[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN SUDAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
June 25, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-51
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-818PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brandon Shields, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
KAREN BASS, California, Chair
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota Ranking Member
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania RON WRIGHT, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
Janette Yarwood, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
OPENING STATEMENT
Prepared statement for the record submitted from Chair Bass...... 3
WITNESSES
Day, Ramsey, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau For
Africa, United States Agency for International Development..... 12
James, The Honorable Makila, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East
Africa and The Sudans, Bureau of African Affairs, United States
Department of State............................................ 18
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 38
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 39
Hearing Attendance............................................... 40
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Omar............................................ 41
THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN SUDAN
Tuesday, June 25, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:48 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Karen Bass [chair
of the subcommittee] presiding.
Ms. Bass. This hearing for the Subcommittee on Africa,
Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting
today to hear testimony on the U.S. response to the political
crisis in Sudan.
Let me just thank everyone here for your patience. I am
sorry that we are starting so late. I know you are aware that
votes were called, which means everything stops around here and
we had to go vote. But I do not believe that we will be
interrupted any further.
Today, we are here to further explore the fluid situation
in Sudan, the potential for a successful transition to a
civilian-led government, and the policy options available to
the United States. Sudan is at a critical junction and must
decide if it wants to continue on the path of former leader
Bashir or transition to a civilian-led rule as the transitional
military council has promised.
Initially, when the TMC seized power, they opened the
political space and met with civilian-led groups. The organized
protests were led by Sudanese professionals--Sudanese
Professionals Association made up of doctors, lawyers,
teachers, engineers, and others. In January 2019, the SPA
joined with other civil society organizations and political
coalitions to sign the Declaration of Freedom and Change. This
commitment to a peaceful struggle targeted broader goals,
including ending al-Bashir's rule, forming a transitional
government, ending violence against protesters, and
restrictions to freedom of speech and expression and
accountability for the crimes against Sudanese citizens.
But the situation has deteriorated. I look forward to
hearing more from our witnesses regarding the U.S. response to
the political crisis in Sudan and how the U.S. can address
these blatant human rights violations and support efforts to
get the country on the path toward democratic representative
governance.
So, without objection, all members have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
So I want to thank our distinguished witnesses who are here
with us today for this hearing. I know that your staff have
come to the Hill multiple times to keep us informed about
events in the country, but the time has come to really
understand how the U.S. is engaging the country during this
political crisis.
Let me say also that this is the first hearing. We
anticipate having additional hearings. We did this very
quickly, which is why we have one panel which is a government
panel. Usually we have more than one panel and that we always
include people who are from the country, but we were not able
to do this on quick notice. So I do not want you to think that
this is the last time we are going to have this discussion nor
do I want you to think that we intentionally excluded people
who are from Sudan.
So there are many of us here in Congress who pay close
attention to what is happening in Sudan. Considering all of the
recent events in the country, the increased insecurity and the
increased human rights violations, we think it is critical to
get this update on events in the country, how the U.S. is
responding and how the U.S. is adjusting its policy based on
this new space the country is in.
So I would like to know about the Assistant Secretary's
trip to the country, the role of the new Special Envoy, how has
the U.N. drawn down effective humanitarian operations, and
about the drawdown of personnel at the U.S. embassy in
Khartoum. Do you expect additional ordered departures? Are
staff who remain in the country safe?
I will tell you that several of us were planning on
traveling to Sudan next week and our trip was canceled because
we were told that it was not safe to be in the country. Members
of Congress from both of sides of the aisle are engaged on
Sudan and we want to make sure that we have a strong, unified
message to help citizens of Sudan realize their goal of a
civilian-led transition to power.
I now recognize the ranking member for the purposes of
making an opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bass follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much, Madam Chair, and I want
to thank you for convening today's hearing on the ongoing
political crisis in Sudan, a political crisis which has urgent
and broad humanitarian and human rights implications.
On several occasions, both you and I have visited Sudan,
including trips to Darfur, and we do believe that the people of
Sudan deserve better. We have also come to understand the
country's importance as a critical link between North Africa,
sub-Saharan Africa, and the Horn and that what happens in Sudan
has implications for other countries including and in
particular South Sudan, which you and I visited together in
June 2017.
Thus, today's topic extends beyond a single country, it
also extends beyond a single crisis. Indeed, for most of my
nearly 40 years in Congress, Sudan has been in political
crisis. Today's pattern of repression followed by protests
followed by coup followed by suppression is a pattern we saw
play out throughout much of Sudan's modern history including in
1964 and in 1985.
Counting the removal of longtime strongman Bashir this past
April by the military, there have been some five coups since
independence in 1956. It is thus hard not to think of a
political crisis when one hears the name ``Sudan.'' For those
of a certain age, Hollywood has even kept alive the Sudanese
political crises of the 19th century. We all remember Charlton
Heston depicting General Gordon on the big screen in some five
remakes of the adventure story, ``Four Feathers,'' depicting
the revolt of the Mahdi. Such depictions though sensationalized
and dramatized nonetheless have some value, for that late 19th
century movement of the Mahdi reverberates today with much of
the Sudan's modern history being intertwined with the question
of how a modern State interacts with political Islam.
Today's hearing also underscores the involvement of this
subcommittee which since 2005 has held roughly a dozen
hearings. I have chaired them. You have chaired them, Madam
Chair. And my good friend, the late Donald Payne, did it as
well.
This subcommittee has also been engaged in the question of
sanctions relief for a regime that has been a State sponsor of
terrorism. Whatever the trajectory which began in the last
administration and continued into this one toward lifting
sanctions has been halted by events since last April 11th when
Bashir was removed from office by Sudan's military.
That kindled in me a hope, personally, for I had met Bashir
in 2005 in Khartoum and I found him to be absolutely inflexible
in his opposition to any reform. All he wanted to talk about
was sanctions relief in our conversation which went on for well
over an hour. I asked him if he ever visited--``When was the
first time you went to Darfur, Mr. President?'' There was no
answer to that. I was on my way there right after that meeting.
For a brief period this spring, we had hope that his
removal would lead to a transition to civilian-led democratic
government which respected human rights and thus, ultimately,
would lead to sanctions relief. But those hopes have been
delayed, if not belayed, indefinitely. On June 3rd,
demonstrators who had kept vigil in Khartoum were violently
dispersed with some 120 killed.
Thus, in the context for today's hearing we shall hear from
the Administration witnesses as to what our policy response
should be. Given the history of Sudan, what might we do
differently this time to encourage a movement toward true
civilian rule? While much of Sudan's history is intertwined
with political Islam from the Mahdist movement to the Muslim
Brotherhood, there are also those committed to democracy and
respect for religious freedom including especially within the
Muslim community.
What can be done to encourage those individuals, parties,
and counter trends? Further, what milestones must be met in the
transition to democracy and sanctions relief? We know the
conditions which, first, the Obama administration and then the
Trump administration set as preconditions for any relief, and
in that regard I am grateful that the Trump administration
included respect for civil and political rights as important
markers to be met and for Deputy Secretary John Sullivan
forcefully raising the issue of respect for religious freedom
in a speech he gave in Sudan in November 2017.
What of holding Sudan to the terms it agreed to as part of
the comprehensive peace agreement with South Sudan in 1905,
including popular consultation with respect to South Kordofan,
the Blue Nile States, and deciding the status of Abyei, terms
which have never been fulfilled? Finally, how do we address the
ongoing humanitarian crisis? It is estimated that the need for
humanitarian aid has increased 40 percent since 2018, and the
humanitarian crisis is linked to the political.
While we work toward solving the political crisis, how do
we meet the immediate humanitarian needs? No one should starve
or have lack of medicine. I yield back.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
I want to introduce our two panelists now. Makila James is
a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and has served as
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Africa and the Sudan since
September 17th, 2018. Prior to taking up these
responsibilities, she was on the faculty of the National War
College and served as the director of the International Student
Management Office at the National Defense University.
Ambassador James has also held a variety of positions in
Washington and overseas, including as the U.S. Ambassador to
the Kingdom of Swaziland from 2012 until 2015.
Ramsey Day serves as Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator
for the Africa Bureau. Prior to joining USAID in January 2018,
Mr. Day was the Senior Director for the Center for Global
Impact at the International Republican Institute where he led
the Institute's project designs, strategic planning, and
monitoring and evaluation efforts. He also worked in Amman,
Jordan as the IRI country director from 2014 to 2017, leading
programs in public opinion research, good governance, and
political party building.
With that, Mr. Day.
STATEMENT OF RAMSEY DAY, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR AFRICA, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Day. Good afternoon, Chair Bass and Ranking Member
Smith and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here today alongside my friend Makila.
USAID greatly appreciates the subcommittee's support for
the people of Sudan and for drawing attention to this important
issue. USAID remains deeply concerned over the brutal crackdown
by Sudan's security forces on unarmed civilians who for months
gathered peacefully in the streets of Khartoum and across
Sudan, seeking to establish a representative and inclusive
government after 30 years of oppression, division, and
corruption under Omar al-Bashir.
After decades of unwavering partnership between USAID and
the people of Sudan, we are gravely concerned this nonviolent,
well-organized, and massive effort by the Sudanese people to
demand a democratic and representative government has been met
with violence. United Nations human rights experts warn of
Sudan sliding into a human rights abyss and have joined other
voices calling for an independent investigation into violations
against the peaceful protesters, which the Transitional
Military Council, or TMC, has adamantly rejected.
Darfur has still not recovered from the mass killing, mass
displacement, and genocide that began in 2003, the aftermath of
which USAID responds to with humanitarian assistance on a daily
basis and nearly 1.8 million people displaced by conflict and
security in Darfur, many of whom have been displaced for well
over a decade.
I remain deeply troubled that one of the key factors
exacerbating the instability in Khartoum is the presence of the
inactivity of the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, which evolved
from the very forces that already committed mass atrocities in
Darfur. As a show of good faith that it can operate in the
interest of the Sudanese people, the TMC must allow for an
independent and credible investigation of the human rights
violations committed in Khartoum and hold accountable those
responsible for the violence.
On June 3rd, the TMC unilaterally announced that elections
would be held in 9 months. USAID agrees with our State
Department colleagues that such a timeline is unacceptable and
would virtually ensure that the military and security forces
who overthrew Bashir will remain in power, continuing the
blatant violations of human rights and silencing of the
peaceful demands of the citizens.
The upheaval in Khartoum is also intensifying the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur, just as the United Nations-
African Union joint peacekeeping operation in Darfur, or
UNAMID, is in the process of drawing down toward a planned exit
a year from now. UNAMID continues to play an important role in
the protection of civilians and a role that simply cannot be
filled by the RSF. The international community assesses that
more than eight million people are in need of humanitarian
assistance in Sudan, including one million refugees most of
whom are from South Sudan.
The United States remains the largest donor of humanitarian
assistance in Sudan. Over the last 2 years, the U.S. Government
has provided nearly $340 million in humanitarian assistance,
reaching more than 2.5 million people. Current programming
focuses on emergency food distribution, improving health and
nutrition, and increasing access to safe drinking water.
The TMC's decision to cutoff the internet and telephone
networks has significantly hampered humanitarian operations.
USAID will continue to call on the TMC to ensure unfettered
access for humanitarians to help the Sudanese people in need of
lifesaving assistance. However, humanitarian access remains
uneven and unpredictable. The reduced staff capacity of several
Sudanese ministries and other government offices has in some
cases slowed humanitarian access, but the operating environment
varies greatly by location. The current restrictive and
bureaucratic process for facilitating humanitarian operations
must be improved to ensure timely delivery.
USAID also provides approximately five million dollars in
development assistance to the Sudanese people which supports
conflict mitigation at the community level and bolsters civil
society including women, youth, and persons with disabilities.
While we certainly have concerns about a rapid move to
elections, USAID stands ready to support civil society to
engage in a credible electoral process.
The people of Sudan have been united by a vibrant,
inspirational, and massive public demonstration for democracy
and civilian rule which has eluded the country since 1989. A
transition to civilian rule with an empowered civil society
inclusive of all Sudanese is essential to stopping the cycle of
conflict and oppression and chart a new course for the people
of Sudan on their journey to self-reliance.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Day follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Ambassador James.
STATEMENT OF MAKILA JAMES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST
AFRICA AND THE SUDANS, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. James. Good afternoon, Chair Bass, Ranking Member
Smith, members of the subcommittee. I am really pleased to be
here today to share the space with my colleague to talk about
the situation in Sudan. I want to appreciate that this
subcommittee and Congress as a whole has been very supportive
in all of our efforts. We are all working toward a more
peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Sudan.
Since the ouster of Omar al-Bashir on April 11th, we have
been in close contact with your staff to provide updates on the
very fluid situation. I want to convey our very sincere
appreciation for the strong, bipartisan support for the
statements surrounding the events on the ground. Our
overarching policy goal in Sudan is to support the formation of
a civilian-led transitional government that can begin to
implement much needed reform and prepare the country for free
and fair elections.
The Sudanese people have made their demand very clear. They
want civilian leadership. We seek to help the Sudanese people
avoid the many risks such as continued military rule, a return
to conflict among militias or security forces, and the re-
emergence of the National Congress Party and other political
forces that seek to counter their aspirations. The
reprehensible attacks by the security forces under Transitional
Military Council control and led by the Rapid Support Forces
beginning on June 3rd sought to thwart those aspirations.
However, the people of Sudan have shown remarkable resilience
and determination in the face of this brutal violence.
We should seek to similarly be undaunted in supporting
their goals of a peaceful transition to civilian-led
transitional government that respects the human rights and
fundamental freedoms. I personally visited Khartoum right after
the Sudanese people unseated President Bashir, and I was moved,
moved by the passion, the dedication, and the commitment of the
people to bring change, and I saw the protesters in the street
peacefully.
On June 10th, the Department appointed Special Envoy for
Sudan, Ambassador Donald Booth, to lead the Department's
efforts to secure a peaceful political solution to the current
crisis in Sudan. He and Assistant Secretary Tibor Nagy recently
traveled to Khartoum and Addis, and Ambassador Booth is
currently in Khartoum today.
We have repeatedly and at the highest levels, both publicly
and privately, called for the TMC to end immediately all
attacks on civilians, obstruction of medical care, blocking of
the internet, and undue restrictions on the media and civil
society. We have urged TMC leadership to withdraw the RSF from
Khartoum and turn over law enforcement to the police as a way
of demonstrating that they are ready to negotiate in good
faith.
The TMC is ultimately responsible for all the attacks on
civilians by security forces and we have pressed them to allow
a credible and independent investigation and to hold those
responsible for violence to account. To be clear, our previous
engagement with the Government of Sudan known as the Phase II
process has been suspended indefinitely. Our hope is to help
the Sudanese people achieve a civilian-led transitional
government that respects their rights and to then help that
government, working with our international partners, to address
the significant economic and political challenges it will
inherit from the Bashir regime.
We believe that an agreement between the Sudanese military
authorities and the opposition umbrella group called the Forces
for Freedom and Change, FFC, on the formation of a civilian-led
transition is the best possible outcome. The FFC is broadly
representative and committed to peaceful engagement. We have
encouraged the parties to buildupon the agreements made to date
and to develop a transitional government system that is
civilian-led, includes checks and balances to promote
consensus, and that will form a government within a reasonable
amount of time agreed to by all the parties before holding
elections.
Succeeding in this process will require compromise and
courage from Sudan's leaders. We and other partners can play a
very supportive role. Sudan's military also has a role to play
as a partner in a civilian-led government. They can choose to
be a partner in the solution and agree with FFC and form a
civilian-led government and work with them in a transitional
government that ends conflicts, implements reforms, and leads
to free and fair elections. This is the only pathway to a
stable Sudan and a better relationship with the United States.
Last, we are coordinating with Africans and other
international partners and stakeholders to align our efforts in
support of a peaceful solution and a civilian-led government
that heeds the demands of the Sudanese people. We support the
role of the African Union and the strong response of the
African Union Peace and Security Council following the bloody
June 3rd attacks on peaceful protesters.
We have also welcomed the engagement of Ethiopian Prime
Minister Abiy and the work of the Envoy he has appointed, as
well as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD,
to mediate between the parties in conjunction with the African
Union. Ambassador Booth and other U.S. officials are in regular
contact with the mediators to support their efforts, encourage
productive dialog leading to an agreement, and to back them
with the full array of options at our disposal including
measures that target those involved in human rights violations
and abuses and who undermine the establishment of a peaceful
transitional government.
We are coordinating with the African Union, the U. N., the
Troika (US, UK, and Norway), and other European partners and
countries in the region, including important stakeholders such
as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.
Senior officials have been in engaged in a frank and frequent
dialog with them to coordinate efforts to send a common demand
to the TMC to end attacks on civilians and to agree to the
formation of a civilian-led transitional government.
[The prepared statement of Ms. James follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you very much for your
testimony. And if there is more, I am sure as we engage in
questions and answers we will be able to do that. So we are
going to begin that now, and we will each take 5 minutes. We
will do a round, and then we will come back through again if
any of the members have more that they would like to say.
Ambassador, you were talking about the UAE, Saudi Arabia,
and Egypt, and I wanted to know if you could expand a little
bit on your thoughts on what the role is that they are playing,
because I know that it is not positive.
Ms. James. The United States has been having active
engagement with all the countries that have a stake in what is
going on in Sudan, including the Gulf States and Egypt, on the
crisis that is happening. We have had very frank conversations
at the level of Under Secretary Hale, Ambassador Booth, myself,
the Department's Near East Asian Affairs Bureau, and our
embassies in the region.
There was recently a meeting held just last weekend in
Berlin. Countries that are interested in Sudan, we call
ourselves the Friends of Sudan, and we gathered, including the
countries from the Gulf States, to talk about how we could be
supportive and how we could work together.
Ms. Bass. Is it the Administration's view that these three
countries are playing a positive role?
Ms. James. Well, we do think they can bring something to
the table because they have influence and leverage with some of
the parties. Particularly, there is leverage over the
Transitional Military Council, and so we are urging them to use
that leverage and to use the financial assistance that they
have pledged to the country to move the TMC toward accepting an
agreement and to ending violence.
So to that extent, we think that they are receptive to that
message. They have given us positive indications that they want
to be supportive. And so, yes, we think they could play a
constructive role.
Ms. Bass. They could play a positive role, but they have
not up until now.
Ms. James. Well, I would say that we have urged them to be
mindful of how their funds can undermine the process.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ms. James. And they have indicated to us that the money
that they have pledged to date has been used just to stabilize
the Sudanese pound, but going forward they want to work with
the rest of the international community on how to continue
disbursing those funds, so to that extent they can play a
constructive role moving forward.
Ms. Bass. OK. So what is the status of--you mentioned the
effort by Prime Minister Abiy. And so, what is the status of
the Ethiopian and AU mediation efforts? I know when the Prime
Minister first went there, if I am not mistaken--or no, I am
sorry. When leaders of the opposition went to Addis, when they
returned home, they were arrested. And I do not know where they
are now, but I wanted to know what you thought of the Prime
Minister's role in general and what happened to the opposition
forces. Are they still incarcerated?
Ms. James. With respect to the general role that Prime
Minister Abiy and his newly appointed Envoy Mahmoud Dardir are
playing, we think it is a very constructive role. Actually,
they are working very closely with the African Union. The
African Union has basically supported Prime Minister Abiy's
Envoy in taking the lead in mediation.
So we see a coming together of the African Union and the
Ethiopian efforts, including efforts with IGAD. It has been
positive. It has been going in a direction where they have
presented proposals to the parties and we understand that the
FFC has accepted them; the TMC has not. But that they are
talking to all parties and trying to get this agreement signed,
we think that is a constructive thing. We think it brings
value.
I actually have to say I do not have the latest on the
people who were arrested. We will have to get back to you on
that one.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. I would appreciate that. And then I
wanted to know what support we are providing to the mediation
efforts. You know, you certainly referenced Booth and the
Assistant Secretary, but specifically what are we doing? And
then what tools do we have to press the TMC to hand over power?
Ms. James. Well, our very presence, the very fact that we
have an Envoy there helps us play a coordinating role. The
coordinating role I described with the Gulf States, as well as
with other partners, many in the Troika, the U.S., U.K.,
Norway, our engagement there, we are able to play a role where
we are coordinating positions. We are putting forward ideas on
how to assist the country once a civilian government is
established.
So we think our role has been very complementary and
supportive of the Envoy's role from the African Union and from
ET/IGAD, so we think we are playing our part. With respect to
actual tools we have, I think Assistant Secretary Nagy has
spoken to this. We do have a wide array of tools. Some of them
are to incentivize good behavior and we are also exploring what
happens if things do not go well.
I do not want to go through chapter and verse now because
we are in early stages, but we are looking at all options. The
most important thing right now is we have robust diplomacy.
That is our first tool that we really want to put into full
effect. With all the Envoys now, with the ongoing dialog that
is happening, we think diplomacy is one of our biggest and
strongest tool----
Ms. Bass. Let me, before I run out of time, I wanted to
know what actions that we have taken to press for an impartial,
independent investigation to some of the killings that have
taken place. And I do not mean to exclude you, Mr. Day, but
Madam Ambassador, and then maybe in my last few seconds Mr. Day
can respond.
Ms. James. The killings were reprehensible and I think from
the very first day we have issued statements from the State
Department. We have also commended those statements coming from
a number of other sources including our European colleagues,
our European partners, and the Gulf States. So we have been all
encouraging everyone to release statements and to put pressure
on the TMC.
And our frank dialog that we had in Berlin just this
weekend, we underscored that everyone has to make it very clear
to the TMC no more violence will be acceptable under any
circumstances and that there will be a cost to pay. I did not
want to get into the cost in great detail now, but we are
looking at all options including sanctions down the line should
there be any kind of repeat of violence.
Ms. Bass. OK.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Hopefully those sanctions include indictments? I
mean Bashir being the monster that he was, still was very
concerned about his ICC indictments, so hopefully that is being
very seriously considered.
If I could--this is Administrator Day, if you could, you
talked about how the Rapid Support Forces, witnesses said that
they were formerly Janjaweed. Could you elaborate on that? And
you did say, and I am glad you were so emphatic that we are
fully against the May 13th decree by the TMC demanding that
UNAMID bases are turned over to the RSF. And I am wondering,
you know, that is a 10,000-strong deployment unless it has been
downgraded further. I am wondering what role they may or may
not be asked to play in terms of peace. They are there, they
are not far. You know, of course Khartoum is not Darfur, but if
you could speak to that.
And then the point you made in your opening about how
credible reports that the RSF attacked protesters while they
were sleeping, attacked medical staff and hospitals assisting
the wounded, raped women and men, including healthcare workers,
and then you go on from there. How safe is it now? Has that
been chronicled? Do we know what are those people doing?
Someone who has been attacked in such a horrific way, did they
find any kind of refuge, particularly the wounded?
And what about a humanitarian worker on the ground right
now in Khartoum or in proximity to it, how safe are they? And
that goes for the medical staff as well. You mentioned one
American was killed. Are you at liberty to disclose who that
was, if you would? Was that person a humanitarian worker, for
example. And again, I would ask you how many of these RSF
forces are there. I mean, you know, the Janjaweed was not all
that big, but they are unbelievably lethal because of their
monopoly on weapons and other things in space, if you could
speak to that as well.
And is there anything being considered at the United
Nations in terms of a deployment of a force or re-deployment of
existing forces in Sudan?
Mr. Day. Thank you, Congressman. There are several
components of that, that I will defer to the Ambassador on, but
I will comment on a few of those. No. 1 is related, of course,
to the humanitarian situation and the role that the RSF is
potentially playing in that. You are absolutely right. Many of
the leaders of the RSF are the same leaders that were leading
the Janjaweed militia during the Darfur genocide started in
2003.
We are deeply concerned about that and how it will impact
our ability to operate from a humanitarian perspective. The
humanitarian situation is significant and it is serious. We
have seen a significant increase in the humanitarian need over
the last year or so, not just because of the political
situation but also the economic. One million of these are
refugees from South Sudan where USAID is reaching about 2.5
million people. But the operating environment is incredibly
fluid. Where we have access 1 day, we may not have access
another day.
So there are a lot of hydraulics that play. It is a very,
very dangerous operating environment at the time. So one of the
elements that UNAMID plays, you had mentioned UNAMID, is that
it does provide some level of security in some of the areas in
which we are operating, so it does play an important role. Any
kind of transition from UNAMID bases to something that is
controlled by the RSF is deeply concerning to us and absolutely
unacceptable.
On many of the other issues, I would defer to the
Ambassador.
Mr. Smith. You do not mean that they get involved with
mitigating the violence, you mean that they would lose their
bases.
Mr. Day. They would not play a constructive role,
absolutely not.
Ms. James. The first thing that I would add is that the RSF
is under the TMC and the TMC is ultimately responsible for all
the violence that is happening in the country. So we have made
it very clear that we expect the TMC to have the RSF removed
from Khartoum. They are a force that is operating without
control and they need to be removed from that area. We have
also said there should be accountability and that there should
be accountability for the June 3rd violence and that we expect
an impartial and credible investigation. So we are holding the
TMC for the violence of the RSF. They are not a separate entity
unto themselves.
The other thing you asked about with respect to an American
who was killed, I am not aware of an American who was killed
although I am aware of an American who was shot and who is in
the hospital. And when Assistant Secretary Nagy and Envoy Don
Booth were traveling, they visited him in the hospital. They
personally engaged with him to assure him that these issues are
of great concern to us.
But I do not think anyone was killed, but severely injured
and that is unacceptable as well.
Mr. Smith. Was that person a humanitarian aid worker or----
Ms. James. I do not believe so.
Mr. Smith. Woman or man?
Mr. Day. We could check on that.
Mr. Smith. OK, thank you. Thank you, Chair.
Ms. Bass. Mr. Wright.
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Madam Chair. I thank both of you for
being here.
Mr. Day, you had mentioned the situation on the ground is
dangerous, that operationally it is very fluid. Do we know,
have we been able to do a--has anyone been able to do a needs
assessment? Do we know exactly what kind of supplies are needed
there?
Mr. Day. Sure. Thank you, Congressman. We do believe the
type of humanitarian assistance that we are providing is what
is needed which has been food distribution, which is the
primary issue that we are--and food security is incredibly
important at this point. There are about 5.8 million people in
Sudan that are in what we call IPC 3 or IPC 4 areas, which is
either crisis or worse emergency. IPC 5 would be in a
catastrophic situation.
But--so there are significant needs, but it is really on
the food security side, nutrition, and then as well as water
and sanitation.
Mr. Wright. To what extent is the TMC preventing things,
food and medicine to that extent from getting where it needs to
be?
Mr. Day. Historically, there has been interference or at
least bureaucratic impediments in terms of getting permanence
to operate in certain areas. Since 2016, the humanitarian
access has improved. However, I say that with some caution just
because it is very spotty, it is very uneven, and it is very
unpredictable. So we have not seen any kind of systematic
interference in our humanitarian access, but in some cases we
just have more access than we have in other places.
Mr. Wright. OK. Well, would you go as far as to say that
their interference, people are dying because of their
interference, that food and medicine is not getting where it
needs to be. Is it that dire?
Mr. Day. The situation is dire and there are people who are
dying because of the food insecurity in Sudan. That said, the
humanitarian operations are functioning and we are in good
coordination with other donors. So I do not know that I would
go so far as to say that there has been systematic and direct
interference by the TMC that has led us to widespread inability
to get to where we need to go.
Mr. Wright. But their cooperation leaves a lot to be
desired, does it not?
Mr. Day. Yes.
Mr. Wright. Ambassador James, you have talked a bit about
some other African nations and their involvement and I did not
hear anything about Russia and China. And we know that they are
meddling in Africa, Chinese in particular, all over Africa.
Have you heard--do you have any knowledge that they are getting
involved in Sudan?
Ms. James. I do not have anything specific to add on China
in particular. We have certainly monitored Russian actions
because the Russians were certainly involved with the Sudanese
in some other African conflicts and so we are keeping a close
eye, but I have not anything new to report to you today.
Mr. Wright. OK, great.
Madam Chair, I would like to give the remainder of my time
to the ranking member, if he needs it.
Ms. Bass. I am. I am.
Mr. Burchett.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Chair and Ranking Member.
I was going through my questions here and everybody seems
to be sort of reading off the same sheet now, but I appreciate
that. There have been reports that there are tensions between
the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Force as the RSF.
Should fighting break out between the security forces, what
would that conflict look like? And both of you all can take a
shot at it.
Ms. James. Well, Congressman, I started by noting that we
consider the RSF an entity that the TMC must be accountable for
and must control. We understand that there are some tensions.
We have certainly seen it play out with respect to what
happened on June 3rd. I think it is very clear that the RSF was
at the fore of that. The RSF initiated that action. And so our
pressing the TMC today is to say you must hold these people
accountable. You must rein them in. You must stop this
continued violence.
We are hoping that our pressing them collectively, not just
the United States but all of the international partners
pressing the TMC that there is going to be accountability and
there is going to be a cost if they do not rein them in that
that will generate enough motivation for them to really move
seriously. We have to watch it. It is a very delicate
situation. It is very fluid. Nobody wants to see more violence
happening, so we have to kind of take this in very carefully
measured steps.
But we have been making the point very clear to the TMC,
you are responsible for what happens with the RSF. We have not
allowed them to separate out and say they do not have control.
They have to be accountable at the end of the day. That is our
consistent and collective message.
Mr. Day. And from USAID's perspective, we are in constant
scenario planning mode and in the event that there is a further
deterioration of the security situation we would be able to
respond as necessary.
Mr. Burchett. OK, thank you.
Ms. Bass. Are you finished?
Mr. Burchett. Yes, ma'am. Yield the rest of my time. I
apologize.
Ms. Bass. OK. That is OK. Thank you.
A few more questions. I wanted to ask again about Ethiopia
and its role. And if there is an agreement based on the
Ethiopian proposal, how could the U.S. and other partners
ensure that key reforms are implemented to support a democratic
transition? And then how will the U.S. respond if the TMC forms
a transitional government without the opposition?
How about you, Mr. Day.
Mr. Day. Well, again I will defer to the Ambassador on some
of the political dynamics, but I will say that in the event
that there is a civilian-led government that is formed and it
is a government that we would want to work with, we are
prepared and we are in, as I mentioned, in constant scenario
planning. So in the event that there is a civilian-led
government that we would want to work with, we are prepared to
adjust our assistance posture toward that government. So we are
ready to go.
Ms. Bass. Well, I was describing if they formed a
government without the opposition.
Mr. Day. I am sorry, without the opposition.
Ms. Bass. If the military, right.
Mr. Day. So we will work with our----
Ms. Bass. What will we do? What will our response be?
Mr. Day. So we will certainly work with our colleagues at
the State Department to make a political analysis as to whether
or not this is a government in which we can work. But in the
event that we can work, well, then we are ready to go.
Ms. Bass. I think that was a--referring that to you,
Ambassador.
Ms. James. Chair, I would like to just be very clear and
unequivocal about this. We have conveyed in very strong terms
that a unilateral government formed by the TMC would not be
credible, would be unacceptable, and we would have a very
difficult time engaging with such a government.
Ms. Bass. What do you think the UAE and Saudi Arabia and
Egypt would do?
Ms. James. Well, we have had frank discussions as I said,
this last week as well as the previous contacts I have
described, and they have said to us repeatedly, they too want
to see a civilian-led government that is in their interest
because they are fundamentally concerned about stability.
Anything short of a civilian-led transitional government that
does not have the consensus and the buy-in from the people will
not provide the stability that they care about.
So we believe them. We take them at their word that they
want to see that, that they are sending those similar kinds of
messages, and we urge them to continue to do that publicly,
privately, and to use their leverage.
Ms. Bass. So are we doing anything to return internet
access? I do not believe the internet is back, is it?
Ms. James. My understanding is that it is not back yet. We
are very concerned about that. Of course, it affects not only
messaging, but it also affects humanitarian assistance
delivery, it affects a number of things.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ms. James. We are very concerned about that. We have,
again, been making that one of our clear messages to the TMC,
``You have to restore the internet.''
Ms. Bass. So what are we doing to support, then, the human
rights defenders, journalists, and civil society during this
period? And when you say to them that they have to restore the
internet, what is their response? Because they have not done
it.
Ms. James. Well, they have not done it. I could not tell
you chapter and verse as to what they are doing behind the
scenes, we have not seen it. But they know that it is part of
our broader messaging. If you do not allow the people to
demonstrate peacefully, if you do not allow not just the
internet, but media freedom, then all of this undermines
credibility in their efforts to get a civilian government.
We have been making the linkage that you cannot have a good
faith process if you do not allow the people to speak and to be
seen and to be able to demonstrate peacefully. So we have been
simply reiterating this as part of our broader messaging to
them that people have a right to peacefully protest.
Ms. Bass. Do you get a sense that they take us seriously? I
mean we do not have an ambassador, right?
Ms. James. We have a charge and that is because they have a
charge here. But our Charge, Steven Koutsis, has been very
engaged. He has regular meetings across the board with FFC and
TMC and other stakeholders, so we think that we are getting our
message across.
We have actually seen some moderation. When I arrived in
Khartoum at first, early April, one of the first demands was
that the negotiators that the TMC put forward were not
credible. They were considered tainted, and we pressed that
they had to remove them. The TMC did remove those people. And
so we think that they do begin to hear us, but it has to be
consistent and it has to be a collective message from the
broader international community.
Ms. Bass. So it just seems to me, I mean, you know, I was
there a few months ago before this happened and they were so
excited and interested in moving U.S. relations forward, and
they were all ears. And to me it seems like that has closed. I
do not get the impression that they are taking us seriously. If
we have said over and over again, they need to restore internet
access and they have not, I do not know if we have any ability
technology-wise to supersede that.
Ms. James. I could not answer on the technical issue of
what we can do on the internet specifically, other than make it
very clear that that is part of our broader demand for giving
the public access to media and the ability to be heard and to
be seen. In terms of our leverage, one of the most important
bits of leverage we have, and I think the committee is quite
aware, is that we were in discussions with the government prior
to the fall of Bashir. We were in discussions on what we called
Phase II. That process has been suspended indefinitely.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ms. James. The government is very much interested in
resuming that because they see it as the ultimate path to
getting to economic assistance.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ms. James. So that leverage is something that we are----
Ms. Bass. They want the State sponsored terrorism removed.
Ms. James. We are continuing to press that there will not
even be a reassessment of starting that dialog unless the
civilian government is in place. So we think we have their
attention because that is leverage that they really want us to
exert in their behalf.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you much, Madam Chair.
Let me ask you if I could, the makeup of the RSF, you know,
the information I have looked at suggests there may be as many
as 50,000 troops. A man who goes by the nickname of Hemeti who
is well-known for his atrocities, and I am wondering what we
know about him. And I am wondering if you could tell us how the
Saudis and the Gulf States provide money. What is the flow of
money, munitions, other materiel, do they have any influence to
try to end this reign of terror since they seem to be the purse
strings?
But again, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, I mean
it could be--who goes by the nickname of Hemeti. But 50,000
troops, is that accurate, because that is a huge force, and are
they at loggerheads with the military or are they in some way
in cahoots with the military, if you could speak to that as
well.
Who in the RSF has been--who are they targeting? I mean
when they went into the hospitals, when they raped men and
women, when they killed people, what was their target? They
must have had--it could not have been indiscriminate. They must
have had people. Is there any sectarian violence involved here?
Are there Muslims, for example, or Catholics, or others? Is
there any evidence of that? I think that is important.
And again, the Janjaweed leadership, how many of these
people are newly recruited into this new force? You know, the
Janjaweed was notorious for its brutality. They never went away
and, apparently, they have reconstituted themselves under a new
banner. If you could speak to that as well.
Ms. James. Let me start with Hemeti first. Hemeti is the
deputy of the TMC and in that position he has a role of
influence within the TMC structure. And so, we engage with him,
not to confer legitimacy, not because we believe that he is
somebody who is credible and a good leader, but because we have
to engage with him to deliver our tough messages. So we do meet
with him quite regularly as part of our engagement strategy to
be sure that they are getting our messages loud and clear.
With respect to the RSF, I could not answer your question
yet on the numbers, but we all know that the RSF are a remnant
of the--they are a rebranded version of what was the Janjaweed.
These are not people who we consider to be credible security
forces, but we do feel like because they have been a part of
the security forces, the TMC has to rein them in and has to
direct their behavior and has to be accountable for their
behavior.
But the RSF is quite a concern for us, a very big concern.
These are not disciplined forces. These are not trained
security. And there is a great concern that the division
between them and the regular army, the Sudanese Armed Forces,
is very worrisome. Nobody wants to see a civil war break out.
And so we are trying to convey to General Burhan who is the
head of the TMC that he must be accountable for what is
happening with Hemeti and the RSF. We cannot say that enough.
And it is not just the United States. This is a point that all
the countries involved in Sudan including the members who were
at the meeting on the weekend, the Gulf States, Egypt,
Ethiopia, the AU, we have all been sending a similar message.
The RSF must be reined in.
They have the potential to destabilize what could be a
successful transitional process because they, of course, are
worried about their future, so we have been repeating that
message over and over to Burhan. He has to be accountable for
what is happening with Hemeti and the RSF.
Mr. Smith. Is there any kind of graph that would show the
line of authority with Hemeti and others, and how many of these
commanders are seasoned janjaweed who have committed the most
gross atrocities on the face of the earth and now they are
unleashed again to kill fellow Sudanese, do we have that? I
mean how many--what is the core group that really makes up this
terrible organization?
Ms. James. I do not have a definitive number for you today.
We can do some checking on that. But I think it is accurate to
say that they are widely dispersed throughout Khartoum. They
are in Omdurman. They are in other large cities, so they are in
many different places. And we have urged that they be removed
from the streets of Khartoum. They have no business in
Khartoum. There are no barracks for them in Khartoum. And if
they are going to be removed off the streets they have to be
totally decommissioned there. There is no place for them to go
back into barracks in Khartoum.
Mr. Smith. Now you have testified that AU has suspended
their membership. Does that have any real impact? I mean Bashir
actually ran the organization during one cycle. And I am just
wondering if--what else is on the table that could really
impact them?
Ms. James. The point I was trying to underscore earlier
about the robust diplomacy that is happening now, we are at a
new moment right now. Between the Envoy that the AU has
assigned, the Envoy from IGAD and from Ethiopia, and our own
Envoy, as well as the Envoy from the United Nations and others,
we see that there is now a consensus coming together. There is
a core of diplomacy that is really beginning to have an impact.
We are not only doing it in Khartoum, we are doing it in
various other capitals as well as in the Gulf States.
Ambassador Booth will be traveling not only from Addis to
Khartoum, he will be going to the Gulf States this week coming.
And so, we are going to continue sending the message that we
need to be coordinated and using all of our leverage. No one
country alone can move the situation. It is going to take our
collective activity, which is why we are spending a lot of time
coordinating with our partners in any country that has
influence and a constructive role to be played.
So that is what has been happening. That is the real
leverage, using the diplomacy first because things are
beginning to make a difference. You have the FFC open to an
idea that has been put forward from the African Union and the
IGAD members and that is something that we want to build on. We
want to lock in what they have already agreed to and keep
building on that and pressing the TMC to come to the table.
It is not going to be an overnight process, but we have to
keep the pressure up from all the different bits of leverage
that we have. And many different members of the international
community have different degrees of leverage. We are trying to
bring it all together.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Representative Omar.
Ms. Omar. Ambassador James, I wanted to talk to you about
the role of foreign influence in the events of June 3rd,
particularly wanted to talk to you about Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and the United Arabs. I know that the Administration sees the
importance of engaging the Gulf States since David Hale called
both the Saudis and the Emirates after the attacks.
What do you think are the interests of Saudi Arabia, the
Emirates, and Egypt's objectives and interests in Sudan?
Ms. James. Well, the first thing I would say is that after
the June 3rd violence, the UAE and Saudi Government both issued
statements, as well as Egypt and others, strongly condemning
the violence. They took that action immediately unprompted, and
I take that to mean that they were shocked and appalled by the
violence as we were. So I would give them some degree of credit
in recognizing that that was a horrific experience. It
undermined the process that was going along in a constructive
way.
Ms. Omar. What are----
Ms. James. With respect to their interests, I would say
that certainly they have a lot of--a long-term economic
interest, but they also have an interest in fundamental
stability. Any instability in Sudan is going to affect the
whole region. They have raised that with us on several
occasions. We take that to be a very serious concern.
Instability in the region is something that is going to affect
all the neighbors and they have a stake in making sure that
that instability does not spill over.
Ms. Omar. And, Ambassador, do you think they have an
interest in democratization of Sudan, and do you know if
Secretary Pompeo discussed Sudan with MBS in his meeting
yesterday?
Ms. James. I do not have a readout on the Secretary's
conversations, so I could not address that. But I would say
they have a--the Gulf States have the same interests we have in
terms of stability and the best way to get that stability is to
have the civilian-led government. They have said that
repeatedly. They support that. They have made it very clear
that they do not support the TMC. They are not there for the
TMC, but they engage with the TMC the way we engage to deliver
tough messages.
I take them at their word that instability cannot be
addressed if you do not have a government that the people
fundamentally will accept. That is why the civilian-led
government has been all of our mantra. That is all the people
are demanding. That is what the people want. We believe they
understand that is the root to stability.
Ms. Omar. And we know that the Saudis and the Emirates have
had a history of crushing democratic uprising in the region,
and so I am wondering--that is contrary to what our interests
are what we see as a stability being driven by in the Middle
East. How is Ambassador Booth going to bring them around to see
things from our point of view?
Ms. James. Well, I start with the fact that I do not think
we are pushing on such a closed door to begin with because in
the meetings I held just this weekend with senior officials,
the basic message was that we are all in agreement the
civilian-led transitional government is imperative. It is
imperative for the stability, but it is also the key to
unlocking future economic assistance. That is what the country
fundamentally needs. The instability in Sudan was driven by the
economic crisis. They want to see the economic crisis
addressed. We cannot address it until the State sponsored
terrorism issue is addressed, so stability is key for all of
us.
I think the Gulf States have that same interest. We are all
moving in the direction of what will it take to get us there.
That means we have to get a mediated process which everybody
will agree to that will lead to a civilian government. I think
the Emirates, the Saudis, are in the same position we are of
wanting to see that happen sooner than later. It is the only
guarantee to stave off the instability.
Ms. Omar. Yes. And I know that the people of Sudan have
fought really hard to make sure that they can get rid of a
dictator and I hope we do everything to make sure that they do
not get a dictator for another 30 years.
As you have mentioned that there might be possible
sanctions down the road, to clarify do you mean the Global
Magnitsky sanctions on Hemeti for his role on the June 3rd, or
something else?
Ms. James. Well, respectfully, I would like to say that we
have not really finished that review process. We are looking at
the options, but the options would include a range of things.
As I said, there are some incentives, but there are also some
sanctions, everything from visa sanctions to economic
sanctions. I think I would leave it in that broad category for
now as we are still assessing what are the best tools. We want
to use the right tool and we really want to target the right
people. So visa sanctions are certainly on the table as are
economic sanctions.
Ms. Omar. We often see different ways that we engage and
the ways that we use our toolboxes. There are a lot of people
who are talking to me about the way that we have engaged
aggressively in the situation in Venezuela and how we are not
aggressively in the case of Sudan. And some people would say
this is a country of brown people who are Muslim, you know, we
might not be interested in engaging aggressively because our
allies do not want us to. And I hope that we are trying to find
a balance and trying to be consistent with our values as we
engage diplomatically in this particular issue.
Thank you and I yield back.
Ms. Bass. Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, of course,
today's conversation and hearing is not just about the future
of Sudan and the Sudanese people, but also Ethiopia which, of
course, is host to hundreds of thousands of refugees. And even
an issue that touches my district in the suburbs of
Minneapolis, Minnesota, where one of the first questions asked
in my recent town hall just last weekend was from a Sudanese
immigrant who asked what we are doing to help the transition to
an accountable form of government in his former country.
So to that end, I cannot help but reflect on the fact that
we do not have an ambassador representing our country right
now. Personnel at our embassy has been drawn down and the U.N.
is also drawing down personnel. And so, my first question to
both of you is, under those circumstances are we positioned to
provide the assistance and support necessary and how do those
three things affect our ability to do so?
Ambassador James.
Ms. James. Yes, sir. With respect to the ordered departure,
our first priority always, at all of our embassies overseas, is
the safety of our own people and those who work for us. Drawing
down the embassy was a prudent measure to take in the early
days partly because air travel was inconsistent, and we would
have no way to evacuate people. So we took an action based on
the safety of our own people to draw down to just the essential
core staff.
The essential core staff though is working around the clock
and we are now trying to support them as hard as we can back in
Washington. Ambassador Booth's appointment is to help with some
of the regional diplomacy. So we do think that we have a number
of tools, the Envoy, the embassy team, and then the robust
group that we have back here in Washington, so we do think our
work is still going forward.
Yes, we would like to be at full staffing, but the most
important thing is the safety of the people who are there. We
think we are at a reasonable number for the risk and for the
work that we have to get done. So that is with respect to the
ordered departure.
Mr. Phillips. Mr. Day.
Mr. Day. I would only add that I think we are well
positioned in the event that there is a real political
transition in Sudan. We have been working in Sudan for nearly
three decades. We are the largest humanitarian donor. Our
development assistance is quite limited, but at the same time
we do have a pretty significant network of civil society
organizations that we have supported over the last several
decades.
We have made available some money through our elections and
political processes fund and we also are supporting human
rights monitoring. So at this point we feel like our assistance
is probably appropriate for what the environment is, would
allow, again separating humanitarian assistance and development
assistance. But in the event that there is a political
transition, we stand at the ready to adjust our assistance
posture.
Mr. Phillips. OK. I appreciate that. My next question is
about stolen assets and money laundering. Do you believe those
issues are issues in Sudan?
Ms. James. I would have to say they absolutely are issues.
We have not personally engaged on those deeply since April
11th, but we know that the FFC has been looking at the issue
and we have urged them to be transparent in whatever work that
they are doing around that issue.
But it is certainly something that a civilian-led
government could take on. I think we are not going to get a lot
of traction on that right now, but if we can get to a civilian-
led government I think it is something that we would urge them
to put on their agenda.
Mr. Phillips. As you know, the Treasury Department issues
anti-money laundering advisories on occasion. We have done so
relative to Venezuela and Ukraine. Would you argue that we
should be doing so with Sudan so that we can identify and track
some of those assets?
Ms. James. To be quite honest, the priority right now is to
really get the political process moving forward, to get the
civilian-led government. That is the first thing. When that
happens and we have a responsible government in place, then we
can do a lot of other things along the lines you are
describing. But without a responsible government, I think it is
just going to be so much more difficult, if not impossible. So
our priority right now is really to make this diplomacy robust
and to get the civilian-led government in place.
Mr. Phillips. OK.
Mr. Day, any comments on laundering?
OK. With that I yield my time.
Ms. Bass. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Let me just ask a couple final questions. On December 28th,
the New York Times in an article on the front lines of the
Saudi War in Yemen, child soldiers from Darfur, the point was
made that on any given time for nearly 4 years there was some
14,000 Sudanese militia mostly from Darfur who really comprise
the RSF, so child soldiers are deployed. They take part in that
battle, then some, I guess, maybe many are returned. Is that
what we are talking about in terms of the composition of those
50,000 RSF forces? Are we talking about child soldiers who are
growing older of course, but more battle-hardened, who have now
turned their violence against Sudanese people?
And again, if I could ask, do we have any sense as to how
much money from the Gulf States is flowing to this transitional
government and will the Saudis and others do more to just put a
tourniquet on the money and their diplomatic support for this
terrible bloodletting?
And again--well, third and finally, does USAID have enough
resources? I mean we are talking millions of people again. Is
there a need for an urgent supplemental or is money being
diverted from some other account to ensure that food, clothing,
medicine, and shelter is provided for the victims?
Ms. James. With respect to the child soldier issue, I would
note that Sudan has recently been relisted under the Child
Soldier Protection Act which has consequences with it. It has
sanctions attached to it. But, of course, as they are already
under SST sanctions it does not trigger any new financial
issues, but it is something that we will take note of and a
civilian government will have to address that so they are
relisted for the reasons you described.
I would say that some of those comprise, some of the RSF
forces, I could not give you a breakdown, a real number, but we
know that there have been child soldiers deployed to Yemen and
that we have been concerned about that and we have raised
that----
Mr. Smith. Do we have any idea of what their cycling is? I
mean we all worry here, even the United States, the U.K.,
others, that when people were deployed, went to fight with
ISIS, when they came back posed a very real threat to the U.S.
or name the country. Are these soldiers upon their return now
obviously better trained in really barbaric behavior? Are they
then--I mean how many are we talking about and are they
disciplined? I mean who are they?
Ms. James. I actually do not have a firm answer for what
happens to the returnees. We could come back to you with more
information.
Mr. Smith. Could you provide that for the record?
Ms. James. But I would also like to answer your question
about the money from the Gulf States.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Ms. James. What we have been told repeatedly, we have had
several interventions on this issue, the Saudis and the UAE
Government pledged a total of three billion dollars over a 2-
year timeframe. They have indicated to us that they have each
deposited 250 million into the Central Bank of Sudan and that
that money is there to stabilize the pound.
And it was not given to the TMC and it is not against the
people of Sudan, but it was to avoid a crisis, a fire as they
described it. We have made the strong case to them that any
additional disbursements of those funds should be done in
coordination with the international community, one to make it
more effective and sustainable and to use it to help a
civilian-led government, which will need that assistance over
time.
So they seem to be responsive to those entreaties and we
hope that that is how they will disburse the remainder of that
three billion.
Mr. Day. Ranking Member Smith, I think on the issue of do
we have enough resources, given the increasing need as well as
the access issues the humanitarian operations are fully
functional. And so areas in which we can gain access, we have
the resources that we need to address many of those issues. As
the situation evolves, we may have to reassess as we go forward
because it was only a year, year and a half ago that we were at
about 4.5 million in need of humanitarian assistance and now we
are at 8 million. So this is an extremely fluid situation, so
we will continue to watch this.
We are also looking at other ways in which we may be able
to support many of the people of South Sudan. We are looking at
Office of Transition Initiatives programming. We are looking at
ways in which we can continue to monitor the human rights
issues. So there is a wide range of tools that we are using,
but on the humanitarian assistance side we are deploying the
resources that we have available to us, but many of the
restrictions are going to be more on the access side than they
are of are the resources there. We can move resources from one
place to another.
Mr. Smith. And before I run out of time, is there any
serious consideration at the U.N. of redeploying or in some way
constituting a force--I know it takes a long time to do all of
that but, you know, my sense is that--I do not have a great
deal of optimism that peace is going to break out. So one of
the contingencies should be, will there be a U.N. force ready
for deployment?
Ms. James. To my knowledge, the U.N. Security Council has
not taken this issue up yet. But the U.N. does have an Envoy, a
very capable Envoy Nick Haysom who has been fully engaged in
all the conversations with the other Envoys, with the TMC, and
with the FFC. He has been in Khartoum quite a bit. He has
engaged with us. We think the U.N. is clearly poised to take
action, but it has not come to the Security Council to my
knowledge.
If I could add one other point that I did not mention
earlier, June 30th is close approaching. We are very concerned
about the potential violence for June 30th. We have also been
conveying very strong messages to the TMC that they must allow
peaceful protests. That if there is any repeat of the violence
that we saw on June 3rd that there will be consequences and
that the people have a right to protest because we are
anticipating that there will be major activities on the date of
June 30th.
Mr. Smith. And you think Hemeti gets that?
Ms. James. Well, we have been conveying that across the
board. Certainly we have been conveying it to Burhan and to
others. We think that message is being repeatedly delivered by
other partners as well. It is not just our message, it is the
collective international community's message.
Mr. Smith. Thank you so much. Thank you for your work under
such difficult circumstances. Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Sure, my pleasure.
I just have a couple of final questions. I wanted to know
if the U.S. is encouraging the TMC to turn al-Bashir over to
the ICC.
Ms. James. That has not been a topic of recent
conversation. As you have seen probably in the media, he has
had a hearing at the court in Khartoum.
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Ms. James. And I think that is where he stands right now.
He is incarcerated in Khartoum, but there has not been
engagement on the ICC issue.
Ms. Bass. I wanted to know if you know of where the speaker
of the Parliament is, the speaker that was in place last year.
I do not know if there is a new speaker. And other
parliamentary leaders before Bashir's removal, are they still
in place or is Parliament not functioning at all?
Ms. James. My sense is that Parliament is not functioning
and there have certainly been a lot of people who have been
removed from office. I could not say the status of the speaker,
per se. I really do not know that and I will do some checking.
But another----
Ms. Bass. Could you find out for me?
Ms. James. Yes.
Ms. Bass. I would like to know where he is.
Ms. James. Thank you.
Mr. Day. And, Madam Chair, on that front, I would just add
that on the public administration side, because of course USAID
worked closely with the Humanitarian Aid Commission, many of
those institutions have in many ways been either dismantled or
completely sidelined. In some cases, the National Intelligence
and Security Services that have actually been--they were
interfering in our ability to work with the HAC to get the
permits that we needed.
In an odd chain of events, the inability or the distraction
of the NISS has actually enabled some of that permitting
process to actually improve. So it is still complicated in
terms of the humanitarian access in certain areas, but in many
cases our interactions with the Government of Sudan has been
almost nonexistent.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
The internet blackout, I just want to say in closing, the
internet blackout, we know, is affecting most of the country's
citizens and has now been turned off for what I believe is 21
days. Internet access, we believe, must be reinstated, and I
urge those behind this to unblock internet access immediately.
Governments must understand that prohibiting access does not
mean that citizens will stop exercising their civil rights. I
urge the government also to stop the censoring of print
newspapers and stop detaining and harassing journalists,
activists, and any citizen exercising their right to free
speech and protest peacefully.
Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle are very
engaged in Sudan and plan to continue to do that and we want to
make sure that we have a strong, unified message to help the
citizens of Sudan realize their goal of a civilian-led
transition to power. As I mentioned when we started, this is a
first hearing, this is not our last. I would appreciate it if
you would pass the word to Ambassador Booth and Nagy that we
would like to have them come and speak to us and we would like
to do that very soon.
When we have another hearing on Sudan, we will make sure
that we have more than one panel and there will be Sudanese who
are represented in the future. I apologize we were not able to
do that this time, but assure you that this is not the last
time that you will hear from us on this issue. Members of
Congress, as I said, are very, very concerned about this and do
not plan to let up.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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