Chair Larsen, and Aviation
Subcommittee Ranking Member Garrett Graves requested that the
DOT IG launch an investigation of international pilot training
standards and training for commercial pilots operating outside
of the United States, including training for the Boeing 737
MAX.
C. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
According to multiple news sources, it was reported that
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is conducting a criminal
investigation into the FAA's certification of the Boeing 737
MAX.\31\ Reports indicate the investigation began after the
October 2018 Lion Air crash and is primarily focusing on the
certification process.\32\ According to news reports, the FBI
Seattle Office and the Justice Department's criminal division
in Washington State are leading the investigation.\33\ The
Justice Department has declined to comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See Steve Miletich, FBI Joining Criminal Investigation into
Certification of Boeing 737 MAX, The Seattle Times (Mar. 20, 2019),
available at https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/
fbi-joining-criminal-investigation-into-certification-of-boeing-737-
max/; Evan Perez and Shimon Prokupecz, Justice Department Issues
Subpoenas in Criminal Investigation of Boeing, CNN (Mar. 21, 2019),
available at https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/20/business/boeing-justice-
department-subpoenas/index.html.
\32\ Id.
\33\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
According to multiple news sources, it was reported that
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is investigating
whether Boeing ``was adequately forthcoming to shareholders
about material problems with the [Boeing 737 MAX]'' and whether
the company's ``financial statements have appropriately
reflected potential impacts from the problems.'' \34\ The SEC
has declined to comment.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Bloomberg, Boeing Faces SEC Probe into Disclosures about 737
MAX Troubles (May 24, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-05-24/boeing-faces-sec-probe-into-disclosures-about-737-max-
troubles.
\35\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. NEXT STEPS AND IMPACTS OF THE GROUNDING
Returning to Service in the United States. After the
October 2018 Lion Air crash, Boeing announced that the company
is working on a design change to implement a software patch for
the MCAS. Boeing continues to work on the certification
documentation required to certify the MCAS software enhancement
and the associated pilot training material. The FAA is
responsible for reviewing and approving this and any other
design changes to the 737 MAX. According to the FAA, the ``737
MAX will return to service for U.S. carriers and in U.S.
airspace only when the FAA's analysis of the facts and
technical data indicate that it is appropriate.'' \36\ Boeing
CEO Dennis Muilenburg expects the 737 MAX to return to service
by the end of 2019,\37\ although the FAA has not committed to a
timeline.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Elwell, supra note 7, at 9.
\37\ CNBC, Boeing CEO Says Troubled 737 MAX Jets Should be Flying
by the End of the Year (June 3, 2019).
\38\ NBCDFW, FAA Meets with International Regulators Over Boeing
737 MAX (May 23, 2019), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/FAA-Meets-
With-International-Regulators-Over-Boeing-737-Max-510341841.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Input. On May 23, 2019, the FAA convened
foreign civil aviation authorities from around the world in
Fort Worth, Texas, to explain the agency's plan and approach to
evaluating Boeing's forthcoming changes to the 737 MAX.\39\ As
stated by Acting FAA Administrator Dan Elwell,
``Internationally, each country has to make its own decisions,
but the FAA will make available to [its] counterparts all that
[it has] learned, all that [it has] done, and all of [its]
assistance under [U.S.] International Civil Aviation
Organization commitments.'' \40\ The European Union (EU) has
stated it will require four conditions before allowing the 737
MAX to fly again in its skies, including that the European
Aviation Safety Agency (the EU's equivalent of the FAA)
approves Boeing's updates to the aircraft separate from the FAA
determination.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ FAA Acting Administrator Dan Elwell's Opening and Closing
Remarks at Directorates General Meeting, May 22 & 23 2019, https://
www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=93206
&omniRss=news_updatesAoc&cid=101_N_U.
\40\ Id.
\41\ POLITICO, Shadow of Global Mistrust Colors FAA's 737 MAX
Gathering (May 22, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impacts on Airlines and their Customers. There are more
than 370 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft worldwide,\42\ and, according
to news reports, there are fewer than 100 operated by U.S.
airlines and grounded at this time.\43\ Southwest Airlines is
the top 737 MAX operator in the United States. Airlines have
cancelled thousands of flights as a result of the international
grounding of the 737 MAX aircraft and have made schedule and
fleet adjustments to best accommodate passengers.\44\ According
to news reports, United Airlines alone has cancelled more than
3,000 flights and has removed its 14 MAX aircraft from
scheduled service through August 3, 2019,\45\ and American
Airlines has removed its 24 MAX aircraft from scheduled service
through September 3, 2019.\46\ It is reported that even after
the 737 MAX returns to service, airlines recognize potential
difficulty in getting passengers comfortable flying in the
aircraft again.\47\ Media reports indicate that at least one
airline has cancelled its contract with Boeing for new 737 MAX
aircraft altogether.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ See Boeing, 737 MAX Updates, https://www.boeing.com/
commercial/737max/737-max-contacts.page.
\43\ CNBC, U.S. Grounds Boeing 737 MAX Planes, Citing Links Between
2 Fatal Crashes (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/13/
boeing-shares-fall-after-report-says-us-expected-to-ground-737-max-
fleet.html.
\44\ See American Airlines statement, June 9, 2019, http://
news.aa.com/news/news-details/2019/The-Latest-Information-About-737-
MAX-Operations/default.aspx; Statement of Gary Kelly, Southwest
Airlines, April 26, 2019, https://www.southwest.com/html/air/737-MAX-
8.html?clk=737MAX8_190408; and CNBC, United CEO Says He's Not Sure
Travelers Will Want to Fly a Boeing 737 MAX--Even After a Fix (May 30,
2019).
\45\ United CEO, supra note 44.
\46\ CNBC, American Airlines Extends Cancellations from Grounded
Boeing 737 Max to Sept. 3 (June 9, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/
09/american-airlines-extends-boeing-737-max-to-september.html.
\47\ Id.
\48\ See e.g., Reuters, Azerbaijan Cancels $1 Billion Contract with
Boeing for Safety Reasons (June 3, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-boeing-azerbaijan/azerbaijan-cancels-1-billion-contract-
with-boeing-for-safety-reasons-idUSKCN1T413D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WITNESSES
Sharon Pinkerton, Senior Vice President,
Legislative and Regulatory Policy, Airlines for America
Captain Daniel Carey, President, Allied Pilots
Association
Captain Chesley Sullenberger, Pilot, US Airways
(Retired)
Sara Nelson, International President, Association
of Flight Attendants--CWA
The Honorable Randy Babbitt, Former
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
APPENDIX 1.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Seattle Times, ``Why Boeing's emergency directives may have failed to
save 737 MAX,'' by Dominic Gates on April 3, 2019.
STATUS OF THE BOEING 737 MAX: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rick Larsen
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Larsen. The subcommittee will come to order. I ask
unanimous consent the chair be authorized to declare recesses
at today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent members not on the
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
today's hearing and ask questions. Without objection, so
ordered.
Good morning. And I want to thank today's witnesses for
joining the subcommittee's ongoing discussion on the status of
the Boeing 737 MAX. Today's hearing is the second in a series
investigating the tragic Boeing 737 MAX accidents. The purpose
of today's hearing is to hear from people who fly the airplanes
and from the people who fly in the airplanes, and those who
represent them.
A total of 346 people have died in the Lion Air and
Ethiopian Airlines accidents, and their loved ones deserve
answers. The traveling public's confidence in U.S. aviation is
shaken. Congress, the administration, and industry must work
together to restore confidence in air travel. The foundation of
this committee's investigation into the Boeing 737 MAX is
ensuring safety.
As I have said before, if the public does not feel safe
about flying, then they won't fly. If they don't fly, airlines
don't need to buy airplanes. If they don't need to buy
airplanes, airplanes don't need to be built. And if there is no
need to build airplanes, there will be no jobs in aviation.
The foundation of the aviation industry is its safety, and
today's hearing builds on the committee's ongoing
investigation. Safety remains this committee's guiding
principle. In this committee we use all tools to reduce the
likelihood of future tragedies.
I want to start by updating subcommittee members and the
public on the committee's work since last month's hearing.
Chair DeFazio and I continue to engage with the Federal
Aviation Administration, the NTSB, Boeing, pilots, aviation
stakeholders, and others about these accidents. Second, the
committee's oversight and investigation team continues to work
with the FAA and Boeing on securing records that the chair and
I requested on the certification of the MAX.
More recently, Chair DeFazio and I have recently wrote to
Transportation Secretary Chao and FAA Acting Administrator
Elwell, expressing concerns about the slow pace of the FAA's
response to our records request. It is my expectation that both
will cooperate with the committee's investigation in a timely
manner. Third, we have written to Boeing, United Technologies
Corporation, and the FAA, requesting a timeline and supporting
documents related to the awareness of when the angle of attack,
or the AOA, disagree alert, on some Boeing 737 MAX planes, was
defective, as well as when the groups notified airlines about
this defect.
The committee is aware of information suggesting that
Boeing decided in November of 2017 to defer a software update
to correct the AOA disagree alert defect until 2020, 3 years
after discovering a flaw, and only accelerated its timeline
after the October 2018 Lion Air accident. This information is
deeply concerning, and the committee must find out what Boeing
knew, when the company knew it, and who it informed.
I also have questions about the decision to not deem the
AOA disagree alert as safety critical. The information the
committee is requesting will help us better understand these
management decisions. And I as well, again, encourage all
members of the subcommittee to continue personally monitoring
the situation. Staff continues to be available for any
questions the subcommittee may have surrounding our
investigation and can provide you with updates as they become
available.
What I hope to hear today from witnesses: More than 300
Boeing 737 MAX planes have been grounded worldwide since the
Ethiopian Airlines accident in March, and more than 130 are
parked. More than 4,500 orders for the MAX worldwide remain
unfilled since Boeing stopped delivering, that is over a longer
period of time.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to gather views and
perspectives from key users of the aircraft--pilots, flight
attendants, the industry, and those representing passengers'
views--on what the FAA, Boeing, and the airlines need to do
before returning the 737 MAX to service. The committee is not
here yet to make conclusions as to what caused these accidents,
that is the NTSB's job, but as with any aviation accident,
investigators must consider a multitude of factors, including
aircraft design, aircraft maintenance, weather, and human
performance, before making a final determination of probable
cause or causes.
In the end, there will be a root cause and there will be
contributing factors. Nevertheless, it is critical the public
hear from frontline stakeholders as part of our oversight work.
Captain Carey and Captain Sullenberger, I look forward to
hearing the pilots' perspective on these accidents, pilots'
role in the FAA certification process, and associated pilot
training.
Ms. Nelson, flight attendants are on the front lines of
passengers. I am interested in hearing your thoughts of what
must take place to restore the confidence of the flying public
and help you perform your important work.
Ms. Pinkerton, I would like to hear more about the impact
of the grounding on the airlines, airlines' engagement with the
FAA and Boeing on certification of the aircraft and related
fixes, and next steps to ensure safety.
And, Mr. Babbitt, as a former FAA Administrator, I look
forward to your thoughts on the importance of coordination of
the international aviation community on this issue and how the
FAA can regain its credibility and restore the public's trust.
And I hope today's testimony will help this committee
better understand what is needed to restore the trust of the
flying public and show this committee's commitment to safety by
asking all the appropriate questions.
As Congress seeks answers during the Lion Air and the
Ethiopian Airlines accidents, this committee must also work to
restore the public confidence in the MAX and the FAA's mission,
importantly, to maintain the safety of U.S. aviation in
aerospace. The committee will continue its thorough
investigation until it fully understands all the issues
surrounding the 737 MAX accidents.
And I will continue to work with Chair DeFazio and my
colleagues, Representative Graves and Representative Graves in
the full committee, as well as FAA, NTSB, Boeing, aviation
stakeholders, and the families of victims throughout this
process.
So, again, I want to thank today's witnesses. I look
forward to hearing your insights, and I turn to Representative
Graves of Louisiana for an opening statement.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't
know why you keep mispronouncing my name and pronouncing his
the right way.
I want to thank you all for being here today. And I think
the most important thing that we all need to stay focused on is
the families and the victims. I am, once again, very, very
sorry for your loss. Anything we do that loses sight that this
is about people, it is about lives lost, it is about safety, is
a distraction. And throughout this process, we need to stay 100
percent focused on lessons learned, on safety, and making sure
that this does not happen again.
In light of that, I want to go through and reference some
of the different committees and efforts that are underway right
now to ensure that we do extract every lesson learned from
these disasters and make sure that other families don't have to
go through the devastating situation that these families are
going through today.
Right now, the special committee on Safety Oversight and
Certification Advisory Committee, a DOT-initiated group, is
going through studying this process, lessons learned, from the
disasters. The Safety Oversight Certification Advisory
Committee that, once again, DOT has established, is going
through and evaluating the lessons learned here. Joint
Authorities Technical Review is an FAA-initiated group that is
looking at this. The Boeing board of directors has a review
committee that Boeing initiated. The Technical Advisory Board,
FAA initiated. There are various Department of Transportation
inspector general investigations that are underway right now.
And as I recently became aware, this committee is doing an
investigation and has hired investigators to look at this as
well. So there are numerous efforts that are underway right now
to ensure that we chart a better path forward.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today.
Thank you to every single one of you. And I did have a chance
to review your testimony.
Ms. Nelson, you make a really important point in your
testimony talking about how we need to ensure that we don't
allow this to erode the United States sort of standing in the
international aviation community. And you are exactly right
about that, we need to ensure we do that.
Captain Sullenberger, thank you for being here. In your
testimony, you talk about the chain of events, and I think you
used the term ``causal chain of events'' that contributed to
this. We need to make sure, and a lot of people are focused on
one single aspect of this, but I think it is important, your
testimony is exactly right, that we do need to look at every
aspect, not just one. Certainly, the MCAS system has been a
focus of this and it needs to continue to be, but we need to
make sure we look at every other step in the process as well to
make sure that we don't fix one thing and don't recognize
perhaps the failures or challenges associated with other
aspects of this. And I appreciate that.
Mr. Babbitt, thank you for your testimony. And you talked
about your confidence in the FAA certification system, and yet
I think you said in your testimony that it is not perfect. But
one of the things that you do have faith in, and don't let me
put words in your mouth, but I will leave it in your testimony,
you talked about how the certification process may be
imperfect, but you do have a lot of faith in our ability to
adapt and fix it.
One of the things in reviewing all of your testimony, that
comes to mind, we are becoming more heavily reliant upon
technology. We know it in everything that we do. And I have got
my old car that I drive that has virtually no technology, and
if I get in somebody who has got a newer car, and all of the
different sensors that are out there, and the rearview mirrors
when you are changing lanes, when you are fading off, when you
are going too fast, it is somewhat overwhelming and it is very
different. Is it making us become more complacent in driving,
in flying planes? And if so, how do we challenge that? How do
we challenge that--us becoming more complacent and ensuring
that we stay as alive as on top of what we are doing and don't
become too dependent upon this technology.
How does that technology challenge the certification
process? How does the certification process need to adapt to
the fact that we are becoming more reliant upon technology to
ensure, once again, that we are staying alive, that we are
paying attention to what is happening?
Look, at the end of the day, I am going to circle back to
where I started. This is about safety and it is about people.
And there have been many efforts that we have seen over the
past few months to make this a partisan effort, and I cannot
disagree with that more. I think it is a huge mistake to do
that. There is nothing that is partisan about this. Every
single one of us that are here today in this room, every one of
us that is on this dais, we all need to stay singularly focused
on the fact this is about safety and people.
And I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
second hearing today, and I am looking forward to the
witnesses. I do want to make note, we have a markup in another
committee, four bills that are very much related to the State
that I represent, and I am going to have to run in and out. I
think we have 80 amendments over there.
So I yield back.
[Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Aviation
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling today's hearing.
I also want to express my condolences to the families and friends
of those lost in the two accidents, some of whom are with us today.
This is the second hearing that the Subcommittee has held on the Boeing
737 MAX, and we are closely following open investigations and the FAA
and NTSB process for making key fixes. Throughout this process we must
stay focused on lessons learned, safety, and ensuring that this tragedy
never repeats itself.
As has been said before, the United States has the strongest
aviation safety record in the world. The reason we have such a safe
system is that past Congresses and administrations of both parties have
pushed partisanship aside and worked together to improve the safety of
our system.
When accidents happen, we must ask hard questions and demand that
aviation stakeholders do the same.
The FAA is asking itself hard questions, as is Boeing. We would be
remiss if we didn't expect airlines and pilot organizations to ask
themselves similarly hard questions.
In addition to design and potential certification deficiencies, we
have to understand why pilots facing similar challenging circumstances
react in very different ways. We have to take a look at industry
assumptions on pilot responses and human-computer interfaces. And we
have to figure out whether global pilot training requirements
adequately prepare pilots for all situations they may face,
particularly when automated systems fail.
If we don't work to understand these factors, we are not doing
everything we can to keep the flying public safe.
We are all committed to ensuring that automated aircraft systems
provide the safety benefits they are supposed to. But when automation
fails, a well-trained pilot must be prepared to respond. By looking
into all these issues, we can seek to avoid accidents relating to
automation failures on other aircraft too.
At some point, the Boeing 737 MAX will fly again. The FAA has laid
out a rigorous and uncompromising process for the aircraft to go
through before its return to service. Based on what we know currently,
we believe it will involve changes to the MCAS system and changes to
training requirements.
We can all be confident that the FAA will only unground the 737 MAX
when it is certain that Boeing has addressed any identified issue and
that the aircraft is completely safe to fly.
I believe that Congress must be at least as meticulous and
deliberative as the FAA in our efforts to figure out what went wrong
and determine what our next steps are.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Graves. And it is
fair for you to make sure you make your votes and your markup.
We appreciate that.
Before I turn to Chair DeFazio for an opening statement, I
just ask unanimous consent the following be entered into the
record of today's hearing: A June 12 letter from Ms. Nadia
Milleron and Mr. Michael Stumo to Chair DeFazio, and the
written testimony from the Association of Professional Flight
Attendants.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter from Nadia Milleron and Michael Stumo, Submitted for the Record
by Hon. Larsen
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Statement of Lori L. Bassani, National President, Association of
Professional Flight Attendants, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen
On behalf of the National President of the Association of
Professional Flight Attendants (APFA), I am submitting this testimony
to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. APFA is the
largest mainline Flight Attendant Union in the world and represents the
28,000 plus Flight Attendants of American Airlines. First and foremost,
APFA grieves for our professional colleagues, the 12 Flight Attendants
who lost their lives in the Lion Air and Ethiopia Airlines crashes, as
well as for the 330 passengers and 4 pilots who perished. These people
expected the Boeing 737 MAX 8 planes they were flying on and operating
to be fit for service. We now know that they were not.
These accidents account for a massive loss of life. In the wake of
this loss, we are left with a dire commitment to fulfill. As safety
professionals, we in the aviation industry must ensure that accidents
like these never happen again. We need our investigative agencies to
set aside all political interests to uncover exactly what happened with
the MAX 8 and why it happened. We need our agencies to spare no
expense, or time, to ensure that when the 737 MAX returns to the air it
is 100% airworthy.
The members of APFA are and will be on the forefront of the issues
surrounding the MAX 8. Aside from Southwest, American Airlines flies
the largest fleet of the MAX 8 among all airlines. The 24 planes in our
fleet have been pulled from service and this has affected over 100
flights a day. The flying public and schedules of flight crew have been
impacted.
Though various parties will be involved in determining the timeline
to get the MAX 8 in operation again, as Flight Attendants, we will be
the ones fielding the questions and concerns of passengers when the
plane is reintroduced. Our Flight Attendants must be included every
step of the way as they must be 100 percent comfortable and confident
in the aircraft's airworthiness to transport customers and crew.
Let me state that we have the highest regard for our pilots,
members of our brother union, the Allied Pilots Association, which
represents American Airlines' pilots. We stand in solidarity with APA
as they continue to advocate for what they need to feel confident in
the aircraft they are flying. Recently, it was reported that our flight
deck crewmembers were denied access to a 737 MAX simulator. APA wanted
their own safety experts to test this full-motion simulator that has
integrated the new fixes for the Boeing MCAS before it went through the
FAA certification process. Our pilots expected to be able to test these
new systems prior to certification so that their input would have real
bearing on the final solution. In a statement last week, Jason
Goldberg, a spokesperson for APA said, ``We really have no idea why
this stance would be taken towards our participation. We can't
understand why.'' We don't either. This is not acceptable. The pilots
who fly the 737 MAX every day must be involved, like the Flight
Attendants at every step in the reintroduction.
I would like to point out one key issue that must be addressed
prior to the 737 MAX going back into service. The overriding question
or issue is one of trust. Does the public, and do our Flight Attendants
and pilots, trust our management, the FAA, and Boeing to make their
decisions solely based on safety?
Let me be clear. While we understand management's position that the
grounding of the 737 MAX has created a hardship during the busy summer
travel season, financial considerations should never trump safety. We
applaud Mr. Ali Bahrami, the FAA's Associate Administrator for Safety,
who recently stated that although the FAA is ``under a lot of
pressure,'' the MAX would be returned to service only after design
reviews, flight testing and the other safety checks are successfully
completed. While Mr. Bahrami was reluctant to give a date, he agreed
with Boeing's estimate of a return by the end of 2019. We believe the
public gets mixed messages when members of AA management make arbitrary
statements that the MAX will be ``ready to go'' by mid-August. Let me
assure you that as cabin crew, we spend the greatest amount of time
with the traveling public and they rely on us to reaffirm that we have,
and will continue to have, the safest aviation system in the world. As
Flight Attendant safety professionals, our top priority is safety,
period.
To underscore the trust deficit that our regulators and
manufacturers have developed, NPR recently polled its listeners and out
of 1,600 respondents, over 1,000 said that they would not fly the MAX
when it is returned to service.
Again, I have raised the issue of trust because it is the Flight
Attendants who will be on the front line when this plane goes back in
the air. If the public does not believe that the process of returning
the 737 MAX 8 to service is not the result of a thorough, rigorous, and
transparent safety-driven process, then this aircraft will likely be
forever tainted.
The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee must continue to
exercise its constitutionally mandated responsibility to conduct
oversight of executive branch agencies. I congratulate Chairman DeFazio
and Chairman Larsen for conducting this important hearing. I look
forward to future hearings once the FAA approval software and training
fixes are announced. Congress must continue its oversight functions on
behalf of all people, airline passengers and crew.
Mr. Larsen. And with that, I will turn to Chair DeFazio for
an opening statement.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is, of course, our second hearing. I don't think we
should be here today. I don't think 346 people should have
died, and I believe that this was preventable.
We have family here today who lost a daughter, and we will
hear from them at a future meeting. But there are a lot of
questions that still remain unanswered, and we are pressing
forward with this as a very comprehensive investigation. A lot
of it leads back to the Organizational Designation
Authorization process, certification process.
The question about the role of engineers in this process
versus that of operators, pilots, and other safety
professionals who work on those planes. It is inexplicable to
me, and I asked--in the first hearing, I asked the Acting
Administrator, I said, is this a safety critical system, MCAS?
And he said, yes. And my question then was: How could we allow
a safety critical system with a single point of failure? We do
not allow that in the aviation industry. Well, the answer from
Boeing, at an early meeting after Lion Air was, well, the
pilots were the backup system. The pilots didn't know it
existed.
And the original system was relatively mild, .6 degrees of
deflection, you know, not repeated overrides of the pilot's
command, and, you know, that was in the manual. But then the
Boeing engineers changed it to 2\1/2\ degrees repeated
overriding the pilot's decision, and asked the FAA to take it
out of the manual. Now, that to me is shocking. It is in the
first manual when it is a relatively mild system that kind of
is similar to what we are going to--they are proposing with
their fix, except it will have two angle-of-attack sensors
input and other modifications.
So how could the FAA agree to that? Did they understand
what it did? Did anybody understand what this would do? I don't
think the implications were fully known.
There have been 14 versions of this plane since 1967. It
has been an incredible workhorse airplane. You know, I have
flown on one, I am sure, thousands of times. I have flown 6
million miles since I have been in Congress, so many, many,
many times. But at some point, you got to think there is a
cutoff, where this is a new plane and it is different than the
one from 1967. And it shouldn't just be an amended-type
certificate, it has to go through recertification. Now, of
course, that is a longer process. It is more expensive, it
might require pilot retraining. And the question is, why didn't
we get to that point with this plane? And that also goes for
the longer term looking at the certification ODA process.
Further, we discovered that the disagree light was
inoperable in many of the planes, the ones that hadn't bought
the extra package, apparently inadvertently, according to
engineers. But this was not reported to FAA for a year. And
until it became public, Boeing had no intention of fixing that
till 2020. Could that have played a role in helping to prevent
these tragedies? Well, we will never quite know that, will we?
You know, that is unacceptable.
And we have been in touch with both Boeing itself and
United Technologies Corporation, who designed that software, to
ask for a timeline and some explanation of how they think that
is a proper procedure. You know, we are going to hear today
from a number of people who are going to provide compelling
testimony. I won't go through the list again, others have
mentioned it. But I want to thank you for being here today.
We have now begun to receive substantial numbers of
documents from both Boeing and the FAA, and I have the
oversight staff and the aviation staff going through those
documents. And we will, I expect, fully expect, at a future
hearing have the FAA back in and have Boeing in to this
committee once we have the documentation digested that we need
to ask the meaningful, very pointed questions we will ask.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Chair DeFazio.
I recognize the ranking member of the full committee,
Representative Graves of Missouri.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you and Ranking Republican Graves for having this hearing. And
I also want to express my condolences to the families and
friends of the accident victims.
You know, today's hearing is going to focus on how to
safely return the 737 MAX back to service. And this process, it
has to be careful, it has to be deliberative, and all involved
have to be absolutely laser focused on safety. I believe
everyone at the FAA and at Boeing understand that to do
anything less than that is absolutely unacceptable. We owe it
to all of those who tragically lost their lives to get it
right.
As this process moves forward, input from the stakeholders,
both in the United States and around the world, is going to be
very important. And today, the subcommittee is going to hear
from some of those stakeholders.
As many of you know, I am extremely proud of our aviation
system here in the United States, and much of that pride stems
from how safe our system has been. And knowing how imperative
it is that we maintain this record and reputation, for that
matter, I want to share some of my thoughts on safely
ungrounding the 737 MAX.
First, the FAA's process to certify the 737 MAX--to certify
the fix on the MAX, it has to be and will be a very intensive
process. The FAA is going to conduct technical and operational
reviews and assessments, simulator and flight testing. There is
going to be evaluations and reevaluations and reevaluations on
top of that. And they are also going to share information with
and consider the comments and recommendations from the
stakeholders that are out there. And ultimately, I anticipate
that the FAA is going to issue multiple notices and multiple
directives and orders.
In addition, the Technical Advisory Board, or the TAB, and
we will hear a lot of about that with experts on there from the
FAA, from the U.S. Air Force, from NASA, from the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center, they are all going to
conduct parallel and an independent review, and the FAA is
going to consider their recommendations in this process.
Boeing is going to need to demonstrate compliance with
safety regulations and with the FAA directives. U.S. airlines
are also going to have to demonstrate compliance with all FAA
directives, and they will need to implement the required
training across their fleets.
Internationally, each country is going to have to make its
own ungrounding decision. The FAA is going to share
information, and they are going to provide assistance as it is
requested. And I am glad that the FAA is working with the
international regulators towards finding consensus regarding
the certification and return to service the 737 MAX.
The second thing is the FAA is working with Boeing, they
are working with the airlines, they are working with pilots and
international regulators, and they are going to determine what
training is going to be required both prior to the ungrounding
and as recurrent training obviously moves forward in this
process. And I believe it is critically important that we avoid
focusing primarily just on pilot training on the old MCAS
system and what occurred in the two MAX accidents. Because
there is real concern that training to the old system could
result in negative training by unintentionally introducing or
reinforcing outdated information or inapplicable concepts which
could actually decrease safety, and they could, they could
actually decrease safety.
The third thing is, I think it is vitally important that we
allow for the various investigations and reviews to run their
full course before we take any legislative action. To act
preemptively would only be--it is only going to be for optics.
And for people to be able to say that we did something, that is
what that would only be about, rather than solving what I think
is an identifiable problem in our system. Aviation accidents
rarely have one contributing factor. Those of us who fly, we
know that. There is always a number of investigations, and
there are a number of investigations that are looking at the
certification of the 737 MAX. And if problems are found, I do
believe that they have to be addressed.
But in reading the preliminary accident reports as well as
obviously many others with a lot of flying experience, many
have raised concerns with the pilot training, with pilot
experience, with aircraft maintenance, and definitely with
airline operations. And all of these issues have to be
investigated and they have to be reviewed. To ignore any
possible factor or to jump to any predetermined conclusions
about those factors, it creates the risk of future accidents
that could have been prevented by full and thorough
investigations.
And my final thing is we have to avoid politicizing our
aviation system. Safety is what the core--it is absolutely at
the core of what every pilot, every flight attendant, every air
traffic controller, engineer, repairman, manufacturer, every
inspector, every operator, and every regulator strives for each
and every day. It is the reason why in the last decade here in
the United States there have been nearly 7 billion passengers
on 90 million commercial flights with 1 fatality. That is a
heck of a record for the FAA and the aviation community in the
United States, and it is a heck of a record to be very proud
of.
And certainly, one loss of life is one too many. But that
unprecedented safety record is due to the safety culture of the
aviation industry, which includes a collaborative and
nonpunitive approach to certification and safety oversight. And
we must uphold that strong safety culture and that reputation.
Over the next few months, the FAA and Boeing are going to
work hard at ensuring that the safe return of the 737 MAX, that
it is safely returned to service. And their progress is
obviously going to be very closely monitored, not only by this
committee, but by the entire world. But I can say without any
hesitation that I believe that the Acting Administrator of the
FAA, that I believe him when he said that the FAA will return
the 737 MAX to service in the United States only--only when it
determines, based on the facts and technical data, that it is
safe to do so. Only then will it happen.
So, again, I want to thank you, Chairman, for having this
hearing, and I would yield back the balance.
[Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member Graves, for holding
this hearing.
I would also like to again express my condolences to the friends
and families of the accident victims.
The focus of today's hearing is how to safely return the 737 MAX to
service. This process must be careful and deliberative, and all
involved must be laser-focused on safety. I believe everyone at the FAA
and Boeing understand that to do anything less is absolutely
unacceptable.
We owe it to all those who tragically lost their lives to get this
right.
As this process moves forward, input from stakeholders, both in the
United States and around the world, is very important. Today the
Subcommittee will hear from some of those stakeholders.
As many of you know, as a pilot I am extremely proud of our
aviation system in the U.S., and much of that pride stems from how safe
our system has been. Knowing how imperative it is that we maintain this
record and reputation, I want to share some of my thoughts on safely
ungrounding the 737 MAX.
First, the FAA's process to certify the 737 MAX fix must be--and
will be--intensive. The FAA will conduct technical and operational
reviews and assessments, simulator and flight testing, and evaluations
and reevaluations. They will also share information with, and consider
comments and recommendations from, stakeholders. Ultimately, I
anticipate that the FAA will issue multiple notices, directives, and
orders.
In addition, the Technical Advisory Board (TAB), with experts from
the FAA, the U.S. Air Force, NASA, and the Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center will conduct a parallel and independent
review, and the FAA will consider their recommendations.
Boeing will need to demonstrate compliance with safety regulations
and FAA directives. U.S. airlines will also have to demonstrate
compliance with FAA directives, and they will need to implement
required training across their fleets.
Internationally, each country will make its own ungrounding
decision, and the FAA will share information and provide assistance as
requested.
I am glad that the FAA is working with international regulators
towards finding consensus regarding the certification and return to
service of the 737 MAX.
Second, the FAA is working with Boeing, airlines, pilots, and
international regulators, and will determine what training will be
required, both prior to the ungrounding and as recurrent training going
forward.
I believe it is critically important that we avoid focusing pilot
training on the old MCAS system and what occurred in the two MAX
accidents. There is a real concern that training to the old system
could result in negative training by unintentionally introducing or
reinforcing outdated information or inapplicable concepts, which could
actually decrease safety.
Third, it is vitally important that we allow the various
investigations and reviews to run their course before we take
legislative action. To act preemptively would only be for optics--for
people to be able to say we did something--rather than solving an
identifiable problem in our system.
Aviation accidents rarely have one contributing factor. There are a
number of investigations looking at the certification of the 737 MAX,
and if problems are found they must be addressed. But, in reading the
preliminary accident reports I, as well as many others with flying
experience, have also raised concerns with pilot training, pilot
experience, aircraft maintenance, and airline operations. All of these
issues must also be investigated and reviewed.
To ignore any possible factor or to jump to predetermined
conclusions about those factors creates the risks of future accidents
that could have been prevented by full and thorough investigations.
Finally, we must avoid politicizing aviation safety. Safety is at
the core of what every pilot, flight attendant, controller, engineer,
repairman, manufacturer, inspector, operator, and regulator strives for
each and every day. It is the reason that in the last decade in the
United States, there have been nearly 7 billion passengers on 90
million commercial flights, with only one fatality. That is a heck of a
record for the FAA and aviation community in the U.S. to be proud of.
Certainly, one life lost is one too many, but that unprecedented safety
record is due to the safety culture of the aviation industry, which
includes the collaborative, non-punitive approach to certification and
safety oversight. We must uphold that strong safety culture.
Over the next few months, the FAA and Boeing will be hard at work
ensuring the safe return to service of the 737 MAX. Their progress will
be closely monitored not only by this committee but by the world. But I
can say without any hesitation that I believe the Acting Administrator
of the FAA when he said, ``the FAA will return the 737 MAX to service
in the United States only when [it] determine[s], based on facts and
technical data, that it is safe to do so.''
Thank you again for holding today's hearing.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Graves.
I want to now welcome our witnesses. I am not going to read
titles and biographies, but we will have Sharon Pinkerton from
A4A; Captain Dan Carey of Allied Pilots; Captain Chesley
Sullenberger, retired pilot; Sara Nelson from the AFA-CWA; and
Honorable Randy Babbitt, former Administrator, FAA.
And I recognize each of you for 5 minutes. Without
objection, though, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record. Since it has been made part of the
record, we request you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
And first, we will recognize Sharon Pinkerton for 5
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF SHARON PINKERTON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY POLICY, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA;
CAPTAIN DANIEL CAREY, PRESIDENT, ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION;
CAPTAIN CHESLEY B. ``SULLY'' SULLENBERGER III, PILOT, US
AIRWAYS (RETIRED); SARA NELSON, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT,
ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS--CWA, AFL-CIO; AND HON. J.
RANDOLPH BABBITT, FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Pinkerton. Good morning. Chairman DeFazio, Ranking
Member Graves, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, thank
you for having this hearing today. My name is Sharon Pinkerton.
I am the senior vice president for policy at Airlines for
America. It is an honor and privilege to be here today to talk
about aviation safety. Nothing is more fundamental to this
industry than a commitment to safety.
U.S. carriers have led the world in aviation safety for
decades, and we are very proud of that record, but the events
that are bringing us here today have humbled us. These are
sobering tragedies. And as an industry, as Americans, as human
beings, we mourn the lost lives on Lion Air flight 610 and
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302.
I want to convey, not just our condolences, but also our
industry's commitment to support policies and actions that are
going to help ensure the highest level of aviation safety.
Our industry doesn't simply shrug off failures like this;
we fixate on root and proximate causes in order to learn from
what happened, and take that knowledge to better ensure the
safety of our passengers and crew.
As an industry, we are constantly challenging ourselves to
meet and exceed the highest levels of safety. It has to be said
that travel on U.S. passenger carriers remains exceptionally
safe, as the committee knows, because you have played a role in
shaping this system. We have flown almost 8 billion people on
94 million flights over the last 10 years. And in that time,
there was one fatality, and although that is too many, our
record is remarkable.
Commercial aviation remains the safest mode of
transportation by a wide margin, but we cannot and we will not
rest on the status quo, and that is our promise to you and to
the families that are here.
As you know, several authorities are still reviewing the
two overseas accidents. It is important to allow those
investigations to conclude before rendering final judgment. But
we know from experience that there are usually several factors,
not just one, that contribute to any accident. While we wait
for the findings and recommendations, Boeing has taken
responsibility and pledged to make improvements by updating the
flight control software. Our response must be deliberate, rely
on facts and data, before we form recommendations, which is how
the FAA is approaching these accidents.
The FAA's safety and regulatory framework is the gold
standard in the world, and our safety record is the proof of
that. We have a culture of collaboration in aviation where
everyone throughout the system, public and private employees,
manufacturers, carriers, everyone is encouraged to speak up and
speak out if they see a potential safety issue.
The industry does work closely with the FAA, and we believe
that a transparent and collaborative relationship is critical
to making the safest aviation system in the world even safer.
Our safety record is the result of deliberate and systemic
improvements over many years. We have moved from an early 1990s
very forensic approach, looking back to determine what
happened, to a very proactive and predictive data-driven
approach to determine that anticipates and prevents accidents
before they occur.
It was really in the mid-1990s that the industry and the
FAA started to rely more on data: data from the plane, data
from our employees, data from the controllers. The Commercial
Aviation Safety Team, or CAST, was formed to give all of the
players, labor unions, operators in the FAA, manufacturers, a
seat at the table to share information. And the 1996 FAA bill
provided protection to entities to help create a safe
environment for that information sharing. The Aviation Safety
Information Analysis and Sharing program, otherwise known as
ASIAS, represents the overarching program that connects all of
the FAA's safety programs and shares data from across those
programs and uses that information to identify risk and develop
mitigation strategies.
What is extraordinary about how this industry approaches
data sharing, it is unique to the aviation mode. Aviation data
is not proprietary. We don't compete. We communicate and we
collaborate when it comes to safety.
With respect to the impacts of the grounding of the MAX on
passengers, there were three U.S. carriers that were operating
the MAX when the aircraft was grounded in March; those carriers
immediately began reassigning existing resources to minimize
disruption passengers. Fortunately, carriers were able to
accommodate over 99 percent of impacted travelers through
rebooking and rerouting.
Of course, the question still remains, when will the MAX be
returned to service? And the answer is, not before the FAA,
working with our pilots, certifies that it is safe, and not
before adequate training is performed.
The FAA, working closely with our pilots unions, our
technical experts----
Mr. Larsen. Ms. Pinkerton, I am going to have to ask you to
wrap up.
Ms. Pinkerton [continuing]. And Boeing, is engaging in a
rigorous process.
I will close by saying safety is something not that our
industry doesn't take for granted, and we never will. For us in
the aviation community, our hearts break for the family
members. However, we take solace in the fact that there are
dedicated professionals, both public and private, that will do
everything they can to maintain our tremendous safety record
and build on it moving forward.
Thank you.
[Ms. Pinkerton's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sharon Pinkerton, Senior Vice President,
Legislative and Regulatory Policy, Airlines for America
Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, Members of the Committee,
Before I begin, on behalf of our industry, I would like to offer
both profound and heartfelt condolences to the families, friends and
loved ones of the passengers and crew members aboard both Lion Air 610
and Ethiopian Airlines 302 as well as our commitment to actions and
policies to help ensure the highest level of aviation safety. Our
hearts and thoughts are with them.
My name is Sharon Pinkerton and I am the Senior Vice President of
Legislative and Regulatory Policy for Airlines for America (A4A). Thank
you for the opportunity to testify. We welcome and appreciate the
opportunity to discuss our most important and paramount priority,
aviation safety.
Nothing is more foundational to our industry than our deep
commitment to safety; it is an ingrained second nature that touches
every aspect of our global industry. The entire aviation community
understands that safety is the bedrock upon which consumer confidence
is built. When it comes to safety, our baseline is perfection. When
perfection is not attained, it is critical we undertake a methodical
and deliberate review of all the components of our extremely complex
and technical system to make sure we isolate problems and identify the
fixes necessary to make our system better. As an industry, we look
forward to playing a constructive role in building upon and improving
the tremendous safety record we have all worked so hard to achieve.
That's why the flying public can have tremendous confidence in the U.S.
airline industry today. We have an unparalleled safety record that any
other industry--let alone any other mode of transportation--should
envy. We must not lose sight of the fact that aviation is THE safest
mode of transportation by any measure.
aviation safety--facts matter
Safety of our passengers and employees is at the core of U.S.
airline operations and everything we do. The unprecedented safety
record of U.S. carriers has been the result of deliberate and systemic
improvements over many years. We've moved from a forensic approach of
determining what happened in aviation accidents to a proactive, data-
driven approach which identifies risks and hazards aimed at preventing
accidents before they occur.
The nation's impressive commercial aviation safety record is due in
large part to the aviation industry and government voluntarily
investing in calculated safety enhancements to further reduce the
nearly infinitesimal fatality risk in U.S. commercial air travel. For
example, the work of the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) data
driven regulations, and other industry safety activities, contributed
to reducing the fatality risk for commercial aviation in the U.S. by 83
percent from 1998 to 2008. Today, the CAST aims to reduce the remaining
risk (50 percent) by 2025 by further leveraging industry data and
analytical tools from the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing Program (ASIAS). These efforts and others like them have helped
the U.S. achieve the safest period in its history.
Because there are few commercial aviation accidents and no common
causes, more data points are needed. Voluntary programs such as the
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), Flight Operational Quality
Assurance (FOQA) program and Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP)
give air carriers and the government insight into millions of
operations so potential systemic safety issues and trends can be
identified.
Together with our industry partners, the FAA and labor, we identify
and manage risk through several collective efforts and those voluntary
programs. For example, the ASAP encourages voluntary reporting of
safety issues and events that come to the attention of pilots, cabin
crew, mechanics and dispatchers. ASAP is based on a safety partnership
that includes the FAA, the certificate holder and employee labor
organizations. Employees report instances of noncompliance and safety
concerns without fear of recrimination. ASAP reports are analyzed and
evaluated, and corrective measure are taken by the industry to address
the safety concerns raised.
Similarly, CAST and ASIAS represent long-standing commitments to
building safety partnerships between government and industry that focus
on pursuing safety improvements in a collaborative and proactive
manner. ASIAS connects a wide variety of voluntarily provided safety
data from airline aircraft performance data and safety reports as well
as other information sources from across industry. The ASIAS program
works closely with a variety of integrated safety teams to analyze
safety data, identify risks and develop mitigation strategies. The
program continues to evolve but has matured to the point that it now
incorporates voluntarily provided safety data from operators that
represent 99 percent of U.S. air carrier operations in the National
Airspace System (NAS).
While any loss of any life is tragic, the odds of suffering a
fatality are far greater as a pedestrian, riding a bike, being a
passenger in a car or even being struck by lightning, based on data
from the collaborative efforts between government and industry to
improve aviation safety.
We strongly believe the FAA's safety and regulatory framework is
the gold standard in the world, and our U.S. safety record demonstrates
its success. As an industry, we will continue to adapt to change;
identify new risks and hazards; collectively and collaboratively
analyze risk; develop mitigation strategies; and continue to make the
safest airspace system in the world even safer. Our continued success
depends on these strong partnerships built on trust.
industry impact, assessment and response
For A4A member airlines that operated the 737 MAX, the FAA decision
to ground the aircraft created several immediate operational
challenges. These challenges were most acute at the onset of the
grounding as carriers were forced to make quick operational decisions
to accommodate passengers and adjust schedules. The extent of the
necessary adjustments varied based on overall fleet size, segments
operated, available spare aircraft and other factors. Below is a table
showing the 737 MAX aircraft in U.S. airline fleets as of March 31,
2019:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Airline 737 MAX Fleet as of 3/31/19
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Southwest 34
American 24
United 14
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal USA 72
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impacted carriers immediately started a process of forensically
analyzing their individual operations for available aircraft to cover
flight segments in order to minimize customer disruption as much as
possible. While each carrier dealt with the situation in a manner
consistent with their respective business, in general, the industry
employed an array of mechanisms to cope with the disruptions, including
but not limited to:
Trimmed 2019 capacity growth;
Incorporated spare aircraft into the active schedule;
Increased daily utilization of other aircraft types;
Deferred some painting, Wi-Fi installation/upgrades, and
selected other discretionary enhancements;
Reduced frequency on longer routes where alternative
routings were practicable;
Temporarily suspended lighter routes;
Leveraged automated rebooking tools (99 percent of
passengers rebooked within 24 hours); and
Consideration of leasing additional aircraft or deferring
retirements.
In the initial days after the grounding, it was unclear how long
the aircraft would remain grounded. Given the uncertainty, carriers
made schedule adjustments in order to accommodate the loss of the
aircraft for three- to four-week periods. Many of those short-term
plans have now been extended for months. The lack of certainty remains
to this day, which means carriers will have to continuously revisit
schedules and operational plans as the situation progresses. The bottom
line is that impacted air carriers will do everything they can to make
sure customers are accommodated.
Fleet management is a continual challenge. As the Committee knows,
U.S. airlines have been making significant upgrades to their fleets
over the past decade, which means new aircraft are coming on-line every
day, including several 737 MAX. In addition to the scheduling
accommodations made for existing aircraft, carriers have had to adjust
flight schedules and service plans based on the unknown delivery
schedule. Following is a table of 737 MAX orders for A4A members as of
March 31, 2019:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A4A Member Airline On Order as of 3/31/2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Southwest 268 (44 in the remainder of 2019)
American 76 (16 in the remainder of 2019)
United 171 (16 in the remainder of 2019)
Alaska 32 (3 in the remainder of 2019)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal USA 515 (76 in the remainder of 2019)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Canada 37 (12 in the remainder of 2019)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As indicated, several dozen 737 MAX aircraft were slated for
delivery between the date of the grounding and the remainder of the
year, and the return of the aircraft is generally not expected in time
for the peak summer travel season. In fact, A4A has projected summer
2019 air travel on U.S. airlines to rise for the tenth consecutive year
to an all-time high of 257.4 million passengers (2.8 million per day).
The more 737 MAX time is built into the schedule, the more aircraft
time is needed to cover lost availability. A4A estimates 737 MAX-
related summer flying reductions of approximately 250 daily flights and
43,000 daily seats for American, Southwest and United alone. This
pulldown in capacity is likely to put upward pressure on load factors.
The high load factors and use of spare aircraft for active flying--
to partially offset the void left by the grounded MAX fleet--will make
irregular operations caused by severe weather or other factors more
difficult to mitigate. Carriers are preparing accordingly and will
continue to be as nimble as possible to provide a seamless operation,
capitalizing on investments in equipment, staff and training made over
the past several years.
airworthiness--return to service decision
As noted, there is currently significant uncertainty related to the
timeline upon which the 737 MAX will be approved to return to service.
However, we recognize and agree that a full and robust process of
analyzing and testing any software design and training requirements is
of the utmost importance and the first step toward re-establishing
public confidence. Boeing has indicated they have put the software
update through hundreds of hours of analysis, laboratory testing,
verification in a simulator, and test flights. As the industry
continues to await guidance from Boeing and the FAA on the impending
737 MAX software enhancements and training requirements, we are
encouraged by the reported progress and proposed path forward for
returning the aircraft to service. We are confident that, once
certified by the FAA, the proposed enhancements will support the safe
operation of the MAX--making the aircraft one of the safest in the sky.
We are confident in our employees, procedures, airplanes, training,
maintenance, and performance monitoring systems. Boeing has said that
the software update will provide another layer of safety to the
operation of the MAX aircraft. We look forward to the FAA's final
guidance and will fully comply with any modifications and additional
training requirements to strengthen the reliability of the 737 MAX.
We fully expect the 737 MAX eventually will be deemed airworthy and
will return to service. When that decision is made, each carrier will
take specific steps based on its operations, maintenance and training
programs. In fact, much of the planning has been on-going since the
initial removal from service. Multiple departments at the airlines
including aircraft maintenance, training, crew planning and scheduling
as well as network planning and scheduling have roles in returning the
aircraft to service. While specific timing may vary, generally, once
the 737 MAX is approved for return to service several steps will be
taken, including but not limited to:
Necessary modifications to software and/or physical
installations resulting from the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System (MCAS) review must be implemented, completed and
inspected;
While A4A members who operate the 737 MAX support the
findings of the FAA Flight Standards Board (FSB) for Level B training
and checking for the MCAS system, we are awaiting a release of training
guidance and will review and comment once that training guidance has
been issued.
Assurance that aircraft are in compliance with all
current Airworthiness Directives that may have been issued or that
became due during the out-of-service period;
Assurance that any calendar-scheduled maintenance tasks
are accomplished;
Accomplish all pre-flight service checks per applicable
maintenance manuals;
Review the aircraft's Maintenance Logbook and execute an
Airworthiness Release for flight; and
Execute any required maintenance flight tests.
We are confident that the collaborative global process the FAA has
undertaken will eventually lead to a decision that will be supported by
manufacturers, operators, pilots and foreign regulatory bodies as well
as the flying public. The FAA has been transparent with international
regulators throughout this process by sharing their safety response to
these accidents as well as their data and testing. Make no mistake, it
will take a significant amount of work, but a collaborative message and
understanding will go a long way toward building public confidence in
the aircraft. We look forward to playing a constructive role in that
process.
recommendation
We believe it is more important than ever that we make fact-based
data-driven decisions when it comes to policy toward our aviation
safety system. Our industry has learned over the decades to wait for
ongoing investigations to conclude before rushing to judgment. Our
aviation system is safer than ever, and the U.S. commercial aviation
safety record is second to none.
Our safety record has evolved over decades with collaboration
between the FAA, manufacturers, air traffic controllers, pilots,
operators and many others. An open culture of effective collaboration
should not be misconstrued with coziness. There is no doubt or
disagreement that a balance is needed when it comes to a regulator and
the industry it oversees, but factual assessment of the results
achieved by that relationship should weigh heavily on the minds of
those so anxious to change it. Airlines do not compete when it comes to
safety. Safety is simply not something anyone in our industry takes for
granted, and it never will.
Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss not to take the opportunity to
thank you for your work on H.R. 1108, the Aviation Funding Stability
Act of 2019. We sincerely appreciate the Committee's leadership and
focus on practical solutions to mitigate federal shutdown impacts. As
you know, the impact of government shutdowns is particularly acute on
the aviation industry. With a robust FAA Airport and Airway Trust Fund
balance there is absolutely no reason that thousands upon thousands of
people should be forced to work without pay. As we look down the barrel
of yet another controversial budget and funding season--we will
continue to support your efforts. The systemic approach to improving
aviation safety means you fixate on and reduce risk across all
components. I think we can all agree, taking government shutdowns out
of the picture will certainly improve our system.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Captain Carey, 5 minutes as well. Be sure, everyone, that
you are pulling the microphone right up to your mouth.
Captain Carey, 5 minutes. Thank you.
Mr. Carey. Good morning, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member
Mr. Graves of Missouri, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Mr.
Graves of Louisiana, honorable members of this committee. My
name is Captain Daniel Carey. I am a 35-year career pilot at
American Airlines. I am also president of the Allied Pilots
Association, the largest independent airline pilots union in
the world.
I also serve as a member of the board of the Coalition of
Airline Pilots Associations here in Washington, a trade group
representing 32,000 professional airline pilots whose concern
is safety and security of the traveling public.
The piloting profession is in my family. My father and two
uncles were fighter pilots in World War II, one of whom lost
his life in the service of our Nation. My father was an early
pioneer with Trans World Airlines, and my daughter pursues a
professional career as a commercial pilot today.
I would also like to recognize the family of Samya Stumo,
who is here today. God bless you all. Samya was a young woman
as well, pursuing her career and young life, and tragically
lost her life on ET 302.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, what brings us
together today is the tragic accidents of two Boeing MAX
aircraft. We owe it to those 346 souls and the flying public
around the world to make sure these kinds of events never
happen again.
In my 35-year career at American Airlines, I have operated
as captain on five different types of airplanes, 28 years on
Boeing aircraft. I am here to tell you, Boeing designs and
engineers and manufactures superb aircraft.
Unfortunately, in the case of the MAX, I will have to agree
with the Boeing CEO, they let the traveling public down in a
fatal and catastrophic way. As said here earlier by some of the
speakers, we will await the conclusion of the several
investigations underway around the world before we determine
the final judgment of the MAX disasters.
There are a few facts we do know. The MAX was designed to
provide the same aircraft feel as the 737. This was intended to
minimize costs to Boeing's customers by allowing the MAX to be
certified as a 737 typed aircraft. This led Boeing engineers to
add the MCAS system. Many mistakes were subsequently made by
Boeing, as the MCAS was designed as a federated, not an
integrated aircraft system.
As a single port of failure, this design meant that the
redundancy of the system went back to the captain and first
officer of the aircraft. The huge error of omission was the
fact that Boeing failed to disclose the existence of the MCAS
system to the pilot community around the world. The final fatal
mistake was, therefore, the absence of robust pilot training in
the event of an MCAS failure.
The most important issue now is the question of the
airworthiness of the MAX aircraft. I believe the Boeing
engineers have indeed found the problems to the software
problems--issues facing the MAX. And, therefore, the
redundancies are now embedded in the aircraft in the event of a
misfiring of the MCAS going forward. However, at APA, we remain
concerned about whether the new training protocol, materials,
and methods of instruction suggested by Boeing are adequate to
ensure that pilots across the Nation and around the world can
operate the MAX fleet with absolute and complete safety.
In fact, during a meeting with the FAA in April, the FAA
officials highlighted a critical checklist that Boeing directed
pilots to use to recover the MAX after an MCAS firing. The FAA
officials stated that this critical checklist had not been
validated since 1967. This is an example of why the APA has
integrated into the flight standardization board comments,
calling for the review, improvement, and training of critical
MCAS misfire recovery checklists.
I don't have all the answers today, nobody does, but I do
have some questions. First, is the FAA sufficiently independent
of the manufacturers as to provide legitimately rigorous audit
of manufacturing design and engineering? Second, should a
federated system, which may lead to an unrecoverable event, be
certified ever by the FAA? Third, should the FAA aircraft
certification, as for example, a 737 designation from 1967,
have a timeline or a sunset date? Finally, is the FAA
sufficiently equipped to ensure that pilot training protocols
are vigorous and robust as aircraft become more and more
sophisticated?
Mr. Chairman, these are among the questions that I hope
this committee examines, and of course, there are many others.
Unfortunately, as pilots know, improvements in aviation are
often, too often, written in the blood of the unfortunate
victims of these airplane accidents. But all of us--pilots,
flight attendants, airline companies, manufacturers, the
executive branch of our government, and Congress--owe it to the
victims at the highest level of diligence to make sure these
kind of accidents never happen again.
This is a global aviation crisis of trust and will require
global solutions to restore and bolster culture and respect----
Mr. Larsen. I am going to have to ask you to wrap up.
Mr. Carey. The pilots of the Allied Pilots Association are
humbled and proud to be part of this noble cause. Thank you,
and I look forward to your questions.
[Mr. Carey's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Daniel Carey, President, Allied Pilots
Association
Good morning, Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member Mr. Graves of
Louisiana. Good morning, Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member Mr. Graves
of Missouri. Good morning to you, Honorable Members of the Committee.
My name is Daniel Carey. I am a 35-year career captain with
American Airlines and president of the Allied Pilots Association. The
Allied Pilots Association is the largest independent pilot union in the
world. I am not just privileged, but honored to represent the 15,000
professional men and women pilots of American Airlines. I can tell you
that they are an outstanding group of professional pilots dedicated to
ensuring the safe passage of all people who fly on American Airlines in
our country and around the world. I am also a member of the board of
the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations, a trade association
representing 32,000 professional pilots dedicated to airline safety and
security.
The piloting profession is in my DNA. My father and two uncles were
distinguished World War II fighter pilots who served our nation, one of
whom gave his life. My father was also an early pilot pioneer for Trans
World Airlines. My daughter, his granddaughter, continues the family
tradition as a commercial pilot.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, what brings us together
today are the tragic accidents involving two Boeing 737 MAX aircraft.
The hearts of all our 15,000 American Airlines pilots go out to the
families, friends and associates of the 346 souls lost in the Lion Air
and Ethiopian Air crashes. We owe it to those lost souls and to the
flying public, worldwide, to make sure these kinds of events never
happen again.
In my 35-year career at American Airlines, I have flown as Captain
in five models of American's aircraft with more than 28 years on Boeing
aircraft. My professional view is that the Boeing Corporation has
manufactured superbly engineered and designed aircraft over many
decades. Unfortunately, in the matter of the 737 MAX, I completely
agree with the Boeing CEO's assessment that the company let down the
public with catastrophic consequences.
As professional pilots, we understand that the ultimate conclusion
regarding the causes of these accidents must await the final findings
of the exhaustive investigations underway.
There are certain facts we know:
1. The 737 MAX was designed to provide the same aircraft feel to
the pilots as the 737. This was intended to minimize the operating cost
to Boeing's customers by allowing the MAX to be certified by the FAA as
a 737. The point was to provide Boeing's customers with a new advanced
aircraft while minimizing the training cost associated with a different
aircraft certification. This led Boeing's engineers to add the MCAS
system. Many mistakes were subsequently made by Boeing engineers as
MCAS was designed as a ``federated'' not ``integrated'' system. As a
single-point-of-failure design, this meant that any redundancy to the
system, if it failed, was completely dependent on the Captain and First
Officer of the aircraft.
2. The huge error of omission is that Boeing failed to disclose
the existence of MCAS to the pilot community.
3. The final fatal mistake was, therefore, the absence of robust
pilot training in the event that the MCAS failed.
I can tell you that the members of APA are offended by remarks made
by those who seem to blame the pilots killed in those two crashes. Some
negative aspersions have appeared in the press relating to the quality
of pilots trained in Africa. I am here to tell you that I worked in
Africa and trained African pilots to fly large aircraft. I am very
familiar with Ethiopian Air's pilot training program and facilities,
and I can tell you that they are world-class. In fact, while not one
U.S. airline has a MAX simulator, one non-U.S. airline does--Ethiopian
Air. To make the claim that these accidents would not happen to U.S.-
trained pilots is presumptuous and not supported by fact. Vilifying
non-U.S. pilots is disrespectful and not solution-based, nor is it in
line with a sorely needed global safety culture that delivers one
standard of safety and training. Simply put, Boeing does not produce
aircraft for U.S. pilots vs. pilots from the rest of the world.
The most important issue now is the question of the airworthiness
of the 737 MAX fleet. I believe that the Boeing engineers have indeed
made significant positive changes with the new software fixes, many of
which our pilots demanded when we met with Boeing officials in November
2018. There are now redundancies embedded in the aircraft in the event
of the ``firing'' of MCAS. However, at APA we remained concerned about
whether the new training protocol, materials and method of instruction
suggested by Boeing are adequate to ensure that pilots across the globe
flying the MAX fleet can do so in absolute complete safety.
In fact, during a meeting with the FAA on April 12, 2019, with U.S.
airlines and pilot unions, FAA officials highlighted a critical
checklist that Boeing directed pilots to use to recover the MAX after
an MCAS misfire. The FAA official stated that this critical checklist
had not been validated since 1967, noting that the 737 has been
dramatically modified many times since. The FAA official cited
potential issues with pilot ``manual trim effort'' required and
challenging ``elevator loads'' confronting pilots when this checklist
is executed. This is an example of why APA's comments to the Flight
Standardization Board include calling for a review, improvement and
training of critical MCAS misfire recovery checklists.
With regard to the public policy issues generated by the fatal MAX
crashes, the foremost and most urgent, in my view, is assessment of the
adequacy of the FAA aircraft certification process. This is a complex
subject because the certification process is extremely sophisticated.
So, I do not have all the answers about ways to improve the FAA
aircraft certification process, but I do have some questions:
1. First, is the FAA sufficiently independent of the manufacturers
so as to provide a legitimately rigorous audit of the manufacturers'
design and engineering?
2. Second, should a ``federated'' system, which may lead to an
unrecoverable event, ever be certified by the FAA?
3. Third, should an FAA aircraft certification--such as a 737
designation from 1967--have a date for termination or sunset?
4. Finally, is the FAA sufficiently equipped to ensure that pilot
training protocols are vigorous and robust as aircraft are becoming
more and more technologically sophisticated?
Mr. Chairman, these are among the questions that I respectfully
hope this committee examines. Of course, there are many others as well.
Unfortunately, as pilots know, improvements in aviation are often
written in the blood of the unfortunate victims of airplane accidents.
But all of us--the pilots, flight attendants, airline companies,
manufacturers, the executive branch of our government, and Congress--
owe those victims the highest level of diligence to make sure these
kinds of accidents never happen again.
This is a global aviation crisis of trust and will require global
solutions to restore and bolster aviation's global safety culture and
reputation. As sad and grim as these crashes were, there is an
opportunity to lead and bring something positive out of this darkness.
As the last line of defense for our passengers, the members of the
Allied Pilots Association are humbled and proud to be a part of this
noble cause.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Captain Chesley B. Sullenberger
III, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sullenberger. Thank you, Chairman Larsen, Ranking
Member Graves, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, and
other members of the committee. It is my honor to appear today
before this Subcommittee on Aviation. Like Americans and many
others around the world, I am shocked and saddened by these two
awful tragedies and terrible loss of life.
I just met the parents of 24-year-old Samya Stumo, and I
saw in their eyes the incomprehensible immensity of their loss.
These crashes are demonstrable evidence that our current system
of aircraft design and certification has failed us. These
accidents should never have happened. The accident
investigations of these crashes will be not completed but for
many months, but some things are clear, accidents are the end
result of a causal chain of events, but in this case, the chain
began with decisions that had been made years before to update
a half-century-old design.
Boeing added MCAS, but the existence of it was not
communicated to pilots until after the first crash. Some have
said that even though MCAS software had flaws, the pilots on
these flights should have performed better and been able to
solve the sudden, unanticipated crisis they faced. Boeing has
said that they did not categorize a failure of MCAS as more
critical because they assumed that pilot action would be the
safeguard.
From my 52 years of flying experience and my many decades
of safety work, I know that we must consider all the human
factors of these accidents and how system design determines how
many and what kinds of errors will be made and how
consequential they will be. These two recent crashes happened
in foreign countries. But if we do not address all the
important issues and factors, they can and will happen here.
We owe it to everyone who flies, passengers and crews
alike, to make sure that pilots will be able to handle an
unexpected emergency and keep their passengers and crew safe,
but first, we should design aircraft for them to fly that do
not have inadvertent traps set for them.
I am one of a relatively small group of people who have
experienced such a crisis and lived to share what we learned
about it. I can tell you firsthand that the startle factor is
real and it is huge. It absolutely interferes with one's
ability to quickly analyze the crisis and take effective
action.
Within seconds, these crews would have been fighting for
their lives in the fight of their lives. In both 737 MAX
accidents, the failure of a single angle-of-attack sensor
quickly caused multiple instrument indication anomalies and
sudden loud and in some cases false warnings, creating major
distractions, masking the cause, and would have made it even
harder to quickly analyze the situation and take effective
corrective action.
I recently experienced all these warnings in a 737 MAX
flight simulator during recreations of the accident flights.
Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews
could have run out of time before they could have solved the
problems.
Prior to these accidents, I think it is unlikely that any
U.S. airline pilots were confronted with this scenario in
simulator training. We must make sure that everyone who
occupies a pilot seat is fully armed with the information,
knowledge, training, skill, judgment and experience to be the
absolute master of the aircraft and all its component systems
and of the situation simultaneously and continuously throughout
the flight.
As aviation has become safer, we can no longer define
safety solely as the absence of accidents. We must do much more
than that, we must be more proactive than that. In essence, we
must investigate accidents before they happen. We should all
want pilots to experience these challenging situations for the
first time in a simulator and not in flight with passengers and
crew on board. And reading about it on an iPad is not even
close to sufficient. Pilots must experience it physically
firsthand.
If we don't learn from these crashes, if we just file the
findings away on a shelf to gather dust, we will only compound
these tragedies. We will make the loss of lives in these
accidents even more tragic if we say that these were just black
swan events, unlikely to happen again, and decide not to act
and, instead, just protect the status quo.
Only by discovering and correcting the ways in which these
tragedies occurred can we begin to regain the trust of our
passengers, flight attendants, pilots, and the American people.
[Mr. Sullenberger's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Chesley B. ``Sully'' Sullenberger III,
Pilot, US Airways (Retired)
Thank you, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, Chairman
DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, and other members of the committee. It
is my honor to appear today before the Subcommittee on Aviation.
We are here because of the tragic crashes within five months of
Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302, two fatal accidents with no survivors
on a new aircraft type, something that is unprecedented in modern
aviation history.
Like most Americans and many others around the world I'm shocked
and saddened by these two awful tragedies and the terrible loss of
life. Now we have an obligation to find out why these tragic crashes
happened, and keep them from ever happening again.
These crashes are demonstrable evidence that our current system of
aircraft design and certification has failed us.
We don't yet know in every way how it has failed us. Multiple
investigations are ongoing. We owe it to everyone who flies to find out
where and how the failures occurred, and what changes must be made to
prevent them from happening in the future.
It is obvious that grave errors were made that have had grave
consequences, claiming 346 lives.
The accident investigations of these crashes will not be completed
for many months, but some things are already clear.
Accidents are the end result of a causal chain of events, and in
the case of the Boeing 737 MAX, the chain began with decisions that had
been made years before, to update a half-century-old design.
Late in the flight testing of the 737 MAX, Boeing discovered an
aircraft handling issue. Because the 737 MAX engines were larger than
the engines on previous 737 models they had to be mounted higher and
farther forward for ground clearance, which reduced the aircraft's
natural aerodynamic stability in certain conditions. Boeing decided to
address the handling issue by adding a software feature, Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), to the 737 MAX. MCAS was
made autonomous, able in certain conditions to move a secondary flight
control by itself to push the nose down without pilot input.
In adding MCAS, Boeing added a computer-controlled feature to a
human-controlled airplane but without also adding to it the integrity,
reliability and redundancy that a computer-controlled system requires.
Boeing also designed MCAS to look at data from only one Angle of
Attack (AOA) sensor, not two. One result of this decision was that it
allowed false data from a single sensor to wrongly trigger the
activation of MCAS, thus creating a single point of failure. A single
point of failure in an aircraft goes against widely held aircraft
design principles.
On both accident flights, the triggering event was a failure of an
AOA sensor. We do not yet know why the AOA sensors on these flights
generated erroneous information, triggering MCAS, whether they were
damaged, sheared off after being struck, were improperly maintained or
repaired, or for some other reason.
Boeing designers also gave MCAS too much authority, meaning that
they allowed it to autonomously move the horizontal stabilizer to the
full nose-down limit.
And MCAS was allowed to move the stabilizer in large increments,
rapidly and repeatedly until the limit was reached. Because it moved
stabilizer trim intermittently, it was more difficult to recognize it
as a runaway trim situation (an uncommanded and uncontrolled trim
movement emergency), as appears to have happened in the first crash.
Though MCAS was intended to enhance aircraft handling, it had the
potential to have the opposite effect; being able to move the
stabilizer to its limit could allow the stabilizer to overpower the
pilots' ability to raise the nose and stop a dive toward the ground.
Thus it was a trap that was set inadvertently during the aircraft
design phase that would turn out to have deadly consequences.
Obviously Boeing did not intend for this to happen. But to make
matters worse, even the existence of MCAS, much less its operation, was
not communicated to the pilots who were responsible for safely
operating the aircraft until after the first crash.
Also with the MAX, Boeing changed the way pilots can stop
stabilizer trim from running when it shouldn't. In every previous
version of the 737, pilots could simply move the control wheel to stop
the trim from moving, but in the MAX, with MCAS activated, that method
of stopping trim no longer worked. The logic was that if MCAS
activated, it had to be because it was needed, and pulling back on the
control wheel shouldn't stop it.
It is clear that the original version of MCAS was fatally flawed
and should never have been approved.
It has been suggested that even if the MCAS software had flaws, the
pilots on these flights should have performed better and been able to
solve the sudden unanticipated crises they faced. Boeing has even said
that in designing MCAS they did not categorize a failure of MCAS as
critical because they assumed that pilot action would be the ultimate
safeguard.
We owe it to everyone who flies, passengers and crews alike, to do
much better than to design aircraft with inherent flaws that we intend
pilots will have to compensate for and overcome.
Pilots must be able to handle an unexpected emergency and still
keep their passengers and crew safe, but we should first design
aircraft for them to fly that do not have inadvertent traps set for
them.
We must also consider the human factors of these accidents.
From my 52 years of flying experience, and my many decades of
safety work--I know that nothing happens in a vacuum, and we must find
out how design issues, training, policies, procedures, safety culture,
pilot experience and other factors affected the pilots' ability to
handle these sudden emergencies, especially in this global aviation
industry.
Dr. Nancy Leveson, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
has a quote that succinctly encapsulates much of what I have learned
over many years: ``Human error is a symptom of a system that needs to
be redesigned.''
These two recent crashes happened in foreign countries, but if we
do not address all the important issues and factors, they can and will
happen here. To suggest otherwise is not only wrong, it's hubris.
As one of our preeminent human factors scientists, Dr. Key
Dismukes, now retired as Chief Scientist for Human Factors at the NASA
Ames Research Center, has said, ``Human performance is variable and it
is situation-dependent.''
I'm one of the relatively small group of people who have
experienced such a sudden crisis--and lived to share what we learned
about it. I can tell you firsthand that the startle factor is real and
it is huge--it interferes with one's ability to quickly analyze the
crisis and take effective action.
Within seconds, these crews would have been fighting for their
lives in the fight of their lives.
These two accidents, as well as Air France 447 which crashed in the
South Atlantic in June 2009, are also vivid illustrations of the
growing level of interconnectedness of devices in aircraft. Previously,
with older aircraft designs, there were mostly stand-alone devices, in
which a fault or failure was limited to a single device that could
quickly be determined to be faulty and the fault remain isolated. But
with integrated cockpits and data being shared and used by many
devices, a single fault or failure can now have rapidly cascading
effects through multiple systems, causing multiple cockpit alarms,
cautions and warnings, which can cause distraction and increase
workload, creating a situation that can quickly become ambiguous,
confusing and overwhelming, making it much harder to analyze and solve
the problem.
In both 737 MAX accidents, the failure of an AOA sensor quickly
caused multiple instrument indication anomalies and cockpit warnings.
And because in this airplane type the AOA sensors provide information
to airspeed and altitude displays, the failure triggered false warnings
simultaneously of speed being too low and also of speed being too fast.
The too slow warning was a `stick-shaker' rapidly and loudly shaking
the pilot's control wheel. The too fast warning was a `clacker',
another loud repetitive noise signaling overspeed. These sudden loud
false warnings would have created major distractions and would have
made it even harder to quickly analyze the situation and take effective
corrective action.
I recently experienced all these warnings in a 737 MAX flight
simulator during recreations of the accident flights. Even knowing what
was going to happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time
and altitude before they could have solved the problems.
Prior to these accidents, I doubt if any U.S. airline pilots were
confronted with this scenario in simulator training.
We must make sure that everyone who occupies a pilot seat is fully
armed with the information, knowledge, training, skill, experience and
judgment they need to be able to be the absolute master of the aircraft
and all its component systems, and of the situation, simultaneously and
continuously throughout a flight.
As aviation has become safer, it has become harder to avoid
complacency. We have made air travel so safe and routine, some have
assumed that because we haven't had a lot of accidents in recent years
we must be doing everything right.
But we can no longer define safety solely as the absence of
accidents. We must do much more than that; we must be much more
proactive than that.
We need to proactively find flaws and risks and mitigate them
before they lead to harm.
We must investigate accidents before they happen.
Each aircraft manufacturer must have a comprehensive safety risk
assessment system that can review an entire aircraft design
holistically, looking for risks, not only singly, but in combination.
We must also look at the human factors and assumptions made about
human performance in aircraft design and certification, and pilot
procedure design.
In addition to fixing MCAS in a way that resolves all the many
issues with it, including that the AOA Disagree light be made operative
on all Max aircraft, we must greatly improve the procedures to deal
with uncommanded trim movement, provide detailed system information to
pilots that is more complete, give pilots who fly the 737 MAX
additional Level D full flight simulator training so that they will
see, hear, feel, experience and understand the challenges associated
with MCAS, such as Unreliable Airspeed, AOA Disagree, Runaway
Stabilizer and Manual Trim. They must have the training opportunity to
understand how higher airspeeds greatly increase the airloads on the
stabilizer, making it much more difficult to move manually, often
requiring a pilot to use two hands, or even the efforts of both pilots
to move it. And in some cases, how it cannot be moved at all unless the
pilot flying temporarily stops trying to raise the nose and relieves
some of the airloads by moving the control wheel forward.
Pilots must develop the muscle memory to be able to quickly and
effectively respond to a sudden emergency. Reading about it on an iPad
is not even close to sufficient; pilots must experience it physically,
firsthand.
We should all want pilots to experience these challenging
situations for the first time in a simulator, not in flight with
passengers and crew on board.
We must look closely at the certification process. There have been
concerns about the aircraft certification process for decades. Just a
brief search revealed 18 reports produced by GAO, DOT OIG, and
Congressional committees since 1992.
Many questions remain to be and must be answered:
Has the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) outsourced too much
certification work?
Should FAA be selecting the manufacturer employees who do
certification work on behalf of FAA, instead of the employer, as is
currently the case?
Did oversight fail to result in accountability?
Do the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) employees and Boeing
employees doing certification work have the independence they need to
ensure safe designs?
Was there a failure to identify risks and their implications?
Was the analysis of failure modes and effects inadequate?
How was it that critically important information was not
effectively communicated and shared with airlines and pilots?
Many other questions must be asked about the role Boeing played in
these accidents:
Was there a leadership failure?
A governance failure?
An engineering failure?
A risk analysis failure?
A safety culture failure?
Whistle-blower protection must be strong and effective, and if it
is not strong enough, we must strengthen it.
Key leaders and members of each safety-critical aviation
organization must have subject matter expertise; in other words, they
must be pilots who understand the science of safety. There should be at
least one person so qualified on each corporate board of directors of
each aviation company. Top project engineers of aircraft manufacturers
must also be pilots.
Airlines worldwide must adhere to the highest standards of aircraft
maintenance and crew training.
All the layers of safety must be in place. They are the safety net
that helps keep air travelers and crews from harm.
Only by investigating, discovering, and correcting the ways in
which our design, certification, training and other systems have failed
us and led to these tragedies can we begin to regain the trust of our
passengers, flight attendants, pilots and the American people. And, of
course, in order for passengers to trust that the 737 MAX is safe to
fly, pilots will have to trust that it is.
We have a moral obligation to do this.
If we don't--if we just file the findings away on a shelf to gather
dust, we will compound these tragedies. What would make the loss of
lives in these accidents ever more tragic is if we say these were black
swan events, unlikely to happen again, and decide not act on what we
learn from them. To protect the status quo.
The best way to honor the lives tragically lost is to make sure
that nothing like this ever happens again.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Captain Sullenberger.
I now recognize Sara Nelson, Ms. Nelson, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Nelson. Thank you, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member
Graves, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and the entire
committee, for the opportunity to testify on the issues
surrounding the Boeing 737 MAX.
As a 23-year flight attendant and international president
of the Association of Flight Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO,
representing nearly 50,000 of aviation's first responders at 20
airlines, I am here today because the public looks to flight
attendants when it comes to aviation safety. We are aviation's
first responders and last line of defense, and we have more
public contact and interaction than any other profession within
aviation, and the public trusts us to look out for their
interests.
We are all here today because 346 lives were lost on Lion
Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302. This hearing
room has many people in it who have lost loved ones due to
tragedy in aviation. We can see their faces, feel the warmth of
their smiles, and try with all our strength to carry on without
them. Some days we do this with more success than others.
But we also know, with certainty, that if there was
anything at all that we could have done to prevent their lives
being cut short, we would do it. This reality is inescapable.
We know that aviation safety and security is written in their
blood, and we must ensure their sacrifices mean that we fully
examine the chain of events that led to their death so that
this is never repeated.
As I stated on March 13, shortly after the grounding of the
737 MAX, lives must always come first. But a brand is at stake
as well, and that brand is not just Boeing, it is America. What
America means in international aviation and by extension in the
larger world more generally, that we set the standard for
safety, competence, and honesty in governance of aviation.
Under various agreements between the FAA and other
countries or groups of countries, foreign authorities agree to
work with the FAA to accept U.S. certification of aircraft and
manufactured aeronautical products. This system of
international aircraft certification has been built upon global
recognition of the FAA and its statutory mandate to maintain
safety at the highest possible level. This is now under
question, and it means that the FAA must ensure that it has
taken all measures to assure the safety of the 737 MAX within
the U.S. as well as all countries who must also approve the
aircraft for its return to service.
Both Boeing and the FAA seem to recognize the need to win
back public support and the importance of involving
stakeholders in the process. Over the course of the last
several months, our union has witnessed a chastened tone from
Boeing and what appears to be a real desire to regain trust.
This is critically important if remaining questions are to be
answered and stakeholders around the world are to be convinced
that the 737 MAX is safe to fly.
It is significant that the FAA has formed the Technical
Advisory Board and that they are engaging the rest of the world
and conducting a rigorous review of the software fix and full
accounting of human interaction with the functionality of the
plane. The fix must be rigorously tested and communicated with
utmost transparency and required training. And while this is
not an area of expertise for our union, flight attendants must
be assured that operators, pilots, regulators, and an
independent assessment is confident in the safe return to
flight. We put our own lives on the line when we return to
flight, and we will do so knowing all has been done to ensure
safety.
We are heartened to receive assurance that Acting
Administrator Elwell is working in close coordination with
worldwide regulators in returning the MAX to service. Mr.
Elwell's time in leadership has not been easy, and yet he is
tasked with securing the confidence of regulators around the
world and the traveling public, and we need to do all we can to
help him.
Questions remain, but we believe that the FAA's engagement
of all stakeholders is the right leadership approach. We
encourage both Boeing and regulators to continue efforts with
stakeholders to answer all the questions and communicate fully
the lessons learned, along with any necessary changes in
procedure.
Flight attendants take our role in aviation seriously. And
while we are not yet there, we look forward to assuring the
public that it is safe to return to flight.
We continue to receive questions from the traveling public
about the 737 MAX, and there is confusion about the progression
of the 737 aircraft models. It is common for crew to receive
questions, when working the 737 NG, about whether or not the
aircraft is safe. This signals the fundamental question about
the progression of the 737 aircraft models and whether or not
the MAX should have been designated as an entirely new aircraft
type. And this is the type of question that has to be answered
if we can regain public confidence. I should also note that we
do not have one question from flight attendants asking when we
will regain the flight hours that we have lost with the 737
MAX, because safety is nonnegotiable.
We believe that we need to take a close look at ODA and the
process for certification, and we also think that this
committee's work to ensure a review of cabin aircraft
certification in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 is
critically important. We believe that funding and ensuring a
government shutdown----
Mr. Larsen. I would ask, Ms. Nelson, to wrap up.
Ms. Nelson [continuing]. Never happens again is critically
important, and we support H.R. 1108 to ensure that doesn't
happen.
Again, we commend this committee for its diligence in
promoting aviation safety, and we look forward to the continued
leadership from Acting Administrator Elwell in promoting a 737
MAX return to service that inspires confidence among aviation
workers, our counterparts around the world, and the traveling
public.
Thank you.
[Ms. Nelson's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sara Nelson, International President, Association
of Flight Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO
Thank you Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Sam
Graves, and Ranking Member Garret Graves for the opportunity to testify
on the issues surrounding the Boeing 737 Max. My name is Sara Nelson,
International President of the Association of Flight Attendants--CWA,
AFL-CIO (AFA), representing nearly 50,000 of aviation's first
responders at 20 airlines.
As I said on March 13th shortly after the U.S. grounding of the
737Max,
``It is good news that the 737 MAX will now get the focus it
needs to address the concerns of undetermined safety issues. We
must focus on the needed fix, rather than the uncertainty of
flight. Lives must come first always. But a brand is at stake
as well. And that brand is not just Boeing. It's America. What
America means in international aviation and by extension in the
larger world more generally--that we set the standard for
safety, competence, and honesty in governance of aviation.''
I am here today because the public looks to flight attendants when
it comes to aviation safety. We are aviation's first responders and
last line of defense. We have more public interaction than any other
profession within aviation, and the public trusts us to look out for
their interests.
That is why both Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) have individually come to our union to engage us in discussions
about our concerns and the process to return the 737 MAX to service.
Both Boeing and the FAA deserve credit for recognizing the need to
win back public support and the importance of involving stakeholders in
this process. The truth is that these tragic incidents and the
revelations surrounding them have shaken the public trust in our entire
aviation system due to the decisions made by Boeing during the original
certification process, the slow and inadequate response in the wake of
the loss of Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, and
the questions surrounding FAA oversight throughout.
Over the course of the last several months our union has witnessed
a chastened tone from Boeing and what appears to be a real desire to
regain trust. This is critically important if remaining questions are
to be answered and stakeholders around the world are to be convinced
the 737 Max is safe to fly.
It is significant that the FAA formed the Technical Advisory Board,
with individuals not involved in any aspect of the Boeing 737 MAX
certification including NASA, the U.S. Air Force and Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center, to evaluate Boeing and FAA efforts
related to Boeing's software update and its integration into the 737
MAX flight control system. We are also heartened to receive assurance
from Acting Administrator Elwell that certification of the 737 Max is
being done in close coordination with world-wide regulators under the
most conservative approach and all of the time necessary to regain
public trust around the world.
Regaining that trust first and foremost requires transparency.
Congressional oversight is important, and we commend this Committee for
its diligence in investigating the events surrounding the loss of 346
lives, and what must be done to ensure this never happens again.
We recognize the efforts of both Boeing and the FAA for seeking our
input and help in reassuring the public. Questions remain, but we
believe this is the right leadership approach. We encourage both Boeing
and regulators to continue efforts with stakeholders to answer all
questions and communicate fully the lessons learned along with any
necessary changes in procedures. Flight Attendants take seriously our
role in aviation safety. While we are not there yet, we look forward to
being able to reassure the public when this process is complete.
questions remain
On May 15, 2019, the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee held a hearing on the ``Status of the Boeing 737 MAX.'' In
their opening remarks,\1\ Committee Chair Peter DeFazio and Aviation
Subcommittee Chair Rick Larsen addressed the importance of this and
subsequent hearings and investigations by this Committee and other
investigative bodies into the two fatal accidents that occurred in a
five month span of time and involved Boeing 737 MAX airplanes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Chairs
DeFazio, Larsen Statements from Hearing on ``Status of the Boeing 737
MAX'', May 15, 2019. https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-
releases/chairs-defazio-larsen-statements-from-hearing-on-status-of-
the-boeing-737-max, accessed June 12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chair Larsen noted, ``[i]f the public doesn't feel safe about
flying then they won't fly; if they don't fly, airlines don't need to
buy airplanes; if they don't need to buy airplanes, then airplanes
don't need to be built; and if there is no need to build the airplanes,
then there will be no jobs . . . the foundation of the U.S. aviation
system is safety.'' Clearly, AFA and the aviation industry agree that
the ``foundation of the U.S. aviation system is safety.'' Without
safety, the commercial aviation system our economy is so reliant upon
today would simply not exist, and neither would tens of thousands jobs
held by flight attendants, pilots, dispatchers, maintenance
technicians, baggage handlers, customer service representatives, the
list goes on and on.
In his opening remarks on May 15, Chair DeFazio remarked on the
historical process the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has used
to approve airplane designs, noting that ``[s]ince the 1950s, the FAA
has relied on a system of delegating certain certification authorities
to manufacturers. And it has done so safely. However, for years, I have
raised questions about how the FAA oversees the work of manufacturers
that have been delegated these responsibilities.'' Some of the
questions Chair DeFazio asked regarding FAA oversight include the
following: ``Does the FAA have sufficient resources to oversee the
delegation program? Does the FAA have enough internal expertise to
oversee the most sophisticated engineering work in the world? What
firewalls exist between manufacturers and its FAA-designated
representatives to ensure proper oversight and that there is no undue
influence placed on them?''
Obtaining comprehensive answers to these questions through an open,
transparent public investigative process will be the first step to
addressing the concerns of crew members and the traveling public
regarding the safety of commercial aviation. Equally critical to
ensuring confidence is the effectiveness of any subsequent legislative
and regulatory measures taken in response to identified shortcomings.
This process will be long and resource intensive, but it is absolutely
critical that it be done right to guarantee that the foundation of the
U.S. aviation system continues to be safety.
On March 10, 2019, the Association of Flight Attendants released a
statement regarding the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and
called on U.S. airlines to ``work with Boeing, the FAA, and the NTSB to
address concerns and take steps to ensure confidence for the traveling
public and working crews.'' In a March 11, 2019 letter addressed to
Acting FAA Administrator Dan Elwell, AFA recommended a comprehensive,
public review of all potential issues that may have contributed to the
two tragic accidents involving Flight 302 and last October's Lion Air
Flight 610 accidents. We noted at the time that these reviews should
consider at minimum the ``certification basis, maintenance practices,
operational procedures, and crew training aspects of the 737 MAX
program.''
certification issues
The 737 MAX program is not the first recent Boeing aircraft to face
intense scrutiny of its design certification process following a
safety-related incident. In January, 2013, an auxiliary power unit
(APU) lithium-ion battery on a Japan Airlines Boeing 787-8 caught fire,
which led to the grounding of the U.S. 787 fleet, an investigation by
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and modifications to
the main and APU batteries. In its November, 2014 final report \2\ on
the 787 APU battery incident, the NTSB noted several safety issues that
occurred during the design certification process. These issues bear
troubling similarities to problems that may have occurred during
certification of the 737 MAX as alleged in recent media reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ NTSB, Incident Report--Auxiliary Power Unit Battery Fire, Japan
Airlines Boeing 787-8, JA829J, Boston, Massachusetts, January 7, 2013,
Adopted November 21, 2014. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/AIR1401.pdf, accessed June 12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, the NTSB stated that the Boeing battery analyses ``did
not consider the possibility that cascading thermal runaway of the
battery could occur as a result of a cell internal short circuit.''
This may have reflected a lack of imagination, with unfortunately
severe economic consequences for Boeing. A lack of imagination during
the 737 MAX certification process may have led to far more tragic
consequences. A June 1, 2019 article in the New York Times \3\ states
that while some potential failures of the MCAS were flight-tested, the
one test not conducted was activation of the MCAS ``as a result of a
faulty angle-of-attack sensor--a problem in the two [Lion Air and
Ethiopian Airlines] crashes.''
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\3\ New York Times, Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max,
Blind to a Late Design Change, June 1, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/01/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html, accessed June 12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB report also stated that there was insufficient guidance
provided in ``determining and justifying key assumptions in safety
assessments'' for the 787 batteries. Boeing had assumed that ``an
internal short circuit within a cell would be limited to venting of
only that cell without fire.'' The NTSB report noted that the
``assessment did not explicitly discuss this key assumption or provide
the engineering rationale and justifications to support the assumption.
Also, as demonstrated by the circumstances of this incident, Boeing's
assumption was incorrect, and Boeing's assessment did not consider the
consequences if the assumption were incorrect or incorporate design
mitigations to limit the safety effects that could result in such a
case.'' The June 1, 2019 New York Times article suggests that incorrect
assumptions by Boeing engineers working on the 737 MAX design may have
also occurred: ``Current and former employees at Boeing and the Federal
Aviation Administration who spoke with The New York Times said they had
assumed the system [MCAS] relied on more sensors and would rarely, if
ever, activate. Based on those misguided assumptions, many made
critical decisions, affecting design, certification and training.''
The NTSB 787 battery report also noted that insufficient guidance
was provided to FAA certification engineers whose role was to ensure
compliance with certification requirements: ``Guidance to FAA
certification staff at the time that Boeing submitted its application
for the 787 type certificate, including FAA Order 8110.4, `Type
Certification,' did not clearly indicate how individual special
conditions should be traced to compliance deliverables (such as test
procedures, test reports, and safety assessments) in a certification
plan.'' Similarly, the June 1, 2019 New York Times article appears to
suggest that insufficient guidance provided to FAA engineers during the
certification process may have also contributed to the flawed 737 MAX
safety assessment: ``Regulators didn't conduct a formal safety
assessment of the new version of MCAS. The current and former
employees, many of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of
the continuing investigations, said that after the first crash, they
were stunned to discover MCAS relied on a single sensor. `That's nuts,'
said an engineer who helped design MCAS. `I'm shocked,' said a safety
analyst who scrutinized it. `To me, it seems like somebody didn't
understand what they were doing,'' said an engineer who assessed the
system's sensors.' ''
Another issue that may have impacted the 737 MAX certification
process arises from conflicts of interest due to inappropriate
relationships between regulator and regulated party. An example of how
a personal relationship has affected oversight was discussed on March
27, 2019 by the Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General
(IG) in testimony to Congress.\4\ He made the following points
regarding the relationship one inspector had with the regulated party,
an airline: ``FAA guidance recognizes the impact that a single
inspector can have on safety culture and establishes standards that
require inspectors to act impartially and avoid the appearance of
preferential treatment when they perform their official duties.
Nonetheless, our recent work identified concerns regarding an FAA
inspector's oversight of [an airline's] flight test program, which is
used to verify the airworthiness of aircraft following major repairs.
We found that an inspector had developed a personal relationship with
the head of the carrier's flight test program and appeared to give the
carrier preferential treatment when safety concerns were raised. The
inspector also worked with the carrier to suppress future complaints.
Ensuring that FAA's inspector workforce meets standards of impartiality
remains a key oversight challenge for the Agency to strengthen its
safety culture and effectively identify and mitigate risks.'' Compare
this to the following from the June 1, 2019 New York Times 737 MAX
article: ``On March 30, 2016 . . . [the 737 MAX chief technical pilot]
sent an email to senior F.A.A. officials with a seemingly innocuous
request: Would it be O.K. to remove MCAS from the pilot's manual? The
officials, who helped determine pilot training needs, had been briefed
on the original version of MCAS months earlier. . . . Under the
impression that the system was relatively benign and rarely used, the
F.A.A. eventually approved . . . [the] request, the three officials
said. . . . [The chief technical pilot], a former F.A.A. employee, was
at the front lines of this effort.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ DOT/OIG, Perspectives on Overseeing the Safety of the U.S. Air
Transportation System, Statement of Calvin L. Scovel, III, Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Transportation, Before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation and
Space, United States Senate, March 27, 2019. https://www.oig.dot.gov/
sites/default/files/Aviation%20Safety%20Long%20Statement_3-27-
19_final.pdf, accessed June 12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The close relationship between the FAA, airplane manufacturers and
airlines can be seen in how the FAA has changed policy over the years
regarding design changes and its certification requirement that an
airplane with a passenger seating capacity of more than 44 seats can be
evacuated from the airplane to the ground within 90 seconds, often
referred to as the 90 second rule.
Design standards are used in the design phase of a project, and can
be verified while the product, in this case, an airplane, ``is still on
the drawing board.'' i.e., before the airplane is built. Performance
standards evaluate the performance of the product, often under the
influence of factors that cannot be effectively integrated or evaluated
during the design. Typically, a performance standard involves a test of
the product after it is built. In the case of a full scale evacuation
demonstration (a performance standard) of an airplane, the factors that
must be evaluated are the performance of the passengers and crew.
Clearly, the original intent of the evacuation demonstration was to
show the satisfactory accomplishment of emergency evacuation
procedures. The final rule reinforced this intent and required
airlines, as a Part 121 operational requirement, to conduct evacuation
demonstrations. (30 FR 3200, March 9, 1965).
The following year, FAA Notice 66-26 (31 FR 10275, July 29, 1966)
proposed to establish comparable requirements for the airplane
manufacturers. This notice stated that `` . . . traditionally, it has
been considered sufficient to provide the necessary components for
emergency evacuation through detailed quantitative requirements
prescribed in the airworthiness rules. However, experience has shown
that compliance with these requirements does not ensure that the
airplane can be evacuated, during an emergency, within an acceptable
time interval. Differences in the relationships between elements of the
emergency evacuation system introduce a considerable variation in
evacuation time, and this variation is expected to be even more marked
on larger transport aircraft under development.'' Thus, it was
acknowledged that relationships between the various elements of the
evacuation system, not just the elements themselves, had a critical
influence on evacuation time. In other words, the whole was
considerably more complicated than the sum of its parts. Since the
manufacturer would be demonstrating the basic capability of a new
airplane type without regard to crewmember training, operating
procedures and similar items (such demonstration of procedures was
still required under Part 121, the operational requirements), this new
demonstration was not expected to validate the evacuation procedures of
the air carriers or operators. FAA Notice 66-26 also proposed that once
a manufacturer had successfully conducted an evacuation demonstration
for a particular airplane type, the passenger seating capacity could be
increased by no more than five percent if the manufacturer could
substantiate, by analysis that all the passengers could be evacuated
within the prescribed time limit. This appears to be the first proposal
to suggest the use of ``analysis'' in lieu of full-scale evacuation
testing. However, this analysis was intended to provide comparison with
the full-scale evacuation actually conducted on the airplane. These
proposals were adopted as a final rule (32 FR 13255, September 20,
1967).
The tests conducted by operators to show satisfactory
accomplishment of emergency evacuation procedures and by manufacturers
to show that the aircraft interior configuration and the relationship
between the elements of its emergency evacuation system could be
evacuated within a specified time period were allowed to be satisfied
under a single test under Amendment 25-46 (43 FR 50578, October 30,
1978). Under this amendment, the FAA also stated that ``A combination
of analysis and tests may be used to show that the airplane is capable
of being evacuated within 90 seconds under the conditions specified in
25.803(c) of this section if the Administrator finds that the
combination of analysis and tests will provide data with respect to the
emergency evacuation capability of the aircraft equivalent to that
which would be obtained by actual demonstration.'' The FAA recognized
the problems with this new provision and in its discussion of it
concluded that: ``Several commentators objected to the proposed
amendment to 25.803(d) which would allow analysis in showing that the
airplane is capable of being evacuated within 90 seconds. One
commentator stated that analysis alone is an incomplete means of
showing compliance and should not be allowed. Another commentator
stated that extrapolations based on analytical testing have no
practical relation to actual conditions which occur in accidents and
evacuation demonstrations. The FAA agrees that the limitations on the
use of analytical procedures should be made clear. The requirement that
the Administrator find the analysis data acceptable was intended to
preclude approvals which might be based on insufficient test data, such
as in the case of a completely new model or a model which has major
changes or a considerably larger passenger capacity than a previously
approved model'' (Italics ours.)
Despite this intent, the FAA granted a request from Boeing to
remove a pair of exits from the B747 airplane in the early 1980's. AFA
strongly protested this action that would make it more difficult for
flight attendants to safely evacuate passengers from the airplane.
In a 1985 hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of this Committee
(formerly named Public Works and Transportation Committee) and its
Chairman, James Oberstar, AFA testified and presented data and past
accident experience to illustrate our concerns, as well as those of
passengers, with this emergency exit reduction. The FAA Administrator
took steps that resulted in no US airline removing exits from their
747s, and at this hearing, suggested that a reassessment of regulations
pertaining to emergency evacuation of transport airplanes was
warranted. Consequently, an Emergency Evacuation Task Force, open to
the public, for that purpose was established in September, 1985. The
continued use of full-scale emergency evacuation demonstrations was one
of the matters considered by that task force. One of the presentations,
by Boeing, suggested that a rudimentary analytical procedure be used in
lieu of full scale demonstrations. Basically, the manufacturers favored
analysis, while the representatives of people who flew on the
airplanes, either as crewmembers or passengers, opposed analysis. The
task force was unable to reach consensus on when to accept analysis in
lieu of a demonstration. A similar process was undertaken by an
advisory committee to the FAA in the 1990s with the same failure to
reach consensus.
The procedures used by the flight attendants in a full scale
emergency evacuation certification demonstration are intended to become
the baseline procedures for the aircraft type and model tested. This
was the reason for the promulgation of the 1965 rule requiring
operators to conduct full scale emergency evacuation demonstrations.
These procedures are found in the Flight Standardization Board Report
for each type and model of aircraft. Yet some demonstrations conducted
since 1996 have utilized a procedure, with FAA allowance, that makes it
easier for the manufacturer to pass the test, but it is not a procedure
that is used by U.S. scheduled operators. The intent of the regulation
requiring full scale evacuation demonstrations is not being carried out
by the FAA.
The analytical method does little more than calculate that, if the
design standards are met, the aircraft could be evacuated within the
requirements of the performance standard. Since the design requirements
were intended to provide an airplane capable of being evacuated within
the requirements of the performance standard, use of the analytical
method is redundant.
Analysis is not a method that can predict failure of an emergency
evacuation system, unlike a full-scale demonstration utilizing
appropriate evacuation procedures.
The result of the FAA's policy and of the currently inadequate
``state of the art'' analytical methods accepted under the policy, is
that the first full scale evacuation of a new airplane will be
performed by the traveling public under emergency conditions rather
than by paid test subjects under the controlled test conditions of a
demonstration. There is no assurance that the evacuation would be
successful. For this reason, the FAA should be required to rescind its
policy of allowing the use of analysis in lieu of the full-scale
demonstration until a scientifically valid method is developed,
including current demographic changes in the passenger population.
This close relationship between FAA, airplane manufacturers and
airlines was further touted and cemented on February 20, 2003 when, in
her first major speech \5\ after becoming FAA Administrator, Marion
Blakey referred to those regulated by the FAA as its ``customers.'' She
said that the FAA needed to be more consistent in responding to ``our
customers.'' Then Ms. Blakey said:
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\5\ FAA, Speech--``The Spirit of December 14th'', Marion C. Blakey,
Washington, DC, February 20, 2003. https://www.faa.gov/news/speeches/
news_story.cfm?contentKey=2992, accessed June 12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``So, I'm announcing today a new customer-service initiative
that provides written guidance and training to all managers and
supervisors in our regulation and certification offices
throughout the country on applying FAA rules and policies in a
standard and consistent manner. And, we want to know from our
customers if we're not being consistent. We're going to let
them know that they have the right to ask for review on any
inspector's decision on any call that's made in the
certification process . . . that they can ``buck it up'' to
first-line supervisors, field office managers, regional
division managers, or even to Washington if necessary--with no
fear of retribution. Information on how to do this--names,
titles, and phone numbers--will be prominently displayed on the
Web and in all our regional and field offices. We need your
help to make this program a success.''
According to a USA Today article's \6\ reference to an April 3,
2008 hearing before this Committee, ``Inspectors who testified before
Congress last month and others who spoke in recent interviews said they
bitterly recalled the introduction of the program. They said it sent a
not-too-subtle message that the airlines were encouraged to complain
about them and had the upper hand in any dispute over safety-compliance
issues.''
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\6\ USA Today, FAA's Customer Initiative Undercut Safety
Inspectors, May 30, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to its effect on safety regulation of airlines, the FAA
``Customer Service Initiative'' specifically stated that customers
``have the right to ask for review on any inspector's decision on any
call that's made in the certification process'' from all levels
including FAA Washington.
On October 13, 2005, the FAA published its final rule \7\
(Establishment of Organization Designation Authorization Program, 70 FR
59931) establishing the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA)
program. This rule expanded the scope of approved tasks, increased the
number of eligible organizations, and established a systems-based
approach to managing designated organizations. According to the rule's
summary, the ``effect of this program will be to increase the
efficiency with which the FAA appoints and oversees designee
organizations, and allow the FAA to concentrate its resources on the
most safety-critical matters.'' Of course, not all who submitted
comments to this rule agreed; one dissent in particular, from the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association, was summarized in the
rule's preamble as arguing that the ``proposed ODA program
significantly modifies the current regulatory oversight system,
deteriorating the established technical FAA oversight by going to a
`systems' oversight approach that would provide less specific and
technical FAA oversight and would, in time, reduce safety.'' The FAA
disagreed, asserting that a systems approach will increase safety, as
more effective delegation programs will free up resources for tasks
more critical to safety. Unfortunately, the subsequent incidents
involving the 787 main battery and 737 Max crashes appear to support
the commenter's prediction that safety will, in fact, be reduced over
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ FAA, Establishment of Organization Designation Authorization
Program, 70 FR 59931, October 13, 2005. https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/10/13/05-20470/establishment-of-
organization-designation-authorization-program, accessed June 12, 2019.
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Under various agreements between the FAA and other countries or
groups of countries, foreign authorities agree to work with the FAA to
enable acceptance of US Type certificated and manufactured aeronautical
products, including aircraft, engines, propellers, rotorcraft, and
aeronautical components. In many of these agreements, the FAA is relied
upon to assist in the certification process of products for the
aviation authority and country to approve these products. This system
of international aircraft certification has been built upon global
recognition of the FAA and its statutory mandate to maintain safety at
the highest possible level. The loss of this past esteem of FAA
certification and regulation of US aviation and the profound tragedies
of two US aircraft crashes within five months, in addition to the other
safety problems we've discussed, means that the FAA must ensure that it
has taken all measures to assure the safety of the 737 MAX within the
U.S. as well as in all countries who must also approve the this
aircraft for return to service.
In 2006, the NTSB published the results of a study, Safety Report
on the Treatment of Safety-Critical Systems in Transport Airplanes.\8\
This report, which focused on certification of systems critical to
flight safety and seems as relevant today as then, was prompted by four
recently-concluded accident investigations involving two Boeing, one
McDonnell-Douglas, and one Airbus aircraft: USAir flight 427 in 1999;
TWA flight 800 in 2000; Alaska Airlines flight 261 in 2002; and
American Airlines flight 587 in 2004. The NTSB suggested improvements
to the certification process for the following three reasons, quoted
directly from the report:
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\8\ NTSB/SR-06/02, Adopted April 25, 2006
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The process for assessing risks to aircraft systems does not
adequately address important failure conditions associated with
structures and with human/system interaction.
2. The results of the process for assessing risks to safety-
critical systems are not adequately preserved to support continued
airworthiness of certificated airplanes.
3. Existing policy, practices, and procedures for the ongoing
assessment of risks to safety-critical systems do not ensure that the
underlying assumptions made during design and certification are
adequately and continuously assessed in light of operational
experience, lessons learned, and new knowledge.
The NTSB also concluded that ``a program must be in place, once the
type certification process is completed, to ensure the ongoing
assessment of risks to safety-critical systems. Such a program must
recognize that ongoing decisions about design, operations, maintenance,
and continued airworthiness must be done in light of operational data,
service history, lessons learned, and new knowledge, for designs that
are derivatives of previously certificated airplanes.''
Given the possibility that problems in the type certification
process may have contributed to the recent 737 MAX accidents, as well
as the concerns that have been expressed by Congress, the NTSB, DOT IG,
and others, a return to the FAA certification processes prior to the
2005 FAA rule on ODA, footnote 7 supra, with inclusion of learned
safety enhancements since then may be the best way to prevent a
certification applicant's pecuniary and market-based interests from
interfering with ensuring safety of the airplane and related
requirements directly by the FAA. Such a return to direct FAA
certification with designated engineering representatives will likely
require increased FAA personnel and funding, with compensation for
certification engineers to be more competitive with the private sector.
stable funding for aviation safety
The ``foundation of the U.S. aviation system is safety.'' In the
case of the Boeing 737 Max we not only need a conservative, transparent
process for certification--we need to recognize the systemic issues
that have undermined safety. We need an aviation system that is
supported by stable, long-term funding and is shielded from political
cliffs of government funding.
AFA supports HR 1108, the ``Aviation Funding Stability Act of
2019,'' introduced by Transportation & Infrastructure Committee
Chairman Peter DeFazio and Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Rick Larsen.
Aviation safety is non-negotiable. HR 1108 would authorize the FAA to
keep all of its programs running and all of its employees working by
drawing from the Airports and Airways Trust Fund (AATF) during any
lapse in typical government appropriations. By drawing from the AATF
during a shutdown, the FAA would ensure that all FAA employees would be
paid for work during a funding lapse and FAA programs would continue to
operate. This bill should be acted on with urgency.
We encourage Congress to give serious attention in all budgeting to
properly funding the Department of Transportation and the Federal
Aviation Administration in order to fully support aviation safety.
closing
Safety is not something ``customers'' buy, it is something we all
fundamentally expect as a baseline of operation. Regulator oversight
cannot be put in terms of client/customer relations.
Again, we commend this Committee for its diligence in promoting
aviation safety. We look forward to continued leadership from Acting
Administrator Elwell in promoting a 737 Max return to service that
inspires confidence among aviation workers, our counterparts around the
world, and the traveling public.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I now recognize Randy Babbitt, former Administrator of FAA,
for 5 minutes. Good to see you, Randy.
Mr. Babbitt. Good morning. Pardon me.
Good morning. Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves,
Chairman DeFazio, and Ranking Member, also, Graves, and to the
full members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
come here today and discuss the return to service and
certification issues surrounding the Boeing 737 MAX.
I would also like to take a second and offer my
condolences, heartfelt condolences to the family and the
friends and the loved ones of the passengers and the crew,
crewmembers, and all aboard Lion Air 610 as well as the
Ethiopian flight 302.
In interest of disclosure, not in my original testimony, I
have had the opportunity to fly the Boeing simulator yesterday,
and I flew both scenarios of the old software and the new
software. Obviously, this came after I turned in my testimony.
But I have had a pilot's license from the time I soloed in
1962 to date. I have also been an aviation safety advocate for
over 40 years, so I do bring some background and, I believe,
some understanding of accident investigations and changes that
have been made subsequently to improve aviation safety and
efficiency over the last 40 years.
As president of ALPA in the nineties, I championed the One
Level of Safety, which essentially melded the regulations under
part 121 into the operations of part 135, and that provided a
vast improvement of regional carriers airline safety standards.
And while serving as the FAA's Administrator, the program for
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, known as
ASIAS, was introduced, and today, provides a collection of data
that has dramatically improved safety by having stakeholders
and operators reporting and sharing problems and issues that
they encounter, operational issues, and they report these
before they become accidents.
We also began to purposely focus on collaboration with all
facets of aviation operations to be more forthcoming with
mistakes, errors uncovered, and other issues, and we have also
asked that the FAA consider to be less punitive in order to
inspire more voluntary disclosures.
Following the tragic accident in Buffalo, I called on the
industry and the organizations representing the professional
airplane pilots of the country together for a call to action
focused on professionalism. We revisited a lot of past actions
and then entered into a partnership with the industry to
actively address concerns raised by the discoveries uncovered
in the Colgan Air flight 3407 tragedy.
We identified steps to strengthen and improve pilot
training, hiring, testing, and all the practices surrounding
aviation at the regional airlines and major carriers.
Participants agreed on best practices and changes to them for
pilot record checks, development of pilot mentoring programs,
and reassessing rules for pilot fatigue, flight, and duty time,
and this time based on scientific research about fatigue.
And we should acknowledge that the FAA's mission is to
provide the safest and most efficient transportation and
aerospace system in the world. In an aviation system, data is
our friend. Ninety million flights, seven billion passengers
carried over the last decade in the U.S. is the most incredible
safety record the world has ever seen, and it is also not
symptomatic of a flawed safety structure.
In 1970, to take a look back, in 1970, we were losing a
hull in this country every 6 weeks. Eight accidents a year. And
looking back today, we haven't lost a hull in 10 years. That is
quite a dramatic recommendation of the dramatic efforts that
safety continues--or that continuous safety improvements will
bring you.
Our Nation's system of certification of aircraft has been
evolving also for over 60 years, and it must continue to evolve
and improve. But as we move forward with increased reliance on
automation, the linkage and the interface between man and the
machine must also evolve. It is imperative that pilots have a
full and complete understanding of the automation of the
equipment that they operate and the systems designed to protect
the operational envelope of the aircraft. But of equal
importance is ensuring that pilots have the full training,
operational knowledge, and understanding of those operational
boundaries and the limitations of those systems.
Automation and training must also keep improving on
maintaining situational and operational awareness of what
equipment and automation is actually controlling. Pilots need
to understand the operational realm in which automation takes
control of an aircraft and be aware of the situation calling
for the action, as well as the full range of possibility that
that action can be.
No pilot should ever be surprised by an event that takes
place in an airplane in which they are certified. That includes
training exposure to all phases of the operational envelope as
well as the safety protections that are designed to protect the
operating envelope and protect it from excursions.
In closing, a retrospective look into the introduction of
service shows that assumptions were made by Boeing and accepted
by the FAA and design changes incorporated that should have
been more rigorously tested and flight crews better educated
and trained in reaction to a new safety protection system that
Boeing had introduced.
History tells us that this is not a new problem, but in
fact, has been part of aviation history, unfortunately. Going
back to aircraft such as early jets, like the Comet, and metal
fatigue, later Douglas DC-10s, Lockheed Electra engine mounts
had to be redesigned----
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Babbitt [continuing]. Douglas pitch trim compensators,
all of which had to be redesigned, but those aircraft did
finish out their lives with--successfully after the required
modifications.
I am comfortable, in closing, that the FAA and Boeing,
working together, have rigorously evaluated and reevaluated the
design, along with revised training requirements that will
ensure reintroduction----
Mr. Larsen. I have to ask you to wrap up.
Mr. Babbitt [continuing]. To service by the 737 MAX.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[Mr. Babbitt's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. J. Randolph Babbitt, Former Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration
Good morning, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members
of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Status of the Boeing 737 MAX: Stakeholder Perspectives.
I would also like to offer my most heartfelt condolences to the
families, friends and loved ones of the passengers and crew members
aboard both Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302. My thoughts and
prayers are with them.
background
I have had a pilot's license from the time I soloed in 1962 to
date. I have been an aviation safety advocate for over 40 years, so I
do bring some background and understanding to accident investigations
and changes that have subsequently been made to improve aviation safety
and efficiency over the last forty plus years.
As the President of ALPA I championed ``One Level of Safety'' which
essentially melded the regulations of Part 121 operations into Part 135
providing a vast improvement of Regional Carriers safety standards.
While serving as the FAA's Administrator the program for Aviation
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (``ASIAS'') was introduced and
provides data today that dramatically has improved safety by having
stakeholders and operators reporting and identifying problems and
operational issues before they become accidents. We also began to
purposely focus on collaboration with all facets of aviation operations
to be more forthcoming with mistakes and errors and at the same time
moving the FAA to be less punitive to inspire more voluntary
disclosures.
Following the tragic accident in Buffalo I called on the industry
and the organizations representing Professional Airline pilots of the
country together for a ``Call to Action'' focused on professionalism.
Safety starts with professionalism and we revisited our past actions
and then entered into a partnership with the industry to actively
address concerns raised by the Colgan Air Flight 3407 tragedy. We
identified immediate steps to strengthen and improve pilot hiring,
training, and testing practices at airlines that provide regional
service, as well as at our major air carriers. Participants agreed on
best practices for pilot record checks, development of pilot mentoring
programs and reassessing rules for pilot flight and duty time to
incorporate scientific research about fatigue. Professionalism is not
something we can regulate, but I am proud to note that Labor
organizations answered our Call to Action and supported either the
establishment or expansion of professional standards and ethics
committees, codes of ethics, and safety risk management meetings
between FAA and major and regional air carriers. The FAA has worked in
full cooperation with the industry to raise professional standards and
improve cockpit discipline. I believe the ``Call to Action'' has proven
the critical importance of professionalism in aviation safety.
safety
The FAA's mission is to provide the safest, most efficient
aerospace system in the world. And in the aviation system, data is our
friend. 90 million flights and 7 billion passengers carried over the
last decade in the U.S. is the most incredible safety record the world
has ever seen and is not symptomatic of a flawed safety structure. But,
like aviation itself, we must strive to improve and continue to evolve
in our ever-changing environment of advancing technology and oversight.
And the evolution and adoption of safety management systems has proven
success. In 1970 the U.S. was suffering major airline hull losses of
one every 6 weeks! As noted earlier, we have not lost a domestic
aircraft in over a decade which reflects the dramatic effect of
continuous safety improvements.
Quoting from my own testimony made almost a decade ago, ``Safety
remains the vital core of the FAA mission. The flying public must have
confidence that the airplanes they board are properly designed and
maintained. They must know that their pilots are qualified, trained for
their mission, and fit for duty. Nothing less is worthy of the FAA
name, or our responsibility for preserving the lives of the flying
American public.'' I concluded with the observation that ``The FAA has
demonstrated a consistent track record of protecting the safety of the
flying American public. Our successes in aviation safety continue to
set a global standard of American leadership that is not only
acknowledged, but also emulated throughout the world.'' I believe those
statements are equally valid today.
certification
Our nation's system of Aircraft certification has been evolving for
over 60 years and must continue to evolve and improve. But as we move
forward with increased reliance on automation, the linkage or interface
between man and the machine must evolve as well. It is imperative that
pilots have a full and complete understating of the automation of the
equipment they operate. The FAA works with the industry to improve
Flight deck layout and alert/warning display strategies that influence
a crew's ability to interface with their airplane. And today's modern
Aircraft continue to introduce systems that now incorporate even better
systems to protect the ``operational envelope'' of the aircraft but of
equal importance is ensuring that pilots have a full training and
operational knowledge and understanding of those operational boundaries
and the limitations of those systems. We also must continue to improve
the operational knowledge and training of our flight crews. And we
should be fully aware--to quote Chris Hart, former Chairman of the NTSB
``Weaknesses in pilot skills are masked by automation when it works but
amplified when it doesn't''.
We have made remarkable technological improvements and the current
safety record is proof positive of their importance. And key to
continuing our introduction of innovative improvements to tomorrow's
aircraft operational and safety systems is to ensure that safety
regulations not stifle innovation, but to ensure that changes and
innovation have safety and risk assessment as part of the design
incorporated and built into them.
automation & training
Automation and therefore training must keep improving to maintain
the man-machine interface. Training should also include maintaining
situational and operational awareness of what equipment including
artificial intelligence and automation is controlling. Pilots need to
understand the operational realm in which automation takes control of
an aircraft and be appropriately aware of the situation calling for the
action as well as the full range of possibility of that action.
Pilots in today's system need to continue improved training to
operate in today's operational environment. We have the technology to
expand training with the use of visual reality and high-fidelity
simulation so that no pilot should ever be surprised by event that
takes place in an aircraft in which they are certified. That includes
exposure to all phases of the operational envelope and environment as
well as the built-in safety protections that are designed to protect
the operating envelope from excursions.
closing
A retrospective look into the introduction into service shows that
assumptions were made, and design changes incorporated that should have
been more rigorously tested and flight crews better educated and
trained in reaction to a new safety protection system that Boeing had
introduced.
History shows us that this is not a new problem but in fact has
been part of Aviation history unfortunately. Going back to aircraft
such as early jets and understanding metal fatigue that occurred in the
de Havilland Comet. Later, Douglas DC 10 and Lockheed Electra engine
mounts required redesign and maintenance procedures. Douglas DC-8 Pitch
Trim compensators, all of which had to be re-designed after
introduction to service. All of those aircraft finished their aviation
lives successfully after required modifications.
And I am quite comfortable that Boeing and the FAA together have
rigorously reevaluated the redesign along with revised training
requirements that will ensure the re-introduction to service by the
Boeing 737 Max will be safe and successful.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Babbitt. I appreciate it.
I appreciate everyone's patience with my impatience as
well. And we now move to Member questions, and we will
recognize Members for 5 minutes, and I will start by
recognizing myself.
My questions are going to largely focus on the training and
training standard, the training recommendations that will be
necessary to get to return to service, and I just want to
explore that.
Captain Sullenberger, although you weren't specific, you
were more generalized, is it your position that there ought to
be required simulator training for pilots on the new--on the--
for the software fix for the 737 MAX before it is returned to
service, versus a computer-based simulator training?
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes. It is critical that we address all
the issues. It is critical that pilots, as soon as possible,
experience in a full motion level D simulator and not just a
part task trainer, all the effects of the MCAS system, and also
all the other things that likely have not been trained either
at all or since initial qualification on the airplane, like
unreliable air speed, manual trim operation, including manual
trim operation at very high indicated air speeds where it may
require either two hands or the efforts of two pilots to
actually move the trim manually, or in some cases it may not be
possible to move to trim manually until air loads are reduced.
They need to develop a muscle memory of their experiences so
that it will be immediately accessible to them in the future,
even years from now, when they face such a crisis.
Mr. Larsen. OK. I am just going to ask our staff, and we
don't need to get into the technical details of what D level
versus B level training is, but if staff can do a memo for the
subcommittee members, that is kind of some basic stuff, so we
don't need to spend time here talking about those differences,
but if you could do that for the Members so we understand that.
Captain Carey, do Allied Pilots have a different position
or the same position as Captain Sullenberger?
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Chairman Larsen. While Captain
Sullenberger's recommendations are certainly the best-case
scenario, logistically, American Airlines has 4,200 pilots on
the 737 MAX, Southwest would have 9,000 737 pilots, we are in
favor of the scenario that Captain Sullenberger described in a
video concept. And we do 9-month training protocols, so our
pilots would receive a CBT program----
Mr. Larsen. CBT means what?
Mr. Carey. Computer-based training.
Mr. Larsen. OK.
Mr. Carey. And then the video training program of the
scenario that Captain Sullenberger suggests. And after that, we
have a 9-month training program, which would enable every
American Airlines pilot to go through that simulator scenario
and that muscle memory exercise within 10 months.
Mr. Larsen. So it would be----
Mr. Sullenberger. May I add that a spot scenario might help
get pilots in the simulator more often and sooner.
Mr. Larsen. Spot scenario?
Mr. Sullenberger. I understand that that is a logistical
matter of great importance, but the point is, there are other
ways to accommodate more pilots sooner than waiting for their
recurrent training cycle to occur.
Mr. Larsen. OK. Ms. Pinkerton, from the airlines'
perspective, how does this--where do you come down on this
training issue to get to return to service?
Ms. Pinkerton. As you know, I am not a pilot, so I don't
have this kind of expertise, but we are relying on people who
do have the expertise. The FAA is utilizing the Flight
Standards Board on this very topic. And we are confident that
working with those independent experts, involving our pilots'
unions, they will come to the right decision about what kind of
training is needed, and we will provide that training.
Mr. Larsen. So from the airline perspective, you are saying
that the Flight Standards Board, given the recommendation of
the FAA, is where this committee should look for advice on how
we should think about the training necessary to go to return to
service?
Ms. Pinkerton. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. OK. Mr. Babbitt, have you considered this
decision, and could you give us your views on it?
Yeah. Have you considered this question, and give us your
views?
Mr. Babbitt. Yes. I think that, you know, some training--as
I said in my testimony, I don't think a pilot should ever be
surprised by anything that happens in an airplane, and this is
a pretty substantial piece, and I had the opportunity to see it
both ways. However, I think it is a very similar maneuver to
other things that happen in the aircraft.
My suggestion would be to evaluate it. And quite often, I
know ALPA was often involved with the FAA and carriers to
decide what training was needed. And I think a consortium of a
group like that could make a recommendation, perhaps it is give
them computer-based training, but maybe the next check--next
cycle of checks that you should be exposed to it.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks. And, President Nelson, I have a
question for you. I just want to affirm what you said. Flight
attendants are the ones answering the questions from the flying
public about is this--is this that plane or is this a different
kind of plane. So I just want to emphasize, the FAA needs to
continue to include you all in the outreach because you are the
ones answering the questions of the flying public more so than
any other group of people.
Ms. Nelson. I appreciate that. And I think that there has
been a recognition of that that we have to be fully involved
for there to be a successful return to flight.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I understand, on the Republican side, we are going to go
with Mr. Mitchell first for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I share the concern, and I can't imagine the pain of the
families of the victims of both flights. I will meet tomorrow
with the family of Ms. Stumo to talk about this. They can share
with me their concerns. Couldn't schedule it today.
They have a need for answers to the problems, what caused
this. They have a need for responses sooner than later.
I am concerned--I talked to Chairman Larsen about the
delays of the FAA responding to questions that were asked
several months ago. We haven't had much response from FAA as to
some simple questions. The design of MCAS. The review of
certification process of MCAS. What role Boeing had versus what
roles were undertaken by the FAA. So they need to be reviewed.
It should be clear to us, however, that what happened in
both flights were cascading issues, errors, whatever term you
want to put on it. One fed another. There was a chain of events
that if any one or more--if a couple of those things hadn't
happened, we would not have had the outcomes we had. I raised
at the last hearing that also included in that is the
qualifications and training of the pilots, both in terms of
MCAS and in general.
One thing I think the families deserve is full information.
Not having bits and pieces wander out or have pieces used for
political process has been noted.
Captain Carey, you have made more than a few headlines of
late by releasing portions of an apparently secret recording
made in November. I would like to ask you some questions about
that. First--and I would like your responses also for the
record if you are unable to respond--who made that recording,
sir?
Mr. Carey. I did, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. Did the board of directors
authorize that or know in advance you were making a recording?
Mr. Carey. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you tell Boeing officials you were making
that recording prior to the meeting or subsequent to that?
Mr. Carey. No, sir. That is not required under Texas law.
Mr. Mitchell. I am glad you are aware of that. Are you
aware that--I am sure you are--that in April, you issued a
press release fully confident in the Boeing 737 MAX and its
capabilities? This is your organization, correct?
Mr. Carey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Shortly thereafter, and this is deeply
concerning to me, that then portions of the tape were released
in the midst of a union campaign, being it is everyone's
problems, that it is Boeing's fault, they did it. Bits and
pieces of information.
What is--what is the value of that to either the system or
the family in doing that? We don't have complete information
out yet, so explain to me what warranted that.
Mr. Carey. Sir, the APA is founded on safety. Safety first
always, and safety is not for sale. Boeing came to visit us in
November 27 of 2018. We were ready to record the meeting if we
thought it was a PR meeting and not a sincere exchange of
technical data.
Mr. Mitchell. Stop a second. It wasn't we, because you said
they were unaware. So you----
Mr. Carey. We, my team. My subject matter experts at APA,
my safety committee chairman, and my training committee
chairman, and our subject matter experts. My team. We decided
if we thought Boeing was insincere at the meeting, we would
record the meeting.
Boeing has a history with the 737 rudder control back in
the nineties, a USAir accident, which Captain Sullenberger is
very familiar with, of being dishonest, or less than
forthright. Talk about honesty, sir. I made FOIA requests on
November 28, 2018, on all MCAS data between the FAA and Boeing.
To date, we have not had one piece of data arrive.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I have not had a response either to the
requests I made to the FAA, so I share your frustration.
Mr. Carey. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. But let me make a point, which is, your board
supports the equipment, and then shortly thereafter in May, you
release----
Mr. Carey. Sir, our initial press release----
Mr. Mitchell. Let me finish the question, sir. That is the
way it works.
You then release portions of a tape, portions of it. I
would ask you for the record here that you submit the entire
tape so we can hear it in its entirety.
Mr. Carey. The entire tape has been submitted to the
committee, sir. It has been submitted to Chairman DeFazio.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, do you have it? Mr. DeFazio?
Mr. Carey. We submitted an entire transcript of the tape to
Chairman DeFazio and the tape itself.
Mr. Mitchell. Do we have that?
OK. I would like to hear that.
Let me make one final comment because we are almost out of
time.
Mr. Carey. We will certainly--APA will certainly supply
you, sir, with a copy of that written transcript and the tape.
Mr. Mitchell. I would appreciate that.
One final comment before I get gaveled out here. I believe,
as I said earlier, it is a cascade of errors. One of the
questions I posed in the last hearing, which continues to
trouble me a great deal, is the pilots of Ethiopian Air, their
hours give me a great deal of question. The pilot in the right
seat could not fly under our standards here. We need to look at
the ICAO standards versus our standards in North America for
pilot qualifications and training, and reconcile that, along
with all these other questions, because there are a series of
them. And until we get those answers, I would respectfully ask
let's not give up bits and pieces because it is damaging.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell.
I turn to Chair DeFazio for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Captain Carey, it says in your testimony, 737
MAX does not provide the same aircraft field to the pilots as
the 737. This was intended to minimize the operating costs to
Boeing's customers by allowing the MAX to be certified by the
FAA as a 737.
And then in Captain Sullenberger's testimony, he mentions
that it disturbed the engine mounts, disturbed the natural
aerodynamic stability of the 737 in certain conditions.
I got a--what are those conditions, and why was this
necessary? Or was it just about avoiding certification and
pilot training? What are those conditions? Can either of you
answer that quickly? We got only 5 minutes.
Mr. Sullenberger. I would like to know and hear from Boeing
why MCAS was necessary. Was it to meet a certification standard
or was it to achieve a common type certificate that would not
require additional training for pilots and, therefore, for
airlines?
Mr. DeFazio. OK. So we don't know the answer to that
question. That's a pretty critical question.
Mr. Sullenberger. I do not know the answer.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Anybody there know the answer?
Mr. Carey. Sir, there is some speculation or there is some
data coming in from Boeing engineers that have contacted us
that there may be some negative dynamic stabilization problems
with the aircraft, which required Boeing engineers to add the
MCAS system to the 737 MAX 8 and 9 design.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. We really need----
Mr. Babbitt. If I could comment?
Mr. DeFazio. We really need to--quickly.
Mr. Babbitt. If I might comment, Boeing's description to me
was that the airplane, at high angles of attack, had a softer
elevator feel than the original aircraft, and they wanted it to
have more field.
Mr. DeFazio. Feel. But it wasn't dangerous. So the pilots
would be trained to deal with that.
Mr. Babbitt. That is correct, and that is quite common.
Mr. DeFazio. But if they hadn't experienced it, they
wouldn't be trained to deal with it.
Mr. Babbitt. It is quite common in the industry. For
example, Airbuses, I have flown every Airbus made, and----
Mr. DeFazio. Well, I don't want anybody, if you could,
avoiding, you know, things that cost a little bit of money or
delay the deployment of an aircraft that could lead to pilots
who are not informed as to all the characteristics of that
aircraft, which you already said earlier, the MCAS, people
should be informed of this system.
Now, there is also, you know, because of the pilot
discussion, there is in Captain Sullenberger's, he said that
there were many false warnings simultaneously?
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes. As opposed to older aircraft designs
where cockpit instruments were essentially standalone devices
and information was not shared between them, and a fault in one
could be easily identified and isolated and disregarded.
Now, in modern airplanes with higher levels of
integration--that is, higher levels of electronic
interconnectedness and sharing of data between devices--it is
now possible, as happened on these cases and in the June 1,
2009, crash of Air France 447, where a single errant data bit,
a single fault, a single failure can now have cascading effects
rapidly through multiple systems and create a condition of
multiple warnings, some of them false. It is difficult to sort
it out because of the startle factor, the workload, the task
saturation to identify the root cause, and it can be
contradictory, ambiguous, confusing, and ultimately
overwhelming.
Mr. DeFazio. Would a disagree light have helped in that
situation?
Mr. Sullenberger. It might. With so much going on, such
loud warnings, so many other disparate indications, they might
have missed it, but had they seen it, it might have had been
that one----
Mr. DeFazio. Captain Carey, looks like you wanted to say
something there. Did you, or are you just taking notes?
Mr. Carey. Yes, sir, I would like to comment. Excuse me,
Captain Sullenberger.
The MCAS system is a federated system, which means it is
not integrated into the control laws and logic of the computers
on the 73 MAX aircraft. Again, the failure was that Boeing did
not disclose the existence of MCAS to the pilot community
around the world. Therefore, robust training was not conducted.
The last line of defense in the MCAS system--when we asked
Boeing at the November 27th meeting in Texas what the last line
of defense was with the MCAS firing and firing and firing till
the aircraft stabilized was full nose down, they said the
pilots. Well, they didn't ever tell us the system existed. So,
therefore, we did not have robust training.
Mr. Sullenberger. And let me add, I think some false
assumptions were made about how the system would operate, how
it would be noticed or become aware of by pilots, and what
human performance would be in those conditions. I think it was
a false assumption to think that, before MCAS' existence, much
less its operation, was even disclosed to pilots, that they
would interpret this particular scenario----
Mr. DeFazio. One other quick thing here----
Mr. Sullenberger [continuing]. As a runaway trim----
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. And that leads to some of Ms.
Nelson's testimony that I wanted to get to, which is
questioning engineering assumptions. She questions the
engineering assumptions that went into the battery on the 787.
They were wrong. She is questioning the engineering assumptions
that went into the MCAS system as they radically changed it on
the 737 MAX and didn't disclose it, and then also evacuation
standards, which will be an ongoing concern of this committee,
which are only computer simulated. Computers are not humans.
They are not human factors. They don't anticipate everything.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I now recognize for 5 minutes Ranking Member Graves of
Missouri.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. OK. Thank you.
Then we will go with--I think we have Representative
Balderson from Ohio.
Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the folks here testifying today. I appreciate
your time.
My first question is for Ms. Pinkerton. You note that
following the grounding of the 737 MAX, the airline industry
employed a variety of mechanisms to cope with the disruptions.
Southwest has the most 737 MAX air jets in operation of any
carrier in the United States. Southwest is also the largest
passenger carrier in central Ohio. Can you discuss how
Southwest and A4A member carriers have accommodated the loss of
the 737 with minimal disruptions for service?
Ms. Pinkerton. Yes. As I mentioned, the A4A carriers that
had the MAX grounded have done several things: rebooking
passengers, rerouting. But in addition to that, they have had
to make systemic changes. They are utilizing spare aircraft.
They are doing things like delaying optional enhancements like
souped-up Wi-Fi and painting the aircraft. Unfortunately, we
have had, our carriers have had to completely eliminate some
service or take flights on markets that are more likely flown
and reduce frequencies, but for the most part, carriers have
been able, like I said, to accommodate 99 percent of folks.
We are anticipating that, despite the capacity drawdown
that Southwest, American, and United have had to do, we are
going to see a 3-percent increase in seats overall this summer,
and that is with other carriers filling in the capacity and
different airlines, different aircraft coming online also that
are providing that capacity.
Mr. Balderson. OK. Thank you very much.
My next question is for Captain Carey and Captain
Sullenberger. You both mentioned the need to ensure pilot
training protocols are vigorous and robust, especially as
aircraft are becoming more and more high tech. I agree that
passenger safety should always be the most important aspect of
our aviation industry and that our pilots should receive the
best possible training.
Are there any obvious or necessary changes you believe
should be made to licensure requirements or pilot training?
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Mr. Balderson. I was interested to
know that Boeing afforded Captain Babbitt, former Captain
Babbitt, retired Captain Babbitt the opportunity to utilize
their simulator, their 737 MAX simulator full-motion down in
Miami yesterday. Boeing invited two of our pilots who are here
today who have accumulated over 5,000 hours on the Boeing 737
aircraft to use that simulator on June 5. Shortly before that
appointment, Boeing rescinded that invitation.
So it is curious to me, while Boeing is working on this
fix, they don't want the people who fly it to actually see it.
So as far as the APA getting behind the software changes and
the FAA recertification of the 737 MAX return to service, we
would like our safety committee chairman and our safety
committee and training experts to be permitted to fly the 737
MAX simulator. The only one in existence right now in North
America is in Boeing's facility in Miami. However, there is
another one. It is in Addis Ababa. It belongs to Ethiopian
Airlines.
Mr. Balderson. Captain.
Mr. Sullenberger. It needs to be a priority for every
manufacturer, for every airline to provide all pilots and
flight attendants with all the information that they need to
operate their equipment safely, to understand it. As complexity
increases, it makes resilience harder without the proper
knowledge. And the most important trait that every technology
must have is that it be intuitive. It has to make sense. It has
to--it has to be additive to one's training, one's experience,
and not contrary to it.
And so especially for things that operate in a surprising
or counterintuitive way, we must be made aware of it and its
complications and its implications. We must experience it
firsthand in the simulator before we face a crisis in flight
with an airplane full of passengers and crew.
Mr. Balderson. Thank you both very much.
I yield back my remaining time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Balderson.
Representative Lipinski for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lipinski. I thank you, Chairman Larsen and Ranking
Member Graves for holding this hearing.
It is clear we all know, we all agree, we need to get to
the bottom of what happened with these two crashes so that we
can provide answers to the families and friends of the victims,
but also to do all we can to try to ensure nothing like this
ever happens again.
I want to focus my questions on the certification process.
You know, I had said at the hearing we had a few weeks ago, I
think that there was something went wrong. We need to figure
out what that is. We are still waiting for answers and
investigation here. But I want to ask more general questions
about the ODA program, and I want to start with Captain
Sullenberger.
In your testimony, you pose a lot of important questions
for Congress to consider with respect to the certification
process. Do you have any specific recommendations at the moment
with regards to general reforms of the process?
Mr. Sullenberger. It is important that oversight include
accountability or it means nothing. First, it is important that
FAA be provided the budgets that are sufficient consistently to
fulfill its responsibilities--the safety of the traveling
public--in terms of staffing, in terms of providing those who
oversee certification with the subject matter expertise to be
able to do their jobs, especially as technology improves and
especially in this global aviation industry.
It is often very difficult internationally for FAA to have
the budget, the staffing, and the subject matter expertise to
do the oversight that is necessary, in particular for foreign
manufacturers.
It is important, as Captain Carey has said and Ms. Nelson
has said, that the FAA have the independence to do their jobs
without political or economic influence. It is important that
whistleblower protections be in place, and that the safety
culture in our organizations, FAA and manufacturers, be strong
enough that those who have the integrity and the courage to
insist on the highest design standards for the safety of the
public not be overruled by supervisors with other agendas.
Mr. Lipinski. How do we do those things?
Mr. Sullenberger. Pardon me?
Mr. Lipinski. How do we do those?
Mr. Sullenberger. We start with the organization itself,
and we start with how the incentives in each organization are
aligned. Are they aligned for expedience or for economy, or are
they aligned for consistent application of best practices? Are
people hired and promoted and receive bonuses based upon
production numbers or based upon quality safety?
We get what we measure, we get what we reward. And right
now, in the important ways, the incentives are not aligned
toward consistent public good sufficiently in all our
organizations. Key members and leaders of each safety-critical
aviation organization must have subject matter expertise, and
in some cases, they must not be only engineers, they must also
be pilots, so they understand in a firsthand way the
implications of design choices.
Every design involves compromises between strength and
weight, performance and cost. We need to make sure that these
decisions are made in a fully informed fashion, in a
transparent way, and that communication about them is
communicated effectively at every level so we know what risks
are and why we are taking them.
We also must look at faults, not just individually, but in
combination. I think that may be a part of what happened here,
that there was not a full appreciation of the magnitude of the
risk to a single fault to these systems and the lack of
knowledge among the operators.
Mr. Lipinski. I want to give Ms. Nelson a chance to address
this in the last minute I have.
Thank you.
Ms. Nelson. OK. So we have talked with engineering experts
who advised us that a culture of safety would engineer a plane
from a clean sheet and a software fix is not a fix to a
manufacturing problem. Now, they have also assured us that
there can be, it is possible to have a software fix to make the
737 MAX safe, but starting from a place of the FAA, turning at
the same time to say that the manufacturers and the airlines or
their customers, as opposed to providing that direct oversight
and creating the Organizational Designation Authorization
program, ODA, there were many warnings that, over time, this
program would lead to a deterioration of safety. And that is
because there is not the rigorous oversight throughout the
process that may have led Boeing, from the very beginning, to
make very different decisions here because of the oversight
that would have been involved if we were to return to the FAA
oversight prior to ODA.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I now recognize Representative Spano for 5 minutes.
Mr. Spano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, witnesses, for being here. We appreciate it.
And thank you to the family members for being here. Again,
I want to as well wish you all the best, and express our
condolences to you, and tell you that our prayers are with you.
And so thank you for being here.
I would like to ask a series of questions to the panel, if
I may, just have you respond, if you would, by raising your
hand, all right, then I will acknowledge which one of you--for
the record, I will indicate which ones of you have answered in
the affirmative.
How many of you would describe yourselves as a safety
advocate?
Let the record reflect that every single person on the
panel has raised their hand.
How many of you are pilots?
Let the record reflect that Captain Carey, Captain
Sullenberger, and Mr. Babbitt are pilots.
How many of you are licensed airline pilots?
Let the record reflect as well that Captain Carey, Captain
Sullenberger, and Mr. Babbitt are licensed airline pilots.
How many of you are aeronautical engineers?
Let the record reflect that no one on the panel is an
aeronautical engineer.
How many of you have designed a commercial transport
aircraft?
Let the record reflect that no one on the panel has
designed a commercial transport aircraft.
How many of you are software engineers?
Let the record reflect that no one on the panel is a
software engineer.
How many of you have designed software for commercial
transport aircraft?
Let the record reflect that no one on the panel has
designed software for commercial transport aircraft.
How many of have you certified a commercial transport
aircraft? How many of you have certified a commercial transport
aircraft?
Let the record reflect that Mr. Babbitt has certified a
commercial transport aircraft.
And finally, how many of you have conducted an accident
investigation or been an official party representative to an
accident investigation?
Let the record reflect--raise your hand. OK. Let the record
reflect that Captain Carey, Captain Sullenberger, Ms. Nelson,
and Mr. Babbitt have been an official party representative to
an accident investigation.
Thank you for that. I follow up with a couple of questions.
First of all, Captain Sullenberger, you indicate in your
statement that we can, quote/unquote, ``no longer define safety
solely as the absence of accidents.''
From a layperson's perspective, to me, safety is preventing
an accident. So can you unpack that statement for me? Why is it
that we can no longer define safety as the absence of
accidents?
Mr. Sullenberger. The short answer is because we have been
able to make them much more rare. And if we do only that, we
are not doing our jobs. We need to look at all the near misses.
We need to look at all the unresolved systemic risks and latent
conditions. We need to do a lot more of what we are currently
doing, doing audits, relying upon self-reporting of safety
incidents, all the little things that become links in a causal
chain that might lead to an incident or an accident.
Mr. Spano. Understood. Thank you.
Mr. Sullenberger. And to intervene and break that chain, to
resolve these risks and these conditions before they can lead
to harm. And then--and we have been doing that for many years.
We are doing it more and more, but we need to do it even more
than we are. If we had, we might have been able to avoid these
two most recent ones.
Mr. Spano. My next question is for Mr. Babbitt, and then if
any of you want to follow up with a response as well.
Can you just briefly speak to the challenge that we face to
ensure public safety in a global aviation landscape? Like--so,
for instance, what are the FAA's duties and responsibilities?
What are our responsibilities as policymakers? What should our
objectives be? What should the regulatory framework look like
when we have many variables around the world that we cannot
control?
Mr. Babbitt. That is an excellent question, and it presents
quite a challenge to the FAA or any regulator. And the
challenge is you have to make assumptions on the base level of
education that you have for pilots, and if you say, for
example, two pilots sitting here and you say, do either of
you--put your hand up if you have an ATP, and we both put our
hands up. We have got one captain down here who has got, you
know, 35 years with American Airlines. And the one sitting next
to me over here has an ATP in a 172.
Mr. Spano. Could you clarify--could you--let me interject.
So what is an ATP, just for the record, if you could clarify?
Mr. Babbitt. I am sorry. Air transport pilot.
Mr. Spano. Thank you.
Mr. Babbitt. But you can get an air transport pilot rating
in a Cessna 172. That doesn't compare to Captain Carey's
experience or Captain Sully's experience, but yet they both
have ATPs. So we make these assumptions. We need a little more
information when we design airplanes to say, well, they have to
have an ATP. Well, OK. They have an ATP, but we need more than
that.
And I agree with Captain Sullenberger that, you know, the
data mining that we have today, ASIAS--ASIAS, that I mentioned
in my testimony, is providing incredible data where everyone
can report, without repercussion, and we use that data to
prevent accidents. We would rather investigate data today than
we would accidents. It is that simple. But we also need to have
a better understanding of the assumptions that the FAA, the
manufacturers--because the assumptions we make in the United
States may not be the assumptions made in Germany or France or
other places.
Mr. Spano. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. I recognize Representative Johnson of Georgia
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding this hearing.
I want to express my condolences to the friends and
relatives of the victims of these two air crashes, and thank
you for your presence today.
Captain Sullenberger, you, in your testimony, stated
essentially that this 737 platform which had been around for 50
years or so was updated with the design of the 737 MAX, which
pretty much sits on the same platform as the 737 but the 737
MAX has larger engines. And these larger engines, because of
ground clearance, those engines on the MAX were required to be
mounted higher and further forward on the wings. Is that
correct?
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. And because of that design need,
the new engines actually reduced the aircraft's aerodynamic
stability in certain conditions which, therefore, inspired the
folks at Boeing to address that issue with adding a software
feature called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation
System, also known as MCAS. Is that correct?
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. And the MCAS system operated
automatically, causing the nose of the plane to be pushed down
without pilot input, if conditions warrant it?
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. And the condition that warranted it
would derive from the operation of one angle-of-attack sensor.
That would be something that would happen to the sensor would
cause the MCAS system to operate and push the nose down without
pilot input.
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. And if that angle-of-attack sensor
failed in some way, it could result in a problem in the
operation of the aircraft. Pushing the nose down, that means
the plane is going to go down, correct?
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes. And not just once but repeatedly.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. And the MCAS system was not a
system that was revealed to the airline industry, and thus to
the pilots, prior to the first aircraft disaster in the
Philippines.
Mr. Sullenberger. My understanding is that it may have been
revealed to some airlines, but to my knowledge, no airline
pilots around the world knew of its existence before the first
crash.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. No pilot around the world knew that
the MCAS system could thrust the nose of the plane downward.
They did not know that, and so, therefore, they had no training
in terms of how to react to a sudden nosedive by the plane. Is
that correct?
Mr. Sullenberger. I am sorry. Would you say that again?
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. A pilot without knowledge of an
MCAS system in the plane, flying a 737 MAX, a pilot not knowing
of this MCAS system and now the plane is suddenly, the nose of
the plane is headed downward, you are not trained or no pilot
was trained in how to react to that occurring, prior to the
crash in the Philippines of the 737 MAX.
Mr. Sullenberger. That is essentially correct. As I
understand it, the assumption on the part of Boeing and the
designers was that pilots, even though they did not know of the
existence of the MCAS feature, the software, that they would
somehow interpret this repeated nose-down movement as being a
runaway stabilizer procedure, which would be something that
they were familiar with. But it is, as I said, demonstrably
evident that at least two professional airline crews were
unable to do that.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Was the FAA notified of the MCAS
addition to the 737 platform prior to the crashes?
Mr. Sullenberger. My understanding is that, at some point,
they were made aware of the feature, but that they were not
aware of the changes to the operation of the feature prior to
the first crash; that it had been redesigned to activate with
greater movement each time it activated, and it would activate
until the full range of motion that could be achieved was
achieved. In other words, it would act repeatedly until the
nose was forced as far down as it could go.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Captain Sullenberger.
Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Massie is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Massie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all the witnesses for coming today.
Captain Sullenberger, do you think that better trained
pilots or more experienced pilots should have been able to
handle the situation and the malfunctions in the Lion Air and
Ethiopian Airlines crashes?
Mr. Sullenberger. Congressman, the first thing that we have
to remember is that we are all, as humans, subject to hindsight
bias, and it makes it very difficult for us to know with
certainty what one might have done suddenly facing an
unanticipated situation that we now have knowledge of.
I think that it is unlikely that other crews would have had
very different experiences or performed very differently than
these two crews did on their accident flights, prior to
knowledge of the system, certainly in the first case, and not
having practiced it in a simulator since then.
Mr. Massie. Wasn't there a crew on the same plane on Lion
Air that experienced a malfunction----
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes.
Mr. Massie [continuing]. Prior to the crash?
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes.
Mr. Massie. And how did they----
Mr. Sullenberger. At least one apparently experienced this
and was successful, but obviously two were not. I don't know
what the probability of success would be, but some--at least
one did and at least two did not.
Mr. Carey. May I comment, sir?
Mr. Massie. Sure. Let me ask you a question first, Captain
Carey. Are your members trained on runaway trim procedures,
U.S. pilots?
Mr. Carey. It would depend on what aircraft type they have
been on and how many years they have been with the airline. The
simple answer would be, yes, at some time in their career they
were trained on a runaway stabilizer situation, either on the
aircraft they are flying or previous model.
What I would like to comment, sir, at your pleasure, the
Lion Air airplane that did successfully land after the MCAS
experience was fortunate enough to have a third pilot in the
jump seat, and that pilot recognized the malfunction and led to
the safe landing of that aircraft.
Mr. Massie. If the other pilots had had the same training
as the third pilot, would they have recognized it?
Mr. Carey. It may have just been fate that the third pilot
was there while the--you have to remember, sir, and members of
the panel, this is a sudden, violent, and terrifying event.
This airplane is pitching up and down rapidly and violently.
There's bells, warnings, and clackers sounding. Communication
is difficult. The third pilot in the jump seat, those stab trim
wheels are right in front of that observer, and that pilot was
fortunate enough to recognize the malfunction.
Mr. Massie. Let's talk about your members and colleagues.
Would they know how to respond to that situation or how to
identify and respond to runaway trim?
Mr. Carey. I would have to completely concur with Captain
Sullenberger's remarks. In this situation, I believe that some
crews would have recognized it in time to recover and some
would not have.
Mr. Massie. Mr. Babbitt, can you tell us about your
experience in the simulator in encountering this similar
situation? What was that like?
Mr. Babbitt. It was a very educational experience, I will
say that. I think I would agree with Captain Sullenberger that,
you know, any of these events, all of us up here have
experienced different emergencies, and they are very attention
getting, and sometimes, you know, you might have been focused
over here.
I had the advantage, as did Captain Sullenberger, I knew
what was going to happen. I have read, and I knew what the
procedures should have been in the old system; I knew what the
procedures were in the new system. And so I was able to follow
the procedures, but essentially, I had training. I had been
briefed as to what the reaction of the airplane was going to
be, and nevertheless, it is any emergency. When a fire bell
goes off in the aircraft--I have had engine fires--it is quite
discerning, and one of the first things you do is stop the
noise.
In this case, you can't stop the noise. The stick shaker
continues to go, and we figured out--I mean, my experience in
Boeing is we had one going and one not. That would tell you you
have got an indicator problem. But yes. And then the new
software fix was, I think, a very good one. It obviously limits
the amount of authority given to the pitch-down, and it only
does it once. I mean, you either fix it or you don't, and it is
a runaway stabilizer trim.
Mr. Massie. I would like to ask one more question----
Mr. Babbitt. Sure.
Mr. Massie [continuing]. Real quick of Captain
Sullenberger.
I think you are spot on by, in your statement, that we need
to--we can no longer define safety solely as the absence of
accidents. We need to look at the near misses.
But how do you balance the pilots not wanting somebody
looking over their shoulder versus going back and looking at
the near misses?
And if he could respond, I am done asking questions.
Mr. Larsen. You have 15 seconds.
Mr. Sullenberger. The key to that is trust. When pilots
trust that their professional observations, self-reported, will
be de-identified and used only for safety purposes, they are
willing to make those kinds of safety reports, that that can
only come from them and not from somewhere else.
Mr. Massie. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I recognize Representative Titus for 5 minutes, and then
our side, Mr. Allred will be after Representative Titus.
Representative Titus, 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you all have said, this investigation is very important
for the future. For the past, maybe it gives some solace to
those who have family members or friends who are lost, but it
is not going to bring back those lost lives. So as we think
about the future, I would wonder if now that you are having
greater scrutiny by the FAA, now that you are looking into what
caused these problems, now that you are revisiting the ODA,
have you discovered any other shortcuts that Boeing or some of
the airlines might have taken that we don't know about and
haven't caused accidents yet?
Mr. Babbitt.
Mr. Babbitt. No. The ODA process has been around the since
the beginning of time and airplanes. I mean, the only pilots I
know that didn't go through it were Orville and Wilbur.
Everybody else has had to turn over their designs as they
wanted things certified. And, you know, the process works. I
mean, you simply don't have the manpower to do all--to
absolutely, you know, watch every piece of design. Boeing has
over 40,000 engineers. The FAA has 1,400, and you work hand in
hand. And the ODA process is the same in the United States as
it is at EASA, which is the European.
So I think, you know, what we need to do--one of the things
that is incumbent upon us now as we move forward with
increasing technology is understanding and training pilots to
appreciate more and more of the safety envelope is protected by
automation, meaning that this is not the only airplane that
will help you recover. Captain Sullenberger flew the A320. If
that airplane gets too close to a stall, the airplane pushes up
its own power. If you get going too fast, it pulls the nose up
for you. It does a lot of things, and these are all things to
protect the safety envelope, but the pilots need to have
absolute training and understanding of what----
Ms. Titus. I understand all that, we have been through all
that, but that doesn't answer my question. Have you come up--
have you discovered any other problems that we just haven't
made the news because there hasn't been a crash?
Mr. Babbitt. No. I think----
Ms. Titus. That is reassuring.
Mr. Babbitt. Obviously, if I knew what those problems might
be. I don't anticipate there were any. I think Boeing has done
a respectably--they have built wonderful airplanes over the
years, and I have put in my testimony, I think they made a bad
assumption as to what they needed to tell people. They assumed
the system was one everyone was familiar with, based on similar
systems in the aircraft, and they were incorrect.
Ms. Titus. OK. Thank you. I hope you are right.
As you--uh-huh. Thank you.
Mr. Carey. Ms. Titus, thank you.
I would like to see more FAA oversight of foreign repair
stations. This is vital to the future of aviation. More and
more aviation maintenance, heavy maintenance is being
outsourced overseas to countries like El Salvador, Brazil,
China. As much as we would like to keep these jobs in the
United States, and that is certainly our agenda, the economic
reality is these maintenance facilities are going overseas, and
we would like to see very robust oversight of these facilities.
Mr. Sullenberger. May I comment also----
Ms. Titus. Please.
Mr. Sullenberger [continuing]. To clarify something that
Captain Babbitt said?
ODA is actually a fairly recent revision of the previous
DER system, and one of the major changes in that is that the
FAA no longer chooses their designees. They are chosen by the
manufacturer. And so, again, the incentives are not aligned as
consistently toward public good with those kinds of choices
being made and depending upon who their supervisors are.
Ms. Titus. Uh-huh. Would you like to comment, Ms. Nelson?
Mr. Babbitt. I think the rationale behind that was, if you
have 40,000 engineers, you know who the better ones are, you
know the ones who should have risen to the management of the
projects. The FAA doesn't know these people at all. They have
oversight of them and they work in parallel with them. If you
have been part of a certification team or service--
certification flights, which I have been, you have an FAA pilot
in one seat and you have a Boeing pilot in the other putting
the airplane through the paces. If you look at the records, the
FAA has flown the airplane just about as much as the Boeing
pilots have in testing.
Ms. Titus. I appreciate that, but you say you lack the
resources to have adequate oversight. I believe that is true,
from all I have heard from FAA over the last several years, and
there is going to be a tendency by someone who works for a
company reviewing what that company is doing to be more
positive than somebody who is objective and outside. I mean,
that is just--that is just a fact.
I would ask very quickly, Ms. Pinkerton, some of the
airlines are now reconsidering the use of the 787 MAXes. They
have ordered thousands of them. Some of them are changing out
their whole fleet because they want to keep the same plane, and
you understand all the economics of that.
Have you heard any of the airlines addressing some
reconsideration of this or how they are taking that into
account with the grounding of all these planes?
Ms. Pinkerton. Well, I have certainly seen the reports.
Some of those are commercial decisions that each carrier is
going to make.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Allred for 5 minutes.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first express my deepest condolences to the
families of those lost in these two crashes. I extend my
condolences to the families who are here and those that are
not. I want to do what we can to make sure that something like
this doesn't happen again, not only with the MAX, but with
future aircraft and iterations of aircraft.
To that end, I want to begin with you, Captain Carey. At
our May 15 hearing, I raised my concerns to Acting
Administrator Elwell after reading a report in the Dallas
Morning News regarding your meeting with Boeing that the FAA
was not made aware of the concerns of your pilots.
Moving forward, what role do you think pilots should play
in alerting the FAA of concerns like those that you raised in
that meeting?
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Mr. Allred. First of all, I would
like to thank Acting Administrator Elwell. He has been quite
progressive in allowing us contact to his office and his
professionals.
Going forward, we would like to see our subject matter
experts, our 737 pilots in our safety and training program at
the Allied Pilots Association invited to future certification
proceedings on all future designs. So we have the 777-900
coming down the chute from Boeing shortly. This will be the
first commercial aircraft with folding wings. Do we want that
to be certified on the original Boeing 777 certificate from
1996 or whenever it was? And this goes back to the timeline or
the sunset of a certificate as we are speaking. The 737 is
operating on a 1967 certificate.
So we absolutely would like the stakeholders, the flight
attendants, the pilots, the engineers, and the maintenance
personnel to be involved in future certification with the
manufacturer and progressively with the administration as these
designs come to commercial use.
Mr. Allred. After the designs have already been introduced,
are you confident in the processes to raise those concerns now?
Mr. Carey. I believe we--I am confident in the ability to
raise the concerns through the ASAP program, the safety
reporting program, the Whistleblower Program, and forums like
this, public forums that you so graciously put forward.
I would like to say, to answer a question that was raised
earlier, the Allied Pilots Association only endorsed the safety
of the American Airlines version of the MAX, because we were
one of two airlines in the world to purchase the optional dual
AOA system. So we professed our confidence in our version of
the airplane. I called the president of Southwest pilots union
and said, heads-up, you guys don't have the redundancy that we
have.
Mr. Allred. Well, you raised a point I wanted to follow up
with Captain Sullenberger.
In your written testimony, you state that, quote,
``whistleblower protection must be strong and effective, and if
it is not strong enough, we must strengthen it.''
In your experience, do you believe that current protections
are sufficient? And, if not, what can be done to ensure that
employees are freely able to come forward with their concerns?
Mr. Sullenberger. It is apparent to me it is not
sufficient. I think there are those who need to come forward,
and they need to feel free of recrimination, in order to make
sure that the truth is known.
Mr. Allred. Mr. Babbitt, same question to you.
Mr. Babbitt. I can tell you at the FAA, when I was there,
whistleblower reports were taken incredibly seriously. I, in
fact, established an entire department to ensure that they were
heard, that they had the protections that were needed, and the
followups were made. It is a very robust system. And to my
knowledge, I know of no one who has come forward later after
leaving or anything and said, geez, I tried to be a
whistleblower and no one would listen to me. That doesn't
happen at the FAA, not at least in my tenure there.
Mr. Carey. I think there may be a problem within the
manufacturing side, the commercial side. For example, Boeing
has what they call a Boeing ethics department. So if an
engineer or an employee raises a vital concern, if it has
economic impact to the corporation, they may be coached or
counseled.
Mr. Allred. Yeah. That is great. Well, I have about 40
seconds left.
And, Captain Carey, I just want to ask you one more
question. From your written testimony, you state that there is
only one standard of safety and training and that, quote,
``simply put, Boeing does not produce aircraft for U.S. pilots
versus pilots from the rest of the world.''
Can you elaborate on that?
Mr. Carey. Absolutely, sir. You know, we have to get away
from the days of the American pilot machismo in the ``Top Gun''
movie. Ethiopian Airlines flies a plane into Washington Dulles
every day from Addis Ababa, and they have been doing it for
years. They have a proud aviation culture. They were founded by
TWA in 1945 and managed through 1975. They are very proud of
the fact that Emperor Selassie was the only head of state from
Africa to attend JFK's funeral because he had a Boeing aircraft
that brought him here.
Mr. Allred. Thank you so much.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I now recognize Representative Johnson of Texas, and
followed by Representative Davids from Kansas.
Representative Johnson, 5 minutes.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And let me express my appreciation for all of the witnesses
being here and especially the family representatives.
We care deeply about airline safety. For one thing, all of
us get on a plane every week, going and coming home, and so we
are as concerned about American safety as any other safety
around the world.
I live in Dallas, Texas, where we have DFW and Love Field,
and both airports have airlines very involved in this area. And
it does cross my mind often how aboveboard we are with the
examination of the planes and the agencies in charge, and
wonder sometimes if some laxity might cause a little slip-up.
I know that we have very, very safe aviation activities,
but I wonder if each of you could tell me anything that would
give us a little bit more assurance that we are headed in the
right direction for making sure that safety is the number one
concern each time a plane is involved.
This kind of accident gets your attention, and we want to
be supportive of whatever it takes to ensure more and more
safety. We have more and more air traffic and more and more
technology involved. Change does come. So I am very concerned.
As an old mind who does not move as fast as some young ones, I
am basically very concerned about safety and aviation. We see
more and more traffic.
So each of you will take some time, if you will, to give me
some of your thoughts of what we need to focus on to ensure
that.
Ms. Pinkerton. Congresswoman, I think that you can rest
assured that our aviation system is the safest in the world. I
have been an observer of this industry for 20 years. I worked
on the Hill and did oversight of the FAA. I worked at the FAA,
and now I represent the airlines. And I can tell you, the
dedicated people that are at the FAA and that are in the
airline industry, safety is absolutely our top priority. And
when accidents like this happen, we take them incredibly
seriously. We go back, we look, and we try to be better the
next time.
So even though we have had a decade of a perfect safety
record, albeit that one terrible fatality, we recognize that we
have to be better. And that is why I mentioned in my testimony,
the types of programs that we have right now, allow us to
predict and prevent. We identify trends.
I can assure you that when the FAA, because--and I will
tell you what the good sign is. I think Sara Nelson mentioned
she has noticed a chastened attitude and motivation. When
something like this happens in the aviation community, we
redouble our efforts. We don't rely on our perfect record from
the past. We know we have to get better, and we are committed
to doing that.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you.
Ms. Nelson. I would like to note that I agree
wholeheartedly with Sharon. And I think that there is no doubt
that everyone across the industry, whether it is regulators,
operators, or the frontline personnel who make the airlines
fly, are absolutely committed to safety, and can tell you
without a doubt that that is the foremost thought on their
minds.
There are some things that we can learn from this, though,
and things that we can do better. And one of them is fully
funding FAA personnel and making sure that we are competitive
with the private sector for the certification engineers who are
working at the FAA. And I think that we can also make sure that
the reporting systems that Captain Carey was talking about that
help us continue to analyze how we are doing, look at near
misses, look at potential problems where employees had a
distraction with their safety duties, and they are able to do
that because they can report these issues without a punitive
response.
So that has been under attack in recent years, and in our
experience, has been diminished somewhat, and we have had to
fight very hard for the continued programs that ensure a
nonpunitive reporting system so that all of the employees can
identify when they see an issue. And I would say that those two
issues especially could be addressed in this time, both the
funding and also the continued support of the reporting systems
that allow us to continue to analyze the safety----
Mr. Larsen. All right.
Ms. Nelson [continuing]. Of citizens and keep us safe.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, President Nelson.
Thank you, Representative Johnson.
I recognize Representative Davids for 5 minutes.
Ms. Davids. Thank you, Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses who are here today to
testify, and thank you to the families. My condolences on your
loss and condolences to those who are not here today.
The first thing I would like to do is just to acknowledge
that all of us--we have heard from you, we have heard in
previous testimony and hearings that we have had--that all of
us recognize that safety is the underlying most important
foundational piece of our aviation system, not just in this
country, but around the world. And as leaders in that space, I
know that all of the folks here are putting that as a top
priority. I can tell from your testimony, not just your verbal,
but also your written testimony, and the meetings that I have
had with folks who are also part of the FAA.
And I think that one of the pieces that we have to also
keep in mind is that pronouncements from anyone, whether it is
manufacturers, stakeholders, Members of Congress, or other
people who are performing oversight, about what any causes
might have been of these accidents are premature until we get
the results of the investigations. And I have appreciated all
of you bringing that up and continuing to remind folks of that.
One of the things I would like to start off with is
actually a followup from the line of questioning that Mr.
Balderson was on earlier, which is to ask, Mr. Carey, you
mentioned that the invitation for the folks from Allied Pilots
made on June 5 simulator training was canceled. I am curious if
you could tell us what the reasoning for the cancellation was.
Mr. Carey. We are still trying to determine that. We
initially received an invitation to go down to the Boeing
simulator at Miami, 737 MAX full-motion simulator, and Captains
Goldberg, behind me, and Captain Tajer, were going to
participate in a flight review of the MCAS system at Boeing's
invitation. The invitation was withdrawn. We are trying to get
some simulator time either at Boeing.
I mentioned earlier Ethiopian has a simulator we are trying
to get into to use. And also a correction to my earlier
statement, there are also two 737 MAX simulators in Canada. So
if Boeing will not renew their invitation, we will certainly go
purchase time at one of those other carriers.
Ms. Davids. So at this point, there hasn't been a
rescheduling of the invitation?
Mr. Carey. No. That is somewhat upsetting to us. I mean, we
are the largest airline in the world, and we would like a fair
take at reviewing this MCAS scenario, in a muscle memory
scenario as Captain Sullenberger described earlier.
Ms. Davids. And then I would like to--Mr. Babbitt, I would
like to hear your thoughts on the funding question in making
sure that we are keeping FAA properly funded, both what was
your experience, and then if you can opine on where we are at
right now? I am not sure if you feel comfortable doing that
because you are not currently the Administrator, but I would
like to hear a little bit about that.
Mr. Babbitt. Thank goodness for that. Thank you.
The funding is always an issue. You come in with a robust--
we have always an enormous amount of things that people would
like the FAA to undertake and do. You simply don't have the
funds. And so prioritizing what you need to do. And obviously,
what is at the fulcrum of that prioritizing is safety.
And I think in--I didn't get to answer Ms. Johnson's
question, but I think the biggest fear we have is--and funding
will help alleviate it, but the biggest fear that I have is
complacency. We have a system that is incredibly safe and,
therefore, a lot of people say, well, geez, it is running
great. Why do we need to do anything else? Well, we need to do
anything else because we are always breaking new boundaries,
pioneering new areas, understanding new technology, and we have
to evaluate those things.
And remember, the FAA's task is not to design the systems;
it is to design the safety boundaries that the system has to
operate in. We--you know, it is sort of like baseball. You
know, the commissioner set the rules. The players have to play
by those rules, and that is what we do. That is what the FAA
does.
And so prioritizing--and I guess the best thing I could
suggest is that we make certain that, when the FAA does, in
fact, prioritize, they share those thoughts with the
committees, which I know we do.
Ms. Davids. Thank you.
And finally, I would just say that the concept of oversight
is something that is our duty under the Constitution. We also
have the duty to make sure that we are properly funding all of
our safety, especially aviation, but all of our safety
mechanisms in this country. So that is on Congress.
Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I recognize Representative Craig of Minnesota for 5
minutes.
Ms. Craig. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, as all of us, I want to express my sincere
condolences to the families and friends of the victims of the
Boeing 737 crashes. We take this responsibility in this
Congress incredibly seriously. So thank you all for being here
with us today.
Before I came to Congress, I worked in a highly regulated
space, the medical technology field, where we heeded very
strict compliance and reporting requirements to disclose
aftermarket or postmarket issues that were encountered by
physicians, by hospitals, by many, many stakeholders with our
devices. It was a government system, the FDA's Adverse Event
Reporting System, sometimes referred to as the MAUDE database.
Ms. Pinkerton, I found the voluntary reporting programs you
mentioned to be incredibly interesting. And I wanted your
thoughts on whether we should have a more structured approach,
rather than a voluntary reporting system, so that, as Captain
Sullenberger said, we resolve these risks before we encounter
an event. If you would speak to that, and I am going to ask a
number of you also to speak to whether you think the postmarket
reporting requirements are adequate from an FAA perspective.
Ms. Pinkerton. Thank you for the question. And with respect
to the structure of our safety programs, I think the voluntary
nature--and it will be great to hear from our union partners on
that--the voluntary nature of it is part of the beauty of it,
and Congress has passed statutory protections for voluntarily
coming forward and, frankly, that has been a linchpin of our
safety management systems and all of these data-sharing
programs.
So I would--you know, I think everything--and we certainly
welcome any scrutiny of these programs. I think it is always
good to ask the questions, but those programs are working
remarkably successfully right now.
With respect to the FAA standards on parts, I think--again,
I think they are welcomed scrutiny. And that is the beauty of
the oversight that you are taking seriously and that you all
are performing. The IG, the Secretary has asked for oversight.
Again, I think the scrutiny is welcomed. The standards are
working very well right now.
Ms. Craig. Captain Carey or Sullenberger, do you have
anything to add to that?
Mr. Carey. Well, we are quite proud of the fact that the
Allied Pilots Association, in partnership with the FAA and
American Airlines, established the first aviation safety
reporting program nearly 25 years ago, it is now known as ASAP,
and this has been tremendously successful in averting disasters
over the last 25 years. And this program started with the
pilots at American Airlines, but now it reaches out to the
other stakeholder workgroups within the airline industry at
every airline in the country.
Mr. Sullenberger. Let me just add that I agree with Captain
Carey. And as mentioned earlier about some of the maintenance
issues with foreign repair stations and their oversight, those
in particular are troubling. More and more, over time,
airlines, for economic reasons, have outsourced much of their
heavy maintenance that used to be done in-house by their own
employees, supervised by their own employees, often there was
an FAA overseer on the site, now to overseas locations where
a--if the FAA even has the budget and the staff to make a
foreign visit, it is virtually impossible for them to arrive
unannounced.
There is also a continuing problem within the industry of
counterfeit parts, people trying to reuse parts or use parts
without a proper provenance where you know with certainty its
history from the manufacturer to its delivery onsite and to use
in an airplane.
So there still are some ongoing systemic issues that have
never been resolved.
Ms. Craig. Ms. Nelson, you mentioned in your testimony the
2006 NTSB results of a study, ``Safety Report on the Treatment
of Safety-Critical Systems in Transport Airplanes.'' The NTSB
concluded that existing decisions made during design and
certification process practices were not subject to ongoing
risk assessment and consideration of new information from
aftermarket operations and maintenance of aircraft.
Do you believe that this 2006 NTSB recommendation has been
addressed and implemented by the FAA?
Ms. Nelson. This has been addressed, I would say, yes. It
has not been fully implemented. And my assumption for the
biggest reason that it has not been fully implemented is the
funding to carry out those recommendations.
Ms. Craig. It comes back to funding. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chair, I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I recognize Representative Stanton for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Chair Larsen. I
appreciate it.
Thanks for the witnesses for being here and being patient
with this committee. Sorry we are coming in and out. Obviously,
we serve on multiple committees.
My first questions are for former FAA Administrator
Babbitt. Mr. Babbitt, Captain Carey has questioned whether a
sunset or termination date for FAA aircraft certification,
particularly for those like the 737 designation from 1967,
should be incorporated into the FAA certification process.
As this committee examines the certification process, with
your decades of FAA experience and as a pilot yourself, do you
think this is an idea worth considering?
Mr. Babbitt. Well, they actually do. Those certifications,
the original certification in 1967, applied to that airplane
obviously. And what you look at as, maybe 2 years later, we
have a new engine we put on that airplane. Do we recertify it?
Not really. It has maybe the same thrust, and so--and the
parties work together. The airline, the manufacturer. They say
this doesn't significantly operate the aircraft differently. It
doesn't feel any differently. The pilots do need to understand
what the new engine limitations might be, but that's that.
Those are--every time there is a significant change made, it is
evaluated by the FAA.
I guess the point we should get to for this one is, were
the changes made to this aircraft substantial enough that it
should have dictated, wait a minute. It has got a different
wing. It has got this. It has got that. Maybe we should have
another type certificate for this airplane.
And that is a valuable or, you know, something worth
considering.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much. As you know, Boeing
advanced the 737 MAX as a fourth generation of the 737. This
had several benefits for Boeing saving money. It gave them a
jump-start on their design and engineering work and required
less pilot training. But most importantly for Boeing, it
allowed the company to apply for the same common type
certification, saving considerable time in getting the aircraft
off the ground.
In your opinion, should the FAA have considered--under
these circumstances, should the FAA have considered this a new
aircraft model rather than a variation of an existing one?
Mr. Babbitt. They did consider. I am certain that they
looked at it, and there is an entire matrix of changes that you
go through, and these are typically shared. I know in the past,
most of the pilot unions involved get to look at that matrix,
whether it is certification, minimum equipment, things like
that. But what is important to remember, I have heard several
times that if this was a new type certificate, it would be very
expensive. Not necessarily. If the old airplane simply has one
new feature and we say, well, we are going to have to give a
different type rating for this, all you are going to have to
train in is that difference.
A great example is in the Airbus aircraft to transition
from an A320 to an A330, which is a dramatically different
airplane, it is 4 days of difference in training. If you had
never flown an A320, it would be a 3- or 4-week course.
Mr. Stanton. To your knowledge, has the FAA ever denied a
manufacturer's application to treat an aircraft like a
variation of an existing aircraft?
Mr. Babbitt. Yes.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you. My question is now for Captain
Sullenberger. Captain, thank you for being here. I want to
explore with you a question raised in Captain Carey's testimony
on pilot training. As aircraft become more and technologically
advanced, is the FAA equipped to make sure that pilot training
is sufficiently rigorous to handle the potential scenarios that
could arise?
Mr. Sullenberger. I have concerns, Congressman, because
over many years, pilots have been given less and less detailed
information, especially in the documentation, the manuals that
we have access to, even online. So it becomes harder and harder
for those of us who really want to understand in a deep way
exactly how these machines operate, where the surprises are,
where the dark corners are, where the counterintuitive features
are that we have that might bite us, it is a trap for us if we
are unwary.
And going back to the certification issue for a moment.
Mr. Stanton. Please.
Mr. Sullenberger. I want to address quickly one more, I
think, unappreciated change that occurred with the MAX, having
stretched this airplane even more than the previous version.
The result of that, because of the legacy short landing gear,
and the geometry that that affords for the nose angle on
takeoff and landing, the speeds for takeoff and for landing
have been increased significantly over previous versions, about
20 knots, I understand, that is 23 miles an hour, which
slightly increases the risk of a runway overrun.
And when you are operating at airports like Burbank, like
Chicago Midway, like LaGuardia that are short runways
constrained by obstacles, in some cases by water, that becomes
even more of a consideration, especially if the runways are wet
or contaminated by snow and ice. And that is yet one more
compromise that has been made in this latest stretch to the
original design.
Mr. Stanton. I thank you, Captain. I have more questions,
but my time is short, so I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal, you are recognized for 5 minutes. And I ask
that you apologize to Mr. Brown.
Mr. Carbajal. I apologize to whoever I need to apologize
to.
Thank you all for being here, for giving us your time and
to share your thoughts and testimony with us.
Captain Carey, thank you for your time again. I know you
have a very distinguished career as a 35-year captain with
American Airlines and spent time in Africa training African
pilots.
Based on your experience training non-U.S. pilots, why is
it important for a company like Boeing to create an aircraft
for pilots around the world and not just U.S. pilots? Are there
any improvements you think the FAA can make to evaluate pilot
training?
Mr. Carey. Boeing is a national treasure. I worked as a kid
in the machine shop on Long Island making parts for the
aircraft industry. That is how I paid my way through flight
training. The pilots in Africa or Europe--America--we are lucky
here in the United States because we have a robust military,
and we have a pool of well-trained military pilots. We also
have a thriving corporate and commuter regional airline
industry. So, again, we have a constant assembly line of well-
trained experienced pilots. That doesn't exist in small nations
around the world, like Greece or Portugal or Ireland or even
the United Kingdom. They have to use ab initio trainings,
programs.
Ethiopia. When I was in Africa in 2012 and 2013, I was
training the Presidential pilots for the President of
Equatorial Guinea on their new Boeing 777 aircraft. And I spent
a year there. And we maintained a relationship to use the
training and maintenance facilities at Ethiopian. Ethiopian has
a world-class maintenance and training facility. They can do
overhauls on Boeing aircraft, just like we do at Tulsa Tech,
American Airlines' largest maintenance facility in the world.
Going forward, I would like to see more training. When I
was hired 35 years ago, we trained every 6 months, recurrent
training. Captain Sullenberger can attest to that. Now, the FAA
has given what they call a single visit exemption, where
airlines can retrain their pilots every 12 months. American
Airlines happens to do 9-month cycles. I think we should go
back to more training. More training leads to a safer sky.
One fatality in seven billion is one more than we need. As
Captain Sullenberger said earlier, we need to prevent accidents
from the factory floor to the sky, and we can do it.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Mr. Babbitt, you oversaw the FAA
after the crash of the Air France flight 447, and the Colgan
Air flight 3407. In your testimony, you mention our Nation's
system of aircraft certification has been evolving for over 60
years and must continue to evolve to improve.
What are some of the improvements that FAA can make to the
current certification process and, two, from your experience,
are there any lessons learned that we should keep in mind as we
work through the issues facing the 737 MAX?
Mr. Babbitt. Thank you for the question. I think that what
the FAA could do has been mentioned by several people here. You
are certainly going to need experts in the various areas of new
technology that we are seeing. You know, we are now seeing
artificial intelligence induced into decisionmaking an
aircraft. And the data behind those needs to continue to
expand, all of that takes money.
So, you know, in terms of subject matter experts,
increasing, you know, where we need them, and anticipating that
is going to be very important. As I said in my testimony, data
is our friend. You know, what we did coming out of 3407 or the
Air France, we took that data and made changes based on it.
Unfortunately, we don't have much data, as of today, for either
the Lion Air or the Ethiopian accidents. We know the basics of
what happened, but we don't know, and our own NTSB will
eventually look at that data and give us more information,
which will provide a roadmap for us to, OK, we need to expand
and do a better job in these areas if we are going to take the
lessons learned from that data.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. Thank you both.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I recognize Representative Brown for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I too want to offer my condolences to the family and
friends of those who died in the two crashes involving the
Boeing 737 and MAX 8.
I want to thank the panel, not only for being here today
and your testimony, but your work as aviation safety advocates.
A lot of your testimony, a lot of the questions have
focused on training, and I don't want to be redundant, so I
have been able to check off a lot of my questions. I just want
to clarify a few things.
The simulators, Captain Sullenberger, you mentioned a level
D, I think you categorize it as a full feel simulator. I
understand there is one in the United States, two in Canada,
one in Ethiopia. Is that accurate?
Mr. Sullenberger. That is my understanding.
Mr. Brown. Are there other simulators that either--you
know, that may not provide full feel, but allow for ample
training on emergency procedures, system failures, mechanical
failures----
Mr. Sullenberger. Captain Carey would know better than I,
but there are, of course, simulators for previous versions,
including the 737 NG, the immediate predecessor to the MAX. But
that, of course, wouldn't be able to replicate the activation
of MCAS.
Mr. Carey. That is correct.
Mr. Brown. Let me--the cockpit is a busy place, even in
normal flight conditions. And when there is a flight condition
that triggers an emergency indicated in an instrument or some
other indicator, it gets really, really busy. I just want to
sort of explore. I come out of the Army aviation community
where, you know, I flew back in the 1980s, so we still had sort
of steam gauges in the OH-58, and I know we have advanced
considerably in every airframe, rotary wing, and fixed wing,
but can you give us a sense of--for the 737--how many emergency
procedures are in the documentation, either a pilot's manual,
an operator's manual for mechanical or system failures? Give us
a rough estimate.
Mr. Carey. I have my 737 subject matter experts behind me.
They inform me there are hundreds, sir.
Mr. Brown. There are hundreds. And of those hundreds, is
there sufficient simulator time to train on those hundreds?
Mr. Carey. We train--at American, we train every 9 months,
and we go through the major ones, the ones that would be most
difficult for a pilot to handle.
Mr. Brown. And now, of course, the training challenge with
the MCAS is that we didn't, as Captain Sullenberger mentioned,
we lacked the information that it was on board. But are there
other automated systems? And I think this is a followup to a
question that was asked by Representative Titus. Are there
other systems that create automated systems----
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Brown, make sure you are getting in the
microphone there.
Mr. Brown. Yeah, I just couldn't see the witnesses beyond
Mrs. Napolitano. Sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Are there other automated--it is the design flaw of the
room, don't worry. No, you are fine.
Are there other automated systems that present similar
challenges in terms of--and I am focusing on the simulator--
that there is adequate simulator time to train on?
Mr. Carey. Well, as far as the 737 MAX goes, the MCAS is
the only federated system, which is not integrated into the
flight control laws and logic. So this would be one that is
unique in itself. As we talk about this in a static matter, you
are an aviator yourself, we have to remember that as the pilots
are trying to regain control of this aircraft, they experience
+2 positive G forces and -.7 negative G forces. As you know,
sir, those are extreme forces on the human body while you are
trying to read a checklist, perform duties, move switches, move
controls, not to mention the human suffering that was obviously
heard behind the cockpit door. So this was a terrible situation
to put an aircrew in.
Mr. Brown. So, Captain Sullenberger, you mentioned that,
you know, on the level D, there need to be more simulators or
certainly more simulator time. Are there any other missing
components in the training programs? This is a--you know, you
mentioned simulators. Are there any other missing components?
Mr. Sullenberger. Yes. And some things we are doing to some
extent already, but we need to do much more. I have seen in my
career a huge tsunami of change in technology and in training,
and I have seen certain trims. One we mentioned already, the
reduction in the information about their systems and their
airplanes that is now available to pilots compared to years
ago.
Mr. Brown. Let me just jump in because I got 10 seconds.
Does Congress need to legislate this or is this something that
it can self-correct in the market or with the FAA?
Mr. Sullenberger. I think it needs FAA direction. I think
it needs--the airlines need incentives to do more training, not
just in what we consider batting practice of one-off events,
but really in an operational flying scenario. Give them
multiple challenges that they have never seen before where they
must have a creative reserve to use what they know, adapt it,
and apply it in a new way to solve a new problem.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Carey. I concur.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Just so we know, in order of the Members that are here, I
will begin with Norton next, then Lynch, then Napolitano, and
then Payne. That is the order that we have right now.
Representative Norton, 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. I appreciate this hearing, but I particularly
appreciate the families who are here. The least we owe you are
our condolences.
Actually, sometimes the committee learns more from the
newspapers than from anyplace else. And I am looking at a--
perhaps this is best for the pilots. I am looking at a New York
Times piece that indicates--I am sorry, it is a Wall Street
Journal piece, that 25 percent of people who fly airplanes want
to avoid the MAX, 38 percent said they weren't sure. The flying
public doesn't know what to do, in other words.
But the FAA has signaled that it is preparing for flight
trials for the proposed 737 MAX enhancement as early as this
week and preparing to take an important step toward returning
the 737 MAX service by late summer. Now, we know it will
require the FAA endorsement and, indeed, foreign regulators as
well. But I need to ask you, is this the pace that you would
expect, given what Boeing has gone through in the last several
months? Is this the pace to get back into service?
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton. I would expect
that Boeing and the FAA have this as their top priority, as do
the air carriers who have these airplanes on order. We have 24
MAXes--we had 24 MAXes in service at American Airlines, and now
I believe there are 6 more that are already off the assembly
line, and that is just 1 airline. These aircraft are needed.
They are needed for passenger service. We want them back in
service.
Ms. Norton. But you think that this pace is to be expected?
Mr. Carey. I think that the Boeing Corporation and the FAA
is capable of getting this airplane back in the sky by the end
of the summer.
Ms. Norton. I think the flying public would be very
pleased, given your expertise, to hear that. But I am now
interested, I have become more interested again from what I
read in the press and what happens in the factory.
Now, the information I have is from the North Charleston
plant. Now, the 737 MAX was designed and assembled there, but
the information we have really bewilders me because it is on
the 737 Dreamers. So the verdict seems to be in on that. And
that the employees from the plants were whistleblowers, and
as--5 years ago, the agency did not allow the employees from
the plants to certify the aircraft to FAA. That is 5 years ago
for the Dreamers--I am sorry. Yeah, the Dreamers.
And it bothers me because the MAX is also manufactured
there. The employees, the whistleblowers, said that they
believed the strong demand for this other plane, on which the
information is in, the 787, had pushed Boeing to quickly turn
out jets as it raced to meet deadlines.
So I am trying to find whether there is something endemic
in the culture that we ought to watch out for, given what we
already know now about the 787 Dreamers. And what do you think,
therefore, of the pace in light of what we know about the
Dreamers, which were also manufactured at the south--at the
south Charleston factory?
Ms. Pinkerton. Congresswoman, if I can respond. From the
airline perspective, we have no interest in a rapid pace. We
want----
Ms. Norton. Well, you sort of have some interest in it.
Obviously, Boeing is losing money, it needs to get these planes
up in the air.
Ms. Pinkerton. We have much--a much stronger interest in
the FAA and Boeing working with our pilots union in getting----
Ms. Norton. I am asking about this plant, which also is a
plant that produced the MAX. Does anyone have any misgivings
about that?
Mr. Sullenberger. Congresswoman, I have seen those same
reports, and it gives me great concern that with both the 787
manufacturer and the manufacturer of the Air Force tanker, the
KC-46, there was some debris left in some bays of the interior
of the aircraft that could possibly chafe wiring and cause
future issues, and that Boeing has become aware of this and is
aggressively trying to get to the root of the problems with the
manufacturing process so that no foreign objects remain in
manufactured aircraft.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
I recognize Mr. Lynch for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for their help this morning.
And I certainly want to join my colleagues in offering my
condolences to the families of the victims, and thank you for
your presence here today.
Earlier in the hearing, the ranking member mentioned that
we should avoid politicizing this issue. And I do agree that
over a long period of time, our aviation system had been
extremely safe, a stellar record. And as someone who gets on a
commercial airliner at least a couple of times a week, and as
someone who has very warm relations with many of the pilots--I
have been doing this for 20 years, so I have come to know a lot
of the pilots, flight attendants, machinists, and people who
work at the airport. My brother-in-law works on the runway at
Logan Airport in my district. They all take enormous pride in
that long and stellar safety record.
On October 29, 2018, that long excellent record was
severely damaged when Lion Air flight 610, a Boeing 737 MAX,
crashed into the Java Sea at about 450 miles an hour, killing
184 passengers and 5 crewmembers on board. That long record of
excellent safety operations was again damaged 4 months later on
March 10 of this year when Ethiopian Airlines flight 302,
again, a Boeing 737 MAX, crashed 6 minutes after takeoff. That
crash resulted in the deaths of all on board, 149 passengers
and 8 crewmembers.
After that crash, I, along with many of my colleagues on
this committee, signed a letter asking that the 737 MAX be
grounded. That decision was not political. That decision was
based on the tragic facts, on the tremendous loss of life. We
supported the grounding of the 737 MAX because we felt it was
the right thing to do. It was the right thing to do for the
pilots. It was the right thing to do for the crew. It was the
right thing to do for the flight attendants, for the
passengers, and for the public.
I represent an area that surrounds Logan Airport. The main
runways out of Logan take the majority of flights over my
district, over the homes and schools and neighborhoods of the
people who live in my district and who I represent. An air
disaster like Lion Air or Ethiopian Air 302, coming out of
Logan Airport, crashing minutes after takeoff in a densely
populated area would be a mass casualty event on the ground in
my district.
So it wasn't a political decision to ground the 737 MAX
after those accidents, and it won't be a political decision to
put those planes back in the air. It will be based on the
assurances that we have because of the experts that we have
here today and the diligence that we will apply to the testing
of this system that will rule the day on that decision.
I do want to ask Captain Sullenberger, you know, the
descriptions of the Lion Air disaster report that because of
the faulty data on that angle of attack--the angle-of-attack
data, the MCAS system, forced the nose of the aircraft
downward, quote, ``more than two dozen times during an 11-
minute span.'' And there were reports from other pilots who
have had similar problems that the plane acted like a bucking
bronco.
I am just wondering, you know, some people are trying to
blame the pilots here, and I am just wondering whether with an
aircraft behaving like that, is it fair to blame--is it fair to
blame these pilots? Because you would think that if we could
get the software right, they wouldn't have to deal with an
aircraft that is acting like a bucking bronco. I just don't
want to take the easy path and blame the pilots.
Mr. Sullenberger. I think asking--well, first, we shouldn't
be blaming dead pilots. We need to do much more than that. But
asking whether this was a pilot error or design error doesn't
really address the right question, because human performance is
a variable and it is situation dependent, and we must make
accurate assumptions about what is possible in extreme
emergencies, given the distractions, the workload, the task
saturation.
You are right, we shouldn't expect pilots to have to
compensate for flawed designs. But we have to realize that
everything we do, our entire system, the aircraft designs, the
way we train pilots, the culture we have, the knowledge we give
them, the information we give them or withhold from them
determines three important things. How many errors----
Mr. Larsen. Captain Sullenberger, I am sorry. You are going
to have to get it in writing. Those three issues will have to
be in writing to the committee.
Mr. Sullenberger. I am sorry, what was that?
Mr. Larsen. I am moving on to Mr. Payne. We will have to
take it for the record.
Mr. Sullenberger. I am sorry.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Representative Payne for 5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I too want to express my condolences to the family and
friends who have suffered from this tragic event.
But, Captain Carey, based on your experiences, what, if
any, improvements can be made by the process that the FAA uses
to evaluate what pilot training is required on new aircraft?
Mr. Carey. Well, I would like the Administration to look
into future designs. For example, the Boeing 777-900 will be in
production in the near future. I would like to see pilot
involvement, just like they do in the shipping industry or the
United States Navy, where the crews are involved in the
development of the airplane or the ship from when they lay the
keel.
I think that we have the subject matter experts at American
Airlines management aviation side and the aviation side of the
Allied Pilots Association to put significant input into the
design and development of modern jet aircraft. I believe that
if any of our pilots would have seen the MCAS system early on,
that it would not have slipped through the cracks and not have
entered service without robust training.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. And that doesn't happen at this point
now?
Mr. Carey. No, sir.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Ms. Pinkerton, as you are aware, many
airlines have canceled flights because of the grounding of the
737 MAX causing immediate operational challenges and other
issues. What are the long-term effects of a continued grounding
on your carriers and the flying public?
Ms. Pinkerton. Congressman, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, carriers have been able to adapt. They are doing
things like utilizing spare planes. They are postponing doing
optional things like painting planes or putting on Wi-Fi. So
they are taking a number of steps to ensure that we have the
needed capacity in the system. And in fact, for the busy travel
season, we are going to be up as an industry, up an overall 3-
percent increase in capacity. So these are challenges. I don't
mean to make it sound easy, but we are managing it to really
mitigate the impact on passengers.
Mr. Payne. OK. And, Mr. Chairman, I will be kind and yield
back.
Mr. Larsen. You are my favorite Member today.
So that covers committee members, and I will now recognize
Representative DeSaulnier for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always wanted to
be on this subcommittee, so I will try to be your second
favorite. That will be a challenge.
To the family members here, I couldn't help but think--
search my memory from high school, the Arthur Miller play ``All
My Sons,'' if you remember that, about people who built
military aircraft in World War II and cut corners. And the
ending of the play was by the person who was involved in
cutting corners, and I am not saying that this was the case in
this instance, said, I should have thought of all of those
pilots as my children. And I think there is a good analogy here
that we all should think of any loss of life should--although
they weren't our children, we should think of it that way.
Captain Sullenberger, nice to see you.
Mr. Sullenberger. Good to see you, Congressman.
Mr. DeSaulnier. For the chair and others, Captain
Sullenberger has had the good wisdom to live in my district
from time to time, so we have gotten to be friends, and I have
great respect. We are working on a bill on safe landings, as a
consequence of the Air Canada near miss at SFO. And I want to
thank the committee staff and the chair for helping with that.
We spent a lot of time, you and I, talking about human
factors, and you talked about it in your comments, and, Captain
Carey, maybe you can jump in here, and your comment that we can
no longer define safety as the absence of accidents I think was
very well put.
So I look at the aviation industry. My perspective is you
have got these issues on technology and human factors that we
see in the chemical industry, the refining industry, the
healthcare industry, and we are learning more and more about
neuroscience and how we can help with that.
So being able to do that is important, but you also have,
in my view, the coming consequences for the aviation industry
on climate change, how we are going to deal with that. I have
an amendment put in Appropriations that the Academy of Sciences
would look at that and look at all transportation, because we
are going to have more disruptions, and pilots are going to
have--and aircraft controllers, more challenges, and I
anecdotally can see that.
And then lastly is, what is a reasonable rate of return for
the shareholders, knowing that you want private investors, but
when they can move their investments around, there is pressure
sometimes to cut corners. And sometimes to some people that is
a euphemism for efficiency.
So when it comes to human factors in the blending
particularly of new technology, both of you have been eloquent,
but could you add a little bit more to that that we could
institutionalize it? Because I am afraid we are becoming
complacent in this field because of our great safety record.
Mr. Sullenberger. Well, first of all, I want to
congratulate you for including in your bill much more emphasis
on and funding for study of human factors. And as we use more
and more technology, that human machine interface is going to
become even more important.
I would say that, talking about the federated versus
integrated system where Boeing as a fix for this lately
discovered instability issue with the MAX, they have appended
to a conventional airplane a computer control system but
without giving it the integrity, the reliability, the
redundancy that it should have had.
And so that needs to be part and parcel of everything that
we do going forward, making sure that when we have any device
or feature in an airplane that can autonomously move flight
controls, in this case, a secondary flight control or a change
engine thrust, it needs to be built to those highest standards
and certified to those high standards.
Mr. DeSaulnier. Captain Carey, do you have anything to add
before I yield the balance of my time?
Mr. Carey. I will leave you some time left, sir. I just
have a quick comment about the near miss at San Francisco. And
we talk about one level of safety all the time. The Canadian
pilots have much more liberal flight time, duty time
regulations than the U.S. pilots have. And I think maybe future
panels should look into requiring overseas carriers to operate
into our country under our rules and regulations.
Mr. DeSaulnier. I am going to yield back the balance of my
time, and thank the chairman for letting me sit on this
hearing.
Mr. Larsen. That is fine. Thank you, Representative
DeSaulnier.
So I understand there are no other questions from other
Members. I do have one set of questions for the full panel.
First off, for Captain Sullenberger, those three elements
that you were going to cover for Mr. Lynch, what are they?
Mr. Sullenberger. The design of our systems in which we
operate determine how many errors will be made, what kinds of
errors will be made, and how consequential those errors will
be. And the safer we make our system, the fewer errors there
will be, the less serious they will be, and the better the
consequences of the inevitable human errors that are made.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
For all the members of the panel, is there one area of
inquiry that you think this subcommittee should pursue? What
would, in your view, the next step for the subcommittee be?
Start here. If you have one now, then we will take it. If
not, we will take it for the record.
Ms. Pinkerton. I will think on that and provide you
something for the record.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
Captain Carey?
Mr. Carey. A critical checklist. For example, the MCAS--the
airworthiness directive after the Lion Air crash that came out
on the MCAS system. The manual trim, we learned after
Ethiopian, that it was almost humanly not possible later stages
in the event for a person to move the manual trim wheel. So we
not only have to devise checklists, we have to make sure those
checklists are able to be performed by a flight crew in that
situation.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks.
Captain Sullenberger?
Mr. Sullenberger. I would love to add two thoughts. First,
that each aircraft manufacturer must have a systemic, a
comprehensive way of safety risk assessment that can review
holistically entire aircraft designs looking for risks, not
singly, but in combination. And the second thought I would have
is that leadership starts at the top, quality and safety start
at the top, and it starts with governance at the board level of
our aviation manufacturing companies.
I would love to see more people with--men and women--with
subject matter expertise and who understand the science of
safety, and that means engineering expertise, someone needs to
be a pilot on the board who understands the implication of
design choices.
Mr. Larsen. Interesting. Thank you.
President Nelson?
Ms. Nelson. In terms of getting the MAX back up in the air,
there just simply needs to be transparency in the process and a
full explanation to all the stakeholders and continued
involvement. But what I think that this committee needs to
really look at is the relationship between the FAA and the
manufacturers and the airlines and this issue of client and
customer relationship as opposed to governance and oversight
from the FAA and proper funding to get that done.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Babbitt?
Mr. Babbitt. Yes, sir. I think the FAA, with committee
oversight, and manufacturers as well need to devote a little
more energy to understanding what is coming in the future with
this relationship between the man and the machine and the
interface. I have quoted in my written testimony, I didn't give
it here, but in my written testimony, I quoted Chris Hart,
former Chairman of the NTSB, who said, you know, automation
does a wonderful job of masking weaknesses in human
performance. But it is amplified when that automation fails,
and I think we need to understand better what we could do to
protect that from happening.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Well, I want to thank the panel of witnesses for coming
today, for responding to our request to be here, for helping
the subcommittee understand better what the flying public
thinks we ought to be doing, as opposed to what the FAA thinks
or the industry thinks, and it is very helpful and appreciated.
And before I gavel out, I do as well want to recognize the
families, relatives, and friends of the men and women who were
the victims of the two crashes. Thank you for coming, again,
for being vocal in your efforts to ensure that this
subcommittee stays accountable to the families and relatives
and to the flying public here in the U.S.
With that, there are no further questions. I ask unanimous
consent the record of today's hearing remain open until such
time as our witnesses have provided answers to any questions
that may be submitted to them in writing. And unanimous consent
that the record remain open for 15 days for any additional
comments and information submitted by Members or witnesses to
be included in the record of today's hearing. Without
objection, so ordered.
And if no other Members have anything to add, the
subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Paul Hudson, President, FlyersRights.org,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen
FlyersRights.org is the largest airline passenger organization with
60,000 member/supporters and represents airline passengers on the FAA
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) on air safety issues.
Paul Hudson has represented airline passengers and the general public
on ARAC since 1993.
As such we are a stakeholder with an abiding interest in the safety
of the now grounded Boeing 737 MAX after two crashes in six months
ended the lives of 346 passengers, crew, devastated several thousand
family members and shocked the world aviation community and the general
public.
This is not the first time, FlyersRights.org has called for the
grounding or limiting routes of Boeing airliners for safety reasons. In
2013, we filed a petition for intervention with the NTSB with the
support of three battery experts after battery fires caused the
grounding of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner for six weeks. We have also
criticized the safe use of this two engine aircraft by the FAA
authorizing flights of five hours or more from the nearest emergency
landing facility.
We have also expressed concerns about the use of the two engine 737
MAX for long distance over ocean flights to Hawaii and the North
Atlantic, without several years of trouble-free operations which has
been the traditional under FAA ETOPS certification standards.
In early December 2018 we directly asked Boeing why it had not
grounded the MAX based on the preliminary report of the Lion Air
disaster and concerns by a pilot member familiar with Lion Air.
The subject hearing has now exposed a slew of new and existing
safety problems, plus a damning review of the MAX and its FAA
certification in testimony by Captains Sullenberger, Carey and Babbitt,
three of the most experienced commercial pilots and air safety experts
in the US and the world.
In our view this requires that the Boeing 737 MAX certainly not be
ungrounded in the next 6-9 months, and that serious consideration be
given to permanent revocation of its certification to offer air travel
services to the general public. Some mistakes in its design are
unfixable without a complete redesign to produce new aircraft that is
inherently stable and safe for the public to fly.
These likely unfixable safety problems include a design that is
inherently unstable unlike any other airliner currently in service in
US airspace, an MCAS automation system that is both needed to keep the
plane from being unflyable or even crashing but that is subject to
multiple failures requiring heroic efforts by pilots at best, to
impossible ones at worst. Pilots must deal with about 100 emergency
conditions already documented in flight manuals.
On top of unfixable safety problems, the flying public, most
aviation authorities and many pilots and flight attendants have lost
confidence in both the MAX and its primary safety regulator the FAA. In
a recent survey of our members, 70% said that they would not fly the
MAX if it is ungrounded, 20% said they would and 10% responded other.
Other surveys have shown before many of the revelations the past two
months that 20-50% would not fly the MAX.
Ultimately it is the flying public that will have the last word on
whether this aircraft is commercially viable. Any airline that makes
the current version of the 737 a major part of its fleet will be
operating at a competitive disadvantage. And should a third crash occur
it would threaten the viability of the Boeing Corporation, and the
international leadership of the US commercial aviation industry with
its 2 million jobs and the number one US goods export.
History tells us that the public has little tolerance for mass
fatality transportation disasters, be it the British ``unsinkable''
Titanic, the German dirigible Hindenburg, the UK Comet as first
jetliner (3 crashes in one year). In each case the public lost
confidence and the companies failed, and the sponsoring nations lost
their leadership in that form of mass transportation.
Photos of 89 of the 157 Victims of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302
Crash, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix
----------
Questions from Hon. Garret Graves for Sharon Pinkerton, Senior Vice
President, Legislative and Regulatory Policy, Airlines for America
Question 1. There has been substantial focus on the quality and
methodology of training at the major U.S. carriers. What training do
U.S. carriers conduct to prevent an inflight loss of control accident?
Answer. The FAA is extensively involved in virtually all aspects of
Part 121 Carrier training of Pilots, Flight Attendants, and Mechanics.
This includes not only the actual substance of the required training,
but nearly every aspect of a Part 121 Carrier's training program,
ranging from the adequacy of its facilities to the qualifications of
its instructors.
Requirements focused on preventing loss of control accidents--
specifically the manual handling maneuvers most critical to stall and
upset prevention--are mandated within the ``extended envelope''
provisions of 24 CFR 121.423. This training consists of Extended
Envelope Training (EET) and Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
(UPRT), and as of March 12, 2019, is required of each pilot to be
qualified to serve as either pilot in command or second in command for
a Part 121 Air Carrier. Recurrent training follows on an annual basis.
These two programs are typically required to be delivered in a Level C
or higher full flight simulator and are intended to assure pilots gain
confidence in their abilities and the capabilities of their aircraft in
very dynamic conditions (ex. aircraft stall, upset, bounced landing).
Both of these FAA mandated programs help ensure our Part 121 carriers
are among the best trained aircrews in the world.
Question 2. We heard comments/criticism that the B737 has been
modified many times, yet pilots have been allowed to fly the various
versions with little to no training. Can you comment on the role of the
FAA regarding their oversight of Part 121 carriers and the operation of
multiple models of the same aircraft type?
Answer. As a routine part of the certification process, the FAA, in
collaboration with the manufacturer, and operators, directs manual
construction, training tables, and even limitations on the number of
distinct models of an aircraft type an individual pilot can be deemed
qualified to operate. For instance, when one U.S. airline began
operating the B737 MAX aircraft, per FAA-imposed limitations, a pilot
could maintain currency and qualification on only two variants of the
B737. The FAA gave the airline a choice: its pilots could fly the B737
Classic and the B737 Next Gen, or its pilots could fly the B737 Next
Gen and the B737 MAX--but no pilot would be allowed to operate all
three variants of the B737.
Question 3. We have heard the term ``Advanced Qualification
Program'' or AQP used regarding air carrier training. What does AQP
refer to?
Answer. An AQP is a training syllabus that seeks to integrate
training and evaluation at each stage of a curriculum. For pass/fail
purposes, pilots must demonstrate proficiency in scenarios that test
both technical and crew resource management skills together. Air
carriers participating in the AQP must design and implement data
collection strategies which are diagnostic of cognitive and technical
skills critical to their operations. In addition, they must implement
procedures for refining curricula content based on quality control
data. Thus, air carriers have a data informed, individual job task-
centered training program. The items that are trained change as the
carrier uses assurance data gathered through its Safety Management
System (SMS) to identify areas within the operation where performance
can be improved.
Question 4. Recent statements by a number of aviation professionals
seem to call into question the value of training materials on an iPad.
Do you care to comment on these statements?
Answer. Our member carriers training curricula includes, but is not
limited to, simulator training in the areas of; Extended Envelope
Training (FAR 121.423, AC 120-109A), Upset Prevention and Recovery
Training (AC 120-111), Unreliable Airspeed Training, Manual Flight (to
include Pitch, Power and Trim), and Automation Management. As mentioned
earlier, an AQP uses data to inform a carrier of particular areas it
needs to train. AQP actually incorporates a taxonomy to determine the
appropriate medium for training for the tasks that need emphasis.
Utilizing computer based training for items that require specific
understanding or items that need emphasis has become a much-relied upon
method for training delivery across all industry and has proven not
only efficient but extremely effective, especially given an
individual's relative ease of access to computer delivery. Tablets
(i.e. Ipads) allow a pilot to effectively focus their attention on a
specific area of emphasis, not only when required, but additionally,
whenever and wherever they choose.
Question from Hon. Garret Graves for Captain Chesley B. ``Sully''
Sullenberger III, Pilot, US Airways (Retired)
Question 1. Having had the opportunity to participate in flight
simulations of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents, can
you comment on your observations and experience?
Answer. Within seconds, the crews of the Lion Air and Ethiopian
flights would have been fighting for their lives in the fight of their
lives.
These two accidents, as well as Air France 447 which crashed in the
South Atlantic in June 2009, are also vivid illustrations of the
growing level of interconnectedness of devices in aircraft. Previously,
with older aircraft designs, there were mostly stand-alone devices, in
which a fault or failure was limited to a single device that could
quickly be determined to be faulty and the fault remain isolated. But
with integrated cockpits and data being shared and used by many
devices, a single fault or failure can now have rapidly cascading
effects through multiple systems, causing multiple cockpit alarms,
cautions and warnings, which can cause distraction and increase
workload, creating a situation that can quickly become ambiguous,
confusing and overwhelming, making it much harder to analyze and solve
the problem.
MCAS was software that was designed to autonomously move flight
controls (in this case a secondary flight control) and that was
essentially a fly-by-wire system, but it was not designed with the
integrity, reliability and redundancy that a fly-by-wire system
requires.
And the fact that MCAS was appended to a conventionally controlled
airplane meant that it was federated and not integrated into it, thus
it lacked appropriate protections.
In both 737 MAX accidents, the failure of an AOA sensor quickly
caused multiple instrument indication anomalies and cockpit warnings.
And because in this airplane type the AOA sensors provide information
to airspeed and altitude displays, the failure triggered warnings
simultaneously of speed falsely being too low and also of speed being
too high. The false too slow warning was a `stick-shaker' rapidly and
loudly shaking the pilot's control wheel. The too fast warning was a
`clacker', another loud repetitive noise signaling overspeed. These
sudden loud warnings would have created major distractions and would
have masked the cause and made it even harder to quickly analyze the
situation and take effective corrective action.
I recently experienced all these warnings and indications and more
in a full motion Level D Boeing 737 MAX flight simulator during
recreations of the accident flights. Even knowing what was going to
happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time and altitude
before they could have solved the problems.
First, the startle factor of a sudden confusing emergency is real
and huge. I know from personal experience on US Airways 1549 that it
absolutely interferes with one's ability to respond effectively. One's
pulse and blood pressure suddenly increase, and one can feel it
happening. The sudden stress of a life-threatening crisis causes tunnel
vision, a severe narrowing of focus.
The fact that with MCAS active, simply pulling back on the controls
would NOT stop MCAS from running the pitch trim nose down robbed the
pilots of the single most effective and intuitive tool that pilots have
in a situation like this, because MCAS inhibits the control column trim
cutout switches. And the most insidious aspect of MCAS was that it kept
repeatedly lowering the nose very rapidly. It was maniacal.
The many loud, and in some cases, false warnings would have created
a high workload, leading to task saturation, as the pilots tried to
keep the nose of the aircraft from repeatedly being lowered by MCAS,
and completely explain how it was that crews were not able to realize
that thrust was causing rapid acceleration.
And the fact that MCAS kept running the trim nose down in
intermittent spurts made it much harder for these crews to recognize
the emergency as a traditional runaway trim scenario.
And I also experienced firsthand how difficult it was to move the
pitch trim wheels manually, at high airspeeds requiring both hands or
the efforts of both pilots, and at very high airspeeds, it may not be
possible to move the trim manually until the control wheel is moved
forward, further lowering the nose to reduce the very high airloads on
the horizontal stabilizer.
Questions from Hon. Garret Graves for Hon. J. Randolph Babbitt, Former
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Question 1. Mr. Babbitt, when an aircraft like the 737 MAX receives
an amended type certificate, is it certified based on current
certification standards or under the standards the original type
certificate was issued? Is there something inherently unsafe in using
an amended type certificate to certify an aircraft?
Answer. Before issuing an amended type certificate, the FAA reviews
the new design to determine which design standards must be met. When
the design changes are significant, the new design will be required to
meet the latest standards. For some elements of the design where the
safety of that design has been well established, changes to the
standard may not be required. If the design includes new or novel
design features for which there is no current design standard, a new
standard will be established. The process for establishing the safety
standards for the new design is a thorough and time-consuming review
for the FAA and the manufacturer. These processes assure that the newly
amended type certificate meets the appropriate safety standards.
Question 2. One of your key safety initiatives was making sure
pilots did not fall too reliant on automotive systems. How can we
better train pilots to not become reliant on automation and equip them
with the skills necessary to deal with system malfunction?
Answer. Pilots in today's airspace system need to continue
receiving advanced training to operate in today's operational
environment. We should utilize the new technology available today to
expand training with the use of visual reality and high-fidelity
simulation so that no pilot should ever be surprised by events that
take place in an aircraft in which they are certified. That includes
exposure to all phases of the operational envelope and environment as
well as the built-in safety protections and automation that is designed
to protect the operating envelope from excursions. Pilot training
should also require a full understanding of all possible control inputs
produced by automation as well as the logic driving the automation
actions.
Additionally, training and line operation should include
requirements and demonstrations of manually flying aircraft to confirm
pilot skills are being maintained to guarantee safe operations when
automation is not available or has failed for any reason.
Question 3. Having had the opportunity to participate in flight
simulations of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents, can
you comment on your observations and experience?
Answer. The simulator session which I operated from the left seat
as the pilot in command included both versions of the Max 8 software
and both scenarios were flown with the Captain's Angle of Attack
(``AOA'') sensor failed. On take-off, at rotation, the ``Stick Shaker''
warning went off, so I used the ``Failed Airspeed Indication''
procedures and proceeded to retract the flaps to ``clean''.
Once the flaps retracted the MCAS became armed and began to trim
the aircraft to a nose down (``AND'') attitude and I instinctively
trimmed the nose back up to a neutral control column position and
turned off the trim system, which is both instinctive and standard
procedure in all Boeing Aircraft for a ``runaway stabilizer trim
emergency''.
The Boeing pilot asked me to repeat the same event but asked that I
not turn off the trim switches nor trim the aircraft. The control
column forces got fairly heavy as the MCAS trimmed and when back
pressure on the control column was relaxed, MCAS again trimmed the nose
down further. I allowed the MCAS to trim a third time and then
electrically trimmed the aircraft back to ``neutral control column
pressure'', turned the Stabilizer Trim Switches off and flew the
aircraft to a normal landing using manual trim.
Repeating with the upgraded software change the main difference was
that MCAS only trimmed once and even without nose up trimming to
neutral, the control column pressure to maintain level flight was very
manageable and then later, by turning off the Stabilizer Trim switches,
we returned to a normal landing again using manual trim.
My overall impression was the original software was a bit
aggressive and in retrospect could have had more background information
for pilots in their initial training. Seeing the new software and the
requirement for dual input from angle of attack indications for all
practical purposes eliminates the potential for an accidental
triggering of the MCAS system. Additionally, when the system does call
for MCAS input, it is less aggressive and restricted to only one input
occurrence.