[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FEMA CONTRACTING: REVIEWING LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST DISASTERS TO
IMPROVE PREPAREDNESS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 9, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-18
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-475 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey John Katko, New York
Kathleen M. Rice, New York John Ratcliffe, Texas
J. Luis Correa, California Mark Walker, North Carolina
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Max Rose, New York Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Lauren Underwood, Illinois Mark Green, Tennessee
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Van Taylor, Texas
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Al Green, Texas Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Michael Guest, Mississippi
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Val Butler Demings, Florida
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
Donald M. Payne Jr., New Jersey, Chairman
Cedric Richmond, Louisiana Peter T. King, New York, Ranking
Max Rose, New York Member
Lauren Underwood, Illinois John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Al Green, Texas Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Michael Guest, Mississippi
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Mike Rogers, Alabama (ex officio)
officio)
Lauren McClain, Subcommittee Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico, Chairwoman
Dina Titus, Nevada Dan Crenshaw, Texas, Ranking
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Member
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Van Taylor, Texas
officio) Mike Rogers, Alabama (ex officio)
Lisa Canini, Subcommittee Staff Director
Katy Flynn, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Xochitl Torres Small, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Mexico, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Management, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Dan Crenshaw, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Management, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Witnesses
Mr. Brian Kamoie, Associate Administrator for Mission Support,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Ms. Marie A. Mak, Director for Contracting and National Security
Acquisitions, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Ms. Katherine Trimble, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for
Audits, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Brian Kamoie...... 57
Question From Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Brian Kamoie..... 59
Question From Chairwoman Xochitl Torres Small for Brian Kamoie... 59
Questions From Honorable Max Rose for Brian Kamoie............... 60
Questions From Honorable Al Green for Brian Kamoie............... 60
Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for Brian Kamoie....... 63
Questions From Honorable Cedric R. Richmond for Brian Kamoie..... 63
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Marie A. Mak....... 64
Question From Honorable Al Green for Marie A. Mak................ 64
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Katherine Trimble.. 65
Question From Honorable Al Green for Katherine Trimble........... 65
FEMA CONTRACTING: REVIEWING LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST DISASTERS TO
IMPROVE PREPAREDNESS
----------
Thursday, May 9, 2019
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery, and the
Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and Accountability,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m.,
in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Donald M.
Payne, Jr. [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery], presiding.
Present: Representatives Payne, Torres Small, Titus, Rose,
Underwood, Barragan, Green, Clarke, Thompson, King, Crenshaw,
Joyce, Higgins, and Taylor.
Mr. Payne. Seeing that we have a quorum, the Committee on
Homeland Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``FEMA Contracting: Reviewing Lessons Learned from Past
Disasters to Improve Preparedness.''
I would like to thank Chairwoman Torres Small and Ranking
Member Crenshaw of the Oversight, Management, and
Accountability Subcommittee for coming together with Ranking
Member King and me to hold this hearing.
I would also like to thank the witnesses for being here
today to discuss disaster contracting.
This week is Hurricane Preparedness Week, and today marks
22 days until the 2019 hurricane season begins. Unfortunately,
there are still real questions about FEMA's preparedness for
disasters, not the least of which is that there is not a
confirmed administrator at the helm of FEMA.
I am particularly concerned about FEMA's contracting for
disasters. Proper disaster contracting is crucial to the
successful response efforts, as disaster contracts provide for
several survival and comfort items like food, water, blankets,
and cots that communities need following a major devastation.
Disaster contracts also provide for important response-related
services like debris removal, translators, and housing
inspectors.
While the magnitude of the effects of hurricanes,
earthquakes, wildfires, and the like are obvious, FEMA seems to
continually fall short in the realm of disaster contracting.
From Hurricane Katrina, we learned that one of the most
important aspects of disaster preparedness is advance
contracting. However, here we are, 14 years after Katrina, and
the Government Accountability Office noted in its December 2018
report, GAO-19-93, on 2017 disaster contracting that FEMA still
needs to improve its advance contracting practices.
Specifically, the GAO found that the advance contracts FEMA
had in place prior to the 2017 hurricane season were not
sufficient to cover the need, the absence of which caused FEMA
to scramble to enter into post-disaster contracts. Simply put,
there needs to be more contracts in place before a disaster
strikes.
While it is difficult to predict exact needs prior to
disasters, we do know that hurricane season every June 1 to
November 30, and history has shown us that FEMA is likely to be
underprepared in some fashion.
From a recent April 2019 GAO report, GAO-19-281, we also
know that FEMA is still struggling with acquiring and retaining
its disaster contracting work force. The absence of adequate
staffing levels causes undue delays in the screening and
delivery of important goods and services by impacted
communities following a disaster.
Then there are instances in the 2017 such as the failed
Bronze Star and Tribute contracts from FEMA. In the case of the
Bronze Star contract, deficiencies in FEMA's contract
procedures resulted in delayed delivery of crucial supplies
that would have helped Puerto Ricans protect their homes from
further damage after Hurricane Maria. Similarly, the Tribute
contract was for 30 million emergency meals, and it had to be
canceled after Tribute only delivered 50,000 of the 30 million
meals required. These types of contracting errors are troubling
and have major consequences.
We need to have an honest conversation today about how FEMA
should proceed with preventing future contracting missteps, the
results of which are Americans going without emergency goods
and services.
When a disaster strikes, the American people depend on the
Federal Government to get it right. Yet, as the GAO has
reported, FEMA's disaster contracting apparatus is unprepared,
and its disaster contract work force is overwhelmed and
overworked. FEMA itself also has acknowledged its contracting
work force shortcomings, as evidenced in their ``2017 Hurricane
Season After-Action Report.''
To make matters worse, the President has again proposed
cuts to the agency's discretionary funding, further
complicating FEMA's ability to address disaster contracting
work force challenges.
Furthermore, the recent Federal Government shut down,
roughly 6 months before the start of hurricane season, caused
FEMA to order a stop on outstanding contracts, causing the
agency to lose valuable disaster contracting preparation time.
Emergency preparedness, response, and recovery is too
important of a mission for this agency to consistently struggle
with disaster contracting. Having experienced the horrors
disasters can cause, a community with Hurricane Sandy, I know
how critical it is for FEMA to have effective processes in
place before a disaster strikes.
With this, I look forward to engaging with the DHS Office
of Inspector General and the GAO about underlying issues that
they have identified that seem to chronically cause FEMA to
miss the mark with disaster contracting. I also look forward to
hearing from FEMA about what Congress can do to help the agency
improve its disaster contracting.
[The statement of Chairman Payne follows:]
Statement of Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr.
May 9, 2019
This week is Hurricane Preparedness Week, and today marks 22 days
until the 2019 hurricane season begins. Unfortunately, there are still
real questions about FEMA's preparedness for disasters, not the least
of which is that there is not a confirmed administrator at the helm of
FEMA.
I am particularly concerned about FEMA's contracting for disasters.
Proper disaster contracting is crucial to successful response efforts,
as disaster contracts provide for several survival and comfort items
like food, water, blankets, and cots that communities need following
major devastation. Disaster contracts also provide for important
response-related services like debris removal, translators, and housing
inspectors. While the magnitude of the effects of hurricanes,
earthquakes, wildfires, and the like are obvious, FEMA seems to
continually fall short in the realm of disaster contracting.
From Hurricane Katrina, we learned that one of the most important
aspects of disaster preparedness is advanced contracting. However, here
we are 14 years after Hurricane Katrina, and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) noted in its December 2018 report (GAO-19-
93) on 2017 disaster contracting that FEMA still needs to improve its
advanced contracting practices. Specifically, the GAO found that the
advanced contracts FEMA had in place prior to the 2017 hurricane season
were not sufficient to cover the need; the absence of which caused FEMA
to scramble to enter into post-disaster contracts. Simply put, there
needs to be more contracts in place before a disaster strikes. While it
is difficult to predict exact needs prior to disasters, we do know that
hurricane season is every June 1--November 30; and history has shown us
that FEMA is likely to be under-prepared in some fashion.
From a recent April 2019 GAO report (GAO-19-281), we also know that
FEMA is still struggling with acquiring and retaining its disaster
contracting work force. The absence of adequate staffing levels causes
undue delays in the securing and delivery of important goods and
services impacted communities need following disasters. Then there were
instances in 2017 such as the failed Bronze Star and Tribute contracts
from FEMA. In the case of the Bronze Star contract, deficiencies in
FEMA's contracting procedures resulted in delayed delivery of crucial
supplies that would have helped Puerto Ricans protect their homes from
further damage after Hurricane Maria. Similarly, the Tribute contract
was for 30 million emergency meals and it had to be canceled after
Tribute only delivered 50,000 of the 30 million meals required. These
types of contracting errors are troubling and have major consequences.
We need to have an honest conversation today about how FEMA should
proceed with preventing future contracting missteps, the results of
which are Americans going without emergency goods and services. When
disaster strikes, the American people depend on the Federal Government
to get it right. Yet, as the GAO has reported, FEMA's disaster
contracting apparatus is unprepared, and its disaster contracting work
force is overwhelmed and overworked. FEMA itself also has acknowledged
its contracting work force shortcomings, as evidenced in their 2017
Hurricane Season After-Action Report. To make matters worse, the
President has again proposed cuts to the agency's discretionary
funding, further complicating FEMA's ability to address disaster
contracting work force challenges.
Furthermore, the recent Federal Government shutdown--roughly 6
months before the start of hurricane season--caused FEMA to order a
stop on outstanding contracts; causing the agency to lose valuable
disaster contracting preparation time. Emergency preparedness,
response, and recovery is too important of a mission for this agency to
consistently struggle with disaster contracting. Having experienced the
horrors disasters can cause a community with Hurricane Sandy, I know
how critical it is for FEMA to have effective processes in place before
disaster strikes.
With this, I look forward to engaging with the DHS Office of
Inspector General and the GAO about the underlining issues they have
identified that seem to chronically cause FEMA to miss the mark with
disaster contracting. I also look forward to hearing from FEMA about
what Congress can do to help the agency improve its disaster
contracting practices.
Mr. Payne. With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member of
the Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
Subcommittee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an
opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
hearing, and thank you for calling it and working with our
colleagues on this with the two subcommittees.
In 2012, Superstorm Sandy wreaked havoc on the States of
New York and New Jersey, as you well know, as well as 10 other
States, resulting in around 150 deaths, hundreds of thousands
of impacted residents, and over $65 billion in damages. The
storm's effects were widespread and extensive, with substantial
flooding, massive power outages, and fuel shortages in parts of
the region.
Following Hurricane Sandy, FEMA released an after-action
report detailing successes, lessons learned, and areas of
needed improvement in hurricane recovery efforts.
One area highlighted for improvement was reducing the
complexity of the public assistance program. FEMA's public
assistant grant program provides Federal assistance to State,
local, Tribal, and certain private and nonprofit organizations
following a Presidential major disaster declaration.
While FEMA did take several steps to help Government
officials better understand this program and reduce the
complexity of rules, State and local officials to express
confusion regarding the program, and lack of clarity delayed
recovery efforts.
The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 improved the
public assistance program by providing alternative procedures
to allow for flexibility for recovery projects that encourage
timely and cost-effective completion. These alternative
procedures rely on fixed-cost estimates that allow recipients
or subrecipients to use remaining funds for other eligible
purposes if the cost of the project is below the estimate.
FEMA's Hurricane Sandy after-action report noted that the
new public assistance program can, ``serve as a springboard for
FEMA to continue reducing the complexity of the PA program.''
However, according to the DHS Office of Inspector General,
FEMA continues to fail in overseeing grant recipients'
effective management of disaster relief grants, which poses
potential financial risks to taxpayers.
The GAO has reported on FEMA's need for better management
of its advance contract program. Advance contracts for goods
and services enable the Government to quickly and effectively
mobilize resources in the aftermath of a disaster.
Among other recommendations, GAO recommends that FEMA
update its strategy for advance contracts to provide clear
guidance on the use and prioritization of such contracts so
they can quickly and cost-effectively provide goods and
services to disaster-stricken areas. Delays in response and
recovery efforts due to a lack of coordination and inconsistent
information are not acceptable.
Following major disasters, advance and post-disaster
Federal contracts and assistance are essential to rebuilding
our Nation's communities. It is imperative that FEMA continues
to streamline its efforts to ensure proper oversight, improve
coordination, and maintain its focus on survivors and their
recovery needs.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today--I want to thank them for being here--on how to improve
FEMA contracting mechanisms so that response and recovery
efforts are timely and effective following catastrophic
disasters and emergencies.
I yield back. Thank you.
[The statement of Ranking Member King follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Peter T. King
May 9, 2019
In 2012, Superstorm Sandy wreaked havoc on the States of New York
and New Jersey, as well as 10 other States, resulting in around 150
deaths, hundreds of thousands of impacted residents, and over $65
billion in damages. The storm's effects were widespread and extensive,
with substantial flooding, massive power outages, and fuel shortages in
parts of the region.
Following Hurricane Sandy, FEMA released an After-Action Report
detailing successes, lessons learned, and areas of needed improvement
in hurricane recovery efforts.
One area highlighted for improvement was ``reducing the complexity
of the public assistance program.'' FEMA's public assistance grant
program provides Federal assistance to State, local, Tribal, and
certain private non-profit organizations following a Presidential major
disaster declaration.
While FEMA did take several steps to help Government officials
better understand the public assistance program and reduce the
complexity of program rules, State and local officials continued to
express confusion regarding the program, and the lack of clarity
delayed recovery efforts.
The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 improved the public
assistance program by providing alternative procedures to allow for
flexibility for recovery projects that encourage timely and cost-
effective completion.
These alternative procedures rely on fixed-cost estimates that
allow recipients or subrecipients to use remaining funds for other
eligible purposes if the cost of the project is below the estimate.
FEMA's Hurricane Sandy After-Action Report noted that the new public
assistance procedures ``can serve as a springboard for FEMA to continue
reducing the complexity of the PA program.''
However, according to the DHS Office of Inspector General, FEMA
continues to fail in overseeing grant recipients' effective management
of disaster relief grants which poses potential financial risks to
taxpayers.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported on FEMA's
need for better management of its Advance Contract program. Advance
contracts for goods and services enable the Government to quickly and
effectively mobilize resources in the aftermath of a disaster.
Among other recommendations, GAO recommends that FEMA update its
strategy for advance contracts to provide clear guidance on the use and
prioritization of such contracts so that they can quickly and cost-
effectively provide goods and services to disaster-stricken areas.
Delays in response and recovery efforts due to lack of coordination
and inconsistent information are not acceptable.
Following major disasters, advance and post-disaster Federal
contracts and assistance are essential to rebuilding our Nation's
communities. It is imperative that FEMA continues to streamline its
processes to ensure proper oversight, improve coordination, and
maintain its focus on survivors and their recovery needs.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how to
improve FEMA contracting mechanisms so that response and recovery
efforts are timely and effective following catastrophic disasters and
emergencies.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. King.
I now recognize the Chairwoman of the Oversight,
Management, and Accountability Subcommittee, the gentlewoman
from New Mexico, Ms. Torres Small, for an opening statement.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Chairman Payne. Thanks for the
opportunity to co-chair this hearing with you.
With the 2019 hurricane season just 3 weeks away, this
hearing couldn't be more timely. It is an opportunity to
discuss lessons learned from past disasters and assess whether
necessary improvements have been made to ready the Nation for
future events.
Disasters can strike with little to no warning. We
unfortunately experienced this first-hand in my district in New
Mexico when a tornado touched down outside of Dexter this past
March. I would also like to acknowledge those affected by the
flooding in Ranking Member Crenshaw's district.
These disasters demonstrate that at a moment's notice FEMA
may need to assist thousands of survivors who suddenly have an
immediate need for emergency goods and services. FEMA cannot
prepare for every eventuality, but as the frequency and
severity of natural disasters increase, it is as important as
ever that the agency take corrective action to better execute
its no-fail mission.
Disaster contracting is one area where improvements are
most needed. As the witnesses from GAO and the DHS Office of
the Inspector General can confirm, FEMA has a checkered history
with the disaster response and recovery contracts it awards and
oversees.
I am glad that some improvements have been made since
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in 2005. For example,
more contracts are being competitively bid, reducing the
potential for waste, fraud, and abuse, and more contracts are
being awarded to local vendors, stimulating local economies.
But challenges remain. FEMA still struggles to utilize
advance contracts. These contracts are awarded prior to a
natural disaster when there is not an urgent need for emergency
goods and services, which allows FEMA to maximize competition
and properly evaluate vendors' qualities.
We saw this problem borne out in the response to Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria. In multiple instances, FEMA had to
cancel contracts it awarded after a hurricane hit rather than
relying on advance contracts that were in place prior to a
storm.
Some of the vendors had no business being awarded
Government contracts. FEMA awarded more than $30 million worth
of emergency tarps and sheeting contracts to a company that was
formed just weeks before Hurricane Maria struck. It is no
surprise that this company failed to deliver.
Another firm, with one employee and a history of canceled
contracts, was for some reason entrusted to deliver 30 million
meals to hurricane survivors in Puerto Rico. Less than a month
later, the company only managed to supply 50,000 meals, about
one-tenth of 1 percent of what was agreed to. Not surprisingly,
FEMA had to cancel this contract too.
If FEMA had had more advance contracts in place or a better
process for vetting vendors after a hurricane hit, some of
these mistakes could have been avoided.
FEMA must also do a better job of overseeing disaster
contracts awarded by State and local governments. As the
Inspector General has reported, local emergency managers, some
of whom may be dealing with a disaster for the first time, need
guidance and training from FEMA on how to follow Federal
procurement regulations. At the end of the day, it is Federal
tax dollars that are on the line.
As the Chair of our Oversight, Management, and
Accountability Subcommittee, I am also concerned about FEMA's
ability to recruit and retain qualified contracting officers. I
understand that, as of January, more than one-third of the
positions within FEMA's Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
were vacant, and the agency has actually lost contracting staff
since 2017.
This is not the direction we need to be headed. If
anything, FEMA needs more contracting officers, not less. These
should be permanent positions, not the short-term hires FEMA is
using as a stopgap.
Mr. Kamoie, I look forward to learning about the steps you
have taken over the past 2 years to assess FEMA's work force
needs and to hire more contracting staff in particular. The
agency's procurement office needs to be at full strength as we
head into the 2019 hurricane season.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I
look forward to a fruitful discussion with all three of our
witnesses here today.
[The statement of Chairwoman Torres Small follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Xochitl Torres Small
May 9, 2019
With the 2019 hurricane season just 3 weeks away, this hearing
couldn't be more timely. It is an opportunity to discuss lessons
learned from past disasters and assess whether necessary improvements
have been made to ready the Nation for future events.
Disasters can strike with little to no warning. We unfortunately
experienced this first-hand in my district in New Mexico when a tornado
touched down outside of Dexter this past March. I'd also like to
acknowledge those affected by the flooding in Ranking Member Crenshaw's
district. These disasters demonstrate that at a moment's notice, FEMA
may need to assist thousands of survivors who suddenly have an
immediate need for emergency goods and services. FEMA cannot prepare
for every eventuality. But as the frequency and severity of natural
disasters increase, it is as important as ever that the agency take
corrective action to better execute its no-fail mission.
Disaster contracting is one area where improvements are most
needed. As the witnesses from GAO and the DHS Office of Inspector
General can confirm, FEMA has a checkered history with the disaster
response and recovery contracts it awards and oversees. I am glad that
some improvements have been made since Hurricane Katrina struck the
Gulf Coast in 2005. For example, more contracts are being competitively
bid, reducing the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse. And more
contracts are being awarded to local vendors, stimulating local
economies.
But challenges remain. FEMA still struggles to utilize advance
contracts. These contracts are awarded prior to a natural disaster when
there is not an urgent need for emergency goods and services, allowing
FEMA to maximize competition and properly evaluate vendors'
qualifications. We saw this problem borne out in the response to
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. In multiple instances, FEMA had to
cancel contracts it awarded after a hurricane hit--rather than relying
on advance contracts that were in place prior to a storm. Some of the
vendors had no business being awarded Government contracts. FEMA
awarded more than $30 million worth of emergency tarps and sheeting
contracts to a company that was formed just weeks before Hurricane
Maria struck. It's no surprise this company failed to deliver. Another
firm with one employee and a history of canceled contracts was, for
some reason, entrusted to deliver 30 million meals to hurricane
survivors in Puerto Rico. Less than a month later, the company only
managed to supply 50,000 meals, about one-tenth of 1 percent of what
was agreed to. Not surprisingly, FEMA had to cancel this contract too.
If FEMA had had more advance contracts in place--or a better process
for vetting vendors after the hurricane hit--some of these mistakes
could have been avoided.
FEMA also must do a better job of overseeing disaster contracts
awarded by State and local governments. As the inspector general has
reported, local emergency managers--some of whom may be dealing with a
disaster for the first time--need guidance and training from FEMA on
how to follow Federal procurement regulations. At the end of the day,
it's Federal tax dollars that are on the line.
As the chair of our Oversight, Management, and Accountability
Subcommittee, I'm also concerned about FEMA's ability to recruit and
retain qualified contracting officers. I understand that, as of
January, more than one-third of the positions within FEMA's Office of
the Chief Procurement Officer were vacant, and the agency has actually
lost contracting staff since 2017. This is not the direction we need to
be headed. If anything, FEMA needs more contracting officers--not less.
And these should be permanent positions, not the short-term hires FEMA
is using as a stop-gap.
Mr. Kamoie, I look forward to learning about the steps you have
taken over the past 2 years to assess FEMA's work force needs and to
hire more contracting staff in particular. The agency's procurement
office needs to be at full strength as we head into the 2019 hurricane
season.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Chairwoman.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Oversight,
Management, and Accountability Subcommittee, the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Crenshaw, for an opening statement.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member
King, and Chairwoman Torres Small. It is great to be with all
of you.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here.
I have been here long enough to see the range of issues
this committee deals, from countering threats from terrorist
activity, to cybersecurity, to National disasters. All can be
harmful, affect National security, and, most importantly,
impact the American people.
I am pleased we are holding this hearing today to explore
the ways FEMA can improve its contracting. FEMA has one of the
most important functions of the Federal Government in helping
our citizens prepare for and recover from disasters.
My home State of Texas witnessed the devastation that
nature can cause when Hurricane Harvey hit in late August 2017.
It is something my constituents and I saw and dealt with first-
hand. That storm brought torrential downpours that caused
catastrophic flooding in Houston and many of the areas I
represent. Hurricane Harvey cost 107 people their lives and is
estimated to have cost $125 billion in damage.
But Texans are resilient. During the storm, we evacuated
our neighbors with the help of our friends from the Cajun Navy,
volunteers from across the country, the Texas National Guard,
and the U.S. Coast Guard. As soon as the waters receded, we got
to work with recovery.
It has been over 600 days, and we are still recovering and
rebuilding after the devastation caused by this storm. While we
are grateful for the assistance from FEMA, we must always ask
ourselves how we can do better. It is our role to review the
activities of Federal agencies and determine what we can do
better to serve our constituents and the American taxpayer.
That is part of our oversight role in Congress and on this
committee.
While 2017 was an unusual year because of the unprecedented
number of disasters, including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria and the California wildfires, FEMA must be prepared for
all disasters regardless of their frequency.
FEMA assists with disaster recovery utilizing three
different methods. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, FEMA began
using advance contracts for goods and services it typically
needs in a disaster. The Agency also provides help after a
disaster through post-disaster contracts and public assistance
grants. In the 2017 disaster season, many of the post-disaster
contracts were for power distribution equipment and food and
water. FEMA uses public assistance grants to supplement State
and local efforts for things like debris removal and emergency
protective measures as well as projects to repair
infrastructure and facilities.
Responsible administration of these contracts is vital to
helping the victims of a disaster recover and in helping the
States and localities recover and rebuild. We need to get these
contracts right to ensure that we can adequately address basic
needs immediately following a disaster.
As we rebuild our communities, we need to ensure that
Federal funds are not wasted either. We should not be picking
winners and losers with these contracts. They need to be
entered with the goal of ensuring that everyone wins--the
victims, the communities, the contractors, and the taxpayers.
FEMA needs to continuously improve its management and oversight
of its contracts to ensure that this is the case.
While I applaud FEMA for its excellent work in helping
rebuild lives and communities after a disaster, we all must
recognize that there may be ways to improve its operations. I
look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on the best
ways to add accountability and oversight in the disaster
recovery process.
I would also like to add that I have a report prepared by
the Texas General Land Office on lessons learned from Hurricane
Harvey. This is a detailed proposal that I think FEMA should
have, and I ask unanimous consent to enter it into the record.
Mr. Payne. Duly noted.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The information has been retained in committee files and is
available at http://www.glo.texas.gov/recovery/files/texas-at-risk-
report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Crenshaw. I yield back the balance of my time. Thank
you.
[The statement of Ranking Member Crenshaw follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Dan Crenshaw
May 9, 2019
I've been here long enough to see the range of issues this
committee deals with. From countering threats from terrorist activity,
to cybersecurity, to natural disasters. All can be harmful, affect
National security, and most importantly, impact the American people.
I am pleased we are holding this hearing today to explore the ways
FEMA can improve its contracting. FEMA has one of the most important
functions of the Federal Government in helping our citizens prepare for
and recover from disasters.
My home State of Texas witnessed the devastation nature can cause
when Hurricane Harvey hit in late August 2017.
It is something my constituents and I saw and dealt with first-
hand.
That storm brought torrential downpours that caused catastrophic
flooding in Houston and many of the areas I represent. Hurricane Harvey
cost 107 people their lives, is estimated to have caused 125 billion
dollars in damage.
Texans are resilient. During the storm we evacuated our neighbors,
with the help of our friends from the Cajun Navy, volunteers from
across the country, the Texas National Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard.
As soon as the waters receded we got to work with recovery.
It's been over 600 days and we are still recovering and rebuilding
after the devastation caused by this storm. While we are grateful for
the assistance from FEMA, we must always ask ourselves, how can we do
better? It is our role to review the activities of Federal agencies and
determine what we can do better to serve our constituents and the
American taxpayer. That is part of our oversight role in Congress and
on this committee.
While 2017 was an unusual year because of the unprecedented number
of disasters, including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the
California wildfires, FEMA must be prepared for all disasters
regardless of their frequency. FEMA assists with disaster recovery
utilizing three different methods.
After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, FEMA began using advance contracts
for goods and services it typically needs in a disaster. The agency
also provides help after a disaster through post-disaster contracts and
public assistance grants.
In the 2017 disaster season, many of the post-disaster contracts
were for power distribution equipment and food and water. FEMA uses
public assistance grants to supplement State and local efforts for
things like debris removal and emergency protective measures as well as
projects to repair infrastructure and facilities.
Responsible administration of these contracts is vital in helping
the victims of a disaster recover and in helping the States and
localities recover and rebuild. We need to get these contracts right to
ensure that we can adequately address basic needs immediately following
a disaster.
As we rebuild our communities, we need to ensure that Federal funds
are not wasted. We should not be picking winners and losers with these
contracts; they need to be entered with the goal of ensuring that
everyone wins--the victims, the communities, the contractors, and the
taxpayers.
FEMA needs to continuously improve its management and oversight of
its contracts to ensure that this is the case. While I applaud FEMA for
its excellent work in helping rebuild lives and communities after a
disaster, I recognize that there may be ways to improve its operations.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on the best ways to
add accountability and oversight in the disaster recovery process.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Now it is now my honor recognize the overall Chairman of
the Homeland Security Committee, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning to our panel of witnesses.
I want to thank both you and Chairwoman Torres Small for
holding this hearing today and to the witnesses for being here.
Disaster contracting is a central component of disaster
preparedness and an issue that I have been following for quite
some time.
Since Hurricanes Katrina exposed gaps in FEMA's disaster
contracting practices in 2005, the agency still has not managed
to make the necessary adjustments that facilitate smoother
response and recovery efforts and make FEMA a better steward of
taxpayers' dollars. Moving into the 2019 hurricane season, I am
concerned that FEMA will fall short in this area once again.
To add to my worry, for the last 2 months, FEMA has not had
a Senate-confirmed administrator. In the absence of permanent
leadership, FEMA is likely to get even further behind with
preparing its disaster contracting initiatives.
Contracting is incredibly important to how we as a Nation
prepare for and respond to disasters. After shortcomings were
identified in preparation for and in response to Hurricane
Katrina, Congress enacted reforms in 2006 requiring FEMA to
establish advance contracts for goods and services to enable
the Government to quickly and effectively mobilize resources in
the aftermath of a disaster and provide a preference to local
businesses in the area affected by a major disaster. But as we
will hear today from the DHS-OIG and the GAO, FEMA has yet to
adequately implement all of the reforms, despite it being well
over a decade since the law was passed.
Having advance contracts in place before a disaster helps
ensure the Federal Government has the adequate and appropriate
resources to respond when a disaster strikes. Without these
advance contracts, the Government risks taxpayers' money by
spending more than is necessary for goods and services, or,
worse, Americans in need might be left waiting as the Federal
Government has to go out and award new contracts in the midst
of a disaster.
FEMA must do its due diligence to ensure that companies
selected for advance contracts can meet the contract terms. The
opportunity to be in on advance contracts must also truly be
full and open, with equal consideration being given to small
businesses, including minority-owned businesses.
In 2017, when responding to the catastrophic Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria, FEMA had to cancel multiple contracts
due to the agency's failure to weed out inexperienced or
unqualified vendors. Some of the vendors had been barred from
doing work with other agencies.
While I know FEMA claims this did not affect their work on
the ground in 2017, common sense tells us that emergency
response is improved by having qualified vendors in place to
provide goods and services reliably.
FEMA has also made post-disaster awards to vendors outside
the disaster area without adequate justification, meaning the
agency may have missed opportunities to award contracts to
local businesses, which could have helped jump-start disaster-
affected local communities.
Moreover, FEMA must deal with staffing vacancies in the
Office of Chief Procurement Officer, which, as of last summer,
had over 70 vacant positions. FEMA must not only fill these
vacancies, it also needs to ensure its staff is properly
trained to conduct the duties assigned to them.
We will talk about it a little later, because they have
hired new people, they hired 13, I think, and 12 have already
left. So it continues to be a problem.
So let me just say that we want to get it right. FEMA is
the last line of defense to help the American people. When all
systems fail, FEMA should be there. Congress has been really
good in supporting FEMA's mission. They will give them the
resources; now we just need to get it right.
So I hope from these reports, Mr. Chairman, that we get an
opportunity to continue to work on improving FEMA's response.
In light of that, I would also like to suggest that we hold
a meeting to discuss contracts governed by section 428, or the
Stafford Act, especially for Puerto Rico recovery. I have made
a couple of visits to Puerto Rico, and it just seems like we
should be further along than we are. I want to make sure, if
there is something we are missing in this process to speed it
up, that we fix it.
With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
May 9, 2019
Disaster contracting is a central component of disaster
preparedness and an issue I have been following for some time now.
Since Hurricane Katrina exposed gaps in FEMA's disaster contracting
practices in 2005, the agency still has not managed to make the
necessary adjustments that facilitate smoother response and recovery
efforts and make FEMA a better steward of taxpayers' dollars. Moving
into the 2019 hurricane season, I am concerned that FEMA will fall
short in this area once again.
To add to my worry, for the last 2 months, FEMA has not had a
Senate-confirmed administrator. In the absence of permanent leadership,
FEMA is likely to get even further behind with preparing its disaster
contracting initiatives.
Contracting is incredibly important to how we as a Nation prepare
for and respond to disasters. After shortcomings were identified in
preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress enacted
reforms in 2006 requiring FEMA to: Establish advance contracts for
goods and services to enable the Government to quickly and effectively
mobilize resources in the aftermath of a disaster; and provide a
preference to local businesses in the area affected by a major
disaster. But, as we will hear today from the DHS-OIG and the GAO, FEMA
has yet to adequately implement all of the reforms, despite it being
well over a decade since the law was passed.
Having advance contracts in place before a disaster helps ensure
the Federal Government has the appropriate resources to respond when a
disaster strikes. Without these advance contracts, the Government risks
taxpayer money by spending more than is necessary for goods and
services. Or worse, Americans in need might be left waiting as the
Federal Government has to go out and award new contracts in the midst
of a disaster. FEMA must do its due diligence to ensure that companies
selected for advance contracts can meet the contract terms. The
opportunity to bid on advance contracts must also truly be ``full and
open'' with equal consideration being given to small businesses,
including minority-owned businesses.
In 2017, when responding to the catastrophic hurricanes Harvey,
Irma, and Maria, FEMA had to cancel multiple contracts due to the
agency's failure to weed out inexperienced or unqualified vendors. Some
of the vendors had been barred from doing work with other agencies.
While I know FEMA claims this did not affect their work on the ground
in 2017, common sense tells us that emergency response is improved by
having qualified vendors in place to provide goods and services
reliably. FEMA also made post-disaster awards to vendors outside the
disaster area without adequate justification, meaning the agency may
have missed opportunities to award contracts to local businesses, which
could have helped jump-start disaster-affected local economies.
Moreover, FEMA must deal with staffing vacancies in the Office of
the Chief Procurement Officer, which as of last summer had over 70 open
positions. FEMA must not only fill these positions. It also needs to
ensure its staff is properly trained to conduct the duties assigned to
them. According to information provided by FEMA, as of April 2019 only
51 percent of the agency's acquisitions cadre was deemed qualified by
FEMA's own qualification system. This is unacceptable and must change
immediately. The American people expect FEMA and its Federal partners
to support response and recovery in times of disaster. Learning from
past disaster contracting mistakes and getting contracting right going
forward is essential to that task.
Today, I look forward to hearing from representatives of the
Government Accountability Office and the Department of Homeland
Security's Inspector General on the shortcomings and opportunities for
improvement in FEMA procurement. I also look forward to hearing from
FEMA on the steps the agency has taken to improve its process and work
with both GAO and DHS OIG to address their outstanding recommendations.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that, under the
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses.
Our first witness, Mr. Brian Kamoie, who serves as
associate administrator for mission support at FEMA. In this
role, Mr. Kamoie oversees the Office of the Chief Procurement
Officer, which is responsible for FEMA's contracting and
acquisitions, and the Office of the Chief Component Human
Capital Officer, which is responsible for personnel issues at
the Agency.
Prior to joining FEMA in 2013, he served as senior director
for preparedness policy on the White House National Security
Council and deputy assistant secretary for preparedness and
response at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Next, we have Ms. Marie Mak, who leads the Government
Accountability Office's work on a wide range of issues
involving acquisitions contracting at the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. Ms. Mak has
nearly 20 years of service to GAO. She had previously worked at
the Naval Air Systems Command and U.S. Coast Guard
Headquarters.
Am I pronouncing your name correctly?
Ms. Mak. Yes.
Mr. Payne. All right. I got one right today.
Finally, we are joined by Ms. Katherine Trimble, deputy
assistant inspector general for audits at the Department of
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, where she
oversees disaster management and infrastructure protection
issues.
Prior to joining DHS-OIG in 2018, Ms. Trimble worked at GAO
for 20 years. She has been responsible for multiple in-depth
reviews of major DHS acquisitions and was also involved with
GAO's assessment of Federal, State, and local responses to
Hurricane Katrina.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement
for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Kamoie.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN KAMOIE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MISSION
SUPPORT, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Kamoie. Good morning, Chairman Payne and Chairwoman
Torres Small, Ranking Members King and Crenshaw, and Members of
the subcommittee. My name is Brian Kamoie, and I am the
associate administrator for mission support at FEMA.
On behalf of Acting Administrator Gaynor, I appreciate the
opportunity to talk with you today about the agency's disaster
contracting program and its key role in achieving FEMA's
mission to help people before, during, and after disasters.
FEMA's Office of the Chief Procurement Officer manages the
agency's contracting needs to handle day-to-day operations and
support survivors throughout the disaster response and recovery
process. FEMA's procurement team negotiates high-quality, cost-
effective, and timely contracts to accomplish FEMA's mission.
Since 2016, FEMA has executed more than 32,000 contract
actions, resulting in over $10.5 billion in contract
obligation.
FEMA adheres to and assesses contractors according to the
Federal Acquisition Regulations. As part of the acquisition
process, contracting officers evaluate proposals and vet
potential contractors, including obtaining past performance
information.
During declared disasters, the Federal Acquisition
Regulations and Department of Homeland Security policy give
FEMA specific authorities and flexibilities to expedite
contracting actions so that our agency and our partners can
obtain resources quickly to help survivors. These authorities,
such as the ``unusual and compelling urgency'' exception in the
Federal Acquisition Regulations, help streamline procurement
timelines while adhering to applicable Federal and Agency
procedures.
Each year, FEMA enters into prepositioned contracts in
advance of disasters to enable the agency to meet immediate
response needs before additional longer-term contracts are put
into place. Prepositioned contracts provide a variety of
services and commodities, ranging from crisis counseling and
housing inspection services to the delivery of critical
commodities like generators, water, and meals. As of April
2019, FEMA has 87 prepositioned contracts, 23 of which are to
small businesses.
Following a disaster, FEMA's goal is to contract with local
companies within a declared disaster area for resource needs
when practicable. Locally-sourced contracts stimulate the local
economy, create job opportunities, and support long-term
recovery for affected communities. Since 2017, of the more than
$6.9 billion obligated in support of disasters, locally-sourced
contracts made up more than $842 million, representing 12.2
percent of total disaster dollars obligated.
Additionally, FEMA has an industry liaison program which
establishes strategic relationships with vendors and
stakeholders, serves as an information provider for vendors
seeking to do business with FEMA, and connects vendors with
program offices in support of FEMA's mission. The program's
goal is to support the availability of the right resources and
services at the right time to local and State governments and
disaster survivors.
During the historic 2017 hurricane season, FEMA executed
more than 3,500 disaster-related contract actions, for a total
obligation of $2.6 billion. In addition, the agency executed
more than $1 billion in non-disaster contracts. This is more
than a 100 percent increase in FEMA's annual expenditures and a
50 percent increase in the number of contracting actions from
the prior year.
Based on lessons learned from the 2017 hurricane season as
well as recommendations from the Government Accountability
Office and the Department's Office of Inspector General, FEMA
has made improvements in our contracting process. These
include: Increasing the dollar ceiling on prepositioned
contracts; adjusting periods of performance on contracts so
that none expire during hurricane season; awarding
prepositioned contracts to enhance transportation capabilities
for island responses; and increasing the number of contracting
personnel supporting disasters, specifically senior-level and
disaster acquisition staff.
FEMA also introduced the Master Acquisition Planning System
in 2016, a tool that results in acquisitions that are more
cost-effective and best meet FEMA's needs through preplanning
of resources.
As part of our on-going outreach and education, FEMA's
Procurement Disaster Assistance Team provides training to our
partners to familiarize them with Federal procurement standards
applicable to FEMA's public assistance disaster grants. These
teams deploy to disaster locations to provide our partners
training where they need it when they need it.
FEMA is also in the process of developing a procurement
toolkit that will help our partners develop their own
prepositioned contracts.
I am pleased to be here today to represent the dedicated
FEMA staff and for the opportunity to discuss with you our
important mission to help people before, during, and after
disasters. I am happy to take any questions the committee may
have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kamoie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Kamoie
May 9, 2019
introduction
Good morning, Chairman Payne and Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking
Members King and Crenshaw, and Members of the subcommittees. My name is
Brian Kamoie, and I am the associate administrator for mission support
at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On behalf of FEMA
Acting Administrator Peter Gaynor, I appreciate the opportunity to
speak with you today about the agency's disaster contracting program
and its key role in achieving FEMA's mission to help people before,
during, and after disasters.
office of the chief procurement officer
FEMA's Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) manages the
agency's contracting needs. OCPO negotiates high-quality, cost-
effective, and timely contracts to improve the delivery of FEMA's
mission. Since 2016, FEMA has executed 32,716 contract actions,
resulting in over $10.5 billion in contract obligations.
Whether before, during, or after a disaster, we adhere strictly to,
and assess contractors in accordance with, the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR). As part of the acquisition process, contracting
officers evaluate proposals based on the award criteria set forth in
the solicitation and a series of factors required by Federal
regulations, along with vetting potential contractors. Contracting
officers obtain performance information about potential contractors
from the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System,
which is the Government-wide system used to collect contractor and
grantee integrity information.
contracting in disasters
In times of Presidentially-declared disasters, the FAR and the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide FEMA with specific
authorities and flexibility to expedite contracting actions so that our
agency and our partners can obtain resources and services quickly to
help disaster survivors. These authorities allow for streamlined
procurements and increased contract dollar thresholds while adhering to
applicable procedures outlined in Federal and agency regulations.
Contracts can range from providing commodities, such as meals and
water, to temporary housing and disaster case management.
Under the FAR (48 CFR 6.302-2), unusual and compelling urgency
can be used to justify using options other than full and open
competition, though contracts awarded under these circumstances are
limited in duration to less than 150 days. FEMA may also issue rated
orders under the Defense Production Act, use preliminary contractual
instruments, such as letter contracts authorizing the contractor to
manufacture supplies or perform services immediately, or award sole-
source contracts to specific subsets of small businesses.
Our disaster contracting can also include the use of pre-positioned
Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts, DHS
strategically-sourced contracts, General Services Administration
schedules, and other mechanisms to simplify and expedite procurement
activities.
Above all, FEMA's pre-negotiated and disaster contracts are tools
to help the agency provide the resources and services necessary to help
survivors during and after disasters.
pre-positioned contracts
Each year, we enter into pre-positioned contracts to enable the
agency to meet immediate disaster response needs before additional
longer-term contracts are put into place. Pre-positioned contracts
provide a variety of services, including technical assistance for our
individual and public assistance programs, lodging, crisis counseling,
housing inspection, and air transportation services. We also have pre-
positioned contracts in place for critical commodities like generators,
water, meals, cots, and infant and toddler kits. These commodity
contracts are in addition to the inventory kept on hand in
strategically-placed warehouses across the country for immediate use.
As of April 2019, FEMA has 87 pre-positioned contracts, 23 of which
were awarded to small businesses. We have executed and/or modified
existing contracts to account for increased dollar ceilings,
appropriate performance periods, and geographic coverage. FEMA has also
reviewed all pre-positioned contracts to make sure that none will
expire during the hurricane season, including adjusting the periods of
performance where necessary.
locally-sourced contracts
Following a Presidentially-declared disaster, as required in
Section 307 the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, as amended, FEMA's goal is to seek local companies
within a declared disaster area to meet the needs for that disaster
response. Locally-sourced contracts stimulate the local economy, create
job opportunities, and support long-term viability and recovery for
communities affected by a disaster. Since 2017, of the more than $6.9
billion obligated for contracts awarded in support of disasters,
locally-sourced contracts made up more than $842 million, representing
12.2 percent of total disaster dollars obligated.
To reach local companies, we can give contract preferences through
a local area set-aside solicitation to allow only local firms within a
specific geographic area to compete, or FEMA can give local firms
preference in the evaluation of proposals. If a local preference is not
a viable option at the onset of a disaster, such as when no local
businesses can provide a needed resource or local companies temporarily
lack the capability after a disaster, the Stafford Act mandates the
transition of disaster requirements at the earliest opportunity from
non-local vendors, where feasible and practicable, to organizations,
firms, and individuals residing or doing business primarily in the
area(s) affected by a major disaster or emergency.
small business considerations
While there is no regulatory requirement for small business
participation in disaster contracting, FEMA creates an environment that
stimulates maximum participation for small businesses in Federal
Government contract awards for companies that are disadvantaged or
owned by women or veterans. FEMA participates in small business
conferences to promote these opportunities.
In response to Section 307 of the Stafford Act, FEMA established
Local Business Transition Teams. We deploy these teams to help with the
transition of contracts to the local economy, co-locating a team with
local, State, and Federal disaster leadership, private-sector liaisons,
and most importantly, the local businesses that could provide support
to their communities. These teams facilitate the transition of disaster
requirements by assisting the FEMA Joint Field Office (JFO) acquisition
staff with identifying requirements, assessing transition feasibility,
and creating acquisition packages for contract award. These teams also
educate local vendors through procurement education seminars to foster
successful business participation during recovery efforts.
By encouraging local procurement wherever feasible, the Local
Business Transition Team assists in the restoration of local economies,
employment opportunities, tax bases, and ultimately, the recovery of
affected communities.
industry liaison program
FEMA's Industry Liaison Program (ILP) establishes strategic
relationships with suppliers and stakeholders, serves as an information
provider for suppliers seeking to do business with FEMA, and connects
suppliers with program offices in support of our mission. The program's
goal is to support the availability of the right resources and
services, at the right time, to local and State governments and
disaster survivors.
The program achieves this mission by coordinating vendor
presentations and industry days, conducting market research, and
performing vendor analysis reporting at FEMA Headquarters. Industry
liaisons also coordinate the flow of vendor inquiries across FEMA
Headquarters, Regions, and JFOs.
In the aftermath of Hurricanes Irma and Maria, ILP staff
participated in North Miami's Minority Enterprise Development Week
(MEDWeek) Government & Commercial Contracting Panel in Florida. More
than 125 vendors attended, mostly consisting of minority businesses, as
well as State and local officials. Additionally, ILP participated in,
and helped to facilitate, outreach events in Puerto Rico. Our staff
spoke to over 700 vendors about FEMA's procurement needs and doing
business with the agency. These events were held across Puerto Rico
during February and March 2018. ILP also participated in the Federal
Business Opportunity Conference, held in Puerto Rico in December 2018.
The objective of this conference was to foster business relationships
between the Government and local businesses. ILP provides continual
support to internal partners and vendors seeking to do business with
FEMA. Since October 1, 2017, ILP has processed more than 5,000 email
and 1,900 phone inquiries.
5-year master acquisition planning system (maps)
Since 2016, we have used the Master Acquisition Planning System
(MAPS) for all mission-critical acquisitions and acquisitions that are
more than $5 million. FEMA's senior leadership recognized the need for
a tool to track major and mission-critical acquisitions, including pre-
positioned contracts. This system is designed to alert the procurement
organization and program office leadership of upcoming acquisitions.
This allows for adequate planning of resources and personnel for the
project, resulting in acquisitions that are more cost-effective and
best meet FEMA's needs. It also reduces the need for bridge or non-
competitive contract awards. MAPS uses a time estimator to plan dates
for awards of major and mission-critical contracts. Since its
deployment, MAPS has helped FEMA improve acquisition planning, which
ultimately increases the use of competitive acquisition procedures,
leading to more competitive pricing.
continuous improvement of fema disaster contracting
During the historic 2017 hurricane and wildfire seasons, FEMA
executed more than 3,500 disaster-related contract actions, for a total
obligation of $2.6 billion. In addition, the agency executed more than
$1 billion in non-disaster contracts. This is more than a 100 percent
increase in our annual expenditures and a 50 percent increase in the
number of contracting actions from the prior year.
Based on internal lessons learned, as well as recommendations from
our partners at the U.S. Government Accountability Office and DHS's
Office of Inspector General, FEMA has improved our contracting
processes. The improvements include:
Increasing the Dollar Ceiling on some pre-positioned
contracts (such as water, meals, and infant toddler kits) to
increase capacity and help facilitate the process of getting
goods/services to disaster survivors more expeditiously while
complying with regulations.
Adjusting Periods of Performance on pre-positioned contracts
to make sure they do not expire in the middle of hurricane
season.
Enhancing the Transportation Capabilities for Island
Responses by working to solicit additional shipping and air
transportation services across the Pacific and Alaska. This
includes awarding a contract in March 2019 that will provide a
full suite of shipping and cross-docking services for Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Increasing the Number of Contracting Personnel to Support
Disasters by instituting a robust rotation of contracting
personnel in the National Response Coordination Center to
respond to disaster incidents, improving the agency's ability
to acquire commodities in support of disasters quickly.
Increasing the Number of Disaster Acquisition Response
Team Staff to increase the availability of acquisition
personnel to support field activities and JFOs. FEMA also
entered into a contract for acquisition support, providing
additional acquisitions capability for the upcoming
hurricane season. We will continue to add personnel who
promote sound business decision making in support of
disaster survivors.
Increasing the Number of Senior-Level Acquisition
Personnel in the quality review process.
Filling Critical Vacancies to replace departing employees
to make sure sufficient acquisition capabilities remain in
place to meet the needs of the agency.
In addition to implementing lessons learned, we continue to provide
training to acquisition personnel to deliver high-quality contracting
to disasters, with an emphasis on past performance. FEMA conducts
disaster contracting webinars with a continually-evolving curriculum to
incorporate lessons learned and past performance, share information,
and improve the process.
We also have a Procurement Disaster Assistance Team to provide
necessary contracting outreach and education. The purpose of this team,
in part, is to provide training to State, local, Tribal, and
territorial partners to ensure they are familiar with the Federal
procurement standards applicable to FEMA's public assistance disaster
grants. Additionally, we are developing a procurement toolkit that will
facilitate our partners' ability to develop their own pre-positioned
contracts to facilitate their response to events, which allows for the
community and its economy to recover more quickly.
Last, FEMA will continue to transition from pre-positioned
contracts to the use of locally-sourced contracts as soon as is
practicable during disaster response and recovery.
conclusion
Every day, I am grateful for the opportunity to work with a program
dedicated to supporting FEMA's mission to help people before, during,
and after disasters. Thank you for your interest in the program and
your support. We look forward to collaborating with your subcommittees
moving forward. I am happy to answer any questions you may have at this
time.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
I now recognize Ms. Mak to summarize her statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARIE A. MAK, DIRECTOR FOR CONTRACTING AND
NATIONAL SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Mak. Good morning, Chairman Payne and Chairwoman Torres
Small, Ranking Members King and Crenshaw, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittees.
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss Federal
contracting efforts in response to the 2017 hurricanes and
wildfires. These efforts are critical, given that contracts
play a key role in the immediate disaster response and longer-
term community recovery. Also, effective planning and
maximizing the use of contracts following a disaster can help
FEMA to quickly and cost-effectively provide needed goods and
services to survivors.
Our most recent reports on advance and post-disaster
contracting indicate that FEMA continues to face several key
challenges. The three areas that I would like to highlight
today are contracting work force issues, coordination, and
transparency.
First, in our reviews on disaster response, work force has
come up as a theme.
Specific to contracting, FEMA leveraged contracting staff
from its regions, headquarters, and its deployable contracting
work force to support disaster response. Yet we found that 8
out of FEMA's 10 regional offices had only 1 permanent full-
time contracting official.
Given that regional offices are responsible for managing
most post-disaster contracts as well as coordinating with
States and localities on the use of these advance contracts,
not having enough contracting personnel becomes significant
after a disaster hits.
Recognizing this challenge, in the short term, FEMA plans
to fill some of these gaps using contractor support and to hire
some additional staff dedicated to disaster response. However,
without assessing its current contracting work force to
determine what mission and skill gaps really exist, it will be
difficult for FEMA to fill the contracting positions with the
specific skills it needs to better respond to future disasters.
Second, in our review of advance contracts, those that are
put in place prior to disasters so that they can be expedited
in getting critical goods and services to the survivors, we
found improvements could be made in Federal coordination and
information sharing with State and local governments. For
example, we found inconsistencies with FEMA's efforts to
perform regular outreach with States to help them in
establishing their own advance contracts, since they are really
the first responders after a disaster hits.
It is also important that States and localities as well as
FEMA's own work force are aware of what Federal advance
contracts exist and how they can be leveraged. In this case, we
found that FEMA's documentation listing advance contracts did
not consistently identify contracts for life-sustaining goods
such as generators, meals, manufactured housing units. As a
result, FEMA contracting personnel and their State and local
counterparts may not be well-informed about the types of goods
and services that are available.
Recognizing these challenges, FEMA is developing a toolkit
to share information on advance contracts, but at the time of
our review, it was still deciding what information to include.
Finally, there is a lack of transparency regarding full
extent of disaster contracting obligations. This is due to the
criteria for closing a National interest action code in the
Federal Procurement Database System. It is the only public,
Government-wide database that is used for tracking Federal
procurements. This code is what contracting personnel select
when entering related contract information into the system.
The closing of the codes for both Harvey and Irma less than
a year after the storms made landfall make it significantly
more difficult to determine the extent of Federal contracting
obligations. In contrast, codes for prior hurricanes were open
for at least 5 years, with the Katrina code remaining open for
13 years.
Without reevaluating the criteria to close these codes, the
ability to identify and track Federal contracting dollars for
disasters is not comprehensive and provides limited visibility
to all interested stakeholders, including Congress.
Chairman Payne and Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking Members
King and Crenshaw, Members of the subcommittees, this completes
my statement. I would be prepared to respond to any questions
that you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Mak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marie A. Mak
May 9, 2019
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-19-518T, a testimony before the Subcommittees on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery and Oversight,
Management, and Accountability, Committee on Homeland Security, House
of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
According to FEMA--a component within DHS--the 2017 disasters
affected 47 million people, or about 15 percent of the Nation's
population. Federal contracts have played a key role in responding to
these disasters and in long-term community recovery. So far, FEMA has
obligated billions of dollars on these contracts.
This testimony is based primarily on GAO's recent reports on
disaster contracting--specifically advance contracting and post-
disaster contracts related to the 2017 disasters--which detail much of
FEMA's disaster contracting activities. It addresses key challenges
FEMA faced contracting for goods and services in response to these
disasters.
To conduct this work, GAO analyzed data from the Federal
Procurement Data System-Next Generation through June 30, 2018, the
latest and most complete data available for the 2017 disasters. GAO
also analyzed FEMA guidance and documentation and interviewed FEMA
officials to discuss the use of contracts to respond to the 2017
disasters.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made a total of 19 recommendations--most of which were to
FEMA--related to contracting activities in response to the 2017
disasters. Ten of these are described in this statement. DHS concurred
with most of these recommendations, and has some actions under way, but
it has not fully implemented them. Attention to these recommendations
can assist FEMA as it uses contracts to respond to future disasters.
disaster contracting.--fema continues to face challenges with its use
of contracts to support response and recovery, director, contracting
and national security acquisitions
What GAO Found
Following Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the 2017
California wildfires, Federal agencies entered into disaster-related
contracts worth about $9.5 billion, according to data as of June 30,
2018--the latest and most complete data at the time of GAO's review
(see figure). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) obligated
about $2.9 billion of this total through advance contracts, which it
establishes prior to a disaster to rapidly mobilize resources. FEMA
obligated an additional $1.6 billion through post-disaster contracts,
which are established after disasters hit.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In its December 2018 and April 2019 reports, GAO made 10
recommendations to strengthen FEMA's ability to address challenges GAO
identified in how FEMA plans, coordinates, and tracks its contracts:
Planning.--FEMA has an outdated strategy and unclear guidance on
how contracting officers should use advance contracts and has
not fully assessed its contracting work force needs.
Effectively planning its contract use is critical to FEMA
quickly providing critical goods and services.
Coordination.--FEMA did not fully coordinate with States and
localities on certain contracts and encountered communication
and coordination challenges with other Federal agencies.
Effective coordination helps FEMA ensure stakeholders have the
tools needed to facilitate their disaster response efforts.
Tracking.--The full extent of 2017 disaster contracting activities,
for FEMA and other agencies, is unknown. GAO found that codes
used to track obligations for these disasters in a Federal
procurement data system were closed without full consideration
of user needs or due to inconsistent implementation of criteria
established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
other agencies, limiting visibility over Federal disaster
contracts.
Chairman Payne, Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking Members King and
Crenshaw, and Members of the subcommittees: I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
contracting practices in response to the catastrophic 2017 disasters--
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the California wildfires.
According to FEMA--a component within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)--these disasters affected 47 million people, or about 15
percent of the Nation's population. Once a major disaster has been
declared by the President, Federal contracts play a key role in its
immediate aftermath and in long-term community recovery by providing
life-sustaining goods and services to survivors. FEMA has obligated
billions of dollars on contracts in response to the 2017 disasters.
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006
required FEMA, among other things, to establish advance contracts.
Advance contracts are established prior to disasters to quickly provide
life-sustaining goods and services in the immediate aftermath of a
disaster.\1\ FEMA may also award new contracts to support disaster
response efforts following a disaster declaration. According to FEMA
officials, these post-disaster contract awards may be required, for
example, if advance contracts reach their capacity, or if goods and
services that are not suitable for advance contracts are needed.
According to our analysis of Federal Procurement Data System-Next
Generation (FPDS-NG) data, Federal agencies had obligated about $9.5
billion in response to the 3 2017 hurricanes and the California
wildfires as of June 30, 2018--the most recent and complete data
available.\2\ FEMA obligated about $2.9 billion of this total through
advance contracts, and roughly an additional $1.6 billion through post-
disaster contracts.
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\1\ Pub. L. No. 109-295, 601-699. PKEMRA included several
provisions, notably the requirement for FEMA to identify requirements
that can be contracted for in advance and establish advance contracts.
Among other provisions, PKEMRA also required FEMA to develop a
contracting strategy that maximizes the use of advance contracts to the
extent practical and cost-effective; establish a process to ensure
coordination of advance contracts with State and local governments, as
appropriate; and encourage State and local governments to engage in
similar pre-planning and contracting.
\2\ Advance contract obligations included in this analysis were
limited to FEMA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) contracts.
Obligations for the California wildfires were limited to contracts
identified by FEMA and USACE.
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My statement today addresses key challenges FEMA faced contracting
for goods and services in response to these disasters. This statement
is primarily based on reports we issued in December 2018 and April 2019
on FEMA's disaster-contracting activities in response to the 2017
hurricanes and California wildfires.\3\ For the reports cited, among
other methodologies, we reviewed FPDS-NG data through June 30, 2018--
the most recent and complete data available--to identify FEMA contract
obligations for the 2017 disasters. We also analyzed FEMA guidance and
documentation and interviewed FEMA officials to discuss the use of
contracts to respond to the 2017 disasters. Each of the reports cited
in this statement provide further detailed information on our scope and
methodology.
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\3\ GAO, 2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the
Use of Post-Disaster Contracts to Support Response and Recovery, GAO-
19-281 (Washington, DC: Apr. 24, 2019); and 2017 Disaster Contracting:
Action Needed to Better Ensure More Effective Use and Management of
Advance Contracts, GAO-19-93 (Washington, DC: Dec. 6, 2018).
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We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
fema experienced challenges in planning, coordinating with
stakeholders, and tracking the use of contracts
Challenges in Acquisition and Workforce Planning
Ensuring that there is adequate time to complete acquisition
planning activities and identifying the contracting work force required
to execute mission needs can help agencies establish a strong
foundation for successful acquisition outcomes. However, our prior work
identified challenges FEMA faced in its acquisition and work force
planning efforts for disaster contracting. The Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) requires agencies to perform acquisition planning
activities for all acquisitions to ensure that the Government meets its
needs in the most effective, economical, and timely manner possible.\4\
In our December 2018 report, we found that FEMA had guidance in place
establishing time frames for certain FEMA acquisitions following the
completion of the acquisition package.\5\ Further, FEMA implemented an
acquisition tracking tool in 2016--the 5-Year Master Acquisition
Planning Schedule (MAPS)--which monitors the status of and provides
acquisition planning time frames for certain high-value and mission-
critical acquisitions, including advance contracts, regardless of
dollar value.
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\4\ FAR 7.102.
\5\ GAO-19-93.
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However, we found that FEMA had not established time frames or
released guidance for the pre-solicitation phase of the acquisition
planning process, when program officials identify a need and develop
key acquisition package documents (see figure 1).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Not adhering to suggested time frames can place a burden on
contracting officers and increase the likelihood of not awarding a
contract on schedule. This, in turn, may create a need for FEMA to non-
competitively extend the existing contract--this extension may be
considered a bridge contract. Given the lack of a Government-wide
definition, we defined bridge contracts in our prior work as:
Extensions to an existing contract beyond its period of performance
(including base and options) and new, short-term contracts awarded on a
sole-source basis to an incumbent contractor to avoid a lapse in
service caused by a delay in awarding a follow-on contract.\6\ FEMA
officials acknowledged that the use of non-competitive bridge contracts
is not an ideal practice as they cannot ensure the Government is paying
what it should for goods and services. However, in December 2018, we
found that FEMA used bridge contracts for at least 10 of its advance
contracts used in response to the 2017 disasters--with some of these
contracts lasting for several years.
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\6\ The FAR does not define bridge contracts or require that they
be tracked.
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To decrease dependence on bridge contracts, FEMA established MAPS
to help track and monitor the status of acquisition planning time
frames for certain acquisitions. However, most of the program office
and contracting officials we spoke with during our December 2018 review
had limited familiarity with the tool. In our December 2018 report, we
recommended that FEMA update and implement existing guidance to
identify acquisition planning time frames and considerations across the
entire acquisition planning process and clearly communicate the purpose
and use of its acquisition planning tool to relevant personnel. DHS
concurred, but in its response to our report stated it believed
existing outreach and training on MAPS had resolved these challenges.
We acknowledged FEMA's training in our report, but noted that not all
relevant staff we spoke with were familiar with MAPS, and that there
was no formal guidance on the time frames for the entirety of the
acquisition planning process. Given these issues, we continue to
believe FEMA needs to take additional steps to implement our
recommendation.
Without planning and guidance on its use of advance contracts, FEMA
lacks reasonable assurance that it is maximizing their use to the
extent practicable and cost-effective to quickly provide goods and
services following a disaster. PKEMRA requires the FEMA administrator
to develop a contracting strategy that maximizes the use of advance
contracts to the extent practical and cost-effective, and FEMA
contracting officials told us that advance contracts should be used
before awarding new contracts. However, in December 2018, we found that
FEMA's advance contract strategy and guidance did not clearly identify
the objectives of advance contracts or whether and how they should be
prioritized for use in relation to new post-disaster contracts.
For example, we reported that FEMA's lack of an updated strategy
and guidance contributed to confusion and challenges with the use of
advance contracts for tarps, used to cover small areas of roof damage.
Although FEMA had awarded advance contracts to provide tarps, a
subsequent modification to these contracts limited the ability to use
them for immediate disaster response needs--one of FEMA's stated
purposes. Furthermore, we found that FEMA awarded vendors new post-
disaster contracts for tarps before using its existing advance
contracts. According to FEMA officials at that time, neither of the
post-disaster contract vendors was able to provide the required tarps
when needed.\7\ We concluded that the timing and use of the existing
tarp advance contracts raised questions about the ability of
contracting officers to use these contracts to provide tarps
immediately following disasters. Additionally, we concluded that an
updated advance contracting strategy could have enabled FEMA to more
quickly provide the needed tarps to survivors, considering the
additional time and staff resources needed to award new post-disaster
contracts.
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\7\ The first post-disaster contract was terminated for convenience
citing shortages in available tarps following the 2017 hurricane
season. A stop-work order was issued for the second post-disaster
contract following concerns over whether the tarps received met FEMA's
specifications.
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In our December 2018 report, we recommended that FEMA update its
strategy to clearly define the objectives of advance contracts, how
they contribute to FEMA's disaster response operations, and whether and
how they should be prioritized in relation to making new, post-disaster
contract awards. We also recommended FEMA update its guidance
accordingly. DHS concurred with these two recommendations and
identified actions it plans to take to address them.
Our prior work also showed that FEMA's ability to adequately plan
for and manage its disaster contracts is further complicated by
persistent acquisition work force challenges, including attrition and
staffing shortages. In April 2019, we found that FEMA had identified
work force shortages as a continuing challenge for disaster response
and recovery. But FEMA had not assessed its contracting work force--
including regional contracting work force needs--since at least
2014.\8\ We recommended FEMA assess its work force needs to address
these shortcomings and develop a plan, including time lines. DHS
agreed, identified steps FEMA has taken and plans to take to address
the recommendation, and estimated addressing the recommendation by
September 2019.
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\8\ GAO-19-281.
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Continued Challenges Coordinating with Federal, State, and Local
Partners on Contracting Issues
Our prior reports found that FEMA experienced challenges
coordinating with State, local, and Federal partners over disaster
preparation and response efforts. Coordination is critical to ensuring
that States and localities have their own tools in place to facilitate
disaster response, and that contracting needs are clearly communicated
and considered among Federal agencies. Yet FEMA faced continued
challenges and inconsistencies in its coordination with States and
localities over the use of advance contracts.
In January 2017, FEMA updated guidance to include requirements for
coordination with State and local governments on the use of Federal
advance contracts. This update was in response to our September 2015
finding that there were inconsistencies in whether and how staff in
FEMA's regional offices performed State and local outreach on advance
contracting efforts.\9\ However, in December 2018, we reported on
similar inconsistencies in State and local outreach.\10\ We found that
FEMA's guidance did not specify how often or what types of advance
contract information should be shared with States and localities, or
instruct FEMA contracting officers to encourage States and localities
to establish their own advance contracts for the types of goods and
services needed during a disaster. As a result, we found that while
some FEMA regional officials regularly performed outreach with States
and localities to assist them with establishing advance contracts for
goods and services commonly needed during a disaster--like security,
transportation, and office supplies--other FEMA regional officials did
so less frequently. According to regional officials, coordinating more
frequently with States and localities allows them to avoid overlap
between State and Federal contracting efforts, and helps FEMA officials
know what resources the States have in place before a disaster occurs
and how long States are capable of providing those resources following
a disaster. We recommended in our December 2018 report that FEMA update
its guidance to provide specific direction for contracting officers to
perform outreach to States and localities on the use and establishment
of advance contracts. DHS concurred and stated it would update guidance
and continue efforts to establish resources for State and local
governments on advance contracts.
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\9\ GAO-15-783.
\10\ GAO-19-93.
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Information on FEMA's advance contracts can be used to facilitate
State and local coordination over the use and establishment of advance
contracts. However, our work showed that this information was
inconsistent and could further hinder FEMA's information sharing and
coordination efforts. In December 2018, we reviewed FEMA's advance
contract list and other resources FEMA contracting officials said they
used to identify advance contracts--like biannual training
documentation--and found differences in the advance contracts
identified.\11\ For example, we reported that FEMA officials told us
that the advance contract list available to contracting officers is
updated on a monthly basis. However, our analysis found that 58 advance
contracts identified on the June 2018 advance contract list had not
been included in contracting officers' May 2018 training documentation.
The missing contracts included those for telecommunications services,
generators, and manufactured housing units.
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\11\ GAO-19-93.
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Recognizing some of the shortcomings in communicating with State
and local governments following the 2017 disasters, FEMA stated it
would develop a toolkit to provide States and localities with
recommendations for advance contracts, emergency acquisition guidance,
and solicitation templates. However, at the time of our December 2018
review, FEMA officials were uncertain what information they would share
with States and localities on advance contracts, and said they did not
plan to provide the complete list of the advance contracts FEMA has in
place to avoid being overly prescriptive. Yet without a centralized and
up-to-date resource on advance contracts, FEMA contracting officers and
their State and local counterparts may not be able to effectively
communicate about advance contracts and use them to respond to future
disasters. Given FEMA's recent emphasis on the importance of States and
localities having the capability to provide their own life-saving goods
and services in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, we concluded
that clearly communicating consistent and up-to-date information on the
availability and limitations of Federal advance contracts is imperative
to informing State and local disaster response efforts.
In our December 2018 report, we recommended that FEMA identify a
single centralized resource listing its advance contracts and ensure
that resource is updated regularly. Further, we recommended that FEMA
should communicate information on advance contracts using that resource
to States and localities to inform their advance contracting efforts.
DHS concurred with these two recommendations and identified some steps
it planned to take, but also stated it believes the existing advance
contract list satisfies our recommendation for a single centralized
resource. However, as our report noted, we found inconsistencies in
this list that FEMA needs to address for advance contract information
to be complete and up-to-date for the contracting officers who rely on
it.
In addition to challenges coordinating with State and local
governments, we identified coordination and planning concerns between
FEMA and other Federal agencies. As the Federal disaster coordinator,
FEMA obtains requirements from States and localities.\12\ It then tasks
the appropriate Federal agencies with specific missions, based on their
emergency support functions. Agencies assigned to specific missions are
then responsible for fulfilling requirements, and may use contracts to
do so. However, we reported in April 2019 that some Federal agencies
experienced challenges coordinating with FEMA and State and local
partners.\13\ For example, USACE officials reported that, during their
debris removal mission following the California wildfires, local
officials believed that the soil removed would be replaced. However,
this was not part of the mission assignment from USACE to FEMA. In
these instances, agency officials told us they relied on FEMA to
communicate information on their mission assignments to be able to
administer contracts.
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\12\ According to the National Response Framework--a guide to how
the Federal Government, States and localities, and other public and
private-sector institutions should respond to disasters and
emergencies--the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for
ensuring that Federal preparedness actions are coordinated to prevent
gaps in the Federal Government's efforts to respond to all major
disasters, among other emergencies. The framework also designates FEMA
as the lead agency to coordinate the Federal disaster response efforts
across 30 Federal agencies.
\13\ GAO-19-281.
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According to a FEMA official during our April 2019 review,
coordination and planning concerns related to mission assignments--like
contracting considerations--should be worked out in advance between
FEMA and agencies such as USACE. However, we found that FEMA policy and
guidance lack details on how that coordination should take place.
Further, a FEMA official told us that contracting considerations are
not necessarily built into mission assignments. We recommended in April
2019 that FEMA revise its mission assignment policy and guidance to
better incorporate consideration of contracting needs and ensure clear
communication of coordination responsibilities related to contracting.
DHS concurred and plans to develop tools and training within the next
year to provide the necessary guidance.
Challenges with Tracking of Contract Use
Limited transparency into disaster contracting obligations further
complicates the challenges noted above. We found in April 2019 that the
full extent of disaster contracting--for both advance and post-disaster
contracts--related to the 2017 disasters was and continues to be
unknown.\14\ This was due to changes in the criteria for establishing
and closing a National interest action (NIA) code--a mechanism for
Government-wide tracking of emergency or contingency-related
contracting--in FPDS-NG, and DHS's inconsistent implementation of the
updated criteria for closing codes. Specifically, the codes for Harvey
and Irma closed on June 30, 2018, less than a full year after the
hurricanes hit. The code for Maria is valid through June 15, 2019,
about 21 months after that hurricane made landfall. This is in contrast
to prior hurricanes, for which codes sometimes remained open more than
5 years after the disaster, with the code for Hurricane Katrina being
open for 13 years after the disaster. The ability to identify disaster
contracting for the 2018 hurricanes was similarly limited as the NIA
codes for Hurricanes Florence and Michael expired on March 15, 2019 and
April 12, 2019, respectively, about 6 months after those storms made
landfall.
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\14\ GAO-19-281.
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Based on a memorandum of agreement, the General Services
Administration (GSA), DHS, and the Department of Defense (DOD) are
jointly responsible for determining when a NIA code should be
established and closed. DHS delegated its role, on behalf of civilian
agencies for disaster or emergency events, to its Office of the Chief
Procurement Officer. The agreement outlines criteria DHS should
consider in making determinations to establish and close a NIA code.
For our April 2019 review, we identified changes in these criteria
between June 2012 and June 2018. For example, the updated agreement
does not include the National interest and visibility of an event as
criteria for extending a NIA code, allowing a NIA code to expire
regardless of the high visibility of the event and information needs of
key users. DHS officials reported several rationales to support their
decision to close the NIA codes for the 2017 hurricanes, but these were
inconsistent with the criteria in the agreement and did not consider
key user needs or fully explain the decisions to close the codes.
Once a NIA code in FPDS-NG is closed, there is no other publicly-
available, Government-wide system available to comprehensively track
contract obligations for specific events. Our April 2019 report
demonstrated the magnitude of contract dollars that are no longer
easily trackable once a NIA code is closed. For example, using the
description field in FPDS-NG, we found that between July 1 and
September 30, 2018--after the NIA codes were closed--agencies obligated
at least $259 million on contracts for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.
However, not all agencies put event-specific information in the
description field, and we found for the 2017 hurricanes only 35 percent
of contract obligations linked to a NIA code included this information.
Moreover, as we have previously reported, and illustrate in figure 2,
it can take years to fully account for Federal contract obligations
related to response and recovery after a hurricane.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In our April 2019 report, we made two recommendations, including
that
GSA, in coordination with DOD and DHS, assess whether the
criteria in the current NIA code agreement meets the long-term
needs for high visibility events and account for the needs of
users, such as FEMA, other agencies, and Congress; and
in the interim, DHS, in coordination with DOD and GSA,
should keep the existing NIA codes for disasters open, reopen
the NIA codes for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Florence, and
Michael, and request that agencies retroactively update
applicable contract actions to reflect these codes, to the
extent practicable.
GSA and DOD indicated they would work jointly with DHS to assess
the criteria in the agreement within the year. DHS did not comment on
that recommendation.\15\ Given the high visibility and National
interest in these events, assessing the criteria, keeping NIA codes
open, and reopening closed codes for the recent disasters to the extent
practicable would help ensure visibility over Federal disaster
contracts.
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\15\ DHS did not concur with a draft recommendation to keep the
existing NIA codes open, citing concerns with being bound by the
current agreement and its authority to direct other agencies to
retroactively update relevant contract actions to reflect the reopened
codes. We revised that recommendation to address these concerns.
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In conclusion, given the circumstances surrounding the 2017
disasters, and the importance of preparedness for future disasters, it
is critical to ensure that FEMA is well-positioned to respond through
its use of contracts. Our work has shown that without effective
planning on the use of contracts, FEMA may face challenges in quickly
providing critical goods and services to survivors following a
disaster. Further, without effective coordination, FEMA cannot ensure
that local, State, and Federal partners have the tools they need to
assist in disaster response. Moreover, not tracking certain information
on a Government-wide basis in FPDS-NG may result in key users lacking
the information necessary to provide oversight of FEMA's and other
agencies' disaster contract actions. Implementing our recommendations
to update its planning guidance and advance contract strategy; assess
acquisition work force needs; improve coordination with State, local,
and Federal partners; and improve tracking of disaster contracting
actions will help FEMA overcome key challenges it faces in contracting
during a disaster, and improve future response efforts.
Chairman Payne, Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking Members King and
Crenshaw, and Members of the subcommittees, this concludes my
statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you for your testimony.
Now I recognize Ms. Trimble to summarize her statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE TRIMBLE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR AUDITS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Trimble. Thank you, Chairman Payne, Chairwoman Torres
Small, Ranking Members King and Crenshaw, and Members of the
subcommittees. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss
lessons learned from past disasters to improve FEMA
contracting.
My testimony today will focus on the Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General's work to assess the
efficiency and effectiveness of FEMA's contracting practices in
support of disaster response and recovery efforts.
As the OIG's body of work has shown, FEMA has long-standing
challenges managing both its contracting process and ensuring
locally-awarded contracts meet Federal requirements.
First, let me provide some context. As you know, when
disasters occur, State and local entities are the first to
respond. But when the magnitude of a disaster exceeds the
State, territorial, Tribal, or local government's capabilities,
FEMA may assist, including through awarding Federal contracts.
However, our recent work has demonstrated that FEMA
contracting needs improvement. For example, in our recently-
issued report, we found FEMA did not follow all contracting
laws, regulations, and procedures in awarding more than $30
million for two Bronze Star contracts for roof tarps and
plastic sheeting.
Although expediting the contract award process may be
necessary following major disasters, FEMA's missteps could have
caused a qualified bidder to be eliminated from further
consideration or, in the case of Bronze Star, an unqualified
bidder receiving a Federal contract. Failure of the Bronze Star
contracts delayed FEMA's process for delivering crucial
supplies to help Puerto Rican residents protect their homes
after Hurricane Maria.
FEMA did not concur with our recommendations but told us
that it is taking actions that we believe address the intent of
our recommendations.
In our March 2019 review of the Transitional Sheltering
Assistance Program, we found FEMA released to its contractor
the personally identifiable information of approximately 2.3
million disaster survivors of the 2017 hurricanes and
wildfires. FEMA released survivors' financial account
information, putting them at an increased risk of identity
theft and fraud. This privacy incident occurred because FEMA
lacked controls to ensure it shared only what the contractor
needed to administer the TSA program.
While we commend FEMA for already taking actions to address
our recommendations, FEMA estimates it will not fully implement
all recommendations until June 2020, 1 year after the coming
hurricane season.
Now I will discuss contract-related challenges affecting
local governments and impacting FEMA reimbursement.
Following disasters, local communities contract for a range
of goods and services, yet our work has found FEMA faces
significant challenges ensuring State and local governments
understand and comply with Federal requirements. From October
2014 through May 2019, we identified more than $363 million in
contract costs ineligible for Federal reimbursement because
entities did not follow Federal contracting requirements.
One common challenge with local contracts is monitoring
debris removal. Debris-removal costs are significant, averaging
about one-third of total damage costs per recent hurricanes, or
an estimated $1.5 billion in Florida and Georgia following
Hurricane Irma.
Our September 2018 management alert highlights the
financial risks involved when contractors are not properly
monitored. FEMA's guidance places the responsibility for
monitoring debris-removal operations on local governments. We
generally found that local governments hired contractors,
debris-monitoring companies, to oversee other contractors,
debris haulers. We also found that FEMA and the State did not
perform direct monitoring to ensure local governments fulfilled
their responsibilities.
Debris-monitoring companies are responsible for estimating
debris loads. If monitors overestimate the amount of debris
collected, local governments will pay more than they should and
then request Federal reimbursement at an inflated cost to
taxpayers.
Our team traveled to Florida and Georgia and observed
debris-removal operations first-hand. These pictures from our
fieldwork depict truckloads that the monitor overestimated as
50 to 90 percent full when, in reality, the trucks were only 25
to 50 percent full.
Our review found that when FEMA provided even limited
oversight, such as it did in Georgia, it identified almost
half-a-million dollars in ineligible debris costs for one
county in just 1 week.
In closing, the massive scale of damage caused by seemingly
more frequent disasters and the large number of high-dollar-
value contracts that FEMA and local communities will continue
to award pose grave concern. For these reasons, we continue to
review these areas, aiming to emphasize the need for positive
change. We will advise you of the results of our on-going work
once it is completed.
Mr. Chairman, Ms. Chairwoman, this concludes my testimony.
I am happy to answer any questions you or the other Members of
the subcommittee may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Trimble follows:]
Prepared Statement of Katherine Trimble
May 9, 2019
why we did this
The inspections and audits discussed in this testimony are part of
our on-going oversight of FEMA's contracting practices in support of
disaster response and recovery efforts.
what we recommend
We made numerous recommendations in these reports. Our
recommendations are aimed at helping FEMA address management failures
in overseeing procurements and reimbursing procurement costs.
what we found
This testimony highlights the OIG's efforts at improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of FEMA's disaster response and recovery
contracting practices. In particular:
Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on Disaster-related
Procurement and Contracting.--We published this report to
remind FEMA of the challenges that arise during the disaster
recovery phase. The report summarizes procurement concerns we
reported from fiscal years 2015 through 2017.
Management Alert--Observations of FEMA's Debris Monitoring
Efforts for Hurricane Irma.--We concluded that FEMA removed the
Federal and State monitoring responsibilities for debris
operations from its Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide,
increasing the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer
funds.
Management Alert--FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors'
Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information.--FEMA exposed
2.3 million survivors' Personally Identifiable Information to
its contractor, in violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 and its
own contract with the company.
FEMA Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star
LLC.--FEMA inappropriately awarded two contracts due to
management control weaknesses.
fema response
FEMA has generally concurred with our recommendations; however,
over 100 recommendations, many addressing issues discussed in this
testimony remain unimplemented.
Chairman Payne, Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking Members King and
Crenshaw, and Members of the subcommittees, thank you for inviting me
here today to discuss lessons learned from past disasters to improve
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) contracting. My testimony
today will focus on the Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General's (OIG) work to assess the efficiency and
effectiveness of FEMA's contracting practices in support of disaster
response and recovery efforts. It is important to continue addressing
these challenges ahead of the 2019 hurricane season that begins on June
1.
Within 30 days in August and September 2017, 3 unprecedented,
catastrophic hurricanes devastated areas of the United States and its
territories, causing significant destruction. Immediately following
these events, the most destructive wildfires in California's history
devastated the northern parts of the State. In response to these
hurricanes and wildfires, the President signed 7 major disaster
declarations, authorizing FEMA to provide individual assistance, public
assistance, and hazard mitigation assistance to affected communities
within designated areas. In addition to the situational challenges FEMA
faced from these disasters, long-standing procurement issues affected
FEMA's ability to respond. Our work has highlighted some of these
challenges, including the canceled Bronze Star roof tarp contracts and
procurement issues related to debris removal in Florida, which I will
discuss further in my testimony.
background
When disasters occur, State and local governments are typically
responsible for disaster response efforts. When the magnitude of an
incident exceeds the affected State, territorial, Tribal, or local
government capabilities to respond or recover, FEMA provides Federal
assistance to aid their efforts, under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (Stafford Act).
FEMA's public assistance (PA) program provides assistance to these
Government entities and certain types of private non-profit
organizations so that communities can quickly respond to, and recover
from, Presidentially-declared major disasters or emergencies. FEMA and
PA grant recipients must comply with all applicable Federal
regulations, including Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) and 2 CFR Part 200, Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost
Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, established by
the Office of Management and Budget. Responsible entities are defined
as:
Recipient.--A non-Federal entity that receives a Federal
award directly from a Federal awarding agency to carry out an
activity under a Federal program. Recipients typically include
States, territories, and Tribal governments.
Subrecipient.--A non-Federal entity that receives a subaward
from a pass-through entity (i.e., the recipient) to carry out
part of a Federal program. Subrecipients include local
governments and certain not-for-profit organizations.
FEMA works in partnership with the grant recipient to assess
damages, educate potential subrecipients, and formulate projects
(subawards) for emergency or permanent work. The type of assistance
available may vary among designated areas. FEMA determines project
eligibility based on factors such as the applicant's legal
responsibility, affected facility, type of work, and cost. In addition,
FEMA categorizes all work as either emergency, (e.g., debris removal)
or permanent (e.g., roadway and bridge repairs).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide (PAPPG).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA's Role in Awarding Federal Contracts
In addition to the above responsibilities, FEMA also provides goods
and services directly to safeguard disaster survivors and to assist
State, local, territorial, and Tribal governments with their response
efforts. For example, during disaster response, FEMA may take immediate
actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs,
such as temporary roof repairs in the form of blue tarps and plastic
sheeting.
According to FEMA guidance, it competes procurements whenever
possible and practical, uses advance contracting for recurring
disaster-related requirements, and at times uses other contracting
methods.\2\ FEMA is responsible for ensuring all contract activities
comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which requires
agencies to carry out acquisition planning activities for all
acquisitions to ensure that the Government meets its needs in the most
effective, economical, and timely manner possible. According to FEMA,
it obligated more than $4.9 billion in contracts in 2017 and 2018.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Advance contracts are those contracts that are established
prior to disasters and that are typically needed to quickly provide
life-sustaining goods and services in the immediate aftermath of
disasters.
\3\ FEMA Disaster Contracts Quarterly Report, Fiscal Years 2017-
2018. Note: Fiscal Year 2018 Quarter 4 data has not yet been published.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA's Role Overseeing State and Local Awarded Contracts
State, territorial, Tribal, and local governments, as FEMA grant
recipients and subrecipients, use PA program grant funds to respond to
and recover from major disasters. To help achieve these goals, these
governments procure a range of goods and services following disasters,
such as debris removal and debris monitoring services; water, food, and
shelter; permanent repairs to roads and bridges; and repairs to
critical public facilities like schools and hospitals.
States, territorial, Tribal, and local governments must comply with
Federal procurement requirements outlined in 2 CFR Part 200, and are
also required to comply with FEMA guidance. For instance, the Public
Assistance Program and Policy Guide (PAPPG) combines all PA program
policy into a single volume and provides an overview of the PA program
implementation process with links to other publications and documents
with additional process details.\4\ The PAPPG also contains PA program
policy to guide eligibility determinations, including Federal
procurement and contracting requirements.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ FEMA website, https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/
documents/111781 (as of April 24, 2019).
\5\ PAPPG, version 3.1, Chapter 2: Public Assistance, V. Cost
Eligibility, G. Procurement and Contracting Requirements (March 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA is responsible for monitoring States, territories, and Tribal
governments to ensure they are properly administering grants. States,
territories, and Tribal governments, in turn, must manage local
government and non-Government entities to ensure grant fund
expenditures comply with Federal procurement requirements.
Noncompliance can result in high-risk contracts that may lead to
excessive and ineligible costs. In addition, failure to follow these
Federal requirements can hinder many of the socioeconomic goals
Congress intended.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on Disaster-related
Procurement and Contracting (OIG-18-29) (December 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address some of the State and local concerns surrounding
procurements, FEMA has implemented a Procurement Disaster Assistance
Team to provide procurement-specific training and resources to State
and local government officials, typically during response efforts, to
achieve greater compliance with procurements under grants. Following
the 2017 hurricanes, FEMA deployed staff to Texas, Florida, Puerto
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, to provide real-time procurement
support.\7\ \8\
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\7\ OIG-18-29 and FEMA's 2017 After Action Report (December 2017).
\8\ DHS OIG will discuss Procurement Disaster Assistance Team
efforts in a report expected to be issued later this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
results of oig audits and our recommendations
Following the 2017 disasters, the OIG initiated several audits
related to FEMA's processes for awarding and administering contracts.
Additionally, the OIG regularly audits PA grant awards, which include a
review of State and local entities' procurements and related
expenditures. Collectively, these reviews illustrate a pattern of FEMA
management failures in overseeing procurements and reimbursing
procurement costs.
OIG Audits of FEMA-Awarded Contracts
FEMA did not follow procurement requirements during Bronze
Star contracting.--As noted in our May 2019 report, FEMA wasted
personnel resources, time, and taxpayer money by issuing,
canceling, and reissuing contracts for blue tarps for survivors
in Puerto Rico to protect their homes from further damage after
Hurricanes Irma and Maria.\9\ FEMA did not follow all
procurement laws, regulations, and procedures in awarding more
than $30 million for two Bronze Star contracts. Specifically,
FEMA did not fully determine Bronze Star's or its supplier's
compliance with the contracts' terms, conducted inaccurate
technical evaluations of proposals, used incorrect FAR clauses
in its original solicitations, and did not consult the Disaster
Response Registry. As a result, FEMA inappropriately awarded
the two contracts to Bronze Star, which delayed delivery of
crucial supplies and impeded Puerto Rican residents' efforts to
protect their homes and prevent further damage. We recommended
that FEMA take actions, including developing new or updating
existing policies, to better ensure that future prospective
contractors can meet the terms of FEMA's contracts. However,
FEMA did not concur with any of our recommendations,
maintaining that its existing processes adequately ensure that
all contract terms and conditions are clearly defined and
implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ FEMA Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC
(OIG-19-38) (May 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA risked PII of millions of survivors by not following
specifications of a Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA)
contract.--FEMA released to its contractor Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) and Sensitive PII (SPII) of
approximately 2.3 million disaster survivors of the 2017
hurricanes and wildfires. This was in direct violation of
Federal and DHS requirements and the terms of the TSA contract.
The contract identifies 13 data elements FEMA must send to its
contractor to verify disaster survivor eligibility during the
TSA check-in process at participating hotels. However, FEMA
repeatedly released PII from 20 data fields, including
survivors' bank account and electronic funds transfer numbers,
even though the TSA contractor did not need this PII to
administer the program on FEMA's behalf. This privacy incident
occurred because FEMA lacked controls to ensure it shared only
the data elements the contractor required to perform its
official duties administering the TSA program.\10\ We
recommended that FEMA assess the extent of the privacy incident
and implement a process to destroy the erroneously-released
data, as well as implement controls to ensure that only
required data is released to contractors in the future. FEMA
has already begun taking actions to address our
recommendations, but estimates it will not complete
implementing all recommendations until June 30, 2020. Given the
sensitive nature of these findings, we urge FEMA to expedite
this time line.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Management Alert--FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors'
Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (Redacted) (OIG-19-32)
(March 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OIG Audits of FEMA Grant Awards to Recipients and Subrecipients
Over the years, our work has shown that FEMA continues to face
systemic problems and operational challenges and fails to manage
disaster relief grants and funds adequately. As we noted in our
December 2017 report on lessons learned from disaster-related
contracting \11\ and 11 subsequent audit reports on various State and
local grant awards,\12\ FEMA faces significant challenges in ensuring
proper management of FEMA disaster funds--namely, ensuring disaster
grant recipients and subrecipients understand and comply with Federal
regulations and FEMA guidelines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ OIG-18-29.
\12\ See Appendix A for a complete listing of these reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, from October 2014 through May 2019, we identified (and
questioned) more than $363 million in ineligible contract costs because
local entities did not follow Federal procurement regulations.
Furthermore, we identified more than $207 million in ineligible costs
that subrecipients may have incurred had we not identified the
procurement problems before FEMA obligated disaster assistance grant
funds.\13\ These procurement-related deficiencies include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ OIG-18-29 and Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Failure to provide full and open competition, resulting in
FEMA having limited assurance that incurred costs were
reasonable, as well as an increased risk for fraud, waste, and
abuse.
Failure to take all affirmative steps to assure the use of
disadvantaged businesses when possible, resulting in small and
minority firms, women's business enterprises, and labor surplus
area firms not always having sufficient opportunities to bid on
Federally-funded work.
Failure to include all required contract provisions,
resulting in increased risk of misinterpretations, pricing
errors, increased scope of work, and contract disputes.
Failure to verify whether contractors were suspended,
debarred, or otherwise excluded or ineligible, which can result
in U.S. taxpayers bearing excessive and ineligible costs. Lack
of compliance also increases the risk of favoritism, collusion,
fraud, waste, and abuse.
Our prior reports contained recommendations to help FEMA address
on-going issues and improve its related controls. For example, we
recommended FEMA:
recover and de-obligate Federal grant funds awarded to or
spent by local governments that did not follow appropriate
acquisition standards and contracting procedures;
debar organizations and individuals responsible for
regulatory and ethical infractions or gross mismanagement of
Federal funds;
improve technical assistance provided to State and local
governments to help ensure compliance with all laws,
regulations, and grant guidance; and
update and improve grant and disaster-related guidance,
policies, and procedures to help ensure that Federal funds are
spent appropriately and receive proper monitoring.
Currently, there are 109 OIG recommendations to FEMA that remain
open and unimplemented. Many are related to the procurement issues
summarized above, and corrective action is needed in response to all of
them to strengthen FEMA as a whole.
OIG 2017 Disaster Activities
Oversight of debris removal monitoring operations highlights one of
the common State and local procurement challenges. By and large, FEMA
grant recipients and subrecipients rely on contractors to collect and
remove disaster debris after major disasters. Our September 2018
management alert on debris monitoring efforts following Hurricane Irma
highlights the risks of contractors not being properly monitored.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Management Alert--Observations of FEMA's Debris Monitoring
Efforts for Hurricane Irma (OIG-18-85), September 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA did not ensure subrecipients provided adequate
oversight of debris removal operations in Georgia or Florida.--
A majority of the municipalities in Florida we visited relied
on contractors to collect and remove debris and to monitor
debris operations.\15\ However, local municipalities generally
did not have their own personnel engaged in actively monitoring
the contractors' debris removal capacities or contract
execution.\16\ We believe the lack of monitoring may have been
due to FEMA's eliminating debris monitoring responsibilities in
drafting its PAPPG. The PAPPG encourages, but does not require,
the subrecipient to use its own employees to monitor debris
removal operations. FEMA's change from the 2010 guidance to the
PAPPG resulted in:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ OIG-18-85.
\16\ FEMA refers to a subrecipient's permanently employed personnel
as ``force account labor'' (44 CFR Sec. 206.228).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
loss of specific guidance for FEMA, States, and local
governments regarding debris monitoring and oversight
responsibilities;
FEMA not directly overseeing debris operations, including
monitoring and hauling; and
an increased risk of overstated debris loads. FEMA's current
guidance provides little to no incentive for subrecipients to
oversee the debris removal process as required by Federal
regulations.\17\ We recommended that FEMA implement clear and
unambiguous guidance for debris removal operations, including
guidance on managing and overseeing contractors, as well as how
to determine the appropriate level of debris removal oversight.
FEMA's estimated completion date for implementing clear
guidance is August 30, 2019; but, as of April 2019, FEMA has
not provided any updates. Given the importance of this
information, we urge FEMA to expedite this time line.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ 2 CFR 200.318(b) requires the applicant to assert a ``high
degree of oversight in order to obtain reasonable assurance that the
contractor is using efficient methods and effective cost controls.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Costs to Taxpayers.--Overstated debris loads occur
when the percentage of debris collected by haulers is
overestimated. Local governments pay haulers for the volume of
debris collected in each truck, measured in cubic yards. For
instance, if a monitor of the hauling activity determines a
truck's total capacity is 10 cubic yards, and the truck is
assessed as 75 percent full, then the ``load call'' for that
truck is 7.5 cubic yards. To record the amount of estimated
cubic yards actually dumped, monitors prepare load call
tickets. Local governments use load call tickets to
substantiate their claims for debris removal. When monitors
overestimate debris loads or haulers collect unauthorized
debris, local governments may incur and request reimbursement
for unreasonable or ineligible costs. We recommended that FEMA
require local governments identify quality control methods for
verifying the amounts of debris collected and claimed for
Federal reimbursement.
Figure 1 depicts a load that includes large tree limbs and a stump.
The truck driver convinced the monitor to estimate the load call at 95
percent full although more than half of the truck was empty.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 2 similarly depicts a load containing a large stump and tree
branches. The monitor overstated the debris load at 50 percent of the
truck's capacity when more than 75 percent of the truck was empty.
GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) visited one
Georgia county and validated a 28,000 cubic yard overstatement for a
single week of debris removal operations. At $16.43 per cubic yard,
this equates to $460,040 in ineligible costs for just one subrecipient
for only 1 week.
Figure 3 illustrates what USACE personnel observed throughout the
week they shadowed contracted monitors in that Georgia county.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Debris removal is a common problem that occurs after most disasters
across the country. Collectively, in our prior OIG audits we found a
wide range of debris removal problems, including contracts awarded
without proper competition; ineligible contracts, such as time and
materials contracts used outside of the eligibility period; inadequate
accounting and contractors overbilling local governments; and
collection of ineligible debris from private or ineligible
property.\18\
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\18\ FEMA's Oversight and Management of Debris Removal Operations
(OIG-11-40), (February 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
looking forward: related on-going work
The OIG has a number of on-going audits and reviews that we
initiated based on our observations during visits to disaster sites and
post-disaster analyses. In most of our work we examine contracting
issues similar to those highlighted in my testimony today. We will be
reporting on these issues later this year. These audits include:
An audit of FEMA's use of advance contracts in Puerto Rico
and whether those contracts are sufficient to meet previously
identified needs.
Two follow-on reviews of debris procurement issues--one for
the State of Florida following Hurricane Irma and another
specifically involving Monroe County, Florida. These reviews
will look at whether FEMA ensured State and local entities
followed procurement requirements and whether taxpayer dollars
could have been saved through better contracting practices.
An audit of FEMA's PA grant awards to Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority (PREPA) to determine whether these grants, and
subsequent contracts between PREPA and Whitefish Energy
Holdings LLC and Cobra Acquisitions, comply with Federal laws
and regulations, and FEMA guidelines.
Additional work assessing FEMA's contracts to administer the
Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program, and whether this
program fully met disaster survivor needs.
An audit of FEMA's supply chain management and distribution
of commodities in Puerto Rico after Hurricanes Irma and Maria.
An audit of FEMA contract award processes to assess whether
its policies and procedures are sufficient to assess the
capabilities of prospective contractors for disaster response
commodities and services.
An audit of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power
program in Puerto Rico, being implemented under Tu Hogar
Renace, to determine whether the program, including the use of
contractor support, has complied with Federal regulations and
internal policies and has achieved its overall goals.
An audit of FEMA's oversight of State and local government
spending in response to Federally-declared disasters.
conclusion
The massive scale of damage caused by seemingly more frequent
disasters, as well as the large number of high-dollar-value contracts
that FEMA and local communities will continue to award and FEMA will
continue to reimburse pose grave concern. There is a significant risk
of exposing billions of taxpayer dollars to fraud, waste, and abuse. As
we have found in our prior work, FEMA needs to improve its management
of the contracting process to ensure staff adhere to the FAR and agency
requirements, better protect survivor data, and avoid delays in the
delivery of critical services and supplies. FEMA can also enhance its
oversight of Federal funds by improving its guidance to local
communities that apply for PA program reimbursement of disaster
response and recovery costs. For these reasons, we will continue to
review these areas, aiming to emphasize the need for positive change.
We will advise you of the results of our work once it is completed.
Mr. Chairman, Ms. Chairwoman, this concludes my testimony. I am
happy to answer any questions you or other Members of the subcommittees
may have.
appendix a
LIST OF OIG AUDIT REPORTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report Number Report Title Date Issued
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OIG Audits of FEMA
Grant Awards
OIG-18-09..................... Management Alert--FEMA October 2017.
Should Recover $6.2
Million in Public
Assistance Funds for
Disaster Repairs That
Are Not the Legal
Responsibility of
Richland County,
North Dakota.
OIG-18-17..................... Napa State Hospital, November 2017.
California, Should
Improve the
Management of Its
$6.7 Million FEMA
Grant.
OIG-18-25..................... The Omaha Tribe of November 2017.
Nebraska and Iowa
Mismanaged $14
Million in FEMA
Disaster Grants.
OIG-18-60..................... The city of Waterloo, April 2018.
Iowa Jeopardizes $1.9
Million in Estimated
FEMA Grant Funding.
OIG-18-62..................... Victor Valley April 2018.
Wastewater
Reclamation
Authority,
California, Provided
FEMA Incorrect
Information for Its
$33 Million Project.
OIG-18-63..................... FEMA Should Recover May 2018.
$20.4 Million in
Grant Funds Awarded
to Diamondhead Water
and Sewer District,
Mississippi.
OIG-18-64..................... Cache County, Utah, May 2018.
Needs Additional
Assistance and
Monitoring to Ensure
Proper Management of
Its FEMA Grant.
OIG-19-05..................... FEMA Should Disallow November 2018.
$9.1 Million in
Public Assistance
Grant Funds Awarded
to Ascension Parish
School Board,
Louisiana.
OIG-19-06..................... FEMA Should Disallow November 2018.
$22.3 Million in
Grant Funds Awarded
to the Chippewa Cree
Tribe of the Rocky
Boy's Indian
Reservation, Montana.
OIG-19-09..................... FEMA Should Recover November 2018.
$413,074 of Public
Assistance Grant
Funds Awarded to
Nashville-Davidson
County, Tennessee,
for a May 2010 Flood.
OIG-19-12..................... FEMA Should Recover December 2018.
$3,061,819 in Grant
Funds Awarded to
Jackson County,
Florida.
OIG Summary Reports
OIG-18-06..................... Summary and Key October 2017.
Findings of Fiscal
Year 2016 FEMA
Disaster Grant and
Program Audits.
OIG-18-29..................... Lessons Learned from December 2017.
Prior Reports on
Disaster-related
Procurement and
Contracting.
OIG-18-75..................... Summary and Key September 2018.
Findings of Fiscal
Year 2017 FEMA
Disaster Grant and
Program Audits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Payne. I would like to thank all the witnesses for
their testimony.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
I would really like to start with the Bronze Star issue. My
understanding is that the company was formed a month before
Hurricane Maria hit, had only two employees, and had never held
a Government contract. Yet FEMA awarded the company two
contracts worth more than $30 million, with the expectation
that it would deliver 475,000 emergency tarps and 60,000 units
of plastic sheeting for temporary roof repairs.
For perspective, I have a visual on the monitors of the
emergency tarps that were used on homes and building after
Hurricane Maria. As you can see, there are a lot of structures
with substantial roof damage. Disaster survivors needed these
tarps.
Ms. Trimble, can you tell the subcommittee what happened to
the two contracts given to Bronze Star?
Ms. Trimble. So, shortly after the contracts were awarded
to Bronze Star, FEMA learned that Bronze Star would not be able
to deliver the tarps in the time frame specified.
That is the bottom line. I can go into a little bit, if you
like, as to the problems we uncovered during the solicitation
and award process that led to that outcome.
Mr. Payne. OK.
Mr. Kamoie, was FEMA aware that Bronze Star, a two-person
company formed more than 1 month before Hurricane Maria hit
landfall, didn't have any prior experience before awarding its
contracts for emergency tarps and plastic sheeting? If so, did
this raise any red flags for you?
Mr. Kamoie. Thank you, Chairman Payne.
Bronze Star was awarded those contracts after full and open
competition. A lack of prior experience is not a reason to
preclude a vendor from competing. They were determined to be
technically acceptable and financially responsible and
otherwise eligible.
Those contracts ended up being--the tarp contract--1 of 6
contracts, so we had redundant capability. As soon as it became
clear to us that they were unable to perform, we terminated the
contracts. Bronze Star was not paid under those contracts at
all.
Mr. Payne. Can the OIG respond to that, please?
Ms. Trimble. So, in our review of the two Bronze Star
contracts, we did find some missteps that FEMA took that we
believe could have led to different outcomes.
First of all, contracting staff did not use the Disaster
Response Registry, which is required by the FAR, to look at
potential vendors for the types of supplies and services they
needed, including plastic sheeting and blue tarps.
Second, the solicitations that FEMA posted included
incorrect clauses as to what the source of the material should
be. What FEMA posted was that all materials had to be from the
United States when, in fact, they meant to post a clause that
would have permitted a little more flexibility and allowed for
some materials to come from outside of the United States.
That led to the third problem, that when FEMA personnel
reviewed the solicitations it received, the offers it received,
rather than holding the bidders to the buy America, the
America-only standard, it actually did review the offers based
on the broader allowing of materials from outside of the United
States.
The problem with that is that, by posting a solicitation
that required buy America, only U.S.-sourced products, I think
FEMA missed out on the chance for other companies to bid, and
then it was not an appropriate technical evaluation to say that
Bronze Star and the other bidder met the terms of the contract,
because they didn't, because Bronze Star said that it would be
sourcing materials from both the United States and outside of
the United States.
Then, finally, our fourth observation was that we felt FEMA
could have done more to confirm that Bronze Star would
ultimately be able to meet the terms of the contract. For
example, in the follow-on solicitation after Bronze Star
failed, FEMA did ask the next contractors to provide more
information verifying that they would in fact be able to meet
the terms of the contract.
Mr. Payne. OK.
Well, I am going to try to stick within the parameters, and
hopefully we will be able to come back to--we obviously see how
big a problem this one company was.
I will recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman.
First of all, I thank all the witnesses for your testimony.
Mr. Kamoie, National Interest Action codes are used to
track contract actions across the Federal Government as they
relate to a particular disaster. These codes have kind of
arbitrary closing dates. For instance, the NIA code for Katrina
lasted for 13 years, the NIA code for Hurricane Sandy remained
open for over 5 years, but after only 9\1/2\ months the NIA
codes for Harvey and Irma were closed.
Can you tell me what the criteria is for deciding when to
keep them open and when to close them?
Mr. Kamoie. Sure. The National Interest Action codes are
governed by an agreement, a memorandum of agreement between the
General Services Administration, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Department of Defense. Based on the GAO's
recommendation, and I believe I saw in the General Services
Administration response, we will revisit those time lines with
GSA and DOD.
Mr. King. Ms. Trimble, can you comment on that, the
disparity between 13 years and 9\1/2\ months? I am not
suggesting he is wrong; I am just wondering why there is such a
disparity.
Ms. Trimble. So that was work that Ms. Mak spoke to, if you
would like to ask her the question.
Ms. Mak. When we asked Department of Homeland Security why
they closed these National Interest Action codes, or NIA codes,
their rationale was very inconsistent with the criteria that
they have in this memorandum of agreement between these 3
departments.
One of them they said was, the purpose of these NIA codes
is to track Federal procurement related to response and not
recovery. But their own agreement says it covers response and
recovery.
Another reason they gave us was that the number of contract
actions that FEMA was making had decreased. Our concern there
was that there were other components still within DHS as well
as DOD that continue to execute contracts related to both
Harvey and Irma.
Then DHS also pointed to FEMA's own internal tracking
system that has the ability to track contracts by disaster and
budget line, but not all other agencies that respond to that
way have these internal systems. Then remember, internal agency
systems are not available to the public, and there is no one-
stop-shop shopping for a Government-wide database other than
this Federal Procurement Database System.
Mr. King. OK. Thank you.
I am trying to get some good news out of bad news.
Obviously, we hear, you know, critiques at these type hearings,
and I understand that. But how effective do you think FEMA is
at lessons learned? For instance, having lived through Sandy
and saw the devastation there, what lessons were learned from
that that were successfully applied to subsequent hurricanes?
In other words, can you show the actually positive action that
resulted from Sandy?
I guess we will start with the IG.
Ms. Trimble. Sure. Thank you.
So I think we have seen some mixed results in how FEMA has
responded to the recommendations related to our body of work.
We have years' worth of work looking at FEMA's relationship
with State and local governments as they carry out work for
disaster response and recovery, which is not, you know, done
through direct FEMA contracts, but the State and local
governments, they issue their own contracts that are then
eligible for Federal reimbursement.
So we, for years, have been recommending to FEMA--well,
first of all, we have been finding for years that local
governments aren't doing a very good job at following Federal
contracting requirements, such as full and open competition or
providing opportunities for local, small, and disadvantaged
businesses.
We also through the years have made a number of
observations and often recommend that money that the local
governments are requesting to be reimbursed is not, in fact,
eligible, because they haven't followed Federal procurement
contracting rules.
FEMA has kind of a mixed bag in responding to our
recommendations. They often don't take back money from local
governments, which can be understandable, but what we are
looking for is for FEMA to provide more specific information to
State and local governments to make sure this problem doesn't
happen in the first place, to make sure that local governments
fully understand the requirements they are expected to adhere
to if they are going to request to be reimbursed with Federal
funds.
Mr. King. Time is just about up, Ms. Mak. Do you have any
further comments on that, or Mr. Kamoie?
Ms. Mak. From GAO's perspective, our biggest concerns with
FEMA in terms of being able to address these contracts are a
lack of strategy, and then guidance to do a lot of these
things, and then the systemic issue of acquisition planning.
Given that work force is such a challenge as well, guidance is
extremely important, to have that in place so people at least
know where to go, what to see. The same thing applies for
advance contracts, being able to have some guidance in place.
Then the strategy of how we do it, the long-term, broader look
of how we do it and how we can be better prepared.
Mr. King. Mr. Kamoie.
Mr. Kamoie. Thank you, Ranking Member King. Since you
mentioned Sandy, I will just cite a few things that have
happened since Sandy which we believe are improving.
Mr. King. Quickly.
Mr. Kamoie. Since Hurricane Sandy we have tripled our
number of contracting officers, from 45 to 163.
In our Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, we
established expeditionary and incident support branches.
Our competition rate for contracts in fiscal year 2017, 85
percent of our contracts were competitive; in 2018, it was 77
percent.
Even GAO noted we have been responsive in training our
contracting officers on defining a local area, for example,
where----
Mr. King. The Chairman is sort-of giving me a look here, so
you have gone over the time. But, anyway, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Next, we will hear from the gentlelady from New Mexico,
Chairwoman Torres Small.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Kamoie, I really appreciate you noting FEMA's role both
before, during, and after disaster. I want to touch on FEMA's
communication and coordination challenges with State and local
governments, something that all of you have touched on during
your testimony.
A community I serve, the village of Ruidoso, New Mexico,
has been struggling for more than 10 years to negotiate Federal
assistance for extensive flooding that occurred back in 2008.
Based on guidance from FEMA, the village awarded contracts for
bridge replacements and is in the process of awarding contracts
for extensive sewer repairs.
As I understand it now, after a significant portion of the
work is complete, FEMA has decided that some of the projects
are no longer eligible for Federal assistance. After 10 years
of slow correspondence, challenging regulations, and employee
turnover, we are seeing local officials that have been given a
June 2020 deadline to complete all remaining construction.
Mr. Kamoie, I don't expect you to have the details on this
particular situation, but can I have your commitment today that
someone at FEMA will look further into this issue and
communicate its findings with my office and the village of
Ruidoso?
Mr. Kamoie. Absolutely, Chairwoman Torres Small.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you.
Mr. Kamoie. One word on our assistance and our coordination
with State and local government. A development I believe
certainly since Katrina is our Procurement Disaster Assistance
Team.
This is a team of highly-trained attorneys and contract
specialists that we deploy to disasters to provide guidance to
our State and local partners on Federal procurement
requirements and the requirements of our public assistance
grant program. In fiscal year 2019 thus far, they have been
deployed to 80 percent of declared disasters.
So we recognize the importance of providing good guidance.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you. I am glad to see that
improvement made. The challenge is rehashing kind-of what
happened in 2008 before a lot of these improvements were made.
Mr. Kamoie. You have my commitment; we will follow up.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you.
Now I am shifting a bit. FEMA's 2017 after-action report
found that the agency's advance contracts were exhausted after
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and so FEMA committed to
awarding new contracts for future storms.
I noted that you recognize there are 87 current contracts.
What is FEMA's process for determining that number and what
types of contracts that are issued for advance contracts?
Mr. Kamoie. That is a great question, Chairwoman Torres
Small. We work with our program offices, the Office of Response
and Recovery. We look at the needs of, you know, essentially
the last several disaster seasons to understand where, had we
had advance contracts in place, we might have delivered, you
know, more quickly or more comprehensively.
So it is a lessons-learned process and working with our
field offices and our regions to understand what it is we would
need in place, you know, to put the right agreements in place.
Ms. Torres Small. Are you confident you have all the
advance contracts you need for the 2019 hurricane season?
Mr. Kamoie. Yes.
Ms. Torres Small. In December 2018, a GAO report found that
FEMA did not have an up-to-date strategy and clear guidance for
its own contracting staff on the use of advance contracts. Ms.
Trimble noted how such guidance could have helped in avoiding
the contracting mistakes with Bronze Star.
Mr. Kamoie, what steps is FEMA taking to address GAO's
finding?
Mr. Kamoie. I appreciate the question, Chairwoman Torres
Small.
We do hold training, regular training, with our disaster
procurement staff. In fact, from April 29 to May 3, we had over
100 of our staff, including our Disaster Acquisition Response
Team in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. I have looked at the agenda of
that multiple-day training, and it includes everything from
advance contracting to local set-asides to documentation
required when we deviate from local set-asides. So we
continually provide training and guidance to our staff.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you.
Ms. Mak, how would you assess that response so far?
Ms. Mak. Our concern with the training is that when they
provide the training, they have an advance contract list that
is different than what FEMA headquarters has as their
consolidated advanced contract list. When there are two
resources being used as advance contract list, and they differ,
it causes differences of what the States and localities know,
and within FEMA, they don't know what advance contract lists
are, what they are using. Both of those, we talked to
officials, they are using both of those as resources. That
inconsistency creates confusion. It creates: OK. What can I
use? What is really available within FEMA?
Then externally to States and localities, it, again,
creates confusion so the States and localities don't really
know what is available from the Federal Government.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you. I yield my time.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Crenshaw, the Ranking Member.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. I want to start with where I
left off on my opening statement about the report from the
General Land Office from Texas, and I would again recommend
everyone take a look at that. Some of the best ideas will come
from local levels. Some of the issues they saw there were
attempts to, I think, devolve some of the responsibilities down
to the State level, where they understand their population
better; they understand what needs to be done and can remove
certain issues such as overlap, lack of coordination, and just
more generally keeping the Government solutions to the lowest
possible level. Are you aware of any other States, or has this
conversation come up before, where States are asking to take on
some of the roles traditionally done by FEMA with simply
overarching support by FEMA?
Mr. Kamoie. Thank you, Ranking Member Crenshaw. I mean, our
philosophy in disaster response is that disasters should be
Federally-supported, State-managed, and locally-executed. So I
think it is a continual conversation about the relative roles
and responsibilities and who can serve the population best. I
am not familiar with that particular Texas Land Office report,
but I look forward to reading it.
Mr. Crenshaw. OK. What kind of progress has there been made
in what has been brought up before, with this--better
communications with States on what exactly FEMA is going to do
and what exactly the State is going to do? Has there been any
progress in that direction? As it relates to contracts
specifically, too?
Mr. Kamoie. I think the Procurement Disaster Assistance
Team has made great strides in clarifying that, in that they
have been to 80 percent of the declared disasters this year,
and I believe last year they got to 70 percent. We continue to
clarify and provide guidance.
Even on debris monitoring, we are looking at how to update
our debris monitoring guidance. We have made our partners aware
that debris monitors are a reimbursable expense under the
public assistance program. We are looking at developing
uniformed guidance on noncompliance, so what our State and
local partners can do about contractors who do not perform. So
can we communicate better? I would submit to you, sir, we can
always communicate better and always clarify. I do believe we
have made progress.
Mr. Crenshaw. I appreciate that. I am also especially
concerned about the record-keeping issue. It is really hard to
figure out what to do better if we don't keep good records, and
this came up with the NIA issue as well. What is being done to
fix that?
Mr. Kamoie. So, in accordance with the GAO's
recommendation, my understanding is that the three departments
who are the parties to that memorandum of agreement about the
time line and the criteria for the closer of the National
incident action codes will revisit that agreement and make sure
that we are providing the transparency we need.
Mr. Crenshaw. OK. Related to work force issues, it is one
of the most important things that ensures success, and you
mentioned before that you have increased pretty markedly the
number of contractors working. That is good news. How are they
incentivized, though, to make the most efficient and effective
decisions? So we are hearing a lot about the Bronze Star issue.
Are there consequences when someone blatantly makes a mistake
like that? How does that work?
Mr. Kamoie. So, on the work force issue, because I have not
actually talked about it in any depth. I mean, in addition to
contractual support we put an acquisition support contract in
place with 21 staff. We are seeking to fill an additional 51 of
a cadre of on-call response and recovery staff. But we have
also made available--no additional staff members of our
existing procurement office in terms of their number, but we
have cross-trained them to, all in our operations branch,
support the National Response Coordination Center. There is 69
available.
As to your question as to accountability, the Bronze Star
contract was a full and open competition and found technically
acceptable. We continue to provide guidance. We use that as a
lesson learned. So we continue to work with our work force to
make sure they are making the most effective, efficient
decisions they can.
Mr. Crenshaw. OK. I want to end with a question about the
MAPS systems. This is a recent system that got put in place to
improve--improve how workers can use the contracting system,
but it was also reported that many in the program office are
unfamiliar with the system. So my question, are there any
problems with the system that you would like to share with this
committee, and are there any problems with getting everyone
trained up on it?
Mr. Kamoie. So it is a system that allows us to tell our
program offices, for example, 18 months in advance of an
expiration of a contract in place, so that we can work with
them to plan for that acquisition. So it will take continual
reinforcement, training, and guidance to get everybody to take
maximum advantage of it. I don't think that is a problem of the
system so far as change management and making sure everybody
knows of the resource that is available.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Next, we will have the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kamoie, I appreciate that some of these things we have
talked about happened before you got there, but I think we need
to hear what steps FEMA's taking so that we can avoid another
Tribute contracting problem or a Whitefish Energy problem, or a
situation where one very generous chef and paella pan can feed
more people than FEMA can. But what I hear from you is just
kind-of piecemeal responses as opposed to any overall strategy.
You continue to defend the contract with Bronze Star, and we
have heard: Well, they have done a little; they are looking at
it.
But here is the title of the report: ``FEMA Should Not Have
Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC.'' That is about as
plain as you can get. I mean, it doesn't say maybe they did,
and it was legal, and they looked at everything.
It says they should not have awarded it. That doesn't leave
much question for doubt.
So I think what we need from you is a strategy where you
are looking at systemic changes, not just responding to
individual disasters or contracts, but having said that, I want
to ask you some more about the work force issue.
I chair the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management, and we have jurisdiction
over the Stafford Act, so we are going to have some hearings in
the coming weeks with the deputy administrator, and we want to
talk about the shortfalls. you mentioned a few figures just
there, but I have some basic questions.
Have you looked at whether you think it would be better to
have Government employees or long-term contracts to fill these
work force needs? Do you have a strategy of that? Do you have a
list of contracts that you have in place to kind-of get ahead
of the game, as opposed to responding to incidents? Can you
address those issues?
Mr. Kamoie. Absolutely, Congresswoman Titus. Thank you for
the questions. We are in the final stages, and I am sure
deputy--or Acting Administrator Gaynor will speak to this when
he visits with you, of a coordinated work force review, where
we have looked at our incident management work force in an
attempt, strategically, to right-size it, and look at what
kinds of personnel would best fit those needs.
We do have contractors in that work force in our public
assistance and individual assistance, technical assistance
positions, for example. Then we have other types of positions
for others. So, once that coordinated work force review is
completed, we would be glad to provide it to you and the
committee. But we are taking a close look at that.
In terms of--I just want to say, in terms of systemically
looking at contracts, we do an after-action and look
systemically across all of our contracts. I would submit to
you, we never like to see a contractor not perform. We don't
want to terminate for non-performance.
In the 2017 hurricane season, between 59 advance contracts
and 1,973 post-disaster contracts, out of 2,032 contracts, we
terminated 4 for non-performance. Do we like to see that? Of
course not. Is that evidence of a systemic problem that we need
to address? It is an awful small percentage of the overall
contracts. But we have taken the recommendations seriously. We
have taken steps to require more information from potential
vendors so that we can make responsibility determinations. We
take our stewardship of taxpayer dollars very seriously. So we
do look systemically at our contracting.
Ms. Titus. I believe it was mentioned earlier that one of
the contracts you gave was to a company that had been kind-of
blacklisted or not used by other agencies. When you are
choosing the contracts, do you look at that information to see
if they have a record with other Government agencies that might
not have been successful?
Mr. Kamoie. We do, Congresswoman. I believe you are
referring to Tribute, and there was what I would consider to be
derogatory information, but unfortunately the system of record
that kept that information kept it for 3 years. It turns out,
upon further review, the derogatory information about non-
performance was over 3 years old. In fact, it was 5 years old.
We paid Tribute only for what it delivered, the meals that it
delivered, and that was 1 of 8 feeding contracts. So we had
redundant capability to provide what disaster survivors needed.
Ms. Titus. Is there anything legislative that you need to
allow you to do this better?
Mr. Kamoie. Ma'am, I can't think of another authority. If
we do, we will certainly let you know. I believe we have the
authorities we need. It relies on us continuing to train our
contracting professionals, who are very much on the lookout to
make sure we are being responsible stewards of the taxpayer
dollars.
Ms. Titus. Does the GAO agree with this assessment?
Ms. Mak. Our biggest concern when it comes to managing
these contracts like you indicated is work force. Until they
really do a--even as I mentioned earlier, hiring contractor
support and term-limited staff, dedicated disaster response,
that is like a Band-Aid. That is a short-term solution. They
have to have a long-term strategic plan, and the assessment
that they gave us for 2018, to us, was not really an
assessment. It just included numbers of people, of contracting
officials. It didn't identify what kind of contracting
officials you need. There are differences in contracting
officials, and then where do you want them. In the regions?
Like I mentioned, if you only have one full-time
contracting official in each 1 of the 8 of the regions, that is
a problem. So we need them to identify where and what, long
term, have a strategy and put in place, and when is that going
to happen. So we have asked for a time line and a plan.
Ms. Titus. I would like to see that, if you get that.
Ms. Mak. Yes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Next, we will have the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the
witnesses today, speaking to us in this important hearing.
Regarding advance contracts, I have several questions. In the
continental United States, responding to a disaster, when FEMA
responds to a disaster, access to the affected and impacted
communities and populations, we find a way to get there,
regardless of road damage and bridges. Again, you are dealing
with the continental United States.
But when dealing with an island like Puerto Rico, one of
the things that I encountered, and was quite frustrating in the
effort to respond--I represent south Louisiana. We have major
ports and tremendous skill set there, very compassionate
people. We are certainly accustomed to dealing with natural
disasters and hurricanes and have a density of population of
men and women that generationally know how to respond and
wanted to go help in Puerto Rico. One of those assets, shall we
say, in south Louisiana, included barges that could quickly
establish beach landing and access roads to the major roads and
arteries to distribute FEMA's pre-positioned, pre-contracted
services to the impacted areas and populations of Puerto Rico.
Because the traditional access through the established ports
and through the roads and bridges, it couldn't get anything
anywhere.
So, in the common-sense planning for advance contracts,
when we are dealing with islands, populations, does FEMA now
have a plan to have advance contracts for barge access, for
beach landings? These guys can quickly establish access roads
to distribute materials that ended up sitting in the ports and
on the docks in Puerto Rico for a long time, was quite
challenging to get that relief material and services and
supplies, et cetera, to the impacted populations. What has FEMA
done since then regarding beach access via barge?
Mr. Kamoie. Thank you for the question, Congressman
Higgins. We have enhanced our transportation contracts,
shipping and air, for both the islands and Alaska. I will need
to follow up with you on the details because I think you are
mentioning some specific modes of transport, and I don't want
to misspeak, but we have addressed with advance contract----
Mr. Higgins. Can my office reach out to your office and
share some data with you regarding that?
Mr. Kamoie. Absolutely.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. I would like to move on. Building
code enforcement in Puerto Rico is a concern that all of us
should have. It is an American treasure. It has harvested the
paychecks of working Americans and distributed quite
compassionately in large amounts. In America, you know, we have
an expectation that--you mentioned the stewardship of these
funds. So building code enforcement, generally speaking, what
is your observation on that? How strong--they have adopted new
codes, which is encouraging, but how do you see the enforcement
of building codes now that we are a year into this thing?
Mr. Kamoie. Mr. Higgins, enforcement of building codes is
outside both my expertise and area of responsibility, so I am
going to take----
Mr. Higgins. It is within your parameter of opinion,
though.
Mr. Kamoie. I am going to take the question back, and we
will follow up with you----
Mr. Higgins. That is a good answer.
Mr. Kamoie [continuing]. On the agency's view.
Mr. Higgins. Safe answer from a witness. One final
question. What policies are in place to encourage contractors
that have contracted with FEMA to avoid participating in fraud
or accusations of fraud with subcontractors? I have had
conversations with subcontractors that were encouraged to do
work and then never paid by folks that had contracts with FEMA.
They had no recourse through the Government because their
contract wasn't with the Government. What investigative
authority do you have? What recourse do these subcontractors
have? What policies do you have in place to protect against
fraud? With my remaining time, please answer that, sir.
Mr. Kamoie. Certainly. We do take the stewardship
seriously. We do provide oversight. I don't know the answer on
what recourse or what remedy subcontractors have, but of course
we have our Office of Inspector General. Within my division of
FEMA, the Office of the Chief Security Officer, we have a Fraud
Investigations Unit. So----
Mr. Higgins. Can you get us--can you get the committee back
a more specific answer on that? My time has expired, but we
would appreciate that.
Mr. Kamoie. Absolutely.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Next, we will have the gentleman from New York, Mr. Rose.
Mr. Rose. Thank you, Chairman. I am always slightly
interested in yielding all my time to Mr. Higgins because I
always do enjoy your questions, sir. But I will resist. I will
resist.
My district was one of the hardest hit by Hurricane Sandy.
We experienced first-hand how many bad contractors were really
hired and how they just totally failed the great people of
Staten Island and south Brooklyn and New York City.
Misinformation led to just absolute chaos in the days after the
storm. Contractors on the ground, they kept changing the rules
on victims while losing their paperwork over and over and over
again. They were overpaid. People got rich. Believe it or not,
my district office still has active cases dealing with this
recovery. So, you know, you all--I don't want to be redundant
because we are all here with the shared interest of trying to
fix something. So, sir,--Kamoie, right?
Mr. Kamoie. Yes, Kamoie.
Mr. Rose. You said something, though, that intrigued me
just now. You said basically Congress can't give you any
additional authority, you are good to go. My question is very
simple. Are we? You know, in the event the next superstorm is
coming--the next hurricane is coming. You said you have learned
lessons from the past. When another natural disaster hits my
community, or any of ours, is FEMA going to be there to get the
job done, and what else can we do to ensure that that is the
case?
Mr. Kamoie. Congressman Rose, I appreciate the question. So
my response on do we need additional authorities was related to
looking systemically at our contracting practices. When
Congresswoman Titus asked me that question, I can't think of
any additional authority we need to look at our contracting.
Congress did provide us on the response and recovery side--now
I am going well beyond contracting and just the agency's
overall response and recovery--Congress gave us and we very
much appreciate the authorities you provided us in the Disaster
Recovery Reform Act that we are very actively implementing,
everything from our ability to increase administrative cost
reimbursement to our State partners to authorities with our
work force. So we asked you and you provided a great deal of
authority in that legislation.
Mr. Rose. That authority basically authorizes you to
prepare for something, pre-advance contracting, so on and so
forth. Is there any mechanism in place--and this is for all of
you--for us to ensure, district by district, that you have done
that? So, if I could have a superstorm hit next week, is there
any database that I can look and say, ``All right, man, FEMA's
good to go; we got our X, Y, Z contractors already in place''?
Do we have any system in place where I can ensure that you have
done your job?
Mr. Kamoie. So what we have is our National Preparedness
Report, and we work with our State and local partners, where
they report to us their capability gaps. We invest in
nondisaster and preparedness grant funding. So we do report
against kind-of core capabilities that do give us a general
sense of our preparedness. I will have to go back and talk with
my colleagues about whether that is county by county.
Mr. Rose. Yes. That would be--or Congressional district by
Congressional district, however you want to organize, it would
be wonderful. I do want to make a formal request that you get
back to us on that, that we have--you have just said that when
it comes to contracting, giving us the authority you need, now
we want to be able to check that you have exercised that
authority.
Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Mak. What we found was that there is inconsistent
coordination within the regions. Different regions, some
coordinated a little more regularly, and some did not. So,
therefore, we did make a recommendation to have more regular
coordination to achieve those benefits that you are talking
about because positive relationships can help in terms of the
FEMA and the State emergency management personnel, providing
opportunities for both FEMA and the States and localities to
establish their contracts, the advance contracts that they
need, and knowing which contracts are available, and then as
well as FEMA knowing what the State can do to respond initially
before the Federal Government gets involved.
Mr. Rose. Absolutely. Look, we will help you find the
plumbers and the roofers.
Ms. Mak. We definitely found inconsistencies.
Mr. Rose. We all have those folks in need of work, but no
one wants to be caught flat-footed again.
Thank you, I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
We will now hear from the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate this
hearing. Certainly the last year that I was in the Texas Senate
last year, we had a lot of Harvey hearings and became very
familiar. There was a lot of hand-wringing. Obviously, it is
tremendously complicated to recover from a disaster, and I
would commend Commissioner Bush's report from the GAO in Texas,
which was the point for Harvey recovery in Texas, that Ranking
Member Crenshaw put into the record. I think that that is a
very good lessons learned that Texas had in their experience
interacting with FEMA, including that was a very important
experience for my State.
Just specifically, and I wanted to just, Mr. Kamoie, just
wanted to go to your testimony, your written testimony. You
outline a series of changes or improvements, and I will just
quickly read the headlines here: Increasing the dollar ceiling,
adjusting periods of performance, enhancing the transportation
capabilities for island responses, increasing the number of
contracting personnel to support disasters, increasing the
number of disaster acquisition response team staff, increasing
the number of senior-level acquisition personnel in filling
critical vacancies. So my question to you is: It sounds like
these improvements are under way, but are there pieces of these
improvements that need to be--that you need statutory
assistance? In other words, is there legislation that is
required from the U.S. Congress to assist FEMA to implement
these changes? These seem like good changes. I think they are
well thought through, I know you are implementing them, but
what can we do? What is our role?
Mr. Kamoie. Thank you, Congressman Taylor. In a number of
cases that you have cited, they are completed. Our increasing
the dollar ceiling, adjusting periods of performance, enhancing
transportation capabilities. We will need to think about
whether any statutory changes are required to implement the
others. At this point, I cannot think of any, but if we do, we
will follow up with you.
Mr. Taylor. OK. I mean, you know, obviously, our job is to
legislate, and your job is to act. So, if there is statutory
assistance that you need, you know, let us know. I mean, we
obviously are all here for the same thing, to have a great
disaster response recovery effort, and that is a collective
effort, and certainly Congress is part of that. If you don't
have the statutory authority that you need, I think just
building on what Congressman Rose mentioned.
Shifting over to Texas specifically, something that I heard
over and over again last year from local governments was the
inability to understand from FEMA whether or not a contract had
been awarded, what the extent was, the services that would be
provided. They were generally frustrated that they just
couldn't seem to quite get straight answers. I just wanted to
kind-of hear what your thoughts were about how we can get more
certainty for a subdivision to know, hey, this is taken care
of. You know, this tarp thing is taken care of. This water
thing is taken care of. These meals are taken care of. This
debris removal has been taken care of. Because that is--clearly
certainty is important for people to operate because if they
know you don't have it, well, then, they can go and work on it
themselves. But if they are unclear, if they call and say,
``Well, I don't know, we can't help you,'' that is very
frustrating for that mayor, for the head of that particular MUD
district, whatever that subdivision in Texas may be.
Mr. Kamoie. So I appreciate that, Congressman Taylor. I
think it is going to require more communication and
coordination with our State and local partners, our Procurement
Disaster Assistance Team, these folks we deploy. We will
continue to provide guidance and help our partners in
navigating, not just the regulatory requirements but the
clarity you were asking for in terms of spelling out kind of
what is in and what is out.
Then the last thing I will say on the legislative offer,
again, I appreciate it, and I will just say again, we
appreciate very much the Disaster Recovery Reform Act that
Congress passed, gave us a lot of authorities that we needed.
Thank you.
Mr. Taylor. OK. So I am sort-of reattacking this, but what
are you going to do so the next disaster, a mayor knows when he
calls, he gets a definitive answer, that, ``Yes, it has been
approved,'' ``No, it hasn't''?
Mr. Kamoie. We will continue to reach out through our
regional offices, through our joint field offices who are on
the ground in the local community, to make sure that we are
providing the accurate information and answering the questions.
So, you know, what we can do is ensure that our personnel are
trained and have built relationships with those local officials
so that they can get their questions answered in both a timely
and accurate way. So I will be sure that we will take back and
work with our regional colleagues and our Procurement Disaster
Assistance Team to make sure that we are providing that
guidance.
Mr. Taylor. I have to say, I am not totally satisfied with
your answer, but I appreciate your effort to respond. You are
welcome to come back to my office and respond in writing, but I
really want to--this is important. Subdivisions deserve to know
certainty. Saying we are going to train well and work harder,
that doesn't--I am sorry, I am out of time, but we can discuss
this offline.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Next, we will have the gentle lady from New York, Ms.
Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank our
Ranking Member and our alternative Chair or additional Chair,
Ms. Torres, and I thank our expert witness for appearing before
us today.
I just want to say at the outset that I want to join in
Congressman Rose's request for a district-by-district
contracting assessment and plan. I think that that will be very
important because we are talking about natural disasters, and
we are talking about them as if they are in the past when just
last week we had a suite of tornadoes rip through the southern
part of our Nation. So I believe, quite frankly, that we need
to be forward-leaning with respect to this, and it is really
critical that FEMA get its footing, so that, again, we are able
to move forward with the forecast of a lot of these naturally-
occurring types of events so that we are not in retrospect or
we are not flat-footed dealing with these issues. That is why I
think this National Interest Action System is so very important
because when you don't have a consistent basis for analysis,
you know, 10 years here, 5 years there, 6 months there, it
doesn't give you the real view to how we can improve and what
our improvement has been. You may be able to sit here and say:
I see improvement.
For the rest of us, we are saying: Well, I was hit by
Superstorm Sandy, and people in my district are still
recovering, right?
So I want to drill down a little bit more about the NIA
code.
Ms. Mak, in a sentence or two, can you please describe what
the National Interest Action code is?
Ms. Mak. Sure. Thank you for the question. Basically when
any contract is being put in place, contracting officials have
to put that information into this system, this Federal database
system. When you track it, when we do our analysis, we go pull
it from that NIA code. Now, when the NIA code is closed, to be
able to track that information, we actually did some data
analysis after the NIA codes were closed to just see what kind
of information we could get. We used the description field.
Ms. Clarke. So essentially these codes allow you and the
public to track contracting activity for specific disasters?
Ms. Mak. Absolutely, you are correct.
Ms. Clarke. From GAO's perspective, how long should a NIA
code remain open after a disaster to accurately track contract
obligations?
Ms. Mak. I think it differs from disaster to disaster,
depending on how large the impact, how far it is, and those
kinds of things. So we don't really say what time frame, but we
have noticed that in the past they are open anywhere from 2 to
4 years, at least better than a 1-year--or less than a year.
And then----
Ms. Clarke. Right. So the question becomes, should we be
categorizing? For instance, a rural community gets hit by a
tornado, you are dealing with a less densely-populated area
than perhaps an urban area or even a suburban area. Or maybe
even looking at the regions, you know, what the density--
population density and the assets in a particular area would
be. Do you think that sort of categorizing would then enable us
to look at what time frames should be applicable or----
Ms. Mak. That is possible, if they collect--if the data is
historically collected and that analysis is done. As far as we
are aware of, it is not.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. I want to shift gears very quickly
to the question of these debris removal contracts. Well, there
is going to be a lot of debris removal, when you see these
types of events occurring on an almost monthly basis. So I want
to ask, Ms. Trimble, regarding policy changes FEMA made for
overseeing debris removal operations, the new policy eliminated
Federal and State oversight of debris removal activities.
Because of the policy changes, local contractors in Florida and
Georgia, for instance, were able to overstate debris loads and
overcharge the Federal Government, and this put more than $1.5
billion of taxpayer dollars at risk. Can you explain this issue
a bit more?
Ms. Trimble. Sure. So I think there are two things in play.
So, in 2016, FEMA consolidated all its different----
Ms. Clarke. I think your microphone----
Ms. Trimble. I am sorry. So two points to make here, that
in 2016, FEMA consolidated all its different pieces of public
assistance grant program guidance into one consolidated guide.
However, when it did that, and for example, in the case of
debris removal, about a hundred pages worth of very specific
debris removal and monitoring guidance that was available to
local communities was cut out of, you know, that ultimate guide
that was published in 2016. So you have two problems. Then, as
you said, at the same time, the responsibilities for FEMA and
the States to oversee local debris removal and monitoring
activities went away. So you had two things happen at the same
time that I think led to the problems that we saw when our
teams were out in Florida and Georgia doing their work.
So, as I alluded to earlier, there really is a need for
FEMA to provide that more detailed information again. It
actually still is out there, and some local communities know
where to find it because they have used it before. But the
concern is that new communities or new officials in communities
who haven't worked with it before might not find it as readily.
Furthermore, you know, just the way the new public
assistance guidance has been consolidated, it is not
necessarily clear what certain roles and responsibilities might
be.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. I thank you.
Mr. Kamoie, I am sorry, my time has run out, but I would
like to ask that if you can do--go back and develop clear rules
and guidance for monitoring debris removal operations, what
would be done to comply with those recommendations, if you
provide that to our Chairman, that would be very helpful.
Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Kamoie. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Clarke [continuing]. Madam Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Next, we will have the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
all others that I should thank as well.
Please allow me to thank all of you for what you do. I
understand that it is very difficult. I have a number of
questions. The first has to do with CDBGDR. Are there any
recommendations that you have that would assist you in--for us
to help you and assist you in the use of the CDBGDR funds,
community development disaster relief funds. Any
recommendations?
Mr. Kamoie. Congressman Green, that is outside my area of
responsibility and expertise, but I will take that back to the
agency for my colleagues who would be most familiar with those
grant programs.
Mr. Green of Texas. Thank you. I greatly appreciate it. As
you know, we are still waiting in Texas for some of that
funding to arrive. So I thought I would just take a shot and
see if there was some possibility that you might be able to
give some assistance.
Here is another one. In my city, we hear the words
``shelter in place,'' and there are many persons who have no
shelter to shelter in place. Churches will open their doors,
and they will sometimes have some minor damages. They provide
food, blankets. How does FEMA interact with the churches? How
do we get that done so that they can be properly compensated?
Mr. Kamoie. So we do have an office of faith-based
organizations, and its director, Kevin Smith, I will be glad to
talk with him and perhaps he might be able to follow up with
you and provide you information on how we interact with faith-
based organizations.
Mr. Green of Texas. Do you contract with any of the
churches for shelter? I know that the municipalities will
usually provide some places for shelter. In Houston, we have
the Astrodome, and we have other facilities, but do you----
Mr. Kamoie. I am sorry, Congressman. That is just outside
my area of knowledge. We will be sure to follow up in writing--
--
Mr. Green of Texas. OK.
Mr. Kamoie [continuing]. With information about that.
Mr. Green of Texas. Well, let me just continue outside your
area for a few more. Let's talk for just a moment about the
20,000 pallets of water in Puerto Rico. I went down there--
20,000 pallets of bottled water that did not get used timely.
Can you tell me anything about that?
Mr. Kamoie. So my understanding is that the contractor
distributed water when they were supposed to dispose of it.
Some of it was past its expiration date, and I believe we
terminated and wrote to them regarding their noncompliance with
the contract that we let, for disposal of water bottles,
plastic caps, and pallets.
Mr. Green of Texas. Ms. Mak, do you have anything that you
would add?
Ms. Mak. This issue really comes down to understanding what
the requirements are, and that is a challenge that we also
found that FEMA has faced in its acquisition planning process.
If you don't--if you can't define what you really need, how
much you need, and those kinds of things, that is a problem
because it requires more time for contracting officials. They
might award initial contract, and then they might have to
follow up with several other contracts. So we have also asked
that they really look at the acquisition planning process in
terms of defining requirements.
Mr. Green of Texas. Quickly, probably outside your area of
expertise, but what percentage of your contracts are awarded to
minorities and women?
Mr. Kamoie. That is in my area of expertise. I don't know
the number, but we will follow up in writing with that.
Mr. Green of Texas. That is a very important thing for you
to do, and if you would, I would like to also get some sense of
the number that--number of persons that are from the impacted
area, that, as you know, in Puerto Rico, there was a big
complaint, a significant complaint, that people from the area
were not being utilized. People were coming in from the
mainland to service people on the island. So it would be of
great benefit to know these things. Now, how am I assured that
I will hear from you? Who will be contacting me?
Mr. Kamoie. Our legislative affairs division will follow up
with this information.
Mr. Green of Texas. OK. If they do not, am I at liberty to
call you?
Mr. Kamoie. Yes.
Mr. Green of Texas. OK. Final question, Mr. Chairman, if I
may, I just want to ask one more.
Timely payment of contractors--small contractors. I get
complaints from contractors who are telling me that they are
not being paid timely. I understand that you no longer handle
debris. You have stopped contracting that out, the
municipalities do it. But can you provide any degree of
oversight? Maybe I should have Ms. Mak respond, but such that
these small contractors will be paid timely.
Mr. Payne. Quickly.
Mr. Kamoie. So we certainly can provide guidance to our
State and local partners about timely payment and our
expectations regarding how they exercise their responsibility
under the grant programs. So our Procurement Disaster
Assistance Team can reinforce that.
Mr. Green of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Let's see. We will quickly try to go
through maybe one or two questions. I just had a very important
question that has been concerning me since it was brought to my
attention. DHS OIG issued a report, OIG-19-32, in March 2019,
indicating that FEMA unnecessarily shared the personally
identifiable information and sensitive personally identifiable
information of 2.3 million of disaster survivors with a
contractor--shared their personal information with this
contractor. What safeguards have you put in place to ensure
that an incident like this does not happen again? I mean, this
is bank records, Social Security numbers. I mean, you know, the
most personal information that we hold sacred, that is--you
know, has been exposed. I mean, over 2 million people. How does
something like that happen?
Mr. Kamoie. Thank you, Chairman Payne. So the contractor at
issue administered the transitional sheltering assistance
program for us. We changed the business model. It used to be
that survivors would check in to transitional housing, a hotel,
provide their credit card, and we would reimburse the survivor
for those expenses. We changed the business model such that we
now have the contractor pay hotels directly. But we didn't turn
off the sharing of the information. So, upon learning that that
data was still being transmitted to the contractor, who, before
the business model changed, fully authorized to receive that
information in administration of the program, we stopped
sharing the data. We purged it from their systems. We have no
evidence that that data in their systems was at any time
breached. We have no evidence that any survivor has suffered
identity theft or loss because of that sharing.
Mr. Payne. But did you let them know this has happened?
Mr. Kamoie. We are working through evaluating the options
regarding the communication with the----
Mr. Payne. Evaluating?
Mr. Kamoie [continuing]. Survivors, and----
Mr. Payne. Wait a minute. Evaluating the--I think you need
to get to the task at hand. Evaluating?
Mr. Kamoie. What I said was we are evaluating what we will
offer to them and how we will communicate with them regarding
this, the oversharing of data.
Mr. Payne. I think this needs to be expedited.
Mr. Kamoie. I hear you loud and clear, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Payne. You know, I mean, how do you know people's
identities haven't been stolen?
Mr. Kamoie. We have no evidence that they have been, but
I----
Mr. Payne. You don't have any evidence that they haven't?
Mr. Kamoie [continuing]. They have not been.
Mr. Payne. You haven't on either side, right, and you have
no evidence that they haven't been, correct?
Mr. Kamoie. Correct. So we----
Mr. Payne. Let me, OIG, please. I know----
Ms. Trimble. So, since we made the discovery and it was our
staff who, meeting with both FEMA--well, meeting with FEMA
initially, looking at the records they had on survivors, it was
our staff who realized there was personally identifiable
information that was not required for the administration of the
program. Our staff then met with the contractor and verified
that, yes, the contractor had received that unnecessary PII.
So, as to moving forward, our recommendations are two-fold.
One, clean-up, clean up the incident at hand and take the steps
necessary. Mr. Kamoie is right about the steps that FEMA has
initiated to assess essentially the extent of the damage. It is
true that there has been no evidence that PII has gotten past
the contractor out into the public, or what have you.
The concern is when--from our understanding and information
shared with us, the contractor only kept basically the past 30
days' worth of information on its system, that would have shown
any vulnerabilities. Prior to that, we don't know. We don't
know if their system perhaps was infiltrated and if that
information went anywhere, so that is of a concern, but I am
sure FEMA remains diligent in addressing it.
The other issue is making sure this doesn't happen again--
--
Mr. Payne. I would hope so.
Ms. Trimble [continuing]. Recommendation.
Mr. Payne. Ms. Mak.
Mr. Kamoie. So we are reviewing all of our data-sharing
agreements with all of our programs that share sensitive
information and the contractors with whom that information is
shared so that we make sure the cybersecurity safeguards are in
place, and the data-sharing agreements are in place to protect
the information because we know that survivors not only expect
us to deliver the care that they need after a disaster, but
they expect us to protect their information as well.
Mr. Payne. Well, I hope that FEMA has the urgency that I
feel that this needs to be rectified. You know, I mean, you
know, you are being kind-of, you know, matter-of-fact about it.
This is serious. This is frightening. Well, lend me your Social
Security number and your bank records for me to hold on to. I
mean, you know, let me just hold it.
Mr. Kamoie. We agree with you, with the seriousness of it,
and we agree with you on the urgency.
Mr. Payne. That is 2.3 million people's information.
Mr. Kamoie. I agree, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Payne. It is absolutely unacceptable. I am sorry. I
have gone over, but I felt that had to be borne out.
No? Mister--no.
No?
Ms. Torres Small. Just very quickly----
Mr. Payne. Chairwoman.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Kamoie, I was troubled by your comment that you don't
see systemic problems. I think--or that--your question about
whether systemic problems with contracting exists, and I want
to speak specifically to a systemic problem that I see, which
is the contracting work force. I appreciate Ms. Mak's comments
about needing an in-depth study for the work force needs. I
know that you said it in your opening statement that there were
some gains that had been made in your contracting work force.
But based on the information I have, you are still a third
understaffed, and you have actually lost staff since 2017.
So I appreciate your agreement that we do need that in-
depth study. When can we expect to see that in-depth study?
Mr. Kamoie. Let me be clear, Chairwoman Torres Small. In
response to Congressman Titus' question about whether the
cancellation for non-performance of 4 contracts represented a
systemic problem, I don't know if it does. That does not mean I
don't see systemic opportunities to improve our contracting
process. It is what we have been doing. I was simply citing the
4 terminations for nonperformance. It is a challenge to recruit
and retain 1,102 contracting specialists in the Federal
Government.
Ms. Torres Small. Mr. Kamoie--I apologize--the question was
just, when can we expect to see the study?
Mr. Kamoie. I believe the completion date that we estimated
to the GAO recommendation was in August, but I will follow up
with a more specific date. Sorry, I just don't remember the
exact date, but we have already committed to a date, and we
will provide that to you.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you. You are re-upping that
commitment to the date----
Mr. Kamoie. Absolutely.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you. I yield my time.
Mr. Kamoie. I am sorry I didn't remember the date.
Ms. Torres Small. I yield my time.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I would like to ask unanimous consent for the Center for a
New Economy's report on ``Federal Contracting in the Post-
Disaster Period'' be entered into the record.
Assuming no objections, without objection, so ordered.\2\
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\2\ The information has been retained in committee files and is
available at https://grupocne.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
Federal_Contracts_FINAL_withcover-1.pdf.
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Mr. Payne. I would like to thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony and the Members for their questions.
The Members of the committee may have additional questions
for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions.
Without objection, the committee record shall be kept open
for 10 days.
Hearing no further business, this subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Brian Kamoie
Question 1. Please provide an up-to-date list of all advance
contracts that FEMA has in place. For each contract, please include the
acquisition name, description of goods or services rendered, contractor
name and DUNS number, contract number, base award date, and total
contract value.
Question 2a. Please identify all advance contracts FEMA has awarded
since August 25, 2017--the day Hurricane Harvey made landfall.
Of these contracts, how many were awarded for new requirements?
Question 2b. How many were awarded for existing requirements
following expiration of the prior contract's period of performance?
Answer. The attached Excel Spreadsheet details the advance
contracts FEMA has in place as of May 1, 2019. None of these contracts
are for new requirements; they are follow-on contracts to pre-
positioned contracts established in response to PKEMRA requirements.*
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* The attachment has been retained in committee files.
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Question 3a. At the May 9 joint subcommittee hearing, you told
Members that during the 2017 hurricane season, FEMA terminated 4
contracts for non-performance. However, according to OIG-19-38, FEMA
supplied the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector
General (DHS OIG) with documentation showing a total of 19 contract
cancelations related to Hurricane Maria alone.
Please provide a comprehensive list of FEMA contracts that were
canceled during the response to and recovery from Hurricanes Harvey,
Irma, and Maria. For each contract, please include the contract number,
description of goods or services for which the contract was awarded,
date of award, date of cancelation, vendor name and DUNS number, total
contract amount, and amount obligated prior to cancelation.
Question 3b. The DHS OIG reported that the high number of contract
cancelations during the 2017 hurricane season ``could potentially
indicate systemic contracting deficiencies that FEMA needs to
address.'' What, if any, action has FEMA taken to address these
deficiencies?
Answer. There were 35 contracts terminated for the 3 2017
hurricanes; Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Of those 35, 1 contract was
cancelled for cause, (the equivalent of default in commercial
contracting), and 4 contracts were cancelled for lack of performance
during the 2017 hurricane season.
All but 1 of the 5 contracts cancelled for lack of performance were
terminated for the convenience of the Government. This is a standard
contracting term used to describe a non-punitive process. During a
disaster response, planning needs can change. If an initiated contract
is no longer required as anticipated, it can be terminated at the
convenience of the Government an action that ends contract performance
without penalizing the vendor.
Per your request, please see the attached file. The spreadsheet
contains a detailed list of contracts cancelled during the 2017
hurricane season and shows the terminated contracts by individual
contract action. In two circumstances, there were partial contract
actions made on the same contract but at different times. The total
number of terminated contracts remained the same throughout.
FEMA OCPO is working collaboratively with the DHS OIG to address
their recommendations. FEMA is committed to ensuring that mission needs
are met with an effective procurement process.
FEMA has conducted the following training sessions:
Mission Readiness Training (MRT): April 22-26, 2019.
Disaster Readiness Training Webinar: May 16, 2019.
Topics covered during both training opportunities included using
the Disaster Response Registry, Buy American/Trade Agreements Act, set-
asides, reporting requirements, lessons learned and acquisition best
practices. These training sessions contained a discussion on current
procurement policies, and the experience is designed to increase the
business knowledge of acquisition professionals supporting FEMA's
mission.
Question 4. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, any recipient or
subrecipient of Federal funds, including contractors or subcontractors,
is required to make their products, services, activities, and programs
accessible to individuals with disabilities. Please send documentation
of FEMA's efforts to monitor and enforce this requirement.
Answer. There is language in external-facing FEMA contracts
regarding Section 504 obligations. Section 504 requirements are a part
of training for FEMA contracting officers. Additionally, Section 504
accessibility requirements are a part of the FEMA Section 504 Public-
Facing Implementation Plan. This plan will be published on FEMA's
website soon. One item identified for action in the plan is providing
notice of Section 504 responsibilities to all contractors carrying out
public-facing activities on behalf of FEMA. The plan is supported by
FEMA program offices with points of contact for Section 504 access
requirements and is monitored through the Office of Equal Rights (OER)
and Access Coordinators.
Section 504 requirements are also the responsibility of the OER
Cadre during disasters. The Cadre reviews housing programs to ensure
accessible housing for persons with disabilities; accessibility to all
FEMA and State disaster programs, services, and benefits; provides
community outreach to impacted communities to ensure that information
about the rights of all disaster survivors, including those with
disabilities, is made accessible and available to the whole community;
and provides guidance and technical assistance to FEMA programs and
State counterparts to ensure civil rights compliance, including Section
504.
Question 5a. How does FEMA ensure that contractors providing
temporary housing assistance to disaster survivors make housing
accessible to persons with disabilities as required by law?
Answer. In addition to actions taken by FEMA Contracting Office,
the OER Cadre monitors housing program activity in providing mobile
homes and trailers to ensure that accessible housing is available to
disaster survivors with disabilities, and to ensure that temporary
housing assistance programs consider the needs of persons with
disabilities by maintaining adequate accessible housing stock for the
impacted area.
The Regional Disability Integration Advisor (RDIA) prepares
individuals and families by strengthening communities before, during,
and after disasters by providing guidance, methods, and strategies to
integrate individuals with disabilities and coordinate emergency
management efforts to meet the needs of all citizens, including
children and adults with disabilities and others with access and
functional needs.
The RDIS provides overall direction and coordination around all
activities within the region, including during disaster response and
recovery operations.
Question 5b. How does FEMA ensure that the multiple policy
directives intended to protect the rights of people with disabilities
are properly conveyed to States and localities?
Answer. Information from policy directives is provided through the
FEMA Office of Equal Rights (and other FEMA programs such as External
Affairs, Individual and Household Programs) in several Section 508
compliant formats and in different languages as determined by the
demographics of the impacted communities. This information is
distributed through flyers, local media, the internet, and public
meetings. FEMA information about the rights of persons with
disabilities is also part of the information supplied through FEMA's
website. FEMA and the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
have communicated with the States and localities that are recipients of
Federal financial assistance about their obligations under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act through letters and publication of guidance
resources on-line.
During steady state, Regional Disability Integration Advisors
(RDIS) assigned to each region, work with States and localities to
provide guidance related to housing needs of people with disabilities.
RDIS form partnerships with housing organizations and agencies to
ensure that the rights of people with disabilities are planning factors
in all housing discussions. During active disasters the RDIS will work
closely with a Disability Integration Advisor deployed to serve as
advisor across all housing activities. The Disability Integration
Advisor participates in State-run housing calls and brings disability
subject-matter expertise which is integrated throughout the planning
process.
Question 6. In a 2019 report (GAO-19-281), GAO found that FEMA had
challenges developing requirements for post-disaster contracts. For
example, following Hurricane Harvey, FEMA awarded contracts to supply a
food bank. But the requirement for food was expressed in ``truck
loads'' rather than numbers of meals or pallets. Because of this,
FEMA's initial contracting capacity fell short, and an additional
contract had to be awarded. How can FEMA's program offices better
identify requirements for critical goods and services following
disasters?
Answer. FEMA's Office of the Chief Procurement Officer has a
Portfolio Management Section to support customer acquisition needs. The
role of the Portfolio Manager is to educate and assist the program
office with identifying the problem statement and requirements.
Portfolio Managers will also assist program offices with the completion
of the appropriate procurement documents so Contracting Officers can
execute better contracts. Currently, the staff of 5 supports mostly
steady-state requirements and pre-positioned contracts. However, after
the 2017 Hurricane Season, Portfolio Managers deployed to disaster
locations to assist field operations with developing their
requirements. This effort is expected to help improve post-disaster
contracting by ensuring requirements are clear and actionable. In
addition, the Portfolio Management Section will add 4 additional
positions in the near term to support the development of requirements
in the field, before and during disasters.
Question 7. In May 2018, there were reports of FEMA spending $74
million to Carnival Corporation to house Federal aid workers and first
responders after Hurricanes Irma and Maria. Reportedly, the contracted
ship from Carnival was only half full and taxpayers paid more than $800
per night for passengers. Please explain how the Carnival Corporation
contract was awarded and how FEMA determined the decision to lease the
cruise ship to be cost efficient.
Answer. In response to overwhelming demand for housing in the U.S.
Virgin Islands (USVI) immediately following Hurricane Maria, FEMA
chartered the cruise ship Carnival Fascination for shipboard lodging of
FEMA employees, employees of other Federal agencies, and other first
responders destined for, or already located in the USVI for recovery
operations. The contract price was fully inclusive of shipboard lodging
(including showers and other facilities) and food.
Price reasonableness was established based on full and open
competition. Eight offers were received in response to this
solicitation. The price analysis determined that the maximum price per
person of the cruise ship submitted by offerors were $225 per person,
the minimum was $123.68 per unit and the average was $176.30.
Carnival's per-unit cost was below the average price per person. All
other vendors were found to be technically unacceptable. While the
contract was awarded for $74 million, subsequent modifications reduced
the value of this contract to $49 million.
Question From Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Brian Kamoie
Question. A recent DHS OIG Management Alert (OIG-19-32) included
recommendations for how FEMA can better handle disaster survivors' data
to prevent another data violation from occurring. Though FEMA concurred
with these recommendations, the agency said that the recommendations
will not be fully implemented until June 2020. Please explain why it
will take FEMA until next hurricane season to implement these
recommendations.
Answer. The June 2020 estimated date of completion was provided to
DHS OIG prior to a security assessment being finalized.
However, DHS deployed a Joint Assessment Team on-site at the
Corporate Lodging Consultants (CLC) to determine the security posture
of the CLC system, and detect any system vulnerabilities, including any
further threats or impacts from the incident. DHS and FEMA concluded
that the current security posture of the CLC network that hosts FEMA
data is below DHS security standards and issued 11 vulnerability
findings.
To date, all vulnerabilities identified in the Security Assessment
of CLC Final Report dated April 2, 2019 have been remediated. A new
network environment was put in place to remediate the remaining
outstanding vulnerabilities and to ensure CLC's environment is in
compliance with DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A.
The FEMA-DHS Joint Assessment Team (JAT) conducted a security
assessment on the revised architecture, including the new and old
environments, at the CLC location in Atlanta, Georgia, from July 9-July
18, 2019. FEMA anticipates providing a supplemental report based on
this new assessment by October 1, 2019.
Question From Chairwoman Xochitl Torres Small for Brian Kamoie
Question. GAO recently recommended (GAO-19-281) that FEMA assess
its contracting work force needs--including staffing levels, mission
needs, and skill gaps--at FEMA headquarters, regional offices, and
among FEMA's Disaster Acquisition Response Team (DART). When will this
assessment be complete, and will you commit to providing committee
staff with a copy of the assessment once it is complete?
Answer. FEMA's Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO)
assesses its work force on an annual basis to determine the appropriate
number of contract officials needed to meet its mission. At the
beginning of each fiscal year, an 1102 staffing model exercise is
conducted by all DHS contracting activities. The exercise is based on
the current inventory of GS-1102 personnel, number of contract actions,
and hours performed (direct and indirect) by GS-1102 personnel. The
calculation produced by the model assists management by identifying the
number of personnel needed to perform the contract actions. FEMA
completed its staffing model exercise on January 28, 2019.
To address its immediate skill gaps and personnel needs, FEMA OCPO
has entered into a contract for acquisition support services for
additional personnel to temporarily fill the gaps found during the
assessment. In addition, FEMA OCPO plans to hire Cadre of On-Call
Response and Recovery Employees to provide dedicated support during
disasters.
The staffing model exercise for fiscal year 2018 is attached to
this response.*
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* The attachment has been retained in committee files.
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Questions From Honorable Max Rose for Brian Kamoie
Question 1. Is there any mechanism in place to ensure that the
various FEMA regions have adequate amounts of prepositioned contracts
in place before a disaster strikes?
Question 2. What, if any, efforts does FEMA make to track this
information on a county-by-county or Congressional-district-by-
Congressional-district basis? Please provide this information if it is,
in fact, available.
Answer. All prepositioned contracts are available to all FEMA
contracting personnel without regard to region. FEMA does not track
contract activity by county or Congressional district.
Questions From Honorable Al Green for Brian Kamoie
Question 1. After Hurricane Harvey, the Texas General Land Office
(GLO) worked closely with FEMA to account for the needs of every Texan
affected by the storm. GLO relied on FEMA for accurate data to assist
victims in a timely manner, particularly when it came to temporary
housing. Unfortunately, I have been told that FEMA provided data to GLO
that was incomplete, late, and even incorrect. GLO struggled to make
use of the temporary housing data, and multiple times FEMA had to
recall the data and resend correct information. According to GLO, the
problems with the data FEMA shared were so bad that at one point more
than 200 people in the logistical implementation process were standing
by doing nothing because GLO was waiting on FEMA for actionable
information. What has FEMA learned from its experience collaborating
with States during the 2017 hurricane season, and what is the agency
doing to improve its data-sharing capabilities ahead of the 2019
hurricane season?
Answer. The Texas General Land Office (GLO) implemented its first
State-managed direct housing mission by executing an Inter-Governmental
Services Agreement (IGSA) with FEMA. The IGSA was intended to allow
greater flexibility in securing housing solutions as well as a
streamlined approach to long-term recovery. Although FEMA implemented a
new and creative solution, FEMA learned that we must define roles and
responsibilities across all phases of State-led housing missions,
increase data collection and sharing capabilities, and work with States
to increase their capacity to succeed in the future.
Privacy Act and I.T. security-related restrictions contributed to
challenges providing Texas GLO and their contractors direct access to
Housing Operations Management Enterprise System (HOMES), FEMA's system
of record for direct housing, which contributed to the challenges
experienced in operational data sharing for the housing mission. FEMA
has identified that many HOMES access issues can be mitigated by
working with States to establish plans and protocols for State-
Administered Direct Housing prior to disaster declarations. To address
this issue, FEMA is developing a State-Administered Direct Housing
Grant Guide to provide guidance to States, territories, and Tribal
nations on the process, roles, and responsibilities for implementing
direct housing and permanent housing construction through a grant,
provided under the Disaster Recovery Reform Act. This Guide will also
include templates to streamline the process of standing up housing
missions, establishing roles and responsibilities, and promoting
effective operational data sharing.
The Texas housing mission also demonstrated FEMA's data system
needs to be more flexible and receive updates to account for new
housing solutions deployed in the 2017 and 2018 hurricane seasons. As
part of the Grants Management Modernization effort, FEMA is developing
its next-generation direct housing system of record which will provide
a common operating platform for all users involved in housing missions.
This new system of record will support State-led housing missions and
provide a dynamic environment to better inform decision makers.
In regard to data sharing, FEMA completed Phase 1 of a multi-phase
internal Information Sharing Assessment to help ensure the agency will
properly share data during the 2019 hurricane season while also
adhering to all information security, information law, and privacy
requirements.
The assessment:
Created a new workflow process to draft Information Sharing
Access Agreements to be used in the 2019 hurricane season,
which will expedite completion of the Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) data-sharing agreements, to include all
applicable U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) data sharing.
Documented and consolidated all Recovery data sharing with
HUD, working closely with Todd Richardson, HUD's General Deputy
Assistant Secretary. In addition, HUD signed a new blanket
``Agreement for Release of Non-PII Data'' that allows FEMA to
very rapidly share all non-PII data.
Inventoried all active automated and manual PII information-
sharing agreements to ensure they meet security and privacy
standards so there will be no discontinuance of services during
the 2019 hurricane season, to include all applicable HUD data
sharing.
Created a new Communications plan to inform FEMA Regions and
Joint Field Offices of all information sharing support services
available within RAD to further expedite data sharing during
the 2019 hurricane season.
Expanded Recovery data available on OpenFEMA, which presents
FEMA data in an open forum, to provide additional data fields,
better data dictionaries, and simplified dataset downloads
capabilities.
Through the Disaster Assistance Improvement Program, FEMA has
expanded its data-sharing interface with HUD and Small Business
Administration (SBA), including updating the Computer Matching
Agreements with both agencies.
The FEMA/HUD data exchange provides FEMA registration data to HUD
for the purpose of determining and informing both agencies of
duplications of housing benefits. When a disaster survivor registers
with FEMA, it checks with HUD to determine whether that person is
already receiving assistance from HUD. If so, then HUD informs FEMA of
the type of assistance being provided by HUD. If HUD is not providing
assistance, then FEMA sends more detail about the registrant, including
information about any rental units provided by FEMA.
FEMA has 3 data exchanges in place with SBA:
1. ``Batch'' import/export of FEMA registrations.--With this
integration, FEMA queues up batches of registrations as they
get submitted either on-line (on DisasterAssistance.gov) or by
the FEMA call center. Every 10-15 minutes, SBA retrieves these
registrations from FEMA's system electronically. For FEMA
registrants who have also applied for an SBA disaster loan, the
SBA provides updates on the decisions made on these loan
applications electronically back to FEMA.
2. FEMA Disaster Assistance Center/SBA Electronic Loan Application
(ELA).--Disaster survivors who register with FEMA on-line at
DisasterAssistance.gov and who meet certain eligibility
criteria are presented with an option to apply for an SBA
disaster loan on-line. A FEMA registrant who opts to apply for
a loan, clicks an ``Apply'' link from the Disaster Assistance
Center which redirects the survivor to SBA's ELA website. SBA's
ELA electronically retrieves the data that the survivor already
entered to prepopulate the electronic loan application,
preventing the need to duplicate data entry.
3. Duplication of Benefits.--FEMA hosts a service that enables SBA
to view a specific set of information about FEMA registrants
for the purpose of determining what benefits those disaster
survivors are receiving from FEMA.
Question 2. If a hurricane strikes the United States this year,
FEMA will need to rely on the relationships that might be strained as a
result of problems like what GLO experienced in 2017. What is FEMA
doing to ensure State partners have the utmost confidence in the agency
ahead of the 2019 hurricane season?
Answer. FEMA currently provides on-site and virtual technical
assistance to SLTT partners through the FEMA Regions across program
areas. Following the historic 2017 disaster season, FEMA announced the
agency's intention to enhance customer service and increase the
efficiency of program delivery by embedding FEMA staff with State,
local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners where appropriate and
based on a SLTT's identified capability gap. The purpose of FIT is to
ensure that FEMA is helping its non-Federal partners improve its
ability to prepare for and respond to disasters. Since the initiative's
launch, FITs have supported State and local disaster response efforts
and provided technical assistance to numerous local, State, and
Federally-declared disasters and emergencies.
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) requires
all States and territories to send an assessment of their emergency
management capabilities to FEMA on an annual basis. States and
territories meet this requirement by completing the Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment/Stakeholder Preparedness Review
(THIRA/SPR). FEMA works with the States and territories throughout the
year to help them understand the assessment process, collect, and
submit useful and actionable information, and provide appropriate
context for that information.
FEMA also provides invitational travel for one representative from
each State/territory to attend annual technical assistance deliveries
designed to help States/territories understand and complete the
assessment and apply the results. During these deliveries, FEMA:
Provides detailed walkthroughs of the assessment process;
Explains how State/territory capability assessments advance
National preparedness strategic goals;
Identifies ways that States/territories can improve their
assessments;
Shares tools, resources, and guidance to help communities
conduct their assessments;
Gathers feedback on how FEMA can improve future technical
support for conducting assessments;
Offers suggestions for how States/territories can apply the
results of their assessments; and
Shares how FEMA uses assessment results.
During these deliveries, FEMA personnel engage directly with State/
territory representatives, providing guidance and support, answering
questions and addressing concerns, and engaging in dialogs on a variety
of topics. This affords an opportunity for FEMA to build and further
develop relationships with the States/territories. Deliveries also
feature opportunities for States/territories to share lessons learned
and best practices with one another and ask for FEMA guidance and
feedback on their current assessments.
FEMA uses these assessments to better understand State/territory
capabilities, including potential gaps and shortfalls, from each State/
territory's point of view. FEMA also uses this information to help
States/territories build and sustain their capabilities and works with
States/territories to help them better understand how FEMA uses the
information they provide.
Furthermore, the FEMA Continuous Improvement Program released the
Continuous Improvement Planning Toolkit (CIPT) on May 22, 2019 to
provide guidance, tools, and templates to assist SLTT partners with
conducting continuous improvement activities. The CIPT is available to
SLTT on the FEMA Preparedness Toolkit.
Question 3. How has FEMA prepared itself logistically for a
scenario in which the United States is again struck by three major
hurricanes in quick succession?
Answer. FEMA has taken a number of measures to prepare itself for a
scenario in which the United States is again struck by 3 major
hurricanes in quick succession. The agency has increased its inventory
in the Continental United States (CONUS) and outside of the Continental
United States (OCONUS) to levels that exceed those in 2017. FEMA has
also expanded the number of Incident Support Base/Federal Staging Area
Teams ready to quickly deploy and establish staging areas to receive
life-saving/life-sustaining commodities and supplies for disaster
survivors. The agency has increased to $3 billion response logistics
contract capacity, to include key commodity and transportation
(Maritime and National Cross-Docking) contracts, and developed, with
the Defense Logistics Agency, 5-year contracts to provide emergency
fuel (diesel, mogas, jet) and propane for all 50 States, the Caribbean,
and Guam/CNMI. FEMA has awarded a new contract for 352 new generators
to add to the existing inventory to assist CONUS and OCONUS disaster
operations. In addition, FEMA has established a new west coast
Distribution Center in Tracy, CA with 224,000 sq. ft. increasing the
capability for storing critical commodities and supplies in the region
by four-fold, and secured a new Manufactured Housing Contract in 2019
with next generation specifications, internal fire suppressant systems,
and the ability to manufacture more units for FEMA Direct Housing.
Question 4a. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
requires FEMA to show preference for local vendors when post-disaster
contracts are awarded. By contracting with local businesses, FEMA can
help stimulate local economies at a time that they're fighting to
recover from a natural disaster. When local contractors aren't used,
FEMA is supposed to provide written justification for all non-local
awards. According to GAO, FEMA still struggles to consistently document
cases where local vendors are not used.
What are you doing to address this issue?
Question 4b. Of all of the contracts awarded to local vendors
during the response to and recovery from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria, how many went to women-, minority-, and veteran-owned
businesses?
Answer. FEMA Office of the Chief Procurement Officer's (OCPO)
Quality Review Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) requires all proposed
contract actions over $500,000.00, and proposed Time and Material
contracts at any cost, to be reviewed by the Quality Control and Policy
Branch. The quality review process includes reviewing the Stafford Act
requirement to buy local when practical and feasible and documenting
when it's not. These reviews, in addition to peer and management
reviews, ensure proposed contract actions are executed in accordance
with applicable laws and procedures. OCPO will continue their policy of
post-award reviews to increase compliance and enhance knowledge of the
acquisition policies and procedures.
FEMA has conducted the following training sessions:
Mission Readiness Training (MRT): April 22-26, 2019.
Disaster Readiness Training Webinar: May 16, 2019.
Topics covered during both training opportunities included topics
such as using the Disaster Response Registry, Local Business
Transition, Buy American/Trade Agreements Act, set-asides, reporting
requirements, lessons learned, and acquisition best practices. These
training sessions contained a discussion on current procurement
policies, and the experience is designed to increase the business
knowledge of acquisition professionals supporting FEMA's mission. The
training sessions included a discussion on the requirements to buy
local when feasible, in accordance with the Stafford Act.
The attached Excel spreadsheet, titled Hurricanes Harvey Irma Maria
Awards--1181295, lists the awards along with their socioeconomic
designation in FPDS.*
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* The attachment has been retained in committee files.
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Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke for Brian Kamoie
Question 1a. At the May 9 joint subcommittee hearing, you told
Members that FEMA planned to revisit the time lines for closing the
National Interest Action (NIA) codes for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria. What is the status of this re-evaluation?
Question 1b. Will the NIA codes be extended and/or reopened? If
yes, when will this occur? If no, please explain.
Answer. Conversations are on-going regarding extending and/or
reopening the NIA codes for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The
decision to extend and/or reopen the codes has not been made, however,
FEMA does expect a decision in the near term.
Questions From Honorable Cedric R. Richmond for Brian Kamoie
Question 1. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
required FEMA to better coordinate its contracting activity with State
and local governments. Some improvements have been made over the past
15 years, but GAO has reported on continued challenges in this area. A
recent GAO report (GAO-19-93) recommended that FEMA perform outreach to
State and local governments on the use and establishment of advance
contracts, identify a centralized resource listing all available
advance contracts, and communicate information on available advance
contracts to States and localities through this centralized resource.
What efforts has FEMA made to address these GAO recommendations?
Answer. FEMA continues to employ the Procurement Disaster
Assistance Team (PDAT), which provides contracting outreach and
education to Public Assistance applicants when contracting under a
grant. The purpose of this team, in part, is to provide training to
State, local, Tribal, territorial, and eligible private non-profit
partners to ensure they are familiar with the Federal procurement
standards applicable under FEMA's public assistance program. As part of
the education and outreach, PDAT encourages the use of pre-positioned,
or advanced, contracts so that public assistance applicants are in a
better position to respond to and recover from emergencies and major
disasters. In addition, FEMA is developing a resource toolkit to aid
State and non-State applicants to properly contract under grants,
including when establishing pre-disaster contracts, so they are better
prepared to conduct emergency work.
FEMA has also made available a list of all advance contracts to
FEMA contracting personnel through its SharePoint site and via training
and webinars.
Question 2a. What types of resources, guidance, and training does
FEMA provide to State and local governments to help them better adhere
to Federal contracting requirements?
How does FEMA track whether these requirements are met?
Question 2b. What changes have been made to this process since the
2017 hurricane season?
Answer. Since the 2017 hurricane season, FEMA continues to employ
the Procurement Disaster Assistance Team (PDAT), which provides
contracting outreach and education to public assistance applicants when
contracting under a grant. The purpose of this team, in part, is to
provide training to State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) and
eligible private non-profit (PNP) partners to ensure they are familiar
with the Federal procurement standards applicable under FEMA's public
assistance program. PDAT continues to provide guidance to SLTT and PNP
partners through in-person and virtual trainings. On the PDAT website,
public assistance applicants can find comprehensive procurement
resources, including webinars, checklists, and summary materials to
help them purchase goods or services in compliance with the Federal
rules. FEMA is also developing a resource toolkit to aid State and non-
State applicants on establishing pre-disaster contracts, so they are
better prepared to conduct emergency work.
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Marie A. Mak
Question. What, if any, additional authorities do you think FEMA
needs to better execute its disaster contracting mission?
Answer. Our work did not identify the need for additional
authorities. However we did find areas for improvement that can help
FEMA better execute its mission, and we note the steps Congress has
already taken to bolster our recommendations. Specifically, in April
2019 the Senate introduced a bipartisan bill--the Federal Advanced
Contract Enhancement Act--to ensure the 9 recommendations we made in
December 2018 are addressed, including steps FEMA should take to more
effectively manage and use its advance contracts and improve
information sharing with States and localities. In June 2019,
Representative Thompson also introduced this legislation in the House.
Legislative steps, such as this, can provide additional assurance that
our recommendations will be addressed and FEMA's contracting practices
will be more efficient.
We also made recommendations about data transparency that we think
would help FEMA better execute its mission. Specifically, in April 2019
we found that the full extent of disaster contracting related to the
2017 disasters is unknown due to changes in the criteria for
establishing and closing a National interest action (NIA) code in the
Federal Procurement Data System--Next Generation (FPDS-NG) and DHS's
inconsistent implementation of the updated criteria for closing codes.
Currently, the NIA code in FPDS-NG is the only mechanism for
Government-wide tracking of contract actions for a specific declared
emergency or contingency event. According to a senior FEMA procurement
official, the lack of publicly-available information on disaster
contract obligations may increase the workload of its already strained
contracting work force, who will need to respond to individual data
requests from interested parties--such as Congress and other Federal
agencies--since that data can no longer be tracked and identified
through FPDS-NG. We recommended: (1) That agencies update the
memorandum of agreement between the General Services Administration
(GSA) and the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (OHS)
outlining the criteria for establishing and closing NIA codes, and (2)
that OHS, in coordination with DOD and GSA, keep the existing NIA codes
open, reopen the codes for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Florence, and
Michael, and request that agencies retroactively update applicable
contract actions, to the extent practicable. OHS did not concur with
this second recommendation. If OHS does not take action on that
recommendation, visibility into contracting obligations related to the
2017 and 2018 major hurricanes will be limited.
Question From Honorable Al Green for Marie A. Mak
Question In your investigations and reporting on the 2017 hurricane
season, what did GAO learn about the accuracy of data shared with
States by FEMA?
What recommendations would you make to improve their data-sharing
capabilities?
Answer. GAO's reporting following the 2017 hurricanes identified
some challenges with the information FEMA shares with States, as well
as broader coordination challenges between FEMA and its State and local
partners. In December 2018, we identified inconsistencies in
information on FEMA's advance contracts. For example, we found that 58
advance contracts included in FEMA's June 2018 advance contract list
were not identified in training documentation provided to FEMA
contracting officers the month prior, in May 2018, and 26 of the
contracts included in the May training documentation were not included
on the June advance contract list. The missing contracts were for goods
and services like generators, foreign language interpretation services,
manufactured housing units, and meals. Without a centralized resource
listing up-to-date information on FEMA's advance contracts that is
communicated to States and localities, FEMA may not have the tools they
need to effectively communicate about advance contracts and use them to
respond to future disasters. To improve the consistency of information
FEMA shares with States, we recommended that FEMA identify a single
centralized resource listing advance contracts that is updated
regularly to include all available advance contracts, and communicate
information on available advance contracts through this centralized
resource to States and localities.
Question From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Katherine Trimble
Question. What, if any, additional authorities do you think FEMA
needs to better execute its disaster contracting mission?
Answer. Our current body of work has not identified additional
authorities that would help FEMA to better execute its disaster
contracting mission, but as we reported in our May 2019 report, FEMA
Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC (OIG-19-38),
FEMA needs to do a better job of executing its existing authorities.
Question From Honorable Al Green for Katherine Trimble
Question. In your investigations and reporting on the 2017
hurricane season, what did the DHS OIG learn about the accuracy of data
shared with States by FEMA?
What recommendations would you make to improve their data-sharing
capabilities?
Answer. We currently don't have any recommendations addressing
FEMA's data-sharing capabilities. However, we expect to issue a number
of reports in the next 6 to 8 months addressing FEMA data accuracy and
data-sharing issues related to the 2017 disasters. Specifically:
An upcoming report on FEMA information technology will
address data accuracy and information sharing between FEMA and
Federal and State partners.
Our audit work on FEMA's logistics and supply distribution
in Puerto Rico addresses data quality issues related to
commodity distribution.
In addition, we are assessing information sharing between
FEMA and the Texas General Land Office as part of our audit of
the Intergovernmental Service Agreement between the two
entities for the provision of direct housing assistance
following Hurricane Harvey.
We are happy to brief you and your staff on the results of these
audits when they are complete.