[House Hearing, 116 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] RUSSIA AND ARMS CONTROL: EXTENDING NEW START OR STARTING OVER? ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ July 25, 2019 __________ Serial No. 116-59 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http:// docs.house.gov, or http://www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 37-182PDF WASHINGTON : 2019 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi JIM COSTA, California JUAN VARGAS, California VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and The Environment WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois, Ranking GREGORY MEEKS, New York Member ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida ANN WAGNER, Missouri DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana DAVID TRONE, Maryland RON WRIGHT, Texas JIM COSTA, California MIKE GUEST, Mississippi VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee Gabrielle Gould, Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page WITNESSES Countryman, Thomas, Board Chairman, Arms Control Association..... 7 Creedon, Madelyn, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution.................................................... 21 Mckeon, Brian, Senior Director, Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement.......................................... 28 Karako, Thomas, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, and Director, Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies.......................................... 38 APPENDIX Hearing Notice................................................... 60 Hearing Minutes.................................................. 61 Hearing Attendance............................................... 62 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD Responses to questions submitted for the record from Representative Wagner.......................................... 63 RUSSIA AND ARMS CONTROL: EXTENDING NEW START OR STARTING OVER? Thursday, July 25, 2019 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and the Environment, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Keating [presiding]. This hearing will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the future of the U.S.-Russia arms control, and specifically the extension of New START. Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. I will now make an opening statement, and then, turn it over to the ranking member for his opening statement. I would like to start off this afternoon with a reminder of how we got here. Even as a very young child, I clearly remember the Cuban Missile Crisis, as do many of my colleagues. I imagine when the United States and the USSR were in a 13-day standoff, and then, the presence of the Soviet nuclear armed missiles in Cuba was in the air, on the television, and many of us suffered, I think, even at early ages the trauma of knowing something was going on in our households and knowing how concerned our parents were and the whole country was. Many of us, including the then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, believed we were on the brink of a nuclear war. In the aftermath, the United States and the USSR signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and in the decades that followed, negotiated numerous other agreements, including SALT I and II, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and INF Treaty, and START. While none of these agreements were perfect, and both sides have continued to develop new and more powerful weapons, our arms control regimes have kept us on the brink of mutually assured destruction. Today, it is important to take stock of how far we have come from the tension and the rampant worry about nuclear annihilation that shaped much of the second half of the 20th century. The United States and Russia are in compliance with New START, as multiple administration officials have stated and testified previously. And the agreement has effectively reduced nuclear arsenals in both countries. Through New START, we have also had unprecedented access to transparency around Russia's nuclear arsenal. Since the agreement entered into force in 2011, the United States and Russia have carried out nearly 300 inspections and more than 18,000 notifications. This has meant our military has been better informed about the threats we face and how we could prioritize investments in defense and readiness. General John Hyten, Commander of the United States Strategic Command, told Congress earlier this year that he is a, quote/unquote, ``big supporter'' of the treaty, and that he saw no reason to withdraw from it, unless Russia stops complying. Other leaders, including former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, former Secretary of State George Shultz, and former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, have specifically called for extension of New START. So, in calling the hearing today, I hope to answer one question: why would we ever let this agreement lapse? I have heard criticism about New START, that it does not go far enough or it does not include countries like China. I have heard concern about Russia's compliance generally with other international agreements and treaty obligations. And I have heard concerns about weapon systems that are not covered by New START, which would be in our national security interest to bring under an arms control regime. These are all valid issues to raise in the context of the discussion about the arms control and Russia. However, none of them leads to a good reason to let New START lapse, and all of them can be addressed while still extending the agreement. I have been in a lot of briefings and conversations about this agreement, and in none of them--many of them led by esteemed current and former national security officials--have I heard anyone mention a single thing we gain by letting the limitations and transparent measures enshrined in New START lapse, nor have I heard a single legitimate cost to staying in the agreement. I would like to think there is broad consensus that the United States should be able to walk and chew gum at the same time, and nothing in New START restricts our ability to extend it and, also, negotiate in parallel with Russia, China, and others about additional concerns or nuclear weapons. It is also my understanding that it is the United States policy to support nonproliferation efforts and, in fact, that we benefit greatly from them. We entered into all these agreements because arms control serves our interests. Without it, we face greater risks of miscalculation, destruction, and loss of human life. An arms race is also incredibly costly. At a time when we are debating the need for broad investments in infrastructure and in education, and areas to address very real safety concerns across the country, and to remain globally competitive, how exactly we are planning to pay for the inevitable arms race that comes from losing the limits to START will create real problems. The relative peace and stability we feel right now that a nuclear attack from Russia is not imminent is due to the fact that we have these type of agreements; that we know more about what Russia is doing; that they know more about what we are doing. It is because of this that our nightly news does not speculate as to whether or not we will soon be in a war. Why would we ever seek to go back to an era of uncertainty about Russia's next move, things we inevitably fear, and preparing for the worst? Because that is really what I am waiting for, to hear any good reason why we would take on all the risks and costs of losing New START for no clear gain. I would like to thank the witnesses for being here and being willing to provide their expert testimony on this issue. I now turn it to the ranking member for his opening statement. Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here. I really appreciate it. And it is getting toward the end of our time out here, so we are all excited, too. So, I just want to be brief today. I think this is a really important hearing and I want to ensure that our questions are answered. And there are no easy answers to this. Let me start off by saying that I believe in arms control agreements. President Reagan once said that it was his ``fervent goal and hope that we will some day no longer have to rely on nuclear weapons to deter aggression and assure world peace''. Maybe that will be in heaven someday; maybe it will be here on earth. We would love to get there, but arms control agreements help to achieve that goal. Limiting the American and Russian nuclear arsenals is a good thing. These weapons are more than enough to deter any nation from considering an attack on American soil. A carefully crafted deal makes the world a safer place, not only on the day that it is signed, but for the foreseeable future. I agreed with the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, not because it was not a good treaty, but because Russia was clearly violating it. With the end of the INF Treaty, the New START Treaty is the only game in town. And while it appears that Russia is complying with the New START agreement, it still has flaws. In 2010, when it was ratified, there were concerns over the scope of the agreement, important issues that were left out. Furthermore, Vladimir Putin has taken advantage of these flaws to aggressively develop new forms of nuclear weapons that fall outside of the scope of this arms control agreement, while the United States sat idly by on the sidelines. Additionally, the treaty does not limit nonstrategic nuclear weapons, otherwise known as tactical nukes. When it comes to these kinds of weapons, Russia has at least a 10-to-1 advantage. Last, Russia is close to fielding two new delivery vehicles, a nuclear-capable air-launch ballistic missile and a sea-launched hypersonic cruise missile, that would not fall under the New START's limitations. Since 2010, I believe the strategic environment has changed significantly. Given Russia's increased stockpile in nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it is important to find a way to reduce the disparity between the U.S. and Russia on these types of weapons. While we agree it is important to reduce Russia's nuclear weapons stockpile, the great power competition we find ourselves in shows that cold war-style bilateral agreements may not be the best approach anymore. New START only restricts two nuclear powers: Russia and America. Nowhere in this agreement would it be possible to include China, which is rapidly developing and modernizing its nuclear arsenal. The DIA Director, Lieutenant General Robert Ashley, has pointed out that China will likely double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the next decade, and that over the last year the Chinese have launched more ballistic missile tests than the rest of the world combined. If we are to achieve successful global nuclear arms control, we must find a way to complete a broader, multilateral nuclear arms control agreement that includes Russia and China. I want to end on this note, given the coinciding timelines of the 2020 Presidential election and the expiration of the New START. Any hope of extending New START lies solely on the shoulders of President Trump's administration because Russia's Ambassador to the United States has already stated that they will not negotiate in the 16 days that New START remains in effect following the 2021 inauguration. All this being said, I believe that our priority should be to support broader multilateral negotiations with Russia and China that bring some of these new systems into an arms control agreement while supporting the administration's efforts to negotiate on an extension of New START. President Reagan had the vision to see a world without the threat of nuclear weapons, and I think there is a way that we can get there. And I stand ready to help in that effort, even if that takes some time. Again, there is no easy answer to all this. I look forward to hearing from all of you. And I yield back. Mr. Keating. I thank the ranking member. We are very privileged to have an outstanding panel of witnesses here today, individuals who are rich in experience in the academic area, in the NGO areas, and serving very related positions for our country. I want to thank these members for their service to our country. I want to thank them for being here. Mr. Thomas Countryman is the chair of the Arms Control Association Board of Directors and former Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Ms. Madelyn Creedon is the president of the Green Marble Group and a former Principal Deputy Administrator of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. Mr. Brian McKeon is senior director of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement and a former Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. And Dr. Thomas Karako is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I want to thank all of you for being here. We appreciate the time you have committed to this. We ask you to limit your testimony to 5 minutes. And without objection, your prepared written statements will be made part of the record. I will now go to Mr. Countryman for his statement. STATEMENT OF THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, BOARD CHAIRMAN, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION Mr. Countryman. I thank Chairman Keating and Ranking Member Kinzinger for this opportunity, but especially for your interest in this topic. If we are to arrest the decline in American global leadership, this Congress must reassert itself. For more than 50 years, every U.S. President has proposed and pursued negotiations with Moscow to regulate destabilizing nuclear competition and reduce the risk of U.S. and allies being destroyed in a nuclear war. They sought and concluded a series of treaties with strong bipartisan support that have made America and the world much safer. They knew that treaties require compromise with rivals who do not share our values; that treaties are not concessions made to adversaries, but an essential component of national security. The U.S. used to take pride in leading the world in promoting agreements that prevented the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reduced the risk of their use. Our leaders knew that numerical or technological superiority could not prevent the United States from destruction in the case of nuclear war. Ronald Reagan put this inescapable fact most succinctly: ``A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.'' The current administration veers away from this tradition, to detriment of our national security. Its hostility toward international agreements, particularly in arms control; its ``go big or go home'' approach, which requires agreements to address all possible problems, instead of one big one; its increasing use of the rhetoric of nuclear dominance and invulnerability; its belief that enhancing American security requires diminishing others' security, all have increased the risk of unintended nuclear war. In November, the administration announced, without a coherent military or diplomatic plan B, its decision to terminate the INF Treaty. Russia's violation made withdrawal justifiable, but justifiable is not the same thing as smart. The administration has no viable plan to persuade Russia to remove its missiles and, instead, pursues development of new missiles which are not militarily necessary and would, if deployed, likely divide NATO and lead Russia to increase the number and type of missiles aimed at NATO targets. Congress would be wise to withhold support for a new Euromissile race. Worse, the administration has dithered for more than a year on extending New START before it expires in 2021. In one of my final meetings in 2017 before I left government, I said to the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister that the new administration and Russia should sign an extension of New START at an early point, before some genius in either capital got the idea that extension could be used as leverage. He agreed. But what we both feared has come to pass, a dangerous fantasy that Moscow needs this treaty more than we do, a futile search for leverage, and a risk of ending up with no constraints on Russia's arsenal. The President wants to bring China into trilateral talks on a new agreement to limit weapons not covered by New START. Now, pursuing talks with other nuclear-armed States and trying to limit all types of nuclear weapons is a noble objective, one I support in principle, but there is no realistic chance such an agreement could be reached, certainly not before New START expires. And that leads to the conclusion that this is a deliberate poison pill, a pretext for running out the block in order to kill New START. It would be national security malpractice to discard New START, to leave Russian nuclear forces unconstrained, our intelligence into their capabilities drastically curtailed, and the incentives for costly nuclear competition multiplied. Without INF, without New START, there would be no binding limits on the two biggest arsenals for the first time in 50 years. Our difficult nuclear relationship with Russia would be more complicated; the risks of renewed nuclear competition would grow, and our efforts to mitigate nuclear risks in other parts of the world would be more difficult. The conditions for an expensive, destabilizing, and dangerous arms race would emerge. As the chairman and the ranking member of the committee have suggested, the immediate step should be a 5-year extension of New START to provide a foundation for a more ambitious successor agreement. Extension is the only major step the President can take with Russia that would simultaneously improve our security, open the possibility of addressing other difficult issues we have with Russia, and draw bipartisan, if not unanimous, approval. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Countryman follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Countryman. Ms. Creedon. STATEMENT OF MADELYN CREEDON, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Ms. Creedon. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, and members of the subcommittee. It is, indeed, a pleasure to be here today to discuss the much-needed 5-year extension to New START and U.S. nuclear policy and forces. First, I would like to make clear that I do not represent any organization today and that my remarks are strictly my own. But I would like to make five brief points. First, New START should be extended. No further action is needed by the Senate. Both Presidents Trump and Putin just have to say yes. Extension of New START is in the national security interests of the U.S. because it would continue the limits on both Russian and U.S. strategic systems, continue to provide transparency and assurance through onsite inspections, information exchanges and declarations, insight not readily obtained by national technical means. The U.S. and Russia, previously the Soviet Union, have a history and a tradition of strategic arms limitation agreements and the transparency, verification, and compliance mechanisms they provide. Without a treaty, we will enter a period of uncertainty and risk the possibility of a new strategic arms race. Second, modernizing the nuclear triad of delivery systems and platforms, and life-extending the U.S. nuclear warheads is essential to maintaining the safe, secure, and reliable stockpile we have today. It is important to note that the central limits of New START are the basis for the modernization effort that was kicked into high gear by the Obama Administration and continued by the Trump administration. This modernization is a long-term effort that will extend well into the 2050's. The New START central limits are extremely flexible, so that each side can ascertain what mix of delivery systems and warheads are needed to ensure its own security. Third, there is another piece of modernization that is often overlooked, but also needs sustained support, and that is the National Nuclear Security Administration's nuclear complex. This complex provides the manufacturing capability to support the nuclear warhead life-extension programs, which, in turn, obviates the need to hold large quantities of weapons in reserve. In addition, the science complex ensures that the stockpile can be maintained and adapted without a return to explosive, underground nuclear testing. It is a truly amazing fact that the advances made in the science of nuclear weapons over the last 25 years allow the NNSA labs to now know and understand more about the function and performance of nuclear weapons than they did in the days of testing. The NNSA complex is old. Much of it dates back to the Manhattan Project and the early days of the cold war, and it needs to be replaced or refurbished. Fourth, we should never forget that, ultimately, it is people who sustain our deterrent. Military and civilians of DoD and NNSA work to maintain the continuum of deterrence, beginning with threat prevention and nonproliferation. They need support and we need to ensure that the entire nuclear enterprise always has the best and the brightest. And fifth, our allies and partners also rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantor of their security against nuclear attack, however remote the possibility. As much as they want the U.S. deterrent to be safe, secure, and reliable, they do not want a new arms race and a return to the days of mutual assured destruction. As of September 2017, the U.S. has 3,822 warheads in its stockpile, more than enough, with another 2,000-plus warheads awaiting dismantlement. This is down from the mid-sixties peak of 31,255 warheads. We surely do not want a return to those days and increase the risk of nuclear war, rather than reduce it. In conclusion, in my prepared testimony I referenced a 2010 op-ed by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Jake Garn, a former Republican Senator from Utah, supporting New START. In that piece, they cautioned against seeking a silver bullet that solves all problems. New START was under consideration at the time that they wrote the op-ed and was being criticized for not covering the full range of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In many respects, that is what the Trump administration is doing again with respect to extending New START, criticizing it for what it is not and was never intended to be, a silver bullet treaty. The treaty should be extended and time provided to take the next step toward stability. Thank you for holding this hearing on a very important topic that is not discussed enough, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Keating. Thank you, Ms. Creedon. Mr. McKeon. STATEMENT OF BRIAN McKEON, SENIOR DIRECTOR, PENN BIDEN CENTER FOR DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the importance of arms control agreements with Russia. I agree with much of what was said, if not all of it, by my two colleagues. I will try very hard not to duplicate what they said. I will focus primarily on New START. An extension of New START, which we have discussed already, would bring significant benefits to American security, for the same reasons the treaty was a good idea in the first place: the transparency and predictability that it provides. New START contains an inspection and verification regime that includes regular exchanges of data; regular notifications, including advance notification of launches, and intrusive onsite inspections of the military bases on the territory of the other party where nuclear forces are based. General Hyten, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified last winter that the insight provides by the verification measures are ``unbelievably important,'' quote/ unquote, to his understanding of Russian force posture. Without a treaty, our confidence levels about the size, location, and nature of Russian forces would decrease, and the intelligence resources required to monitor such forces would increase, but they would not yield information equivalent to that which can be obtained through the onsite inspections. The treaty limits the number of strategic launchers and warheads that each party may deploy as well as a combined limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers. This structure provides several advantages to the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. First, the Commander of the Strategic Command can devise the war plans secure in the knowledge about the size and location of Russian nuclear forces. Without the treaty, he would be required to engage in worst-case planning assumptions, which eventually could result in decisions to increase the size of deployed forces. Second, the Departments of Defense and Energy can plan for the recapitalization of the nuclear triad and the DOE production facilities with certainty about the requirements for U.S. forces well into the next decade. The flexibility in the treaty is particularly important at a time when all three legs of the triad are aging out and scheduled for replacement at the same time. In the event that DoD encounters reliability issues with the current force or technical issues in the recapitalization program that affects one leg of the triad, we can respond by adjusting other legs of the triad to ensure that we maintain an adequate deployed deterrent. Third, the upper limits prevent the two sides from engaging in an unproductive and unnecessary arms race in order to seek an advantage against the other. An arms race is not foreordained, but it cannot be ruled out, and at times the President has threatened it. The Trump administration, as has been stated, has not committed to an extension and appears focused now on the new goal of a trilateral agreement involving the United States, Russia, and China. The President's ambition is admirable; the only problem is there is almost zero chance of it happening during his first term. For starters, the architect of this ``go big or go home'' strategy is Mr. Bolton, the National Security Advisor, who has never seen an arms control agreement that he liked. He shepherded one in the Bush 43 administration that limited nuclear-deployed arms for exactly 1 day and, then, it expired. So, there are reasons to be skeptical about this gambit. Second, arms control treaties negotiated between the United States and Russia usually took months or years to negotiate, and then, the Senate's consideration and review would also take months or even longer. A trilateral agreement involving the United States, Russia, and China would be vastly more complicated. Third, there is the simple and practical fact that China is not interested. Given the significant disparity in its nuclear forces compared to the United States and Russia, even with the expansion that China is going through that the ranking member identified, the idea that Beijing would negotiate a treaty of this sort is fanciful. Finally, I am skeptical about this, given the current state of bilateral relations between the United States and Russia, which I think we would all concede is poor. In an ideal world, we would pursue an arms control agenda with Russia that includes negotiations on non-strategic weapons, on further reductions in strategic systems, and discussions about Russia's novel systems. We must have those discussions about the novel systems in the context of New START and the New Start extension. But we also have to recognize we live in a world where distrust between the United States and Russia is high, where Russia has violated the INF Treaty, illegally occupied Crimea, intervened in Eastern Ukraine, and sought to interfere in our elections. We have to be realistic about what can be achieved in this environment. It is realistic to extend New START and, as has been stated, doing so is not inconsistent with the pursuit of a more ambitious agreement. In fact, it seems illogical to pursue more expansive limits on nuclear weapons while contemplating a world in which there are no limits between the United States and Russia. That would be the classic case of letting the perfect get in the way of the very good. The New START agreement is a very good agreement, and the United States and Russia should pursue an extension. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. McKeon. Dr. Karako. STATEMENT OF THOMAS KARAKO, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, AND DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Dr. Karako. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, thank you for the opportunity to comment today on nuclear arms control. It is a very timely issue. U.S. and Russian officials were just meeting about this last week, and, of course, we are probably just eight or 9 days away from the potential termination of the INF Treaty. Now, in 18 months, the United States will face the question of whether or not to extend New START, but that decision need not be made today. Instead, it is worth considering how this moment in the U.S.-Russian relationship, this decision point, can best be used to advance some longer-term U.S. goals for arms control and defense more broadly. With today's hearing, the committee usefully connects the question of New START extension to Russia's violation of INF. A lot has changed since 2010. Indeed, contempt for agreements seems to now have become a defining feature of Russia's international identity. And that identity and track record should be central to our thinking about future agreements with them, including whether and under what circumstances an extension should be made. Now much commentary on this issue has treated the prospect of extension as self-evident, as urgent and necessary to forestall an arms race. And Washington has gradually come to grips with the reality of renewed, long-term geopolitical competition. Many of Russia's violations have also become more widely acknowledged. But I wonder, have the implications of Russian behavior really sunk in? The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review warned that, quote, ``Concluding further agreements with a State in violation of multiple existing agreements would indicate a lack of consequences for its non-compliance and thereby undermine arms control broadly.'' End quote. Chairman Dunford has expressed doubt about New START extension on similar grounds. It is also debatable how a lack of extension would necessarily lead to further buildup. Rather than occurring in response to some sort of U.S. action, Russia's nuclear renaissance was initiated separately and prior to more recent U.S. modernization efforts. Apart from further uploading ICBMs, it is hard to imagine Russia affording much more than they are doing already. To be sure, there are benefits in the treaty's degree of certainty with respect to the category of nuclear weapons called strategic, even if the line between strategic and non- strategic systems grows more artificial by the day. Given that Russia seems uninhibited from just about every other form of bad behavior, it is worth dwelling on the apparent anomaly that they comply with New START while violating just about everything else. Moscow may simply not feel the need to violate a treaty structured around so-called strategic weapons when they can do so much with non-strategics, and with which they have, reportedly, a 10-to-1 advantage. These non-strategic Russian systems include the INF-violating missile, other sea- and air-launched missiles, and the transoceanic torpedo. Russia appears to value the treaty extension, and we should at least try to get some leverage of this value in the service of broader defense goals. And one path is to earnestly renew negotiations for a comprehensive approach to all nuclear weapons. That was urged by the Senate in its 2010 resolution of ratification and it was pursued by the Obama Administration. Russia showed little interest then, but it was the right goal and we should pursue it again. Another important goal is that multilateral arrangement that includes China, which is, after all--this has changed since 2010--now the pacing threat for United States national security. Such a move was endorsed by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister mentioned before in 2013. Getting China to that table will not be easy. It is not obvious why it would be in China's interest to do so, at least not as the table is now set. It may require resetting the table, perhaps even working with Russia in a post-INF context to field significant forces around China. In sum, it may be beneficial to extend New START on conditional terms, a condition that Russia immediately enter into and sustain good-faith negotiations for that more comprehensive accord. These negotiations could also advance a joint effort to coach China into some kind of regime. There are 18 months for these options to be explored. Those talks should be given time to proceed, but talking about the urgency of unconditional extension I worry could have the unintended consequence of undermining the U.S. negotiating position and setting back these larger, longer-term goals. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and I look forward to questions. [The prepared statement of Dr. Karako follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Keating. Thank you, Dr. Karako. I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. This is the committee with European-Eurasian jurisdiction. So, I want to focus, first, on the relationship we have with our NATO allies as it relates to this issue. In trips I have had already to Europe talking to our allies and discussions I have had back here at home with our NATO allies, there was great concern about the way that the U.S. approached the INF Treaty and backing away from it. Their concerns were more than private. They were public. They were concerned they were not consulted ahead of time and brought into those discussions with an INF Treaty that affected them directly. They were concerned, too, that as we proceeded to do that, that we did not take that 6-month period--this is about the last--and concentrate at least and demonstrate efforts to renegotiate some of that. And that is important, I think, because how we deal with these allies is critical to our strength in the future and our global security as a whole. So, with that in mind, what would it look like in terms of our NATO allies if we made a decision not to proceed to this agreement and extend it in the first round? Now I noticed that was addressed by Mr. Countryman and Ms. Creedon. If you would like to comment on that, since you brought up this in your testimony? Mr. Countryman. Briefly, the NATO alliance is one in which the United States should not only be a leader, but a listener. And all of the NATO allies have spoken of the importance of extension of New START. They all support it. On the INF, I think they were disappointed by the degree of consultation. There was no interagency process, as it has been pursued for many years in Washington, before the President made this announcement. While the announcement was not a surprise, what you have just said is correct, that there was zero effort on the part of the United States to pursue alternatives to the disappearance of INF other than building new missiles. So, I think the Europeans have a valid criticism there. Finally, non-strategic nuclear weapons, of which the United States has more than a thousand by the last information I had, are an important issue for the NATO alliance as well. And one of the things that makes negotiating a new agreement to include non-strategic weapons impractical is we have not begun any kind of process of consultation with our NATO allies, whose interests are directly affected, about what we would put on the table with regard to non-strategic weapons. Mr. Keating. Ms. Creedon? Ms. Creedon. Thank you. NATO has consistently, over the course of the last series of summits, reiterated that NATO is a nuclear alliance and remains such as long as nuclear weapons exist. That said, NATO has substantially reduced the number of strategic warheads placed on its soil and certainly is not interested in increasing those. In order to avoid more increases in nuclear arms, maintaining the New START Treaty is extraordinarily important for NATO. Just recently, the NATO Secretary General has reiterated this in a press conference that he held shortly after the most recent NATO Russia Council meeting, which NATO is still continuing to hold. And I would add, it is not just our NATO allies that are very interested in ensuring that we continue with New START. It is the whole range of our allies in the Indo-Pacific as well. Mr. Keating. We talked about leverage briefly, and Dr. Karako mentioned that, too. But, given our relationship now with Russia, and given the fact that New START could be extended just with the Presidents' initiatives to do that, I just think it creates more leverage for the U.S. to just move forward and demonstrate we are prepared to do this. China is now engaged more than ever in training exercises with Russia together. Trying to deal with that could, indeed, make our initial leverage more difficult. Does anyone want to comment on that? Ms. Creedon. Well, it might make it more difficult, but I think there is also something important to consider. And that is the significant disparity currently between the number of nuclear warheads and systems that Russia and the U.S. have compared to China. So, right now, between the U.S. and Russia, they have 90 percent of the world's nuclear delivery systems. There is room, there is opportunity, there is need for further reductions on the part of those two nations before we can bring in China, at least on the strategic arms. Mr. Keating. I now recognize the ranking member. Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, to all of you, thank you for being here. And by the way, Mr. Countryman, you were born to be in public service with a last name like that. [Laughter.] And I know everybody tells you that, but I am like, it is like when you meet somebody whose last name is ``Butcher'' and they are a butcher, or something. But thank you all for your service. A couple of quick points. Mr. McKeon, I appreciate your testimony. I just wanted to make a point. I think just bringing up that Ambassador Bolton is involved is not a reason. I actually have a great deal of respect for the guy, and I know he takes a lot of hits in the media and people use him as a foil, but I think he knows foreign policy really well. And so, I think that is important to note. But let me ask a question to Mr. Karako or Dr. Karako. So, let's say we extend New START for infinity, forever, and we abide by the current limits forever into the foreseeable future. What limits does China have under that? Dr. Karako. Oh, of course, the answer is none. And up until now, they have managed, China has managed to get away without any binding limitation on transparency or anything--and so, again, fully stipulating the challenges of getting them to that table. Mr. Kinzinger. And let me ask you on that, too. So, let's say we get them to the table. Let's say we negotiate directly with China and we have a China-U.S. treaty, and that freezes us under the current limits we are already under under New START, for instance. What is the motivation for China to be involved if, in fact, we are under the same limits we are already under, under another treaty, for them to get into that treaty and limit themselves? Would you agree that there is no motivation whatsoever, then, at that point? Dr. Karako. I would say, in a vacuum with no other context, not necessarily. But there are other things going on, including, for instance, in the post-INF world, things that the United States can and will likely be doing in the region with our allies. Mr. Kinzinger. So, it looks like, I think the best thing we can hope for--and I think we all agree on this, and we probably all agree on 90 percent of the issue, anyway, with some nuances--but we would obviously like to see a treaty between the U.S., Russia, and China, where we are all, in essence, living by the same kind of rules. Because if any one of those three are out, then, obviously, that is an advantage for them. They do not have to abide by that agreement and you have two others that are. But let me ask you, so we have an agreement with Russia and nothing with China. In the next 10 or 20 years, who do you see as the biggest threat to the United States from a national security perspective, Russia or China? Dr. Karako. Well, the typical formulation is Russia may be urgent, maybe more provocative, but, of course, the pacing threat for the National Defense Strategy in the Pentagon right now is China. And so, that is why I tried to emphasize that we need to look beyond the 5-years, and as we think about the 5- year extension, include that long-term perspective in there. It is worth making the effort for that longer-term push. Mr. Kinzinger. And I think, too, one of the things, if we enter a multilateral treaty, which I think we would all love to see, but you can begin to put a lot of new things in there as far as we are opening up a front; we are concerned about a front opening up in space right now. We know some of the capabilities that the Chinese and Russians have in space. There are cyber issues. There are any number of things that may be able to be wrapped into some broader situation. Because, right now, when it comes to space, it is kind of like the laws of the old pirates of the sea, right? There really is no law. There are no rules. And that is something that I think is of as great a concern to the United States and national security even as nuclear weapons. They are both very intense, but this one is not getting enough attention. Let me ask you another question. What could we use if we want to get China to the table in this, which is all of our goal--I think we would all agree--what could we use as leverage to get the Chinese to the table? And also, do you think we could expect Russia's help in doing so? Dr. Karako. It is hard to say we can expect anything from Russia, but what I would suggest is that, in the absence of the INF Treaty, the United States, through long-range precision fires and other things, should be pursuing longer-range strike fires from multiple domains. That is the sort of thing that will get China's attention. Now the administration has said we are only going to be pursuing conventional intermediate-range missile forces, and that is a good thing. But we can begin the process of holding lots of different things at risk in China through that means. Mr. Kinzinger. And right now, we know Russia is developing new strategic systems to get around our missile defenses. I guess my question in my limited seconds here, if you want to talk a little about that? But also, do you believe Russia would agree to discuss the inclusion of these weapons in any New START extension? Dr. Karako. In terms of hypersonic glide vehicle kind of things? Mr. Kinzinger. Yes. Dr. Karako. Possibly, but I would not count on it. That is the sort of thing that is an emerging threat and it is an emerging advantage. At least a couple of years ago, we were a little bit behind the curve on that. So, it is something we are scrambling to catch up on, both on the strike and defensive side, but we are not there yet. Mr. Kinzinger. Well, again, I want to thank the chairman and thank you all for being here. It is a really important issue, and we could stand to learn a lot from all of you. So, thank you for being here. I yield back. Mr. Keating. Thank you. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses. I want to begin by asking you, Mr. Countryman, what you think is the likely both short-term and long-term outcome if we do not extend New START in terms of American national security interests? Mr. Countryman. In the short term, we would immediately lose valuable eyes on Russian nuclear capabilities. Also, in the short term, and something that does make this urgent, there is an important international meeting in the spring of 2020, the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference that is held every 5 years. Traditionally, it has been important for the U.S. and Russia to demonstrate that they are reducing their arsenals and reducing the nuclear threat to the world in order to gain consensus at the review of a treaty that has been strongly in our national security interests. Neither the U.S. nor Russia at this point can go to that conference next year and say with a straight face, ``We have done our best to fulfill our legal obligation to keep reducing our arsenals.'' That will be a loss for our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to still more countries beyond the nine that hold them now. In the medium term, you should also expect that Russia will be able, because of open production lines, because of its possession of heavy missiles, to be able to upload more nuclear warheads more rapidly than the United States can with no visibility whatsoever from our side. And in the long run, I think we are setting the conditions for a very expensive and destabilizing nuclear arms race that two Presidents have expressed their readiness to conduct. Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. Ms. Creedon, National Security Advisor Bolton has long opposed New START extension. In a 2010 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, he argued that New START would cripple the United States' ``long-range conventional warhead delivery capabilities and severely constrain our nuclear flexibility,'' and we would, I quote, ``pay for this mistake in future conflicts entirely unrelated to Russia''. End quote. Did his predictions turn out to be true? Ms. Creedon. So, I do not think so at all. One of the things that is very clear is that the New START Treaty does not limit either conventional systems nor does it limit missile defense systems. And at the time, there was a lot of, I would say pulling of hair and gnashing of teeth, that the New START Treaty was going to limit these things, and they do not. It does not. The other thing is, one of the beauties, if you will, of the New START Treaty is that it is an infinitively flexible treaty. So, it sets top-line numbers for delivery systems and platforms and top-line numbers for operationally deployed warheads. And within those top lines, the U.S. has infinite flexibility to be able to shape its systems based on what is most important to its national security interest at the time. So, I think it is an extraordinarily flexible treaty. Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. My final question is, there has been a lot of discussion about a trilateral agreement and including Russia in this conversation. It is important to note that China's nuclear arsenal numbers about 300 weapons while the United States and Russia have more than 1300 and 1400, respectively. And I think there have been a number of people who have argued, and I think Senator Markey actually, on May 15th, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, ``I think it's pretty clear that the attempt to move this to multilateral arms control talks with Russia and, then, adding in China is really a poison pill to provide an excuse for not extending New START.'' Do you agree with that assessment, Mr. Countryman? Mr. Countryman. Yes, and the point about getting China into the negotiations, nobody has explained what we would like China to sign up to and what we would put on the table. Broadly speaking, three options. We could ask China to agree to the same limit of strategic warheads as the U.S. and Russia, thereby giving a U.S. blessing to China quadrupling its nuclear forces. We could propose that the U.S. and Russia go down to China's level of about 300 warheads, give or take. I think that is a great idea, but not achievable anytime in the near future. Or we could tell the Chinese, ``Let's lock in forever a 5-to-1 numerical advantage for the United States over China.'' It is impossible to explain why the Chinese would go for that. No coherent negotiating strategy that would draw on the Chinese has been put forward. Mr. Cicilline. And in the few seconds I have left, Mr. Countryman, if the United States and Russia began increasing their nuclear arsenal, in the absence of an extension of New START, what is China's likely response to be? Mr. Countryman. The main thing is they will keep doing what they are doing, which is building up forces anyway. But the incentive to accelerate that growth will be even greater, as not only the U.S. and Russia lose transparency about each other, the rest of the world, including China, will have no clue as to the actual size of the two arsenals. Mr. Cicilline. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Keating. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett. Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. I had a couple of questions, and I will just throw them out to the committee. And you all just jump in when you want to-- even if you do not want to. I would appreciate it. What can we use as leverage to get the Chinese to the table on the arms control issue? Not everybody at once. Dr. Karako. I guess I would again say, agreeing with what has been said just a moment ago, that is not going to be easy. Right now, China possesses a considerable advantage on the conventional strike in the region. That is their home game. That is our away game. And they have got a lot of advantages to push around their neighbors. I think that what was formerly called the ``pivot'' or the emphasis on the Asia-Pacific, and now, with the Trump administration, it is the Indo-Pacific, more and more strike assets and different operations in that region, making it harder for China to push its neighbors around, that would be a good thing. Ms. Creedon. I think we are going about this a bit wrong. So, in the context of nuclear weapons and warheads and delivery systems, there is zero incentive for China, given the significant disparity between the U.S. and China, and then, also, Russia and China. What we really need to think about, since we have no history of bilateral-type arrangements with China, how do we look at building a relationship initially? And so, there are some things that we might do to start to build this relationship. So, one of the things that we might consider, which would also be extraordinarily important to the U.S. Navy, is ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty, for example. China has ratified this. They operate under it, and the U.S. has not ratified and is at a significant disadvantage in the region. So, that would be something that we might do to begin relationships under a treaty umbrella. The second thing--and this is a little bit out there--but, on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Russia has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; China has not, nor has the U.S. Basically, China has been waiting to see what we do. OK. Both the U.S. and China would like to see North Korea not resume testing and freeze its nuclear weapons program. Another idea, for instance, might be the U.S. and China agreeing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in exchange for DPRK to also sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. So, I think we need to think about this in much more creative ways to build that relationship with China. Mr. Countryman. I agree with everything that Madelyn Creedon has just said. I will also point out that a trilateral negotiation in which Russia and China are in the same room with a U.S. negotiator does not increase our leverage vis-a-vis Russia to have China in the same room. And it does not increase our leverage vis-a-vis China to have the Russians in the same room. It is extremely difficult to immediately jump to the level of familiarity with concepts, particularly the crucial concept of transparency which U.S. and Russian negotiations have built up over decades, extremely difficult to jump to that level with the Chinese, for whom transparency is an extremely alien concept. We do need to work hard on military-to-military channels and honest, closed, secret, strategic discussions between United States and Chinese officials about military and strategy issues as a first step. Mr. Burchett. You said, ``closed''. Do you mean, you are talking closed-door meetings? Mr. Countryman. I mean getting to understand the way each other thinks in a frank way. Yes, closed door. Mr. Burchett. I got you. What would be the impact on allied national security if we failed to extend the New START? Would the U.S. nuclear umbrella be stretched way too thin? Mr. McKeon. At the current time, Congressman, we have more than enough for our deterrent purposes in the war plans. Under New START, I would point you to an unclassified report to the Congress in 2013, when new deployment guidance was issued by President Obama where a statement to that effect was made, that we had more-than-adequate forces under the New START limits. If there is a buildup in response to the absence of a treaty by the Russians and we decide to respond, I do not think that would stretch our forces. We can adequately cover our deterrence requirements by a buildup. The question it poses to STRATCOM and DoD is, if we reduce forces, then, as you adjust the war plans to meet our deterrent requirements, that is where the harder calculations come in. Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Keating. Thank you. The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Costa. Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important subcommittee hearing. I would like to drill down a little bit more about whether we should move forward or not with regards to the New START. I do not know, Mr. McKeon, following your comment, the New START covers Russian weapon systems. What do you think, as we see their modernization program, what systems we should be most concerned about here in the United States? Mr. McKeon. Well, there are several issues going on in the Russian modernization program. They have been modernizing their triad and they are ahead of us in that respect. They are doing some work on nuclear weapons, which we really can't talk about in this forum. Mr. Costa. How rapidly is that taking place? Mr. McKeon. Well, the overall modernization, I have a quotation from General Hyten in my prepared statement, sir, that he anticipates that their overall modernization will be completed next year and they are about, I think, 80 percent of the way there. Mr. Costa. And to what extent does the New START limit those efforts? Mr. McKeon. New START only has two core limits. It limits launchers, the number you can have deployed and non-deployed, and strategically deployed warheads. Other than that, there are no limits. The issues of concern to the United States and our Western allies are also the so-called novel systems that President Putin has boasted about from time to time--the hypersonic glide weapon, it is under development, the so-called doomsday underwater torpedo that he has talked about. Mr. Costa. How real are those? Mr. McKeon. I am two and a half years out-of-date on the intelligence, sir, so I do not know the current state of those programs. But when I left government, I would say that they were not as far along as you might infer from his public statements. And in any event, we have never had defenses against Russia's strategic systems. Our national missile defense has never been designed to stop a Russian system. Mr. Costa. Notwithstanding discussions with---- Mr. McKeon. So, we are already vulnerable to Russian strategic weapons, whether they have---- Mr. Costa. Well, and we have been for some time. Mr. McKeon. Correct. Mr. Costa. So, are we pretty confident about our intelligence, notwithstanding what we can and cannot talk about in this hearing, in terms of what new systems they are developing? Mr. McKeon. I would really hesitate to opine on how confident the intelligence community is today. We, obviously, have very good satellites and other technological capabilities. I think our intelligence about leadership---- Mr. Costa. Would any other witness like to opine? Mr. McKeon [continuing]. Intentions are not that great. Mr. Costa. Any of the other witnesses like to opine? Ms. Creedon. Well, to that end, I think the thing that we also have to remember is that our intelligence is greatly enhanced by extending New START because it provides for those on-the-ground inspections. It provides for the notifications. It provides for displays. It provides, in the context of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, an opportunity to discuss whether or not new systems are, in fact, covered or not by the New START Treaty. So, there is a lot in the context of the New START Treaty in the intelligence arena that we would lose if it were not extended for the additional 5 years. Mr. Costa. I have read that our cost to update our own modernization program could extend $50 billion-plus per year for a number of years. What are the financial costs if we do not, if New START does expire, do you think? Mr. Countryman. There is immediately greater spending on intelligence, and then, no matter how much we spend on intelligence and national technical means, we would not be able to substitute for the information we get from notification and inspections. Mr. Costa. So, what is your view in terms of the cost of our own efforts to modernize? Mr. Countryman. It is huge, I mean huge. It is probably $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years. And I expect that, if the demise of New START leads to nuclear planners in both capitals, in the absence of solid information, working off of worst-case scenarios, they would propose ever greater levels of expenditure and armament. That is where we were throughout the arms race of the sixties, and I think that is the more expensive, riskier status, riskier race we would go back to. Mr. Costa. I do not know who feels most confident to talk about the Chinese, but what are the odds that we should be concerned about China's nuclear arsenal? I mean, they handle it differently than we and the Russians do in terms of how they store and how they maintain alert status, as I understand it. Ms. Creedon. The Chinese arsenal is actually quite small. Mr. Costa. Yes, that is what I understand. Ms. Creedon. And so, the Chinese advantage is really in the area right now of conventional systems, and that is the---- Mr. Costa. And that is expanding greatly? Ms. Creedon. Yes. Mr. Costa. We have watched their buildup. It is a dramatic increase. My time has expired. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Keating. Thank you. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Wright. Mr. Wright. Thank you. I want to thank all of you for being here today. Let me stress that I have great respect for you, your intelligence, your experience. And like everyone up here, I think we should pursue an arms control treaty. But I remember very vividly a previous U.S. President who set conventional wisdom on its head with his approach to adversaries and arms control and foreign policy generally, who was thoroughly vilified in the press, vilified by the left as a reckless cowboy who was going to lead us into nuclear war. But what his policies did do is help bring down the Soviet Union, which resulted in genuine arms control. If I were a betting man, I would bet that none of you 2 years ago would have predicted that Donald Trump would set foot in North Korea, but he did. And no President has set conventional wisdom on its head like this one has since Ronald Reagan. So, I would caution against utilizing conventional wisdom to predict what this President might or might not achieve. The second thing is--and, Dr. Karako, I want to get your thoughts on this for just a second--it seems to me only prudent that we would periodically review every treaty we have, whether it is an arms control treaty or a trade agreement, whatever it might be, to see if they are still working for the American people, because no treaty is sacrosanct. Would you agree with that? Dr. Karako. Sure, in principle. The NATO treaty might come close to that, but, in principle, that is right. That is one of the reasons that something like New START had a 10-year period and with the option of a 5-year extension. It was not indefinite. Mr. Wright. The purpose of an arms control treaty is not to make us feel good; it is to actually control arms. And any of you can answer this. Given that we know Russia is developing new weapons, and given, as Dr. Karako mentioned, their disdain for even respecting agreements, if they do not agree to limit new weapons, are not we setting ourselves up for a future violation in the future, if we go through with this one? There is nothing in their recent behavior that would give us confidence that they would treat another agreement any differently. Would you all comment, all of you? Dr. Karako. I would say, again, that there is that anomaly, that Russia has seemingly complied with New START while being willing to violate just about everything else. And so, I have not suggested that extension of New START would mean that they would violate it. On the contrary, because so many things have changed since 2010, that disparity that everyone has referred to and alluded to, it has a different significance today. It is salient. It matters more that they are doing all these things that are not covered by the treaty. Mr. Wright. I still have a little time. Mr. Countryman, did you want to---- Mr. Countryman. First, I have the greatest respect for Ronald Reagan, who came into office not knowing much about nuclear weapons and made it a priority to study up from day one. And as a consequence, you are absolutely right, he took radical, world-changing steps in that direction. When the Soviets violated the ABM Treaty by building a radar, he did not pull out of the treaty; he did not stop negotiating other treaties. He pressed ahead until that violation was corrected, and that treaty was preserved. And most importantly, he made that sentence, together with Mr. Gorbachev, that no one in the current administration is prepared to repeat, that ``nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.'' I wish that Russia were the only country in the world that took such a cavalier attitude toward international agreements. It is important to distinguish between the verification mechanisms of INF and New START. Because the INF Treaty succeeded in its goal of eliminating all known intermediate- range missiles, the onsite inspection provisions were allowed to lapse. And if we get to some kind of extended agreement that addresses the question of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, we should find a way to address that problem. Mr. Wright. Ms. Creedon? No, you do not have a comment? If you do not, that is fine. We can go to Mr. McKeon. Ms. Creedon. I am conscious of your time, sir. But the only thing I really wanted to add on this is the New START Treaty was intentionally and specifically to continue the legacy of strategic arms control, and that is what it did. And it defines strategic arms within its treaty. If there are going to be new weapons that fit within the definition of what is a strategic arm, then the New START Treaty would cover it and limit it. And that is a very different topic of conversation than what most of the conversations are, and most of those conversations are about those systems that are not covered by this treaty. And that was known at the time it was entered into, and it was known at the time all the other strategic arms control treaties were entered into. The idea was to have New START control the strategic arms, and then, have an opportunity to get after all those other things that were not included in New START. That is what we still need to do. Mr. Wright. And I am out of time unless the chairman wants to---- Mr. Keating. No. The chair recognizes the vice chair of the committee, Ms. Spanberger from Virginia. Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have talked a lot about the nuclear forces modernization cycle that began in the early 2000's, and that many of these modernization programs would be subject to limits under the New START Treaty. But Russia is also developing a number of new strategic weapon systems that are not currently subject to the treaty. These include nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles, globe-circling nuclear-powered cruise missiles, and long-range nuclear torpedoes. While these weapons are not currently included in the treaty, Article 2 allows for emerging offensive arms to be considered for inclusion through a bilateral consultative process. Mr. Countryman, you were very clear that an extension of New START should not be contingent on the inclusion of these emerging weapon systems. And with that in mind, I am curious if you could share, what is the best way that we could address these new strategic nuclear weapon systems and capabilities into the future? Mr. Countryman. The treaty itself contains the means for doing so. The Bilateral Consultative Commission can be used by both parties to address concerns they have, and specifically, Article 2 says that is where you address them. I would like to see both Washington and Moscow use the Bilateral Consultative Commission aggressively; that is, not just meet once every 4 months, but stay in session and work hard on these issues, because I believe both Russian and American issues can be resolved sufficiently to allow extension of New START without further problem. Ms. Spanberger. And a bit of a broader question, Mr. McKeon, for you. When we are looking about emerging technologies and future technological capabilities, from your perspective, are there things we should be anticipating that we are not or are there things we should be anticipating when looking at our treaty efforts, be they bilateral or multilateral? Mr. McKeon. I think the conversation about Russia and China and strategic systems needs to be broader than nuclear. And I think the ranking member spoke about this when he was still here. We have issues with the Chinese and Russians in space and in cyberspace, and we have seen reports about Russia mapping out where some of the underwater sea cables are. So, there are a lot of issues in the context of a broader strategic stability conversation that we need to have with both the Russians and Chinese. Continuing New START, assuming Russian compliance, at least gives us some forum to have these conversations with the Russians. We have restrictions on mil-to-mil engagements with the United States and Russia because of the intervention in Ukraine. Those might be reconsidered. We have tried to have strategic stability conversations with the Chinese over many administrations. So far, they have not been interested. We need to take a broader lens, I think, not just on the nuclear question, as important as that is. Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Keating. Thank you. The chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank each of you for being here. And it certainly was positive to see the agreement with Congressman Wright and Mr. Countryman about the success that President Ronald Reagan achieved, the victory in the cold war and the liberation of dozens of countries, and the creation of dozens of new countries around the world because of successful policies. I appreciate the contributions of each of you, as we achieve new policies. Dr. Karako, before the United States announced the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, they consulted with the allies in Europe. NATO issued a statement supporting the U.S. withdrawal and agreeing with the U.S. conclusion that Russia had violated the treaty. Has the United States consulted with its allies about potential extension of New START? Would you expect the allies to support a U.S. decision to allow the treaty to lapse? Dr. Karako. I could not speak for what they would do, other than to speculate. But I think that what you just described there in terms of consulting with NATO, you are right, they did go through--it might not have been exactly when some of our allies wanted or as soon, but, eventually, they did speak with one voice. And I think it kind of depends on how well we communicate the seriousness of what we are trying to accomplish. Mr. Wilson. And additionally, Dr. Karako, Russia is developing new strategic systems designed to get around the missile defenses of the United States. These systems do not appear to be limited by the New START. How many of these systems would Russia need to have an edge over our citizens? How useful is the U.S. missile defense system against Russia's existing nuclear weapons? Dr. Karako. Well, of course, today, and as the Trump administration's missile defense review reaffirmed, U.S. missile defenses are not directed against or not capable, in terms of capability or number, of really dealing with the strategic threat from Russia. That has not changed, and we are not on a programmatic path to change that. These new systems, however, you are right, they are more on a regional level and the so-called non-strategic level, designed to get at the gaps and seams of what we are relatively good at in terms of point or regional ballistic missile defense. Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And for each of you, beginning with Mr. Countryman, again, who has a unique name, do you believe the United Kingdom and France should join the arms control process, as Russia has suggested? Do you believe they would be willing to limit their nuclear forces or provide transparency into their numbers and capabilities? Mr. Countryman. On the first part, I think that the British, in particular, also the French, have provided more transparency than China has, and unprecedented compared to their historical record. I do not believe that they would be willing to enter into a process right now. What I would like to see is increased use of the P5 mechanism in which those five countries you mentioned have consulted on nuclear issues with a view to increasing transparency, developing trust, exchanging views on doctrines. Getting to understand each other is, I think, a precondition for what I hope 1 day will be that kind of multilateral negotiation. Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Ms. Creedon. Ms. Creedon. So, I certainly agree with Tom. France and the U.K. have been extraordinarily open. In fact, they have actually been more transparent than even has the U.S. But transparency would be a very good first step. And I would expand this discussion because what we have not talked about Pakistan, India, or Israel, or the DPRK, all of whom have nuclear weapons and all of whom could benefit from some sort of a transparency process from the outset. Certainly, Pakistan, India, and Israel are not transparent, nor is China. Even Russia is not terribly transparent, except in the context of the New START Treaty. And if we did not have the New START Treaty, we would even lose that. So, transparency is a very good way to start confidence- building measures, exchanges of information, so we did not get ourselves in some sort of a situation of an accidental nuclear war or a misunderstanding that started a nuclear war inadvertently. Mr. Wilson. And, Mr. McKeon. Mr. McKeon. The only thing I would add, sir, to what has been said is I would be skeptical the French would ever want to get into a multilateral conversation about limitingtheir deterrent, which they see as independent and vital to the defense of their country. The British might eventually be coaxed into such a process. Mr. Wilson. And, Dr. Karako. Dr. Karako. Yes, the independence of our allies, they have been very transparent, but at the same time they have their numbers. It is not that significant relative to Russia. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, each of you, for being here today. I yield back. Mr. Keating. And thank you. Today's hearing is one of the more important hearings that we can have, and it is important to have it at this juncture. We really worked hard as a committee to get this done before we broke, so that we can do all we can do to move the ball forward on an extension of New START, whatever form that may take. There was a great deal of agreement on what the challenges we have and the goals that we should achieve, some differences on how we can get there, but that agreement is important. This is, indeed, an issue that is an existential threat, much as it was years ago. The human costs that are at stake are enormous. And I think, indeed, the situation is even more dangerous than before. With the extension of artificial intelligence and the prospect of miscalculation greater, the threat is greater. Also, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, it is extremely important, too, because we have great challenges ahead of us in that committee as well and great costs attendant to those challenges. The modernization effort that has been mentioned is one that will be expensive. We have to look at how we can curb the overall expenditures that we have, so that we can accomplish that. Because we have new threats, not just in modernization of current types of assets, but expansion in the cyber area, into space, and, as we have mentioned, in the ocean. And the last point I would make is this: that extending New START is important. We can do other things that we discussed here while moving ahead and showing the U.S. is taking that initiative themselves. Our profile around the world right now, as we have moved away from the INF Treaty, although justified, yet something we could have executed in a better manner, casts a view of us around the world, as well as the moving away from, which we did not discuss, the JCPOA, a treaty, not a treaty, but an agreement that included Iran, which, indeed, was very transparent and actually a model of transparency compared to our other agreements. It is important, in the wake of that, that we move ahead and be the leaders on a New START extension, so that the U.S. can be where it should be, in a position of global leadership in arms control. So, I thank you. I thank you, Mr. Countryman, Ms. Creedon, Mr. McKeon, Dr. Karako, for your participation in this important agreement. We look forward to hearing from you in the future. Feel free to have any input you can on this important matter with this committee. And with that, I will adjourn the committee. [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]