[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WHAT EMERGENCY?: ARMS SALES AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S
DUBIOUS END-RUN AROUND CONGRESS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
June 12, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-46
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36568PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
Cooper, The Honorable R. Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State,
Political-Military Affairs..................................... 8
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 57
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 58
Hearing Attendance............................................... 59
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Statement for the record submitted from Representative Connolly.. 60
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted from Chairman Engel............. 61
Responses to questions submitted from Representative Lieu........ 63
Responses to questions submitted from Representative Phillips.... 65
Responses to questions submitted from Representative Allred...... 66
WHAT EMERGENCY?: ARMS SALES AND THE
ADMINISTRATION'S DUBIOUS END-RUN AROUND CONGRESS
Wednesday, June 12, 2019
House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Engel. The committee will come to order.
Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit
statements, extraneous material, and questions for the record,
subject to the limitation in the rules.
We meet today to examine the fiasco surrounding the Trump
Administration's decision to invoke emergency authority under
the Arms Export Control Act and abuse of authority, in my view,
and ram through $8 billion in arm sales to Gulf countries.
We will hear testimony from the Assistant Secretary of
State for Political-Military Affairs, Clarke Cooper. Mr.
Assistant Secretary, thank you for appearing before us today.
Welcome to members of the public and the press and thank
you to our friends from C-SPAN, who are broadcasting this
important proceeding.
Before I recognize myself for an opening statement, I want
to just say to the members I am going to be a little heavy with
the gavel today because we want to try to get in as many people
asking questions as possible. So the 5-minutes will be pretty
hard and fast, instead of letting it go for six or 7 minutes.
So I would ask people to please speak within the 5-minute
recognized period.
Let me say that the war in Yemen and America's role in it
have been a major focus of this committee since the start of
the Congress. I have made my views clear. While our Gulf
partners have legitimate security concerns, the coalition's war
effort has been reckless. We have heard too many heartbreaking
reports about hospitals, school buses, weddings, and funerals
wiped out in a fiery flash of destruction.
At the same time, I am also angry. I am angry because, once
again, the Administration wants to cut Congress out of the
process. We are a co-equal branch of government. That is the
way our Constitution was written. And it is not simply the
executive branch's decision to disregard what Congress' will
is. And we have seen, unfortunately, too many times, time, and
time, and time again.
Some of the weapons that cause the destruction are made in
the United States. Other weapons made in our country have ended
up in the hands of militias in Yemen, some of which are on the
terrorist list. These are just a few of the reasons Congress
has voiced deep concern about American policy on these matters
and why offensive arms sales to the Gulf face a rocky path
forward, when subjected to congressional review.
Let's be clear. Congress' ability to review arms exports is
upheld by law and upheld by long-standing tradition.
In light of these concerns in Congress, did the
Administration come to us to negotiate a path forward? No. Did
they listen to Members on both sides of the aisle who wanted
greater assurances that American weapons would not be used in
the slaughter of civilians? No. Did they pay the least amount
of respect to a co-equal branch of government and its
legitimate and vital role? No.
No, instead they employed an obscure and rarely used
provision of the law to declare a phony emergency, rammed these
sales through, and undercut Congress' ability to carry out its
oversight role. If it were a real emergency for security under
such an imminent threat that the transfer of weapons was the
only way to prevent the catastrophe, then we probably would not
be sitting here today. It would just be approved because it
would be a real catastrophe.
But here is the reality: there is no emergency. Do you know
how I know? I know because a real emergency would require
weapons that can be delivered immediately. If you need them
right now, you want weapons that can be delivered immediately,
not months or even years from now as these do.
A real emergency would require weapons that have already
been built and are relevant to whatever the immediate threat
is. A real emergency would not justify building new factories
in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to manufacture
weapons that have been built in the United States for years and
years. A real emergency would not be followed by our Defense
Secretary telling us the threat has now diminished.
Again, there is no emergency. It is phony. It is made up
and it is an abuse of the law, once again, attempting to cut
Congress out of the whole picture. This is not a dictatorship.
We do not rule this nation by fiat.
Again, we are a co-equal branch of government. Remember
when you were in school and you learned the checks and
balances? Congress is a co-equal branch of government. We are
not going to permit this to go by without a whimper.
Just a few days before the Administration notified Congress
about this so-called emergency, we got a briefing on the threat
that Iran poses in the region. I have no doubt that Iran is a
threat to the United States, to our interests, and our allies
and partners. It is the world's most prolific state-sponsor of
terrorism. Its activities in the Gulf could paralyze commerce
and air travel. Tehran has supplied the Houthis with dangerous
weapons and the Houthis have avoided negotiations to end the
conflict, all while they have blocked assistance to help
alleviate the world's worst humanitarian catastrophe.
But this is nothing new. I obviously cannot talk about the
details of the briefing we received but suffice it to say,
though, we did not hear a single word about an emergency or a
plan to move ahead with this sale. For this major fiasco, the
Administration quietly let us know on a Friday afternoon before
a holiday weekend. It is really a slap in the face.
Congress is going to have to give itself stronger tools
before the Administration just starts ignoring us completely. I
have been working with Ranking Member McCaul for months on
legislation to make sure future arm sales only go forward if
the country buying those weapons meet certain conditions.
We will also have to strongly consider changing the Arms
Export Control Act's emergency provision, which the
Administration again has flagrantly abused in this case. And we
are looking at every possible avenue for stopping these
transfers before they go forward under this phony
justification, including measures that members of this
committee will introduce later today.
But for now, I would like some answers. I would like to
know about the process that led to this outrageous decision. I
would like to know who was involved, who thought it was a good
idea to conjure up an emergency and cut an entire branch of the
Federal Government out of the conversation.
And we will get to those questions and others, Mr.
Assistant Secretary, following your opening statement.
Before that, I will yield to my friend, the ranking member,
Mr. McCaul of Texas, for any opening comments he may have.
Mr. McCaul. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first
start out by saying what an honor it was to attend the Normandy
ceremony with you this past weekend.
Make no mistake, the Iranian regime is our strategic enemy
in the Middle East. They are the No. 1 state-sponsor of terror
in the world today. They have a brutal history of American
bloodshed, from the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon in 1983,
to the deaths of over 600 U.S. Servicemembers from 2003 to
2011. They continue to hold American hostages and plot against
our allies in Europe.
Iran's destabilizing behavior in the Middle East threatens
that region, and is a growing threat to the security of the
United States, our military, and our citizens.
Just last week, Marine General Frank McKenzie, our top
military commander in the region, warned about attacks by Iran
and/or its proxies, stating: I think the threat is immanent.
Our allies in the region face this menace every day.
I fully support the efforts of Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates to defend themselves against Iran, including U.S.
arms and training. I support the efforts to combat the violent
overthrow of a legitimate U.N.-backed Government in Yemen by
the Iran-backed Houthi rebels. These rebels repeatedly launch
missiles and armed drones into Saudi Arabia, threatening
innocents, including Americans.
But I am also troubled by the numerous civilian deaths in
this war, including from Coalition airstrikes. I firmly believe
we can support our strategic partners while also insisting they
prosecute that arm more responsibly. And for this reason, I am
working with Chairman Engel on legislation conditioning certain
future arms sales with the goal of helping stop civilian
deaths.
We are here today because the State Department recently
certified to Congress that the Iran threat constitutes an
emergency, requiring the immediate provision of certain defense
systems to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan. This rarely used
emergency authority bypassed Article I congressional review of
these sales. The founding fathers put Article I first, which
represents the American people, before Article II in the
Constitution, and they did that for a reason.
There have been times when international emergencies
required expedited sales. For example, President George H. W.
Bush used emergency authority in the immediate wake of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. President Reagan made such a
determination in 1984 during the Iran-Iraq War. In both of
those cases, critical weapons were delivered very quickly
during hot wars.
But as I said last month, the recent use of this emergency
authority, in my judgment, was unfortunate. Of note, some of
these sales will not be ready for delivery for over a year. I
would have preferred State to adhere to the formal statutory
30-day congressional review process to expedite these 22 arms
sales, where a resolution of this approval process could have
been an option.
In fact, I had a very good conversation with Ambassador
Bolton about a week or two before this decision was made. I
discussed the legislation the chairman and I were working on,
and I thought things were actually going in the correct and
proper direction.
I do share the Administration's frustration that some of
these informal holds of these arms sales for over a year was a
little too long. In your written statement, you have said that
these arms sales are necessary to ensure the United States
remains a credible supplier of choice for our partners, rather
than Russia and China. And I agree with that.
Last week, it was reported that Saudi Arabia, however, has
been buying ballistic missiles from China. And while we are not
discussing ballistic missile technology today, it is disturbing
if our allies are depending or deepening their defense
relationships with our adversaries, like China.
Assistant Secretary Cooper, I want to thank you for your
service to our country in so many ways, and some ways we cannot
even discuss here in public. And I look forward to hearing your
views on the threat, the decisionmaking process in designating
this an emergency, and the details on these 22 weapons sales.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you. I want to thank the gentleman
from Texas, our ranking member.
Our witness this morning is Mr. R. Clarke Cooper, Assistant
Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. Mr.
Assistant Secretary, thank you for coming. I recognize you for
5 minutes to summarize your testimony. Everything will go into
the record, including your written testimony as well.
Assistant Secretary, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE R. CLARKE COOPER, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS
Mr. Cooper. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members,
in recent days, neutral shipping has been attacked. By
providing a deterrent against hostile actions, this transfer
lowers the risk of a broader conflict. The determination
reflects the United States' grave concern with the growing
escalation in the Gulf and its implication for the security of
our friends in the region.
These words could precisely describe the context of the
recent emergency certification this hearing has been convened
to discuss but they are actually from a State Department
statement from 1984. Then, as now, Iran's Revolutionary
Government threatened international shipping in the Gulf and,
through its proxies, supported attacks on American interest in
the region, resulting in the deaths of 241 American
Servicemembers in Beirut. Then, as now, our partners required
the reassurance provided by an American demonstration of
resolve. And then, as now, the Administration took steps to
deter war, not to bring it closer.
In his recent certification, Secretary Pompeo advanced a
set of arms transfers to support our partners in this current
crisis. These capabilities include aircraft support, munitions,
logistic services, unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and
recognizance platforms, training, and advisory services. None
of these constitute introductions of fundamentally new
capabilities to the region. None fundamentally altered the
military balance of power. None are in a nature or category
that Congress has not previously reviewed and approved for
these particular partners.
The Secretary's decision to exercise his statutory
authorities under the Arms Export Control Act reflect the
current threat from Iran. But before speaking to that, I would
like to describe the broader context.
First, in today's world, our partnership are more vital,
not less so. We must ensure our partners that they have the
capabilities, the systems, the communications, the
intelligence, and the training to play their particular role in
maintaining the stability and security of their regions.
Our adversaries recognize the importance of our
partnerships and have adopted purposeful strategies of trying
to disrupt them at all levels, including in terms of our
security cooperation. For instance, by seeking to replace us,
as has been noted, as suppliers of choice. Congress is very
much aware of this, which is why you passed the Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in 2017.
At the same time, we deeply appreciate the particular
considerations that relate to arms transfers. Many members,
many Americans, are concerned about the use of the arms we
provide overseas, including in the context of the Yemen Civil
War. These concerns are appropriate and we share them.
From the beginning of the conflict, we have maintained that
a political solution is urgently needed and we have supported
the United Nations-led effort working toward that objective.
Moreover, what makes America stand out from many foreign
suppliers of defense material is the premium we place on
ensuring that our capabilities are not contributing to gross
violations of human rights.
We have worked with the Saudi-led Coalition over the course
of its operations to reduce the occurrence of civilian
casualties. Our support in this regard has ranged from the
provision of training on targeting, and the supply of more
precise munitions, to mentoring and advising the Coalition on
best practices, lessons learned, and integrating complex data
into a system that is specifically designed to reduce civilian
casualties.
We have also provided higher end legal training on the laws
of our own conflict and have directly and regularly engaged
both military and political leadership in this topic. So this
is the context: The need to remain engaged partners, to ensure
we remain their primary security partner, and to make clear
that we support our partners in the defense of their realms,
and the security of their regions, and to deter our shared
adversaries from disrupting those objectives.
This mention of adversaries brings me back to the emergency
cited by the Secretary in his certification--Iran and its
maligned activities. As Secretary Pompeo stated publicly, and
as he and acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan briefed the
Congress, we have seen increased threat streams from Iran,
relating both to U.S. and partner equities in the region. These
troubling and escalatory indications and warnings from the
Iranian regime have prompted an increased U.S. force posture in
the region. The Iran-backed Houthis publicly threatened to
increase operations, targeting vital military targets in the
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi-led Coalition
positions in Yemen.
Add to this, as Ambassador Bolton recently described,
Iranian attacks on commercial shipping off the coast of the
United Arab Emirates, the unmanned aerial vehicle attacks on
pumping stations of the Saudi East-West pipeline, and the
rocket fired into a park just about a kilometer from our U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad just a few days after that. And just today,
today a Houthi cruise missile fell on the Arrivals Hall of the
Saudi Arabia's Aba Airport--International airport, reportedly
injuring 26 civilians.
These provocative actions mark a new evolution in the
threat Iran poses to the region to our partners and to our own
national security, including the security of hundreds of
thousands of Americans and their families who live and work in
the Gulf States. It is this situation, the significant increase
in both the intelligence of threat streams and clear
provocative and damaging actions taken by Iran's Government
that the Secretary did determine it constituted an emergency.
It is this confluence of strategic priorities, the vitality
of our bilateral relationships and partnerships, and the urgent
regional threat that drove him to make the certification.
Before closing, I would like to make one further point. In
the process of his confirmation and my own, the Secretary and I
each provided Congress with our commitments to the
congressional review process for arms sales. This commitment
stands. I value deeply Congress' role in the review of the arms
transfer process. I take pride in the depth and the detail of
the working relationship that we have with the committees in
the course of this process. I do not view the Secretary's
certification as setting aside this process. Indeed, by carving
out a certain set of cases in the context of a statutory
authority long-granted by Congress, the Secretary's action is
an affirmation of the value we place on our engagement with you
on arms transfers and broader security assistance issues.
Mr. Chairman, in 1984, Ambassador Michael Armacost
explained President Reagan's emergency certification to
Congress in these words. I quote: Our decisions were a prudent
yet clear response to an escalating emergency which threatens
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. They satisfied a clear military
need. In addition, we sent a political signal, both reassurance
and deterrence. It was a measured response which promotes
regional stability and security.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members, political signal
of both reassurance and deterrence, a measured response which
promotes regional stability and security, these are the
purposes for which President Reagan certified an emergency in
1984 and they are the purposes for which Secretary Pompeo
invoked the same authority just 2 weeks ago.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. I thank you for your testimony.
I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. All time
yielded is for the purposes of questioning our witness. And I
will start by recognizing ourself.
Look, Mr. Secretary, Saudi Arabia is an ally and they have
legitimate security concerns. And Iran is not an ally and they
are the leading state-sponsor of terrorism and have all kinds
of maligned intentions. But it is not an excuse to cut Congress
out of the picture. It is not an excuse to say we know better
and, therefore, Congress is superfluous or irrelevant. It is
really, really a bad policy to act like that.
The Houthis are bad. They threatened Saudi Arabia and
civilians but it does not mean we give the Saudis a blank
check. It does not mean that we look the other way when they
drop bombs on children in school buses. And I think there has
to be some responsibility here, and I just do not understand
the Administration's decision to totally cut Congress out of
the process when we have a process that works. And I really
just hope this does not happen again.
The State Department has cited an increase in Iranian
threats as a major justification for invoking the Arms Export
Control Act emergency power provisions. I have long believed,
again as I said, that Iran remains the greatest threat to the
region but this appears to be a convenient excuse, a convenient
way to get these weapon sales out the door without consulting
Congress.
So let's discuss the timing of these sales. When was the
decision made to move forward with these sales under emergency
authority? Was it before May 4th, when the White House
announced the deployment of the carrier strike group to the
Gulf?
The New York Times reported last night that this decision
was made in the spring, saying that, quote, ``Mr. Pompeo told
State Department officials to find a way to push through the
arms sales'', unquote. So which came first, the arms sales or
the threat? Defense Secretary Shanahan indicated that Iranian
threat had diminished. Does this mean the emergency no longer
exists?
So I understand that some of these items on the emergency
list will take months, if not a year or more to produce. So let
me ask you this: What kind of emergency responds in months or
years to circumstances you claim exist right now? And if the
Iran threat were to be reduced in some way, would you move
ahead with these transfers?
These are all very important questions. I hope you can
summarize them because it really makes me more dubious in fact
believing that the Administration, for some reason, has decided
not to partner with the Congress in these important issues. And
I really think that in the future the Administration should
change its attitude and work with Congress, working with the
American people. We are all here to serve the same country, and
the same people, and we should not be cut out of the process
and treated like enemies.
So if I could get a comment on anything I have said.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will start with the
partnering with Congress and our communications.
Yes, as I stated in my testimony, we value that engagement
and want to return, and we have returned to the normal
consultative process on arms transfers and sales. This is an
emergency. This was a one-time event, as the Secretary stated.
And I would note that the sales that were included in the
emergency declaration certification had been through the
consultative process and review with Congress.
There is nothing new in those 22 sales, which does lead to
your point about the release of those. On the DCS or direct
commercial sales side of it, yes, there are immediacy of
receival of shipment in that sense. But as to an emergency on
timing, yes, the protracted process did contribute to the
conditions that necessitated an emergency.
So in some of these cases, you are right, there is going to
be a tail or a logistical latency on them. That tail or
logistical latency has been built in because of the protracted
process. But again, consultation, review period with Congress,
that is desirous for all parties; for not only the legislative
branch but for the executive branch. It makes our transfer
stronger. It actually provides accountability to the partners
that are in the receipt of that.
As for the timing of the emergency declaration, similar to
the timing of the release on imposition of sanctions, the
emergency declaration or that certification is in the
Secretary's toolkit. It is a tool of diplomatic deterrence or
prudential diplomatic deterrence. To say that it was
preconceived is like saying that we are predetermining
sanctions being issued to a particular partner. There are
partners right now that we are looking at that we are reviewing
potential imposition of sanctions.
In this case, because of the uptick of the threat streams
that were being reported, risking not only equities but persons
made it more of a priority.
Again, I would be happy to talk more in a closed fora about
those threat streams. But talking about timing, timing
certainly was of the essence in regards to sending a message.
There were three audiences on that message, Mr. Chairman, one
being Tehran, sending a message of deterrence to Tehran. The
other one, not mutually exclusive, is sending a message to our
partners to reassure them that we are with them shoulder-to-
shoulder, that we do value their sovereignty, that we do value
their role in the greater region that they play to protect our
interest and equities.
And then finally, one that has been touched upon here
already today, a third audience was our near-peer adversaries.
Our national security strategy is very transparent, so
transparent that our adversaries see it as a way to also
communicate in a fashion where they see opportunity. And what
we do not want to do is we do not want to create conditions
that would provide opportunity for our near-peer adversaries.
So there was a certainly a shared aspect on this
declaration, the primary one being, Mr. Chairman, was the
immediacy of the threat streams that were coming and know that
the threat has not abated.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We certainly hope this
is a one-time exception. I think there is a process. This
emergency was declared. There is an informal notification and a
formal notification. Typically, when you start the informal
process, it is an opportunity to negotiate and work things out.
Usually that takes place within a matter of a month or two.
Some of these holds have been in place for over a year. So in
some respects, I certainly understand the frustration with the
State Department.
Having said that, getting the classified briefing, you know
the top Marine general calling on his proxies to prepare for
war, and our top commander in the region calling the threat
imminent, can you tell me what impact the authorization of
these sales by the Secretary have had on these threats?
Mr. Cooper. In an open fora like this, I can tell you that
there is a postured response. Again, our emergency declaration
is just, I mentioned, it is a tool. It is not the only tool
that our Government has. There was citation earlier this
morning about our forced posture in the region. That, also, is
a tool.
It does not mean that the threat has abated but it sends a
very clear message to Tehran. But equally important, we are
reassuring our partners that we have not abandoned them or that
we have left them to carry the full load of responsibility in
the region.
Mr. McCaul. And do you think these precision-guided weapons
that have been now sent, that certainly would help prevent some
of the collateral damage that we are seeing.
Mr. Cooper. Precise targeting, actually, would actually
mitigate civilian casualties. It is not just the precision
weapons. It also comes with the training.
One thing that Members who have been involved in the
informal review process of not just precision-guided weapons
but any platform, what makes us a preferred partner, not just
in the Gulf region but globally, is we do not just provide a
munition. We do not just provide a platform. We provide a
partnership. And a partnership comes with that a long tail on
training, capacity building, getting our partners to not only
have the system but actually operate in a way that we would
find it acceptable by our standards, by USG standards.
When I say training, that also is a matter of understanding
the application of these things. It includes teaching them
about the Law of Armed Conflict. It also helps them better
understand what would be considered no-go/go for the targeting
process. So it is not just a matter of conveyance of a
munition.
Mr. McCaul. Now this gets to the emergency issue. Out of
these 22 sales--I do not know if you can answer this off the
top of your head_but how many were ready to deliver in less
than 60 days, or have already been delivered in theater?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
I will do a quick little one-on-one. So foreign military
sales and when we are doing the letters of offer, there is a
process there that can take 20 to 30 days. Direct commercial
sales, however, to your point on the immediacy and it is the
point that the chairman raised as well, to paraphrase a
colloquialism, our DOD colleagues refer to pushing then--
pushing munitions is happening now and actually has happened
prior to this hearing.
Mr. McCaul. How many would take over a year or two to
deliver?
Mr. Cooper. It depends on if it has not been built or
manufactured. But if anything is what is called off-the-shelf,
it is already moving.
Mr. McCaul. And then finally, how many have not even been
built yet?
Mr. Cooper. I would have to followup on that in detail.
Part of the difference is is if it is a direct commercial
sale, we do not have, State Department does not have
jurisdiction on a direct commercial sale export. It is on the
FMS cases that we have that direct jurisdiction over.
Mr. McCaul. Well and my last point is that the chairman and
I are working on legislation, as we had prior to this
announcement, to authorize the sales. We understand the policy
of arming the Saudis, and the threat that Iran poses, and the
alliance between the Saudis and Israel. And we understand the
Houthi proxy in Yemen is a threat to Saudi Arabia, and Israel,
and the region, and to the United States.
We just have an issue with the process. And we think
consulting with Congress is always the better route. I
understand, in this case, there is an emergency. We are
continuing our work in good faith on legislation to address
future sales. And we hope that we can work with the State
Department on this legislation, and I talked to Senator Risch
yesterday about this as well, something that I think would be
practical common sense that could pass the House, Senate, and
be signed into law.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. I do agree with you that the Houthi are evil
and supported by Iran. At the same time, you tell us that with
more accurate targeting techniques and technology, Saudi Arabia
will hit fewer hospitals. That assumes they are not trying to
hit hospitals. I hope your assumption is correct.
You tell us that you want to send a message with this to
our adversaries--to your adversaries. It appears as if your
adversary is Congress and the message is loud and clear. You
will stretch every statute beyond its breaking point in order
to make Congress irrelevant to the decisionmaking process.
The arms sales you are talking about are controversial.
There is significant opposition in Congress. And rather than
confront that, you go around it. And so the issue is not what
is our foreign policy but whether we protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.
We have heard some criticism from both sides of the aisle
on this. The fact of the matter is if Congress were united, we
could stop this. We could go right now to those on the floor
and demand that the rule be changed, and we make an order and
protect an amendment to the Foreign Ops approps bill and the
Defense approps bill pending on the floor today, requiring--and
we could require that any transfer of weapons to Saudi Arabia
or the Emirates get an affirmative vote by Congress. We could,
at minimum, just repudiate this phony declaration of emergency.
And so I will yield to any Republican member that wants to
join me in that effort.
As you see, Congress is divided. You have defeated your
enemy.
Now this declaration of emergency is bogus. A court may
very well decide that in a few years. And if this one is not,
you can imagine that at some future time, there would be a
bogus declaration.
Is there any personal liability that anybody in the
executive branch faces if they just decide to ignore the Arms
Export Control Act or come up with absurd definitions designed
to claimed to be adhering to it when a court determine that
they had violated? Can you basically do anything you want, as
long as you can say it with a straight face, as a practical
matter? Or do you face--or do you or anyone else in the
Administration face any civil or criminal liability?
Please limit your answer to that question.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman Sherman.
So no, the short answer is no. We are in compliance with
statute.
Mr. Sherman. Well, let's say that in some future decision
you were not in compliance with statute because we do not--
would you face any liability or can you violate the statute
with impunity should you or your successor choose to do so?
Mr. Cooper. I am not aware of anybody, regardless of branch
of government, being able to violate statute at will.
Mr. Sherman. But what is the outcome if some successor of
yours decides to violate the statute?
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to gander that. I am going to
focus on what is legal and what is not legal, sir.
Mr. Sherman. I would hope that you would get legal advice
on this----
Mr. Cooper. Yes.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Because as extreme as this
Administration is, it is quite possible that a court would
determine that you folks have gone too far, that you have
violated the law, that there is not a good faith emergency, and
that those involved are deliberately, intentionally violating
the Arms Export Control Act.
Mr. Cooper. Congressman Sherman, this is in compliance with
the Arms Export Control Act.
Mr. Sherman. You think you are complying. Many of us do
not. And who knows what the determination of what some future
tribunal or court would be? We have swung very far in the
direction of a Presidential power.
So the question here, it appears as if you have determined
that the emergency is that Congress will not agree with you.
Mr. Cooper. No, sir.
Mr. Sherman. Well, you told us what you wanted to do. We
did not approve. And so you declared an emergency.
If Congress had promptly agreed with your plans, would
there be an emergency?
Mr. Cooper. Yes. So an emergency are conditions-based--and
I am glad you asked that question, Congressman Sherman--the
conditions that we have discussed here today and we can discuss
further in another fora. Not only were the threat streams
emanating from Tehran, there were the conditions of the
readiness of our partners, ensuring our partners that we stand
with them, and then there were also the conditions of looking
at near-peer adversaries looking for opportunistic----
Mr. Sherman. Right and so you decided that whatever policy
you want to carry out must be carried out and that anything
that prevents you from doing it, even for a short time,
constitutes an emergency. Please read the Constitution.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, sir. I have been swearing to support
the Constitution for over 20 years in different capacities in
my career. And Congress is a partner. We are partners with
Congress. We will continue to work with Congress on reviews.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Cooper, for being here. If you can
generalize, how long have these sales been in the works?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you Congressman. So not each sale but
many, there are a number of sales that have gone up to 18
months. So it has been raised here that this is where we get
into partners being concerned, not surprising, through
engagements not only with Members of Congress but in bilateral
discourse, there has been concern about our ability to be
standing shoulder-to-shoulder with partners who are carrying a
number of equities for us in the region.
Mr. Perry. And during that 18 months or throughout that 18
months, has Congress been made aware of the Administration's
intent to make the sales?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, Congressman. In fact, going back to the
process at large, the informal review process includes a
lengthy consultation period. I think a number of members
already cited the normal turnaround time, depending if it is a
NATO or non-NATO partner, it can be anywhere from 20 to 30
days. That is usually when issues may be flagged or identified
by the Congress that we are able to address.
Why we have that period of time and why it is done in a
fashion that is just between the Department and Congress is
because these are issues that need to be resolved inside the
USG, inside U.S. Government so we are not exposing our partners
to our own internal scrutiny. But normally, it could be up to
30 days. In these cases, we were reaching months, if not close
to 2 years.
Mr. Perry. Eighteen months is a little longer than 30 days.
If you know, how long ago did Senator Menendez object?
Mr. Cooper. Again, some of these cases go back to over 18
months.
Mr. Perry. And is the fact that Senator Menendez objected
testimonial, to a certain extent, to the fact that the
Administration is complying with the process because, if you
were not complying with the process, Senator Menendez would not
have had the opportunity to object?
Mr. Cooper. And to that point, we--after the emergency
declaration, we returned immediately to that process. So there
are cases that are currently under informal review right now
before the Congress right after the declaration. So the process
has not stopped, essentially.
The declaration was a highlight of 22 particular cases but
the process of informal review, tiered review notification
never stopped.
Mr. Perry. Did you, Mr. Secretary Cooper, did you receive a
request from this committee to conduct a classified briefing
regarding these sales and the particular circumstances
surrounding the sales from a threat perspective prior to--that
we would have that briefing prior to this hearing?
Mr. Cooper. Congressman, I know that we had offered a
classified briefing. The offer still stands. Happy to come to
come back either in a closed hearing or in a briefing setting.
We were not able to secure one. But again, happy--if there is
interest, happy to provide that.
There is threat stream data that is worth noting. There was
citation of some of that by Central Command General McKenzie. I
think it was cited here but in an open fora, we cannot go there
right now.
Mr. Perry. So you made the offer but did the committee
request a classified briefing regarding the actions
precipitating the emergency declaration regarding these arms
sales prior to this hearing?
Mr. Cooper. No, sir, not that I am aware of.
Mr. Perry. Would you say that this move is based on new
intelligence received regarding Iran in particular?
Mr. Cooper. The short answer is yes. A little bit more to
that is that there were evolving threat streams. I think one
thing that we cannote is that there is always a persistent
threat, as several members have noted that here today, that is
not going to abate, not just direct threats but through proxies
outside of the region, threats to our equities outside the
region. That is not new.
What was new was the particular uptick in the threat
posture.
Mr. Perry. Well, thank you, Secretary Cooper. And I, for
one, if I have the authority to do so, I am requesting a
classified briefing at your convenience and availability
regarding the action precipitating the sales. And if no one
else wants to attend, I will be happy to sit down with you
myself and do that. So I would like to work that out with your
schedule.
I just want to remind all my colleagues that we are here
for the United States of America, for the security of the
United States of America, and remind my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle that when I brought up the fact that the IRGC
was driving around in M-1 tanks, American-made M-1 tanks, no
one here seemed to have a problem with that during the last
administration.
When the last Administration sent pounds of cash to a vowed
enemy of the United States, nobody on the other side of the
aisle seemed to have a problem with that.
And when the last administration crafted the JCPOA to
expressly exclude Congress, nobody on the other side of the
aisle seemed to have a problem with that process either.
I yield.
Chairman Engel. I just want to quote my dear late mother,
who used to tell me two wrongs do not make a right.
Let me call on Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, one thing that I think that all Members of
Congress do agree upon that Iran is a bad actor, and that Iran
has done things, and continues to do things that threatens the
region.
One thing that I think some Members also know, maybe not
everyone articulates it, that Saudi Arabia also does not have
clean hands. And they, too, at times, malign the region. And
they too bring some--because when I think about Wahhabism, that
is a threat to us. When I think about who were in those planes
that--I come from New York--that destructed the World Trade
Center, they were Saudi Arabians.
When I think about the tragedy that continues to take place
in Yemen, and the killing of innocent people, in that regard, I
believe it is our responsibility to also hold them in check. I
think that it is important that when you see the killing of an
American columnist, that we should say something and do
something in that regard.
Now it seems to me that the Administration realizes that
also because the Administration--you know I just saw the
President yesterday talk about a beautiful letter that he
received from Kim Jong-Un. Kim Jong-Un does not--I believe in
talking to our adversaries but Kim Jong-Un does not send
beautiful letters when we see him killing his own people and
starving his own people, as a similar crisis is continuing to
take place in Saudi Arabia.
So the concern that Members of Congress have had was about
how our partners were using the weapons that they received, and
how that was fueling the conflict in Yemen, and creating the
worst humanitarian catastrophe possibly in the world. These
concerns still have not disappeared. The administration did not
come to Congress to ask how to move forward with these sales
and did not make any policy changes to assuage our concerns.
The Administration could have sent the sales to Congress
under the regular notification period, allowing Congress to
disapprove, 30 days to disapprove. Three days prior to the
emergency declaration, there was a classified meeting and the
Secretary was there. He did not mention at all that there was
an emergency situation. Yet, just 3 days later, all of a sudden
there was an emergency situation. It seems evident that that
was utilized to get around Congress because some in Congress do
want to hold everyone accountable for their actions and to make
sure that we are setting a standard.
My concern and question when I just look at the number of
mortar bombs, 15,000 mortar bombs that may end up in the hands
of militants in Yemen and may be used against civilians. So my
one question to you is: Why in the world would a regime need
15,000 mortar bombs in the scenario that we are talking about?
Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman Meeks. To start with, we
will start with the munitions and weapons. As cited in my
testimony, we have partners that are under direct threat. They
are not just carrying our equities or our water. We just had an
attack by the Houthis on a Saudi Arabian civilian international
airport. So it is not just a matter of defense. It is a matter
of posture in Yemen.
As you noted, the Houthis are Iran-sponsored. So this is
not just a matter of a civil war. This is addressing a greater
threat.
As to the threat streams, it is ever-evolving. So yes,
Congress was briefed on the threats by State, by Defense, and
yes, there was a constant assessment process taking place
before that briefing, after that briefing; even today, the
intelligence community with the executive branch monitors that
threat for changes in posture. So it did necessitate the
emergency declaration.
And we are with you on accountability. Holding a partner
accountable, any partner, does not preclude us from working
with a partner. If anything, detaching ourselves from our
partner, removing ourselves from our partner puts at risk
ensuring that accountability.
So no, having a security cooperation status with a partner
does not mean we do not hold them to account on human rights.
It does not mean we do not hold them to account on rule of law.
And it does not mean that we do not hold them to account on
civil society.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Cooper, thank you for being here. And I think the
question has been raised about why the Administration took this
route versus the normal route and I think that has been
covered.
I realize you may not be able to say, and you have already
stated that you cannot say much in this setting, and I ask the
chairman to hold a classified briefing with this committee, if
the chairman would do that, to second what Mr. Perry said,
because I think there is confusion. And if we are not united as
a government, it shows confusion and weakness to any adversary
we may have. And I think the best thing that the Administration
can do is work to get all of us onboard of why because I
question some of it, too, and I want to support the
Administration. But without having a SCIF-type of briefing,
what we have over there at the Capitol Visitor Center is not
real in-depth. And so I ask the chairman to hold that as soon
as possible, so that we can be on the same side of this.
We have certainly learned that when an administration moves
past or bypasses Congress, like the Obama Administration did
with the JCPOA and passed over a billion dollars to Iran, the
consequences of that take a long time to go back and correct.
And we do not want to make that mistake.
We have heard reports of arms going into the hands of
people we do not want them to. And what guarantees do we have
that this equipment will not get into the hands of radical
Islamic terrorists like the five or six different ISIS
terrorist groups that are in that region?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman Yoho.
And yes, I would reaffirm that I would be happy to come
back to have a further conversation on the classified setting.
As to the point on the delivery of systems and weapons to
coalition partners, this is part of our relationship in a
bilateral sense of the advocacy and the credibility of what
they are applying, where they are applying it, and who has
actual command and control of whatever weapon or system is in
place. That is constantly part of the program.
I earlier mentioned that when we provide a munition or an
arms transfer, it does not just stop at the transfer. It goes
come with a longer tail, not just on providing capability and
sustainment, but also accountability as well. So it is not
limited to just provision of a good. There is an accountability
aspect there.
This is actually part of the portfolio in my part of the
Department is when we actually do followup. In cases, we do
precondition future transfers based on their ability to account
for munitions or arms.
Mr. Yoho. Let me interrupt there because I have got reports
of radical Islamic terrorists having MANPADS that went to Saudi
Arabia and now they have them. We need better safeguards.
And I guess a more direct question is what information have
you requested from Saudi, and the UAE, and Jordan about how the
defense articles transferred as part of these sales will be
used, so that we have checks and balances? Because we suffer
the consequences of that. If you kill one radical terrorist, 20
get born out of that. And we are the ones that our name is on
that ammunition and they know it.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman Yoho. It is incumbent
upon us from a nonproliferation aspect, a protection, a command
and control of those elements, those arms, those munitions.
As to talking about certain aspects of that from a
bilateral sense, I would like to save that for when we are
together in a non-open fora. But I would like to add that on
the MANPADS issue, Members may or may not know that there is an
interagency task force on the tracking of, the decommissioning
of, knowing where they are in the globe. That interagency task
force actually is housed, not only at the Department of State,
but it is within my part of the Department. So we do have
jurisdiction on that specifically from an interagency
standpoint. I am happy to talk about that further.
Mr. Yoho. All right, thank you.
And one more important question. Do these sales threaten
Israel's qualitative military edge and has Israel expressed any
concerns about these sales?
Mr. Cooper. I can tell that on any sale, not only these
sales, every sale, QME is part of the analytical review
process. I do not want to talk into detail about our bilateral
communications in an open fora but, with every sale, as you
mentioned, QME is an assessment factor.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your time and your service.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Yoho. Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Secretary Cooper, thank you for being here
today.
You know following up on the concerns of the transfer of
arms, that we make sure it does not wind up in the wrong hands,
I think this is why the process of going through Congress and
making sure that we are part of it is important. Because at the
end of the day, when these arms are found with al-Qaida, like
they were in the past, you know they are going to come to us
and say well you did not supervise this, you did not keep an
eye on this, and we have to answer to the public because they
know there is a process by which we approve these arms sales.
So at the end, it just seems like the Administration always
likes to bypass Congress. And then I go back to my district and
I have to answer why do they think that it is important for
them to just go about doing business without the approval of
Congress. One of the most important things in this country is
the fact that we have checks and balances.
So you know, let's get with it. Let's go back and tell them
that hey, we are part of this country.
And the other issue that I have, are they running out of
ammunition? Are they running out of arms, the Saudis, that we
have to do this in an emergency?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman. As to talking about
particular readiness and capacity posture, I do not want to
talk about that in open fora. But what I can say in an open
fora is that reassurance be provided to not just Saudi Arabia
but the other Gulf partners in the emergency declaration was
not just the message. There was the material aspect of it. But
to particular readiness and capacity issues on any bilateral
partner, we would not want to have in open fora.
And I am with you on the relationship with Congress. This
is why I emphasized in my testimony the value of having the
review process. All these cases have been under congressional
review for quite some time. It does not preclude any review of
any future cases. And we did, as soon as the one-time
declaration was issued by Secretary Pompeo, returned to the
normal review consultative process with Congress.
Mr. Sires. I always get a kick out of these classified
briefings because it was supposed to be classified the type of
arms that we are selling to the Saudis. I mean I think
everybody in the world knows what is going there. So how
classified do you do that when everybody seems to have a list
of what kind of arms they are getting?
Mr. Cooper. The sale, the transparency aspect is not
classified. What is classified is when we talk about any
partner's capacity of readiness. We certainly would not want an
adversary to know the strengths or weaknesses of any of our
partners.
Mr. Sires. Well, Mr. Secretary, all I can say is keep us
informed. It seems to be that this Administration has a habit
of just doing things without informing or not even turning
information over to the Congress that we need to make our
decisions. It seems that we constantly have to go to court.
Some of the other committees have to constantly go to court to
get information. It is like pulling teeth with this
Administration, information that belongs to us so we can make
our decision. I know you do not have an answer to that.
Mr. Cooper. Well, I do. All the information, as you
mentioned, there is no secret about the cases here because we
do operate in a transparent fashion. So the cases have been
under congressional review, in some cases, almost 2 years. I do
not know how more consultative we can be in that sense. This is
what probably contributed to the Secretary's decision point,
the primary one being the uptick in the threat streams.
But the process has been in place. We value the process. We
are not walking away from the process but in this particular
case, an emergency necessitated a declaration to move forward.
Mr. Sires. And we all get the fact that Iran is a bad
actor. And we all understand, at least I understand, how
important it is to make sure that Israel is not overpowered by
Iran and his minions. So, it is important. Thank you.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Sires.
Mrs. Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Cooper, for your time and
certainly for your service and also, at the beginning when we
were all casually talking, your offer to bring this committee
together in a closed and classified setting. So I appreciate
that very, very much. And I think it would do much good because
I much agree with my friends across the aisle and colleagues on
this side of the aisle that oftentimes what happens over at the
CVC is inane.
So while I understand the strategic imperative to reassure
regional partners standing against an aggressive Iran, I am
seeking to better understand the Administration's decision, I
think we all are, to sidestep normal processes, especially
giving ongoing reports, frankly, of Saudi human rights abuses;
very important to me.
Russia remains, sir, the largest arms supplier to the
strategically important Asia-Pacific region. How do the pending
arms sales to partners in the Middle East effect long-term
efforts to convince Asia-Pacific countries to buy American?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congresswoman Wagner. I actually
just came back from South Asia and there was some honest, if
not difficult, conversations with partners about their current
status, their wanting to have a more deep, fulsome relationship
with the United States. However, they needed to find ways to
off-ramp some legacy requirements or legacy equipping from,
say, Russia.
Earlier in this hearing, I referenced in my testimony
CAATSA sanctions.
Mrs. Wagner. Right.
Mr. Cooper. That is a tool. That is a tool that Congress
provided the Administration. It is certainly a tool that is
available in any of our partnerships. Again, being in an open
fora, I do not want to go into detail where we are looking for
that to be applied but it is certainly something that having
that as a tool factors in our discussions and negotiations
bilaterally with our partners.
Mrs. Wagner. Well I am comforted to know that you were
there and that you are having these discussions. And I look
forward to perhaps some more detail in that regard.
So if, as you mentioned in your testimony, none of the
sales would alter the military balance of power in the region,
why are emergency procedures necessary, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, again as noted, these were not new sales.
We are not introducing new technology, new capabilities. What
made it an emergency was a confluence of these conditions.
So when one looks at the conditions not just on where our
partners are or where they assess we are, there was the
immediacy of the threat streams emanating from Iran. So the
direct threats, not only to our interest, but to our partners
as well. Couple that being able to reassure our partners that
we are still with them and then also add to the layer, also
referred to here earlier, of sending a message to our near-peer
adversaries that do not take advantage of the current threat
posture in the region; we are standing with our partners.
Mrs. Wagner. Secretary Cooper, you explained in your
testimony that China and Russia are, I believe you called them,
secondary audiences for May's notification. Can you explain how
the emergency notification advantages the United States in
competition with Russia and China?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, thank you. Russia and China are extremely
aggressive in their advocacy for sale, pushing their arms
munitions to anybody. They usually do it at a cut price, cut
rate. They certainly do not do it in a transparent fashion the
way we do it.
It is unique that the United States arms transfer process,
by statute and by policy, is done in such a transparent
fashion, not only for our accountability to the taxpayer, but
also our accountability to a partner who we are investing in.
We also, as I mentioned, have a long what I would say tail
of support with our sales that is not replicated by our near-
peer adversaries. We provide not just training sustainment; we
are with them along the way. And it is important to factor in
in that training sustainment, it is inclusive of human rights,
Rule of Armed Conflict, making sure that our partners are using
these systems in a way that we would find appropriate from our
standards.
Sending that message to our near-peer adversaries is to say
do not take advantage of a situation in a particular conflict
area and by no means think that we are stepping away from a
partner who we are working with, who is not only protecting
their sovereignty and their region, they are carrying equities
on our behalf, on behalf of American national security.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you for your time and your service. My
time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back and I look forward to our
further discussions.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mrs. Wagner.
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here, Mr. Cooper, Secretary Cooper, and
thank you for your service to the country.
You said earlier that you want to make sure that with
actions that the Administration took like this, that you want
to make sure the transfer appears stronger. You want to make
sure that we are making sure our partnerships are vital. Well
what about the partnership with Congress that is required under
the constitution? The partnership that is there is at equal
level of government. And how can it be perceived as stronger in
a statement because of the actions that were taken by the
Administration for so-called emergency when, next week, it
appears the Senate is going to take 22 resolutions of
disapproval and vote against this and it would only take a
President's veto to overcome this? And you are here today in
front of this committee asking questions that should have been
asked and answered before this was done. How is that possibly
making our Country look stronger when this action divides our
Country, not only internally, but in the eyes of all those
allies and not internationally? How can that possibly be
stronger?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman Keating. Actually,
having this hearing is stronger. Our open society, our
discourse is a message of strength.
Mr. Keating. I am sorry. I hate to interrupt. My time is
limited here.
But it is not stronger when it happens afterwards. It is
not stronger.
Now you have been--you know you are Assistant Secretary of
Political-Military Affairs Secretary. So you do have some
knowledge of the crafting of this memorandum of justification.
Is that correct?
Mr. Cooper. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keating. Now is Jared Kushner part of that? Was he at
any meeting?
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to talk about anything pre-
decisional but what I can tell you----
Mr. Keating. Why not?
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. This is a Secretary of State
policy decision.
Mr. Keating. Excuse me. Excuse me. You want it both ways.
You are not going to talk about anything pre-decision and you
are here--you cannot talk about everything after the decision.
I mean we are here to ask questions about the pre-decision. So
how can you sit here and say you are not going to--just you are
dismissing us.
Mr. Cooper. I am not, sir.
Mr. Keating. You are just saying we are not going to talk
about it.
Mr. Cooper. If I may----
Mr. Keating. Answer this question: Was in any way,
indirectly or directly, Jared Kushner involved in any
discussions on this? Was he involved when there was the Saudi
Summit? Were there discussions about this? Was Jared Kushner,
since you are in a position to know, in any way involved in
this whatsoever?
Mr. Cooper. Congressman Keating, what I can tell you that I
do know is that Mr. Kushner does not have an interagency role
in the review of these cases. These cases were done in the
interagency process that we discussed earlier.
Mr. Keating. The cases?
Mr. Cooper. This is the 22 cases in the emergency
declaration.
Mr. Keating. What about the overall issue of providing arms
to the Saudis? Was Jared Kushner involved in that? Do not
define it so narrowly.
Mr. Cooper. I am not defining it narrowly. I am talking
about the emergency declaration that was conditions-based.
Mr. Keating. Well just please answer my question.
Mr. Cooper. So I can talk to you about the conditions.
Mr. Keating. No, no, I want you to answer my question. It
is pretty simple. You were involved in all of this. Was Jared
Kushner involved? How could you not answer that?
Mr. Cooper. Not in the emergency declaration.
Mr. Keating. No, I am not asking that--in discussions with
the Saudis about arms sales?
Mr. Cooper. There are a number----
Mr. Keating. This was a predicate to that.
Mr. Cooper. Congressman, OK, I see what you are asking.
Mr. Keating. OK.
Mr. Cooper. On bilateral communications from Ambassador,
country team, MIL to MIL relationships, there are a number of
lines of communication with our partners, including----
Mr. Keating. Please answer my question.
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. Saudi Arabia that include a host
of government----
Mr. Keating. Was he involved?
Mr. Cooper. Not in the emergency declaration.
Mr. Keating. No, answer my question.
Mr. Cooper. I am, sir.
Mr. Keating. Evidently, you are not answering the question.
Mr. Cooper. So, Congressman----
Mr. Keating. How is that a tough question?
Mr. Cooper. It is not. Congressman, it is not if I can
answer it.
Mr. Keating. This is a man that is in charge of the Middle
East process. He has got a direct line to the Saudi leadership,
is well-established. He has discussions all the time with the
Saudi rules, himself sometimes in private. So tell me----
Mr. Cooper. Congressman Keating----
Mr. Keating [continuing]. Why cannot you answer that
question?
Mr. Cooper. I am. Congressman Keating----
Mr. Keating. No you are not.
Mr. Cooper. Congressman Keating, there are multiple lines
of communication with our partners in Riyadh, including here in
Washington, as well as our embassy with Ambassador Abizaid.
Mr. Keating. I did not ask you about the multiple lines. Is
Jared Kushner----
Mr. Cooper. He would be one of the lines of communication
as a government official.
Mr. Keating. He was involved. Is that a yes?
Mr. Cooper. No, sir, that is not what I am tracking.
Mr. Keating. I have got 16 seconds. I can see you are not
going to answer my question.
Mr. Cooper. So we are talking about an emergency
declaration that was a policy decision by the Secretary of
State that was based on conditions----
Mr. Keating. I am sorry, my time is up. I am going to have
to yield back. I did not get an answer.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Curtis.
Mr. Curtis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
personally express my appreciation to you and the ranking
member for holding this hearing.
I also would like to express, like many of my colleagues,
frustration that we find ourselves here. I, too often, as a
Member of Congress, am reminded of what it was like to raise
six children and hear their squabbles and their differences.
And not too different than that, I find plenty of blame to go
around on all sides.
As a Member of Congress, I think we are frustrated more
than we would like with powers that we believe belong to us not
being exercised. If I were to put myself in the shoes of the
Presidents, I would be very frustrated if my lot was dependent
on a dysfunctional Congress who, time after time, could not act
together and resolve these problems, as is our responsibility.
I would like to associate myself with the comments of both
the chairman and the ranking member, and move just slightly
onto a slightly different view of this issue, and talk about
what concerns me even more, and that is the situation on the
ground for the civilians in Yemen.
And I would like to know, in your opinion, what the U.S.
Government is currently doing with Saudi Arabia and UAE to
minimize civilian casualties in Yemen, and ensure adherence to
the Geneva Convention, and deal with the humanitarian crisis on
the ground. In my mind, there is one justification for the
United States to be involved in this and that is that we can
make it better for Yemen than if we were not involved. I would
like to hear your comments on that.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman Curtis.
Yes, I will start with no question about the conditions,
the deplorable humanitarian conditions, the heartbreaking
conditions in Yemen. As stated earlier, we are fully supportive
of the United Nations led political process to get resolution,
to seek resolution in Yemen.
As to enabling our partners to be better at mitigating not
only civilian casualties but mitigating any kind of contact
with civilian infrastructure, that comes with training. That is
in place. That is in process. There are evidence in elements of
improvement that has been reported from the field on that.
However, decoupling ourselves from our partners puts at risk a
greater risk of further civilian casualties.
So it is not to say that it is going away immediately but
the work is there. The commitment is there. Our being tied to
our partner, our being committed to our partner helps ensure
mitigation of civilian casualty, as well as destruction of
civilian property.
Mr. Curtis. Thank you. I would like to join with my
colleagues on two points. One is to thank you for your service.
And the other, Mr. Chairman, is to ask for further classified
briefing so that we can better understand the conditions here
and the type of classified briefing that would allow us to go
into much greater detail than we frequently get.
Thank you and I yield my time.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Curtis. We will talk about
another classified briefing. Thank you.
Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling this hearing on what is an egregious and legally
questionable move by the Administration to transfer weapons to
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Let me be clear. I believe this committee, on a bipartisan
basis, is absolutely committed to supporting America's allies.
We are committed to defending America from emerging threats and
we are committed to our security. But we are also committed to
upholding the rule of law, the Constitution, and the respect
for human rights.
The administration is trying to abuse the law in order to
sell weapons to supposed allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
These are countries that are already using American-made
weapons in a campaign in Yemen that has resulted in innocent
civilians being targeted and killed. The justification for this
appalling action by the Administration is a bogus emergency.
The Administration claims that Iran poses such an imminent
threat to our allies that emergency assistance is needed for
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to defend themselves.
This is an administration that has cozied up to Riyadh,
sweeping aside gross human rights violations, turning a blind
eye to the Saudis taking a buzz saw to Washington Post
journalists, and supporting an intervention in Yemen that is
causing famine, destruction, and amounting loss of life.
Just because you do not like the process does not mean you
get to ignore it. In your opening statement, you noted the
importance of them being able to send a political signal with
these arms sales. It does send a signal and a message. It is a
message that we abandon our principles if you write a big
enough check. Congress does not agree and the Constitution does
not permit it.
So I am going to begin. We understand--Mr. Cooper, I want
to followup on Mr. Keating's question with respect to the role
of Jared Kushner in this process. Was Mr. Kushner in any
meetings that you attended on this topic of arms sales broadly
to Saudi Arabia. That is a yes or a no.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Cicilline, I will not talk about pre-
decisional in this fora--in this fora. But I will tell that
from an interagency standpoint on assessment, that is not in
his wheelhouse.
Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Secretary, I have limited time.
Mr. Chairman, I will ask that you direct the witness to
answer my question.
Chairman Engel. I will direct the witness to answer the
question. It is a pretty simple question.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
No. The answer is no.
Mr. Cicilline. OK. We understand Mr. Kushner was involved
in the Saudi Summit, where these were promised. Did he try to
push to deliver on these promises? That is a yes or a no.
Mr. Cooper. No.
Mr. Cicilline. Is your testimony that documents will show
that Mr. Kushner has no involvement in this whatsoever?
Mr. Cooper. As I said, Mr. Cicilline, there are a number of
bilateral lines of communication----
Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect----
Mr. Cooper. But----
Mr. Cicilline [continuing]. I am going to repeat the
question.
Mr. Cicilline. Is it your testimony that documents will
show that Mr. Kushner had no involvement in this discussion
relating to arms sales to Saudi Arabia? That is a yes or a no.
Mr. Cooper. If it is that broad, I cannot attest to that.
But what I can attest to is that on any--any of our partners,
we have a long deep list of USG officials, be it executive
branch or otherwise, including Congress----
Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Secretary, I understand the process. I
am asking you to answer a specific question and you literally
are not going to.
Mr. Cooper. I am.
Mr. Cicilline. Does the Administration, Mr. Secretary,
believe Iran is likely to attack Saudi Arabia or the UAE? That
is a yes or a no.
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to go into detail on threat
posture here but there are threats that are ongoing, that are
evolving against our partners, as well as us. We are not going
to discuss--I am not going to spill classified in an open
hearing.
Mr. Cicilline. OK. The vast majority of the arms the
Administration wants to sell with respect to this transaction
are offensive weapons, correct?
Mr. Cooper. It is not limited to that. There is
sustainment.
Mr. Cicilline. I did not say limited. The vast majority are
offensive weapons.
Mr. Cooper. There are offensive weapons, there are
sustainment packages, there are training packages----
Mr. Cicilline. But the vast majority are offensive. Is that
not correct, sir?
Mr. Cooper. A number of them are offensive.
Mr. Cicilline. And the Saudi-led Coalition has used
American-made offensive weapons to strike civilian targets in
Yemen. Is that not correct?
Mr. Cooper. Regrettably, there have been civilian targets
that have been hit in the coalition operations.
Mr. Cicilline. And the emergency request includes equipment
that will not be ready, in some cases for months, in some cases
for years. Is that not correct?
Mr. Cooper. That is part of the emergency, Congressman, is
that there has been a protraction of the process. So what we
can get delivered immediately, we can but because of the
extended review process, yes, there is an emergency because
there has been an extension on that latency of the logistics
tail. So there is some----
Mr. Cicilline. It is hard to understand how an emergency
response could take years but----
Mr. Cooper. Those conditions help create the emergency.
Mr. Cicilline [continuing]. I accept your representation.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, you stated in your testimony, and I
am going to quote you, that, and I quote, we review the
Secretary's action, in this case, to bypass Congress as an
affirmation of the value that we continue to place on our
engagement with you on arms transfers and broader security
issues, end quote.
Well I have to say, it is a little hard to believe that we
are supposed to take your complete disregard for the
congressional review process as an indication that you value
congressional engagement. This is gaslighting. You are claiming
your ignoring this provision is your way of affirming the role
Congress plays. That is an absurdity. Can you explain that?
Mr. Cooper. Our communication and our engagement with
Congress never abated. There was never a cessation of it at
all. So we do value that communication. This emergency was a
one-time declaration authorized through statute provided by
Congress 40 years ago.
Mr. Cicilline. And finally, then, Mr. Secretary, final
question. Are there any other emergencies on the horizon that
will so enhance your appreciation of the consultative process
that you plan to completely bypass Congress?
Mr. Cooper. I cannot--I do not have a crystal ball or a
Magic 8 Ball like some people use as a paperweight on their
desk, but I will tell you that we are constantly monitoring
threat streams with our colleagues in the intelligence
community. I am not going to also opine about particular
threats that may or may not be developing, especially in an
open fora. Why tip our hats to our adversaries?
So I cannot say that there are not future emergencies that
may befall U.S. interests or our national security. That
risks----
Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Secretary, the point of the question was
the lack of consultation.
And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Mast.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
I would just say I do not like to waste my time and I do
not like to ask questions twice, as I do not believe any of my
colleagues do. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, I do not know the
appropriate procedural request but is there a request that we
can make to move into a closed door portion of this hearing,
remove individuals of staff that do not have classified
clearances or security clearances, and attempt to get the
answers that we seek? Is there a procedural motion that I can
make to move into that process?
Chairman Engel. Yes, Mr. Mast, this is an open hearing but
we will schedule those sessions at an appropriate time,
classified session.
Mr. Mast. So there is no option right now to ask to move
into a portion of this hearing be closed door?
Chairman Engel. No, but we will, in the short-term, have
another briefing.
Mr. Mast. I thank you for committing to having another
briefing in a classified session in that, as I said, I do not
like to waste my time and I do not like to ask questions twice.
Chairman Engel. I think, if I can just interrupt you for a
minute, I think Mr. Secretary Cooper has to leave by about
12:30 was it? So we would not be able to do that now but we
will. I promise you, in the future, we will do it.
Mr. Mast. That being the answer, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Mast.
Mr. Bera.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper, you are the Assistant Secretary for Political
and Military Affairs, correct?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Bera. And PM has responsibility for ensuring the
proposed weapon sales comply with the Arms Export Control Act,
right?
Mr. Cooper. That is correct.
Mr. Bera. That is the AECA.
Mr. Cooper. Correct.
Mr. Bera. So you would have been aware of both the proposed
sales and the legal rationale under the AECA.
Mr. Cooper. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Bera. And that is why it was you who briefed
congressional staff on the emergency declaration on May 24th?
Mr. Cooper. That is correct. The declaration was issued on
the 23d.
Mr. Bera. Yes, right.
Mr. Cooper. We did a formal notification and the same day
did a briefing.
Mr. Bera. Right, thank you. And in fact, that is why you
are here today.
So PM would have been involved in crafting the memorandum
justification for the Secretary to explain the exercises of
emergency powers under the AECA, right?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, in a broad sense, but we cannot go into
details of that crafting.
Mr. Bera. OK but----
Mr. Cooper. But it was the Secretary's decision based on
our----
Mr. Bera. But PM would be involved in crafting the
justification.
Mr. Cooper. Correct.
Mr. Bera. Great. And that information would be reflected on
the clearance page of that document, correct?
Mr. Cooper. Say that one more time.
Mr. Bera. The information of who drafted the justification
memo would be reflected on the clearance page of that document,
showing both who drafted it and who cleared it.
Mr. Cooper. In a very broad, general sense, that is--you
have identified the process.
Mr. Bera. We will expect to get that information to us
within the next 48 hours. And we will make sure H and your
staff have that request, in terms of who drafted and cleared
that document.
Which bureau had the pen on drafting the justification
memo?
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to go into internal processes.
What I can share in an open fora is that all these cases
leading up to the declaration fulfilled interagencies----
Mr. Bera. Just I am asking which bureau had the pen
drafting the justification memo. That is not classified.
Mr. Cooper. There was an interagency process for all these
cases that contributed to the declaration but----
Mr. Bera. That information would be reflected on the
clearance page of that document, showing both, again, who
drafted it and who cleared it. And again, we will expect to get
that information to us within the next 48 hours and we will
make sure H and your staff get that request in writing today.
Was Marik String involved?
Mr. Cooper. Are you referring to our legal advisor?
Mr. Bera. Well, at the time of the drafting, was Marik
String--at that time he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State.
Mr. Cooper. Again, Congressman, I am not going to talk
about individuals in the Department in the interagency----
Mr. Bera. But he worked for you at that time.
Mr. Cooper. There are--well, there are----
Mr. Bera. On May 23d.
Mr. Cooper. There are hundreds of people in our bureau
but----
Mr. Bera. But on May 23d, he worked for you. Was he a
lawyer in your Department during that time?
Mr. Cooper. He is a lawyer in our Department.
Mr. Bera. Was he a lawyer at that time? My understanding is
that was not his position. What position does Mr. String hold
now?
Mr. Cooper. Mr. String is our legal advisor.
Mr. Bera. Right. So he is legal advisor to the Department
of State. He is the top lawyer at the State Department and he
is in an acting capacity. When was that transition announced?
Mr. Cooper. I do not remember but I could tell you that he
is not the only lawyer in the Department. He is----
Mr. Bera. He is the top lawyer in the Department.
Mr. Cooper. That is correct. That is correct but he is one
person.
Mr. Bera. That transition, my understanding, was announced
May 24th per an email from the L front office around 3:30 p.m.
So on the very day that this emergency declaration was sent
to the Hill, according to public records, you know this is when
he got this promotion to be the top lawyer.
According to public records, Mr. String was first admitted
to the bar in 2013. And of course, when he was at PM, he was
not there acting as a lawyer. So he has only practiced law for
4 years or so. And as far as we can tell, none of that was in
international law, which is central to what the legal advisor
does.
Do you know of otherwise?
Mr. Cooper. I go back to that the L Bureau is a pretty
robust bureau with----
Mr. Bera. But he is the top lawyer at the State Department.
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. There are lawyers, paralegals,
just like we say, analysts.
Mr. Bera. He is the top lawyer at the State Department.
Mr. Cooper. That is correct.
Mr. Bera. The website for the Office of Legal Advisors says
they typically hire about 15 people for every 1,000 applicants,
which is something just over 1 percent for an entry level
position, not for the top lawyer.
Was Mr. String promoted to this position because of his
work on the Gulf arms sales?
Mr. Cooper. No.
Mr. Bera. Did his promotion have any connection to work on
these Gulf arms sales?
Mr. Cooper. Not that I am aware of. I would say his
promotion to that position was based on his merit, his
performance, and his ability to do the job.
Mr. Bera. Who would know the justification of that
promotion and who can we get that information to us?
Mr. Cooper. I honestly do not know.
Mr. Bera. OK. Well, we will expect to get that information
to us within 48 hours as well. And we will make sure H and your
staff has that request in writing.
So you had no awareness that Mr. String was going to be
promoted.
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to talk about personnel issues
here but I could tell you that it is not uncommon for personnel
to do transfers within department like any other interagency
move.
Mr. Bera. Your testimony is that there is no documents that
would show that you were aware of Mr. String's promotion?
Mr. Cooper. Of course I was aware of his promotion.
Mr. Bera. OK, great. We would like to see any documents
that suggest your awareness of that promotion.
Chairman Engel. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Burchett.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I appreciate your
leadership in shepherding us through this minefield. And thank
you, sir, for being here.
I am concerned with the Saudi Coalition's disregard for our
end use requirements. More specifically, the February reports
that the coalition had gifted armored personnel carriers to
various third-party militia groups on the ground in Yemen,
including al-Qaida-linked groups.
Additionally, I was incredibly disturbed at the Houthis and
the Iranians have gotten their hands on American-made MRAPs and
are probably busy reverse-engineering them.
What steps are being taken to ensure that none of these
weapons end up in our third-party--in third-party hands or even
the hands of our enemies, which generally third-parties turn
out to be?
Mr. Cooper. Congressman, thank you.
What I can share in this open fora is that with security
partnerships, not only--provision of arms munition does not
preclude us on accountability and on followup. So in that
particular case, on the MRAPs, one of the first things I did in
arriving at the Department was to contact bilaterally our
partners, the Emiratis. I do not want to go into detail here
but I can tell you that there are some requirements that they
need to be responsive to on that. And it is not limited to this
partner. This would be every partner where we do lay out some
conditions that need to be met.
So it is not the first time in the history of the
Department where we have approached a partner for not only
accountability but also some reconciling points on particular
third-party transfers.
Mr. Burchett. Yes, sir, I would like to have one of those
closed door meetings, although I do not know really what good
they do. I left one once early on and I asked my colleague
beside me, I said I am going to miss about 30 minutes of it, I
guess I can probably catch it on CNN or FOX pretty quickly
after I leave here.
Mr. Cooper. I hope not.
Mr. Burchett. Yes, well, I am afraid this--anyway.
Are you concerned that this created a precedent where non-
Gulf partners may try to use near-peer competition as leverage
to extract demands from the United States?
Mr. Cooper. No, sir, and the reason why is because what was
the prime predicate to this emergency was the threat streams
from Iran.
So again, I want to share that while there were multiple
audiences, and there certainly were several conditions
contributing to the emergency determination by the Secretary,
the primary one was the threat streams from Iran.
Mr. Burchett. OK, thank you very much and thank you for
being here.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me always to speak.
And I will yield back the remainder of my time.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Burchett.
Mr. Espaillat.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are here today, Mr. Chairman, obviously because
President Trump has declared an emergency, has authorized the
U.S. sale of arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE while
circumventing Congress. The problem, Mr. Chairman, is that this
Administration has been discredited with regards to fabricating
emergencies when there are not and ignoring emergency when in
fact there are emergency.
Mr. Chairman, I submit to you that this practice by the
Administration is very troubling. And as I said, it has a
dismal record of fabricating emergencies where there are none
and ignoring emergencies when, in fact, there are.
Now let's go to the tape on this one. So there was hundreds
and thousands of women, primarily, showing up on our border
with little children. Many had characterized that as a
humanitarian crisis. So what does this Administration do? It
ignores it and tries to build a wall.
So there is a Muslim ban put into practice. I, myself, went
to JFK Airport when it did try to stop folks of Muslim faith.
The two families that I assisted were both families of members
of the Armed Forces of Muslim faith, whose mother and wife were
coming into the country and they were detained with the
potential of being sent back. So much for a fabricated crisis.
The scientific community says that there is a problem with
global warming, that there is an emergency. And yet, this
Administration chooses to walk away from the Paris Accord.
And then let's go to now Saudi Arabia, MBS, Khashoggi. We
all know the Khashoggi entered the Saudi Embassy in Istanbul on
October 2, 2018 at about 1 p.m. and that in fact he was chopped
up into little pieces with a buzz saw.
Mr. Secretary, do you feel that Khashoggi is a law-abiding
democratic leader? I am sorry, MBS--do you feel that MBS is a
law-abiding democratic leader?
Mr. Cooper. To your question on our partners in Riyadh,
their system of government is different. They are a partner of
ours. They are an important regional security partner.
As you mention Khashoggi, however, it does not preclude us
holding those who committed that murder accountable. That is
something that the Government is committed to and----
Mr. Espaillat. Is there a problem----
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. I think both Congress and----
Mr. Espaillat. Is there a problem in Saudi Arabia of
women's rights?
Mr. Cooper. It is fair to say that we, as a Government,
continue to lean on and continue to encourage our partners to
validate rule of law, recognize the rights, the human rights of
individuals----
Mr. Espaillat. Is there a problem in Saudi Arabia with
dissidents being tracked down and disappearing or, perhaps,
being tortured and jailed?
Mr. Cooper. Congressman, our security relationship does not
preclude our work, our constant and necessary work to get a
partner like Saudi Arabia to do better when it comes to human
rights in open society----
Mr. Espaillat. So we are dealing with a thug, here. We are
dealing a thug here that we are giving arms to.
Do we, as a common practice, sell arms to the Kim regime in
North Korea?
Mr. Cooper. Different--different----
Mr. Espaillat. Do we sell arms to Putin in Russia?
Mr. Cooper. That adversary is not the same.
Mr. Espaillat. So we do not sell----
Mr. Cooper. They are not a security partner of ours.
Mr. Espaillat. So we do not sell arms to Putin. We do not
sell arms to Kim because they are thugs.
Mr. Cooper. Well, we do not sell arms to adversaries----
Mr. Espaillat. And yet, we are selling arms to MBS?
Mr. Cooper. We do not sell arms to those who are an
existential threat to the United States and U.S. interest.
Moscow is a threat. We are addressing a threat in
Pyongyang. Riyadh is a security partner of ours. We are working
with a security partner. One that does not preclude us from
addressing those issues that you enumerated----
Mr. Espaillat. I think----
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. But they are still a security
partner.
Mr. Espaillat. Mr. Secretary, I think that having an
American citizen go into an Saudi embassy in Istanbul and
disappearing is troubling and that MBS has a troubled record
with regards to women's right, dissidents in that nation, and
that we are dealing with a thug. We are arming a street thug
and that we should be ashamed of that. And that this
Administration, once again, has fabricated a crisis and has
circumvented Congress.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Espaillat.
Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Secretary Cooper
for being here.
Both the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times have
written articles about Charles Faulkner. He was a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs. Prior to
that position, he lobbied for a defense contractor that made
precision-guided munitions, which form a large part of these
weapon sales.
Did you know Mr. Faulkner?
Mr. Cooper. I did not get a chance to meet him. He had
departed the Department before I arrived.
Mr. Lieu. Was he involved in these weapon sales that we are
talking about?
Mr. Cooper. Not that I am aware of but I never had a chance
to meet Mr. Faulkner.
Mr. Lieu. Was he forced to resign?
Mr. Cooper. I am not aware and I cannot also talk about
personnel actions.
Mr. Lieu. Did you read The New York Times and Wall Street
Journal articles about Charles Faulkner?
Mr. Cooper. I saw one of the articles, I believe.
Mr. Lieu. But is the article accurate?
Mr. Cooper. I do not know. I do not know. I do not think
so. I do not know Mr. Faulkner but, again, he had a particular
function in the H Bureau but I am not aware of him having a
role.
Mr. Lieu. So you are not aware if he was involved in these?
Mr. Cooper. No, sir, I am not.
Mr. Lieu. Could he have had a role in these 22 cases?
Mr. Cooper. Well if one looks at processing with H, so we
were talking earlier today about the consultative process on
informal review, tier review----
Mr. Lieu. He could have had a role in that process.
Mr. Cooper. He would have on the--absolutely. So the
notification process, from an historic nature, based on how old
some of these cases were----
Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. Based on his time, he would have,
especially the ones that were 18 months, nearly 2 years old, he
would have been aware of communicating that to Congress on the
informal notification.
Mr. Lieu. So part of the weapons would be precision-guided
munitions. Behind me is a strike at a civilian funeral in Yemen
in 2016. And what happened is Saudi jets came by, dropped very
precise precision-guided munitions, killed and injured hundreds
of civilians. Then those jets came around again and struck the
same place.
As a result, the State Department and other agencies went
into a huge agency review process and they realized that
precision-guided munitions were making things worse in Yemen
because the Saudis were actually intending to hit the targets
that they struck. We saw that last year, when the Saudis very
precisely struck a school bus, killing over 40 children.
There was a legal memo written the State Department about
possible war crimes that the U.S. may be involved in because we
were giving weapons to an organization that we knew, a
coalition that was committing war crimes. Have you seen that
memo?
Mr. Cooper. I am not aware of that memo, Congressman.
Mr. Lieu. In your job, do you have to make sure that weapon
sales comply with the Law of Armed Conflict?
Mr. Cooper. We do.
Mr. Lieu. Were you given any advice from State Department
lawyers or other lawyers about whether these sales complied
with the Law of Armed Conflict?
Mr. Cooper. We do. That is part of the process on the front
end. So if we talk about the left side of this, and we are
talking about the early stages, we--that part of that review
takes place.
Mr. Lieu. Is this written or oral guidance you were given?
Mr. Cooper. Both, in some cases.
Mr. Lieu. All right. Could we see the written guidance you
were given as to how these weapon sales comply with the Law of
Armed Conflict?
Mr. Cooper. As far as legal analysis or intelligence
analysis, I do not think that is in my purview but I note that.
I could tell you that from when we are looking at any case,
it is not just a matter of regional political policy dynamics.
It does include the legal review that you mentioned. It also
includes----
Mr. Lieu. You were given written guidance on the Law of
Armed Conflict about these weapon sales.
Mr. Cooper. There is always an ongoing process on any case.
Mr. Lieu. I get it. Were you given any written guidance on
the Law of Armed Conflict?
Mr. Cooper. There is going--there would be at some times in
these cases----
Mr. Lieu. Either in an open or a classified setting, can we
get that written guidance?
Mr. Cooper. I cannot commit to release of internal
deliberations. Again, that is not just legal. That is also
intelligence, human rights, foreign policy, a number of
considerations that go through not only the Department but
external to the Department.
Mr. Lieu. So you know that under Law of Conflict in
international law, personnel can be liable for war crimes if
they give weapons to people they know are going to commit war
crimes. So in the case of Charles Taylor, he was prosecuted for
war crimes. The U.S. Government actually cited that case in a
supplemental governmental filing.
So let me ask you this: Do you agree with that principle
that if we sold a whole bunch of weapons to a coalition that we
knew was going to commit war crimes that we could also be
liable for war crimes, personnel?
Mr. Cooper. Our security partner, our partner in the Gulf--
our partners in the Gulf, we are working with them to mitigate
civilian casualties.
So as you noted, precision--it is not just precision. I
would agree with you on that. It is about process. It is about
getting it right, getting it good on mitigating.
So it is not just a matter of precision weapons because
that is not enough. It is a matter of targeting integrity. It
is also getting a partner up to a standard that we would not
only find acceptable in the U.S. but as well as in other fora.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. And the Republicans in our U.S. Senate
is about to pass 22 resolutions blocking these arms sales on a
bipartisan basis because those standards have not been met.
I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Lieu.
Ms. Wild.
Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Greetings, Secretary Cooper. The administration informed
Congress just last week that included in the Administration's
emergency authorization for arms is a provision that allows
Raytheon Company, a top American defense firm, as you are
aware, to team with the Saudis to build high-tech bomb parts in
Saudi Arabia.
Previously, the U.S. has guarded such technology and we
have seen what has happened in China as American companies were
forced to produce key technological parts of wind turbines in
Chinese plants. In January 2018, a wind turbine company based
in Beijing called Sinovel was found guilty of stealing trade
secrets. Specifically, the obtained software developed by the
U.S. company, AMSC, to manage the flow of electricity from wind
turbines into the electrical grid.
So my question to you is: Can you assess the risk of Saudi
Arabia potentially stealing highly sensitive defense
information that will be used to build these weapons?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you Congresswoman Wild. And you are
correct to observe that when we are working with any partner,
be it Saudi Arabia or anybody, that as far as protection of not
only trade information but unique technology do need to be
protected. It is part of our risk assessment in any transfer of
arms, as well as any transfer of tech. This is not just Saudi
Arabia. This is all partners.
To your particular question, those are not unique
technologies that have not already been introduced into the
ecosystem, so to speak, with Saudi Arabia. And another point
that was part of the analysis was also how that would impact or
not impact our defense industrial base back here at home.
So when we are looking at it from a global supply chain
aspect, not new to the region, not new to the partner certainly
does not preclude protections or Governors and assessed not an
impact on our industrial base as well.
Ms. Wild. OK, let me stop you there.
So is it your testimony that the technology that will be
shared is out there in the chain of knowledge and information
in this industry?
Mr. Cooper. Specific to Saudi Arabia, it is not a new
application but it is not in the open fora, if that is what you
are asking.
Ms. Wild. So you are saying it is technology that Saudi
Arabia already has that we are sharing with them.
Mr. Cooper. That they have not already been exposed to is
probably a better way to put it.
Ms. Wild. Exposed to in what way?
Mr. Cooper. Through our MIL to MIL, our security
cooperation status.
Ms. Wild. So is it your testimony there is no new
technology that is being shared with the Saudis?
Mr. Cooper. There is technology associated with this
manufacturing that is not new.
Ms. Wild. I do not think that is an answer to my question.
Mr. Cooper. OK. All right.
Ms. Wild. My question to you is, very specifically: Is
there any new technology being shared with the Saudis as part
of this emergency authorization for arms?
Mr. Cooper. In this declaration, I am not aware of there
being new technology, not only not new to the partner but also
not new as far as what has been presented to Congress.
Ms. Wild. I am not sure that is an answer but let me just
move on.
The arms sale notification States that the Saudis and
Emiratis will co-produce some of the weapons in the arms sale
package, meaning they will co-produce with the United States.
That means that this weapons deal will ship American jobs,
manufacturing, and technology overseas. At least three of the
22 arms sale licenses would allow a U.S. defense company to
shift production of military items to Saudi Arabia and the
Emiratis, which will hurt American workers and could cost
Americans jobs.
First question: Why is the co-production needed and
included in this deal?
Mr. Cooper. The co-production is part of our reassurance of
our allies. To your point about the industrial base, we want to
make sure that these particular partners not only had that
reassurance but to send a message that we do trust them as a
partner.
The assessment aspect of it----
Ms. Wild. Wait a second. Wait, wait, wait. We are selling
them arms, right?
Mr. Cooper. Right. So this----
Ms. Wild. Why do they need assurance that they can trust
us?
Mr. Cooper. This is interoperability. This is also
integration. This is a global supply chain. And these are parts
that are American-produced. So when we talked about the
assessment question on our impact or not impact on our
industrial base, that did factor.
This is inclusive of American made components----
Ms. Wild. I understand that.
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. That would be manufactured----
Ms. Wild. I understand it is a co-production process but it
seems to me that what we have got is a situation where we are--
this arms sale deal and emergency authority is basically
shipping American jobs and manufacturing abroad, right?
Mr. Cooper. It is actually a creation of jobs. It is a
proliferation of jobs. So you could call it a positive
proliferation but it is inclusive of jobs for manufacturing
components here that are integrated with those components and
manufacturing abroad.
This was something that was part of the assessment and did
not see an incursion upon, essentially, our bottom line.
Ms. Wild. And that is the end of justification.
Thank you, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thanks for coming. I know people talked
about having a further classified briefing. I would welcome
that. However, as a couple of my colleagues have discussed,
Secretary Pompeo briefed Members of Congress in a classified
setting on May 20th and 21st, yet there was no mention made of
a need for the emergency that was announced 3 days later. I
know because I was there.
Had there been discussions about an emergency declaration
before he briefed us? Had you been involved in any discussions
about the need for an emergency declaration before he briefed
us?
Mr. Cooper. I could tell you that there is ongoing----
Mr. Levin. Was there before--sir, we do not have a lot of
time. Yes or no?
Mr. Cooper. So, OK. Congressman Levin, certainly looking at
what we call tools, the emergency declaration was certainly in
the toolkit, no different than us being----
Mr. Levin. But why did not the Secretary say a dang thing
about it when he came and briefed us in a classified setting--
--
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to----
Mr. Levin [continuing]. Three days before you announced it?
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to take a guess or gander but I
could provide here right now is that you had an emerging,
changing posture on the----
Mr. Levin. So within 3 days, an emergency was created that
required that declaration.
Mr. Cooper. Congressman, yes. Yes.
Mr. Levin. So your testimony here is that in those two or
three intervening days, an emergency arose that required a
declaration.
Mr. Cooper. I would--yes. And I would parallel this to also
imposition of sanctions. I mean we have a number of tools in
our diplomatic----
Mr. Levin. Sir, with all due respect, I just do not think
that is credible.
Let me move on. You said here, and I am quoting you as best
I can, earlier, holding a partner accountable does not prevent
us from working with that partner, quote, unquote. And you
referenced human rights, civil society.
In what ways is the United States holding Saudi Arabia
accountable for the gruesome murder of the Washington Post
journalist, Mr. Khashoggi? How are we holding them accountable?
Mr. Cooper. There has been a line of communication, not
only by the Secretary but others, with Riyadh on----
Mr. Levin. So we are chit-chatting about it in private.
Mr. Cooper. And there is no question, I do not think there
is any question or daylight on the concurrence that his murder
was prosecuted in a fashion that needs to be addressed, and
needs to be made accountable, and those involved need to be
brought to justice.
As to that----
Mr. Levin. Was the Crown Prince involved, sir?
Mr. Cooper. I do not know.
Mr. Levin. The CIA has concluded that he was.
Has the President of the United States and the Secretary
admitted the findings of our intelligence agencies that the
Crown Prince ordered the murder of Mr. Khashoggi?
Mr. Cooper. As a 20-year member of the intelligence
community, I am not going to talk classified information in
here.
I will say, though, that there is no disagreement on
anybody in the Administration or on Capitol Hill that Mr.
Khashoggi's murder needs to be addressed----
Mr. Levin. OK, so----
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. And those who prosecuted the
murder need to be brought to justice.
Mr. Levin. OK, let me move on. I have limited time. I
appreciate your answer.
In what way are we holding Saudi Arabia accountable for the
war crimes it has committed by murdering civilians on multiple,
multiple occasions in Yemen and for causing a famine in Yemen
through the prosecution of this war that we have been actively
involved in? In what way are we holding them accountable,
besides vetoing congressional resolutions about it?
Mr. Cooper. We are also combating the Houthi threat,
which----
Mr. Levin. I am not asking about the Houthi threat.
Mr. Cooper. Well, the Houthi treat contributed to the
famine.
Mr. Levin. Sir, the Houthi threat does not necessitate war
crimes.
Mr. Cooper. Houthi's mining grain mines and denying access
to food----
Mr. Levin. You just want to change the subject.
Mr. Cooper. OK.
Mr. Levin. We can have another hearing about Houthi war
crimes. I am talking about--you are selling arms to Saudi
Arabia and you are making a simplistic black and white thing;
this is the good guys, this is the bad guys.
Mr. Cooper. It is not binary. It is not simplistic,
Congressman Levin. I think no one here would ever say that
this----
Mr. Levin. So in what way are we holding Saudi Arabia
accountable for the horrific crimes it is committing in Yemen?
Mr. Cooper. Our partnership with this security partner----
Mr. Levin. Namely, Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Cooper. Correct, they are----
Mr. Levin. You can name them.
Mr. Cooper. They are not the only one but that particular
partner in the region, our partnership with Riyadh does--it is
incumbent upon us to provide not only the munitions but also
the training and the sustainment that goes with it. That is in
inclusive of our relationship to get them to be a better
partner.
Mr. Levin. Sir, my time has expired. In the end, we all
have to answer for our actions in the same way and I just pray
that we take more seriously the horrific reality on the ground
in Yemen and change course immediately.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Engel. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
I am going to call on Ms. Spanberger to ask a question, and
Mr. Malinowski to take the chair, and then ask his question
after Ms. Spanberger.
Ms. Spanberger.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. As followup
to my colleague Mr. Levin's comment, I want to give you the
opportunity to perhaps correct what it is you said. The
statement related to Jamal Khashoggi's murder, a Virginia
resident. You said his murder was prosecuted in a fashion that
needs to be addressed.
It is my hope that the Department does not think that any
State-sponsored murder that happens in a consulate is ever one
that is perhaps just discussed related to how it was actually
prosecuted. I hope that you will denounce that murder. Would
you like to take the opportunity to do that now?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. We have denounced the murder and, of
course, we would never abide by State-sponsored acts like that.
So no, we--there is no daylight on that one.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you. Mr. Cooper, in your testimony,
you have repeatedly referred to the need to provide our
partners in the region with defensive capabilities. In fact you
say, specifically, this is not intended to be an escalatory
military step and yet, many of the 22 cases are distinctly
offensive weapons, including the Paveway precision-guided
munitions or smart bombs. We have a picture of that weapon
system right here.
Can you explain to me the disconnect to why we are
providing offensive and extremely lethal weapons for apparently
defensive purposes?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. So as far as weapons capability, we
want to make sure that not only these partners in the region,
if they are actually carrying equities for us, that it is not a
matter of just their own sovereignty but ensuring that they are
providing protection for our equities. So it is not just a
matter of saying we want to make sure your sovereignty is
protected, they are carrying a weight for us.
As far as the precision aspect, as discussed earlier, it is
contributing to what would be considered the improvement or
targeting integrity in any realm to ensure that the target is
actually the one that is supposed to be hit is hit versus a
scattagorical or a less precise target.
Ms. Spanberger. OK, so let's talk about that targeting
integrity with the next image we have here.
This is actually a school bus that was hit by one of these
Paveways. More than 40 children died when this precision-guided
weapon hit a school bus. More than 50 people killed, more than
40 of them school children.
So when are talking about the offensive weapons that we
deem--that the Department now deems is in an emergency exigent
circumstance, one that the Department chooses to circumvent the
congressional power, Article I of the Constitution, which gives
us the authority to approve weapon sales of these types of
weapons to entities that will commit mass atrocities like this,
I just want to make sure we are clear on the level of lethality
that we are discussing.
And that brings me to a point. You have referred multiple
times to a protracted process. And I would remind you, sir,
that the protracted process you are bemoaning is, in fact, the
constitutional process that we, as Members of Congress, have a
responsibility to exercise when we are selling our weapon
systems that are this lethal to countries abroad, be they
allies or otherwise.
And you have specifically said this is a one-time event, a
one-time event. But I would note that there is nothing
specified in this statute that says the Department can have
this one-time circumvent effort around constitutional
authority.
Are you committing to this being a one-time event?
Mr. Cooper. One-time event is conditions-based. But I will
tell you if you look at the history and the precedent, this is
only the fifth time in 40 years that this has been applied. The
first time was in 1979 during the Carter Administration. This
is only the fifth time.
So it is, you are right, it is highly unusual. The
circumstances are unusual but it is a part of that toolkit for
diplomatic deterrence.
Ms. Spanberger. So I would also note, having spent time in
national security myself, these are not toolkits for diplomatic
returns. These are toolkits for more aggressive offensive
natures.
And speaking of offensive, the U.S. is supporting the Saudi
offensive efforts against the Houthis but where does that lead
us? We have talked a lot about Iran. We have talked a lot about
the escalation with Iran. We are now supplying these weapons to
Saudi Arabia and another--a number of other partners in the
Gulf, including fighter jets, precision-guided munitions, anti-
tank missiles.
What it is we are preparing for, sir? I did attend that
classified briefing as well. There was no clear discussion that
some major incident was imminent and, therefore, the need to
circumvent Congress. What is it that we are preparing for that
we are arming our allies in the region with this many offensive
weapons?
Mr. Cooper. On readiness and capability. We can talk
further in a closed brief.
I would also say there are some threat streams that are not
just directly tied to U.S. interest. I was able to talk about
one here today because it was open source. So the attack on the
civilians at the International Airport in Saudi Arabia----
Ms. Spanberger. That happened today, more than weeks after
this emergency declaration was put in place.
Mr. Cooper. Right but I am using that as an example in an
open fora. That is not unique.
So we do need to have a further conversation about those
types of impacts and capital I impacts. So threat streams
definitely are a factor but it is not, when I say streams, it
is direct threats to us, the indirect threats to us via proxies
in other locations outside the region, and then direct threats
to our partners in the region.
Ms. Spanberger. And many of my colleagues have raised the
issue of this being a general trend that we are seeing out of
this Administration to circumvent the responsibility of
Congress. And I would like to again note for the record that we
also have constitutional responsibility as it relates to any
aggressive war-making actions, be it with Iran or anyone else.
So I hope that if the Administration is, indeed, trying to
preparing itself for any sort of offensive hostilities, they
will begin respecting the Constitution, Article I of the
Constitution and come before Congress to make their case.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Malinowski [presiding]. Thank you.
I will recognize myself.
Secretary, you opened your testimony by referring to the
last time this happened in 1984 when we shipped a bunch of
Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia to defend against a threat
from Iran. Can you tell us what a Stinger missile is?
Mr. Cooper. It is an offensive capability.
Mr. Malinowski. It is a weapon for shooting down aircraft
that are attacking you.
Mr. Cooper. Yes.
Mr. Malinowski. It is a defensive weapon.
Mr. Cooper. Yes.
Mr. Malinowski. It was designed to defend Saudi Arabia
against potential air attacks from Iran. And at that point,
actually, the Department made explicitly the case that the
reason these weapons were being provided is that they were
available immediately to help the Saudis deal with an imminent
threat.
Mr. Cooper. Right.
Mr. Malinowski. We are now talking about precision-guided
munitions, Paveways and the like. These are not defensive
weapons. These are weapons designed to enable Saudi Arabia to
continue conducting air strikes in Yemen, is that not right?
Mr. Cooper. That is correct but I would go back to the
defensive capability issue that you brought up. Our partners,
we do provide--there are some defensive systems that we have
provided that are anti-aircraft, anti-air artillery, ADA
capabilities. However, when one looks at the concentric ring of
security, we are not just talking about particular capabilities
that are coming or occurring upon sovereign space of our
partners. There is addressing the threat streams that are
direct to their sovereignty but also in a regional capacity.
So yes, those are offensive capability----
Mr. Malinowski. They are offensive weapons. They are not
going to help the Saudis defend against attacks on their
shipping or missile attacks on the airport in Riyadh.
You also mentioned, at one point earlier today, that
precision weapons are helpful in avoiding civilian casualties
in Yemen, which I find that rather strange. They are using
precision weapons now, are they not?
Mr. Cooper. That is correct.
Mr. Malinowski. They have been using precision weapons to
precisely hit hospitals, schools, bridges, humanitarian
targets. These are precision strikes.
So how is the provision of additional PGMs going to help
them avoid civilian casualties? Help us there.
Mr. Cooper. No one would deny the tragedy, the heartbreak
of the civilian casualties. There is no question about that.
There is room to improve the integrity of the targeting
process. It does not preclude us from making sure that our
partners, as we are doing, as is reported, to get them to be in
a better place to apply precision weapons in a precise manner
for targets that are not civilian targets, that are not
civilian entities.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, we have been trying to do that for 5
years.
In March, there was a strike by the Saudis, presumably
using precision weapons on a Save the Children Hospital in
Yemen. That hospital was on a no-strike list that we provided
to the Saudis, was it not?
Mr. Cooper. I do not know but it should have been on a no-
strike list.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, there you have it and yet, you have
testified today, Secretary, that the reason we are doing this
is because we need to reassure the Saudis to trust us and they
continue, year after year in Yemen, to hit targets that we have
specifically asked them not to hit. And our response to that is
to blow past congressional objections, to give them these
weapons so that they can trust us.
Isn't the issue whether we can trust them?
Mr. Cooper. With any partnership, including Saudi Arabia,
there is an ongoing discourse, ongoing engagement. There is
work to be done. But to walk away from our partner would make--
would exacerbate the situation in Yemen.
Mr. Malinowski. No one is suggesting we walk away.
Mr. Cooper. There were civilian targets that have been
victim by Houthi targeting. But to walk away from our partner,
would exacerbate the current situation.
Mr. Malinowski. No one is suggesting we walk away.
Let me shift to one last issue. We brought up, several
members have brought up the Khashoggi killing. And setting
aside the controversial question of who ordered it, did they
set out to kill him or kidnap him? Would you say it is fair to
assume that the Saudi Government's intention in targeting
Khashoggi was to send a message to Saudi exiles in countries
like the United States who are critical of the Saudi regime? Is
that a fair starting assumption, would you say?
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to assess the assumption but
what I can provide is that from a USG standpoint is that we do
support dissident voices, wherever they are located, Saudi
Arabia or any other partner, that we do not silence civil
society; that we actually bolster and support civil society.
Mr. Malinowski. Understood. The reason I asked, are you
familiar with Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act?
Mr. Cooper. If you are referring to 36(c)--are you talking
about Section----
Mr. Malinowski. No, Section 6. It says that we--no export
licenses may be issued under----
Mr. Cooper. Yes.
Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. This Act with respect to any
country determined by the President to be engaged in a
consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment
directed against individuals in the United States.
Have you looked at this case and others with respect to the
application of the Arms Export Control Act?
Mr. Cooper. That is correct. And that was part of the
calculus on all these cases when they entered the congressional
informal process, the review process, the tier review process.
Again, some of these predating the murder of Mr. Khashoggi,
some of these actually after the murder of Mr. Khashoggi.
Mr. Malinowski. So you see no pattern of intimidation of
individuals in the United States by the Saudis?
Mr. Cooper. Addressing any kind of intimidation by any
partner is not precluded from any assessment. That also
includes--I think what you are referring to in the statute is
inclusive of the human rights report that is issued by every
country team and that is also part of the calculus.
Mr. Malinowski. All right. Well, I yield back and recognize
Congresswoman Omar.
Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman.
So it is no secret that you know with in line of what my
colleague from New York said, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are
brutal regimes. They export brutality. They crush democratic
movements abroad, directly and indirectly. I also believe that
they have been funders of terrorists. And we have heard reports
that they are transferring U.S. weapons to al-Qaida.
I believe that our relationship with them, in its current
form, is immoral, but it is not only immoral, it is
counterproductive to our national security. I believe trusting
them to protect our needs and protecting us against terroristic
threats is like trusting a thief to protect your shop.
This Administration, selling them billions of dollars of
weapons, is dangerous and it is outrageous. Doing so is open
disregard for the will of Congress and the American people, a
slap in the face to our democracy and our values.
Twice in the last 25 years Saudi Arabia and the Emirates
have invaded Bahrain to crush democratic uprisings. The Saudis
actively supported the Egyptian coup in 2013. In April of this
year, the United Nations finally believed they were on the
verge of negotiating peace in Libya. This has, instead,
collapsed into a civil war. Haftar has waged his bloody
campaign with Saudi backing and Emirate weapons.
More recently in Sudan, Hemeti visited MPS in Jeddah. And
shortly after that, him and the Janjaweed immediately began
murdering democratic protesters by the hundreds.
It is clear that State see Saudi's hand in the crackdown,
since David Hale called MBS' brother, Khalid bin Salman, to ask
him to use Saudi influence to stop the killings.
This is a disturbing pattern of destabilization and
totalitarianism. Backing the Saudi and Emirates is backing war
crimes and crimes against humanity; providing them with arms is
complicity.
So I ask you: How can we make sure that U.S. weapons do not
end up in the hands of the Janjaweed? How can we ensure that
U.S. weapons are not being used to murder political protesters
in Sudan?
Mr. Cooper. Congresswoman Omar, thank you.
As to our partnerships, and you mentioned Saudi Arabia and
the Emirates, and there are some other partners that are either
developing or devolving in some cases, all of our partnerships,
on a security sense, including some that are economic, are
predicated on our interests, on U.S. interest. But that is not
new. That is not unique to this Administration, or the previous
administration, or back to the time of Washington.
We develop partnerships because of what works best for U.S.
interest. It does not preclude us, though from holding partners
accountable, not just on human rights, access to civil society,
but also holding accountable on protecting our interests. And
so when we are either provision of a weapon system, or a
capacity, or a certain kind of sustainment, with that comes a
relationship. So it is a long-term investment. That is what
makes us unique to our adversaries.
Ms. Omar. But to the question of how can we assure that
this partnership can be trusted to protect us from eventually
having some of our weapons end up in the hands of terrorists,
is my question, and making sure that it does not go into
murdering political protesters in Sudan. Because what we have
seen is that our weapons have been used to assault schools,
bridges, hospitals in places like Yemen. We have seen the
Saudis' involvement and their footprint in Libya. We have seen
their involvement and footprint in Somalia with al-Shabab.
So what I am asking you is: How can you assure the American
people that we are not emboldening them to continue to reign
their terror in destabilizing that region, when we trust them
to be a partner in stabilizing it?
Mr. Cooper. Saudi Arabia has been a long-time security
partner in the region for almost 40 years. It does not and
never has precluded us from accountability on the front end of
the process, not just on Saudi arms transfers and security
cooperation, security assistance, there is a non-proliferation
aspect to it.
And I think an interesting point you brought up is in our
assessment and our consideration we do in the interagency is
making sure that in a MIL to MIL sense, there is not spillage,
so to speak, into law enforcement in that law enforcement
entities do not--are not in receipt of systems because MIL to
MIL, those relationships are for sovereignty and security, not
for the crackdown of civil society, not for the crackdown of
their own people.
Ms. Omar. Secretary Cooper, my time is up. What I will say
is I do not believe this is the case of spillage. This is an
active engagement. Report after report has shown that this is
not an accident. This is a part of what the Saudis and the
Emirates are engaged in and I hope that we will reassess our
relationship with them in trying to make sure that we are
stabilizing that region and that we are continuing to engage in
our war against terror.
Mr. Malinowski. Representative Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Cooper, the Administration has repeatedly
asserted that issuing these licenses is essential to deal with
an emergency. In fact, you said earlier in our hearing it was a
policy decision by the Secretary of State based on an emergency
so urgent, so urgent that you cannot even wait for a 30-day
congressional review. In fact, the Secretary's determination on
May 24th is based on exactly that finding. That was the
determination, I would just remind you again, that came 3 days
after a classified briefing for the entire House with the
Secretary of State, where while it was clearly under
consideration, he did not take the time to even mention it to
the Congress.
But you have clearly made an assessment that the weapons
and ordinates in these licenses are available for delivery very
soon, right, if it is an emergency?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, the ones that were direct commercial
sales----
Mr. Deutch. No, no, no.
Mr. Cooper. OK.
Mr. Deutch. But that is a--if it is an emergency to deliver
these, you have considered when they could be delivered, right?
Mr. Cooper. It is part of the calculus, right.
Mr. Deutch. So you have got to have specific information
about when each of these items in these licenses will be
available for delivery to the Saudis and Emiratis, right?
Mr. Cooper. Again, part of the calculus.
Mr. Deutch. Well, I am just asking if you have done that.
You have done that for each of these, right?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, so from not just the Department of State
side, from the interagency side. Regardless if there is an
emergency status, it is incumbent upon us to----
Mr. Deutch. No, I understand.
Mr. Cooper. It is a timing issue, sir.
Mr. Deutch. Assistant Secretary, I get it. I get it. I have
sat through this whole hearing.
Mr. Cooper. OK.
Mr. Deutch. It is a timing issue and it is such an
emergency that you could not wait 30 days.
So what I am trying to figure out is, and what I would ask
you is, if you could provide the information to the committee
here, which we have not had an opportunity to hear from you on,
when each of these items is going to be ready for delivery.
Mr. Cooper. I cannot say on specific--on specificity on
each one. What I can say is if it is a DCS sale, a direct
commercial sale, if it is already off the shelf, it is going.
It is moving now.
Mr. Deutch. I cannot----
Mr. Cooper. What would not be moving is if it is in a
manufacturing line.
Mr. Deutch. I get it. I understand.
Mr. Cooper. OK.
Mr. Deutch. We all understand that. That is what I am
asking you. I do not need you to tell me----
Mr. Cooper. OK.
Mr. Deutch. No, no, let me just finish. I do not need you
to tell me if it is manufactured, it is going to come later. I
want to know if this is an emergency, what is the time line?
How long will it take? Not the--I will get to the other ones. I
will get to the commercially made ones. How long will it take
to manufacture these to produce them for delivery?
Mr. Cooper. To your question, per case--per case, not all
cases----
Mr. Deutch. Yes.
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. Per case it is conditions based.
Part of it is contractually based. So we can talk, based on it
is either going to be a few months or longer, which has
contributed to the emergency calculus.
Mr. Deutch. I got you. So it is a few months or longer for
all but the commercial, which I will get to.
Mr. Cooper. That is correct.
Mr. Deutch. It is a few months or longer. So it is such an
emergency, a few months or longer, for every single one of the
other items but there was not 30 days for Congress to review.
You understand why that is so difficult for this institution to
understand, right?
Mr. Cooper. The review never stopped, Congressman.
Mr. Deutch. There was no formal----
Mr. Cooper. The review was currently happening at the time.
Mr. Deutch. There was no formal--come on. Assistant
Secretary, please do not--you said earlier that the review is
ongoing because we know about this. There was no formal 30-day
notice, correct?
Mr. Cooper. The informal notification----
Mr. Deutch. Correct?
Mr. Cooper. The informal----
Mr. Deutch. There was no--there was no formal 30-day notice
given.
Mr. Cooper. Congress was in communication with us.
Mr. Deutch. Was there a formal 30-day notice given?
Mr. Cooper. The formal----
Mr. Deutch. Yes or no? Can you direct him to answer that,
Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Malinowski. It is a pretty simple yes or no question.
Mr. Deutch. Yes.
Mr. Cooper. Yes, there was formal notification in the form
of an emergency declaration by the Secretary of State.
Mr. Deutch. That is not what I am asking you and that is
the problem that we have with the way this whole thing has been
handled.
Let me move on. And you understand that, Assistant
Secretary, and I do not appreciate the--I do not appreciate the
attempt to try to be clever and simply refuse to answer the
question, which is no. Pursuant to law, you have not granted
that 30-day notice. You have gone forward with this emergency
on a list of items that none of which will be available for at
least months, except for the ones I am going to talk about now.
And you could not find time to give us the 30-day notice.
Let me talk about the commercial ones. Two and a half--over
$2 billion of precision-guided munitions are available now. Is
it typical for those to be manufactured before approval is
given by Congress?
Mr. Cooper. There are going to be items that are going to
be on the shelf ready for any partner at any time.
Mr. Deutch. I want to make sure I understand that. So one
company manufactured over $2 billion of precision-guided
munitions just to have on the shelf in case it was decided that
perhaps they would be available, someone might have interest in
purchasing them. Is that what you are telling us?
Mr. Cooper. There are other weapons systems that are
readily available.
Mr. Deutch. I understand but with respect to PGMs.
Mr. Cooper. If it is an earlier generation item, it is
going to be----
Mr. Deutch. I just--I want to know about these $2 billion
in PGMs that are scheduled to be delivered to the Saudis and
Emiratis by one company. Were these--you are telling me that
that company built these, hoping 1 day to have a buyer, that it
was not part of a longer plan. That it was not part of a
discussion that the President had when he was in Saudi Arabia 2
years ago; that none of that happened. They just built them and
oh, here we come; perhaps we will have a chance to sell them.
Mr. Cooper. I would offer that Saudi Arabia is not the only
partner that we work with in security cooperation, security
assistance. So that particular item, PGMs, would not be limited
to just Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Deutch. I understand.
Mr. Malinowski. I have to be ruthless on timing. We have 8
minutes--seven minutes to vote and we still have Mr. Allred. I
apologize.
Mr. Deutch. We do. I just do not think it is too much to
ask whether the Assistant Secretary is telling us that $2.5
billion, over $2 billion of precision-guided munitions
manufactured to be sold to the Saudis and Emiratis were not
actually manufactured for that purpose and it is a coincidence
that they are available now pending this emergency declaration.
Mr. Malinowski. I would say the non-answer does answer the
question.
Mr. Allred.
Mr. Allred. OK. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary for being
here.
Like my colleague, Mr. Levin, I attended the classified
briefing on May 21st. And the question that Mr. Levin posed to
you that the emergency emerged--you said that an emergency
emerged between the classified briefing on May 21st on Iran,
and the notification to necessitate the use of an emergency
authorities.
When was the decision memo prepared?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Congressman Allred.
The decision process certainly developed with the threat
streams but what I would offer, as far as having it as a known
toolkit, it has always been there. So any Secretary of State
knows that they have, as authorized through statute by
Congress, that they had this emergency declaration as an
option----
Mr. Allred. Excuse me. Are you aware of when the memo was
prepared?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, the memo was prepared----
Mr. Allred. When was that?
Mr. Cooper. It would have been right before we issued the
declaration.
Mr. Allred. So it was prepared before the briefing on May
21st?
Mr. Cooper. It was prepared and issued at the time of
declaration.
Mr. Allred. All at once?
Mr. Cooper. But to be fair, to be fair, the ongoing
analysis and the monitoring of the threat streams well predates
May 21st threat brief, hence, the necessity to have Secretary
Pompeo and the Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan come here
and brief Congress. So----
Mr. Allred. You know what I do not appreciate is that when
Congress assembles and we receive a briefing, that there is an
emergency declaration made 3 days later that we were not made
aware of. That should have been given to us at that time. That
is part of our oversight responsibilities.
So if the memo was prepared before that briefing, which I
am going to ask some very directed questions in writing that I
hope will be responded to about when that was prepared, I want
to know why we were not briefed on that at that time, when we
could have asked questions about this.
So do you have an answer to that question? Do you know why
Congress was not briefed at the time on May 21st by the
Secretary of State, the Acting Secretary of Defense, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about an emergency
declaration that was going to be made 3 days later?
Mr. Cooper. In a broad sense, Congress was briefed on two
counts. The first count is before May 21st there was already
the ongoing consultative process, not only on these 22 cases
relevant to Iran and the emergency declaration, but also any
other host of cases that we have before Congress on other
partners in other parts of the world. That was already
happening anyway.
What was unique, as you noted, was the necessity for the
executive branch to come to Congress and update Congress and
what had been identified on very specific threat streams that
were of concern and direct threats to U.S. interest, U.S.
persons, as well as our partners.
Mr. Allred. OK. I am going to try and get to the bottom of
this because I want to know whether or not Congress was kept in
the dark. That is what I want to know. We are the duly elected
representatives of the American people and we have a
constitutional responsibility to oversee what you are doing in
the name of the American people.
And if that decision was reached before we were briefed, I
want to know why we were not told about it. And if it was
reached after that briefing, then I want to know that as well.
I want to know what went into that decisionmaking.
Because to me, this sounds like and it seems like, as many
of my colleagues have said, an attempt just basically to
circumvent Congress because we did not agree with the decision
to sell these arms to Saudi Arabia because of what they are
doing in Yemen with these weapons.
The rationale you have given centers around Iran. And I
want to ask you, because I have asked some of your colleagues
in the Administration, whether or not you accept the United
States intelligence assessment by the CIA with high confidence
that Mohammed bin Salman ordered Jamal Khashoggi's
assassination, whether you, personally, accept that assessment?
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to talk about any intelligence
assessments.
Mr. Allred. That is not an----
Mr. Cooper. I am not.
Mr. Allred. No, I am asking you whether you accept an
intelligence assessment----
Mr. Allred. I am not. I am not going to talk about any
particular assessments, not only on posture, not only on
threat, not on any assessment in the I.C. in an open hearing.
Mr. Allred. Oh, this is something that cannot be shared
with the American people whether or not you accept the CIA's
own assessment?
Mr. Cooper. We are talking about assessments.
Mr. Allred. OK.
Mr. Cooper. We are not talking about----
Mr. Allred. Was the declaration of emergency dependent on a
CIA assessment or on an intelligence assessment, broadly
speaking?
Mr. Cooper. The emergency declaration absolutely included
threat reporting, some of it raw, some of it finished
intelligence.
Mr. Allred. So do you see the problem here? Do not answer
that.
The problem here is that you are willing to accept an
assessment here that serves your ends and what you want to do,
which is sell arms that the Congress does not want you to sell
to an ally. But you are not willing to accept that assessment
when it goes to holding that ally responsible for the murder of
an American resident, of a journalist.
What happens when the United States of America starts
sanctioning murders abroad? What happens to the world order
when we do not stand up and say something? When the Russians
are able to kill someone in Great Britain, we say something but
we will not say something when the Saudis do. This is not who
we are and I think that you know that.
Mr. Trone [presiding]. Thank you.
Secretary Cooper, we have got about 2 minutes left. In your
testimony earlier, you said when our adversaries sell weapons
of war, they do not place the same, if any, premium that we do
in addressing the risk of the capabilities that we provide may
contribute to the abuses of human rights or violation of
international humanitarian law.
Do you acknowledge the likelihood these weapons would, in
fact, contribute to an abuse of human rights or a violation of
international law?
Mr. Cooper. Congressman, with all partners, we are
committed to mitigate any of those abuses. And when we conduct
our interagency assessments on any transfer, on any sale, that
is calculated in there.
It is also not just a part of statute. It is actually a
part of our policy. Our Conventional Arms Transfer policy
mandates that we guarantee that we ensure that, as we move
forward in the consultative process with Congress, that we are
looking at how we mitigate those risks and that we also
provide----
Mr. Trone. What are the guarantees? What guarantees do you
have with the Saudis or the Emiratis that these weapons will
not be used against civilians in Yemen? What guarantees?
Mr. Cooper. Particular to the Saudis in this partnership is
that this comes with not only the receipt of systems, or
munitions, or weapons, along with that comes our capacity
training, our precision training, our rule of law, our Rule of
Armed Conflict training. This is us being coupled with a
partner to make them a better partner, not just make them a
capable partner, make them a better partner. It is incumbent
upon us to do this.
Walking away from a partner increases risk, exposes
potential risks for a more difficult, more catastrophic
situation.
Mr. Trone. What type of commitment do we have that they are
going to actually do that?
Mr. Cooper. Reportedly, we are getting commitments from the
Government that they have acknowledged the room to improve, the
room to be a better partner and actually mitigate civilian
casualties. There is an acknowledgment----
Mr. Trone. This is the same guy, the same folks that made
the deal that took care of Khashoggi with a bone saw? The same
guys that kidnapped the Prime Minister of Lebanon? The same
guys that have disappeared hundreds of dissidents who disagree?
The same group? That is the same group you made the deal with?
Mr. Cooper. Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is almost
four decades old. Our relationship with Saudi Arabia----
Mr. Trone. Four decades old and going in the wrong
direction.
Mr. Cooper. It is a relationship that has long invested and
they are carrying our water, and they are carrying our equities
on our behalf in a very difficult, fraught region with direct
threats to us, to our persons and our interest. It does not
preclude us, though, as you noted, it does not preclude us from
working with Saudi Arabia or any other partners to ensure that
they have improved their processes, that it is not just about
precision, that it is about more dedication and delicacy----
Mr. Trone. Improvements seem to be going the wrong way.
That is my clear inclination and everybody else in this
committee. It is not getting better. It is getting worse by the
arrogance of the Crown Prince.
We are all done. Thank you for your testimony.
Adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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ADDITONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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