[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-26]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2020 PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 3, 2019
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JACKIE SPEIER, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts MO BROOKS, Alabama
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma, Vice
Chair
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Sarah Mineiro, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................
WITNESSES
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Contracting and National
Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office... 4
Rapuano, Hon. Kenneth, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security, Department of Defense.... 2
Raymond, Gen John W., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Chaplain, Cristina T......................................... 56
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces........................... 25
Rapuano, Hon. Kenneth........................................ 28
Raymond, Gen John W.......................................... 39
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces................... 26
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
FISCAL YEAR 2020 PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 3, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:27 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Horn [presiding]. Good afternoon. Welcome, everybody.
Thank you for being here. Kendra Horn. I am sitting in for Mr.
Cooper for a few moments. I would like to welcome the witnesses
and thank you all for being here today.
And I am going to offer Mr. Cooper's opening statement for
the record. If you would like for me to share it, I am happy to
do so, if you find that helpful. Otherwise, I will just submit
it for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Ms. Horn. And as the vice chair of this committee, I want
to say that I am happy that you are all here today, eager to
have this really critical conversation about the priorities and
end posture for our national security space enterprise, which
is clearly critical to our Nation's overall security in
maintaining superiority in this space and look forward to your
testimonies.
And I don't--the ranking member is--Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah.
Ms. Horn. Yeah. There you are. I offer an opportunity for
the ranking member to make a few comments as we begin.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you. Thank the chair, vice chair.
I appreciate our witnesses being here. This is a, as you
know, a very important topic for our country. This is going to
get a lot of attention this year in the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], as it should. We have put a lot of work
into this. And it is going to be monumentally important for our
Nation. This is very important stuff. And so I am glad the
committee is taking it up. I look forward to working with you
on it. And I yield back.
Ms. Horn. Okay. All right. I will now turn it over to the
witnesses to give their opening statements. You will each have
5 minutes, and then of course your written statements will be
submitted for the record.
Mr. Rapuano.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH RAPUANO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Rapuano. Chairman Cooper, distinguished members
of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to--it is on. Sorry. It
is a pleasure to appear before you along with General Raymond
and Ms. Chaplain today.
The U.S. is at a strategic inflection point in an era of
renewed great power competition. Our reliance on space is at an
all-time high and expanding. Our way of life and national
defense rely on space, yet our posture was built for a
permissive space environment. At the same time, potential
adversary threats are also at an all-time high and expanding.
China and Russia understand the essential role of space to
our way of war. They see this reliance as our Achilles heel,
and they are developing offensive military capabilities,
doctrine, and organizations intended to place U.S. and allied
space systems at risk.
They are developing, testing, and fielding a full suite of
antisatellite weapons, including ground-launched missiles and
directed-energy weapons, and continue to launch experimental
satellites that conduct sophisticated, on-orbit activities to
counter space capabilities.
I cannot emphasize enough how serious these challenges are.
This is not about space for space's sake. This is about life
here on Earth. Our national defense and the lives of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines rely on space. To be
clear, we are currently ahead in space, but we are not postured
for the emerging strategic environment we are facing and risk
steadily losing our margin of advantage.
Department of Defense space professionals are the best in
the world, but we are not currently postured to maintain our
comparative advantages in the emerging strategic environment.
Our challenges stem from decentralized advocacy, fragmented
responsibilities across multiple services and agencies, and
nascent space warfighting doctrine capabilities and expertise.
We have put considerable thought and analysis into studying
the problem, and it is time for action, and we need your
support. To compete, deter, and win in space is a complex,
massive, and enduring undertaking; therefore, we must
fundamentally change our approach to space from a key support
function in a benign environment to space as a critical and
contested warfighting domain.
This requires changes in policies, strategies, capabilities
and, yes, organization. A new armed force is foundational to
our approach. Last month, the Department provided Congress with
a legislative proposal for the establishment of the U.S. Space
Force as a new branch of our Armed Forces.
The U.S. Space Force will catalyze the transformation of
space as a warfighting domain. It will provide the undivided
attention, advocacy, and leadership necessary to develop the
people, the doctrine, and the capabilities to maintain our
unfettered access to and ability to fight and win in space.
This will ensure continued U.S. dominance in space.
We will also establish a combatant command, the United
States Space Command, to focus joint warfighting in space. It
will plan and conduct space operations to enhance deterrence
and assure allies and partners and defeat threats to U.S.
national interests. Essential to the success of USSPACECOM will
be the doctrine, equipment, and trained personnel presented to
it by the United States Space Force.
The U.S. Space Force, Space Command, the Space Development
Agency, and other vital reforms will put the U.S. on the right
path to enhance deterrence in space. The Department greatly
appreciates the work of this committee, the focus you have
provided on national security space, and highlighting the need
for a strategic paradigm shift and structural change.
Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions
today.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rapuano can be found
in the Appendix on page 28.]
Ms. Horn. Thank you very much.
General Raymond.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN W. RAYMOND, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND
General Raymond. Congresswoman Horn, Congressman Rogers,
members of the committee, distinguished members of the
committee, I am absolutely honored to appear before you today.
I think this is my third time as the Commander of Air Force
Space Command. I appreciate your support. And on behalf of the
26,200 men and women that make up Air Force Space Command--
simply the world's best--we thank you for your leadership.
Today, consistent with our National Security Strategy and
our National Defense Strategy, there is an unprecedented
alignment that space is a warfighting domain just like air,
land, and sea. While we have become comfortable declaring space
as a warfighting domain, the implications of this declaration
are significant and driving tremendous change.
With your strong support, we have developed a strategy,
resourced that strategy, and have made significant advances in
the national security space enterprise. This fiscal year 2020
budget builds on our efforts over the past 2 years and proposes
a 17 percent increase in space funding over the previous fiscal
year, in total a $14 billion investment.
With my posture statement in the record, let me summarize
just a few points, if I could. First of all, our primary focus
is on enhancing lethality and readiness in this warfighting
domain. We have invested in new, defendable architectures. We
have invested in space situational awareness and command and
control capabilities necessary to operate in a warfighting
domain.
We have funded training infrastructure to develop our joint
space warfighters and the cadre that is so critical to our
Nation's success. We have enhanced and expanded our
partnerships with the intelligence community, our allies, and
with commercial industry, to include nontraditional partners.
And I would just, if I could, take a moment from the
script. The last five times I have testified here I have had
Betty Sapp at my side. And yesterday Betty Sapp retired as the
Director of the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office]. And I
will tell you, she has been a spectacular partner, and the work
that we have done together has provided great advantage to our
Nation. I am going to miss her.
You will see, in these partnerships, we have enhanced our
partnerships with the National Reconnaissance Office. It is the
best we have ever been. And we have hosted payloads on allied
partners' satellites, which is also a significant step forward.
Finally, we have focused on capitalizing on innovative
business practices. We have retooled the Space and Missile
Systems Center, and it is something we call SMC-2.0. We have
established, based on the recommendations of the NDAA last
year, a space RCO [Rapid Capabilities Office] that is up and
running at Kirtland Air Force Base. And we are adopting open
architectures and standards to drive innovation across a
broader commercial base, which has been so important to the
space domain.
Let me close by reiterating that we do not want a war to
extend into space. Our mission is to deter that. But the best
way to deter that is to be prepared to fight and win that war
if deterrence were to fail, and we are.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. I greatly
appreciate it, and I really look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Raymond can be found in
the Appendix on page 39.]
Ms. Horn. Thank you, General.
Ms. Chaplain, look forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND
NATIONAL SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Vice Chair Horn, Ranking Member Rogers, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today to
discuss DOD [Department of Defense] space programs.
Space is at a pivotal point right now. In the face of
growing threats and lengthy development cycles, DOD is
embracing new approaches to help speed up the acquisition
process, establish better partnerships with the commercial
sector, and change its acquisition culture.
There is also a proposal before Congress on strengthening
leadership for space. Bringing about this broad span of change
will be challenging to say the least and not without risk.
More specifically, while DOD is undertaking this change, it
will need to concurrently focus on completing older programs
that are still struggling. The ground system for GPS [Global
Positioning System], known as OCX [Next Generation Operation
Control System], for example, is 5 years late. And while the
contractor has improved the pace of building and testing
software, we still see a lot of schedule risk.
The Air Force also recently stopped development work on JMS
[Joint Space Operations Center Mission System], a ground system
for processing space situational awareness data, because it
didn't deliver as expected. We are also still faced with long
gaps between delivery of satellites and ground systems needed
to make use of their capabilities.
Moreover, there are a myriad of challenges facing space
programs that are just getting underway. First, even with the
new space proposal, there are still a lot of open questions
about leadership. For example, at this time, it appears that
there will be a number of space acquisition activities outside
the Space Force, including the Missile Defense Agency, the NRO,
and some military space service activities.
But so far, it is uncertain what the overall governance
structure for space will be. If there are conflicts in
requirements, funding, or priorities between agencies that are
not in the Space Force, who resolves them and makes a final
decision?
There is also a new entity being rolled out, the Space
Development Agency [SDA], which has very worthwhile goals of
adopting innovative technologies for space. But at this time,
it is unclear how it will mesh with similar agencies, and also
still unclear who is in charge of future architectures for
space. These questions may well be resolved as details for the
Space Force and SDA get worked out, but new programs will be
operating with uncertainty for the time being.
Second, while streamlining may help speed up space programs
and change the culture, we know from past efforts to streamline
space that there is also a risk of inviting programs to move
too quickly and disregard the engineering and acquisition
discipline that is so very important to space.
Keep in mind that space is different than other types of
weapons. You cannot easily fix satellites once they are in
orbit. We consistently see programs suffer major setbacks
because one quality procedure was not followed or one small
flaw and one small part was not detected. This does not mean
streamlining cannot be done or should not be done. It just
means we should heed lessons from the past, maintain good
insight, oversight, and expertise, and be prepared to cancel
programs that falter.
Third, there is a question about DOD's capacity to manage
multiple new programs concurrently. Yes, there is a healthy
increase being proposed for space, but consider at least nine
significant programs are getting underway. They will likely
require heavy investments upfront, and that DOD will also be
seeking money for a new Space Force, for space protection, for
new Space Development Agency, a new missile defense space
layer, as well as priorities outside of space such as the
nuclear triad.
There are also questions about workforce capacity. We
recently reported that just tracking who is in the space
acquisition workforce is a challenge, and there are gaps in
technical expertise that could be stretched with multiple new
programs.
Moreover, all these new programs will be software
intensive, but DOD has challenges managing software. We
recently found space software programs struggle to effectively
engage system users, which is critical to their success. We
understand many new programs are attempting to be more agile
and to use more modern tools, but it remains to be seen how
successful DOD can be in adopting these new ways.
Again, good things are happening in space. There is
attention from the highest levels of government, more
resources, and a recognition that different approaches and
cultures are needed. What is key to making them happen is not
to lose focus on improving acquisition management and
oversight, building capacity as we speed up programs, and
continuing to reduce fragmentation.
This concludes my statement, and I am happy to answer any
questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain can be found in the
Appendix on page 56.]
Ms. Horn. Thank you. I appreciate all three of you being
here today.
And I am going to start with, I think, what is one of the
obvious questions, and I know many of us on this committee and
the committee as a whole have begun to address it, and that I
think is alignment of our priorities and the realignment of
space in the form of a Space Force or some other realignment,
which it is clear, I think, to me and to, I would say, most of
us or everyone on this committee certainly that space as a
contested area is unquestionable and it is undoubted, and we
have a lot of adversaries increasing their presence, their
investment, and the work that they are doing in this arena so
that we have to, I think, be smart about how we move forward.
And I asked a couple of these questions to General Dunford
the other day, and I think I want to hear from you today. And I
am going to start with Space Force and how we structure that.
And first of all, your sense of whether or not this is an
alignment that needs to be--that needs to have a direct report
up to the Joint Chiefs or what that looks like.
And I would like to start, General Raymond, because you are
currently there, with your sense of how this realignment would
impact, and do you see the need for Joint Chiefs?
General Raymond. Thank you.
Let me first say that I fully support the standup of a
Space Force underneath the Department of Air Force. I do so for
several reasons: First of all, it will elevate space to the
level of importance that it is for our--to our Nation and to
our joint force; secondly, it will align and unify space
activities that are currently spread out across the Department
under one force; thirdly, it will provide a four-star that will
come to work every day focused on that domain, which I think is
really, really important; and then, finally, by putting the
Space Force underneath the Department of the Air Force, we do
so in a very efficient manner. And so, for all of those
reasons, I think it is structured properly in the way the
legislation--legislative proposal came forward, and I am
supportive.
Ms. Horn. Thank you.
Mr. Rapuano.
Secretary Rapuano. I agree wholeheartedly with General
Raymond's response. I would simply add that, as a major
warfighting domain, space is a vast, physical domain. It
requires the time and attention and undivided focus of senior
leadership in the Department in the form, consistent with our
proposal, with the Chief of Staff of the Space Force who will
be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as a vice,
who will be the four-star vice to the Chief of Staff.
It is that focused attention on the mission, and it is
the--per the Goldwater-Nichols structure, it is that organize,
train, and equip function that will present the trained
personnel, the doctrine, and the expertise as well as the
equipment in the form of the architecture to the U.S. Space
Command, which will then leverage those capabilities in the
day-to-day employment of the joint space forces.
Ms. Horn. Thank you.
Following on that a little bit, it is clear that we have
some challenges with identifying acquisition development,
development timelines as China, Russia, some of our other
adversaries are beginning to put more time and resources into
this domain that we need to streamline. And so I have a couple
of questions following on the identification and the cost and/
or relative cost savings that this might impact.
So, in the recent GAO [Government Accountability Office]
report that looks at what we know about space, having it in so
many different places across DOD, and I understand that the
proposed Space Force plan would still have--we would still have
some programs under the intelligence community umbrella.
Setting that aside to a certain extent, the fact that we
still have areas that we just don't know where acquisition is
going and we are not quite clear on all of the workforce
issues, General Raymond, I think I want to know what steps--as
we put this plan into place but in the interim, what steps the
DOD will be taking and Space Command will be taking to identify
the number of acquisition personnel that are needed so that
when we stand--when this is stood up or we do this realignment
that we don't--you don't find ourselves in that same position.
General Raymond. Yeah. So this committee has helped over
the years just discuss how important it is that we reduce the
timeline from requirements to acquisition, so we have to get
this right.
Today, we have rearchitected SMC-2.0, and we have elevated
the stature of the human resource capital manager of that. Our
personnel numbers at SMC today are the best it has ever been.
They are about 85 percent manned. Our midlevel managers are the
highest it has ever been as well and have pretty significant
capability.
One of the things that we are looking at and addressing is,
there is about--I think in your report you mentioned about
8,000 acquisition professionals that are dealing with space.
And one of the things that we have studied over this past year
and we are putting together an office to manage that broader
enterprise look at acquisition officers spread out across the
Department that have space expertise, and so we are going to
put mechanisms in place to be able to track that and develop
that towards the end of being able to move fast and deliver
critical capabilities for our Nation.
Ms. Horn. Following on that with space workforce
development, and I have--I will have a question for you in just
a moment about the GAO report, with the 2-year rotations
occurring, 2-year rotations, do you see that the current
structure as challenging to develop and retain the expertise in
the DOD workforce in the space domain?
General Raymond. I am pretty comfortable with our ability
to develop expertise in the space domain. I think we have got a
level of expertise that is greater than when I first got into
this job, and I am comfortable. I think there is--you know,
there is cost benefits. There is goodness of moving people as
well to get different expertise and bringing in outside talent
to help us, and so I am comfortable we have it about right.
Ms. Horn. In the transition to a new architecture, do you
think that would help to recruit and retain even if they are
moving within Space Force but to develop and retain that
expertise in a way that is more focused? And perhaps that is a
better way that I could describe that question.
General Raymond. Yeah. So I would tell the subcommittee, it
is an exciting time to be in this business. There are a lot of
people knocking on our doors wanting to come to work for us. It
is really an exciting time, and we have had no problem
recruiting talent to come our way.
And I think the way we restructured SMC, it provides some
opportunities to get people in, build that talent, and then
actually, as you mentioned, move them around to different areas
of expertise to help grow them for the future.
Ms. Horn. Thank you.
And one final question for you, Ms. Chaplain. Could you
specify--you have summarized well the GAO report--the biggest
area of challenge that you identified, specifically around the
lack of knowledge about where all of the acquisition pieces are
that you found in your GAO report.
Ms. Chaplain. Yeah. I would like to say it is not just
unique to space. The way DOD tracks its acquisition
professionals in general focuses on certain skill sets like
program managers, engineers, and not necessarily the mission
area or platforms that they work on. So we found that DOD
couldn't really tell us who was in the space acquisition
workforce because of the way their systems track.
But it is a good idea to maybe change the system so that
you can track at least for space. If you are talking about
bringing together organizations, you want to know who is out
there to draw on. And then it would help you do more analysis
in terms of types of expertise that you might need more of,
which I think has been an issue for a long time.
Ms. Horn. Thank you, all.
We have been joined by our chairman. I want to thank you
all, the witnesses, for your testimony and questions, and I
will turn it over to Chairman Cooper.
Mr. Cooper [presiding]. Sounds like you were doing a great
job. I am happy for you to stay there, if you would like.
Who is the next questioner? I don't want to interfere in
the line of questioning. Mr. Rogers, I would be honored to
recognize my friend from Alabama.
Mr. Rogers. I thank my friend from Tennessee.
This is great stuff. Something that Mr. Rapuano said a few
minutes ago I think this committee should be sure and take note
of. You know, General Raymond listed some of the significant
impacts of having a separate Space Force. But the fact that we
are going to have a four-star Chief of Staff and a four-star
vice chief of--no, not chief--yeah, General Hyten, two space
professionals in the tank advocating for space is huge as we
try to have a new service.
You know, one of the problems that we found with this
committee is that space was being starved in the Air Force. It
is not going to be starved anymore under this new construct,
and it is going to get the kind of resources we need to be
successful. So I am excited about that, and I want everybody to
take note of that because that is a big deal in this
organizational structure.
I also want to note, Ms. Chaplain did the work that helped
focus this committee on this. A lot of folks in the government
don't get the attention they ought to get, but she ought to be
recognized for the hard work she did in helping me and Jim
Cooper and the rest of this committee recognize the foundation
that had been laid by the Rumsfeld Commission, Allard
Commission, several reports that her office had done. This
Space Force idea did not come up out of me and Jim Cooper. It
came through the work of those commissions and the GAO studies,
and I appreciate what you have done.
To that point, Ms. Chaplain, looking back over the last 30
years at the Rumsfeld Commission, the studies you have done,
the Allard Commission, what do you think--where do you think we
are now given what they were saying we needed to be doing? Are
we following through on the path that they pointed us toward?
Ms. Chaplain. I think we are. We have had a lot of attempts
since those commissions to do things, but they were mostly on
the edges, or they were reforms that didn't work very long. And
now we have something before us that can make lasting change,
which is one of the important ingredients that those
commissions brought out. Some of them envisioned even more
dramatic changes that are being proposed right now. They
envisioned an independent Space Force.
And one of the commissions that was done under this
committee also envisioned a giant national space security
organization that would include the NRO. But they all also
admitted that maybe you need these interim steps in between.
Mr. Rogers. Exactly.
Ms. Chaplain. And I think that is where we are now is the
interim step.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah. Back a few minutes ago I was trying to
refer to the term ``vice chairman'' talking about General
Hyten. And that is when he suggested to this committee in
briefings is that this is an evolutionary process. We don't
have to go from where we are now without a Space Force to this
full-blown construct that has all the IC [intelligence
community] in it and in a separate department. Just like the
Air Force didn't evolve out of the Army to be what it is today;
it went through iterations, and that is what I envision here.
Ms. Chaplain in her opening statement, General Raymond,
made reference to some confusion about the role of SMC versus
Space Development Agency. And you made some reference to it.
How do you see those two working--in my view, I don't know why
we would need an SMC once we have a full-blown Space
Development Agency. So tell me how you see that working out.
General Raymond. First of all, I don't think there is any
argument at all that we have to get faster.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah.
General Raymond. And we have talked about this for years.
The time from requirement to capability has to get shortened.
And so, with the help of this committee and with Congress last
year, we, for example, stood up a Space Rapid Capabilities
Office to get after that. We have rearchitected the Space and
Missile Systems Center to get after that. We have had
partnerships with the Air Force RCO. We have had partnerships
with the NRO, and it is all in my written statement.
So everybody is moving out fast to work to shorten that
timeline. And I think that is a national imperative. The Space
Development Agency is doing the same thing, and I--that there
is all goodness in what we say that they are going to do. The
details of that, as I understand, are still being worked.
And so what we are going to have to do is I am going to
have to--and I look forward to working with Dr. Griffin as we
go forward to make sure that these are synchronized activities
and not competing, and I think we can do that.
Mr. Rogers. Great. In talking with my friend Chairman
Cooper about this and others, we are a little concerned that
the proposal that came over from the Defense Department has
some cross-jurisdictional problems that need to be cleaned up.
We want to make sure you understand that, while we want and
expect and are determined to see the standing up of a separate
Space Force, the version--the proposal that you all sent us is
not going to be the final product because we are going to have
to clean up some of those things.
Just from a legislative standpoint, this committee, meaning
the HASC, the House Armed Services Committee, and our
counterpart on the Senate side should be the committee that
decides this, and I think you are going to see some changes
made.
And I hope you understand this is a process. You all make
proposals. We make--come back--counter proposals, and we get to
a place where we have something good. But I do want you to know
we see some pretty glaring problems that are going to have to
be cleaned up in that proposal.
And, with that, I thank the chairman for the time, and I
yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman from Alabama.
Let me ask unanimous consent that the members of the full
committee, such as Mr. Lamborn, be able to ask questions at the
end of subcommittee questioning.
Hearing no objection, that will be approved.
Next questioner will be Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of you for being here.
Mr. Rapuano and General Raymond, I think it is pretty
clear, I am sure to all of us in the room, where you stand on
this now. I appreciate that. And yet I am also wondering, you
know, from an outside perspective, where you think there is
some redundancy.
I mean, from an outsider, Space Force, Space Command, new
Space Development Agency sort of sounds like, do we have to do
all that? And yet some redundancy is always good. Some of it is
probably over the top. What----
General Raymond. I think--thank you for the question.
I think if you go back to Goldwater-Nichols back in the
1980s, it was kind of two functions that were laid out. One
function is an organize, train, and equip function and that is
the function of services. The other function is a warfighting
function, and that is the function of combatant commands.
And so they actually have two different roles. So, if you
look at the proposals being talked about with the Space Force
and the combatant command, the Space Force would provide
organized, trained, and equipped professionals to U.S. Space
Command to be able to employ. So there is actually two
different functions, and it works--it has been working very
well since the 1980s.
Mrs. Davis. Did you want to comment, Mr. Rapuano?
Secretary Rapuano. I would just add to General Raymond's
response that it really is fundamental to the way that the
Department of Defense operates with regard to how do we
organize, man, train, and equip for warfighting domains. And
having the undivided attention of a dedicated service with
senior leadership who are only thinking about space has been
one of the missing pieces.
And if you look at the studies all the way back to
Rumsfeld, that is a consistent theme, is the disaggregation and
the lack of elevation associated with space. And that is why
the Space Force, from our perspective, is such a fundamental
component.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. And yet it has taken us a while to
get there.
Secretary Rapuano. Yes, it has.
Mrs. Davis. Yeah.
Ms. Chaplain, I know you spoke about that the DOD is not
able to track professionals in the same way. But where do you
come in on this then when it comes to the professionals
themselves and whether or not we are able to--you suggested
maybe we need to have a different kind of system for doing
that, a different kind of analysis for where people should be
in their--those pathways.
Ms. Chaplain. You know, when I was talking about a
different system, I actually meant the IT [information
technology] system that tracks acquisition professionals. But
one issue that has been pertinent to space for a long time is
maintaining and increasing expertise in certain areas. And if
you are going to move to the Space Force construct, it is a
good opportunity to really look at your workforce and see the
types of professionals you need.
It was mentioned just earlier about 2-year rotations for
programs in terms of officers managing them. The best practice
is actually to have longer tenures and people maybe even on the
civilian side, more of them so that you can really develop that
deep expertise. I think that is something the NRO has been
trying to do over the past few years and has been pretty
successful. So I think there are things we can do for the space
acquisition workforce now that we have an opportunity to do.
Mrs. Davis. Do we risk some protective measures for our
workforce in enabling these kinds--the establishment of the
Space Force? I mean, are there some things that, down the road,
that we suspend and that come back and bite us later on?
Ms. Chaplain. There is a big question, I think, in terms of
where your committee has had is on the authorities being
proposed for the Space Force under the DOD proposal. It is an
area I don't know too much about, but there are some
authorities that other intelligence agencies have that I think
were envisioned for this, that people have concerns about. But
it is an area worth exploring.
Mrs. Davis. So maybe it is worth looking at, yeah.
And to all of you, I just have a few seconds, what
challenges does the Department of Defense face that threaten
the improvement of cybersecurity of our weapons systems, any
one high-priority concern?
Secretary Rapuano. So really what we have been focusing on
in the last 2 years has been integrated approach to cyber
throughout the Department and a systemic approach to
understanding vulnerabilities, and that is of currently
deployed capabilities as well as the full life cycle from birth
associated with how do we bake in cyber resilience and security
from the very beginning. And they are two very different
challenges, but we have to do both particularly for our more
critical systems.
Mrs. Davis. And when it comes to our work with our allies
with NATO, do they share the same concerns?
Secretary Rapuano. They do.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Brooks from Alabama.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Rapuano, according to the Space Force
proposal, quote, as necessary, Department of Defense components
may retain organic space capabilities uniquely required to
support the core mission of that military service or defense
agency, end quote.
Can you please describe and elaborate on what happens to
Army Space and Missile Defense Command, the Navy Space and
Naval War Systems Command, and the community involved with user
equipment under the Department of Defense's Space Force
proposal?
Secretary Rapuano. So, again, per that guidance, the
organic capabilities within a service that are necessary for
the execution of their missions will stay within the service.
Those capabilities that are global and pertain to beyond the
unique mission of the service, for example, global GPS, global
comms, they will go to the Space Force.
Mr. Brooks. Second question, and first, background, as you
may know, Redstone Arsenal has a long history in commercial
military and even adversary space capability development and
analysis.
To give just a few examples, Army organizations at Redstone
Arsenal are currently developing a space layered sensor suite
for the ballistic missile defense system and low-Earth orbit
communications and imagery satellites to support the tactical
warfighter.
The Department of Defense's fiscal year 2020 budget request
seeks approximately $105 million in research, development,
testing, and evaluation funding, and approximately $44 million
in operations and maintenance funding for the Space Development
Agency.
What is the expected impact of this funding to present
space capability development providers, and how is the Space
Development Agency expected to leverage the expertise that
already exists at places like Redstone Arsenal?
Secretary Rapuano. So the intent of the Space Development
Agency is not to replace or displace existing institutions
working on space development and acquisition. It really is to
augment and complement. This is a growing field, as you are
well aware, just from the budget numbers including this year's.
We see the need for more of these capabilities, and we
simply want to ensure that they are working in an integrated
way to achieve strategic outcomes. So we don't see these
current capabilities or institutions or facilities being
replaced or moved as a general proposition.
Mr. Brooks. And final issue, last week India conducted an
antisatellite test. Can any of you speak to the dangers of such
tests--this is for the whole panel--particularly the problems
that can be caused by space debris created by antisatellite
tests?
Secretary Rapuano. Well, let me just take a start, and then
I will hand it over to General Raymond. We, as the lead
spacefaring nation in the world, have a lot invested in the
ability to safely conduct space operations, and debris is a
significant concern. So we certainly have consistently favored
minimizing potential for debris.
We, of course, are the stewards of the space traffic
management as well as space awareness, and we facilitate those
kinds of safety measures throughout space. So we work with our
allies and partners as well, who have--share the same
understanding and priority with regard to the space debris
example.
General Raymond. Yes. We are aware that that was going to
happen. We immediately detected the launch. We immediately
detected the successful intercept. We started tracking pieces
of debris. Today we are tracking about 270 pieces of debris.
We act as the space traffic control for the world. We do
all the analysis to determine if any two objects in space are
going to collide, and then we provide warning. We take great
care in providing that warning to the world, and we also take
great care in making sure that the astronauts on the
International Space Station are safe.
Mr. Brooks. If I understand correctly, you stated that you
were aware that it was going to happen. Was there anything done
to discourage India from creating so much space debris?
Secretary Rapuano. We have expressed concerns to all our
partners and allies with regard to debris and looking to
minimize debris to the maximum extent possible.
Mr. Brooks. Are we pretty much limited to tracking this
debris and trying to avoid collisions thereafter, or is there
anything that can be done about the debris that is already up
in space?
General Raymond. There is not a lot today that can be done
about the debris problem that we face in space. We track about
23,000 objects. The way that we tackle that problem is to quit
creating debris in the first place, until we provide that
warning for the world, to keep the domain safe for all.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
Now the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal, is
recognized.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Raymond, how would you describe the Air Force's
progress towards ending reliance upon the RD-180?
General Raymond. The Air Force has a three-prong launch
strategy. First and foremost, we must have assured access to
space. That is critical, critical to our Nation. In fact, it is
a vital national interest, as articulated in the National
Security Strategy. The second thing we want to do is increase
competition. And the third thing, as mandated by law, we are to
get off the RD-180 engine.
Our launch strategy is working on all of those fronts. We
have had 76 for 76 successful launches. We have had a 24
percent reduction in launch costs since 2012, and we are on
track to get off the RD-180 engine by the statutory limits.
Mr. Carbajal. When you say ``statutory limits,'' you mean
fiscal year 2019?
General Raymond. The law describes not procuring any more
additional engines past fiscal year 2022.
Mr. Carbajal. 2022. Thank you.
What are the risks if this is delayed since the Air Force
has asked for backup options in the case of delay?
General Raymond. I am not--I am sorry. Can you clarify the
question for me?
Mr. Carbajal. If we don't meet that deadline, it is my
understanding the Air Force has asked--is considering options
in case we are not able to meet that statutory deadline.
General Raymond. We are going to meet the statutory
deadline.
Mr. Carbajal. Great. Well, that is good to hear.
General Raymond, how are you ensuring that all companies
that are able to compete for phase 2 of the launch services
acquisition are able to and are on a level playing field?
General Raymond. It is critical, absolutely critical that
we have fair and equitable competition, and, again, that is the
second prong of our strategy. I am very comfortable with where
we stand today, that we have that fair and equitable
competition, that we have--we now have companies that are
mature enough to be able to launch the full spectrum of
launches that the United States military requires. And I am
very comfortable going forward with our strategy.
Mr. Carbajal. Not to be redundant, but are the risks that
the LSA [Launch Service Agreement] approach down-selecting to
two providers will exclude competitors for at least 5 years,
what are you doing to ensure we retain competition?
General Raymond. Again, competition is critical to our
strategy. It is a little bit of a nuance. It is not a down-
select from--to two. We are having a full and open competition
for two, and so everybody can compete for that. We are
comfortable that there is companies that--many companies that
can compete and win that. We think that the playing field is
level.
And if you look at the manifests that are projected over
the next 5 years, the manifests really support two companies,
and so we think we are on the--on firm and solid footing on
this strategy.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, General.
Ms. Chaplain, what are your recommendations on ensuring
fair and open competition for launch?
Ms. Chaplain. We have not had recent work on EELV [Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle] or the new launch program, but we
have always been very much of a proponent of ensuring
competition to the extent you can. And I do believe General
Raymond is right that the manifest for phase 2, that there
won't be quite the demand from DOD to support three providers,
but there has been a concern that those--some of the providers
getting money now as part of technology maturation efforts
won't be able to be a player for that period of time.
It is difficult to keep competition in launch. You are
always at risk of maybe losing competition because one of the
companies may not be able to stay in business. So it is--to the
extent that you can keep other players in the game, it is
beneficial.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
General Raymond, General Hyten has noted that, quote, I
will not support buying big satellites and make juicy targets--
that make juicy targets, end quote. However, in replacing the
missile warning satellites, the Air Force is investing billions
of dollars on a similar architecture of a handful of
satellites.
What are you doing to complicate the adversary's incentive
to target these satellites, for example, investing in a
disaggregated architecture and taking advantage of hosted
payload opportunities?
General Raymond. Let me just say that General Hyten is a
good friend, and we are in great alignment on this topic. There
are lots of things that we are doing to enhance the resiliency
of our architectures, and what I would like to do, if possible,
is take that conversation and the specifics in a classified
hearing. But let me give you some top bullets.
We are focusing on, again, having more defendable
architectures. We are developing tactics, techniques, and
procedures to be able to respond to threats and be able to
fight through threats. We are working hard to develop the joint
space warfighters that can operate successfully in a contested
domain.
And then, finally, we are also expanding our--and enhancing
our partnerships with our allies in commercial industry and
intelligence community. And this budget, for example, we are
placing a couple payloads on allied satellites to, again, do
some more dispersal. So there is a long strategy, and I will go
into more specifics in a classified hearing. Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, General.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
And now yet another gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Byrne. It is Alabama day on the subcommittee.
General, I want to go back to the launch vehicle issue, if
you don't mind. To what extent will the new launch vehicle
prototypes DOD is investing in be ready by the time they are
needed, and can you talk about the technical risks and how they
are being mitigated?
General Raymond. We are working very closely, Congressman,
with those companies, as you would expect. We are very
comfortable with the level of maturity where they are. We are
comfortable what their plans of what they have to do here over
the next year and are confident, completely confident that they
will be ready to execute our missions when it is time.
Mr. Byrne. Okay. And how do you balance mission assurance
and innovative technology development of space launch?
General Raymond. You know, I have been in the space launch
business for a long time, and I was in the space launch
business on a staff back in the 1990s when we didn't have a lot
of success. We were blowing up significant amount of rockets,
and we have taken great, great care in turning that around.
And as I talked about in my opening statement, we are 76
for 76, and every launch is a new launch that we are focused
on. There is room for innovation. I think the way you do that
innovation is you have a close partnership and relationship
with the folks that are innovating, and we enjoy that today.
And there are some innovative things that are happening.
For example, this year we are going to use reusable boosters
for the first time. So there is room for innovation. We work
side by side. We make sure that we do it smartly and that we
are 77 for 77 and 78 for 78.
Mr. Byrne. Good.
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to first congratulate you and the
administration. You are the first administration to recognize
space as a warfighting domain, and that in and of itself was a
big step forward.
But try to give me a little more general sense--I know
there are some things you can't tell me in a nonclassified
setting, but can you describe what our adversaries are doing or
have the capability of doing in space and compare and contrast
that with us?
And, General, if you need to jump in, that would be good
too.
Secretary Rapuano. Yes. I can certainly go into greater
details in the closed session. But really since the Gulf war,
our principal potential adversaries have been extremely focused
on the enablers that have provided a wide range of highly
exquisite capabilities to the United States military in terms
of targeting, positioning, locationing, communications. The
list does go on.
And they have been very focused, and the Chinese in
particular have made massive investments in their space
capabilities, and they are developing counterspace capabilities
and deploying those capabilities.
They are looking to denigrate our advantage that we have in
terms of our space-based capabilities and enabling functions.
So we are very mindful of that. And this really is what forced
the transition of understanding of space versus an enabling
zone for capabilities as a warfighting domain.
And the architecture that we have right now was not
designed for a nonpermissive environment. So that is where we
are focused. That is where we have a sense of urgency with
regard to how do we accelerate these capabilities, how do we
better organize and equip. And, ergo, the organizational
structuring, in terms of having that center of gravity,
institutionalizing the advocacy of space, the development of
doctrine, the training of personnel, is critical to being able
to present that force to the combatant command that will then
be operating the joint space forces on a daily basis.
Mr. Byrne. General, do you want to add anything to that?
General Raymond. I agree with all that. I would just say
that--and kind of as a teaser for the classified session. At an
unclassified level, I would say that, you know, there is a
spectrum of activity that we are concerned about, everything
from low-end reversible jamming of communication satellites and
GPS satellites, for example, all the way up to a high-end
direct-ascent ASAT as demonstrated in 2007. And I can give you
the specifics on that spectrum at a classified hearing.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman from California is recognized.
Mr. Garamendi. Just a couple of things. I was going through
the suggested questions by the staff. Extraordinary set of
questions, most of which are not going to be able to be
answered in this setting, and I would recommend that they be
answered for the record because they are--each and every one of
them are very, very important. Maybe 20 percent of them have
actually--are going to be able to be asked here, so I would ask
that.
The second thing really has to do with the Space Force
itself. I have been going back and forth on that. I have been
trying to visually see how this thing works. And here we are
with a year in which we are supposed to make a decision, and
there is no organization chart. Presumably you have one. If it
is a secret, maybe we can get it in the next session, in the
secret session. If so, I would probably ask, why is it secret?
We heard that from one of our--my colleagues that there is
this Redstone facility. Each of the services have their own
space programs. How are those to be integrated into this Space
Force, or are they going to be kept separate, as you indicated
the Redstone situation would continue to be separate?
Secretary Rapuano. As I noted, those capabilities that are
unique to the organic mission of the service will stay under
the service. The global or joint capabilities will fleet up
under the Space Force. So that is a process that will--in terms
of the details of where these delineations are made, will be
taking place going forward. But if you have, for example, a
global communications system run by one service, that set of
capabilities and that responsibility would revert to the Space
Force so it can be leveraged for the entire----
Mr. Garamendi. So could you give an example of a service
that has such a global communications system and it would be
transferred from whatever service that was to the Space Force?
Secretary Rapuano. I don't have the details, but I believe
the Navy has a global SATCOMs [satellite communications].
General Raymond probably----
Mr. Garamendi. And so you think they maybe might be willing
to transfer that to the Air Force. That will be an interesting
switch. We have seen some turfing examples in the past. This
entire thing is fraught with turf.
Secretary Rapuano. That is really the very point of
institutionalizing space, the warfighting domain, and the
development of the organize, train, and equip function in a
service model because of the disaggregated approach that we
have taken, and, again, that was in an era where space was not
contested. It was not a warfighting domain.
So the focus was on maximum enablement of service
warfighting mission capabilities. You didn't need as much of
that integrated approach where you are looking at an
architecture in space that is resilient and that which we can
defend or reconstitute rapidly in a conflict.
Mr. Garamendi. I am going to really wait until the
classified section. I just draw my final point to the questions
that have been raised by the chairman. Seven-year unlimited
authority to transfer funds from here to there and everywhere,
really think that is going to happen? And why would it be
necessary to happen?
Secretary Rapuano. We are looking forward to working with
Congress on----
Mr. Garamendi. Given what the Department of Defense and the
administration is doing with transfers right now, like the Air
Force has endured two strategic bases, one I think you are
familiar with, General Raymond, Offutt and Tyndall, maybe $6
billion, $7 billion of repair of those bases. And the
Department of Defense has transferred $1 billion that was
unused by the Army to the counternarcotics so that they could
build a couple of walls someplace. What in the hell is the
priority here? Is it to rebuild Tyndall or maybe Offutt, or is
it to build 100 miles of fence?
Mr. Rapuano, what is the priority at the Department?
Secretary Rapuano. Well, we have multiple priorities.
Mr. Garamendi. No, that is not the question. Okay. What are
the priorities? What are the multiple priorities?
Secretary Rapuano. We have readiness priorities, and we
have priorities when it comes to responding to lawful direction
with regard to other national security priorities of the
Nation.
Mr. Garamendi. So would you classify a fence in El Paso as
more important than getting Offutt, the home of STRATCOM, up
and running?
Secretary Rapuano. I am not in a position to make that
trade, Congressman.
Mr. Garamendi. I asked you not for the trade, but what is
your priority? What is your advice?
Secretary Rapuano. The Department's priority is to respond
to lawful direction when the priorities are coming from above.
Mr. Garamendi. From whom? Lawful direction from whom? From
the President?
Secretary Rapuano. From the President with regards to
barrier.
Mr. Garamendi. Who decides that that wall is more important
than getting Tyndall Air Force Base back up and operating,
which is a key base, and STRATCOM, a key base? A fence is more
important? I think not. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
And now the gentleman from Colorado, the patient gentleman
from Colorado.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
having this hearing.
And in response to the last set of questions, I will just
say that I believe our military has the capability to walk and
chew gum at the same time. I think we can handle multiple
priorities simultaneously and do them right and do them well.
General Raymond, I was so pleased to see you nominated to
be the first Commander of the reactivated U.S. Space Command.
We in Colorado Springs are very proud of you, and I am very
excited about what it means to our Nation to have such a
dedicated leader and experienced warfighter overseeing the
pointed end of the spear.
As you know, it is my great honor to represent the airmen
of Air Force Space Command and so many of our space
warfighters. As we move forward into plans to establish U.S.
Space Command, can you describe for us relative to the threat
of our near-peer adversaries that they pose to our space
assets, why is it important that we act now without delay?
General Raymond. First of all, thank you. I am honored to
be nominated. And it is just that, a nomination, and there are
still things that have to happen.
And I will just tell you from an Air Force Space Command
point of view, it is really critical that we embrace that space
is a warfighting domain. Everything that we do in space,
everything that we do as a joint force is enabled by space,
everything. There is not--you can't come up with anything that
we do as a joint force that isn't.
And it is very important that we have the ability to
protect and defend those capabilities so the sailors, soldiers,
airmen, and Marines that have come to rely on those always have
them. It is like the light switch that you turn on. It is
always on. That is our job.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Now, in the context of warfighting, what does warfighting
in space--what does readiness mean?
General Raymond. So I don't consider it warfighting in
space. I consider it just warfighting. It is just a war. And it
is not just--I don't want to--that came out wrong. It is war,
and it is important, but it is an event that a country can
choose to fight it on the land, they can choose to fight it in
the sea, they can choose to fight it in space or in the air.
And so it is just another domain of where military activity--
military activity occurs.
What we call for that is to make sure that we have the
ability to protect and defend those critical satellites and
those critical capabilities to make sure that our forces and
our Nation and our coalition and allied partners always have
those capabilities and to be able to hold our adversaries at
risk. We want to deter this. This is all about deterrence, and
the way you deter is you change that calculus.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
And now I am going to drill down and ask a couple of really
specific questions. After spending $500 million in years of
development, GAO recently reported that operational testing in
2018 found that the Joint Space Operations Center Mission
System Increment 2--that is a mouthful--was not operationally
effective or suitable.
I understand that future increments have been canceled, and
now that they are--now that there is a new program called Space
C2, which is supposed to be using agile software development to
deliver capabilities to the warfighters every 90 days, how will
this be structured to succeed where JMS failed?
General Raymond. First of all, thanks for the question.
You know, any commander that is responsible for operations
in any domain has a couple must-haves. You have to have the
ability to have awareness of the domain that you are operating
in, and you have to have the ability to command and control
capabilities.
This C2 system that you talked about, our new program, is
that system for space. Of all the things that I have submitted
to the record in my report, this is the program that has my
highest attention. I meet on this at least monthly.
The way we are doing this that is different, completely
different than what we did with JMS, first of all, we started
with a prototype, and we had the Air Force RCO develop a
prototype of this capability because they had already built a
similar prototype. So we are using leveraging work that had
already been done in another domain.
We have developed open standards, called OMS [Open Mission
Systems] and UCI [Universal Command and Control Interface],
that will allow companies to innovate to meet those standards
and will allow multidomain integration. We have built industry
consortium to make sure we have the industry's voice in this
program with us.
We are building this to be coalition friendly from the
front because, just like in any other conflict, we expect that
we will partner with our coalition and our allies. We have
developed a data library so we can--a cloud-based data library,
if you will, so we can ingest more data, including commercial,
intelligence, and DOD data.
And then, finally, and probably most importantly is that we
are adopting agile software--best practices in agile software
development. It is not good enough to take 5 years to develop
software and then test it and see if it works. We are doing it
in much quicker sprints, 90-day sprints, and we are already
getting the capability delivered to the floor.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I still have questions on COMSATCOM
[commercial satellite communications], overhead persistent
infrared system, and weather satellites, but I will save those
for the classified session.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman for his questions.
I hope that as many members as possible can join us in HVC-
301 [House Visitors Center room 301] for the classified
session.
Let me ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's
opening statement be inserted for the record.
Hearing no objection, so done.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Cooper. So this subcommittee hearing is adjourned, and
let's move in the next 10 minutes to the classified session.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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