[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2019
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 18, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2019
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 18, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-743PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House Senate
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts, MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Co-chair
Chair JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio TOM COTTON, Arkansas
THOMAS SUOZZI, New York STEVE DAINES, Montana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey TODD YOUNG, Indiana
BEN McADAMS, Utah DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
BRIAN MAST, Florida GARY PETERS, Michigan
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Department of State, To Be Appointed
Department of Labor, To Be Appointed
Department of Commerce, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
Jonathan Stivers, Staff Director
Peter Mattis, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. Executive Summary............................................. 1
Statement From the Chairs.................................... 1
Overview..................................................... 3
Key Findings................................................. 7
Political Prisoner Cases of Concern.......................... 20
General Recommendations to Congress and the Administration... 27
Political Prisoner Database.................................. 33
II. Human Rights................................................. 37
Freedom of Expression........................................ 37
Findings and Recommendations............................... 37
China's Compliance with International Standards on Freedom
of Expression............................................ 39
30 Years after Tiananmen................................... 39
Press Freedom and Tiananmen................................ 41
Freedom of the Press....................................... 41
Internet and Social Media.................................. 45
Curtailment of Academic Freedom in China................... 47
Worker Rights................................................ 58
Findings and Recommendations............................... 58
Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining..................... 61
Heightened Suppression of Labor Rights Advocacy............ 61
Jasic Incident............................................. 62
Civil Society Organizations................................ 62
Worker Strikes and Protests................................ 64
996.ICU Campaign and Excessive Overtime.................... 65
Social Insurance........................................... 65
Employment Relationships................................... 66
Work Safety and Industrial Accidents....................... 67
Occupational Health........................................ 68
Criminal Justice............................................. 77
Findings and Recommendations............................... 77
Introduction............................................... 80
Use of Criminal Law to Punish Rights Advocates............. 80
Arbitrary Detention........................................ 81
Chinese Authorities' Retaliatory Use of Criminal Law
against Canadian Citizens................................ 83
Ongoing Challenges in Implementation of the Criminal
Procedure Law............................................ 84
Torture and Abuse in Custody............................... 86
Medical Care in Custody.................................... 86
Wrongful Conviction........................................ 87
Policing................................................... 87
Death Penalty.............................................. 88
Organ Harvesting........................................... 89
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 101
Findings and Recommendations............................... 101
International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom......... 104
Policies and Regulations Pertaining to Religious Freedom... 104
Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) and Taoism.......................... 106
Christianity--Catholicism.................................. 107
Christianity--Protestantism................................ 107
Falun Gong................................................. 109
Islam...................................................... 109
Other Religious Communities................................ 110
Ethnic Minority Rights....................................... 116
Findings and Recommendations............................... 116
Introduction............................................... 118
Party and State ``Sinicization'' of Ethnic Minorities...... 118
Policies Affecting Hui Islamic Communities................. 118
Grassland Protests in Inner Mongolia....................... 119
Detention of Mongol Writers................................ 120
Population Control........................................... 123
Findings and Recommendations............................... 123
International Standards and China's Coercive Population
Policies................................................. 125
Coercive Implementation and Punishment for Noncompliance... 125
Report of Forced Sterilization in Mass Internment Camps in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.................... 127
The Universal Two-Child Policy............................. 127
Demographic and Humanitarian Consequences of Population
Control Policies......................................... 128
Special Topic: Migrant Neighborhoods a Target of Anti-Crime
and Vice Campaign.......................................... 138
Findings and Recommendations............................... 138
Introduction............................................... 140
Urban Village Eviction, Demolition, and Surveillance under
the Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign: Yuhuazhai in Xi'an..... 141
Vulnerability of Internal Migrants and Household
Registration Policies.................................... 142
Status of Women.............................................. 148
Findings and Recommendations............................... 148
Discrimination in Employment............................... 150
Domestic and Gender-Based Violence......................... 152
Public Participation....................................... 152
Human Trafficking............................................ 157
Findings and Recommendations............................... 157
Defining Human Trafficking................................. 159
Trends and Developments.................................... 159
Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region...... 162
Risk Factors............................................... 162
Anti-Trafficking Efforts................................... 163
Hong Kong.................................................. 164
North Korean Refugees in China............................... 174
Findings and Recommendations............................... 174
Introduction............................................... 176
Border Conditions and Repatriation of Refugees............. 176
Crackdown on Foreign Missionaries.......................... 177
Trafficking of North Korean Women.......................... 178
Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents............... 178
Public Health................................................ 182
Findings and Recommendations............................... 182
Legislative and Policy Developments........................ 183
Food Safety................................................ 183
Drug Safety................................................ 183
Ongoing Misuse of the PRC Mental Health Law................ 185
The Environment.............................................. 189
Findings and Recommendations............................... 189
Introduction and Environmental Governance.................. 191
Environmental Enforcement and Persistence of Severe
Pollution................................................ 191
Public Interest Litigation and Criminal Enforcement........ 192
Suppression of Environmental Protests and Advocates........ 192
Media Reporting on Environmental Incidents and Corruption.. 194
Assessing the Chinese Government's Commitment to Combat
Climate Change........................................... 195
Wildlife Trade and Traditional Chinese Medicine............ 196
Business and Human Rights.................................... 202
Findings and Recommendations............................... 202
Introduction............................................... 205
Corporate Involvement in Possible Crimes Against Humanity
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region................. 205
Clothing Made With Forced Labor Imported Into United States 207
Commercial Firms' Role in Government Data Collection and
Surveillance Across China................................ 209
Role of Commercial Firms in Government Censorship.......... 211
III. Development of the Rule of Law.............................. 219
Civil Society................................................ 219
Findings and Recommendations............................... 219
Introduction............................................... 222
Universal Periodic Review.................................. 222
Government Suppression of Civil Society.................... 223
Foreign NGOs' Activities in China.......................... 224
Arbitrary Detention of Canadian Citizen Michael Kovrig in
China.................................................... 225
Overall Regulatory Environment for Domestic NGOs........... 226
Suppression of the LGBTQ Community......................... 226
Institutions of Democratic Governance........................ 234
Findings and Recommendations............................... 234
Governance in China's One-Party System..................... 236
Communist Party Centralized and Expanded Control........... 236
Communist Party Formalized Control Over Personnel
Management in Government................................. 237
Use of Technology to Control Citizens...................... 238
Citizen Participation...................................... 239
Accountability............................................. 240
Possible Political Motivations Behind Detaining Interpol
President................................................ 242
Access to Justice............................................ 250
Findings and Recommendations............................... 250
Communist Party's Control Over the Judicial Process........ 252
Judicial Interference and Party-Led Investigation.......... 252
Persecution of Human Rights Lawyers........................ 254
Citizen Petitioning........................................ 255
Legal Aid.................................................. 256
Other Developments in the Judicial System.................. 256
IV. Xinjiang..................................................... 263
Findings and Recommendations................................. 263
Intensified Repression in Mass Internment System............. 266
Documentation of Mass Internment Camps....................... 270
Forced Labor in Mass Internment Camps........................ 272
Transfer of Camp Detainees to Facilities Outside of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.......................... 273
Detentions of Leading Turkic Cultural and Intellectual
Figures.................................................... 273
Detentions of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz; Documentation in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan of XUAR Mass Internment Camps............... 274
Forcible Displacement of the Children of Camp Detainees...... 275
Intrusive Homestay Programs.................................. 275
Repressive Surveillance Technology and Security Measures..... 276
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 276
V. Tibet......................................................... 288
Findings and Recommendations................................. 288
Introduction................................................. 291
Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the
Dalai Lama or His Representatives.......................... 291
Government and Party Policy.................................. 291
Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists...................... 293
Self-Immolation.............................................. 295
Status of Tibetan Culture and Language....................... 296
Freedom of Expression........................................ 296
Freedom of Movement.......................................... 297
Economy, Environment, and Development Concerns............... 298
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.......................... 306
Findings and Recommendations................................. 306
Introduction: Hong Kong's Autonomy........................... 309
Erosion of Political Autonomy in Hong Kong................... 309
National Anthem Bill......................................... 310
2019 Anti-Extradition Bill and Pro-Democracy Demonstrations.. 311
Government Prosecution in Hong Kong Courts................... 313
Fundamental Freedoms......................................... 314
Macau........................................................ 315
I. Executive Summary
Statement From the Chairs
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Commission) was established by the U.S.-China Relations Act of
2000 (Public Law No. 106-286) as China prepared to enter the
World Trade Organization. The Commission is mandated to monitor
human rights and the development of the rule of law in China,
and to submit an annual report to the President and Congress.
The Commission is also mandated to maintain a database of
political prisoners in China--individuals who have been
detained or imprisoned by the Chinese government for exercising
their internationally recognized civil and political rights, as
well as rights protected by China's Constitution and other
domestic laws.
The Commission's 2019 Annual Report covers the period from
August 2018 to August 2019. The comprehensive findings and
recommendations in this report focus on the Chinese
government's compliance with or violation of internationally
recognized human rights, including the right to free
expression, peaceful assembly, religious belief and practice,
as well as any progress or regression on the development of the
rule of law. As discussed in the subsequent chapters of this
report, the human rights and rule of law conditions in China
have continued to worsen this past year.
A part of the Commission's mandate is the inclusion of
recommendations for legislative and executive action. In
addition to the recommendations contained in this report, the
Commission drafted, edited, and provided support for numerous
legislative initiatives over the last year, including those
related to human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region, Hong Kong's autonomy and rule of law, Tibet policy and
human rights, the 30th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen
protests, and the use of advanced technology to facilitate
human rights abuses in China.
Over the past year, the Commission held congressional
hearings on ``Hong Kong's Future in the Balance: Eroding
Autonomy and Challenges to Human Rights,'' ``Tiananmen at 30:
Examining the Evolution of Repression in China,'' and ``The
Communist Party's Crackdown on Religion in China.'' The
Commission also held a town hall event in New York City with
the New York and New Jersey Tibetan communities. The Commission
regularly conducts congressional briefings and meetings with
non-governmental organizations, academics, legal professionals,
and human rights advocates. The Commission's Political Prisoner
Database is an important tool for documenting political
prisoners in China and providing publicly accessible
information on individual cases for U.S. Government officials,
advocates, academics, journalists, and the public.
As Legislative and Executive Branch decisionmakers seek a
more effective strategy for promoting human rights and the rule
of law in China, the Commission plays an essential role in
reporting on conditions, raising awareness of human rights
violations, and informing U.S. policy. We are grateful for the
opportunity to serve as the Commission Chair and Co-Chair, and
we appreciate the attention of the U.S. Congress and
Administration to the issues highlighted in this report.
Sincerely,
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Representative James P. McGovern Senator Marco Rubio
Chair Co-Chair
Overview
It has been three decades since China's People's Liberation
Army was ordered to forcefully end the peaceful protests for
political reform in Tiananmen Square and throughout China. The
violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests was a key
turning point in history as the Chinese government and
Communist Party suspended experiments in openness and reform
and strengthened a hardline approach to prevent the growth of
independent civil society and reinforce their control over the
people of China.
Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government and
Party have expanded a costly and elaborate authoritarian system
designed to intimidate, censor, and even imprison Chinese
citizens for exercising their fundamental human rights,
including freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and freedom
of religion. Authorities targeted and imprisoned citizens
calling for democratic reform--including Nobel Peace Prize
laureate Liu Xiaobo, who took part in the Tiananmen protests
and co-authored Charter 08, a political treatise that called
for constitutional government and respect for human rights. In
the years since Tiananmen, Liu Xiaobo spent a total of almost
16 years in detention and died in state custody in 2017.
After Xi Jinping became Chinese Communist Party General
Secretary in 2012, and President in 2013, the space for human
rights advocacy and political reform narrowed further as the
Chinese government and Party exerted a tighter grip over
governance, law enforcement, and the judiciary. Under President
Xi's tenure, authorities launched a nationwide crackdown on the
legal community and rights defenders; curtailed civil society,
academia, and religious life; led an anticorruption campaign
that helped remove political opposition inside the Party; and
eliminated term limits on the presidency, signaling Xi's
intention to remain in power indefinitely.
During its 2019 reporting year, the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China (Commission) found that the human rights
situation has worsened and the rule of law continued to
deteriorate, as the Chinese government and Party increasingly
used regulations and laws to assert social and political
control. The Chinese government continued its crackdown on
``citizen journalists'' who report on human rights violations,
with mainstream Chinese journalists calling conditions in China
an ``era of total censorship.'' The abuse of criminal law and
police power to target rights advocates, religious believers,
and ethnic minority groups also continued unabated, and
reporting on such abuses became increasingly restricted.
Further, the Chinese government has become more efficient
in the use of advanced technology and information to control
and suppress the people of China. Nowhere is this more of a
concern than in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),
where the Commission believes Chinese authorities may be
committing crimes against humanity against the Uyghur people
and other Turkic Muslims. Over the past year, Chinese
authorities have expanded a system of extrajudicial mass
internment camps in the XUAR. Although the true number of
detainees has not been publicly reported, experts estimate one
million or more Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others
currently are or have been detained and subjected to abuse and
forced labor in mass internment camps.
Outside the camps, the Chinese government and Party have
created a pervasive and high-tech surveillance system in the
XUAR that some observers have called an ``open-air prison.''
The system integrates facial recognition cameras and real-time
monitoring of cell phones into an Orwellian policing platform
that observes every aspect of life in the XUAR and allows
Chinese officials to tighten their control of Uyghurs and other
Turkic Muslims in the region. This surveillance system is
implemented--often with the assistance of domestic and
international businesses--using security personnel and
surveillance technology that helps Chinese officials repress
Uyghurs and others in the XUAR.
As the world commemorated the 30th anniversary of the
Tiananmen Square Massacre in 2019, China's leaders not only
refused to provide a full, public, and independent accounting
of events, but also continued to prohibit any public mourning
by the families of the victims and censored discussion of the
events of 1989 in mainland China. Hundreds of thousands of
people joined together in Victoria Park in Hong Kong to
participate in a candlelight vigil on the Tiananmen
anniversary.
In Hong Kong, millions of people took to the streets to
protest the Hong Kong government's introduction of a bill to
amend the city's extradition law, revisions that would put
anyone in Hong Kong--including U.S. citizens--at risk of
extradition to mainland China, where lack of due process and
custodial abuses have been well documented. The protest on June
16, 2019, which organizers estimated had over two million
participants, was spurred by the unwillingness of the Hong Kong
government to formally withdraw the extradition bill. As
protests continued throughout the summer, Hong Kong police used
rubber bullets, tear gas, pepper spray, and water cannons
against peaceful protesters. Although consideration of the
extradition law amendments was suspended, protesters continued
to call for the bill to be withdrawn and for accountability for
the excessive use of force by the Hong Kong police and criminal
gangs--who were suspected of working with police--against
protesters.
The 2019 Hong Kong protests are a manifestation of an
unprecedented grassroots movement revealing deep discontent
with the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy. Under the ``one
country, two systems'' framework based on the 1984 Sino-British
Joint Declaration and established by Hong Kong's Basic Law, the
Chinese government agreed to allow Hong Kong a ``high degree of
autonomy'' with the ``ultimate aim'' of electing its Chief
Executive and Legislative Council members by universal
suffrage. Yet instead of making progress toward universal
suffrage, Hong Kong authorities have prosecuted and sentenced
pro-democracy leaders, disqualified and removed pro-democracy
legislators from office, and introduced a new national anthem
bill that would restrict free expression. In addition, mainland
Chinese authorities continued to arbitrarily detain Hong Kong
bookseller Gui Minhai, who was first abducted in 2015. Anson
Chan, the former Hong Kong Chief Secretary and Legislative
Council member, recently offered this insight: ``If only
Beijing would understand what makes Hong Kong tick, what are
the values we hold dear, then they can use that energy to
benefit both China and Hong Kong. Instead, they have this
mentality of control.''
In Tibet, the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama's escape
into exile passed without any progress toward a genuine
dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama or
his representatives. This past year, Chinese authorities
continued to systematically repress the peaceful exercise of
internationally recognized human rights and intensify their
restrictions on the religious and cultural life of Tibetans.
Access to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) remained tightly
controlled, with international journalists reporting that it
was more difficult to visit the TAR than North Korea. In a
white paper issued in March 2019, the Chinese government
restated the claim that it has the sole authority to select the
next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, in violation of the
religious freedom of the Tibetan Buddhist community.
Chinese authorities continued to aggressively target
unregistered Christian churches this past year as part of the
implementation of new regulations on religious affairs. In a
troubling development, congregations with hundreds of
worshipers were officially banned, including Zion Church and
Shouwang Church in Beijing municipality; Rongguili Church in
Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province; and the Early Rain
Covenant Church in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province.
Sources also reported Protestant church closures in Guizhou,
Henan, Anhui, and Zhejiang provinces.
The Chinese government and Communist Party seek to
legitimize their political model internationally while
preventing liberal and universal values from gaining a foothold
inside China. The Party's United Front Work Department and
Central Propaganda Department are increasingly active beyond
China's borders, working to influence public perceptions about
the Chinese government and neutralize perceived threats to the
Party's ideological and policy agenda. These efforts focus
heavily on shaping the mediums through which ideas about China,
what it means to be Chinese, and Chinese government activities
are understood. The practical effect of these activities is the
exportation of the Party's authoritarian values. On the ground,
this takes multiple forms, such as interfering in multilateral
institutions; threatening and intimidating critics of the
Chinese government; imposing censorship mechanisms on foreign
publishers and social media companies; influencing academic
institutions and critical analysis of China's past history and
present policies; and compelling American companies to conform
to the Party's narratives and to convey those narratives to
U.S. policymakers. Chinese government-led investment and
development projects abroad, such as the Belt and Road
Initiative, bring with them a robust non-democratic political
agenda. Just as at home, the Chinese government tries to
integrate economic development and political control to
leverage the market without endangering the Party's
authoritarian values.
The people of China continued to actively organize and
advocate for their rights, despite the Chinese government's
deepening repression. In the labor sector, non-governmental
organizations and citizen journalists documented numerous
worker strikes and other labor actions over the past year,
despite an expanded crackdown on labor advocates and citizen
journalists throughout the country. At Jasic Technology in
Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province, workers who
attempted to set up a trade union were taken into custody in a
crackdown starting in July 2018. Authorities also detained
supporters of the Jasic workers, including university students,
labor rights advocates, and citizen journalists, many of whom
remained in detention as of August 2019. Earlier this year,
Chinese internet technology workers launched a campaign against
exploitative work hours--referred to as ``996,'' a 9 a.m. to 9
p.m. schedule for six days a week common in many Chinese
companies. Such long hours violate China's labor laws.
Women in China continued to face severe discrimination in
hiring, wages, and promotions along with gender bias and sexual
harassment in the workplace. Public pressure from advocacy
campaigns, including a #MeToo-inspired movement, led Chinese
officials to initiate policies to address sexual harassment and
gender discrimination in employment. Nonetheless, inadequate
enforcement and discriminatory laws persist.
Rising authoritarianism in China is one of the most
important challenges of the 21st century. In the coming
decades, global challenges will require a constructive Chinese
role that respects and elevates the voices of over 1.3 billion
people in China instead of suppressing them. U.S. foreign
policy must prioritize the promotion of universal human rights
and the rule of law in China, not only to respect and protect
the basic dignity of the people of China, but to better promote
security and prosperity for all of humanity.
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Key Findings
Freedom of Expression
The Chinese government and Communist Party
continued to restrict freedom of expression and freedom
of the press in contravention of international human
rights standards.
At the UN Human Rights Council's third
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of China's compliance
with international human rights norms, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) reported that the Chinese
government and Communist Party violated freedom of
expression and freedom of the press. NGO stakeholders
raised concerns about Chinese government influence over
the UPR process.
Conditions for journalism in China continued
to deteriorate. Some professional Chinese journalists
described current conditions for journalism as an ``era
of total censorship.'' In addition, the government's
ongoing crackdown on ``citizen journalists'' who have
founded or are associated with websites that document
human rights violations continued, as seen in the
detention of individuals focused on labor conditions,
such as Wei Zhili, Yang Zhengjun, and Ke Chengbing.
Foreign journalists faced multiple challenges from the
government, including surveillance, harassment, and
obstruction.
The government and Party continued to link
internet security to national security. This past year,
authorities detained and prosecuted individuals who
criticized government officials and policies online.
Authorities also censored or distorted a range of news
and information that the government deemed
``politically sensitive,'' including the 30th
anniversary of Tiananmen, rights conditions in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the protests
in Hong Kong against proposed extradition legislation,
and trade issues.
Declining academic freedom in China linked to
Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping's
reassertion of ideological control over universities
was illustrated by reports of the internment of
hundreds of predominantly Uyghur scholars in mass
internment camps in the XUAR; the detentions of
university students who advocated for labor rights; and
the dismissal, suspension, and other forms of
discipline imposed on faculty who criticized the
government and Party.
Worker Rights
China's laws and practices continue to
contravene international worker rights standards,
including the right to create or join independent trade
unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions, an
organization under the direction of the Chinese
Communist Party, remains the only trade union
organization permitted under Chinese law.
The Chinese government did not publicly report
on the number of worker strikes and protests, and NGOs
and citizen journalists continued to face difficulties
in obtaining comprehensive information on worker
actions. The Hong Kong-based NGO China Labour Bulletin
documented 1,702 strikes and other labor actions in
2018, up from 1,257 strikes and other labor actions in
2017. In March 2019, Chinese internet technology
workers launched a campaign against ``996''--a 9 a.m.
to 9 p.m. schedule for six days a week common in many
Chinese technology companies. The campaign began with a
project on the Microsoft-owned software development
platform Github that identified how the schedule
violates provisions in Chinese labor laws. The project
received over 200,000 stars indicating popular support.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Number
Year Manufacturing Construction Transportation Services Other Reported
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 15.5% 44.8% 15.9% 13.3% 10.6% 1,702
(263) (763) (270) (227) (180)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 19.7% 38.1% 8.6% 15.2% 10.8% 1,257
(267) (518) (117) (207) (148)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: China Labour Bulletin. Note that the percentages indicate the percentage of total worker actions
documented that year.
During the 2019 reporting year, Chinese
authorities restricted the ability of civil society
organizations to work on labor issues, and authorities
expanded a crackdown on labor advocates across China.
As of August 2019, authorities continued to detain over
50 workers and labor advocates, including Fu Changguo,
Zhang Zhiyu (more widely known as Zhang Zhiru), and Wu
Guijun.
Chinese authorities and university officials
monitored, harassed, and detained students and recent
graduates who advocated on behalf of workers.
Authorities detained approximately 50 supporters of
workers who attempted to organize an independent union
at Jasic Technology in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong
province, including Peking University graduate Yue Xin.
In October 2018, Cornell University's School of
Industrial and Labor Relations suspended two student
exchange programs with Renmin University due to ``gross
violations of academic freedom'' in China. As of May
2019, Chinese authorities had detained 21 members of
the Marxist Society at Peking University, including Qiu
Zhanxuan and Zhang Shengye.
Government data showed a continued decline in
workplace deaths this past year, although Chinese
workers and labor organizations expressed concern about
inadequate safety equipment and training. In March
2019, a chemical explosion killed 78 people in Jiangsu
province, the largest industrial accident in China
since 2015.
Criminal Justice
Chinese government and Communist Party
officials continued to abuse criminal law and police
power to ``maintain stability'' (weiwen) with the goal
of perpetuating one-party rule. The Chinese government
used the criminal law to target rights advocates,
religious believers, and ethnic minority groups.
The government continued to claim that it
reserved the death penalty for a small number of crimes
and only the most serious offenders. Amnesty
International estimated that China carried out more
executions than any other country. The death penalty
disproportionately targeted ethnic and religious
minorities, such as Muslim Uyghurs, for their religious
beliefs.
Authorities continued to use various forms of
arbitrary detention to deprive individuals of their
liberty this past year, contravening international
human rights standards.
Authorities held rights advocates, lawyers,
petitioners, and others in prolonged pretrial
detention, including under ``residential surveillance
at a designated location,'' a form of incommunicado
detention that can last up to six months, restricts
access to counsel, and places detainees at risk of
abuse by authorities.
Freedom of Religion
Scholars and international rights groups have
described religious persecution in China over the last
year to be of an intensity not seen since the Cultural
Revolution. Chinese Communist Party General Secretary
and President Xi Jinping has doubled down on the
``sinicization'' of religion--a campaign that aims to
bring religion in China under closer official control
and into conformity with officially sanctioned
interpretations of Chinese culture. Authorities have
expanded the ``sinicization'' campaign to target not
only religions perceived as ``foreign,'' such as Islam
and Christianity, but also Han Buddhism, Taoism, and
folk religious beliefs.
Violations of the religious freedom of Hui
Muslim believers continued to intensify, with plans to
apply ``anti-terrorism'' measures currently used in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the Ningxia
Hui Autonomous Region (Ningxia)--a region with a high
concentration of Hui Muslim believers. A five-year plan
to ``sinicize'' Islam in China was passed in January
2019. Meanwhile, ongoing policies included measures
requiring Islamic religious leaders and lay believers
to demonstrate their political reliability.
Chinese authorities continued to subject
Protestant Christian believers in China belonging to
both official and house churches to increased
surveillance, harassment, and control. The Commission
observed reports this past year of official bans of
large unregistered churches, including Zion Church and
Shouwang Church in Beijing municipality; Rongguili
Church in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province;
and Early Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu municipality,
Sichuan province. After the PRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs signed an agreement with the Holy See in
September 2018 paving the way for unifying the state-
sanctioned and underground Catholic communities, local
Chinese authorities subjected Catholic believers in
China to increasing persecution by demolishing
churches, removing crosses, and continuing to detain
underground clergy.
As in previous years, authorities continued to
detain Falun Gong practitioners and subject them to
harsh treatment, with 931 practitioners reportedly
sentenced for criminal ``cult'' offenses in 2018. Human
rights organizations and Falun Gong practitioners
documented coercive and violent practices against
practitioners during custody, including physical
violence, forced drug administration, and other forms
of torture.
Bans on religious belief proliferated at the
local level for students and various professionals.
Party disciplinary regulations were revised to impose
harsher punishment on members for manifestations of
religious belief.
Ethnic Minority Rights
Authorities carried out the physical
destruction and alteration of Hui Muslim spaces and
structures, continuing a recent trend away from
relative toleration of Hui Muslim communities. These
changes narrowed the space for Hui Muslim believers to
assert an ethnic and religious identity distinct from
that of the dominant Han Chinese population.
Mongol herders in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region demonstrated and petitioned the
government over the loss of traditional grazing lands.
As in past reporting years, authorities detained some
of the Mongol herders who peacefully protested.
Population Control
Central government authorities rejected calls
to end birth restrictions, despite population experts
and National People's Congress delegates voicing
demographic, economic, and human rights concerns over
the Chinese government's population control policies.
The Commission continued to observe reports of Chinese
authorities threatening or imposing punishments on
families for illegal pregnancies and births, using
methods including heavy fines, job termination, and
abortion.
The Chinese government's restrictive family
planning policies have exacerbated China's aging
society and sex ratio imbalance. Human trafficking for
forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation
continue to be challenges that have worsened under the
decades-long population control policies implemented by
the Chinese government.
Special Topic: Migrant Neighborhoods a Target of Anti-Crime and Vice
Campaign
An anti-crime campaign launched by central
authorities in 2018 was used to target marginalized
groups in China. Called the ``Specialized Struggle to
Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice,'' the
stated aims of the three-year campaign include
guaranteeing China's lasting political stability and
further consolidating the foundation of Communist Party
rule.
The Commission observed reports of local
governments invoking this anti-crime campaign in order
to target petitioners (individuals and groups who seek
redress from the government), religious believers,
village election candidates, and lawyers. Some local
governments have also increased monitoring of internal
migrant neighborhoods in the name of the anti-crime
campaign.
Status of Women
Women in China face severe discrimination
throughout their careers, from job recruitment and
hiring to wages and promotions. Gender bias and sexual
harassment in the workplace are major factors
contributing to the employment gender gap, as well as
national laws mandating parental leave and other
entitlements for women but not men.
Despite official repression, independent
public advocacy for women's rights continue to
influence public discourse and policy. Following
significant public pressure via advocacy campaigns led
by grassroots activists, Chinese officials initiated
policies to address gender discrimination in
employment. Nonetheless, inadequate enforcement and
discriminatory laws persist.
Thirty percent of women have experienced some
form of domestic violence, yet as of December 2018--
nearly three years after the passage of the PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law in March 2016--Chinese courts had
issued only a total of 3,718 protection orders.
Human Trafficking
Chinese authorities subjected Uyghur Muslims
and other ethnic minorities in the XUAR to forced labor
in the production of food, textiles, and other goods.
Women and girls from countries including Burma
(Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, North
Korea, Pakistan, and Vietnam were trafficked into China
for forced marriage and sexual exploitation; and
individuals from Burma, Mongolia, Nepal, and North
Korea were trafficked to China for the purpose of
forced labor. Chinese nationals were trafficked outside
of China to other parts of the world, including the
United States.
The government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) reportedly continued to
generate revenue by sending DPRK nationals to work in
China under conditions that may constitute forced
labor, in possible violation of UN sanctions.
Hong Kong remained a destination for the
trafficking of migrant domestic workers from Indonesia
and the Philippines who face exploitative working
conditions.
North Korean Refugees in China
The Chinese government continued to detain
North Korean refugees in China and repatriate them to
the DPRK, where they face severe punishment, including
torture, imprisonment, forced labor, and even
execution. The repatriation of North Korean refugees
violates China's obligations under international human
rights and refugee law and may amount to ``aiding and
abetting crimes against humanity.'' This past year,
Chinese and North Korean authorities reportedly imposed
stricter border controls to deter North Korean refugees
from escaping the DPRK.
The majority of North Korean refugees leaving
the DPRK are women. The Chinese government's refusal to
recognize these women as refugees denies them legal
protection and may encourage the trafficking of North
Korean women and girls within China. Many children born
to Chinese fathers and North Korean mothers remain
deprived of basic rights to education and other public
services, owing to their lack of legal resident status
in China, which constitute violations of the PRC
Nationality Law and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.
Public Health
Food safety and vaccine safety scandals have
continued to flare up in the past year, despite the
Chinese government's attempts in the past decade to
improve quality control. Analysts point to a lack of
accountability, weak regulatory capacity and
enforcement of laws, corruption, and government
procurement systems that favor low-cost goods. The
National People's Congress passed a new vaccine
management law in June 2019 aimed at strengthening
vaccine supervision, penalizing producers of
substandard or fake vaccines, and introducing
compensation for victims of faulty vaccines.
Despite strong regulations aimed at improving
food and vaccine safety and punishment for companies
and individuals found guilty of criminal acts,
authorities also continued to detain citizens for
speaking out and organizing protests, including victims
and parents of children who received tainted vaccines.
Chinese authorities reportedly continued to
forcibly commit individuals to psychiatric facilities,
including government critics and those with grievances
against government officials and legal processes, even
though the PRC Mental Health Law prohibits such abuses.
The Environment
Environmental pollution remained a major
challenge in China due to authorities' top-down
approach to environmental challenges, transparency
shortcomings, and the suppression and detention of
environmental advocates. The Chinese government's
vision of environmental governance was articulated in
the National Development and Reform Commission's work
report for 2018, which states, ``the government leads,
enterprises are the main actors, and social
organizations and the public participate.'' The role
for the public in environmental protection, however,
remained limited.
In 2018, carbon dioxide emissions in China
continued to increase, as Chinese state-owned banks
funded international coal-fired power projects. While
the Chinese government continued to report progress in
environmental protection, a March 2019 ranking of air
pollution in over 3,000 cities around the world,
indicated that 57 of the 100 most polluted cities in
2018 (based on fine particulate concentrations) were in
China.
Business and Human Rights
Chinese domestic businesses and international
businesses are increasingly at risk of complicity in
the egregious human rights violations committed by the
Chinese Communist Party and government. For example, in
the XUAR, experts have documented the rapid expansion
of a network of mass internment camps in which
authorities have arbitrarily detained over a million
individuals from predominantly Muslim ethnic minority
groups. The company Hangzhou Hikvision Digital
Technology has supplied surveillance systems to the
camps as part of a public-private partnership with XUAR
authorities.
The Commission observed numerous reports this
past year of forced labor in the XUAR. One
investigation found that materials from firms using
forced labor in the XUAR had entered the supply chains
of major international clothing companies including
Adidas, H&M, Nike, and Patagonia.
Chinese security authorities continued to work
with domestic companies to expand the reach and
analytical power of government surveillance systems
across China. Chinese technology firms SenseTime,
Megvii, CloudWalk, Yitu, and Tiandy all reportedly sold
technology to Chinese authorities for use in
surveillance systems. The government uses this
technology to surveil rights advocates and others the
government views as threats.
Civil Society
In the past few years, the Chinese government
has harshly repressed human rights lawyers, women's
rights advocates, labor rights defenders, citizen
journalists, and petitioners. In conjunction with the
continued implementation of legislative and regulatory
reforms passed in 2016 and the increased role and
purview of the Party over all aspects of Chinese
society, the space non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) had in which to carry out human rights advocacy
activities continued to shrink.
The Chinese government highlighted overseas
NGOs as threats to China's ``political security,''
without defining the term. The Chinese government
invoked this vague term to crack down on organizations
working in human rights and rule-of-law advocacy.
Chinese government efforts to suppress labor
advocacy--labeling such advocacy as driven by foreign
interests--made it increasingly difficult for workers
in China to organize grassroots efforts and advocate
for their rights. Chinese authorities carried out a
large-scale nationwide crackdown on labor rights
advocates that began in July 2018 when workers at the
Jasic Technology factory in Shenzhen municipality,
Guangdong province, attempted to organize a labor union
and received widespread national support from
university students and internet users. Authorities
portrayed the labor protests as orchestrated by a
``foreign-funded'' NGO, and harassed, physically
assaulted, detained, and prosecuted labor advocates and
supporters.
The Chinese government continued to suppress
the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
questioning (LGBTQ) individuals in China. LGBTQ
individuals faced a multitude of challenges, including
a lack of legal protections. The Chinese government
cracked down on organizations and rights defenders
active on LGBTQ issues. Nevertheless, LGBTQ advocates
supported online campaigns highlighting workplace
discrimination and sexual harassment, and censorship.
The Chinese government has not followed multiple
recommendations from UN bodies regarding LGBTQ
protections.
Institutions of Democratic Governance
China's one-party authoritarian political
system remains out of compliance with international
human rights standards because authorities deprived
citizens of the right to meaningfully participate in
the electoral process and in public affairs in general.
As General Secretary Xi Jinping continued to
promote rule-based governance, the Chinese Communist
Party passed a series of rules to formalize the manner
and extent of the Party's control over the government
and society. These rules reinforced the all-
encompassing authority of the Party and centralized
personal leadership of Xi Jinping. One set of rules
formalized the Party's longstanding control over the
judiciary, the procuratorate, public security agencies,
national security agencies, and judicial administration
agencies.
Central authorities also issued rules to
regulate personnel management in the government by
requiring civil servants to receive political
indoctrination and by imposing political considerations
as criteria for career advancement. In one instance,
the Party Central Committee issued an opinion
prohibiting officials from expressing views
inconsistent with or ``improperly discussing'' the
Party's policy even outside of work hours.
Citizens' opportunities to participate in
limited local elections diminished this past year.
Chinese authorities reduced the frequency of elections
for grassroots-level committees--from once every three
years to once every five years--in order to synchronize
with the terms of the corresponding Party offices,
thereby ``complementing the Party's complete
leadership.''
On the international stage, China
categorically denied responsibility for human rights
violations despite evidence of human rights abuses. It
further rejected recommendations to cease the practice
of arbitrary detention and rejected calls to release
political prisoners.
Access to Justice
Chinese authorities continued to influence the
judiciary, control the legal profession, and persecute
human rights lawyers in violation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Official media's promotion of the Party's
absolute leadership over the judiciary had a negative
impact on the overall judicial process. The Supreme
People's Court planned to amend past judicial
interpretations to conform to the approved political
ideology and not issue any new judicial interpretations
unless the topic is specified by the Party. With
respect to the legal profession, the Minister of
Justice urged lawyers to ``unify their thoughts'' and
to accept the Party's complete leadership over their
work.
Authorities continued to view legal
representation provided by human rights lawyers as a
threat to the Party's political security, as they
continued to criminally prosecute them on charges such
as ``subversion of state power.'' Authorities also
restricted the speech and movement of human rights
lawyers, and in some cases stripped them of their law
licenses.
Xinjiang
In the past year, authorities in the XUAR
expanded a system of extrajudicial mass internment
camps, arbitrarily detaining one million or more
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others. Security
personnel at the camps subjected detainees to torture,
including forced ingestion of drugs; punishment for
behavior deemed religious; forced labor; overcrowding;
deprivation of food; and political indoctrination.
Authorities transferred some detainees from mass
internment camps in the XUAR to detention facilities in
other parts of China, due to factors including
overcrowding in camps within the XUAR and authorities'
desire to conceal information on camp detainees. Some
detainees reportedly died in camps due to poor
conditions, medical neglect, or other reasons.
Scholars and rights groups provided strong
arguments, based on available evidence, showing that
the ``crimes against humanity'' framework may apply to
the case of mass internment camps in the XUAR. Article
7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court provides a list of 11 acts, any one of which may
constitute ``crimes against humanity'' ``when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acts listed in Article 7 of the Possible application to the treatment
Rome Statute of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) Imprisonment or other severe Arbitrary, prolonged detention of
deprivation of physical liberty Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and
in violation of fundamental others in mass internment camps in
rules of international law; the XUAR since around April 2017;
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(f) Torture; Security personnel in mass internment
camps in the XUAR subjected detainees
to widespread torture, including
through the use of electric shocks
and shackling people in painful
positions;
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) Persecution against any Security personnel have detained a
identifiable group or million or more Uyghurs, Kazakhs,
collectivity on political, Kyrgyz, and Hui; enforced harsh,
racial, national, ethnic, widespread restrictions on peaceful
cultural, religious, gender as Islamic practices of XUAR residents;
defined in Paragraph 3 [Article and subjected Turkic and Muslim XUAR
7(3) of the Rome Statute], or residents to intense surveillance,
other grounds that are checkpoints, intimidation, and
universally recognized as involuntary biometric data
impermissible under collection.
international law, in
connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph
[Article 7 of the Rome Statute]
or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Enforced disappearance of Hundreds of intellectuals forcibly
persons. disappeared by authorities in the
XUAR are among the million or more
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Hui
detained in mass internment camps.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mass internment camp detainees reportedly
included permanent residents of the United States and
Australia. American officials stated in March 2019 that
Chinese authorities may have detained several American
residents in mass internment camps. As of April 2019,
authorities had reportedly detained more than a dozen
Australian residents. In addition, at least five
Australian children reportedly were unable to leave the
XUAR due to restrictions on the freedom of movement of
their parents in the XUAR.
Authorities reportedly placed the children of
mass internment camp detainees in the XUAR in
orphanages, welfare centers, and boarding schools,
often despite the willingness of other relatives to
care for the children, raising concerns of forcible
assimilation.
XUAR government authorities continued to use
surveillance technology and other measures to tighten
state control over ethnic minority groups in the
region, and to identify individuals to detain in mass
internment camps. A Human Rights Watch report
documented authorities' continued use of a centralized
system known as the ``Integrated Joint Operations
Platform'' (IJOP) to compile and analyze information
collected through mass surveillance mechanisms in the
XUAR and detect ``abnormal'' behaviors, targeting
individuals for detention in camps or other types of
restriction on movement.
Tibet
The Chinese government and Communist Party
significantly tightened restrictions on access to the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan areas
in China for international journalists, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), foreign officials,
scholars, and members of the Tibetan diaspora. Chinese
authorities require all foreign visitors to the TAR to
apply for a special permit. Tourists must be
accompanied by government-designated tour guides, and
are only allowed to see controlled sites. International
journalists have stated that the isolation of the TAR
is worse than that of North Korea, allowing the Chinese
government to conceal human rights abuses and
environmentally damaging large-scale activities, such
as damming rivers and mining, and to promote the claim
that Tibetans benefit from and support the Party and
its actions.
The government and Party intensified security
and surveillance in the TAR and other Tibetan
autonomous areas, using increasingly advanced
technology, and continued an ``anti-crime and vice
campaign'' to crack down on Tibetans suspected of
organizing or participating in activities that
authorities deem to be threatening to government
control or ``social stability.''
Authorities continued to restrict the
religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists under the
``sinicization'' campaign, which aims to bring religion
in China under closer official control and into
conformity with officially sanctioned interpretations
of Chinese culture. Actions taken included mandatory
political education for religious leaders, large-scale
evictions from influential monasteries, banning
religious activities for youth, and replacing images of
the Tibetan Buddhists' spiritual leader, the Dalai
Lama, with past and current Party leaders Mao Zedong
and Xi Jinping.
The Chinese government continued to pursue
large-scale infrastructure and investment projects in
the TAR and other Tibetan areas, including hydropower
dams, mines, and the resettlement of Tibetan nomads,
with no apparent representative input from the Tibetan
population, independent environmental NGOs, or rights
groups. These activities violate the social, economic,
and cultural rights of Tibetans, such as their rights
to housing and livelihood, and raised concerns among
environmental scientists and advocates about their
regional and global impact.
The Panchen Lama, Gedun Choekyi Nyima, whom
the Dalai Lama recognized in May 1995, reached his 30th
birthday on April 25, 2019, while remaining
incommunicado in government custody at an unknown
location. Moreover, in violation of the religious
freedom of Tibetan Buddhists, the Party continued to
promote public appearances by its chosen Panchen Lama,
Gyaltsen Norbu, including his first trip abroad to
Thailand, and to a sacred Buddhist site, adding to
speculation that Chinese officials will eventually
attempt to use him in efforts to select the next Dalai
Lama.
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
The Commission observed a further erosion of
Hong Kong's autonomy and fundamental freedoms under the
``one country, two systems'' framework. The Hong Kong
government sought to advance changes to the territory's
extradition law to allow the surrender of individuals
to mainland China and to empower the Chief Executive to
make decisions on fugitive arrangements on a case-by-
case basis without a vetting process in the Legislative
Council (LegCo). If passed, the bill would expose local
and foreign citizens transiting, visiting, or residing
in Hong Kong to the risk of being extradited to China.
A series of mass protests against the
extradition bill on the scale of tens of thousands to
two million took place in Hong Kong beginning in March
2019, garnering widespread international attention and
concern. Protests continued throughout the summer,
despite the Hong Kong government's decision to
suspend--but not withdraw--consideration of the
extradition bill. Protesters demanded that the
government formally withdraw the extradition bill,
create an independent commission to investigate reports
of the excessive use of force by police during the
protests, retract the characterization of the June 12
demonstrations as a ``riot,'' drop all charges against
arrested anti-extradition bill protesters, and pursue
democratic reforms to allow for universal suffrage in
Hong Kong's elections.
Over the past year, the Hong Kong government
continued to reject the candidacy of LegCo and local
election nominees such as Lau Siu-lai and Eddie Chu
Hoi-dick based on their political beliefs and
associations, violating Article 21 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, which guarantees the right to
``vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections.''
The Hong Kong government continued to pursue
criminal charges against leaders and participants of
public demonstrations, including the 2014 pro-democracy
protests (``Umbrella Movement''). In April 2019, a Hong
Kong court found nine leaders of the Umbrella Movement
guilty of charges related to ``public nuisance'' and
sentenced Benny Tai Yiu-ting and Chan Kin-man to 16
months in prison and Raphael Wong and Shiu Ka-chun to 8
months in prison.
The Hong Kong government limited the freedoms
of expression, association, and assembly by banning the
pro-independence Hong Kong National Party (HKNP) and
rejecting the visa renewal request of Financial Times
Asia editor Victor Mallet who hosted an event featuring
Andy Chan, founder of the HKNP, months earlier. An
event featuring dissident artist Badiucao was canceled
over ``safety concerns'' after authorities from the
Chinese government reportedly issued threats against
the artist.
Chinese government influence over the
territory, and Hong Kong officials' willingness to
conform to the interests of the Chinese government,
continued a trend of decreased autonomy observed over
the past several years. This trend has implications for
both the protection of the rights and freedoms of the
people of Hong Kong and for the future of U.S. policy
towards Hong Kong, which is based on the territory's
continuing autonomy.
The Commission did not observe progress in
Macau toward universal suffrage in the 2019 Chief
Executive (CE) election. Former Macau Legislative
Assembly president Ho Iat Seng won the uncontested
election on August 25, 2019, because he was the only
candidate able to garner enough nominations in the 400-
member CE Election Committee.
--------------------
The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated
in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of
this Annual Report, including its findings, views, legal
determinations, and recommendations, does not necessarily
reflect the views of individual Executive Branch members or the
policies of the Administration.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 17 to
0.
Voted to adopt: Representatives McGovern, Kaptur, Suozzi,
Malinowsky, McAdams, Smith, Mast, and Hartzler; Senators Rubio,
Lankford, Cotton, Daines, Young, Feinstein, Merkley, Peters, and King.
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Political Prisoner Cases of Concern
Members of Congress and the Administration are encouraged
to consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD)
for credible and up-to-date information on individual prisoners
or groups of prisoners. The Cases of Concern in the
Commission's 2019 Annual Report highlight a small number of
individuals whom Chinese authorities have detained or sentenced
for peacefully exercising their internationally recognized
human rights. Members of Congress and the Administration are
encouraged to advocate for these individuals in meetings with
Chinese government and Communist Party officials. For more
information on these cases and other cases raised in the Annual
Report, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of August 2019)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abdughappar Abdurusul Date of Detention: July 2018
2018-00645 Place of Detention: Unknown, but taken
into custody while in Ghulja (Yining)
city, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR)
Charge: Unknown
Status: Sentenced to death
Context: A 42-year-old businessman and
philanthropist living in Ghulja,
Abdughappar Abdurusul may have been
detained for taking the Hajj
pilgrimage independently, rather than
through a Chinese government-organized
group. His brother reported that
officials sentenced Abdurusul to death
in a mass trial without legal counsel
and seized his family's assets.
Additional Information: Authorities
also reportedly detained his wife,
Merhaba Hajim, in April 2018, and held
her in a mass internment camp. She
reportedly died in detention. In 2017,
authorities detained their eldest son
Abuzer, then 18, after he returned to
China from studying in Turkey.
Authorities also detained Abdurusul's
younger brother Abduqadir Abdurusul
and his wife (name not reported) in or
around July 2018. Details on their
detentions were unavailable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rahile Dawut Date of Detention: December 2017
2018-00552 Place of Detention: Unknown, possibly
held in a mass internment camp in the
XUAR
Charge: Unknown
Status: Disappeared
Context: Uyghur ethnographer Rahile
Dawut disappeared and is believed to
be held in a mass internment camp.
Friends and other observers suggested
authorities may have detained her due
to her efforts to preserve Uyghur
culture and heritage, or her foreign
connections. She formerly taught at
Xinjiang University and is well
regarded for her scholarly research on
traditional Uyghur culture.
Additional Information: At least one of
Dawut's graduate students also
reportedly disappeared.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tashpolat Teyip Date of Detention: March 2017
2019-00064 Place of Detention: Unknown location in
the XUAR
Charge: Possibly related to separatism
Status: Sentenced to death with 2-year
reprieve
Context: Xinjiang University president
Tashpolat Teyip disappeared in Beijing
municipality as he prepared to fly to
Germany to attend a conference. A
Uyghur geographer who received
international acclaim for his
environmental research, authorities
accused Teyip of being a
``separatist,'' together with 5 other
Uyghur intellectuals. Authorities
reportedly cracked down on Teyip for
being ``two-faced,'' a term Chinese
officials use to refer to ethnic
minority cadres who pretend to support
the Chinese Communist Party. A student
of Teyip said his custom of beginning
public statements with a Uyghur
greeting may have prompted authorities
to target him.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sanubar Tursun Date of Detention: Late 2018
2019-00071 Place of Detention: Unknown, possibly
held in a mass internment camp in the
XUAR
Charge: Unknown
Status: Unknown
Context: Renowned Uyghur singer Sanubar
Tursun disappeared inside China in
late 2018. In November 2018, concerts
she had been scheduled to perform in
France in February 2019 were canceled,
after her international contacts could
no longer reach her. Authorities may
have sentenced Tursun to 5 years in
prison, but sources were unable to
confirm this.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bonkho Kyi Date of Detention: November 2015
2012-00261 Place of Detention: A prison in
Wenchuan (Lunggu) county, Aba (Ngaba)
Tibetan & Qiang Autonomous Prefecture
(T&QAP), Sichuan province
Charge: Unknown
Status: Sentenced to 7 years
Context: Between October and December
2015, public security officials in Aba
(Ngaba) county, Aba T&QAP, detained at
least 8 Tibetans accused of
involvement in organizing observances
of the Dalai Lama's 80th birthday,
including Bonkho Kyi, who had helped
organize a public picnic to celebrate
the birthday.
Additional Information: Other Tibetans
in Aba county detained for
commemorating the Dalai Lama's 80th
birthday included Argya Gya (Akyakya),
Tsultrim (Tsulte), and Tsultrim, all
of whom remained in detention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tashi Wangchug (also spelled Date of Detention: January 27, 2016
Wangchuk) Place of Detention: Dongchuan Prison,
2016-00077 Qinghai province
Charge: Inciting separatism
Status: Sentenced to 5 years
Context: Tibetan language rights
advocate and entrepreneur Tashi
Wangchug (also spelled Wangchuk)
shared information online calling on
the Qinghai provincial government to
improve bilingual education and hire
more bilingual civil servants.
Authorities used as evidence in Tashi
Wangchug's trial a short New York
Times documentary that featured his
attempts to file a lawsuit over the
lack of sufficient Tibetan-language
education.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bian Lichao Date of Detention: February 25, 2012
2015-00171 Place of Detention: Shijiazhuang
Prison, Hebei province
Charge: Unknown
Status: Sentenced to 12 years
Context: Public security officials
detained middle school teacher and
Falun Gong practitioner Bian Lichao,
allegedly because he made DVDs and
other materials to promote the Falun
Gong-connected Shen Yun performance
arts group.
Additional Information: In 2014,
authorities also detained Bian's wife,
daughter, and another relative in
connection with Bian's daughter's
attempts to visit him in prison.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gao Zhisheng Date of Detention: August 2017
2005-00291 Place of Detention: Beijing
municipality (unconfirmed).
Authorities disappeared Gao while
holding him at his family's home in
Jia county, Yulin municipality,
Shaanxi province.
Charge: Unknown (if any)
Status: Disappeared
Context: The reason for Gao's current
detention is unknown. Since August
2006, authorities have held Gao--a
former lawyer whose license was
suspended in 2005--under various forms
of detention, reportedly for
representing farmers in land
expropriation cases and for writing
open letters condemning persecution of
Falun Gong practitioners and
Christians. Authorities reportedly
tortured Gao during detention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Huang Qi Date of Detention: November 28, 2016
2004-04053 Place of Detention: Mianyang PSB
Detention Center, Sichuan province
Charges: Illegally providing state
secrets to foreign entities,
intentionally leaking state secrets
Status: Sentenced to 12 years
Context: Huang Qi is a citizen
journalist and founder of the website
64 Tianwang, which reported on
petitioners and other human rights
issues in China. Huang previously
served prison sentences for posting
articles online about the 1989
Tiananmen protests and Falun Gong, and
for aiding the parents of children who
died in the 2008 earthquake in
Sichuan.
Additional Information: Authorities
have refused requests for medical
parole despite Huang's life-
threatening kidney disease.
Authorities have also detained Huang's
85-year-old mother, Pu Wenqing, in
confinement at home and at a hospital
since December 2018.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jiang Wei Date of Detention: November 9, 2015
2018-00366 Place of Detention: Liaoning Women's
Prison, Liaoning province
Charge: Unknown
Status: Sentenced to 12 years
Context: Jiang is a Falun Gong
practitioner who has been detained
multiple times for her beliefs.
Previously, authorities ordered Jiang
to serve 3 years at a reeducation-
through-labor camp in 1999, subjecting
her to electric shocks and other
physical abuse. In 2004, authorities
sentenced Jiang to 8 years in prison,
and later committed her to a
psychiatric hospital.
Additional Information: Jiang has
reportedly endured maltreatment while
in prison, including abusive language,
beatings, and 15 days of solitary
confinement. While in solitary, she
was kept in a cell too small to stand
in. She was also forced to eat and
defecate in the cell, which was
infested with flies and mosquitoes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Li Yuhan Date of Detention: October 9, 2017
2017-00361 Place of Detention: Shenyang No. 1 PSB
Detention Center, Liaoning province
Charges: Picking quarrels and provoking
trouble, fraud
Status: Pretrial detention
Context: A lawyer, Li previously
represented rights lawyer Wang Yu,
whom authorities detained in a
crackdown on human rights legal
professionals that began in mid-2015.
Additional Information: Li suffers from
various health conditions, including
heart disease, hypertension, and
hyperthyroidism. Staff at the
detention center reportedly instructed
other inmates to urinate on her food,
denied her hot water for showers,
denied her medical treatment, and
threatened to beat her to death. In
March 2018, Li went on a hunger strike
to protest the mistreatment, which
prompted detention center officials to
force-feed her.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qin Yongmin Date of Detention: January 9, 2015
2004-02138 Place of Detention: Guanghua Prison,
Hubei province
Charge: Subversion of state power
Status: Sentenced to 13 years
Context: A longstanding democracy
advocate, Qin Yongmin previously
served 8 years in prison for his
participation in the Democracy Wall
movement and 12 years in prison for
his role in co-founding the China
Democracy Party. He also co-founded
the NGO China Human Rights Watch (also
known as ``Rose Group''). A 2018 court
decision noted the 2012 publication in
Hong Kong of Qin's writings on
peaceful democratic transition.
Additional Information: Authorities
detained Qin's wife, Zhao Suli, around
the same time as Qin. After more than
3 years of ``enforced disappearance,''
Zhao returned to her Wuhan home around
February 2018. Authorities continued
to restrict Zhao's activities after
her release.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wang Yi Date of Detention: December 9, 2018
2018-00615 Place of Detention: Chengdu PSB
Detention Center, Sichuan province
Charges: Inciting subversion of state
power, illegal business activity
Status: Pretrial detention
Context: Authorities detained Early
Rain Covenant Church pastor and
founder Wang Yi one day before
officially banning the unregistered
Protestant church located in Chengdu
municipality, Sichuan. Wang's
detention took place amid a broad
crackdown on unregistered churches in
China.
Additional Information: In addition to
Wang, authorities detained at least
100 Early Rain members beginning in
December 2018. Authorities continued
to surveil many of the members even
after releasing them, including Wang's
wife, Jiang Rong. Church members
reported that while in detention they
were force-fed unknown medication and
were coerced to confess or to falsely
accuse Wang and other church leaders
of wrongdoing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yue Xin Date of Detention: August 24, 2018
2018-00665 Place of Detention: Unknown
Charge: Unknown
Status: Disappeared
Context: Beginning in July 2018,
authorities took into custody over 60
individuals connected to factory
workers' attempts to form a labor
union at Jasic Technology (Jasic) in
Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong
province. On August 19, Peking
University graduate Yue Xin published
an open letter calling on central
authorities to permit the workers to
unionize. On August 24, police
detained Yue Xin and about 50
individuals who had gathered in
Shenzhen to show support for the
detained Jasic workers.
Additional Information: Authorities
continued to hold at least 32
individuals in detention in connection
with the Jasic protests as of December
7, 2018. In January 2019, Yue Xin and
other student supporters of Jasic
workers appeared in a video giving
what appeared to be forced
confessions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Haitao Date of Detention: June 26, 2015
2015-00343 Place of Detention: Shaya Prison, XUAR
Charges: Inciting subversion of state
power; stealing, spying, purchasing,
and illegally providing state secrets
and intelligence for overseas entities
Status: Sentenced to 19 years, upheld
on appeal
Context: In June 2015, authorities in
Urumqi municipality, XUAR, reportedly
launched a ``clean-up of individuals
active on the internet'' campaign as
part of a ``stability maintenance''
effort in the region, detaining Zhang
in connection to his online criticism
of the government's ethnic minority
policies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Zhiyu Date of Detention: January 20, 2019
(more widely known as Place of Detention: Detention center in
Zhang Zhiru) Bao'an district, Shenzhen
2019-00117 municipality, Guangdong province
Charge: Gathering a crowd to disturb
social order
Status: Formally arrested, awaiting
trial
Context: Zhang Zhiyu (more widely known
as Zhang Zhiru) was one of five labor
advocates whom authorities detained in
January 2019. These detentions appear
to be part of an ongoing crackdown on
grassroots labor advocacy. Zhang is
the director of the Chunfeng Labour
Dispute Service Center, which he
founded in 2007, and has been involved
in many landmark labor disputes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, members of Congress and the Administration are
encouraged to advocate for the increasing number of individuals
prosecuted and imprisoned in connection with their promotion of
democracy or human rights in Hong Kong. For more information on
the following case and related cases, see Section VI--
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau in this report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name Case Summary (as of August 2019)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chan Kin-man Date of Detention: Began serving
sentence April 24, 2019
Place of Detention: Pik Uk Prison, Sai
Kung, New Territories, Hong Kong
Charges: Conspiracy to commit public
nuisance, incitement to commit public
nuisance, incitement to incite public
nuisance
Status: Sentenced to 1 year and 4
months, appeal filed
Context: Professor Chan Kin-man of the
Chinese University of Hong Kong,
Professor Benny Tai of the University
of Hong Kong, and Reverend Chu Yiu-ming
initiated the peaceful ``Occupy Central
with Love and Peace Campaign'' in 2013,
demanding universal suffrage for the
2017 Chief Executive (CE) election and
2020 Legislative Council elections. In
response to the National People's
Congress Standing Committee August 2014
decision that the CE would not be
elected by universal suffrage in 2017,
Chan and others mobilized supporters to
protest the decision in what is now
known as the ``Umbrella Movement,''
during which protesters occupied the
Central district in Hong Kong for 79
days, demanding electoral reform and
universal suffrage.
Additional information: Hong Kong
authorities pursued charges related to
public nuisance against 9 pro-
democracy advocates for their
activities in the Umbrella Movement. In
2019, a Hong Kong court found them
guilty on April 9, and on April 24,
sentenced Chan Kin-man and Benny Tai to
1 year and 4 months in prison, and Chu
Yiu-ming to 1 year and 4 months,
suspended for 2 years. On August 15,
2019, Tai was released on bail pending
appeal.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
General Recommendations to Congress and the Administration
As the Chinese government and Communist Party continue to
erode the rule of law in China and the human rights of the
Chinese people, the U.S. Government should develop coordinated
policies that reflect that pressing for greater transparency,
reciprocity, and adherence to universal standards is necessary
to advance American interests and the interests of Chinese
citizens eager for peace, rights protections, the rule of law,
and genuine political reform. A shared commitment to universal
human rights and the rule of law--and willingness to act in
their defense--is the foundation for the cooperative alliances,
security partnerships, and multilateral consultative mechanisms
underpinning U.S. power since the end of World War II. The
Commission makes the following recommendations for
consideration by Congress and the Administration:
Develop a Whole-of-Government Approach to Human
Rights in China. In order to ensure that the U.S. Government
can strategically address a more authoritarian China, the
President should issue a policy directive to develop a
comprehensive strategy embedding human rights, the rule of law,
and democratic governance into the critical mission strategies
of all U.S. Government entities interacting with the Chinese
government. This strategy should include expanding efforts
within the U.S. Government to counter disinformation, coercive
political influence operations, and censorship efforts,
particularly those targeting diaspora communities. As the
Administration develops this strategy, attention should be paid
to messaging and programs that address the rights violations
that affect the largest number of Chinese citizens,
particularly workers, families, religious believers, ethnic
minority groups, internet users, women, and rural residents;
avoid fostering an atmosphere of unfair suspicion of Chinese-
Americans who are often targets of coercive political influence
operations; and inform Chinese nationals of their civil rights
while living, studying, or working in the United States.
Address Abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR). The Administration should aggregate policy
responses within the U.S. Government to address gross human
rights violations in the XUAR, including by:
Using Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
Act (Public Law No. 114-328) sanctions to hold
accountable Chinese business entities and officials
complicit in the mass internment and surveillance of
Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities and to
encourage like-minded allies to issue their own
sanctions.
Controlling sales of new and emerging technologies,
including facial recognition systems, machine learning,
and biometric and artificial intelligence technologies,
by placing the XUAR government and security agencies on
the U.S. Department of Commerce's ``Entity List.''
Requesting an open debate or, at the very least, an
Arria-formula briefing at the UN Security Council on
the XUAR, and initiating or signing on to joint
statements on the XUAR at the UN Human Rights Council.
Creating guidelines for counterterrorism and law
enforcement cooperation with China and other countries
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to ensure that
the U.S. Government does not condone or assist in
Chinese authorities' crackdown on domestic political
dissent or restrictions on internationally recognized
human rights.
Working with Congress to pass legislation that
provides information and new authorities, including
export controls and limitations on U.S. Government
procurement from China, that will allow a more robust
approach to the Chinese government's atrocities in the
XUAR, including through passage of the Uyghur Human
Rights Policy Act of 2019 (S. 178/H.R. 649).
Hold Chinese Government Officials Accountable for
Abuses. In addition to the list-based sanctions of the Global
Magnitsky Act, the Administration should strategically use the
mechanisms available in the International Religious Freedom Act
of 1998 (Public Law No. 105-292), the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (Public Law No. 106-386),
the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016
(Public Law No. 114-122), and the Admiral James W. Nance and
Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2000 (Public
Law No. 106-113--Appendix G) to levy financial sanctions
against or deny U.S.-entry visas to Chinese officials complicit
in human rights violations including severe religious freedom
restrictions and human trafficking.
Update the ``Tiananmen Sanctions.'' Congress
should strengthen existing sanctions prohibiting the sale of
``crime control and detection'' equipment (Public Law No. 101-
246 902(a)(4)) to the Chinese government to include related
services and training, as well as add language identifying and
controlling the technology needed for mass surveillance, the
creation of predictive policing platforms, and the gathering of
sensitive electronic or biometric information.
Condition Access to U.S. Capital Markets. The
Administration should identify and list Chinese companies and
entities with a presence in U.S. capital markets that have
provided material support or technical capabilities to
facilitate human rights abuses in China--including in the
XUAR--and strengthen disclosure requirements at the Securities
and Exchange Commission to alert American investors about the
presence of such Chinese entities in U.S. capital markets.
Address the Erosion of Hong Kong's Autonomy. The
Congress should pass the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy
Act of 2019 (S. 1838 / H.R. 3289), which requires an annual
certification of Hong Kong's autonomy to spur regular
discussions on how to maintain Hong Kong's special trade and
economic status under U.S. law. The bill also provides tools to
hold accountable Hong Kong and Chinese government officials who
suppress freedom of expression and assembly or undermine the
rule of law.
Update the Tibetan Policy Act. The Congress should
update the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (Public Law No. 107-228)
to clarify in U.S. policy that the reincarnation of the Dalai
Lama is an exclusively religious matter that should be made
solely by the Tibetan Buddhist faith community. The legislation
should make clear that Chinese officials who interfere in the
process of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the
Dalai Lama will be subject to targeted financial, economic, and
visa-related sanctions like those in the Global Magnitsky Act.
The Administration should heed the guidance from Congress on
the implementation of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of
2018 (Public Law No. 115-330) and use the sanctions available
in the act against Chinese officials responsible for denying
Americans access to Tibetan regions.
Voice Support for Human Rights in China. Members
of Congress and Administration officials, especially the
President, should regularly meet with Chinese civil society and
human rights defenders, Hong Kong civil society, the Dalai Lama
and other Tibetans in exile including the Central Tibetan
Administration, members of the Uyghur diaspora, and other human
rights advocates and non-governmental organizations. It is also
essential that the President of the United States express
support for human rights and democracy in China.
Address Digital Authoritarianism. Because the
growth of digital authoritarianism is one of the most urgent
national security and human rights challenges associated with
the Chinese government's foreign policy, the Administration and
the Congress should work together to:
Lead a global effort with allies and partners to
develop a set of principles for Artificial Intelligence
(AI) development and usage to ensure the protection of
human rights, including the right to privacy.
Launch a digital infrastructure initiative that makes
information and communication technology development a
priority for U.S. foreign assistance programs,
including through implementation of the BUILD Act of
2018 (Public Law No. 115-254).
Counter Internet Censorship. The Administration
should develop a comprehensive interagency action plan to
promote internet freedom through the funding and wide
distribution of effective technologies that provide the
greatest possible access to the internet within China and
globally. The plan could include actively opposing the Chinese
government's efforts to establish a new international norm of
``internet sovereignty,'' expanding digital security training
for civil society advocates, and transparently employing
congressionally mandated funding to circumvent China's ``Great
Firewall.'' In addition, the Administration should develop
talking points for U.S. Government officials--including those
engaged in trade negotiations--that consistently link freedoms
of press, speech, and association to U.S. and Chinese
interests, noting how censorship prevents the free flow of
information on issues of public concern, including public
health and environmental crises, food safety problems, and
corruption.
Promote Transparency in University and Think Tank
Funding. As part of any amendment to the U.S. Higher Education
Act of 1965 (Public Law No. 89-329), Congress should require
U.S. colleges and universities to publicly report all foreign
gifts, contracts, and in-kind contributions that exceed $10,000
per year from a single foreign government, institution, or
group of institutions. U.S. think tanks and other non-
governmental organizations should be required to publicly
disclose all foreign grants and gifts as part of their tax
filings to maintain non-profit status.
Counter Foreign Malign Influence. The
Administration should provide to Congress a strategy to address
the strategic challenge posed by the Chinese government's
intensified use of disinformation, propaganda, economic
intimidation, and political influence operations to weaken
commitments to universal human rights and promote the Chinese
Communist Party's political-economic model globally. The
Administration should develop an action plan to counter the
Chinese government's ``sharp power'' efforts globally,
monitoring and controlling foreign influence operations and
providing information about the Chinese ministries, entities,
and individuals engaged in foreign influence operations and
their connections with entities of the Chinese Communist Party
or government. The Congress should pass the ``Countering the
Chinese Government and Communist Party's Political Influence
Operations Act'' (S. 480/H.R. 1811) that, among other
priorities, clarifies that U.S. Government policy and
statements should clearly differentiate between the Chinese
people and culture and the Chinese government and Communist
Party, ensuring that central Chinese government and Party
political influence operations do not lead to the targeting of
Chinese-Americans or the Chinese diaspora.
Expand the Mandate of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA). The Administration and the Congress
should work together to expand the mandate of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) (Act June 8, 1938, ch.
327, sec. 14) to bring oversight and transparency to issue
areas beyond foreign representation and address the challenges
the United States faces today, which include incidents of
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations working with Chinese
embassies and consulates in the United States, Confucius
Institutes and Classrooms at U.S. universities and high
schools, and American companies accepting funding from Chinese
sources to acquire technologies prohibited by U.S. export
controls.
Develop a Non-Governmental Code of Conduct. The
Administration should work with U.S. non-governmental
organizations and academic institutions to formulate a code of
conduct for interacting with Chinese government-affiliated
entities to assist them in navigating the challenges of working
effectively in China and to counter influence operations that
are manipulative, coercive, or corrupting of democratic
institutions and help protect human rights and academic
freedom.
Prioritize Reciprocity. The Administration, as
part of ongoing trade discussions, should seek a rules-of-the-
road agreement that will correct longstanding diplomatic,
investment, media, and cultural and academic exchange
imbalances in U.S.-China relations and provide to Congress a
strategy for pursuing reciprocity more generally in U.S.-China
relations, particularly to ensure that U.S.-based media outlets
and non-governmental organizations have the same freedom to
operate, publish, and broadcast afforded to a growing number of
Chinese government-sponsored and funded think tanks, academic
institutions, and media entities in the United States.
Expand Global Alliances to Advance Human Rights.
International responses to human rights have the greatest
impact when the U.S. Government exercises effective diplomatic
leadership with our allies and partners. The Administration
should send to Congress a multilateral human rights diplomacy
strategy on China, to coordinate responses when the Chinese
government uses multilateral institutions to undermine human
rights norms and closes off discussion of its failures to
uphold its international obligations. The Administration should
also consider as part of such strategy:
Creating a public mechanism for coordinating human
rights diplomacy and technical assistance programs with
like-minded allies that includes the meaningful
participation of experts and non-governmental
organizations from all participating countries.
Expanding funding for capacity-building initiatives
for rights and rule-of-law advocates in settings
outside China, given growing restrictions on the
funding of civil society organizations inside China.
Forming a multinational human rights dialogue where
the U.S. Government invites countries without human
rights dialogues with China (or those whose human
rights dialogues have been canceled by the Chinese
government) to participate in or observe formal
discussions with the Chinese government.
Coordinating public statements, diplomatic demarches,
and public diplomatic efforts to condemn detentions of
political and religious prisoners and other serious
human rights abuses in China, and creatively
communicating these efforts to the Chinese people.
Prioritize an End to Torture and Arbitrary
Detention Through Diplomatic Engagement. The Administration
should prioritize an end to torture in detention and all forms
of arbitrary detention in China and raise these issues in all
bilateral discussions and in multilateral institutions of which
the U.S. and China are members. The Administration should
create public diplomacy campaigns and support media efforts to
raise global awareness about the detention of political and
religious prisoners in ``black jails,'' psychiatric
institutions, compulsory drug detoxification centers, police
and state security detention centers, and mass internment camps
in the XUAR. In addition, the Administration should consider
funding non-governmental projects that assist individuals with
submissions to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, in
order to provide actionable information to the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights and UN system of Special
Procedures, and to accumulate evidence on Chinese officials
complicit in the torture and arbitrary detention of political
and religious prisoners.
Take Meaningful Action to Address Human
Trafficking. To respond to China's ``Tier 3'' designation for
failing to meet minimum standards for addressing human
trafficking, the Administration should use all the tools
available in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000 (Public Law No. 106-386) and the Girls Count Act of
2015 (Public Law No. 114-24), including individual sanctions
for officials and entities complicit in human trafficking. In
addition, the Administration should send Congress a strategy to
address forced labor in the XUAR, including by publicly
identifying Chinese businesses profiting from such labor,
assisting corporations to identify forced labor goods from the
XUAR in global supply chains, and expanding the use of the
``reasonable suspicion'' standard found in the Trade
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) (Public
Law No. 114-125) to stop goods made with forced labor from
entering the United States.
Protect North Korean Refugees. The Administration
should employ the tools available in the North Korean Human
Rights Act of 2004 (Public Law No. 108-333) and the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (Public Law No. 114-122)
to expand efforts to channel uncensored news and information
into North Korea and to North Korean asylum seekers in China,
including through defector communities, and to impose secondary
sanctions on Chinese corporations, individuals, or banks that
profit from North Korean forced labor and those assisting the
North Korean government in avoiding international sanctions.
The Special Representative for North Korea at the Department of
State should provide Congress with a strategy to protect North
Korean refugees in China, implement the recommendations of the
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, and close
existing prison labor camps and other forms of arbitrary
detention in North Korea and in China where refugees are
detained.
Advocate for Specific Political Prisoners. Members
of Congress and Administration officials at the highest levels
should raise specific prisoner cases in meetings with Chinese
government officials. Experience demonstrates that consistently
and prominently raising individual prisoner cases--and the
larger human rights issues they represent--can result in
improved treatment in detention, lighter sentences or, in some
cases, release from custody, detention, or imprisonment. The
Administration should consider creating a Special Advisor for
Religious and Political Prisoners to coordinate interagency
resources on behalf of political and religious prisoners in
China and globally. Members of Congress are encouraged to
``adopt'' individual prisoners and advocate on their behalf
through the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission's ``Defending
Freedoms Project.''
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Political Prisoner Database
Recommendations
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (https://
ppdcecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on a
prisoner or groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner's
database record for more detailed information about the
prisoner's case, including his or her alleged crime,
specific human rights that officials have violated,
stage in the legal process, and location of detention
or imprisonment, if known.
Advise official and private delegations traveling to
China to present Chinese officials with lists of
political and religious prisoners compiled from
database records.
Urge U.S. state and local officials and private
citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city
relationships with China to explore the database, and
to advocate for the release of political and religious
prisoners in China.
A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY
The Commission's 2019 Annual Report provides information
about Chinese political and religious prisoners \1\ in the
context of specific human rights and rule-of-law abuses. Many
of the abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party and
government's application of policies and laws. The Commission
relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly
available online database maintained by the Commission, for its
research, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and
routinely uses the database as a resource to prepare summaries
of information about and support advocacy for political and
religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration
officials. The Commission invites the public to read about
issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of
this Annual Report, and to access and make use of the PPD at
https://ppdcecc.gov. (Information about the PPD is also
available at https://www.cecc.gov/resources/political-prisoner-
database.)
The PPD received approximately 306,974 online requests for
prisoner information during the 12-month period ending July 31,
2019--a change of approximately negative 38.96 percent compared
with the 502,900 requests reported in the Commission's 2018
Annual Report for the 12-month period ending July 31, 2018.\2\
During the 12-month period ending in July 2019, the United
States remained the country of origin for the largest share of
requests for information, with approximately 27.2 percent of
such requests. China was in the second position, with
approximately 20.5 percent of such requests, followed by
Ukraine (3.9 percent), India (2.9 percent), the United Kingdom
(2.6 percent), Hong Kong (2.3 percent), Brazil (1.9 percent),
Canada (1.8 percent), the Russian Federation (1.7 percent),
France (1.6 percent), and the Republic of Korea (1.4 percent).
Internet Protocol addresses that do not provide information
about the name of the registrant or the type of domain were the
source of the largest share of online requests for information
during the Commission's 2019 reporting year, accounting for
approximately 52.6 percent of the 306,974 requests for
information in the 12-month period ending in July 2019. The
approximate number of requests from other sources are as
follows: Domains ending in .com were second, with 18.9 percent
of requests for PPD information. Domains ending in .net were
third, with 8.8 percent of online requests for information,
followed by U.S. Government domains (.gov) with 1.7, then by
domains for Brazil (.br) with 1.6 percent, India (.in) with
1.3, Germany (.de) with 1.0, Italy (.it) with 0.9, China (.cn)
with 0.9, the European Union (.eu) with 0.7, and Mexico (.mx)
with 0.7. Domains for Turkey (.tr), France (.fr), and the
Russian Federation (.ru) accounted for 0.6 percent of requests
each.
POLITICAL PRISONERS
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information
that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on the
staff member's area of expertise. Staff seek to provide
objective analysis of information about individual prisoners,
and about events and trends that drive political and religious
imprisonment in China.
As of September 1, 2019, the PPD contained information on
9,933 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of
those, 1,587 are cases of political and religious prisoners
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and
8,346 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have
been released, who were executed, who died while imprisoned or
soon after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that
there are considerably more than 1,587 cases of current
political and religious imprisonment in China. Commission staff
work on an ongoing basis to add cases of political and
religious imprisonment to the PPD.
When the PPD was first launched, the Dui Hua Foundation,
based in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information
Network, based in London, shared their extensive experience and
data on political and religious prisoners in China with the
Commission to help establish the database. The Dui Hua
Foundation continues to do so. The Commission relies on its own
staff research for prisoner information, as well as on
information provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
other groups that specialize in promoting human rights and
opposing political and religious imprisonment, and other public
sources of information.
MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY
The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational
institutions, and individuals who research political and
religious imprisonment in China, or who advocate on behalf of
prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly leveraged
the capacity of the Commission's information and technology
resources to support such research, reporting, and advocacy.
In 2015, the Commission enhanced the functionality of the
PPD to empower the Commission, the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, and individuals to
strengthen reporting on political and religious imprisonment in
China and advocacy undertaken on behalf of Chinese political
prisoners. The upgrade allowed the PPD full text search and the
basic search both to provide an option to return records that
either include or do not include an image of the prisoner. In
addition, the 2015 enhancement allowed PPD record short
summaries to accommodate more text as well as greater capacity
to link to external websites.
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power
to handle the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in
China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human
rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her
detention. These types include violations of the right to
peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association,
and freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate
peaceful social or political change and to criticize government
policy or government officials.
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the
internet to query the database and download prisoner data
without providing personal information to the Commission, and
without the PPD downloading any software or web cookies to a
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries,
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not
download software or a web cookie to a user's computer as the
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be
a nickname) and password are the only information required to
set up a user account.
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Notes to Section I--Executive Summary
\1\ The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual
detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under
international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion,
freedom of association, and freedom of expression, including the
freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change, and to
criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is
illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were
detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to
them by China's Constitution and law, or by international human rights
standards, or both. Chinese security, prosecution, and judicial
officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the political or
religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or
religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a generic
crime. In such cases, defendants typically deny guilt but officials may
attempt to coerce confessions using torture and other forms of abuse,
and standards of evidence are poor. A defendant may authorize someone
to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, yet officials may deny the
counsel adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the
counsel's access to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time
to prepare a defense.
\2\ CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 22.
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Expression
II. Human Rights
Freedom of Expression
Findings
At the UN Human Rights Council's third
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of China's compliance
with international human rights norms, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) reported that the Chinese
government and Communist Party violated freedom of
expression and freedom of the press. The Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights apparently
removed information submitted by at least seven non-
governmental groups, among which were NGOs that
advocate for the rights of Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Hong
Kong people, from an official summary of UPR
submissions. That information from some of the missing
submissions was inserted in a supplement prior to the
November 2018 session did little to dispel stakeholder
concerns about Chinese government influence during the
UPR.
Conditions for journalism in China continued
to deteriorate. Some professional Chinese journalists
described current conditions for journalism as an ``era
of total censorship.'' In addition, the government's
ongoing crackdown continued against ``citizen
journalists'' who have founded or are associated with
websites that document human rights violations, as seen
in the detention of individuals focused on labor
conditions, such as Wei Zhili, Yang Zhengjun, and Ke
Chengbing. Foreign journalists faced multiple
challenges from the government, including surveillance;
harassment of Chinese nationals who work as news
assistants; limits on the length of work visas or visa
denial; and obstruction in the coverage of developments
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and
other ethnic minority or border areas.
The government and Party continued to link
internet security to national security. This past year,
authorities detained and prosecuted individuals who
criticized government officials and policies online,
and censored or distorted a range of news and
information that the government deemed ``politically
sensitive,'' including the 30th anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen protests, the protests in Hong Kong against
proposed extradition legislation, and trade issues.
Declining academic freedom in China linked to
Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping's
reassertion of ideological control over universities
was illustrated by reports of the internment of
hundreds of predominantly Uyghur scholars in mass
internment camps in the XUAR; the detention of
university students who advocated for labor rights; and
the dismissal, suspension, and other forms of
discipline imposed on faculty who criticized the
government and Party.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Give greater public expression, including at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of
press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and
detention of both domestic and foreign journalists; the
denial, threat of denial, or delay of visas for foreign
journalists; and the censoring or blocking of foreign
media websites. Consistently link press freedoms to
U.S. interests, noting how censorship and restrictions
on journalists and media websites prevent the free flow
of information on issues of public concern, including
public health and environmental crises, food safety
problems, and corruption, and act as trade barriers for
foreign media and companies attempting to access the
Chinese market. Raise these issues with Chinese
officials during bilateral dialogues. Assess the extent
to which China's treatment of foreign journalists
contravenes its World Trade Organization commitments
and other obligations.
Sustain, and where appropriate expand, programs that
develop and widely distribute technologies that will
assist Chinese human rights advocates and civil society
organizations in circumventing internet restrictions,
in order to access and share content protected under
international human rights standards. Continue to
maintain internet freedom programs for China at the
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors to provide digital security training and
capacity-building efforts for bloggers, journalists,
civil society organizations, and human rights and
internet freedom advocates in China.
Raise with Chinese officials, during all appropriate
bilateral discussions, the cost to U.S.-China relations
and to the Chinese public's confidence in government
institutions that is incurred when the Chinese
government restricts political debate, advocacy for
democracy or human rights, and other forms of peaceful
political expression. Emphasize that such restrictions
violate international standards for free expression,
particularly those contained in Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Emphasize that such restrictions erode
confidence in media and government institutions.
Urge Chinese officials to end unlawful detention and
official harassment of Chinese rights advocates,
lawyers, and journalists subject to reprisal for
exercising their right to freedom of expression. Call
on officials to release or confirm the release of
individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising
freedom of expression, such as Liu Feiyue, Huang Qi,
Sun Lin, Zhang Haitao, Tashi Wangchug, Chai Xiaoming,
Wei Zhili, Ke Chengbing, Yang Zhengjun, Lu Guang, Yang
Hengjun, and other political prisoners mentioned in
this report and documented in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database.
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of Expression
China's Compliance with International Standards on Freedom of
Expression
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year, the Chinese
government and Communist Party continued to restrict expression
in contravention of international human rights standards,\1\
including Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.\2\ According to the ICCPR--which
China signed in 1998 \3\ but has not ratified \4\--and as
reiterated in 2011 by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression, countries may impose certain restrictions or
limitations on freedom of expression, if such restrictions are
provided by law and are necessary for the purpose of respecting
the ``rights or reputations of others'' or protecting national
security, public order, public health, or morals.\5\ An October
2009 UN Human Rights Council resolution specified that
restrictions on the ``discussion of government policies and
political debate,'' ``peaceful demonstrations or political
activities, including for peace or democracy,'' and
``expression of opinion and dissent'' are inconsistent with
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.\6\ The UN Human Rights Committee
also cautioned that restrictions on freedom of expression noted
in Article 19(3) should be interpreted narrowly so that the
restrictions ``may not put in jeopardy the right itself.'' \7\
At the UN Human Rights Council's (HRC) third Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) of China's compliance with international
human rights norms this past year,\8\ international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) reported multiple violations
of freedom of expression and press freedom in China in written
submissions \9\ available in the months prior to China's
November 2018 opening session and in oral comments at the March
2019 session to consider the HRC's report.\10\ NGO stakeholders
also raised concerns about efforts by the Chinese government to
silence criticism of its record during the UPR.\11\ In one
publicly reported incident, the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) removed information
submitted by at least seven groups, among which were NGOs that
advocate for the rights of Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Hong Kong
people,\12\ from an initial official summary of stakeholder
submissions in September 2018,\13\ replacing that summary with
a revised version in October 2018.\14\ That information from
some but not all of the missing submissions was inserted in a
corrigendum issued a few days before the November session \15\
did little to dispel stakeholder concerns about Chinese
government influence.\16\ A coalition of 40 NGOs subsequently
called on HRC States Parties to adopt a resolution to ``express
collective concern about worsening rights abuse in China and
the government's failure to follow through on its obligations
and commitments.'' \17\
30 Years after Tiananmen
International coverage of the 30th anniversary of the
protests for political reform and democratic change in
Tiananmen Square, Beijing municipality, and hundreds of other
locations in China in the spring of 1989,\18\ provided new
accounts, images,\19\ and analysis of the Chinese Communist
Party and government's violent suppression of those
demonstrations on June 3 and 4, 1989 (``June Fourth'' or
``Tiananmen''). Among the highlights were a former military
journalist's account of opposition among some military leaders
to the use of force to quell the protests; \20\ a collection of
secret documents from a meeting of senior Party leaders from
June 19 to 21, 1989; \21\ and essays by younger Chinese
describing how they learned about June Fourth despite ongoing
government censorship.\22\ An academic analysis linked Party
General Secretary and President Xi Jinping's aggressive
policies of ideological conformity and information control,
Party discipline, and centralization of his own power to the
political legacy of June Fourth.\23\
China's Defense Minister Wei Fenghe spoke publicly about
Tiananmen in early June 2019, reiterating the official position
that the government's crackdown in 1989 was ``correct.'' \24\
Wei's use of ``political turmoil'' (zhengzhi dongluan) in these
comments reflected a revival of hardline official rhetoric on
Tiananmen, a ``regression'' from the comparatively mild
expressions commonly used in official statements such as
``political turbulence'' (zhengzhi fengbo) and the ``turn from
spring to summer'' (chunxia zhi jiao).\25\ Likewise, the July
2019 obituary for senior leader Li Peng in the state-run media
outlet Xinhua reiterated the harsher language: Xinhua commended
Li--the premier who declared martial law in Beijing in May 1989
\26\--for his staunch support of the ``resolute measures to
halt the turmoil [dongluan] and quell the counterrevolutionary
rebellion [fan'geming baoluan].'' \27\
The government's tight control of information about the use
of violence against protesters as well as the crackdown on
protesters has left much unknown about Tiananmen, particularly
the total number of dead and wounded. The Tiananmen Mothers
\28\--a group in China composed of parents and family members
of persons killed on or around June 4--wrote in March 2019 to
the National People's Congress, again appealing to the
government for truth, accountability, and a reckoning over the
victims.\29\ Through years of effort, the Tiananmen Mothers
have confirmed the deaths of 202 persons, but overall estimates
range from the hundreds to the thousands.\30\ Referring to
persons detained in connection to June Fourth, John Kamm, the
executive director of the U.S.-based Dui Hua Foundation, which
maintains an extensive database of political prisoners in
China,\31\ estimated some 15,000 detentions in a 2009 speech,
noting, ``Whatever the number is, it is staggeringly high.''
\32\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Press Freedom and Tiananmen
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the spring 1989 protests, freedom of expression was a key
demand among the student demonstrators,\33\ a demand also taken up by
Chinese journalists who petitioned the government for dialogue on press
freedom.\34\ Despite a hardline editorial in the Party mouthpiece
People's Daily on April 26, 1989, which condemned the student protests
as ``counterrevolutionary'' and ``turmoil,'' \35\ some official media
outlets reported on the demonstrations with a ``new openness'' and
accuracy in May 1989,\36\ including front-page coverage of the protests
across the country on May 6, 1989.\37\ Former People's Daily journalist
Liu Binyan \38\ reported in 1992 that a `` `dark age' once more
descended over the mass media'' after the military crackdown, with
increased ideological control over news content.\39\ Progress also
ended in the efforts to pass national press legislation in spite of
robust developments and drafting in the late 1980s.\40\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of the Press
China fell one place lower in Reporters Without Borders'
2019 press freedom index from its rank in 2018 (176th to
177th), making it the fourth worst country in the world for
press freedom.\41\ Some professional Chinese journalists
described current conditions for journalism as an ``era of
total censorship.'' \42\ A leading investigative journalist who
left the field in 2019 \43\ emphasized his disenchantment with
the practice of journalism in China.\44\ Freedom of the press
is guaranteed in China's Constitution,\45\ yet regulations on
news media, some related to the broad restrictions on internet
content in the PRC National Security Law and PRC Cybersecurity
Law, leave journalists vulnerable to criminal prosecution.\46\
The Chinese government's repression of Uyghur and other ethnic
minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
since 2017 has resulted in a significant increase in detained
journalists \47\ as well as editorial staff from at least one
leading newspaper and a publishing house.\48\ The November 2018
detention of photojournalist and U.S. resident Lu Guang in the
XUAR, while he was reportedly in Urumqi municipality to give a
photography workshop,\49\ and the January 2019 detention of
Australian national and political commentator Yang Hengjun,
while at the Guangdong international airport en route to
Shanghai municipality,\50\ heightened concerns about freedom of
speech and the press, and for the safety of individuals
traveling to China for personal or professional activity.\51\
PARTY CONTROL OF THE MEDIA
In January 2019, Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and
members of the Standing Committee of the Party Central
Committee Political Bureau visited People's Daily, the Party's
flagship newspaper, to publicize efforts by the news media to
keep up with emerging technologies of the digital era.\52\
These efforts--officially referred to as ``media convergence''
(meiti ronghe)--envisage a fusion of news media and digital
technologies,\53\ whereby ``Party newspapers, periodicals,
broadcast stations, websites `and other mainstream media must
catch up with the times, bravely utilizing new technologies,
new mechanisms and new modes, accelerating the pace of
convergence and achieving more expansive and optimized
propaganda results.' '' \54\ High-level promotion of ``media
convergence'' this past year occurred in tandem with government
entities responsible for news media moving under the Central
Propaganda Department's operations, part of a sweeping
reorganization of Party and government institutions in March
2018 that has reinforced Party power more broadly.\55\
Media serving ``as government mouthpieces instead of as
independent bodies operating in the public interest'' are a
major challenge to free expression, according to international
experts.\56\ The Chinese Communist Party historically
designated the Chinese news media as its ``mouthpiece,'' \57\
providing the Party's version of the news and shaping public
opinion.\58\ Official control included prohibitions on
independent reporting or use of foreign media reports, and
restricting coverage to ``authoritative'' content, typically
from the state media agency Xinhua and People's Daily.\59\
China Digital Times, a U.S.-based web portal that translates
leaked censorship directives from the Central Propaganda
Department and other government entities,\60\ highlighted
directives from the reporting year that restricted coverage of
the China-U.S. trade war and of high-ranking Chinese leaders,
among other issues authorities deemed ``politically
sensitive.'' \61\ In a related development, People's Daily
monetized its expertise in identifying ``politically
sensitive'' content by marketing the services of its in-house
censors \62\ and in formally training and certifying
censors.\63\
Wielding state media to positively portray the Party and
government \64\ as well as to criticize developments that
authorities consider to be security threats \65\ continues to
be a manifestation of the Party-defined ``mouthpiece'' role of
the news media. This past year, official coverage of Uyghurs
and other predominantly Muslim groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, at least one million of whom have been
detained in mass internment camps for ``political
reeducation,'' reportedly portrayed the region as ``happy and
stable.'' \66\ Chinese state media also reportedly manipulated
information about the summer 2019 protests in Hong Kong, rather
than objectively reporting on protester grievances about the
eroding rule of law.\67\ State media, moreover, provided
negative coverage of the Hong Kong protests in its
international outlets, such as CGTN and China Daily, to
generate a counter-narrative to international media outlets'
coverage.\68\
CRIMINAL DETENTION AND PROSECUTION OF CITIZEN JOURNALISTS
This past year, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
ranked China in second place, after Turkey, for having the
highest number of detained journalists in the world,\69\ a
large number of whom can be classified as ``citizen
journalists.'' \70\ Citizen journalists in China cover issues
such as the treatment of ethnic minority groups, labor
protests, and rights defense activities,\71\ topics that the
government and Party restrict in official news outlets.\72\
Bitter Winter, an online magazine managed in Italy which
reports on religious freedom and human rights in China,\73\
described its contributors from China as amateurs, noting that
``only in a few cases [do] our reporters have professional
training in journalism . . ..'' \74\ CPJ identified 47
journalists in detention as of December 2018,\75\ and Reporters
Without Borders counted 111 detained journalists as of April
2019.\76\ Government control of court data, media censorship of
cases, obstruction by local law enforcement, and official
harassment of lawyers representing journalists contribute to
the challenge in assessing the total number of detentions.\77\
The ongoing crackdown on citizen journalists who have
founded or are associated with websites that document human
rights violations continued this past year, particularly in the
detention of individuals focused on labor conditions and
religious freedom. Authorities detained staff from two websites
that monitor worker rights' protections, including Shang Kai in
August 2018,\78\ Yang Zhengjun in January 2019,\79\ and Chai
Xiaoming,\80\ Wei Zhili, and Ke Chengbing in March 2019.\81\
Shang and Chai were former editors at Red Reference, a self-
described ``leftist'' website that expressed support for worker
efforts in 2018 to organize a union at the Jasic Technology
factory in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province.\82\ Yang,
Wei, and Ke worked at the website iLabour (Xin Shengdai),
highlighting inadequate labor conditions and occupational
health hazards such as pneumoconiosis.\83\ [For further
information on the Jasic crackdown and occupational health
hazards in China, see Section II--Worker Rights.] Between
August and December 2018, authorities also reportedly detained
45 Chinese contributors to Bitter Winter.\84\
Trials and sentencing proceeded against several citizen
journalists detained in 2016 \85\ and 2017 \86\ whom
authorities prosecuted on the charges ``inciting subversion of
state power,'' ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble,'' and
``illegally procuring state secrets for overseas entities.''
\87\ According to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
the incitement and state secrets charges are ``vague and
broad,'' thus restricting the freedoms of expression and
association that are protected by international human rights
instruments.\88\ The Dui Hua Foundation noted similar concerns
about the lack of transparency in the charge ``illegally
procuring state secrets for overseas entities,'' and its misuse
to prosecute journalists, among others.\89\ Some citizen
journalists are vulnerable to abuse and maltreatment in
detention.\90\
Citizen journalist cases of concern from this past year
included the following:
Liu Feiyue, Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch
(CRLW). In January 2019, the Suizhou Municipal
Intermediate People's Court in Hubei province sentenced
Liu to five years' imprisonment and three years'
deprivation of political rights for ``inciting
subversion of state power.'' \91\ Liu's indictment
specified CRLW's reporting on human rights violations,
its annual report on rights defense and forced
psychiatric commitment, and its calls on authorities to
release political prisoners.\92\
Sun Lin, freelance writer. In January 2019,
the Nanjing Municipal Intermediate People's Court in
Jiangsu province sentenced Sun to four years'
imprisonment for ``inciting subversion of state power''
in connection to Sun's social media posts that
authorities apparently deemed ``politically
sensitive.'' \93\ Authorities previously sentenced Sun,
a former journalist for Nanjing media outlets, to four
years' imprisonment in June 2008, in connection to work
he published on an overseas website.\94\
Huang Qi, 64 Tianwang.\95\ On July 29, 2019,
the Mianyang Municipal Intermediate People's Court in
Sichuan province found Huang guilty of ``illegally
providing state secrets to overseas entities'' and
``intentionally leaking state secrets,'' sentencing him
to serve 12 years' imprisonment.\96\ In an editorial
following the sentence, the Washington Post noted, ``in
actuality, his only offense was speaking out against
government wrongdoing.'' \97\ Authorities also
continuously harassed and extralegally detained Huang's
85-year-old mother, Pu Wenqing,\98\ as she sought to
raise attention to reports that detention center
authorities have denied Huang adequate medical care,
tortured him, and refused her applications for his
medical parole.\99\
WORSENING WORKING CONDITIONS FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS
Official Chinese efforts to control coverage of China in
international news media reportedly intensified this past year,
increasing the difficulties for foreign journalists in China.
The Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC) annual survey
of working conditions in China described a marked deterioration
in 2018.\100\ The FCCC documented the Chinese government's
``escalation of human and digital'' surveillance of foreign
journalists; \101\ harassment of Chinese nationals who worked
as news assistants; \102\ threats against and harassment of
sources; \103\ limits on the length of work visas or denial of
work visa renewal altogether to retaliate against unfavorable
coverage by specific journalists or their news outlets; \104\
and interference in the coverage of developments in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and other ethnic
minority or border areas of China.\105\ The Chinese government
also continued to block access in China to major international
news outlets,\106\ such as the New York Times,\107\ and
additional international news and online information sites were
censored by authorities around the Tiananmen anniversary,
including the Intercept, the Guardian,\108\ and Wikipedia.\109\
Incidents this past year of official control of foreign
journalists included the following:
Visa non-renewal or threat of withholding a
visa. In August 2018, Chinese authorities refused to
renew the work visa of Megha Rajagopalan,\110\ a
BuzzFeed reporter who described developments in the
XUAR as ``dystopian.'' \111\ In addition, authorities
did not issue a journalist visa to Bethany Allen-
Ebrahimian, who submitted an application in late 2018
to join Agence France-Presse in China.\112\ The
Committee to Protect Journalists called it ``an act of
retribution for her past reporting on the Chinese
government's efforts to spread political power abroad
and is a shameful attempt to prevent critical coverage
of China . . ..'' \113\ In another incident, Voice of
America reported in March 2019 that a Chinese embassy
official in Russia threatened to place a journalist
from Russia's Sputnik News on a visa ``blacklist'' in
connection to the journalist's alleged ``negative''
coverage of the Chinese economy.\114\ [For information
on the Hong Kong government's visa denial to Victor
Mallet, Asia editor of the Financial Times, see Section
VI--Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.]
Interference in the XUAR. FCCC also reported
instances of official harassment, surveillance, and
intimidation while foreign reporters were on assignment
in the XUAR in 2018.\115\ In April 2019, a New York
Times correspondent recounted both high-tech (digital)
and low-tech (human) surveillance of him and a
colleague while on assignment in the XUAR.\116\ [For
further information on official harassment of foreign
journalists in the XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Lack of access in the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR). Five respondents to the FCCC's annual working
conditions survey unsuccessfully applied to the Chinese
government for a special permit to visit the TAR in
2018.\117\ In a March 2019 position paper, the FCCC
emphasized that the Chinese government's restrictions
on access to the TAR and Tibetan areas in Qinghai,
Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces has limited the
amount of ``accurate information'' on the ``lives of
ethnic Tibetans living in China.'' \118\
Internet and Social Media
During the 2019 reporting year, senior officials reiterated
the Party's aim to further secure Party control of digital
space and technologies. In September 2018, the newly appointed
head of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Zhuang Rongwen,
urged Party and government to marshal ``netizens'' (wangmin) as
a ``force'' (liliang) in Party control.\119\ As mentioned
earlier in this section, in January 2019, Party General
Secretary and President Xi Jinping called for even greater
uniformity on digital platforms through deeper ``convergence''
with the Party's ideological priorities.\120\ A key premise
underlying this aim is ``internet sovereignty,'' a notion the
Chinese government and Party have linked to national security
concerns such that each country may manage the internet within
its own borders.\121\ Internet sovereignty, however, implies
that internet and social media use in any individual country is
not subject to international standards on freedom of
expression, information, and association as they pertain to the
internet and social media.\122\
Content control remained a focus in the growing body of
internet and social media regulations and censorship
technologies.\123\ [For information on the role of internet
service providers in censorship, data privacy concerns, and
surveillance, see Section III--Business and Human Rights.]
These regulatory and technological developments, in combination
with provisions in the PRC Criminal Law that punish certain
political and other speech,\124\ severely curtailed freedom of
speech online,\125\ and included the detention and potential
criminal prosecution of individuals engaged in speech \126\ and
other forms of online expression authorities deem to be
``politically sensitive.'' \127\ The Cyberspace Administration
of China issued provisions for internet service providers in
November 2018,\128\ that one expert claimed will ``increase the
requirements for self-inspection for services with `public
opinion properties' or `social mobilization capacity.' '' \129\
Some experts have found that Chinese government censorship is
less motivated by preventing dissemination of sensitive content
than by a fear that online speech has the potential to
stimulate collective organizing.\130\ Other analysis,
nevertheless, questioned this interpretation, finding instead
that government criticism remains a central target of official
censorship within the complex operation of state repression in
China.\131\ Indeed, as Human Rights Watch researcher Yaqiu Wang
observed, the nationwide Twitter crackdown this past year
appeared ``absent any protests or other social events organized
via Twitter as a trigger, . . . signal[ing] a new level of
suppression of free speech . . ..'' \132\
Tiananmen anniversary.\133\ Official efforts
to suppress mention of Tiananmen online were
demonstrated by the government's ``simultaneous social
media crackdowns'' to stem access to information and
communication \134\ and blocking online access to
international media.\135\ At least one commentator
speculated that the Cybersecurity Association of
China's six-month campaign (January to June 2019) to
``clean up online ecology'' \136\ was linked to the
30th anniversary.\137\ According to research conducted
by the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab and the
University of Hong Kong's Weiboscope, June Fourth is
the most censored topic on the Chinese internet.\138\
During ten years of research, Citizen Lab collected a
list of 3,237 Tiananmen-related keywords that
apparently trigger censorship in China.\139\ Weiboscope
identified 1,256 Tiananmen-related posts censored
between 2012 and 2018, among which are images of a
single lit candle and the annual Tiananmen vigil held
in Hong Kong.\140\
Twitter crackdown. Reports began to emerge in
November 2018 that Chinese authorities were several
months into a coordinated, nationwide effort to silence
Twitter users in China.\141\ These Twitter users
included not only government critics and advocates for
greater rights protection but also individuals who
apparently were not politically active on- or
offline.\142\ Public security officials harassed and
intimidated targeted individuals, employing
interrogation, usually at a police station;
administrative or criminal detention; coercion to
compel a promise to no longer use Twitter; and deletion
of entire Twitter archives.\143\ Prior to the 30th
anniversary of Tiananmen, the social media company
Twitter reportedly suspended the accounts of at least
100 Twitter users, including political commentators and
nationalists,\144\ which it later claimed was part of
routine maintenance and not in response to Chinese
authorities.\145\
Criminal prosecution--``June Fourth liquor''
case. In April 2019, the Chengdu Municipal Intermediate
People's Court in Sichuan province tried and sentenced
four men involved in the ``June Fourth liquor''
case.\146\ Authorities accused them of posting photos
online of the self-made labels they placed on bottles
of hard liquor in 2016, which memorialized June Fourth
by using a product name homophonous with the date ``89/
6/4,'' an image modeled on the well-known ``Tank Man''
photo, and promotional language that said ``Never
forget, Never give up.'' \147\
Curtailment of Academic Freedom in China
Domestic and international experts have linked the
widespread deterioration of academic freedom in China to Party
General Secretary and President Xi Jinping's reassertion of
ideological control over universities since he assumed the
senior-most Party and government leadership positions in 2012
and 2013, respectively.\148\ Around politically sensitive
anniversaries this past year, such as the 100th anniversary of
the 1919 May Fourth Movement and the 30th anniversary of the
1989 Tiananmen protests, authorities also increased pressure at
Chinese universities,\149\ such that some Chinese scholars
reportedly have asserted that the ``current [academic]
environment is the most restrictive in their lifetimes.'' \150\
Reports this past year demonstrated a broad range of official
repression, including the following:
Detention or disappearance of 435 prominent
Uyghur scholars in mass internment camps by authorities
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) as part
of the government and Party's massive crackdown on
Uyghur and other ethnic minority groups in the XUAR
since 2017, according to a Uyghur rights advocacy
organization.\151\ Authorities also have detained
scholars from other ethnic minority groups in the XUAR;
\152\
Interrogation, forced videotaped confessions,
and in some cases detention of 20 student labor rights
advocates and participants of on-campus ``leftist''
study groups by authorities,\153\ including Peking
University students Qiu Zhanxuan \154\ and Yue Xin;
\155\
Intensified promotion of ideological and
``patriotic'' education in the classroom; \156\
Book bans,\157\ such as leading law scholar
Zhang Qianfan's textbook on constitutional law; \158\
A leadership change at Peking University that
apparently emphasized Party and public security
credentials over academic qualifications; \159\
Discipline, suspension, and dismissal of
professors who publicly aired critical assessments of
the government or Party,\160\ notably Tsinghua
University law professor Xu Zhangrun; \161\
Widespread use of surveillance cameras in
classrooms to monitor discussion as well as the
encouragement of students to report professors or
classmates with dissenting views; \162\
Pressure on domestic academic experts who have
been contacted by foreign journalists or scholars for
interviews and commentary either to refuse such
requests or restrict the ``candor'' of their comments;
\163\ and
Prevention of Chinese academics and others
from participating in academic exchange and
travel,\164\ such as rights lawyer Chen Jiangang's
April 2019 travel to the United States to begin a
Humphrey Fellowship.\165\
The government and Party's restrictions on academic and
intellectual freedom in China also compounded concerns in the
United States about international scholarly exchange with
China. A report from leading China specialists highlighted the
lack of reciprocity and accountability in academic exchange as
a factor for the report's policy guidance that recommended a
shift away from engagement in U.S.-China relations to the more
cautious ``constructive vigilance.'' \166\ In October 2018,
Cornell University emphasized violations of academic freedom
when it suspended two exchange programs with Renmin University
(Renda) in Beijing municipality following reports that Renda
officials had harassed students advocating for worker
rights.\167\ The Commission also observed reports of alleged
Chinese government harassment taking place outside mainland
China involving two foreign specialists (one incident in Hong
Kong and multiple incidents in New Zealand) whose work has been
critical of the Chinese leadership.\168\ The Chinese government
also denied a visa to one American expert to attend a
conference in Beijing.\169\ While known cases of outright visa
denial to foreign scholars whose research or publications are
deemed by Chinese authorities to be ``politically sensitive''
remain limited,\170\ the threat of visa denial is a
longstanding concern of foreign scholars.\171\ Foreign scholars
also have pointed to difficulties accessing archives and
libraries,\172\ the culling of digital archives and Chinese
government censorship demands on foreign academic
publishers,\173\ and limitations on conducting field work in
China.\174\ Accurate data on the frequency and substance of
such incidents, nevertheless, are difficult to obtain.\175\
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Expression
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Expression
\1\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Gongmin yanlun ziyou de
xianfa quanli burong jianta'' [Constitutional right to citizens'
freedom of speech not easily trampled upon], October 3, 2018.
\2\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966,
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution
217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 19.
\3\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed May 15,
2019. China signed the convention on October 5, 1998.
\4\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/40/6, December 26, 2018,
recommendations 28.5, 28.6; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review China, Addendum, Views
on Conclusions and/or Recommendations, Voluntary Commitments and
Replies Presented by the State under Review, A/HRC/40/6.Add.1, February
15, 2019, para. 2 (28.5, 28.6). The Chinese government did not accept
recommendations to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights proposed by several countries during the UN Human
Rights Council's third Universal Periodic Review of China's compliance
with international human rights norms, noting that it was ``making
preparations for ratification, but the specific date of ratification
depends on whether relevant conditions in China are in place.''
\5\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966,
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19(3); UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/17/27,
May 16, 2011, para. 24.
\6\ Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, adopted by UN Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/
HRC/RES/12/16, October 12, 2009, para. 5(p)(i).
\7\ UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19:
Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, September 12, 2011,
para. 21.
\8\ UN Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review--China,
Third Cycle, accessed July 10, 2019.
\9\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders et al., ``Collection
of Civil Society Reports Submitted to the United Nations for 3rd
Universal Periodic Review of People's Republic of China,'' October
2018, paras. 18-28; International Service for Human Rights and
Committee to Protect Journalists, ``The Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China: UPR Briefing Paper,'' March 2018; PEN
International, Independent Chinese PEN Centre, PEN America, and PEN
Tibet, ``Joint Submission for the UPR of the People's Republic of
China,'' 2018, paras. 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 18; Human Rights in China,
``Stakeholder Submission by Human Rights in China,'' March 2018, paras.
1, 15.
\10\ ``China, UPR Report Consideration--38th Meeting, 40th Regular
Session Human Rights Council,'' [Webcast], UN Web TV, March 15, 2019,
38:43, International Service for Human Rights (Joint Statement), Ms.
Sarah Brooks; 43:50, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Mr. Kai
Mueller; 49:11, Human Rights Watch, Mr. John Fisher; Human Rights
Watch, ``UN: Unprecedented Joint Call for China to End Xinjiang
Abuses,'' July 10, 2019.
\11\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``China's Response to UN
Rights Review Blatantly Ignores Its Persecution of Tibetans,'' March
14, 2019; Massimo Introvigne, ``Universal Periodic Review of China: A
Disappointing Document,'' Bitter Winter, March 15, 2019; Human Rights
Watch, ``UN: China Responds to Rights Review with Threats,'' April 1,
2019; Kris Cheng, `` `Political Censorship': United Nations Removes
Submissions from Int'l Civil Groups at China's Human Rights Review,''
Hong Kong Free Press, November 6, 2018; Andrea Worden, ``China Deals
Another Blow to the International Human Rights Framework at Its UN
Universal Periodic Review,'' China Change, November 25, 2018.
\12\ Su Xinqi and Joyce Ng, ``Demosisto Report Detailing Human
Rights Concerns in Hong Kong Removed from UN Review Hearing, Joshua
Wong Claims,'' South China Morning Post, November 7, 2018; ``Joint
Press Statement: China UPR,'' reprinted in Human Rights Watch, November
5, 2018. The signatories to the statement were the Hong Kong rights
advocacy group Demosisto Human Rights Watch; International Service for
Human Rights; Nonviolent Radical Party, Transnational and Transparty;
Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center; Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy; Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization; Uyghur Human Rights Project; and World Uyghur Congress.
Kris Cheng, `` `Political Censorship': United Nations Removes
Submissions from Int'l Civil Groups at China's Human Rights Review,''
Hong Kong Free Press, November 6, 2018; Andrea Worden, ``China Deals
Another Blow to the International Human Rights Framework at its UN
Universal Periodic Review,'' China Change, November 25, 2018.
\13\ UN Human Rights Council, Summary of Stakeholders' Submissions
on China, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/3, September 3, 2018.
\14\ UN Human Rights Council, Summary of Stakeholders' Submissions
on China, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/3*, September 3, 2018 (October 10,
2018 version).
\15\ UN Human Rights Council, Summary of Stakeholders' Submissions
on China, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Corrigendum, A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/Corr.1*, November 5,
2018.
\16\ Andrea Worden, ``China Deals Another Blow to the International
Human Rights Framework at Its UN Universal Periodic Review,'' China
Change, November 25, 2018; International Campaign for Tibet, ``China's
Response to UN Rights Review Blatantly Ignores Its Persecution of
Tibetans,'' March 14, 2019; Human Rights Watch, ``UN: China Responds to
Rights Review with Threats,'' April 1, 2019; Kris Cheng, `` `Political
Censorship': United Nations Removes Submissions from Int'l Civil Groups
at China's Human Rights Review,'' Hong Kong Free Press, November 6,
2018.
\17\ International Service for Human Rights, ``HRC40--High Time for
a Resolution Calling for Access, Accountability in China,'' January 30,
2019.
\18\ Elizabeth M. Lynch, ``Introducing #Tiananmen30--Eyewitnesses
to History,'' China Law & Policy (blog), May 28, 2019; Elizabeth M.
Lynch, ``Frank Upham--Our Man in Wuhan,'' China Law & Policy (blog),
May 29, 2019; Elizabeth M. Lynch, ``Andrea Worden--The Cries of
Changsha,'' China Law & Policy (blog), June 3, 2019; Eva Xiao and
Elizabeth Law, ``The `Other' Tiananmen--30 Years Ago, Protests Engulfed
China,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Yahoo! News, May 31, 2019.
\19\ Jennifer Creery, ``Video: 30 Years On, Canadian Journalist
Shares Newly Restored Footage of China's Tiananmen Massacre Horror,''
Hong Kong Free Press, May 30, 2019.
\20\ Chris Buckley, ``30 Years after Tiananmen, a Chinese Military
Insider Warns: Never Forget,'' New York Times, May 28, 2019.
\21\ Andrew J. Nathan, ``The New Tiananmen Papers,'' Foreign
Affairs, May 30, 2019; Chris Buckley, ``New Documents Show Power Games
behind China's Tiananmen Crackdown,'' New York Times, May 30, 2019.
\22\ Yangyang Cheng, ``Four Is Forbidden,'' ChinaFile, Asia
Society, May 30, 2019; Gerry Shih and Anna Fifield, ``What Does
Tiananmen Mean for Chinese Too Young to Remember It?,'' Washington
Post, June 1, 2019; ``How I Learned about Tiananmen,'' ChinaFile, Asia
Society, June 3, 2019. See also Louisa Lim, ``After Tiananmen, China
Conquers History Itself,'' New York Times, June 2, 2019.
\23\ Glenn Tiffert, ``30 Years after Tiananmen: Memory in the Era
of Xi Jinping,'' Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 39. See
also Orville Schell, ``Tiananmen: The Crackdown That Defined Modern
China,'' Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2019.
\24\ Lee Chyen Yee, ``Chinese Defense Minister Says Tiananmen
Crackdown Was Justified,'' Reuters, June 1, 2019; ``Wei Fenghe cheng
Liusi Tiananmen zhenya shi zhengque de'' [Wei Fenghe says the June 4th
Tiananmen crackdown was correct], Voice of America, June 2, 2019. See
also ``China Military Says Shouldn't Say Tiananmen Protests Were
`Suppressed,' '' Reuters, May 30, 2019.
\25\ ``Xianggang yulun: Zhongguo Fangzhang de Liusi yanlun xianshi
guanfang lichang `daotui' '' [Public opinion in Hong Kong: China's
Defense Minister's statement about June 4th shows that the official
position has ``regressed''], Voice of America, June 3, 2019;
``Zhuanfang: Zhongguo guanmei heyi chongti `pinxi fan'geming baoluan'
'' [Interview: Why has official Chinese media again raised ``quell the
counter-revolutionary rebellion''], Deutsche Welle, December 18, 2018.
See also Qian Gang, ``Reading Xi's Reform Anniversary Speech,'' China
Media Project, December 18, 2018.
\26\ Erik Eckholm and Chris Buckley, ``Li Peng, Chinese Leader
Derided for Role in Tiananmen Crackdown, Dies at 90,'' New York Times,
July 23, 2019.
\27\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang Quanguo Renda Weiyuanhui Guowuyuan
Quanguo Zhengxie fugao Li Peng tongzhi shishi'' [Party Central
Committee, NPC Standing Committee, State Council, and CPPCC report
Comrade Li Peng passed away], Xinhua, July 23, 2019.
\28\ Elizabeth M. Lynch, ``Teng Biao--His Tiananmen Awakening,''
China Law & Policy (blog), June 2, 2019.
\29\ Tiananmen Mothers, ``Mourning Our Families and Compatriots
Killed in the June Fourth Massacre: A Letter to China's Leaders,''
translated and reprinted in Human Rights in China, March 15, 2019.
\30\ Ludovic Ehret and Eva Xiao, `` `Unimaginable': 30 Years On,
Families of Tiananmen Dead Demand Truth,'' Agence France-Presse,
reprinted in Hong Kong Free Press, June 2, 2019; Verna Yu, ``Tiananmen
Square Anniversary: What Sparked the Protests in China in 1989?,''
Guardian, May 30, 2019.
\31\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Last Known Tiananmen Prisoner to Be
Released in October,'' May 2, 2016.
\32\ John Kamm, Dui Hua Foundation, ``How Tiananmen Changed
China,'' Remarks to the Commonwealth Club of California, June 3, 2009.
\33\ Wang Dan, ``30 Years after Tiananmen: The Meaning of June
4th,'' Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 31-32; Verna Yu,
``Tiananmen Square Anniversary: What Sparked the Protests in China in
1989?,'' Guardian, May 30, 2019.
\34\ Sheryl WuDunn and Special to the New York Times, ``1,000
Chinese Journalists Call for Greater Freedom of Press,'' New York
Times, May 10, 1989. Journalists from state media called for dialogue
with senior leaders on freedom of the press and permission to provide
more accurate coverage of the protests in a petition reportedly signed
by approximately 1,000 journalists.
\35\ Chris Buckley, ``People's Daily Editorial Fanned Flames of
1989 Protest,'' Sinosphere (blog), New York Times, April 25, 2014. For
a translated excerpt from the April 26, 1989, People's Daily editorial,
see Geremie R. Barme, ``Rumour--A Pipe Blown by Surmises, Jealousies,
Conjectures,'' China Heritage, Wairarapa Academy for New Sinology, June
7, 2019.
\36\ Liu Binyan, ``In Beijing's Newsrooms,'' Nieman Reports, Nieman
Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University (Spring 1992),
reprinted August 28, 2014; Orville Schell, ``Tiananmen: The Crackdown
That Defined Modern China,'' Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2019;
Elizabeth M. Lynch, ``Andrea Worden--The Cries of Changsha,'' China Law
& Policy (blog), June 3, 2019. See also The Tiananmen Papers, eds.
Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002), 92.
The Tiananmen Papers included a translation of an official document
from Shanghai municipality that noted many Shanghai newspapers at the
time had praised former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang in their
coverage of his death.
\37\ Sheryl WuDunn and Special to the New York Times, ``China
Newspapers Try New Openness,'' New York Times, May 6, 1989.
\38\ The Tiananmen Papers, eds. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2002), 14; John Gittings, ``Liu Binyan,''
Guardian, December 7, 2005.
\39\ Liu Binyan, ``In Beijing's Newsrooms,'' Nieman Reports, Nieman
Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University (Spring 1992),
reprinted August 28, 2014.
\40\ ``Zhongguo jizhe jie: Xinwen zui cha de shidai'' [Chinese
journalists' day: Worst of times for news media], Radio Free Asia,
November 8, 2018; Wu Wei, ``Fangsong xinwen guankong, tuijin xinwen
lifa'' [Release control of news media, promote press legislation], New
York Times, October 13, 2014; Sun Xupei, ``Sun Xupei: Sanshi nian
xinwen lifa licheng he sikao'' [Sun Xupei: Thirty years on the history
of and reflections on press legislation], China Reform Net (Zhongguo
Gaige Wang), February 14, 2012.
\41\ Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2019,
accessed June 11, 2019.
\42\ Jiang Yannan, ``Quanmian shencha shidai: Zhongguo meiti ren
zheng zai jingli shenme?'' [An era of total censorship: What are
Chinese journalists experiencing nowadays?], Initium, September 9,
2018. For an English translation of this article, see ``Journalists in
a `Total Censorship Era,' '' China Digital Times, October 8, 2018.
``Zhongguo diaocha baodao: guoqu `shi' hengbianye wailai yi pian
miming'' [Investigative journalism in China: a past strewn with
``corpses,'' a future vast and hazy], Radio Free Asia, May 2, 2019.
\43\ Jiang Ziwen and Yue Huairang, `` `Zang'ao jizhe', Zhongqingbao
shendu diaochabu zhuren Liu Wanyong gaobie meiti'' [``Tibetan mastiff
journalist'' China Youth Daily investigative journalism department head
Liu Wanyong says farewell to journalism], The Paper, April 25, 2019;
David Bandurski, ``Liu Wanyong Bids Journalism Farewell,'' China Media
Project, May 6, 2019.
\44\ Jane Perlez, ``For China's Leading Investigative Reporter,
Enough Is Enough,'' New York Times, June 7, 2019; David Bandurski,
``Liu Wanyong Bids Journalism Farewell,'' China Media Project, May 6,
2019.
\45\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 35.
\46\ PEN International, Independent Chinese PEN Centre, PEN
America, and PEN Tibet, ``Joint Submission for the UPR of the People's
Republic of China,'' accessed May 15, 2019, paras. 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 18;
Jiang Yannan, ``Quanmian shencha shidai: Zhongguo meiti ren zheng zai
jingli shenme?'' [An era of total censorship: What are Chinese
journalists experiencing nowadays?], Initium, September 9, 2018.
\47\ Reporters Without Borders, ``China: 58 Uyghur Journalists
Detained,'' June 3, 2019; Elana Beiser, Committee to Protect
Journalists (CPJ), ``Hundreds of Journalists Jailed Globally Becomes
the New Normal,'' December 13, 2018; Committee to Protect Journalists,
``47 Journalists Imprisoned in China in 2018,'' accessed May 7, 2019.
CPJ identified 23 ethnic Uyghurs in its list of 47 detained or
imprisoned journalists. Marco Respinti, ``The Fate of Bitter Winter's
45 Arrested Reporters,'' Bitter Winter, February 7, 2019. Of the 45
detained contributors from Bitter Winter, at least 22 reportedly were
detained in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
\48\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Update--Detained and
Disappeared: Intellectuals under Assault in the Uyghur Homeland,'' May
21, 2019; ``Veteran Editor of Uyghur Publishing House among 14 Staff
Members Held over `Problematic Books,' '' Radio Free Asia, November 26,
2018; ``Xinjiang Authorities Detain Prominent Uyghur Journalist in
Political `Re-Education Camp,' '' Radio Free Asia, October 18, 2018.
For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
records 2019-00194 on Ablajan Seyit and 2019-00195 on Memetjan Abliz
Boriyar.
\49\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``China Detains Award-
Winning Photographer in Xinjiang,'' November 28, 2018; Rights Defense
Network, ``Lu Mei sheyingshi Lu Guang bei zhengshi zao Xinjiang Kashi
jingfang zhengshi daibu'' [U.S.-based photographer Lu Guang confirmed
to have been formally arrested by Kashgar, Xinjiang, police], December
13, 2018; Robert Y. Pledge, ``A Photographer Goes Missing in China,''
New York Times, December 8, 2018. For more information on Lu Guang, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00601.
\50\ Damien Cave and Chris Buckley, ``Chinese-Australian Writer
Yang Hengjun Detained in China,'' New York Times, January 23, 2019;
Gerry Shih, ``China Confirms Detention of Australian Writer Yang
Hengjun on Suspicion of Endangering National Security,'' Washington
Post, January 24, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on January 24,
2019,'' January 24, 2019; David Bandurski, ``This Is Yang Hengjun,''
China Media Project, March 30, 2011.
\51\ William Yang, ``Chinese Photographer Lu Guang's Detention
Raises Alarm,'' Deutsche Welle, May 2, 2019; PEN America,
``Disappearance of Australian Author Yang Hengjun Terrifying Sign of
China's Repression of Writers,'' January 23, 2019.
\52\ ``Xi Jinping: Tuidong meiti ronghe xiang zongshen fazhan
gonggu quan Dang quanguo renmin gongtong sixiang jichu'' [Xi Jinping:
Promote deeper development of media convergence, consolidate the entire
Party and people's common ideological foundation], Xinhua, January 25,
2019; David Bandurski, ``PSC Converges for Media Convergence,'' China
Media Project, January 29, 2019.
\53\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, ``Guanyu meiti
ronghe fazhan, Xi Jinping Zongshuji zheyang shuo'' [These are General
Secretary Xi Jinping's sayings about the development of media
convergence], January 25, 2019.
\54\ David Bandurski, ``PSC Converges for Media Convergence,''
China Media Project, January 29, 2019.
\55\ ``Zhonggong jiaqiang guankong `bi ganzi' chuanmei jianguanju
chengli'' [Central Committee strengthens control over the ``writing
stick,'' news broadcast regulatory department established], Duowei,
April 10, 2019. See also CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018,
66-67, 227-28.
\56\ UN Human Rights Council, Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration:
Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade,
Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, A/HRC/
14/23/Add.2, March 25, 2010, para. 1(a). See also UN Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media,
Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
Joint Declaration on Media Independence and Diversity in the Digital
Age, May 2, 2018.
\57\ ``Dangmei xing Dang yu zhengzhijia banbao Xi Jinping xinwen
sixiang chulu'' [Party media is surnamed Party and politicians run
newspapers, Xi Jinping's news thought released], Duowei, June 14, 2018;
David Bandurski, ``Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,'' China Media Project,
February 22, 2016; Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda
and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2008), 46; Zhu Jidong, ``Lun xin shidai jianchi
zhengzhijia banbao de zhongyaoxing'' [In the new era, adhering to the
importance of politicians running the newspapers], Journalism Lover
(Xinwen Aihaozhe), December 7, 2018, reprinted in People's Daily,
December 10, 2018.
\58\ David Bandurski, ``PSC Converges for Media Convergence,''
China Media Project, January 29, 2019; Xiao Qiang, ``As Hong Kong
Demonstrations Continue, China Is Controlling What the Mainland
Hears,'' interview with Ailsa Chang, All Things Considered, NPR, August
14, 2019; WeChatscope, University of Hong Kong, ``Censored on WeChat:
As Tensions in China-US Trade Conflict Rose, so Did WeChat
Censorship,'' Global Voices, February 18, 2019.
\59\ ``Minireview: 2018 in Censorship (Oct-Dec),'' China Digital
Times, February 5, 2019.
\60\ ``Directives from the Ministry of Truth,'' China Digital
Times, accessed August 15, 2019.
\61\ ``Minitrue: No News on U.S. Trade Dispute,'' China Digital
Times, May 9, 2019; ``Minitrue: No Hyping Xi-Trump Meeting at G20,''
China Digital Times, December 2, 2018; ``Minireview: 2018 in Censorship
(Oct-Dec),'' China Digital Times, February 5, 2019.
\62\ Xie Yu, ``People's Daily Website Becomes Top Stock Pick as It
Ratchets Up Censorship to New Level, Fuelling Revenue Expectations,''
South China Morning Post, March 12, 2019.
\63\ Zhang Jinwen and Feng Sichao, ``Renminwang fafang shou pi
hulianwang neirong fengkongshi zhengshu'' [People's Daily Online issues
first group of certificates for online content risk control
specialists], People's Daily, July 24, 2019.
\64\ Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, ``Inside China's Audacious Global
Propaganda Campaign,'' Guardian, December 7, 2018; Javier C. Hernandez,
`` `We're Almost Extinct': China's Investigative Journalists Are
Silenced under Xi,'' New York Times, July 12, 2019.
\65\ Javier C. Hernandez, `` `We're Almost Extinct': China's
Investigative Journalists Are Silenced under Xi,'' New York Times, July
12, 2019.
\66\ Anna Fifield, ``China Celebrates `Very Happy Lives' in
Xinjiang, after Detaining 1 Million Uighurs,'' Washington Post, July
30, 2019.
\67\ Emily Feng and Amy Cheng, ``China State Media Present Their
Own Version of Hong Kong Protests,'' NPR, August 14, 2019; Lily Kuo,
``Beijing's New Weapon to Muffle Hong Kong Protests: Fake News,''
Guardian, August 11, 2019.
\68\ Emily Feng and Amy Cheng, ``China State Media Present Their
Own Version of Hong Kong Protests,'' NPR, August 14, 2019; Simone
McCarthy, ``Hong Kong Protests Put Chinese State Media's Drive to Win
over an International Audience to the Test,'' South China Morning Post,
August 16, 2019.
\69\ Elana Beiser, Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Hundreds of
Journalists Jailed Globally Becomes the New Normal,'' December 13,
2018; Committee to Protect Journalists, ``47 Journalists Imprisoned in
China in 2018,'' accessed May 7, 2019.
\70\ Ian Johnson, `` `My Responsibility to History': An Interview
with Zhang Shihe,'' NYRB Daily (blog), New York Review of Books,
January 30, 2019; Eva Pils, Human Rights in China (Medford, MA: Polity
Press, 2018), 88-89. Journalist Ian Johnson writes that ``citizen
journalists'' are ``a breed of self-taught activists who used the newly
emerging digital technologies to record interviews and post them
online, thus bypassing--for about a decade starting in the early
2000s--traditional forms of censorship.'' Scholar Eva Pils also points
to the changes in communication technologies that gave rise to citizen
journalism.
\71\ Iris Hsu, ``How Many Journalists Are Jailed in China?
Censorship Means We Don't Know,'' CPJ Blog (blog), Committee to Protect
Journalists, March 12, 2019.
\72\ Lin Yijiang, ``Dozens of Bitter Winter Reporters Arrested,''
Bitter Winter, December 27, 2018; Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``China: Release Liu Feiyue and Decriminalize Human Rights Activism,''
January 29, 2019; Catherine Lai, ``How China's Multi-Pronged Crackdown
on Dissent Took Aim at Citizen Journalists and Rights Defence
Websites,'' Hong Kong Free Press, February 16, 2018.
\73\ Lin Yijiang, ``Dozens of Bitter Winter Reporters Arrested,''
Bitter Winter, December 27, 2018; Marco Respinti, ``The Fate of Bitter
Winter's 45 Arrested Reporters,'' Bitter Winter, February 7, 2019.
\74\ Marco Respinti, ``The Fate of Bitter Winter's 45 Arrested
Reporters,'' Bitter Winter, February 7, 2019.
\75\ Elana Beiser, Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Hundreds of
Journalists Jailed Globally Becomes the New Normal,'' December 13,
2018; Committee to Protect Journalists, ``47 Journalists Imprisoned in
China in 2018,'' accessed May 7, 2019.
\76\ Reporters Without Borders, ``China: 58 Uyghur Journalists
Detained,'' June 3, 2019.
\77\ Iris Hsu, ``How Many Journalists Are Jailed in China?
Censorship Means We Don't Know,'' CPJ Blog (blog), Committee to Protect
Journalists, March 12, 2019.
\78\ ``Hongse Cankao bianji bu Beijing bangongshi bei chachao,
gongzuo renyuan bei xingju'' [Red Reference's editorial department in
Beijing subjected to search, staff criminally detained], Red Reference,
August 12, 2018. For more information on Shang Kai, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00010.
\79\ Rights Defense Network, ``Jiya yi ge duo yue hou Guangdong zi
meiti `Xin Shengdai' bianji Wei Zhili, Ke Chengbing you zao zhiding
jusuo jianshi juzhu Yang Zhengjun de qingkuang bu ming'' [After more
than one month of detention, ``New Generation'' editors Wei Zhili and
Ke Chengbing placed under residential surveillance at a designated
location, Yang Zhengjun's conditions are unclear], April 23, 2019. For
more information on Yang Zhengjun, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2019-00129.
\80\ Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, ``Former Online Media
Editor Arrested for `Inciting Subversion of State Power,' '' accessed
June 15, 2019; ``Zhongguo zuoyi wangzhan bianji bei yi `dianfu zui'
juliu'' [Editor of Chinese leftist website detained for ``subversion of
state power''], Radio Free Asia, March 25, 2019. For more information
on Chai Xiaoming, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2019-00126.
\81\ ``Beijing Ramps Up Crackdown on Labour Activists,'' Financial
Times, March 28, 2019. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2019-00127 on Wei Zhili and 2019-
00128 on Ke Chengbing.
\82\ Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, ``Former Online Media
Editor Arrested for `Inciting Subversion of State Power,' '' March 21,
2019; ``Zhongguo zuoyi wangzhan bianji bei yi `dianfu zui' juliu''
[Editor of Chinese leftist website detained for ``subversion of state
power''], Radio Free Asia, March 25, 2019; ``Hongse Cankao bianji bu
Beijing bangongshi bei chachao, gongzuo renyuan bei xingju'' [Red
Reference's editorial department in Beijing subjected to search, staff
criminally detained], Red Reference, August 12, 2018.
\83\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shenzhen jingfang zaici kua shi
zhuabu, Xin Shengdai bianji Wei Zhili (Xiao Wei) bei bu, Ke Chengbing
(Lao Mu) shilian'' [Shenzhen police again cross city lines for
detentions, New Generation editors Wei Zhili (Xiao Wei) detained, Ke
Chengbing (Lao Mu) is disappeared], March 20, 2019; ``Chinese Labor
Activist Repeatedly Interrogated in Detention,'' Radio Free Asia, April
9, 2019.
\84\ Lin Yijiang, ``Dozens of Bitter Winter Reporters Arrested,''
Bitter Winter, December 27, 2018; Marco Respinti, ``The Fate of Bitter
Winter's 45 Arrested Reporters,'' Bitter Winter, February 7, 2019.
\85\ Authorities prosecuted the cases of Huang Qi and Liu Feiyue
this past year, both of which are described in detail later in this
sub-section. The Commission also continued to monitor the cases of
several 64 Tianwang ``volunteers'' detained in 2016. Authorities
formally prosecuted some of them and held others in some form of
detention during the 2019 reporting year. For more information on those
cases, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2013-
00063 on Chen Tianmao, 2016-00464 on Yang Xiuqiong, 2016-00105 on Li
Zhaoxiu, and 2018-00314 on Jiang Chengfen.
\86\ ``Zhen Jianghua xingju 37 tian qiman wei huoshi duo wei
weiquan renshi yin Shijiu Da bei weiwen'' [Zhen Jianghua not released
37 days after criminal detention, many rights defenders subjected to
stability maintenance measures due to 19th Party Congress], Canyu Net,
October 9, 2017; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chinese Government
Puts Human Rights Defenders on Trial during Holiday Season to Hide
Rights Abuses,'' January 8, 2019; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Free
Anti-Censorship Activist,'' April 2, 2018; Rights Defense Network,
``Guangdong renquan hanweizhe, NGO renshi Zhen Jianghua huoxing 2
nian'' [Guangdong human rights defender and NGO worker Zhen Jianghua
sentenced to 2 years in prison], December 29, 2018. Zhen is scheduled
for release on September 1, 2019. For more information on Zhen
Jianghua, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-
00360. ``Minsheng Guancha bianji Ding Lingjie bei jing daizou jiashu
wei shou tongzhi'' [Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch editor Ding Lingjie
taken away by police, family has not received [detention] notice],
Radio Free Asia, September 25, 2017; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch,
``Li Xuehui, Ding Lingjie he Li Hui deng duo ren bei yi xunxin zishi
zui panxing'' [Li Xuehui, Ding Lingjie and Li Hui, among others,
sentenced for picking quarrels and provoking trouble], December 28,
2018; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Ding Lingjie,'' accessed May 2,
2019; Rights Defense Network, ``Weiquan renshi Ding Lingjie nushi
xingman chuyu'' [Rights defender Ms. Ding Lingjie completed sentence
and is released from prison], May 21, 2019. Authorities reportedly
released Ding on May 21, 2019. For more information on Ding Lingjie,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00328.
\87\ Lin Yijiang, ``Dozens of Bitter Winter Reporters Arrested,''
Bitter Winter, December 27, 2018; Marco Respinti, ``The Fate of Bitter
Winter's 45 Arrested Reporters,'' Bitter Winter, February 7, 2019.
\88\ UN Human Rights Council, Opinions adopted by the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention at its eighty-first session, April 17-26, 2018,
A/HRC/WGAD/2018/22, June 27, 2018, paras. 52-54.
\89\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Arbitrary Classification of State
Secrets,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, August 16, 2018.
\90\ ``China's Jailed Citizen Journalists at Risk of Torture,
Death: Press Freedom Group,'' Radio Free Asia, December 19, 2018.
\91\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), ``China: Release Liu
Feiyue and Decriminalize Human Rights Activism,'' January 29, 2019.
According to CHRD, the court also fined Liu approximately US$150,000,
an amount purportedly equivalent to the overseas funding Liu allegedly
received to finance the website. For more information on Liu Feiyue,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00460.
\92\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, `` `Liu Feiyue an' jin
kaiting shengyuanzhe zao kouya'' [``Liu Feiyue's case'' goes to trial
today, supporters taken into custody], August 7, 2018.
\93\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chinese Government Puts
Human Rights Defenders on Trial during Holiday Season to Hide Rights
Abuses,'' January 8, 2019; ``China to Try Outspoken Nanjing Journalist
for `Subversive' Social Media Posts,'' Radio Free Asia, February 8,
2018. For more information on Sun Lin, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2008-00617.
\94\ Reporters Without Borders, ``Boxun Journalist in Nanjing Gets
Four Years in Prison,'' June 30, 2008.
\95\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``The Arbitrary Classification of State
Secrets,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, August 16, 2018.
\96\ Mianyang Municipal Intermediate People's Court, ``Huang Qi
guyi xielou guojia mimi, wei jingwai feifa tigong guojia mimi an yishen
gongkai xuanpan'' [First instance [trial] publicly announced sentence
of Huang Qi for intentionally leaking state secrets and illegally
providing state secrets abroad], July 29, 2019. The court sentenced
Huang to 3 years' imprisonment on the charge of ``intentionally leaking
state secrets'' and to 11 years' imprisonment on the charge of
``illegally providing state secrets to overseas entities''; it ordered
him to serve 12 years of the combined 14-year sentence. In addition,
the court sentenced him to four years' deprivation of political rights
and a fine of 200,000 yuan (US$28,000). For more information on Huang
Qi, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-04053.
\97\ ``A Chinese Dissident Jailed for Critical Thought Deserves the
World's Help,'' editorial, Washington Post, July 31, 2019.
\98\ Lily Kuo, `` `The Last Time I Saw Granny Pu': 85-Year-Old
Mother of Chinese Dissident Seized by Police,'' Guardian, December 20,
2018; Rights Defense Network, ``Zao ruanjin de Huang Qi muqin Pu
Wenqing yao jian Zhongyang xunshizu, dianhua bei pingbi cheng konghao''
[Huang Qi's mother Pu Wenqing, currently held in soft detention, asks
to see Central investigation team, but phone call filtered into empty
number], July 9, 2019. For more information on Pu Wenqing, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00619.
\99\ ``Jailed Chinese Activist's Life in `Immediate' Danger: Rights
Groups,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Straits Times, November 5,
2018; Yaxue Cao, ``85-Year-Old Mother Fights for the Release of Her
Son, Renowned Human Rights Defender,'' China Change, October 15, 2018;
Human Rights in China, ``Mother of Detained Rights Activist Huang Qi
Fears Reprisal, Calls for International Attention,'' November 19, 2018.
\100\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Under Watch: Reporting
in China's Surveillance State, January 2019, 1.
\101\ Ibid., 1-2.
\102\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Under Watch: Reporting
in China's Surveillance State, January 2019, 7-8. See also Owen Guo,
``Reflections of a Chinese Reporter in Foreign Media,'' SupChina,
August 21, 2018.
\103\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Under Watch: Reporting
in China's Surveillance State, January 2019, 8.
\104\ Ibid., 11-12.
\105\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Under Watch: Reporting
in China's Surveillance State, January 2019, 5-7; Foreign
Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC), ``Foreign Journalist Access to
Tibet,'' FCCC Position Paper, March 2019, 1.
\106\ Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting
Constructive Vigilance, Report of the Working Group on Chinese
Influence Activities in the United States (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2018), 5, 93.
\107\ Gerry Shih, ``China Adds Washington Post, Guardian to `Great
Firewall' Blacklist,'' Washington Post, June 8, 2019.
\108\ Ryan Gallagher, ``China Bans The Intercept and Other News
Sites in `Censorship Black Friday,' '' Intercept, June 7, 2019;
``Western News Sites Blocked as Chill on Chinese Media Continues,''
China Digital Times, June 7, 2019.
\109\ Josh Horwitz, ``Online Encyclopedia Wikipedia Blocked in
China Ahead of Tiananmen Anniversary,'' Reuters, May 15, 2019.
\110\ Austin Ramzy and Edward Wong, ``China Forces Out Buzzfeed
Journalist,'' New York Times, August 23, 2018.
\111\ Megha Rajagopalan, ``This Is What a 21st-Century Police State
Really Looks Like,'' BuzzFeed News, October 17, 2017.
\112\ Megha Rajagopalan, ``An American Reporter Was Denied a Visa
to China. She Said It's Because She Criticized the Communist Party.,''
BuzzFeed News, June 19, 2019.
\113\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``China Refuses Visa
Application for Critical American Journalist,'' June 19, 2019.
\114\ ``Weixie ba jizhe liuru hei mingdan E'meiti zhize Zhongguo
ganshe xinwen ziyou'' [For threatening to put journalist on blacklist,
Russian media accuses China of meddling in freedom of the press], Voice
of America, March 5, 2019.
\115\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, Under Watch: Reporting
in China's Surveillance State, January 2019, 14-15.
\116\ Paul Mozur, ``Being Tracked while Reporting in China, Where
`There Are No Whys,' '' New York Times, April 16, 2019.
\117\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC), ``Foreign
Journalist Access to Tibet,'' FCCC Position Paper, March 2019, 1, 4.
The FCCC urged foreign governments to pressure the Chinese government
to approve individual reporting trips to the TAR by the end of 2019,
rather than offering only highly restricted government-arranged group
media access, and to push for the removal of prior approval
requirements in 2021, one year in advance of the 2022 Winter Olympics
in Beijing municipality.
\118\ Ibid., 1.
\119\ Zhuang Rongwen, ``Kexue renshi wangluo chuanbo guilu nuli
tigao yong wang zhi wang shuiping'' [Scientifically understanding the
natural laws of online communication, striving to boost the level of
internet use and network governance], Qiushi Journal, September 16,
2018; Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Graham Webster, ``Translation:
China's New Top Internet Official Lays Out Agenda for Party Control
Online,'' DigiChina (blog), New America, September 24, 2018. See also
Nectar Gan, ``Cyberspace Controls Set to Strengthen under China's New
Internet Boss,'' South China Morning Post, September 20, 2018.
\120\ ``Xi Jinping: Tuidong meiti ronghe xiang zongshen fazhan
gonggu quan Dang quanguo renmin gongtong sixiang jichu'' [Xi Jinping:
Promote deeper development of media convergence, consolidate the entire
Party and people's common ideological foundation], Xinhua, January 25,
2019; David Bandurski, ``PSC Converges for Media Convergence,'' China
Media Project, January 29, 2019.
\121\ Marina Svensson, ``Human Rights and the Internet in China:
New Frontiers and Challenges'' in Handbook of Human Rights in China,
eds. Sarah Biddulph and Joshua Rosenzweig (Northhampton, MA: Edward
Elgar, 2019), 637.
\122\ Ibid., 644, 646.
\123\ Mingli Shi, ``What China's 2018 Internet Governance Tells Us
about What's Next,'' DigiChina (blog), New America, January 28, 2019;
Adrian Shahbaz, Freedom House, ``China,'' in Freedom on the Net 2018:
The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, October 2018.
\124\ Eva Pils, ``Human Rights and the Political System'' in
Handbook of Human Rights in China, eds. Sarah Biddulph and Joshua
Rosenzweig (Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2019), 43n24.
\125\ See, e.g., Manya Koetse, ``Chinese Blogger Addresses Weibo's
`Elephant in the Room,' '' What's on Weibo (blog), June 10, 2019.
\126\ See, e.g., ``Blogger Tried for `Defaming' Chinese Leaders
Past and Present,'' Radio Free Asia, January 31, 2019. For more
information on this case, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2016-00380 on Liu Yanli.
\127\ See, e.g., `` `Spiritually Japanese' Artist Held in China's
Anhui over Pig-Head Cartoons,'' Radio Free Asia, August 1, 2019. For
more information on this case, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2019-00303 on Zhang Dongning.
\128\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Ju You Yanlun Shuxing Huo
Shehui Dongyuan Nengli de Hulian Wang Xinxi Fuwu Anquan Pinggu Guiding
[Provisions for the Security Assessment of Internet Information
Services Having Public Opinion Properties or Social Mobilization
Capacity], effective November 30, 2018, art. 17. For an English
translation of these provisions, see Rogier Creemers, ``New Rules
Target Public Opinion and Mobilization Online in China (Translation),''
DigiChina (blog), New America, November 21, 2018.
\129\ Rogier Creemers, ``New Rules Target Public Opinion and
Mobilization Online in China (Translation),'' DigiChina (blog), New
America, November 21, 2018.
\130\ Jessica Baron, ``Cyber-Sovereignty and China's Great
Firewall: An Interview with James Griffiths,'' Forbes, April 8, 2019;
Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, ``How Censorship in
China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,''
American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (May 2013).
\131\ Blake Miller, ``Delegated Dictatorship: Examining the State
and Market Forces behind Information Control in China,'' (PhD diss.,
University of Michigan, 2018), chap. IV.
\132\ Yaqiu Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``China's Social Media
Crackdown Targets Twitter,'' November 21, 2018.
\133\ Renee Xia, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``30-Year
Censorship and No Accountability for Tiananmen: Here Lies the Hope,''
June 4, 2019.
\134\ Threat Lab, Electronic Frontier Foundation, ``30 Years Since
Tiananmen Square: The State of Chinese Censorship and Digital
Surveillance,'' June 4, 2019.
\135\ Charlotte Gao, ``Ahead of Tiananmen Incident Anniversary,
China Launches a New Round of Internet Crackdown,'' The Diplomat,
January 4, 2019; ``Western News Sites Blocked in China,'' China Digital
Times, June 7, 2019.
\136\ David Bandurski, ``WeChat Exposes,'' China Media Project,
January 5, 2019.
\137\ Charlotte Gao, ``Ahead of Tiananmen Incident Anniversary,
China Launches a New Round of Internet Crackdown,'' The Diplomat,
January 4, 2019.
\138\ Citizen Lab and Weiboscope, ``China's Censored Histories:
Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre,''
Global Voices, April 17, 2019.
\139\ Citizen Lab and Weiboscope, ``China's Censored Histories:
Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre,''
Global Voices, April 17, 2019. See also Li Yuan, ``Learning China's
Forbidden History So They Can Censor It,'' New York Times, January 2,
2019.
\140\ Holmes Chan, ``Archive Reveals Scale of China's Tiananmen
Massacre Blackout as Netizens Fight to Evade Censors,'' Hong Kong Free
Press, April 16, 2019. See also Li Yuan, ``Learning China's Forbidden
History So They Can Censor It,'' New York Times, January 2, 2019.
\141\ Eva Xiao, ``Stealth Crackdown: Chinese Censorship Extends to
Twitter as Activists' Accounts Disappear,'' Agence France-Presse,
reprinted in Hong Kong Free Press, November 18, 2018; Yaqiu Wang, Human
Rights Watch, ``China's Social Media Crackdown Targets Twitter,''
November 21, 2018; Yaxue Cao, ``China Steps Up Nationwide Crackdown to
Silence Twitter Users--The Unmediated Story,'' China Change, December
5, 2018.
\142\ Gerry Shih, ``Chinese Censors Go Old School to Clamp Down on
Twitter: A Knock on the Door,'' Washington Post, January 4, 2019. See
also Christian Shepherd and Yuan Yang, ``Chinese Authorities Step Up
Crackdown on Twitter Users,'' Financial Times, April 15, 2019.
\143\ Yaqiu Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``China's Social Media
Crackdown Targets Twitter,'' November 21, 2018; Yaxue Cao, ``China
Steps Up Nationwide Crackdown to Silence Twitter Users--The Unmediated
Story,'' China Change, December 5, 2018.
\144\ Paul Mozur, ``Twitter Takes Down Accounts of China Dissidents
Ahead of Tiananmen Anniversary,'' New York Times, June 1, 2019.
\145\ Paul Mozur, ``Twitter Takes Down Accounts of China Dissidents
Ahead of Tiananmen Anniversary,'' New York Times, June 1, 2019; Ellen
Cranley, ``Twitter Apologized for Suspending Accounts of Chinese
Government Critics Ahead of Tiananmen Square Anniversary,'' Business
Insider, June 2, 2019.
\146\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``June 4th Wine Bottle
Case,'' May 30, 2018, accessed May 18, 2019; ``China Hands Suspended
Jail Term to Man Who Sold Tiananmen Massacre Liquor,'' Radio Free Asia,
April 1, 2019 (Fu Hailu was given a three-year sentence, suspended for
five years); Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi Jiu'an' zui xin
tongbao: Luo Fuyu dangting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3 nian, huanqi 4
nian zhixing'' [Latest bulletin on ``Chengdu June 4th liquor case'':
Luo Fuyu sentenced in court to 3 years, suspended for 4 years], April
3, 2019; Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi Jiu'an' zui xin
tongbao: Zhang Junyong dangting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3 nian, huanqi
4 nian zhixing'' [Latest bulletin on ``Chengdu June 4th liquor case'':
Zhang Junyong sentenced in court to 3 years, suspended for 4 years],
April 2, 2019; Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi Jiu'an' zui
xin tongbao: Chen Bing jujue renzui dangting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3
nian 6 ge yue ci an daoci chen'ai luoding'' [Latest bulletin on
``Chengdu June 4th liquor case'': Chen Bing refuses to admit guilt,
sentenced in court to 3 years and 6 months in prison, the dust has now
settled in this case], April 4, 2019; ``Court in China's Sichuan Jails
Fourth Man over Tiananmen Massacre Liquor,'' Radio Free Asia, April 4,
2019. For more information on the June Fourth liquor bottle cases, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00240 on Fu
Hailu, 2016-00241 on Chen Bing, 2016-00242 on Luo Fuyu, and 2016-00243
on Zhang Junyong.
\147\ Rowena Xiaoqing He, ``Never Forget. Never Give Up: The
Tiananmen Movement, 30 Years Later,'' Globe and Mail, April 22, 2019;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``June 4th Wine Bottle Case,'' May 30,
2018, accessed May 18, 2019; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``A High-Proof
Tribute to Tiananmen's Victims Finds a Way Back to China,'' New York
Times, May 30, 2017.
\148\ Glenn Tiffert, ``30 Years after Tiananmen: Memory in the Era
of Xi Jinping,'' Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 42.
\149\ On May 4, 1919, students protested in Beijing municipality
against the provisions in the Treaty of Versailles that ceded disputed
territory to Japan. See Dan Xing Huang, ``The Chinese Enlightenment at
100,'' Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2019; Chris Buckley and Amy Qin, ``Why
Does a Student Protest Held a Century Ago Still Matter in China?,'' New
York Times, May 3, 2019. On the role of university students during the
100 Flowers Movement in 1957, see Yidi Wu, ``Blooming, Contending, and
Staying Silent: Student Activism and Campus Politics in China, 1957''
(PhD diss., UC Irvine, 2017).
\150\ Glenn Tiffert, ``30 Years after Tiananmen: Memory in the Era
of Xi Jinping,'' Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 42.
\151\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Update--Detained and
Disappeared: Intellectuals Under Assault in the Uyghur Homeland,'' May
21, 2019; ``Uyghur Scholar Arrested Over Politically Sensitive Book,''
Radio Free Asia, December 10, 2018 (Gheyret Abdurahman, Xinjiang
Academy of Social Sciences); Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ``Star
Scholar Disappears as Crackdown Engulfs Western China,'' New York
Times, August 10, 2018 (Rahile Dawut, Xinjiang University); ``Xinjiang
University President Purged under `Two-Faced' Officials Campaign,''
Radio Free Asia, February 10, 2018 (Tashpolat Teyip, Xinjiang
University).
\152\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Arrest Leading Kyrgyz Historian for
`Undecided' Crime,'' Radio Free Asia, November 30, 2018 (Askar Yunus,
Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences).
\153\ Eli Friedman, ``It's Time to Get Loud about Academic Freedom
in China,'' Foreign Policy, November 13, 2018; Yuan Yang, ``China
Student Speaks of Harassment over Protests,'' Financial Times, November
4, 2018; Javier C. Hernandez, ``China Using Taped Confessions to
Intimidate Young Communists, Students Say,'' New York Times, January
21, 2019; Manfred Elfstrom, ``China's Recent Crackdown on Labour
Activists May Have Little to Do with Their Own Actions,'' South China
Morning Post, February 7, 2019.
\154\ Gerry Shih, `` `If I Disappear': Chinese Students Make
Farewell Messages amid Crackdowns over Labor Activism,'' Washington
Post, May 25, 2019; Christian Shepherd and Ben Blanchard, ``Leading
Chinese Marxist Student Taken Away by Police on Mao's Birthday,''
Reuters, December 26, 2018.
\155\ Guo Rui and Mimi Lau, ``Fears for Young Marxist Activist
Missing after Police Raid in China,'' South China Morning Post, October
12, 2018; Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, ``Who Are the
Student [sic] Who `Go to Shenzhen'? Yue Xin, from Beijing to
Shenzhen,'' accessed May 31, 2019.
\156\ Glenn Tiffert, ``30 Years after Tiananmen: Memory in the Era
of Xi Jinping,'' Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 42; Sarah
Cook, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Latest Propaganda Target: Young
Minds,'' The Diplomat, April 26, 2019.
\157\ ``Beijing duli shudian bei yaoqiu xiajia yi xilie jingnei
chuban wu'' [Independent bookstore in Beijing ordered to take a series
of mainland publications off shelves], Voice of America, June 14, 2018;
Amy Hawkins and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, ``Why 1984 Isn't Banned in
China,'' Atlantic, January 13, 2019.
\158\ Christian Shepherd, ``Disappearing Textbook Highlights Debate
in China over Academic Freedom,'' Reuters, February 1, 2019; ``Zhang
Qianfan on Academic Censorship,'' China Digital Times, February 8,
2019.
\159\ Yojana Sharma, ``Beijing Signals Tighter Control over
Dissenting Scholars,'' University World News, November 1, 2018; ``China
Replaces Head of Peking University with Communist Party Chief,'' Radio
Free Asia, October 25, 2018.
\160\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Gongmin yanlun ziyou de
xianfa quanli burong jianta'' [Constitutional right to citizens'
freedom of speech not easily trampled upon], October 3, 2018; ``Duo
ming gaoxiao jiaoshi yin `yanlun budang' shoudao chuli'' [Many
university teachers disciplined because their ``speech was
inappropriate''], Yingying shoufa (WeChat account), reprinted in China
Digital Times, February 7, 2019; ``Shandong xuezhe Liu Shuqing fabiao
gongquanli wenzhang zao xiaofang chufen'' [Shandong scholar Li Shuqing
disciplined for publishing essay on public power], Radio Free Asia, May
7, 2019; ``Ketang lun zheng zao xuesheng jubao fu jiaoshou bei che
jiaoshi zige'' [Reported on by student for discussing politics in
class, associate professor's teaching credentials withdrawn], Radio
Free Asia, March 29, 2019; Taisu Zhang et al., ``What Does the
Punishment of a Prominent Scholar Mean for Intellectual Freedom in
China?,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, March 28, 2019; Chris Buckley, ``A
Chinese Law Professor Criticized Xi. Now He's Been Suspended.,'' New
York Times, March 26, 2019; Guo Yuhua, ``Na you xuezhe bu biaoda?''
[When do scholars not have something to say?], Financial Times, March
26, 2019. For an English translation of Guo Yuhua's essay, see Geremie
R. Barme, ``J'accuse, Tsinghua University,'' China Heritage (blog),
Wairarapa Academy for New Sinology, March 29, 2019.
\161\ Chris Buckley, ``A Chinese Law Professor Criticized Xi. Now
He's Been Suspended.,'' New York Times, March 26, 2019; Guo Yuhua, ``Na
you xuezhe bu biaoda?'' [When do scholars not have something to say?],
Financial Times, March 26, 2019. For an English translation of Guo
Yuhua's essay, see Geremie R. Barme, ``J'accuse, Tsinghua University,''
China Heritage (blog), Wairarapa Academy for New Sinology, March 29,
2019.
\162\ ``Ketang lun zheng zao xuesheng jubao fu jiaoshou bei che
jiaoshi zige'' [Reported on by student for discussing politics in
class, associate professor's teaching credentials withdrawn], Radio
Free Asia, March 29, 2019; Sarah Cook, ``The Chinese Communist Party's
Latest Propaganda Target: Young Minds,'' The Diplomat, April 26, 2019.
\163\ Chinese Influence & American Interests: Promoting
Constructive Vigilance, Report of the Working Group on Chinese
Influence Activities in the United States (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2018), 59; Foreign Correspondents' Club of China,
Under Watch: Reporting in China's Surveillance State, January 2019, 10.
\164\ Elizabeth M. Lynch, ``The Despair behind May 4: Are We Seeing
It Again Today?,'' China Law and Policy (blog), May 2, 2019; Ai
Xiaoming, ``I Travel the Earth in Sound--Marking the 10th Year of Being
Barred from Leaving China,'' China Change, March 29, 2019; Ian Johnson,
``The People in Retreat: An Interview with Ai Xiaoming,'' NYRB Daily
(blog), New York Review of Books, September 8, 2016.
\165\ Chen Jian'gang, ``A Statement by Lawyer Chen Jiangang,
Blocked Today from Leaving China to Take Part in the Humphrey
Fellowship Program,'' China Change, April 1, 2019; ``China Bars Human
Rights Lawyer from US State Dept. Program,'' Associated Press, April 3,
2019. Chen had been accepted into a U.S. State Department-supported
program. Authorities prevented him from leaving the Beijing Capital
International Airport.
\166\ Chinese Influence & American Interests: Promoting
Constructive Vigilance, Report of the Working Group on Chinese
Influence Activities in the United States (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2018), xi, 40, 47, 48-49; Tao Zhang, ``Chinese
Influence and the Western Academy: Time for a Concerted Response,''
Asia Dialogue, University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute, April
2, 2019; Ellen Nakashima, ``China Specialists Who Long Supported
Engagement Are Now Warning of Beijing's Efforts to Influence American
Society,'' Washington Post, November 28, 2018. See also Anastasya
Lloyd-Damnjanovic, ``A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and
Interference Activities in American Higher Education,'' Wilson Center,
September 6, 2018.
\167\ Eli Friedman, ``It's Time to Get Loud about Academic Freedom
in China,'' Foreign Policy, November 13, 2019; Yuan Yang, ``China
Student Speaks of Harassment over Protests,'' Financial Times, November
4, 2018.
\168\ Holmes Chan, ``Visiting Australian Academic Kevin Carrico
Tailed and Accused of Separatism by Pro-Beijing Newspaper,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, December 18, 2018; Peter Hartcher, ``No Longer Safe:
Researcher Harassed by China in Her Own Country,'' Sydney Morning
Herald, January 29, 2019.
\169\ Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, ``U.S. Scholar Who Advises
Trump Says China Blocked His Visa Application,'' New York Times, April
17, 2019.
\170\ ``Mei dui Hua xuezhe shoujin qianzheng Zhongguo you jin le
naxie Meiguo xuezhe?'' [U.S. tightens visas for Chinese scholars, which
U.S. scholars does China prohibit?], Radio Free Asia, April 16, 2019.
Radio Free Asia's examples are Richard Fisher, Andrew Nathan, Xia Ming,
and Perry Link. Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, ``A Preliminary Study of
PRC Political Influence and Interference Activities in American Higher
Education,'' Wilson Center, September 6, 2018. The Wilson Center report
examples included the ``Xinjiang 13,'' a group of 13 scholars allegedly
placed on a blacklist following the publication of a book of critical
essays about conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Rory Truex, ``Repressive Experience among
China Scholars: New Evidence from Survey Data,'' Social Science
Research Network, August 1, 2018, accessed May 15, 2019: 1, 6-7.
\171\ Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, ``A Preliminary Study of PRC
Political Influence and Interference Activities in American Higher
Education,'' Wilson Center, September 6, 2018, 43, 64.
\172\ Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Rory Truex, ``Repressive
Experience among China Scholars: New Evidence from Survey Data,''
Social Science Research Network, August 1, 2018, accessed May 15, 2019:
7-9, 13; Glenn Tiffert, ``30 Years After Tiananmen: Memory in the Era
of Xi Jinping,'' Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 44.
\173\ Glenn Tiffert, ``30 Years after Tiananmen: Memory in the Era
of Xi Jinping,'' Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 45;
Nicholas Loubere and Ivan Franceschini, ``How the Chinese Censors
Highlight Fundamental Flaws in Academic Publishing,'' Chinoiresie,
October 16, 2018.
\174\ Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Rory Truex, ``Repressive
Experience among China Scholars: New Evidence from Survey Data,''
Social Science Research Network, August 1, 2018, accessed May 15, 2019:
1, 16, 17.
\175\ Ibid., 13.
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Findings
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year,
Chinese authorities severely restricted the ability of
civil society organizations to work on labor issues,
expanding a crackdown on labor advocates across China.
As of August 2019, over 50 workers and labor advocates
were under some form of detention in connection with
the crackdown.
The Chinese Communist Party-led All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only
trade union organization permitted under Chinese law,
and workers are not permitted to establish independent
unions. In November 2018, Chinese authorities detained
two local-level ACFTU officials, Zou Liping and Li Ao,
who attempted to assist workers at a Jasic Technology
factory in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province,
in setting up an ACFTU union.
The Chinese government did not publicly report
the number of worker strikes and protests, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizen
journalists continued to face difficulties in obtaining
comprehensive information on worker actions. The Hong
Kong-based NGO China Labour Bulletin (CLB), which
compiles data on worker actions collected from
traditional news sources and social media, documented
1,702 strikes and other worker actions in 2018, up from
1,257 incidents in 2017. In 2018, almost half (44.8
percent) of the worker actions documented by CLB were
in the construction sector, although significant
incidents were documented by workers at a recycling
company, food delivery workers, and factory workers in
the manufacturing sector.
In March 2019, Chinese internet technology
workers launched a campaign against exploitative work
hours--referred to as ``996,'' a 9 a.m. to 9 p.m.
schedule for six days a week common in many technology
companies. The campaign, described by an American tech
worker advocate as ``the largest demonstration of
collective action the tech world has ever seen,''
posted a list of companies, including Huawei and
Alibaba, that reportedly require their employees to
follow the 996 schedule. Jack Ma, the founder of
Alibaba called the 996 schedule ``a blessing,'' and
some Chinese companies blocked access to the software
development platform Github, a Microsoft subsidiary,
where tech workers first posted the campaign.
During this reporting year, international
media documented the use of forced labor associated
with mass internment camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR). Based on personal accounts,
analysis of satellite imagery, and official documents,
the New York Times documented a number of new factories
in or nearby the camps, and the Associated Press
tracked shipments from one of these factories to a
U.S.-based company Badger Sportswear.
In March 2019, following a chemical explosion
that killed 78 people in Jiangsu province, the largest
industrial accident in China since a 2015 industrial
explosion in Tianjin municipality killed 173 people,
the UN special rapporteur on human rights and toxics
stated that, ``China's repeated promises on chemical
safety must be followed by meaningful action and
lasting measures if it is to meet its human rights
obligations.''
In 2019, Chinese authorities detained three
citizen journalists from the iLabour (Xin Shengdai)
website--Yang Zhengjun, Ke Chengbing, and Wei Zhili--as
well as NGO worker Li Dajun, all of whom had advocated
on behalf of pneumoconiosis victims.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Press the Chinese government to immediately release
labor advocates and journalists who are in prison or
detention for the exercise of their lawful rights and
to stop censoring economic and labor reporting.
Specifically, consider raising the following cases:
Detained NGO staff and labor advocates,
including Fu Changguo and Zhang Zhiyu (more
widely known as Zhang Zhiru);
Citizen journalists and NGO workers who had
advocated on behalf of pneumoconiosis victims,
including Yang Zhengjun, Ke Chengbing, Wei
Zhili, and Li Dajun;
Detained factory worker advocates from Jasic
Technology in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong
province, including Mi Jiuping and Liu Penghua;
Detained university students and recent
graduates, including Yue Xin and Qiu Zhanxuan;
and
Detained local-level ACFTU officials Zou
Liping and Li Ao who supported grassroots
worker organizing efforts.
Call on the Chinese government to respect
internationally recognized rights to freedom of
association and collective bargaining, and allow
workers to organize and establish independent labor
unions. Raise concern in all appropriate trade
negotiations and bilateral and multilateral dialogues
about the Chinese Communist Party's role in collective
bargaining and elections of trade union
representatives, emphasizing that in a market economy,
wage rates should be determined by free bargaining
between labor and management.
Call on the Chinese government to permit academic
freedom on university campuses in China, and stop the
harassment, surveillance, and detention of students who
support worker rights.
Call on the Chinese government to end the use of
forced labor associated with the mass internment camps
in the XUAR.
Promote and support bilateral and multilateral
exchanges among government officials, academics, legal
experts, and civil society groups to focus on labor
issues such as freedom of expression, collective
bargaining, employment discrimination, and occupational
health and safety. Seek opportunities to support
capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese labor
and legal aid organizations defending the rights of
workers.
When appropriate, integrate meaningful civil society
participation into bilateral and multilateral
dialogues, meetings, and exchanges. Invite
international unions and labor NGOs as well as domestic
civil society groups from all participating countries
to observe relevant government-to-government dialogues.
Encourage compliance with fundamental International
Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. Request that the
ILO increase its work monitoring core labor standards
in China, including freedom of association and the
right to organize.
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining
The Chinese government and Communist Party's laws and
practices continue to contravene international worker rights
standards, including the right to create or join independent
trade unions.\1\ The Party-led All-China Federation of Trade
Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade union organization
permitted under Chinese law.\2\ The ACFTU's submission to the
November 2018 session of the UN Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese government's
human rights record claimed that it had 303 million members,\3\
including 140 million migrant workers.\4\ Based on a National
Bureau of Statistics of China survey,\5\ however, the Hong
Kong-based non-governmental organization (NGO) China Labour
Bulletin concluded that around 80 percent of the migrant
members of the ACFTU were not aware of their membership.\6\ In
2018, 288.36 million out of 775.86 million employed Chinese
were migrant workers,\7\ individuals with rural household
registration but who work and reside in urban areas without
access to most government benefits.\8\ Scholars and
international observers noted that the ACFTU typically
prioritized Party interests over the interests of workers and
did not effectively represent workers.\9\ In November 2018, at
the 17th National Congress of the ACFTU, held once every five
years, Wang Dongming, the ACFTU Chairman and a Vice Chairman of
the National People's Congress Standing Committee, emphasized
that the ACFTU should be loyal to the Party.\10\ At the
enterprise level, union representatives often side with
management interests.\11\ Provisions in the PRC Labor Law, PRC
Labor Contract Law, and PRC Trade Union Law provide a legal
framework for negotiating collective contracts,\12\ but these
laws designate the Party-controlled ACFTU as responsible for
negotiating with employers and signing collective contracts on
behalf of workers.\13\ Restrictions on workers' rights to
freely establish and join independent trade unions violate
international standards set forth by the International Labour
Organization (ILO),\14\ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,\15\ International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,\16\ and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.\17\ As a member of the ILO, China is
obligated to respect workers' right to collective
bargaining.\18\
Heightened Suppression of Labor Rights Advocacy
The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, which
participated in an October 2018 pre-session to the UPR,
summarized that labor rights in China have ``deteriorated
significantly in recent years'' and that authorities have
increased efforts to ``quell labor [unrest] by coercive
means.'' \19\ During the Commission's 2019 reporting year,
Chinese authorities expanded a nationwide crackdown on labor
advocates, following authorities' detention of workers and
their supporters at a Jasic Technology factory in Shenzhen
municipality, Guangdong province, beginning in July 2018.\20\
According to the China Labor Crackdown Concern Group, an
organization made up of concerned individuals in mainland China
and abroad, as of August 2019, over 50 of the 130 labor
advocates detained since July 2018 remain missing or in
custody,\21\ and beginning in January 2019, ``[s]ocial work
organizations and labour rights activists at large have become
targets.'' \22\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jasic Incident
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In July 2018, factory workers Mi Jiuping and Liu Penghua obtained
signatures from 89 of approximately 1,000 employees at Jasic
Technology, a company in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province,
that manufactures industrial equipment, in support of organizing a
union.\23\ Local-level ACFTU officials had initially supported worker
efforts to organize a union,\24\ but later that month, Guangdong
authorities in Guangdong province detained around 30 people including
Mi and Liu.\25\ The Jasic incident was distinct from the thousands of
other worker actions in 2018,\26\ because self-described Maoist and
Marxist university students and recent graduates organized in support
of the workers.\27\ In August 2018, authorities detained about 50 of
the student and recent graduate supporters, including Peking University
graduate and outspoken women's rights advocate Yue Xin, who had
traveled to Guangdong.\28\ Police and university officials also
monitored and harassed individuals involved in labor advocacy on
college campuses.\29\ In October, Cornell University's School of
Industrial and Labor Relations suspended two student exchange programs
with Renmin University in Beijing municipality due to ``gross
violations of academic freedom'' \30\ after university officials--
reportedly at the direction of the Communist Party--harassed,
threatened, and surveilled student supporters of the Jasic workers.\31\
In November, authorities detained at least 12 additional supporters of
the Jasic workers' labor advocacy,\32\ and two local-level ACFTU
officials, Zou Liping and Li Ao, who had assisted the workers' attempts
to establish a union.\33\ As of May 2019, Chinese authorities had
detained 21 members of the Marxist society at Peking University,
including the group's leader Qiu Zhanxuan.\34\ In May, the labor
scholars who edit Made in China Journal, a publication supported in
part by the Australian National University, wrote that there is a ``. .
. serious moral and political issue for those Western universities that
collaborate with academic institutions . . . that blatantly and
unapologetically collude with Chinese authorities to suppress student
activists.'' \35\ [For more information on academic freedom in China,
see Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Civil Society Organizations
This past year, Chinese authorities severely restricted the
ability of civil society organizations to work on labor issues
and expanded a crackdown on labor advocates across China.\36\
Labor NGOs have been active in China since the mid-1990s,\37\
and had even advised workers on collective bargaining and other
rights advocacy beginning around 2002.\38\ Following an earlier
crackdown on labor advocates that began in 2015,\39\ Chinese
labor NGOs have been less active, and the work of some labor
NGOs has become more service-oriented.\40\ In 2019, Chinese
authorities continued to crack down on labor advocates,
including Wu Guijun, He Yuancheng, and Song Jiahui.\41\ Between
August 2018 and July 2019, authorities detained 22 individuals
working with 10 different labor NGOs or social service
centers,\42\ including from the following organizations:
Dagongzhe Migrant Workers Center (Dagongzhe
Zhongxin). In August 2018, authorities in Shenzhen
municipality, Guangdong province, detained Dagongzhe
staff Fu Changguo and Huang Qingnan on suspicion of
aiding Jasic workers with foreign financial
support.\43\
Red Reference (Hongse Cankao). In August 2018,
authorities in Beijing municipality searched the office
of this leftist website and detained staff member Shang
Kai.\44\ In March 2019, authorities in Nanjing
municipality, Jiangsu province, placed former editor
Chai Xiaoming under ``residential surveillance in a
designated location'' on suspicion of ``subversion of
state power.'' \45\
Qingying Dreamworks (Qingying Meng Gongchang).
In November 2018, Shenzhen authorities detained seven
individuals associated with Qingying Dreamworks, a non-
profit center providing workers' services in a
neighborhood with many migrant workers: co-founders
Wang Xiangyi and He Pengchao; staff members Jian
Xiaowei, Kang Yanyan, Hou Changshan, Wang Xiaomei; and
supporter He Xiumei.\46\ As of June 2019, these
individuals were still missing.\47\
Chunfeng Labor Dispute Center (Chunfeng
Laodong Zhengyi Fuwu Bu). In January 2019, Shenzhen
authorities detained founder Zhang Zhiyu (more widely
known as Zhang Zhiru) and former staff Jian Hui from
Chunfeng Labor Dispute Center, which provided legal
assistance to workers.\48\ Authorities held Zhang on
suspicion of ``disturbing public order.'' \49\ In 2014,
Party-run Global Times described Zhang as ``one of
China's top defenders of labor rights.'' \50\
iLabour (Xin Shengdai). In January 2019,
authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong,
detained Yang Zhengjun,\51\ the editor-in-chief of the
labor advocacy website iLabour (Xin Shengdai), and in
March, authorities in Guangzhou detained two other
editors, Ke Chengbing \52\ and Wei Zhili.\53\ The
iLabour website reported on worker rights issues in
China, including the health hazard pneumoconiosis.\54\
Authorities held the editors on suspicion of ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \55\
In May 2019, during three separate raids,\56\ Chinese
authorities detained social workers from the following
organizations that assisted migrant workers:
Hope Community (Lengquan Xiwang Shequ).
Beijing authorities detained Li Dajun, director of Hope
Community.\57\
Qinghu Social Learning Center (Qinghu Shequ
Xuetang). Shenzhen authorities detained center director
Li Changjiang.\58\
Guangdong Mumian Social Work Service Center
(Guangdong Mumian Shehui Fuwu Gongzuo Zhongxin).
Guangzhou authorities detained Tsinghua University
post-doctoral researcher and Mumian volunteer Liang
Zicun.\59\
Domestic labor advocates' connections to foreign groups and
funding were reportedly of particular concern to authorities.
In January 2019, for example, Party-run Global Times reported
that Dagongzhe Migrant Workers Center was ``fully funded by
overseas NGOs,'' and ``instigating [labor] incidents and
coercing some workers into taking radical actions.'' \60\ Also
in January, Chinese authorities forced some student labor
advocates to watch videotaped confessions of other students in
which they may have been forced to admit to, among other
things, ``working with foreign forces to hurt China's
international image.'' \61\ [For more information on civil
society in China, see Section II--Civil Society.]
Worker Strikes and Protests
The Chinese government did not publicly report on the
number of worker strikes and protests, and NGOs that work on
labor issues continued to face difficulties in obtaining
comprehensive information on worker actions.\62\ Lu Yuyu, a
citizen journalist who posted data about social unrest--
including labor protests--on social media platforms, continued
to serve a four-year sentence in Yunnan province.\63\ China
Labour Bulletin (CLB), which compiles data on worker actions
collected from traditional news sources and social media,\64\
documented 1,702 strikes and other labor actions in 2018, up
from 1,257 strikes and other labor actions in 2017.\65\ The
majority of the labor actions documented by CLB were small in
scale: in 2018, 1,524 incidents (89.5 percent) involved fewer
than 100 people, and 163 (9.6 percent) involved over 1,000
people, including 13 with over 10,000 people (0.8 percent).\66\
In 2018, police were involved in 267 of the total incidents
(15.7 percent), although police were involved in over half (7
out of 13 protests) of the incidents involving over 1,000
people.\67\ During this reporting year, wage arrears in China
were a problem due in part to the continued refusal of
employers to give workers contracts,\68\ and in 2018, 1,342
strikes and other labor actions (78.7 percent) involved wage
arrears.\69\
\70\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Number
Year Manufacturing Construction Transportation Services Other Reported
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 15.5% 44.8% 15.9% 13.3% 10.6% 1,703
(263) (763) (270) (227) (180)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 19.7% 38.1% 8.6% 15.2% 10.8% 1,257
(267) (518) (117) (207) (148)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: China Labour Bulletin. Note that the percentages indicate the percentage of total worker actions
documented that year. CLB changed their methodology beginning in 2017.
Chinese law does not protect workers' right to strike,\71\
contravening the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which China has signed and ratified.\72\
Examples of strikes and worker actions this past year
included the following:
Temporary Workers. In November 2018, reports
indicated that hundreds to thousands of temporary
workers protested outside of a Biel Crystal factory, a
major supplier for Apple and Samsung, in Huizhou
municipality, Guangdong province, after the factory
reportedly laid off 8,000 people due to poor sales of
Apple's iPhone.\73\
Independent Contractors. In February 2019,
food delivery drivers for online food delivery
companies Meituan and Ele.me went on strike in four
cities after the companies significantly reduced
delivery rates for drivers.\74\
Wage Arrears and Bankruptcy. In April 2019,
over 1,000 workers at Little Yellow Dog Environmental
Protection, a recycling company, protested in at least
four cities after the company announced that it would
not be able to pay workers.\75\ According to CLB, the
local labor bureau in Dongguang municipality,
Guangdong, did not support an arbitration request filed
by the workers.\76\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
996.ICU Campaign and Excessive Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2019, Chinese internet technology workers launched a campaign
against exploitative working hours, protesting ``996''--a 9 a.m. to 9
p.m. schedule for six days a week common in many technology
companies.\77\ Chinese labor laws generally require that work schedules
not exceed 8 hours per day or 44 hours per week,\78\ with overtime
limited to 3 hours per day and 36 hours per month.\79\ The campaign
began as a project on the software development platform Github,\80\ a
subsidiary of Microsoft; the campaign identified labor law provisions
that the schedule violates.\81\ The campaign posted a list of
companies, including Huawei and Alibaba, that reportedly require their
workers to adhere to the 996 schedule.\82\ According to an American
tech worker advocate, the campaign was ``the largest demonstration of
collective action the tech world has ever seen,'' \83\ as the project
received over 200,000 ``stars'' indicating support.\84\ Jack Ma, the
founder of Alibaba, called the 996 schedule ``a blessing,'' \85\ and
some Chinese companies blocked access to Github.\86\ In April, two
Chinese programmers released an ``anti-996'' license for open source
software that requires any individual or company using the licensed
software to comply with all applicable labor laws and international
labor standards.\87\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social Insurance
The majority of workers in China continued to lack social
insurance coverage. According to the PRC Social Insurance Law,
workers are entitled to five forms of social insurance: basic
pension insurance, health insurance, work-related injury
insurance, unemployment insurance, and maternity insurance.\88\
Under the law, employers and workers are required to contribute
to basic pension, health, and unemployment insurance; in
addition, employers are required to contribute to work-related
injury and maternity insurance on behalf of workers.\89\
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS),
in 2018, the number of people covered by work-related injury
insurance coverage increased by 11.45 million to a total of
238.68 million for a coverage rate of 30.8 percent.\90\
Similarly, NBS reported that work-related injury insurance
coverage increased for migrant workers by 2.78 million people
to 80.85 million, for a coverage rate of 28.0 percent.\91\
Unemployment and maternity insurance coverage rates increased
slightly to 25.3 percent and 26.3 percent, respectively for all
workers.\92\ In July 2018, the central government established a
central adjustment fund to shift some pension funds from
wealthier provinces to provinces with more retirees.\93\ The
Ministry of Finance reported that in 2019, central authorities
planned to collect and redistribute a total of 484.5 billion
yuan (US$72 billion),\94\ with Guangdong province expected to
provide a net contribution of 47.4 billion yuan and Beijing
municipality a net contribution of 26.3 billion yuan, while
Liaoning and Heilongjiang provinces are expected to receive net
distributions of 21.6 billion yuan and 18.4 billion yuan,
respectively.\95\
Employment Relationships
This past year, several categories of workers were unable
to benefit fully from protections provided under Chinese law.
The PRC Labor Law and PRC Labor Contract Law only apply to
workers who have an ``employment relationship'' (laodong
guanxi) with their employers.\96\
DISPATCH LABOR AND CONTRACT LABOR
The Commission continued to observe reports of dispatch
labor (laowu paiqian) and contract worker (waibao) abuses
during this reporting year, in violation of domestic laws and
regulations.\97\ Firms, including state-owned enterprises, have
long used dispatch labor--workers hired through subcontracting
agencies--to cut costs,\98\ and some firms have replaced
dispatch labor with contract labor to further reduce costs.\99\
For example, in September and October 2018, former dispatch
workers at the Sino-German automobile joint venture FAW-
Volkswagen in Changchun municipality, Jilin province, protested
after management ended its reliance on dispatch workers, but
then made employees choose to either become formal employees at
lower pay or accept more tenuous employment as contract
workers.\100\ In January 2019, the state-backed media outlet
Sixth Tone reported on contract workers who were employed at a
Protek factory in Shanghai municipality--a site that assembled
Apple iPhones.\101\ Employees there protested after learning
that they would not be paid promised bonuses.\102\ The PRC
Labor Contract Law stipulates that dispatch workers shall be
paid the same as full-time workers doing similar work, and may
only perform work on a temporary, auxiliary, or substitute
basis.\103\
INTERN LABOR
During this reporting year, reports continued to emerge of
labor abuses involving vocational school students working at
school-arranged ``internships.'' In October 2018, the Hong
Kong-based NGO Students and Scholars Against Corporate
Misbehavior released a report on the widespread use of 16- to
19-year-old student interns in Chongqing municipality who were
forced to work 12-hour shifts on production lines as part of
compulsory internships.\104\ In November 2018, the Financial
Times reported that hundreds of students in Beijing
municipality and Kunshan city, Shandong province, were required
to complete mandatory internships during which they had to work
up to 18 hours a day at below minimum wage sorting and packing
goods for the Chinese e-commerce company JD.com.\105\ In August
2019, China Labor Watch published a report on labor violations
at Hengyang Foxconn in Hunan province, which included required
overtime for interns at a facility that manufactures products
for Amazon.\106\ Regulations prohibit interns from working
overtime and require internships to be relevant to students'
plans of study.\107\
FORCED LABOR
This past year, international media reported on the use of
forced labor associated with mass internment camps in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In December 2018,
based on personal accounts, analysis of satellite imagery, and
official documents, the New York Times documented a number of
new factories in or nearby the camps,\108\ and the Associated
Press tracked shipments from one of these factories to a U.S.-
based company Badger Sportswear.\109\ In March 2019, the State
Council Information Office issued a white paper acknowledging
that certain products were being made in the camps.\110\ In May
2019, a Wall Street Journal report found that the supply chains
for a number of additional international companies may involve
forced labor in the XUAR, including Adidas, Kraft Heinz, Coca-
Cola, and Gap.\111\ [For more information on forced labor in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, see Section II--Human
Trafficking, and Business and Human Rights; and Section IV--
Xinjiang.]
WORKERS ABOVE THE RETIREMENT AGE
Chinese workers above the legal retirement age continued to
lack certain legal protections afforded to other workers under
Chinese law, as the number of elderly workers increased.\112\
According to the PRC Labor Contract Law and the law's
implementing regulations, once workers reach retirement age or
receive pensions, their labor contracts are terminated by
operation of law.\113\ The inability of workers over the
retirement age to establish a formal employment relationship
with their employers leaves them without the protections
provided for in Chinese labor laws in cases of work-related
injury, unpaid overtime, or other labor issues.\114\ [For more
information on China's aging population, see Section II--
Population Control.]
Work Safety and Industrial Accidents
During this reporting year, government data showed a
continued decline in workplace deaths, although Chinese workers
and labor organizations expressed concerns about inadequate
safety equipment and training. According to the National Bureau
of Statistics of China (NBS), a total of 34,046 people died in
workplace accidents in 2018,\115\ compared to 37,852 deaths in
2017.\116\ According to one labor expert, however, the actual
number of deaths ``may be much higher, because incidents
involving few deaths often go unreported.'' \117\ In 2018,
there were 333 officially reported coal mining deaths, a major
decrease from recent years, although according to China Labour
Bulletin, ``the decline in accident and death rates . . . has
far more to do with mine closures and the falling demand for
coal . . . than the introduction of any new safety measures.''
\118\
Management of Chinese companies and factories often did not
provide adequate safety equipment or required safety training.
In April 2019, for example, a migrant construction worker in
Qingdao municipality, Shandong province, claimed that he was
fired after he filmed and posted a video online that showed the
low quality of safety helmets that the company had allegedly
provided to workers.\119\ In response to the video, which
received over two million views, the Ministry of Emergency
Management (MEM) posted a message on Weibo, China's Twitter-
like microblogging platform, which said that the realization of
safe production relies on workers having safe helmets, and that
[MEM] should pay more attention to safety measures in practice
rather than what the companies say about those measures.\120\
In a December 2018 report entitled, ``A Nightmare for Workers:
Appalling Conditions in Toy Factories Persist,'' New York City-
based China Labor Watch (CLW) detailed conditions in four
factories that make toys for Hasbro, Disney, and Mattel, brands
that are sold in Walmart, Costco, and Target,\121\ including
inadequate pre-job safety training and inadequate safety
equipment.\122\ In March 2019, CLW published a report on
Dongguan Dongwon Electronics, a factory in Dongguan
municipality, Guangdong province, that manufactures Samsung
mobile phone chargers, which described, among other violations
of Chinese law, a lack of pre-job safety training.\123\
The Chinese government's ineffective enforcement of work
safety regulations may also have contributed to a significant
industrial accident.\124\ On March 22, 2019, an explosion at
Jiangsu Tianjiayi Chemical plant in Yancheng city, Jiangsu
province, killed 78 people, injured 640, destroyed 16 nearby
factories, and forced the evacuation of almost 3,000
people.\125\ This explosion was the largest industrial accident
since a 2015 explosion in Tianjin municipality killed 173
people.\126\ Between 2016 and 2018, Chinese authorities had
issued 5 administrative fines against the chemical plant,\127\
and in February 2018, the State Administration of Work Safety
had identified 13 production-related hazards at the
facility.\128\ Following the explosion, the UN special
rapporteur on human rights and toxics declared that, ``China's
repeated promises on chemical safety must be followed by
meaningful action and lasting measures if it is to meet its
human rights obligations.'' \129\ [For more information on the
Jiangsu Tianjiayi Chemical plant explosion, see Section II--The
Environment and Climate Change.]
Occupational Health
The Chinese government reported a decrease in the number of
cases of occupational disease. In May 2019, the National Health
Commission reported that there were 23,497 cases of
occupational disease reported in 2018,\130\ compared to 26,756
cases in 2017 \131\ and 31,789 cases in 2016.\132\ Of the
occupational disease cases in 2018, 19,468 were work-related
cases of the lung disease pneumoconiosis.\133\ In January 2019,
however, National Health Commission research acknowledged that
the documented number of pneumoconiosis cases was only ``the
tip of the iceberg.'' \134\
This past year, protesters from Hunan province who demanded
compensation demonstrated the difficulties that pneumoconiosis
victims face in obtaining the official recognition required to
obtain workers' compensation.\135\ In November 2018,
approximately 200 retired migrant construction workers from
Hunan traveled to Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong, continuing
a long-term campaign to seek compensation for pneumoconiosis,
which they asserted was caused by their earlier work in
Guangdong.\136\ After Shenzhen police used pepper spray on the
retired workers on November 7, authorities agreed to provide
limited compensation to the workers, most of whom had never
signed labor contracts.\137\ In 2019, Chinese authorities
detained three citizen journalists from the iLabour (Xin
Shengdai) website, Yang Zhengjun, Ke Chengbing, and Wei
Zhili,\138\ as well as NGO worker Li Dajun, all of whom had
advocated on behalf of pneumoconiosis victims.\139\
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Notes to Section II--Worker Rights
\1\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art.
23(4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16,
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 22(1); United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, accessed May 15, 2019. China has signed but
not ratified the ICCPR. International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)
of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8; Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018--China (Includes
Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau),'' March 13, 2019, sec. 7.
\2\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law],
passed April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts. 9-11;
International Labour Organization, Interim Report--Report No 387, Case
No 3184 (China), February 15, 2016, October 2018, 238-39; Elaine Hui
and Eli Friedman, ``The Communist Party vs. China's Labor Laws,''
Jacobin, October 2, 2018; Aaron Halegua et al., ``Forty Years On, Is
China Still Reforming?,'' ChinaFile, Asia Society, November 9, 2018.
See also Christopher Balding and Donald C. Clarke, ``Who Owns
Huawei?,'' Social Science Research Network, April 17, 2019, 9-10.
\3\ All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``Submission to United
Nations Periodical Review of China,'' March 2018.
\4\ All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``Submission to United
Nations Universal Periodical Review of China--On Migrant Workers,''
March 2018; All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``Nongmin gong ruhui
renshu cong 1 yi zengjia dao 1.4 yi'' [The number of migrant workers
who join a union has increased from 100 million to 140 million], April
16, 2018.
\5\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2018 nongmingong
jiance diaocha baogao'' [Migrant workers monitoring and survey report],
April 29, 2019.
\6\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and Their Children,''
May 2019; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2018 nongmingong
jiance diaocha baogao'' [Migrant workers monitoring and survey report],
April 29, 2019.
\7\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2018 National
Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2019.
\8\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and Their Children,''
May 2019; Cai Yiwen, ``China's Aging Migrant Workers Are Facing a
Return to Poverty,'' Sixth Tone, November 28, 2018.
\9\ Christopher Balding and Donald C. Clarke, ``Who Owns Huawei?,''
Social Science Research Network, April 17, 2019, 9-10; Freedom House,
``China,'' in Freedom in the World 2019, February 2019, sec. E3; Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018--China (Includes
Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau),'' March 13, 2019, sec. 7. See also Elaine
Hui and Eli Friedman, ``The Communist Party vs. China's Labor Laws,''
Jacobin, October 10, 2018.
\10\ ``Wang Dongming zai Zhongguo Gonghui Shiqi Da baogao zhong
zhichu yi Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang wei
zhidao'' [Wang Dongming's report at the 17th National Congress of the
ACFTU points out that Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era is the guide], October 23, 2018; ``The
Chinese Trade Union Holds Its National Congress,'' Briefs, Made in
China Journal, October 26, 2018.
\11\ Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, ``Absurdity of
China's Trade Union Law and ACFTU Revealed in Jasic Labour Dispute,''
December 27, 2018; Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, ``Years of
Missing Social Security Contribution in Hong Kong-Owned Factory: ACFTU
Ignored Workers' Call for Help,'' December 27, 2018.
\12\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed
July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018,
arts. 16-35; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa [PRC Labor
Contract Law], passed June 29, 2007, effective January 1, 2008, amended
July 1, 2013, arts. 51-56; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC
Trade Union Law], passed April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts.
6, 20. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``The State of Labour Relations
in China, 2018,'' January 9, 2019.
\13\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed
July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018,
art. 33. Article 33 of the PRC Labor Law notes that ``In an enterprise
that has not yet set up a trade union, such contracts shall be signed
by and between representatives recommended by workers and the
enterprise.'' Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa [PRC Labor
Contract Law], passed June 29, 2007, effective January 1, 2008, amended
July 1, 2013, arts. 6, 51, 56; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa
[PRC Trade Union Law], passed April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009,
arts. 6, 20; Ivan Franceschini and Kevin Lin, ``Labour NGOs in China:
From Legal Mobilisation to Collective Struggle (and Back?),'' China
Perspectives, no. 1 (2019): 77. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``The
Road Ahead for China's Trade Unions,'' November 8, 2018.
\14\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 87)
Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right To
Organise, July 4, 1950, arts. 2, 3, 5. See also UN General Assembly,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, September 14, 2016,
paras. 3, 16-17, 54, 57.
\15\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art.
23(4).
\16\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16,
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 22(1); United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, accessed May 15, 2019. China has signed but
not ratified the ICCPR. See also UN General Assembly, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of
Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, September 14, 2016, para. 55.
\17\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8.1; United
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed May 15,
2019. China has signed and ratified the ICESCR. See also UN General
Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of
Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, September
14, 2016, para. 55.
\18\ International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up, June 18,
1998, art. 2(a). Article 2 of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work states that ``all Members, even if they
have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation
arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance
with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights
which are the subject of those Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining . . ..'' International Labour Organization, ``China,''
NORMLEX Information System on International Labour Standards, accessed
May 15, 2019. China became a member of the ILO in 1919, and post-1949,
the People's Republic of China began participating in the ILO in 1983.
China Labour Bulletin, ``China and the ILO: Formalistic Cooperation
Masks Rejection of Key Labor Rights,'' reprinted in Human Rights in
China, January 20, 2001.
\19\ Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU), ``HKCTU's
Representative Speaking at the UPR Pre-Session: Bring Labour Rights
Issues in China to International Scrutiny,'' October 31, 2018.
\20\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Calls for the Release of All
Jasic Workers and Supporters,'' November 1, 2018; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``Submission to UN on Fu Changguo, Li Zhan, Liu Penghua, Mi
Jiuping and Yu Juncong--March 13, 2019,'' April 1, 2019; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Why the Jasic Dispute Matters: This Year and in the Years
to Come,'' December 12, 2018.
\21\ China Labour Crackdown Concern Group (@labour--china), ``Since
July 2018, over 130 labor activists have been detained, or disappeared
by the authorities. Over 50 of these activists are still missing or in
custody . . .,'' Twitter, August 7, 2019, 2:25 a.m.; China Labor
Crackdown Concern Group, ``One Year, One Hundred Arrested, What You
Need to Know about China's Labor Crackdown,'' July 27, 2019; China
Labor Crackdown Concern Group, ``About Us,'' accessed August 19, 2019.
See also CIVICUS, ``China: `Crackdown on Jasic Labour Struggle Seeks to
Eliminate Unrest during Economic Downturn,' '' March 26, 2019;
``Chinese Labour Crackdown: Missing, Detained, Arrested,'' Financial
Times, March 29, 2019.
\22\ China Labor Crackdown Concern Group, ``One Year, One Hundred
Arrested, What You Need to Know about China's Labor Crackdown,'' July
27, 2019.
\23\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Submission to UN on Fu
Changguo, Li Zhan, Liu Penghua, Mi Jiuping and Yu Juncong--March 13,
2019,'' April 1, 2019; Shannon Lee, ``Preliminary Thoughts on the
Shenzhen Jasic Events,'' Shannon Lee's China Blog, September 17, 2018;
HZ, ``Jasic Detainee #1: The Story of Worker-Poet Mi Jiuping,'' Labor
Notes, November 5, 2018; Awei, ``Jasic Detainee #2: Li Zhan: Standing
with Workers through Thick and Thin,'' Labor Notes, November 17, 2018;
Xiao Hui, ``Jasic Detainee #3: The Story of Yu Juncong: Always Standing
against Injustice,'' Labor Notes, November 19, 2018; HZ, ``Jasic
Detainee #4: Liu Penghua: We Need a Union, Not Just Rights Defense,''
Labor Notes, November 26, 2018. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders
(CHRD), ``Defending Rights in a `No Rights Zone' Annual Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2018),'' February 2019,
3, 19. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database records 2018-00622 on Liu Penghua, 2018-00627 on Yu Juncong,
2018-00628 on Mi Jiuping, and 2018-00629 on Li Zhan.
\24\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Jasic Crackdown Extends to Trade
Union Officials and Lawyers,'' December 4, 2018; International Labour
Organization, Interim Report--Report No 389, June 2019, para. 226.
\25\ Human Rights in China, ``30 Shenzhen Workers and Supporters
Detained for Demanding to Form Labor Union,'' July 30, 2018; Shannon
Lee, ``Preliminary Thoughts on the Shenzhen Jasic Events,'' Shannon
Lee's China Blog, September 17, 2018. For more information on the
individuals detained in July 2018, see the following records in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00622 on Liu Penghua,
2018-00627 on Yu Juncong, 2018-00628 on Mi Jiuping, 2018-00629 on Li
Zhan, 2018-00630 on Zhang Zeying, 2018-00632 on Huang Lanfeng, 2018-
00633 on Wu Shuang, 2018-00634 on Hu Zhi, 2018-00635 on Yu Junchuan,
2018-00636 on Kuang Hengshu, 2018-00637 on He Qiong, 2018-00638 on Song
Yao, 2018-00639 on Zhang Yu, 2018-00640 on Zhang Baoyan, 2018-00641 on
Chen Zhongge, 2018-00642 on Yu Kailong, 2018-00646 on Chen Yeling,
2018-00647 on Tang Xiangwei, 2018-00649 on Lan Zhiwei, 2018-00652 on
Qiao Zhiqiang, 2018-00653 on Chen Zhongge, 2018-00654 on Hu Kaiqiao,
2018-00655 on Shang Yangxue, 2018-00656 on Li Li, 2018-00657 on Yu
Weiye, 2018-00658 on Zhang Yong, 2018-00659 on Mo Juezhan, 2018-00660
on Xiong Zhi, 2018-00661 on Ye Yanfei, 2018-00662 on Huang Wenyi, and
2018-00663 on He Xuanhua.
\26\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Why the Jasic Dispute Matters: This
Year and in the Years to Come,'' December 24, 2018.
\27\ Au Loong Yu, ``The Jasic Mobilisation: A High Tide for the
Chinese Labour Movement?,'' editorial, Made in China Journal 3, no. 4
(2018):12-16; Shannon Lee, ``Preliminary Thoughts on the Shenzhen Jasic
Events,'' Shannon Lee's China Blog, September 17, 2018.
\28\ ``Detained Activist Yue Xin on the Jasic Workers,'' China
Digital Times, August 24, 2018; Lily Kuo, ``50 Student Activists
Missing in China after Police Raid,'' Guardian, August 24, 2018;
Shannon Lee, ``Preliminary Thoughts on the Shenzhen Jasic Events,''
Shannon Lee's China Blog, September 17, 2018. For more information on
the individuals detained in August 2018, see the following records in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00664 on Shen
Mengyu, 2018-00665 on Yue Xin, 2018-00667 on Gu Jiayue, 2019-00001 on
Zhan Zhenzhen, 2019-00003 on Yang Shaoqiang, 2019-00006 on Xu
Zhongliang, 2019-00008 on Hu Pingping, 2019-00009 on Wu Haiyu, 2019-
00010 on Shang Kai, 2019-00011 on Fu Changguo, and 2019-00016 on Huang
Qingnan.
\29\ ``Beida xianshi 1984 ban, ni zhidao duoshao?'' [Peking
University is now a real version of 1984, how much do you know?],
Telegra.ph (blog), May 1, 2019; ``Orwell in the Chinese Classroom,''
Made in China Journal, May 27, 2019. Xin Guang Pingmin Fazhan Xiehui,
``Jiankong, guli, wumie . . . . . . wo xiang ba Renda Xin Guang de
zaoyu jiang gei ni ting'' [Surveilled, isolated, slandered . . . . . .
I want to tell you about the treatment Xin Guang received], Jasic
Workers Student Support Group (blog), GitHub, December 4, 2018;
``Translation: Harassment of Workers' Rights Group,'' China Digital
Times, December 21, 2018; Gerry Shih, `` `If I Disappear': Chinese
Students Make Farewell Messages amid Crackdowns over Labor Activism,''
Washington Post, May 25, 2019; Eddie Park, ``The Red Runners of Peking
University,'' SupChina, November 15, 2018.
\30\ Elizabeth Redden, ``Cutting Ties: Cornell Ends a Partnership
with Renmin University of China, Citing Academic Freedom Concerns,''
Inside Higher Ed, October 29, 2018.
\31\ Eli Friedman, ``It's Time to Get Loud about Academic Freedom
in China,'' Foreign Policy, November 13, 2018. See also Xin Guang
Pingmin Fazhan Xiehui, ``Jiankong, guli, wumie . . . . . . wo xiang ba
Renda Xin Guang de zaoyu jiang gei ni ting'' [Surveilled, isolated,
slandered . . . . . . I want to tell you about the treatment Xin Guang
received], Jasic Workers Student Support Group (blog), GitHub, December
4, 2018; ``Translation: Harassment of Workers' Rights Group,'' China
Digital Times, December 21, 2018.
\32\ Sue-Lin Wong, ``Labor Activists Missing in China after
Suspected Coordinated Raids,'' Reuters, November 12, 2018. For more
information on the individuals detained in November 2018, see the
following records in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database:
2019-00019 on Zhang Shengye, 2019-00020 on Sun Min, 2019-00022 on Zong
Yang, 2019-00023 on Liang Xiaogang, 2019-00027 on Zheng Yiran, 2019-
00028 on Lu Daxing, 2019-00029 on Li Xiaoxian, 2019-00030 on He
Pengchao, 2019-00034 on Wang Xiangyi, 2019-00035 on Jian Xiaowei, 2019-
00036 on Kang Yanyan, 2019-00037 on Hou Changshan, 2019-00038 on Wang
Xiaomei, 2019-00045 on He Xiumei, 2019-00046 on Zou Liping, 2019-00047
on Li Ao, 2019-00048 on Wu Jiawei, and 2019-00049 on Zheng Shiyou.
\33\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Jasic Crackdown Extends to Trade
Union Officials and Lawyers,'' December 4, 2018; Christian Shepherd,
``Two Chinese Trade Union Officials Arrested after Helping Workers:
Source,'' Reuters, November 30, 2018; ``Police Detain Rights Lawyer
Linked to Labor Movement in China's Guangdong,'' Radio Free Asia,
November 30, 2018.
\34\ Gerry Shih, `` `If I Disappear': Chinese Students Make
Farewell Messages amid Crackdowns over Labor Activism,'' Washington
Post, May 25, 2019. See also Eddie Park, `` `Deers' vs. `Horses': Old
and New Marxist Groups Wage Ideological Battle at Peking University,''
SupChina, January 9, 2019.
\35\ ``Orwell in the Chinese Classroom,'' Made in China Journal,
May 27, 2019.
\36\ Kevin Lin, ``State Repression in the Jasic Aftermath: From
Punishment to Preemption,'' Made in China Journal 4, no. 1 (2019): 16-
19. See also Manfred Elfstrom, ``Two Steps Forward, One Step Back:
China's State Reactions to Labor Unrest,'' China Quarterly, no. 237
(March 2019): 6.
\37\ Ivan Franceschini and Kevin Lin, ``A `Pessoptimistic' View of
Chinese Labour NGOs,'' Made in China Journal 3, no. 2 (2018): 56-60.
\38\ Jude Howell and Tim Pringle, ``Shades of Authoritarianism and
State-Labour Relations in China,'' British Journal of Industrial
Relations 57, no. 2 (June 2019): 234-35.
\39\ Ivan Franceschini and Kevin Lin, ``Labour NGOs in China: From
Legal Mobilisation to Collective Struggle (and Back?),'' China
Perspectives, no. 1 (2019): 75.
\40\ Ivan Franceschini and Kevin Lin, ``Labour NGOs in China: From
Legal Mobilisation to Collective Struggle (and Back?),'' China
Perspectives, no. 1 (2019): 82; Kevin Lin, ``State Repression in the
Jasic Aftermath: From Punishment to Preemption,'' Made in China Journal
4, no. 1 (2019): 16-19.
\41\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Well-Known Labour Activists Detained
by Shenzhen Police,'' January 22, 2019; Manfred Elfstrom, ``China's
Recent Crackdown on Labour Activists May Have Little to Do with Their
Own Actions,'' South China Morning Post, February 7, 2019. For more
information on government suppression of labor advocates in the 2018
reporting year, see CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 86-87.
\42\ Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, Students and Scholars
Against Corporate Misbehavior, Worker Empowerment, et al., ``Statement
of `18-19 Chinese Labor Rights Mass Crackdown' from Various Circles in
Hong Kong,'' reprinted in China Labor Crackdown Concern Group, August
7, 2019; China Labor Crackdown Concern Group, ``One Year, One Hundred
Arrested, What You Need to Know about China's Labor Crackdown,'' July
27, 2019.
\43\ Worker Empowerment, ``Joint Statement: Release Fu Changguo
Now!'' September 13, 2018; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Submission
to UN on Fu Changguo, Li Zhan, Liu Penghua, Mi Jiuping and Yu Juncong--
March 13, 2019,'' April 1, 2019. For more information, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2019-00011 on Fu
Changguo and 2019-00016 on Huang Qingnan.
\44\ Red Reference, ``Hongse cankao bianji bu Beijing bangongshi
bei chachao, gongzuo renyuan bei xingju'' [Red Reference's editorial
department in Beijing subjected to search, staff criminally detained,''
Jasic Workers Support Group, August 26, 2018; ``Zhongguo zuoyi wangzhan
bianji bei yi `dianfu zui' juliu'' [Editor of Chinese leftist website
detained for ``subversion of state power''], Radio Free Asia, March 25,
2019. For more information on Shang Kai, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2019-00010.
\45\ ``Zhongguo zuoyi wangzhan bianji bei yi `dianfu zui' juliu''
[Editor of Chinese leftist website detained for ``subversion of state
power''], Radio Free Asia, March 25, 2019. For more information on Chai
Xiaoming, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-
00126.
\46\ Human Rights in China, ``HRIC Urges International Attention on
32 Jasic Workers and Supporters Detained, Disappeared,'' December 7,
2018; ``Shenzhen shi Pingshan qu kaichuang fuwu qing gong xin moshi
zhuli wugong qingnian chuanye, dajian yuanmeng pingtai'' [Pingshan
district, Shenzhen municipality, creating a new mode of serving young
workers, helping young people start a business, building a dream
platform], Global Times, September 14, 2017. For more information, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2019-00030 on He
Pengchao, 2019-00034 on Wang Xiangyi, 2019-00035 on Jian Xiaowei, 2019-
00036 on Kang Yanyan, 2019-00037 on Hou Changshan, 2019-00038 on Wang
Xiaomei, and 2019-00045 on He Xiumei.
\47\ International Labour Office, International Labour
Organization, 389th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association,
GB.336/INS/4/1, June 22, 2019, 68-69.
\48\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Well-Known Labour Activists Detained
by Shenzhen Police,'' January 22, 2019. See also ``Shenzhen Chunfeng
Laodong Zhengyi Fuwu Bu zhuren Zhang Zhiru bei chuanhuan hou huoshi''
[Zhang Zhiru, director of the Shenzhen Chunfeng Labor Dispute Service
Center, released after summons,'' Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2014. For
more information on Zhang Zhiyu, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2019-00117.
\49\ Keegan Elmer, ``At Least Five Labour Rights Activists Arrested
across China,'' South China Morning Post, January 22, 2019.
\50\ Li Qian, ``How Zhang Zhiru Became One of China's Top Defenders
of Labor Rights,'' Global Times, September 19, 2014.
\51\ ``Calls Grow for Release of Chinese Website Editors Who
Advised Migrant Workers,'' Radio Free Asia, March 28, 2019. For more
information on Yang Zhengjun, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2019-00129.
\52\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Gone for 100 Days: Three Labour
Activists `Disappeared' in China,'' June 27, 2019; ``Calls Grow for
Release of Chinese Website Editors Who Advised Migrant Workers,'' Radio
Free Asia, March 28, 2019. For more information on Ke Chengbing, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00128.
\53\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Gone for 100 Days: Three Labour
Activists `Disappeared' in China,'' June 27, 2019; ``Calls Grow for
Release of Chinese Website Editors Who Advised Migrant Workers,'' Radio
Free Asia, March 28, 2019. For more information on Wei Zhili, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00127.
\54\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Gone for 100 Days: Three Labour
Activists `Disappeared' in China,'' June 27, 2019; Committee to Protect
Journalists, ``Labor Rights Website Editor Wei Zhili Arrested in China;
Another Is Missing,'' March 21, 2019.
\55\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Gone for 100 Days: Three Labour
Activists `Disappeared' in China,'' June 27, 2019.
\56\ Keegan Elmer and Guo Rui, ``Three More People Detained as
China Continues to Crack Down on Labour Groups,'' South China Morning
Post, May 12, 2019; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Must
Release Detained Labor Rights Advocates,'' July 25, 2019. According to
the South China Morning Post and Chinese Human Rights Defenders, the
three raids appeared to be coordinated.
\57\ Keegan Elmer and Guo Rui, ``Three More People Detained as
China Continues to Crack Down on Labour Groups,'' South China Morning
Post, May 12, 2019; Hongshui zhi tao (@hongshuizhitao), ``Canyu jiuzhu
chenfei gongren de Beijing shegong Li Dajun shilian, qi qi bei zhua''
[Beijing social worker who participated in helping workers with
pneumoconiosis Li Dajun lost contact, wife also detained], Weibo post,
May 8, 2019, 9:40 p.m., reprinted in Youth Spark, May 8, 2019; ``Fei
zhengfu zuzhi nijing qiu cun Beijing laogong zuzhi fuze ren yi bei
kou'' [Non-governmental organizations face adversity, Beijing labor
organization founder may have been taken into custody], Radio Free
Asia, May 9, 2019.
\58\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Must Release Detained
Labor Rights Advocates,'' July 25, 2019; Keegan Elmer and Guo Rui,
``Three More People Detained as China Continues to Crack Down on Labour
Groups,'' South China Morning Post, May 12, 2019.
\59\ Guangdong Mumian Social Work Service Center, ``Mumian
jianjie'' [Mumian introduction], accessed August 19, 2019; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``China Must Release Detained Labor Rights
Advocates,'' July 25, 2019.
\60\ Yu Jincui, ``Rational Solution Needs to Be Explored to Sort
Out Capital-Labor Relations,'' Global Times, January 1, 2019.
\61\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``China Using Taped Confessions to
Intimidate Young Communists, Students Say,'' New York Times, January
21, 2019.
\62\ Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, ``Investigative
Report on Labour Rights Conditions of Hong Kong Enterprises and Hong
Kong Listed Enterprises in Mainland China 2017-2018,'' October 2018, 2;
Freedom House, ``China,'' in Freedom in the World 2019, February 2019,
sec. E3.
\63\ Human Rights Watch, ``Liu Feiyue Convicted of `Inciting
Subversion' for Monitoring Violations,'' January 29, 2019. For more
information on Lu Yuyu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2016-00177.
\64\ China Labour Bulletin changed their methodology beginning in
2017. China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map Applies New Fixed Sampling
Method in 2017,'' February 17, 2017. For information on China Labour
Bulletin's methodology through the end of 2016, see China Labour
Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China Labour Bulletin's Strike Map,''
March 29, 2016.
\65\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' accessed April 26,
2019; China Labour Bulletin, ``Economic Recovery Means More Bad Jobs
for China's Workers,'' January 18, 2018.
\66\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' accessed May 15,
2019. Two incidents recorded in 2018 had an unknown number of
participants.
\67\ Ibid.
\68\ China Labour Bulletin, ``A Decade On, China's Labour Contract
Law Has Failed to Deliver,'' December 28, 2018; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, ``2016 nian nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao''
[2016 report on monitoring and survey of migrant workers], April 28,
2017. In 2016, 35.1 percent of migrant workers had contracts, down from
42.8 percent in 2009. National Bureau of Statistics of China,
``Nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao'' [Migrant workers monitoring and
survey report], April 29, 2019. The Chinese government did not report
the percentage of migrant workers who were working under a contract in
2018.
\69\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' accessed May 15,
2019.
\70\ Ibid.
\71\ Feng Xiang, ``Solidarity Under a Song: What Strikes in China
Tell Us,'' American Affairs Journal 3, no. 1 (2019); China Labour
Bulletin, ``Labour Relations FAQ,'' accessed May 15, 2019.
\72\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8(1)(d);
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
accessed July 14, 2019. China has signed and ratified the ICESCR. See
also UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai,
A/71/385, September 14, 2016, paras. 54, 56-57.
\73\ ``Chinese Smartphone Screen Maker Hit by Workers' Protests,''
Financial Times, November 16, 2018; Peggy Sito and Li Tao, ``China-
Based Supplier of Apple Screens Biel Denies It Has Laid Off Thousands
of Workers,'' South China Morning Post, November 16, 2018; ``Pingguo
shouji gongying shang Guangdong caiyuan wan ren'' [Apple mobile phone
supplier in Guangdong lays off [nearly] ten thousand], Radio Free Asia,
November 16, 2018; Dui Hua Foundation, ``Mass Incidents Monitor,''
accessed May 15, 2019.
\74\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Food Delivery Drivers Strike in
Protest at Post-New Year Pay Cuts,'' February 28, 2019.
\75\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workers at Recycling Start-Up Stage
Protests over Wage Arrears,'' April 23, 2019; Zhang Qing, ``Xiao Huang
Gou qiongtu `qizu baoming' zhengtuo buliao tuan dai `wang' [Little
Yellow Dog in straitened circumstances ``abandons life,'' [but] can't
get rid of the ``net'' of group lending], Sina, April 29, 2019. The
four cities were Dongguan municipality, Guangdong province; Shanghai
municipality; Chongqing municipality; and, Xi'an municipality, Shaanxi
province.
\76\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workers at Recycling Start-Up Stage
Protests over Wage Arrears,'' April 23, 2019.
\77\ ``996.ICU,'' reprinted in Github, accessed May 19, 2019;
``GitHub Protest over Chinese Tech Companies' `996' Culture Goes
Viral,'' Radii China, March 29, 2019; Yuan Yang, ``China and the Anti-
996 Campaign,'' Financial Times, May 8, 2019.
\78\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed
July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018,
art. 36; Xin Zhiping, ``Xin Zhiping: fendou ying tichang, 996 dang
tuichang'' [Xin Zhiping: struggle should be supported, 996 should be
stopped], Xinhua, April 15, 2019. According to Xin, the ``996''
schedule ``clearly'' violates Chinese labor law.
\79\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed
July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018,
art. 41.
\80\ Emily Feng, ``GitHub Has Become a Haven for China's Censored
Internet Users,'' Morning Edition, NPR, April 10, 2019.
\81\ ``996.ICU,'' reprinted in Github, accessed May 19, 2019;
``GitHub Protest over Chinese Tech Companies' `996' Culture Goes
Viral,'' Radii China, March 29, 2019; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong
Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995,
amended December 29, 2018, arts. 16, 41.
\82\ ``996 (Huo qita weifa jiaban zhidu) gongsi mingdan'' [996 (and
other illegal overtime systems) company list], 996.ICU, Github,
accessed June 13, 2019; Rita Liao, ``China's Startup Ecosystem Is
Hitting Back at Demanding Working Hours,'' TechCrunch, April 12, 2019.
\83\ JS Chen, ``Tech Workers Are Workers, Too,'' Jacobin, May 6,
2019.
\84\ ``Overseas Tech Workers Warn of `Race to Bottom' in China
Overtime Row,'' Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2019; Klint Fliney, ``How
Github Is Helping Overworked Chinese Programmers,'' Wired, April 26,
2019.
\85\ Bryce Covert, ``The Richest Man in China Is Wrong, 12-Hour
Days Are No `Blessing,' '' New York Times, April 21, 2019; Lin Qiqing
and Raymond Zhong, `` `996' Is China's Version of Hustle Culture. Tech
Workers Are Sick of It.,'' New York Times, April 29, 2019.
\86\ ``Tech Employees' Work Schedule Protest Censored,'' China
Digital Times, April 5, 2019.
\87\ Klint Fliney, ``How Github Is Helping Overworked Chinese
Programmers,'' Wired, April 26, 2019; `` `Anti 996' License Version 1.0
(Draft)'', 996.ICU, Github, April 17, 2019.
\88\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shehui Baoxian Fa [PRC Social
Insurance Law], passed October 28, 2010, effective July 1, 2011, art.
2. For information on workers' low levels of social insurance coverage
in previous reporting years, see CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10,
2018, 90; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 90; CECC, 2016
Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 81-82; CECC, 2015 Annual Report,
October 8, 2015, 87-88.
\89\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shehui Baoxian Fa [PRC Social
Insurance Law], passed October 28, 2010, effective July 11, 2011, arts.
10, 23, 33, 44, 53. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Social
Security System,'' March 2019.
\90\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2018 National
Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2019; National Bureau
of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique of the People's
Republic of China on the 2017 National Economic and Social
Development,'' February 28, 2018.
\91\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2018 National
Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2019; National Bureau
of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique of the People's
Republic of China on the 2017 National Economic and Social
Development,'' February 28, 2018.
\92\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2018 National
Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2019.
\93\ State Council, ``Guowuyuan guanyu jianli qiye zhigong jiben
ganglao baoxian jijin zhongyang tiaoji zhidi de tongzhi'' [State
Council circular on the establishment of a central adjustment fund for
basic pensions], June 13, 2018; State Council, ``Pension Funds for
Enterprise Employees to be Centrally Coordinated,'' June 13, 2018.
\94\ Ministry of Finance, ``2019 nian zhongyang tiaoji jijin shouru
(shangjiao) qingkuang biao'' [2019 pension central adjustment fund
(paid) situation table], accessed June 13, 2019; Cheng Siwei and Liu
Jiefei, ``Rich Provinces Cough Up Pension Funds to Help Struggling
Peers,'' Caixin, April 10, 2019.
\95\ Ministry of Finance, ``2019 nian zhongyang tiaoji jijin jiao
bo cha'e qingkuang biao'' [2019 pension central adjustment fund
collection difference situation table], accessed June 13, 2019; Cheng
Siwei and Liu Jiefei, ``Rich Provinces Cough Up Pension Funds to Help
Struggling Peers,'' Caixin, April 10, 2019.
\96\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed
July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018,
art. 2; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa [PRC Labor Contract
Law], passed June 29, 2007, effective January 1, 2008, amended December
28, 2012, art. 2.
\97\ Jenny Chan, ``Challenges of Dispatch Work in China,''
AsiaGlobal Online, March 21, 2019; China Labour Bulletin, ``Volkswagen
Workers in Changchun Continue Their Fight for Equal Pay,'' November 10,
2018; Qian Zhecheng and Fan Liya, ``Shady Agents Persist at Major Apple
Product Factory,'' Sixth Tone, January 21, 2019.
\98\ Jenny Chan, ``Challenges of Dispatch Work in China,''
AsiaGlobal Online, March 21, 2019. For information on contract or
dispatch labor from previous reporting years, see CECC, 2018 Annual
Report, October 10, 2018, 90-91; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5,
2017, 90-91; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 86.
\99\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Volkswagen Workers in Changchun
Continue Their Fight for Equal Pay,'' November 10, 2018; Zhang Lu,
``The Struggles of Temporary Agency Workers in Xi's China,'' Made in
China Journal 3, no. 2 (2018): 46-49; ``Support Changchun FAW-
Volkswagen Dispatch Workers' Struggle for Equal Pay for Equal Work,''
Globalization Monitor, May 22, 2019.
\100\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Volkswagen Workers in Changchun
Continue Their Fight for Equal Pay,'' November 10, 2018; ``Support
Changchun FAW-Volkswagen Dispatch Workers' Struggle for Equal Pay for
Equal Work,'' Globalization Monitor, May 22, 2019; Zhang Lu, ``The
Struggles of Temporary Agency Workers in Xi's China,'' Made in China
Journal 3, no. 2 (2018): 46-49;
\101\ Qian Zhecheng and Fan Liya, ``Shady Agents Persist at Major
Apple Product Factory,'' Sixth Tone, January 21, 2019.
\102\ Ibid.
\103\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa [PRC Labor
Contract Law], passed June 29, 2007, effective January 1, 2008, amended
December 28, 2012, arts. 63, 66.
\104\ Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior, ``Apple
Watch Series 4: Still Failed to Protect Teenage Student Workers,''
October 2018, 3.
\105\ Tom Hancock, Yuan Yang, and Nian Liu, ``Illegal Student
Labour Fuels JD.com `Singles Day' Sale,'' Financial Times, November 20,
2018.
\106\ China Labor Watch, ``Amazon Recruits Illegally: Interns
Forced to Work Overtime,'' August 8, 2019, 3; Gethin Chamberlain,
``Schoolchildren in China Work Overnight to Produce Amazon Alexa
Devices,'' Guardian, August 8, 2019.
\107\ Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance, Zhongdeng
Zhiye Xuexiao Xuesheng Shixi Guanli Banfa, [Measures on Managing
Secondary Vocational School Student Internships], issued and effective
June 26, 2007, art. 5.
\108\ Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ``China's Detention Camps for
Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,'' New York Times, December 16, 2018.
\109\ Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, ``US Sportswear
Traced to Factory in China's Internment Camps,'' Associated Press,
December 19, 2018. Badger Sportswear is a part of Founder Sport Group
which is owned by CCMP Capital Advisors LP. ``About Us,'' Badger Sport,
accessed September 6, 2019; Iris Dorbian, ``CCMP to Buy Uniforms Maker
Badger Sportswear,'' The PE Hub Network, August 23, 2016.
\110\ State Council Information Office, ``The Fight against
Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang,''
March 2019, 22; ``Forced Labor Risk in Xinjiang, China,'' Fair Labor
Standards Association, April 2019, 1-2.
\111\ Eva Dou and Chao Deng, ``Western Companies Get Tangled in
China's Muslim Clampdown,'' Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2019.
\112\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Nongmingong jiance
diaocha baogao'' [Migrant workers monitoring and survey report], April
29, 2019; Cai Yiwen, ``China's Aging Migrant Workers Are Facing a
Return to Poverty,'' Sixth Tone, November 28, 2018.
\113\ State Council, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa
Shishi Tiaoli [PRC Labor Contract Law Implementing Regulations], issued
and effective September 18, 2008, art. 21; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Laodong Hetong Fa [PRC Labor Contract Law, passed June 29, 2007,
effective January 1, 2008, amended July 13, 2012, art. 44(2). The PRC
Labor Contract Law provides that if a worker receives a pension, his or
her labor contract terminates (zhongzhi), but the implementing
regulations require that contracts be terminated for all workers upon
reaching the legal retirement age.
\114\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Tracking the Ever-Present Danger for
Workers on the Streets of China,'' December 20, 2018; Hanming Fang and
Jin Feng, ``The Chinese Pension System,'' Shanghaitech SEM Working
Paper, September 1, 2018, 14.
\115\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2018 National
Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2019.
\116\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2017 National
Economic and Social Development,'' February 28, 2018, sec. XII.
\117\ Gerry Shih, ``After China's Deadly Chemical Disaster, a
Shattered Region Weighs Costs of the Rush to `Get Rich,' '' Washington
Post, March 31, 2019.
\118\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Deaths from Coal Mine Accidents in
China Fall to New Low of 333 in 2018,'' January 24, 2019.
\119\ ``Yixian gongren anquan mao duibi shiyan shipin yinfa taolun,
yingji guanlibu huiying'' [First line workers safety helmet comparison
test results in debate, Ministry of Environmental Management responds],
Observer, March 17, 2019; Jiayun Feng, ``Construction Worker Loses Job
after Exposing Low-Quality Helmets,'' SupChina, April 22, 2019; Linda
Lew, ``Chinese Worker Smashes Hard Hat in Viral Video, Raises Safety
Concerns,'' South China Morning Post, April 16, 2019.
\120\ ``Yixian gongren anquan mao duibi shiyan shipin yinfa taolun,
yingji guanlibu huiying'' [First line workers safety helmet comparison
test results in debate, Ministry of Environmental Management responds],
Observer, March 17, 2019; Jiayun Feng, ``Construction Worker Loses Job
after Exposing Low-Quality Helmets,'' SupChina, April 22, 2019; Linda
Lew, ``Chinese Worker Smashes Hard Hat in Viral Video, Raises Safety
Concerns,'' South China Morning Post, April 16, 2019.
\121\ China Labor Watch, ``A Nightmare for Workers: Appalling
Conditions in Toy Factories Persist,'' December 6, 2018, 1.
\122\ Ibid, 3.
\123\ China Labor Watch, ``An Investigative Report on Dongguan
Dongwon,'' March 11, 2019, 3, 4, 10.
\124\ ``China Chemical Blast: Blast outside Zhangjiakou Plant Kills
22,'' BBC, November 28, 2018. See also Linda Lew, ``Explosions and
Landslides--The Worst Industrial Accidents in China since 2014,'' South
China Morning Post, March 22, 2019.
\125\ China Labour Bulletin, ``At Least 78 Dead, Hundreds Injured
in Massive Chemical Plant Explosion,'' March 25, 2019; Liu Kang, Ling
Junhui, and Chen Rufa, ``Yi shengming de mingyi Jiangsu Xiangshui `321'
teda baozha shigu qi riji'' [In the name of life--Xiangshui, Jiangsu
``3.21'' massive explosion tragedy 7th-day memorial], Xinhua, March 27,
2019; Zhao Jing, Wei Shumin, Liang Yingfei, and Yang Rui, ``Xiangshui
huagong yuan baozha zhuizong: gongren cheng baozha yi yin tianranqi
qihou [Xiangshui chemical park explosion: workers suspect [it was]
caused by natural gas leak], Caixin, March 22, 2019; Liu Jia,
``Yanchang baozha shigu beihou: Nijiaxiang Jituan de hong yu hei''
[Behind the scenes of the Yanchang explosion story: Nijiaxiang Group's
red and black], Southern Weekend, reprinted in China Digital Times,
March 22, 2019.
\126\ Linda Lew, ``Explosions and Landslides--The Worst Industrial
Accidents in China since 2014,'' South China Morning Post, March 22,
2019; William Zheng, ``Death Toll from China Chemical Plant Blast Rises
to 79,'' South China Morning Post, March 25, 2019.
\127\ Yu Han, ``The Yancheng Blast Shows the Importance of Media
Oversight,'' Sixth Tone, March 22, 2019; Austin Ramzy and Javier C.
Hernandez, ``Explosion at Chemical Plant Kills 64; Employees
Detained,'' New York Times, March 22, 2019.
\128\ Yu Han, ``The Yancheng Blast Shows the Importance of Media
Oversight,'' Sixth Tone, March 22, 2019.
\129\ UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, ``China
Must Fulfil Repeated Pledges on Chemical Safety: Expert,'' March 29,
2019.
\130\ Planning Development and Information Technology Division,
National Health Commission, ``2018 nian woguo weisheng jiankang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao'' [Report on development statistics of the health
and wellness industry in 2018], May 22, 2019.
\131\ National Institute of Occupational Health and Poison Control
and Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, ``2017 nian
zhiye bing baogao qingkuang'' [Report on the situation of occupational
diseases in 2017], June 19, 2018.
\132\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``2015-2016
nian quanguo zhiye bing baogao qingkuang'' [2015-2016 report on the
situation of occupational diseases nationwide], December 28, 2017, 1,
3-4.
\133\ Planning Development and Information Technology Division,
National Health Commission, ``2018 nian woguo weisheng jiankang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao'' [Report on development statistics of the health
and wellness industry in 2018], May 22, 2019.
\134\ Zhang Lei, ``Zhiye bing fangzhi meiyou wancheng shi''
[Occupational disease prevention unfinished], Jiankang bao [Health
News], January 3, 2019.
\135\ ``Winter Is Coming: China 2018-2019 (Wildcat),'' Chuang, June
7, 2019. In 2016, reportedly fewer than 10 percent of pneumoconiosis
victims had an employment contract.
\136\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Shenzhen Commits to Compensate
Protesting Pneumoconiosis Workers,'' November 14, 2018.
\137\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Shenzhen Police Use Pepper Spray on
Protesting Pneumoconiosis Workers,'' November 9, 2018; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Shenzhen Commits to Compensate Protesting Pneumoconiosis
Workers,'' November 14, 2018.
\138\ Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, ``Hundreds of Hunan
Workers Petitioned to Support the Criminally Detained `iLabour'
Editors!,'' April 15, 2019; Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Labor
Rights Website Editor Wei Zhili Arrested in China; Another Is
Missing,'' March 21, 2019. For more information on the three citizen
journalists' cases, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
records 2019-00127 on Wei Zhili, 2019-00128 on Ke Chengbing, and 2019-
00129 on Yang Zhengjun.
\139\ Hongshui zhi tao (@hongshuizhitao), ``Canyu jiuzhu chenfei
gongren de Beijing shegong Li Dajun shi lian, qi qi bei zhua'' [Beijing
social worker who participated in helping workers with pneumoconiosis
Li Dajun lost contact, wife also detained], Weibo post, May 8, 2019,
9:40 p.m., reprinted in Youth Spark.
Criminal
Justice
Criminal
Justice
Criminal Justice
Findings
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year,
Chinese government and Communist Party officials
continued to abuse criminal law and police power to
punish government critics and to ``maintain stability''
(weiwen) with the goal of perpetuating one-party rule.
The Chinese government in many cases violated the
freedoms of Chinese citizens protected under PRC laws
and international human rights standards, and used
criminal law to target rights advocates, religious
believers, and ethnic minority groups.
Authorities continued to use various forms of
arbitrary detention--such as extralegal ``black jails''
and forced psychiatric commitment of individuals
without mental illness--to deprive individuals of their
liberty, contravening international human rights
standards. Authorities also continued to use
administrative detention that circumvented judicial
oversight and protections for detainees' rights under
the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL).
Authorities continued to detain individuals
under broad provisions in the PRC Criminal Law--such as
crimes of ``endangering state security,'' ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble,'' and ``organizing and
using a cult organization to undermine implementation
of the law''--to suppress rights advocacy and other
activities protected under international human rights
standards.
Authorities held rights advocates, lawyers,
petitioners, and others in prolonged pretrial
detention, including under ``residential surveillance
at a designated location'' (RSDL), a form of
incommunicado detention that can last up to six months,
restricts access to counsel, and places detainees at
risk of abuse by authorities.
In one case with numerous human rights
violations, Falun Gong practitioner Sun Qian said that
she was tortured while in custody, subjected to
arbitrary and prolonged pretrial detention, and
prevented from obtaining proper legal counsel. In other
cases, officials denied detainees access to counsel,
such as human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang who was
prevented from seeing lawyers appointed by his wife.
In December 2018, Chinese authorities
separately detained Canadian citizens Michael Spavor
and Michael Kovrig for allegedly ``endangering state
security.'' In the same month, during a retrial, the
Dalian Intermediate People's Court sentenced to death
Canadian Robert Schellenberg for drug smuggling.
Observers believed these actions within the criminal
justice system were likely Chinese authorities' attempt
to exert pressure on the Canadian government for the
arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial executive
of the Chinese technology company Huawei, whom Canadian
authorities detained in December 2018 based on an
extradition request made by the U.S. Department of
Justice.
Authorities continued to torture and otherwise
abuse detainees:
Authorities denied requests to release human
rights website 64 Tianwang founder Huang Qi for
medical reasons. In October 2018, authorities
reportedly purposely manipulated readings of
Huang's high blood pressure and rejected
attempts by detention center officials to allow
additional treatment due to ``political''
reasons.
Authorities reportedly required Taiwanese
college employee and non-governmental
organization (NGO) volunteer Lee Ming-cheh to
work more than 10 hours a day without a day of
rest and served him and other prisoners spoiled
food. After Lee's wife Lee Jingyu made public
statements concerning her prison visit,
authorities revoked her right to visit her
husband.
Authorities continued to develop technology-
based means to help public security officials track
persons of interest--based in part on large-scale,
sometimes involuntary collection of personal data--
raising concerns over Chinese citizens' privacy and the
potential for public security officials' capacity to
use this technology to crack down on rights advocates
and other targeted persons. The manner in which
authorities collected personal data, including
biometric data, appeared to violate privacy protections
in international human rights instruments.
While the Chinese government continued to
claim that it reserved the death penalty for a small
number of crimes and only the most serious offenders,
Amnesty International estimated that China carried out
more executions than any other country. China continued
to classify statistics on its use of the death penalty
as a state secret, and the Commission did not observe
official reports on overall death penalty numbers. A
French NGO reported that the death penalty
disproportionately targeted ethnic and religious
minorities, such as Uyghur Muslims, for their religious
beliefs.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Publicly advocate for political prisoners and other
targets of government oppression whom officials have
deprived of liberty on unsubstantiated criminal charges
and for apparent political or religious reasons. Refer
to the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for
details on individual cases.
Include discussion of rights protections for rights
advocates and other targets of government repression in
a wide range of bilateral and multilateral discussions
with Chinese officials. Stress to the Chinese
government the importance of procedural compliance and
effective legal representation in criminal cases in
relation to the goal of rule-based governance.
Urge Chinese officials to end all forms of arbitrary
detention, as well as forms of extrajudicial detention,
that are imposed without meeting the standards for a
fair trial as set forth in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and other international
human rights instruments. These include detentions in
``black jails,'' psychiatric institutions, compulsory
drug detoxification centers, and the detention of over
a million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other individuals from
ethnic minority groups in mass internment camps in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Consult with Chinese officials regarding progress
toward adopting the recommendations made in February
2016 by the UN Committee against Torture in relation to
China's compliance with the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, such as the call to repeal the provisions
in Chinese law allowing for ``residential surveillance
at a designated location.'' Further, encourage Chinese
officials to extend invitations to all UN special
rapporteurs who have requested to visit China.
Urge Chinese officials to adopt a legal and
regulatory framework for technology-based policing
practices that meets international human rights
standards. Such a framework should include, for
example, privacy protections, restrictions on police
authority to collect personal information without
consent, and protections against discriminatory
practices, including profiling of ethnic and religious
minorities. Encourage Chinese officials to require
police who use information technology to complete
appropriate human rights training and impose strict
penalties for officials who authorize or carry out
preemptive detentions.
Stress to the Chinese government the need for greater
transparency on the number and circumstances of
executions and urge Chinese officials to further limit
the crimes for which the death penalty is applicable.
Urge the Chinese government to ban explicitly in
national legislation the harvesting of organs from
executed prisoners.
Continue and, where appropriate, expand support for
programs involving U.S. entities engaging with reform-
minded Chinese organizations and individuals (both
within and outside the government) that draw on
comparative experience to improve the criminal justice
process. For example, the experience of the United
States and other jurisdictions can inform individuals
and institutions in China that are working toward
reducing reliance on confessions, enhancing the role of
witnesses at trials, and creating more reliable
procedures for reviewing death penalty cases.
Call on the Chinese government to publicly commit to
a specific timetable for ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which the Chinese government signed in 1998 but has not
yet ratified.
Criminal
Justice
Criminal
Justice
Criminal Justice
Introduction
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year, Chinese
government and Communist Party officials continued to use
criminal law and police power to punish their critics and to
``maintain stability'' (weiwen) with the goal of perpetuating
one-party rule. In doing so, the Chinese government violated
the freedoms and rights of Chinese citizens protected under PRC
laws and international human rights standards \1\ and targeted
rights advocates, religious believers, and ethnic minority
groups in particular.
Use of Criminal Law to Punish Rights Advocates
This past year, authorities continued \2\ to detain
individuals under provisions in the PRC Criminal Law (CL) to
suppress rights advocacy and other activities protected under
international human rights standards.\3\ Selected examples
follow:
CRIMES OF ENDANGERING STATE SECURITY
The Chinese government continued to prosecute individuals
under ``endangering state security'' charges for peacefully
exercising their rights.\4\ CL Articles 102 to 112--listing
offenses including ``subversion of state power,'' \5\
``separatism,'' and ``espionage''--are collectively referred to
as crimes of ``endangering state security,'' \6\ some of which
carry multi-year sentences or the death penalty.\7\
In December 2018, the Zhuhai Municipal
Intermediate People's Court in Guangdong province
sentenced Zhen Jianghua \8\ to two years in prison for
``inciting subversion of state power.'' \9\ Authorities
detained Zhen in September 2017,\10\ and officially
charged him in March 2018.\11\ Zhen is the executive
director of Human Rights Campaign in China (HRCIC),
which reports on cases involving rights advocacy and
provides aid for people who are involved in or who have
reported on advocacy cases.\12\
Beginning on December 9, 2018, public security
officials in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province,
took into custody over 100 leaders and members of the
Early Rain Covenant Church, an unregistered Protestant
house church in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan
province.\13\ Authorities criminally detained Early
Rain founder and pastor Wang Yi \14\ and placed Wang's
wife Jiang Rong \15\ under ``residential surveillance
at a designated location,'' both on suspicion of
``inciting subversion of state power.'' \16\ [For more
information on the crackdown on Early Rain, see Section
II--Freedom of Religion.]
Additional cases in which authorities detained
rights advocates on ``subversion'' grounds include
human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang,\17\ Civil Rights
and Livelihood Watch founder Liu Feiyue,\18\ and
Tiananmen Square protest leader Zhou Yongjun.\19\
PICKING QUARRELS AND PROVOKING TROUBLE
Authorities used the charge of ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble'' \20\ under Article 293 of the PRC Criminal
Law to punish petitioners and rights advocates.\21\ One Chinese
legal scholar described the criminal charge as being ``so
broadly defined and ambiguously worded that prosecutors can
apply it to almost any activity they deem undesirable, even if
it may not otherwise meet the standards of criminality.'' \22\
In April 2019, the Chengdu Municipal
Intermediate People's Court in Chengdu, Sichuan
province, tried Zhang Junyong,\23\ Fu Hailu,\24\ and
Luo Fuyu \25\ and sentenced them to three years in
prison, suspended for four to five years,\26\ and Chen
Bing \27\ to three years and six months in prison, all
for ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \28\
Authorities first detained the four in May 2016 on
suspicion of ``inciting subversion of state power''
after Fu posted images online of satirical liquor
bottles meant to commemorate the violent suppression of
the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy protests.\29\
In May 2019, the Gulou District People's Court
in Xuzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, sentenced
Zhang Kun \30\ to two years and six months in prison
for ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \31\
The arrest and sentencing was connected to Zhang
posting a video in which he revealed that prison
authorities at Pengcheng Prison in Yunlong district,
Xuzhou, had subjected him to torture and abuse while he
was imprisoned there between 2015 and 2016 for the same
charge.\32\
ORGANIZING AND USING A CULT TO UNDERMINE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW
Authorities continued to charge members of religious
communities and spiritual movements with ``organizing and using
a cult organization to undermine implementation of the law''
under CL Article 300.\33\ For example, in January 2019,
Qingshan District People's Court in Baotou municipality, Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region, sentenced Falun Gong practitioners
Wang Ying \34\ and Wang Hongling \35\ to two years in prison
and one year and six months in prison, respectively.\36\
Authorities detained the two in connection to Falun Gong
materials they distributed in Batou.\37\ [For more information
on official Chinese persecution of Falun Gong, see Section II--
Freedom of Religion.]
OTHER CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS
Authorities accused rights advocates and others of other
criminal offenses, including ``gathering a crowd to disturb
social order,'' \38\ ``obstructing official business,'' \39\
and ``illegal business activity'' \40\ on account of activities
protected under international human rights standards.\41\
Arbitrary Detention
Authorities continued to use various forms of arbitrary
detention \42\ that deprive individuals of their liberty,
contravening international human rights standards.\43\ During
China's November 2018 UN Human Rights Council Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese government's human rights
record, non-governmental organizations and member states called
for the Chinese government to end its use of arbitrary
detention, including in mass internment camps used to
arbitrarily detain Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minority
groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.\44\ [For more
information on arbitrary detention in China's mass internment
camps, see Section IV--Xinjiang.] During the UPR, China
rejected calls to end various forms of arbitrary detention.\45\
Descriptions of selected forms of arbitrary detention
follow:
BLACK JAILS
Authorities continued to hold individuals in ``black
jails,'' extralegal detention sites that operate outside of the
PRC's judicial and administrative detention systems.\46\ For
example, authorities or individuals presumably acting on their
behalf held rights advocates in ``black jails'' as a part of
``stability maintenance'' efforts leading up to the Shanghai
International Import Expo in November 2018,\47\ and the annual
meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference in March 2019.\48\
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES
Authorities continued to forcibly commit individuals
without mental illness to psychiatric facilities--a practice
known as ``bei jingshenbing''--to punish rights advocates,
despite protections in the PRC Mental Health Law (MHL) \49\ and
related regulations.\50\ [For more information, see Section
II--Public Health.] For example, from August to October 2018,
authorities forcibly committed Lu Qianrong \51\ to a
psychiatric facility in Changzhou municipality, Jiangsu
province, reportedly due to Lu's posting ``unfavorably against
the country'' on social media.\52\ Authorities reportedly
forced Lu to take daily antipsychotic medication while in
detention.\53\
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
Authorities continued to use administrative forms of
detention, which allow officials to detain individuals without
judicial oversight or protections for their rights under the
PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). For example, police have
ordered human rights defenders to serve up to 20 days of
administrative detention without any judicial process.\54\ In
addition, authorities continued to operate compulsory drug
detoxification centers \55\ where they can hold detainees for
up to two years.\56\
This past year, Chinese authorities, human rights
advocates, and legal scholars continued to call for the
abolition of ``custody and education'' (shourong jiaoyu),\57\
in which public security officials can detain sex workers and
their clients for six months to two years without judicial
oversight.\58\ Chinese legal experts have questioned the
legality of such ``extrajudicial prisons without any due
process.'' \59\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese Authorities' Retaliatory Use of Criminal Law against Canadian
Citizens
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 10, 2018, Chinese authorities separately detained Canadian
citizens Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig on suspicion of
``endangering state security.'' \60\ Reports suggest that authorities
held Spavor and Kovrig under ``residential surveillance at a designated
location'' (RSDL),\61\ a coercive measure under the CPL that allows
security authorities to hold a criminal suspect in de facto
incommunicado detention for up to six months.\62\ Reports further
indicate that authorities held them in conditions that some experts
have said may amount to torture.\63\ In May 2019, the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs said that authorities had formally arrested both
Spavor and Kovrig for crimes of ``endangering state security.'' \64\
In another case involving a Canadian citizen, the Dalian Municipal
Intermediate People's Court in Liaoning province changed Robert
Schellenberg's sentence for drug smuggling from a 15-year imprisonment
to a death sentence in January 2019,\65\ in spite of a provision in the
PRC Criminal Procedure Law generally prohibiting the trial court from
imposing a harsher sentence in a retrial.\66\ The court cited ``new
evidence'' for the change in Schellenberg's original November 2018
judgment of 15 years.\67\ Moreover, Chinese lawyers and international
observers noted irregularities in Schellenberg's case, namely, the
court of second instance having remanded the case without being
requested to do so by the procuratorate, as well as the expediency with
which the court of first instance concluded the case on remand (16
days), compared to the first round of proceedings (two years).\68\
Observers suggested that the detentions of Spavor and Kovrig as well
as the death sentence of Schellenberg, were likely Chinese authorities'
attempt to exert pressure on the Canadian government \69\ for the
arrest of the chief financial officer of the Chinese technology company
Huawei,\70\ Meng Wanzhou,\71\ whom Canadian authorities detained based
on an extradition request made by the U.S. Department of Justice.\72\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``RETENTION IN CUSTODY'' (LIUZHI) UNDER THE PRC SUPERVISION LAW
The PRC Supervision Law (Supervision Law),\73\ authorizes
the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) to investigate
suspected official misconduct \74\ using methods including
``retention in custody'' (liuzhi),\75\ an extrajudicial form of
detention that allows NSC officials to hold individuals without
legal representation.\76\ ``Retention in custody'' contravenes
rights guaranteed by international legal standards, as it
denies the ``minimum guarantees'' of those charged as a
criminal including access to counsel, and to be tried while
present.\77\
In early October 2018, authorities placed then President of
the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), Meng
Hongwei, under liuzhi while he was on a trip to China.\78\ NSC
officials transferred Meng's case to the Supreme People's
Procuratorate, which approved his arrest on April 23, 2019.\79\
In June 2019, while on trial in the Tianjin No. 1 Intermediate
People's Court, Meng pled guilty to taking bribes.\80\ One
Chinese commentator noted that the NSC's detention of the
president of an organization such as Interpol highlights a
``new normal'' of Chinese authorities arresting Party officials
in anti-corruption cases despite their positions in prominent
international organizations.\81\
Ongoing Challenges in the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law
This past year, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee passed legislation that could adversely affect the
rights of prisoners and detainees. In addition, the Commission
continued to observe reports of authorities violating the
rights of detainees, despite protections in the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law (CPL) \82\ and international human rights
standards.\83\
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In October 2018, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee passed an amendment to the CPL.\84\ In cases of
corruption, state security, and terrorism,\85\ the amendment
allows courts to try defendants in absentia, which violates
international fair trial standards.\86\ Rights groups warned
that Chinese authorities might use this amendment to threaten
and punish human rights defenders outside of China through
abuse of international arrest warrants.\87\
The CPL amendment also provides for lenient and expedited
sentencing, both of which require the defendant to
``voluntarily'' confess his or her crime, despite ongoing
concerns about the reliance on coerced confessions in China's
criminal justice system.\88\ ``Lenient sentencing'' is allowed
if the defendant admits to a crime, does not dispute the facts
of the case, and willingly accepts punishment.\89\
Additionally, the amendment provides for expedited sentencing
in cases under the jurisdiction of basic-level people's courts
of a defendant who faces a maximum three-year sentence, has
confessed, accepted punishment, and who agrees to the use of an
expedited process.\90\
COERCED CONFESSIONS
Authorities continued to coerce detainees to confess guilt
to crimes, in violation of the CPL,\91\ and in some cases
forced detainees to recite apparently scripted remarks in court
or on camera while in pretrial custody.\92\
For example, in or around January 2019, authorities
reportedly forced more than 20 university students involved in
labor advocacy to watch video confessions of four young labor
rights advocates--Yue Xin,\93\ Shen Mengyu,\94\ Gu Jiayue,\95\
and Zheng Yongming \96\--whom authorities detained in August
2018 after they had helped organize protests in support of
workers' attempts to organize a union at Jasic Technology in
Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province.\97\ The students
reported that the videos appeared coerced,\98\ and that
authorities showed the video confessions in order to deter
students from further activism.\99\ [For more information on
the Jasic student protests advocating labor rights, see Section
II--Worker Rights. For information on the televised confession
of former Supreme People's Court Judge Wang Linqing, see
Section III--Access to Justice.]
PROLONGED PRETRIAL DETENTION
Authorities in some cases held suspects in pretrial
detention beyond limits allowed in the CPL \100\ and
international human rights standards.\101\ Observers indicate
that detainees held in prolonged pretrial detention are at an
increased risk of torture.\102\
For example, in February 2017, authorities in
Beijing municipality detained Falun Gong practitioner
Sun Qian for ``organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law.'' \103\ During her trial in
September 2018, Sun said that she was tortured while in
custody,\104\ and lawyers have noted that in addition
to arbitrary and prolonged pretrial detention,
authorities have prevented her from obtaining legal
counsel by harassing and intimidating 11 different
lawyers she had hired to represent her.\105\
This past year, Chinese courts tried and
sentenced individuals after prolonged periods of
pretrial detention, including human rights lawyer Wang
Quanzhang \106\ (pretrial detention of almost three
years and six months),\107\ four men in the ``June
Fourth liquor'' case (almost three years of pretrial
detention for each),\108\ and founder of rights website
64 Tianwang Huang Qi \109\ (held for two years and
eight months before receiving a sentence).\110\
ACCESS TO COUNSEL
Authorities continued to deny some criminal suspects
meetings with their lawyers and to prevent others from hiring
their preferred attorneys, particularly in cases involving
rights advocates. Chinese law grants suspects and defendants
the right to hire \111\ and meet with defense counsel,\112\ but
it restricts meetings in cases of ``endangering state
security,'' such as terrorism, or significant bribes,\113\ as
well as for those held in ``residential surveillance at a
designated location'' (RSDL),\114\ contravening international
standards.\115\
For example, in January 2019, the Tianjin No. 2
Intermediate People's Court sentenced human rights lawyer Wang
Quanzhang to four years and six months in prison for ``inciting
subversion of state power,'' a crime of ``endangering state
security.'' \116\ Authorities prevented lawyers appointed by
Wang's wife, Li Wenzu, from representing Wang in court,\117\
and Wang dismissed his state-
appointed lawyer during the trial.\118\ Wang is well known for
taking on cases of Falun Gong practitioners, petitioners, and
others deemed ``politically sensitive'' by authorities, and had
been in custody since the July 2015 crackdown on human rights
lawyers.\119\ Several international observers expressed concern
over Wang's deprivation of counsel and continued
detention.\120\ [For more information on access to counsel and
the harassment and prosecution of rights lawyers, see Section
III--Access to Justice.]
RESIDENTIAL SURVEILLANCE AT A DESIGNATED LOCATION
Authorities continued to place some criminal suspects in
``residential surveillance at a designated location''
(RSDL),\121\ a form of incommunicado detention that can last up
to six months,\122\ restricts access to counsel,\123\ and
places detainees at risk of abuse by authorities.\124\
For example, in January 2019, authorities detained former
Chinese official and Australian citizen Yang Hengjun \125\ when
he arrived in China from New York.\126\ Authorities placed Yang
in RSDL on suspicion of ``endangering national security.''
\127\ Authorities did not inform the Australian embassy within
three days of Yang's detention in violation of the China-
Australian consular agreement.\128\ In August 2019, Chinese
authorities notified Australian diplomats that Yang had been
formally arrested on suspicion of committing espionage.\129\
Yang has written articles critical of the Chinese
government.\130\
Torture and Abuse in Custody
Authorities continued to torture and abuse detainees,\131\
violating international standards.\132\ Examples include the
following:
On February 28, 2019, rights lawyer Jiang
Tianyong completed his two-year prison term for
``inciting subversion of state power.'' \133\ Upon his
release, Jiang told his wife that authorities had
deprived him of sunlight and ordered him to sit on a
marble block for prolonged periods, injuring his spine
and causing him to no longer be able to sit up
straight.\134\ Jiang's wife also said that Jiang
suffered from depression and significant memory
loss.\135\
In December 2018, Lee Jingyu, wife of
Taiwanese college employee and non-governmental
organization (NGO) volunteer Lee Ming-cheh,\136\
reported that authorities in Chishan Prison in Nanzui
township, Yuanjiang city, Yiyang municipality, Hunan
province, required her husband to work more than 10
hours a day without a day of rest, and served him and
other prisoners rotten food.\137\ Under such treatment,
Lee has reportedly lost significant weight.\138\ After
she made public statements concerning her prison visit,
authorities revoked Lee Jingyu's right to visit her
husband for three months.\139\ In 2017, authorities
sentenced Lee Ming-cheh to five years' imprisonment for
``subversion of state power.'' \140\
Medical Care in Custody
Authorities continued to deny or fail to provide adequate
medical care to some detainees, which violates international
human rights standards \141\ and may amount to torture.\142\
Human rights website 64 Tianwang founder Huang
Qi, whom authorities detained in 2016,\143\ suffers
from ``high blood pressure, heart disease, [a] chronic
kidney condition, and hydrocephalus.'' \144\ The
Mianyang Municipality Public Security Bureau (PSB) in
Sichuan province has denied requests to release Huang
on ``bail on medical grounds.'' \145\ In October 2018,
Huang reportedly told his lawyer that authorities in
Sichuan manipulated readings of his high blood pressure
and the Mianyang PSB rejected attempts by detention
center officials to allow additional treatment due to
``political'' reasons.\146\ In January 2019, the
Mianyang Municipal Intermediate People's Court tried
Huang on charges of ``illegally providing state secrets
to foreign entities'' and ``intentionally leaking state
secrets.'' \147\ During the trial, Huang dismissed his
lawyer out of concern for his lawyer's safety.\148\ In
July 2019, the court sentenced Huang to 12 years in
prison.\149\
In July 2019, legal advocate Ji Sizun \150\
died in a hospital less than three months after
completing a term of four years and six months in
prison, which authorities reportedly imposed in
connection to his support of the 2014 Hong Kong pro-
democracy protests (``Umbrella Movement'').\151\
Despite having completed his sentence in April, Ji
remained in the custody of authorities in Fujian
province, who placed him in a local hospital and
restricted family visits.\152\ Ji suffered a paralyzing
stroke in prison, intestinal cancer, and other
illnesses, but authorities reportedly denied him
adequate medical treatment and denied applications for
medical parole.\153\ Ji died after his condition
worsened due to internal bleeding.\154\ Within hours of
Ji's death, police officers reportedly coerced Ji's
family to consent to immediate cremation.\155\
Wrongful Conviction
Although authorities highlighted efforts to correct past
wrongful convictions and to prevent future ones,\156\ some
Chinese legal experts expressed concern about continued abusive
practices that facilitated wrongful convictions, such as
illegal collection of evidence and coerced confessions.\157\
The Dui Hua Foundation noted how authorities' use of unreliable
jailhouse informants could lead to wrongful convictions.\158\
The Commission observed reports of wrongful convictions
overturned this year:
In November 2018, the Jilin Province High
People's Court found Jin Zhehong--who had already
served 23 years in prison--not guilty because ``the
evidence was insufficient and the facts were not
clear'' in the murder of a 20-year old woman.\159\ One
of Jin's lawyers said his client had ``repeatedly
accused the investigators of using torture to extract
confessions out of him.'' \160\
In January 2019, the Liaoyuan Municipal
Intermediate People's Court in Jilin province ordered
4.6 million-yuan (approximately US$670,000)
compensation for Liu Zhonglin after he served 25 years
in prison.\161\ During his 1994 trial for murder, Liu
did not have a lawyer present, and has maintained that
police tortured him to obtain a confession.\162\
Policing
This past year, authorities continued to develop
technology-based means to help public security officials track
persons of interest.\163\ These developments are based in part
on large-scale, sometimes involuntary collection of personal
data--raising concerns about privacy and public security
officials' capacity to crack down on rights advocates and other
targeted persons.\164\ Collection of personal information,
including biometric data, may violate privacy protections in
international human rights instruments,\165\ and the Commission
did not observe efforts by authorities to bring the collection
or use of such information in line with international
standards.\166\ Examples of technology used to track and
collect data on individuals included \167\ smart glasses,\168\
artificial intelligence,\169\ facial recognition,\170\ and
drones.\171\ Authorities increasingly used technology that can
scan facial features as well as vehicle license plates \172\
for comparison against a centralized database linked with other
personal information.\173\ At times the technology was used in
conjunction with the social credit system.\174\ [For more
information on the social credit system, see Section II--
Business and Human Rights.] Reports indicated that authorities
use such technology to publicly shame individual
lawbreakers.\175\ While such technology could aid criminal
investigations, observers have noted the risk involved in
authorities using the technology against human rights
advocates.\176\ Reports indicated that U.S. and Chinese firms
aided Chinese police in developing their surveillance
technology.\177\ [For more information on the involvement of
U.S. companies in the Chinese government's development and
procurement of surveillance technology, see Section II--
Business and Human Rights. For information on public security
and counterterrorism policy implementation in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
In addition, in February 2019, new provisions from the
Ministry of Public Security took effect \178\ with the stated
purpose of ``protecting the law enforcement authority of the
police.'' \179\ The provisions address concerns for police
officers' safety when their interaction with citizens becomes
violent by permitting the Ministry of Public Security to punish
``actors who violate the law enforcement authority of the
police,'' \180\ as well as reducing the liability of individual
police for damage caused in the line of duty.\181\ A Chinese
legal expert asserted that under the new regulations, the
increase in police authority comes at the expense of citizens'
rights.\182\
Death Penalty
Following the November 2018 session of the UN Human Rights
Council's Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government's
human rights record, the Chinese government rejected all
recommendations calling for reform of its use of the death
penalty,\183\ and continued \184\ to claim that it reserved the
death penalty for a small number of crimes and only the most
serious offenders.\185\ Amnesty International, however,
estimated that authorities ``execute[d] and sentence[d] to
death thousands of people,'' more than any other country,\186\
and officials voiced support for the continued use of the death
penalty.\187\ The Chinese government classifies statistics on
its use of the death penalty as a ``state secret,'' \188\ and
the Commission did not observe official reports on overall
death penalty numbers.
According to a French NGO, authorities disproportionately
sentenced religious minorities, including Uyghurs of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, to the death penalty for
their religious beliefs.\189\ For example, in a case reported
by Radio Free Asia in November 2018, authorities sentenced to
death prominent Uyghur businessman and philanthropist,
Abdughappar Abdurusul, reportedly for taking a trip to Saudi
Arabia for the Hajj pilgrimage.\190\ [For more information on
the crackdown on Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region, see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Organ Harvesting
Between July and August 2019, two scientific journals
retracted at least 13 transplant studies by authors in China
published between 2008 and 2014.\191\ The studies were
retracted after a bioethicist and her colleagues raised
concerns that organs in certain studies may have been sourced
from executed prisoners in China.\192\
Criminal
Justice
Criminal
Justice
Notes to Section II--Criminal Justice
\1\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, arts. 2, 4, 52, 56, 123, 135-39, and 156-59; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Jingshen Weisheng Fa [PRC Mental Health Law], passed October
26, 2012, effective May 1, 2013, arts. 27, 29, 30, 32, 75(5), 78(1);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry
into force March 23, 1976; International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 2106 (XX) of December 2, 1965, entry into force January 4,
1969; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/
46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, accessed
June 12, 2019. China signed the Convention against Torture on December
12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988. Michael Caster, ``China
Thinks It Can Arbitrarily Detain Anyone. It Is Time for Change,''
Guardian, January 3, 2019.
\2\ See, e.g., CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 103-04;
CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 103-04; CECC, 2016 Annual
Report, October 6, 2016, 101-02; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, October 8,
2015, 104-05.
\3\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry
into force March 23, 1976.
\4\ For examples, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
records 2014-00343 on Shi Genyuan, 2019-00126 on Chai Xiaoming, 2004-
02398 on Luan Ning, 2014-00387 on Yu Wensheng, and 2019-00041 on
Halmurat Ghopur.
\5\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `Inciting Subversion of
State Power': A Legal Tool for Prosecuting Free Speech in China,''
January 8, 2008; Joshua Rosenzweig, ``What's the Difference between
Subversion and Inciting Subversion?,'' Siweiluozi's Blog (blog),
January 19, 2012; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law],
passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended and effective
November 4, 2017, art. 105.
\6\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended and effective November 4,
2017, arts. 102-13; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC
Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective
October 26, 2018, art. 73. In addition to the severe criminal
penalties, endangering state security offenses permit authorities to
use ``residential surveillance at a designated location,'' which in
practice could ``amount to incommunicado detention . . . putting
detainees at a high risk of torture or ill-treatment.''
\7\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended and effective November 4,
2017, art. 113.
\8\ For more information on Zhen Jianghua, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00360.
\9\ Rights Defense Network, ``Guangdong renquan hanwei zhe, NGO
renshi Zhen Jianghua huoxing 2 nian'' [Guangdong rights defender and
NGO worker Zhen Jianghua sentenced to 2 years in prison], December 29,
2018.
\10\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Zhen Jianghua jiaren shoudao
xingshi juliu tongzhi shu zuiming shexian shandong dianfu guojia
zhengquan'' [Zhen Jianghua's family received criminal detention notice,
suspected of inciting subversion of state power], September 7, 2017.
\11\ Wen Yuqing, ``Zhen Jianghua jian ju qiman ji zhuan pibu''
[Zhen Jianghua's arrest approved immediately after expiration of
residential surveillance], Radio Free Asia, March 30, 2018.
\12\ Rights Defense Network, ``Guangdong renquan hanwei zhe, NGO
renshi Zhen Jianghua huoxing 2 nian'' [Guangdong rights defender and
NGO worker Zhen Jianghua sentenced to 2 years in prison], December 29,
2018.
\13\ Independent Chinese PEN Center (ICPC), ``Guanyu huiyuan Wang
Yi Mushi deng bei juya de kangyi shengming'' [Statement protesting
against the detention of [ICPC] member and Pastor Wang Yi], December
13, 2018; Mimi Lau, ``Christian Pastor Wang Yi Faces Subversion Charges
in China after Raid on Church,'' South China Morning Post, December 13,
2018.
\14\ For more information on Wang Yi, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00615.
\15\ For more information on Jiang Rong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00643.
\16\ Rights Defense Network, ``Sichuan Chengdu Qiuyu Jiao an
qingkuang tongbao: 8 ren zao xingju, 1 ren zhidingjusuojianshijuzhu, 3
ren bei qiangpo shizong (2018 nian 12 yue 13 ri)'' [Sichuan Chengdu
Early Rain Church situation bulletin: 8 people detained, 1 person put
in residential surveillance at a designated location, 3 people forcibly
disappeared (December 13, 2018)], December 13, 2018; Rights Defense
Network, ``Sichuan Chengdu `12.9' Qiuyu Jiao an qingkuang tongbao: 11
ren zao xingju, 1 ren zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu, 6 ren bei qiangpo
shizong, 1 ren bei xingzheng juliu, gong 19 ren (2018 nian 12 yue 19
ri)'' [Situation bulletin on ``December 9'' case of Early Rain Church
in Chengdu, Sichuan: 11 criminally detained, 1 in residential
Surveillance at a designated location, 6 forcibly disappeared, 1
administratively detained, for a total of 19 persons (December 19,
2018)], December 19, 2018; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Submission
to UN on Wang Yi and Jiang Rong--February 2019,'' February 20, 2019.
\17\ For more information on Wang Quanzhang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00278.
\18\ For more information on Liu Feiyue, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00460.
\19\ ``Tiananmen Square Protest Leader Charged with Subversion in
China's Guangxi,'' Radio Free Asia, December 21, 2018. For more
information on Zhou Yongjun, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2009-00228.
\20\ Luo Xiang, ``Pocket Monsters: How `Pocket Crimes' Warp China's
Legal System,'' Sixth Tone, January 7, 2019.
\21\ For examples of petitioners charged with ``picking quarrels
and provoking trouble,'' see Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai
`Jinbohui' yi jieshu 10 tian reng you 13 wei weiquan renshi zai laoli
shounan'' [Shanghai Import Expo has been over for 10 days, 13 rights
advocates still suffering detention], November 20, 2018. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2018-00571 on Bao Naigang, 2019-00063 on Zeng Hao, and 2019-00252 on
Guo Hongying. For rights advocates targeted by authorities on the
charge of ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble,'' see Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, Defending Rights in a ``No Rights Zone'': Annual
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2018),
February 2019; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law],
passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended and effective
November 4, 2017, art. 293. See also Dui Hua Foundation, ``Complaints
with Retribution: China's Muffling of Gaoyangzhuang,'' Dui Hua Human
Rights Journal, May 8, 2019.
\22\ Luo Xiang, ``Pocket Monsters: How `Pocket Crimes' Warp China's
Legal System,'' Sixth Tone, January 7, 2019.
\23\ For more information on Zhang Junyong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00243.
\24\ For more information on Fu Hailu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00240.
\25\ For more information on Luo Fuyu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00242.
\26\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi jiu an' zuixin
tongbao: Zhang Junyong dang ting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3 nian, huanqi
4 nian zhixing'' [Latest on the ``Chengdu June 4th liquor case'': Zhang
Junyong sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, suspended for 4 years],
April 2, 2019; Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi jiu an' zuixin
tongbao: Luo Fuyu dang ting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3 nian, huanqi 4
nian zhixing'' [Latest on the ``Chengdu June Fourth Liquor Case'': Luo
Fuyu sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, suspended for 4 years], April
3, 2019; Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi jiu an' zuixin
tongbao: Fu Hailu dang ting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3 nian, huanqi 5
nian zhixing'' [Latest on the `Chengdu June 4th liquor case': Fu Hailu
sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, suspended for 5 years], April 1,
2019. The Chengdu Intermediate People's Court sentenced Zhang to 3
years' imprisonment, suspended for 4 years; Fu Hailu to 3 years'
imprisonment, suspended for 5 years; and Luo Fuyu to 3 years'
imprisonment, suspended for 4 years.
\27\ For more information on Chen Bing, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00241.
\28\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi jiu an' zuixin
tongbao: Chen Bing jujue renzui dang ting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3
nian 6 ge yue ci an daoci chen'ai luoding'' [Latest on the ``Chengdu
June 4th liquor case'': Chen Bing refuses to admit guilt, sentenced to
3 years and 6 months' imprisonment, the dust has now settled in this
case], April 4, 2019; Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi jiu an'
zuixin tongbao: Zhang Junyong dang ting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3 nian,
huanqi 4 nian zhixing'' [Latest on the ``Chengdu June 4th liquor
case'': Zhang Junyong sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, suspended for
4 years], April 2, 2019; ``Four Chinese Activists Sentenced over Liquor
Labels,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in France24, April 4, 2019.
\29\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi jiu an' zuixin
tongbao: Chen Bing jujue renzui dangting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3 nian
6 ge yue ci an daoci chen'ai luoding'' [Latest on the ``Chengdu June
4th liquor case'': Chen Bing refuses to admit guilt, sentenced to 3
years and 6 months' imprisonment, the dust has now settled in this
case], April 4, 2019; Mimi Lau, ``Tiananmen Square `Tank Man Liquor
Label' Protester Sentenced to 3\1/2\ years in Prison,'' South China
Morning Post, April 4, 2019; ``Four Chinese Activists Sentenced over
Liquor Labels,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in France24, April 4,
2019.
\30\ For more information on Zhang Kun, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00110.
\31\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhang Kun beikong xunxinzishi an 5
yue 5 ri zai Xuzhou Gulouqu fayuan xuanpan Zhang Kun huoxing 2 nian 6
ge yue'' [Gulou District Court in Xuzhou announced decision in Zhang
Kun's case of being accused of picking quarrels and provoking trouble
on May 5, Zhang Kun sentenced to 2 years, 6 months], May 7, 2019.
\32\ Rights Defense Network, ``Jiangsu Xuzhou renquan hanweizhe
Zhang Kun an jiang yu 2018 nian 12 yue 28 ri zai Xuzhou shi Gulou qu
fayuan kaiting'' [Case of Xuzhou, Jiangsu, rights defender Zhang Kun
will go to trial on December 28, 2018, at the Gulou District Court in
Xuzhou municipality], December 20, 2018; Human Rights Campaign in
China, ``Xuzhou gongmin Zhang Kun shexian xunxinzishi an bei
jianchayuan di er ci tuihui zhencha'' [Xuzhou citizen Zhang Kun's case
of suspected picking quarrels and provoking trouble sent back for
investigation for a second time by procuratorate], December 28, 2017.
\33\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended and effective November 4,
2017, art. 300. For more information on the use of Article 300, see Dui
Hua Foundation, ``NGO Submission for the Universal Periodic Review of
the People's Republic of China,'' March 2018, paras. 14-15. See also UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/40/6, November 6, 2018, item 28.192; UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review--China, Addendum, A/HRC/40/6/Add.1, February 15, 2019,
item 28.192. In response to a Universal Periodic Review recommendation
from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to ``continue to fight
against cult organizations to safeguard the people's welfare,'' China
replied, ``Accepted.'' For the Commission's past reporting on the
issue, see, e.g., CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 104;
CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 133; CECC, 2014 Annual
Report, October 9, 2014, 97-98; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, October 10,
2013, 93-94; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, October 10, 2012, 85.
\34\ For more information on Wang Ying, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00070.
\35\ For more information on Wang Hongling, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00084.
\36\ ``Er ling yi ba nian ba yue yi ri dalu zonghe xiaoxi'' [August
1, 2018, comprehensive news report from mainland China], Clear Wisdom,
August 1, 2019; ``Neimenggu Baotou shi Wang Ying, Wang Hongling zao
wupan'' [Wang Ying and Wang Hongling of Baotou municipality, Inner
Mongolia, falsely accused], Clear Wisdom, February 6, 2019.
\37\ ``Er ling yi ba nian ba yue yi ri dalu zonghe xiaoxi'' [August
1, 2018, comprehensive news report from mainland China], Clear Wisdom,
August 1, 2019.
\38\ New Citizens' Movement, ``Shenzhen Zhang Zhiru deng shu ming
laogong weiquan renshi bei zhuabu'' [In Shenzhen, Zhang Zhiru and
several other labor advocates detained], New Citizens' Movement (blog),
March 1, 2019. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2019-00117 on Zhang Zhiyu and 2013-00316 on
Wu Guijun.
\39\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Lushi shenqing huijian Liu
Fuxiang deng ren zao ju'' [Lawyer's application to see Liu Fuxiang and
others is denied], January 4, 2019.
\40\ ``Hubei: Wuhan `8.03' feifa jingying an 8 ren ru xing jingying
e gaoda 1000 yu wan'' [Hubei: in Wuhan ``8.03'' illegal business
activity case 8 people sentenced, business [made] over 10 million
yuan], National Office for the Fight against Pornography and Illegal
Publications, June 18, 2019; Yang Rui and Ren Qiuyu, ``Novelist Known
for Gay Content Sentenced for `Illegal Publishing,' '' Caixin, May 21,
2019.
\41\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art.
9; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry
into force March 23, 1976, art. 9(1).
\42\ UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its
78th session (19-28 April, 2017), A/HRC/WGAD/2017/4, August 11, 2017.
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention classifies detention as
``arbitrary'' when there is no legal basis for the deprivation of
liberty, when detention results from the exercise of certain
fundamental rights, when non-observance of international fair trial
norms is particularly serious, when displaced persons are placed in
prolonged administrative custody without the possibility custody
without resolution, or when it is a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination.
\43\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art.
9; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16,
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 9(1). China has signed and
stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR. United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, accessed April 1, 2019. China signed the ICCPR on
October 5, 1998. Countries recommended that China ratify the ICCPR, but
China rejected this, saying ``China is making preparations for
ratification, but the specific date of ratification depends on whether
relevant conditions in China are in place.'' UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/
HRC/25/5, February 15, 2019, items 28.5, 28.6, 28.10; Permanent Mission
of the People's Republic of China to the UN, ``Aide Memoire,''
reprinted in United Nations, April 13, 2006; State Council, European
Council, Prime Minister's Office of Sweden, and European Commission,
``Joint Statement of the 12th China-EU Summit,'' reprinted in Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, November 30, 2009. Upon presenting its candidacy
for the 2013 UN Human Rights Council elections, China reportedly
promised to ``further protect civil and political rights,'' although it
did not specifically state intent to ratify the ICCPR. UN General
Assembly, Note Verbale Dated June 5, 2013 from the Permanent Mission of
China to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General
Assembly, June 6, 2013, A/68/90. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention classifies detention as ``arbitrary'' when there is no legal
basis for the deprivation of liberty, when detention results from the
exercise of certain fundamental rights, when non-observance of
international fair trial norms is particularly serious, when displaced
persons are placed in prolonged administrative custody without the
possibility of resolution, or when it is a violation of international
law on the grounds of discrimination. UN Human Rights Council, Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention at its 78th session (19-28 April 2017), A/HRC/WGAD/
2017/5, July 28, 2017.
\44\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/40/6, December 26, 2018, 28.35
(Switzerland), 28.175 (Australia), 28.177 (United States of America),
28.178 (Belgium), 28.180 (Germany), 28.181 (Iceland), 28.191 (Czechia);
Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Rights Defense Network, ``Joint
Civil Society Submission for Universal Periodic Review (Third Cycle)
Country: People's Republic of China,'' March 16, 2018; Human Rights
Watch, ``Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of China,'' March
2019.
\45\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review--China, Addendum, Views on conclusions and/or
recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the
State under review, A/HRC/40/6/Add.1, February 15, 2019, paras. 28.35,
28.175, 28.177, 28.178, 28.180, 28.181. For the original
recommendations, see UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working
Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/40/6, November 6,
2018, 28.35 (Switzerland), 28.175 (Australia), 28.177 (United States of
America), 28.178 (Belgium), 28.180 (Germany), 28.181 (Iceland).
\46\ Harry Wu and Cole Goodrich, ``A Jail by Any Other Name: Labor
Camp Abolition in the Context of Arbitrary Detention in China,'' Human
Rights Brief 21, no. 1 (Winter 2014), 3-4; Teng Biao, ``Xing xing se se
de Zhongguo heijianyu'' [Teng Biao: All sorts of black jails], Radio
Free Asia, reprinted in Human Rights in China, March 19, 2019; Amnesty
International, ``China: Submission to the United Nations Committee
against Torture 56th Session, November 9-December 9, 2015,'' October
2015, 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `We Can Beat You to Death
with Impunity': Secret Detention and Abuse of Women in China's `Black
Jails,' '' October 2014, 6. See also ``Guo Gai, Wang Jianfen: Wuxi hei
jianyu shimo: yingjiu he kuxing yanshi'' [Guo Gai and Wang Jianfen:
Details of black jails in Wuxi: Rescue and torture reenactment],
Charter 08 (blog), December 23, 2015.
\47\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Zhongguo Guoji Jinkou Bolanhui'
Shanghai kaimu zhong Shanghai weiquan renshi bei xing ju, guan
heijianyu, qiangpo shizong'' [``China International Import Expo''
opened in Shanghai, Shanghai rights advocates were arrested, placed in
black jails, and forcibly disappeared], November 5, 2018; ``Jinkou
Bolanhui kaimu Shanghai zhongduo weiquan renshi zai `weiwen' '' [As
Import Expo opens, numerous Shanghai rights defenders encounter
``stability maintenance''], Radio Free Asia, November 5, 2018.
\48\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhonggong kai Lianghui Shanghai
weiquan renshi zao xingshi juliu, guan heijianyu, qiangpo shizong
qingkuang tongbao (xuji)'' [Status report on Shanghai rights defenders
being criminally detained, held in black jails, forcibly disappeared
during CCP's Two Sessions (continued)], March 9, 2019; Rights Defense
Network, ``Beijing `Lianghui' linjin, dangju dasi bangjia weiquan
renshi he fangmin qingkuang tongbao'' [With the ``Two Sessions''
approaching, authorities wantonly kidnap rights defenders and
petitioners, a status report], February 28, 2019. See also Lily Kuo, ``
`Two Sessions': Beijing Locked Down for China's Greatest Political
Spectacle,'' Guardian, March 4, 2019.
\49\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingshen Weisheng Fa [PRC Mental
Health Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 1, 2013, arts. 27,
29, 30, 32, 75(5), 78(1).
\50\ Supreme People's Procuratorate, Renmin Jianchayuan Qiangzhi
Yiliao Zhixing Jiancha Banfa (Shixing) [People's Procuratorate Measures
on Implementation of Compulsory Medical Treatment (Trial)], issued May
13, 2016, effective June 2, 2016, arts. 9, 12.
\51\ For more information on Lu Qianrong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00614.
\52\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Anhui Lu Qianrong bei guan
jingshenbingyuan 65 tian'' [Anhui's Lu Qianrong forcibly committed to
psychiatric hospital for 65 days], October 24, 2018.
\53\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lu Qianrong bei wang shang quanmian
jin yan shengming'' [Lu Qianrong's declaration concerning his being
completely banned from online speech], January 11, 2019.
\54\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhi'an Guanli Chufa Fa [PRC Public
Security Administration Punishment Law], passed August 28, 2005,
amended October 26, 2012, effective January 1, 2013, arts. 10, 16. See
also the following records in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database: 2018-00448 on Hu Changjie and 2018-00457 on Zou Wanli.
\55\ See, e.g., Yang Bo and Wang Mingrun, ``Guangzhou Ribao jizhe
fang'ai ri zoujin Nanfeng Qiangzhi Geli Jiedusuo duihua HIV huanzhe''
[Guangzhou Daily reporter visits Nanfeng Compulsory Drug detoxification
Center to speak with people with HIV on AIDS prevention day], Guangzhou
Daily, December 1, 2018; ``Qiangzhi geli jiedu'' [Compulsory drug
detoxification], Jiayuguan Education Information Web, March 6, 2019;
Liang Dahong, ``Guizhou Tongzi xian Qiangzhi Geli Jiedusuo--20 nian
anquan wushigu!'' [Tongzi county, Guizhou, Compulsory Detoxification
Center--20 years all without any incidents], Spreading Culture Network,
October 31, 2018. See also State Council, Jiedu Tiaoli [Regulations on
Drug Detoxification], issued and effective June 22, 2011, art. 4;
Ministry of Public Security, Gong'an Jiguan Qiangzhi Geli Jiedusuo
Guanli Banfa [Measures on the Management of Public Security Agency
Compulsory Isolation and Drug Detoxification Centers], issued and
effective September 19, 2011, arts. 1-2.
\56\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jindu Fa [PRC Narcotics Law], issued
December 27, 2007, effective June 1, 2008, art. 47; State Council,
Jiedu Tiaoli [Regulations on Drug Detoxification], issued and effective
June 22, 2011, art. 27.
\57\ Emile Dirks, ``Partial Victory for China's Detainees,'' East
Asia Forum, February 12, 2019; Isabelle Li and Shan Yuxiao, ``China
Signals End of Controversial Sex Work Detention Program,'' Caixin,
December 29, 2018; Li Qiaochu, ``Quanguo Renda Changweiyuanhui
Fagongwei: jianyi feizhi shourong jiaoyu zhidu'' [NPC Legislative
Affairs Commission: Proposes repeal of ``custody and education''
system], People's Daily, December 26, 2018.
\58\ State Council, Maiyin Piaochang Renyuan Shourong Jiaoyu Banfa
[Measures on Custody and Education for Sex Workers and Their Clients],
issued September 4, 1993, amended January 8, 2011, arts. 2, 3, 9; Asia
Catalyst, `` `Custody and Education': Arbitrary Detention for Female
Sex Workers in China,'' December 2013; Meng Yaxu, ``Weihe si ci
`maotou' duizhun shourong jiaoyu? Quanguo Zhengxie weiyuan huiying''
[Why critique custody and reeducation four times? CPPCC committee
member responds], Beijing Youth Daily, December 26, 2018.
\59\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Abolish Arbitrary Detention for
Sex Workers,'' March 7, 2019; ``Rights Group Calls on China's
Parliament to End Sex Worker `Re-education,' '' Radio Free Asia, March
6, 2019. One human rights scholar called for the end of the system
because it primarily targets women and is prone to abuse.
\60\ Nathan VanderKlippe, Robert Fife, Steven Chase, and Les
Pereaux, ``Canadians and Chinese Justice: A Who's Who of the Political
Feud So Far,'' Globe and Mail, January 15, 2019, accessed July 3, 2019.
\61\ Michael Caster, ``China Thinks It Can Arbitrarily Detain
Anyone. It Is Time for Change,'' Guardian, January 3, 2019; Safeguard
Defenders, ``The Use of Solitary Confinement in RSDL as a Method of
Torture,'' RSDL Monitor (blog), April 11, 2019.
\62\ Nathan VanderKlippe, ``Two Canadians Detained in China for
Four Months Prevented from Going Outside, Official Says,'' Globe and
Mail, April 10, 2019; Safeguard Defenders, ``The Use of Solitary
Confinement in RSDL as a Method of Torture,'' RSDL Monitor (blog),
April 11, 2019.
\63\ Nathan VanderKlippe, ``Two Canadians Detained in China for
Four Months Prevented from Going Outside, Official Says,'' Globe and
Mail, April 10, 2019; Safeguard Defenders, ``The use of solitary
confinement in RSDL as a method of torture,'' RSDL Monitor (blog),
April 11, 2019. Spavor and Kovrig were held in (separate) isolation
rooms with lights on for 24 hours, were barred from going outside, and
were subjected to 6- to 8-hour interrogations.
\64\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``2019 nian 5 yue 16 ri Waijiaobu
fayanren Lu Kang zhuchi lixing jizhehui'' [May 16, 2019, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lu Kang holds a regular press conference],
May 16, 2019; Liu Zhen, ``China Charges Canadians Michael Kovrig and
Michael Spavor with Spying,'' South China Morning Post, May 16, 2019;
``China Formally Arrests Canadians Kovrig, Spavor in Case Linked to
Huawei,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Vancouver Sun, June 11, 2019;
``Jia'nada ji renyuan Kang Mingkai shexian fanzui an qude zhongyao
jinzhan'' [Canadian national Michael Kovrig's criminal case makes
significant progress], China Peace Net, reprinted in Liupanshui
Chang'an Net, March 5, 2019; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC
Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended and
effective November 4, 2017, art. 111.
\65\ Abhishek G Bhaya, ``Canadian `Drug Smuggler' Faces Stricter
Sentence as Chinese Court Orders Retrial,'' CGTN, December 30, 2019;
Eva Dou and Paul Vieira, ``Chinese Court Sentences Canadian National to
Death for Drug Crimes in Retrial,'' Wall Street Journal, January 14,
2019.
\66\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, art. 237.
\67\ Abhishek G Bhaya, ``Canadian `Drug Smuggler' Faces Stricter
Sentence as Chinese Court Orders Retrial,'' CGTN, December 30, 2019;
Eva Dou and Paul Vieira, ``Chinese Court Sentences Canadian National to
Death for Drug Crimes in Retrial,'' Wall Street Journal, January 14,
2019.
\68\ ``The Schellenberg Affair: Chinese Lawyers and Law Professors
Opposing Court's Handling of Robert Schellenberg's Case,'' China
Change, January 16, 2019; Ye Bing, ``Mo Shaoping lushi: Xielunboge an
chengxu budang dangting xuanpan sixing qiansuoweijian'' [Lawyer Mo
Shaoping: Schellenberg's Case procedures were improper, pronouncing a
death sentence in court is unprecedented], Voice of America, January
16, 2019; Donald Clarke, ``China's Death Threat Diplomacy,'' China
Collection (blog), January 14, 2019; Amnesty International, ``China
Must Revoke Death Sentence against Canadian Citizen for Drug Crimes,''
January 15, 2019; Tom Blackwell, ``Rapid Verdict and Death Sentence to
Canadian Was `Very Abnormal' in Chinese System, Says His Beijing
Defence Lawyer,'' National Post, January 17, 2019; Eva Dou and Paul
Vieira, ``Chinese Court Sentences Canadian National to Death for Drug
Crimes in Retrial,'' Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2019. See also
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure
Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, art.
237.
\69\ Eva Dou and Paul Vieira, ``Chinese Court Sentences Canadian
National to Death for Drug Crimes in Retrial,'' Wall Street Journal,
January 14, 2019; Donald Clarke, ``China's Hostage Diplomacy,'' Lawfare
(blog), January 11, 2019; Donald Clarke, ``China's Death Threat
Diplomacy,'' China Collection (blog), January 14, 2019; ``Canadian Man
Accused of Spying in China Gets Visit by Consular Officials,'' CBC,
March 25, 2019.
\70\ Julia Horowitz, ``Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou Arrested in Canada,
Faces Extradition to United States,'' CNN, April 6, 2019; Nathan
VanderKlippe, Robert Fife, Steven Chase, and Les Pereaux, ``Canadians
and Chinese Justice: A Who's Who of the Political Feud So Far,'' Globe
and Mail, April 10, 2019.
\71\ Christopher Balding and Donald C. Clarke, ``Who Owns
Huawei?,'' Social Science Research Network, April 17, 2019; Raymond
Zhong, ``Who Owns Huawei? The Company Tried to Explain. It Got
Complicated,'' New York Times, April 25, 2019. Huawei may be a state-
owned enterprise, according to experts.
\72\ Julia Horowitz, ``Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou Arrested in Canada,
Faces Extradition to United States,'' CNN, April 6, 2019; Nathan
VanderKlippe, Robert Fife, Steven Chase, and Les Pereaux, ``Canadians
and Chinese Justice: A Who's Who of the Political Feud So Far,'' Globe
and Mail, April 10, 2019. Authorities released Meng on bail and ordered
her to remain in Canada pending final judgment on her extradition to
the United States.
\73\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law],
passed and effective March 20, 2018.
\74\ Ibid., art. 3.
\75\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law],
passed and effective March 20, 2018, art. 22; CECC, 2018 Annual Report,
October 10, 2018, 103. The 2018 CECC Annual Report used the term
``confinement'' as the translation of the term liuzhi.
\76\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [PRC Supervision Law],
passed and effective March 20, 2018; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A
(XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14;
Amnesty International, ``China: Draft Criminal Procedure Law Amendments
Would Mean Further Deprivation of Right to Fair Trial before Court,''
ASA 17/8545/2018, June 7, 2018; Maya Wang, ``Where Is China's Interpol
Chief?,'' Made in China Journal 4, no. 1 (January-March 2019): 20-25.
\77\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966,
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution
217A (III) of December 10, 1948.
\78\ Chris Buckley and Aurelien Breeden, ``Head of Interpol
Disappears, and Eyes Turn toward China,'' New York Times, October 5,
2018; Lily Kuo, ``Former Interpol Chief `Held in China under New Form
of Custody,' '' Guardian, February 11, 2019; Eva Dou, ``Interpol's
Chinese Ex-President Is in Hands of Beijing's Powerful Antigraft
Agency,'' Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2018.
\79\ Yu Ziru, ``Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan yifa dui Meng Hongwei
jueding daibu'' [Supreme People's Procuratorate decides to arrest Meng
Hongwei according to law], Xinhua, April 24, 2019; ``China Formally
Arrests Interpol's Former Chief for Corruption,'' Press Trust of India,
reprinted in Business Standard, April 24, 2019. See also Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed
July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, art. 170.
\80\ Vanessa Romo, ``Former Interpol President Pleads Guilty to
Bribery in Chinese Court,'' NPR, June 20, 2019; ``Gong'anbu fu buzhang
Meng Hongwei shouhui an yi shen kaiting'' [First instance hearing in
bribery case of former Vice Minister of Public Security Meng Hongwei
begins], People's Daily, June 20, 2019.
\81\ Chris Buckley and Aurelien Breeden, ``Head of Interpol
Disappears, and Eyes Turn toward China,'' New York Times, October 5,
2018.
\82\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, arts. 2, 14.
\83\ See, e.g., Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners, adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955,
approved by the Economic and Social Council resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of
July 31, 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of May 13, 1977; Body of Principles for
the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 43/173 of
December 9, 1988, principles 6, 21, 24.
\84\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018.
\85\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, arts. 291-97; Mini vandePol et al., ``China's Revised Criminal
Procedure Law Expands Powers for Corruption Trials,'' Global Compliance
News, Baker McKenzie, January 15, 2019; Laney Zhang, ``China: Criminal
Procedure Law Amended to Allow Criminal Trials In Absentia in
Corruption Cases,'' Global Legal Monitor, Library of Congress, January
10, 2019.
\86\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966,
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14(3)(d). See also Amnesty
International, ``China: Draft Criminal Procedure Law Amendments Would
Mean Further Deprivation of Right to Fair Trial before Court,'' ASA 17/
8545/2018, June 7, 2018.
\87\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Defending Rights in a ``No
Rights Zone'': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
in China (2018), February 2019; ``China's Parliament Expands Use of In
Absentia Trials Targeting `Absconders,' '' Radio Free Asia, October 30,
2018. See also Amnesty International, ``China: Draft Criminal Procedure
Law Amendments Would Mean Further Deprivation of Right to Fair Trial
before Court,'' ASA 17/8545/2018, June 7, 2018.
\88\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3,
2016, para. 20; Zhiyuan Guo, ``Torture and Exclusion of Evidence in
China,'' China Perspectives, no. 1 (2019): 45-46; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July
1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, art. 15; Mini vandePol
et al., ``China's Revised Criminal Procedure Law Expands Powers for
Corruption Trials,'' Global Compliance News, Baker McKenzie, January
15, 2019.
\89\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, art. 15; Mini vandePol et al., ``China's Revised Criminal
Procedure Law Expands Powers for Corruption Trials,'' Global Compliance
News, Baker McKenzie, January 15, 2019.
\90\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, art. 222; Mini vandePol et al., ``China's Revised Criminal
Procedure Law Expands Powers for Corruption Trials,'' Global Compliance
News, Baker McKenzie, January 15, 2019.
\91\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, arts. 52, 56; Zhai Yanmin, ``Forced Confessions and Trial by
Media: The Testimony of Rights Defender Zhai Yanmin,'' Hong Kong Free
Press, December 9, 2018.
\92\ Zhai Yanmin, ``Forced Confessions and Trial by Media: The
Testimony of Rights Defender Zhai Yanmin,'' Hong Kong Free Press,
December 9, 2018; Safeguard Defenders, ``Scripted and Staged: Behind
the Scenes of China's Forced TV Confessions,'' April 2018, 4-5.
\93\ For more information on Yue Xin, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00665.
\94\ For more information on Shen Mengyu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00664.
\95\ For more information on Gu Jiayue, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00667.
\96\ For more information on Zheng Yongming, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00053.
\97\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``China Using Taped Confessions to
Intimidate Young Communists, Students Say,'' New York Times, January
21, 2019; Jasic Workers Support Group, `` `Renzui shipin' xijie
gongbu'' [``Confession video'' details made public], January 21, 2019;
Christian Shepherd, ``At a Top Chinese University, Activist
`Confessions' Strike Fear into Students,'' Reuters, January 21, 2019.
\98\ Jasic Workers Supporters Group, ``Yi ping `renzui shipin':
yanji zhuolie wuneng, kexiao zi dao ziyan'' [A review of the
``confession video'': acting clumsy and incompetent, laughable that it
was self-directed], January 21, 2019; Christian Shepherd, ``At a Top
Chinese University, Activist `Confessions' Strike Fear into Students,''
Reuters, January 21, 2019.
\99\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``China Using Taped Confessions to
Intimidate Young Communists, Students Say,'' New York Times, January
21, 2019; Jasic Workers Support Group, `` `Renzui shipin' xijie
gongbu'' [``Confession video'' details made public], January 21, 2019;
Christian Shepherd, ``At a Top Chinese University, Activist
`Confessions' Strike Fear into Students,'' Reuters, January 21, 2019.
\100\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, arts. 156-59.
\101\ See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of
December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 9(3)-(4),
14(3)(c).
\102\ Amnesty International, ``China,'' in Amnesty International
Report 2017/18: The State of the World's Human Rights, POL 10/6700/
2018, 2018, 125-27; ``Pretrial Detention and Torture: Why Pretrial
Detainees Face the Greatest Risk,'' Open Society Justice Initiative,
Open Society Foundations, Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, and University of
Bristol, June 2011; Penal Reform International and Association for the
Prevention of Torture, ``Pre-Trial Detention: Addressing Risk Factors
to Prevent Torture and Ill-Treatment,'' 2013.
\103\ Nathan VanderKlippe, ``Family Fears Canadian Falun Gong
Practitioner Tortured for Confession,'' Globe and Mail, November 16,
2018.
\104\ Nathan VanderKlippe, `` `I Did Nothing Illegal': Canadian
Falun Gong Practitioner Denies Wrongdoing in Single-Day Trial,'' Globe
and Mail, September 12, 2018.
\105\ Limin Zhou, ``Court Procedure for Canadian Citizen Detained
in China a `Show Trial,' Says Sister,'' Epoch Times, September 12,
2018; Nathan VanderKlippe, ``Eleven Lawyers and Counting: Pressure from
China Frustrates Defence for Arrested Canadian Falun Gong
Practitioner,'' Globe and Mail, May 9, 2018; Nathan VanderKlippe, `` `I
Did Nothing Illegal': Canadian Falun Gong Practitioner Denies
Wrongdoing in Single-Day Trial,'' Globe and Mail, September 12, 2018.
\106\ For more information on Wang Quanzhang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00278.
\107\ Rights Defense Network, ``709 an tongbao: Wang Quanzhang
lushi bei yi dianfu guojia zhengquan zui qisu'' [July 9 case bulletin:
lawyer Wang Quanzhang indicted for subversion of state power], February
15, 2017; Rights Defense Network, ``Wang Quanzhang dianfu guojia
zhengquan an yi shen gongkai xuanpan'' [Wang Quanzhang publicly
sentenced in first instance trial for subversion of state power],
January 28, 2019.
\108\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Chengdu Liusi jiu an' zui xin
tongbao: Zhang Junyong dang ting bei panjue youqi tuxing 3 nian, huanqi
4 nian zhixing'' [Latest on the ``Chengdu June 4th liquor case'': Zhang
Junyong sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, suspended for 4 years],
April 2, 2019. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2016-00241 on Chen Bing, 2016-00240 on Fu
Hailu, 2016-00242 on Luo Fuyu, and 2016-00243 on Zhang Junyong.
\109\ For more information on Huang Qi, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2004-04053.
\110\ Rights Defense Network, ``Dalu NGO `Liusi Tianwang' fuzeren
Huang Qi yi bei dangju zhixing daibu'' [Head of mainland NGO `64
Tianwang' Huang Qi arrested by authorities], December 20, 2016; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Release Huang Qi, Respect Right to
Fair Trial,'' January 14, 2019; Mianyang Intermediate People's Court,
``Huang Qi guyi xielou guojia mimi, wei jingwai feifa tigong guojia
mimi an yishen gongkai xuanpan'' [First instance [trial] publicly
announced sentence of Huang Qi for intentionally leaking state secrets
and illegally providing state secrets abroad], July 29, 2019.
\111\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, art. 39.
\112\ Ibid.
\113\ Ibid.
\114\ Ibid.
\115\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966,
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14(3)(b), (3)(d).
\116\ Tianjin No. 2 Intermediate People's Court, ``Wang Quanzhang
dianfu guojia zhengquan an yi shen gongkai xuanpan'' [Wang Quanzhang
publicly sentenced in first instance trial for subversion of state
power], January 28, 2019. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``
`Inciting Subversion of State Power': A Legal Tool for Prosecuting Free
Speech in China,'' January 8, 2008; Joshua Rosenzweig, ``What's the
Difference between Subversion and Inciting Subversion?,'' Siweiluozi's
Blog (blog), January 19, 2012.
\117\ UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Opinion no. 62/2018 concerning Wang Quanzhang, Jiang
Tianyong, and Li Yuhan (China), A/HRC/WGAD/2018/62, October 12, 2018,
para. 67.
\118\ Christian Shepherd, ``China Jailing of Rights Lawyer a
`Mockery' of Law, Says Rights Group,'' Reuters, January 27, 2019.
\119\ Rights Defense Network, ``709 Wang Quanzhang lushi suowei
dianfu guojia zhengquan anjin xuanpan huoxing 4 nian 6 ge yue'' [709
lawyer Wang Quanzhang's so-called inciting subversion of state power
case is announced, receives a sentence of 4 years and 6 months], April
10, 2019; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Protect Lawyers from Beatings
and Harassment,'' June 25, 2015.
\120\ Alvin Lum, ``China Faces Barrage of Criticism over Jailing of
Human Rights Lawyer Wang Quanzhang,'' South China Morning Post,
February 7, 2019; Press Statement, U.S. Department of State,
``Sentencing of Wang Quanzhang,'' January 30, 2019.
\121\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [PRC Criminal
Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26,
2018, art. 75.
\122\ Ibid., art. 79.
\123\ Ibid., arts. 39, 77(2).
\124\ See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, ``Mandates of the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention; the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association; the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders; the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers; the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy; the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; and the Special
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment,'' OL CHN 15/2018, August 24, 2018; Safeguard Defenders,
``The Use of Solitary Confinement in RSDL as a Method of Torture,''
April 11, 2019; Michael Caster, ``China Thinks It Can Arbitrarily
Detain Anyone. It Is Time for Change,'' Guardian, January 3, 2019. See
also Benedict Rogers, ``China's `Residential Surveillance at a
Designated Location'--A Licence to Disappear, Hold and Torture
Dissenters,'' Hong Kong Free Press, February 4, 2018.
\125\ For more information on Yang Hengjun, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00083.
\126\ Michael Smith, ``Lawyer for Detained Writer in China to Seek
Release on Health Grounds,'' Australian Financial Review, March 17,
2019.
\127\ Amnesty International, ``China Secret Detention Places Writer
at Risk of Torture,'' January 24, 2019.
\128\ Jerome A. Cohen, ``Chinese Detention of Australian Blogger
Yang Hengjun,'' Jerry's Blog (blog), January 25, 2019. See also Michael
McGowan and Lily Kuo, ``Yang Hengjun: Australia `Deeply Disappointed'
at Criminal Detention of Writer in China,'' Guardian, July 19, 2019.
\129\ Zhang Hui, ``Waijiaobu zhengshi: Aoji renyuan Yang Jun
shexian jiandie zui bei pibu'' [Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms:
Arrest of Australian Yang Jun on suspicion of espionage approved],
Global Times, August 27, 2019; `` `We Are Just Ordinary People': Wife
of Australian Jailed in China Shocked over Espionage Charges,''
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, August 27, 2019; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised
March 14, 1997, amended and effective November 4, 2017, art. 110.
\130\ Amnesty International, ``China: Secret Detention Places
Writer at Risk of Torture,'' January 24, 2019; Michael Smith, ``Lawyer
for Detained Writer in China to Seek Release on Health Grounds,''
Australian Financial Review, March 17, 2019.
\131\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai weiquan renshi Ding Deyuan
yuzhong zao canbao de nuedai ouda'' [Shanghai rights defender Ding
Deyuan experiences mistreatment and beatings in prison], October 20,
2018; ``Hubei Yingcheng Xiong Jiwei, Li Guoping bei kao laohu deng 20
yu xiaoshi'' [Xiong Jiwei and Li Guoping of Yingcheng, Hubei, tied to
tiger chair for over 20 hours], Clear Wisdom, November 13, 2017;
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Li Yuhan (Li Yuhan),'' accessed June
25, 2019; Elizabeth Li, ``Woman Dies 3 Months after Prison Release:
Years of Torture Damaged Her Body,'' Epoch Times, February 6, 2019;
CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 107; CECC, 2017 Annual
Report, October 5, 2017, 107-08.
\132\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987;
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the
First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955, approved by the Economic and
Social Council resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of July 31, 1957 and 2076
(LXII) of May 13, 1977, principles 31, 32; Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988,
principle 6.
\133\ For more information on Jiang Tianyong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00179.
\134\ ``Jiang Tianyong jiankang kanyou qizi xiwang ta dao Meiguo
kanbing'' [Jiang Tianyong's health a worry, wife hopes he can come to
U.S. for medical treatment], Radio Free Asia, March 8, 2019.
\135\ Ibid.
\136\ For more information on Lee Ming-cheh, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00248. See also CECC, 2018
Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 105.
\137\ Ryan Drillsma, ``HR Activists: Lee Ming-che Subject to
`Inhumane Treatment' by China,'' Taiwan News, December 25, 2018;
Racqueal Legerwood, Human Rights Watch, ``Taiwanese Activist at Risk in
Chinese Prison,'' March 18, 2019; Amnesty International, ``Urgent
Action Update: Prisoner of Conscience Ill-Treated in Prison (China: UA
71.17),'' February 13, 2019; International Labour Organization, ILO
Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28,
1930, art. 13; International Labour Organization, ``Ratifications of
CO29--Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),'' accessed May 16, 2019.
China has not ratified the ILO's Forced Labour Convention of 1930. See
also International Labour Organization, ``Q&As on Business and Forced
Labour,'' accessed July 11, 2019.
\138\ Ryan Drillsma, ``HR Activists: Lee Ming-che Subject to
`Inhumane Treatment' by China,'' Taiwan News, December 25, 2018. Under
such treatment, Lee has reportedly lost 30 kilograms (66 pounds).
Racqueal Legerwood, Human Rights Watch, ``Taiwanese Activist at Risk in
Chinese Prison,'' March 18, 2019; Amnesty International, ``Urgent
Action Update: Prisoner of Conscience Ill-Treated in Prison (China: UA
71.17),'' February 13, 2019.
\139\ Hunan Province Chishan Prison, ``Notice to Lee Chingyu from
Chishan Prison,'' January 22, 2019, reprinted in Human Rights Watch;
Racqueal Legerwood, Human Rights Watch, ``Taiwanese Activist at Risk in
Chinese Prison,'' March 18, 2019.
\140\ Mimi Lau, ``Rights Activist Lee Ming-Cheh First Taiwanese to
Be Jailed for Subversion on Mainland China,'' South China Morning Post,
November 28, 2017.
\141\ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955, approved by the Economic and
Social Council resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of July 31, 1957 and 2076
(LXII) of May 13, 1977, arts. 22-26; Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988,
principle 24.
\142\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Juan E. Mendez, A/HRC/22/53, February 1, 2013, paras. 17-22; Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December
10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, art. 1.
\143\ Rights Defense Network, ``Dalu NGO `Liusi Tianwang' fuzeren
Huang Qi yi bei dangju zhixing daibu'' [Head of mainland NGO ``64
Tianwang'' Huang Qi arrested by authorities], December 20, 2016. For
more information on Huang Qi, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2004-04053.
\144\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China:
UN Human Rights Experts Gravely Concerned about Huang Qi's Health,''
December 20, 2018. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Huang
Qi,'' December 19, 2016.
\145\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Huang Qi,'' December 19,
2016; Rights Defense Network, `` `Liusi Tianwang' fuzeren Huang Qi
shenqing qubao houshen zao ju'' [Head of `64 Tianwang' Huang Qi's
appeal for bail is denied], February 3, 2017.
\146\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Huang Qi,'' December 19,
2016.
\147\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Release Huang Qi,
Respect Right to Fair Trial,'' January 14, 2019.
\148\ Human Rights in China, ``Trial Suspended as Sichuan Activist
Huang Qi Reportedly Dismissed His Lawyer,'' January 16, 2019.
\149\ Mianyang Intermediate People's Court, ``Huang Qi guyi xielou
guojia mimi, wei jingwai feifa tigong guojia mimi an yishen gongkai
xuanpan'' [First instance [trial] publicly announces sentence of Huang
Qi for intentionally leaking state secrets and illegally providing
state secrets abroad], July 29, 2019.
\150\ For more information on Ji Sizun, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2008-00627. See also Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Ji Sizun,'' accessed August 14, 2019.
\151\ Rights Defense Network, ``Ehao: Fujian zhuming renquan
hanweizhe Ji Sizun Xiansheng zao Zhongguo dangju pohai zhi si chuyu jin
2 yue 14 tian'' [News of passing: well-known human rights defender Mr.
Ji Sizun is persecuted to death by Chinese authorities only 2 months
and 14 days after leaving prison], July 10, 2019; Lily Kuo, ``Death of
`Barefoot Lawyer' Puts Focus on China's Treatment of Political
Prisoners,'' Guardian, July 15, 2019; Rights Defense Network, ``Fujian
renquan lushi Ji Sizun jin huoxing 4 nian 6 ge yue'' [Fujian human
rights lawyer Ji Sizun sentenced to four years and six months], April
18, 2019; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Ji Sizun,'' accessed August
14, 2019; Yaqiu Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``Another Chinese Activist
Leaves Prison Gravely Ill,'' May 20, 2019.
\152\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Ji Sizun,'' accessed August
14, 2019; Yaqiu Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``Another Chinese Activist
Leaves Prison Gravely Ill,'' May 20, 2019.
\153\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Ji Sizun,'' accessed August
14, 2019; Yaqiu Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``Another Chinese Activist
Leaves Prison Gravely Ill,'' May 20, 2019.
\154\ Rights Defense Network, ``Ehao: Fujian zhuming renquan
hanweizhe Ji Sizun Xiansheng zao Zhongguo dangju pohai zhi si chuyu jin
2 yue 14 tian'' [News of passing: well-known human rights defender Mr.
Ji Sizun is persecuted to death by Chinese authorities only 2 months
and 14 days after leaving prison], July 10, 2019; Lily Kuo, ``Death of
`Barefoot Lawyer' Puts Focus on China's Treatment of Political
Prisoners,'' Guardian, July 15, 2019.
\155\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Ji Sizun,'' accessed August
14, 2019.
\156\ See, e.g., ``Zhou Qiang: 2018 nian jiuzheng zhongda yuan
cuo'an 10 jian xuangao 819 ren wuzui'' [Zhou Qiang: 2018 sees 10 major
wrongful conviction cases corrected, 819 people declared not guilty],
People's Daily, March 12, 2019; Grenville Cross, ``How a People's Jury
System Is Helping Chinese Courts to Open Up as Part of Vital Judicial
Reforms,'' South China Morning Post, November 21, 2018; ``Chinese Man
Compensated for Wrongful Conviction,'' Xinhua, January 7, 2019;
``Procuratorates to Engage More in Crime Investigation to Cut Wrongful
Convictions,'' Xinhua, February 21, 2019.
\157\ Zhiyuan Guo, ``Torture and Exclusion of Evidence in China,''
China Perspectives, no. 1 (2019). See also Eva Pils, Human Rights in
China (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2018), 64-69.
\158\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Jailhouse Informants and Wrongful
Convictions,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, February 7, 2019.
\159\ Laurie Chen and William Zheng, ``Chinese Man Cleared over
1995 Murder after Spending 23 Years in Jail,'' South China Morning
Post, December 1, 2018; Jin Zhehong, ``Man Freed after 23 Years, Name
Cleared,'' China Daily, November 30, 2018.
\160\ Laurie Chen and William Zheng, ``Chinese Man Cleared over
1995 Murder after Spending 23 Years in Jail,'' South China Morning
Post, December 1, 2018.
\161\ ``Liu Zhonglin an: mengyuan guanya 25 nian huo Zhongguo
guojia peichang 460 wan'' [Liu Zhonglin's case: wrongfully jailed for
25 years, receives compensation of 4.6 million from the Chinese
government], BBC, January 7, 2019; ``Chinese Man Compensated for
Wrongful Conviction,'' Xinhua, January 7, 2019; ``Chart of the Day:
Compensation for Wrongful Convictions,'' Caixin, January 10, 2019.
\162\ Wang Lianzhang, ``Man Exonerated after Longest-Ever
Wrongfully Served Term,'' Sixth Tone, April 20, 2019; ``Liu Zhonglin
an: mengyuan guanya 25 nian huo Zhongguo guojia peichang 460 wan'' [Liu
Zhonglin's case: wrongfully jailed for 25 years, receives compensation
of 4.6 million from the Chinese government], BBC, January 7, 2019;
``Chinese Man Compensated for Wrongful Conviction,'' Xinhua, January 7,
2019. See also, CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 108.
\163\ Liang Chenyu, ``Five Ways China Used Facial Recognition in
2018,'' Sixth Tone, December 28, 2019; Stephen Chen, ``China to Build
Giant Facial Recognition Database to Identify Any Citizen within
Seconds,'' South China Morning Post, September 24, 2018; Sui-Lee Wee,
``China Uses DNA to Track Its People, with the Help of American
Expertise,'' New York Times, February 21, 2019.
\164\ Liang Chenyu, ``Five Ways China Used Facial Recognition in
2018,'' Sixth Tone, December 28, 2019; Stephen Chen, ``China to Build
Giant Facial Recognition Database to Identify Any Citizen within
Seconds,'' South China Morning Post, September 24, 2018; Sui-Lee Wee,
``China Uses DNA to Track Its People, with the Help of American
Expertise,'' New York Times, February 21, 2019.
\165\ UN Human Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital
Age, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
A/HRC/39/29, August 3, 2018, paras. 5-11, 17, 23; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly
resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 12; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23,
1976, art. 17. See also UN Office of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UN Security Council, United
Nations Compendium of Recommended Practices for the Responsible Use and
Sharing of Biometrics in Counter-terrorism, accessed August 15, 2019,
30-53.
\166\ For additional discussion about privacy concerns in this
context, see, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: Voice Biometric
Collection Threatens Privacy,'' October 22, 2017; Human Rights Watch,
``China: Police `Big Data' Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent,''
November 19, 2017; Paul Mozur, ``Internet Users in China Expect to Be
Tracked. Now, They Want Privacy.,'' New York Times, January 4, 2018.
\167\ Paul Mozur, ``Inside China's Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame
and Lots of Cameras,'' New York Times, July 8, 2018.
\168\ Liang Chenyu, ``Five Ways China Used Facial Recognition in
2018,'' Sixth Tone, December 28, 2019; ``China's First 5G Police
Station Unveiled in Shenzhen,'' Global Times, April 29, 2019.
\169\ Tom Simonite, ``This US Firm Wants to Help Build China's
Surveillance State,'' Wired, November 14, 2018; Charles Parton,
``Social Credit Is Just One Part of China's New State Control,''
Spectator, November 17, 2018.
\170\ Liang Chenyu, ``Five Ways China Used Facial Recognition in
2018,'' Sixth Tone, December 28, 2019; Stephen Chen, ``China to Build
Giant Facial Recognition Database to Identify Any Citizen within
Seconds,'' South China Morning Post, September 24, 2018; Li Tao,
``Facial Recognition Snares China's Air Con Queen Dong Mingzhu for
Jaywalking, but It's Not What It Seems,'' South China Morning Post,
November 23, 2018.
\171\ ``China's First 5G Police Station Unveiled in Shenzhen,''
Global Times, April 29, 2019; Tenzin Dharpo, ``China Deploys `Hunter-
Killer' Drones in High Altitude Border Regions of Tibet, Xinjiang,''
Phayul, December 7, 2018.
\172\ Xue Keyue, ``Lhasa Uses Facial Recognition, Big Data Analysis
in New Taxis,'' Global Times, March 5, 2019; Erika Kinetz, ``In China,
Your Car Could Be Talking to the Government,'' Associated Press,
November 29, 2018.
\173\ Li Tao, ``China Tests Facial Recognition at Border Crossing
of Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge,'' South China Morning Post, October
24, 2018; ``China Rolls Out Facial Recognition Scans on Guangzhou
Subway,'' Radio Free Asia, October 29, 2018; Alfred Ng, ``Chinese
Facial Recognition Company Left Database of People's Locations
Exposed,'' CNet, February 13, 2019. See also Paul Mozur, ``Inside
China's Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras,'' New York
Times, July 8, 2018.
\174\ See, e.g.,``2018 nian shixin heimingdan niandu fenxi baogao
fabu'' [2018 annual credit blacklist report published], Credit China
(CreditChina.gov.cn), February 19, 2019; Robyn Dixon, ``China's New
Surveillance Program Aims to Cut Crime. Some Fear It'll Do Much More,''
Los Angeles Times, October 27, 2018. See also He Huifeng, ``China's
Social Credit System Shows Its Teeth Banning Millions from Taking
Flights, Trains,'' South China Morning Post, February 2, 2019.
\175\ Laurence Dodds, ``Chinese Businesswoman Accused of Jaywalking
after AI Camera Spots Her Face on an Advert,'' Telegraph, November 25,
2018; Robyn Dixon, ``China's New Surveillance Program Aims to Cut
Crime. Some Fear It'll Do Much More,'' Los Angeles Times, October 27,
2018. See also Paul Mozur, ``Inside China's Dystopian Dreams: A.I.,
Shame and Lots of Cameras,'' New York Times, July 8, 2018.
\176\ Sarah Cook, `` `Social Credit' Scoring: How China's Communist
Party Is Incentivizing Repression,'' Hong Kong Free Press, February 27,
2018.
\177\ Tom Simonite, ``This US Firm Wants to Help Build China's
Surveillance State,'' Wired, November 14, 2018; Emily Feng, ``Chinese
Surveillance Group Faces Crippling US Ban,'' Financial Times, November
18, 2018; Charles Rollet, ``Evidence of Hikvision's Involvement with
Xinjiang IJOP and Re-Education Camps,'' IVPM, October 2, 2018; Sophie
Richardson, Human Rights Watch, ``Thermo Fisher's Necessary, but
Insufficient, Step in China,'' February 22, 2019.
\178\ Ministry of Public Security, Gong'an Jiguan Weihu Minjing
Zhifa Quanwei Gongzuo Guiding [Provisions on Safeguarding the Law
Enforcement Authority of Police Officers by Public Security Agencies],
passed December 7, 2018, effective February 1, 2019.
\179\ Du Xiao, ``Duo cuo bing ju weihu minjing zhifa quanwei''
[Using multiple measures simultaneously to safeguard authority of
people's police to enforce the law], Legal Daily, February 2, 2019;
Zhang Yu and Zhu Ziyang, ``Gong'anbu zhiding chutai `Gong'an Jiguan
Weihu Minjing Zhifa Quanwei Gongzuo Guiding' '' [Ministry of Public
Security formulates and launches ``Provisions on Safeguarding the Law
Enforcement Authority of Police Officers by Public Security
Agencies''], People's Daily, December 29, 2018.
\180\ Ministry of Public Security, Gong'an Jiguan Weihu Minjing
Zhifa Quanwei Gongzuo Guiding [Provisions on Safeguarding the Law
Enforcement Authority of Police Officers by Public Security Agencies],
passed December 7, 2018, effective February 1, 2019, arts. 8, 9.
\181\ Ministry of Public Security, Gong'an Jiguan Weihu Minjing
Zhifa Quanwei Gongzuo Guiding [Provisions on Safeguarding the Law
Enforcement Authority of Police Officers by Public Security Agencies],
passed December 7, 2018, effective February 1, 2019, art. 16. See also
Charlotte Gao, ``China Vows to Protect The Authority of Police,'' The
Diplomat, September 11, 2018.
\182\ ``Gong'anbu ni xin gui `weihu jingcha quanwei' '' [Ministry
of Public Security drafts new regulations ``to protect police
authority''], Radio Free Asia, September 10, 2018.
\183\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/40/6, December 26, 2018, paras.
28.2, 28.158-28.169; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working
Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, Addendum, Views on
conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies
presented by the State under review, A/HRC/40/6/Add.1, February 15,
2019, paras. 28.2, 28.158-28.169.
\184\ CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 109.
\185\ ``Zuigao Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao'' [Supreme People's
Court work report], Xinhua, March 12, 2019, sec. 2. See also Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979,
revised March 14, 1997, amended and effective November 4, 2017, art.
48.
\186\ Amnesty International, Amnesty International Global Report:
Death Sentences and Executions 2018, ACT 50/9870/2019, April 2019, 21.
\187\ Christian Shepherd, ``Chinese Judges Make Rare Defense of
Death Penalty amid Western Criticism,'' Reuters, December 21, 2018; Cao
Yin, ``Hard Line Taken on Acts against Children,'' China Daily,
November 29, 2018; All-China Women's Federation, ``Quanguo Renda
daibiao Zhang Baoyan: guaimai funu ertong fanzui ying `lingrongren' ''
[NPC deputy Zhang Baoyan: The crime of trafficking women and children
should receive ``zero tolerance''], March 4, 2019.
\188\ Amnesty International, Amnesty International Global Report:
Death Sentences and Executions 2018, ACT 50/9870/2019, April 2019, 21.
See also Dui Hua Foundation, ``How Transparency in Death Penalty Cases
Can Reduce Wrongful Convictions,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, August
22, 2017.
\189\ Martin Banks, ``Governments Use Death Penalty to Crackdown on
Religious Minorities,'' New Europe, March 1, 2019. See also Amnesty
International, ``China's Deadly Secrets,'' ASA 17/5849/2017, April
2017, 7; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang
Account for 21% of China's Total in 2017,'' July 25, 2018.
\190\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Sentence Uyghur Philanthropist to
Death for Unsanctioned Hajj,'' Radio Free Asia, November 21, 2018. For
more information on Abdughappar Abdurusul, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00645.
\191\ J.R. Chapman, P. Stock, and M. Haberal, ``Organs from
Executed People Are Not a Source of Scientific Discovery,'' editorial,
Transplantation 103, no. 8 (August 2019): 1534; ``Retraction: Salvage
Liver Transplantation for Recurrent Hepatocellular Carcinoma after
Liver Resection: Retrospective Study of the Milan and Hangzhou
Criteria,'' PLOS ONE 14, no. 7 (July 23, 2019); ``Retraction: De Novo
Cancers Following Liver Transplantation: A Single Center Experience in
China,'' PLOS ONE 14, no. 7 (July 23, 2019); ``Retraction: A Scoring
Model Based on Neutrophil to Lymphocyte Ratio Predicts Recurrence of
HBV-Associated Hepatocellular Carcinoma after Liver Transplantation,''
PLOS ONE 14, no. 7 (July 23, 2019); ``Retraction: Downgrading MELD
Improves the Outcomes after Liver Transplantation in Patients with
Acute-on-chronic Hepatitis B Liver Failure,'' PLOS ONE 14, no. 7 (July
25, 2019); ``Retraction: Genetic Polymorphism of Interferon Regulatory
Factor 5 (IRF5) Correlates with Allograft Acute Rejection of Liver
Transplantation,'' PLOS ONE 14, no. 7 (July 31, 2019); ``Retraction:
Symptom Experienced Three Years after Liver Transplantation under
Immunosuppression in Adults,'' PLOS ONE 14, no. 8 (August 1, 2019). See
also Ivan Oransky, ``Journals Retract More Than a Dozen Studies from
China That May Have Used Executed Prisoners' Organs,'' Retraction Watch
(blog), August 14, 2019.
\192\ Ivan Oransky, ``Journals Retract More Than a Dozen Studies
from China That May Have Used Executed Prisoners' Organs,'' Retraction
Watch (blog), August 14, 2019; Melissa Davey, ``Call for Retraction of
400 Scientific Papers amid Fears Organs Came from Chinese Prisoners,''
Guardian, February 5, 2019; Wendy Rogers et al., ``Compliance with
Ethical Standards in the Reporting of Donor Sources and Ethics Review
in Peer-Reviewed Publications Involving Organ Transplantation in China:
A Scoping Review,'' BMJ Open 9, no. 2 (February 2019).
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of Religion
Findings
Observers have described religious persecution
in China over the last year to be of an intensity not
seen since the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese
government under President and Communist Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping has doubled down on the
``sinicization'' of religion--a campaign that aims to
bring religion in China under closer official control
and in line with officially sanctioned interpretations
of Chinese culture. Authorities have expanded the
``sinicization'' campaign to target not only religions
perceived as ``foreign,'' such as Islam and
Christianity, but also Chinese Buddhism, Taoism, and
folk religious beliefs.
Party disciplinary regulations were revised to
impose harsher punishments on Party members for
manifestations of religious belief.
In sharp contrast to their past treatment of
Buddhist and Taoist communities, local officials
directly targeted local Buddhist and Taoist sites of
worship throughout China. Local officials in the
provinces of Liaoning, Shanxi, Hubei, and Hebei ordered
the destruction of Buddhist statues. In past decades,
government and Party officials had rarely targeted
Chinese Buddhist and Taoist communities with direct
suppression--both were considered to be relatively
compliant with Party and government leadership and
compatible with the official promotion of traditional
Chinese culture.
In September 2018, the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs signed an agreement with the Holy See,
paving the way for the unification of state-sanctioned
and underground Catholic communities. Subsequently,
local Chinese authorities subjected Catholic believers
in China to increased persecution by demolishing
churches, removing crosses, and continuing to detain
underground clergy. The Party-led Catholic national
religious organizations also published a plan to
``sinicize'' Catholicism in China.
As in previous years, authorities continued to
detain Falun Gong practitioners and subject them to
harsh treatment, with at least 931 practitioners
sentenced for criminal ``cult'' offenses in 2018. Human
rights organizations and Falun Gong practitioners
documented coercive and violent practices against
practitioners in custody, including physical violence,
forced drug administration, sleep deprivation, and
other forms of torture.
Violations of the religious freedom of Hui
Muslim believers continued to intensify, with plans to
apply ``anti-terrorism'' measures currently used in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the Ningxia
Hui Autonomous Region (Ningxia)--a region with a high
concentration of Hui Muslim believers. A five-year plan
to ``sinicize'' Islam in China was passed in January
2019. Meanwhile, ongoing policies included measures
requiring Islamic religious leaders and lay believers
to demonstrate their political reliability.
Religious communities outside of the five
religions that are the main objects of official
regulation continued to exist in China, but the
religious practices of communities that previously
received tacit recognition and support were subject to
repression over the last year.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all
citizens freedom of religion in accordance with its
international human rights obligations. Stress to
Chinese authorities that freedom of religion includes
the right to freely adopt beliefs and practice
religious activities without government interference.
Stress to the Chinese government that the right to
freedom of religion includes, but is not limited to:
the right of Buddhists and Taoists to carry out
activities in temples and to select monastic teachers
independent of state control; the right of Catholics to
be led by clergy who are selected and who conduct their
ministry according to the standard called for by
Catholic religious beliefs; the right of Falun Gong
practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong inside
China; the right of Muslims to freely preach, undertake
overseas pilgrimage, select and train religious
leaders, and wear clothing with religious significance;
the right of Protestants to exercise their faith free
from state controls over doctrine and worship, and free
from harassment, detention, and other abuses for public
and private manifestations of their faith, including
the display of crosses; and the right of members of
other religious communities to be free from state
control and harassment.
Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined,
detained, or imprisoned for peacefully pursuing their
religious beliefs, as well as people confined,
detained, or imprisoned in connection to their
association with those people. The Administration
should use existing laws to hold accountable Chinese
government officials and others complicit in severe
religious freedom restrictions, including by using the
sanctions available in the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114-328) and
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (Public
Law No. 105-292). Ensure that conditions related to
religious freedom are taken into account when
negotiating any trade agreement as mandated by the
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015 (Public Law No. 114-26).
Call on the Chinese government to fully implement
accepted recommendations from its October 2013 session
of the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic
Review, including taking necessary measures to ensure
that rights to freedom of religion, religious culture,
and expression are fully observed and protected;
cooperating with the UN human rights system,
specifically UN special procedures and mandate holders;
facilitating visits to China for UN High Commissioners;
taking steps to ensure that lawyers working to advance
religious rights can practice their profession freely,
and promptly investigating allegations of violence and
intimidation impeding their work; and considering
possible revisions to legislation and administrative
rules to provide better protection of freedom of
religion.
Call on the Chinese government to abolish Article 300
of the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes
``organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law,'' and Article 27 of the PRC
Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which
provides for detention or fines for organizing or
inciting others to engage in ``cult'' activities and
for using ``cults'' or the ``guise of religion'' to
disturb social order or to harm others' health.
Encourage U.S. political leaders to visit religious
sites in China to raise awareness of and promote
freedom of religion.
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of Religion
International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom
Both Chinese and international law provide guarantees of
religious freedom. Despite these guarantees, the Commission
continued to observe widespread and systematic violation of the
principles of religious freedom, as Chinese authorities
exercised broad discretion over religious practice.
Under international law, freedom of religion or belief
encompasses both the right to form, hold, and change
convictions, beliefs, and religion--which cannot be
restricted--and the right to outwardly manifest those beliefs--
which can be limited for certain, specific justifications.\1\
These principles are codified in various international
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).\2\ China has signed \3\ and stated its intent
to ratify \4\ the ICCPR, which obligates China to refrain in
good faith from acts that would defeat the treaty's purpose.\5\
Article 36 of China's Constitution guarantees citizens
``freedom of religious belief'' and protection for ``normal
religious activities.'' \6\ With essential terms such as
``normal'' undefined, it is unclear whether China's
Constitution protects the same range of belief and outward
manifestation that is recognized under international law.\7\
Nevertheless, China's Constitution and other legal provisions
\8\ join the ICCPR in prohibiting discrimination based on
religion \9\ and loosely parallel the ICCPR's prohibition on
coercion \10\ by forbidding state agencies, social
organizations, and individuals from compelling citizens to
believe or not believe in any religion.\11\
China's Constitution prohibits ``making use of religion to
engage in activities that disrupt social order, impair the
health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of
the State.'' \12\ The ICCPR does allow State Parties to
restrict outward manifestations of religion or belief, but such
restrictions must be ``prescribed by law and . . . necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.'' \13\
Policies and Regulations Pertaining to Religious Freedom
Top Chinese officials continued to emphasize
the importance of the national-level campaign to
``sinicize'' religion. Members of the Standing
Committee of the Communist Party Central Committee
Political Bureau (Politburo)--China's top policymaking
body--continued to highlight the need to ``sinicize''
religion in China at national-level political
gatherings.\14\ Politburo Standing Committee member
Wang Yang promoted the campaign among lower level
officials through local visits \15\ and in meetings
with state-affiliated religious organizations.\16\
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping announced ``the need
to uphold the sinicization of religion in order to
actively guide religions to adapt to socialist
society'' in 2015,\17\ and the subsequent
``sinicization'' campaign aims to bring religion in
China under closer official control and in line with
officially sanctioned interpretations of Chinese
culture.\18\ In the years following, officials have
escalated the repression of religious practice, which
one scholar of Chinese politics has characterized as
being the worst since the Cultural Revolution.\19\
The ``sinicization'' campaign characterizes
control over religious groups as connected to national
security and foreign affairs. The repression of
religion is happening alongside a general crackdown on
popular culture \20\ as the Party responds to the
increased complexity of society and the growth of new
groups in the period of economic reform and
opening.\21\ Religious believers are among the social
groups of which Chinese officials are the most
wary.\22\ This is in part because the fast growth and
the level of organization within certain religious
communities represents the potential for competing with
the Party and government monopoly on collective
organization.\23\ Party and government officials accuse
some of these religious communities of being used by
foreign forces to ``infiltrate'' Chinese society,\24\
targeting Christian, Muslim, and Tibetan Buddhist
groups in particular as retaining undue foreign
influence.\25\ Official pronouncements also identified
``extremism'' as a particular problem that officials
should address within Islam.\26\ Meanwhile, Party and
government policy promoted the Chinese Buddhist
community to project an image of China as a country
supporting Buddhism while fostering connections with
majority-Buddhist countries.\27\
Administration of religious affairs and
implementation of the revised Regulations on Religious
Affairs. Local government bureaus continued to be
responsible for managing religious affairs.\28\ These
religious affairs agencies have effective authority
over the state-sanctioned ``patriotic'' religious
associations that act as liaisons between the
government and practitioners of the five ``main''
religions in China,\29\ while the Party's United Front
Work Department vets the association leaders.\30\
Public security bureaus are generally responsible for
enforcement of laws against religious activity that
authorities deem illegal.\31\ Following President and
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's exhortations to
focus on religious work,\32\ the regulatory framework
for religion imposed increased restrictions on
religious freedom through revisions to the Regulations
on Religious Affairs that took effect on February 1,
2018.\33\ The revisions include prohibitions on groups,
schools, and venues engaging in or hosting religious
activities unless they have been officially designated
as religious (Article 41) and on clergy acting as
religious professionals without official certification
(Article 36).\34\ The revisions also established legal
responsibilities and penalties for violations of the
regulations, including fining those who ``provide the
conditions'' for unauthorized religious activities
(Article 71).\35\
Other laws and Party policies also continued
to restrict citizens' freedom to hold religious beliefs
and practice religion. Article 300 of the PRC Criminal
Law criminalizes ``organizing and using a cult to
undermine implementation of the law,'' \36\ and the PRC
National Security Law prohibits ``the use of religion
to conduct illegal criminal activities that threaten
state security.'' \37\ The latter also contains
mandates to ``maintain the order of normal religious
activities,'' ``oppose the interference of foreign
influence into domestic religious affairs,'' and
``suppress cult organizations.'' \38\
Revised Party disciplinary regulations impose
harsher punishments on Party members for manifestations
of religious belief. New disciplinary measures for
Party members that increased the penalty for
involvement in religious activities in violation of
Party policies from a warning for a ``minor offense''
to dismissal took effect on October 1, 2018.\39\ One
international law expert has noted that because Party
membership to a large degree determines the extent to
which citizens may participate in public life, the ban
on religious belief for Party members constitutes
discrimination against religious believers and a
violation of freedom of religious belief.\40\
Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) and Taoism
In sharp contrast to the past treatment of Buddhist and
Taoist communities, the Commission observed numerous reports of
local officials ordering the destruction of Buddhist statues
throughout China, including in the provinces of Liaoning,
Shanxi, Hubei, and Hebei.\41\ Officials in Dalian municipality,
Liaoning province, ordered Buddhist iconography taken down and
replaced with the Chinese national flag.\42\ In September 2018,
the Party secretary of Hebei province threatened county-level
officials with dismissal if a large bronze Guanyin bodhisattva
statue in their jurisdiction was not demolished.\43\ In
November 2017 the State Administration for Religious Affairs
and 11 other central Party and government departments issued a
joint opinion targeted at combating commercialization in
Buddhism and Taoism that prohibited the construction of large
outdoor statues so as to avoid negative effects on ``the
healthy development of [the two religions'] dissemination.''
\44\ One human rights expert has noted that when a state
distinguishes between proper and improper conduct in order to
uphold religious standards or to enhance the legitimacy of
particular religions over others, it violates the state
neutrality necessary to maintain the free exercise of religious
freedom.\45\
A large number of Chinese citizens engage in Buddhist and
Taoist practices, with estimates of around 244 million
Buddhists as of 2010,\46\ and 173 million citizens engaging in
some Taoist practices as of 2007.\47\ [For information on
Tibetan Buddhism, see Section V--Tibet.] Both communities have
been subjected to extensive regulation and control by
officials: government authorities connected with local
religious affairs bureaus are involved with the administration
of officially sanctioned temples; all candidates for the clergy
must obtain the approval of the local patriotic association and
religious affairs bureau for ordination; \48\ and Buddhist
ordinations themselves are restricted by the state-run
patriotic associations.\49\
In past decades, government and Party officials rarely
targeted Chinese Buddhist and Taoist communities with direct
suppression--both were considered to be relatively compliant
with Party and government leadership and compatible with the
official promotion of traditional Chinese culture.\50\ At the
outset of the implementation of ``sinicization'' policies in
Buddhist and Taoist contexts, Chinese officials had sought to
bolster the idea of these two religions as indigenous religions
embodying Chinese culture and values so that they might serve
as a bulwark against ``infiltration'' of other values via
religions perceived as foreign.\51\ Officials also sought to
leverage the Buddhist and Taoist communities to foster closer
diplomatic ties with other countries with significant Buddhist
or Taoist communities--an aim that has persisted within this
reporting year to include overtures toward majority-Buddhist
countries.\52\
Christianity--Catholicism
The number of Catholics in China is estimated to be around
10.5 million,\53\ and they have historically been divided
between ``official'' congregations led by state-sanctioned
bishops and ``underground'' congregations whose bishops are not
recognized by the Chinese government.\54\ Official statistics
reported in 2018 that 6 million Catholics were part of
officially sanctioned congregations \55\ with bishops selected
by Party-led religious organizations and ordained by other
official bishops--a process described by the Chinese government
as ``self-selection and self-ordination.'' \56\ Underground
Catholic believers have historically avoided the ministry of
official bishops because of the belief that legitimate
ecclesiastical authority can be conferred only by the Pope's
mandate,\57\ and also an objection to official bishops'
affiliation with the Party-led body for Catholic leadership in
China, the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA).\58\
Underground clergy are frequently subjected to detention and
other government pressure to compel them to join the CPA.\59\
The Holy See and the Chinese government announced a
provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops on
September 22, 2018.\60\ A representative for the Holy See
stated that its aim was for Chinese Catholic believers to have
bishops recognized by both the Holy See and Chinese
authorities,\61\ while observers noted that the Chinese
government was likely seeking to increase its control over the
underground community.\62\ Although the terms of the agreement
were not made public, a source familiar with the negotiations
stated that the agreement gave the Chinese government the
authority to nominate bishops, which the Pope would retain the
right to veto.\63\ The Holy See also recognized seven formerly
excommunicated official bishops as part of the deal,\64\ having
already asked two underground bishops to give up their
positions to make way for two of these state-sanctioned
bishops; \65\ the Chinese government made no commitments toward
recognizing the more than 30 underground bishops.\66\
Observers and Catholic believers expressed concern that the
agreement did not provide sufficient support for the Chinese
Catholic community,\67\ with one scholar pointing out that the
authorities' persecution of both underground and official
Catholic communities has actually intensified over the last
year under the ``sinicization'' campaign.\68\ In spring 2019,
authorities detained three underground priests of Xuanhua
diocese in Hebei province.\69\
Christianity--Protestantism
During the 2019 reporting year, Chinese officials further
\70\ escalated the repression of Protestant Christian belief.
While official repression has historically focused on
unregistered church communities (commonly referred to as
``house churches''), believers worshiping at state-sanctioned
churches have also become targets of state restrictions under
President Xi Jinping.\71\ The number of Chinese Protestants is
estimated to number around 60 to 80 million.\72\ Instances of
official persecution recorded by U.S.-based organization
advocating for religious freedom, ChinaAid Association
(ChinaAid), increased from 1,265 in 2017 to more than 10,000 in
2018.\73\
Much of the increased repression targeted house church
communities. Several major house churches with hundreds to
thousands of members were forcibly closed: Zion Church and
Shouwang Church, among the largest unregistered churches in
Beijing municipality, were banned in September 2018 and March
2019, respectively; \74\ Rongguili Church, an important church
in southern China, Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province,
was forced to suspend activities in December 2018; \75\ and
Early Rain Covenant Church (Early Rain) in Chengdu
municipality, Sichuan province, was declared an ``illegal
social organization'' in December 2018.\76\ Beginning December
9, authorities also detained more than 100 Early Rain church
members for several days, including Early Rain pastor Wang
Qi,\77\ who, along with three other church members, remained in
criminal detention as of August 2019.\78\
Local authorities also banned or shut down activities at
numerous other house churches across China,\79\ with a campaign
in Henan province reportedly aiming to close more than two-
thirds of all churches within the province.\80\ Local
authorities in different areas also pressured unregistered
churches to disband with repeated raids and harassment,\81\
heavy administrative penalties,\82\ termination of electricity
and water supplies,\83\ and compelling landlords to evict
churches from meeting spaces.\84\ Authorities also subjected
individual members of house church communities to detention:
ChinaAid recorded more than 5,000 detentions in 2018, more than
1,000 of which were of church leaders.\85\ Members were also
subject to other rights abuses--for example, various people
connected to Early Rain, including lawyers defending the
detained, reported ongoing detentions \86\ and
disappearances,\87\ denying detainees access to lawyers,\88\
and various forms of harassment, including physical assault,
eviction, cutting off utilities, death threats, and
surveillance.\89\ Authorities also tried to compel at least one
member to sign a statement renouncing the church.\90\
Officials in different localities violated believers'
freedom of religion by eliminating their options to join
unregistered churches, shutting down state-sanctioned churches,
and increasing control over remaining churches. In some cases,
unregistered house churches were pressured into joining the
state-sponsored Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM)--a
national religious organization responsible for maintaining
political relations between the Protestant community and Party
and government leadership.\91\ In some areas, officials refused
to let churches register and demanded instead that individual
believers join already-established TSPM churches.\92\ In Henan,
even TSPM churches were ordered closed by officials, with most
of the 10,000 churches shut down in Henan in 2018 being state-
sponsored.\93\ For many of the remaining TSPM churches in Henan
and in other areas such as Beijing municipality, government
officials implemented measures subjecting congregations to
increased control, for example, by requiring the installation
of surveillance equipment inside church buildings.\94\
In many areas, local authorities required both TSPM and
house churches to demonstrate political loyalty to the Chinese
Communist Party and Chinese government, for example, by
requiring changes to church services to include singing the
national anthem and speeches by government officials, as well
as demanding that churches hang national flags, portraits of
President Xi, and posters listing ``socialist core values,''
while also ordering the removal of Christian symbols such as
crosses and signs with Christian messages.\95\ In parts of
Henan province, the prohibition on Christian symbols was
extended to the homes of believers.\96\
Falun Gong
As in previous years, authorities continued to detain Falun
Gong practitioners and subject them to harsh treatment.\97\ Due
to government suppression, it is difficult to determine the
number of Falun Gong practitioners in China.\98\ Chinese
authorities commonly prosecute Falun Gong practitioners under
Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law; \99\ the Falun Gong-
affiliated website Clear Wisdom reported that at least 931
practitioners were sentenced under Article 300 in 2018, with
the greatest number sentenced in the northern provinces of
Liaoning, Shandong, Hebei, and Heilongjiang.\100\ In November
2018, two lawyers had their licenses to practice temporarily
suspended by the Ministry of Justice in Changsha municipality,
Hunan province, for arguments made in defense of Falun Gong
practitioners against Article 300 charges.\101\ International
human rights non-governmental organization Dui Hua Foundation
characterized the penalties as part of an incipient pattern of
official punishment of attorneys representing politically
sensitive clients that will likely discourage other criminal
defense lawyers from pursuing ``perfectly legal and effective
defense strategies.'' \102\ Clear Wisdom, an organization that
reports on the Falun Gong community, documented coercive and
violent practices against practitioners during custody,
including physical violence,\103\ forced drug
administration,\104\ sleep deprivation,\105\ and other forms of
torture.\106\ In February 2019, Clear Wisdom reported 69
confirmed deaths of Falun Gong practitioners in 2018 due to
abuse by officials.\107\
Islam
Violations of the religious freedom of the 10.5 million
\108\ Hui Muslim believers continued to intensify, with
observers raising alarm at an announcement in November 2018
that authorities in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (Ningxia)
had signed an ``anti-terrorism'' cooperation agreement with
counterparts in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR).\109\ The agreement would apply ``anti-terrorism''
measures currently used in the XUAR to Ningxia--a region with a
high concentration of Hui Muslim believers.\110\ Ningxia
authorities announced in March 2019 that they would launch
``thorough inspections'' of religious venues and carried out
``innovative'' religious management measures, such as raising
national flags in mosques and organizing religious leaders to
study the Chinese Constitution, socialist core values, and
traditional classical Chinese culture.\111\ Local officials in
Weishan Yi and Hui Autonomous County, Dali Bai Autonomous
Prefecture, Yunnan province, reportedly accused Hui Muslim
believers of engaging in ``illegal religious activities'' and
forcibly evicted the local Muslim community from three mosques
in December 2018 before a planned demolition.\112\ [For more
information on Uyghur Muslim believers, see Section IV--
Xinjiang; for more information on Muslim believers of other
ethnic minority backgrounds, see Section II--Ethnic Minority
Rights.]
A five-year plan to ``sinicize'' Islam in China was passed
in January 2019.\113\ Meanwhile, ongoing policies included
measures requiring Islamic religious leaders and lay believers
to demonstrate their ``political reliability''--for example, to
be officially certified, imams and other religious personnel
must be educated at one of 10 state-sanctioned Islamic schools
or otherwise obtain equivalent education,\114\ and be vetted by
the local religious affairs bureau and the China Islamic
Association.\115\ After certification, religious leaders are
required to continue attending political training
sessions.\116\ All Chinese Muslims seeking to carry out the
Hajj pilgrimage must fulfill requirements for ``political
reliability,'' including taking ``patriotic education''
classes, obtaining the approval of their local religious
affairs bureau, and participating only through tours arranged
by the China Islamic Assocation.\117\
Other Religious Communities
Religious communities outside of the five religions that
are the main objects of official regulation \118\ continued to
exist in China, but the religious practice of communities that
previously received tacit recognition and support were subject
to repression over the last year. For example, although folk
religion was acknowledged in a 2018 white paper issued by the
State Council Information Office,\119\ authorities in Jiangsu
province launched a wide-scale campaign from February through
March 2019 to demolish over 5,900 temples of tudigong, a god
from traditional Chinese folk religion.\120\ Authorities also
destroyed religious iconography and filled in the mikveh (a
bath used for religious ceremonies) in a synagogue in Kaifeng
municipality, Henan province, and subjected the Jewish
community of less than 1,000 to other increased restrictions,
including the cancelation of plans for foreign support for the
local Jewish community.\121\
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Religion
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Religion
\1\ Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human
Rights Law and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
19, 24, 203-04.
\2\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art.
18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16,
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18. Article 18 of the ICCPR
upholds a person's right to ``have or adopt a religion or belief'' and
the freedom to manifest that religion or belief ``in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.'' Article 18 also prohibits coercion
that impairs an individual's freedom to freely hold or adopt a religion
or belief. See also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of November 25,
1981.
\3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16,
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976; United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, accessed June 29, 2019. China has signed but not
ratified the ICCPR.
\4\ State Council Information Office, ``Guojia Renquan Xingdong
Jihua (2016-2020 nian)'' [National Human Rights Action Plan of China
(2016-2020)], September 29, 2016, sec. 5. The Chinese government stated
its intent to ratify the ICCPR in its 2016-2020 National Human Rights
Action Plan.
\5\ United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, entry into
force January 27, 1980, arts. 18, 26.
\6\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 36.
\7\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 36; Liu Peng, ``Crisis of Faith,'' China
Security 4, no. 4 (August 2008): 30.
\8\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 36; State Council, Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli
[Regulations on Religious Affairs], issued November 30, 2004, amended
June 14, 2017, effective February 1, 2018, art. 2; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed July 5, 1994, effective
January 1, 1994, amended December 29, 2018, art. 12.
\9\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966,
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 26.
\10\ Ibid., art. 18(2).
\11\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 36; State Council, Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli
[Regulations on Religious Affairs], issued November 30, 2004, amended
June 14, 2017, effective February 1, 2018, art. 2.
\12\ PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982
(amended March 11, 2018), art. 36.
\13\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966,
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18; UN Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or
Religion), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, July 30, 1993, para. 8.
\14\ State Council, ``Li Keqiang zuo de zhengfu gongzuo baogao''
[Government work report delivered by Li Keqiang], March 5, 2019; John
Dotson, ``Propaganda Themes at the CPPCC Stress the `Sinicization' of
Religion,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 9, 2019, 1-4.
\15\ ``Wang Yang: quanmian tigao zongjiao gongzuo shuiping, qieshi
weihu zongjiao lingyu hexie wending'' [Wang Yang: raise level of
religious work across the board, earnestly safeguard harmony and
stability in the religious sphere], Xinhua, April 17, 2019; ``Wang
Yang: quanmian guanche Dang de zongjiao gongzuo fangzhen jianchi woguo
zongjiao zhongguohua fangxiang'' [Wang Yang: thoroughly implement the
Party's religious work policy, adhere firmly to sinicization of
religion in China], Xinhua, February 6, 2018; ``Wang Yang: shenru zashi
zuohao minzu zongjiao he tuopin gongjian gongzuo'' [Wang Yang:
thoroughly and practically accomplish ethnic and religious work, and
poverty alleviation], Xinhua, October 17, 2018.
\16\ ``Wang Yang: quanmian guanche Dang de zongjiao gongzuo
fangzhen jianchi woguo zongjiao zhongguohua fangxiang'' [Wang Yang:
thoroughly implement the Party's religious work policy, adhere firmly
to sinicization of religion in China], Xinhua, February 6, 2018.
\17\ ``Jiang woguo zongjiao zhongguohua chixu tuixiang shenru--
Quanguo Zhengxie `Xin Shidai Jianchi Woguo Zongjiao Zhongguohua
Fangxiang De Shijian Lujing' Jie Bie Zhuti Xieshang Zuotan Hui
zongshu'' [Continue to deepen the sinicization of religion in China--a
summary of the National Symposium on the Theme of the CPPCC's ``New Era
of Adhering to the Practical Path of Our Nation's Religious
Sinicization''], People's Political and Legal News, reprinted in
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, January 7, 2019.
\18\ John Dotson, ``Propaganda Themes at the CPPCC Stress the
`Sinicization' of Religion,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April
9, 2019, 4.
\19\ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ``Vatican Agreement Latest Front in Xi's
Widening Religious Clampdown,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation,
October 10, 2018, 4-5.
\20\ John Dotson, `` `Dramas Must Feature Goodness': The CCP
Launches Renewed Efforts to Control Themes in Popular Culture,'' China
Brief, Jamestown Foundation, March 5, 2019, 1-5.
\21\ Gerry Groot, ``The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work
Department under Xi,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 24,
2018, 14.
\22\ Ian Johnson, ``How the Top-Heavy Catholic Church Is Losing the
Ground Game in China,'' America, September 18, 2017; Eleanor Albert,
Council on Foreign Relations, ``Religion in China,'' October 11, 2018.
\23\ See, e.g., Cyrille Pluyette, ``En Chine, le Pouvoir Renforce
son Controle sur les Religions,'' Le Figaro, updated December 12, 2017,
translated in Marc Alves, ``In China's Crackdown on Religions, Buddhism
Gets a Pass,'' Worldcrunch, February 5, 2018; Andre Laliberte,
``Buddhist Revival under State Watch,'' Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs (2011): 111-12.
\24\ Theory Study Center Group of the Party Organization for the
State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Dang de Shiba Da yilai
zongjiao gongzuo lilun he shijian chuangxin'' [Innovations in religious
work theory and practice since the 18th Party Congress], Seeking Truth,
September 15, 2017; State Administration for Religious Affairs,
``Guojia Zongjiao Shiwu Ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian'' [State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2018 work objectives], February
14, 2018.
\25\ John Dotson, ``Propaganda Themes at the CPPCC Stress the
`Sinicization' of Religion,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April
9, 2019, 4.
\26\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Guojia Zongjiao
Shiwu Ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian'' [State Administration for
Religious Affairs 2018 work objectives], February 14, 2018; ``Yang
Faming weiyuan: jianchi woguo Yisilan jiao zhongguohua fangxiang''
[CPPCC member Yang Faming: maintain China's sinicization of Islam],
Xinhua, March 10, 2018.
\27\ Sudha Ramachandran, ``Rivalries and Relics: Examining China's
Buddhist Public Diplomacy,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, March
5, 2019; Angad Singh, ``China Is Using `Buddhist Diplomacy' in Its
Quest to Dominate Global Trade,'' Vice News, March 21, 2019.
\28\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on
Religious Freedom in Mainland China (2016),'' 2016, 38-39.
\29\ Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question
in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 153-54,
330. The ``patriotic'' religious associations are state-controlled
institutions that represent the five ``main'' religions of China: the
Buddhist Association of China, the China Islamic Association, the China
Taoist Association, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, the
National Conference of Bishops (an organization led by Catholic
clergy), the Three-Self (for ``self-governing, self-financing, and
self-expanding'') Patriotic Movement and the Chinese Christian Council
(the latter two organizations have overlapping membership and represent
Protestants). According to Goossaert and Palmer, although ``nominally
independent,'' the ``patriotic'' religious associations are effectively
under the authority of the State Council's agency for religious
affairs.
\30\ Ibid., 154.
\31\ Jessica Batke, ``PRC Religious Policy: Serving the Gods of the
CCP,'' China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University, 52 (Winter 2017), February 14, 2017, 3; Vincent Goossaert
and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2011), 330.
\32\ CECC, 2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 122.
\33\ ``Li Keqiang qianshu Guowuyuan ling gongbu xiuding hou de
`Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli' '' [Li Keqiang signs State Council order
issuing revised ``Regulations on Religious Affairs], Xinhua, September
7, 2017.
\34\ State Council, Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli [Regulation on Religious
Affairs], issued November 30, 2004, amended June 14, 2017, effective
February 1, 2018, arts. 36, 41.
\35\ Ibid., art. 71.
\36\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law ], passed
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, effective October 1, 1997,
amended November 4, 2017, art. 300.
\37\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Anquan Fa [PRC National
Security Law], passed and effective July 1, 2015, art. 27.
\38\ Ibid.
\39\ ``Chinese Communist Party Targets Members with Religious
Beliefs,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, September 13, 2018; Zhongguo
Gongchandang Jilu Chufen Tiaoli [Chinese Communist Party Regulations on
Disciplinary Action], effective October 1, 2018, arts. 61-64.
\40\ Carolyn M. Evans, ``Chinese Law and the International
Protection of Religious Freedom,'' University of Melbourne Faculty of
Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 36 (2002), 20.
\41\ Wang Anyang, ``Buddhist Statues Disappearing throughout
China,'' Bitter Winter, February 20, 2019; Shen Xinran, ``CCP
`Exterminating Buddha' by Destroying Large Statues,'' Bitter Winter,
March 17, 2019; Shen Xinran, ``World's Largest Cliff-Carved Guanyin
Statue Demolished,'' Bitter Winter, March 1, 2019. See also Yang
Xiangwen, ``Factories of Buddhist Statues Demolished in Hebei,'' Bitter
Winter, April 2, 2019.
\42\ Wang Anyang, ``Buddhist Statues Disappearing throughout
China,'' Bitter Winter, February 20, 2019.
\43\ Shen Xinran, ``CCP `Exterminating Buddha' by Destroying Large
Statues,'' Bitter Winter, March 17, 2019.
\44\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, et al., ``Guojia
Zongjiao Shiwu Ju deng 12 bumen lianhe fa wen zhili Fojiao Daojiao
shangyehua wenti'' [State Administration for Religious Affairs among 12
departments to jointly issue document to manage problem of
commercialization of Buddhism and Taoism], November 23, 2017.
\45\ Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human
Rights Law and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
69.
\46\ Pew Research Center, ``Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures
Project--China,'' accessed June 10, 2019. See also Zhe Ji, ``Chinese
Buddhism as a Social Force: Reality and Potential of Thirty Years of
Revival,'' Chinese Sociological Review 45, no. 2 (Winter 2012-2013):
10-12. Quantitative assessments for the total number of Buddhists are
difficult to determine because Buddhist religious identity does not
need to be formalized within a particular institution and may overlap
with other religious practices.
\47\ Katharina Wenzel-Teuber, ``2015 Statistical Update on
Religions and Churches in the People's Republic of China,'' China
Heute, no. 1 (2016), translated in Religions & Christianity in Today's
China 6, no. 2 (2016): 25.
\48\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Quanguo Hanchuan
Fojiao Siyuan Guanli Banfa [National Measures for Regulating Chinese
Buddhist Temples and Monasteries], issued October 21, 1993, arts. 1, 3;
Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious
Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017,
32-33. See also Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious
Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011),
332-33.
\49\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Quanguo Hanchuan
Fojiao Siyuan Chuanshou San Tan Da Jie Guanli Banfa [National Measures
for Administering the Initiation Regarding the Three Pure Precepts in
Chinese Buddhist Temples], issued September 22, 2011, amended September
20, 2016.
\50\ Cyrille Pluyette, ``En Chine, le Pouvoir Renforce son Controle
sur les Religions,'' Le Figaro, updated December 12, 2017, translated
in Marc Alves, ``In China's Crackdown on Religions, Buddhism Gets a
Pass,'' Worldcrunch, February 5, 2018; Eleanor Albert, Council on
Foreign Relations, ``Religion in China,'' October 11, 2018.
\51\ ``China's Holy Sites List on the Stockmarket,'' Economist,
April 26, 2018; ``Party vs Profit in Tug of War over Chinese
Buddhism,'' China Digital Times, April 27, 2018.
\52\ Sudha Ramachandran, ``Rivalries and Relics: Examining China's
Buddhist Public Diplomacy,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, March
5, 2019.
\53\ Ian Johnson, ``How the Top-Heavy Catholic Church Is Losing the
Ground Game in China,'' America, September 18, 2017; Anthony Lam Sui-
ky, ``The Decline of China's Catholic Population and Its Impact on the
Church,'' AsiaNews, August 23, 2016.
\54\ Jason Horowitz and Ian Johnson, ``China and Vatican Reach Deal
on Appointment of Bishops,'' New York Times, September 22, 2018.
\55\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' April 3, 2018.
\56\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Guojia Zongjiao
Shiwu Ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian'' [State Administration for
Religious Affairs 2018 work objectives], February 14, 2018; Li Zhao,
``Zhongguo jiang jinian `duli' jiaohui de `zixuan zisheng' zhujiao
liushi zhounian'' [China commemorates ``self-selection, self-
ordination'' of bishops for 60 years in the ``independent'' church],
AsiaNews, February 10, 2018; China Catholic Patriotic Association and
Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church, Zhujiao Tuan Guanyu Xuan
Sheng Zhujiao De Guiding, [Provisions for Selecting and Ordaining
Bishops], issued and effective April 8, 2013.
\57\ Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, ``The Division of the Roman Catholic
Church in Mainland China: History and Challenges,'' Religions 8, no. 3
(March 2017): 1, 3, 6-7.
\58\ Eva Dou, ``For China's Catholics, State-Controlled Church Is
`Like a Tree with No Roots,' '' Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2018;
Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, ``The Division of the Roman Catholic Church in
Mainland China: History and Challenges,'' Religions 8, no. 3 (March
2017): 7; Ilaria Maria Sala and Isabella Steger, ``Some Catholics Are
Deeply Disturbed That the Vatican Is Cozying Up to China's Repressive
Regime,'' Quartz, August 25, 2016.
\59\ CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 125-26; Eva Dou,
``For China's Catholics, State Controlled Church Is `Like a Tree with
No Roots,' '' Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2018; ``Msgr. Peter
Shao Zhumin of Wenzhou Freed after 7 Months,'' AsiaNews, April 1, 2018.
\60\ ``Communique Concerning the Signing of a Provisional Agreement
between the Holy See and the People's Republic of China on the
Appointment of Bishops,'' Vatican News, September 22, 2018; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, ``Zhongguo tong Fandigang jiu youguan wenti qianshu
linshixing xieyi'' [China and the Vatican sign provisional agreement
regarding related questions], September 22, 2018.
\61\ ``Greg Burke: Holy See/China Agreement Has Pastoral
Objective,'' Vatican News, September 22, 2018.
\62\ Paul P. Mariani, ``The Extremely High Stakes of the China-
Vatican Deal,'' America, December 7, 2018; Ian Johnson, ``With Vatican
Talks and Bulldozers, China Aims to Control Christianity,'' New York
Times, September 24, 2018.
\63\ Jason Horowitz and Ian Johnson, ``China and Vatican Reach Deal
on Appointment of Bishops,'' New York Times, September 22, 2018.
\64\ Paul P. Mariani, ``The Extremely High Stakes of the China-
Vatican Deal,'' America, December 7, 2018.
\65\ Jason Horowitz and Ian Johnson, ``China and Vatican Reach Deal
on Appointment of Bishops,'' New York Times, September 22, 2018.
\66\ Ibid.
\67\ Joseph Zen Ze-Kiun, ``The Pope Doesn't Understand China,'' New
York Times, October 24, 2018; Ian Johnson, ``With Vatican Talks and
Bulldozers, China Aims to Control Christianity,'' New York Times,
September 24, 2018; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ``Vatican Agreement Latest Front
in Xi's Widening Religious Clampdown,'' China Brief, Jamestown
Foundation, October 10, 2018.
\68\ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ``Vatican Agreement Latest Front in Xi's
Widening Religious Clampdown,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation,
October 10, 2018.
\69\ Mimi Lau, ``Vatican Officials on Goodwill Mission to China to
Build on Bishops Deal with Beijing after Detention of Underground
Catholic Priest,'' South China Morning Post, April 17, 2019.
\70\ ChinaAid Association, ``2018 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' February
28, 2019, 57-59.
\71\ Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations, ``Christianity
in China,''October 11, 2018.
\72\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 9.
\73\ ChinaAid Association, ``2018 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' February
28, 2019, 58.
\74\ Christian Shepherd, ``China Outlaws Large Underground
Protestant Church in Beijing,'' Reuters, September 9, 2018; Javier C.
Hernandez, ``As China Cracks Down on Churches, Christians Declare `We
Will Not Forfeit Our Faith,' '' New York Times, December 25, 2018;
``Beijing shi zhengfu zhengshi qudi Shouwang Jiaohui'' [Beijing
government formally bans Shouwang Church], Radio Free Asia, March 26,
2019.
\75\ Mimi Lau, ``China Shuts Leading Underground Christian Church,
Third This Winter,'' South China Morning Post, December 16, 2018.
\76\ ChinaAid Association, ``2018 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' February
28, 2019, 36.
\77\ ``Group Says Dozens Detained in Raid on Chinese Church,''
Associated Press, December 10, 2018; ChinaAid Association, ``Updated:
100 Church Attendees in Custody,'' December 10, 2018; Human Rights
Watch, ``China: Repression of Christian Church Intensifies,'' December
13, 2018.
\78\ Rights Defense Network, `` `12-9' Chengdu Qiuyu Shengyue Jiao
an Li Yingqiang qubao huoshi, bei xingju de 28 ren zhong reng you 3 ren
zao jiya (2019 nian 8 yue 8 ri)'' [8/18/2019: Li Yingqiang of
``December 9'' Chengdu Early Rain Covenant Church case released; 3 of
28 people criminally detained still in detention], August 18, 2019.
\79\ ``Zhongguo duodi quanmian gudi jiating jiaohui'' [Complete
bans on house churches in multiple locations across China], Radio Free
Asia, October 29, 2018; ChinaAid Association, ``2018 Annual Report:
Chinese Government Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland
China,'' February 28, 2019, 34-37.
\80\ ``Crackdown on Christian Churches Intensifies in China,''
Voice of America, September 7, 2018.
\81\ ChinaAid Association, ``Chinese Officials Continue Sunday
Raids on Local Churches, Early Rain Covenant Church Congregants Still
Not Free despite Bail,'' June 28, 2019; ChinaAid Association, ``2018
Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution of Churches and
Christians in Mainland China,'' February 28, 2019, 45.
\82\ ChinaAid Association, ``2018 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' February
28, 2019, 46.
\83\ Ibid., 45.
\84\ Ibid., 45.
\85\ Ibid., 58.
\86\ ChinaAid Association, ``More Than 30 Early Rain Covenant
Church Members Taken into Custody,'' January 11, 2019; ChinaAid
Association, ``Updated: Spouses of Arrested House Church Members Taken
into Custody,'' February 15, 2019.
\87\ ChinaAid Association, ``Early Rain Covenant Church Members
Vanish,'' March 19, 2019.
\88\ ChinaAid Association, ``Government Denies Imprisoned Members
of Sichuan Church Meetings with Lawyers,'' February 5, 2019; ChinaAid
Association, ``Imprisoned Pastor Denied Communication with Lawyer,''
February 23, 2019; ChinaAid Association, ``Early Rain Covenant Church
Pastor and Deacon Continue to Face Significant Legal Challenges,''
August 26, 2019; Rights Defense Network, ``Chengdu Qiuyu Jiao an zhi
Wang Yi Mushi an jinzhan tongbao'' [Bulletin of developments in the
case of Pastor Wang Yi of Chengdu's Early Rain Church], August 1, 2019.
\89\ ChinaAid Association, ``Officials Continue Abuse of Early Rain
Covenant Church Members,'' January 4, 2019; ChinaAid Association, `` `I
Will Kill You Sooner or Later,' Official Threatens Family of Imprisoned
Christians,'' February 20, 2019; ChinaAid Association, ``Wife, Children
of Imprisoned Church Elder Evicted,'' February 22, 2019; ChinaAid
Association, ``Officer Beats Elderly Mother of Imprisoned Pastor,''
February 24, 2019; ChinaAid Association, ``Authorities Beat Christian
Couple,'' March 4, 2019; ChinaAid Association, ``Chengdu Authorities
Force Christians from Homes,'' March 7, 2019; ChinaAid Association,
``Non-Christian Seized by Police for Helping Early Rain Covenant Church
Members,'' April 11, 2019; ChinaAid Association, ``Authorities Continue
Crackdown on Early Rain Covenant Church,'' April 18, 2019; Rights
Defense Network, ``Qiuyu Shengyue Jiaohui jianbao (2019.5.30)''
[Briefing on the Early Rain Covenant Church (5/30/2019)], May 30, 2019;
ChinaAid Association, ``Authorities Continue to Harass Early Rain
Covenant Church,'' June 16, 2019; Michelle Yun, ``Christian Family
Details Crackdown on Church in China,'' Associated Press, July 8, 2019.
\90\ ``Early Rain Church Members Attend First Service after China
Crackdown,'' Associated Press, July 8, 2019.
\91\ ChinaAid Association, ``2018 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' February
28, 2019, 27; Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious
Question in Modern China, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011),
330.
\92\ ChinaAid Association, ``2018 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' February
28, 2019, 36.
\93\ Nina Shea and Bob Fu, ``Inside China's War on Christians,''
Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2018.
\94\ ChinaAid Association, ``2018 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' February
28, 2019, 25.
\95\ Ibid., 20, 26, 40, 80.
\96\ Ibid., 26.
\97\ For information on suppression of Falun Gong practitioners
from previous years, see, e.g., CECC, 2016 Annual Report, October 6,
2016, 125-27; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, October 8, 2015, 123-25. See
also ``Communist Party Calls for Increased Efforts to `Transform' Falun
Gong Practitioners as Part of Three-Year Campaign,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, March 22, 2011.
\98\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 113.
\99\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``NGO Submission for the Universal
Periodic Review of the People's Republic of China,'' March 2018, para.
14.
\100\ ``931 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their Faith in
2018,'' Clear Wisdom, January 13, 2019.
\101\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Administrative Penalties against
Lawyers: Another Strike against Professional Autonomy and Religious
Freedom,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, January 10, 2019.
\102\ Ibid.
\103\ ``Liaoning Man Immobilized on a Wood Board in Spread-Eagle
Position for Weeks before and after His Two-Year Prison Sentence,''
Clear Wisdom, July 23, 2019.
\104\ ``After Being Drugged in Detention, Woman in Her Late 70s
Still Suffering from Lingering Effects Six Months after Release,''
Clear Wisdom, May 8, 2019.
\105\ ``Falun Gong Practitioners Deprived of Sleep for Weeks in
Hebei Provincial Women's Prison,'' Clear Wisdom, April 11, 2019.
\106\ ``Liaoning Man Immobilized on a Wood Board in Spread-Eagle
Position for Weeks before and after His Two-Year Prison Sentence,''
Clear Wisdom, July 23, 2019.
\107\ ``69 Falun Gong Practitioners Confirmed to Have Died in 2018
as a Result of Arrests and Torture,'' Clear Wisdom, February 14, 2019.
\108\ Alice Y. Su, ``The Separation Between Mosque and State,''
ChinaFile, Asia Society, October 21, 2016; Sarah Cook, Freedom House,
``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and
Resistance under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 68-69. See also Ian
Johnson, ``Shariah with Chinese Characteristics: A Scholar Looks at the
Muslim Hui,'' New York Times, September 6, 2016. Experts on Chinese
religion have noted that most statistics on Muslim believers in China
make broad assumptions about religious identity based on ethnicity--for
example, presuming that all people of Hui ethnicity are Muslim
believers, and that no people of Han, Tibetan, or other ethnicities are
Muslim.
\109\ ``China's Ningxia to `Learn From' Xinjiang's Anti-Terror
Campaign,'' Radio Free Asia, December 3, 2018; Sophia Yan, ``Fears
China's Internment Camps Could Spread as Area Home to Muslim Minority
Signs `Anti-Terror' Deal,'' Telegraph, November 29, 2018.
\110\ ``China's Ningxia to `Learn From' Xinjiang's Anti-Terror
Campaign,'' Radio Free Asia, December 3, 2018; Sophia Yan, ``Fears
China's Internment Camps Could Spread as Area Home to Muslim Minority
Signs `Anti-Terror' Deal,'' Telegraph, November 29, 2018.
\111\ Cao Siqi, ``Ningxia Sets Up Democratic System to Select Imams
for Mosques,'' Global Times, March 6, 2019.
\112\ ``Dozens Detained as Muslims Resist Mosque Closures in
China's Yunnan,'' Radio Free Asia, December 31, 2018.
\113\ ``Beijing Outlines 5-Year Plan to Make Islam `Chinese in
character,' '' ummid.com News Network, January 6, 2019; ``China
Explores Effective Governance of Religion in Secular World,'' Global
Times, January 6, 2019.
\114\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' April 4, 2018.
\115\ China Islamic Association, Yisilan Jiao Jiaozhi Renyuan Zige
Rending Banfa [Measures for Confirming the Credentials of Islamic
Professional Religious Personnel], issued and effective August 7, 2006,
art. 3; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 76.
\116\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 76.
\117\ Li Ruohan, ``Chinese Muslims Say They Feel a Stronger Sense
of National Identity During Pilgrimage to Mecca,'' Global Times, August
2, 2018.
\118\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' April 4, 2018.
The central government has referred to the five religions as China's
``major religions,'' stating that the religions citizens ``mainly''
follow are Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism.
See, e.g., Henan Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Henan
Sheng Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli [Henan Province Regulations on Religious
Affairs], issued July 30, 2005, effective January 1, 2006, art. 2;
Shaanxi Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Shaanxi Sheng
Zongjiao Shiwu Tiaoli [Shaanxi Province Regulations on Religious
Affairs], issued September 23, 2000, amended July 30, 2008, effective
October 1, 2008, art. 2. Some local regulations on religious affairs
define ``religion'' to mean only these five religions.
\119\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' April 4, 2018.
\120\ ChinaAid Association, ``Jiangsu Authorities Demolish 5,911
Temples,'' April 23, 2019.
\121\ ``Kaifeng Jews Persecuted along with Other Religions,''
AsiaNews, February 16, 2019.
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority Rights
Findings
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year,
the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work
Department continued to promote ethnic affairs work at
all levels of Party and state governance that
emphasized the importance of ``sinicizing'' ethnic and
religious minorities. Officials emphasized the need to
``sinicize'' the country's religions, including Islam.
Official ``sinicization'' efforts contributed to the
increasing marginalization of ethnic minorities and
their cultures and languages.
Reports indicate that official efforts to
repress Islamic practices in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) have spread beyond the XUAR to
Hui communities living in other locations. Developments
suggest officials may be starting to carry out
religious repression in areas outside of the XUAR that
are modeled on restrictions already implemented within
the XUAR. In November 2018, official media reported
that Zhang Yunsheng, Communist Party official of the
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, had signed a
counterterrorism agreement with XUAR officials during a
trip to the XUAR to learn about its efforts to fight
terrorism, maintain ``social stability,'' and manage
religious affairs.
During the reporting year, authorities carried
out the physical destruction and alteration of Hui
Muslim spaces and structures, continuing a recent trend
away from relative toleration of Hui Muslim faith
communities. Officials demolished a mosque in a Hui
community in Gansu province, raided and closed several
mosques in Hui areas in Yunnan province, closed an
Arabic-language school serving Hui students in Gansu,
and carried out changes such as removing Arabic signage
in Hui areas. These changes narrowed the space for Hui
Muslim believers to assert an ethnic and religious
identity distinct from that of the dominant Han Chinese
population.
Mongol herders in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region (IMAR) protested and petitioned the
government over the loss of traditional grazing lands.
As in past reporting years, authorities detained some
of the Mongol herders who peacefully protested.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge Chinese authorities to adopt a comprehensive
anti-discrimination law that includes a definition of
racial discrimination in full conformity with the
International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); to amend
Chinese domestic laws to expressly define and
criminalize all forms of racial discrimination in full
conformity with Article 1 of ICERD; and to expressly
prohibit both direct and indirect racial discrimination
in all fields of public life, including law enforcement
and other government powers.
Urge Chinese authorities to establish independent
national human rights institutions in accordance with
the Principles relating to the Status of National
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights (the Paris Principles).
Urge Chinese authorities to formulate and establish
comprehensive statistics, surveys, and administrative
records on acts of racial discrimination and related
administrative and civil complaints, investigations,
procedures, and sanctions.
Urge Chinese authorities to allow Hui and other
predominantly Muslim ethnic minority populations to
freely engage in Islamic religious rituals, as a matter
of their right to religious freedom, and in accordance
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
as well as China's Constitution, which prohibits
discrimination based on religion.
Call on the Chinese government to allow Mongol
herders to exercise their fundamental rights of freedom
of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, as
well as the right to be free from arbitrary detention.
Convey to Chinese officials the importance of
consulting with ethnic minority communities regarding
the impact of proposed development on their traditional
grazing lands.
Raise the cases of Mongol political prisoners,
including detained Mongol historian Lhamjab Borjigin
and detained Mongol writers O. Sechenbaatar and
Tsogjil, in public forums and meetings with Chinese
officials, and call for their immediate release from
detention.
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority Rights
Introduction
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year, Chinese
Communist Party and government authorities promoted policies
and regulations restricting rights guaranteed to ethnic
minority groups under Chinese and international law. The PRC
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for the
languages, religious beliefs, and customs of these
``nationalities,'' in addition to a system of regional autonomy
in designated areas.\1\ Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed
and declared its intention to ratify, contains safeguards for
the rights of ``ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities''
within a state.\2\ In practice, however, Chinese authorities
reportedly implemented policies that marginalized the cultures
and languages of ethnic minority populations.\3\ International
human rights organizations submitted reports in advance of the
November 2018 session of the UN Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review that criticized China's controls on
ethnic minorities' religious freedom and cultural identity.\4\
[For additional information on ethnic minority rights, see
Section IV--Xinjiang and Section V--Tibet.]
Party and State ``Sinicization'' of Ethnic Minorities
During this reporting year, the Chinese Communist Party's
United Front Work Department (UFWD) continued to promote ethnic
affairs work at all levels of Party and state governance that
emphasized the importance of ``sinicizing'' ethnic and
religious minorities.\5\ The UFWD promoted an approach to
ethnic affairs that stressed ethnic unity; \6\ the ``five
identifications'' (wu ge rentong) (referring to identification
with the Chinese nation, the Chinese people, Chinese culture,
the Chinese Communist Party, and ``socialism with Chinese
characteristics''); \7\ the primacy of Mandarin Chinese; \8\ a
resistance to foreign culture; \9\ and the use of both material
assistance and propaganda efforts to manage ``ethnic
problems.'' \10\ At the March 2019 meetings of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing
municipality, officials emphasized the need to ``uphold the
Party's leadership over religious work [and] persist in
advancing the sinicization of our country's religions.'' \11\
During the March 2019 National People's Congress (NPC), Premier
Li Keqiang delivered the annual government work report, telling
NPC delegates that they must ``uphold the sinicization of
religion in China.'' \12\
Policies Affecting Hui Islamic Communities
Officials implemented policies and restrictions in Hui
communities in ways that represented intensified efforts to
promote the ``sinicization'' of ethnic and religious
minorities. In the past, Chinese officials have allowed Hui
Muslims to practice religion more freely than Uyghur or other
Turkic Muslims, but in recent years have placed more limits on
Hui Muslim traditions.\13\ International observers have
reported that official efforts to repress Islamic practices in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) appear to have
spread beyond the XUAR to Hui communities living in other
locations.\14\ In November 2018, official media reported that
Zhang Yunsheng, Communist Party official of the Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region, had signed a counterterrorism agreement with
XUAR officials during a trip to the XUAR to learn about its
efforts to fight terrorism, maintain ``social stability,'' and
manage religious affairs.\15\ A researcher for the NGO Human
Rights Watch expressed concern the agreement signaled that
officials would carry out religious repression in areas outside
of the XUAR modeled on restrictions already implemented within
the XUAR.\16\
During this reporting year, authorities carried out the
physical destruction and alteration of Hui Muslim spaces and
structures. Officials demolished a mosque in a Hui community in
Gansu province,\17\ raided and closed several mosques in Hui
areas in Yunnan province,\18\ and closed an Arabic-language
school serving Hui students in Gansu.\19\ Officials in
provinces with significant Hui populations promoted ``anti-
halal'' and ``sinicization'' efforts during the year, requiring
the removal of Arabic signage on buildings and crescent domes
on mosques, and also discontinued halal food standards, in
order to stop the spread of Islamic influences officials deemed
``foreign.'' \20\ In July, Reuters reported that officials in
Beijing municipality had ordered some local restaurants and
stores to remove words and symbols with Islamic significance
from their signage, including the word ``halal'' written in
Arabic.\21\ [For more information on freedom of religion for
Muslims in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion.]
Grassland Protests in Inner Mongolia
During this reporting year, authorities detained Mongol
herders who protested or petitioned the government over the
loss of traditional grazing lands. As in past reporting
years,\22\ authorities detained some of the Mongol herders who
peacefully protested.\23\
Representative examples of protests and petitioning by
Mongol herders included the following:
2 In April 2019, authorities administratively
detained three Mongol herders who had traveled to
Hohhot municipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
(IMAR), to petition authorities over access to grazing
lands.\24\ Authorities escorted herders Haaserdun,
Tegshibayla, and Oobuuren back to their hometown in
Zaruud Banner, Tongliao municipality, IMAR, and ordered
them to serve eight days' administrative detention for
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \25\
On April 22, 2019, more than 100 Mongol
herders in Urad (Wulate) Middle Banner, Bayannur
(Bayannao'er) municipality, IMAR, protested in front of
local government offices to demand a meeting with IMAR
chairwoman Bu Xiaolin, who was visiting the area.\26\
Authorities detained around a dozen herders, including
Bai Xiurong and Altanbagan, each of whom security
personnel ordered to serve 14 days' administrative
detention for unknown charges.\27\ On the evening of
April 22 and the early morning of April 23, some of the
herders protested in front of a local government
building to call for the release of Bai, Altanbagan,
and other herders still detained.\28\
Detention of Mongol Writers
Authorities in the IMAR tried a Mongol historian on charges
related to a book he wrote and detained two Mongol writers who
had advocated on behalf of herders' rights:
Lhamjab Borjigin. On April 4, 2019, the
Xilingol (Xilinguole) League Intermediate People's
Court in Xilinhot city, Xilingol League, tried 75-year-
old Mongol historian Lhamjab Borjigin on the charges of
``ethnic separatism,'' ``sabotaging national unity,''
and ``illegal publication and illegal distribution.''
\29\ A Xilinhot official previously linked the first
two charges to a book Borjigin self-published in 2006
about Mongols' experiences during the Cultural
Revolution.\30\
O. Sechenbaatar. On April 12, 2019, security
personnel in Heshigten (Keshenketeng) Banner, Chifeng
municipality, detained 68-year-old Mongol writer O.
Sechenbaatar on suspicion of ``obstructing official
business,'' after he participated in a nearby protest
involving more than 200 herders over government plans
to restrict local herders' access to traditional
grazing lands.\31\ Sechenbaatar has authored numerous
books and other materials on Mongolian culture, and he
has hosted group discussions about Mongol herders'
concerns on the messaging service WeChat.\32\ On April
16, 2019, more than 100 herders protested in front of a
government building in Heshigten to call for O.
Sechenbaatar's release from detention.\33\
Tsogjil. On April 16, 2019, security personnel
in Hohhot took into custody 40-year-old Mongol writer
Tsogjil, and authorities subsequently took him back to
his hometown in Heshigten Banner, and detained him on
April 17 on the charge of ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble.'' \34\ According to a U.S.-based
Mongol rights organization, prior to his detention,
Tsogjil had advocated for Mongols' language and
cultural rights, as well as their access to natural
resources, including by hosting WeChat discussion
groups.\35\ Tsogjil had traveled to Hohhot to submit a
complaint to regional government officials regarding
Mongol herders' rights.\36\
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Notes to Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights
\1\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa, [PRC Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984,
amended February 28, 2001. For protections related to languages,
religious beliefs, and customs, see Articles 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47,
49, and 53.
\2\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966,
entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27.
\3\ See, e.g., Rustem Shir, ``China's Effort to Silence the Sound
of Uyghur,'' The Diplomat, May 16, 2019; Sang Jieja, ``Why Is China So
Terrified of Tibetan Language Classes?,'' La Croix International, March
4, 2019; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``SMHRIC
Statement at UN Forum on Minority Issues 11th Session and Chinese
Delegate's Response,'' November 29, 2018.
\4\ See, e.g., Amnesty International, ``China: Human Rights
Violations in the Name of `National Security': Amnesty International
Submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session of the
UPR Working Group, November 2018,'' March 1, 2018, 7, 11-12; Society
for Threatened Peoples, ``Third Cycle, Thirty-First Session of the UPR,
UPR Submission on China,'' accessed June 11, 2019, 2-3; Human Rights
Watch, ``Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of China,'' March
29, 2018.
\5\ Gerry Groot, ``The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work
Department under Xi,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation 18, no. 7,
April 24, 2018; ``Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa `shenhua Dang he guojia
jigou gaige fang'an' '' [CCP Central Committee issues ``plan for
deepening reform of Party and state government agencies' reform
agenda''], Xinhua, March 21, 2018; CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October
10, 2018, 137. At the March 2018 meetings of the National People's
Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in
Beijing municipality (Two Sessions), the UFWD assumed control of the
government departments overseeing ethnic affairs (the State Ethnic
Affairs Commission) and religion (the State Administration for
Religious Affairs).
\6\ Shen Guiping, ``Jiang qingchu Zhonghua wenhua, zhulao Zhonghua
minzu gongtong ti yishi--`Shehui Zhuyi Xueyuan Gongzuo Tiaoli' xuexi
tihui'' [Clearly explain Chinese culture, forge a unified Chinese
consciousness - ``Socialism Institute Work Regulations'' learning
experience], China Ethnicity News, February 1, 2019.
\7\ Tao Wenzhao, ``Zai gongtong fanrong fazhan zhong zhulao
Zhonghua minzu gongtong ti yishi'' [Forging Chinese collective
consciousness while collectively prospering in development], Guangming
Daily, January 5, 2018.
\8\ Hao Shiyuan, ``Zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtong ti yishi bixu
tuiguang guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi'' [To forge Chinese collective
consciousness the national common language and characters must be
promoted], People's Daily, October 31, 2018; Shen Guiping, ``Jiang
qingchu Zhonghua wenhua, zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtong ti yishi--
`Shehui Zhuyi Xueyuan Gongzuo Tiaoli' xuexi tihui'' [Clearly explain
Chinese culture, forge a unified Chinese consciousness - ``Socialism
Institute Work Regulations'' learning experience], China Ethnicity
News, February 1, 2019.
\9\ Shen Guiping, ``Jiang qingchu Zhonghua wenhua, zhulao Zhonghua
minzu gongtong ti yishi--`Shehui Zhuyi Xueyuan Gongzuo Tiaoli' xuexi
tihui'' [Clearly explain Chinese culture, forge a unified Chinese
consciousness - ``Socialism Institute Work Regulations'' learning
experience], China Ethnicity News, February 1, 2019.
\10\ State Ethnic Affairs Commission, ``Guojia minwei zhaokai
quanguo minzu xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi Guo Weiping chuxi bing jianghua''
[SEAC holds national ethnic propaganda work meeting, Guo Weiping
attends and delivers a speech], March 27, 2019.
\11\ ``You Quan: Jianchi Dang dui zongjiao gongzuo de lingdao,
chixu tuijin woguo zongjiao Zhongguohua'' [You Quan: uphold the Party's
leadership over religious work, persist in advancing the Sinicization
of our country's religions] Xinhua, March 20, 2019. See also John
Dotson, ``Propaganda Themes at the CPPCC Stress the `Sinicization' of
Religion,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 9, 2019, 2.
\12\ State Council, ``Zhengfu gongzuo baogao'' [Government work
report], reprinted in Xinhua, March 16, 2019; Nectar Gan, ``Beijing
Plans to Continue Tightening Grip on Christianity and Islam as China
Pushes Ahead with the `Sinicisation of Religion,' '' South China
Morning Post, March 6, 2019.
\13\ See, e.g., Mimi Lau, ``Chinese Arabic School to Close as Areas
with Muslim Populations Are Urged to Study the Xinjiang Way,'' South
China Morning Post, December 9, 2018; Sam McNeil, ``Hui Poet Fears for
His People as China `Sinicizes' Religion,'' Associated Press, December
28, 2018.
\14\ Ian Johnson, ``How the State Is Co-Opting Religion in China,''
Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2019; Chun Han Wong, ``China Applies
Xinjiang's Policing Lessons to Other Muslim Areas,'' Wall Street
Journal, December 23, 2018; Nectar Gan, ``Chinese Hui Mosque Protest
Ends after Authorities Promise to Consult Community,'' South China
Morning Post, August 15, 2018; ``China's Ningxia to `Learn From'
Xinjiang's Anti-Terror Campaign,'' Radio Free Asia, December 3, 2018.
Hui Muslims also live in the XUAR, but reports from the past reporting
year have focused on increased repression of Hui communities outside of
the XUAR. See, e.g., Joanne Smith Finley, `` `Now We Don't Talk
Anymore,' '' ChinaFile, Asia Society, December 28, 2018.
\15\ Ji Yuqiao, ``Ningxia Learns From Xinjiang How to Fight
Terrorism,'' Global Times, November 27, 2018; Deng Zhihua, ``Ningxia
dangwei zhengfa wei deng bumen fu Xinjiang kaocha duijie fankong weiwen
gongzuo'' [Ningxia political-legal committee department travels to
Xinjiang to inspect counterterrorism and stability maintenance work],
Ningxia Daily, November 27, 2018. See also ``China's Ningxia to `Learn
From' Xinjiang's Anti-Terror Campaign,'' Radio Free Asia, December 3,
2018; Sophia Yan, ``Fears China's Internment Camps Could Spread as Area
Home to Muslim Minority Signs `Anti-Terror' Deal,'' Telegraph, November
29, 2018.
\16\ Sophia Yan, ``Fears China's Internment Camps Could Spread as
Area Home to Muslim Minority Signs `Anti-Terror' Deal,'' Telegraph,
November 29, 2018. See also David R. Stroup, ``The Xinjiang Model of
Ethnic Politics and the Daily Practice of Ethnicity,'' China at the
Crossroads (blog), December 19, 2018.
\17\ ``Gansu Linxia yi qingzhensi zao qiangchai duo ren bei ju'' [A
mosque in Linxia, Gansu, is demolished, many people are detained],
Radio Free Asia, April 12, 2019; William Yang, ``Zhongguo xu tui
Yisilan Hanhua Gansu qingzhensi zao `mieding' '' [China continues
Hanification of Islam, Gansu mosque ``extinguished''], Deutsche Welle,
April 12, 2019; Bai Shengyi, ``Gansu yi qingzhensi gang jiancheng jiu
zao qiangchai Musilin laoren tang de tongku'' [Mosque in Gansu
demolished just after being built, elderly Muslims lie on the ground
and weep], Bitter Winter, April 12, 2019.
\18\ Liwei Wu, ``Love Allah, Love China,'' Foreign Policy, March
25, 2019; Meng Yihua, ``Three Hui Mosques Raided in China's Yunnan
Province,'' Muslim News, January 25, 2019.
\19\ Zhao Yusha, ``Gansu Shuts Down Arabic School over
Regulations,'' Global Times, December 4, 2018; Mimi Lau, ``Chinese
Arabic School to Close as Areas with Muslim Populations Are Urged to
Study the Xinjiang Way,'' South China Morning Post, December 9, 2018;
Chun Han Wong, ``China Applies Xinjiang's Policing Lessons to Other
Muslim Areas,'' Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2018.
\20\ James Palmer, ``China's Muslims Brace for Attacks,'' Foreign
Policy, January 5, 2019; Liu Caiyu, ``Gansu Removes 4 Halal-Linked
Standards to Curb Religious Extremism,'' Global Times, December 17,
2018; ``China: `Arabic-Sounding' River Renamed to Curb Islamic
Influence,'' Al Jazeera, October 2, 2018; Liwei Wu, ``Love Allah, Love
China,'' Foreign Policy, March 25, 2019. See also Liu Caiyu, ``Islamic
Communities Urged to Uphold Sinicization, Improve Political Stance,''
Global Times, January 6, 2019; Nectar Gan, ``Beijing Plans to Continue
Tightening Grip on Christianity and Islam as China Pushes Ahead with
the `Sinicisation of Religion,' '' South China Morning Post, March 6,
2019; Sam McNeil, ``Hui Poet Fears for His People as China `Sinicizes'
Religion,'' Associated Press, December 28, 2018.
\21\ Huizhong Wu, ``Sign of the Times: China's Capital Orders
Arabic, Muslim Symbols Taken Down,'' Reuters, July 31, 2019.
\22\ See, e.g., CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 139;
CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5 2017, 148-49.
\23\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Police Hold Another Ethnic Mongolian
Writer over Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, April 16, 2019; Southern
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Two More WeChat Group
Administrators Detained,'' April 26, 2019.
\24\ ``Chinese Police Hold Another Ethnic Mongolian Writer over
Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, April 16, 2019; ``Nei menggu duo wei mumin
shangfang bei juliu Neimeng xuexiao jinggao bu de wangyi lingdao ren''
[Many herder petitioners detained in Inner Mongolia, Inner Mongolian
school warned against discussing leaders], Radio Free Asia, April 8,
2019.
\25\ ``Chinese Police Hold Another Ethnic Mongolian Writer over
Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, April 16, 2019; ``Nei menggu duo wei mumin
shangfang bei juliu Neimeng xuexiao jinggao bu de wangyi lingdao ren''
[Many herder petitioners detained in Inner Mongolia, Inner Mongolian
school warned against discussing leaders], Radio Free Asia, April 8,
2019.
\26\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Two More
WeChat Group Administrators Detained,'' April 26, 2019; ``Two More
Ethnic Mongolians Jailed in China, WeChat Groups Deleted,'' Radio Free
Asia, April 26, 2019.
\27\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Two More
WeChat Group Administrators Detained,'' April 26, 2019; ``Two More
Ethnic Mongolians Jailed in China, WeChat Groups Deleted,'' Radio Free
Asia, April 26, 2019.
\28\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Two More
WeChat Group Administrators Detained,'' April 26, 2019; ``Two More
Ethnic Mongolians Jailed in China, WeChat Groups Deleted,'' Radio Free
Asia, April 26, 2019.
\29\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Writer
Tried behind Closed Doors as `National Separatist,' Pending Sentence,''
April 11, 2019; ``China Tries Ethnic Mongolian Historian for Genocide
Book, in Secret,'' Radio Free Asia, April 12, 2019. For more
information on Lhamjab Borjigin, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2019-00105.
\30\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Southern
Mongolian Writer Faces Charges of `National Separatism' and `Sabotaging
National Unity,' '' July 23, 2018; ``Neimeng qi xun zuojia jiu zuo
fanyi Hanzi zao qingsuan dangju ni yi fenlie zui qisu'' [Inner
Mongolian writer in his seventies faces criticism for older Chinese
translation work, authorities plan to indict him for separatism], Radio
Free Asia, July 23, 2018; ``China Holds Ethnic Mongolian Historian Who
Wrote `Genocide' Book,'' Radio Free Asia, July 23, 2018.
\31\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Writer
Placed under Criminal Detention for Defending Herders' Rights,'' April
16, 2019; ``Chinese Police Hold Another Ethnic Mongolian Writer over
Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, April 16, 2019.
\32\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Writer
Placed under Criminal Detention for Defending Herders' Rights,'' April
16, 2019; ``Chinese Police Hold Another Ethnic Mongolian Writer over
Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, April 16, 2019.
\33\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Writer
Placed under Criminal Detention for Defending Herders' Rights,'' April
16, 2019.
\34\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Activist
Placed under Criminal Detention for `Picking Quarrels and Provoking
Troubles,' '' April 19, 2019; ``Third Ethnic Mongolian Writer Held in
China's Inner Mongolia,'' Radio Free Asia, April 22, 2019.
\35\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Activist
Placed under Criminal Detention for `Picking Quarrels and Provoking
Troubles,' '' April 19, 2019; ``Third Ethnic Mongolian Writer Held in
China's Inner Mongolia,'' Radio Free Asia, April 22, 2019.
\36\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Activist
Placed under Criminal Detention for `Picking Quarrels and Provoking
Troubles,' '' April 19, 2019; ``Third Ethnic Mongolian Writer Held in
China's Inner Mongolia,'' Radio Free Asia, April 22, 2019.
Population
Control
Population
Control
Population Control
Findings
To address demographic concerns and spur
population growth, the Chinese Communist Party and
government relaxed the family planning policy in 2016
to allow all married couples to have two children. The
``universal two-child policy,'' however, remained a
birth limit policy, and the Commission continued to
observe reports of official coercion committed against
women and their families during this reporting year.
Chinese authorities threatened or imposed punishments
on families for illegal pregnancies and births, using
methods including heavy fines, job termination, and
abortion.
Chinese authorities implemented the
``universal two-child policy'' for a fourth consecutive
year in 2019, and the latest government statistics
showed that the policy's effect was limited. The
National Bureau of Statistics of China data showed that
the total number of births in 2018--reportedly the
lowest since 1961--dropped by 2 million in comparison
to the 2017 figure. This decline is much larger than
what some population experts had predicted. In 2018,
China's fertility rate remained around 1.6 births per
woman, below the replacement rate of 2.1 births per
woman necessary to maintain a stable population. The
birth rate was 10.94 per 1,000 persons, reportedly the
lowest since 1949 when the People's Republic of China
was founded. The working-age population continued its
seventh consecutive decline by 4.7 million, while the
elderly population increased by 8.59 million. China's
overall sex ratio in 2018 was 104.64 males to 100
females, and there were approximately 31.64 million
more males than females in China.
This reporting year, central government
authorities rejected calls to end birth restrictions,
despite population experts and National People's
Congress delegates voicing demographic, economic, and
human rights concerns over China's population control
policies. Experts urged the Chinese government to
implement policies, including financial incentives and
other forms of assistance, to encourage couples to have
children. If not adequately addressed, China's decades-
long birth limit policies and resultant demographic
challenges could weaken China's economy and political
stability.
The Chinese government's restrictive family
planning policies have exacerbated China's sex ratio
imbalance, which reportedly has fueled the demand for
foreign women and resulted in human trafficking for
forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.
Four decades of China's population control
policies combined with a traditional preference for
sons may have encouraged a black market for illegal
adoptions. This past year, the Commission observed a
new trend in which pregnant foreign women sold their
newborn children in China for illegal adoption.
One former mass internment camp detainee in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) alleged
that authorities sterilized her without her knowledge
while she was in detention. Two former detainees
reported that camp authorities forced female detainees
to take unknown medications and injected them with
unknown substances, after which the women ceased
menstruating.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Highlight the looming demographic challenges
currently facing China in bilateral meetings with
Chinese government officials--including a rapidly aging
population, shrinking workforce, and sex ratio
imbalance; and emphasize that these demographic trends
could harm China's economy if not addressed in a timely
manner by ending as soon as possible all birth
restrictions imposed on families.
Use authorities provided in the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 2000 (Public Law No. 106-113) and
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(Public Law No. 114-328) to deny entry into the United
States and impose sanctions against Chinese officials
who have been directly involved in the formulation,
implementation, or enforcement of China's coercive
family planning policies, including those who have
forced men and women to undergo sterilizations and
abortions.
Call on China's central and local governments to
vigorously enforce provisions of Chinese law that
provide for punishment of officials and other
individuals who engage in these abuses.
Publicly link, with supporting evidence, the sex
ratio imbalance exacerbated by China's population
control policies with regional humanitarian and
security concerns--human trafficking, crime, increased
internal and external migration, and other possible
serious social, economic, and political problems--and
discuss and address these issues in bilateral and
multilateral dialogues.
Call on officials in the XUAR to address allegations
of the forced sterilization of mass internment camp
detainees; and call on officials to respond to accounts
that authorities subjected female camp detainees to the
forced injection of unknown substances and forced
ingestion of unknown medication that disrupted their
menstrual cycles.
Population
Control
Population
Control
Population Control
International Standards and China's Coercive Population Policies
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year, Chinese
authorities continued to implement coercive population control
policies that violate international standards. Starting in
2016, the Chinese Communist Party and government relaxed birth
restrictions and implemented the ``universal two-child
policy.'' \1\ The ``universal two-child policy,'' however,
continued to impose birth limits as the PRC Population and
Family Planning Law and provincial-level regulations restrict
married couples to having two children.\2\ Exceptions allowing
for additional children exist for couples who meet certain
criteria, which vary by province, including some exceptions for
ethnic minorities,\3\ remarried couples, and couples who have
children with disabilities.\4\ Despite population experts and
National People's Congress delegates voicing their concerns
over China's population policy on demographic and human rights
grounds, central government authorities rejected calls to end
birth limits during this reporting year.\5\ Local-level
officials reportedly continued to enforce compliance with
family planning policies using methods including heavy
fines,\6\ job termination,\7\ and coerced abortion.\8\
Coercive controls imposed on women and their families, as
well as additional abuses engendered by China's population and
family planning system, violate standards set forth in the 1995
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the 1994
Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on
Population and Development.\9\ China was a state participant in
the negotiation and adoption of both documents.\10\ Acts of
official coercion committed in the implementation of population
control policies also contravene provisions of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment,\11\ which China has ratified.\12\
Coercive Implementation and Punishment for Noncompliance
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year, the Commission
continued to observe reports of coercive enforcement of family
planning policies. The PRC Population and Family Planning Law
contains provisions that prohibit officials from infringing
upon the ``legitimate rights and interests'' of citizens while
implementing family planning policies.\13\ Some provincial-
level population planning regulations, however, continued to
explicitly instruct officials to carry out abortions--often
referred to as ``remedial measures'' (bujiu cuoshi)--for
unsanctioned pregnancies.\14\ Some local government authorities
emphasized in official reports the need to prevent and control
illegal pregnancies and births, and instructed family planning
officials to carry out the invasive ``three inspections''
(intrauterine device (IUD), pregnancy, and health inspections)
and ``four procedures'' (IUD insertion, first trimester
abortion, mid- to late-term abortion, and sterilization).\15\
For example, a government report from Dalu township, Qionghai
city, Hainan province, stated that local authorities carried
out in total 264 ``four procedures'' operations in 2018.\16\
The same report also touted that local authorities had a
success rate of 83 percent in detecting pregnancies within the
first six months of the gestation period and reached 100.5
percent of their family planning work targets.\17\
Chinese authorities also continued to use various methods
of punishment to enforce citizens' compliance with family
planning policies. In accordance with national-level legal
provisions,\18\ local provisions and governments have directed
officials to punish noncompliance through heavy fines, termed
``social compensation fees'' (shehui fuyang fei), which are
often much greater than the average annual income in localities
across China.\19\ In addition to fines, officials imposed or
threatened other punishments for family planning violations
that included job termination \20\ and abortion.\21\ The PRC
Population and Family Planning Law prohibits, and provides
punishments for, infringement by officials on citizens'
personal, property, and other rights while implementing family
planning policies.\22\
CASES OF COERCION
In March 2019, authorities in Yuncheng district, Yunfu
municipality, Guangdong province, reportedly dismissed a female
public school teacher, surnamed Xie, from her job for giving
birth to a third child in violation of China's two-child
policy.\23\ Earlier in December 2018, authorities also
dismissed Xie's husband from his job, reportedly leaving the
family in a dire financial situation.\24\ Xie became pregnant
in June 2018, and local authorities from various government
agencies pressured her--a total of 14 times--to terminate her
pregnancy or face losing her job.\25\ Xie refused and gave
birth to her third child in January 2019.\26\ She argued that
authorities' administrative actions were illegal and violated
several provincial and national laws and regulations.\27\ As of
June 2019, the Commission had not observed any update on the
case.
According to Chinese and international reports, shortly
before the lunar new year in January 2019, local authorities in
Chengwu county, Heze municipality, Shandong province, froze the
financial accounts and work pay of a couple surnamed Wang,
because they had failed to pay ``social compensation fees'' in
the amount of 64,626 yuan (approximately US$9,500).\28\ The
couple, however, had approximately 23,000 yuan (approximately
US$3,300) in their accounts, with the remaining balance still
due.\29\ Authorities had fined the couple for the January 2017
birth of their third child, which violated national law and
local family planning regulations.\30\ The Wangs were
reportedly in a dire financial situation as a result of the
account freeze.\31\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report of Forced Sterilization in Mass Internment Camps in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mihrigul Tursun. According to international media, authorities in the
XUAR forcibly sterilized ethnic Uyghur Mihrigul Tursun without her
knowledge while she was detained in a mass internment camp in the XUAR.
Authorities detained Tursun three times in mass internment camps and
other facilities, for a total of 10 months.\32\ Tursun said authorities
at a mass internment camp where she was held forced her and other
detainees to swallow unknown pills and drink ``some kind of white
liquid,'' and injected them with unknown substances.\33\ According to
Tursun, the white liquid halted menstruation in some detainees and
caused severe bleeding in others.\34\ Following her release from
custody \35\ and arrival in the United States, doctors confirmed that
she had been sterilized.\36\ Gulbahar Jelilova, an ethnic Uyghur woman
detained in a mass internment camp in the XUAR, also said that doctors
repeatedly injected female detainees with an unknown substance that
stopped their menstruation.\37\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Universal Two-Child Policy
To address demographic challenges facing China, the Party
and government implemented the ``universal two-child policy''
in 2016 to boost population growth,\38\ but government
statistics showed that the policy's effect was limited. In
2016, the former National Health and Family Planning Commission
had predicted that the universal two-child policy would result
in population growth,\39\ with an estimated total of 17.5 to 21
million children born per year during the 13th Five-Year Plan
period (2016-2020).\40\ According to a January 2019 National
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) report, however, the number
of total births in 2018 was 15.23 million--reportedly the
lowest since 1961 \41\--showing a decline of 2 million births
in comparison to the 2017 figure of 17.23 million.\42\ This
decline is much larger than the range of 300,000 to 800,000
annual drop that some population experts predicted.\43\ Yi
Fuxian, a prominent U.S.-based demographic expert, disagreed
with the official NBS report and suggested that the total
births in 2018 may have been as low as 10.3 million.\44\
Some experts argued that the universal two-child policy did
have a short-term effect of encouraging births and stabilizing
the birth rate.\45\ This effect was evidenced by the one-time
increase of 1.31 million births in 2016, and in the first few
years of the ``universal two-child policy,'' over 50 percent of
new births reportedly were second children.\46\ Experts noted,
however, that these phenomena were likely caused by a temporary
``pile-up effect,'' as many women nearing the end of their
childbearing age rushed to give birth to a second child after
the two-child policy became effective in 2016.\47\ As this
``pile-up effect'' is unsustainable, experts predicted that
beginning in 2018, the annual newborn population would rapidly
decline further.\48\ Some experts attributed the decline in
births to the shrinking number of women of childbearing age
\49\ and the reluctance on the part of many married couples to
have children owing to concerns such as the high cost of
rearing a child,\50\ the lack of adequate child care and
education options,\51\ and the potential disruption to career
development.\52\
As the ``universal two-child policy'' failed to boost
population growth for a second consecutive year, population
experts and National People's Congress (NPC) delegates, citing
demographic and economic challenges, as well as human rights
concerns, called on the Chinese government to end all birth
restrictions imposed on Chinese families. Experts noted that
China's decades-long birth limit policies and resultant
demographic challenges, which include a rapidly aging
population and a shrinking workforce, could weaken China's
economy and political stability.\53\ Falling fertility in the
past two years shows that the existing universal two-child
policy may not adequately mitigate China's demographic
challenges, causing experts and NPC delegates to call on
Chinese authorities to abolish all birth restrictions.\54\
Experts also warned that even if all birth restrictions are
removed, it may not stop the trend of a falling birth rate and
population decline, especially if it is not supplemented by
policies that encourage births.\55\ Experts urged the Chinese
government to provide financial incentives, such as tax breaks,
subsidies, and other forms of assistance to encourage couples
to have more children.\56\
In addition to demographic concerns, some experts also
emphasized that Chinese government authorities should respect
and protect citizens' human rights and not intrude on their
private reproductive lives.\57\ In an August 2018 China Daily
interview, Zhang Juwei, Director of the Institute of Population
and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
said that it is ``inappropriate'' to control population size
for the sake of ``boosting economic and social development . .
. because reproductive rights are the fundamental rights of
families.'' \58\
This past year, central government authorities rejected
calls to end all birth restrictions imposed on Chinese
families. In a written statement posted in January 2019, the
National Health Commission (NHC) rejected an NPC recommendation
of abolishing the birth limit policy, stating that ``it is not
appropriate to immediately and completely remove the `family
planning [policy],' '' as it is still a law and policy mandated
in China's Constitution.\59\ In a separate response to the NPC,
the NHC reiterated that Chinese family planning authorities
will continue to impose ``social compensation fees'' on couples
who violate the two-child policy.\60\
Demographic and Humanitarian Consequences of Population Control
Policies
Four decades of population control policies have
exacerbated China's demographic challenges, which include a
rapidly aging population, shrinking workforce, and sex ratio
imbalance. Affected in recent decades by government
restrictions on the number of births per couple, China's total
fertility rate has dropped from approximately 3 births per
woman in the late 1970s \61\ to an estimated 1.6 births per
woman in 2018, below the replacement rate of 2.1 births per
woman necessary to maintain a stable population.\62\ Some
reports suggested that the fertility rate in 2018 may have been
as low as 1.02 births per woman.\63\ In addition, the National
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) reported that China's birth
rate in 2018 was 10.94 per 1,000 persons in the population,
reportedly the lowest since the founding of the People's
Republic of China in 1949.\64\
China's low fertility rate and birth rate have contributed
to a rapidly aging population and a shrinking workforce.
According to the NBS, from 2017 to 2018, China's working-age
population (persons between the ages of 16 and 59) declined by
4.7 million to 897.29 million, continuing a downward trend for
a seventh consecutive year.\65\ During the same period, the
elderly population (persons aged 60 or older) increased by 8.59
million in 2018 to 249.49 million, or 17.9 percent of the total
population.\66\ According to the State Council National
Population Development Plan (2016-2030), China's working-age
population is expected to decline rapidly from 2021 to 2030,
while the elderly population will increase markedly during the
same period and is predicted to reach a quarter of the
population by 2030.\67\ By 2050, the elderly population is
expected to account for approximately one-third of China's
total population,\68\ while the working-age population is
expected to decrease by 200 million.\69\ These demographic
trends reportedly may burden China's healthcare, social
services, and pension systems,\70\ and could bring adverse
effects to China's economy.\71\
The Chinese government's restrictive family planning
policies have also exacerbated China's sex ratio imbalance,
which reportedly fueled the demand for foreign women and
contributed to human trafficking. Although Chinese authorities
continued to implement a ban on ``non-medically necessary sex
determination and sex-selective abortion,'' \72\ some people
reportedly continued the practice in keeping with a traditional
cultural preference for sons.\73\ According to a January 2019
NBS report, China's overall sex ratio in 2018 was 104.64 males
to 100 females, and there were approximately 31.64 million more
males than females in China (713.51 million males to 681.87
million females).\74\ The NBS reported that the sex ratio at
birth (SRB) in 2015 was 113.51 males to 100 females,\75\ but it
did not provide statistics on the SRB since 2016 when the
universal two-child policy was implemented.\76\ Demographic
experts have long expressed concerns that the sex ratio
imbalance in China could lead to an increase in crime,\77\
trafficking of women,\78\ and social instability.\79\ This past
year, international media reports continued to suggest a link
between China's sex ratio imbalance and the trafficking of
foreign women--from countries including Burma (Myanmar),
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, and Vietnam--into China
for forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation.\80\ [For
more information on cross-border trafficking, see Section II--
Human Trafficking.]
Decades of birth limits under China's population control
policies combined with a traditional preference for sons may
also have encouraged a black market for illegal adoptions.\81\
This reporting year, the Commission observed a new trend in
which foreign women sold their newborn children in China for
illegal adoption.\82\ According to Vietnamese news media
reports, Vietnamese authorities detained and investigated
individuals suspected of moving pregnant women across the
border into China to sell newborn children.\83\ In the
Vietnamese province of Nghe An alone, there were at least 27
pregnant women who had traveled to China to sell their newborns
in 2018.\84\ [For inconsistencies in the definition of ``human
trafficking'' between Chinese law and international standards,
see Section II--Human Trafficking.]
Population
Control
Population
Control
Notes to Section II--Population Control
\1\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``2016 nian 12
yue 12 ri Guojia Weisheng Jishengwei lixing xinwen fabuhui wenzi
shilu'' [National Health and Family Planning Commission regular press
conference text record], December 12, 2016; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC Population and Family Planning Law],
passed December 29, 2001, amended December 27, 2015, effective January
1, 2016, art. 18.
\2\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC
Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended
December 27, 2015, effective January 1, 2016, art. 18. Article 18 of
the Population and Family Planning Law provides that ``the state
advocates two children per married couple.'' For provincial population
regulations that require couples be married to have children and limit
them to bearing two children, see, e.g., Fujian Province People's
Congress Standing Committee, Fujian Sheng Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu
Tiaoli [Fujian Province Population and Family Planning Regulations],
issued April 29, 1988, amended November 24, 2017, arts. 8, 12; Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee, Guangxi
Zhuangzu Zizhiqu Renkou He Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli [Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region Population and Family Planning Regulations], issued
March 23, 2012, effective June 1, 2012, amended January 15, 2016, art.
13.
\3\ See, e.g., Fujian Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Fujian Sheng Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli [Fujian Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations], issued April 29, 1988,
amended November 24, 2017, art. 9(4)-(5); Heilongjiang Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Heilongjiang Sheng Renkou Yu
Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli [Heilongjiang Province Population and Family
Planning Regulations], issued October 18, 2002, effective January 1,
2003, amended April 21, 2016, art. 13.
\4\ For provincial population planning provisions that allow these
exceptions for having an additional child, see, e.g., Fujian Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Fujian Sheng Renkou Yu Jihua
Shengyu Tiaoli [Fujian Province Population and Family Planning
Regulations], issued April 29, 1988, amended November 24, 2017, art.
9(1)-(3); Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing
Committee, Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu Renkou He Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli
[Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Population and Family Planning
Regulations], issued March 23, 2012, effective June 1, 2012, amended
January 15, 2016, art. 14(1)-(5); Jiangxi Province People's Congress
Standing Committee, Jiangxi Sheng Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli
[Jiangxi Province Population and Family Planning Regulations], issued
June 16, 1990, amended January 20, 2016, art. 9(2)-(3).
\5\ National Health Commission, ``Dui Shisan Jie Renda Yici Huiyi
di 1949 hao jianyi de dafu'' [Reply to 13th NPC First Session's
suggestion no. 1949], January 8, 2019; ``Zhongguo shengyu lu quanqiu
dao shu quanmian kaifang reng yaoyao wuqi (xia)'' [China's fertility
rate lowest in the world, is the end of family planning policy still
distant? (part 2)], Radio Free Asia, January 25, 2019; Christopher
Bodeen, ``China's Leaders Want More Babies, but Local Officials
Resist,'' Associated Press, February 19, 2019.
\6\ See, e.g., Michelle Wong, ``China's Two-Child Policy Under Fire
as Parents' Bank Account Frozen for Having Third Child,'' South China
Morning Post, February 14, 2019; Luo Fa, ``Zhongguo yan'ge shixing er
tai zhengce Shandong fufu sheng san tai zao fa'' [China strictly
implements two-child policy, Shandong couple punished for giving birth
to a third child], Deutsche Welle, February 18, 2019.
\7\ See, e.g., Dashan, ``Guangdong: nu jiaoshi san tai, fuqi
shuangshuang kaichu, 3 ge haizi 4 ge laoren, juejing'' [Guangdong:
female teacher had three children, husband and wife both fired, 3
children and 4 elderly family members in dire situation], China 50
Plus, April 3, 2019. See also Xie Zhengling, ``Huai di san hai bei
citui'' [Fired for bearing a third child], Worker Online, Southern
Daily, January 10, 2019.
\8\ See, e.g., Dashan, ``Guangdong: nu jiaoshi san tai, fuqi
shuangshuang kaichu, 3 ge haizi 4 ge laoren, juejing'' [Guangdong:
female teacher had three children, husband and wife both fired, 3
children and 4 elderly family members in dire situation], China 50
Plus, April 3, 2019. See also Xie Zhengling, ``Huai di san hai bei
citui'' [Fired for bearing a third child], Worker Online, Southern
Daily, January 10, 2019.
\9\ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the
Fourth World Conference on Women on September 15, 1995, and endorsed by
UN General Assembly resolution 50/203 on December 22, 1995, Annex I,
paras. 9, 17. The Beijing Declaration states that governments which
participated in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their
commitment to ``[e]nsure the full implementation of the human rights of
women and of the girl child as an inalienable, integral and indivisible
part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms'' (Annex I, para. 9)
and ``[t]he explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all
women to control all aspects of their health, in particular their own
fertility, is basic to their empowerment'' (Annex I, para. 17).
Programme of Action adopted by the Cairo International Conference on
Population and Development on September 13, 1994, paras. 7.2, 8.25.
Paragraph 7.2 states, ``Reproductive health therefore implies that
people . . . have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide
if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are
the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe,
effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of
their choice . . ..'' Paragraph 8.25 states, ``In no case should
abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.'' For coercive
controls imposed on Chinese women and their families, see, e.g., Sha
Heshang de Weibo (@Shaheshangdeweibo01), ``Guangdong Yufun shi nuzi
sheng san tai, fuqi shuangshuang bei kaichu'' [A woman in Yunfu
municipality, Guangdong, gave birth to three children, husband and wife
both dismissed from jobs], Weibo post, March 26, 2019; Michelle Wong,
``China's Two-Child Policy Under Fire as Parents' Bank Account Frozen
for Having Third Child,'' South China Morning Post, February 14, 2019.
\10\ United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, September 15, 1995, chap. II, para. 3;
chap. VI, para. 12. China was one of the participating States at the
Fourth World Conference on Women, which adopted the Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action. United Nations Population Information Network,
Report of the International Conference on Population and Development
(ICPD), A/CONF.171/13, October 18, 1994, 271. China was one of the
participating States at the ICPD, which reached a general agreement on
the Programme of Action.
\11\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987,
art. 1; UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3,
2016, para. 51. In 2016, the UN Committee against Torture noted its
concern regarding ``reports of coerced sterilization and forced
abortions, and . . . the lack of information on the number of
investigations into such allegations . . . [and] the lack of
information regarding redress provided to victims of past violations.''
For acts of coercion committed in the implementation of population
planning policies, see, e.g., Dashan, ``Guangdong: nu jiaoshi san tai,
fuqi shuangshuang kaichu, 3 ge haizi 4 ge laoren, juejing'' [Guangdong:
female teacher had three children, husband and wife both fired, 3
children and 4 elderly family members in dire situation], China 50
Plus, April 3, 2019. See also Xie Zhengling, ``Huai di san hai bei
citui'' [Fired for bearing a third child], Worker Online, Southern
Daily, January 10, 2019; Luo Fa, ``Zhongguo yan'ge shixing er tai
zhengce Shandong fufu sheng san tai zao fa'' [China strictly implements
two-child policy, Shandong couple punished for giving birth to a third
child], Deutsche Welle, February 18, 2019.
\12\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, accessed May 14, 2019. China signed the
Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
\13\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC
Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended
December 27, 2015, effective January 1, 2016, arts. 4, 39.
\14\ He Yafu, ``Cha dian bei duotai de Deng Chao he Zhao Ruirui''
[Deng Chao and Zhao Ruirui who were almost aborted], CNPOP, February 9,
2014. For examples of provincial-level population planning regulations
instructing officials to carry out abortions, see Jiangxi Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Jiangxi Sheng Renkou Yu Jihua
Shengyu Tiaoli [Jiangxi Province Population and Family Planning
Regulations], issued June 16, 1990, amended and effective May 31, 2018,
art. 15; Hubei Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Hubei
Sheng Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli [Hubei Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations], issued December 1, 2002, amended and
effective January 13, 2016, art. 12.
\15\ See, e.g., ``Chen Zhongyi zai Xide xian ducha tuo pin gong
jian shi qiangdiao: jia kuai anquan zhufang jianshe zhua hao tuchu
wenti zhenggai qianfang baiji quebao wancheng niandu jian pin renwu''
[Chen Zhongyi inspects [work] on poverty allievation in Xide county and
emphasizes: accelerate construction of safe housing, focus on
rectification of problems, use all means necessary to ensure completion
of annual poverty alleviation tasks], Liangshan Daily, reprinted in
Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture Poverty and Immigration Bureau,
November 16, 2018; Ju'nan County People's Government, ``Laopo Zhen
Jisheng Ban gongzuo zhize'' [Laopo Township Family Planning Office job
responsibilities], November 27, 2018; Dalu Township People's
Government, ``Dalu zhen 2018 niandu zhengfu gongzuo baogao'' [Dalu
township 2018 government work report], reprinted in Qionghai Municipal
People's Government, January 23, 2019. See also Ma Jian, Women's Rights
in China, ``Nongcun jihua shengyu zhong de `san cha' qingkuang
diaocha'' [Investigation into the ``three inspections'' of rural family
planning], reprinted in Boxun, April 15, 2009; Yu Han, ``Jihua shengyu
qiangzhi jiezha renliu hai ku le Zhongguo ren'' [Chinese people suffer
from family planning [policy's] forced sterilizations and abortions],
Tencent, June 15, 2012.
\16\ Dalu Township People's Government, ``Dalu zhen 2018 niandu
zhengfu gongzuo baogao'' [Dalu township 2018 government work report],
reprinted in Qionghai Municipal People's Government, January 23, 2019.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ State Council, Shehui Fuyang Fei Zhengshou Guanli Banfa
[Measures for Administration of Collection of Social Compensation
Fees], issued August 2, 2002, effective September 1, 2002, arts. 3, 7;
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC Population
and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended December
27, 2015, effective January 1, 2016, arts. 18, 41.
\19\ For a list of provincial-level provisions that mandate
collection of ``social compensation fees,'' see ``2018 nian shehui
fuyang fei zhengshou biaozhun yu zui xin guiding'' [2018 social
compensation fee collection standards and newest provisions], Shebao
Chaxun Wang, January 15, 2018. For an example of a local government
that collected or demanded collection of ``social compensation fees''
during this reporting year, see, e.g., Luo Fa, ``Zhongguo yan'ge
shixing er tai zhengce Shandong fufu sheng san tai zao fa'' [China
strictly implements two-child policy, Shandong couple punished for
giving birth to a third child], Deutsche Welle, February 18, 2019.
``Social compensation fees'' are also known as ``social maintenance
fees.''
\20\ See, e.g., Dashan, ``Guangdong: nu jiaoshi san tai, fuqi
shuangshuang kaichu, 3 ge haizi 4 ge laoren, juejing'' [Guangdong:
female teacher had three children, husband and wife both fired, 3
children and 4 elderly family members in dire situation], China 50
Plus, April 3, 2019. See also Xie Zhengling, ``Huai di san hai bei
citui'' [Fired for bearing a third child], Worker Online, Southern
Daily, January 10, 2019.
\21\ See, e.g., Dashan, ``Guangdong: nu jiaoshi san tai, fuqi
shuangshuang kaichu, 3 ge haizi 4 ge laoren, juejing'' [Guangdong:
female teacher had three children, husband and wife both fired, 3
children and 4 elderly family members in dire situation], China 50
Plus, April 3, 2019. See also Xie Zhengling, ``Huai di san hai bei
citui'' [Fired for bearing a third child], Worker Online, Southern
Daily, January 10, 2019.
\22\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC
Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended
December 27, 2015, effective January 1, 2016, arts. 4, 39(1)-(2).
Article 4 of the PRC Population and Family Planning Law states that
officials ``shall perform their family planning work duties strictly in
accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and
they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of
citizens.'' Article 39 states that an official is subject to criminal
or administrative punishment if he ``infringe[s] on a citizen's
personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and
interests'' or ``abuse[s] his power, neglect[s] his duty, or engage[s]
in malpractice for personal gain'' in the implementation of family
planning policies.
\23\ Dashan, ``Guangdong: nu jiaoshi san tai, fuqi shuangshuang
kaichu, 3 ge haizi 4 ge laoren, juejing'' [Guangdong: female teacher
had three children, husband and wife both fired, 3 children and 4
elderly family members in dire situation], China 50 Plus, April 3,
2019. See also Xie Zhengling, ``Huai di san hai bei citui'' [Fired for
bearing a third child], Worker Online, Southern Daily, January 10,
2019.
\24\ Dashan, ``Guangdong: nu jiaoshi san tai, fuqi shuangshuang
kaichu, 3 ge haizi 4 ge laoren, juejing'' [Guangdong: female teacher
had three children, husband and wife both fired, 3 children and 4
elderly family members in dire situation], China 50 Plus, April 3,
2019. See also Xie Zhengling, ``Huai di san hai bei citui'' [Fired for
bearing a third child], Worker Online, Southern Daily, January 10,
2019.
\25\ Dashan, ``Guangdong: nu jiaoshi san tai, fuqi shuangshuang
kaichu, 3 ge haizi 4 ge laoren, juejing'' [Guangdong: female teacher
had three children, husband and wife both fired, 3 children and 4
elderly family members in dire situation], China 50 Plus, April 3,
2019. See also Xie Zhengling, ``Huai di san hai bei citui'' [Fired for
bearing a third child], Worker Online, Southern Daily, January 10,
2019.
\26\ Dashan, ``Guangdong: nu jiaoshi san tai, fuqi shuangshuang
kaichu, 3 ge haizi 4 ge laoren, juejing'' [Guangdong: female teacher
had three children, husband and wife both fired, 3 children and 4
elderly family members in dire situation], China 50 Plus, April 3,
2019.
\27\ Ibid.
\28\ ``Shandong cunmin sheng san hai wei jiao shehui fuyang fei
Weixin lingqian bei dongjie, cun ganbu: ta jia jingji tiaojian bing bu
hao'' [Shandong villager had three children but did not pay social
compensation fees, WeChat cash account frozen, village official said
his family's financial situation not good], Jiemian, reprinted in
Guancha Net, February 13, 2019; Luo Fa, ``Zhongguo yan'ge shixing er
tai zhengce Shandong fufu sheng san tai zao fa'' [China strictly
implements two-child policy, Shandong couple punished for giving birth
to a third child], Deutsche Welle, February 18, 2019; Michelle Wong,
``China's Two-Child Policy Under Fire as Parents' Bank Account Frozen
for Having Third Child,'' South China Morning Post, February 14, 2019;
Christopher Bodeen, ``China's Leaders Want More Babies, but Local
Officials Resist,'' Associated Press, February 19, 2019.
\29\ Christopher Bodeen, ``China's Leaders Want More Babies, but
Local Officials Resist,'' Associated Press, February 19, 2019;
``Shandong cunmin sheng san hai wei jiao shehui fuyang fei Weixin
lingqian bei dongjie, cun ganbu: ta jia jingji tiaojian bing bu hao''
[Shandong villager had three children but did not pay social
compensation fees, WeChat cash account frozen, village official said
his family's financial situation not good], Jiemian, reprinted in
Guancha Net, February 13, 2019; Luo Fa, ``Zhongguo yan'ge shixing er
tai zhengce Shandong fufu sheng san tai zao fa'' [China strictly
implements two-child policy, Shandong couple punished for giving birth
to a third child], Deutsche Welle, February 18, 2019; Michelle Wong,
``China's Two-Child Policy Under Fire as Parents' Bank Account Frozen
for Having Third Child,'' South China Morning Post, February 14, 2019.
\30\ ``Shandong cunmin sheng san hai wei jiao shehui fuyang fei
Weixin lingqian bei dongjie, cun ganbu: ta jia jingji tiaojian bing bu
hao'' [Shandong villager had three children but did not pay social
compensation fees, WeChat cash account frozen, village official said
his family's financial situation not good], Jiemian, reprinted in
Guancha Net, February 13, 2019; Luo Fa, ``Zhongguo yan'ge shixing er
tai zhengce Shandong fufu sheng san tai zao fa'' [China strictly
implements two-child policy, Shandong couple punished for giving birth
to a third child], Deutsche Welle, February 18, 2019; Michelle Wong,
``China's Two-Child Policy Under Fire as Parents' Bank Account Frozen
for Having Third Child,'' South China Morning Post, February 14, 2019;
Christopher Bodeen, ``China's Leaders Want More Babies, but Local
Officials Resist,'' Associated Press, February 19, 2019.
\31\ ``Shandong cunmin sheng san hai wei jiao shehui fuyang fei
Weixin lingqian bei dongjie, cun ganbu: ta jia jingji tiaojian bing bu
hao'' [Shandong villager had three children but did not pay social
compensation fees, WeChat cash account frozen, village official said
his family's financial situation not good], Jiemian, reprinted in
Guancha Net, February 13, 2019; Luo Fa, ``Zhongguo yan'ge shixing er
tai zhengce Shandong fufu sheng san tai zao fa'' [China strictly
implements two-child policy, Shandong couple punished for giving birth
to a third child], Deutsche Welle, February 18, 2019; Michelle Wong,
``China's Two-Child Policy Under Fire as Parents' Bank Account Frozen
for Having Third Child,'' South China Morning Post, February 14, 2019;
Christopher Bodeen, ``China's Leaders Want More Babies, but Local
Officials Resist,'' Associated Press, February 19, 2019.
\32\ The Communist Party's Crackdown on Religion in China, Hearing
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 115th Cong. (2018)
(testimony of Mihrigul Tursun, Uyghur Muslim detained in Chinese mass
internment camp), 1-2, 5; Shosuke Kato and Kenji Kawase, ``Xinjiang:
What China Shows World vs. What Former Detainee Describes,'' Nikkei
Asian Review, August 10, 2019.
\33\ The Communist Party's Crackdown on Religion in China, Hearing
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 115th Cong. (2018)
(testimony of Mihrigul Tursun, Uyghur Muslim detained in Chinese mass
internment camp), 4, 5, 7; Shosuke Kato and Kenji Kawase, ``Xinjiang:
What China Shows World vs. What Former Detainee Describes,'' Nikkei
Asian Review, August 10, 2019.
\34\ The Communist Party's Crackdown on Religion in China, Hearing
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 115th Cong. (2018)
(testimony of Mihrigul Tursun, Uyghur Muslim detained in Chinese mass
internment camp), 4.
\35\ Ibid., 5.
\36\ Shosuke Kato and Kenji Kawase, ``Xinjiang: What China Shows
World vs. What Former Detainee Describes,'' Nikkei Asian Review, August
10, 2019; Shannon Molloy, ``China's Sickening Acts on Female Prisoners
at `Re-Education' Camps,'' news.com.au, August 13, 2019.
\37\ Shannon Molloy, ``China's Sickening Acts on Female Prisoners
at `Re-Education' Camps,'' news.com.au, August 13, 2019. For more
information on Gulbahar Jelilova, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2019-00032.
\38\ Noelle Mateer and Tang Ziyi, `` `Singles Tax' Furor Highlights
Sensitivity over Pressure to Have More Children,'' Caixin, November 5,
2018; ``China to Encourage Childbirth in 2019,'' Xinhua, December 22,
2018; ``China's Demographic Danger Grows as Births Fall Far Below
Forecast,'' Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2019.
\39\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Li Bin
zhuren deng jiu `shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce' da jizhe wen wenzi
shilu'' [Text record of director Li Bin and others answering
journalists' questions regarding ``implementation of the universal two-
child policy''], March 8, 2016.
\40\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Zhidaosi
fuzeren jiu 2015 nian chusheng renkou shu da Jiankang Bao, Zhongguo
Renkou Bao jizhe wen'' [Department of Community Family Planning
official answers questions from Health News and China Population Daily
journalists regarding the number of births in 2015], January 20, 2016.
\41\ ``China's Demographic Danger Grows as Births Fall Far Below
Forecast,'' Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2019; ``China Sees Fewest
Births in 2018 since Mao's Great Famine,'' Bloomberg, January 21, 2019;
Hu Chao and Meng Leilei, ``Is China Facing a Looming Population
Crisis?,'' CGTN, February 7, 2019.
\42\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2018 nian jingji
yunxing baochi zai heli qujian fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiao hao
wancheng'' [The economy moved within reasonable range in 2018, main
expected development targets were reached], January 21, 2019; National
Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Li Xiru: renkou zongliang pingwen
zengzhang chengzhenhua shuiping wenbu tigao'' [Li Xiru: total
population increases steadily, urbanization level improves steadily],
January 23, 2019. For the total number of births in 2017, see National
Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2017 nian jingji yunxing wenzhong
xianghao, hao yu yuqi'' [The economy was stable in 2017, exceeding
expectations], January 18, 2018.
\43\ Ma Danmeng and Han Wei, ``Couples Not Delivering on Beijing's
Push for Two Babies,'' Caixin, January 19, 2018; Liang Jianzhang and
Huang Wenzheng, ``Chusheng renkou xuebeng wei yao haizi jianshui he
butie'' [Birth population avalanche: cut taxes and provide subsidies to
encourage having more children], Caixin, January 18, 2018; ``China's
Declining Birth Rate Requires Policy Change,'' Xinhua, January 25,
2018.
\44\ ``Zhongguo shengyu lu quanqiu dao shu quanmian kaifang reng
yaoyao wuqi? (xia)'' [China's fertility rate lowest in the world, is
the end of family planning policy still distant? (Part 2)], Radio Free
Asia, January 25, 2019.
\45\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``China's Number of Births Just Keeps
Dropping,'' The Diplomat, November 1, 2018; Liang Jianzhang and Huang
Wenzhang, ``Opinion: China's Demographic Crisis Is a Reality,'' Caixin,
January 25, 2019; Asa Butcher, ``Birth Rate Drops in China for Third
Consecutive Year since Child Policy Change,'' GB Times, January 4,
2019; Cao Siqi, ``China Births Dip in 2018,'' Global Times, January 1,
2019.
\46\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``China's Number of Births Just Keeps
Dropping,'' The Diplomat, November 1, 2018; Liang Jianzhang and Huang
Wenzhang, ``Opinion: China's Demographic Crisis Is a Reality,'' Caixin,
January 25, 2019; Asa Butcher, ``Birth Rate Drops in China for Third
Consecutive Year since Child Policy Change,'' GB Times, January 4,
2019; Cao Siqi, ``China Births Dip in 2018,'' Global Times, January 1,
2019; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 154.
\47\ Liang Jianzhang and Huang Wenzhang, ``Opinion: China's
Demographic Crisis Is a Reality,'' Caixin, January 25, 2019; Shannon
Tiezzi, ``China's Number of Births Just Keeps Dropping,'' The Diplomat,
November 1, 2018; ``Zhongguo weilai ji nian xin sheng renkou yuji chixu
xiajiang'' [China's newborn population expected to continue declining
in the next few years], Voice of America, November 1, 2018.
\48\ Liang Jianzhang and Huang Wenzhang, ``Opinion: China's
Demographic Crisis Is a Reality,'' Caixin, January 25, 2019; Cao Siqi,
``China Births Dip in 2018,'' Global Times, January 1, 2019; Shannon
Tiezzi, ``China's Number of Births Just Keeps Dropping,'' The Diplomat,
November 1, 2018.
\49\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``China's Number of Births Just Keeps
Dropping,'' The Diplomat, November 1, 2018; Asa Butcher, ``Birth Rate
Drops in China for Third Consecutive Year since Child Policy Change,''
GB Times, January 4, 2019; Hu Chao and Meng Leilei, ``Is China Facing a
Looming Population Crisis?,'' CGTN, February 7, 2019.
\50\ Hu Chao and Meng Leilei, ``Is China Facing a Looming
Population Crisis?,'' CGTN, February 7, 2019; Wang Xiaodong,
``Birthrate's Continued Fall Triggers Search for Ways to Grow
Families,'' China Daily, March 18, 2019; Marcus Roberts, ``The
Bifurcation of Chinese Family Planning Policy,'' Mercator Net, February
26, 2019.
\51\ Wang Xiaodong, ``Birthrate's Continued Fall Triggers Search
for Ways to Grow Families,'' China Daily, March 18, 2019; ``China
Facing Shortage of Child Care Services,'' Xinhua, April 3, 2019;
``China to Encourage Childbirth in 2019,'' Xinhua, December 22, 2018.
\52\ Wang Xiaodong, ``Birthrate's Continued Fall Triggers Search
for Ways to Grow Families,'' China Daily, March 18, 2019; Echo Huang,
``China in 2018 Saw Its Fewest Births in More than Half a Century,''
Quartz, January 21, 2019; ``Family Support, Career Prospects Top
Concerns for Having Second Child: Newspaper,'' Xinhua, January 23,
2019.
\53\ ``China's Demographic Danger Grows as Births Fall Far Below
Forecast,'' Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2019; ``China Sees Fewest
Births in 2018 since Mao's Great Famine,'' Bloomberg, January 21, 2019;
Zhou Minxi, ``Young, Middle Class and Childless: Behind China's
Declining Birth Rates,'' CGTN, January 30, 2019; Tom Clifford, ``China
Faces Economic Headwinds from Shrinking Population,'' International
Policy Digest, March 27, 2019.
\54\ Steven Lee Myers and Claire Fu, ``A Flurry of Ideas to Reverse
China's Declining Birthrate, but Will Beijing Listen?,'' New York
Times, March 13, 2019; Teng Jing Xuan, ``Will a Boom in Lucky `Pig'
Babies Reverse China's Fertility Slump?,'' Caixin, December 20, 2018;
Asa Butcher, ``Birth Rate Drops in China for Third Consecutive Year
since Child Policy Change,'' GB Times, January 4, 2019.
\55\ Liang Jianzhang and Huang Wenzhang, ``Opinion: China's
Demographic Crisis Is a Reality,'' Caixin, January 25, 2019; Steven Lee
Myers and Claire Fu, ``A Flurry of Ideas to Reverse China's Declining
Birthrate, but Will Beijing Listen?,'' New York Times, March 13, 2019;
Marcus Roberts, ``The Bifurcation of Chinese Family Planning Policy,''
Mercator Net, February 26, 2019.
\56\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``China's Number of Births Just Keeps
Dropping,'' The Diplomat, November 1, 2018; Liang Jianzhang and Huang
Wenzhang, ``Opinion: China's Demographic Crisis Is a Reality,'' Caixin,
January 25, 2019; Shi Yu, ``People-First Policy for Healthy Growth,''
China Daily, August 22, 2018.
\57\ ``Zhongguo shengyu lu quanqiu dao shu quanmian kaifang reng
yaoyao wuqi (xia)'' [China's fertility rate lowest in the world, is the
end of family planning policy still distant? (part 2)], Radio Free
Asia, January 25, 2019; Christopher Bodeen, ``China's Leaders Want More
Babies, but Local Officials Resist,'' Associated Press, February 19,
2019; Shi Yu, ``People-First Policy for Healthy Growth,'' China Daily,
August 22, 2018.
\58\ Shi Yu, ``People-First Policy for Healthy Growth,'' China
Daily, August 22, 2018.
\59\ National Health Commission, ``Dui Shisan Jie Renda Yici Huiyi
di 1949 hao jianyi de dafu'' [Reply to 13th NPC First Session's
suggestion no. 1949], January 8, 2019.
\60\ National Health Commission, ``Dui Shisan Jie Renda Yici Huiyi
di 1948 hao jianyi de dafu'' [Reply to 13th NPC First Session's
suggestion no. 1948], January 8, 2019.
\61\ World Bank, ``Fertility Rate, Total (Births Per Woman):
China,'' accessed April 3, 2019.
\62\ Central Intelligence Agency, ``World Factbook: China,''
accessed May 15, 2019; Charlie Campbell, ``China Is Preparing to End
Draconian Family Planning Measures. but That Won't Solve Its
Demographic Crisis,'' Time, August 28, 2018.
\63\ Marcus Roberts, ``The Bifurcation of Chinese Family Planning
Policy,'' Mercator Net, February 26, 2019; Christopher Bodeen,
``China's Leaders Want More Babies, but Local Officials Resist,''
Associated Press, February 19, 2019.
\64\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2018 nian jingji
yunxing baochi zai heli qujian fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiao hao
wancheng'' [The economy moved within reasonable range in 2018, main
expected development targets were reached], January 21, 2019; Tom
Clifford, ``China Faces Economic Headwinds from Shrinking Population,''
International Policy Digest, March 27, 2019; Stella Qiu, Yawen Chen,
and Ryan Woo, ``Modern China's Birth Rate Falls to Lowest Ever,''
Reuters, January 21, 2019; Central Intelligence Agency, ``World
Factbook: China,'' accessed May 15, 2019. According to the Central
Intelligence Agency, the birth rate is defined as ``the average annual
number of births during a year per 1,000 persons in the population . .
.. The birth rate is usually the dominant factor in determining the
rate of population growth.''
\65\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2018 nian jingji
yunxing baochi zai heli qujian fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiao hao
wancheng'' [The economy moved within reasonable range in 2018, main
expected development targets were reached], January 21, 2019; National
Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Li Xiru: renkou zongliang pingwen
zengzhang chengzhenhua shuiping wenbu tigao'' [Li Xiru: total
population increases steadily, urbanization level improves steadily],
January 23, 2019; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2017 nian
jingji yunxing wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi'' [The economy was stable
in 2017, exceeding expectations], January 18, 2018; ``Jisheng weiji
baofa Zhongguo 10 nian hou 2 ren gongzuo yang 1 ren'' [Family planning
crisis, in China 10 years from now, the work of 2 people will support 1
person], 21st Century Business Herald, reprinted in Boxun, January 29,
2019.
\66\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2018 nian jingji
yunxing baochi zai heli qujian fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiao hao
wancheng'' [The economy moved within reasonable range in 2018, main
expected development targets were reached], January 21, 2019; National
Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Li Xiru: renkou zongliang pingwen
zengzhang chengzhen hua shuiping wenbu tigao'' [Li Xiru: total
population increases steadily, urbanization level improves steadily],
January 23, 2019; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2017 nian
jingji yunxing wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi'' [The economy was stable
in 2017, exceeding expectations], January 18, 2018.
\67\ State Council, ``Guojia Renkou Fazhan Guihua (2016-2030
Nian)'' [National Population Development Plan (2016-2030)], issued
December 30, 2016.
\68\ Chen Jian, ``Baogao yuce, 2050 nian Zhongguo laonian xiaofei
shichang jiang da 60 wanyi yuan'' [Report predicts, China's elderly
consumer market will reach 60 trillion yuan by 2050], China News
Service, October 21, 2018; Zhu Yueying, ``Fazhan zhihui yanglao yingdui
laolinghua'' [Develop smart [ways] to care for the elderly to address
aging], People's Daily, December 6, 2018.
\69\ `` `Renkou yu Laodong Lupishu: Zhongguo Renkou yu Laodong
Wenti Baogao No. 19' fabuhui zhaokai'' [``Population and Labor Green
Paper: China's Population and Labor Issues Report No. 19'' conference
held], Social Sciences Academic Press, January 3, 2019; Tang Ziyi,
``Chart of the Day: China's Shrinking Workforce,'' Caixin, January 29,
2019.
\70\ ``Jisheng weiji baofa Zhongguo 10 nian hou 2 ren gongzuo yang
1 ren'' [Family planning crisis, in China 10 years from now, the work
of 2 people will support 1 person], 21st Century Business Herald,
reprinted in Boxun, January 29, 2019; Wang Feng and Yong Cai, ``China
Isn't Having Enough Babies,'' New York Times, February 19, 2019; David
Stanway, ``China Lawmakers Urge Freeing Up Family Planning as Birth
Rates Plunge,'' Reuters, March 12, 2019; Frank Tang, ``China's State
Pension Fund to Run Dry by 2035 as Workforce Shrinks Due to Effects of
One-Child Policy, Says Study,'' South China Morning Post, May 3, 2019.
\71\ `` `Renkou yu Laodong Lupishu: Zhongguo Renkou yu Laodong
Wenti Baogao No. 19' fabuhui zhaokai'' [``Population and Labor Green
Paper: China's Population and Labor Issues Report No. 19'' conference
held], Social Sciences Academic Press, January 3, 2019; Zhou Minxi,
``Young, Middle Class and Childless: Behind China's Declining Birth
Rates,'' CGTN, January 30, 2019; ``China's Demographic Danger Grows as
Births Fall Far Below Forecast,'' Wall Street Journal, February 9,
2019.
\72\ For national laws and regulations prohibiting the practices of
non-medically necessary gender determination testing and sex-selective
abortion, see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [PRC
Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended
December 27, 2015, effective January 1, 2016, art. 35; National Health
and Family Planning Commission et al., Jinzhi Fei Yixue Xuyao De Tai'er
Xingbie Jianding He Xuanze Xingbie Rengong Zhongzhi Renshen De Guiding
[Provisions on Prohibiting Non-Medically Necessary Sex Determination
and Sex-Selective Abortion], issued March 28, 2016, effective May 1,
2016. For provincial regulations that ban non-medically necessary sex
determination and sex-selective abortion, see, e.g., Jiangxi Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Jiangxi Sheng Renkou Yu Jihua
Shengyu Tiaoli [Jiangxi Province Population and Family Planning
Regulations], issued June 16, 1990, amended and effective May 31, 2018,
arts. 12-14; Hubei Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Hubei
Sheng Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Tiaoli [Hubei Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations], issued December 1, 2002, amended and
effective January 13, 2016, art. 31.
\73\ See, e.g., Linda Lew, ``Chinese Blood Mule, 12, Caught Trying
to Smuggle 142 Samples into Hong Kong for Sex Testing,'' South China
Morning Post, March 28, 2019; ``Feifa tai'er xingbie jianding cheng
heishe! Chouxue ji dao jingwai jiance bian zhi nan nu'' [A black market
for illegal fetal sex determination! Blood sample sent overseas to
determine sex], Shanghai Observer, October 26, 2018.
\74\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2018 nian jingji
yunxing baochi zai heli qujian fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiao hao
wancheng'' [The economy moved within reasonable range in 2018, main
expected development targets were reached], January 21, 2019.
\75\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2015 nian guomin
jingji yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao'' [National economy
moved in the direction of steady progress in 2015], January 19, 2016.
\76\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2016 nian guomin
jingji shixian `Shisan Wu' lianghao kaiju'' [National economy achieved
a good start for the ``13th Five-Year Plan'' period in 2016], January
20, 2017; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2017 nian jingji
yunxing wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi'' [The economy was stable in
2017, exceeding expectations], January 18, 2018; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, ``2018 nian jingji yunxing baochi zai heli qujian
fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiao hao wancheng'' [The economy moved
within reasonable range in 2018, main expected development targets were
reached], January 21, 2019; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou Yu Jihua
Shengyu Fa [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December
29, 2001, amended December 27, 2015, effective January 1, 2016, art.
18. On December 27, 2015, the 12th National People's Congress Standing
Committee amended the Population and Family Planning Law, which became
effective on January 1, 2016, allowing all married couples to have two
children.
\77\ Liu Yanju, ``Daling sheng nu bushi shenme wenti, nongcun sheng
nan caishi zhenzheng de weiji'' [Older leftover women are not a
problem, rural leftover men are the real crisis], Beijing News, January
23, 2019; Wusheng County Communist Party Committee Party School,
``Pinkun diqu daling nan qingnian hunpei kunnan wenti de diaocha yu
sikao ---- yi Wusheng xian Liemian zhen weili'' [Research and
reflection on the problem of older men with marriage difficulties in
poor rural areas: Wusheng county's Liemian township as an example],
December 6, 2018; Dandan Zhang, Lisa Cameron, and Xin Meng, ``Has
China's One Child Policy Increased Crime?,'' Oxford University Press
(blog), March 25, 2019; Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The
Security Risks of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Monkey Cage (blog),
Washington Post, April 30, 2014.
\78\ Liu Yanju, ``Daling sheng nu bushi shenme wenti, nongcun sheng
nan caishi zhenzheng de weiji'' [Older leftover women are not a
problem, rural leftover men are the real crisis], Beijing News, January
23, 2019; Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The Security Risks
of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Monkey Cage (blog), Washington
Post, April 30, 2014; Peng Xunwen, ``3000 wan `shengnan' gen shui
jiehun'' [Who will marry the 30 million ``surplus men?''], People's
Daily, February 13, 2017.
\79\ Wusheng County Communist Party Committee Party School,
``Pinkun diqu daling nan qingnian hunpei kunnan wenti de diaocha yu
sikao ---- yi Wensheng xian Liemian zhen weili'' [Research and
reflection on the problem of older men with marriage difficulties in
poor rural areas: Wusheng county's Liemian township as an example],
December 6, 2018; Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The Security
Risks of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Monkey Cage (blog),
Washington Post, April 30, 2014; Peng Xunwen, ``3000 wan `shengnan' gen
shui jiehun'' [Who will marry the 30 million ``surplus men?''],
People's Daily, February 13, 2017.
\80\ See, e.g., ``How China's Massive Gender Imbalance Drives Surge
in Southeast Asian Women Sold into Marriage,'' Agence France-Presse,
reprinted in South China Morning Post, December 11, 2018; Rina
Chandran, ``New Roads, Old War Fan Sale of Southeast Asian Brides in
China,'' Reuters, December 7, 2018; Anna Maria Romero, ``How China's
One-Child Policy Has Resulted in Millions of Single Men, Plus South
East Asian Women Sold into Marriage,'' The Independent, December 13,
2018; Sidharth Shekhar, ``Chinese Men Using CPEC to Lure Pakistani
Women for Trafficking to China as `Brides,' '' Times Now News, April
20, 2019.
\81\ See, e.g., Nguyen Hai, ``Another Vietnamese Woman Investigated
in Sale of Newborns to China,'' VnExpress, February 16, 2019; Nguyen
Hai, ``Vietnam Probes Sale of Newborns to China,'' VnExpress, January
28, 2019; Frank Hossack, ``China's Child Trafficking Problem Its
Unwanted Children,'' Nanjinger, August 19, 2018.
\82\ Nguyen Hai, ``Another Vietnamese Woman Investigated in Sale of
Newborns to China,'' VnExpress, February 16, 2019; Nguyen Hai,
``Vietnam Probes Sale of Newborns to China,'' VnExpress, January 28,
2019.
\83\ Nguyen Hai, ``Another Vietnamese Woman Investigated in Sale of
Newborns to China,'' VnExpress, February 16, 2019; Nguyen Hai,
``Vietnam Probes Sale of Newborns to China,'' VnExpress, January 28,
2019.
\84\ Nguyen Hai, ``Another Vietnamese Woman Investigated in Sale of
Newborns to China,'' VnExpress, February 16, 2019; Nguyen Hai,
``Vietnam Probes Sale of Newborns to China,'' VnExpress, January 28,
2019.
Anti-Crime and
Vice Campaign
Anti-Crime and
Vice Campaign
Special Topic: Migrant Neighborhoods a Target of Anti-Crime and Vice
Campaign
Findings
An anti-crime campaign launched by central
authorities in 2018 is being used to target
marginalized groups in China. Called the ``Specialized
Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate
Vice,'' the stated aims of the three-year campaign
include guaranteeing China's lasting political
stability and consolidating the foundation of the
Chinese Communist Party's authoritative power.
The Commission observed reports of local
governments invoking this anti-crime campaign to target
groups of people including petitioners (individuals who
seek redress from the government), religious believers,
village election candidates, lawyers, and internal
migrants.
Municipal governments carried out large-scale
evictions and demolitions of internal migrant
neighborhoods in the name of the anti-crime campaign.
These localities appear to be using the campaign to
achieve the goals of a central government plan to
``renovate'' urban villages across China by 2020. Urban
villages are municipal neighborhoods that are
categorized as rural under China's household
registration (hukou) system. Registered residents of
these urban villages often rent to internal migrants,
who have hukou from other localities and face
discrimination in housing, education, and the provision
of government services.
In addition to evictions and demolitions of
internal migrant neighborhoods, local governments have
also invoked the anti-crime campaign to justify
increasing monitoring and surveillance of internal
migrant neighborhoods. For example, in Xi'an
municipality, public security officers investigated
over 800 internal migrant communities and over 400
urban villages under the local ``2019 Thunder Strike
and Iron Fist Anti-Crime and Vice Operation.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on Chinese authorities to end forced evictions,
demolitions, and heightened surveillance of internal
migrant communities across China, and to follow both
international and Chinese law in providing adequate
notice, compensation, and assistance to residents when
public safety requires demolishing dangerous
structures.
Encourage the Chinese government to expand both the
rights of migrant workers in China, and the space for
civil society organizations that provide social
services and legal assistance to internal migrants.
Note that improving the rights of internal migrants and
expanding their access to social services would likely
lower the chances of spontaneous, large-scale protests,
while large-scale forced evictions, demolitions, and
surveillance could increase the likelihood of such
protests.
Call on Chinese authorities to accelerate reforms to
the hukou system, including lowering restrictions on
migration to major cities and centers of economic
opportunity; equalizing the level and quality of public
benefits and services tied to local hukou and residence
permits; and implementing laws and regulations to
provide equal treatment for all Chinese citizens,
regardless of place of birth, residence, or hukou
status.
Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with
Chinese policymakers and academic institutions engaged
in research and outreach to migrants, in order to
advance legal and anti-discrimination assistance for
migrants and their families, and to encourage policy
debates aimed at eliminating inequality and
discrimination connected to residence policies,
including the hukou system.
Anti-Crime and
Vice Campaign
Anti-Crime and
Vice Campaign
Special Topic: Migrant Neighborhoods a Target of Anti-Crime and Vice
Campaign
Introduction
This past year, the Commission observed reports of local
authorities in jurisdictions across China targeting internal
migrants, petitioners, religious groups, and others with
increased monitoring and other forms of repression. In many
cases, local authorities tied these actions to a central-level
Chinese Communist Party and government campaign called the
``Specialized Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and
Eliminate Vice'' (Saohei Chu'e Zhuanxiang Douzheng, or the
``anti-crime and vice campaign''). This section will examine
the origins and broad application of this campaign, with a
special focus on how lower-level Party and government officials
used the campaign to justify increased monitoring of internal
migrants and large-scale evictions and demolitions of migrant
neighborhoods.
On January 23, 2018, the Communist Party Central Committee
and the State Council announced the commencement of a three-
year national anti-crime and vice campaign in the form of a
centrally issued circular. Authorities did not make the
circular publicly available, but the central government news
agency Xinhua provided a summary of the circular.\1\ According
to that summary, the four stated aims of the campaign are:
guaranteeing the people's contentment in life
and work,
social stability and orderliness,
China's lasting political stability,\2\ and
further consolidating the foundation of
Communist Party rule.\3\
A Chinese academic observed that the campaign is intended
to bring greater legitimacy to the Party's governance by
increasing central Party and government officials' control over
local government, which is often otherwise dominated by
``grass-roots leaders'' of villages and enterprises.\4\ A Party
official announced that by the end of March 2019, authorities
had prosecuted 79,018 people as part of the campaign.\5\
According to state-run media outlet Xinhua, the Party has
directed the campaign to focus on ``key areas, key industries,
and key sectors with prominent problems of crime and vice,''
\6\ and the Ministry of Public Security emphasized that the
campaign must include the ``modernization of social management
at the grassroots level to eradicate the breeding grounds of
crime and vice'' (chanchu hei'e shili zisheng turang).\7\ This
broad mandate has provided local authorities with large
discretion to target various types of groups and conduct,
leading international media \8\ as well as the Central
Commission for Discipline and Inspection to openly criticize
the broad application of the campaign at the local level.\9\
Local authorities across China have invoked the campaign to
restrict the freedoms of a wide range of marginalized groups.
For example, a number of local governments have specifically
named petitioners--individuals with grievances seeking redress
from the government--as targets of the campaign.\10\ Some local
governments reportedly increased monitoring and suppression of
religious groups in the name of the anti-crime and vice
campaign, with officials asking residents to report on members
of religious groups that are not officially registered.\11\
Authorities excluded 51,000 individuals from running in village
elections as part of the anti-crime and vice campaign, claiming
some of these individuals had suspected ties to organized crime
or ``did not meet criteria'' such as ``excellent political
quality.'' \12\ Authorities have also used the campaign to
suppress ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region.\13\ [For
more information on how government officials have used this
campaign against religious believers, ethnic minority groups,
petitioners, and other groups, see Section II--Freedom of
Religion, Section IV--Xinjiang, and Section V--Tibet.]
Also as part of the campaign, some local governments
increased monitoring of ``urban villages'' (chengzhong cun)
that are often areas with large populations of internal
migrants.\14\ Local municipal governments have sought to
demolish these urban villages, sometimes referred to as
``slums'' (penghu qu) by government sources, as part of a
national plan to ``renovate'' (gaizao) all urban villages by
2020.\15\ Some local government documents specifically point to
urban villages and neighborhoods with large numbers of migrant
workers as areas with ``crime and vice forces'' (hei e
shili).\16\ One example of increased monitoring of migrant
communities this past year as part of the anti-crime and vice
campaign is Xi'an's ``2019 Thunder Strike and Iron Fist Anti-
Crime and Vice Operation'' (lei ting tie wan saohei chu'e
xingdong) that involved public security officers investigating
over 800 internal migrant communities and over 400 urban
villages.\17\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urban Village Eviction, Demolition, and Surveillance under the Anti-
Crime and Vice Campaign: Yuhuazhai in Xi'an
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 2018, local officials of the Xi'an Hi-Tech Industries
Development Zone (Xi'an Hi-Tech Zone), Xi'an municipality, Shaanxi
province, initiated an eviction and demolition campaign followed by a
large-scale inspection and registration of remaining businesses and
residents as part of local implementation of the national ``anti-crime
and vice campaign'' in February 2019.\18\ The campaign targeted
Yuhuazhai village in Yanta district, Xi'an, itself a collection of
eight urban villages \19\ with a local official reporting more than
100,000 internal migrant residents compared with 9,000 residents with
local residence permits--leading to numerous rights abuses and several
deaths.\20\ The campaign was led by the Xi'an Hi-Tech Zone Management
Committee and largely state-owned education technology company China Hi-
Tech Group,\21\ acting jointly with over 20 government agencies to
``thoroughly renovate, evict, and demolish'' residences and local
enterprises within the village.\22\ China Business News reporters
observed that in October 2018, the Xi'an Hi-Tech Zone Management
Committee reportedly held a competition among ten districts and
townships over the acquisition of more than 33 square kilometers of
land, scoring them on categories including whole-village demolition,
barrier removal, and pollution reduction.\23\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urban Village Eviction, Demolition, and Surveillance under the Anti-
Crime and Vice Campaign: Yuhuazhai in Xi'an--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local officials reportedly hired several thousand people--some
allegedly members of criminal syndicates--to harass and assault
residents,\24\ resulting in at least one death,\25\ as well as to
demolish commercial establishments in October.\26\ Officials gave
businesses and residents notice on the same day of the demolition,
thereby depriving them of the opportunity to seek judicial or
administrative review and denying entrance to those without residence
permits so that many were unable to recover their personal
property.\27\ In November, residents reportedly protested continued
demolitions and faced violence from people in local security
uniforms.\28\ Demolition campaigns reportedly were also planned for 116
villages in and around Xi'an, with 62 scheduled to begin within
2019.\29\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vulnerability of Internal Migrants and Household Registration Policies
Chinese authorities have a history of carrying out forced
evictions \30\ that affect migrant workers in particular.
International rights organizations documented widespread forced
evictions prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and Expo 2010 in
Shanghai municipality.\31\ In late 2017 and early 2018, in
response to two fatal fires in migrant neighborhoods,\32\
authorities in Beijing municipality and the surrounding areas
launched a campaign of large-scale forced evictions and
demolitions in migrant neighborhoods across the region.\33\
Residents reportedly were given days or hours to leave.\34\
Chinese migrant workers continued to be marginalized
because of their residency status under the household
registration (hukou) system. The hukou system, established in
1958,\35\ classified Chinese citizens as being urban or rural
and effectively tied them to a locality.\36\ According to the
National Bureau of Statistics of China, in 2018, 286 million
people in China did not live in their hukou location.\37\ Yet
provision of certain government services, such as education,
remains tied to one's hukou location, which is, in general,
inherited from one's parents.\38\ The hukou system reportedly
also exacerbates these migrants' vulnerability to exploitation
in China's workforce.\39\ [For more information on forced
labor, see Section II--Human Trafficking.]
In 2014, the government began to reform the hukou system to
gradually eliminate the urban-rural distinction and allow some
migrants to obtain hukou in smaller cities.\40\ In April 2019,
the National Development and Reform Commission required cities
with populations of 1 to 3 million to eliminate all
restrictions on obtaining hukou, yet restrictions remained in
cities with populations above 3 million, such as Xi'an and
Beijing,\41\ and the government continues to use the hukou
system to restrict internal migration.\42\
In 2014, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights urged China ``to ensure that any relocation necessary
for city renewal is carried out after prior consultation with
the affected individuals . . ..'' \43\ In 2018, the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination was
concerned by reports that changes to the hukou system ``have
not made substantial positive changes for many rural migrants,
including ethnic minorities.'' \44\
Actions taken by Chinese government officials enforcing the
eviction campaign throughout China contravene both
international standards \45\ and Chinese law.\46\ Restrictions
on movement and discrimination arising from the hukou system
contravene international human rights standards guaranteeing
freedom of residence.\47\
Anti-Crime and
Vice Campaign
Anti-Crime and
Vice Campaign
Notes to Section II--Special Topic: Migrant Neighborhoods a Target
of Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign
\1\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan fachu `Guanyu Zhankai Saohei
Chu'e Zhuanxiang Douzheng De Tongzhi' '' [Party Central Committee and
State Council issue ``Circular Regarding the Launch of the Specialized
Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice''], Xinhua,
January 24, 2018.
\2\ These three concepts originally appeared in Xi Jinping's
inaugural address to the study session of the Communist Party Central
Committee Political Bureau at the 18th Party Congress's in 2012. Xi
Jinping, ``Jinjin weirao jianchi he fazhan Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi
xuexi xuanchuan guanche Dang de Shiba Da jingshen'' [Focus on upholding
and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics; study,
disseminate, and implement the spirit of the 18th Party Congress],
November 17, 2012, reprinted in People's Daily, November 19, 2012;
``Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan fachu `Guanyu Zhankai Saohei Chu'e
Zhuanxiang Douzheng De Tongzhi' '' [Party Central Committee and State
Council issue ``Circular Regarding the Launch of the Specialized
Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice''], Xinhua,
January 24, 2018.
\3\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan fachu `Guanyu Zhankai Saohei
Chu'e Zhuanxiang Douzheng De Tongzhi' '' [Party Central Committee and
State Council issue ``Circular Regarding the Launch of the Specialized
Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice''], Xinhua,
January 24, 2018.
\4\ Guo Rui, ``China's War on Organised Crime, Corrupt Officials
Sees 79,000 People Detained,'' South China Morning Post, April 14,
2019.
\5\ ``Saohei ban: jiezhi sanyue di quanguo qisu shehei she'e fanzui
an 14226 jian'' [Crime and vice office: number of suspected crime and
vice cases prosecuted nationwide reaches 14,226 by end of March],
Xinhua, April 9, 2019.
\6\ ``Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan fachu `Guanyu Zhankai Saohei
Chu'e Zhuanxiang Douzheng De Tongzhi' '' [Party Central Committee and
State Council issue ``Circular Regarding the Launch of the Specialized
Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice''], Xinhua,
January 24, 2018.
\7\ ``Tigao zhengzhi zhanwei zhongshen tuijin saohei chu'e
gongjianzhan'' [Raise the status of political thought in deepening and
promoting the tough battle to eliminate crime and evil], People's
Public Security Daily, reprinted in Ministry of Public Security,
October 17, 2018.
\8\ ``Zhongguo san nian saohei chu'e ying `zhongkao': baolu de
wenti yu qianjing'' [China's three-year [campaign to] eliminate crime
and vice meets ``midterm test'': exposed problems and future
possibilities], BBC, April 10, 2019; ``China Is Waging a Nationwide
Campaign against Gang Crime,'' Economist, February 28, 2019.
\9\ Zhang Yan, ``Saohei chu'e bixu jingzhun shibie jingzhun daji''
[Eliminate crime and vice campaign requires precise distinctions and
precise attacks], China Discipline and Inspection Daily, April 17,
2019.
\10\ See, e.g., ``Yongzhou shi saohei chu'e zhuanxiang douzheng
dudao zu gonggao'' [Yongzhou Municipal Specialized Struggle to
Eliminate Crime and Vice Supervisory Group public announcement],
Yongzhou Municipal People's Government, April 12, 2019; Rights Defense
Network, ``Hei shehui dingyi zao dianfu, Hubei Qianjiang Zhouji
Nongchang duli houxuanren Peng Feng shoudao difang saohei wenjian''
[Definition of organized crime radically changed, Zhouji farm,
Qianjiang, Hubei independent candidate Peng Feng receives local anti-
crime document], August 15, 2018; Rights Defense Network, ``Neimenggu
E'erduosi Hangjin Qi zhengfu ba shangfang gaozhuang wangshang fatie
deng xingwei dou lieru saohei chu'e de fanchou'' [In Ordos, Inner
Mongolia, Hanggin Banner government lists petitioning, online posting
as categories in scope of eliminate crime and vice campaign], March 19,
2018.
\11\ Feng Gang, `` `Saohei chu'e' xingdong maotou zhizhi zongjiao
xintu'' [``Anti-crime and vice'' campaign spearhead aimed at religious
believers], Bitter Winter, November 16, 2018; Gu Qi, `` `Saohei' shize
zhenya xinyang'' [``Anti-crime'' in reality suppresses religious
faith], Bitter Winter, February 18, 2019.
\12\ Xiong Feng, ``Rang renmin qunzhong daizhe manman de anquan gan
juesheng quanmian xiaokang--quanguo saohei chu'e zhuanxiang douzheng
kaiju zhi nian zongshu'' [Let the masses carry a sense of safety while
achieving comprehensive moderate prosperity--national eliminate crime
and vice campaign year summary], Xinhua, December 27, 2018; Zhang Yang,
``Saohei chu'e wuzhuo shouhu tian lang qi qing'' [Eliminate the filth
of crime and vice, protect clear skies and fresh air], People's Daily,
Feburary 26, 2019.
\13\ `` `Sao hei chu'e' ru jiang shaoshu minzu bei `hei'?''
[``Anti-Crime and Vice'' comes to Xinjiang, have ethnic minorities
become ``criminalized''?], Radio Free Asia, April 16, 2019; ``China Is
Waging a Nationwide Campaign against Gang Crime,'' Economist, February
28, 2019. See also ``Hei shili goujie Dalai Lama Xizang saohei mingque
qingli mubiao'' [Organized crime forces collude with the Dalai Lama,
Tibet makes clear its goal of cleansing], Duowei, February 10, 2018.
\14\ Ma Li, ``Why China's Migrants Can't Just Leave Poverty
Behind,'' Sixth Tone, September 1, 2018; ``Saohei chu'e zhuanxiang
douzheng youguan wenti'' [Questions regarding the specialized struggle
to sweep away organized crime and eliminate vice], Yong'an Municipal
People's Government, November 16, 2018; ``Saohei chu'e zhexie shi yao
zhidao!'' [Things you need to know about the anti-crime and vice
campaign!], Guizhou Finance Bureau, March 15, 2019.
\15\ Tom Hancock, ``Chinese Slum Demolitions Reveal Government Debt
Strains,'' Financial Times, April 22, 2019; He Huifeng, ``China's Mass
Urbanisation Projects Mean the End for Guangzhou's 800-Year-Old Urban
Villages,'' South China Morning Post, April 16, 2019; State Council,
``Guojia Xinxing Chengzhenhua Guihua (2014-2020 nian)'' [National Plan
for New Model of Urbanization (2014-2020)], March 16, 2014, table 5.
\16\ ``Zhi quan qu guangda renmin qunzhong guanyu saohei chu'e
zhuanxiang douzheng de gongkai xin'' [Open letter to the people of the
district regarding the specialized struggle to sweep away organized
crime and eliminate vice], Guangfeng District People's Government,
March 4, 2019; ``Saohei chu'e zhexie shi yao zhidao!'' [Things you need
to know about the anti-crime and evil campaign!], Guizhou Finance
Bureau, March 15, 2019; Wang Ruolin, ``Woshi hangye lingyu zhengzhi
qude jieduanxing chengxiao'' [Shenzhen business management achieving
results in phases], Shenzhen News, April 9, 2019; ``Saohei chu'e
zhuanxiang douzheng youguan wenti'' [Questions regarding the
specialized struggle to sweep away organized crime and eliminate vice],
Yong'an Municipal People's Government, November 16, 2018.
\17\ ``Quanmian tuijin `2019 leiting tie wan saohei chu'e xingdong'
woshi gong'an jiguan `tie chui xingdong' quanmian zhili she huang she
du'' [Full-scale promotion of ``2019 Thunderclap Iron Fist Anti-Crime
and Vice Operation'' Xi'an public security agencies' ``Iron Hammer
Operation'' comprehensively managed suspected obscenity and gambling],
Xi'an Evening Post, reprinted in Xi'an People's Government, March 28,
2019.
\18\ Xie Tao, ``Xi'an Gaoxin jingfang zuzhi kazhan Yuhuazhai da
guimo qingcha xingdong'' [Police in Gaoxin, Xi'an, organize large-scale
inspection operation in Yuhuazhai], China Business News, February 22,
2019.
\19\ ``Gaobie chengzhong cun bainian Yuhua yin `xinsheng' ''
[Bidding farewell to 100-year-old urban village Yuhua and ushering in
``new era''], Development Zone Report, October 26, 2018; Real Estate
Elder Sister S (dichanSjie), ``Zaijian le, Yuhuazhai!'' [Goodbye,
Yuhuazhai!], Zhihu, October 17, 2018.
\20\ Li Jing, Zhao Bin, and Zhang Pengkang, ``Yuhuazhai yuedi
chaiqian? gongye yuanqu kaichai, cunzi cengcai hai wei qidong''
[Yuhuazhai to be demolished at the end of the month? industrial park
district begins demolition, village demolition yet to begin], China
Business News, October 22, 2018. See also Li Yunfeng, ``Xi'an Yuhuazhai
tuijin zhengcun chaiqian, bainian chengzhong cun jiu mao huan xin yan''
[Yuhuazhai, Xi'an, advances with demolition of entire village, hundred-
year-old urban village gets a facelift], Phoenix New Media, December 4,
2018; Xiong Bin and Chen Jie, ``Xi'an Yuhuazhai cunmin kangyi qiangsu
zao zhenya'' [Villagers in Yuhuazhai, Xi'an, protesting forced
demolition are oppressed], New Tang Dynasty Television, December 6,
2018.
\21\ Real Estate Elder Sister S (dichanSjie), ``Zaijian le,
Yuhuazhai!'' [Goodbye, Yuhuazhai!], Zhihu, October 17, 2018; Wang Feng,
``Zhuanxing zhiye jiaoyu: Zhongguo Gaoke Jituan chengli quanqiu jiaoyu
fazhan yanjiu yuan'' [Transforming professional education: China Hi-
Tech Group Co. establishes global education development research
center], 21st Century Economic Report, April 28, 2017.
\22\ Li Yunfeng, ``Xi'an Yuhuazhai tuijin zhengcun chaiqian,
bainian chengzhong cun jiu mao huan xin yan'' [Yuhuazhai, Xi'an,
advances with demolition of entire village, hundred-year-old urban
village gets a facelift], Phoenix New Media, December 4, 2018.
\23\ Li Jing, Zhao Bin, and Zhang Pengkang, ``Yuhuazhai yuedi
chaiqian? gongye yuanqu kaichai, cunzi cengcai hai wei qidong''
[Yuhuazhai to be demolished at the end of the month? industrial park
District begins demolition, village demolition yet to begin], China
Business News, October 22, 2018.
\24\ ``Xi'an yu qian cunmin kangyi qiangchai zao zhenya'' [Xi'an
represses more than a thousand villagers protesting forced
demolitions], Radio Free Asia, December 5, 2018.
\25\ Xiong Bin and Chen Jie, ``Xi'an Yuhuazhai cunmin kangyi
qiangsu zao zhenya'' [Villagers in Yuhuazhai, Xi'an, protesting forced
demolition are oppressed], New Tang Dynasty Television, December 6,
2018.
\26\ Ibid.
\27\ ``Feifa chaiqian yan de minxin yifa zhiguo zhongyu minsheng''
[How can illegal demolition gain the people's support, when rule of law
is prioritized over people's livelihood], China Guangdong Web, November
12, 2018.
\28\ ``Feifa chaiqian yan de min xin yifa zhiguo zhongyu minsheng''
[How can illegal demolition gain the people's support, when rule of law
is prioritized over people's livelihood], China Guangdong Web, November
12, 2018; ``Xi'an yu qian cunmin kangyi qiangchai zao zhenya'' [Xi'an
represses more than a thousand villagers protesting forced
demolitions], Radio Free Asia, December 5, 2018.
\29\ Real Estate Elder Sister S (dichanSjie), ``Zaijian le,
Yuhuazhai!'' [Goodbye, Yuhuazhai!], Zhihu, October 17, 2018.
\30\ See, e.g., Amnesty International, ``Standing Their Ground:
Thousands Face Violent Eviction in China,'' ASA 17/001/201, October
2012, 11-23; Human Rights Watch, ``Demolished: Forced Evictions and the
Tenants' Rights Movement in China,'' March 25, 2004, 6-11.
\31\ Amnesty International, ``Standing Their Ground: Thousands Face
Violent Eviction in China,'' ASA 17/001/201, October 2012, 11-12, 31-
32; Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, ``One World, Whose Dream?
Housing Rights Violations and the Beijing Olympic Games,'' July 2008,
7-8; UN Watch, ``38 Rights Groups Urge U.N. to Investigate Shanghai
Expo Eviction of 18,000 Families,'' July 22, 2010.
\32\ ``Beijing Daxing huozai yu'nanzhe mingdan gongbu jingfang
xingju 18 ren'' [List of victims of fire in Daxing, Beijing, made
public, police criminally detain 18], People's Daily, November 20,
2017; Guo Chao, ``Quanshi kaizhan anquan yinhuan da paicha da qingli da
zhengzhi'' [Citywide launch of major inspections, major sweeps, and
major rectifications of safety risks], Beijing News, November 20, 2017;
Jiang Chenglong and Cui Jia, ``Beijing Continues Its Safety Crackdown
in Wake of Fire,'' China Daily, November 27, 2017; Zheping Huang,
``What You Need to Know about Beijing's Crackdown on Its `Low-End
Population,' '' Quartz, November 27, 2017; ``Beijing Shibalidian xiang
huozai hou `diduan renkou' zai zao baoli quzhu gongmin lianshu duncu
Cai Qi cizhi'' [After fire in Beijing's Shibalidian township, more
violent evictions of the `low-end population,' citizens jointly sign
letter urging Cai Qi to resign], Radio Free Asia, December 14, 2017.
\33\ Beijing Municipality Administration of Work Safety Committee,
Beijing Shi Anquan Shengchan Weiyuanhui Guanyu Kaizhan Anquan Yinhuan
Da Paicha Da Qingli Da Zhengzhi Zhuanxiang Xingdong De Tongzhi
[Circular on Launch of Special Campaign of Major Investigations, Major
Cleanup, and Major Rectification of Safety Risks], issued November 19,
2017, sec. 4; Matt Rivers and Serenitie Wang, ``Beijing Forces Migrant
Workers from Their Homes in `Savage' Demolitions,'' CNN, December 9,
2017; ``Sensitive Word of the Week: Low-End Population,'' China Digital
Times, November 30, 2017; ``Beijing Shibalidian xiang huozai hou
`diduan renkou' zai zao baoli quzhu gongmin lianshu duncu Cai Qi
cizhi'' [After fire in Beijing's Shibalidian township, more violent
evictions of the `low-end population,' citizens jointly sign letter
urging Cai Qi to resign], Radio Free Asia, December 14, 2017; ``Chinese
Artist Who Filmed Beijing's Mass Evictions Now Faces Eviction
Himself,'' Radio Free Asia, January 1, 2018. See also Shen Fan and Li
Rongde, ``Beijing's Migrant Eviction Frenzy Spills Over to Hebei,''
Caixin, December 27, 2017; ``Beijing `diduan' xingdong manyan Hebei
Sanhe baoli qugan wailai renkou'' [Beijing `low-end' campaign spreads,
migrants violently driven out of Sanhe, Hebei], Radio Free Asia,
December 30, 2017.
\34\ Shen Fan and Li Rongde, ``Beijing's Migrant Eviction Frenzy
Spills Over to Hebei,'' Caixin Global, December 27, 2017; Emily Wang
and Yi-Ling Liu, ``Beijing Evictions of Migrant Workers Stir Widespread
Anger,'' Associated Press, November 29, 2017; Jun Mai, `` `They Came
Banging and Kicking': Beijing Airport Workers Swept Up in Fire Safety
Crackdown,'' South China Morning Post, November 29, 2017. For more
information on past forced evictions, see CECC, 2018 Annual Report,
October 10, 2018, Section II--Special Topic: Forced Evictions in
Beijing Municipality.
\35\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli [PRC Regulations on Household
Registration], issued and effective January 9, 1958.
\36\ See, e.g., Hongbin Li et al., ``Human Capital and China's
Future Growth,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 1 (Winter
2017): 28; Yang Song, ``Hukou-Based Labour Market Discrimination and
Ownership Structure in Urban China,'' Urban Studies 53, no. 8 (2016):
1658; Spencer Sheehan, ``China's Hukou Reforms and the Urbanization
Challenge,'' The Diplomat, February 22, 2017. For more information on
China's hukou system, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017,
169-70.
\37\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2018 nian jingji
yunxing baochi zai heli qujian fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiaohao
wancheng'' [The economy moved within a reasonable range in 2018, main
expected development targets are accomplished well], January 21, 2019.
\38\ See, e.g., Hongbin Li et al., ``Human Capital and China's
Future Growth,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 1 (Winter
2017): 28; Yang Song, ``Hukou-Based Labour Market Discrimination and
Ownership Structure in Urban China,'' Urban Studies 53, no. 8 (2016):
1658; China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and Their Children,''
accessed July 26, 2019; Eli Friedman, Insurgency Trap: Labor Politics
in Postsocialist China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 14.
\39\ Ma Li, ``Why China's Migrants Can't Just Leave Poverty
Behind,'' Sixth Tone, September 1, 2018; China Labour Bulletin,
``Migrant Workers and Their Children,'' accessed July 26, 2019.
\40\ State Council, Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Tuijin Huji Zhidu
Gaige De Yijian [Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household Registration
System Reform], issued July 30, 2014, paras. 4-9; ``China to Help 100m
Settle in Cities,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, July 30, 2014;
State Council General Office, ``Tuidong 1 yi fei huji renkou zai
chengshi luohu fang'an'' [Plan promoting city hukou registration for
100 million individuals without household registration], issued October
11, 2019, paras. 4-6; ``Beijing to Scrap Urban-Rural Residency
Distinction,'' China Digital Times, September 21, 2016.
\41\ Cheng Siwei and Timmy Shen, ``Residency Restrictions to Be
Scrapped in Many of China's Cities,'' Caixin, April 8, 2019; National
Development and Reform Commission, ``2019 nian xinxing chengzhenhua
jianshe zhongdian renwu'' [Key tasks of new urbanization construction
in 2019], April 8, 2019; ``Hukou Difficulty Index,'' MacroPolo, Paulson
Institute, accessed May 15, 2019. See also ``About On the Road,''
MacroPolo, Paulson Institute, accessed July 26, 2019.
\42\ State Council, Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Tuijin Huji Zhidu
Gaige De Yijian [Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household Registration
System Reform], issued July 30, 2014, paras. 6-7. See also ``About On
the Road,'' MacroPolo, Paulson Institute, accessed July 26, 2019.
\43\ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China,
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee
at its 40th Meeting, May 23, 2014, E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, June 13, 2014,
para. 30.
\44\ UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China,
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee
at its 2675th Meeting, August 28, 2018, CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17, September
19, 2018, paras. 34-35.
\45\ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR
General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the
Covenant), E/1992/23, December 13, 1991, paras. 8(a), 18. Note that
this finding is reaffirmed in UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing
(Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, E/1998/2, 20 May 20, 1997, para. 1;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of
December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 11(1); United
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed February 13,
2019. China has signed and ratified the ICESCR. See also UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The
Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, E/1998/2, May
20, 1997, paras. 15-16.
\46\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Qiangzhi Fa [PRC
Administrative Enforcement Law], passed June 30, 2011, effective
January 1, 2012, arts. 43-44. For analyses of the legality of the
evictions in Beijing under Chinese law, see ``Jiang Ping, He Weifang
deng xuezhe lushi dui Beijing shi zhengfu qugan wailai jumin de
xingdong ji qi yiju de xingzheng wenjian xiang Quanguo Rendahui
Changweihui tiqing hexianxing shencha de quanwen'' [Full text of
request from Jiang Ping, He Weifang, and other scholars and lawyers to
the National People's Congress Standing Committee for a review of the
constitutionality of the Beijing government's campaign to expel
nonresidents and relevant administrative documents], December 19, 2017,
reprinted in Rights Defense Network, December 24, 2017; Wang Liuyi,
``Beijing shi ``dongji qingli xingdong'' de hefaxing fenxi'' [Analyzing
the legality of Beijing's ``winter cleanup campaign''], WeChat post,
reprinted in China Digital Times, November 28, 2017.
\47\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966,
entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 26;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 2,
13(1); UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding
Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China, Including Hong
Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 40th
Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, June 13, 2014, para. 15; UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme
Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip Alston, A/HRC/
35/26/Add.2, March 28, 2017, paras. 27-28. See also Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``From Forced Evictions of Migrant Workers to Abused
Children: Violations of Social & Economic Rights in China Refute the
`China Development Model,' '' December 7, 2017.
Status of Women
Status of Women
Status of Women
Findings
Women in China face severe discrimination
throughout their careers, from job recruitment and
hiring to wages and promotions. Such disparities have
increased over the current period of economic reform
that began in 1978, accelerating during the 2000s with
the intensification of market liberalization. Gender
biases and sexual harassment in the workplace are major
factors contributing to the employment gender gap, as
well as national laws mandating parental leave and
other entitlements for women and not men. These laws
enforce the role of women as caregivers and have led
employers to avoid hiring women without children in
order to avoid the cost of these legal entitlements.
Following widely publicized grassroots
campaigns highlighting challenges faced by women in the
workplace, Chinese officials initiated policies to
address gender discrimination in employment, including
creating a cause of action for disputes over employment
discrimination and sexual harassment and a series of
policies aimed primarily at punishing employers for
discriminatory job recruitment practices. Nonetheless,
inadequate enforcement and discriminatory laws persist;
local bureaus responsible for enforcement seldom take
punitive action in response to complaints, and some
laws themselves continue to discriminate against women
by barring them from performing certain jobs.
Thirty percent of women have experienced some
form of domestic violence, yet nearly three years after
the passage of the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law in
March 2016, Chinese courts had only issued a total of
3,718 protective orders by December 2018. News media
and expert analysis noted that cultural norms that do
not recognize domestic violence as a crime contributed
to the low number of reported incidents, with family
members and police commonly discouraging victims from
going forward with requesting protective orders or
divorce.
Despite official repression, independent
public advocacy for women's rights continues to
influence public discourse and policy. Public advocacy
in recent years has highlighted gender inequities in
recruitment and sexual harassment, while news media and
civil society actors have noted a connection to the
issues publicly addressed by national officials this
year as a sign that independent advocacy is having an
impact even as it has been severely suppressed.
Chinese officials continued censoring online
discussion of topics related to feminism and harassing
and threatening individual citizens engaging in
advocacy. These restrictions were a continuation of the
official repression of women's rights advocacy
beginning in 2015.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Publicly and privately urge the Chinese government to
respect the freedom of expression and assembly of all
rights advocates, and in particular to refrain from
harassing and intimidating the independent rights
advocates seeking to increase awareness about sexual
harassment in public areas.
Urge the Chinese government to publicly expand its
commitment to gender equality through measures such as
increasing the number of women in the highest levels of
political leadership, instituting gender equality and
anti-harassment trainings in government workplaces, and
challenging discriminatory attitudes based on gender
through public education.
Commend the Chinese government for recent legal
developments aimed at promoting the welfare of women
and gender equality. These include the inclusion of a
gender discrimination case among the Supreme People's
Court's guiding cases and the creation of causes of
action allowing plaintiffs to sue for sexual harassment
and gender discrimination in employment. Encourage the
government to strengthen formal support services for
implementation--for example, by increasing funding for
health services or shelters for women experiencing
violence, providing funding and support for lawyers for
legal services, and allowing independent lawyers and
advocates to assist with the promotion and
implementation of laws related to gender equality
through lawsuits and public campaigns.
Support international exchanges among academics,
legal advocates, non-governmental organizations, and
others that focus on the implementation and enforcement
of recently adopted laws promoting gender equity. In
particular, facilitate and support technical assistance
programs that would help all those working in law
enforcement and the judiciary to implement the PRC
Anti-Domestic Violence Law effectively and challenge
discriminatory attitudes. As the first point of
contact, law enforcement in particular should be
trained in addressing reports of violence in a way that
does not undermine victims' concerns or safety. Urge
provincial level officials to implement provincial
regulations according to the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence
Law.
Facilitate and support technical assistance programs
that would help the development of gender equality
education in schools and communities.
Encourage the collection and analysis of data on
disparities in economic and social life based on gender
so as to monitor changes.
Status of Women
Status of Women
Status of Women
Discrimination in Employment
Although international human rights standards prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender,\1\ women in China
continued to face serious obstacles to equal treatment in
employment.
Women in China face severe discrimination
throughout their careers, from job recruitment and
hiring to wages and promotions. Surveys have found that
recruitment listings frequently indicate a preference
or requirement for men,\2\ with 35 percent of civil
servant job listings for 2019 containing gender
specifications despite national laws prohibiting gender
discrimination in hiring.\3\ Women continued to be
represented in the top leadership of only 20.1 percent
of Chinese firms and political institutions while
earning on average 64.3 percent of what men earned,
according to the World Economic Forum's 2018 Global
Gender Gap Report.\4\ An International Labour
Organization (ILO) study conducted in 2015 noted that
such disparities have increased over the current period
of economic reform that began in 1978,\5\ accelerating
during the 2000s with the intensification of market
liberalization.\6\ A survey by Chinese online recruiter
Boss Zhipin Major found that three major reasons for
the gender disparity in workplace advancement were the
comparatively greater share of domestic obligations
shouldered by women, their lack of outside connections
and social support, and underdeveloped management
skills.\7\
National laws mandating parental leave and
other entitlements for women and not men are a major
reason for discriminatory hiring and dismissal. Male
employees are not legally entitled to parental leave,
but employers are required to grant female employees 98
days of parental leave by the Law on the Protection of
Women's Rights and Interests in addition to other
parental benefits required only for women, such as
allowances and termination restrictions.\8\ One scholar
notes that these laws enforce the role of women as
caregivers and have led employers to avoid hiring women
without children in order to avoid the cost of these
legal entitlements.\9\ One expert reported that women
perceive such discrimination against them to have
increased since the implementation of the ``universal
two-child policy'' in January 2016, which generally
allows couples to have two children, somewhat loosening
the restrictions under the former ``one-child policy.''
\10\ [For more information on the ``universal two-child
policy,'' see Section II--Population Control.]
The national parental leave policy is also a
major factor in pregnancy discrimination. Gender
inequality in parental leave has led to a rise in the
number of labor disputes filed by female employees
against their employers for dismissing them or treating
them negatively as a result of reporting their
pregnancies.\11\ Some employers require female
employees to submit applications to have children or
assign them to a ``queue,'' dismissing or otherwise
pressuring those who have children out of turn.\12\
Such negative treatment is prohibited by national
laws,\13\ but employers also retaliated against those
who attempted to vindicate their legal rights. For
example, in December 2018, an employer in Changchun
municipality, Jilin province, assigned one employee to
work alone at a site without toilet facilities after
she obtained a judgment declaring that her employer
should continue her employment contract when she sued
over pressure to leave her position upon reporting that
she was pregnant.\14\
Gender biases and sexual harassment in the
workplace also contribute to the employment gender gap.
Legal entitlements associated with reproduction and
parenthood do not fully explain the gender gap in
employment: A 2018 study by Renmin University in
Beijing municipality found that employers were actually
less likely to hire women for important positions if
they already had two children--and thus were ineligible
for parental benefits.\15\ A 2015 ILO study attributed
most of the wage differential to discrimination,\16\
and Chinese officials have also acknowledged the
negative effect of gender discrimination on female
workforce participation.\17\ A 2018 study found
discriminatory and sexualized views of women were
common in job recruitment advertisements, reflecting
assumptions that women are less qualified for work
requiring strength, intelligence, or mental fitness
\18\ and that employers may use the physical
attractiveness of female employees as a condition of
employment or as an inducement for recruiting male
employees.\19\ Such assumptions continue to affect
women's well-being and careers once they are in the
workplace: A 2018 survey of social media posts and
interactions of female civil servants found consistent
accounts of sexualized and demeaning behavior from
supervisors that included requiring female civil
servants to provide companionship in settings (e.g.,
restaurants, karaoke bars) where they would be sexually
harassed.\20\
After a year of social media campaigns
highlighting sexual harassment cases garnering
significant public attention,\21\ national-level
officials announced policies to address sexual
harassment and gender discrimination in employment. The
Supreme People's Court issued a circular in December
2018 amending the Rules for Civil Causes of Action to
allow disputes over sexual harassment and employment
discrimination.\22\ This was followed in February 2019
by a joint circular outlining measures to promote
gender equality in employment, citing the need to
increase women's participation in the economy.\23\ The
measures primarily targeted gender discrimination in
job recruitment, outlining plans to develop procedures
for notification and mediation and to investigate and
penalize employers and recruitment agencies that fail
to comply.\24\ The circular also included legal
assistance for those bringing claims of gender-based
employment discrimination, job counseling and training
for women, and development of support for
childcare.\25\ In March 2019, Premier Li Keqiang also
announced support for addressing gender discrimination
in employment in his government work report.\26\
Assessments from rights advocates were mixed, from
critiquing the policy announcements for ``lack[ing]
detailed measures'' to seeing them as signs that
``gender discrimination is something that the
government can and is willing to manage.'' \27\
Local-level officials also took actions
related to gender discrimination. For example,
officials in Dezhou municipality, Shandong province,
established a reporting hotline,\28\ and Beijing
municipality officials published anti-sexual harassment
advertisements on all subway lines.\29\
Discriminatory laws and inadequate enforcement
persist. International observers \30\ reported that
gender-based employment discrimination in China has not
been checked by prohibitions against gender
discrimination in existing laws \31\ or by China's
international commitments.\32\ Chinese laws do not give
a clear definition of gender discrimination,\33\
leading to the refusal of courts and arbitration
committees to accept such cases.\34\ In addition, some
laws themselves continue to discriminate against women
by barring them from performing certain jobs--in some
cases based on whether they are menstruating, pregnant,
or breastfeeding.\35\
Domestic and Gender-Based Violence
Domestic violence continued to affect large numbers of
women in China. Based on a large-scale study published by the
People's Daily in November 2018, 30 percent of married women in
China have experienced some form of domestic violence.\36\
Nearly three years after the passage of the PRC Anti-Domestic
Violence Law \37\ in March 2016,\38\ Chinese courts had issued
a total of 3,718 protection orders by December 2018, approving
63 percent out of a total of 5,860 applications.\39\ News media
identified cultural norms that do not recognize domestic
violence as a crime as contributing to the low numbers of
reported incidents, with family members and police commonly
discouraging victims from going forward with requesting
protective orders or divorce--women who do report do so only
after experiencing an average of 35 incidents.\40\ As of August
2019, Yunnan province is the only province to have implemented
measures in accordance with the 2016 law, which includes a
mandatory reporting provision that makes government bodies
responsible for gathering evidence related to domestic
violence.\41\
Public Participation
Low levels of women's representation in
political leadership persisted. Although Chinese
domestic law contains pronouncements stressing the
importance of women's political participation,\42\ the
proportion of female representatives continued to fall
short of the 30 percent target recommended by the UN
Commission on the Status of Women.\43\ The Chinese
government is obligated under its international
commitments to ensure gender equality in political
participation.\44\
Blacklisting advocacy organizations and
activists working on gender equality issues. On January
8, 2019, the Guangzhou Municipal Department of Civil
Affairs in Guangdong province issued a list of
suspected ``illegal social organizations'' that
included the Guangzhou Gender and Sexuality Education
Center (Guangzhou Xingbie Jiaoyu Zhongxin), which
worked on both gender and LGBTQ issues, primarily
focusing on combating sexual harassment and
violence.\45\ Founded by prominent women's rights
advocate Wei Tingting,\46\ the organization had
encountered censorship restrictions for a campaign
raising funds to conduct a survey on the prevalence of
sexual harassment and assault on Chinese college
campuses, which it nonetheless conducted and published
in April 2018.\47\ The organization announced on the
social media platform WeChat in December 2018 that it
would temporarily cease operations.\48\ This followed a
wave of crackdowns on independent women's rights
advocacy in previous years that shut down leading
voices such as the social media accounts of prominent
independent media outlet Feminist Voices in March 2018
\49\ and the Beijing Zhongze Women's Legal Counseling
and Service Center in January 2016.\50\
Heavy censorship of content and symbols
related to feminist issues. As activists moved much of
their advocacy online in the face of growing
pressure,\51\ different social media campaigns in
support of victims of sexual assault engaged millions
before themselves being censored.\52\ According to Hong
Kong University researchers, reports of sexual
misconduct were ``one of the most heavily censored
topics on WeChat in 2018.'' \53\ A wide range of WeChat
public accounts that had circulated a petition in
support of a survivor of an alleged sexual assault were
shut down in April 2019.\54\
Despite official repression, independent
public advocacy for women's rights continued to
influence public discourse and policy. Public advocacy
in recent years has highlighted gender inequities in
recruitment \55\ and sexual harassment.\56\ In
addition, news media and civil society actors have
noted a connection to the issues publicly addressed by
national officials this year as a sign that independent
advocacy is having an impact even as it has been
severely suppressed.\57\
Status of Women
Status of Women
Notes to Section II--Status of Women
\1\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of
December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981, art. 11; United
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, accessed May
13, 2019. China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified it
on November 4, 1980.
\2\ Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 16;
FreeChineseFeminists (@FeministChina), ``Taifeng, a young woman,
visited abt 20 job fairs . . .,'' Twitter, February 16, 2019, 5:05 a.m.
\3\ Wang Ziye, ``Sheng er wei nu, shu zai xingbie: 2019 nian guojia
gongwuyuan zhaolu xingbie qishi diaocha baogao'' [To be born a woman is
to have already lost: report on gender discrimination in 2019 national
civil service recruitment listings], reprinted in China Digital Times,
January 26, 2019; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law],
passed July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, arts. 12-13; Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa [PRC Law on the Protection of
Women's Rights and Interests], passed April 3, 1992, amended August 28,
2005, effective December 1, 2005, arts. 12, 21, 25; Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security, Jiuye Fuwu Yu Jiuye Guanli Guiding
[Provisions on Employment Services and Employment Management], issued
November 5, 2007, amended December 23, 2014, effective February 1,
2015, arts. 20, 58(2); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye Cujin Fa [PRC
Employment Promotion Law], passed August 30, 2007, effective January 1,
2008, art. 27. See also Human Rights Watch, ``China: Female Civil
Servants Face Discrimination, Harassment,'' November 8, 2018.
\4\ World Economic Forum, ``The Global Gender Gap Report 2018,''
December 17, 2018, 63-4.
\5\ Sukti Dasgupta, Makiko Matsumoto, and Cuntao Xia, International
Labour Organization Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, ``Women
in the Labour Market in China,'' ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series,
May 2015, 2.
\6\ Ibid., 8.
\7\ Boss Zhipin, ``BOSS zhipin: 2019 Zhongguo zhichang xingbie
chayi baogao'' [Boss Zhipin: 2019 report on gender differences in
China's job market], March 12, 2019.
\8\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa [PRC Law on
the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests], passed April 3, 1992,
amended August 28, 2005, effective December 1, 2005, art. 27. See also
Dezan Shira & Associates, ``Expecting in China: Employee Maternity
Leave and Allowances,'' China Briefing, April 6, 2017; Dezan Shira &
Associates, ``Paternity Leave in China: Regional Policies and
Differences,'' China Briefing, October 27, 2015.
\9\ Yun Zhou, ``The Dual Demands: Gender Equity and Fertility
Intentions after the One-Child Policy,'' Journal of Contemporary China
28, no. 117 (November 5, 2018): 11, 14-16.
\10\ Yun Zhou, ``The Dual Demands: Gender Equity and Fertility
Intentions after the One-Child Policy,'' Journal of Contemporary China
28, no. 117 (November 5, 2018): 15. See also Noelle Mateer, Charlotte
Tang, and Teng Jing Xuan, ``Lining Up to Get Pregnant: The Unintended
Victims of the Two-Child Rule,'' Caixin Global, December 29, 2018.
\11\ ``28 sui nu yuangong shiyongqi faxian huaiyun zao citui,
lushi: yongren danwei shexian weifa'' [28-year-old female worker
dismissed after discovering pregnancy during hiring trial period,
lawyer: employer suspected of violating law], Bandao Morning News,
reprinted in The Paper, April 19, 2019; Yanan Wang and Shanshan Wang,
``China's new policy against gender bias meets fans, sceptics,''
Associated Press, February 22, 2019.
\12\ Yun Zhou, ``The Dual Demands: Gender Equity and Fertility
Intentions after the One-Child Policy,'' Journal of Contemporary China
28, no. 117 (November 5, 2018): 11; Shi Youxing, `` `Chadui' huaiyun
bei citui, nengfou huopei?'' [Compensation for dismissal for ``cutting
colleagues in line'' to get pregnant?], Procuratorial Daily, October
24, 2018; Chen Yuqian, ``Huaiyun nu yuangong zao citui; zhichang qishi
weifa, yulun qishi hanxin'' [Pregnant female employee dismissed;
employment discrimination is illegal, yet popular opinion is
indifferent], The Paper, April 19, 2019; Noelle Mateer, Charlotte Tang,
and Teng Jing Xuan, ``Lining Up to Get Pregnant: The Unintended Victims
of the Two-Child Rule,'' Caixin Global, December 29, 2018.
\13\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed
July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, arts. 12-29(3); Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa [PRC Law on the Protection of
Women's Rights and Interests], passed April 3, 1992, amended August 28,
2005, effective December 1, 2005, art. 27; ``28 sui nu yuangong
shiyongqi faxian huaiyun zao citui, lushi: yongren danwei shexian
weifa'' [28-year-old female worker dismissed after discovering
pregnancy during hiring trial period, lawyer: employer suspected of
violating law], The Paper, April 19, 2019.
\14\ Chen Yuqian, ``Huaiyun nu yuangong zao citui; zhichang qishi
weifa, yulun qishi hanxin'' [Pregnant female employee dismissed;
employment discrimination is illegal, yet popular opinion is
indifferent], The Paper, April 19, 2019.
\15\ Dorcas Wong, Dezan Shira & Associates, ``China Bans Questions
on Marital, Childbearing Status during Hiring,'' China Briefing, March
7, 2019.
\16\ Sukti Dasgupta, Makiko Matsumoto, and Cuntao Xia,
International Labour Organization Regional Office for Asia and the
Pacific, ``Women in the Labour Market in China,'' ILO Asia-Pacific
Working Paper Series, May 2015, 18-19. See also World Economic Forum,
``The Global Gender Gap Report 2017,'' November 2, 2017, 120-21.
\17\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security et al., Renli
Ziyuan Shehui Baozhang Bu, Jiaoyu Bu, Deng Jiu Bumen Guanyu Jin Yibu
Guifan Zhaopin Xingwei Cujin Funu Jiuye De Tongzhi [Circular Regarding
Furthering the Regulation of Recruitment Activity to Increase Female
Employment], issued February 21, 2019.
\18\ Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 2.
\19\ Ibid., 30, 33.
\20\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Female Civil Servants Face
Discrimination, Harassment,'' November 8, 2018.
\21\ Simina Mistreanu, ``China's #MeToo Activists Have Transformed
a Generation,'' Foreign Policy, January 10, 2019.
\22\ Supreme People's Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zengjia
Minshi Anjian Anyou De Tongzhi [Circular Regarding the Addition of
Civil Causes of Action], issued December 12, 2018, effective January 1,
2019.
\23\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security et al., Renli
Ziyuan Shehui Baozhang Bu, Jiaoyu Bu, Deng Jiu Bumen Guanyu Jinyibu
Guifan Zhaopin Xingwei Cujin Funu Jiuye De Tongzhi [Circular Regarding
Furthering the Regulation of Recruitment Activity to Increase Female
Employment], issued February 21, 2019.
\24\ Ibid.
\25\ Ibid.
\26\ State Council, ``Zhengfu gongzuo baogao'' [Government work
report], reprinted in Xinhua, March 16, 2019.
\27\ Li You, ``China Imposes Hefty Fines for Sexist Hiring
Practices,'' Sixth Tone, February 22, 2019; Amy Qin, ``Stop Asking
Women about Childbearing Status, China Tells Employers,'' New York
Times, February 21, 2019.
\28\ FreeChineseFeminists (@FeministChina), ``Dezhou, Shandong's
new regulation for gender equality in recruitment . . .,'' Twitter,
January 28, 2019, 7:59 p.m.
\29\ Laurie Chen, `` `Speak Up to Prevent Sexual Harassment':
Chinese Feminists Hail Beijing Subway Ads as Sign of Progress,'' South
China Morning Post, September 18, 2018.
\30\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' accessed
April 29, 2019; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Female Civil Servants Face
Discrimination, Harassment,'' November 8, 2018.
\31\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended December 29, 2018, arts. 12-
13. Gender-based discrimination against employees or applicants for
employment is prohibited in most circumstances under Articles 12 and 13
of the PRC Labor Law. See also Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security, Jiuye Fuwu Yu Jiuye Guanli Guiding [Provisions on Employment
Services and Employment Management], issued November 5, 2007, amended
December 23, 2014, effective February 1, 2015, arts. 20, 58(2); PRC
Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 (amended March 11,
2018), art. 48.
\32\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of
December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981, art. 11.1;
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
accessed July 15, 2019. China signed the convention on July 17, 1980,
and ratified it on November 4, 1980. International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force
January 3, 1976, art. 7; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV,
Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, accessed July 15, 2019. China signed the ICESCR on October 27,
1997, and ratified it on March 27, 2001.
\33\ Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 3-4.
\34\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' accessed
April 29, 2019; Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 3-4.
\35\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [PRC Labor Law], passed
July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, amended December 29, 2018,
arts. 59-61, 63; State Council, Nu Zhigong Laodong Baohu Tebie Guiding
[Special Provisions for the Protection of Female Employees' Labor],
issued and effective April 28, 2012, Appendix, para. 1 (labor
restrictions for all women), para. 2 (labor restrictions during
menstruation), para. 3 (labor restrictions during pregnancy), para. 4
(labor restrictions while breastfeeding).
\36\ Renmin Ribao (@renminribao), ``Jintian, zhuanfa weibo: xiang
baoli . . .'' [Today, from Weibo: violence . . .], Weibo post, November
25, 2018, 4:15 p.m.
\37\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Jiating Baoli Fa [PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law], passed December 27, 2015, effective March 1,
2016, chap. 4.
\38\ Fu Danni et al., ``Fan Jiabao Fa shishi liang zhou nian,
renshen anquan baohu ling shishi xiaoli reng dai jiaqiang'' [Two years
under Anti-Domestic Violence Law, effectiveness of protection orders
awaits reinforcement], The Paper, March 1, 2018. See also CECC, 2016
Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 180.
\39\ Zhang Qing and Feng Yuan, ``Jiyu dui 560 fen caidingshu de
fenxi, `Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Jiating Baoli Fa' shishi san
zhounian jiance baogao'' [Report monitoring three years of ``PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law'' implementation: Analysis of 560 judgments],
China Development Brief, March 8, 2019.
\40\ Hannah Feldshuh, ``Domestic Violence in China and the
Limitations of Law,'' SupChina, October 10, 2018; Renmin Ribao
(@renminribao), ``Jintian, zhuanfa weibo: xiang baoli . . .'' [Today,
from Weibo: violence . . .], Weibo post, November 25, 2018, 4:15 p.m.
\41\ Xia Fanghai, ``Xiang jiabao shuo bu! Yunnan chutai jiating
baoli qiangzhi baogao zhidu shishi banfa'' [``Say no to domestic
violence! Yunnan releases enforcing measures for compulsory reporting
mechanism for domestic violence], Yunnan Net, January 3, 2019.
\42\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Funu Quanyi Baozhang Fa [PRC Law on
the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests], passed April 3, 1992,
amended August 28, 2005, effective December 1, 2005, art. 11; Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui He Difang Geji Renmin
Daibiao Dahui Xuanju Fa [PRC Electoral Law of the National People's
Congress and Local People's Congresses], passed July 1, 1979, amended
August 29, 2015, art. 6. Both of these laws stipulate that an
``appropriate number'' of female deputies should serve at all levels of
people's congresses.
\43\ ``Target: 30 Percent of Leadership Positions to Women by
1995--United Nations Commission on the Status of Women,'' UN Chronicle
27, no. 2, June 1990, reprinted in Popline. The target of 30-percent
female representation in leadership positions by 1995 was recommended
by the UN Commission on the Status of Women at its 34th session in
1990. ``China Political Leaders'' [Zhongguo zhengyao], Chinese
Communist Party News, People's Daily, accessed April 13, 2018;
``China's National Legislature Starts Annual Session in Beijing,''
Xinhua, March 5, 2018; ``Reality Check: Does China's Communist Party
Have a Woman Problem?,'' BBC, October 25, 2017; ``China Focus: New Era
for China's Female Deputies,'' Xinhua, March 7, 2018. Upon the
convening of the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, women represented
1 out of 25 members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party
Central Committee (Politburo) and there remained no women among the 7
members of the Politburo Standing Committee--the most powerful
governing body in China. The 13th National People's Congress (NPC) was
seated in March 2018 with 24.9 percent female delegates. Under the
State Council, 1 of the 26 national-level ministerial positions was
filled by a woman. No women were appointed as Party secretaries at the
provincial level, while women were selected for 3 of 31 provincial-
level governorships--compare with 2 out of 31 in the previous
government.
\44\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180
of December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981, arts. 7, 24.
Under Article 7(b) of CEDAW, China, as a State Party, is obligated to
``ensure to women, on equal terms with men,'' the right ``[t]o
participate in the formulation of government policy and the
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public
functions at all levels of government . . ..'' United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, accessed July 15, 2019.
China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on
November 4, 1980, thereby committing to undertake the legal rights and
obligations contained in these articles.
\45\ Guangzhou Municipal Civil Affairs Department, ``Guangzhou Shi
Minzheng Ju gongbu shexian feifa shehui zuzhi mingdan (di liu pi)''
[Guangzhou Municipal Civil Affairs Department issues list of suspected
illegal social organizations (sixth batch)], January 8, 2019; Grace
Tsoi, ``Chinese Anti-Sexual Violence Center Shuts Down,'' Inkstone,
December 7, 2018; Jiayun Feng, ``Guangzhou Gender and Sexuality
Education Center Shuts Down,'' SupChina, December 6, 2018.
\46\ Wei Tingting is one of the Feminist Five rights advocates
detained in March 2015 for organizing an anti-sexual harassment
campaign. For more information on Wei Tingting, see Lu Pin, ``Four
Years On: The Whereabouts of the `Feminist Five' and the Sustainability
of Feminist Activism in China,'' China Change, March 11, 2019; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, October 8, 2015, 173. See also the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00114.
\47\ Erweima Hen Nan Fuzhi (@GSEC123), ``Gong hao ting geng
shuoming'' [Account closure and explanation], WeChat, December 6, 2018;
Jiayun Feng, ``Guangzhou Gender and Sexuality Education Center Shuts
Down,'' SupChina, December 6, 2018.
\48\ Erweima Hen Nan Fuzhi (@GSEC123), ``Gong hao ting geng
shuoming'' [Account closure and explanation], WeChat post, December 6,
2018; Jiayun Feng, ``Guangzhou Gender and Sexuality Education Center
Shuts Down,'' SupChina, December 6, 2018.
\49\ Jiayun Feng, ``Chinese Social Media Censors Feminist Voices,''
SupChina, March 9, 2018.
\50\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``China Is Said to Force Closing of
Women's Legal Aid Center,'' New York Times, January 29, 2016.
\51\ Siodhbhra Parkin and Jiayun Feng, `` `The Government Is
Powerful, but It Can't Shut Us Down': Lu Pin on China's #MeToo
Movement,'' SupChina, July 12, 2019.
\52\ Simina Mistreanu, ``China's #MeToo Activists Have Transformed
a Generation,'' Foreign Policy, January 10, 2019; Viola Zhou, ``Chinese
Social Media Site Blocks Petition Backing Woman Accusing Tech
Billionaire of Rape,'' Inkstone, May 1, 2019.
\53\ King-wa Fu, ``Censored on WeChat: #MeToo in China,'' Global
Voices, March 25, 2019.
\54\ Simina Mistreanu, ``China's #MeToo Activists Have Transformed
a Generation,'' Foreign Policy, January 10, 2019.
\55\ CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 178-179; CECC, 2018
Annual Report, October 8, 2018, 171-72.
\56\ CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 8, 2018, 170.
\57\ Amy Qin, ``Stop Asking Women About Childbearing Status, China
Tells Employers,'' New York Times, February 21, 2019; Yanan Wang and
Shanshan Wang, ``China's New Policy against Gender Bias Meets Fans,
sceptics,'' Associated Press, February 22, 2019.
Human
Trafficking
Human
Trafficking
Human Trafficking
Findings
In its 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, the
U.S. State Department listed China as Tier III, which
is a designation for governments who ``do not fully
meet the minimum standards [under the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act] and are not making significant
efforts to do so.''
Chinese anti-trafficking law remains
inconsistent with international standards in the UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo
Protocol), to which China is a State Party. Whereas the
Palermo Protocol encompasses the exploitation of any
individual, Chinese law addresses the selling of women
and children, making it difficult to assess the scale
of human trafficking in China as defined by
international standards.
Women and girls from countries including Burma
(Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, North Korea,
Pakistan, and Vietnam were trafficked into China for
forced marriage and sexual exploitation. The demand for
such trafficking is due in part to the sex ratio
imbalance in China, a result of decades of government-
imposed birth limits and a traditional preference for
sons, as well as a lack of economic opportunity in
countries of origin.
Chinese nationals were trafficked from China
to other parts of the world, including the United
States. Chinese sex workers were found working in
illicit massage parlors across the United States.
Because of their coercive nature, some of these cases
may constitute human trafficking.
Continued restrictions on movement imposed by
the hukou system contributed to the risks that internal
migrant workers face in human trafficking.
The Chinese government continued to subject
individuals to forced labor during pretrial detention
and in administrative detention.
Chinese authorities subjected Uyghur Muslim
and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) to forced labor in the
production of food, textiles, and other goods. German
scholar Adrian Zenz argues that cases of forced labor
in the XUAR are part of a large-scale government-
subsidized forced labor scheme. Supply chains of major
companies including Adidas AG, C&A Campbell Soup,
Esquel Group, Hennes & Mauritz AB, Kraft Heinz Co.,
Coca-Cola Co., and Gap Inc. may include products made
by such forced labor.
The government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) reportedly continued to
generate revenue by sending DPRK nationals to work in
China under conditions that may constitute forced labor
and in possible violation of UN sanctions.
Hong Kong remained a destination for the
trafficking of migrant domestic workers from Indonesia
and the Philippines who face exploitative working
conditions. The Hong Kong government's refusal to
acknowledge the severity of the human trafficking
problem has resulted in weak policy responses in
addressing the issue.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Request the Department of Labor to use the latest
reporting to update their 2019 ``List of Goods Produced
by Child Labor or Forced Labor'' for China required by
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2005, paying particular attention to including
products produced in or made with materials from the
XUAR, and removing products that may no longer be made
with forced labor.
Support the passage of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy
Act (H.R. 649/S. 178, 116th Cong., 1st Sess.) to
respond to Chinese treatment of Uyghur Muslims, such as
subjecting Uyghurs to forced labor and other human
rights violations in mass internment camps.
Support U.S. Government efforts to improve human
trafficking data collection. Work with regional
governments, multilateral institutions, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to improve the
quality and accuracy of data and to monitor the
effectiveness of anti-trafficking measures. Urge the
Chinese government to collect and share relevant law
enforcement data related to human trafficking.
Incorporate language into bilateral and multilateral
economic agreements requiring member countries to
improve data collection on human trafficking and to
take concrete steps toward eliminating human
trafficking within their borders.
Discuss with Chinese officials in appropriate
bilateral and multilateral meetings the importance of
protecting worker rights as a means of combating human
trafficking for the purpose of forced labor. Stress
that when workers are able to organize and advocate for
their rights, they are less vulnerable to all forms of
exploitation, including forced labor.
Engage in regional cooperation to combat human
trafficking through multilateral agreements and forums
such as the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative
Against Trafficking, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,
and the East Asia Summit. Such regional cooperation
should address migration and the flow of refugees,
poverty, sex ratio imbalances, and other risk factors
that contribute to human trafficking.
Pursue cooperation on anti-trafficking efforts
through the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group on Law
Enforcement Cooperation. Support the work of the U.S.
State Department's International Law Enforcement
Academy Program in Bangkok, Thailand, to build regional
law enforcement capacity.
Facilitate international exchanges among civil
society groups and industry associations to raise
awareness of best practices to identify and combat
human trafficking in supply chains. Support NGOs
working on anti-trafficking research, education,
prevention, and victims' services throughout Asia.
Human
Trafficking
Human
Trafficking
Human Trafficking
Defining Human Trafficking
As a State Party to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children (Palermo Protocol),\1\ China is obligated to enact
legislation criminalizing human trafficking as defined by the
Palermo Protocol.\2\ The definition of human trafficking under
the PRC Criminal Law,\3\ however, remains inconsistent with
Palermo Protocol standards.\4\ The Palermo Protocol definition
of human trafficking involves three components:
the action of recruiting, transporting,
harboring, or receiving persons;
the means of coercion, deception, or control;
\5\ and
``the purpose of exploitation,'' including
sexual exploitation or forced labor.\6\
In contrast, Chinese law focuses on the act of selling a woman
or child,\7\ rather than the purpose of exploitation.\8\ The
definition of trafficking in the PRC Criminal Law does not
clearly cover all forms of trafficking in the Palermo
Protocol,\9\ including certain types of non-physical coercion;
\10\ offenses against male victims; \11\ and forced labor,\12\
though forced labor is illegal under a separate provision of
the law.\13\ As defined by the Palermo Protocol, human
trafficking can but does not always involve crossing
international borders,\14\ such as in the examples of Chinese
government-sponsored forced labor described in this section. In
addition, the Chinese legal definition of trafficking includes
the purchase or abduction of children for subsequent sale
without specifying the purpose of these actions.\15\ Under the
Palermo Protocol, illegal adoptions constitute trafficking only
if the purpose is exploitation.\16\
Human trafficking experts note a dearth of reliable
statistics on the scale of human trafficking in Asia in
general; \17\ in China, inconsistencies between domestic law
and international standards further contribute to the
difficulty of assessing the scale of human trafficking.\18\
Trends and Developments
In 2019, the U.S. State Department listed China as Tier
III, a designation for governments who ``do not fully meet the
minimum standards [Under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act] and are not making significant efforts to do so.'' \19\
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
CROSS-BORDER TRAFFICKING
China remains \20\ a destination country for human
trafficking, particularly of women and children from Southeast
Asia,\21\ and a source country for trafficking to the United
States, Europe, and Latin America.\22\ This past year, the
Commission observed regional and international news media
reports of the trafficking of women and girls to China for
forced marriage and sexual exploitation from Burma
(Myanmar),\23\ Cambodia,\24\ Indonesia,\25\ North Korea,\26\
Pakistan,\27\ and Vietnam; \28\ and the trafficking of
individuals to China from Burma, Nepal, and North Korea for the
purpose of forced labor.\29\
The commission further observed multiple reports of Chinese
nationals working in the U.S. sex industry \30\ through illicit
massage parlors.\31\ The managers of these illicit massage
parlors in some cases subjected women to poor living conditions
and restricted their freedom of movement.\32\ The coercive
nature of these cases may constitute human trafficking.\33\
In addition, in March 2019, a federal jury in New York
found Dan Zhong, a former Chinese diplomat to the United States
and former head of a U.S. affiliate of China Rilin Construction
Group, guilty of forced labor charges.\34\ Prosecutors alleged
that Dan Zhong and his former employer, Wang Landong, also a
former Chinese diplomat, forced Chinese construction workers to
work on construction for diplomatic and commercial
projects.\35\ The security deposits that the workers gave the
former diplomats to secure employment in the United States for
higher wages would be forfeited if the workers escaped.\36\
DOMESTIC TRAFFICKING
According to UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking
in Persons (UN-ACT) and the U.S. Department of State, men,
women, and children were trafficked within China's borders for
forced labor, forced begging, and sexual exploitation.\37\
During this reporting year, the Commission observed cases of
trafficking for the purpose of forced labor, including one case
in Hunan province where traffickers abducted at least 10 men--
many with physical or intellectual disabilities--from several
provinces, and held them for years, forcing them to do various
physically demanding work and beating them for disobeying.\38\
Moreover, many of China's workers in construction and other
industries reportedly worked in conditions that may constitute
forced labor, facing frequent non-payment of wages.\39\ [For
more information on the problem of wage arrears, see Section
II--Worker Rights.]
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED FORCED LABOR
This past year, the Chinese government continued \40\ to
subject individuals to forced labor during pretrial detention
and in administrative detention centers. The International
Labour Organization's (ILO) definition of forced labor makes an
exception for labor performed ``as a consequence of a
conviction in a court of law . . .,'' \41\ but the Commission
observed reports this past year of individuals in China
performing forced labor in detention before trial.\42\ The
Financial Times published an investigative report in August
2018 indicating that garlic peeled by unconvicted Chinese
detainees awaiting trial entered the United States.\43\ This is
in violation of U.S. law.\44\ Moreover, Chinese authorities
continued \45\ to require suspected drug users to perform labor
after detaining them in compulsory drug detoxification centers,
a form of administrative detention that bypasses the judicial
process.\46\ As the Chinese government does not convict
compulsory detoxification detainees in court, the requirement
to perform labor constitutes human trafficking under the
Palermo Protocol \47\ for the purpose of forced labor as
defined by the ILO.\48\ Compulsory drug detoxification centers
are similar to the reeducation through labor (RTL) system,\49\
under which detainees were subjected to forced labor \50\
without judicial process.\51\ After abolishing RTL in 2013,\52\
authorities reportedly converted most RTL facilities to
compulsory drug detoxification centers.\53\
Authorities continued \54\ to detain sex workers accused of
prostitution for up to two years without judicial process and
require them to perform labor in a form of administrative
detention known as ``custody and education'' (shourong
jiaoyu).\55\ In March 2019, one member of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference renewed his call to abolish
the practice of ``custody and education,'' \56\ and a U.S.-
based human rights expert observed that while the intention of
``custody and education'' may be to educate those detained, in
reality ``the system puts people into forced labor.'' \57\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This past year, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) expanded a system of extrajudicial mass internment camps.\58\
German scholar Adrian Zenz estimated that ``up to 1.5 million ethnic
minorities . . . are or have been interned.'' \59\ Satellite imagery,
personal testimonies, and official documents indicate that the XUAR
authorities required current and former detainees of these mass
internment camps to perform forced labor in factories inside or near
the camps.\60\ International media reported that the XUAR authorities
have forced detainees to work in food, textile, and other manufacturing
jobs,\61\ and in some cases in government subsidized factories after
authorities release them from the camps.\62\ Some observers have
compared work in mass internment camps to previous forced labor
practices including the now abolished reeducation through labor (RTL)
system.\63\ [For more information on mass internment camps, see Section
IV--Xinjiang.]
In mid-December 2018, international media reported that Badger
Sportswear,\64\ an American sportswear company, received shipments from
Hetian Taida Apparel Co. Ltd. that included clothing made by forced
labor.\65\ Soon after the reports were released, Badger Sportswear
ended its relationship with Hetian Taida.\66\ Hetian Taida, based in
the XUAR, had a cluster of 10 workshops within a mass internment
camp.\67\ Its workshops were featured in a 15-minute government
broadcasted video report that highlighted ``a vocational skills
education and training center'' in Hotan (Hetian) city, Hotan
prefecture, XUAR.\68\ The chairman of Hetian Taida, Wu Hongbo,
confirmed that the company had a factory inside the camp, saying that
Hetian Taida provided employment to trainees who were deemed
unproblematic by the government as part of their ``contribution to
eradicating poverty.'' \69\
In May 2019, the Wall Street Journal linked supply chains of Adidas
AG, C&A Campbell Soup, Esquel Group,\70\ Hennes & Mauritz AB, Kraft
Heinz Co., Coca-Cola Co., and Gap Inc. to forced labor in the XUAR.\71\
Additionally, according to a July 2019 report by ABC Australia, many
Australian companies source cotton from the XUAR.\72\ German scholar
Adrian Zenz argued that forced labor in the XUAR is part of a large
government-subsidized forced labor scheme that affects current and
former detainees of mass internment camps in the XUAR as well as
individuals not held in the camps.\73\ Zenz warned that ``[s]oon, many
or most products made in China that rely at least in part on low-
skilled, labor-intensive manufacturing, could contain elements of
involuntary ethnic minority labor from Xinjiang.'' \74\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Risk Factors
This past year, Chinese workers migrating within China were
at risk of human trafficking, and government restrictions on
freedom of residence and movement and worker rights exacerbated
this risk. Although the central government promoted hukou
system reforms to move millions of rural Chinese to cities, the
hukou system continued to disadvantage and marginalize internal
migrants.\75\ Migrant workers have limited access to housing
and government benefits due to the lack of official status in
their new places of residence,\76\ and they are more likely to
work in informal employment sectors.\77\ The hukou system
reportedly exacerbates these migrants' vulnerability to
trafficking for the purpose of forced labor.\78\ [For more
information on the marginalization of internal migrants in
China, see Section II--Special Topic: Migrant Neighborhoods a
Target of Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign.]
The Chinese government also limited workers' freedom of
association by not permitting the formation of independent
unions.\79\ A September 2016 UN report noted that the failure
to enforce workers' fundamental right to freedom of association
``directly contributes'' to human trafficking.\80\ Observers
have noted that informal labor contracting practices in China
increase the vulnerability to human trafficking of Chinese
workers involved in Chinese infrastructure projects at home and
abroad, including China's Belt and Road Initiative.\81\ [For
more information on restrictions on worker rights in China, see
Section II--Worker Rights.]
Decades of government-imposed birth limits combined with a
traditional preference for sons have led to a sex ratio
imbalance in China.\82\ In rural areas, this imbalance is more
pronounced as many women have migrated to cities for work.\83\
The sex ratio imbalance has created a demand for marriageable
women that may contribute to human trafficking for forced
marriage.\84\ [For more information on China's population
policies, see Section II--Population Control.]
In addition to domestic human trafficking, individuals from
other Asian countries are at risk for human trafficking in
China.\85\ A lack of economic opportunity in developing
countries in Asia, especially among ethnic minority
communities,\86\ contributes to human trafficking from that
region.\87\ Women and girls in these countries are particularly
at risk of trafficking for the purpose of forced marriage.\88\
The Chinese government continued to treat refugees from the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as illegal
economic migrants and maintained a policy of repatriating
undocumented North Koreans,\89\ leaving the refugees, who are
predominantly women, vulnerable to trafficking for forced
marriage \90\ and sexual exploitation.\91\ [For more
information, see Section II--North Korean Refugees in China.]
While reports from March 2019 indicated that many workers
from the DPRK had been repatriated due to the Chinese
government's enforcement of UN sanctions,\92\ the DPRK
government reportedly continued \93\ to generate revenue by
sending DPRK nationals to work in China under conditions that
may constitute forced labor.\94\ The DPRK government reportedly
withheld approximately 67 percent of the workers' earnings.\95\
Anti-Trafficking Efforts
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year, government
figures indicated a decline in the number of criminal human
trafficking cases opened by public security officials.
According to the 2018 China Law Yearbook, public security
officials opened 6,668 criminal cases involving the trafficking
of women and children in 2017.\96\ This was 6 percent fewer
cases than the 7,121 cases opened in 2016.\97\ The National
Bureau of Statistics of China further reported that in 2017,
authorities uncovered 546 cases of child trafficking,\98\ down
from 618 cases in 2016.\99\ All figures likely include cases of
illegal adoption,\100\ while excluding other cases such as
offenses against male victims \101\ and forced labor.\102\ In
June 2019, the Ministry of Public Security reported it rescued
over one thousand trafficking victims from July to December
2018 in coordination with five Southeast Asian countries.\103\
Hong Kong
Hong Kong remained a destination for human
trafficking,\104\ with migrant domestic workers (MDWs)
particularly at risk of exploitation for forced labor. The Hong
Kong Census and Statistics Department's 2018 annual digest
reported that in 2017, there were over 360,000 MDWs working for
households in Hong Kong, the majority (approximately 97
percent) of whom came from the Philippines and Indonesia.\105\
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), advocates, and MDWs
themselves reported that MDWs continued to face exploitative
working conditions, including inadequate living conditions,
little time off, unpaid wages, and in some cases physical and
emotional abuse.\106\ Two regulations--one requiring MDWs to
live with their employers (live-in rule) \107\ and another
requiring them to leave Hong Kong within two weeks of contract
termination \108\--contribute to MDWs' risk of exploitation for
forced labor.\109\
The definition of human trafficking in Hong Kong's Crimes
Ordinance covers only the cross-border movement of persons
``for the purpose of prostitution'' and not other forms of
trafficking such as forced labor or trafficking that occurs
within Hong Kong.\110\ A 2018 Court of Appeal ruled in favor of
the Hong Kong government when the government appealed a 2016
ruling, saying the Hong Kong government is not ``[obligated
under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights] to enact specific
legislation to combat forced labour.'' \111\ In March 2019
Matthew Cheung, Chief Secretary for Administration of the Hong
Kong government, listed various measures Hong Kong was taking
to combat trafficking and said it is ``unfair and groundless
for some critics to accuse the government of lacking the
determination in tackling people trafficking simply because
there is no composite law here.'' \112\ But critics said there
was no one single law against trafficking and existing laws do
not cover all forms of trafficking present in Hong Kong.\113\
While China acceded to the Palermo Protocol in 2010, the
central government has not extended the Protocol to apply to
Hong Kong.\114\
Human
Trafficking
Human
Trafficking
Notes to Section II--Human Trafficking
\1\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters,
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, accessed May 17,
2019; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--China,'' June
2019, 526. See also CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 178;
CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 186; CECC, 2016 Annual
Report, October 6, 2016, 186; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, October 8,
2015, 184. In previous years, the Commission has used the acronym ``UN
TIP Protocol'' for the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
\2\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 5.1. See also UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, A/HRC/35/37, March 28,
2017, para. 14.
\3\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, effective October 1, 1997,
amended November 4, 2017, art. 240. For a discussion of the human
trafficking related provisions of the PRC Criminal Law, see Laney
Zhang, ``Training Related to Combating Human Trafficking: China,''
Library of Congress, February 2016.
\4\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). Topics that need to be addressed in
domestic human trafficking legislation to bring Chinese law into
compliance with the Palermo Protocol include the addition of non-
physical forms of coercion into the legal definition of trafficking,
the trafficking of men, and providing the ``purpose of exploitation.''
For an examination of the ways in which Chinese laws are inconsistent
with the Palermo Protocol, see Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and
China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,''
Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 148-
77.
\5\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a), (c), (d). Note that for children
younger than 18 years old, the means described in Article 3(a) are not
required for an action to constitute human trafficking.
\6\ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``What Is Human Trafficking?,''
accessed April 27, 2019; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000,
entry into force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a), (c), (d). For
information on how international standards regarding forced labor fit
into the framework of the Palermo Protocol, see International Labour
Office, International Labour Organization, ``Human Trafficking and
Forced Labour Exploitation: Guidelines for Legislation and Law
Enforcement,'' 2005, 7-15; International Labour Organization,
``Questions and Answers on Forced Labour,'' June 1, 2012. The
International Labour Organization lists ``withholding of wages'' as an
indicator of forced labor. See also Peter Bengsten, ``Hidden in Plain
Sight: Forced Labour Constructing China,'' openDemocracy, Februrary 16,
2018.
\7\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, effective October 1, 1997,
amended November 4, 2017, art. 240. The PRC Criminal Law defines
trafficking as ``swindling, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in,
receiving, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose
of selling [the victim].''
\8\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 159. See also UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review--China, A/HRC/25/5, November 6, 2018, para. 28.173; Report of
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China (Addendum),
A/HRC/40/6/Add.1, February 15, 2019, para. 2(28.173). In response to a
recommendation from Ukraine at China's Universal Periodic Review
requesting that China ``[e]laborate comprehensive anti-trafficking
legislation that provides for the criminalization of all forms of
trafficking,'' the Chinese government stated that the recommendation
was ``[a]ccepted and already implemented.''
\9\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 151, 166; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised
March 14, 1997, effective October 1, 1997, amended November 4, 2017,
art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). See also UN Office on Drugs and
Crime, ``What Is Human Trafficking?,'' accessed April 27, 2019.
\10\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 159; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised
March 14, 1997, effective October 1, 1997, amended November 4, 2017,
art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a).
\11\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 160, 166; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised
March 14, 1997, effective October 1, 1997, amended November 4, 2017,
art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). The PRC Criminal Law defines
trafficking as ``swindling, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in,
receiving, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose
of selling [the victim].'' See also ``Sifa da shuju zhuanti baogao zhi
she guai fanzui'' [Judicial big data special report on crimes involving
trafficking], Supreme People's Court Information Center and Judicial
Cases Research Institute, December 22, 2016, 11.
\12\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 159; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised
March 14, 1997, effective October 1, 1997, amended November 4, 2017,
art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a).
\13\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed
July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, effective October 1, 1997,
amended November 4, 2017, art. 244. For a discussion of the human
trafficking related provisions of the PRC Criminal Law, see Laney
Zhang, ``Training Related to Combating Human Trafficking: China,''
Library of Congress, February 2016.
\14\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a); Anti-Slavery International, ``What
Is Human Trafficking?'' accessed May 6, 2019; Human Rights Watch,
``Smuggling and Trafficking Human Beings,'' July 7, 2015; Rebekah Kates
Lemke, ``7 Things You May Not Know About Human Trafficking, and 3 Ways
to Help,'' Catholic Relief Services, March 19, 2019. For an example of
human trafficking report that lists government sponsored forced labor
in China as part of human trafficking, see Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in
Persons Report--China,'' June 2019, 3, 140-44.
\15\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2019, 141;
Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic
Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human
Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 166-67, 170-71; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised
March 14, 1997, effective October 1, 1997, amended November 4, 2017,
art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). The PRC Criminal Law defines
trafficking as ``swindling, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in,
receiving, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose
of selling [the victim].'' In contrast, the purpose of exploitation is
a key element of the Palermo Protocol definition of human trafficking.
For reports from the Commission's 2019 reporting year that describe the
sale of children as human trafficking without specifying the purpose of
the sale, see, e.g., Chen Yikai and You Tianyi, ``9 ming ertong bei
guai an liang renfan bei pan sixing'' [In the case of 9 trafficked
children, two traffickers sentenced to death], Beijing News, December
29, 2018; Wuzhou Procuratorate (@wuzhoujiancha), ``Wuzhou shi jiancha
jiguan pizhun daibu yidui shexian fanmai ziji duo ming haizi de fuqi''
[Wuzhou municipal procuratorate approved the arrest of a married couple
suspected of selling several of their own children], Weibo post, March
11, 2019, 18:55:53; ``Baby-Selling Couple Arrested for Trafficking,''
Sixth Tone, March 12, 2019.
\16\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a), (c). The purpose of exploitation is
one of the required elements of a trafficking case under Article 3 of
the Palermo Protocol. See also UN General Assembly, Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to Eleventh Sessions,
Addendum, Interpretive Notes for the Official Records (Travaux
Preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, A/55/
383/Add.1, November 3, 2000, para. 66; Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking
and China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,''
Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 171.
\17\ See, e.g., W. Courtland Robinson and Casey Branchini, Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and the Kachin Women's
Association Thailand, ``Estimating Trafficking of Myanmar Women for
Forced Marriage and Childbearing in China,'' December 2018, ix; Matt
Blomberg and Kong Meta, ``Wedlocked: Tangled Webs Trap Cambodian
`Brides' in China,'' Thomson Reuters Foundation, March 11, 2019; Jenny
Vaughan and Tran Thi Minh Ha, ``Mothers of the Missing: Anguished
Search for Vietnam's Kidnapped Brides,'' Agence France-Presse, December
12, 2012.
\18\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--China,'' June
2019; Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic
Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human
Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 166, 177.
\19\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2019, 37,
48. See also Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C.
7102. For U.S. State Department Tier Rankings from 2011 through 2019,
see Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2019, 35-
37, 141, 227; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2018, 139,
215.
\20\ For information on cross-border trafficking to and from China
in previous reporting years, see CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10,
2018, 178-79; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 186; CECC,
2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 186; CECC, 2015 Annual Report,
October 8, 2015, 184.
\21\ See, e.g., Heather Barr, Human Rights Watch, ``Give Us a Baby
and We'll Let You Go,'' March 21, 2019; Anna Maria Romero, ``How
China's One-Child Policy Has Resulted in Millions of Single Men, Plus
South East Asian Women Sold into Marriage,'' Independent, December 13,
2018; Jenny Vaughan and Tran Thi Minh Ha, ``Mother of the Missing:
Anguished Search for Vietnam's Kidnapped Brides,'' Agence France-
Presse, December 12, 2012.
\22\ Aamna Mohdin, ``Trafficked Chinese Woman: `The Lorry Door
Opened and We Ran,' '' Guardian, December 12, 2018; Gustavo Arias
Retana, ``Human Trafficking from China Sounds Alarm in Latin America,''
Dialogo, November 15, 2018; Nicholas Kulish, Frances Robles, and
Patricia Mazzei, ``Behind Illicit Massage Parlors Lie a Vast Crime
Network and Modern Indentured Servitude,'' New York Times, March 2,
2019.
\23\ Heather Barr, Human Rights Watch, ``Give Us a Baby and We'll
Let You Go,'' March 21, 2019; W. Courtland Robinson and Casey
Branchini, John's Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and the
Kachin Women's Association Thailand, ``Estimating Trafficking of
Myanmar Women for Forced Marriage and Childbearing in China,'' December
2018; Htike Nanda Win, ``Myanmar Women in China Use WeChat to Escape
Forced Marriages,'' Myanmar Now, February 14, 2019.
\24\ Matt Blomberg and Kong Meta, ``Wedlocked: Tangled Webs Trap
Cambodian `Brides' in China,'' Thomson Reuters Foundation, March 11,
2019; Matt Blomberg, ``Family Ties Thwart Cambodia's Efforts to Tackle
Bride Trafficking in China,'' Reuters, February 20, 2019; Pav Suy,
``Woman Charged for Trafficking Girl to China,'' Khmer Times, September
19, 2018.
\25\ Resty Woro Yuniar, ``Beaten & Abused: An Indonesian Bride
Trafficked to China,'' Inkstone, June 25, 2019; Anna Maria Romero,
``How China's One-Child Policy Has Resulted in Millions of Single Men,
Plus South East Asian Women Sold into Marriage,'' Independent, December
13, 2018.
\26\ Choe Sang-Hun, ``Children of North Korean Mothers Find More
Hardship in the South,'' New York Times, November 25, 2018; Crossing
Borders, ``North Korean Orphans,'' accessed April 19, 2019; ``Bei mai
dao Zhongguo . . . Beihan xinniang cheng shengzi gongju songhui Beihan
zao yuzu qiangbao'' [North Korean brides sold to China become
childbearing tools, may be raped by prison guards upon repatriation to
North Korea], Liberty Times Net, February 19, 2019; Yoon Hee-soon,
Korea Future Initiative, ``Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex &
Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China,'' May 20, 2019.
\27\ Adnan Aamir, ``Chinese Illegal Marriage Operators Exploit
Young Pakistani Women,'' Nikkei Asian Review, April 18, 2019; ``FIA
Continues Crackdown Against Chinese Nationals Involved in Human
Trafficking,'' Geo News, May 9, 2019; Irfan Yar, ``Why and How
Pakistani Christian Girls Are Smuggled to China,'' The Diplomat, May
24, 2019; Salman Masood and Amy Qin, ``She Thought She'd Married a Rich
Chinese Farmer. She Hadn't.,'' New York Times, May 27, 2019.
\28\ Hai Binh, ``Vietnamese Woman Jailed Five Years for Trafficking
Daughter-in-Law to China,'' VN Express, September 28, 2019; ``Bringing
Back the Vietnamese Women Sold into Sexual Slavery and Forced Marriages
in China,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning
Post, December 13, 2018; ``Women Charged with Selling Teenage Girls to
China,'' Asia Times, March 12, 2019.
\29\ ``More Than 40 Human Trafficking Cases Reported in First Two
Months,'' Mizzima, March 18, 2019; ``Myanmar Workers Return Home After
Fleeing Miserable Conditions at Chinese Sugarcane Plantation,'' Radio
Free Asia, January 23, 2019; ``China: 44 Nepali Women Tricked into
Underpaid Overwork in Liaoning Province,'' MyRepublica, reprinted in
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, July 2, 2019; Lee Jeong-ho,
``North Korean Workers and Imports Continue Cross Border into China
Despite UN Sanctions,'' South China Morning Post, October 27, 2018;
``North Korea Still Dispatching Workers to China Despite UN
Sanctions,'' Radio Free Asia, March 21, 2019; Jason Arterburn, C4ADS,
``Dispatched: Mapping Overseas Forced Labor in North Korea's
Proliferation Finance System,'' August 2, 2018, 70-90.
\30\ The Polaris Project, a non-governmental organization based in
Washington, D.C., found that in the United States, ``[t]he vast
majority of women reported to have been trafficked in [illicit massage
businesses] are from China, with a relatively high number coming from
the [sic] Fujian province.'' Polaris Project, ``Massage Parlor
Trafficking,'' accessed April 27, 2019; Nicholas Kulish, Frances
Robles, and Patricia Mazzei, ``Behind Illicit Massage Parlors Lie a
Vast Crime Network and Modern Indentured Servitude,'' New York Times,
March 2, 2019; Mary Helen Moore, ``How Vero Beach Police Landed the
Only Human Trafficking Charge in Recent Florida Busts,'' TC Palm, USA
Today, February 26, 2019.
\31\ Patricia Mazzei, `` `The Monsters Are the Men': Inside a
Thriving Sex Trafficking Trade in Florida,'' New York Times, February
23, 2019; Mary Helen Moore, ``How Vero Beach Police Landed the Only
Human Trafficking Charge in Recent Florida Busts,'' TC Palm, USA Today,
February 26, 2019; Sean Ross, ``AG Steve Marshall Shuts Down Alleged
`Human Traffickers' Masquerading as Massage Parlors in North Alabama,''
Yellowhammer News, April 24, 2019; Sara Jean Green, ``Major
Prostitution Bust: Seattle Police Raid 11 Massage Parlors, Freeing 26
Women,'' Seattle Times, March 8, 2019. See also Nicholas Kulish,
Frances Robles, and Patricia Mazzei, ``Behind Illicit Massage Parlors
Lie a Vast Crime Network and Modern Indentured Servitude,'' New York
Times, March 2, 2019.
\32\ Patricia Mazzei, `` `The Monsters Are the Men': Inside a
Thriving Sex Trafficking Trade in Florida,'' New York Times, February
23, 2019; Sean Ross, ``AG Steve Marshall Shuts Down Alleged `Human
Traffickers' Masquerading as Massage Parlors in North Alabama,''
Yellowhammer News, April 24, 2019. See also Polaris Project, ``Human
Trafficking in Illicit Massage Businesses,'' 2018, 19, 27-34; Mary
Helen Moore, ``How Vero Beach Police Landed the Only Human Trafficking
Charge in Recent Florida Busts,'' TC Palm, USA Today, February 26,
2019.
\33\ As countries that have ratified the Palermo Protocol, both the
United States and China have an obligation to prevent and combat
trafficking in persons. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000,
entry into force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a), 9; United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, 12.a., Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, accessed July 22, 2019. See also
Nicholas Kulish, Frances Robles, and Patricia Mazzei, ``Behind Illicit
Massage Parlors Lie a Vast Crime Network and Modern Indentured
Servitude,'' New York Times, March 2, 2019; Polaris Project, ``Human
Trafficking in Illicit Massage Businesses,'' 2018, 27-34.
\34\ Brendan Pierson, ``Ex-Chinese Construction Exec Found Guilty
in U.S. of Forced Labor Charges,'' Reuters, March 22, 2019; Stewart
Bishop, ``Ex-Chinese Diplomat Convicted of Forced Labor Scheme,''
Law360, March 22, 2019.
\35\ Stewart Bishop, ``Ex-Chinese Diplomat Convicted of Forced
Labor Scheme,'' Law360, March 22, 2019; Brendan Pierson, ``Ex-Chinese
Construction Executive Faces U.S. Trial for Forced Labor,'' Reuters,
March 5, 2019; Brendan Pierson, ``Ex-Chinese Construction Exec Found
Guilty in U.S. of Forced Labor Charges,'' Reuters, March 22, 2019. See
also ``Former Chinese Diplomat Faces US Trial for Forced Labor,'' Epoch
Times, March 6, 2019.
\36\ Stewart Bishop, ``Ex-Chinese Diplomat Convicted of Forced
Labor Scheme,'' Law360, March 22, 2019.
\37\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--China,'' June
2019; UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-
ACT), ``China,'' accessed May 16, 2019.
\38\ Fan Liya, ``Hunan Family Abducted Disabled People for Slave
Labor,'' Sixth Tone, January 21, 2019; Tan Jun, ``Hunan Baojing
jingfang po qiangpo laodong an: jiejiu shi ren, zhu shisan 17 nian fuzi
tuanju'' [Police from Baojing, Hunan, crack forced labor case: 10
people rescued, helped reunite father and son who had been separated
for 17 years], The Paper, January 19, 2019. In another case,
authorities sentenced traffickers to prison terms between one and six
years for subjecting 52 men from various provinces to forced labor. Zhu
Yuanxiang, ``52 ming nanzi shizong ji: bei qiangpo laodong xianzhi
renshen ziyou, youde changda liu nian'' [Recollection of 52 missing
men: forced to perform labor and personal freedoms restricted, some as
long as six years], The Paper, January 19, 2019; Frank Tang, `` `Not a
Single Day of Rest': Victims Reveal Details of Modern Slavery Case in
China,'' South China Morning Post, January 19, 2019.
\39\ Peter Bengsten, ``Hidden in Plain Sight: Forced Labour
Constructing China,'' openDemocracy, February 16, 2018; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Understanding and Resolving the Fundamental Problems in
China's Construction Industry,'' March 18, 2019. See also International
Labour Organization, ``Questions and Answers on Forced Labour,'' June
1, 2012. The International Labour Organization lists ``withholding of
wages'' as an indicator of forced labor.
\40\ For information from previous years on forced labor in
pretrial and administrative detention, see CECC, 2018 Annual Report,
October 10, 2018, 179; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 187;
CECC, 2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 187; CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, October 8, 2015, 186.
\41\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, art. 2.1,
2.2(c); International Labour Organization, ``Ratifications of CO29--
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),'' accessed May 16, 2019.
Article 2.1 defines forced or compulsory labor as ``all work or service
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and
for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.'' China
has not ratified this convention.
\42\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Yang Qian yu zhong chixu
aida qi an fahui chongshen'' [Yang Qian continues to be beaten in
prison, his case is returned for retrial], January 7, 2019; Yuan Yang,
``Supply Chains: The Dirty Secret of China's Prisons,'' Financial
Times, August 30, 2018. See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Kanshousuo
Tiaoli [PRC Public Security Bureau Detention Center Regulations],
issued and effective March 17, 1990, arts. 2, 33-34.
\43\ Yuan Yang, ``Supply Chains: The Dirty Secret of China's
Prisons,'' Financial Times, August 30, 2018.
\44\ Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1307; Yuan Yang, ``Supply
Chains: The Dirty Secret of China's Prisons,'' Financial Times, August
30, 2018. See also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``CBP Issues
Detention Order on Tuna Harvested by Forced Labor Aboard the Tunago No.
61,'' February 6, 2019.
\45\ For information on compulsory drug detoxification centers from
previous reporting years, see CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10,
2018, 179; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 187; CECC, 2016
Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 187; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, October
8, 2015, 186.
\46\ Yang Bo and Wang Mingrun, ``Guangzhou Ribao jizhe fang ai ri
zou jin Nanfeng Qiangzhi Geli Jiedusuo duihua HIV huanzhe'' [Guangzhou
Daily reporter visited Nanfeng Forced Quarantine Drug Rehabilitation
Center to speak with people with HIV on AIDS prevention day], Guangzhou
Daily, December 1, 2018; Wenzhou Municipal Justice Bureau, ``Shi
Huanglong Qiangzhi Geli Jiedusuo zai quan sheng shuaixian tuixing
`4+2+1' jiedu jiaozhi guanli moshi'' [Huanlong Compulsory Quarantine
Drug Rehabilitation Center in Wenzhou Municipality first in the
province to implement ``4+2+1'' drug rehabilitation and correction
management model], Feburary 27, 2019. For relevant legal provisions,
see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jindu Fa [PRC Narcotics Law], passed
December 29, 2007, effective June 1, 2008, arts. 38, 41, 43, 47; State
Council, Jiedu Tiaoli [Drug Detoxification Regulations], issued and
effective June 22, 2011; Ministry of Justice, Sifa Xingzheng Jiguan
Qiangzhi Geli Jiedu Gongzuo Guiding [Judicial and Administrative
Bureaus Compulsory Drug Detoxification Work Regulations], issued March
22, 2013, effective June 1, 2013, art. 43. See also Human Rights Watch,
`` `Where Darkness Knows No Limits': Incarceration, Ill-Treatment, and
Forced Labor as Drug Rehabilitation in China,'' January 2010, 27-31.
\47\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into
force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). Compulsory drug detoxification
center detainee labor can be viewed as constituting trafficking under
Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol, as authorities engage in the
``harbouring'' and ``receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
of force . . . for the purpose of exploitation.'' According to Article
3(a), exploitation includes ``forced labour.'' See also Office to
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State,
``Trafficking in Persons Report--China,'' June 2019.
\48\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, art. 2. See also
Patrick Tibke, International Drug Policy Consortium, ``Drug Dependence
Treatment in China: A Policy Analysis,'' February 2017, 8; Human Rights
Watch, `` `Where Darkness Knows No Limits': Incarceration, Ill-
Treatment, and Forced Labor as Drug Rehabilitation in China,'' January
2010, 27-31.
\49\ Amnesty International, `` `Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' December
2013, 9.
\50\ Amnesty International, `` `Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' December
2013, 17-18; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Fully Abolish Re-Education
Through Labor,'' January 8, 2013; State Council, Guanyu Laodong
Jiaoyang Wenti de Jueding [Decision on the Issue of Reeducation Through
Labor], issued August 3, 1957, item 2.
\51\ Amnesty International, `` `Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' December
2013, 5; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Fully Abolish Re-Education
Through Labor,'' January 8, 2013; State Council, Guanyu Laodong
Jiaoyang Wenti de Jueding [Decision on the Issue of Reeducation Through
Labor], issued August 3, 1957, item 3; State Council, Guanyu Laodong
Jiaoyang de Buchong Guiding [Supplementary Provisions on Reeducation
Through Labor], issued and effective November 29, 1979, items 1-2.
\52\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Quanguo Renmin
Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Feizhi Youguan Laodong Jiaoyang
Falu Guiding De Jueding [Decision on Abolishing Legal Provisions
Regarding Reeducation Through Labor], issued and effective December 28,
2013.
\53\ Sun Ying, ``Sifabu: quanguo jue da duoshu yuan laojiao
changsuo zhuan wei qiangzhi geli jiedu changsuo'' [Ministry of Justice:
vast majority of nation's former reeducation through labor centers
turned into compulsory drug detoxification centers], China National
Radio, November 5, 2014.
\54\ CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 179; CECC, 2017
Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 187-88.
\55\ Emile Dirks, ``Partial Victory for China's Detainees,'' East
Asia Forum, February 12, 2019; Isabelle Li and Shan Yuxiao, ``China
Signals End of Controversial Sex Work Detention Program,'' Caixin,
December 29, 2019; Yue Hongbin and Cao Kun, ``Quanguo Renda Changweihui
Fagongwei: jianyi feizhi shourong jiaoyu zhidu'' [NPC Legislative
Affairs Commission: Proposes repeal of ``custody and education''
system], National People's Congress, December 26, 2018. For relevant
legal provisions, see State Council, Maiyin Piaochang Renyuan Shourong
Jiaoyu Banfa [Measures on Custody and Education of Prostitutes], issued
September 4, 1993, amended January 8, 2011, arts. 2, 6, 13. See also
Asia Catalyst, `` `Custody and Education': Arbitrary Detention for
Female Sex Workers in China,'' December 2013, 8, 25-27.
\56\ Meng Yaxu, ``Weihe si ci `maotou' dui zhun shourong jiaoyu?
Quanguo zhengxie weiyuan huiying'' [Why critique custody and education
four times? CPPCC member's response], Beijing Youth Daily, December 26,
2018; See also Isabelle Li and Shan Yuxiao, ``China Signals End of
Controversial Sex Work Detention Program,'' Caixin, December 29, 2019;
Lin Ping, ``Rights Group Calls on China's Parliament to End Sex Worker
`Reeducation,' '' Radio Free Asia, March 6, 2019; Human Rights Watch,
``China: Abolish Arbitrary Detention for Sex Workers,'' March 4, 2019.
\57\ Lin Ping, ``Rights Group Calls on China's Parliament to End
Sex Worker `Reeducation,' '' Radio Free Asia, March 6, 2019; Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Abolish Arbitrary Detention for Sex Workers,''
March 4, 2019.
\58\ Rob Taylor, ``China Supersizes Internment Camps in Xinjiang
Despite International Criticism,'' Wall Street Journal, November 1,
2018; Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, ``Mapping
Xinjiang's `Re-education' Camps,'' International Cyber Policy Centre,
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018.
\59\ Stephanie Nebehay, ``1.5 Million Muslims Could Be Detained in
China's Xinjiang: Academic,'' Reuters, March 13, 2019; Nick Cumming-
Bruce, ``U.S. Steps Up Criticism of China for Detentions in Xinjiang,''
New York Times, March 13, 2019. See also UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination Reviews the Report of China,'' August 13, 2018.
\60\ Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, ``US Sportswear
Traced to Factory in China's Internment Camps,'' Associated Press,
December 19, 2018; Emily Feng, ``Forced Labour Being Used in China's
`Reeducation' Camps,'' Financial Times, December 15, 2018; Li Zaili,
``Uyghur Women Forced to Labor in Camp,'' Bitter Winter, September 28,
2018; Li Zaili, ``Handicraft Production Base Converted into a Camp
(Video),'' Bitter Winter, September 21, 2018; ``Businesses in China's
Xinjiang Use Forced Labor Linked to Camp System,'' Radio Free Asia,
January 1, 2019; ``Xinjiang Yining qiangbi Musilin dang lianjia
laogong'' [Yining, Xinjiang, forces Muslims to labor for cheap], Radio
Free Asia, December 31, 2018.
\61\ Emily Feng, ``Forced Labour Being Used in China's
`Reeducation' Camps,'' Financial Times, December 15, 2018; Dake Kang,
Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, ``US Sportswear Traced to Factory in
China's Internment Camps,'' Associated Press, December 19, 2018; China
Countering Evil Cults, ``Uncovering Xinjiang's `Reeducation Camps'
(High Definition Video)'' [Video File], YouTube, October 16, 2018.
\62\ Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, ``US Sportswear
Traced to Factory in China's Internment Camps,'' Associated Press,
December 19, 2018; Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ``China's Detention
Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,'' New York Times, December 16,
2018; ``Businesses in China's Xinjiang Use Forced Labor Linked to Camp
System,'' Radio Free Asia, January 1, 2019.
\63\ Emily Feng, ``Forced Labour Being Used in China's
`Reeducation' Camps,'' Financial Times, December 15, 2018; Sarah Cook,
``The Learning Curve: How Communist Party Officials Are Applying
Lessons from Prior `Transformation' Campaigns to Repression in
Xinjiang,'' China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 1, 2019.
\64\ Badger Sportswear is a part of Founder Sport Group which is
owned by CCMP Capital Advisors LP. ``About Us,'' Badger Sport, accessed
September 6, 2019; Iris Dorbian, ``CCMP to Buy Uniforms Maker Badger
Sportswear,'' The PE Hub Network, August 23, 2016.
\65\ Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ``China's Detention Camps for
Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,'' New York Times, December 16, 2018; Dake
Kang, Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, ``US Sportswear Traced to Factory
in China's Internment Camps,'' Associated Press, December 19, 2018. For
more information on Badger Sportswear and its relationship with its
Chinese supplier, Bada Sport and its Hetian Taida facility, see Worker
Rights Consortium, ``Factory Assessment Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd.
(China): Findings, Recommendations, and Status,'' June 24, 2019. See
also Emily Feng, `` Forced Labour Being Used in China's `Reeducation'
Camps,'' Financial Times, December 15, 2018.
\66\ Badger Sport (@badger_sport), ``Update: Wrap Investigation
Concludes No Use of Forced Labor at Western China Facility,'' Twitter,
December 22, 2018, 7:18 p.m.
\67\ Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, ``US Sportswear
Traced to Factory in China's Internment Camps,'' Associated Press,
December 19, 2018.
\68\ Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, ``US Sportswear
Traced to Factory in China's Internment Camps,'' Associated Press,
December 19, 2018; China Countering Evil Cults, ``Uncovering Xinjiang's
`Reeducation Camps' (High Definition Video)'' [Video File], YouTube,
October 16, 2018, 7:14-7:25; Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ``China's
Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,'' New York Times,
December 16, 2018.
\69\ Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, ``US Sportswear
Traced to Factory in China's Internment Camps,'' Associated Press,
December 19, 2018.
\70\ Eva Dou and Chao Deng, ``Western Companies Get Tangled in
China's Muslim Clampdown,'' The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2019.
According to a Wall Street Journal report of May 16, 2019, ``Hong Kong-
based Esquel Group--the world's largest contract shirt maker, which
says its customers include Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger, Nike Inc. and
Patagonia Inc.--set up three spinning mills in Xinjiang to be close to
the region's cotton fields. Esquel CEO John Cheh said that in 2017
officials began offering the company Uighurs from southern Xinjiang as
workers.''
\71\ Eva Dou and Chao Deng, ``Western Companies Get Tangled in
China's Muslim Clampdown,'' Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2019. See also
Fair Labor Association, ``Forced Labor Risk in Xinjiang, China,'' April
2019.
\72\ Sophie McNeill, Jeanavive McGregor, Meredith Griffiths,
Michael Walsh, Echo Hui, and Bang Xiao, ``Cotton On and Target
Investigate Suppliers after Forced Labour of Uyghurs Exposed in China's
Xinjiang,'' Four Corners, ABC News (Australia), July 16, 2019.
\73\ Adrian Zenz, ``Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Grand Scheme of
Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,''
SocArXiv, July 14, 2019.
\74\ Adrian Zenz, ``Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Grand Scheme of
Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,''
SocArXiv, July 14, 2019, 2. See also Fair Labor Association, ``Forced
Labor Risk in Xinjiang, China,'' April 2019.
\75\ National Development and Reform Commission, ``2019 nian
xinxing chengzhenhua jianshe zhongdian renwu'' [Key tasks of new
urbanization construction in 2019], March 27, 2019; Cheng Siwei and
Timmy Shen, ``Residency Restrictions to Be Scrapped in Many of China's
Cities,'' Caixin, April 8, 2019. See also Paulson Institute, MacroPolo,
``Hukou Difficulty Index,'' accessed May 15, 2019.
\76\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and Their Children,''
accessed May 8, 2019; Ma Li, ``Why China's Migrants Can't Just Leave
Poverty Behind,'' Sixth Tone, September 1, 2018. See also Hongbin Li,
Prashant Loyalka, Scott Rozelle, and Binzhen Wu, ``Human Capital and
China's Future Growth,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 1
(Winter 2017), 28; ``Chinese Cities Should Stop Expelling Chinese
Migrants,'' Economist, November 30, 2017.
\77\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and Their Children,''
accessed May 8, 2019; Ma Li, ``Why China's Migrants Can't Just Leave
Poverty Behind,'' Sixth Tone, September 1, 2018.
\78\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and Their Children,''
accessed May 8, 2019; Ma Li, ``Why China's Migrants Can't Just Leave
Poverty Behind,'' Sixth Tone, September 1, 2018.
\79\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [PRC Trade Union Law],
passed April 3, 1992, amended and effective October 27, 2001, arts. 9-
11; China Labour Bulletin, ``Labour Relations in China: Some Frequently
Asked Questions,'' July 2018. For relevant international standards
regarding the right to freely form and join independent unions, see
International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 87) Concerning
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, July 4,
1950, arts. 2, 3, 5; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10,
1948, art. 23(4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16,
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 22.1; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force
January 3, 1976, art. 8.1.
\80\ UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai,
A/71/385, September 14, 2016, paras. 2, 4, 11, 74.
\81\ Emily Feng, ``China's Globetrotting Labourers Face Dangers and
Debt,'' Financial Times, January 15, 2019; Emily Feng, ``China's Global
Construction Boom Puts Spotlight on Questionable Labor Practices,''
NPR, March 30, 2019; Aaron Halegua and Jerome A. Cohen, ``The Forgotten
Victims of China's Belt and Road Initiative,'' Washington Post, April
23, 2019.
\82\ Amanda Erickson, ``The `Bride Price' in China Keeps Rising.
Some Villages Want to Put a Cap on It.,'' Washington Post, September
23, 2018; Heather Barr, Human Rights Watch, ``You Should Be Worrying
About the Woman Shortage,'' December 4, 2019.
\83\ Amanda Erickson, ``The `Bride Price' in China Keeps Rising.
Some Villages Want to Put a Cap on It.,'' Washington Post, September
23, 2018.
\84\ Amanda Erickson, ``The `Bride Price' in China Keeps Rising.
Some Villages Want to Put a Cap on It.,'' Washington Post, September
23, 2018; Heather Barr, Human Rights Watch, ``You Should Be Worrying
about the Woman Shortage,'' December 4, 2018.
\85\ See W. Courtland Robinson and Casey Branchini, John's Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Kachin Women's Association
Thailand, ``Estimating Trafficking of Myanmar Women for Forced Marriage
and Childbearing in China,'' December 2018; Matt Blomberg, ``Family
Ties Thwart Cambodia's Efforts to Tackle Bride Trafficking in China,''
Reuters, February 20, 2019; Yoon Hee-soon, Korea Future Initiative,
``Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North
Korean Women & Girls in China,'' May 20, 2019, 12.
\86\ Jenny Vaughan and Tran Thi Minh Ha, ``Mother of the Missing:
Anguished Search for Vietnam's Kidnapped Brides,'' Agence France-
Presse, December 12, 2012; Emma Graham-Harrison, ``Kachin Women From
Myanmar `Raped Until They Get Pregnant' in China,'' Guardian, March 21,
2019; Heather Barr, Human Rights Watch, ``Give Us a Baby and We'll Let
You Go: Trafficking of Kachin `Brides' from Myanmar to China,'' March
2019, 2-4.
\87\ Ming Ye, ``Through Her Lens: Cong Yan Chronicles China's
Cambodian Brides,'' Sixth Tone, February 8, 2019; Heather Barr, Human
Rights Watch, ``Give Us a Baby and We'll Let You Go: Trafficking of
Kachin `Brides' from Myanmar to China,'' March 2019, 4; W. Courtland
Robinson and Casey Branchini, John's Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health and the Kachin Women's Association Thailand, ``Estimating
Trafficking of Myanmar Women for Forced Marriage and Childbearing in
China,'' December 2018, 54-55; Irfan Yar, ``Why and How Pakistani
Christian Girls Are Smuggled to China,'' The Diplomat, May 24, 2019.
\88\ Ming Ye, ``Through Her Lens: Cong Yan Chronicles China's
Cambodian Brides,'' Sixth Tone, February 8, 2019; Heather Barr, Human
Rights Watch, ``Give Us a Baby and We'll Let You Go: Trafficking of
Kachin `Brides' from Myanmar to China,'' March 2019; ``Bringing Back
the Vietnamese Women Sold into Sexual Slavery and Forced Marriages in
China,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post,
December 13, 2018; W. Courtland Robinson, and Casey Branchini, John's
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Kachin Women's
Association Thailand, ``Estimating Trafficking of Myanmar Women for
Forced Marriage and Childbearing in China,'' December 2018.
\89\ Human Rights Watch, ``North Korea,'' in World Report 2019:
Events of 2018, 2019; Choe Sang-Hun, ``Children of North Korean Mothers
Find More Hardship in the South,'' New York Times, November 25, 2018;
Crossing Borders, ``North Korean Orphans,'' accessed April 19, 2019.
See also Tim A. Peters, ``Reaching Underground Believers and Guiding
Others in Flight: Silent Partners Assist North Koreans Under Caesar's
Sword,'' HKNK Insider, September 24, 2018; Lin Taylor, ``Through Lunar
New Year Feast, North Korean Defectors Draw Attention to Their
Plight,'' Reuters, February 8, 2019; UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, ``Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination Reviews the Report of China,'' August 13, 2018. The UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed concern
that ``China continued to deny refugee status to asylum-seekers from
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and it also continued to
forcibly return them to their country of origin, regardless of a
serious threat of persecution and human rights violations.''
\90\ Choe Sang-Hun, ``Children of North Korean Mothers Find More
Hardship in the South,'' New York Times, November 25, 2018; Crossing
Borders, ``North Korean Orphans,'' accessed April 19, 2019.
\91\ Robert R. King, ``Attention on DPRK and China Policies That
Result in Sex Trafficking,'' Peninsula (blog), Korea Economic
Institute, January 23, 2019; Su-Min Hwang, ``The North Korean Women Who
Had to Escape Twice,'' BBC, January 18, 2019; Julian Ryall, ``Returned
North Korean Defectors Paraded to Lecture on Miseries of Capitalism
They Saw in China,'' Telegraph, December 29, 2018.
\92\ Michelle Nichols, ``Russia, China Sent Home More Than Half of
North Korean Workers in 2018--UN Reports,'' Reuters, March 29, 2019;
Richard Roth and Ben Westcott, ``China and Russia Claim Thousands of
North Korean Workers Sent Home,'' CNN, March 26, 2019.
\93\ For information on North Korean workers in China from previous
reporting years, see CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 180;
CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 188; CECC, 2016 Annual
Report, October 6, 2016, 186-87.
\94\ Lee Jeong-ho, ``North Korean Workers and Imports Continue to
Cross into China,'' South China Morning Post, October 27, 2018; ``North
Korea Still Dispatching Workers to China Despite UN Sanctions,'' Radio
Free Asia, March 21, 2019. See also Jason Arterburn, C4ADS,
``Dispatched: Mapping Overseas Forced Labor in North Korea's
Proliferation Finance System,'' 2018.
\95\ Lee Jeong-ho, ``North Korean Workers and Imports Continue to
Cross into China,'' South China Morning Post, October 27, 2018. See
also Jason Arterburn, C4ADS, ``Dispatched: Mapping Overseas Forced
Labor in North Korea's Proliferation Finance System,'' 2018.
\96\ 2018 Zhongguo falu nianjian [2018 China law yearbook]
(Beijing: China Law Yearbook Press, 2018), 1191, table 1.
\97\ 2017 Zhongguo falu nianjian [2017 China law yearbook]
(Beijing: China Law Yearbook Press, 2017), 1168, table 1.
\98\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2017 nian `Zhongguo
ertong fazhan gangyao (2011-2020 nian)' tongji jiance baogao'' [2017
``Chinese children's development summary (2011-2020)'' statistical
monitoring report], October 2018, sec. 1(5)2.
\99\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2016 nian `Zhongguo
ertong fazhan gangyao (2011-2020 nian)' tongji jiance baogao'' [2016
``Chinese children's development summary (2011-2020)'' statistical
monitoring report], October 27, 2017, sec. 1(5)2.
\100\ The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as ``abducting,
kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring
a woman or child, for the purpose of selling [the victim].'' The
illegal sale of children for adoption thus can be considered
trafficking under Chinese law. In contrast, under the Palermo Protocol,
illegal adoptions constitute trafficking only if the purpose is
exploitation. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law],
passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective November 4, 2017, art. 240;
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into force
December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). See also UN General Assembly, Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to Eleventh
Sessions, Addendum, Interpretive Notes for the Official Records
(Travaux Preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols
Thereto, A/55/383/Add.1, November 3, 2000, para. 66; Office to Monitor
and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State,
``Trafficking in Persons Report--China,'' June 2019; Bonny Ling,
``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation
and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law
17, no. 1 (2016), 166-67, 170-71.
\101\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed
July 1, 1979, amended and effective November 4, 2017, art. 240;
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into force
December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). See also Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking
and China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,''
Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 160,
166-70.
\102\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law], passed
July 1, 1979, amended and effective November 4, 2017, art. 240;
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into force
December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). See also Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking
and China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,''
Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 17, no. 1 (2016): 159,
170, 175.
\103\ Dake Kang, ``Chinese Police Raids Rescue 1,100 Trafficked
Women,'' Associated Press, June 21, 2019; Zhang Hui, ``Chinese,
Southeast Asian Police Rescue Abducted Women,'' Global Times, June 21,
2019.
\104\ For information on human trafficking in Hong Kong from
previous reporting years, see CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10,
2018, 181-82; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 189-90; CECC,
2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 189-90; CECC, 2015 Annual Report,
October 8, 2015, 187-88.
\105\ Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, ``Xianggang tongji niankan'' [Hong Kong annual
digest of statistics], October 2018, 44, table 2.12. The Hong Kong
government refers to migrant domestic workers as ``foreign domestic
helpers.'' For general information on migrant domestic workers, see
International Labour Organization, ``Who Are Domestic Workers?,''
accessed April 24, 2019; International Labour Organization, ``Migrant
Domestic Workers,'' accessed April 24, 2019.
\106\ Mary Ann Benitez, ``Hong Kong Public Helps Bethune House
Secure Enough Funding to Keep Two Refuges for Distressed Helpers Open
until End of Year,'' South China Morning Post, October 28, 2018; Raquel
Carvalho, ``Migrant Domestic Workers Prop Up Hong Kong's Economy, so
Why Are They Excluded?,'' South China Morning Post, March 12, 2019;
Alan Wong, ``Inkstone Index: Hong Kong's Foreign Domestic Workers
Photo: Dickson Lee,'' Inkstone, March 4, 2019; Raquel Carvalho,
``Filipino Domestic Worker in Hong Kong Fired after Employer Found Out
She Has Cervical Cancer,'' South China Morning Post, March 5, 2019;
Communications and Public Relations Office, Chinese University of Hong
Kong, ``Migrants Rights Denied in Hong Kong,'' February 13, 2019.
\107\ Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government, ``Cong waiguo shoupin lai gang jiating yonggong
qianzheng/yanchang douliu qixian shenqing biao'' [Visa/extension of
stay application form for domestic helper from abroad], accessed April
25, 2019, 6(ii); Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government, ``Employment Contract for a Domestic
Helper Recruited from Outside Hong Kong,'' accessed April 25, 2019,
item 3. Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government, ``Foreign Domestic Helpers,'' accessed April 25, 2019,
question 33. See also Karen Cheung, ``Hong Kong Domestic Worker Loses
Legal Bid to Overturn Compulsory Live-In Rule,'' Hong Kong Free Press,
February 14, 2018.
\108\ Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government, ``Cong waiguo shoupin lai gang jiating yonggong
qianzheng/yanchang douliu qixian shenqing biao'' [Visa/extension of
stay application form for domestic helper from abroad], accessed April
25, 2019, 6(vi); Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government, ``Conditions of Employment for
Foreign Domestic Helpers: A General Guide to the Helper,'' accessed
April 25, 2019, item 3; Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government, ``Foreign Domestic Helpers,''
accessed April 25, 2019, question 33.
\109\ Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Hong Kong et al., ``Joint Submission of NGOs for the
Universal Periodic Review (3rd Cycle) Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) China,'' March 2018, paras. 45-46, 48, 50; Mary Ann
Benitez, ``Carrie Lam Urged to End `Institutional Slavery' in Hong Kong
by Acting on Promise of Support for City's Foreign Domestic Workers,''
South China Morning Post, October 12, 2019.
\110\ Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) sec. 129(1). See also Centre for
Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong et
al., ``Joint Submission of NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review (3rd
Cycle) Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) China,'' March
2018, para. 49.
\111\ Department of Justice, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government, ``Summary of Judicial Decision: ZN (`the Applicant')
v Secretary for Justice, Director of Immigration, Commissioner of
Police and Commissioner for Labour (Collectively as `the Respondents')
CACV 14/17; [2018] HKCA 473,'' August 2, 2018, para. 8. For the full
court ruling, see In the High Court of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No. 14 of 2017, (On
Appeal From Hcal 15/2015) Between ZN and Secretary for Justice,
Director of Immigration, Commissioner of Police, Commissioner for
Labour, Judgement.
\112\ ``Hong Kong Determined to Fight People Trafficking and
Protect Helpers,'' South China Morning Post, March 9, 2019.
\113\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--Hong Kong,'' June
2019; Elise Mak, ``Human Trafficking in Hong Kong,'' Harbour Times,
April 25, 2019.
\114\ China made the following declaration regarding the
application of the Palermo Protocol to Hong Kong: ``Unless otherwise
notified by the Government, the Protocol shall not apply to the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.''
See United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters,
12.a. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, accessed May 17,
2019. See also UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and
Eighth Periodic Reports of China, adopted by the Committee at its 59th
Session (October 20-November 7, 2014), CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7-8, November 14,
2014, para. 56.
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean Refugees in China
Findings
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year,
the Chinese government continued to detain North Korean
refugees in China and repatriate them to the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where they face
severe punishments, including torture, imprisonment,
forced labor, and even execution. The repatriation of
North Korean refugees violates China's obligations
under international human rights and refugee law and
may amount to ``aiding and abetting crimes against
humanity.''
The majority of North Korean refugees escape
to South Korea via China and Southeast Asian countries.
This past year, Chinese and North Korean authorities
reportedly imposed stricter border controls to deter
North Korean refugees from escaping the DPRK. The South
Korean government reported that about 1,137 North
Korean refugees escaped to South Korea in 2018,
compared to the peak of 2,914 refugees in 2009.
South Korean missionaries and organizations
have played a crucial role in assisting and
facilitating the movement of North Korean refugees in
China. Chinese authorities' crackdown on and expulsions
of South Korean missionaries in recent years have
undermined refugee rescue work carried out by the
missionaries.
The majority of North Korean refugees leaving
the DPRK are women. The Chinese government's refusal to
recognize these women as refugees denies them legal
protection and may encourage the trafficking of North
Korean women and girls within China. The UK-based Korea
Future Initiative estimated that about 60 percent of
all female North Korean refugees in China are
trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation.
Many children born to Chinese fathers and
North Korean mothers remain deprived of basic rights to
education and other public services, owing to their
lack of legal resident status in China, which
constitutes violations of China's PRC Nationality Law
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to recognize North
Koreans in China as refugees, especially as refugees
sur place who fear persecution upon return to their
country of origin, regardless of their reason for
leaving the DPRK; immediately halt the repatriation of
North Korean refugees; adopt asylum or refugee
legislation and incorporate the principle of non-
refoulement into domestic legislation; establish a
responsible government institution and mechanism to
determine asylee or refugee status for North Koreans
seeking international protection in China, in
cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees;
and allow North Korean refugees safe passage to another
country, including to the Republic of Korea.
Consider using the suite of sanctions that are
available, where appropriate, against Chinese
government agencies and individuals involved in the
repatriation of North Korean refugees; and press for
increased international monitoring of and
accountability for the Chinese government's treatment
of refugees.
Urge Chinese authorities to recognize the legal
status of North Korean women who marry or have children
with Chinese citizens, and ensure that all such
children are granted resident status and access to
education and other public services in accordance with
Chinese law and international standards.
Appoint and confirm the U.S. Special Envoy on North
Korean Human Rights Issues, and encourage the Special
Envoy to work with South Korean counterparts to
coordinate efforts related to humanitarian assistance
and human rights promotion for North Korean refugees in
China, in accordance with the North Korean Human Rights
Reauthorization Act (Public Law No. 115-198).
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean Refugees in China
Introduction
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year, the Chinese
government's policy to detain North Korean refugees and
repatriate them to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) remained in place, despite substantial evidence that
repatriated persons face torture, imprisonment, forced labor,
execution, and other inhuman treatment.\1\ The North Korean
government's imprisonment and torture of repatriated North
Koreans render North Koreans in China refugees sur place who
fear persecution upon return to their country of origin,
regardless of their reason for leaving the DPRK.\2\ The Chinese
government, however, regards North Korean refugees in China as
illegal economic migrants \3\ and maintains a policy of
forcible repatriation based on a 1998 border protocol with the
DPRK.\4\ China's repatriation of North Korean refugees
contravenes its international obligations under the 1951 UN
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, to which China has acceded.\5\ China is also
obligated under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to refrain from
repatriating persons if there are ``substantial grounds for
believing that [they] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.'' \6\
Border Conditions and Repatriation of Refugees
The majority of North Korean refugees escape to South Korea
via China and Southeast Asian countries,\7\ and heightened
security measures along the China-North Korea border may have
contributed to a trend of significant decline in the number of
North Korean refugees that reach South Korea.\8\ This past
year, Chinese and North Korean authorities reportedly imposed
stricter border controls to deter North Korean refugees from
escaping the DPRK.\9\ Chinese authorities also appear to be
conducting regular raids on safe houses and detaining higher
numbers of North Korean refugees than in the past.\10\ Reuters
reported in June 2019 that Chinese authorities detained ``at
least 30'' North Koreans in China since mid-April.\11\ A rights
advocate, however, separately estimated 20 to 30 detentions and
as many as 7 raids every month.\12\ The South Korean Ministry
of Unification reported that about 1,137 North Korean refugees
reached South Korea in 2018, compared to the peak of 2,914
refugees in 2009.\13\
Throughout the 2019 reporting year, Chinese authorities
reportedly detained and repatriated North Korean refugees to
the DPRK. Representative cases included the following:
November 2018. Chinese authorities reportedly
detained two North Korean refugees in Dandong
municipality, Liaoning province, and repatriated them
to the DPRK.\14\ In a separate incident, Chinese
authorities detained another North Korean refugee at an
unknown location near the China-North Korea border and
later repatriated the refugee.\15\
According to a December 2018 Daily NK report,
Chinese authorities repatriated an elderly North Korean
refugee after he had been involved in a traffic
accident at an unknown location in China.\16\ The
refugee reportedly died a week after his repatriation
to the DPRK, due to a lack of medical treatment.\17\
February 2019. China's Ministry of State
Security officials reportedly detained a North Korean
refugee family of three in Shenyang municipality,
Liaoning.\18\ The Daily NK warned that if repatriated,
the family could face severe punishment, because they
escaped North Korea during ``a very politically
sensitive time.'' \19\
April 2019. According to South Korean media
reports, in early April, Vietnamese authorities
reportedly detained three North Korean refugees near
the China-Vietnam border and later transferred them to
Chinese authorities.\20\ In late April, Chinese
authorities detained a group of seven North Korean
refugees--including a minor and her uncle--at an
unknown location in Shenyang, causing concerns that
they too may be repatriated.\21\
May 2019. The Daily NK reported the detentions
of 14 North Korean defectors in China: on May 15, two
detentions in Shenyang; on May 21, four detentions
(including two teenagers) in Nanning municipality,
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, two more detentions
in Shenyang, and two detentions in Tonghua
municipality, Jilin province; and on May 25, four more
detentions in Shenyang.\22\
July 2019. Radio Free Asia cited South Korean
sources who claimed that Chinese authorities detained
60 North Koreans and had already begun repatriating
some of them to the DPRK.\23\
As of August 2019, the Commission had not observed any new
developments in these cases.
In 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that China's
forcible repatriation of North Korean refugees may amount to
``aiding and abetting crimes against humanity.'' \24\ During
this reporting year, UN officials again voiced their concerns
and urged Chinese authorities on a number of occasions to stop
the repatriation of North Korean refugees.\25\
Crackdown on Foreign Missionaries
During this reporting year, the Commission continued to
observe reports of Chinese authorities cracking down on
organizations and individuals, particularly South Korean
Christian missionaries and churches, that have played a crucial
role in assisting and facilitating the movement of North Korean
refugees outside the DPRK.\26\ As documented in the
Commission's 2017 and 2018 annual reports, in recent years
Chinese authorities expelled at least several hundred South
Korean missionaries, many of whom assisted North Korean
refugees in fleeing to South Korea and other countries.\27\ One
international advocacy group stated that the recent wave of
expulsions of foreign missionaries is one of the largest since
1954, a development that has undermined refugee rescue work
carried out by the missionaries.\28\
Trafficking of North Korean Women
North Korean women who enter China illegally remain
particularly vulnerable to human trafficking. The demand for
North Korean women has been linked to a sex ratio imbalance in
China exacerbated by the Chinese government's population
planning policies.\29\ Sources indicate that the majority of
North Korean refugees leaving the DPRK are women,\30\ many of
whom are trafficked by force or deception from the DPRK into or
within China for the purposes of forced marriage and commercial
sexual exploitation.\31\
The Chinese government's refusal to recognize these women
as refugees denies them legal protection and may encourage the
trafficking of North Korean women and girls within China.\32\
According to a May 2019 report published by U.K.-based Korea
Future Initiative, an estimated 60 percent of all female North
Korean refugees in China are trafficked for the purpose of
sexual exploitation.\33\ Roughly 50 percent of those trafficked
women ``are forced into prostitution'' and 15 percent are
``pressed into cybersex.'' \34\ This past year, international
news media reported several cases of traffickers confining
North Korean women and girls at unknown locations in China and
forcing them to work in ``cybersex dens.'' \35\ China is
obligated to take measures to safeguard trafficking victims and
suppress all forms of trafficking of women under the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
and the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children.\36\ [For more
information on the sex ratio imbalance and the trafficking of
women in China, see Section II--Population Control and Section
II--Human Trafficking.]
Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents
Many children born to Chinese fathers and North Korean
mothers remain deprived of basic rights to education and other
public services, owing to their lack of legal resident status
in China. According to some estimates, the population of
children born in China to North Korean women ranges between
20,000 and 30,000.\37\ The PRC Nationality Law provides that
all children born in China are entitled to Chinese nationality
if either parent is a Chinese citizen.\38\ Chinese authorities
reportedly continue to largely deprive these children of their
rights to birth registration and nationality.\39\ Without proof
of resident status, these children are unable to access
education and other public services.\40\ The denial of
nationality rights and access to education for these children
contravenes China's obligations under the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.\41\
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean
Refugees in
China
Notes to Section II--North Korean Refugees in China
\1\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Protect 7 North Koreans Fleeing
Oppression,'' May 14, 2019; Human Rights Watch, ``North Korea,'' in
World Report 2019: Events of 2018, 2019, 437-442; William Gallo, ``S.
Korea Works for Safety of 7 Defectors Held in China,'' Voice of
America, May 3, 2019.
\2\ UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Protection and
International Migration, January 17, 2007, paras. 20-21; Human Rights
Watch, ``China: Protect 7 North Koreans Fleeing Oppression,'' May 14,
2019; Roberta Cohen, ``Legal Grounds for Protection of North Korean
Refugees,'' Brookings Institution, September 13, 2010.
\3\ Lin Taylor, ``Through Lunar New Year Feast, North Korean
Defectors Draw Attention to Their Plight,'' Reuters, February 8, 2019;
Tim A. Peters, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, ``Reaching
Underground Believers & Guiding Others in Flight: Silent Partners
Assist North Koreans under Caesar's Sword,'' September 24, 2018; Colin
Zwirko, ``South Korea `Mobilizing All' Diplomatic Resources to Help
Defectors Held in China,'' NK News, May 3, 2019.
\4\ Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ministry of State
Security and People's Republic of China Ministry of Public Security,
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonganbu Chaoxian Minzhu Zhuyi Renmin
Gongheguo Guojiabaoweibu Guanyu Zai Bianjing Diqu Weihu Guojia Anquan
He Shehui Zhixu De Gongzuo Zhong Xianghu Hezuo De Yidingshu [Mutual
Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and
Social Order in the Border Areas], signed July 8, 1998, effective
August 28, 1998, arts. 4, 9. The protocol commits each side to treat as
illegal those border crossers who do not have proper visa certificates,
except in cases of ``calamity or unavoidable factors.''
\5\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by the
UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons on July 28, 1951, entry into force April 22, 1954,
arts. 1(A)(2), 33(1). Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as amended by
the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as someone who, ``owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country . . ..'' Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that,
``No Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and
Stateless Persons, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
accessed May 10, 2019. China acceded to the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees on September 24, 1982. Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/
2198 of December 16, 1966, entry into force October 4, 1967; United
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and Stateless Persons,
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, accessed May 10, 2019.
China acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees on
September 24, 1982. See also Human Rights Watch, ``North Korea'' in
World Report 2019: Events of 2018, 2019; Human Rights Watch, ``China:
Protect 7 North Koreans Fleeing Oppression,'' May 14, 2019.
\6\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987,
art. 3. Article 3 states that, ``No State Party shall expel, return
(`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV,
Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, accessed May 10, 2019. China signed
the Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4,
1988. UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3,
2016, para. 46. See also Human Rights Watch, ``China: Protect 7 North
Koreans Fleeing Oppression,'' May 14, 2019.
\7\ Ann Babe, ``When the Dream Dies: Female North Korean Defectors
Suffer Prejudice in the Competitive, Self-Absorbed South,'' South China
Morning Post, October 18, 2018; Lee Jeong-ho, ``Treat North Korean
Refugees as `Humanitarian Issue,' Former US Prisoner Kenneth Bae Urges
China,'' South China Morning Post, April 18, 2019.
\8\ See, e.g., ``Number of N. Korean Defectors to S. Korea Falls
under Kim Jong-un: Data,'' Yonhap News Agency, September 30, 2018; Jung
Da-min, ``Why Number of North Korean Defectors Keep Decreasing,'' Korea
Times, October 22, 2018; Shim Kyu-Seok and Sarah Kim, ``3 Defectors
Nabbed by Vietnam and Sent Back,'' Korea JoongAng Daily, April 5, 2019.
\9\ Jung Da-min, ``Why Number of North Korean Defectors Keep
Decreasing,'' Korea Times, October 22, 2018; ``Number of N. Korean
Defectors to S. Korea Falls under Kim Jong-un: Data,'' Yonhap News
Agency, September 30, 2018; Human Rights Watch, ``North Korea'' in
World Report 2019: Events of 2018, 2019; Jo Hyon, ``Video Surveillance
Network Expanded on China-North Korea Border,'' Daily NK, December 28,
2018.
\10\ Josh Smith and Joyce Lee, ``Chinese Raids Hit North Korean
Defectors' `Underground Railroad,' '' Reuters, June 16, 2019; Helen
Regan and Jake Kwon, ``China Is Cracking Down on Safe Houses Used by
North Korean Defectors, Activists Say,'' CNN, June 20, 2019.
\11\ Josh Smith and Joyce Lee, ``Chinese Raids Hit North Korean
Defectors' `Underground Railroad,' '' Reuters, June 16, 2019.
\12\ Helen Regan and Jake Kwon, ``China Is Cracking Down on Safe
Houses Used by North Korean Defectors, Activists Say,'' CNN, June 20,
2019.
\13\ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, ``Policy on North
Korean Defectors,'' accessed May 10, 2019; ``Activists Urge China to
Not Repatriate N. Korean Defectors,'' Voice of America, April 30, 2019.
\14\ Kim Song Il, ``North Korean Defectors in China Repatriated,''
Daily NK, November 28, 2018.
\15\ Ibid.
\16\ Kim Yoo Jin, ``Elderly Man Dies After Defection Attempt and
Repatriation to North Korea,'' Daily NK, December 14, 2018.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ Kim Yoo Jin, ``North Korean Authorities Surprised by
Defections During Politically Sensitive Period,'' Daily NK, March 6,
2019.
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ ``It's Urgent, Too,'' editorial, Korea Herald, April 7, 2019;
Shim Kyu-Seok and Sarah Kim, ``3 Defectors Nabbed by Vietnam and Sent
Back,'' Korea JoongAng Daily, April 5, 2019; Kim Myong-song and Roh
Suk-jo, ``Foreign Ministry `Ignored N.Korean Defectors' Pleas for
Help,' '' Chosun Ilbo, April 5, 2019.
\21\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Protect 7 North Koreans Fleeing
Oppression,'' May 14, 2019; ``Seven Detained North Korean Defectors in
China Face Repatriation,'' Radio Free Asia, April 29, 2019; ``Rally
Held at Chinese Embassy in Seoul for Seven North Korean Defectors
Detained in Shenyang,'' Radio Free Asia, April 30, 2019.
\22\ Jang Seul Gi, ``Arrests of North Korean Defectors in China
Continue,'' Daily NK, June 18, 2019.
\23\ ``China Detains 60 North Korean Defectors, Sends Some Back,''
Radio Free Asia, August 7, 2019.
\24\ UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on
Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/63,
February 7, 2014, Annex II, 28. See also ``Seven Detained North Korean
Defectors in China Face Repatriation,'' Radio Free Asia, April 29,
2019; Jung-Hoon Lee and Joe Phillips, ``Drawing the Line: Combating
Atrocities in North Korea,'' Washington Quarterly 39, no. 2 (2016): 62.
\25\ ``UN Rapporteur Urges China Not to Send N. Korean Defectors
Back to Regime,'' Arirang, May 17, 2019; ``UN Committee Voices Concern
over China's Continued Deportation of N. Korean,'' KBS World Radio,
September 6, 2018; Lee Chi-dong, ``U.N. Refugee Chief Asks S. Koreans
to Be More Hospitable to Asylum Seekers,'' Yonhap News Agency, October
24, 2018.
\26\ Tim A. Peters, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,
``Reaching Underground Believers & Guiding Others in Flight: Silent
Partners Assist North Koreans under Caesar's Sword,'' September 24,
2018; Ha Yoon Ah, ``Many Churches Assisting North Korean Defectors in
China Close, Missionaries Say,'' Daily NK, February 8, 2019;
International Christian Concern, ``Expulsion of Foreign Missionaries in
China Has Greatly Increased,'' February 13, 2019.
\27\ CECC, 2018 Annual Report, October 10, 2018, 192; CECC, 2017
Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 199.
\28\ International Christian Concern, ``Expulsion of Foreign
Missionaries in China Has Greatly Increased,'' February 13, 2019; Ha
Yoon Ah, ``Many Churches Assisting North Korean Defectors in China
Close, Missionaries Say,'' Daily NK, February 8, 2019.
\29\ See, e.g., Joshua Berlinger, ``Report Claims Thousands of
North Korean Women Sold into Sex Slavery in China,'' CNN, May 21, 2019;
``Bei mai dao Zhongguo . . . Beihan xinniang cheng sheng zi gongju song
hui Beihan zao yuzu qiangbao'' [North Korean brides sold to China
became childbearing tools, may be raped by prison guards upon
repatriation to North Korea], Liberty Times, February 19, 2019. See
also Robbie Gramer et al., ``With Human Trafficking Report, Tillerson
Rebukes China on Human Rights,'' Foreign Policy, June 27, 2017.
\30\ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, ``Policy on North
Korean Defectors,'' accessed June 3, 2019. South Korean Ministry of
Unification data show that as of June 2019, 85 percent (969) of the
total number of North Korean refugees (1,137) who entered South Korea
in 2018 were female; and 72 percent (23,606) of all North Korean
refugees (32,706) who have entered South Korea since 1998 were female.
Su-Min Hwang, ``The North Korean Women Who Had to Escape Twice,'' BBC,
January 18, 2019; Robert R. King, ``Attention on DPRK and China
Policies That Result in Sex Trafficking,'' Peninsula (blog), Korea
Economic Institute, January 23, 2019.
\31\ Robert R. King, ``Attention on DPRK and China Policies That
Result in Sex Trafficking,'' Peninsula (blog), Korea Economic
Institute, January 23, 2019; Su-Min Hwang, ``The North Korean Women Who
Had to Escape Twice,'' BBC, January 18, 2019; Julian Ryall, ``Returned
North Korean Defectors Paraded to Lecture on Miseries of Capitalism
They Saw in China,'' Telegraph, December 29, 2018.
\32\ Su-Min Hwang, ``The North Korean Women Who Had to Escape
Twice,'' BBC, January 18, 2019; Choe Sang-Hun, ``Children of North
Korean Mothers Find More Hardship in the South,'' New York Times,
November 25, 2018.
\33\ Yoon Hee-soon, Korea Future Initiative, ``Sex Slaves: The
Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls
in China,'' May 20, 2019.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ Joshua Berlinger, ``Report Claims Thousands of North Korean
Women Sold into Sex Slavery in China,'' CNN, May 21, 2019; Emma Batha,
``North Korean Women Tell of Slavery and Gang Rape in Chinese Cybersex
Dens,'' Reuters, May 20, 2019; Jung Da-min, ``Young North Korean
Defectors Fall Prey to Human Trafficking,'' Korea Times, January 22,
2019.
\36\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of
December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981, art. 6; United
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, accessed May
10, 2019. China signed the Convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified it
on November 4, 1980. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000,
entry into force December 25, 2003, arts. 6-9; United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, Protocol To Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, accessed May 10, 2019. China acceded to the Protocol
on February 8, 2010.
\37\ Crossing Borders, ``North Korean Orphans,'' accessed May 30,
2019; Kim Kwang-tae, ``Journey to Freedom by N. Korean Victims of Human
Trafficking,'' Yonhap News Agency, December 22, 2017; Rachel Judah,
``On Kim Jong-un's Birthday, Remember the 30,000 Stateless Children He
Has Deprived of Recognition,'' Independent, January 7, 2018.
\38\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoji Fa [PRC Nationality Law],
passed and effective September 10, 1980, art. 4. Article 4 of the PRC
Nationality Law provides that, ``Any person born in China whose parents
are both Chinese nationals and one of whose parents is a Chinese
national shall have Chinese nationality.''
\39\ See, e.g., Cara McGoogan, ``We Were Sex Trafficked from North
Korea and Sold to Men at Bridal `Markets,' '' Telegraph, May 22, 2019;
``Bei mai dao Zhongguo . . . Beihan xinniang cheng sheng zi gongju song
hui Beihan zao yuzu qiangbao'' [North Korean brides sold to China
became childbearing tools, may be raped by prison guards upon
repatriation to North Korea], Liberty Times, February 19, 2019.
\40\ See, e.g., Cara McGoogan, ``We Were Sex Trafficked from North
Korea and Sold to Men at Bridal `Markets,' '' Telegraph, May 22, 2019;
``Bei mai dao Zhongguo . . . Beihan xinniang cheng sheng zi gongju song
hui Beihan xao yuzu qiangbao'' [North Korean brides sold to China
became childbearing tools, may be raped by prison guards upon
repatriation to North Korea], Liberty Times, February 19, 2019.
\41\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989, entry into force
September 2, 1990, arts. 2, 7, 28(1)(a). Under the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, China is obligated to register children born
within the country immediately after birth and also provide all
children with access to education without discrimination on the basis
of nationality.
Public Health
Public Health
Public Health
Findings
Food safety and vaccine safety scandals have
continued to emerge this past year, despite the Chinese
government's attempts in the past decade to improve
quality control. Analysts point to a lack of
accountability, weak regulatory capacity and
enforcement of laws, corruption, and government
procurement systems that favor low-cost goods. The
National People's Congress passed a new vaccine law in
June 2019 aimed at strengthening vaccine supervision,
penalizing producers of substandard or fake vaccines,
and introducing compensation for victims of faulty
vaccines.
Despite strong regulations aimed at improving
food and vaccine safety and punishments for companies
and individuals found guilty of criminal acts,
authorities also continued to detain citizens for
speaking out and organizing protests in response to
food and vaccine scandals.
Chinese authorities reportedly continued to
forcibly commit individuals to psychiatric facilities,
including government critics and those with grievances
against government officials and legal processes, even
though the PRC Mental Health Law prohibits forcible
commitment as a form of punishment.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Continue to support technical assistance and exchange
programs in public health. Require that U.S.-China
cooperative programs include the participation of U.S.
and Chinese non-governmental organizations and a focus
on human rights.
Urge Chinese officials--including officials in the
National Health Commission--to focus on effective
implementation of laws and regulations that prohibit
health-based discrimination in employment and
education. Where appropriate, share the United States'
ongoing experience promoting the rights of persons with
disabilities in education and employment, through non-
governmental advocacy and services, as well as legal
and regulatory means.
Urge the Chinese government to establish panels of
legal, medical, social work, and security professionals
from within and outside the government to monitor and
report on implementation of the PRC Mental Health Law
(MHL) and initiatives under the National Mental Health
Work Plan (2015-2020) to ensure that local
implementation consistently meets standards of care and
rights protection stipulated in the MHL, the PRC Law on
the Protection of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, and international standards.
Public Health
Public Health
Public Health
Legislative and Policy Developments
In October 2018, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee released a second draft of healthcare legislation
aimed at protecting healthcare workers from the ongoing problem
of ``commotions at hospitals'' (yi'nao).\1\ The draft
legislation establishes that actions such as disturbing order
at healthcare institutions, threatening or endangering the
personal safety of staff, and illegally gaining favors will be
investigated as crimes.\2\ In February 2019, the Chinese
Communist Party General Office and State Council General Office
issued the ``Provisions on the Food Safety Responsibility
System for Local Party and Government Leading Cadres,'' which,
if implemented, could strengthen food safety accountability for
local officials.\3\ In June 2019, the National People's
Congress passed the PRC Vaccine Management Law set to take
effect in December 2019.\4\
Food Safety
Although the Chinese government has committed itself to
protect citizens' right to safe food,\5\ and it continues to
take steps aimed at improving food safety,\6\ food safety
scandals nevertheless continued to occur.\7\ Authorities
suppressed protests by victims and their parents,\8\ violating
freedoms of expression, assembly, and demonstration.\9\
The Commission observed reports of the following instances
of such suppression during its 2019 reporting year:
In September 2018, after expired, worm-
infested food was served to children at three
kindergartens, authorities detained two individuals in
Wuhu municipality, Anhui province, who were believed to
be responsible.\10\ The incident reportedly affected
765 children.\11\
According to international and domestic
reports, in March 2019 public security authorities in
Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, used pepper
spray to control parents who protested against
unsanitary food served at a private high school and
detained at least 12 of them.\12\ At least 77 students
received medical attention after ingesting the food,
including 3 who were hospitalized.\13\
Drug Safety
Vaccine scandals continued this reporting year,\14\
sparking protests by parents of sickened children.\15\ In the
aftermath of a major vaccine scandal uncovered in 2018
involving Changsheng Biotechnology Company in Changchun
municipality, Jilin province,\16\ public health expert Yanzhong
Huang noted that the case had exposed ``systematic safety risks
across China's entire vaccine industry.'' \17\ Huang further
said that ongoing scandals stem from ``a host of issues
confronting China today: corruption, moral decline, loopholes
in internal corporate controls, weak regulatory capacity, and a
lack of accountability.'' \18\
The Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights and
the World Health Organization, in a jointly issued fact sheet,
noted that the right to quality healthcare includes
``scientifically approved and unexpired drugs.'' \19\ Following
the 2018 vaccine scandal involving Changsheng Biotechnology
Company,\20\ in June 2019 the National People's Congress
Standing Committee passed the PRC Vaccine Management Law, aimed
at strengthening supervision, penalizing producers and
distributors of substandard or fake vaccines, and introducing
compensation for victims of faulty vaccines.\21\
During this past year, the Chinese government took the
following actions against companies and individuals deemed
responsible for vaccine safety violations:
In October 2018, the National Medical Products
Administration imposed a record total penalty of 9.1
billion yuan (approximately US$1.3 billion) on
Changsheng Biotechnology Company, which it found
responsible for producing faulty vaccines that were
administered to hundreds of thousands of people, along
with other illegal actions, and detained 18 people.\22\
In November 2018, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges issued new measures providing for the
mandatory delisting of companies suspected of ``illegal
behavior in the areas of national security, public
security, environmental security, work safety, and
public health.'' \23\ In January 2019, the state media
outlet Xinhua reported that Changsheng Biotechnology
announced that it had received its delisting notice
from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.\24\
In January 2019, authorities in Jinhu county,
Jiangsu province, reportedly fired 3 health officials
and ``held 33 persons responsible'' after at least 145
children were administered expired polio vaccines.\25\
In January 2019, authorities in Shijiazhuang
municipality, Hebei province, criminally detained a
nurse suspected of administering incorrect vaccines to
29 children for financial gain, and removed 2 district
heads of the Shijiazhuang disease control center.\26\
In April 2019, authorities in Hainan province
fined and revoked the license of privately-owned Bo'ao
Yinfeng Healthcare International Hospital, for
reportedly administering fake HPV vaccines to at least
38 patients, one of whom reportedly was pregnant.\27\
The Commission observed that Chinese authorities violated
the rights to free speech and free assembly of individuals who
protested against unsafe vaccines and sought compensation,
including the following: \28\
In February 2019, authorities in Beijing
municipality detained He Fangmei, whose daughter was
paralyzed in March 2018 by a series of tainted
vaccines,\29\ after He Fangmei organized other
aggrieved parents to protest before the annual meetings
of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (Two Sessions).\30\
In April 2019, authorities charged her with ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble,'' and held her at the
Xinxiang Public Security Bureau Detention Center in
Xinxiang municipality, Henan province.\31\ He's case
was sent to court in August 2019.\32\
On or around September 2, 2018, authorities in
Beijing detained Tan Hua, in connection to her public
advocacy for compensation for victims of tainted
vaccines in August 2018, and reportedly transferred her
to the custody of authorities in Shanghai
municipality.\33\
Ongoing Misuse of the PRC Mental Health Law
Authorities continued to use forcible psychiatric
commitment (bei jingshenbing), in violation of the PRC Mental
Health Law, to punish or arbitrarily detain individuals who
expressed political dissent or grievances against the
government.\34\ Two experts in Chinese law commented that the
law's definition of ``mental disorder'' is too vague, and a
``lack of due process in such important decision-making
jeopardizes millions of people's basic right to freedom from
arbitrary detention.'' \35\
Examples of misuse of the law this past year include the
following:
On July 16, 2018, officials in Zhuzhou
municipality, Hunan province, forcibly committed Dong
Yaoqiong, a 29-year-old woman who live-streamed a video
of herself criticizing Communist Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party,
to a psychiatric hospital.\36\ According to Radio Free
Asia, authorities detained her father in August
2018,\37\ and barred a rights lawyer from visiting
her.\38\ The Commission has not observed updates on the
status of Dong Yaoqiong during this reporting year.\39\
In March 2019, authorities in Shanghai
municipality forcibly committed Yan Fenlan to a
psychiatric institution after she had traveled to
Beijing during the Two Sessions to petition for
compensation for her demolished home.\40\ She was first
forcibly committed to a psychiatric institution in 2008
after she petitioned authorities in Beijing and
Shanghai regarding land confiscation.\41\
Public Health
Public Health
Notes to Section II--Public Health
\1\ National People's Congress, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiben
Yiliao Weisheng yu Jiankang Cujin Fa (Cao'an) (Er Ci Shenyi Gao) [PRC
Basic Healthcare and Health Promotion Law (Draft) (Second Deliberation
Draft)], NPC Observer, accessed July 24, 2019, arts. 43, 47, 107; Tian
Xiaohang, ``Woguo ni lifa baohu yiliao weisheng renyuan renshen
anquan'' [China drafts legislation to protect healthcare workers'
personal safety], Xinhua, October 22, 2018. Public reports about these
``commotions'' typically describe incidents of violence against
hospital personnel, sometimes resulting in fatalities, by aggrieved
patients or their extended family. For more information on yi'nao, see
CECC, 2016 Annual Report, October 6, 2016, 203.
\2\ National People's Congress, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiben
Yiliao Weisheng yu Jiankang Cujin Fa (Cao'an) (Er Ci Shenyi Gao) [PRC
Basic Healthcare and Health Promotion Law (Draft) (Second Deliberation
Draft)], NPC Observer, accessed July 24, 2019, arts. 43, 47, 107; Tian
Xiaohang, ``Woguo ni lifa baohu yiliao weisheng renyuan renshen
anquan'' [China drafts legislation to protect healthcare workers'
personal safety], Xinhua, October 22, 2018.
\3\ Chinese Communist Party General Office and State Council
General Office, Difang Dang Zheng Lingdao Ganbu Shipin Anquan Zerenzhi
Guiding [Provisions on the Food Safety Responsibility System for Local
Party and Government Leading Cadres], effective February 5, 2019; Wang
Xiaodong, ``Leading Local Officials to Be Accountable for Food
Safety,'' China Daily, February 26, 2019; ``China Launches Nationwide
Inspection on Food Safety at Schools,'' Xinhua, March 4, 2019; ``State
Council Passes Draft Rules on Implementing Food Safety Law,'' Xinhua,
March 27, 2019; Tingmin Koe, ``China Unveils the First Set of Food
Safety Tasks for Local Government,'' FoodNavigator-Asia, March 5, 2019.
\4\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yimiao Guanli Fa [PRC Vaccine
Management Law], passed June 29, 2019, effective December 1, 2019.
\5\ World Health Organization, ``Human Rights and Health,''
December 29, 2017; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10,
1948, art. 25(1). See also Convention on the Rights of the Child,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989,
entry into force September 2, 1990, art. 24.2(c); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force
January 3, 1976.
\6\ Chinese Communist Party General Office and State Council
General Office, Difang Dang Zheng Lingdao Ganbu Shipin Anquan Zerenzhi
Guiding [Provisions on the Food Safety Responsibility System for Local
Party and Government Leading Cadres], effective February 5, 2019.
\7\ Phoebe Zhang, ``Chinese Kindergartens `Served Rotten, Worm-
Infested Food' to Children, Two People Detained,'' South China Morning
Post, September 27, 2018; Echo Xie, ``Chinese School Principal Sacked
over Claims Mouldy Food Found in Canteen,'' South China Morning Post,
March 17, 2019; Alice Yan, ``Shanghai School Food Scare Triggers City
Wide Kitchen Health Check,'' South China Morning Post, October 23,
2018.
\8\ See, e.g., Mandy Zuo, ``Police Try to Quell Chinese Parents'
Protest over `Mouldy' School Food,'' South China Morning Post, March
14, 2019; Gerry Shih, ``Chinese Police Say They Used `Minimum' Pepper
Spray to Disperse Fuming Parents in Food Safety Scandal,'' Washington
Post, March 14, 2019.
\9\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16,
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 19, 21; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, accessed July 15, 2019. China has signed
but not ratified the ICCPR. Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of
December 10, 1948, arts. 19, 20; PRC Constitution, passed and effective
December 4, 1982 (amended March 11, 2018), art. 35.
\10\ Phoebe Zhang, ``Chinese Kindergartens `Served Rotten, Worm-
Infested Food' to Children, Two People Detained,'' South China Morning
Post, September 27, 2018.
\11\ Ibid.
\12\ Mandy Zuo, ``Police Try to Quell Chinese Parents' Protest over
`Mouldy' School Food,'' South China Morning Post, March 14, 2019; Gerry
Shih, ``Chinese Police Say They Used `Minimum' Pepper Spray to Disperse
Fuming Parents in Food Safety Scandal,'' Washington Post, March 14,
2019; ``Chengdu Qi Zhong Shiyan Xuexiao famei shipin shijian zhong duo
ren zao juliu,'' [Many detained in Chengdu No. 7 Experimental Middle
School moldy food incident], Australian Broadcasting Corporation, March
18, 2019.
\13\ Ye Hanyong, Li Like, and Liu Hai, ``Chengdu gongbu Chengdu Qi
Zhong Shiyan Xuexiao shipin anquan wenti diaocha zuixin jinzhan''
[Chengdu announces latest progress in investigation of Chengdu No. 7
Experimental Middle School food safety problem], Xinhua, March 17,
2019.
\14\ ``29 Children Receive Wrong Vaccine in North China City,''
Global Times, February 4, 2019; Joyce Huang, ``Use of Expired Vaccine
Sparks Public Scare in China,'' Voice of America, January 16, 2019;
Sui-Lee Wee and Elsie Chen, ``China Investigates Latest Vaccine Scandal
After Violent Protests,'' New York Times, January 14, 2019; Yanzhong
Huang, ``China's Vaccine Scandals Must Trigger Deeper Health Care
Reforms,'' Nikkei Asian Review, August 15, 2018.
\15\ Sui-Lee Wee and Elsie Chen, ``China Investigates Latest
Vaccine Scandal After Violent Protests,'' New York Times, January 14,
2019; ``Chinese Official Appears to Be Beaten in Protest over Vaccine
Scandal'' [Video file], South China Morning Post, January 11, 2019.
\16\ Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Imposes Record Fine on Vaccine Maker over
Safety Scandal,'' New York Times, October 17, 2018. In 2018, China's
National Medical Products Administration imposed a record penalty on
Changchun Changsheng Biotechnology Company for the fabrication of data
pertaining to a rabies vaccine the company produced. Authorities
further accused the company of producing substandard vaccines for
diptheria, tetanus, and whooping cough.
\17\ Yanzhong Huang, ``China's Vaccine Scandals Must Trigger Deeper
Health Care Reforms,'' Nikkei Asian Review, August 15, 2018. See also
Yoel Kornreich, ``Vaccine Scandals in China: Why Do They Keep Happening
Over and Over Again?'' Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, December 21,
2018.
\18\ Yanzhong Huang, ``China's Vaccine Scandals Must Trigger Deeper
Health Care Reforms,'' Nikkei Asian Review, August 15, 2018.
\19\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and World
Health Organization, Right to Health (Human Rights Fact Sheet no. 31),
June 2008, 4. See also World Health Organization, Human Rights and
Health, December 29, 2017.
\20\ Kinling Lo, ``Changsheng Bio-Tech, the Vaccine Maker behind
China's Latest Public Health Scare,'' South China Morning Post, July
25, 2018.
\21\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yimiao Guanli Fa [PRC Vaccine
Management Law], passed June 29, 2019, effective December 1, 2019,
arts. 1, 72, 93, 96; Wang Xiaodong, ``Law on Vaccine Supervision
Includes Tough Penalties for Producing Fakes,'' China Daily, July 1,
2019; ``China Adopts Tough Law to Ensure Vaccine Safety,'' Xinhua, June
29, 2019.
\22\ Zhao Wenjun, ``Yao Jian Bumen yifa congyan dui Changchun
Changsheng Gongsi weifa weigui shengchan kuangquanbing yimiao zuochu
xingzheng chufa'' [National Medical Products Administration severely
punishes Changchun Changsheng Company for illegal production of rabies
vaccine], Xinhua, October 16, 2018; Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Imposes Record
Fine on Vaccine Maker Over Safety Scandal,'' New York Times, April 29,
2019; Eric Ng, ``Troubled Chinese Vaccine Maker Changsheng Faces
Delisting for Endangering Public Security under Revised Rules,'' South
China Morning Post, November 19, 2018; China Securities Regulatory
Commission, ``Zhongguo Zhengjianhui xingzheng chufa jueding shu
(Changsheng Shengwu Keji Gufen Youxian Gongsi, Gao Junfang, Zhang Jing
deng 18 ming zeren renyuan)'' [China Securities Regulatory Commission
Administrative Punishment Decision (Changsheng Biotechnology Company,
Gao Junfang, Zhang Jing among 18 responsible individuals)], December 6,
2018. The monetary penalties against Changsheng included confiscation
of illegal gains of 1.9 billion yuan (approximately US$276 million) and
a fine of 7.2 billion yuan (approximately US$1.05 billion).
\23\ ``Zhongguo fabu shangshi gongsi zhongda weifa qiangzhi tui shi
xin gui, Changsheng Shengwu tui shi jizhi qidong'' [China announces new
rules for compulsory delisting of companies for serious violations of
law, delisting of Changsheng Biotech begins], Reuters, November 18,
2018; Wang Quanhao, ``Tui shi xin gui luodi, zhongda weifa tui shi
gongsi zai shang shi xu jian ge 5 nian'' [New rules on delisting set
down, companies delisted for serious violations of law must wait 5
years to relist], Xinhua, November 19, 2018.
\24\ Liu Hui, ``Ding le! Changsheng Shengwu queding bei shishi
zhongda weifa qiangzhi tuishi'' [Decided! Changsheng Biotech confirmed
for compulsory delisting for serious violations of law], Xinhua,
January 15, 2019; Yin Peng, ``Shenjiaosuo qidong dui Changsheng Shengwu
zhongda weifa qiangzhi tuishi jizhi'' [Shenzhen Stock Exchange begins
compulsory delisting process against Changsheng Biotech for serious
violation of law], Xinhua, November 17, 2018.
\25\ Tang Tao and Yang Guang, ``Jinhu xian guoqi jihui yimiao
shijian 17 ren yi bei chuli'' [17 people punished in Jinhu county
expired polio vaccine incident], CCTV, January 11, 2019; Cang Wei, ``3
Health Officials Fired Over Use of Expired Polio Vaccines,'' China
Daily, January 10, 2019; ``Jiangsu Jinhu xian guoqi yimiao shijian 33
zerenren yi bei wenze: 2 ren yisong sifa jiguan'' [33 responsible
persons held accountable in Jinhu county, Jiangsu, expired vaccine
incident: 2 persons handed over to judicial authorities], People's
Daily, February 24, 2019; Nectar Gan, ``Over 100 Babies and Toddlers
Given Expired Polio Vaccines in China, Months after Last Crisis,''
South China Morning Post, January 9, 2019.
\26\ Zhou Yichuan, ``Wulian Yimiao touhuan shijian houxu: jiezhong
renyuan shexian fanzui, yi xingshi juliu'' [Pentavalent vaccine switch
incident follow-up: vaccinating staff detained on suspicion of crime],
Sohu, February 12, 2019; ``29 Children Receive Wrong Vaccine in North
China City,'' Global Times, February 4, 2019.
\27\ Zhang Qianyi, ``Hainan tongbao Bo'ao Yinfeng Kangyang Guoji
Yiyuan shexian shiyong jia yimiao'' [Hainan announces Bo'ao Yinfeng
Kangyang International Hospital suspected of using fake vaccines],
China News, April 29, 2019; Zhuang Pinghui, ``Private Hospital in China
Closed Down after Dozens of Patients Given Fake HPV Vaccines,'' South
China Morning Post, April 28, 2019; ``China Fines a Hospital for
Administering Potentially Fake Vaccines,'' Bloomberg, April 29, 2019.
\28\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16,
1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 19, 21; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, accessed July 15, 2019. China has signed
but not ratified the ICCPR. Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of
December 10, 1948, arts. 19, 20. See also PRC Constitution, passed and
effective December 4, 1982 (amended March 11, 2018), art. 35.
\29\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Yimiao shouhai jiazhang He
Fangmei fufu bei jin ban huzhao'' [He Fangmei and her husband, parents
of vaccine victim, prevented from getting passports], September 14,
2018. He Fangmei's daughter was sickened by a series of vaccines,
including hepatitis A; measles, mumps, and rubella; and diptheria,
tetanus, and pertussis.
\30\ ``China Holds Vaccine Parent-Turned-Activist Detained at
Beijing Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, March 26, 2019; ``Wenti weijie:
yimiao huan'er jiazhang zai du jin Jing qingyuan'' [Problem unsolved:
parents of child vaccine victims again petition in Beijing], Radio Free
Asia, April 29, 2019.
\31\ ``Chinese Vaccine Activist Formally Arrested, Will Likely Face
Jail Over Campaign,'' Radio Free Asia, May 2, 2019; ``China Holds
Vaccine Parent-Turned-Activist Detained at Beijing Protest,'' Radio
Free Asia, March 26, 2019.
\32\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Yimiao Baobao zhi Jia' weiquan
tuanti faqi ren He Fangmei (Shisan Mei) an jianchayuan shencha qisu
qiman, yi zhuan dao fayuan'' [``Tainted-Vaccine Babies' Home'' rights
organization founder He Fangmei (Sister Thirteen) case sent to court
upon expiration of procuratorial indictment review period], August 6,
2019.
\33\ New Citizens' Movement, ``Yimiao shouhaizhe Lianghui zao
weiwen Tan Hua bei qiangpo shizong jin liangbai tian'' [Vaccine victims
face stability maintenance during Two Sessions, Tan Hua forcibly
disappeared nearly 200 days], March 4, 2019; Rights Defense Network,
``Kuangquan yimiao shouhaizhe, Shanghai weiquan renshi Tan Hua bei
qiangpo shizong jin yi 57 tian muqin ye zao qiangpo shizong 40 tian''
[Rabies vaccine victim and Shanghai rights defender Tan Hua forcibly
disappeared for 57 days as of today, her mother also forcibly
disappeared for 40 days], October 28, 2018. For more information on Tan
Hua, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
[forthcoming].
\34\ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingshen Weisheng Fa [PRC Mental
Health Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 1, 2013, arts. 27,
30, 75(5), 78(1). Provisions in the PRC Mental Health Law prohibit
forcible commitment of individuals who do not have mental illness or
who do not exhibit clinically determined ``dangerousness'' to
themselves or others.
\35\ Jerome A. Cohen and Chi Yin, ``It's Too Easy to Wind Up in a
Chinese Psychiatric Hospital, and Far Too Hard to Get Out,'' ChinaFile,
Asia Society, August 23, 2018.
\36\ ``Pomo nuhai Dong Yaoqiong bei song Zhuzhou jingshenbing yuan
Zhongguo ge di ji che Xi huaxiang'' [Girl who splashed ink, Dong
Yaoqiong, sent to Zhuzhou psychiatric hospital, Xi's image quickly
removed from many sites in China], Voice of America, July 23, 2018;
``Woman Who Splashed Xi Jinping Poster Sent to Psychiatric Hospital,''
Radio Free Asia, July 23, 2018.
\37\ ``Chinese Police Detain Father of Ink-Splash Woman Held in
Mental Hospital,'' Radio Free Asia, August 1, 2018. For more
information on Dong Yaoqiong, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2018-00343.
\38\ ``Chinese Police Detain Father of Ink-Splash Woman Held in
Mental Hospital,'' Radio Free Asia, August 1, 2018; ``Chinese Police
Block Lawyer Hired for Ink-Splash Woman in Mental Hospital,'' Radio
Free Asia, July 31, 2018.
\39\ Tracey Shelton and Bang Xiao, ``China `Disappeared' Several
High-Profile People in 2018 and Some of Them Are Still Missing,''
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, June 6, 2019.
\40\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Lianghui weiwen jinxing shi
xilie baodao zhi liu'' [Maintaining social stability during the Two
Sessions: sixth report in series], March 14, 2019; ``Cong yisheng dao
fangmin, Lianghui jian Shanghai Yan Fenlan bei jingshenbing'' [From
doctor to petitioner, Shanghai [resident] Yan Fenlan forcibly committed
to psychiatric facility during Two Sessions], Epoch Times, March 20,
2019.
\41\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Lianghui weiwen jinxing shi
xilie baodao zhi liu'' [Maintaining social stability during the Two
Sessions: sixth report in series], March 14, 2019. For more information
on Yan Fenlan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2008-00619.
The Environment
The Environment
The Environment
Findings
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year,
top Chinese Communist Party and government leaders
continued to highlight the importance of protecting the
environment, yet environmental pollution remained a
major challenge. The government's vision of top-down
environmental governance was demonstrated by the
National Development and Reform Commission's work
report for 2018 which stated, ``the government leads,
enterprises are the main actors, and social
organizations and the public participate.'' In
addition, the government severely limited the role of
the public in environmental protection.
In March 2019, Minister of Ecology and
Environment Li Ganjie reported that ``some local
governments were not containing pollution until clean-
up deadlines approached or national inspection teams
arrived.'' Li noted that these local governments
imposed blanket production bans on businesses
regardless of their environmental performance, thereby
damaging the credibility of the government and the
rights of law-abiding enterprises. In 2018, Chinese
authorities approved the arrest of 15,095 people for
environmental crimes, an increase of over 50 percent
from 2017.
The government continued to report progress in
environmental protection, although a March 2019 ranking
of air pollution in over 3,000 cities around the world,
compiled by IQAir in collaboration with Greenpeace East
Asia, indicated that 57 of the 100 most polluted cities
in 2018 (based on fine particulate concentrations) were
in China. Although some non-governmental organizations
have standing as plaintiffs in certain public interest
lawsuits, most public interest litigation continued to
be brought by the government.
During this reporting year, Chinese and
international media reported on incidents in which
officials lied about environmental problems, failed to
take meaningful action despite repeated environmental
violations, or were involved in environmental
corruption, resulting in some cases of disciplinary
action against local officials. In March 2019, an
explosion at Jiangsu Tianjiayi Chemical plant--a
facility that had been penalized six different times in
the previous two years for environmental and safety
violations--killed 78 people, injured over 600, and
forced the evacuation of almost 3,000. Authorities
responded by closing down all chemical facilities in
the area.
Chinese citizens continued to raise concerns
about health issues related to the environment through
street-level protests and other forms of public
advocacy. Chinese authorities detained Lu Guang, an
American permanent resident and photojournalist who is
known for his photographs documenting environmental
degradation and coal mining, while he was in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in November 2018.
In 2018, carbon dioxide emissions in China
continued to increase, as Chinese government-backed
financial institutions funded international coal-fired
power projects, raising international concerns about
air pollution and increasing carbon dioxide emissions.
The government promoted the use of traditional
Chinese medicine in countries participating in the Belt
and Road Initiative, raising international concerns
about wildlife trafficking and the sale of products
made from tigers and rhinos.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to cease harassment of
environmental advocates and follow international
standards on freedom of speech, association, and
assembly, including those contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and China's
Constitution.
In meetings with Chinese officials, raise the
detentions of photojournalist Lu Guang; Tibetan village
head Karma; founder Xue Renyi and worker Pan Bin of
Chongqing municipality-based Green Leaf Action;
environmental advocates Chen Wuquan, Chen Weiliang,
Chen Zhenming, Chen Huansen, Chen Chunlin, Chen Shuai,
and Chen Longqun; and the Mongolian herders O.
Sechenbaatar and Tsojgil.
Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups working to
use satellite analysis and remote sensing to monitor
environmental problems in China, and also expand
awareness of citizens' environmental rights in China
and the protection of those rights.
Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen the rule of
law and transparency in the environmental and climate
sectors. Raise questions with Chinese officials about
the manipulation of environmental data and censorship
of environmental news reporting, as well as the
detention of the former head of the National Energy
Administration, Nur Bekri.
The Environment
The Environment
The Environment
Introduction and Environmental Governance
During the Commission's 2019 reporting year, top Chinese
Communist Party and government leaders continued to highlight
the importance of protecting the environment, yet environmental
pollution remained a major challenge in China due to
authorities' top-down approach to environmental problems,
transparency shortcomings, and the suppression and detention of
environmental advocates. The central government was focused on
addressing local level officials' shortcomings in protecting
the environment.\1\ Central authorities heavily controlled
media and permitted space for reporting only to the extent
consistent with central government policies,\2\ such as pushing
local officials to enforce its environmental policies.\3\ This
reporting year, carbon dioxide emissions in China continued to
increase,\4\ as Chinese government-backed financial
institutions funded international coal-fired power projects,
raising international concerns about air pollution and
increasing carbon dioxide emissions.\5\
The Chinese government's vision of top-down environmental
governance was demonstrated by the National Development and
Reform Commission's work report for 2018 which stated, ``the
government leads, enterprises are the main actors, and social
organizations and the public participate.'' \6\ In the recently
enacted PRC Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Law,\7\ for
example, the term ``public participation'' refers only to the
requirement that the public must follow official policies.\8\
The law lacks any provision for public supervision, as noted by
Greenpeace East Asia and Nanjing University Ecology department,
who concluded that although ``the new law does take an
important step towards openness . . ., [p]ublic supervision
still has no place in the regulatory system.'' \9\ In December
2018, the UN special procedure mandate holders issued a
statement on climate change calling on State Parties to
``ensure full and effective participation, access to
information and transparency . . . in the public spaces where
actors from civil society can gather and exercise their rights
to freedom of expression and opinion, association and peaceful
assembly.'' \10\
Not only did Chinese authorities fail to promote meaningful
public participation, they actively suppressed those who
monitor environmental issues. Chinese authorities detained Lu
Guang--an American permanent resident and photojournalist \11\
who is known for his photographs documenting environmental
degradation and coal mining \12\--while he was in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in November 2018.\13\ According
to the Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Lu's detention is a
high-profile illustration of the cruel and arbitrary way that
China detains journalists and other civilians in [the XUAR].''
\14\
Environmental Enforcement and Persistence of Severe Pollution
During this reporting year, severe pollution persisted in
China, and Chinese authorities criticized some local officials
for failing to enforce environmental regulations. In March
2019, Minister of Ecology and Environment Li Ganjie reported
that ``some local governments were not containing pollution
until clean-up deadlines approached or national inspection
teams arrived.'' \15\ Li noted that these local governments
imposed blanket production bans on businesses regardless of
their environmental performance, thereby damaging the
credibility of the government and the rights of law-abiding
enterprises.\16\ In constrast, other local governments ``might
have loosened supervision on air pollution and carbon
emissions'' due to the current economic downturn, according to
a China-based adviser to an international environmental non-
governmental organization.\17\ While the government continued
to report progress in environmental protection,\18\ a March
2019 ranking of air pollution in over 3,000 cities around the
world, compiled by IQAir in collaboration with Greenpeace East
Asia,\19\ indicated that 57 of the 100 most polluted cities in
2018 (based on fine particulate concentration) were in
China.\20\ According to a Hong Kong-based professor, ``air
pollution [has much] to do with burning of fossil fuel . . .;
so by addressing the air pollution sources, you actually can
address these CO2 emissions.'' \21\
Public Interest Litigation and Criminal Enforcement
During the 2019 reporting year, the Chinese government
played a dominant role in public interest environmental
litigation, and criminal environmental enforcement
significantly increased. In 2018, Chinese courts accepted 1,737
public interest environmental lawsuits filed by procuratorates,
compared to 65 that were filed by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).\22\ Although some NGOs have standing as
plaintiffs in certain public interest lawsuits, most public
interest litigation continued to be brought by the
government.\23\ In a significant development, in a public
interest case brought by the NGOs China Biodiversity
Conservation and Green Development Fund and Friends of Nature
in December 2018, the Jiangsu High People's Court rejected
claims that three chemical companies pay for soil remediation
near a school.\24\ The court, however, held that the NGOs were
not responsible for court fees assessed by the lower court--an
issue that had been a significant concern to Chinese NGOs.\25\
In 2018, Chinese authorities increased criminal enforcement, as
authorities indicted 42,195 people and approved the arrest of
15,095 people for environmental crimes, a 51.5 percent increase
in arrests from 2017.\26\
Suppression of Environmental Protests and Advocates
Chinese citizens continued to raise concerns about health
issues related to the environment through street-level protests
and other forms of public advocacy at the risk of being
persecuted, such as by imprisonment. China's Constitution \27\
provides for freedom of speech, assembly, association, and
demonstration, as do the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,\28\ the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,\29\ and the UN Human Rights Council Framework on Human
Rights and the Environment.\30\ The following cases not only
illustrate common types of environmental complaints raised by
Chinese citizens but also reveal the ongoing lack of protection
for citizens' rights when they raise environmental concerns:
Hazardous Waste Processing in Guangdong
province. In October 2018, thousands of residents in
Shunde district, Foshan municipality, Guangdong,
protested government plans to build an industrial waste
processing facility near local drinking water sources
and fish farms.\31\ Residents reported that the
government had not provided adequate public
consultation on the project, had criticized residents
who joined the protests for disturbing social order,
and had deleted thousands of social media posts about
the planned project.\32\
Environmental group in Chongqing municipality.
In December 2018, authorities at a closed trial
sentenced Pan Bin, a member of Green Leaf Action, to
four years in prison for ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble.'' \33\ In May 2018, authorities had
detained Xue Renyi, the founder of Green Leaf Action,
and, as of May 2019, he remained in detention.\34\
Green Leaf Action advocates for environmental
protection, and in 2016, police had warned Xue that the
group was being ``controlled'' by ``foreign forces.''
\35\
Land Reclamation in Guangdong. In January
2019, the Zhanjiang Economic and Technological
Development Zone People's Court in Guangdong sentenced
environmental advocates Chen Wuquan (a disbarred rights
lawyer), Chen Weiliang, Chen Zhenming, Chen Huansen,
Chen Chunlin, Chen Shuai, and Chen Longqun to prison
terms ranging from one to five years in prison for
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \36\
Beginning in October 2017, these individuals and other
villagers from Diaoluo village, Donghai Island,
Zhanjiang, protested a land reclamation project that
they claimed was illegal and had destroyed the natural
environment.\37\ In February 2019, the Council of Bars
and Law Societies of Europe, an organization that
represents over one million lawyers in 45 European
countries, criticized the detention and sentencing of
Chen Wuquan as being ``solely motivated by his activity
as a lawyer'' and expressed concern about possible
violations of the UN Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers.\38\