[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-16]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING
ON
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 14, 2019
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-877 WASHINGTON : 2020
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
FILEMON VELA, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
California PAUL COOK, California
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
KATIE HILL, California TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice
Chair
Kelly Goggin, Professional Staff Member
Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Megan Handal, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Fay, Lt Gen Timothy G., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy,
Integration and Requirements (A5), Department of the Air Force. 2
Roper, Dr. William B., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Department of the
Air Force...................................................... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces... 31
Roper, Dr. William B., Jr., joint with Lt Gen Timothy G. Fay. 35
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces..................................................... 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Letter from Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan............. 57
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 61
Mrs. Luria................................................... 61
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 61
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Courtney................................................. 65
Mr. Norcross................................................. 65
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 14, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in
Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Courtney
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Courtney. Again, I am calling to order Seapower and
Projection Forces hearing Department of the Air Force Fiscal
Year 2020 Budget Request.
Again, we are always kind of trying to, you know, dovetail
with the floor schedule, and as the witnesses know, we are
going to have a vote called within a few minutes or so.
The good news is it looks like it is a one-and-done vote,
so I think we can just keep rolling here and--but, again, given
the fact that it is also a flyaway day, you know, again, member
schedules may be also kind of running up against the hearing
schedule here today.
So in the interests of moving along, I am going to waive my
opening statement and enter it for the record and yield to the
ranking member, Mr. Wittman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Wittman. I want also to bypass my opening statement and
enter it into the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Okay, well, gentlemen, the floor
is yours. And your----
Secretary Roper. Chairman Courtney, Ranking Member Wittman,
thank you very much for the hearing today and for your interest
in the Air Force and where we are going to implement the
National Defense Strategy.
In a little different twist, I would actually like to ask
General Fay to begin, because the context of the security
environment we are in and trying to make acquisition, my part,
deliver for the warfighter, is what we are all about.
So to set the stage, I will turn it over to him and then
tell you what we are doing to make the Air Force's acquisition
system competitive in this century.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN TIMOTHY G. FAY, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR STRATEGY, INTEGRATION AND REQUIREMENTS (A5), DEPARTMENT OF
THE AIR FORCE
General Fay. Good morning, Chairman Courtney and Ranking
Member Wittman and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for having us here today to provide testimony on Air
Force force structure and modernization.
I am Lieutenant General Tim Fay, as Dr. Roper said, deputy
chief of staff responsible for strategy, integration and
requirements on the Air Staff.
I want to take just a quick minute or two to discuss the
strategic environment facing the United States Air Force. As
the National Defense Strategy tells us, we face an increasingly
complex global security environment, characterized by overt
challenges to the free and open international order and the
return of long-term strategic competition.
Our United States Air Force must be ready to compete,
deter, and win in this complex and evolving security
environment. We must defend the homeland, provide a safe,
secure and effective nuclear deterrent, and be able to defeat a
conventional enemy while we also deter opportunistic aggression
in another theater and continue to disrupt violent extremists.
And the Air Force must be prepared to do all five of these
missions every single day.
The National Defense Strategy drives how we design and
modernize our forces. It highlights the need for a larger Air
Force. As the bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission
stated in its final report, the United States needs a larger
force than it has today if it is to meet the objectives of the
strategy.
The Air Force, Navy, and Army will all need capacity
enhancements. Additionally, the same report acknowledges that
the Air Force will need more stealthy long-range fighters and
bombers, tankers, lift capacity, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. The Air Force
analysis aligns with the conclusions of the National Defense
Strategy Commission.
We look forward to your questions in discussing the way
ahead for our Air Force with you all today. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM B. ROPER, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Secretary Roper. Thank you, General Fay. Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member Wittman, distinguished members of the committee,
during this period of our national security, acquisition really
has to have a different mindset. Gone are the days of dealing
with violent extremists, at least that being the only mission
we are doing. It will continue into the future, but our focus
needs to be on competing with peers again. And that requires
regaining a competitive mindset in acquisition.
Days and weeks count. We have to speed up the pace at which
we deliver advanced capabilities for the warfighter. And though
that may not see the erosion of our dominance today or
tomorrow, it will eventually, if we don't play the long game in
Air Force acquisition.
A major focus over the past year has been speeding up the
pace. We simply cannot hope to keep our dominant edge if the
rate at which we field capabilities is slower than our
opponents. With authorities that you have given us,
specifically section 804 and the ability to tailor our 5000
programs, we have removed 78\1/2\ years of unnecessary schedule
from our programs.
This is time that would be wasted on things that are not
value-added for delivering for our warfighters, and the demand
signal from our warfighters could not be higher to deliver
faster and give them options they do not have today.
In addition to speeding up the acquisition system, we are
trying to bring in new and better practices that let us do
things smarter. We have had very successful competitions over
the last year that have produced over $15 billion of savings.
And although we are very proud of that in acquisition, the
kudos should be equally shared with our MAJCOMs [major
commands] and requirements owners. They set the bar where we
can have strong competition and see the cost savings from them.
We are also pursuing digital engineering more broadly. It
is a new technology that allows us to have more validated and
more confident designs that can move into production.
Our ground-based strategic deterrent program is leading the
charge. Its digital models are simply eye-watering. They allow
us to do millions of design trades in a single day,
understanding how a design could change performance, could
change cost.
They have set such a high bar, we are starting to rotate
junior acquisition professionals through that program, so as
they become future leaders, they have this mindset of what
digital engineering could do for future programs--reduce cost
and make us a more confident buyer--and we are very proud of
the work we are doing to work with the entire industry base.
It has been long known that the Defense Department has had
a difficult time working with small businesses, especially
commercial tech startups. Last week, we did a pitch day in New
York--a completely different thing for the Department--where we
had small businesses in to pitch their ideas, and if we thought
they aligned with our mission, we were able to award them a
contract and pay them in less than 15 minutes. That is an
unprecedented shift from the 3 months it takes us today.
We cannot compete and win in the long term if our
acquisition system is not connected to the vibrant tech
industry base in this country. And that industry base is not
just defense; it is now commercial and dual-use companies.
We must learn to work with them and work at their pace or
we risk our future superior edge. And I am delighted to say
that the experience we had last week--awarding 51 contracts
worth $8.75 million in a single day--has set a new bar for us.
We do not want small business to be small anymore. It is a
strategic endeavor for the Air Force.
And finally, we are all familiar that 70 percent of the
lifecycle cost of a program is in sustainment, but we have put
very little technology into that area of the Air Force. We have
created a Rapid Sustainment Office, a new program executive
officer, specifically to inject high-tech technologies into the
business of sustainment.
And in less than 4 months, I am delighted to say they are
additively manufacturing a variety of plastic and metal parts
for airplanes. They are using cold spray technology to fix
parts at the depot, instead of scrapping them. They are using
over 140 predictive maintenance algorithms on the C-5 and B-1
that allow us to predict maintenance issues before they occur,
saving cost and increasing readiness, and are using lasers on
robots to de-paint aircrafts, saving over a million dollars per
stripping job.
This is just a sample of what could be done in sustainment
if we continue to bring commercial technologies in. We need to
do all of these things well if we are going to compete and win
in the long term. We can't imagine winning if we are not fast.
We can't imagine winning if we are not working with the entire
industry base. And if we are going to afford a cutting-edge
future Air Force, we must lower the cost of sustainment to
afford it.
So expect, over the coming year, us to focus on these four
pillars and to keep your committee apprised of our progress.
Thank you again for the hearing today and for your interest
in our important mission. And thank you for your service to
this country.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Roper and
General Fay can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you to both witnesses. Again, the
vote was called during the opening statements. Again, we will
try and see if we can keep rolling along, but if not--if we
don't get another member from my side, I think we may have to
just take a very brief--a very, very brief recess and come
right back.
So obviously, this subcommittee has been wrestling with the
issue of tanker for about three or four Congresses, if not
more, and I know, Dr. Roper, you made a visit to Boeing earlier
this week.
I guess one sort of threshold question is, you know, given
the news that the 737s were grounded yesterday and the frame
for tanker is a Boeing 767, if you could just kind of comment
about whether or not the Air Force is looking at any kind of
similar characteristics of the two planes that, again, the Air
Force may be concerned about given, again, recent events.
Secretary Roper. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I was at Boeing earlier
this week on Monday with General Miller, because we have
recently had to shut down the line due to foreign object debris
on the aircraft. So these are things like trash, tools, nuts
and bolts that are simply unacceptable to have on our
airplanes.
General Miller and I walked the line, both the 767 as well
as the tanker line, to see what remedial actions and corrective
action plans Boeing is putting in place. To say it bluntly,
this is unacceptable.
FOD, or foreign object debris, is something we treat very
seriously in the Air Force. Our flight lines are spotless. Our
depots are spotless, because debris translates into a safety
issue.
We were there to review corrective action plans to fix the
root cause, but also the containment plan to ensure that planes
coming off the line had been cleaned of debris.
I am satisfied with Boeing's containment plan, and also due
to great work by DCMA [Defense Contract Management Agency] and
our program office. Planes right now are taking on average five
sweeps to reduce them from this significant FOD issue, but I am
very confident that the plane, once swept, is safe to fly once
leaving the factory. And in fact, General Miller and I accepted
an airplane and flew down to Altus [Air Force Base] this week.
But that is not how we should be accepting airplanes,
sweeping them multiple times. They should be clean on delivery.
And so we will be increasing inspections both on the tanker
line and the 767 line. We are going to be doing spot checks
periodically. We are going to be tracking the reduction of FOD
aircraft to aircraft. And if we don't see progress, then we
will have to raise the stakes.
I can't speak to any other line that Boeing is running. We
do not buy 737s in the Air Force. But I am confident with our
ability to contain FOD, and then the jury is out on whether the
corrective action plans will be implemented.
Boeing's processes are valid. They will prevent FOD on
aircraft. They simply must follow them. And that is a culture
and a discipline issue. And so, on our Air Force, we expect
discipline on our flight lines. We expect the same discipline
on the production line for people that make critical aircraft
for our warfighters.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you for that answer. So I think we are
going to, again, just take a brief timeout here--hopefully, it
would be a 20-second timeout, like in basketball, as opposed to
a full timeout--because it looks like, again, it is a one-and-
done.
So if--again, we will just stand in recess temporarily and
hopefully we will resume very shortly. So, thank you.
[Recess]
Mr. Courtney. I just wanted to cover an issue which again,
it has been another sort of topic over the last two or three
Congresses for this subcommittee, which is that Air Mobility
Command recently acknowledged safety issues associated with the
legacy four-bladed propellers on the C-130H fleet and signed
off on a plan to upgrade.
It is also our understanding that the decision to move
forward with these upgrades resides in your two offices. First
of all, if you could just confirm that, for the record, if that
is correct, and also what is your timeline to review and
approve the upgrades?
General Fay. So, Mr. Chairman, what I can confirm is, yes,
we are two of the folks that are responsible for working
through that paperwork and we are in the process of doing that
right now. We were looking at that actually this morning, and
we think we are going to be able to expedite getting through
that paperwork very rapidly.
Just some context, sir, on that issue if we would,
essentially, what we are talking about is, you know, we put
safety first. We are focused on that very much, and we are
working very carefully with all the affected parties to make
sure we understand exactly where we are on this issue and that
we are moving out rapidly to address it and correct it.
Specifically, some of the things that we have already done
to address this issue and get after it, in addition to what I
will say is our initial actions to make sure we understood the
state of the fleet, we did an inspection of over 1,500 of those
blades almost immediately, identified 2 that were of interest,
and of those 2, 1 was found to be, you know, suspect and we
addressed that right away.
And one thing I would just say, these aircraft are in our
total force and our Reserve and Guard Components, and some of
our most experienced and most effective airmen are in our Guard
and Reserve. These are folks who were on Active Duty. They did
a lot of years and then they got out and they continued a lot
of them to serve.
Some of these folks are what we call generational. We have
got fathers and sons who have crewed the same aircraft that
they take great pride in them because they are citizen airmen
in their community, and we were really pleased with the fact
that we had great airmen getting a good look at those props and
giving us their opinion.
Now, we didn't stop there. We continued digging. We have
flown this fleet now for 60 years. We have got 15 million hours
of flying on this fleet, so we have mounds of data, and we dug
into that data to get after this problem. And as you can
imagine, if it is 60 years old, it wasn't digitized, so it
might have taken us a little while to get through all of that
data, but we did, and what we did was we identified that before
1971--and I am being specific, 1971 actually--the manufacturing
process on those propellers was more manual than automated.
We changed that process in 1971 to a more automated
process, so the propellers manufactured before 1971, we
identified as at risk. So we removed those propellers from the
fleet. There was about 60 of them that we removed.
What I can report to you is we got a report yesterday that
55 of those 60 have been replaced and that the last 5 should be
complete this week, and then we are going to work through the
backlog of the supply chain to make sure we get after getting
our supplies healthy again, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Okay, just so I am clear, because, I mean,
the Navy is moving forward in terms of replacing the blades
with the eight-bladed propellers, and mobility control has said
that this is a, you know, mission-critical effort in terms of
replacement. Is that again where the Air Force is going in
terms of replacement of the blades as opposed to sort of
examining them?
General Fay. So, sir, what I can tell you is on three
separate occasions we have worked what I will call a 1067
process, which is a way to move rapidly to make a change to an
airplane, and we have already replaced 11 of the blades or 11
aircrafts in the fleet now the blades have been replaced on.
And thanks to your help, we have been able to actually get
funding to replace another 33 that are in work.
So of a fleet of about 150 of those C-130H model aircraft,
about 44 we have already worked through that process. So we are
going to continue to work through the 1067 process that we
received, I believe, the 21st of February, as rapidly as we
possibly can and assess how we can work with Air Mobility
Command, our support program office, our engineers, our Guard
and our Reserve teammates to get to a satisfactory answer on
that.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. I am going to yield to Mr.
Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to go
ahead and yield to the other members to pursue their questions,
and then I will follow up after they have had their time.
Mr. Courtney. Congresswoman Luria, you are up.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, Dr. Roper and Lieutenant
General Fay. We were recently briefed on the Mobility
Capability Study and what is put out in the budget in the Air
Force We Need analysis doesn't seem to match for airlift and
aerial refueling numbers versus the Mobility Capability Study
which gave, you know, a very rosy picture of where we stood on
airlift. Can you explain the differences between those numbers?
General Fay. I can. And it comes back a little bit to my
opening statement is--the Air Force we have is too small for
what the nation has asked us to do overall. And so when we took
a look at those two specific studies, the Mobility Capability
Requirements Study and the Air Force We Need Study, there was
three major differences: risk, timeline, and the scenarios we
use to do those studies.
For the Air Force We Need Study, as you recall, you asked
us to take a look at the Air Force we need based on the
strategy unconstrained by budget. So we took a look out to
about late 2020s, early 2030s timeframe, we looked at the
operational plans and defense planning scenarios, and we said,
what would it take, budget unconstrained, to get to a low-risk,
low- to moderate-risk force? And so that was kind of what drove
us there.
On the Mobility Capability Requirement Study, they have a
different, if you will, kind of charter. They were asked to
look at current operational plans today based on the combatant
commanders' needs, and assess if we were able to meet those
combatant commander needs. So my understanding is that TRANSCOM
[U.S. Transportation Command] study concluded that at a higher
level of risk than the Air Force We Need Study, they were able
to meet the combatant commanders' needs at the 479 number.
Mrs. Luria. So just digging a little bit further into that,
when you are looking at the combatant commanders' needs versus
the Air Force We Need, was the Air Force We Need Study using a
more limiting OPLAN [operations plan] than the combatant
commanders? Or is it purely in the level of risk that they
assumed?
General Fay. So for the Air Force We Need Study, because we
went out to 2030, we took a look at the current operational
plans, but we also made some assumptions based on the National
Defense Strategy of some planning scenarios that we would
anticipate having to address in that timeframe.
In this forum, what I can say is that drove us to what I
will say is a larger number of tankers in the Air Force We Need
Study than showed up in the Mobility Capability Requirements
Study, and that would be expected based on timeframe, the
additional scenarios that we looked at out in the 2030
timeframe versus today, and also the fact that because we were
budget-unconstrained in the Air Force We Need Study and we were
strategy driven, we were able to look at that moderate risk
force.
Mrs. Luria. Okay, I think what would be really helpful to
us is if you could provide a comparison of the two, so that we
could basically see where that breakdown was and where the risk
is taken in the Mobility Capability Study that is not taken in
an unconstrained physical environment, so if there is a way
that you could provide that to the committee, that would be
helpful to us.
General Fay. Ma'am, we will take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mrs. Luria. Thank you. I yield my time.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So as we debate the
budget, I think we are basically having a debate over the
National Defense Strategy and whether the budget moves forward
towards implementing that strategy, and I think one of the
underappreciated conceptual shifts in the National Defense
Strategy is what I view to be a move from reliance on
deterrence by punishment, particularly strategic deterrence by
punishment, to conventional deterrence by denial.
And I think most of us would associate the Air Force with
the former rather than the latter, and so to the extent you
agree that there is a lot in the NDS about denying our
adversaries, China foremost among them and Russia a distant
second, the ability to achieve their objectives in real time or
at least degrade it or raise the cost of the first shot, how do
you think about this shift as it relates to the Air Force's
role in the joint force, the platforms you buy, the concept of
operations that you develop?
General Fay. Sir, so the way I would address it is the Air
Force is actually extremely well postured to support the joint
force, kind of in what I will say is this complex security
environment. It is going to be characterized by great
distances. It is going to be characterized by rapidity, so we
have got to move fast. It is going to be characterized by
volume of fires.
It is a very different concept than we have been operating
in the last 20 to 30 years where we have had uncontested
environments, where we have had time to build up bases that are
secure, that we have had time and ability to operate across
domains that are essentially we have total superiority over.
So what I would say is, in the force design work and in the
good acquisitions acceleration that we are seeing from my
acquisition teammates, that we are working to build you an Air
Force that is able to address that security environment and
provide that, if you will, ability to deny objectives and deter
upfront, and if deterrence fails, then a fight and win.
Secretary Roper. Congressman, for my part, I am a big
proponent of the National Defense Strategy. Before joining the
Air Force, I got to serve on the steering committee for it and
write portions of it, so I am a believer that we have to treat
our peer competitors seriously.
What we have to be able to bring to the table on the
acquisition side of the Air Force is a competitive mindset,
because our adversaries are not a fixed target. They are
moving. They are evolving. They are able to build systems that
are commensurate with ours.
So we can't just build an Air Force that defeats them. We
have to be able to build one that competes with them over time.
That means being able to field things faster so that our
adversaries have to react to us and not us to them. It means
that we have to be able to explore high-tech concepts again, so
this is a big shift away from where we have been dealing with
violent extremists.
I am very happy with the first step that the Air Force has
taken. I am happy with our ability to speed up the acquisition
programs, but this is a first step. This will be a long journey
over decades. And so we have to adopt that competitive mindset
that every day counts. And the great thing that we have working
with our requirements owners and MAJCOMs is that we are in
lockstep.
Time matters. Let's impose cost, create conundrums, deny
objectives, which is very different than trying to defeat every
piece of force structure that an adversary has.
Mr. Gallagher. I appreciate the emphasis on time and I
appreciate your comments in your opening testimony about the
need for a more productive relationship between industry--
industry beyond sort of the traditional defense companies and
the Pentagon.
I guess maybe to ask it a different way, as you saw that
conceptual shift towards great power competition and to
deterrence by denial, what changed as a result? I mean, what in
this budget has increased or decreased to align with that
shift?
Secretary Roper. Congressman, I will speak from the
acquisition side and then turn over to my colleague. The thing
that is very different in this budget are the way in which we
are buying things. There is broad use of the section 804
authority to accelerate programs, especially critical programs
for the warfighter.
There is broad tailoring of acquisition programs to take
time out. And the fact that the Air Force has been able to
remove 78\1/2\ years of unnecessary time in 9 months speaks to
buying a different way. We are getting back into the business
of doing things in the real world vice paper studies, flying
before we buy, and trading off performance if it allows us to
field on time, and that is done in partnership with our
warfighters.
So though a lot of the systems are the same, we are
starting by buying them differently. And what I hope that you
will see in subsequent budget are big idea, high-tech concepts
coming out of our laboratory and into programs of record. If we
don't do that, we will accelerate the current Air Force well
but not be able to replace it with follow-on concepts.
General Fay. Sir, coming back to kind of what has changed
in this budget, what I would call out is our research,
development, test, and evaluation budget line. If you take a
look, I think we were 30.9 last year, this year 35.4, about a
12 percent or 13 percent increase, if I am doing the math
right, and what are we investing in? Things like hypersonics,
things like directed-energy, things like propulsion technology
leaps.
In addition to the platforms that you are seeing, the B-21,
the F-35 high-end fight, I would just also call out our space
portfolio. Significant increases in space portfolio, fourth
year in a row, because obviously, we are seeing that as a
domain that is contested, and I think that is about a 17
percent increase over where we were last year just in the space
portfolio alone.
Secretary Roper. And the space portfolio is one that is
truly benefiting from the rapid authorities. Our new space
programs which are meant to contend with a contested
environment are benefiting from being able to move quickly,
begin designing early, and be able to trade off performance to
deliver on time.
So again, thank you to all of you for supporting those in
the past.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Mr. Langevin, to be followed by
Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary and
General, thank you for being here. Thanks for your testimony
and the extraordinary work you are doing.
Secretary Roper, let me start with you. We admire your very
forward-leaning approach leveraging the gamut of acquisition
tools and authorities so that we remain the global leader and
technology leader.
I am concerned, however, that in an effort to field
technologies with speed and agility that we might overlook
critical vulnerabilities in our weapon systems. So my
question--first question is, how is the Air Force building
cyber and EW [electronic warfare] resiliency into its new
acquisitions and modernization efforts to ensure its aircraft
can function in a contested environment?
Secretary Roper. Mr. Congressman, there are two primary
ways. We have increased funding for our cyber red teams, which
go in and try to find vulnerabilities so that we can fix them
before we field. That is an effort I hope to continue seeing
grow, because we have to--there has to be a human factor in
assessing our systems outside the program office, so I am happy
with the work we have done. I would like to see it go broader.
Another big pivot we are making is shifting from waterfall
software development to agile--agile DevOps--and that comes
with better development tools, cloud-based tools where
debugging and having consistency in code is easier to enforce
vice doing everything in a very tailored boutique fashion.
So our cyber resilience should go up as we shift to modern
software practices because we are really leveraging what
commercial industry has already trail blazed. We are not the
only entity with a huge cyber, you know, threat issue, right?
Companies like Google and Amazon and Facebook face this all the
time. They have shifted to cloud-based tools for a reason. You
can develop software faster and the tools are more secure.
So as that becomes the norm in our programs, I hope that we
will start, one, seeing the initial vulnerabilities go down,
and then our red teams being able to find those exceptions to
the rule ahead of us fielding.
Mr. Langevin. So you are building the resilience in and in
measurable ways, as well, through the acquisition at all stages
of acquisition and also, importantly, by design?
Secretary Roper. Yes, Congressman. I predict that in
future, as these things mature, that security will become a
fourth pillar in evaluating programs: cost, schedule,
performance, but security. Does it matter if we are buying
something that is not secure?
So I do think we need to revisit the standards for
cybersecurity so that we have a minimum set that we believe is
acceptable or else we are not a buyer. And so I am hoping that
these two initiatives will drive us towards having a minimum
set of requirements for any program, and if you can't meet
them, then we have to work with someone else who can.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Now that goes both on the cyber and the
EW resiliency?
Secretary Roper. Cyber, EW, and supply chain as well,
Congressman. I worry a lot about a globalized supply chain. It
doesn't mean that we have to control the global supply chain,
but it may mean that we need to start developing standards for
fault tolerant design.
So SpaceX and their Falcon 9 uses a variety of different
mission computers and processors and distributes the
functionality across them, so if any one component fails,
right, the team, the system, the architecture can succeed. It
seems like a really good way to design things today when we are
spread out across the globe in terms of components, but we
don't have a standard in the Air Force. And I think in the
future we will need one because we are not likely to be able to
thrive if we can't benefit from the global supply chain. So it
is supply chain, EW, and cyber, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, thanks. And so obviously, that is
viewed as the supply chain is essential as the industrial base
continues to grow. How is the Air Force working with the
industry to ensure that they are part of the solution on cyber
or EW?
Secretary Roper. On both of those, sir, we can't do it
alone. We don't make anything in the government, so we are only
as good as the industry partners we work with. We have invited
industry in towards helping standardize the tools that we are
using for DevOps. We are hoping to be able to provide hardened
and secure container stacks that industry can use, not just the
primes, but their sub-prime, which is really where we worry.
We don't worry as much about the security of a major
defense prime in their networks. We worry about their subs and
the subs of subs, and we haven't done much to help them, so I
think if we can standardize how coding is done and provide
secure mechanisms to do it that our government furnished, that
is a good first step.
And then the second needs to be figuring out how we deal
with a supply chain base that has spread out globally. How do
we deal with systems that we can't control? And the SpaceX
Falcon 9 example gives an insight as to how we might proceed.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. And how would you work--how are you
working to develop a culture also that incentivizes risk-taking
while accepting smart failure earlier in a program design? I
know my time is up, so why don't we do that one for the record,
if you will?
Secretary Roper. Mr. Chairman, that is an important
question. Would you mind if I took a minute to answer it?
Mr. Courtney. Go ahead.
Secretary Roper. I appreciate your forbearance, sir. I am
glad you asked that, sir. Risk-taking is everything. If we
don't get the risks that fail, we are probably not getting the
ones that succeed.
We recently created an award in the Air Force for risk
takers who don't succeed. It is called the Spectacular Learning
Event Award and we just gave out three, one to our 500-pound
bomb UON [urgent operational need] team, our Air Force Special
Warfare Division UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] team, and our
High Power Microwave Team at AFRL [Air Force Research
Laboratory]. All tried, all failed, but we learned a lot.
Their acquisition path was smart. We need to celebrate
those people and not punish them. So I am glad we have an award
in the Air Force and I hope in future I will be able to tell
you about successive failures that have taught us how to be
better acquisition professionals. Thank you for that question.
Mr. Courtney. You did that in 56 seconds.
Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yesterday, I introduced
legislation to establish a unified combatant command to be
known as the United States Space Command. My legislation also
repeals section 169 of title 10 which was added by section 1601
of the 2019 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. Section
169 authorizes a Space Command as a subordinate unified
command. That authorization is inconsistent with the December
18, 2018, executive memo that directed the establishment of a
unified combatant command.
This directive from the President was issued on advice from
then-Secretary Mattis and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
With unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs, the recommendation
was made as a result of lessons learned from the establishment
of U.S. Cyber Command.
Secretary Shanahan reaffirmed the Pentagon's support for
the unified combatant structure by sending a letter to Congress
requesting the prompt repeal of section 169. Mr. Chairman, I
ask unanimous consent to submit that letter from Secretary
Shanahan for the record.
Mr. Courtney. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 57.]
Mr. Waltz. So due to these conflicting directives and the
importance of establishing a Space Command quickly, I emphasize
quickly, to compete with our adversaries in a growing domain, I
am asking for my colleagues to support my proposal, H.R. 1746,
and for swift action by this committee and both Houses of
Congress. It is important that we move forward, in my strong
view, with establishing the command in this fashion as this
committee continues to review the legislative proposal to
create the Space Force that DOD [Department of Defense]
submitted to Congress last month.
Mr. Chairman, I believe firmly that we are with space where
we were with aviation in the 1940s and the split off from the
Army Air Corps. I think this is a move in the right direction.
Mr. Roper, I would ask you, in your fiscal year 2020 PB
[President's budget], there is resources, there is $72.4
million for the initial standup of the Space Force headquarters
as this first step towards implementing the longer-term vision.
My understanding is funding for the headquarters will
include 160 personnel billets to establish the initial
elements. Can you just elaborate on why that funding is so
necessary as this first step?
Secretary Roper. Congressman, I think the establishment of
the Space Force and the proposal for doing is outside of my
responsibilities in acquisition, but I echo your point that the
criticality of space could not be higher. No one in this room
can live their daily lives without being connected to space-
based capabilities.
Our space programs are ones that I track closer. I worry
about the collapsed industry base in space within the defense
sector. I am excited about the expanding industry base in the
commercial side of our innovation base. We are emphasizing
trying to expand the number of defense companies and their
technical capabilities while also bringing in commercial
counterparts.
The whole focus is to be able to fight and win in space. So
while the Department focuses on how to organize to fight, Air
Force acquisition is fast-tracking every space capability so
that those future warfighters, however they are organized, have
the capabilities that they need to fight and win.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
In your testimony and, frankly, across--I was just talking
to Secretary Esper and General Milley--and I understand where
the NDAA is going in terms of a shift from counterterrorism and
violent extremist organizations to great power competition. I
am worried. We have seen this movie before in the 1980s post-
Vietnam. I am worried about that pendulum swinging too far.
Frankly, some of your comments concern me a little bit, as
well.
So I want to ask you about light attack. I sent a letter
last month with some of my colleagues asking about what
happened to that January RFP [request for proposal] for the
light-attack birds. So in short, what happened? And I will tell
you from my own perspective being on the ground as a special
operator, we need that capability.
SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] needs that
capability. I can't tell you if I had a dollar for every time I
called in for support and they were up getting gas, you know,
because the loiter just isn't long enough. So where are we
going with that?
Secretary Roper. Mr. Congressman, I echo your concern. We
could swing too far in focusing on peer only, but I am willing
to accept as a hypothesis if we are designing for a peer
competitor, we should be able to contend with violent
extremists.
With regard to light attack, from an acquisition point of
view, it is straightforward. We approved an acquisition plan to
buy the aircraft if the warfighters and operators had a need,
but in order for us to release an RFP, we have to have a
funding commitment from the Air Force.
As the Air Force continued experimentation out in the
field, we learned what a light-attack aircraft might do. We
learned what modifying existing turboprops might do. We saw
that there was a competitive industry base in small jets, so
specifically based on our TX competition.
I think the Air Force learned there is a variety of
concepts to explore, not just the turboprop, so we are going to
continue the experiment. We are going to buy two to three of
each of the existing planes and continue testing out in the
field and hopefully get the right choice and it may be a----
Mr. Waltz. Sir, just in the interest of time, we have
special operators in 60 to 70 countries every given day. We
have people out on the ground that need this capability while
the Air Force is experimenting, so I would encourage you to
take another--I would encourage the service take another hard
look at that.
Secretary Roper. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney. Mr. Cisneros.
Mr. Cisneros. Good morning to both of you. So I have just
got a couple questions about our bomber fleet. You know, the B-
52s have been in service a long time and it is going to be in
service basically another 31 years. The B-1 bomber not quite as
long, but that is going to go until 2040, according to your
plan.
Have we already started the research and the development of
these bombers of the future?
General Fay. I will take that if that is all right, sir. As
a bomber pilot, I get really excited about the opportunity to
talk about bombers, as both a B-52 and B-2 former aviator.
What I appreciate, sir, is the fact that this team is
supporting us in the recognition that the bombers bring a lot
of capability to the joint fight especially in what I will say
is the strategic environment we are going to operate in. The
range, the payload, the flexibility they bring to the fight are
absolutely amazing and are going to continue to be a critical
part of the joint fight for a long time to come.
As far as future bombers specifically, what I would just
share with this--with this forum is that the B-21 Raider is on
track and doing very well and we are getting very excited about
that capability and bringing that to the joint fight. It is on
time and it has moved to the next stage into the manufacturing
and the design kind of level recently, and we are getting
pretty excited about the next steps on that.
So what I would say is we are going to continue maintaining
a long-range bomber fleet that is able to reach out globally
and hold any target on the planet at risk.
Secretary Roper. And, Congressman, the thing that is
impressive about the B-21 program isn't just the fact that it
is doing well on design. It has recently completed its critical
design review, but it is setting a new standard for thinking
about sustainment and software and producibility early. So our
goal is to have the bird coming down the line and the software
is ready to go on it.
Our software developers are saying they are going to be
ready first. So I think we will be able to step back from the
B-21 program, look at future programs and say, you really
should focus on the tail-end of the program upfront, because by
the time your design is fixed, it is too late to get the
producibility and sustainability standards that you want.
So I want to give a shout-out to the team working that
program, they are doing a great job.
Mr. Cisneros. So when is the B-21 expected to be
operational?
General Fay. So, sir. I can't get specific in this forum.
But what I can tell you is it is in the 2020s and we are
working very hard to keep that on track and right now it is on
target.
Mr. Cisneros. If it is supposed to be the replacement for
the B-52 or the B-1 bomber, why are we continuing to hold onto
the B-52 for another basically 30 years, instead of just
manufacturing those or developing a plan really to manufacture
those?
And I know costs are limited, of course, but, you know, is
there a plan in place----
Mr. Courtney. Mr. Cisneros, if you could just yield for a
second. Just again, for the information of the subcommittee, we
are going to be having a classified briefing in April on the B-
21, where I think maybe the witnesses might be a little more
comfortable to get into more detail, but again, if you want to
answer that question, I am not--but I just want to at least
share to people that we are going to have a chance to get
deeper into this very soon.
General Fay. Well, sir, one of the things--just to clarify
is that B-52 is going to be with us through at least 2050, so
those 1960-1961-built aircraft have a lot of good airframe life
on them. They have got amazing firepower that they bring to the
fight at range, and we are going to be flying that fleet
through the 2050s, so it is pretty exciting.
Secretary Roper. It is quite remarkable to think that one
of our oldest aircraft is going to carry one of our newest
high-tech weapons in future, so the B-52 will be very likely
the first carrier of hypersonic weapons for the Department. And
so I am hoping I will still be able to be in this job to see
the first weapon come off of the bird.
It is a great airplane. It can carry a ton of capacity. It
has got life left, and we have got modernization efforts to do
to extend it into the future. But it will bring the payload
capacity we need for the contested warfight.
Mr. Waltz. I yield back my time.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And again we are going to have an
opportunity to revisit this very, very shortly. So, Mr.
Bergman, and then he will be followed by Mr. Golden.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, I am going to
base my questions based upon the words that I heard both of you
say here. General Fay, you mentioned that we need a larger
force. Are we talking product or people or both? What was the
frame of reference of that?
General Fay. So what I would say, sir, the answer to that
question is both of the above. As you know, we have been
working very hard over the last few years to grow the Air
Force. We shrunk too small on the people side to the point
where we got down and I will use our maintainers as an example
of where it really hurt us.
We were thousands of maintainers short of what we needed
and that drove terrible outcomes on our ability to fix our
airplanes and be ready, and so we have worked really hard to
turn the corner on that. And I can report from a 4,000-
maintainer deficit, we have closed that gap recently and we are
actually, you know, up to speed on the number of maintainers.
Mr. Bergman. I hate to cut you off, because the time of 5
minutes goes very fast. In that--in that closing the gap on
your maintainers, what percentage of that 4,000 if you will do
you expect to stay for 20 years or more? Or do you break that
down with like--are you going to have first term, what are you
thinking? What is the breakdown of the manpower piece?
General Fay. So, sir, the breakdown of the manpower is
historically--and I am going to use some rough figures that we
will go back to the record and verify--about 50 percent of our
folks that enlist end up doing about a 20-year career now. And
we will clarify that.
Mr. Bergman. Okay, so roughly 50 percent. I mean, I think
that is probably a fair number. Of the 50 percent who don't,
what would you--and there is numbers out there and if you want
to take it for the record--how many of that 50 percent who
don't then spend time in the Guard or Reserve?
General Fay. And again, sir, we can take that for the
record, but it is a significant number and it is actually
really important for us, because we have invested in those
airmen.
Mr. Bergman. Well, you have got long--yes, you have got
long-term skill sets that you have developed. How do we
maintain them over the longest time? It is kind of like the
human version of a B-52, okay, because 65-year-old mechanics
can do very fine work on an airplane only because they have
done it for so long, it is second nature to them.
Dr. Roper, you mentioned that 70 percent of the program
cost is in sustainment. So as we do the testing and the
development and then actually, you know, complete the program
and put it into action, how then--how then do we monitor the
fact, are the sustainment costs staying within a norm--you
know, a norm of what we had planned on? Any comments on that?
Secretary Roper. Yes, sir, it is a passion of mine in this
job. I think sustainment is something we have gotten accustomed
to just paying for; we pay for readiness. And there is a lot we
can do to bring the total operating cost of the Air Force down.
One, we should design for it. That is often an
afterthought. We design for performance. Programs like the B-21
are designing for sustainability. The next thing we can do is
force open architecture into design. We cannot get locked into
a single vendor forever. We need to be able to compete parts of
it, deal with obsolescence more easily. So we are enforcing
open design on our new systems.
What we lack right now is a true incentive to motivate
industry to want to design for them. They will likely lose
money if they give that to us, so we have to have some
alternative way of incentivizing that, which we currently don't
have. I have actually got an open call to industry on the 26th
of April to come in and talk about what would it take.
And the final thing is, we can shift a lot to our
maintainers. If you walk a depot today, you will see amazing
people. You will see great Lean Six product process, but you
won't see a lot of technology, so we are transitioning additive
manufacturing and additive repair, things that could help us
fix things locally, so we don't have to kick it back into the
acquisition system. All of those I hope will bring down the
total cost over time.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And General Fay, one last one for
you. You know, when you are the Air Force Chief of Staff, you
have got a lot on your plate, and I am assuming looking at the
career histories of the Air Force Chiefs of Staff, they all
basically have served their career on Active Duty. They don't
come out of the Reserve Component.
How does an Air Force Chief of Staff keep themselves
informed of the opportunities and challenges in utilizing the
Guard and Reserve in your realm? How do they--how does that Air
Force Chief of Staff know what it is like to be a reservist or
a guardsman?
General Fay. Well, sir, let me start out by thanking this
body for the additional authorities and flexibility you have
given us as we work to create more opportunities to move airmen
back and forth between components, more flexibility.
Mr. Bergman. Defined career--I mean, pretty much defined
career paths that that guardsman or reservist can look at and
that flexibility of the long-term career?
General Fay. So we have really appreciated that and we are
going to continue to work for that because we know that the
future is going to be working to retain those people that we
work so hard to recruit. They have got to be able to move in
and out of the components based on what is going on in their
life. That is just a reality that we are going to have to work
with you to make even better.
As far as what I will say is I have never seen a total
force relationship better in the Air Force between the Guard
and the Reserve and the Active Component. We work very closely
together at all levels. All of us have what I would say is
staffs that are intermingled. I have a number of reservists and
guardsmen on my staff. I cannot tell you who they are because
they come to work every single day in uniform just along their
Active Components, the same in the airplane, the same on the
flight lines that----
Mr. Bergman. This is a good testament for the Guard and
Reserve and I am over my time. I would let you go on forever,
but the chairman there would get mad at me. Thank you. I yield
back.
Mr. Courtney. No, I won't. And that actually is a good
train of thought, so next up is Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much. And gentlemen, it is
good to see you here and excited to hear, General Fay, you
know, your B-2 background at Whiteman Air Force Base, and that
your help--and your position that you are in right now. I very
much appreciate it. Excited to have Major Andrew Kurgard on
your staff now as a fellow--a fellow B-2 pilot there, so we are
glad. And Dr. Roper, it is good to see you again.
I am excited about the focus that you have brought to this
as we move forward as far as sustainment and the software and
helping get this acquisition program more lean and mean, so we
can get the platforms we need quicker.
But a couple of questions regarding the B-2 and the bomber.
So, Dr. Roper, as you know, I am a strong proponent of the
Defense Management System, the DMS, upgrade which is critical
to the survivability of the aircraft.
We have been funding this, the research, we have been
trying to get this out there as quickly as possible. And I
understand that there are some issues with it and it is very
vital for our survivability. So first of all, can you just give
me the status of the program?
Secretary Roper. Yes, Congresswoman. And I am a big
proponent of the B-2, as well, still a fantastic-looking
aircraft.
Mrs. Hartzler. And active--performing, not just looks. It
looks great, but it performs good.
Secretary Roper. It set a new standard. You still feel
something when you see one fly overhead. The DMS-M [Defensive
Management System Modernization] program right now, I would say
there is good and bad. The good is that there has been a 13
percent growth in the cost of the program because we have added
capabilities in. We have made the system better because of the
criticality of the platform to continue giving us the ability
to penetrate until we get the B-21 fielded.
The downside is that after we passed our critical design
review in November, although I don't think we have formally
declared it I predict we will see a 6- to 8-months slip in the
delivery of the capability simply due to the fact that Northrop
Grumman is shifting from waterfall style development to agile.
I have a little patience on this because all of our
industry partners are struggling with this transition. Other
programs like OCX [Next Generation Operational Control System]
or the ALIS [Autonomic Logistics Information System] system for
the F-35 are also going through these growing pains. So we are
going to help Northrop continue this pivot, try to regain as
much schedule as we can, but I think the DMS program is really
setting up Northrop to try to hit their stride for B-21 coding.
So this program is important to me as a dress rehearsal for
B-21, so I am tracking it closely. I visited the vendor 2 weeks
ago with General Ray and we are going to be watching their
progress until they get back on track and deliver.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is great. So there is--you are
thoroughly committed to continuing to make sure the B-2 gets
this, right?
Secretary Roper. Yes, ma'am. It is fully funded in our
program, and as I mentioned, it is really a dress rehearsal for
the B-21, so it has double importance to me.
Mrs. Hartzler. So with a 6- to 8-months slip, when do you
expect the procurement system to actually be on the B-2?
Secretary Roper. So, ma'am, I think--so I really--I have
got to give the program office time to come back to me with, no
kidding, what is the delay going to be? I expect that we will
see everything in the program slide about 6 to 8 months. I
don't expect that there is going to be a disproportionate--this
is just simply getting the code done, but let me take that for
the record so that I can get back an answer that is informed by
the current program office estimate.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Great. I will look forward to receiving
that.
Lieutenant General Fay, we are talking about the B-21, and
I am very excited about it, and I have been very pleased that
it is on time, it is on budget, and it is progressing, and this
is going to be an exciting, exciting aircraft. And as a co-
chair of the Long-Range Strike Caucus, I am very excited about
this capability. And it has been stated by the Air Force they
are going to be based at Whiteman, which we are very excited
about, Dyess and Ellsworth, so has a decision been made on the
basing order? And if not, when can we expect one?
General Fay. No, Congresswoman, a decision has not yet been
made on the basing order. But what I can tell you is as we
decide to retire an aircraft and base B-21s, it will be based
on the Air Force Global Strike Command. We are taking a look at
that and telling us when he has got enough B-21s on the ramp
and available in an operational status before we are going to,
you know, move forward on that.
So that is going to be a little while. And so that will be
the Global Strike commander who makes a recommendation to the
Chief and Secretary on where and when.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Very good. Thank you very much. I
yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Ms. Hartzler. Now the ranking
member, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
our witnesses for joining us.
Lieutenant General Fay, I wanted to get you to elaborate a
little bit more on a comment that you made earlier and that is
the divergence between the OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation]
assessment of mobility and then the Air Force We Need
assessment, there are significant differences. You pointed to
some of that.
Let me ask for your assessment of risk there. A week ago,
we had General Lyons here from TRANSCOM, and when we asked the
question where he said there was a significant risk with where
we are with the current tanker force structure and I asked him
to elaborate on that, he said that significant risk in their
assessment is unacceptable risk. Do you share his evaluation
that keeping or not going to the requisite number of tankers
that the Air Force projects in their assessment creates
unacceptable risk for the Air Force?
General Fay. Sir, what I cannot do is I can't, you know,
second-guess a combatant commander's assessment or evaluation.
He is the one who owns the mission. He is responsible for that.
In my roles as a headquarters Air Force guy, I am responsible
for organizing, train and equip, providing forces for that
combatant commander.
What I can tell you, though, is what the Air Force We Need
Study shows us is that we need to be bigger in a number of
mission areas. It is not just the tankers. We are below where
we need to be in fighters. We are below where we need to be in
bombers. We are below where we need to be in C2, command and
control, aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance.
So sir, what I would say is you drag that back into the Air
Force we are at 312, with the 5 missions I described that we
have been assigned, we are just too small.
Mr. Wittman. Let me go back again to the original question.
Do you agree with his assessment that the current force
structure for tankers is an unacceptable risk?
General Fay. Sir, again I can't speak for General Lyons and
so what I understand----
Mr. Wittman. You would know for your airmen and for the Air
Force's request to perform that mission what the risk is to
your airmen and what the risk is to the Air Force. So I am
asking for your professional assessment of that.
General Fay. So what I understand, sir, is there was a
divergence between the studies that we have looked at
internally in the Air Force that says 479 is acceptable and the
MCRS, the Mobility Capable Requirements Study, which we also
understood was acceptable. So what I owe you, sir, is to circle
back and understand because I was not aware that there was a
discussion about it was now unacceptable. I believed it was
deemed acceptable, so I owe you a come-back for the record,
sir, of where we are disconnected there.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mr. Wittman. Well, General Lyons stated that it was
significant risk associated with the OSD CAPE assessment of
what the tanker force structure would be numbers-wise.
Obviously, the Air Force's assessment is different, so I want
to get your assessment on where OSD CAPE is with the number
that they project and whether there is an agreement with the
Air Force that there is significant risk there.
And when I asked General Lyons to elaborate on significant
risk, he said significant risk is unacceptable risk. So I
really need for you to define that so that we can use that
going forward in our discussions about where we target our
efforts in building that capability.
General Fay. Ranking Member Wittman, we will do that. I
understand that he also--when he called that it is significant,
I was just not aware of the second part that he deemed it
unacceptable.
Mr. Wittman. He did. I asked him the question specifically,
would you quantify significant risk as unacceptable. And he
answered in the affirmative.
General Fay. Sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. One other thing too which lends itself to that
is, as we are looking to get to the 479 number and the delivery
of KC-46As and the challenges that we're having KC-46As with
cameras and booms, we are going to have to keep KC-135s it
appears to me longer. What are you doing with modernization and
service life extensions to be able to keep KC-135s available
for a longer period of time? Because without that, you do not
get to 479.
General Fay. Yes, sir. And just for what it is worth, I
always like that, again as a bomber pilot, I like to call out
my tanker brothers and sisters that do just an amazing job
every single day, and I cannot tell you how many situations I
have been in where they are perhaps the most welcome sight you
can imagine on a dark night. So just give credit where credit
is due.
And, sir, our KC-135 fleet is scheduled to remain in the
fleet until 2040 and beyond, so what I would say is we are
taking all prudent steps to ensure, you know, that we maintain
and operate those aircraft in the appropriate manner to make
them last through 2040 and beyond.
Some of the things that we are looking at and working on on
that is in that realm with the KC-135 is with some of the
communications systems in the way we connect those aircraft and
bring them into what I will say is that larger integrated
network, which is going to be so essential for modern warfare
in the years ahead, and how we defend and protect those
aircraft with a layered approach.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Secretary Roper. Congressman, one thing I would certainly
invite you and any member of the committee to do is to go see
the KC-135s being maintained out of Tinker and see the
professional workforce that we have that are keeping those
planes flying.
One thing that we are very excited about as we start moving
from reactive maintenance to predictive maintenance, so similar
to we all get our oil changed before our car breaks down, we
have seen significant benefit on C-5 and B-1, so predicting
issues before they occur. We are very excited about bringing
this technology into our tanker fleet, so that as we get--as
these things get older, we start being able to forecast things
before we have an unscheduled maintenance event.
Mr. Wittman. Listen, KC-135 is a great aircraft, great
maintenance crews there, but you know, we talk about the B-52
being old, KC-135, some of these aircrafts are even older, so
there is a whole element there in modernizing and keeping them
maintained. And at some point, even the miraculous work our
airmen do, you know, when something is old, it is old and you
can't get past the old in being able to maintain.
Secretary Roper. If the Air Force was the hospital ward, we
definitely would have pediatrics through geriatrics.
Mr. Wittman. Yes, there would be a lot of--a lot of
patients in ICU [intensive care unit], so anyway. Yes. Dr.
Roper, I wanted to ask another question, too. There have been
issues with the KC-46A, and as you know there are several
Category 1 deficiencies that are still ongoing, both the camera
and the boom. Can you give us a little more definition about
what is being done to address those deficiencies?
Specifically with the camera, we understand that initially
it was a software issue and then it was potentially a wiring
issue. The things that I understand is there may be an issue
with the physical limitations of the acuity of the camera in
order to be able to take an incident light situation, be able
to control that light to give a clear image to the operator.
The same with the boom and it not responding well to a lighter
aircraft like the A-10, because of the tensioning and the
recoil on the boom.
Can you, first of all, give us what is the course of
corrective action? And what is the timeframes involved in that?
Because I think time is critically important there.
And then there appears to be on both sides a difference in
where the liability rests and who will pay for the changes that
are necessary in order for those--both those deficiencies to
meet requirements. Can you give us a little more definition on
that?
Secretary Roper. Congressman, I am happy to do that. I will
try to be brief as this is a complicated issue, so I would
certainly offer to the committee or any individual member if
you would like a briefing on the remote visual system [RVS] or
the boom, I am happy to bring it by. It is quite interesting,
but pretty dense and technical.
The boom is easier. Let me focus on that. Boeing designed
to the international standard 7191, which is common throughout
tankers in the world. Subsequently, we have discovered that
planes like the A-10 need a much lower load on that boom. So it
is 1,400 pounds, is the loading on a 7191 standard. We need 600
for the A-10. That constitutes a requirements change. It is the
first one we have had in the tanker since inception.
So, we, the Air Force, are liable for implementing them. It
is straightforward. It is an actuator change and we are already
working with Boeing on cutting that into the line, hopefully in
Lot 7.
The RVS is much more complicated, and Boeing is responsible
for it and all other deficiencies on the airplane, both found
previously and during IOT&E [initial operational test and
evaluation].
The issue is a design flaw. When I was with this committee
last year, we were looking at pictures from testing and saying,
This is not acceptable. Boeing, bring us another design. They
would bring us another design and we had no ability to know
whether it would be acceptable or not. We had no ability to
know whether we could accept the airplane and confidently tell
the warfighter that that fix would bring the RVS up to snuff.
Since then, we started a Tiger Team, because we found we
have tremendous experts in the Air Force on remote visual
systems and humans interacting with screens. We were able to
shift from looking at pictures to deriving nine critical
performance parameters. These are very obscure things that take
time to explain, like dipvergence, depth plane compression,
depth plane curvature, which help us understand the math of an
RVS, and Boeing committed to bring the RVS up to those
specifications that we derived.
So they are responsible for doing that no matter what it
costs, and we are currently working with them on design options
that we will be able to measure in our laboratory before we
take them out and install them on the plane.
If you are interested in coming out to Wright-Patt to AFRL,
we can take you through our RVS laboratory and introduce you to
the scientists who are really driving the design.
So in summary--in summary, Congressman, we really have
shifted from being in the passenger seat on RVS to being in the
driver's seat. The Air Force has more technical expertise on
the RVS than industry does right now. So I am confident that we
have the expertise to get to good; now we have to back it up.
Mr. Wittman. Now, are the timeframes being reflected in
this corrective path accurate when the assessment is about 2
years to do the testing and development to get to the final
agreed technical fix for RVS, and then 4 years to completely
reinstall it on existing aircraft that are coming through the
production line and to make changes on current production line?
Is that 6-year window, that assessment, is that about correct?
Secretary Roper. It is for both, Congressman, it should be
3 to 4 years to completely design, implement, and retrofit.
That is the downside. When I reached that conclusion with
Boeing and had the agreement in a legally binding memorandum of
agreement, so Boeing has to meet those standards contractually,
then it really became a choice for the warfighter. Do they want
the tanker in Boeing's hands while we are waiting for these
fixes to be implemented? Or do we want it in their hands? And
overwhelmingly, from the command, they wanted the tanker in
their hands while we wait for this fix to be done.
Of the nine things that have to be done on RVS, five are
pretty straightforward and can be done via software mods; it is
pixel remapping, things that can be done to fix the obscure
angles that the RVS shows via software. Four are likely to take
hardware. These will be harder, more difficult, and likely more
costly. That is what we are working on with Boeing.
But I would certainly turn over to General Fay to talk
about why would the operator want this tanker with its
deficiencies in their hands while we wait for these fixes?
Mr. Wittman. Listen, I understand that. I am not debating
that it shouldn't be in the hands of the airmen and obviously
we need that. What my element is, is I want some specific
definition about the time to completion on corrective action
for aircraft being delivered and for those aircraft that are
then on the production line coming back out to fully meet the
requirements.
So can you give me a date or a timeframe definitive about
when that will be completed so that all existing aircraft are
compliant and aircraft coming off the production are now
compliant?
Secretary Roper. For the boom, Congressman, I am confident
that we should be able to do that in about 3 years. We are
hoping to have the mod done in time to cut into Lot 7. Then it
is the choice for the commander about how they want to
retrofit, bringing the airplanes into the depot or doing it in
the field.
For the RVS, we are still doing the design with Boeing, so
we have another 2 months until we lock down on the design.
Depending on the number of hardware changes, it will determine
how long it takes, and so I will take it will be an extended
question for the record. But after we have locked down on the
design, I will send a report to this committee on how long it
will take to do the retrofit.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mr. Wittman. Very good. I will do that and in the interest
of time, I, too, would like for you to take a question for the
record to give us some more definition, too, about the B-52 re-
engining program. You heard Mr. Cisneros talk about depending
on the aircraft for the longest period of time of all our
existing bomber fleet. The key is, is what are we going to do
in re-engining that aircraft? Especially making sure that we
don't generate excessive concurrency with development, design,
and integration.
So I want to get an idea on that because that aircraft is
going to stay around. It is those elements as well as avionics
and other modernization that is going to have to take it into
the next 30-plus years.
Secretary Roper. Congressman, I would be happy to take that
for the record, and I can assure you the B-52 re-engining
program has one of the most clever and creative acquisition
plans in our portfolio. I would be delighted to share what they
are doing that I think is smart and will set a standard for
other programs. We will take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mr. Wittman. I think that is key and I want to make sure,
too, that we are keeping in mind because we talk about time all
the time, and you pointed it out as a key element of this, is
to be able to eliminate that con--well, actually make sure that
we are doing things in unison, so you are not, as you said,
doing it in a waterfall approach, that you are doing things
concurrently, so we are doing integration and design as we go,
so timeframes are compressed so we are able to get this into
the B-52 and modernize much more quickly than we would
otherwise.
Secretary Roper. Mr. Chairman, would you allow me a 30-
second answer to that? Thank you, sir. The big picture thing we
are doing is a two-phase award. We are using the section 804
authority--again, thank you for that--to be able to put the
vendor for the engines so we know who they are on an other
transaction agreement so they can begin working with Boeing who
owns the aircraft.
We don't want to award just based on the engine; we want to
know if the engine can be integrated on the airplane. So we
will have one round of evaluation based on the engine itself.
They will turn over their digital twin to us as part of the
competition, which will be great for the Air Force. We will
determine what fuel efficiency it should give us. But the
second round that we will do for the real source selection will
be the engine airplane integration.
I think that will pull down the risk of not discovering
something in this program and giving the warfighter what they
need. The fuel efficiency really matters as an acquisition
person--that is saving money--but fuel efficiency is range for
the operator, so we are going to get that program right,
Congressman.
Mr. Courtney. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Wittman. Actually--and one last question is,
reading the testimony on the B-1 and the B-2, and again in past
years, you know, we have gotten signals from the Air Force that
the B-2 is going to be retired and then--so the testimony sort
of just suggests that there is going to be almost sort of
continued investment in both programs.
Can you just state for the record what the--is there a
sequence now that the Air Force is looking at in terms of
retirements with either one of those two platforms?
General Fay. Mr. Chairman, I will take that one.
Right now, the Air Force--what I would say we are doing,
sir, is we are evaluating smartly as we are moving towards
this--because this is a number of years in the future, we are
assessing very carefully the security environment, the progress
of the B-21, the status of both the B-2 and the B-1 and the B-
52 aircraft as we move forward, and we are trying to make smart
investments with all those factors in mind.
So the short answer, sir, is no. Certainly, we plan and we
plan and we plan again--that is what we do in the military--so
to say right now that I can tell you with certainty that we
know exactly when we are going to do with what airplanes and in
what order, I think we would likely be coming back to this
committee in 6 months or 12 months when something changes in
the security environment and the maintenance of the airplanes
or in some other factor and we would probably have to revisit
that.
But I think the final decision will be the operational
capacity of the B-21. And when those commanders, both at
Strategic Command and other combatant commanders, are able to
look at General Ray, the Global Strike Command commander, he
can assure them he can meet their mission needs.
Secretary Roper. Mr. Chairman, I think we are making the
prudent investments to modernize along with our other systems
so the connectivity of these systems, being able to use
different waveforms, having ADS-B [Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast] Out, things of this nature, what we are
doing broadly are things that we are investigating as
modernization options.
For programs like the B-2, we have to keep the ability to
penetrate. We can't take risk there until the B-21 fields. That
is why there is a major modernization effort.
When you go to the B-52, there are multiple major
modernization efforts--the radar, the avionics, the commercial
re-engine--so in the hospital analogy, this is like a major
knee replacement or hip replacement. So we are definitely
getting that airplane back up to where it is going to be in the
fight.
So I agree with my colleague here. The B-21 is likely to
set the pace. If we stay on path, then it will let us start
making choices about the bomber fleet. But until we are there,
given how complicated the program is and the fact that we had
the A-Team on it, we really have to make sure that the
warfighters aren't taking risk of a complicated development.
So I think this is a question we will have every year until
we get the B-21 where we can say we know we are going to
deliver on time, and right now, we are on a path to do that.
Mr. Courtney. Well, I want to thank both the witnesses and,
again, working with us on the floor votes. And again, as the
questions indicate, this dialogue will continue in the future.
And with that, I will call the hearing closed.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 14, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 14, 2019
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 14, 2019
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 14, 2019
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Secretary Roper. Redesign of the boom and RVS to mitigate
deficiencies are underway. Boeing is on contract to lower the boom load
to meet new requirements that arose during A-10 developmental testing.
Boeing also signed a legally-binding agreement to bring RVS into
compliance with nine Critical Performance Parameters (CPPs) desired by
our government-industry Tiger Team, which will be implemented at their
expense under the original fixed-price contract. Design, still
underway, should conclude in the next few months. Exact timelines for
the design, install and retrofit of both the boom and RVS will be
refined once designs are complete. Due to the expected extensiveness,
the Air Force still estimates 3-4 years to fully retrofit all delivered
KC-46 tankers. [See page 23.]
Secretary Roper. The Air Force has pursued a Section 804
acquisition strategy for B-52 CERP, accelerating the start of the
program, buying down design and integration risk earlier to address an
impending readiness crisis with the TF-33 engines without sacrificing
any engineering rigor. The approved Section 804 acquisition strategy
calls for two distinct rapid prototyping spirals. Spiral one will
deliver a virtual power pod prototype demonstrating the commercial
engine candidate's performance in the B-52's unique, side-by-side pod
configuration, and a virtual system prototype integrating the virtual
power pod with the modified propulsion system. Spiral two will deliver
actual physical prototypes after engine downselect--two B-52H aircraft
modified with new hardware and software to support test activities. The
engine candidates are derived from commercially available, proven
designs. The prototyping phase will conclude in 2025, with the
production effort to immediately follow. Initial Operational Capability
is projected for 2028; Full Operational Capability is projected for
2034. [See page 23.]
General Fay. Both MCRS-18 and AFWN use the 2018 National Defense
Strategy (NDS) wartime mission construct and both studies used the same
mobility analysis methodology. However, the studies differ in the
planning horizons, associated pacing demands, and simultaneity guidance
on prioritization of NDS missions. Specifically, force structure
recommendations for the number of required air refueling aircraft/
squadrons differ between studies due to different time frames,
scenarios/OPLANS, and risk. These differences can be attributed to
study scope parameters in the areas above as well as the overall intent
for an AFWN study unconstrained fiscally while MCRS-18 assessed the
programmed fleet at the end of the FYDP (FY23) for force sizing
sufficiency to satisfy NDS demands. [See page 20.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Secretary Roper. The Air Force continues to project a 6 to 8 month
slip to the B-2 DMS-M software certification milestone. We are still
evaluating impacts to the overall DMS-M schedule. The Air Force will
provide a revised DMS-M schedule to the Committee once finalized.
[See page 18.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
General Fay. Both MCRS-18 and AFWN use the 2018 National Defense
Strategy (NDS) wartime mission construct and both studies used the same
mobility analysis methodology. However, the studies differ in the
planning horizons, associated pacing demands, and simultaneity guidance
on prioritization of NDS missions. Specifically, force structure
recommendations for the number of required air refueling aircraft/
squadrons differ between studies due to different time frames,
scenarios/OPLANS, and risk. These differences can be attributed to
study scope parameters in the areas above as well as the overall intent
for an AFWN study unconstrained fiscally while MCRS-18 assessed the
programmed fleet at the end of the FYDP (FY23) for force sizing
sufficiency to satisfy NDS demands. [See page 8.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 14, 2019
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
Mr. Courtney. Does the Air Force to consider the NP-2000 upgrade a
safety upgrade or an efficiency upgrade?
Secretary Roper and General Fay. No, the Air Force does not
consider the NP2000 upgrade to be a safety or efficiency upgrade. The
implementation of NP2000 is based on the increased performance
capability of the NP2000 propellers, predominately in take-off and low
level operations. In addition, it incorporates a more advanced design
and is corrosion resistant.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NORCROSS
Mr. Norcross. The tanker fleet's end strength will require careful
synchronization between KC-10 retirements and KC-46 production and
delivery to sustain current force projection capabilities. Dr. Roper
met with Boeing this week to discuss the Foreign Object Debris issue
and then following the meeting a new KC-46 was accepted at Altus Air
Force Base. Further, this budget request of 12 KC-46s is 3 less than
the Air Force indicated in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
delivered with the FY 19 budget.
Do these recent setbacks and this new budget request effect the
remaining KC-46 delivery schedule?
Given the agreement for a ``one for one'' swap at Joint Base
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and Travis, how does this budget insure the
maintenance of the KC-10 until the KC-46 is fully delivered?
Can you speak to the importance of ensuring the infrastructure at
these locations is built up to support delivery of KC-46s on time? And,
have you received any indication that the President plans to move Air
Force military construction funding that would impact delivery of KC-
46s as part of his emergency declaration to build the border wall?
Secretary Roper. No. The recent setback caused by Foreign Object
Debris was temporary and deliveries have resumed. Additionally, the
FY20 President's Budget request for 12 aircraft in FY20 will not delay
KC-46 deliveries. Congress appropriated funding for an additional 3
aircraft in FY18, which was not accounted for in the FY19 President's
Budget. These aircraft, combined with the FY20 request for 12 aircraft,
maintains the Air Force's plan to purchase 15 aircraft a year. The
System Program Office is in the process of updating the overall KC-46
delivery schedule and will provide an updated schedule to Congress as
soon as possible.
Answer 2: The FY20 President's Budget provides additional
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding for the KC-10 due to KC-46
delivery delays. This funding will ensure maintenance of the KC-10 at
Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and Travis until replaced by the KC-
46.
Answer 3: The Air Force is working to ensure that infrastructure
will be in place to support on time deliveries of the KC-46. There are
no plans to move Air Force military construction funding that would
impact delivery of the KC-46.
Mr. Norcross. The tanker fleet's end strength will require careful
synchronization between KC-10 retirements and KC-46 production and
delivery to sustain current force projection capabilities. Dr. Roper
met with Boeing this week to discuss the Foreign Object Debris issue
and then following the meeting a new KC-46 was accepted at Altus Air
Force Base. Further, this budget request of 12 KC-46s is 3 less than
the Air Force indicated in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
delivered with the FY 19 budget.
Do these recent setbacks and this new budget request effect the
remaining KC-46 delivery schedule?
Given the agreement for a ``one for one'' swap at Joint Base
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and Travis, how does this budget insure the
maintenance of the KC-10 until the KC-46 is fully delivered?
Can you speak to the importance of ensuring the infrastructure at
these locations is built up to support delivery of KC-46s on time? And,
have you received any indication that the President plans to move Air
Force military construction funding that would impact delivery of KC-
46s as part of his emergency declaration to build the border wall?
General Fay. Do these recent setbacks and this new budget request
effect the remaining KC-46 delivery schedule? No. The recent setback
caused by Foreign Object Debris was temporary and deliveries have
resumed. Additionally, the FY20 President's Budget request for 12
aircraft in FY20 will not delay KC-46 deliveries. Congress appropriated
funding for an additional 3 aircraft in FY18, which was not accounted
for in the FY19 President's Budget. These aircraft, combined with the
FY20 request for 12 aircraft, maintains the Air Force's plan to
purchase 15 aircraft a year. The System Program Office is in the
process of updating the overall KC-46 delivery schedule and will
provide an updated schedule to Congress as soon as possible.
Given the agreement for a ``one for one'' swap at Joint Base
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and Travis, how does this budget insure the
maintenance of the KC-10 until the KC-46 is fully delivered? The FY20
President's Budget provides additional Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
funding for the KC-10 due to KC-46 delivery delays. This funding will
ensure maintenance of the KC-10 at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and
Travis until replaced by the KC-46.
The FY20 budget includes an increase of overall Total Force end-
strength of 4,400 personnel. Of the 4,400 personnel, 1,400 of those are
active duty and Air National Guard Aircraft Maintenance personnel.
Those additional personnel will be utilized to support increasing
requirements from KC-46 deliveries as well as continuing F-35A
deliveries. The Major Commands will balance manpower requirements as we
transition between KC-10 and KC-46 tankers at McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and
Travis.
Depot funding within the FY20 PB covers the requirement of both the
KC-10 and KC-135 fleet, a three KC-46 aircraft reduction will not
affect the KC-10/KC-135 Depot Requirements. Going forward the Cost per
flying hour (CPFH-Operations & Maintenance (O&M) only) through the FYDP
will remain constant, the cost difference between the KC-10 and KC-46
in CPFH funds are negligible and will have no impact from our
perspective on the remaining KC-46 delivery schedule.
Can you speak to the importance of ensuring the infrastructure at
these locations is built up to support delivery of KC-46s on time? The
Air Force is working to ensure that infrastructure will be in place to
support on time deliveries of the KC-46. Achieving full operational
capacity for new weapons systems depends on the delivery of necessary
hangars, maintenance and training facilities, airfields, and fuel
infrastructure. The attached Bullet Background Paper details the
military construction program supporting KC-46 bed-down from FY14
through FY23.
[See graphic on following page.]
And, have you received any indication that the President plans to
move Air Force military construction funding that would impact delivery
of KC-46s as part of his emergency declaration to build the border
wall? There are no plans to move Air Force military construction
funding that would impact delivery of the KC-46.
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