[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-27]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
HEARING
ON
REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS
FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 3, 2019
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-901 WASHINGTON : 2020
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
RICK LARSEN, Washington ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
JIM COOPER, Tennessee SAM GRAVES, Missouri
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
RO KHANNA, California AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
JASON CROW, Colorado, Vice Chair DON BACON, Nebraska
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan JIM BANKS, Indiana
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
Bess Dopkeen, Professional Staff Member
Eric Snelgrove, Professional Staff Member
Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 1
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 4
WITNESSES
Hassell, D. Christian, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Chemical and Biological Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment.................................... 7
Oxford, Vayl, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment........... 10
Szymanski, VADM Timothy G., USN, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command............................................. 8
Whelan, Theresa M., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy................................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hassell, D. Christian........................................ 47
Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 31
Oxford, Vayl................................................. 65
Szymanski, VADM Timothy G.................................... 56
Whelan, Theresa M............................................ 34
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Larsen................................................... 87
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY,
POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 3, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:34 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James R.
Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. The subcommittee will come to order.
I want to first welcome our witnesses in today's hearing,
Reviewing the Department of Defense Strategy, Policy, and
Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction for Fiscal
Year 2020.
This past year, both Russia and North Korea famously
employed chemical weapons, nerve agents in England and
Malaysia, respectively. In Syria, pro-regime and ISIS [Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria] forces have continued to use chemical
weapons on civilian populations since 2013 to achieve their
tactical and strategic objectives.
The President's recent decision to withdraw from the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, could open up
the possibility of proliferation of intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles. Emerging capabilities in biotechnology
may allow individuals acting with nefarious intent or even just
by chance to produce biological agents in a scope and scale not
yet encountered. And more emerging capabilities like cyber and
hypersonics, among others, threaten to exacerbate the
complexity of the world's WMD [weapons of mass destruction]
threats.
In 2014, the Department approved its strategy for CWMD
[countering weapons of mass destruction], which outlined three
end states--no new actors possess WMD, no WMD use, and
minimization of WMD effects--with associated objectives and
lines of effort. The strategy notes fiscal year constraints
will require the Department make strategic choices and accept
some risks, but rogue actors and technological advances still
challenge the strategy's goals of ensuring that the U.S. and
its allies and partners are not attacked or coerced by
adversaries possessing WMD.
Today, we will hear from five of the major players in the
Department who develop CWMD policies, oversee and execute CWMD
programs, and coordinate the Department's CWMD efforts. We
welcome today Dr. Christian Hassell, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, who
is here today for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs and the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment, and we thank him for stepping in.
The office is responsible for developing capabilities to
detect, protect against, and respond to WMD threats; ensuring
DOD [Department of Defense] compliance with nuclear, chemical,
and biological treaties and agreements; continuing to work with
allies and partners to strengthen our collective CWMD
capabilities; and advancing the United States nonproliferation
goals.
Next, we welcome Ms. Theresa Whelan, who is the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Homeland Defense
and Global Security [ASD(HDGS)] for the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy.
The ASD(HDGS) is responsible for developing policy
guidance, providing policy advice, and overseeing planning,
capability development, and operational implementation to
ensure warfighting and national security advantages in the
mission areas of CWMD, cyberspace, and defense support of civil
authorities, among others. The ASD(HDGS) also supervises as the
Department's homeland defense activities.
Ms. Whelan, I want to thank you for acting on behalf of
Assistant Secretary Rapuano today, who is currently down the
hall right now, I know, testifying on our Strategic Forces
Subcommittee's space hearing. He was recently before the
subcommittee testifying about cyber. And clearly, he has a very
big portfolio. And so we are looking forward to hearing about
the Department's current CWMD policies from you, including how
the Department is ensuring that its cooperative threat
reduction programs, which would achieve notable accomplishments
in the past, are oriented to address today's threats and how
the Department's thinking about cyber, opioids, and other
nontraditional materials and capabilities that could be used to
cause mass destruction.
Over the last few years since the strategy was released,
the Department has taken some initial steps to strengthen CWMD
efforts, since the strategy was released. In 2017, the Special
Operations Command [SOCOM] was designated as the coordinating
authority for CWMD. Today, we will hear from Vice Admiral
Timothy Szymanski, the Deputy Commander of SOCOM, about how the
command is leveraging the best practices from its traditional
missions and lessons learned in its coordinating authority role
for countering violent extremism to reinvigorate and integrate
CWMD awareness, planning, capacity, and capability across the
Department and with the interagency.
Welcome, Admiral.
Finally, we welcome Director Vayl Oxford from the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA], the execution arm that falls
within Secretary Roberts' ASD(NCB) [Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense] office.
Before departing, Secretary Mattis approved a new mission
statement for DTRA, redirecting the mission from countering and
deterring WMD and improvised explosive device threats to
countering WMD and improvised threat networks. This and DTRA's
participation in the counter unmanned aerial systems mission
are substantial evolutions. I am interested in understanding
where this agency fits in the Department--in the Department's
CWMD organization today and what effects this change is having
on your core mission and responsibilities.
Director Oxford, we welcome you, and look forward to
hearing about the changes.
Together, these individuals hold positions that comprise
the bulk of assigned roles and responsibilities associated with
aligning CWMD policy to strategy and programs, executing CWMD
programs, and delivering current and future personal protective
equipment to other CWMD capabilities to our warfighters.
In the past few years, the CWMD bureaucracy has evolved as
the Department has recognized and reorganized. In addition to
the movement of the CWMD mission from U.S. Strategic Command to
USSOCOM, in addition in section 901 of the fiscal year 2017
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], Congress split the
former Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics [USD(AT&L)] into two positions, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering [USD(R&E)] and the
Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, in the hopes
of simplifying and focusing the responsibilities of each.
The split of USD(AT&L) into two under secretariats serves
as both an opportunity and a potential area of risk to the CWMD
effort. Though both ASD(NCB) and DTRA fall under ASD(A&S)
[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment], there must continue to be coordination within all
elements of the Office of Secretary of Defense on CWMD,
including with the USD(R&E). This is especially true for the
science and technology investment and research and development
portfolio so characteristic of DTRA's past focus.
There must also be continued focus on and prioritization of
CWMD by all those with assigned roles and responsibilities,
especially considering connected roles and responsibilities of
each in your offices. So we are looking forward to hearing how
the CWMD Unity of Effort Council is now operating.
To that end, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA included a section
mandating that the Secretary of Defense designate a principal
advisor on CWMD to coordinate the CWMD activities of the
Department. Additionally, it directed the development of a plan
to streamline the oversight framework of OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense]. That plan was to focus on any
efficiencies that could be realized and the potential to
reduce, realign, or otherwise restructure current ASD
[Assistant Secretary of Defense] and Deputy ASD positions with
responsibilities for overseeing CWMD policy, programs, and
activities. It also directed a report on these and related
efforts to be submitted with the fiscal year 2020 budget. We
look forward to hearing about where all of this stands today.
Finally, I am concerned that, due to almost two decades of
war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, our preparedness for
significant state-level of WMD event has atrophied. A year ago,
General Scaparrotti said that he believed we were
underprepared, and the Congress has expressed its continued
dissatisfaction with our preparedness for such an event, and
whether our troops are trained and equipped to operate in a
contaminated environment. Thus, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
directed the Department to submit an assessment on material
shortfalls in the United States Forces Korea for chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear defenses. GAO [Government
Accountability Office] has just begun work on this project.
In closing, there is much work to be done to strengthen
CWMD policy, programs, and preparedness. I said as much when I
testified before the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense in
February, and I commend the panel and others who have continued
to highlight the unique challenges posed by technologies that
can cause indiscriminate destruction on a wide scale.
Congress has an important role to play as well, and our
focus today on understanding the 2014 strategy in the context
of today's threat landscape, the budget request's alignment to
current strategy, and how the Department's strategy and end
states are consistent with a national level strategy and whole-
of-government effort, will help ensure effective oversight
going forward.
So, with that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
on the fiscal year 2020 CWMD request, and note that following
the discussion, that we will go into a closed classified
follow-on hearing. With that, before we get to our witnesses, I
want to now turn to the ranking member, Member Stefanik, for
her remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Langevin. And thank you
to the witnesses for being here today.
Inside the Department of Defense, and especially within
Special Operations Command, we often hear of no-fail missions,
and I cannot think of a mission more appropriate for this type
of resolve and determination than the countering weapons of
mass destruction problem set. While the Department of Defense
faces urgent challenges on a daily basis, we can never afford
to lose sight of or be distracted from the critically important
mission of countering weapons of mass destruction.
In February, this committee received testimony from the GAO
and the intelligence community on long-range emerging threats
facing the United States. One of the most alarming findings was
the continuing trend of technological advances allowing a wider
range of actors to acquire sophisticated capabilities that were
once only within reach of well-resourced nation-states. This
democratization of technology has significantly increased the
threat posed by advancements in gene editing and synthetic
biology. We need only to look to China to witness the risks
posed by rogue gene editing scientists who lack the oversight
and moral compass but who possess the expertise and technology
to circumvent international guidelines and standards.
I appreciate the daily focus that the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, U.S. Special Operations Command, OSD Policy,
Acquisition and Sustainment, and countless other organizations
across the Department are providing to prevent, prepare, and
respond to CWMD events across the globe. This is especially
relevant in recent years as Syria, North Korea, and Russia have
all used chemical weapons to intimidate and devastate civilian
populations or for calculated political assassinations. The
pursuit, proliferation, and potential use of weapons of mass
destruction remains a high-consequence threat that we must plan
for.
The Department has tools and resources at its disposal to
help prevent the development, proliferation, use, and effects
of weapons of mass destruction. I am pleased to see a 5 percent
increase in the fiscal year 2020 budget for these activities,
which include chemical and biological defense, detection, and
protection capabilities; chemical demilitarization programs to
reduce our own stockpiles and set a positive example on the
world stage; and cooperative threat reduction program which
proactively partners with foreign countries to prevent
proliferation of materials, technologies, and expertise that
could pose a WMD threat.
Finally, I am interested to hear from our witnesses today
how recent efforts to streamline and provide additional
leadership and accountability to this problem set have taken
shape, specifically the establishment of the Unity of Effort
Council, the maturation of U.S. Special Operations Command in
the new role of coordinating authority, and DTRA's integration
of Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization.
Thank you again to our witnesses, and I yield back to the
Chair.
Mr. Langevin. I want to thank the ranking member.
The witnesses' full statement will--without objection, will
be entered into the record, and you will each be recognized now
for 5 minutes to summarize your remarks, if you would. And we
now recognize Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan for
opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF THERESA M. WHELAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY,
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member
Stefanik, and members of this subcommittee, for the invitation
to join my distinguished DOD colleagues here today to address
current countering WMD policy, strategy, priorities, and
programs. As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security at OSD Policy,
I support the Assistant Secretary of Defense in the execution
of responsibilities for the Department's CWMD policy and
strategy.
The Department's CWMD mission is broad, deep, and
multifaceted, requiring a unity of effort among the Secretary
of Defense's principal staff assistants, along with the Joint
Staff, the combatant commands, the military services, the
defense agencies, and the intelligence community.
Within DOD, OSD Policy focuses on developing, coordinating,
and overseeing implementation and integration of CWMD policy
and strategy. We work closely with other OSD components to
synchronize, to deconflict, and to assess the effectiveness of
activities across and among our respective CWMD missions.
We partner closely with the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs to align DOD CWMD policies with their
activities that affect or require engagement with U.S. and
international partners.
OSD Policy also partners closely with the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and U.S. Special Operations Command to help
incorporate strategic level policy and guidance into their
respective program execution and planning activities.
The complexity of the CWMD mission area requires a unity of
effort, which was codified by the then Deputy now Acting
Secretary of Defense establishing the DOD's CWMD Unity of
Effort Council. The Unity of Effort Council has raised
awareness and accelerated collaboration, coordination, and
deconfliction across DOD's CWMD enterprise. The council is
structured to drive results across the three primary lines of
effort in the 2014 DOD strategy for CWMD: First, to prevent
acquisition of new WMD; second, to contain and reduce threats;
and third, to respond to crises.
With the release of the National Security Strategy in 2017
and the National Defense Strategy [NDS] in 2018, we recognized
the need to determine whether the 2014 CWMD strategy required a
refresh or rewrite. We asked the National Defense University
[NDU] to analyze the CWMD strategy and provide a recommendation
on whether a new strategy would be necessary to execute the
2018 NDS. NDU assessed, and Policy concurred, that since the
CWMD strategy is threat-agnostic and provides a flexible
framework, the strategy remains relevant to the WMD threat
environment and effectively nests under the NDS.
We did, however, identify a need to develop priorities for
the CWMD enterprise that take into account the CWMD strategy's
framework, the NDS approach, and the threat actors identified
in the functional campaign plan for CWMD. Policy is leading
this effort via the Unity of Effort Council.
With regard to threats, a key priority remains the threats
posed by North Korea's WMD programs. DOD is supporting the
State Department's efforts to achieve the final, fully verified
denuclearization of North Korea, and remains postured for any
military contingency. We also remain concerned by the erosion
of international norms against the use of chemical weapons. The
pattern of use by state and nonstate actors is alarming. Russia
in the U.K. [United Kingdom], the Assad regime against Syrian
citizens, North Korean agents in Malaysia, and nonstate actors
in Syria and Iraq.
Additionally, Iran's WMD threat remains with or without
JPOA [Joint Plan of Action]. We continue to support the larger
U.S. Government effort to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear
weapon and counter Iran's proliferation of missiles around the
region. The WMD threat environment is complicated further by
the rapid technological advancement coupled with increased
access to dual-use materials and expertise, particularly in the
biological science fields. The threats are complex with no
simple formula or direct path to eliminate them all. Key
efforts OSD Policy supports to address WMD and related
materials proliferation and use include serving a leadership
role in a proliferation security initiative; updating policy
guidance for a cooperative threat reduction program; engaging
our international partners to enforce North Korea-related U.N.
[United Nations] Security Council resolutions; reviewing and
updating DOD policy and guidance documents related to force
preparation and protection against WMD incidents and
contaminated environments; and last but not least, developing
and reinforcing allies' and partners' capacity and capabilities
to detect, interdict, and respond to WMD use and proliferation.
We appreciate your continued interest in and support for
the CWMD mission space to ensure we remain agile and positioned
to confront WMD challenges.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee,
and I look forward to answering questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Secretary Whelan.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Hassell is now recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF D. CHRISTIAN HASSELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT
Dr. Hassell. Thank you, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member
Stefanik, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to join my colleagues in testifying
on the Department's efforts to counter threats posed by weapons
of mass destruction and to provide context for the President's
fiscal year 2020 budget request. As noted today, I am
representing the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.
Our budget request includes resources to reduce threats and
protect warfighters in several areas. First, the chemical and
biological defense program budget request of $1.4 billion will
continue the development of capabilities to protect against
chemical, biological, and radiological threats. Our chemical
demilitarization program of $986 million will continue to
ensure the safe, complete, and treaty-compliant destruction of
the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. Our nuclear matters
resources of $65 million will support the development of
policies that guide the safety and security of the Nation's
nuclear deterrent and help to counter threats of nuclear
terrorism and proliferation.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency budget request of $1.9
billion includes the areas that will be described by Mr. Oxford
in a moment.
Our National Defense Strategy directs the Department to
compete, deter, and win, alongside our allies and partners, to
prevail in conflict and preserve peace through strength. Among
its key components, the strategy prioritizes nuclear
modernization, readiness, and lethal combat power in contested
environments.
Our office is first responsible for ensuring that our
nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, and effective. This is in
order to prevent--to deter the use of WMD against the U.S. and
our allies. Furthermore, from a readiness standpoint, the
office is the Department's focal point for developing material
capabilities to ensure that our forces are resilient against
WMD threats. So in other words, we must protect those
warfighters so that they can accomplish their mission, even if
it is in a contaminated environment. We often use the phrase
protect to fight, not just protect to survive.
We accomplish these objectives through multiple programatic
efforts. With respect to nuclear threats, the Department of
Defense works with other departments and agencies to strengthen
the Nation's capability to detect and respond to nuclear
proliferation. The chemical and biological defense program
ensures the protection and resiliency of our forces by
providing research, development, testing, and fielding of
protective equipment, detectors, decontamination systems,
vaccines, and therapeutic drugs.
In domestic chemical demilitarization, the Department
continues to make significant progress in meeting the Nation's
commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention by
eliminating our remaining chemical weapons stockpiles in
Colorado and Kentucky.
The Department's counter-WMD activities support a broad
spectrum of efforts that protect our forces and reduce threats.
We strengthen program effectiveness and ensure efficiencies by
acting in collaboration and coordination with numerous
interagency and international partners and, of course, with our
DOD partners as represented here today.
So thank you again for the opportunity to testify before
you today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hassell can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Secretary Hassell.
Vice Admiral Szymanski is now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF VADM TIMOTHY G. SZYMANSKI, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER,
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral Szymanski. Thank you, Chairman.
Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik,
and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation
to update you on the work of U.S. Special Operations Command as
the Department's coordinating authority for countering weapons
of mass destruction.
U.S. Special Operations Command's responsibilities as DOD
coordinating authority revolve around counter WMD campaign
planning, assessing progress against campaign objectives, and
recommending changes to plans for countering WMD, all in
support of the geographical combatant commanders' and
Department priorities. These functions are distinct from the
command's longstanding and continuing operational role in WMD
counterproliferation.
In the past 18 months since USSOCOM assumed the role as the
Department's CWMD coordinating authority, we have completed and
published the Functional Campaign Plan for Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction. This plan focuses joint force activities
below the level of armed conflict to defeat priority actors of
concern along pathways from aspiration or intent to acquire WMD
to development or use of WMD. This approach orients the
Department's military capability and capacity to prevent,
protect, and respond to global WMD threats aligned with
national strategy.
To directly support combatant commanders with their
responsibilities for planning against priority threat actors,
USSOCOM's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Fusion Cell
has developed operational frameworks to compel prudent military
planning focused on specific threat actors, inform the joint
force of both friendly and adversary capability capacity and
intent, and align operations activities and investments across
all instruments of national power.
We recently completed the annual assessment of the joint
force's capability and capacity to counter WMD. Although this
year's assessment was focused on combatant commands, it was
mapped to the objectives of the new functional campaign plan,
and we will use the feedback from across the Department to
include services and combat support agency inputs to identify
gaps and recommend mitigation strategies to the Acting
Secretary of Defense.
In its capacity as DOD countering WMD coordinating
authority, SOCOM works in close partnership with the offices of
each of the distinguished panelists before you. We are guided
by national Department policy and strategy for countering
weapons of mass destruction, as conveyed by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Defense Programs develops new capabilities to
counter WMD and help guide the Unity of Effort Council.
Part of the Countering WMD Fusion Cell that executes
SOCOM's coordinated authority is co-located with and
collaborates daily with Vayl Oxford's forward-leaning team at
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We could not do our work
without the leadership of all these strong partners.
Although SOCOM is the Department of Defense's coordinating
authority, the countering WMD mission is rightfully a whole-of-
government mission. We cannot succeed in this role, and the
joint force cannot perform its mission adequately, without an
active, persistent engagement with the U.S. interagency to
ensure a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities and
complementary activities of the Department of State, Commerce,
Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, the intelligence
community, and many more.
Our annual Countering WMD Coordination Conference in the
fall brought together these departments and agencies with DOD
services, commands, combat support agencies, and the Joint
Staff to identify cross-cutting challenges and make
recommendation to enhance our collective ability to disrupt and
defeat WMD adversaries. This past February, General Thomas
hosted senior leaders from the same broad community at SOCOM
headquarters to assess progress on these challenges and
identify focus areas for the coming year.
We are pleased to include defense representatives from
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom, recognizing that no country can execute the countering
WMD mission alone.
In addition to hosting these outcome-focused fora, we
welcome the recent establishment of the countering WMD Unity of
Effort Council. As the WMD threats to our country become ever
more complex, we will work with the council to further unify
the DOD countering WMD community and address Department
challenges.
SOCOM looks forward to continued close work with the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and Global
Security, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, the Joint Staff, and the rest of the U.S. international
countering WMD community to defeat emerging WMD capabilities
and protect the U.S. and its interest from actors with existing
WMD programs.
Thank you again for the opportunity to address the
committee this afternoon, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Szymanski can be found
in the Appendix on page 56.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Vice Admiral Szymanski.
The Chair now recognizes Director Oxford for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND
SUSTAINMENT
Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Langevin,
Ranking Member Stefanik, members of the committee, thank you
for your continued support to the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency where we respond to the most complex and dynamic threat
environment we face as a Nation. In doing so, DTRA has adopted
a whole-of-government approach working with OSD, the Joint
Staff, the combatant commands, our interagency partners, and
international partners. Our approach enables the Department to
detect, deter, and defeat transregional and multidomain threat
networks.
I am pleased to appear before you today with these three
colleagues of DTRA's closest partners. We work closely with NCB
and Ms. Whelan's office to ensure our priorities are aligned
with the National Defense Strategy. Also, we have a strong and
enduring relationship with the USSOCOM in both its role as
coordinating authority and as a combatant command.
My priorities for DTRA remain enhance combat support,
strengthen and expand our relationships with interagency and
international partners, foster innovation to develop
capabilities to counter weapons of mass destruction and
improvised threats, and to empower the DTRA workforce.
Since I last appeared before the committee, we have
continued to focus our efforts on these priorities and the
guidance outlined in the National Defense Strategy that
requires DOD to build a more decisive and lethal force,
strengthen our nuclear deterrent, and compete below the level
of armed conflict. DTRA plays an important role in all three of
these.
We maintain our counter WMD improvised threat capability
development and operational support to the conventional
warfight. We are strengthening our efforts that support a
secure and effective nuclear deterrent. We have enhanced our
analytic capabilities to enable DOD, the U.S. Government, and
international partners to counter and deter adversary WMD and
improvised threat networks. In doing so, we will enable the
U.S. to compete below the level of armed conflict and counter
the malign influence and disruptive capabilities of our
adversaries.
To do this, we are working closely with the combatant
commands and the interagency to illuminate these adversarial
networks comprised of surrogates, proxies, criminal
organizations, in order to disrupt and defeat them. We also
develop specialized tools and capabilities to be used in
disrupting these networks. Additionally, we are working with
international partners to forge relationships, build
partnership capacity, and counter adversary influence.
As we return to great power competition, we will continue
the pressure on VEOs [violent extremist organizations]. We must
develop agile, integrated, and tailored solutions to address
this global threat environment. To be successful, we must have
a laser-focused workforce that is motivated by the common
purpose of protecting our Nation.
I am proud and honored to be staffed with people that are
dedicated in this mission working with us side by side every
day. Again, thank you for your continued support, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford can be found in the
Appendix on page 65.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Director Oxford.
Members now will be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will
start with the questioning recognizing myself.
Let me begin, if I could, with you, Secretary Whelan. The
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Global Security is well situated to see across many
different areas and understand how different threat areas
intersect. For example, Secretary Rapuano is not here today
because he is testifying in our Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
as I mentioned, in the hearing on space down the hall and was
recently here testifying on cyber and the border.
Can you speak to this broad perspective and how you're
acting upon this responsibility to take--to shape holistic CWMD
policy for the Department? And in your opinion, does the office
require additional resources or restructuring to ensure that
space, cyber, homeland defense, and CWMD all receive the level
of attention that each of these issue areas demand, all of
which are obviously very important?
Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Congressman. So it is quite a broad
portfolio in some ways, but in other ways, it is actually quite
tightly and nicely nested. I actually served in the office some
years ago when it was Homeland Defense and Western Hemisphere,
and I think its current organizational structure is actually
much more suited.
The homeland defense mission is, of course, very
interrelated to space policy and also cyber, as well as CWMD.
This provides the opportunity having them all under one
assistant secretary for Assistant Secretary Rapuano to see
across these areas, make linkages, and ensure that we
essentially have our own internal cross-functional teams to
move forward on linked issues, whether they be linkages between
cyber and our mission assurance policies or space and cyber or
even the impacts of cyber, for example, on the proliferation of
knowledge related to CWMD.
We think that the office is structured quite effectively,
and we appreciate the support that it has had from Congress to
date and we look forward to continuing that support and
relationship with Congress.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I think you touched on my next
question I had, but in really thinking about more specifically
how the Department is thinking about cyber and opioids and
other nontraditional research materials and capabilities that
could be used to cause mass destruction. Can you go into a
little more detail on those issues?
Ms. Whelan. Yes, absolutely. And thank you again. That is a
very important question for the Department. Let me just briefly
first address cyber, and that is a really interesting one
because, of course, cyber can theoretically be used as a tool
to produce effects that result in mass destruction. For
example, you could use cyber as a tool and trigger a release of
CBRN-type materials, chemical, biological, radiological [and
nuclear]. You could also use cyber as a tool to trigger a
cascading series of events that would have the cumulative
effects of mass destruction, or even use cyber as a tool to,
say, force a dam to release all of the water, destroying towns
that were below the dam.
In all of these cases, though, cyber is a tool that enables
the release of some sort of lethal material or kinetic event,
such as an explosion. Cyber isn't in and of itself lethal and
its effects are not assured.
So the common characteristic of the materials that we have
traditionally characterized as WMD is that they are all in and
of themselves lethal materials, and then when weaponized for
use in warfare, they are inherently indiscriminate and large-
scale in effect. The cyber tool, though, when used as a weapon,
is really not inherently indiscriminate or large-scale, and, in
fact, it can actually be quite precise.
Similarly, if you look at even conventional weapons, they
can be targeted and aggregated in such a way as to produce a
mass destructive effect, so--but we don't consider them weapons
of mass destruction.
So we don't consider cyber a weapon of mass destruction,
but we do see that cyber has complicated the CWMD threat arena
by, again, allowing information to proliferate.
As to opioids, very serious issue for us, something that
the Unity of Effort Council is going to take up specifically
with regard to fentanyls. DOD is very concerned about the use
of fentanyls. Countries like Russia and Iran, for example, are
using fentanyls or repurposing them as incapacitants, they call
them, for supposedly law enforcement purposes. We think this is
a very dangerous precedent and have supported the State
Department in their efforts to reduce and engage with countries
that export fentanyls and reduce those exports.
But if you would allow me, I would like to just turn
briefly to Dr. Hassell to address what else we are doing on the
opioid front.
Dr. Hassell. Yes. I am glad you brought that up because it
has been a big area of emphasis for us, especially over the
last few years. We had been concerned about fentanyls for many
years, ever since the 2002 incident in Russia in the theater
when fentanyls were used. Since then, though, with the opioid
crisis, we have seen much more proliferation and much more
availability of these materials. So that has raised our
concern.
We have an immediate issue with our civil support teams,
the part of the National Guard that provides support to law
enforcement and first responders for State and locals. We
provide their equipment, so we need to make sure that they are
protected now.
We are also looking at what is the potential impact on the
battlefield use of this. So as mentioned, we are looking at it
with the Unity of Effort [Council] to bring about all the
issues, not just the material solutions, but what are the
training, what are the policy doctrine, and other issues that
would be brought to bear on that. And then looking at the
specific things, like toxicology, detectors, medical treatment.
But I would emphasize, we are doing this with the
interagency. DOD doesn't often work with, for example, Drug
Enforcement Administration, but that has been a good example of
sort of a new lash-up that has been very helpful, just bringing
the departments together, everyone who has a stake in this
thing. And I am hopeful that is actually going to help move us
forward on this much more quickly.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Good point, Secretary Hassell. And I thank
both of you for your answers, and I think this--again, the
challenges that we face here reinforce the need for much more
of a whole-of-government approach and getting the oars pulling
in the same direction. I see some serious challenges.
I would like now to just give Vice Admiral Szymanski and
Director Oxford a chance to weigh in here. And to both of you,
what are you doing operationally to maintain situation
awareness, continuing to help combatant commanders plan,
maintain, a left-of-boom approach on these topics?
Admiral Szymanski. Chairman, thank you for that question.
So with the signing of the functional campaign plan, the subset
to that is developing operational frameworks so we can get
after the five specific threats from the National Defense
Strategy. So those are the global campaigns that the
geographical combatant commanders are working on.
So how are we working out? We are taking our methodology
from the functional campaign plan, which is basically a
holistic approach to countering through a taxonomy and a
methodology of pathway defeat, much like in your opening
statement when you discussed VEOs and how over the years in 18
years, how we have developed the targeting methodology. It is a
pathway as well, VEOs. So we see the WMD problem set through
that same sort of methodology at least for, again, taxonomy
purposes.
So we are taking that methodology and trying to use that,
again, very threat specific--or threat specific to the NDS, but
the modalities are different for the different threats, but
applying that same sort of operational framework for the
operations, activities, investments that we are doing in each
of those theaters to ensure across all instruments of the
interagency and partnerships, international partnerships, that
we are getting after that pathway defeat short of conflict. So
the things we are doing to build partner nation capacity,
security force assistance, you know, against all the different
pathways.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. And as the coordinating authority, can you
expand a little more on how you are working a whole-of-
government interagency functional campaign plan on these
issues?
Admiral Szymanski. So typically--thanks, again. Typically,
through the CWMD coordination conference really twice a year
for the larger instruments of the interagency and partnership.
But for the GCCs [geographic combatant commands], the real
aspects of coordinating authority is--in my opening statement
is the actual planning, so really trying to baseline the
campaign plan, the functional campaign plan in concert with the
geographical combatant commanders' global campaign plans,
assessing where our operations, activities, and investments are
not meeting the mark or they are meeting the mark and then
making recommendations through--up to the Secretary through the
global integrator, the chairman, on where we need a change in
those plans or resources to get after that pathway defeat.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
And finally, Director Oxford.
Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will break this down
into three easy bins. First is we are directly involved using
our WMD expertise with Admiral Szymanski's planning cell that
is co-located with us, so we are working with his operational
planners to help with the plans for the combatant commands.
Secondly, on situational awareness, we are using our
software development team to actually develop visualization
tools that highlight different aspects of the WMD threat in
various AORs [areas of responsibility]. We have done this
extensively with USFK [United States Forces Korea], with SOCOM,
with 1st Special Forces Group, Seventh Air Force. And in many
cases, we are able to give some of these planning tools to the
Republic of Korea so we are able to put it onto their network
so they have similar situational awareness of the information
on the ground inside Korea so we can share across the forces.
So we are doing that routinely in terms of visualization, which
has common databases people can draw from.
The second thing we have done for situational awareness is
we have established what we call a global integration center
within DTRA. What we are doing now is we have about 400 people
forward embedded with the forces overseas at the COCOMs
[combatant commands], at the embassies, in places like that, so
we now have cross-information flow coming from the community
that is externally based through the combatant commands into
this global integration center that is at my headquarters. So
that is allowing the cross flow of information to go across all
the commands so we have equal awareness of what is going on in
each of those and we can share across the global force.
The last area I will talk about is the command support
itself. I mentioned the embedded support we have forward. That
allows us to have situational awareness on the ground so we
understand the requirements. We can rapidly meet those
requirements by understanding the operational pressures and
what the needs are.
And then the last thing I will mention is I have
operational requirements documents from four-star levels for
all combatant commands. We have been in direct contact with the
commanders of each of the combatant commands to understand what
they need in the counter WMD mission set, and then we address
those through our capability development process.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Director.
I want to turn now to the ranking member for questions.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Vice Admiral Szymanski, SOCOM has now been in the
coordinating authority capacity for 2 years. Can you explain
how SOCOM views this responsibility, how you have tasked and
organized yourself, and what is different now from when that
coordinating responsibility was in STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic
Command]?
Admiral Szymanski. I certainly thank you for the question.
So maybe I will start with the last piece first, how we are
different from the STRATCOM. I think it goes a little bit to my
last response and that we have maybe taken a different
targeting methodology that we have learned from lessons learned
with the violent extremist organization, transregional nature
of that threat, and have applied that on how we can organize at
least planning efforts transregionally on a blue force look
against that threat, against those that--that methodology I
talked about through pathway defeat.
What we have done internally to organize is, obviously, we
stood up the CWMD Fusion Cell headed by Joe--Rear Admiral Joe
Diguardo, ``Digger'' Diguardo, sitting behind me, that co-
located with Mr. Oxford's team there up here in DC. And we
ensure that we have kind of separated our title 10
responsibilities to man, train, and equip for operating in a
contaminate environment and our typical counterproliferation
operational role, but--and really put the focus on the three
aspects of what the chairman's definition of a coordinating
authority, the planning, the--you know, and that is--the basis
of that is the functional campaign plan, the annual assessments
on all the global campaign plans, our nesting and alignment of
our methodology with those global campaign plans, and then
finally, making recommendations to the chairman--to the SECDEF
[Secretary of Defense] through the chairman for where we again
may have to shift resources.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. I wanted to follow up with you,
and also Mr. Oxford can weigh in. In addition to my position as
ranking member on this subcommittee on HASC [House Armed
Services Committee], I also sit on the Intelligence Committee,
so I view this CWMD problem through a national intelligence
lens as well. Can you comment or how would you grade the
intelligence support to CWMD as we compare it to other mission
spaces such as counterterrorism? Do you believe that DTRA,
SOCOM, and the geographic component commands' intel
requirements are being met? I will start with you, Vice
Admiral.
Admiral Szymanski. Yes, thanks for the question. I think
the enterprise--the intelligence enterprise is well positioned
to answer requirements. I think the focus for geographical
combatant commanders has largely been on deter strategic
effects and attacks, and we are trying to bring, I think, maybe
the aspects of the shift to--of the mission towards SOCOM is to
bring some focus through that target methodology that may not
have been there before. And I think as Mr. Oxford just
mentioned, he has got operational requirements now, I think,
that are much more tailored towards the CWMD request for
support and understanding of the threat, the nature of the
threat. It is a complex problem and it needs, you know, a
partnered integrated global solution.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Oxford.
Mr. Oxford. Yes, thank you. I agree with the admiral. We
have actually looked at this pretty hard recently. We sat down
with a senior group from USDI [Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence], talked about the collection process, the
assessment process. We think we are getting everything we need.
We are working hard now to understand where we need to be
looking better, but I will tell you that we have got full
support. I was with Secretary Kernan last Friday. He said
whatever we need we will get from his community. He is
committed to that. So it is a matter of us identifying, as we
get into great power competition, how do we ask that question
better. Sometimes it is one thing to say do you have what you
are getting at, but if you are not asking the right questions
it is hard for the intel community to respond.
Separately, I will say we have also reestablished some
interagency working groups that had gone into default. When I
came back into the office, I started working with the IC
[intelligence community], with SOCOM. We now have some
interagency groups that are looking at this in detail and
sharing information better than we ever had. I will have to go
into the details in the closed session in terms of what those
groups look like.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. I look forward to following up in
closed session.
I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
I now recognize Mr. Larsen for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Oxford, can you talk a little bit about how current
events are impacting DTRA's operations and plans and how
emerging technology is impacting DTRA's operations and plans,
and whether or not you are budgeted for that?
Mr. Oxford. So there is a--it depends on what you mean,
Congressman, by current events. There are so many on a daily
basis. We are faced with the evolving counter UAS [unmanned
aircraft system] threat as one example that has grown rapidly
in the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] AOR with CENTCOM and
SOCOM forces at risk. We have been working that hard for the
last 2\1/2\ years.
When that threat emerged, we were able to do some things to
deal with some of the early threats. Again, I can go into the
details in the closed session in terms of how we did that, but
we are seeing that threat evolve every 60 to 90 days.
Mr. Larsen. The counter UAS?
Mr. Oxford. The counter UAS threat. The adversary is
evolving to our countermeasures, and we have to just stay in
front of that through predictive analysis and some of the
analytic capabilities we have. It is a challenge. Right now, I
think we are properly resourced to get after that problem. We
have just got to stay in front of the evolving threat.
As many people in this committee know, the 4G, the 5G kind
of evolution provides both us advantages, it provides the
adversary advantages in how they can essentially get out in
front of some of our countermeasures. So we need to look at
that every day, and we can talk a little bit more about that in
the closed session if that helps.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, that would be great. Does the same
principle then apply on emerging technology, increased use of
artificial intelligence [AI] and the collection of data and
what adversaries are doing with it but what you are doing with
it as well?
Mr. Oxford. Clearly, from our vantage point, as we have
talked to some of you about, we are applying this in abundance
because we have to get after the great power competition these
days. And we are taking AI, we are using it with all the ops
intel data that we are actually collecting through two
analytical cells, one that we have through our Joint Improvised
Defeat Office that is in Reston, the other one that we have
that we share with Admiral Szymanski, the SOCOM support program
that is in Herndon. We bring in large data sets. We have to
apply the AI to that, but to drive to operational outcomes in
this case it is to get after the nodes of the network to
identify the people, places, and things that are operating
those networks to be able to counter those.
Mr. Larsen. Do you have the people to do that or is that a
restriction for you to expand your capabilities?
Mr. Oxford. So I think this falls into similar categories
of cyber and big data analytics, and the fact that there is a
growing demand so it is a competition that we face. What we
find in many cases, if you are doing this in an applied way as
opposed to a pure research way, people enjoy the national
security nature of the work. But clearly, as we look at the
growing threat space, we are going to need more people, because
it is not the people that does AI, it is the people that
actually interpret the AI results that make decisions.
Mr. Larsen. Secretary Hassell, on chemical
demilitarization, the program has had two Nunn-McCurdy breaches
in the last 8 years, and your budget request is about $985
million, a little under a billion dollars. Will the program--I
am sure the answer is yes, so why don't you just say yes and
then I will just agree with you. Will the program be able to
complete all required destruction by the 2023 deadline?
Dr. Hassell. So thank you, Congressman. If I may, I will
tell you why I am going to say yes.
Mr. Larsen. Perfect.
Dr. Hassell. There has been a change. I have been in this
office for 5 years, and I have observed it, because it was
somebody else's program, but I have observed the problems that
they have had. And two things have happened that give me good
cause for hope. One is simply a change in leadership, very,
very good leadership right now that is making a difference.
They are making measurable headway against the stockpile, and
you can almost track that with some of these people being in
place now.
Mr. Larsen. So, well, how are they doing that, how are they
accelerating then the destruction?
Dr. Hassell. Well, one thing they are doing is also
bringing in some alternative technologies. So there is----
Mr. Larsen. Such as?
Dr. Hassell. New technology, some of the explosive chamber
systems. I am going to quickly get outside of my area here, but
I do know there is some new technologies that they are bringing
in to augment what they were already building in those
facilities. They are improving just the process throughput on
those facilities, holding the contractors more accountable.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. So Nunn-McCurdy breaches are about cost
control. Is--do you foresee this fiscal year 2020 request being
adequate?
Dr. Hassell. I believe so, but I guess I would prefer to
defer to DASD [Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense] Ball who
leads that, and we can get you a written response to that, if
you don't mind.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 87.]
Mr. Larsen. I wouldn't mind that at all. I wouldn't mind
that at all.
Dr. Hassell. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. With that, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. I recognize Mr. Gallagher for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
testifying this afternoon.
So basically, since the nineties we have seen Russian
military doctrine changing in the direction of consistently
lowering the threshold for its nuclear firebreak. And given
this so-called escalate to deescalate doctrine, how, if at all,
and we will start with you, Ms. Whelan, are we planning to
deter or mitigate the effects of low-yield nuclear weapons on
the battlefield? Is it even something we can mitigate?
Ms. Whelan. Thanks for the question. That actually falls to
our Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Soofer, who handles
nuclear and missile defense issues. I will say just from a WMD
perspective, we do--we are concerned about the low-yield
nuclear weapons in terms of creating greater risks of
proliferation, because as you have tactical weapons, you push
them farther down into the units, you reduce security. So that
is a problem from a WMD or a counterproliferation perspective.
But in terms of deterrent strategy, I would defer to my
colleague, Dr. Soofer.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, for anybody on the panel, I mean, are
there any capabilities that we can field or any capabilities
conversely that we are seeing the Russians field that would
give them the ability to operate in a post-radiation
environment? Whoever wants to volunteer.
Mr. Oxford. Congressman, one of the things we are doing is
not necessarily the operations, but we are--for example, one of
the requirements that I won't go into great detail on, we can
do this in the closed session, from General Scaparrotti is how
to counter the influence of those low-yield Russian nuclear
weapons. What does it mean for the operability of his entire
command? It becomes a deterrent strategy that you can't take
down part of the network and defeat his capabilities. We are
working daily at mission assurance looking at his command and
control systems, his theater ballistic missile systems, and
looking at their hardness and their survivability to such
attacks so we understand how they would operate.
Mr. Gallagher. And then the final thing I would ask is, as
we consider the North Korean scenario, obviously, you know, any
outbreak of kinetic conflict would involve enormous
destruction. I mean, Seoul, I think, is the second largest
metropolitan area in the world. You have thousands of pieces of
artillery in Kaesong Heights that can range Seoul. Give us a
sense of how we should be thinking about the WMD component of
that. And do you get the sense that, when we do our war gaming,
what does it reveal? Maybe part of this will have to be in
classified session, but to the extent you can address it in an
unclassified scenario, how should we be thinking about that as
we try and support efforts to solve this crisis diplomatically?
Ms. Whelan. So from--I will just start out very briefly
from a policy perspective, and you are right, much of that
would need to be discussed in a classified session. But from a
policy perspective, it is our intent that our forces on the
peninsula are able to operate in a contaminated environment, if
need be.
We certainly are aware of the North Korean capabilities and
potential intent to use in contingency. So it is a top priority
for us to be prepared or have our forces prepared to address
that. I will let my colleagues, though, speak to some of the
details.
Mr. Oxford. So I will let Dr. Hassell address the personnel
protection, collected protection. One of the things we have
done is recognize that some of the modeling of nuclear weapons'
effects and other effects were inadequate to understand what
the contaminated environment looked like to begin with. We have
developed some capabilities now where we have radiation
detectors mounted on Army Stryker vehicles, so they at 40 miles
per hour can navigate through an environment and find out where
the radiation actually is as opposed to considering an entire
area off limits. It no longer exposes the soldiers to the
actual atmospheric environment. It gives us the opportunity
then to be mobile in that contaminated environment.
Dr. Hassell. I would just add about the preparedness
aspect. The NDAA last year directed us to do a study
specifically on the issue of preparedness on the peninsula of
the U.S. forces. So we submitted that report about a month ago
and it highlighted that things had improved over the years but
there were some gaps. And so we are going through right now and
looking at what are the gaps we need to fill, both from our
program but also from the services who were responsible for the
long-term sustainment.
So we are working for the response to this, the
implementation plan for this, and this is another example
working through the Unity of Effort group. Like I said earlier,
this is one that is going to need an approach, not just on the
materials and, you know, the physical materials, but it is
going to need to make sure that we are addressing training,
doctrine, policy, all aspects of this. And again, this is one
of the priorities for the Unity of Effort.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
Ms. Houlahan is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, sir.
My first question is probably for Ms. Whelan and Dr.
Hassell. It is sort of a 30,000-foot question, which is it
looks as though the budget, the proposed budget is about a 5
percent increase year over year in terms of the chemical
warfare CWMD, but I also see that it looks as though RDT&E
[research, development, test, and evaluation] has gone down by
about $36.4 million in the proposed budget as well. So I am
curious kind of what was the calculus. Why did we decide not to
invest a proportionately 5 percent more in RDT&E or at least
flat?
Dr. Hassell. So if you look at this historically, there is
a cycle that takes place. So even though it looks like the
RDT&E is going down, the total budget, the procurement is going
up. We are transitioning things from RDT&E into procurement. So
over the next 5 years, the procurement budget will be doubling.
And just if you look at historically at programs like this,
there will be a cycle going in there, and then we will be
filling in the RDT&E to kind of come along behind that and
start developing the next generation of systems.
Ms. Houlahan. Ms. Whelan.
Ms. Whelan. The only thing that I will say with regard to
sort of the overall level of effort is that I think the
Department has actually increased the level of effort in the
last couple of years, particularly with the UCP [Unified
Command Plan] transfer of the mission to SOCOM and the
establishment of SOCOM as the coordinating authority. So I
think you have seen an increase in overall level of effort on
this topic within the Department.
Ms. Houlahan. So my specific question or a little bit more
of a deeper dive question, do you feel like, by effectively
reducing RDT&E, although it may be cyclical, that on areas like
synthetic biology or gene editing or any of those other kinds
of things that are moving really fast, that we are maybe
vulnerable?
Dr. Hassell. So that is a specific area we are looking at
right now on synthetic biology, just take that as one example.
So we are going back and looking at what have we been doing to
date, because we have been dealing with this for some time,
looking at our internal resources, our own infrastructure, and
our personnel that we have internally, and it kind of touches
on an earlier question too about personnel, but also looking at
our engagement with industry and academia.
And what we are finding is there are also some efficiencies
we can gain there, so we have joined some academic industry
consortiums. So rather than having to individually engage with
these, we can go and present things to the consortium, and they
can take it on. We have implemented other transactional
authority, and we formed several consortiums specifically for
DOD. So in one case, there is a CWMD consortium for the other
transactional authority system. We have almost 200 member
companies that are part of that. That is much more efficient.
We can move much more quickly, and that in turn saves money, so
it looks like we are not spending as much, but we are getting
more for it.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I very much appreciate that. With
the remainder 2 minutes of my time, I just have a question on
this map here, which just visually, if you kind of look at it,
the blue indicates the biothreat reduction efforts that are
going on in DOD. And I also sit on the Foreign Affairs
Committee specifically in Asia and Africa as well, and
obviously, blue seems to be lighting up the map here in terms
of our efforts.
So my specific question is how are the State Department and
DOD working together on these efforts? And do you feel as
though the coordination is strong or that there are any
barriers that we might perhaps be helpful on or that you have
identified between DOD and State?
Ms. Whelan. So I will go ahead and take that,
Congresswoman, and thank you for that. Actually, as a reformed
Africanist, I can speak specifically to that area that that is
my regional area of expertise. But in general, we actually have
terrific cooperation with the State Department in our CTR
[Cooperative Threat Reduction] programs and also in our
security cooperation programs writ large, which are mutually
reinforcing.
So in the blue areas that we are working, particularly in
Africa, we have the State Department actually looks to us to
work on these particular programs because not only do they
enhance these countries' capabilities to detect nefarious
activities regarding a biothreat, but they also help build our
relationships with these countries government-to-government,
mil-to-mil, so it is quite an effective partnership.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And I have about 20 seconds if you
have--Dr. Hassell, if you have anything else to add.
Dr. Hassell. I just give one example, perhaps the Ebola
response in 2014 and 2015. We were on the phone with the State
Department several times a week, a consortium, I am sorry, I am
using that word too much, but a group of many different offices
within DOD working together with the offices there to
coordinate our response to that, and so it has been very good.
There is other examples as well, but beyond just these areas on
the map, but----
Ms. Houlahan. Perfect. Thank you.
I apologize for going over, and I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ms. Houlahan.
Mr. Bacon is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the
ranking member for how you lead this subcommittee. I appreciate
the bipartisan spirit. And thanks to all four of you for being
here today.
I would like to ask a little about the university research,
and do we have it funded at the right levels, do you need more?
I would love to get your feedback on it. But specifically,
University of Nebraska is very involved. I mean, we have a UARC
[University-Affiliated Research Center] that works on WMD and
WMD detection. They are the Ebola center of excellence in our
country. I mean, they were one of the hubs during the Ebola
crisis. For example, they do foot-and-mouth disease detection,
which could be weaponized. There are a lot of research there.
They have a cyber research center.
So I just want to get your feedback from you all. Are we--
just the research with our universities at all, are you seeing
good dividends or could you just give me your thoughts on it?
Can we fund it more or should we? Whoever would like to tackle
it.
Dr. Hassell. So I will give you my standard answer. It
depends. I think there is assumptions sometimes that we should
start with the assumption we are going to do everything
internally. We have fantastic laboratories and fantastic people
in them. But there is so much talent, as you well know, outside
of the Department and outside of the government laboratories.
So especially on the earlier stage research, we always work
very closely with the universities. Our proposal calls
especially for the very early stage research are really aimed
at that community, and that is the foundation, that is the seed
corn from what we build from.
And as I mentioned before, we are exploring the use of
consortia and professional societies and other things that will
help us to get at that academic community a little more
efficiently.
So I think it is very good, and I come from an academic
background and spent several years running a university
institute, so I am sensitive to the question. There are times,
though, where it has to cross over into classified areas and
more sensitive issues, so sometimes we do have to bring it in-
house.
Mr. Bacon. Which in this case they have vaults.
Dr. Hassell. I was about to say----
Mr. Bacon. Those folks have security clearances, at least
the ones at University of Nebraska do.
Dr. Hassell. Right. I was going to add, we have worked to
actually get clearances for a lot of people. So in some cases,
they don't have to have the facilities, but at least we can
draw them in as consultants. And then as you point out, we have
other places that do have those facilities that can actually do
classified work. We just want to make sure, because of
academia, they want to publish, so it is kind of a balance
there.
Mr. Bacon. My sense is, in this case, they like serving the
customer, which is you, and that is my impression. They are
proud of it.
Admiral, do you have any other thoughts?
Admiral Szymanski. Only, and it is not really related to
CWMD, but since you are asking, I just recently visited Johns
Hopkins Applied University--Applied Physics Lab on AI and some
other things they are doing for SOCOM, and I just was nodding
my head based on your comment there because they are some very
talented people and they do want to help. And as Mr. Oxford
mentioned earlier, they are really interested in national
security. Even if you can't pay them a lot, because we don't
have a lot of those skills in uniform, you know, in either CWMD
or in AI, and I think we are trying to make them--you know,
leverage the full power of that human capital in the
universities.
Mr. Bacon. Any other comments?
Mr. Oxford. I think we are funding New York and Nebraska,
but I will get back to verify that. But we recognize that, just
based on our work with STRATCOM and others out there, that
there is a center out there that we are related to. We can get
you the details on what that looks like.
Mr. Bacon. I just know they are very proud of it, they are
putting a lot of emphasis on it. In fact, I was just talking to
the president of the university today, talking about how much
he enjoys working this. And maybe in my just closing question
or comment for the admiral is they do have a UARC, and they
were working close with STRATCOM when they had the mission for
WMD, but now that is moved over to SOCOM. I just hope you all
are taking it--build on that relationship, because they have
350 researchers, 65 subcontracts working WMD and WMD detection,
and I know they want to continue to serve in this capacity more
so now that it is even SOCOM. They don't want to stop. So thank
you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Waltz is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much.
I am an OSD Policy alum, and so good to see some familiar
faces and a special operator. Vice Admiral, it is good--I think
you were in Policy sometime back, maybe 10 years ago, so it is
good to see you as well.
One of the things that keeps me up at night at least is
where we are going with the synthetic biology piece, and I
would welcome anyone on the panel, how advanced is that
capability from a threat perspective, particularly from a
terrorist perspective? I mean, we sit on many of these
hearings, and we are spending literally hundreds of billions of
dollars on hardware, on carriers, on bombers, on traditional
defense mechanisms, and yet the ability to--for our adversaries
to re-create infectious diseases, many of which have long been
dormant, I would postulate that our public health
infrastructure is not prepared to fully deal with and to employ
it. Is this something that is over the horizon or is this
something that you are viewing as a threat now? And if so,
where does that kind of rack and stack? And I will open that up
for any volunteers on that one.
Dr. Hassell. So I will take that one, because it has been a
principal area of emphasis. I would actually move the time
scale back, though, because we have been looking at this for a
long time. It was possible to use classical gene-editing
techniques for many years. I was doing it in the nineties.
Things have changed, though, as you point out, things with
CRISPR-Cas9 [clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic
repeats and CRISPR-associated protein 9], some of these other
things that are suddenly on the front page of The New York
Times, it has raised a profile and it highlights how things are
changing.
We were getting----
Mr. Waltz. Sorry to interrupt. So is it--and that is what I
am trying to get at, is this just a spotlight that is now on
something that has existed or has the threat truly evolved and
the technology evolved and/or--and, Admiral, I welcome your
input there and yours as well, Mr. Oxford--the enemy's ability,
particularly ISIS, al-Qaida, traditional terrorist
organizations.
Dr. Hassell. That is where the concern is raised is what is
the potential now for a lone actor, small, you know, violent
extremist organization to do that. So that has raised the
democratization, as the term is used oftentimes.
One of the things we did is I went and funded a study at
the National Academy of Sciences to actually look at this,
because we were getting reports all over the place, one, that
this is a marketing hype, kind of your--to answer your
question, the answer was yes to both, because it was a
marketing hype, it really wasn't a change. Others, it is a huge
change, everything is new again, and the end of the world is
nigh. Where was the truth in between those two?
So we empaneled the national academies. They did two
things. One is they developed a framework, so everybody was
jumping into doing an assessment, but they weren't stepping
back and saying how were you doing that assessment? So they
developed their framework and then they used that framework to
do the assessment. And I brought a prop. So what they did is
they came out with a report this past summer, I am happy to
give you a copy of it, and we have talked about this with the
staff here for a couple of years now, so this is out now. We
are now looking at how we respond to this.
Again, this is interagency working on this very heavily and
with the intelligence community to make sure we are looking
at----
Mr. Waltz. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Just in the interest
of time, I do want to commend, I think so far from everything I
have heard, it has been a success story in the shift from
STRATCOM to SOCOM and the relationship with DTRA and talking to
folks. Where are we in doing CTR--in CTR with Russia? And I
understand that we no longer are. And where does that--I mean,
what effects are you seeing, to the extent we can talk about it
in an open hearing?
Mr. Oxford. So we are not doing CTR. We don't have the
authority to work there right now. We probably have the closest
working relationship with the Russians through our other
treaties--or the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty
and the Open Skies treaties. We have routine engagements with
the Russians, but there is no determination or authority to
work CTR with that program, and right now, there has been no
push to get in that space.
Mr. Waltz. And just finally in the interest of time, my
understanding is the majority of JIEDDO's [Joint Improvised-
Threat Defeat Organization] budget or all of JIEDDO's budget
now is in OCO [overseas contingency operations].
Mr. Oxford. It is.
Mr. Waltz. So if we go to a continuing resolution, what
effect is that going to have on your capability?
Mr. Oxford. So we have yet to look at what the provisions
of that may be. If it is to zero base, to some other level, we
would have to go back in and look at the entire agency and
figure out what the right blend would be as a result of that.
In other words, if you say----
Mr. Waltz. The effect on operators----
Mr. Oxford [continuing]. Here is the top line, if you have
got to go down to this top line, I would have to figure out the
impacts across the entire agency. In my mind, it wouldn't just
automatically be an impact to JD; it would be what else would I
have to trade off with the rest of the agency mission. So we
would have to do a zero sum game across the portfolio.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
I am over my time. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Waltz, an important line of
questions too. And I touched on that in my opening statement,
but, you know, I am becoming increasingly concerned about the
dual-use technologies, the threats of bioweapons, and we need
to have a continued and strengthened focus on this area to keep
our country safe, keep our troops safe, and our allies around
the world as well.
So, with that, we are going to now move to the closed
session. Members will likely have follow-up questions, and we
ask you to respond to those questions in writing as
expeditiously as possible.
Thank you all for your testimony, the work you are doing
every day to keep our country safe.
And, with that, this hearing stands adjourned, and we will
now go into the closed session.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 3, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 3, 2019
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 3, 2019
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Dr. Hassell. Yes. Based upon the current program requirements, the
Fiscal Year 2020 Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense
appropriation request for the Chemical Demilitarization Program of
$985.5 million is adequate. [See page 18.]