[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-19]
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 27, 2019
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-880 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
KATIE HILL, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Matt Rhoades, Professional Staff Member
Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member
Rory Coleman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 3
WITNESSES
Abrams, GEN Robert B., USA, Commander, United Nations Command/
Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea...................... 8
Davidson, ADM Philip S., USN, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command........................................................ 5
Schriver, Hon. Randall G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Department of Defense........... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Abrams, GEN Robert B......................................... 99
Davidson, ADM Philip S....................................... 58
Schriver, Hon. Randall G..................................... 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[Responses provided were classified and retained in committee
files.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 120
Mr. Langevin................................................. 117
Mr. Rogers................................................... 119
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 120
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 117
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 27, 2019.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. I call the meeting to order.
Before we get started, one housekeeping item in terms of
how we do the questioning. As you know, when the gavel drops,
if you are here, you are on the list. If you are not here for
the gavel, you then go to the back of the list.
But then, the confusing thing is, if you leave, as a number
of people are going to do and they are--I should drag this out
so you guys can't leave as soon as you want to leave. But I
wouldn't do that to our witnesses. At that point, you are on
the list, so whenever you come back, you get in line.
But that creates an inconvenient situation in that I--you
know, we are thinking somebody is next, then literally 2
minutes before it is their turn, if you come back and you are
in line, you get to bump that person. So if you are sitting
there thinking you are next, then all of a sudden somebody else
gets called on, it is because somebody else came back in those
couple of minutes.
And that is in the rule. That is in the committee rule. So
if you are here for the drop of the gavel, you are in line, and
it is your turn, whenever you come back, assuming you are in
line, you get to jump anybody else who was there. Personally, I
am not in love with that rule, but then again, I approved it.
So we will think about that for the future, but that is the way
it works.
I say that also because, once again, we have a classified
hearing after this. We are going to try to stop at noon. I will
try to get people in who are here, but if somebody comes
creeping back in at 11:57, that complicates things.
So we are going to try to stop at noon, try to start the
classified hearing immediately thereafter, but it will be
sometime between noon and 12:15. I am sure our witnesses were
fascinated by that.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. On behalf of the members of the T&I
[Transportation and Infrastructure] Committee, I have to go to
markup and vote. We appreciate you covering for us. Thank you.
The Chairman. Sure. You will be missed, but we appreciate
your giving us a heads-up.
Okay. We have our posture hearing this morning with the
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea. Our witnesses
are the Honorable Randall Schriver, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Department of
Defense; Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander of the U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command; and General Robert Abrams, Commander
United Nations Command, Combined Forces, U.S. Forces Korea.
Welcome, gentlemen. Appreciate you being here. Appreciate your
service and look forward to your testimony.
Obviously, the Pacific region is a critical region. Both
President Obama and President Trump have emphasized our need to
place greater emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region, and, you
know, we look forward to hearing about all of the issues around
there. Obviously, China is the largest issue working with them,
but also, working with countries around them to make sure that
they are playing by the rules and are respecting their
neighbors.
I think the number one most important thing is it is
crucial to maintain a strong U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific
region. I think our presence brings stability and makes it more
likely that it is going to be a peaceful and prosperous place.
Crucial to that, also, is building alliances. Our presence
alone doesn't work unless we have friends and allies in the
region who want us there, who see us being there as an asset to
their interests. I believe we can do that, and I think we have
done a good job of it.
I want to particularly emphasize, as you note, this is the
first year that is the Indo-Pacific Command change that we made
in the authorizing bill last year to reflect the rising
importance of India to our role in the region. I think the
improvement of our relationship with the nation of India is one
of the most positive developments in foreign relations over the
last several years. I hope we can build on that and improve
upon that.
The most pressing questions we are going to have today is
how do we deal with China on a wide range of issues, and
militarily, what do we need to do to make sure that we have the
equipment we need to adequately deter them from doing things
that we don't want them to do? And then, as I said, how are we
doing in terms of working with other key players in the region
to form alliances to contain that threat?
Then, of course, we have North Korea. Without question, the
situation has improved in the last couple of years. I have had
numerous people say that tension on the Korean Peninsula is
lower than it has been probably since the end of the Korean
war--sorry, since the ceasefire that happened in the Korean
war, since it has not actually ended at this point. I am
curious as to your thoughts of how we build upon that, how we
continue to increase the stability, and hopefully eventually
get to the point where we have a denuclearized Korean
Peninsula.
With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Mr.
Thornberry, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me add my welcome to our witnesses. We appreciate
you all being here today.
I think, in a lot of ways, some of the most important
statements were on the first page of the written testimony that
Admiral Davidson submitted where he talks about what we have
accomplished over the last 70 years, liberating hundreds of
millions of people, lifting billions of people out of poverty.
What has helped accomplish that, or what has provided the
foundation for that progress is commitment of free nations to
work together, which I believe is your engagement, Mr.
Chairman, as well as the credibility of the combat power of
Indo-Pacific Command and a robust and modern nuclear deterrent.
On the next page, I will read one sentence: U.S. power
underpins the post-World War II international system that helps
strengthen the essential foundations of a rule-based
international order for economic growth and prosperity in the
region for everyone.
I think that is absolutely true in the Indo-Pacific. I
think it is absolutely true in the rest of the world, too. And
what I worry about is that we take some of those things for
granted, and could let them deteriorate with consequences that
will result in a darker, more dangerous world.
Sometimes I think we need to just remember the basics, and
part of the basics is strong U.S. military presence and
engagement are the key, not only in this region, but maybe as
importantly as anywhere in this region, given what we see
coming with China and the other challenges.
So we will go down into a lot of details about what that
means for 2020 bill, et cetera, but I just think it is
important to remember that combat power, that nuclear
deterrent, that engagement have been very successful for 70
years, and we should not take those things for granted.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Schriver.
STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Schriver. Good morning. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Thornberry, and
distinguished members of the committee. I am very pleased to be
here this morning to talk about our defense work in the Indo-
Pacific, and particularly honored to be sitting with my great
colleagues, Admiral Davidson and General Abrams.
Our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, we believe,
will be made possible--it can only be made possible with a
robust military presence and combat credibility. We believe
this vision and our aspirations are durable if we achieve those
aims, because they are founded on important principles that are
widely shared and have benefited all the countries of the
region and beyond.
These principles include respect for sovereignty, peaceful
dispute resolution, free, fair, and reciprocal trade, and
adherence to international norms and rules. Though China has
benefited as much as any country, perhaps more from this order,
China, under the current leadership of Xi Jinping, seeks to
undermine this rules-based order and seeks a more favorable
environment for its authoritarian governance model.
China, of course, is not alone. We see other challenges.
Russia is an authoritarian actor seeking to undermine the
rules-based order. We see North Korea and their continuing
dangerous behavior. We see backsliding toward illiberal
governance in key countries, such as Myanmar and Cambodia,
which challenges norms related to human rights, religious
freedom, and dignity.
We see the persistent and evolving threats by non-state
actors, including terrorism and criminal enterprise. And we see
the persistent threat from nontraditional transnational
threats, such as those emerging from natural disaster and
changes to our climate.
China's ambitions, though, are of pressing concern as the
CCP [Chinese Communist Party] seeks a different order. In the
security domain, China devotes very significant resources to
eroding our advantages and threaten our interests. There is,
perhaps, no better example of this than Chinese actions in the
South China Sea.
Despite Xi Jinping's pledge made in the Rose Garden of the
White House in 2015, China has militarized the South China Sea
with the deployment of coastal defense cruise missiles and
long-range surface-to-air missiles, and they threaten our
interests as a result.
We have a specific response, of course, in the South China
Sea. Admiral Davidson and his forces fly, sail, and operate
where law allows. We encourage other countries to do the same,
either alongside us or unilaterally. But nonetheless, we are
concerned with China's drive for a different security
architecture in the region.
And this matters, because if the CCP's authoritarian
approach becomes ascendant, we could expect several trends that
would be unfavorable to us. We could see a weakening of
sovereignty and a potential loss of access to global commons.
We could see an erosion to our system of alliances and
partnerships.
We could see an undermining of ASEAN [Association of
Southeast Asian Nations] and its member states. And we could
see a diminishment of respect for individual and human rights,
and, potentially, even the normalization of the brutal
repression underway in places such as Xinjiang and Tibet.
Our policy response at the Department of Defense is through
implementation of the National Defense Strategy, which outlines
how we will effectively compete with China. This strategy has
three major lines of effort. The first is to build a more
lethal and resilient joint force, and, of course, this must
take into account, as a pacing mechanism, China's and Russia's
ambitions, their pace of modernization, and the growth in their
capabilities.
The second line of effort is strengthening alliances and
partnerships. This is really a core advantage that the United
States has. It not only enables our forward presence, but it
also gives us partners who are more capable themselves in
defending their own interests, and contributing to upholding
regional security. A key example of this is the work we are
doing with the help of Congress through the Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security Initiative.
Our third line of effort is reforming the Department for
greater performance and affordability. And accordingly, this
focuses on efforts to promote innovation, protect key
technologies, and to harness and protect the national security
innovation base to maintain our advantages.
I should note, the National Defense Strategy talks about
competition, not conflict, with China. Competition does not
preclude cooperating with China where our interests align. And
as we compete with China, we will continue to seek a military
relationship with China that aims at reducing risk, and
continues to push China towards compliance with international
norms and standards.
We at the Department of Defense support our interagency
approach to China, including efforts to counter China's global
influence. And we are very supportive of our State Department
and efforts such as the BUILD [Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development] Act, which was another
tremendous example of our work with Congress to give us better
tools in this competitive environment.
So to close, we work at the Department of Defense, along
with our colleagues in uniform, to implement the National
Defense Strategy framework to ensure we are on the trajectory
to compete, deter, and win in our priority theater, the Indo-
Pacific.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Schriver can be found
in the Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Davidson.
STATEMENT OF ADM PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Davidson. Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Thornberry, and distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for providing Assistant Secretary Schriver, General
Abrams, and myself the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the Indo-Pacific region.
I am also joined by Command Sergeant Major Tony Spadaro of
Indo-Pacific Command as well, and I am so glad he is here with
us today.
Let me say thank you for the significant support we have
received from Congress over the last 2 years. The temporary
relief from the Budget Control Act and an on-time fiscal year
2019 budget helped to restore the military readiness and the
lethality necessary to safeguard vital U.S. national interests
in the Indo-Pacific. But there is, indeed, more work to do.
The Defense Department's proposed fiscal year 2020 budget
will help the Department address the challenges described in
the National Defense Strategy, and ensure our military remains
the most lethal force in the world. And this funding is
critical to sustaining the readiness recovery while also
increasing joint force lethality as we return to a great power
competition with both China and Russia.
It bears repeating from what Chairman Thornberry read from
my written statement earlier. For more than 70 years, the Indo-
Pacific has been largely peaceful. This was made possible by
the willingness and commitment of free nations to work together
for a free and open Indo-Pacific, the credibility of the combat
power of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command [INDOPACOM] working with its
allies and partners, and, of course, the credibility of our
nuclear deterrent as well.
Our Nation's vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific
demonstrates our continued commitment to a safe, secure, and
prosperous region that benefits all nations, large and small.
And it continues to place strong alliances and partnerships as
the foundation of our approach to the region.
The vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific includes a
whole-of-government approach with economic, governance, and
security dimensions, and it resonates with our allies and
partners across the region.
Indeed, we are seeing a general convergence around its
importance as Japan, Australia, France, New Zealand, and India
have all put forth similar concepts or visions, and Indonesia
is leading an effort within ASEAN to elaborate one as well.
As the primary military component of the United States
efforts to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific, U.S. INDOPACOM
works with the rest of the U.S. Government and a constellation
of like-minded allies and partners to advance our shared
vision.
Now, there are five key challenges that I believe threaten
that vision and our U.S. national interests. First, until the
nuclear situation is resolved on the peninsula, North Korea
will remain our most immediate threat. The recent summit in
Vietnam clearly identified the U.S. and DPRK [Democratic
People's Republic of Korea] negotiating positions, narrowed the
gap on a number of issues, and made clear that the United
States expects final, fully verified denuclearization of the
DPRK. The outcome of the summit also reinforces the need for
General Abrams and I to maintain the readiness of our joint and
combined forces on and off the peninsula.
China, however, represents the greatest long-term strategic
threat to the United States and, indeed, the region. Through
fear and coercion, Beijing is working to expand its form of
communist/socialist ideology in order to bend, break, and
replace the existing rules-based international order and
prevent a free and open Indo-Pacific.
In its place, Beijing seeks to create a new international
order led by China, with Chinese characteristics, an outcome
that displaces the stability and peace of the Indo-Pacific that
has endured for over 70 years.
China is using a variety of methods, including pernicious
lending schemes, like the One Belt One Road, and promising
loans or grants to extend their diplomatic and political reach
by gaining leverage against the borrowers' sovereignty.
This is happening in the Pacific Islands with their South-
South initiative, as well as closer to home here in the United
States, wherein just over a year, 17--17 Latin American
countries have signed on to One Belt One Road.
The PRC's [People's Republic of China's] military
activities expanded last year with the placement of antiship
cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and radar jammers on
disputed militarized features in the South China Sea in April
of 2018. And today, they continue testing and development of
advanced capabilities like fifth-generation aircraft,
hypersonics, aircraft carriers, and counter-space technologies.
I am also concerned about the growing malign influence of
Russia throughout the region. Moscow regularly plays the role
of spoiler, seeking to undermine U.S. interests and oppose--and
impose additional costs on the United States and our allies
whenever and wherever possible.
Terrorism and other non-state actors also pose threats to
our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, as they seek to
impose their views and radicalize people across the region, as
evidenced in 2017 when ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
captured the southern Philippine city of Marawi, a city of more
than 200,000 people.
Lastly, the Indo-Pacific remains the most disaster-prone
region in the world. It contains 75 percent of the Earth's
volcanoes. Ninety percent of earthquakes around the globe occur
in the Pacific Basin, and many countries across the region lack
sufficient capability and capacity to manage natural and
manmade disasters.
To address all of the challenges I mentioned, U.S.
INDOPACOM is focused on regaining our competitive military
advantage to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific over the short
and long term. We must field and sustain a joint force that is
postured to win before fighting, and if necessary, ready to
fight and win.
U.S. INDOPACOM's ability to prevail in armed conflict is
the foundation of the combat credible deterrence and our
ability to compete. By fielding and maintaining a joint force
ready to fight and win, we reduce the likelihood that any
adversary will resort to military aggression, to challenge, or
undermine the rules-based international order.
To meet this demand, my top five budget needs are focused
on the following: Increasing critical munitions; advancing our
high-end warfare capabilities, like long-range precision fires;
enhancing and improving our persistent, integrated air and
missile defenses; evolving our counter-unmanned aerial systems
capabilities; and by continuing to develop the exquisite set of
tools uniquely provided by the Strategic Capabilities Office,
DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], and our
service research labs. These deliberate actions will help
ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific and deny those who seek to
undermine it in both peace, below the level of conflict, and in
war.
I must add that our five Indo-Pacific treaty allies, in
Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, they
have all been steadfast in their support for a free and open
Indo-Pacific.
Let me close by saying our ability to ensure a free and
open Indo-Pacific is only possible with your support, so I
would, again, like to thank this committee for your continued
support to the men and women of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Davidson can be found in
the Appendix on page 58.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
General Abrams.
STATEMENT OF GEN ROBERT B. ABRAMS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/U.S. FORCES KOREA
General Abrams. Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Thornberry, and distinguished members of the committee.
I have had the privilege to serve in this position as the
Commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command,
and U.S. Forces Korea for just over 120 days. In that short
time I have assessed that the ROK [Republic of Korea]-U.S.
military alliance is stronger than ever.
Our combined force is a strategic deterrent postured to
respond to potential crisis and provocation, and if called
upon, ready to defend the Republic of Korea and our allies in
the region.
Today in Korea, we have tremendous opportunities before us,
as well as some great challenges. Ongoing diplomatic engagement
between South Korea, North Korea, and the United States has led
to a significant reduction in tension compared to the recent
past marked by missile launches and nuclear tests.
Diplomacy is creating the opportunity for North Korea to
choose the path of denuclearization, forge a lasting peace, and
to build a better future for its people. And while diplomacy is
not without its challenges, it remains the mechanism
underpinning the transformation we have witnessed over the past
14 months as we have moved from provocation to detente.
The first steps toward creating a better future for all
Koreans have already begun. We have witnessed multiple
Presidential summits, inter-Korean dialogue, and international
support to sanctions.
The steps agreed to last April at Panmunjom and specified
later in the comprehensive military agreement, combined with
the aforementioned diplomatic efforts, have all contributed to
a marked reduction in tension on the peninsula, and created
mechanisms for the development of cooperation and confidence
building, essential ingredients to the incremental process of
making history on the peninsula.
Still, I remain clear-eyed about the fact that despite a
reduction in tensions along the demilitarized zone, and a
cessation of strategic provocations, coupled with public
statements of intent to denuclearize, little to no verifiable
change has occurred in North Korea's military capabilities.
For instance, we are watching the ongoing Korea People's
Army winter training cycle, including a slate of full-spectrum
exercises, which is progressing along at historic norms,
meaning that we have observed no significant change in the
size, scope, or timing of their ongoing exercises compared to
the same time period over the last 4 years.
Further, North Korea's conventional and asymmetric military
capabilities, along with their continued development of
advanced conventional munitions and systems, all remains
unchecked. These capabilities continue to hold the United
States, South Korea, and our regional allies at risk. As such,
I believe it is necessary to maintain a postured and ready
force to deter any possible aggressive actions.
Fielding our force in Korea requires a foundation of
support and sustainment to meet warfighter needs. Today, that
foundation is sound. It serves as the bedrock from which we
deter aggression and ensure stability, not only on the Korean
Peninsula, but in northeast Asia.
Our posture allows us--allows our diplomats to speak from a
position of unquestioned strength as they work to achieve
enduring peace and final, full, verified denuclearization of
the DPRK.
I also want to thank you for the support we have received
from Congress over the last 2 years as we have significantly
improved the posture and readiness of our forces on the
peninsula from munition stocks to additional ballistic missile
defense capabilities, and much more.
I cannot underscore enough the importance of the on-time
appropriation in 2019, as it has enabled us, for the first time
in many years, to make smarter investments, improve our
planning, and provide predictability to our commanders in the
field so they can sustain the hard-earned readiness that is
essential for being a ``fight tonight'' force.
With the support of Congress, the recently submitted fiscal
year 2020 budget continues the work of improving and sustaining
our defense posture. The readiness required to be a credible
deterrent is perishable. We must continue to exercise the core
competencies necessary to the planning and execution of joint
and combined operations under the strain of crisis.
However, we must also strike a balance between the need to
train and the requirement to create space for diplomacy to
flourish. As such, we have innovated our approach to training
and exercises by tuning four dials that modify exercise,
design, and conduct: size, scope, volume, and timing.
Adjustments to these dials enable us to remain in harmony with
diplomatic and political requirements without sacrificing
warfighting requirements and warfighting readiness to
unacceptable levels.
Our combined forces, Republic of Korea and the United
States, recently completed a significant step in our evolution
by conducting the first of our combined command post exercises,
Dong Maeng 19-1. Earlier this month, we exercised tactical,
operational, and strategic competencies to be prepared should
the call come to respond to crisis, defend the Republic of
Korea, and prevail against any threat.
This training is built upon the relationships, lessons
learned, and staff interactions derived from many combined
training and exercise events conducted by our components and
the Republic of Korea counterparts throughout the year.
The ROK-U.S. alliance remains ironclad. It has been tested
multiple times over the last 65 years, and only becomes
stronger. Our military partnership continues to deepen and
broaden the longstanding relationships that exist at every
echelon.
On behalf of the service members, civilians, contractors,
and their families on the peninsula, we thank all of you for
your unwavering support. And I am extremely proud to be their
commander and to work hand in hand with the Republic of Korea
to protect our great nations.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Abrams can be found in
the Appendix on page 99.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
As you mentioned, as I think all of us mentioned, our
presence in the region is very important, and that presence
takes on many forms, but certainly in Japan and Korea, we have
troops forward stationed there. There has been talk about, you
know, cost sharing, how much the countries that we have our
troop presence in pay.
Now, we, in my view, get an enormous benefit from that
presence. But just for the record, are you satisfied right now
that our partners in the region are paying their fair share of
what the cost should be for our troops being there? Mr.
Schriver, if you want to start with that.
Secretary Schriver. I am, and I think the deals that have
been struck to date have been mutually beneficial with our
allies and ourselves. Of course, we are entering new
negotiations shortly with both countries, and I expect the same
outcome, that we will get something mutually beneficial.
The Chairman. And there has been talk about this cost-plus-
50 idea. It is just a rumor. No one has confirmed it. But just
for the record, I assume you would think that not a good idea,
and not a good approach to our negotiations?
Secretary Schriver. I have seen discussion mostly in the
media. It is not anything we have been directed to seek, and it
is not part of any formal guidance. And, again, I think our
presence view on burden sharing is known. We think there should
be burden sharing, but we will leave that to the negotiation
when the time comes.
The Chairman. So you--would you directly comment on the
idea that cost-plus-50, is that a good idea or a bad idea?
Secretary Schriver. Well, we haven't been directed to do
it. I think we will try to seek a good deal for the United
States obviously, but I think it won't be based on that formula
that I am aware.
The Chairman. Okay. And just for the record, a number of
the members of this committee, bipartisan, have expressed their
concern that that approach would drive a wedge between us and
our allies, which we don't need to do.
All of you mentioned the importance of our alliances. Mr.
Thornberry, I think, articulated it best on the international
treaties. Basically, you know, countries with democracies
working together to promote that greater freedom in the region
reaches the greatest prosperity.
What are the most important steps that we could take to
shore up the various international treaties, organizations, in
the Indo-Pacific region, and what countries are most important
to expand upon those relationships? What can we do to enhance
that level of cooperation in that rules-based democratic
approach to the region? Go ahead.
Secretary Schriver. Well, thank you.
I think we are not only strengthening traditional alliances
and making investments with our traditional allied partners,
but we are expanding the network. And India was mentioned, I
think, in the opening comments, as a great example of a
partnership that we are investing a lot in. We have had our
first two-plus-two. We are making great strides in the defense
relationship.
But I would say throughout maritime Southeast Asia,
Vietnam, for example, is a country that is concerned about
their own sovereignty, concerned about freedom of the seas, and
the South China Sea. We have expanded our defense relationship
with the support of Congress there. I think there are a number
of emerging partners. The Philippines, traditional ally. We are
strengthening that relationship.
So I see a lot of opportunity, and with my colleagues here,
we are investing across the board when we can because we see a
strong demand signal. There is concern about the erosion of
these fundamental principles.
Admiral Davidson. Sir, if I could just build on Assistant
Secretary Schriver's point. Our values really compete well
across the whole of the region, particularly when all that
China has to offer is money. Our ability to expand those
values, protect them absolutely, but expand them to others, I
think, is going to be critically important as we seek new
partners, and the whole of a free and open Indo-Pacific
concept. It is going to require some work. It is at the heart
of my engagements, I know. I know when Assistant Secretary
Schriver travels through the region, he is doing that as well.
The Chairman. So it is your sense that the authoritarian
approach of China is really rubbing a lot of countries in the
region the wrong way, and pushing them more towards us?
Admiral Davidson. I think everybody recognizes that a
country with a closed and authoritarian internal order would be
a threat to a free and open international one, yes.
The Chairman. And then just final question, are there
countries in the region that you see as slipping toward--more
towards China's influence that we need to work harder to try to
pull back?
Admiral Davidson. Well, two of the countries was mentioned
by Assistant Secretary Schriver in his opening statement, and
that is indeed Myanmar and Cambodia. These are places in which
a whole-of-government approach that extends those values is
going to be important. We are going to have to find the areas
in which we can indeed compete with China there. It is going to
be difficult.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral, I want to go back to engagement
for just a second. At the initiative of this committee in
previous years, we have created an Indo-Pacific Stability
Initiative. And the idea was you see that the European Defense
Initiative was pretty successful, both in funding needed
improvements, but also sending a message that we are here and
we are coming with dollars, not just the Chinese, but we are
coming, and we are committed to, in that case, of course, NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance.
Now, I understand there are differences in the Pacific, but
I am concerned that I don't believe the administration has
requested a specific dedicated funding for this initiative,
even though it is authorized in law now.
Can you comment about the benefit, if any, that you see to
having this sort of Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative [IPSI] to
help make it--to help training, to help facilitate military
cooperation in various ways, again, somewhat on the idea that
we have pursued successfully in Europe.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. I think the ERI [European
Reassurance Initiative] model has been very successful for
porting resources and sending capabilities to Europe in a place
in which there had been some capability and capacity withdrawal
in the few years before that.
While there has been no money either appropriated or asked
for with the IPSI, the fact of the matter is I put down a
pretty assertive issue nomination last year for some
capabilities and capacity needed in the theater, and I think in
the fiscal year 2020 budget you are seeing a down payment on
that this year. Thanks.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I will just comment, Mr. Schriver,
one of the requirements in last--in, I believe, last year's
bill, was we need a plan from OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] about how you would fund various elements of this
initiative. We hadn't gotten it yet. So you all work on that
because we intend to pursue it.
I just wanted to ask General Abrams briefly, you talked
about North Korean military activities that are unchecked. What
can you say in this format specifically about their production
of missiles and nuclear weapons? Has there been a change? We
know they have not tested. But in the production of nuclear
weapons and material and missiles, has there been a change?
General Abrams. Sir, we--their activity that we have
observed is inconsistent with denuclearization, and we will be
happy to go into as much detail as you want this afternoon
during the closed session.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Yeah. I just didn't know how far you
could go in an open session, but I--that, I think, gives us a
direction.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses this morning.
Admiral Davidson, on page 14 of your written testimony,
again, you talked about, again, some of the challenges for
increasing joint force lethality. The undersea warfare
provision, again, you, I think, very clearly stated sort of
what is happening in that domain with, as you put it, 160 of
the submarines in the Indo-Pacific region belong to China,
Russia, and North Korea, and, again, as you go on to describe
that is happening at the same time as our fleet size is
shrinking.
Again, just to finish that thought, Vice CNO [Chief of
Naval Operations] Admiral Merz testified before Seapower
yesterday, again, who just sort of walked through, our attack
[submarine] fleet size right now is 51. And with the
retirements of the Los Angeles class, it will be at 42 by 2026.
So given the fact that, again, you don't get all of those--
that sub force, right. You get about 60 percent of it with the
allocation to the Asia-Pacific--or Indo-Pacific region versus
other combatant command areas there.
You know, that trajectory, which Admiral Harris, your
predecessor, described repeatedly in his visits to our
committee over the years is a big concern. And obviously, it is
not getting any better, I don't--I assume, based on your
written testimony. Again, I wonder if you could talk about that
a little bit.
Admiral Davidson. Sir, the undersea domain, despite the
capacity shortfalls, the number of submarines is an area in
which we hold an asymmetric advantage over virtually, well, all
our adversaries. It is a critical advantage that we need to
extend.
The capacity limitations as we go down over the course of
the next several years, is, indeed, a threat to the day-to-day
operations that I think we need to have in the theater for
presence needs and risks our OPLANs [operation plans] to a
certain extent as well. I would be happy to talk about more
details as we get to this later session.
Mr. Courtney. Sure. So Admiral Harris, in open session,
actually testified that only about 50 percent of the stated
requirements for subs can be met given, again, the fleet size
today as opposed to where we are--I mean, that, again, that was
open testimony. Is that still pretty much the state of play?
Admiral Davidson. My day-to-day requirement is met by
slightly over 50 percent of what I have asked for, yes.
Mr. Courtney. Okay. So, you know, this committee actually
tried to change that last year in terms of at least getting
some uptick in terms of the build rate, which, again, the
administration opposed, and it was therefore blocked. The new
budget embraces that belatedly.
And, again, just--it would help, I guess, the cause in
terms of your choices that you have to make out there if,
again, we move forward with a three-sub build rate for this
year's budget year, which actually will not be executed until
2023. And I just wonder if you could comment on that?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. I mean, it is doing our best to
reverse the trend on the weight of force structure of 42 in the
2026 timeframe is a critical need in the Indo-Pacific, yes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I would like to just change the subject for a minute to
talk about, recently, the Coast Guard actually was part of a
deployment in the Straits of Taiwan. The Coast Guard National
Security Cutter Bertholf participated in that. And, again, I
just wonder if you could talk about that part of a sea service
in terms of helping, again, U.S. presence in international
waters.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. The Bertholf is on deployment
in the Western Pacific. It has been for several weeks now and
will be for a few months to come as well. They are a very
important party--partner with the U.S. Navy on really all
things in the region.
In fact, the mission that they were doing not long before
the Taiwan Strait transit was helping us to enforce U.N.
[United Nations] sanctions against North Korea, and the illegal
transfer of oils from--in ship-to-ship transfers there in the
East China Sea.
The Coast Guard has key relationships across the region,
particularly for a lot of nations that don't have militaries,
but they have, perhaps, defense forces at even less and in some
instances where there are just law enforcement forces. Because
it really helps with key challenges that some of these nations
have, whether it is illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing, narcotics or human trafficking, maritime domain
awareness.
So they are an important contributor across the whole of
the region. I have got a good relationship with Linda Fagan,
my--the Coast Guard specific area commander and----
Mr. Courtney. Again, real quick, we are about to--I just
want to thank you for putting the spotlight on that. During the
shutdown, there was this view that, you know, again, this was
not part of the DOD [Department of Defense] fabric, and
obviously what they are doing out there really rebuts that
narrative.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time is
expired. We will go to Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I am going to have to ask you a question
concerning China's nuclear forces. And like the two prior
questioners, as the chairman said, I am very much aware that we
are going to have a classified session, but I am looking for a
full nonclassified answer in this session, because as you know,
as you give us information, it helps us formulate policy not
just by ways in which we know, but by ways in which we can, in
unclassified areas, be able to share the information with
others as we advocate.
I am going to follow on to the theme that Ranking Member
Thornberry had of using our NATO alliance as a question that
comes to us in this area. The United States has backed away
from the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty with
Russia, which is largely viewed more as a European issue than
another theater issue; however, that we know that it also
affects the--our relationship with China. And as we look to
China's modernization of its nuclear forces, the INF is a
relevant concern there.
And we look at your testimony, page 6, China is undertaking
hypersonic glide vehicles, electromagnetic railguns. And this
is, I think, the most important sentence. You said Beijing is
also modernizing and adding new capabilities across its nuclear
forces.
So here we have a near-peer adversary that is adding new
capabilities across its nuclear forces, so this is not just a
sustainment issue just trying to modernize what we have in our
inventory that might be requiring updating. This is actually
new capabilities that they are doing.
You then go on to say that they have nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine, which will be armed with JL-3 sea-
launched ballistic missiles; a road-mobile, nuclear, and
conventional-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile;
road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile; and you go on.
So my question relates to the United States is now leaving
the INF, and it poses both an opportunity as we look to our own
capabilities, but also an opportunity diplomatically.
So would you please give us some characterization of the
threat that China poses, and the intermediate-range missile
threat; what operational importance non-INF compliant assets to
the United States would represent in this changing environment;
and then what would be the benefit of a possible Russia-China-
U.S. deal on inter nuclear--on an INF Treaty in that we know
that when the United States entered into this, there were
significant assets that were dismantled.
So it is not as if we can just say we can't reach this
because people have these assets. These treaties at times have
even resulted in lessening conflict by destroying weapons
systems. Admiral, could you give us a picture of that?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you for the question, Congressman,
a long question.
China--let me put it this way: At the operational level,
about 93 percent of China's total inventory, if they were a
party to the INF, would be in violation of that treaty. These
missiles number in the hundreds--and we can talk more
specifically about that later today--and present a serious
challenge to not just the United States, but all of our
allies', partners' freedom of action in the region.
Our, at the operational level, long-range precision fires
are constrained to just air and sea assets right now. With a
wider set of capabilities with the United States, you really
present a problem to the Chinese, or the Russians, and you
improve our freedom of action by presenting a like dilemma to
them. So I think that is critically important.
I need to add that Secretary Schriver should talk policy
here a little bit.
Secretary Schriver. With respect to any kind of future
arrangement, of course, it is not under active consideration
because we are not quite out of the treaty yet. But given the
significance of China's capability falling in this range,
certainly it would make sense to, if we were to go down that
path of another agreement, to think about China being included.
I can't see it being meaningful without China.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Davidson and General Abrams--I apologize--last year
I led an effort to ensure that we have a floor on our troops in
U.S. Forces Korea. What do you think is the appropriate number
of U.S. troops to have on the peninsula to maintain deterrence
against Kim Jong-un?
General Abrams. Congressman, our current troop levels that
we have with both assigned and rotational forces is
appropriate, and meets our requirements to provide an adequate
and credible deterrent to the DPRK.
Mr. Gallego. Admiral.
Admiral Davidson. I fully agree with that.
Mr. Gallego. Great. And I think this will be--I think you
kind of already answered this next question, whether you can
confirm that our force posture in Korea and Japan is designed
to provide the best deterrence versus North Korea?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, I think our current force
posture does do that. Of course, it takes other forces off the
peninsula as well. And as General Abrams mentioned in his
opening comments, the committee and the Department have done a
lot in the last 2 years to make sure that capability is sound.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Admiral.
So with that in mind, let's go through some projects that
the Pentagon has given us that could be rated to fund the
President's border wall. And just please tell me if you think
each project is more or less important than a wall on the
southern border.
$17.5 million for command-and-control facility at Camp
Tango, Korea? Do you want me to just go through the four or do
you want to go--I have about three more questions after this.
General Abrams. I would appreciate the list, Congressman,
and I am ready.
Mr. Gallego. Sure. $53 million for a UAV hangar at Kunsan
Airbase in Korea; $45.1 million for munition storage facilities
in Guam; and $23.8 million for corrosion control hangar for C-
130s in Yokota, Japan. Are these more or less important than a
border wall?
General Abrams. Congressman, I can only speak to the two
projects that are in Korea. They are certainly important to
the--to U.S. Forces Korea, but it is inappropriate for me to
make--[inaudible] some sort of judgment as we have got to take
into account all of national security.
I am responsible for providing a credible, properly
postured force on the Korean Peninsula, and we would have to
defer that to, you know, some--the Acting Secretary of Defense
or----
Mr. Gallego. I understand. I don't want to put you in a
tough spot. But you would agree that at least those facilities
that you are familiar with in Korea are very much necessary to
force protection and deterrence on the peninsula, correct?
Without making a judgment on the wall?
General Abrams. Right. I am just pausing just for a second.
So, not necessarily for force protection, but principally for
command and control and sustainability, yes.
Mr. Gallego. Excellent. Thank you, General.
Mr. Schriver, we often hear about the need for munitions,
the need for intelligence and surveillance, ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms, and the need for
airlift and sealift to pull forces into the region quickly.
General--I am going to mess up his name. General
O'Shaughnessy told us in the Armed Services Committee last
month that there is no military threat at the southern border.
In light of that, why would the Department use money allocated
for a real threat like China, or North Korea, to pay for a wall
that doesn't help us with a real threat, versus a real threat?
Secretary Schriver. I think as Secretary Shanahan, Acting
Secretary Shanahan said yesterday, we have made arguments based
on what we think our defense priorities are. We now have a
lawful order from the President to execute, and we are looking
how to best do that.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Schriver.
I think what I am trying to--and I am sure--you know,
again, I don't want to put you in a difficult spot. The one
thing I am trying to highlight is that we do have real threats,
real threats that are existential threats, you know, to our
alliances, to our country, and potentially to the world.
And when we are choosing to use our military funds that are
very limited and resources for something that is an imagined
threat, I think that is a problem, especially for us on this
committee.
Mr. Schriver and Admiral Davidson, I understand that we are
more frequently using freedom of navigation patrols to push
back on illegal Chinese claims in the Pacific. What else can we
do to ensure that China doesn't present us with a fait accompli
as we think they are about to do, or they are willing to do, I
should say?
Secretary Schriver. I think they have changed some facts on
the ground with the militarization of those outposts. Our goal
is to make sure that that doesn't become a tool to
operationalize an expansive, illegal sovereignty claim.
So the freedom of navigation operations you mentioned are
important. We have taken other steps, along with Admiral
Davidson's predecessor. We disinvited China from RIMPAC [Rim of
the Pacific Exercise] and pointed to their activities in the
South China Sea as a reason for that.
We have encouraged other countries to join in presence
operations, joint patrols. And our responses in the future may
not necessarily be on point. Their activities in the South
China Sea could be met with consequence elsewhere, as I think
was the case with RIMPAC. So we are intent on making sure that
no one country can change international law or the norms.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you. Following on that line of questions, Xi
Jinping's statements, at any point in time, I don't think, can
be taken at face value. You mentioned his comments in the Rose
Garden in 2015. I can't believe that he didn't already know
that they were going to, as you said, militarize those islands.
China has a longer-term horizon than most of us. We go, you
know, continuing resolution to continuing resolution or a year-
to-year budgeting. Each step of the way, they seem to allow
some period of time to--for a new norm to establish itself. The
new norm are these features, as Admiral Davidson refers to
them. They have now been militarized.
What do we think? What--can you share with us in this arena
what you think the Chinese steps might be next in terms of
trying to gain control? I think there was a dustup between them
and Malaysia on one of their features recently. And are there--
can we see ahead what the Chinese might do next that we would
need to try to counter and not let that become the new norm?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, in the operational space, one of the
things we are starting to see is a higher degree of integration
with forces that are not actually on those features. So we are
seeing fighter patrols, bomber patrols, the integration of ISR
aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and ASW
[anti-submarine warfare] aircraft actually operating from those
bases, and a higher degree of interoperability between some of
the base functions and the afloat forces that they have in the
area as well.
Mr. Conaway. So counters to that would be us continuing to
operate in the international waters?
Admiral Davidson. Certainly. Mr. Schriver mentioned earlier
the importance of allies and partners operating with us in the
region. That stepped up last fall, and I think was a critical
factor in--and the international response there and some of the
behaviors that we saw out of China in both the battlespace and
the diplomatic space back in the fall. Now, I think that is
going to be a critical approach going forward as to have our
allies and partners operating with us in the region.
Mr. Conaway. So without telling us what they are
necessarily, are our crews, sailors, airmen, are they aware of
what their self-protection steps should be, should something
come up suddenly?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, absolutely. So I know Admiral
Aquilino has met with his commanding officers a number of
times, both in the Western Pacific and on the west coast of the
United States. And I have talked directly with General Brown of
Pacific Air Forces as well to make sure that everybody
understands the authorities that they have and to be sure to
ask for the authorities they need going forward.
Mr. Conaway. All right. General Abrams, I suspect I know
the answer to this, but you mentioned in your testimony that
tensions on the peninsula have relaxed or seem reduced
dramatically. North Koreans continue to exercise.
Is there any sense among our Korean allies, South Korean
allies that they are, you know, less likely to defend
themselves? Are they becoming too relaxed or at risk of being
unprepared should the North Koreans do something?
General Abrams. Congressman, absolutely not. ROK military
continues to train intensely at echelon, very capable, very
highly trained, committed, dedicated professional force. They
have not taken their foot off the gas.
Mr. Conaway. All right. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Cisneros is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here this
morning.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just kind of want to follow up on that question as far as
we go with the training. You know in the military, drilling
exercises, train, train, train, kind of like our piano teachers
told us if we took piano lessons, practice makes perfect. That
is what we are striving for.
So if we are canceling or downgrading some of these
exercises that we have traditionally done to prepare, you know,
our forces there on the Korean Peninsula, how are we making
that up? How are we continuing the training? How are we
continuing to make sure our prime operation to make sure that
we are ready?
General Abrams. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity.
First, let me clear up some misinformation. I assumed command
on the 8th of November. Just since November, as of last week,
we have conducted 82 combined ROK-U.S. military field training
exercises at appropriate echelons. So, training has continued,
combined training has continued.
In terms of large-scale exercises, everyone is well aware
that last fall we--or last August, we postponed one of our two
annual exercises. The Secretary of Defense, Secretary Mattis,
challenged me to be creative and innovative, develop an
exercise regime that meets our warfighting readiness
requirements while simultaneously creating and preserving space
for diplomacy to work.
Worked hand in glove with the ROK chairman in December,
crafted this new construct adjusting four dials, size, scope,
volume, and timing of these exercises. We briefed them up our
respective chains of command, had them approved, and then we
have recently executed it.
We met all our training objectives, trained all our
mission-essential tasks, validated our command, control
communications and ISR plans, and validated the alliance
decision-making process. Very rigorous, tough, demanding
command post exercise that is driven by simulation.
And I am happy to go into more detail in the classified
session as to what made it so rigorous and so forth, but we are
a trained and capable force ready to meet our treaty
obligations.
Mr. Cisneros. Are we continuing joint training operations
with our naval forces in the region too, and with our Marines
and the Air Force as well?
General Abrams. Sir, absolutely we are. And the biggest
difference is we just don't talk about it publicly.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. And then just to kind of follow up
on that, the President says he is canceling these exercises. We
are saving $100 million. That money has already been
appropriated for your training and operations. What are we
doing with that $100 million that we are saving when he is
canceling these operations?
General Abrams. Congressman, I can't speak--I know what has
been executed, what has been planned for, programmed for for
U.S. Forces Korea, and we are executing our appropriated budget
as we have planned and programmed.
Mr. Cisneros. Mr. Schriver, do you have any idea what we
are doing with the $100 million that we are saving there by
canceling these operations?
Secretary Schriver. We are, at the request of Congress,
looking at the cost differential between the previous exercises
and our program now. I am not aware that we have a plan for
specifically what to do if there is a significant cost
differential and how we would use that money.
Mr. Cisneros. I yield back the remainder of my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Abrams, I have several questions for you, but
thank all three of you for your service to our country in your
various capacities.
This committee has worked hard to approve a joint emergent
operational need [JEON], to provide enhanced missile defense
capability to our forces on the Korean Peninsula. Over the past
year, what progress has been made on the specific JEON efforts
to enhance missile defense?
General Abrams. Congressman, thanks very much for that. And
we are grateful for the support from the Congress of the United
States on that joint operational needs statement.
Principally, three capabilities. All three remain in
development. They are all on time right now. The first and most
important capability is slightly ahead of schedule, and we hope
to have it fielded here in the next 12 to 16 months.
Mr. Lamborn. Excellent. Thank you.
And then what is the status of the revised missile
guidelines with our South Korean allies? And what is their
planned path forward on missile development? And how do we
factor that into joint operational planning?
General Abrams. Congressman, I think if I have your
question right, that is one of the capabilities that is part of
our Conditions-Based OPCON [Operational Control] Transition
Plan.
In an unclassified setting, their progress continues on
track. They have a plan; it has been resourced in their budget.
And I am happy to provide some additional information this
afternoon in a closed session if you desire.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I will look forward to that. Thank you.
Now, with Admiral Davidson I have a question. In the issue
of readiness, if we have a conflict with a peer competitor in
the INDOPACOM theater, do we have enough ammunition stocks on
hand and prepositioned to fight and win a war? And along with
that, how much supply do we have, and what are our risks if we
don't have enough on hand, prepositioned?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, I would like to take most of that
question down to the closed hearing, if we could.
I will say that in stocks in the theater of critical
munition supplies is a challenge and an ongoing challenge and
one of my consistent requests of the Department as they pursue
their budgets. As well as the ability to resupply out there,
that remains a need as well.
And I am happy to get into more details later on.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate the answer, and
I look forward to that as well.
And, General Abrams, back to you. We have heard concerning
rumors about the level of investment the South Koreans have
made in their own provision of armaments, calling into question
the viability of our operational plans because they don't have
enough precision-guided munitions [PGMs].
Where do they stand with PGMs and small-arms acquisitions
to support our joint requirements?
General Abrams. Congressman, I would prefer to talk about
that in a classified session. Those numbers are classified.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Excellent. I will look forward to that
one as well.
Okay, I will try another one that maybe we can address here
openly. And this is a more broad question, and I am sure we can
take it here in public.
It is a sensitive topic, but trilateral cooperation between
the South Koreans and Japan is essential to our common
security. So what is your assessment of the level of trilateral
cooperation, especially between these two very important
security partners?
Admiral Davidson. Well, sir, I think, you know, the most
key evidence right now is, at the Enforcement Coordination Cell
that the U.S. sponsors in Yokosuka, Japan, we have both
Japanese and Korean partners sitting side by side helping to
enforce the U.N. sanctions regime against North Korea in the
illicit transfer of oil and ship-to-ship transfers there in the
East China Sea and Korea Bay.
I think that is an important bellwether to keep in mind,
that we are working in a very collaborative, cooperative, and
totally transparent manner at sea, in the air, and in the
coordination of those forces in a single headquarters.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I am very encouraged by that. I
appreciate your answers.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Schriver, thanks. Good to see you again.
I have a followup on Mr. Cisneros' questions with regard to
training on the peninsula. And I was wondering, do we have any
demonstrable or tangible action from the DPRK in response to
cessation of readiness exercises on the peninsula?
Secretary Schriver. On our core area of interest and
concern, the issue of denuclearization, we have not seen any
progress to speak of.
Mr. Larsen. So would it be fair for me to conclude that we
gave up something for nothing as a result? If that was my
thought, would you say that would be a reasonable conclusion?
Secretary Schriver. I certainly understand the concern. I
think what we have tried to do is create an environment for a
diplomatic process to unfold. In Hanoi, we were disappointed
that the North Koreans weren't prepared to talk about how to
fulfill Chairman Kim's pledge. Our door is still open for
diplomacy, but to date we have not seen movement on
denuclearization.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. So the next question is, what should we
expect from this diplomacy?
Secretary Schriver. We expect them to fulfill Chairman
Kim's pledge made at Singapore, which is to pursue complete
denuclearization. And we would like them to start by
identifying a common, shared definition of what
denuclearization means, and then we can build a roadmap
alongside them on how to achieve that.
But, ultimately, it is the full, final, verifiable
denuclearization that includes all categories of weapons of
mass destruction and missiles and other delivery systems.
Mr. Larsen. Do we have a timeline under consideration when
we will restart full readiness exercises? When will we stop
waiting for North Korea?
Secretary Schriver. Congressman, we are looking to the
President and the Secretary of State and their judgment on how
the diplomacy will go, and they will give us the signal of how
to make adjustments in the future if they so determine.
Mr. Larsen. Is that--thanks for that. Is that the
Pentagon's role in this, is to wait for a signal? Are you, in
fact, just waiting for--as opposed to injecting any information
into this discussion in the administration?
Secretary Schriver. Well, I think as General Abrams
indicated, the objective is to do both, give our diplomats
space and maintain readiness through the adjustments that have
been made.
If there are risks associated with a prolonged posture like
this, we would certainly make those known. And we have made
known our interest in all the things we think we need to do to
maintain readiness. And I think General Abrams is doing a
tremendous job in that regard.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Thanks.
I want to follow on--not follow up. I have another set of
questions for you on the actual budget. We talked about this a
couple weeks ago, the Strategic Support Forces [SSF] that China
has created in their reorganization of the PLA [People's
Liberation Army].
And I am wondering how the budget proposed to Congress
reflects perhaps a response or an attempt to get ahead to the
reorganization of the PLA, specific to the SSF development?
Secretary Schriver. I think I would primarily point to
increased investments in cyber in that regard, both in terms of
the resiliency and protection of our own infrastructure as well
as expanding the competitive space. We can talk about that more
in the closed session.
But given the mission of the Special Security Force, I
think that is the area I would point to.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. So I think from my first set of
questions, you probably understand--and you understand,
General, as well. I wanted to ask the policy guy, because it is
really more of a policy set of questions--about my concern that
we seem to be giving up something big for not anything, for
nothing from DPRK as part of these negotiations. And it is
something I think is worth exploring for this committee as
well, continue to press on this question, and expect that to
happen.
So thank you very much. And I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us.
Admiral Davidson, I am going to begin with you. Earlier
this month, General Scaparrotti spoke about the challenges he
faces in the European Command, saying he was really two
destroyers short, needed a better presence, both a carrier
strike group and amphibious ready group, there to counter
Russian aggression in the area.
And I wanted to ask you three yes-or-no questions, and then
I want to get you to elaborate.
Would you say that there is a sufficient attack submarine
presence in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. They are not meeting my requirement, no.
Mr. Wittman. Would you say you have a sufficient carrier
strike group presence in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. That is also below what I have requested.
Mr. Wittman. Would you say you have a sufficient amphibious
ready group presence in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. That is slightly below what I have
requested.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. The map you gave us I think is very
telling. There is lots of blue on here. Your AOR [area of
responsibility] has a significant amount of area that requires
a naval presence. I know that the Navy is going through a force
structure assessment, looking at what the future Navy should
be, the types of ships.
Have they consulted with you to look at your needs, to
assess the risks that are going to be there in the future? And
have they talked to you in the respect of being able to help
you reduce your risk to an acceptable level as you manage this
AOR in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. No, the Navy staff is
completely aware of existing contingency planning and where we
are going in the new global campaign plan construct. And it is
informing this force structure assessment that they have
ongoing right now.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Assistant Secretary Schriver, yesterday, Secretary Shanahan
spoke before this committee, and he was discussing the
administration's budgeting. We were talking about those things
that were in it but also those things that were not in it. One
of the things that is concerning is the reduction overall of
the number of aircraft carriers out to 2027, with taking CVN 75
out of the inventory, which actually takes us down to nine
aircraft carriers.
And I am curious if you would discuss with us and give us
the thought behind the analysis, with the shipbuilding
projection, that going down to nine carriers between now and
2027, which is what retiring CVN 75 early would bring--do you
think that that, in relation to what Admiral Davidson has just
told us, do you think that that puts us at an acceptable level
of risk with Navy presence around the world?
Secretary Schriver. Well, those decisions, those tradeoffs
go beyond my purview. I do share the----
Mr. Wittman. Acceptable or nonacceptable risk?
Secretary Schriver. Yeah, I think I have to defer to the
leadership that has to make the global considerations on
tradeoff. I am concerned about any shortcomings identified by
the warfighters such as Admiral Davidson.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good.
Admiral Davidson, in your best professional military
judgment, would you say that reducing the number of carriers
with taking out CVN 75 in the inventory, do you think that that
leaves you and your availability, with having carrier 2.0
presence, do you think that leaves you with an acceptable level
of risk?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, as I think about the future and the
capability of the aircraft carrier, I don't see--as I
constantly revisit our campaign planning and our presence
needs, I really don't see the requirement going down.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good.
Do you see, too, in the region, as you work with your
allies there--we had talked earlier about making sure that we
are coalescing resources, jointly operating, doing joint
operations. Do you believe that with potentially having fewer
carriers available, do you believe that that sends a signal to
them as to our commitment in the Indo-Pacific region as far as
our naval presence?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, I would say our allies and partners
across the region watch everything we do across all of the
joint force, the level of participation we provide in
exercises, what our current operations are doing, and they take
signals from that, absolutely.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you to all the witnesses for being here.
Admiral Davidson, economic, military, and diplomatic
efforts should all be coordinated in order to implement an
effective and coherent strategy. When one of these elements of
power goes rogue, it impacts our overall strategy. What value
do economic sanctions provide to our military strategy on the
Korean Peninsula?
And, two, can you speak to North Korea's illicit sources of
funding and what efforts INDOPACOM is taking to reduce those
sources?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. I mean, most importantly, we
are supporting the State Department's pressure campaign. The
regime's ability to sustain its funding or gain funding from
outside really undermines our diplomatic effort, because it
fails to bring them to the table.
We work with our law enforcement partners as well as posts
across the region on everything that North Korea might be doing
across the economic and diplomatic spaces, as you indicate.
We should note that what they are doing comes in the form
of outright counterfeiting, comes in the form of cyber theft
really across the globe and not in just the region. And we are
certainly in coordination with law enforcement and the rest of
the government on those issues, but they are actually in the
lead there.
Mr. Carbajal. How effective are our sanctions right now?
Admiral Davidson. Well, speaking really just to the illicit
transfer of oil, their imports of refined oil at sea are about
a third less than before the sanctions regime began.
It is very difficult to figure out what impact that
sanctions enforcement regime is having, because it is so opaque
inside North Korea as to how they actually--what do they keep
in strategic reserve, how they distribute it around the
peninsula, and how it affects KJU's [Kim Jong-un's] decision
making overall.
Mr. Carbajal. An area we do not focus enough on are the
threats associated with weapons proliferation, specifically in
regards to North Korea. Reports show that North Korea has
exported conventional arms and ballistic missiles for decades
and has proliferated these arms to countries like Syria which
pose a serious threat to our international security.
Admiral Davidson, as best as you can in this unclassified
setting, can you provide us with better situational awareness
on this issue? Two, are there concerns that North Korea is
proliferating nuclear materials? And, three, how can we do
better to address this concern?
Admiral Davidson. It is well known, I think, across the
United States and our allies that North Korea has long been a
proliferator of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities
around the globe. That is, I think, part and parcel and, in
fact, you know, I should really say, the basis of why we are
going after denuclearizing the peninsula: Because they are not
a reliable country on the globe, and it causes instability in
areas where we don't want to see.
I think to get to more details on this, sir, I would like
to rather take that into a classified setting, if I could.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, gentlemen.
I wanted to follow up on the line of questioning we have
had a lot of discussion about, our relationship with the allies
and our importance of that in the Indo-Pacific region.
And, specifically, Admiral Davidson, you talked about how
in the fall of last year we really started focusing on that,
stepped it up, and I applaud that. I think that is great.
I wanted to just mention that, on March 13, the B-52
bombers, our B-52s, conducted routine training in the South
China Sea for the second time this month. And I think that is
very, very important for the freedom-of-navigation operations
that we have in the region. But it appears that many of our
allies in the Pacific are reluctant to conduct the same type of
freedom of navigation activities.
So I was wondering your thoughts on that, and can we expect
to see our allies and partners support this effort in the
future?
Admiral Davidson. If I could, ma'am, the bomber patrols
that we use really around the whole of the region and not just
in the South China Sea are to maintain our readiness and to
understand how others respond in the region. We don't actually
use them for freedom of navigation operations.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay.
Admiral Davidson. Those are training missions in how they
are employed.
To the point about maritime forces doing freedom of
navigation operations, though, we have encouraged all nations,
really, to step up their operations in the South China Sea. And
if they are not capable of taking a policy decision to actually
do the very assertive freedom of navigation operations we do--
we do them more assertively across the globe and always have in
the United States to enforce these international rights.
And if other countries aren't willing to do that, we are
perfectly happy to see them operate in the international sea
space that is the South China Sea. It demonstrates that it is
an international concern to maintain that open, free, and--
excuse me--open sea and airspace. And we welcome people to do
it unilaterally as well as with us and in other multilateral
forums.
Randy, got anything you want to add?
Secretary Schriver. I would agree with all that. And I
would just add, given the expansive nature of China's claim,
everything inside the Nine-Dash Line, presence operations are
valuable in and of themselves, even if it is not a direct 12-
nautical-mile challenge of a feature claimed by China or any
other party.
So presence, as Admiral Davidson said, is extraordinarily
important given the expansive nature of their claim.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Great.
As far as the partnerships go, we have several compacts set
to expire in the coming years, like the Compact of Free
Association States, which impacts our relationship with them,
you know, economically, diplomatically, and militarily.
So can you expand on the importance of these agreements and
whether we should continue to fund them or should we let them
expire?
Secretary Schriver. We look forward to working with
Congress in the hopes of continuing to fund them based on the
needs. Over time, it is our hope that the requirements will be
less, given the state of their economic development. But for
the foreseeable future, we think there will be need.
And the compact relationship is mutually beneficial. We do
make certain pledges with respect to their defense, but we also
gain access, we gain support at international fora, that we
have a special relationship with these compact states that we
want to extend.
Mrs. Hartzler. Admiral.
Admiral Davidson. If I could just add, madam, those three
compact states are the connective tissue between the United
States and the Western Pacific. We fought and bled in those
lands during World War II. And the relationship that we have
sustained in this compact, I think it is important to maintain
that going well into the future.
Mrs. Hartzler. I want to just mention Japan just a little
bit--I had an opportunity to travel there last year--as well as
South Korea. And, you know, there has been a period of a
heightened tension between South Korea and Japan. I know it
goes back a long ways.
So I was just wondering, can you kind of give an update on
that relationship and the efforts that the Department is doing
to undertake to try to bridge this divide?
Admiral Davidson. I commented a little bit earlier,
Congresswoman, about the Enforcement Coordination Cell in
Yokosuka, which we are using to enforce U.N. sanctions against
North Korea. And Japanese and Korean officers are sitting side
by side right in that headquarters with United States officers
and, in fact, other officers and enlisted from allies and
partners from across the region and, indeed, across the globe.
And I think that is a very positive sign, because it is
providing the transparency and the collaboration and
cooperation of what the sea and air forces are doing in that
sanctions regime to each party.
I can tell you, I have talked extensively with both the
Chief of Defense from Korea and the Chief of Defense in Japan
about at least the military incidents that had occurred earlier
this year, and things seem to be calmer right now.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, I like the way you enforce the
rules. Thank you very much for the courtesy of calling on me
and my colleagues. My apologies----
The Chairman. It gives me purpose here, so I appreciate
that. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi. My apologies to my colleagues for jumping in
front of them.
Mr. Schriver, we have had a discussion about the influence
of China throughout the Pacific, particularly the Pacific
Islands. What is the best way for the United States to be
present to expand or at least maintain our position?
I noted Admiral Davidson just talked about the history back
in World War II and beyond. So if you could elaborate on that,
not just with the Pacific Islands but beyond in the entire
region. Let's leave India aside for just a moment, but the
others.
Thank you.
Secretary Schriver. Well, I think our engagement is very
important. With respect to the Pacific Islands, both Admiral
Davidson and I have led interagency delegations there within
the last 6 months.
But it is really providing an alternative that is whole of
government. As was mentioned earlier, some of these countries
don't have militaries; they have law enforcement entities. So
we bring our Coast Guard in, we bring other agencies in to
really create approaches that meet their needs, which are very
significant: illegal fishing, criminal activity, et cetera. So
we have to fashion approaches that meet their needs and provide
an alternative to what China or any other country might
provide.
And I would also add that we have like-minded partners that
are looking at Oceania. Australia has its step-up program; New
Zealand has its reset. We are all looking to do better.
And with respect to broader approaches in the region, I
think it is the same. There is blowback from how China is
approaching some of these relationships and the debt trap
diplomacy, predatory economics, but we have to be there, as
well, with alternatives. And I think a demand signal is there,
and we are doing our best to meet that demand signal with
quality engagement and meaningful engagement that meets their
interests and needs.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Davidson, would you like to add
anything to that?
Admiral Davidson. Just one more specific thing. We have
undertaken an initiative to look at our defense attaches and
where they are positioned, particularly across the Pacific
Island chain, and we have actually taken some near-term action
to expand that network immediately.
But I completely agree with all of Mr. Schriver's comments.
Mr. Garamendi. I would like to drill down, but not in the
next 2 minutes, on what specific things we should be doing. And
why don't we take another minute or so, and then maybe I have a
followup question, but let's get down to specifics. What is it?
It is military attaches? Fine. What about the rest of the
government, the whole of government?
Mr. Schriver, if you would like to do it.
Or, Admiral, jump in.
Secretary Schriver. Well, as I mentioned, whole of
government, bringing in our Coast Guard where there aren't
military.
So they have, for example, Shiprider Program agreements
with some of the countries that assist them in monitoring their
sovereign territorial waters for the purposes of preventing
illegal fishing, other criminal activity.
We have National Guard State Partnership Programs in place
where there are Pacific Island countries that have militaries.
We just expanded that to include Fiji through the State of
Nevada.
So there are a number of tools that go beyond just the
engagement, the presence of attaches, and we are working to
build those out. Our foreign military financing with State
Department has been stepped up in the region. Fiji would be an
example of that as well, where we are helping with their
peacekeeping forces.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, I was kind of chumming for you to
mention the Peace Corps and the return of the Peace Corps to
the Micronesia area, so I will mention it myself. There is a
whole host of things.
I just draw my colleagues' attention to the whole of
government and the fact that in the President's budget most of
the whole of government, with the exception of the military, is
significantly reduced. And, therefore, our presence beyond the
military is lacking.
I will let it go at that. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Admiral, I want to thank you for mentioning
Communist China and their use of One Belt One Road in Latin
America, in the Western Hemisphere, in our backyard.
And I think it is interesting that Vietnam asked or allowed
us, asked or allowed, whichever way we want to put it, us to
park the Carl Vinson right there. And I think if you wanted
proof that you can't trust Communist China, even their
neighbors don't trust Communist China.
And their movement into the Western Hemisphere concerns me.
We are not here to talk about that today. But I don't think we,
as the United States, have paid enough attention to our
backyard and the Western Hemisphere. And I am afraid we are
going to wake up one day and have a Chinese base in that
Western Hemisphere, and that is something that I don't think we
can afford to allow.
So, with that said, Assistant Secretary Schriver, as
Communist China continues to grow both physically and virtually
around the world, what impacts is this having on the United
States ability to strengthen our partnerships in the Indo-
Pacific regions? Are we at risk of losing our partnerships
because of Communist China and their use of One Belt One Road
to buy their way into favor?
Secretary Schriver. Quite frankly, I think we are more
often than not the preferred partner.
I think a lot of Chinese engagement has resulted in a
backlash, because their intent is not benign. They come in with
the goal of entrapping countries, in many instances. When we go
in, we want genuine partnership, we want to help countries
address their needs. All we really want is countries to be
sovereign and have the ability to protect that sovereignty and
their independence and freedom for maneuver.
So I think we are the preferred partner, but we have to
show up, and we have to be a good, reliable partner to them.
Mr. Scott. I agree with you. And the things like trade
relations, quite honestly, in many cases, have as much, if not
more, to do with peace than the military strength. And I think
it is unfortunate that when the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership]
was being discussed, it became a political football that got
kicked around by both sides, quite honestly. And we need to
have the trade relationships in Asia, and we need trade
relationships with countries other than China in Asia.
General Abrams, you have stated that you have a persistent
need for ISR. I know of no commander who thinks that they have
enough ISR. The geographic challenges of the Korean Peninsula,
the size of it.
And so, in your first 120 days as commander, your support
with ISR to detect attack as early as possible, are you
receiving enough support there? And if not, what do you need
from Congress as we push forward with the National Defense
Authorization Act to do that?
General Abrams. Congressman, we are adequately resourced
with ISR during armistice conditions as it relates to the
current reduction intentions on the peninsula. So I want to be
clear, I am not ringing the five-alarm fire bell right now on
ISR.
But as we look to the future, as conditions might change,
if they change negatively, then our stance and our posture is
not adequate to provide us an unblinking eye to give us early
warning and indicators.
And I can give you a couple of examples during the closed
session of exact capability that we would need, but suffice it
to say we are short to be able to do that if things start to
turn bad.
Mr. Scott. Well, I will tell you, the JSTARS [Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] fly out of Robins Air
Force Base. I am glad that we are starting to do the depot
maintenance work at Robins Air Force Base. Hopefully, we can
get that turnaround time shortened and get more of those planes
in the air.
I want to just leave you with a couple things. I mentioned
this to the Secretary of the Air Force this morning. Hurricane
Michael hit the southeastern United States just under 6 months
ago. We have approximately three legislative days left that are
not fly-in/fly-out days before we leave for the Easter break,
and we are yet to have a disaster bill passed. If that is not
passed before we leave for Easter, then it will delay things
for weeks, potentially even another month.
I hope that the people at the DOD will help hold our feet
to the fire to get that done prior to leaving. And I would
mention to you that you are about 6 months from sequester----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. If he wants
to wrap up that thought, he is more than welcome to.
Mr. Scott. I would just caution you that the calendar is
ticking, and we need some type of agreement on a caps deal--Mr.
Chairman, I think you would agree with me on that----
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. Sooner rather than later so that we
can adopt our National Defense Authorization Act.
The Chairman. And I would echo that thought. I mean, as you
mentioned in the outset, having fiscal year 2019--October 1,
you knew how much money you were going to have, you were good
to go, and that was the first time in I don't know how long.
You know, to get that again for fiscal year 2020 would be
enormously important.
And I think it is the greatest burden in Congress and the
White House. We need to find a way to work together and get
that deal. I think it is there to be made. Obsessing over the
budget caps that were set back in 2011 in a situation where--I
mean, Mr. Turner and I had a robust disagreement, exactly what
that situation was. But we did agree today that it was all part
of the controversy of trying to figure out what to do about the
budget, the debt ceiling, and how do we get the deficit and the
debt under control.
But to jeopardize the entire discretionary budget over an
amount of money that isn't going to have any impact on our
long-term debt and deficit is the height of irresponsibility,
to my mind. We need to work together and get certainly for DOD
but for the entire discretionary budget.
So I appreciate the gentleman making that point. Thank you.
Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
And thank you, gentlemen, for coming today and for
testifying. I am going to continue asking the question that
Representative Larsen and Representative Cisneros were talking
about.
I also serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Asia
Subcommittee, and I had the opportunity to ask the same kinds
of questions of Mr. Victor Cha recently that had to do with the
exercises that are conducted overseas that have been suspended
in some cases, and I am just trying to triangulate the answer.
You mentioned that you had been asked to be creative about
effectively redesigning, reimagining the exercises so that they
could be effective. He mentioned that he was concerned that if
those reimagined exercises continued in the capacity that they
were, which was in some cases not actually in the places they
ought to be, that by the springtime he would be anxious that we
should be returning to actually exercising in the places that
we planned to have those scenarios actually unfold.
And do you have that same kind of concern, where if we
continue to sort of exercise off-site, for lack of a better
descriptor, which is how he was alluding to it, that we are in
some ways less ready than we would have been otherwise?
General Abrams. Congresswoman, I did read those comments.
And I have the utmost respect for Mr. Cha, but he is not fully
read in on how we conducted these exercises.
I would prefer to--I am happy to give the members all the
details you want on things that we have done with the exercise
designed. But I want to assure you and all the members, this
exercise was probably more rigorous, more challenging, and
stressed our systems more appropriately than we have in many
years past. I would prefer to go into how we were able to do
that in a closed session.
But the Department is committed, I know the Secretary of
Defense is committed, to us being able to sustain that
readiness and continue to train and exercise as we need to to
keep it as a ``fight tonight'' capability.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And I will look forward to having
that conversation in the next session.
My next question is for Mr. Schriver and Admiral. It has to
do a little bit with the bases that are currently in Djibouti.
And if you could look kind of at the map of the area that we
are talking about today and think about if there are any
vulnerable countries that you can think of that will maybe
succumb to the lure of China and their money and their
resources. Could you identify what countries those are that you
would be maybe worried could be coopted into being a Djibouti-
type situation?
Secretary Schriver. Before naming specific countries, I
think it is important to note that China is opportunistic.
Wherever they see the conditions--and, generally, they are
weaker, in some cases authoritarian states, vulnerable
economies, et cetera, where their predatory economics have
attraction.
I think what we have seen is attempts in places like Sri
Lanka and the Maldives and Malaysia that were quite robust and
ultimately somewhat thwarted by the elections in Maldives. Mr.
Yameen lost reelection in Sri Lanka. The Rajapaksas were
replaced, at least temporarily. And in Malaysia, we now have
Mr. Mahathir in his second turn as leader. And much of that as
a result of China's overplaying their hands.
Certainly in the Pacific Islands, we see some vulnerable
states that China is approaching. And there has been some press
coverage on some of those--for example, Vanuatu, which I have
visited, others in the administration have visited to assure
them that there are alternatives and shine a light on what
happened in some of these other countries so that they don't
fall prey to it.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
And I have one last question with my one last minute which
has to do with that. And I think that people do say that China
is more successful in developing economic security and security
relationships with countries because it doesn't have the same
kind of regulatory requirements and restrictions as we do in
terms of human rights and vetting and anticorruption
requirements and those sorts of things. And you have mentioned
that our values compete well in this area.
And so I wanted to ask you, do you believe that countries
choose China over us because of these requirements that we
have? Or do you think that we are able to continue to have our
values and also be competitive in the environment that we are
in right now?
Secretary Schriver. I think, as Admiral Davidson, I think,
alluded to earlier, our values are key to our ability to
compete, and there is an attraction to it.
I think the countries that are most susceptible oftentimes
have weak, authoritarian governments that are willing to engage
in activities that are, quite frankly, corrupt. But what we
offer, even if it is not in the vast sums that China can come
to the table with, is clean, transparent, open approaches that
have long-term benefit to the people, not just the leadership.
Ms. Houlahan. I appreciate that, and I agree with that.
Thanks so much for your time.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Davidson, intelligence suggests China has made
strong progress in the development of hypersonic weapons that
pose unique challenges to America's current missile defense
systems.
First question: Do you have a judgment about whether China
is apt to use hypersonic weapons in a regional or strategic
scenario?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, they don't have capability that they
would use, I think, in combat immediately, but their initial
capability, I think, is in the horizon of just the next few
years, yes.
Mr. Brooks. With respect, then, to China's expected
capabilities, are you planning for them to have conventional-
tipped warheads, nuclear-tipped warheads, or both?
Admiral Davidson. I think the Nation needs to be prepared
for any outcome there. Both.
Mr. Brooks. And what are our current hypersonic defense
capabilities?
Admiral Davidson. Well, as you indicated in the preface to
your question, sir, our ability of our integrated air and
missile defense systems to handle hypersonics is short of their
capability. They have a different, you know, flight profile
trajectory that makes it hard for current sensing systems to
maintain track on those things, and it makes it hard for our
current interception systems to actually make the turn and do
the intercepts.
So continued advancement here by the Department--and I
think you are going to be pleased with the downpayment in the
fiscal year 2020 budget. Continued advancement here in both
sensing, which is going to require an airborne or space layer,
as well as continued advancement in our ability to intercept
these weapons, defeat them, I think you are going to see the
beginnings of that in the 2020 budget.
Mr. Brooks. How long do you anticipate it will be before
our defense capabilities are such that we can rely on them?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, I will have to take that for the
record. You know, money is a resource here. That is a factor.
But so is time. And I think Dr. Griffin and as the services
pursue this capability, I think they could give you a more
refined answer than I could. But I need to do some coordination
with them to get back to you.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Brooks. Well, that flows into my next question. How
much more money do you believe we need in the next fiscal year
defense budget in order to adequately accelerate defense
capabilities to hypersonic weapons?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, if I could take that question down
below. You know, I can begin to address that, but I am going to
have to take that for the record as well.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Brooks. All right. Thank you.
We have moved from defense now to offense.
Assistant Secretary Schriver, the Missile Defense Review
opens the aperture for hypersonic glide defense. What
investments are necessary to get the Department of Defense
developing such a capability for the INDOPACOM area of
responsibility?
And then follow up on that with, in your judgment, how long
will it be before America has an effective offensive hypersonic
capability?
Secretary Schriver. I can only answer at the very general
level because----
Mr. Brooks. I understand.
Secretary Schriver [continuing]. There are parts of the
Department that deal with both the offense and the defense
equation. But I do think you will see this reflected in the
2020 budget, an increase in resources both on the defense and
offense side. I do think time is of the essence, given where
China and competitors may be on this.
And, of course, it is not limited to hypersonics but, as
was pointed out, all the enabling sensors and other
capabilities that China is pursuing as well. Because there are
a variety of ways to deal with this capability, and it may not
only be shooting down a missile; it may be disabling other
aspects of their infrastructure.
But to get into more detail, we would probably need to be
another setting, and I would probably have to have the support
of colleagues who have more of the technical background.
Mr. Brooks. Well, to use a football analogy, sometimes the
best defense is a good offense. Do you have anything that you
wish to add about our development of offensive capabilities,
offensive hypersonic capabilities?
Secretary Schriver. Only that I know that it has been
identified as a priority and it is being resourced at greater
levels in our budget.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Hill.
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here and for your service.
Admiral Davidson, North Korea has a variety of sources of
illicit funding, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command supports the
enforcement of U.N. Security Resolution sanctions.
I know you spoke to Mr. Carbajal a few minutes ago about
sanctions enforcement, but can you speak to how Russia and
China are living up to their responsibilities to do the same?
Admiral Davidson. Well, I think in the diplomatic space,
both Russia and China continue to try to undermine the
sanctions effort by proposing relief to sanctions at the U.N.
That is certainly not helpful in what I think should be the
world's objective, to get to a denuclearized North Korea.
I also believe that Russia kind of confounds our
initiatives across the region by direct diplomatic engagements
with other countries to garner the votes that they need to
prevent these sanctions.
I can tell you that China, in the maritime space, using
terrestrial sensors, using airborne sensors, they are watching
how we do the sanctions enforcement regime. They are offering
zero assistance. I can't say that they are preventing our ships
and aircraft from doing their mission, but they are certainly
not monitoring their own territorial seas very well, and they
are not adding to the picture at all. And they continue to
undermine the effort at the U.N. as well.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
So I guess along those same lines, you spoke earlier about
how Russia plays a spoiler role in the region. Can you talk a
little bit more about the specifics around that and what that
entails?
Admiral Davidson. One of the things that they tell other
nations in the region is that our sea and our desire to
maintain an open sea and airspace in the South China Sea, for
example, should not be our objective. Yet they use that same
sea and airspace themselves and actually use the open seas and
airways to, you know, fly threatening bomber profiles to our
allies and, in fact, on the United States as well. You know, I
think that is a high form of hypocrisy.
They are doing some engagements in the region where they
are seeking to either gain access in a commercial fashion or in
a science fashion that could lend itself to military
capabilities. That has been upsetting. The good news there is
that some of these other countries have at least called us and
notified us of that.
And they have made it--they have partnered with China in a
large exercise last fall that was in Russia.
They just are unhelpful in the whole of the diplomatic
informational, military, and economic space.
Ms. Hill. General Abrams or Mr. Schriver, do you have
anything to add on that front?
General Abrams. Congresswoman, I will tell you that we
continue to see positive effects on the sanctions; Admiral
Davidson briefed it earlier. But to reiterate what the admiral
said, the Chinese can and should do much, much more to meet
their obligations in accordance with the U.N. Security Council
resolutions.
Ms. Hill. So what do you think this all kind of boils down
to? What do you think the general effect is having, and what do
we need to do about it, from your end?
Admiral Davidson. Well, China is attempting to undermine
the rules-based international order to their own benefit or to
the benefit of people or entities or regimes, frankly, that
they seek to partner with. It is not helpful.
Ms. Hill. And the same for Russia?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Hill. So along those lines, then, the President has
made the decision to cancel U.S. participation in Key Resolve
and Foal Eagle. What message do you think ending those
operational norms with the ROK, while the White House is saying
we won't impose further sanctions on North Korea because of his
relationship with Kim Jong-un, what do you think that message
sends to--what message do you think that sends to our allies
and partners in Asia and to Russia and China themselves?
General Abrams. Congresswoman, if I could, just to be
precise--and this is not semantics--Key Resolve and Foal Eagle
were not canceled. We have concluded that exercise regime that
was in effect for about 35 years that was probably necessary,
designed, optimized based on the situation on the peninsula
vis-a-vis bellicose and aggressive and provocative behavior
from the DPRK.
We have since transitioned now, in accordance with guidance
from Secretary Shanahan and Minister of Defense Jeong from the
Republic of Korea and their statement. So we have concluded
that previous exercise regime, and they have given us the green
light to develop a new set of exercise regimes so that we can
continue to meet and maintain our readiness requirements.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I believe it was Chairman Smith who said during his
opening statement that on the Korean Peninsula, we are at a
high-water mark since the cessation of conflict during the
Korean war.
I wanted to give General Abrams and Admiral Davidson an
opportunity to reflect on how those improving conditions have
manifested. What is the evidence that we see, and what do we
expect from the trend lines as it relates to the overall status
of conflict on the Korean Peninsula?
General Abrams. Congressman, if you go back just 2 years to
2017, during the height of missile tests, nuclear weapons tests
by the DPRK, I would describe--and I was not the commander
then, but I was certainly watching very closely as the U.S.
Army's force provider to have forces ready should crisis be
required.
I would characterize our posture and our stance as we were
in a low crouch. We were increasing our stockages, increasing
our force posture. We made the decision to deploy an additional
very capable integrated air and missile defense system called
THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]. And, you know,
things were very tense on the peninsula. People were at the
low-ready.
Now, compare and contrast that, juxtapose that on a 2019,
and there is a palpable air of calm on the peninsula. We are
able to sustain and we continue to train and maintain our
readiness. But simultaneously, along the Demilitarized Zone, on
the West Sea, the East Sea, along the Northern Limit Line,
inside the Joint Security Area, that for the first time since
1976 the Joint Security Area is now 100 percent demilitarized.
All of that are evidence, I would say, of how I can say
confidently that the tension has reduced significantly.
Mr. Gaetz. Admiral Davidson, do you have anything to add to
that?
Admiral Davidson. No, sir. But I will add that the
readiness of our forces are key in our mind, and we want to
make sure that both the tactical forces and the operational-
level forces, you know, the headquarters that coordinate
between the United States and the Republic of Korea, all that
training and readiness is sound.
As General Abrams indicated earlier, we are keeping a close
eye on any changes in the capability set, whether it is in
conventional forces in North Korea, whether it is in nuclear,
the potential for a nuclear test, and missile testing. And we
will be ready to respond should those indicators say they are
on a different trajectory than what General Abrams just
described.
Mr. Gaetz. And, Mr. Schriver, it seems to me that this new
era of calm has been ushered in by an unprecedented level of
engagement with the administration on the actors, the players,
the chairman in North Korea.
Have you drawn any conclusions about the actions that have
been taken by the administration and the extent to which they
have contributed to the new sense of calm that General Abrams
articulated?
Secretary Schriver. Well, I think the unprecedented step of
meeting leader-to-leader has made this environment what it is.
Ultimately, that----
Mr. Gaetz. And what it is is safer, right?
Secretary Schriver. Tensions are down, and I would describe
it as safer in terms of avoidance of an immediate conflict,
particularly one that is unintended or unwanted.
We do need North Korea to take advantage of this
environment and fulfill Chairman Kim's pledge to denuclearize.
Mr. Gaetz. And shifting gears briefly to hypersonics, Mr.
Schriver, are we ahead or behind China in hypersonics now?
Secretary Schriver. I am not sure I am qualified to give
you a precise answer on that, other than I am seized with a
sense of urgency, as I believe our Department is, that we need
to invest on both the defense and the offensive side to make
sure that our competitive advantages are maintained.
Mr. Gaetz. And what are the consequences if we don't? If we
are demonstrably behind China in hypersonics going forward, how
do you think that impacts the balance of power globally?
Secretary Schriver. Increased risk and greater
vulnerability for our ability to impact our security interests
and our broad interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to start with General Abrams.
General Abrams, thank you very much for coming into my
office yesterday. I appreciated the discussion.
And I just want to start by saying that, when your
commander, our Commander in Chief, handed you a deck that meant
you could not continue your prime exercises in this theater, I
learned yesterday that you innovated remarkably and have
improved upon the existing, the old exercises to modernize
them, to make them more full-spectrum, and to adapt to the
current situation. And you deserve a lot of credit for that. I
know that is not easy to do in the U.S. military, and I
appreciate that very much.
Admiral Davidson, you stated in your testimony that North
Korea will remain the most immediate challenge until we achieve
the final, fully verifiable denuclearization as committed to by
Chairman Kim Jong-un at the summit in June of 2018.
ASD Shriver, so we gave up the exercises. What did we gain
from the summit?
Secretary Schriver. I think we gained an opportunity to
engage in a way that could be productive if North Korea is
prepared to take the difficult steps in the direction of
denuclearization.
Mr. Moulton. That is an opportunity that didn't exist
before?
Secretary Schriver. I think leader-to-leader engagement did
create an unprecedented opportunity. But North Korea has not
taken the steps to fulfill Chairman Kim's pledge, and we are
disappointed that they haven't come to the table in a serious
manner.
Mr. Moulton. Are you surprised?
Secretary Schriver. Having worked on this in some form or
another for almost 30 years, I think I have seen a lot of
different approaches, none of which have been successful. I
think this is the best opportunity that North Korea will ever
have. Whether or not they make the strategic choice, that is
difficult to say.
Mr. Moulton. Why would they give up their nuclear weapons,
Mr. Schriver?
Secretary Schriver. I think there is a better path and a
better future for the country, quite frankly. And I don't think
their weapons are making them more secure. I think, you know,
it was only a year and a half ago, 2 years ago that we were at
a period of very high tensions and possible military action. I
don't think these weapons are making them more safe and secure.
Mr. Moulton. So you talked about this, the fact that
tensions are down, you said. My colleague just said there is a
new level of calm. Have tensions ever been higher than they
were at the beginning of this administration, when North
Korea's hot-headed leader was exchanging tweets with ours?
Secretary Schriver. We have had periods of heightened
tension. I think 1994, Secretary Perry used to say that is the
closest he came to war while he was Secretary of Defense, but--
--
Mr. Moulton. Right, while he was Secretary. But has it ever
been as dangerous as it was a couple years ago?
I guess my point is that it is one thing to talk about
tensions being down, but if you are just solving your own
problem, you know, the tensions that you created yourself--and,
as a result, we are where we were before in terms of
negotiations, in that North Korea hasn't given up anything. We
now know from public intelligence reports that they are
actually continuing their nuclear weapons development, so they
are farther along than they were at any time. Literally, today,
they are farther along than they have been at any time in
American history.
And all we gained after giving up our exercises is a,
quote/unquote, opportunity that nobody is surprised that the
chairman hasn't taken. Then I just--where do you think this
goes next, and what diplomatic leverage do we have at this
point?
Secretary Schriver. Yeah, the choice for North Korea is
very clear, and it is a stark one. They can continue to live in
isolation; they can continue----
Mr. Moulton. I understand their choice. What leverage do we
have?
Secretary Schriver. Well, the maintenance of sanctions, I
think, continues to put pressure on North Korea.
Mr. Moulton. So you think sanctions are helpful?
Secretary Schriver. I do.
Mr. Moulton. So, then, why did the President just cancel
the latest sanctions?
Secretary Schriver. As I understand it, none of the
sanctions have been removed or changed since the tweet, as the
White House----
Mr. Moulton. Since the tweet. So you would disagree with
the idea of removing sanctions; that would be unhelpful.
Secretary Schriver. I think it is helpful to maintain
pressure. The decisions on future sanctions are beyond my
purview.
Mr. Moulton. So undoing pressure by tweet would not be
helpful.
I want to just shift focus for a second to India. You
previously mentioned how important our relationship is with
India. How does India's recent purchasing of the S-400 and the
leasing of Russian nuclear submarines impact our relationship
going forward?
Secretary Schriver. The decision to procure S-400s has not
gone to contract or been completed. We are very keen to see
them make an alternative choice. We are working with them to
provide potential alternatives. I think it would be an
unfortunate decision if they chose to pursue that.
And, of course, we have the legislation hanging over all of
that. The legislation is not designed to be an impediment in
the growing strategic partnership we have with India. It is
designed to impose cost on Russia and consequence for Russia.
So, one way or another, we want to work through it, because
India is an important emerging strategic partner for us.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Oh, before I call on Mr. Banks, we are going to do the
classified hearing at 12:15. So we are going to be wrapped here
before 12:15 no matter how many people are here, and we are
going to go upstairs for the classified at 12:15.
Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Davidson, in the past, you have mentioned that
INDOPACOM only has a quarter of the intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities required to address the range
of threats in the AOR. For fiscal year 2019, the CNO included
sonobuoys on the Navy's unfunded priority list [UPL]. And,
again, in fiscal year 2020, a portion of the funding request
again appears in the UPL.
In looking at your command's requirements in the current
and foreseeable security environment, would you also include
assets like sonobuoys as a critical ISR shortfall, especially
in light of submarine activity in your AOR?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. Given the ongoing expansion of
Chinese submarine operations in the Pacific and the Indo-
Pacific, as well as new capability that the Russians will be
introducing into the theater over the next couple years with
the Severodvinsk-class cruise-missile-capable submarine,
sensing like sonobuoys is going up in value and need.
Mr. Banks. Thank you for that.
Shifting gears, yesterday, we had Secretary Shanahan in the
same seat that you are in today. I am going to ask you the same
question that I asked the Secretary yesterday.
Even if every Congress and President agree on the goal of a
355-ship fleet for decades to come, we will not reach the
desired goal for at least, I said, 40 years yesterday, without
a firm commitment. The Secretary pushed back and said 18 years.
I will give the Secretary 18 years on the low end, and some
experts say 40 years on the high end.
In light of that, what do you expect the balance of forces
between the U.S. and China to be by the time we achieve a 355-
ship fleet? And when do you believe that it is realistic to
achieve this goal?
Admiral Davidson. To your first question, Congressman, I
think we are going to lose our quantitative edge in about the
2025 timeframe. I think that is going to be a challenge for our
equities in the region, absolutely. I can't comment how much
faster or slower the need--needs to happen here. There are some
shipbuilding limits, the capacity in the United States to
actually produce the ships. But I think the Navy's force
structure assessment will take that fully into account as they
come forward later in the year with it.
Mr. Banks. Thank you for that.
Mr. Schriver, in your testimony, you said, quote, ``There
is an active North Korean effort to undermine sanctions and sow
political division in their execution. North Korea has turned
to the use of illicit ship-to-ship transfers off China's coast
to evade caps on importing refined petroleum and the sale of
textiles and coal. These restrictions were imposed and
periodically strengthened as a result of North Korea's illegal
weapons development activity dating back to March 2016,'' end
quote.
With that, what is the logic of the Trump administration
considering lessening sanctions on North Korea, and rewarding
North Korea if they won't comply with the original sanctions to
begin with?
Secretary Schriver. As I said, I am not aware that
sanctions have been removed or changed. I think it is very
important to keep pressure on--and it is, I think, a defensible
statement we wouldn't be where we are today without the
pressure that North Korea has felt.
Your point about--well, quoting my statement about China,
we will not be successful unless China does more to enforce
sanctions themselves, including their activity in their
territorial water, period.
Mr. Banks. Good. On that same note, Admiral, you have
talked in the past about naming and shaming those entities that
abet sanctions of Asia in North Korea. Have we done that? Have
we made any successful efforts to--at all to minimize sanctions
evasion?
Admiral Davidson. There have been a number of flag states
that the United States has engaged in, as well as other
countries to sideline vessels that have been participating in
the illicit transfer of oil to North Korea as well as some of
the ownership companies and shippers involved.
And I think the key is to disrupting that providing network
as we go forward. But there has been engagement at the
diplomatic level, to your point, naming and shaming of these
individuals, and we have seen robust action from other
countries in that regard.
Mr. Banks. So you have seen progress or we hope to see
progress?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, we have seen progress.
Mr. Banks. You have seen progress.
Admiral Davidson. And it will continue.
Mr. Banks. Thank you.
With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Golden.
Mr. Golden. Thank you, gentlemen.
I have heard a lot of questions and a lot of the ones that
I was going to ask, so I am going to take you in a slightly
different direction, if you would. I think Congresswoman
Houlahan touched upon this a little bit talking about Persian
Gulf ports and China's, you know, presence in that part of the
world.
A little bit outside your AOR, but the National Security
Strategy, National Defense Strategy does talk about reorienting
ourselves from near-peer competition to include China. And I
think a lot of people think of this only in military-to-
military engagement, but you often talk about the economic
aspects of all of this.
And, you know, I was curious, we haven't really talked
about Afghanistan. I have been reading some reports about China
starting to have a little bit of military-to-military
cooperation with Afghan National Government.
We certainly know that their relationship in Pakistan,
think about One Belt One Road and the port that they are
developing there, and their ability to drive into Afghanistan,
get into Central Asia and the Gulf. You know, there is ports in
Iran. I think the success of those ports, you know, figures
largely in that region and security in Afghanistan.
So it is kind of the back door to your AOR, so I just
thought I would give you an opportunity to talk about, as the
U.S. talks in negotiations with Taliban, talks about
withdrawing, what kind of a footprint do you hope to see in
Afghanistan? And what kind of a role--how important it is to
your area of responsibility that the U.S. is present and, you
know, has a strong relationship with the Afghan Government?
Secretary Schriver. I think it is critical. We are in
Afghanistan, first and foremost, to protect the United States
and protect Americans. If Ambassador Khalilzad is successful in
the efforts to promote reconciliation, it is expected that
there would still be some terrorist threat that would remain,
and I would hope that--it is our objective that through those
negotiations, that we have the latitude to maintain a presence
sufficient for that terrorist threat that may remain.
In a post-reconciled environment, we would expect the
Afghans themselves to deal with the terrorist threat. They
certainly don't want that on their territory, at least the
government in Kabul. So it will be conditions-based, and I
think that is being reflected in our negotiations.
Admiral Davidson. Sir, if I could just add quickly, I
mentioned earlier that I think our U.S. values compete
extraordinarily well, and they do in Afghanistan very much so.
And when you look at China's, what can only be said,
incarceration of more than what is estimated to be right now, I
think, 1.5 million people in the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, you know,
I think Afghanistan would view heavy Chinese involvement in
their country and Chinese interests as a chilling factor.
The Chairman. Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to--gentlemen, I want to thank you both,
particularly your families, for--it is a team effort to serve,
and thank you for your years of service.
I want to talk very--go back to India for a moment. I
agree, I think it was the ranking member who said it is a
seminal--or perhaps the chairman--really one of the seminal
alliances, I think, moving forward. What more can we do in our
engagement with India, and what more should we be doing? What
more would you like to do? And how can this body help?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, the signing of the COMCASA
[Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement] and the
two-plus-two meeting that the Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of State had last September in India, I think is a
breakthrough.
Down at the operational level, we are working on an effort
now to really operationalize the COMCASA. It is an agreement
to--it is an IT [information technology], essentially,
agreement in which underpinning that we can do some information
sharing and other things.
There is an opportunity for us to share tactical flyaway
kits, and an operational planning system that I think will
advance our relationship on a military-to-military level very,
very well.
I continue to make the point with them that our
interoperability and compatibility going forward is--will be
advantaged with the purchase of U.S. systems. That allows us to
get to training, doctrine, tactical-level coordination that is
really powerful.
So while they very much want to protect their non-aligned
policy, the tactical and technical capability we get out of
like systems will really advance that relationship down in the
military space.
Randy?
Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
And just--so on top of that, switching to space, how does
China's growing capability, anti-SAT [anti-satellite],
dazzling, their capabilities that they are essentially putting
all over the globe in terms of tracking through One Belt One
Road and through their debt diplomacy, how is that affecting
you operationally? I leave it open to anyone on the panel.
Admiral Davidson. It is a capability development in the
battle space that would have effect on the freedom of action of
the entire joint force, not only in the Indo-Pacific Command,
but really around the globe.
Mr. Waltz. Switching to China--I mean, excuse me, switching
to Japan, do you believe, Mr. Schriver, it is time--I
understand this is an internal Japanese issue. It is a very
contentious political issue in terms of article 9. We are
taking a hard look at cost sharing, growing Chinese
capabilities. U.S. can't do it alone.
We are looking at losing the quantitative edge in terms of
our fleet, as the admiral just mentioned, by 2025. Should we--
what can we do to talk to the Japanese about taking additional
steps, taking that hard step internally and making those
changes they need to their constitution to be a more effective
military partner?
Secretary Schriver. Well, you rightfully acknowledge it is
a sovereign decision of the Government of Japan and the people
there. I think the step to re----
Mr. Waltz. But they have a responsibility as an ally. I
mean, this is a 70-year, you know, construct now and the world
has changed.
Secretary Schriver. I think the step they took to
reinterpret article 9 gave us greater flexibility and latitude,
and we are taking advantage of that. Their new national defense
program guidelines, when compared with our National Defense
Strategy, revealed to us that there is nothing but open space
for us to build this alliance out.
I am not aware that the distinction between reinterpreting
versus actually changing the Constitution is an impediment
right now, but if it were to become one, we would certainly
raise that with our Japanese friends.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. Just in the time I have remaining,
Admiral, how does the Latin American angle in terms of their--
the 17 nations that you mentioned participating, signing
agreements, One Belt One Road, how is that affecting your force
laydown or force posture? Is it significant? Where do we--what
do we do going forward?
Admiral Davidson. All those countries are actually in
SOUTHCOM's [U.S. Southern Command's]----
Mr. Waltz. Right.
Admiral Davidson [continuing]. Area of responsibility. I
actually talked to Admiral Faller just last night to make sure
that I understood, and he wanted to understand my concerns as
well. I think you are not seeing profound military action in
the SOUTHCOM AOR right now. Last year China did run a hospital
ship down there with some medical capability, but----
Mr. Waltz. I would note, just in my time remaining, I do
understand they put a satellite tracking system in Argentina on
land lease, so it is a road that--it is a trend we are seeing.
Admiral Davidson. And we have seen other, you know,
requests across the Indo-Pacific AOR, but the net result of
which is the potential for more bases, places for China to
operate out of base airplanes, fix ships, that kind of thing.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. We will
have to continue the discussion upstairs.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mrs. Luria, and when she is done, we are
going to reconvene in 2212.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you for being here today.
And, Admiral Davidson, it is especially good to see you
again.
I spent 4 years in the Western Pacific on a destroyer, and
then as the aide at 7th Fleet, so I am familiar with the area,
and what is most striking is the large distances that have to
be covered. And I want to focus today especially on our
challenges to do with logistics based off of those large
distances in the Pacific.
And our current Navy logistics enterprise is based on the
ability to deliver fuel, parts, supplies in an uncontested
environment. So I appreciate that you also see this as a
vulnerability in your comments that you provided in preparation
for this hearing.
While China continues to develop weapons such as the DF-26,
they have called it the ``Guam killer,'' which gives you an
idea of the range and what they could intend to use that for,
that threaten our ability to deliver logistics from the six
bases we have relied on for more than 50 years. But we really
haven't changed our tactics, our procedures with regards to
logistics, and practiced those very recently, such as console
ops [operations] with our TAOs [tactical action officers] in
theater for about a decade.
So do you see logistics as an Achilles heel in the Pacific
theater?
Admiral Davidson. Certainly advancements with our logistics
tactics, so to speak, is important going forward. We actually
have done some console ops here in the last 5 years. We just
concluded the Pacific Blitz exercise as well, which merges
essentially what was a tactical exercise and a logistics, both
Navy and Marine Corps exercises to exercise that capability.
Clearly, recapitalization of our sealift system is going to
be critically important as it is aging out and really has
propulsion plants that are, you know, expiring in capability
and our ability to maintain them.
Mrs. Luria. I was going to comment on that as well because
we had the opportunity to hear from Admiral Buzby as the
Maritime Administrator, as well as from U.S. TRANSCOM [U.S.
Transportation Command]. And we focus within the Seapower
Subcommittee as well on the age of the, you know, sealift
fleet.
And, you know, on any given day, if, say, 50 percent of the
sealift fleet were unavailable, what kind of impact would that
have? Because when we were briefed, that was basically what was
available--unavailable at a snapshot in time. What would that--
what impact would that have on your most limiting OPLAN and
ability to carry that out within the theater?
Admiral Davidson. It is risk to our troops and all of our
people that are forward in the region, if there is any delay in
our ability to deliver the logistics in accordance with the
OPLANs.
Mrs. Luria. And going back to the console ops and the
availability of tankers within the region, currently in our MSP
[Maritime Security Program] program, there are no tankers
whatsoever. And do you see that as a need in order to execute
your most pressing OPLAN?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. The Military Sealift Command
is also exploiting commercial opportunities to do some of these
things as well.
Mrs. Luria. And lastly, many of our ships in the theater
have only relied on shore infrastructure, such as in Guam and
Yokosuka and Sasebo and different areas around the theater. Are
you taking any actions to harden that shore infrastructure or
provide additional defenses for it to make sure that we can
maintain the logistics necessary to carry out our two, you
know, principal OPLANs within the area?
Admiral Davidson. Yeah. Certainly there are defensive
capabilities in Guam I would like to see improved. You know, we
are using a mobile system right there now with THAAD on the
ground as well as ship support from the threats that are
exigent.
I think in the future, we are going to need a more robust
fixed site there so that our mobile sites can then be employed
to use--to support our expeditionary logistics and other basing
needs around the region.
Mrs. Luria. And I will wrap up by asking you the same
question that I have asked all combatant commanders who have
come before us, is on a different note, what percentage of your
requested carrier presence have you received within the theater
over the last 2 years?
Admiral Davidson. About 70 percent.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you. And as I am the last to go
today, I wanted to thank you all again for taking the time to
brief us and help us be more informed on a decision-making
process throughout the budget process. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate your testimony
answering questions. We are adjourned, and we will reconvene in
2212 as soon as we can get up there.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 27, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 27, 2019
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 27, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. Please explain the significance of the implications
to trade flows, commercial activity, and the financial information that
flows on cables under the South China Sea if China were to control and
limit the freedom of open seas and access there. What would be the
military and security implications for the Indo-Pacific Command and for
the region at large?
Admiral Davidson. Undersea cables are absolutely critical to global
economic and security interests. They carry an estimated 95-99% of data
worldwide, which supports global commerce, banking, telecommunications,
and more. Twelve major cable systems in the South China Sea connect
Southeast Asia with Northeast Asia, and Asia to the Middle East,
Europe, and the United States. All of these cables run through the
portion of the South China Sea claimed by China, and many are near
China's military outposts on the Spratly Islands. Many also have
terrestrial cable landing points in China. Any disruption to the
cables, even for just a few hours, would cause a massive disturbance to
worldwide data flows, with the effects most pronounced between Asia's
financial and business centers and their counterparts in Europe and the
U.S. Any outage could also impact U.S. and allied battle space
awareness, communications, and coordination, as the military uses some
of these same carrier systems. While we have backup systems available,
the impacts to efficient and timely decision making would likely be
severe.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. The INDOPACOM region remains one of the most natural
disaster-prone areas in the world, and I am concerned that our bases
and installations in the region may not be appropriately postured for
the threat posed by climate change. How do you believe climate change
has impacted this region as well as your foreign humanitarian
assistance operations?
Secretary Schriver. The effects of a changing climate are a
national security issue with potential impacts to Department of Defense
missions, operational plans, and installations. Specifically, the
Department has identified the negative consequences of climate change
as a prevalent transnational challenge in the Indo-Pacific.
The region is already prone to earthquakes and volcanoes as part of
the Pacific Ring of Fire, and suffers regularly from natural disasters
including monsoons, hurricanes, and floods to earthquakes and volcanic
activity. The Department works to ensure installations and
infrastructure are resilient to a wide range of challenges, including
climate and those other environmental considerations. DOD considers
resilience in the installation planning and basing processes to include
impacts on built and natural infrastructure. This includes
consideration of environmental vulnerabilities in installation master
planning, management of natural resources, design and construction
standards, utility systems/service, and emergency management
operations. Our military installations have extreme weather plans and
Commanders are encouraged to work with local communities to address
shared issues regarding environmental impacts.
United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) focuses their
training on readiness to respond to and be resilient to natural
disasters, as well as sustainable resource management toward critical
resources scarcity. This command has also established Pacific
Augmentation Teams around its Area of Responsibility to identify
quickly immediate needs that can be met with military assets.
Mr. Langevin. How are you ensuring that countering violent
extremism activities in your AOR do not perpetuate and aggravate the
underlying conditions that so often lead to extremism?
Admiral Davidson. As we work to advise and assist our Indo-Pacific
partners and build their capacity to counter violent extremism, we also
emphasize the importance of understanding and addressing conditions
that lead to instability and extremism. Effective partnering with the
interagency and prioritizing of security relationships at the local
level play critical roles in the development of comprehensive counter
violent extremism activities that also address the conditions that
fostered violent extremism in the first place.
Mr. Langevin. How are you working with the interagency on programs
that address the underlying conditions of terrorism?
Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM is addressing the underlying
conditions of terrorism in the Indo-Pacific region with a comprehensive
approach utilizing the unique capabilities, relationships, and
expertise from across the entire interagency in a united effort. Since
the launch of the USINDOPACOM Multi-National Engagement Program in
2012, USINDOPACOM has implemented dozens of interagency programs that
leverage military, law enforcement, and other interagency subject
matter experts along with our partner nations' agency equivalents. One
recent example of these training and information exchange programs'
impact is the Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia agreement on
patrolling shared maritime borders, named the Trilateral Cooperation
Agreement (TCA), signed in 2016. The TCA provides a vessel to deploy a
combined force of sea marshals to deter and combat terrorist
organizations such as Abu Sayyaf and the Islamic State. Additionally,
we worked with interagency partners and their host-nation counterparts
in India, Brunei, and the Philippines to increase their understanding
of terrorism indicators. We accomplished this through workshops focused
on information sharing and multinational cooperation required to
interdict terrorist planning and recruiting cycles. These programs, and
many others like them, demonstrate USINDOPACOM's whole-of-government
commitment to working with our allies and partners to counter violent
extremism and address the underlying conditions that lead to terrorism.
Mr. Langevin. How is the U.S. military's relationship with the
Philippine Security Forces complicated by the recent decision of the
Philippine Government to withdraw from the International Criminal Court
amid serious human rights abuses allegedly conducted primarily by the
National Police?
Admiral Davidson. The U.S. military follows stringent vetting
requirements required by the Leahy Law, which restricts funding for any
unit or individual credibly implicated in gross violations of human
rights. When working with Philippine Security Forces (to include the
Philippine National Police), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command follows all
legal requirements and ensures units are cleared through Department of
State review. The Government of the Philippines decision to withdraw
from the International Criminal Court in March 2019 will not impact the
Leahy vetting procedures.
Mr. Langevin. The INDOPACOM region remains one of the most natural
disaster-prone areas in the world, and I am concerned that our bases
and installations in the region may not be appropriately postured for
the threat posed by climate change. How do you believe climate change
has impacted this region as well as your foreign humanitarian
assistance operations?
Admiral Davidson. The Department plans for many variables to
account for potential impacts on our defense missions, installations
and operations, including the effects of a changing climate and other
factors. Climate change has raised concerns about potential impacts to
military installations on Guam, Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of
Marshall Islands, and Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii. Working with the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, DOD expects to complete a study
in the next two years that will help us better understand how to
analyze the vulnerabilities of military installations to the effects of
a changing climate. Extreme weather events occur frequently in the
Indo-Pacific compared to other regions of the world. The impact
generally depends on the frequency, timing, and severity of the event.
Any resulting widespread human suffering, food and water shortages, and
extensive power outages could serve as precipitating events for
regional instability, if not properly managed. Historically, DOD has
supported about 10% of USG disaster responses led by USAID each year.
Factors of whether USAID requests DOD unique capability and support
include disaster type and extent, civil capacity in the host nation,
and the international response. Through its humanitarian assistance
program, DOD assists building partner nation civil capacity for
disaster preparedness and public health. Countries in INDOPACOM area
continue to improve capacity for domestic and regional disaster
response.
Mr. Langevin. Last year I was happy to see INDOPACOM begin close
coordination with the Global Engagement Center by embedding a GEC
officer at your command to help counter state and non-state propaganda.
Can you tell us how this embedded officer has helped your command and
give us and update on how Web Operations and other Inform and Influence
activities benefited from GEC collaboration?
Admiral Davidson. Our Global Engagement Center (GEC) embedded
officer has played a vital role in enabling a whole of government
approach to counter malign influence and propaganda in the Indo-
Pacific. This officer facilitated significant command contributions to
the GEC's flagship communications campaign to counter state propaganda,
enabled rapid response coordination between the command and GEC
headquarters, and helped establish a new team responsible for more
effective employment of command strategic communication tools in the
pursuit of national security objectives. With regard to Web Operations,
this officer is creating a pilot DOD-State Web Operations coordination
process that will improve U.S. government efforts to counter state
propaganda and disinformation. I view this as a critical first step to
leveraging these important tools in the Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Langevin. The INDOPACOM region remains one of the most natural
disaster-prone areas in the world, and I am concerned that our bases
and installations in the region may not be appropriately postured for
the threat posed by climate change. How do you believe climate change
has impacted this region as well as your foreign humanitarian
assistance operations?
General Abrams. Extreme weather events and the shifting of tidal
patterns and coastlines are impacting communities throughout the Indo-
Pacific region. The region is home to over half of the world's
population, and most of these people reside on, or very near the
coastlines. When an extreme weather event occurs, this geographic
vulnerability makes the situation more dire. On the Korean Peninsula,
several challenges face our armed forces. Increased rainfall and
flooding place low-lying areas at risk, while rising sea levels
endanger populations and infrastructure along the extensive shorelines.
Additionally, regional drought has potentiated fire hazards in heavily
forested mountainous regions. For example, a national emergency was
declared in early April in response to a wildfire in South Korea's
northeast Gangwon province. The fire spread rapidly to become one of
the nation's largest forest fires in modern history. The ROK government
requested and received the assistance of USFK forces due to unique U.S.
capabilities. And finally, increased airborne dust and pollution
carried from China and Mongolia creates unique respiratory problems
across the peninsula. As a result, USFK has implemented Command Policy
Letter #10, allowing for the elective use of filtering masks while in
uniform to further protect service members during elevated particulate
air pollution levels. Extreme weather events such as tropical storms,
typhoons, thawing of permafrost, tsunamis, and drought affect millions
of people in the Indo-Pacific region annually and cause billions of
dollars in damages. The impacts of these events can be catastrophic, to
include the destruction of buildings, critical infrastructure, crops,
and livestock. While we cannot prevent natural disasters, our
preparedness can build resiliency and capacity to help reduce the
costs, damages, and loss-of-life that these events inflict. When these
events occur, the U.S. military has surged relief to those affected,
and USFK stands ready to support USINDOPACOM in the event humanitarian
assistance, disaster response, and civic assistance becomes necessary.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. What is your assessment on what China's no first use
policy is today and what it might be in the future given the build-up
of their ballistic missiles?
Secretary Schriver. China has long maintained a no first use
policy, though ambiguity remains over the conditions under which
China's NFU policy would no longer apply. China's future intent may
shift as it fields larger, more-capable nuclear forces as part of its
nuclear modernization program. Some PLA officers have written publicly
of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use
nuclear weapons first--for example, if an enemy's conventional attack
threatened the survival of China's nuclear force or the regime itself.
However, there is no indication that national leaders are willing to
attach these caveats at present.
Mr. Rogers. What are our partners and allies position on no first
use in the context of a declaratory policy? Specifically the ROK and
Japan's positions?
Secretary Schriver. U.S. extended deterrence is an integral part of
our alliance commitments to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, and
both allies appreciate the ironclad U.S. security guarantee. Both the
ROK and Japan were consulted extensively during deliberations leading
to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Each understands that the United
States would only employ nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to
defend the vital interests of the United States and its allies and
partners. In our view, adoption of a no-first-use policy would be
deeply concerning to many of our allies and partners by suggesting the
United States would not use the full means at its disposal to deter and
respond to devastating, non-nuclear strategic attacks against them.
Mr. Rogers. What is your assessment on what China's no first use
policy is today and what it might be in the future given the build-up
of their ballistic missiles?
Admiral Davidson. China continues to assert a ``no first use''
policy for its nuclear forces, maintaining that China will only use
nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear strike against it. However, as
identified in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, China's lack of
transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization
program raises questions regarding its future intent. Ongoing
modernization efforts across its nuclear force include developing sea-
based weapons, improving road-mobile and silo-based weapons, and
testing hypersonic glide vehicles. China has also announced its intent
to form a nuclear triad by developing a nuclear-capable, next-
generation bomber.
Mr. Rogers. What are our partners and allies position on no first
use in the context of a declaratory policy? Specifically the ROK and
Japan's positions?
General Abrams. The United States maintains Mutual Defense Treaties
with both the Republic of Korea and Japan. USFK, in coordination with
USFJ and USINDOPACOM, remains committed to deterring, defending, and if
necessary, defeating any adversary that threatens those alliances. USFK
also maintains open communication with the U.S. Department of State to
coordinate policy matters impacting military activities and instruments
of national power. Our strategic forces serve several purposes. They
are designed and sustained to deter unconventional attacks or
conventional attacks, assure allies and partners, achieve U.S.
objectives if deterrence fails, and serve as insurance in an
unpredictable future. Given the contemporary threat paradigm in
Northeast Asia, some level of strategic ambiguity can be beneficial to
maintaining security. Our triad remains in a constant state of
readiness to provide political leaders with options and continuous
strategic deterrence. The Republic of Korea and Japan, along with our
NATO partners, have long stood by our decision against a No First Use
declaration. Should this policy change, I am confident that our allies
in Asia would continue to support our alliances and the principles upon
which they were formed. If called upon, USFK stands ready to provide
its best military advice concerning the security situation in Northeast
Asia, and all military options available to senior political leaders.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Secretary Schriver, what were the costs to the
Department in fiscal years 2017 and 2018 for joint U.S.-Republic of
Korea military exercises? And what are the projected costs to the
Department in fiscal year 2019 for the rescoped U.S.-Republic of Korea
military exercise program? For each fiscal year, please include a
listing of each exercise with its associated cost. For each exercise,
please include a description of the elements of each exercise, the
direct costs to USFK, and a description of additional costs incurred by
each service component.
Secretary Schriver. The President has consistently stated that he
expects prosperous allies and partners to contribute more to their own
defense and for supporting U.S. forces abroad. The recent U.S.-Republic
of Korea (ROK) Special Measures Agreement includes a roughly 8 percent
increase in contributions and allows GEN Abrams to use such funds for
exercise support. Although it is difficult to gather data to associate
elements of each exercise with direct costs, in 2019, exercise DONG
MAENG cost US$12.9 million and is expected to cost US$19 million in
2020. In contrast, KEY RESOLVE/FOAL EAGLE, the previous iteration of
DONG MAENG, cost US$22 and US$25 million, in 2017 and 2018,
respectively.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. We've talked a lot about cyberwarfare, we have seen
the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, and maturing our cyber forces
across the Department. And while most of our cyber forces are fully
capable on paper, they are not fully ready in practice. All DOD
missions and systems remain at-risk from adversarial cyber operations.
The Department continues to discover mission-critical vulnerabilities
in acquisition programs, and uncover massive data breaches of cleared
defense contractors.
When you think about cyber, what concerns you most with respect to
the threat being posed by China? Please address our own limitations,
but also any concerns from an adversarial standpoint as well. What are
we doing to deter cyber activities below the threshold of war? Do you
have the forces and authorities you need as a combatant commander?
Secretary Schriver. China views cyber as a critical domain that
enables information superiority and an effective means of countering a
stronger foe. We're concerned that the PLA's writings emphasize the
benefits of information operations and cyberwarfare in recent conflicts
and have advocated targeting an adversary's logistics networks as well
as their command and control in early stages of a conflict. China may
also combine its cyber and kinetic attacks to act as a force
multiplier. We are also concerned by continued China-based cyber
intrusions that seek to extract sensitive information from our defense
industrial base sectors, which threatens to erode our military
advantages.
Ms. Stefanik. We've talked a lot about cyberwarfare, we have seen
the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, and maturing our cyber forces
across the Department. And while most of our cyber forces are fully
capable on paper, they are not fully ready in practice. All DOD
missions and systems remain at-risk from adversarial cyber operations.
The Department continues to discover mission-critical vulnerabilities
in acquisition programs, and uncover massive data breaches of cleared
defense contractors.
When you think about cyber, what concerns you most with respect to
the threat being posed by China? Please address our own limitations,
but also any concerns from an adversarial standpoint as well. What are
we doing to deter cyber activities below the threshold of war? Do you
have the forces and authorities you need as a combatant commander?
Admiral Davidson. China possesses significant cyberspace
capabilities that go well beyond the basic intelligence collection
against U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors.
People's Liberation Army writings advocate targeting an adversary's C2
and logistics networks to affect its ability to operate during early
stages of a conflict. I remain concerned that China will continue to
use its cyberspace capabilities for intelligence and cyberattack
purposes, serving as a force multiplier for its other activities short
of armed conflict, and constrain adversary actions by holding vital
networks at risk. Additionally, I have concerns about the U.S.
government's ability to recruit and retain the skilled cyberspace work
force necessary to counter these threats. Below the threshold of armed
conflict, China continuously operates in and through cyberspace to
achieve strategic advantage. USINDOPACOM collaborates and shares
information with a broad array of partners in order to build
situational awareness and enable a proactive posture to defeat
malicious cyber activity at the source. Additionally, USINDOPACOM
supports a whole of government approach to impose costs in response to
malicious cyber activity. With respect to cyber forces, I believe the
effective support relationships between USINDOPACOM, USCYBERCOM, and
the services deliver sufficient capacity to address requirements in the
Indo-Pacific. Regarding authorities, USINDOPACOM continues to work with
USCYBERCOM through the process to delegate cyberspace authorities from
the President to the Secretary of Defense, which will enable time-
relevant operations. Additionally, USINDOPACOM works to maintain a
competitive advantage in cyberspace through effective partnerships with
the interagency, international partners, the defense industrial base,
and private sector critical infrastructure. I believe I have the
necessary authorities to continue building on these endeavors to
improve our posture in cyberspace.
Ms. Stefanik. We've talked a lot about cyberwarfare, we have seen
the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, and maturing our cyber forces
across the Department. And while most of our cyber forces are fully
capable on paper, they are not fully ready in practice. All DOD
missions and systems remain at-risk from adversarial cyber operations.
The Department continues to discover mission-critical vulnerabilities
in acquisition programs, and uncover massive data breaches of cleared
defense contractors.
When you think about cyber, what concerns you most with respect to
the threat being posed by China? Please address our own limitations,
but also any concerns from an adversarial standpoint as well. What are
we doing to deter cyber activities below the threshold of war? Do you
have the forces and authorities you need as a combatant commander?
General Abrams. There is compelling documentation from the U.S.
security industry and other sources related to China's intent to use
their advanced capabilities to acquire proprietary information through
cyberspace operations. The theft of intellectual property not only
reduces the competitive advantage of American companies but also
undermines and erodes our technological advantages. This problem is
compounded by the broad attack surface of thousands of networks
distributed across the defense industry and U.S. government, all
operating under different policies and with varying degrees of
information security. China's policy goals, along with current geo-
political and trade tensions, favor the assessment that cyber espionage
will remain a core component of Chinese competition. These malicious
cyber activities, taking place below the threshold of war, are
countered with an active defense policy. Defense professionals respond
to unauthorized activity or alerts/threat information against DOD
networks, and leverage intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), law
enforcement (LE), and other military capabilities as required. Internal
defensive measures include mission assurance actions to dynamically
reestablish, re-secure, reroute, reconstitute, or isolate degraded or
compromised local networks to ensure sufficient cyberspace access for
U.S. and alliance forces. CYBERCOM is an active and partner in
providing robust forces, such as direct support via the Joint Cyber
Center and as part of the Cyberspace Operations-Integrated Planning
Element (CO-IPE). CYBERCOM is fully integrated into USFK and the
USCYBERCOM CDR is on record as having all the required authorities to
carry out their mission in support of USFK and INDOPACOM.
Ms. Stefanik. General Abrams, can you tell us more about the recent
U.S.-South Korea ``Dong Maeng'' exercise? Did the exercise meet the
intent for strategic, operational, and tactical operations previously
practiced in Key Resolve and Foal Eagle? And to what extent does ``Dong
Maeng'' engage in multiple-domain operations to include space and
cyber? Lastly, what is the significance of discontinuing massive
exercises, like Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve and Foal Eagle
based on good faith with North Korea? How does that impact our overall
readiness in the region?
General Abrams. The suspension of large-scale exercises coincident
with senior-leader engagements in 2018 was a prudent action in support
of diplomacy. Following those suspensions, we have worked to modify our
exercise design and execution to maintain readiness through combined
training and exercises while preserving space for ongoing diplomacy. To
achieve this balance, we have adjusted four dials--size, scope, volume,
and timing--resulting in the 2 March 2019 Alliance decision to conclude
legacy exercises in favor of maintaining our Fight Tonight posture
through the regular conduct of Field Training Exercises (FTX), paired
with newly-designed, operational and theater-level Command Post
Exercises (CPX). What is unchanged is the readiness and posture of our
forces to act as a strategic deterrent postured to respond to potential
crisis or provocation, and if called upon, ready to defend the Republic
of Korea and our allies in the region. Our spring CPX, DONG MAENG 19-1
(DM 19-1) took advantage of changes to these four dials in order to
balance readiness while preserving space for diplomacy. CFC/USFK
effectively used DM 19-1 to train 14 of 14 warfighting Mission
Essential Tasks, displaying our Alliance strength and commitment. These
events, including the DM 19-1 CPX, also include multi-domain and gray
zone scenarios. To safeguard CFC/USFK military readiness, we will
continue to pursue our robust FTX schedule.
[all]