[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY: KREMLIN TOOLS OF MALIGN POLITICAL INFLUENCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
May 21, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-41
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-426PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and The Environment
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois, Ranking
GREGORY MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
DAVID TRONE, Maryland RON WRIGHT, Texas
JIM COSTA, California MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
Gabrielle Gould, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Carpenter, Dr. Michael, Senior Director, Penn Biden Center for
Diplomacy and Global Engagement, Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense with Responsibility for Russia, Ukraine,
Eurasia, the Balkans, and Conventional Arms Control............ 8
Rosenberger, Laura, Director of the Alliance for Securing
Democracy and Senior Fellow with the German Marshall Fund...... 21
Conley, Heather, Senior Vice President, Europe, Eurasia, and the
Arctic, Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic &
International Studies, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 35
Doran, Peter, President & CEO, Center for European Policy
Analysis....................................................... 46
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 73
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 74
Hearing Attendance............................................... 75
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Chaos as Strategy................................................ 76
Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in
Democracies.................................................... 132
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Wagner.......................................... 176
UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY: KREMLIN TOOLS OF MALIGN POLITICAL INFLUENCE
Tuesday, May 21, 2019
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Keating. This hearing will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on
``Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political
Influence.''
Without objection, all members have 5 days to submit
statements and questions, extraneous materials, and the like
for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules.
I will now make an opening statement and turn it over to
the ranking member for his opening statement. But I would like
to ask, without objection, unanimous consent that my remarks
might be extended a bit because we are going to show a film--a
short film, 2 and a half minute film--that I think will shed
some light on what we are discussing today.
I would like to welcome you all to the hearing on Russia
and, specifically, the Kremlin's tools of political influence
around the world.
Much of our work so far in the subcommittee is focused on
our need as the United States to remain a leader in standing up
for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and the
importance of working together with our allies who share our
commitment to these ideals.
Today, we continue along that vein and have before us
expert witnesses who will explain how Putin's Russia undermines
democratic processes and institutions around the world through
various means such as illicit finance, so-called dark money,
and corruption.
It is interesting that, as was focused on military
aggression in places like Georgia and Ukraine and we are
focused on cyber threats, the idea of the corrupt influence
operation, as Dr. Carpenter so called it, hasn't received the
same attention.
But it is so important in realizing what's going on in the
threats to our democracy, particularly by Russia. So these
issues are among other inventions that are attempts to weaken
public discourse around elections and affect their results.
We ourselves have experience with this. Russia intervened
in our elections in 2016. With greater awareness now after this
experience, officials from European and EU elections have been
vigilant working to protect their electoral systems and monitor
for attempts at undermining their democracies.
More systemic ways, however, are used and using illicit
financing and corruption to influence political actors and
parties is one of them.
Just this weekend Austria's vice chancellor resigned after
a shocking video was released seemingly showing him voluntarily
engaging with an individual posing as a member--a family
member--of a Russian oligarch to advance his far-right
political party.
We are still learning about this video and the
circumstances behind how this exchange came to occur. The
Russian government has asserted that they have nothing to do
with that.
We will hear from our witnesses in their testimony how
Russia does use in instance agents that have that degree of
separation. Whether that is the case here or not is to be
determined. But it will be important to analyze this as one
graphic way that this can be done.
The vice chancellor in question has apologized for aspects
of his behavior and has resigned over the weekend, and the
chancellor has called for snap elections to take place.
I do believe, though, that regardless of the unfolding
details that this is an important glimpse for everyone who has
been working on these issues into what kind of corruption
occurs and what it could look like.
We have an excerpt of the video, and with unanimous consent
we will play it for the subcommittee now. Just note that if you
are watching it, Kronen refers to a prominent newspaper and
Strabag is a major Austrian construction company.
So if we could queue this and take a few minutes--a couple
of minutes to look at this film.
[Video is played.]
Mr. Keating. This whole situation underscores two things in
particular. First, that corruption around elections and
political power is real. Whether this was a real transaction or
whether anything would have come of it has not taken away yet,
as the investigation continues.
But it does not take away from the fact that this video
affirms what many experts have studied including those joining
us today, that this kind of corruption happens.
It is more commonplace than I think we often would like to
admit.
Second, that once we recognize Russian malign political
influence around the world for the threat that it is, we have
an opportunity here.
There were protests in Austria following the release of
these tapes and there has been widespread condemnation of the
elected officials' blatant willingness to sacrifice important
democratic principles like fair competition, government
accountability, and freedom of the press.
Sunlight is the greatest disinfectant. We need to support
investigative journalism and transparency around campaign
financing and always will be sure to protect civic space for
free speech and association.
Whether it is a setup or actual Russian corruption
transactions designed to affect internal governing or elections
in a country, democracies, including the United States and our
European allies, need to come together to expose corruption and
illicit financing and work together to ensure that our
democracies remain independent and free from malign foreign
influence.
So I look forward to addressing these points in detail
today and to hear from our witnesses on their work analyzing
how the Kremlin uses various means, financial or otherwise, to
undermine the stability of democracies around the world.
We will not only discuss the tools the Kremlin uses but
also what can be done about it together with our allies.
Sanctions are an important piece of this discussion.
I hope we discuss how we can strengthen our own financial
systems and democratic institutions while also strengthening
our public discourse and media literacy so that we are less
vulnerable to these kind of attacks and interference.
With that, I now turn to the ranking member for his opening
statement.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
this panel for joining us today. Obviously, the video was very
disturbing and, hopefully, it serves as a warning into the
future for anybody that would think to do likewise.
I do not believe any member in this room would deny the
fact that Russia, led by Mr. Putin, is a destabilizing factor
in this world. The Russians have developed an advanced set of
tools to apply pressure on democracies around the world and
they have shown their willingness to use it.
Whenever Putin attempts a new maneuver, he waits to see the
international community's response, and when nothing happens he
escalates.
One of the first tools developed and deployed by the
Kremlin was to hide behind the guise of protecting ethnic
Russians to invade Georgia and Ukraine.
While open hostilities between Russia and Georgia began in
2008, it was Putin's distribution of passports to Georgians
earlier that laid the groundwork for Russian intervention.
In Ukraine, Putin claimed that ethnic Russians were being
persecuted as a precursor for intervention. By using little
green men instead of the Russian military, the Kremlin was able
to deny any involvement in the invasion and occupation of
Ukrainian territory.
Both Ukraine and Georgia have been stalwart allies of the
United States since gaining their independence. Ensuring their
territorial sovereignty of these two countries is essential to
European security and to American interests.
When personal interests are at stake for Vladimir Putin and
his allies, the Russians do not hesitate to utilize their
forces to engage in international affairs.
In 2015, Bashar al-Assad was losing control of Syria. He
requested assistance from the Kremlin, who were more than
willing and dutifully bound to protect--help protect their
naval base in Syria.
In exchange for Russian air power, Assad granted Putin a
50-year lease to the airbase, the same location where they have
launched waves of attacks on civilian centers and hospitals,
killing thousands of men, women, and children, which continues
to this day.
It is not just in Europe or the Middle East where Russia is
attempting to exert their influence. Earlier this year we saw
the Kremlin provide Nicolas Maduro with soldiers to protect
Russian investment in Venezuelan energy sector and provoke the
United States by getting involved in our hemisphere.
The Russian Federation has long used energy as a weapon to
coerce, manipulate, and create conflict around the world. One
of my growing concerns is how European and Eurasian countries
have become reliant on Russian gas and oil without a domestic
backup.
Though almost completed--through the almost completed Nord
Stream II pipeline project, Russia will soon control our
European allies' energy markets.
That is why I introduced H.R. 1616, the European Energy
Security and Diversification Act with Chairman Keating. This
legislation would help our partners defend themselves from the
malign activities of Russia by developing and diversifying
their own energy sources.
I hope our Senate colleagues can pick this up and pass it
quickly. While hindsight is 20/20, we must be able to learn
from our mistakes and adapt.
Prior to the 2016 elections Russia engaged in one of the
most sophisticated information operations to date against the
United States.
This past February the Russians tried to halt the
democratic progress being made in Moldova by manipulating their
elections.
As a result, the pro-Russian socialist party won 35 seats
in the election while the pro-Western democratic party won 30.
We must remain vigilant and I have no doubt that Russia
will continue to do similar attacks on democracies, going
forward. Just this week the EU will be holding their
parliamentary elections.
The Russians will look at every possible avenue to sow
discord and division across the continent to further strain
democracy in Europe. It further shows us why the topic of this
hearing is so important.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about Russia's
malign activities today and how the United States can best
defend itself and go on the offense against them, and one of
the things I think is extremely important is simply exposing
Russian tactics to be able to disinfect against them.
If you are looking at Twitter or Facebook or social media
and you see a story that looks crazy, it probably is. It is
probably not true and, unfortunately, we live in a moment where
people automatically accept the narrative that they are
predisposed to instead of thinking critically about if this a
disinformation campaign.
So, again, I thank the chairman for calling this important
hearing. I thank the witnesses for being here and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. Keating. I would like to thank the ranking member for
his comments and I would like to thank our witnesses, an
extraordinary group of witnesses here on the panel on the
subject matter, and I will introduce them in order.
Dr. Michael Carpenter is a senior director at the Penn
Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement, and a
nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
He previously served in the Pentagon as deputy assistant
secretary of defense with responsibility for Russia, Ukraine,
Eurasia, the Balkans, and conventional arms control.
He also served in the White House as a foreign policy
advisor for Vice President Joe Biden as well as on the National
Security Council as the director for Russia.
Laura Rosenberger is a director of the Alliance for
Securing Democracy and senior fellow at the German Marshall
Fund of the United States.
Prior to that, she served at the State Department and the
National Security Council.
Heather Conley is a senior vice president for Europe,
Eurasia, and the Arctic, and director of the Europe Program for
the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Conley
previously served as the deputy assistant secretary at the
Department of State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.
Peter Doran is the president and CEO of the Center for
European Policy Analysis and served as a Foreign Affairs fellow
in Congress and as a George C. Marshall fellow at the Heritage
Foundation.
I appreciate all of you being here. I look forward to this
testimony. Please limit your testimony as best you can within
the 5-minute arena and without objection your prepared written
statements will be made part of the record.
I will now go to Dr. Carpenter for his statement.
STATEMENT OF MR. CARPENTER, PH.D., SENIOR DIRECTOR, PENN BIDEN
CENTER FOR DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT, FORMER DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR RUSSIA,
UKRAINE, EURASIA, THE BALKANS, AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
Mr. Carpenter. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger,
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much
for this opportunity to testify today on the subject of the
Kremlin's tools of malign political influence.
I also could not imagine three better co-witnesses to be
here on the stage with me.
Today Russia is doubling down on malign influence
operations across Europe and North America. But we remain
unprepared, underfunded, and often ignorant of the threat.
Furthermore, it is not just Russia but also China and other
State and nonState actors whose influence and destabilization
operations pose a threat to our democracy.
To deal with this threat we urgently need to focus more
resources on rooting out Russia's malign networks, addressing
our own massive vulnerabilities, especially to foreign dark
money, and imposing greater costs on Russia when the Kremlin is
caught interfering in our democratic process.
Russia's subversive attacks on our democracy can be grouped
into three main categories: cyber operations, information
warfare, and corrupt influence operations.
Today, I will focus on influence operations or what in
Russian intelligence jargon are called active measures. Active
measures are occurring with increasing frequency. I will not
review all the cases cited in my written testimony but a few
examples should suffice to give a flavor for what we are
dealing with.
In Lithuania in 2004, a Russian oligarch contributed
$400,000 to the campaign of a Presidential candidate who won
the election but was later impeached and removed from office by
the Lithuanian parliament after it was shown that the oligarch
had improperly been given Lithuanian citizenship.
In France in 2014, far-right Presidential candidate Marine
Le Pen received a 9 million euro loan from a bank owned by a
Russian oligarch.
In the Netherlands in 2015, Russian proxies posing as
Ukrainians tried to sway a referendum against Ukraine's free
trade agreement with the EU.
In the U.K., Brexit's biggest financial backer had numerous
meetings with Russian embassy officials and businessmen who
offered attractive investment opportunities.
In the Central African Republic, Libya, Sudan, Madagascar,
Syria, and Venezuela, Russian private contractors provide
services ranging from personal security to election support in
return for access and money.
Russia's State-owned enterprises--Rosneft, Gazprom,
Rosatom, et cetera--regularly offer foreign government
officials preferential deals in return for influence.
In Montenegro, Russia's military intelligence service, the
GRU, crossed the line from influence to destabilization
operations when it tried to foment a violent coup d'etat
against the country's prime minister in October 2016.
Similarly, in Greece a former Duma member and billionaire
oligarch personally funded violent protests against a historic
agreement between Greece and North Macedonia that paved the way
for the latter country to join NATO.
All of these operations are funded through a financial
ecosystem that makes use of laundered money. The Panama Papers
and other sources have showed how offshore networks of shell
companies and shady financial institutions have enabled Russian
oligarchs, officials, and organized crime syndicates to launder
billions of dollars into Western financial institutions.
So the question is how do we stop Russian malign influence.
I would group our responses into three buckets of measures: law
enforcement, legislative, and cost imposition.
First, we need to root out illicit Russian networks. To do
this, we need better coordination between our domestic law
enforcement agencies and our national security apparatus.
Too often one hand does not know what the other is doing. A
standing interagency task force on malign Russian influence
chaired by an NSC senior director would help address this
problem.
Second, we urgently need to address our own vulnerabilities
by closing crucial gaps in governance. The most important is
our campaign finance system, which is so opaque that we do not
even have an inkling how much foreign dark money is sloshing
around the system.
Legislation to identify the beneficial owners of limited
liability companies is also necessary and urgent since shell
companies are often used to mask illicit financial
transactions.
Stricter anti-money laundering regulations are needed to
tighten illicit financial flows and more transparency is needed
for high-end real estate transactions.
This also means more resources are needed for the Treasury
Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
Finally, law firms need to be subjected to greater
transparency so that attorney-client privilege cannot be used
as a loophole through which foreign entities channel illicit
funds to U.S. legal representatives.
A number of bills have been drafted to address these
vulnerabilities, but none so far has been passed into law.
Finally, the third bucket of measures involves imposing
greater costs on Russia for its interference in our democratic
process. In my view, we need to consider much more forceful
actions such as full blocking sanctions on select Russian
banks.
It is time to recognize that trying to change Russia's
behavior through ``targeted sanctions'' on this or that
oligarch or official is not going to work.
It is time to impose real costs on Russia and we have the
tools to do so.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Doctor.
Ms. Rosenberger.
STATEMENT OF MS. ROSENBERGER, DIRECTOR OF THE ALLIANCE FOR
SECURING DEMOCRACY AND SENIOR FELLOW WITH THE GERMAN MARSHALL
FUND
Ms. Rosenberger. Thank you so much, Chairman Keating,
Ranking Member Kinzinger, and distinguished members of the
committee. Thank you for inviting me to address you today.
I submitted my full statement for the record but let me
highlight key points on Russia's operations to undermine our
democracy and what we need to do to address it.
These operations employ five primary asymmetric tools:
information operations, cyber attacks, malign financial
influence, political and social subversion, and strategic
economic coercion.
They exploit democracy's openness while weaponizing
societal and institutional vulnerabilities and election
interference is but one component.
I am glad to address two underappreciated tools today:
malign financial and coercive economic tactics that Russia uses
in Europe.
These activities threaten U.S. national security by
undermining cohesion of NATO and the EU, encouraging policies
favorable to Moscow, and weakening democratic governance.
Putin's primary goal is maintaining power and these
activities also protect and grow the ill-gotten assets of his
inner circle, defending their favored position and the wider
patronage system.
Russian corporations, oligarchs, and organized crime
networks are all agents of malign influence abroad, often
acting on their own to curry favor with those in power, protect
their standing, and guarantee future opportunities.
Here is how. First, Russia enriches elites in target
countries including government officials, former political
leaders, and other well-connected individuals in order to
influence government's policies.
Second, Russian entities provide direct support for
euroskeptic and illiberal populist parties.
Third, energy investments are used similarly to enrich
elites, to fund political parties, and to create dependence in
order to build leverage and impede leaders' ability to
challenge Russia.
Fourth, Russian proxies establish and finance a network of
NGO's in Europe that support and connect euroskeptic and pro-
Kremlin movements.
Fifth, Russia empowers fringe elements including
paramilitary groups to increase polarization and hinder States'
ability to govern.
Finally, Russia uses dark money to support media outlets
across Europe that spread favorable narratives. Russian online
information operations including by the infamous Internet
Research Agency often accompany these tactics, injecting
disinformation and divisive content supporting the Kremlin's
agenda.
These tactics exploit weak regulatory enforcement, legal
loopholes, enabling jurisdiction, erosion of the rule of law,
and societal polarization.
Vulnerabilities include weak penalties for money
laundering, lax foreign investment screening in Europe, and
weak or absent laws on foreign funding of political candidates
or parties, as well as the ability to form anonymous companies
in the United States.
The recent scandal in Austria, which the chairman
discussed, highlights these vulnerabilities and how illiberal
forces in Europe embrace Russian support and facilitate its
activities.
As Dr. Carpenter noted, Chinese investments in Europe bring
similar concerns over elite cultivation by entities with opaque
ties to the party State and Chinese and Russian activities can
reinforce one another.
And as you know, Russia has also used these tools to
undermine democracy in the United States. The U.S. Government
needs to develop a unified and integrated approach to this
issue including by creating a national hybrid threat center and
appointing a counter foreign interference coordinator at the
National Security Council to coordinate U.S. Government
efforts.
They also need to work closely with our allies across the
Atlantic including to facilitate a unified EU and NATO
response. This is particularly essential as Putin seeks to
divide us.
We need to enhance coordination to share threat information
and learn from one another's responses. NATO should continue to
increase focus on nontraditional threats and enhance
cooperation with the EU.
The United States should also work with allies to
articulate clear warnings about the consequences for
unacceptable foreign interference.
The United States should increase assistance programs to
ensure partners and allies can withstand and respond to these
tactics. We should continue working with European partners to
reduce dependence on Russian energy and increase assistance to
civil society including investigative and independent media.
The United States needs to do more to raise costs on Moscow
by fully implementing existing sanctions as part of a
comprehensive strategy with consistent messaging and
coordination with European allies.
Congress should consider additional sanctions particularly
in the financial sector as well as automatic sanctions triggers
if Russia engages in further interference operations.
The United States should make clear that it will not
tolerate enabling, indulging in, or importing Russia's corrupt
and anti-democratic practices including by allies like Hungary.
The United States should prioritize diplomatic efforts to
convince countries of key concern to undertake reforms. We also
need to enhance financial transparency.
Congress should pass measures that require disclosure of
beneficial ownership. Treasury's geographic targeting order
program should be made permanent and nationwide.
The United States should encourage the EU to develop a
central anti-money laundering agency, fortify its new
investment screening framework, and encourage stronger anti-
money laundering enforcement and penalties.
Finally, Putin and his cronies rely on the Western
financial system to protect and grow their assets even while
they seek to weaken us. This gives us leverage and we should
use it.
We can do more to cutoff access to our financial systems
including through targeted sanctions on Putin's cronies and
implementation of the Global Magnitsky Act, and we need to do
more to expose these activities.
Russia's undermining of democracy demands a bipartisan
response. The United States must recognize the threat and,
together with our European allies, act with the urgency and
strength required.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenberger follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Ms. Conley.
STATEMENT OF MS. CONLEY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, EUROPE,
EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC, DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Conley. Thank you, Chairman Keating, Ranking Member
Kinzinger, distinguished members of the committee.
Using a variety of tools, from corruption to influence
operations, the Kremlin undermines and weakens democracies,
rendering them simply unable to respond promptly to Russia's
military actions and making them so beholden to the Kremlin
that the country will actually support Russia's interests over
its own.
The reason we at CSIS study Russian tactics in Europe is to
prevent them from working effectively here in the United States
or, hopefully, to prevent them from happening in Europe.
I would like to offer a note of caution, however. We are
prone to give a little too much weight and acknowledgement of
the so-called brilliance of Russian malign influence
operations. Sometimes they are just quite clumsy and
amateurish.
But they use all of their tools persistently and
purposefully, and they use all available means of influence.
This can be very overwhelming to us and to the American people.
In other words, we simply do not connect our dots very well.
I want to give three framing points and then dive into two
issues that I am particularly concerned about as I look toward
the 2020 U.S. Presidential election.
No. 1, the average American does not know that we are in a
daily battle to preserve and protect the integrity of our
democracy. We are at war.
But this is a very different kind of war because the main
battle space is a fight for the integrity of the American mind,
and this is why it is so challenging.
Russian malign influence is designed to alter how we think
about ourselves and our democracy and to deepen our distrust as
well as our disgust.
It seeks to touch and shape every aspect of our lives--what
we read, our personal preferences, and to make us doubt what we
believe in. It is designed to make us very, very angry at one
another.
And the third point is it uses our weaknesses. That is
Russia's strength--our weaknesses. So polarization and
partisanship are our greatest weaknesses and I am so glad this
committee continues to exhibit the leadership of
bipartisanship.
Polarization is evident in Europe today. We are also not
structured to fight this battle. We are structured to fight
terrorism and terrorism financing. We are not structured to
fight malign influence and its many manifestations.
So as we prepare for 2020, let me offer two thoughts. I
think we are increasingly going to see U.S. voices and U.S.
organizations that will be the key disseminators of Russian
malign disinformation with messages targeting vulnerable and
divided U.S. communities.
This is going to look a lot like domestic election campaign
messaging and it will likely be accompanied by hard-to-refute
deep fake videos, audio, and image files.
I am particularly concerned about U.S. citizens and
organizations wittingly or unwittingly becoming under the
increasing threat of malign influence, faith-based and ultra
conservative organizations, and, of course, opaque financial
support of key U.S. influences, which my colleagues have done a
great job in explaining how that is such a powerful part of
Russia's toolkit.
Just very briefly, over the last decade the Kremlin has
adopted a very compelling ideological narrative to mask its
kleptocratic authoritarianism. Mixing pre-Soviet, Soviet, and
orthodox ideologies, they have weaved together nationalism,
patriotism, and faith, and Vladimir Putin and the Russian
Orthodox Church are truly the embodiment of an anti-Western
anti-individualistic, xenophobic, perversion of capitalism.
They have taken this one step further and they link
Vladimir Putin's leadership to the biblical incarnation of the
Third Rome or the restoration of the Third Temple in Jerusalem.
If you thought the Soviet Union was the godless communism,
this is a very powerful messianic and mystical vision of its
domestic and foreign policy. It is furthered by the Orthodox
Church.
I have seen this work in Montenegro, in Serbia, in
Bulgaria. I have seen it work across the board. It touches
every aspects of people's lives. Their faith is an important
part of their lives. But this is a source of concern to me as
we have our own challenges in separating ourselves in our
faith-based views.
Finally, in my few moments--I am sorry, my voice is leaving
me here--just to followup on the very impressive video of Mr.
Heinz-Christian Strache, we did an entire case study on Austria
in our most recently publication, ``The Kremlin Playbook II:
The Enablers.''
This does not surprise me, and we cannot continue to
articulate the problem. We have to start solving it. Congress
has to pass ultimate beneficial ownership. We have to treat
financial transparency and money laundering as the challenges
to America's national security that they are.
We can fight this. We can win this battle. We can go on the
offensive. But we have to restore confidence in our own
democracy first.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Mr. Doran.
STATEMENT OF MR. DORAN, PRESIDENT & CEO, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN
POLICY ANALYSIS
Mr. Doran. Good morning, Chairman Keating and Ranking
Member Kinzinger, and members of the committee.
I am Peter B. Doran, the CEO and president of the Center
for European Policy Analysis, or CEPA. It is an honor to speak
with you here today.
I have already submitted my written testimony for the
record so I would like to encapsulate it with one overall
message for this committee.
Right now, the Russian government believes that it is in a
battle against the U.S.-led economic and international order.
The Russian government believes it is winning this battle and
they are doubling down on their strategy to undermine Western
democratic systems with tools of malign political influence.
Based on the research and reporting at my organization,
CEPA, I can confirm for this committee the Russian government
aims to attack Western political cohesion by using the very
strengths of our liberal democratic order against us.
Russia has tried to subvert and allegedly topple, in one
case, governments. It has peddled disinformation and called it
free speech and it has used corruption for political purposes
under the cover of neutral business.
These efforts are not isolated. Rather, they are the
products of a coherent unified strategy that was developed at
the highest levels of the Russian government.
Mr. Chairman, I am the co-author of a CEPA analytical
report that I have submitted for the record. This report
details how Russia seeks to weaken democracy by spreading chaos
beyond its borders.
Chaos is Russia's strategy. The Kremlin toolkit of
financial corruption, disinformation, and influence operations
are the means of activating that strategy.
In doing so, Russia targets the things that make us
strong--pillars like a solidarity between our allies, the
integrity of our political systems, and the unbeatable dynamism
of our free market economies.
I would stress for the committee that Russian leaders also
exhibit a strong preference for deploying their malign toolkit
in the energy arena, and when it comes to the corrupting
combination of money and influence, I can think of no better
example than Russia's Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
This Congress is aware of that pipeline. It is the crown
jewel of Russia's malign offensive in Europe. Vladimir Putin
knows exactly what he is doing. He wants to Putinize us by
normalizing corruption.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for sharing that visual aid at
the start of this hearing because it offers us an example of
what is taking place in Austria.
Meanwhile, in Germany, I can confirm for the committee that
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is not just a commercial deal as
project promoters falsely claim. It will normalize a new long-
lasting corrupting influence over our friends in Europe,
especially our essential ally, Germany.
So what do we do? How do we defeat Putin's strategy against
us? Well, first, we need to understand that Russia's use of
political corruption, disinformation, and malign influence has
a purpose--to divide and weaken us.
Second, the Russian government's strategy reveals to us
what its leaders fear--the pillars of our power, especially
when used in coordination with allies.
Third, Vladimir Putin wins when our internal debates about
Russia become polarized and partisan. As long as we are
fighting each other, we are advancing the Kremlin's agenda.
And fourth, U.S. and European policy must be dramatically
reordered when it comes to the sequence of carrots and sticks
we offer to the Kremlin. We need a lot more sticks and no
consideration of carrots or open-ended partnership with Russia
until we see undeniable signs that it has changed strategy.
Let us not give carrots to those who would do us harm. When
it comes to sticks, the costs we put upon Russia for deploying
chaos against us must rise. I would agree with my co-witnesses
here.
Vladimir Putin needs to become more uncertain of our next
move than we are of his. So what might costs look like?
Well, let us finally show that we are serious. Let us
finally put sanctions on Nord Stream 2. America can and should
take this action today.
Sanctions on Nord Stream 2 are the first, best, and most
immediate way to show the Kremlin that we mean business. And
when it comes to money, I would ask the committee to remember
this.
Russia's banks are just as dangerous as Russia's tanks. So
let us also prepare effective mechanisms to prevent the buying
and selling of Russian sovereign debt in our markets should
Russia escalate against us in the future.
Last, but perhaps most importantly, I would encourage this
Congress to continue its essential support for this
administration's commendable efforts to counteract Russian
State-sponsored disinformation and the fake news that the
Kremlin injects into our Western body politic.
This support is vital in counteracting Russia's strategy.
Mr. Chairman, every strategy has a weakness, including chaos.
The Kremlin's malign toolkit of chaos can be defeated.
We just have to get a lot smarter about how we go about it.
I thank you for the time and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Doran follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Mr. Doran.
The chair will now recognize the ranking member for 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, I thank the chairman and, again, I
thank you all for being here.
Ms. Conley, you mentioned, you know, the structure and that
is very correct and I think an important point to know. You
know, the United States needs to now go from remembering the
cold war, kind of a two-front war, to now basically two kinds
of war--asymmetric and symmetric and, you know, being able to
prepare for the big fight but also understanding we have to
execute a fight against terrorism and also economically. So
that is where I think some of that flexibility needs to come
back.
Just a small point of disagreement. You mentioned ultra-
conservative groups, and I would not disagree with that. But I
think there is also groups on the left working on behalf of
Vladimir Putin.
You just look at Code Pink's occupation of the Venezuelan
embassy to support a basically dictator that is a puppet of
Vladimir Putin. So I think it is just important to point out
that this is really all spectrums and Russia uses all tools.
Mr. Doran, I want to ask you how the Russian tactics are
evolving. You know, we have broadly grasped the existing hybrid
warfare toolkit but what do we expect in the next generation of
tactics?
Mr. Doran. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I would say this. When we look at the elements of Russian
malign influence I think you are absolutely correct to ask the
evolution question.
Oftentimes at CEPA we think about these techniques as a
virus. In order to understand a virus you have to first
understand how it evolves and mutates, what you are dealing
with.
Where I would stress for this committee to pay most
attention to is the way in which Russia can compete against us
for pennies on the dollar. Every single effort we put to
counter them costs us more money than they require to attack
us.
So on steps of evolving, Russia is limited only by the
creativity of the GRU and some of their malign actors in
Europe. I would not begin to speculate as to how a virus would
evolve as much as I would about how Russia can evolve.
What I can say is that we need to stop playing whack-a-mole
with the Kremlin and we need to raise the costs on Vladimir
Putin so he does not deploy these techniques against us in the
first place.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. I think that builds into the idea
of--I mean, look back. We hate this term--mutually assured
destruction on the nuclear side was not a good thing. But I
think we need to make it clear to the Russians that we can do
to you what you can do to us.
That raises the cost on them. Vladimir Putin fears nothing
more than losing his grip on power and I think we ought to
threaten that that way.
So I also want to ask the whole panel, Russia's use of
armed mercenary groups like the Wagner Group to secure their
interests and support brutal dictators like Assad and Maduro is
another example of their low-cost high-reward strategy to
hinder our interests.
Our military has shown that we will respond to Russian
aggressions from these groups when provoked as we did when we
quickly obliterated a regiment of the Wagner Group in Syria.
However, the sanctions we have on officials connected with
the group have not stopped the recent deployment of Venezuela
and several sub-Saharan African countries.
I will start with you, Mr. Doran, and we can ask the whole
panel. What would you suggest in terms of a more effective
response against Russia's use of paramilitary groups like
Wagner?
Mr. Doran. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I would underscore my first position that we need to
dramatically raise the financial costs on the Kremlin should we
decide that they have escalated. If we determine, as a country,
that Russia is using its paramilitary forces against us, I
think the ending of the buying and selling of Russian sovereign
debt in our markets is a good first step and I know that is a
question before this Congress.
Mr. Kinzinger. Anybody else?
Ms. Conley. Congressman, I would argue we must make a
declarative policy that the Wagner Group we recognize as a
branch of the Russian military and treat it as a hostile
action.
What is making Wagner so effective is that Vladimir Putin
can immediately send those forces--he can achieve his political
objective with military means. He is not threatening it.
He is doing it and stopping the U.S. He is stopping any
advancement of the U.S. and its objectives and then we have to
confront whether it is worth lives to fight that, and that is
what he is banking on.
We have to make the costs greater. We have to--Russia right
now is so extended in Syria and Central African Republic,
within Venezuela. We have to make that--squeeze those costs and
make them greater.
If they are going to expend themselves then we have to make
that as painful as possible. But we also have to get our policy
house in order and have clear policies with allies that can be
more anticipatory rather than simply responding to Russia's
quicker action.
Mr. Kinzinger. And I notice it got pretty quiet after the
Syrians. Ms. Rosenberger?
Ms. Rosenberger. Yes, I was just going to add I agree with
Heather that we need to recognize the role that Wagner is
playing vis-a-vis the Russian government.
I would also note, though, that the key suspected financier
and one of the key founders of the Wagner Group are actually
both under U.S. sanctions already.
But what I think we need to do is look at how Wagner
operates. It actually seems to operate based on resource
contracts. So if we look in Syria, reports have indicated that
Prigozhin and the Syrian government maintain a contract to
grant Prigozhin a cut of profits from oil fields retaken by
Wagner.
In Sudan, the group is reportedly providing security for
gold mines. The group is also reportedly acting as personal
security as military trainers in Africa.
So it speaks to the systemic nature again of the entire
financial ecosystem and the corrupt nature that groups like
Wagner are able to exploit in order to get these kickbacks.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
Dr. Carpenter, no offense, but I am out of time. So I will
skip you, if you do not mind.
Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. The chair will now recognize
himself for 5 minutes. I just want to deal with something
specific, if I can.
Hungary recently allowed a small Russian bank, the
International Investment Bank, to open their new headquarters
in Budapest. One of the chairmen of the bank has a longstanding
tie with Russian intelligence agencies. What are the risks of
this bank being headquartered in an EU and NATO-member State,
No. 1?
No. 2, what can the United States and the EU do to respond
to decisions by EU member States or non-EU members, for that
matter, to increase these actions that increase the
vulnerability in our overall financial systems?
Third, what tools do we have at our disposal, whether the
U.S. alone or with allies, what tools do we have to eliminate
or lessen these vulnerabilities?
I would like to just jump ball--whoever wants to go first.
Dr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. I am happy to start, Chairman.
I think this is a huge vulnerability for not just Hungary
but for the entire EU because it is a potential Trojan Horse
for Russian money laundering and covert influence.
So what can we do? Well, a number of things. A European
wide anti-money laundering institution is probably the most
important step that the Europeans themselves could take to
regulate these sorts of--this sort of behavior and then
investigate financial institutions like this one that emerge in
their jurisdiction.
For us, we need to push back on Hungary more than we have
been so far. Hungary has become a mini version of Russia. It is
a kleptocratic and increasingly authoritarian system and we
have--because it is an ally and because it is important, and it
is, we have refrained from criticizing and from exerting
leverage over Budapest. I think that is a mistake.
So I think on the geopolitical front we need to apply
pressure on Hungary at the same time as we pursue some of these
broader systemic solutions to money laundering and covert
influence.
Mr. Keating. All right.
Ms. Rosenberger.
Ms. Rosenberger. I would firmly endorse the need for
creation of an EU wide anti-money laundering mechanism. Right
now we have a gap between the European-wide financial system
and the national level regulatory bodies. And so we do not--
there is a mismatch in between the regulatory system and that
needs to be urgently addressed.
And, again, I would completely endorse the need to push
back much harder on Prime Minister Orban. I think the kind of
treatment that he received here in the U.S. last week exactly
undercuts what we need to be doing and the message we need to
be sending.
Ms. Conley. So, Chairman, the IIB and the fact that the
Hungarian government gave the IIB diplomatic immunity is a
U.S., NATO, and EU policy failure.
It is quite interesting that even Mr. Strache mentions in
the video about following Orban, Orbanism, and the play book
that Mr. Orban has created.
I think it is time to now contemplate sanctioning select
Hungarian officials. I think it is time to contemplate, as much
as it grieves me, to limit Hungary's access to NATO classified
information.
I think the--I think the risk now has become so great that
we have to contemplate measures that would just be the last
thing I would wish to contemplate.
But if we do not get serious about this, all it does is
grow the problem. The Hungarian government has been warned by
Members of Congress and the Senate about this and it goes
absolutely unheeded. We have to take action.
Mr. Keating. Well, the we that we are talking about I think
is important, and I just want to drill down on NATO as a whole.
You know, we all are aware of the enormous information sharing
that is going on in regards to security and terrorist threats
that exist with our NATO allies.
It is extraordinary. It is strong. It remains strong. Yet,
we are not breaching this area of attack at all in terms of
what our defences could be. We are not--we are not discussing
it. So what can NATO do together? This, to me, seem critical.
What can NATO do together to deal with this?
Ms. Rosenberger.
Ms. Rosenberger. I think it is a really critical question.
So NATO has done more to look at nontraditional threats as part
of its mandate. But I think it needs to go further.
No. 1, I think it needs to strengthen cooperation with the
EU including on intelligence sharing. No. 2, I think that NATO
needs to reemphasize what--this is an idea proposed by former
U.S. Ambassador to NATO, General Doug Lute--needs to
reemphasize Article 3, which is about resilience.
It is about every member of the alliance actually having
the resilience to withstand and provide for the kind of defense
needed and so many of the tactics that we see the Kremlin using
are actually targeting these internal vulnerabilities. So
resilience has to be a key part of the strategy.
Finally, I think the hybrid threat center that the EU and
NATO have set up in Helsinki needs to do more to prioritize the
kinds of tools and tactics that we are talking about today, it
is doing great work on information operations and cyber attacks
but energy and economic coercion is part of its mandate and it
needs to take a higher priority on that.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. I agree fully. We cannot do this
alone. Since we reversed order of the opening questions, we
will go--now go to Representative Albio Sires, who chairs the
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee in the Foreign Affairs
Committee.
Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being
here.
You know, all my life I keep saying this. While we sleep,
the Russians plot--try to hurt us. And I have spent most of my
life trying to wake people up and say hey, let's start paying
attention.
You know, now they are playing in the Western Hemisphere.
Look what is happening in Venezuela. If you look at Nicaragua,
they sold Nicaragua 50 tanks last year--$80 million. I mean,
that is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. They are
playing in some of the other countries.
Where do you--now we also have in the Western Hemisphere
the Chinese. Do you see any coordination between the Chinese
and the Russians in the Western Hemisphere to destabilize some
of these places?
Dr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. So I would say in terms of overt
coordination, I do not think we have evidence of that. But we,
clearly, see mutually aligned interests in terms of supporting
dictators like Maduro. Also the same thing happens in Syria.
In Europe, we see, for example, malign influence channels
where the Chinese piggyback on Russian malign influence
networks, and vice versa.
The closest example to coordination against a democratic
State is, I believe, in June 2017 there was a series of
coordinated cyber attacks against the South Korean government
that were originating from Russia and China at the same time.
It is circumstantial evidence as to whether that was
coordinated or just, again, they happened to have the same
target. But, clearly, their interests align in terms of
propping up teetering authoritarians and then also undermining
democratic regimes whenever they can.
Ms. Conley. Congressman, I think what we are seeing across
the board is Russia trying to re-enliven its former Soviet
relationships certainly through arms exports. We are seeing
that across the board--Middle East, Africa--as well as some of
its economic contacts.
This is an area of understanding Chinese and Russian
interaction, which is an area of research that we all I think
have to do a much better job.
I would observe they are staying out of each other's way,
to an extent, but what they are trying to do is prevent any
change of regime. This is what frightens both Xi Jinping and
Vladimir Putin the most. It is their own internal unrest
unseating them someday.
So this is all about regime status quo and they will do
what they need to do economically or militarily to try to
preserve regime status quo wherever it may be, and certainly
where it is important to the United States that is even a
higher priority.
Mr. Sires. Anybody else?
Ms. Rosenberger. I would agree, that I do not think we have
seen enough evidence yet of overt coordination. But I do think,
No. 1, there is the alignment of interests.
I do think it is important to understand that China and
Russia have different long-term games. So whereas chaos and
disruption is the goal of most of the Kremlin's activities, you
know, that is in part driven by the fact that Russia is an
objectively declining power.
I think that Heather was absolutely right to emphasize we
cannot give Putin and his cronies more credit than they are
due. This is largely a disruption strategy and that is
relatively easy.
What Beijing is trying to do is actually a much longer-
term, more strategic, and therefore, I think, even more
nefarious game. It is harder to detect.
China is actually trying to not just weaken the
international order in the short term but to construct
something alternative in the long term, and that means that
they are more careful.
They do not want to be caught. Putin often wants to be
caught. And I think that that has different implications for
the policy response.
Nonetheless, I completely agree with what Dr. Carpenter
said. The Chinese often piggyback on the Russians' tactics and
I think that is something for us to be very aware of.
Mr. Sires. Do you see the rise of the right wing and
populist parties in some of these countries as a result of
Russia's effort?
Ms. Conley. I am sorry, Congressman. Can you repeat that,
just at the very end? I did not----
Mr. Sires. You have the rise of all these right wing or
these extremists in some of these countries. Do you see the
rise in that as a result of Russia's hand in some of these
countries?
Ms. Conley. So, again, I would say the weakness exists
already in this society. Many of these groups a decade ago
would have been polling at 1 or 2 percent.
The economic crisis--the global economic crisis--fuelled
great uncertainty. The migration crisis in Europe fuelled it
even more.
So these groups--where Russia had made some long-term
investments and funding them and encouraging them because they
were against the European Union--they were against the United
States--these parties now, because of the conditions, have
grown and Russia is amplifying their message.
So it is not the Russians that are causing this. It is
because of the internal dimensions in European societies. But
Russia is amplifying it, helping those messages, helping to
instill more division in the society and this is the creation
of the chaos, the disruption--anything to make the West look
bad--because the last thing President Putin wants is the
Russian people to want what the West has because he can never
give that to them and remain in power.
So he has to make the West look the absolute worst. And so
he is just showing how horrible it is, how divided it is, how
decadent it is, and then the Russian people will never want the
West.
Mr. Sires. Thank you. My time is up.
Mr. Carpenter. If I could just add to that.
I think there is a pattern of evidence that shows that
Russia is financially and also through other means supporting
right wing groups, especially across Europe.
So if you look at the Jobbik far-right party in Hungary, if
you look at a tiny little pro-Russian party in Poland called
Zmiana, which was funded through laundered money that went
through the Russian laundromat that was funnelled through banks
in Moldova, ended up in Zmiana's coffers as a means of
supporting this little fringe party but on the right to throw
chaos, again, in the Polish political system, and we see this
across the board.
The video of Strache and what has happened in Austria
recently also indicative. So Russia bets on many horses but
they look to the far right as one of the most disruptive
elements in European politics.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Representative Greg Pence from Indiana.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Ranking Member
Kinzinger.
I am going to actually ask a followup question to
Congressman Sires but I am going to get there a little bit--in
a different sort of way.
On May 9th, Chairman Keating and Ranking Member Kinzinger
held a meeting on China's expanding influence in Europe and
Asia--Eurasia. The witnesses laid out in detail how China,
through the Belt and Road Initiative and their use of State-
owned enterprises undermine U.S. interests and those of our
European allies and partners.
As a member of the Transportation Infrastructure Committee,
we even spoke about Chinese SOEs and BDYs specifically in the
context of our domestic infrastructure work just 2 weeks ago.
But China is not alone in these types of activities. As we
are talking about today, Russia is right there with them. This
theme of Russia and Chinese convergent in Europe was my biggest
and most concerning takeaway from our previous hearings.
Ms. Rosenberger, you addressed Russian ownership of assets
in Europe States in your prepared testimony when you cite your
fellow witness, Ms. Conley, saying, quote, ``At a strategic
level Heather Conley found in CSIS's 'Kremlin Play book' that
countries where Russia's economic footprint was greater than 12
percent of GDP were valuable to Russian influence in State
capture.''
Here is my two questions as a takeoff. One, have Russia and
Chinese found new ways to invest in countries' infrastructure
to continue to hurt U.S. allies like private corporations, and
two, to what degree are we observing Russia and Chinese
cooperation in these private coercive economic tactics?
Start with you, Dr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. So, again, Congressman, I would say that we
have seen a certain degree of perhaps tacit coordination. When
the Chinese government was looking at investing in the Port of
Piraeus in Greece, one of the biggest ports in the world, the
Russians were also very much interested in this as an
infrastructure project.
I think the key for the Russians was to ensure that Piraeus
was not bought by Western, especially American, investors, and
so they were happy to see the Chinese move in there.
And then since, of course, there has been a huge tax
evasion scandal that has surfaced as a result of Chinese goods
flowing through that port.
Mr. Pence. And you are referring to private investment of
China and Russia?
Mr. Carpenter. Correct. Well, investment by Chinese State-
owned companies. So sort of parastatals, if you will.
We see competition now as U.S. investors are poised to
develop the Anaklia Deep Water Port on the Black Sea coast of
Georgia. Again, this interferes with the Chinese One Belt, One
Road initiative. They would like to be involved there. The
Russians are also not happy about this investment.
So their interests often align and then we see sometimes a
tacit coordination but, again, nothing overt at this stage.
Ms. Rosenberger. Thank you, sir. I think it is a really
important question. I would caution personally that I do not
believe there is such a thing as a private Chinese company that
is engaged in overseas investment.
There are different kinds of arrangements. Some of them are
State owned. Some of them have different kinds of relationships
with the party State.
But I certainly do not believe, as somebody who has spent a
good bit of my career on China, that there is such a thing of a
private Chinese company that has the ability to engage in
foreign investment and foreign trade activity.
Much of what we see through the Belt and Road Initiative is
the use of market-distorting tactics in order to help provide
for or facilitate foreign investment in targeted States.
This then provides a distortion in the market for other
firms that are trying to compete so that the Chinese firms gain
a foothold. They then are able to create dependencies.
That creates leverage--things like the debt trap, which I
know you heard about in your hearing last week. These are all
an ecosystem that becomes created that gives the Chinese
Communist Party and its proxies a foothold in these countries.
In my testimony, I spoke specifically about an example from
the Czech Republic where a company called CEFC China Energy had
done a lot to cultivate Czech President Zeman and create
potentially some connectivity similar to what we see Russia
doing.
So I think it is really important to understand the very
holistic strategy and the way that it is in fact targeting our
European allies.
Last point--I was in Brussels last week. I got off the
plane, was heading through Customs and the very first thing I
saw was an electronic billboard that was advertising for
Huawei--vote Huawei 5G--it is our values. It is our values.
So I am particularly concerned not just about the broader
strategy, not just about the dependency created, but the
dependencies that are going to be created through investment in
the technology sector.
These are going to be transformative kinds of investments
that will affect not only our economies but our strategic
interests in the decades to come.
Thank you.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Representative Dina Titus from Nevada.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing.
You know, the Mueller report concluded that the Russian
government had interfered in our election--I think the quote
was ``in a sweeping and systematic fashion''--and you all, in
your very expert ways, have laid out a number of examples of
Russian interference in Europe from Greece to Lithuania.
Yet, we have a president who seems to just pooh-pooh all
this. He sides with Putin over our own intelligence. He says he
believes Putin when he did not say--when he tells him he did
not do it or he does not bother to ask about the 2020
elections.
He just minimizes at every turn this Russian engagement. He
seems to think that Russia could be a buddy of ours if we just
find the right interest.
Now, that is totally contrary to a lot of scholars who have
said that--and I think you just mentioned it earlier--Putin
needs the U.S. as an enemy in order to maintain his position at
home.
So my first question would be to you, where do you fall? Do
you think that that is an accurate description or do you think
we can just kind of work out a few of the details and then be
friends with Russia down the road?
And then the second part of the question is you have laid
out for us things we need to do--stronger sanctions, campaign
finance reform, cracking down on LLCs, money laundering.
But I would ask you is not all of that undermined by the
president's position, by his attack on the free press, turning
them into the enemy when they could be a good anecdote to this
sort of activity with the real fake news coming out of Russia?
The lack of the State Department doing anything kind of
that parallel's the EU's action plan against disinformation and
also just his general antipathy toward multilateral
arrangements so we are not working with our allies in Europe?
So, one, how do you feel about Russia being a buddy, and
second, do you think all these suggestions that you make are
being undermined by what's coming out of the White House?
Doctor, you want to start?
Mr. Carpenter. Happy to start, Congresswoman. I think there
is this myth that we have a range of potentially cooperative
interests with Russia when in fact Russia's primary interest is
to undermine U.S. democracy.
They see their role, for example in Syria, as undermining
our ability to create regime change or political transition, if
you will, in Syria. The scope for cooperation is minimal to
nil, there and across the board, whether it is CT, whether it
is in any other sphere, other than potentially in arms control
with the extension of the New START Treaty. That is about the
only potential overlapping interest that I can see. Everywhere
else Russia's primary goal is to undermine us.
Now, in terms of your second question, I completely agree.
The narrative that Russia is pushing here is precisely a
narrative that you cannot trust the media: the media are
biased.
You know, so when the president says things, calls the
media the enemy of the people, he is playing into Putin's
narrative.
That is exactly what Russia wants, and that is why Russia
also cultivates various populist politicians across Europe,
because they advance that very same narrative of undermining
democratic institutions and trust in them--law enforcement, tax
authorities, all of this.
It is not just the Putin play book. It is the Orban play-
book. And then when we see it happening here in this country,
absolutely, this undermines our ability to build resilience
against these subversive tactics.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Ms. Rosenberger. I would just agree that I think we need to
be very clear-eyed on what Putin's strategy is and how that
does not in fact line up with an attempt to be friendly.
But on the--on your question about whether or not some of
these suggestions can exist without a broader strategy, I would
say they can certainly be a little bit of a patchwork and I
think that is what we see cropping up right now by a lot of
dedicated folks in government who are trying to do the right
thing.
But this is a whole of society problem. Many of the
challenges that we are talking about today by their asymmetric
and evolving nature fall in gaps and seams of our government.
It requires an integrated, coordinated, and holistic
approach that requires leadership from the top, strategic
messaging, and I think we need to take some very clear steps in
order to make that possible.
Ms. Conley. Congresswoman, Mr. Putin needs the conflict
with the West. That is his entire point of survival. There can
be no Russia without Mr. Putin and he will protect it from the
West.
Unfortunately, what Mr. Putin needs to protect Russia from
is from China and China's growing encirclement of Russia.
I think exactly to Laura's point, every one of the
departments and agencies are doing their best to do their best.
We just do not have a focused White House bipartisan priority
on this very important task.
And the last thing I will say is even when President Trump
does meet with Mr. Putin and he has expressions of strong
support, what happens is that there is a real reaction against
that. There is an antibody. Congress passes more powerful
sanctions. There is an outcry.
So even when the president takes positions that seem very
much at odds with where our policy is, where our national
interests are, there is a reaction against what that is and I
think that demonstrates we are very uncomfortable.
When President Putin is very pleased with something the
U.S. does we know instinctively that that works against the
United States.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Representative Ron Wright of Texas.
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Conley, I want to go back to energy policy for a moment
and, Mr. Doran, I would like for you to also comment, given
your earlier comment about Nord Stream 2. It has to do with
Russia weaponizing its energy resources against European
countries.
Earlier this year, we passed Mr. Kissinger's European
Energy Security and Diversification Act--let's see if I can get
that word out--which provides support to European countries to
diversity its energy resources.
Tomorrow we are going to consider my bill, the Energy
Diplomacy Act, which will authorize an assistant secretary
State for energy resources within the State Department,
dedicated to advancing our energy security interests and those
of our allies.
Apart from those things, what would you recommend that we
do--Congress do--to help countries end their dependence on
Russian oil and gas, and particularly in Europe?
Mr. Doran. Thank you, Congressman.
I think your question is perfectly phrased and well timed.
I would say this. Because we have heard a lot about perhaps the
vacuum that has been created in the past in Europe and a lot of
questions about what the United States does about it on energy
or diplomacy, and I think the merger of those two things is
important.
First and foremost I think it is essential that we offer
free market alternatives to Russia's monopolistic forms of
competition in the energy space in Europe.
As I said earlier, that means sanctions on Nord Stream 2
while simultaneously providing market-based alternatives
through U.S. LNG and other sources.
I think the United States can and should take a greater
leadership role in rallying our European allies in Europe to
create a--what I would call a shield wall against Nord Stream
2. I would stress this for the committee. Many European allies
look to Germany as a weather vane for what is and is not
acceptable when it comes to their relations with Russia.
We have heard a lot of testimony this morning about how
this ally or that has been too cozy with the Russians, and I
would stress Europeans look at what Germany is doing as a
signal for what is acceptable in their relations with Russia.
The United States can and should create--use its bully pulpit
and its leadership to say there is an alternative.
It is free market based. The Russians are not your friends.
We need to slam the door on their energy competition--
monopolistic competition in Europe.
Ms. Conley. Congressman, we have documented both in the
Kremlin Play Book 1 and the Kremlin Play Book 2 that energy is
a key source of Russian malign influence. It is sort of the
joke of why did the robber rob the bank--well, that is where
the money is. That is where Russia's source of power and its
money is.
So the Bulgarian case which Congressman Pence had mentioned
about this threshold that we saw of Russia's economic footprint
in a given country, Bulgaria has been unable and unwilling to
diversify its own energy, which is crazy.
It pays some of the highest costs of Russian oil and gas
and it is one of the closest neighbors to Russia. It cannot
diversify. There are so many influential tools of, you know,
fictitious NGO's that come up where it has influences with the
g government. It refuses to diversify.
Now, yes, the United States can certainly provide
alternatives. U.S. LNG is a perfect example. Almost overnight
when Lithuania imported U.S. LNG it dropped Gazprom's price by
30. So we need competition, absolutely.
But we need transparency into how Russia is using its
energy leverage in Bulgaria, in Hungary. We need to be as
concerned about Nord Stream 2 as we are about Turk Stream,
which is going to do the exact same thing that South Stream,
which, thankfully, ended due to a lot of American leadership
and European leadership, but it is coming back again.
So we have to work with our European partners. The
challenge that we have is we need to keep our allies in a
strong position. Whatever policy response cannot weaken our
allies. It has to strengthen them.
So I would recommend doing a much more of a deeper dive
financially and to the banks that are supporting Nord Stream 2,
the energy companies.
If they were to completely be transparent about the nature
of their transactions, we may have a different view and maybe a
different tool than sanctioning them, which is, I understand,
certainly under contemplation. But we have different tools and
transparency is one of the biggest.
Mr. Wright. Thank you very much. I am out of time.
Mr. Keating. Representative David Cicilline from Rhode
Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses for your testimony.
Dr. Carpenter, I want to focus for a moment on the dark
money that is supporting political candidates. As you know, the
Russians have provided funds through illicit means directly to
pro-Russian political parties and individuals.
As an example, an obscure Russian bank provided the French
political party National Rally with a multimillion dollar loan
before the last French Presidential election. That is just one
example.
I wonder if you could just tell us what your sense is of
the magnitude of this problem of how pervasive this kind of
dark money is and whether the existing European governments
have the tools at their disposal because of existing laws to
prevent that.
Can the U.S. be doing more to support that work? Should we
be working more closely with them and how should we be doing
that?
Because it seems to me if those resources remain available,
that becomes a very substantial source of Russian malign
activity when they have the ability to prop up and even help be
successful certain candidates.
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
I think this is crucial. This gets at the heart of Russia's
influence operations how it finances them via dark money, and
we really do not know how much of this money flows into Europe
or into our own system.
In 2015, the Treasury Department estimated that some $300
billion is laundered annually into the United States. But that
is from a variety of different sources.
Now, other estimates have said that Russian private
holdings abroad are between $800 billion and about $1.3
trillion. So there is a vast amount of resources that are held
by oligarchs, tycoons, businessmen, Russian companies that is
available for use in dark money operations and influence
operations.
We do not know--the bottom line is we do not know the
extent of it. But what we have to do is empower the Europeans
to go after anti-money laundering regulations and with a
regulator that exists across the EU and we ourselves
desperately need to address the issue of shell companies and
beneficial ownership, exposing that ownership so that we have
more transparency about what the Russians are doing in our own
country.
It is so easy to establish layer upon layer of shell
companies through Delaware, Nevada, North Dakota, other States,
and then to siphon money into our political process. It is just
simply all too easy and we do not know the extent of the dark
money that flows through that process.
Mr. Cicilline. And in addition to that, I know there has
been some effort most recently by the French but I know other
European countries have engaged in some effort to reduce the
dissemination of fake news or fake information on social media
and really hold service providers accountable.
And I do not know whether any of those--there is enough
information to determine whether those have been successful.
Are there lessons we can learn about their effort--and this is
for any of the witnesses--to respond to this other substantial
source of power in these elections that has been misused and
wide dissemination of inaccurate and false information?
Ms. Rosenberger. Thank you.
Yes, I think the EU is actually really leading in this
space and is leading in a way that, frankly, the United States
has not been.
I think there are a number of steps that the EU and its
various institutions have taken that are worth considering. One
is it has created a rapid alert system amongst its member
States, particularly in advance of the parliament elections
that is sharing real-time information among the different
States about what they are seeing in their information
ecosystem so that they can alert one another to possible
trends.
Two, they have taken on this Code of Practice that is a
sort of self-regulatory agreement with the platforms. Some of
the platforms have signed up. Not all of them have. But it is
an interesting model that is then actually giving some
accountability and transparency to what the platforms are
doing.
They are required to provide monthly reports to various
parts of the EU in advance of the parliament elections and
hopefully continuing beyond that.
The one thing I would caution about what we are seeing in
terms of a number of the proposals coming out of Europe and
other parts of the world dealing with information operations
and information manipulation is a focus on content, and I have
argued that in fact what we see engaging in certainly the
Russian style information operations is not properly seen as a
content problem.
It is a problem of bad actors--nefarious actors and
manipulative behavior. Most of the content that we have
actually seen pushed by the Internet Research Agency and
similar outfits is not actually information that is
demonstrably true or not.
It is engaged in manipulation, polarization, and other
kinds of operation under false pretenses.
So I would caution about going down that road. If I could
add just one last point as well on your prior question. I would
just like to note you asked about laws on foreign financing,
and actually we did a survey of the legal frameworks in EU
member states with regard to foreign financing and in fact only
half of EU member states have a complete ban on foreign
financing of political parties or candidates.
So while the dark money problem is a huge issue, in a
number of States there are either major loopholes or no
prohibition whatsoever. So we actually have a problem as well
of just inviting the Russians in through the front door.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you so much. My time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Representative Michael Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to talk about one specific portion of the Russian
foreign policy, which is their Arctic strategy. We have seen
increased Russian military footprint in the Arctic. Media
outlets have reported that in recent years Russia has unveiled
a new Arctic command for new Arctic brigade combat teams, 14
new operational airfields, 16 deep water ports, and 40
icebreakers with an additional 11 in development.
So we see increased military bases, increased military
ports, a dominant ice breaker fleet--when compared to America,
40 to 2. Other media reports have said that Russia has deployed
the S-400 surface-to-air missile as well as the Bastion anti-
shipments.
And so my question is in light of this increased military
buildup--and this is going to be to the entire panel so I will
start with you, Dr. Carpenter--one, I would ask you to speak to
the importance of the Arctic strategy to Russia's overall
global policy, and then two, what should be done to combat
Russia's growing military presence in the Arctic?
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
This is an area of the world that Russia is rapidly
militarizing. With each year, there are more, as you say,
airfields, more military capabilities put into the Arctic in
order for Russia to be able to dominate the Northern Sea Route
and the transit of commerce through that region as well as to
ensure that the Russians have a leg up in terms of developing
hydrocarbon and other mineral resources beneath the Arctic sea
bed.
So this is an area where we have, frankly, lagged. You
mentioned the ice breaker fleet comparison. We have--two is
actually a generous guess. It is more like one and a half,
depending on when that other breaker is able to operate, and
the Russians are just--you know, they are miles ahead of us.
So we need--you know, we have had this mantra of we do not
want to militarize the Arctic. But the reality is that Russia
is militarizing and so we have to respond, not necessarily by
putting in place offensive capabilities but we need to ensure
freedom of navigation.
We have been actually rather reticent to push that in the
Pentagon and I feel that we should be doing a lot more to
assert our rights in those northern sea passages because Russia
has a long-term strategy and they are banking on it. And the
Chinese are looking very enviously also at what Russia is
doing, and we are the--we are caught behind.
Ms. Rosenberger. I would just underscore the strategic
importance of the Arctic and, as Dr. Carpenter ended up there
at the end, China has also been well ahead of us in terms of
the way that it is using and exploiting the various resources
and the strategic passageways there.
So it is of incredible importance. But I am going to let
Ms. Conley jump in on this because she is the true expert here
on this issue.
Ms. Conley. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question.
Again, sort of rethinking how important the Arctic is to
Stalin, the Red Arctic--this was about, you know, man defeating
nature. It is very much about heroism in the Russian mindset.
It is the Russian Orthodox Church; we have had orthodox
priests sprinkling holy water on the North Pole. I mean, there
is lots of myth-making about it.
But they understand it is about--it is strategy, strategy,
and strategic location, getting to the North Atlantic and the
North Pacific very, very quickly.
We have done some analysis of commercial satellite imagery
of Wrangel Island, which is 300 nautical miles from Alaska,
which we are seeing a very sophisticated Sopka-2 radar.
We are also noticing with increased interest a whole new
set of weaponry that the Russians will test in an exercise this
September in Tsentr. We need to pay attention to this. I think
your colleagues in the Senate Armed Services Committee
certainly understand it.
But no one has the resources. No one wants to put the
resources. We do not need 40 Ice Breakers. We do not have the
Arctic coastline.
But we need sufficient presence air, land, and maritime to
be able to ensure we have access to the Arctic that is freedom
of navigation, that is over the air, and to make sure that Mr.
Putin, as he just said in April in St. Petersburg at his annual
Territory of Dialogues, is suggesting that we do not want the
Arctic to turn into another Crimea. Of course we do not.
But we need to make sure that NATO and the United States
are positioned to make sure that Mr. Putin does not even
contemplate thinking about the Arctic as a place to disrupt or
destabilize. We both want mutual peace, security, and
collaboration.
But you are asking the right questions, and you also have
to look at Chinese and Russian interaction in the Arctic, which
is China right now is constructing two ports in the Russian
Arctic, the Port of Sabetta and the Arkhangelsk Port.
Their energy interests are intertwined and we are going to
see a lot of Chinese LNG carriers going through the Bering
Strait. We are not prepared for that future either.
Mr. Doran. Congressman, can I just jump in here really fast
with one final point, which I think is a crucial for this
committee to remember?
Right now, we are in a State of competition with China and
Russia. We have heard a lot about that today. But if in a
sporting competition you are losing 40 to 2, there is no way to
spin it. You are losing.
When we look at our competition in the high north, I would
encourage the committee to remember the essential element of
our allies.
Countries like Norway are power generators for the United
States. They are power projectors for the United States. We can
do a lot more to rely upon our essential allies such as Norway
and others to listen and be more active in the high north.
Something to remember.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Representative Tim Burchett from Tennessee.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is for, I guess, Mr. Doran or Ms. Rosenberger, if that
is OK, and if anybody else wants to jump in just jump in.
In your all's views, what is the most vulnerable European
States to Russian disinformation campaigns and do you project
to be the--who do you project to be the next electoral target?
And if you all hesitate it takes up all my time and it
makes me----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Burchett [continuing]. It makes me look very
intelligent. So just hesitate a little bit.
Ms. Rosenberger. Well, no, no, no, no. So let me--let me
start with the end of it which you asked, which is most likely
to be the next electoral target.
I would argue it is all of them and I would argue that we
cannot see election interference as a discrete thing in and of
itself.
The strategies that all of us talked about today, these
tactics, these are ongoing operations and elections are one
moment in time.
One of my colleagues has said in fact that election
interference or elections are not necessarily the beginning
point or the end point of interference operations. They are the
flash point.
It is a moment of opportunity for Putin to gain particular
strategic gains and where you have a broader target surface.
But most of those operations are going on for quite some time
and continue for quite some time afterwards. So that is point
one.
In terms of who is most vulnerable, it is an incredibly
difficult question, hence the hesitation. I would simply say
that I think what we have seen is countries that are most
vulnerable are those where polarization is high, where
independent media has been--where the space has been shrunk and
where you have--where you do not have credible voices who are
giving people a sense of a shared fact base.
And so I think that those are three vulnerabilities that I
would look at when trying to understand who--which countries
may in fact be most vulnerable.
Mr. Doran. Thank you, Congressman.
Rather than saying one specific country, because I think
there is more than one, I will give you a region to look at--
the Western Balkans, and that applies not just to Russian
disinformation but also China.
There was questions earlier about the purchasing by Chinese
companies in Europe and what industries should we be afraid of.
When it comes to both Russia and China in the Western Balkans
and elsewhere, I would encourage the committee to look at the
media industry.
It is easy to purchase radio stations, television stations,
and other segments of the media and change their editorial
policies to say Chinese policy in Europe is good. Russian
policy is good. So I would encourage that focus. Western
Balkans--that is a key.
Mr. Burchett. Would you encourage us to get into the media
business?
Mr. Doran. I do not think it makes much sense for Congress
to start its own television station. I think your C-SPAN
ratings are kind of low these days.
Mr. Burchett. I know. We would have to do reruns of
``Finding Bigfoot.'' I have always found that does better than
the national news.
Yes, sir? I am sorry.
Mr. Carpenter. If I could just piggyback on that last
point, though. What I think we can do much more of is
supporting investigative journalists across the region. They
are vulnerable in the Western Balkans, as Peter has rightfully
pointed out, where there is a soft target for Russian
disinformation.
But they are vulnerable across the board. There was a
Slovak journalist who was murdered last year. There was a
Ukrainian journalist, Kateryna Handziuk, who was doused with a
fatal dose of acid. She died later.
Across the region they are under fire and they need both a
network of support but also the resources to be able to
withstand these attacks from often entrenched corrupt actors in
these societies and usually backed by Russia and China.
Ms. Conley. I would just offer I think one country that is
probably not in our focus for vulnerability is actually
Germany, which will be having three launder elections in the
fall in the east. It is a political transition that is quite
vulnerable and there are a lot of Russian opportunities for
influence.
And just a point on investigative journalism, there is some
fantastic journalism that is going on in these countries; we
have to support it. It is not us making the news. But they
are--they are being murdered because they are exposing
corruption, which is the power base of Russian influence.
So I cannot begin to tell you we need an offensive strategy
on transparency, investigative journalism, civil society--they
are demanding something different. We need to help them and be
the inspiration we once were.
Mr. Burchett. I have one quick question and I know I am
running out of time. But how would you all assess Russia's
meddling so far in this lead up to this week's European
parliament elections and what would you all be considered--
would you all consider a win for Russia in these elections?
I know you said it is one point in time. I do not want to
go back on those eloquent words you said, ma'am. But if one of
you all could fill me in on that.
Mr. Carpenter. I could start. You know, I think that there
is a degree of Russian interference across the board to support
anti-establishment nationalist populist parties.
So we recently had, amazingly, an anti-immigrant party come
to power as part of a ruling coalition in Estonia where last
year there were 5,200 immigrants, most of whom were former
Estonian citizens that were coming back.
They do not have a migration problem. But these sorts of
parties they play to Russia's interests. And so Russia is
supporting nationalist populist parties across the continent.
Ms. Rosenberger. I will just pick up on that. One of the
challenges, I think, in determining the degree to which we are
seeing Russian interference in Europe relates to a point that
Ms. Conley mentioned earlier in her testimony previewing what
to fear or worry about in terms of the U.S. 2020 elections and
that is that these operations as they have been continuing over
the years have become more deeply embedded in the networks that
are domestic networks.
So whether that is on the financial side, whether that is
on the information side, whether that is on the political or
sort of social group side, these networks have become more
entrenched.
And so witting or unwitting, you have domestic actors that
are engaging in activity that is very difficult to distinguish
from the foreign activity.
That is going to cause particular challenges over time as
well on the information front in dealing with free speech
because when it is a domestic actor that is simply carrying the
message it has much more significant implications than when we
are just dealing with a foreign actor.
So it is very difficult. There has been some great research
that has looked at the degree to which there is this confluence
of the Russian interference operations and the far right
information environment in Europe that just came out a couple
weeks ago in particular looking at several countries and I
think that is really, as we are thinking about how these
problems become compounding over time, why we need so concerned
about acting now.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have gone way
over. I apologize.
Mr. Keating. That is fine. Thank you. Good questions.
Representative David Trone from Maryland.
Mr. Trone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The followup on Mr. Cicilline's question--2017 Germany
passed novel legislation to put massive fines on social media
companies that do not remove obvious criminal content within 24
hours.
2018, based in large part on lessons learned in recent
elections, France enacted a law that allows judges to block
distribution of fake news, you know, during an election.
So what role can and should social media companies
themselves play in deterring disinformation in these propaganda
campaigns?
I will just start with Mr. Michael Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. Well, I think Laura alluded to this point
earlier that the platforms have an obligation to take fake
content, fake accounts and bots, that engage in malicious
behavior off of their--off of their platforms.
It is not so much--if we are into policing content, you
know, as an American with First Amendment concerns, that makes
me squeamish.
But when we look at fake activity, activity that is
generated by robots, that is where the platforms need to be
devoting the resources to weed that information out--weed those
fake accounts off of their platforms--because that is sort of
what often generates the news cycle by amplifying some of the
fake content that otherwise would just sort of fall into a
void.
Ms. Rosenberger. One of the most important things that we
could do, and Congress can play a role here, is to create a
sustained information-sharing mechanism between the government,
law enforcement and intelligence community, and the platform
companies.
Basically what we have right now, if you want to go at this
in a systemic way, the way that Dr. Carpenter just talked about
and that I alluded to earlier--going after the actors and their
behavior--you need to have insights on what the bad guys are
doing over in St. Petersburg or wherever they are and that is
law enforcement and the intelligence community that has
particular insights into the nodes, networks, and pathways.
But it is the platforms that have the information on what
is actually happening--what the actual activity is and how it
is manifesting. You have to bring those two puzzle pieces
together.
Right now that is happening on an ad hoc basis between
certain parts of the U.S. Government and certain platforms. It
needs to happen on a sustained and formalized basis in ways
that protect privacy and speech.
We have examples of this from the cybersecurity domain, the
counterterrorism domain, and the financial integrity domain. It
is beyond time for us to take these steps. I think that it is
absolutely urgent and Congress can actually take that step.
Ms. Conley. Congressman, I would just say again that we
need a fusion center. We are not structured to combat this. We
need private sector engagement and we need the combination. It
is Treasury. It is Justice. It is Intelligence.
We have to restructure ourselves. The other part of the
equation is that we have to do a much better job of public
awareness. In my written testimony I sort of suggested, you
know, during the Second World War we had a big public campaign,
``Loose lips sink ships,'' which is sort of ridiculous.
But if it is, you know--if it is not factually correct you
have to delete--we have to warn the American people. They have
to know that this is about them and they have to be much more
proactive.
So it is getting our structural house in order, but it is
also helping the American people understand that this battle
space is taking place on their computers.
Mr. Doran. Congressman, one idea to take from your question
here is that some of our CEPA analysis has demonstrated if we
spend too much time obsessing about what the bots are doing it
is going to be a losing strategy.
Like I said, it costs the Russians pennies on the dollar to
compete with us in this sector. What I do think we could do is
to increase the networks between, as we have heard, U.S.
Government and outside of government, between experts.
Information sharing is key but also the public--if you
think of this disinformation as a virus the public needs to be
better equipped to protect themselves and each other from
communicating these kinds of information viruses.
Mr. Trone. Thank you.
Have you seen any ideas the EU or NATO have done to help
voters distinguish, you know, what's disinformation from fact
and opinion that has worked?
Mr. Carpenter. I think the model for us to follow is the
model from Finland and the Baltic States, which have been used
to receiving Russian disinformation for decades and decades and
they--you know, so much so that Russia had a Finnish language
service on Sputnik that they canceled in 2014 because it simply
was not getting through.
So that is the ultimate sign of success is when they pull
their programs because they are not getting through. But it
comes from--it comes from sort of being inoculated over the
course of many, many years to the fact that if there is
questionable content in the media that hey, that may not be
real--that it may be a propaganda item that has been put into
the public narrative.
And so it takes a sort of sustained public awareness-
raising campaign to get that level of inoculation within the
society.
Mr. Trone. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
It is clear from this morning's testimony that it is not
enough to just take down a site. We are playing whack-a-mole in
that instance and we have to really treat it as a much deeper
fusion effort that we have in so many other areas.
Now I would like to Representative and former Ambassador to
Luxembourg, Representative Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this
hearing and thank you to our witnesses for their time.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia has cultivated relationships
with the Bosnian Serb community including Milorad Dodik, a
Bosnian Serb politician currently chairing Bosnia's rotating
presidency.
Mr. Dodik has embraced and authoritarian Serb supremacist
ideology, and just last month claimed the 1995 Bosnian genocide
at Srebenica was a fabricated myth.
Although Dodik and other Russian allies in the Bosnian Serb
community oppose NATO membership, NATO foreign ministers agreed
in December to begin the advice and assistance program for
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Bosnian, Croat, and Bosniak presidents support NATO
membership.
Dr. Carpenter, how is Russia exploiting ethnic divisions to
stall Bosnia's ascension to NATO and what can the United States
do to combat these very dangerous tactics?
Mr. Carpenter. Well, Russia has always seen Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a soft target for its influence operations and
certainly President Dodik has travelled extensively to Moscow
to confer and to consult with President Putin about the
strategic direction of the country.
He essentially presents a veto over Bosnia's ability to
move forward with its Membership Action Plan and actually join
the NATO alliance.
And so far as he is in power or people like him in
Republika Srpska, it is hard to envisage that the country will
actually be able to 1 day join either NATO,or, by the way, the
EU because although they say that the EU is still a long-term
strategic priority, I am not so sure that when it actually
comes to it that people like Dodik will encourage the country
to move forward.
So we have to--you know, we have to try to work with those
people inside Bosnia that want a better future. But for right
now, you know, Dodik is fully supported by Putin.
The latest example was the Night Wolves motorcycle gang
which is a Russian sort of Trojan Horse. It is an intelligence
front. Was in Banja Luca with Dodik supporting him and offering
that sort of information support.
So this is a long-term effort. But, unfortunately, it is
the goal that Putin sees, by the way, for Ukraine and for
Georgia is to have sort of Republika--mini-Republika Srpskas in
these other countries, too, because they are a veto on the
Euro-Atlantic integration.
Mrs. Wagner. To that point, as some of our witnesses have
pointed out, Russian policies in the Balkans are largely
opportunistic and not strategic.
In light of this, it is important not to overestimate
Russia's ability to control events in foreign countries. But in
aggravating ethnic tensions in the Balkans, Russia is playing
with fire.
Ms. Conley, how likely is it that Russia will inadvertently
ignite a conflict in the Balkans that it cannot control?
Ms. Conley. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Many times Russia creates problems that only it can,
uniquely, solve and I think this is very true in the Western
Balkans. Former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General
Scaparrotti, has highlighted year after year his concern that
the Western Balkans is particularly vulnerable not only to
Russian malign influence but to instability.
Many Americans do not know we have 800-plus forces in
Kosovo today as part of a NATO mission in K-4 and we cannot
take stability in the Western Balkans for granted.
The challenge is, I think, for both the EU and the U.S. we
have allowed our presence to atrophy and others--Russia, China,
as well as Turkey, Qatar--have reintegrated and reinfluenced
the region.
We do not have--the Western Balkans is not a top priority
in our foreign policy toolkit. In Bosnia, in particular, which
you highlight, the Dayton Accords now, which was designed to
stop violence, which it did, it has now imprisoned Bosnia--that
it cannot move forward. It cannot reform, which in large is
Dodik's ability to prevent Bosnia from joining the Euro-
Atlantic community.
So I believe this will be fuelled by Russia to distract, to
disrupt, to potentially fuel a migration push toward Europe--
whatever it can do to distract.
But this is unfinished business. This is weakness that
Russia is simply exploiting and because the U.S. and EU do not
have clarity and strength of policy, it is being allowed to
happen.
So this is an area of huge concern. The problem is Mr.
Dodik is getting so much play because there is not a lot of
forces to push against him.
Mrs. Wagner. I have got some questions about Latvia and
Estonia, which I will submit especially to you, Mr. Doran, but
my time has lapsed, and I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Representative, and I think
that this committee will be focusing on those areas that you
brought up--very important areas, going forward, that need
greater attention and we will be delving into those issues as
this committee goes forward in this Congress.
I would like to call upon the vice chairman of the
committee, Representative Abigail Spanberger.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses for being here today.
My question is to followup on the discussion related to
civic engagement that I know has been the thread of a lot of
the discussion in question so far.
I am directing these specifically to Ms. Conley and Ms.
Rosenberger but I welcome the other two witnesses to add
anything to this discussion.
The European Union's East StratCom Task Force established
in 2015 seeks to raise awareness of Russian disinformation and
to educate the public about disinformation and improve media
literacy overall, particularly when it comes to the internet
and social media.
The Swedish government, for example, instituted a
nationwide digital competence curriculum for elementary school-
age children teaching them how to spot fake news and discern
the difference between reliable and unreliable sources.
As a former intelligence officer with CIA but also as a
mother of three young children, I do believe our national
security strength begins with the American people, especially
with our children, and that means ensuring they have the
necessary education and tools to make objective evidence-based
decisions.
So do you all believe the European Union's approach in
focusing on education and public awareness training and
especially with a pivot toward programs focused on children can
be or is an effective strategy to counter disinformation and
are there any other countries pursuing this type of program
that you have been aware of that you think are successful that
we should try and learn from?
Ms. Rosenberger. Well, thank you. I think those are really
important questions.
I would note just a couple of points. The first is that I
think this idea of building resiliency here at home is
absolutely critical to dealing with so many of these
challenges.
Whether that is resiliency of our financial system on some
of the tactics we were speaking about earlier or resilience on
the information side, these are vulnerabilities in our own
societies that are being exploited and we need to recognize
that.
Public awareness in education is absolutely a big part of
that. I would sort of parcel them out into two different
pieces. Public awareness about the threat requires real
consistent strategic messaging.
Ms. Conley mentioned earlier, you know, some of the
programs we have seen on the counterterrorism front. I think it
is very important that we think about simple messages that we
can replicate.
Sweden, I think, may have been mentioned earlier as an
example to look at for some of the tactics that they have used.
You mentioned the awareness campaigns. But they have also done
a lot of really good work up and down the board at raising
public awareness.
The one thing I would say that the East StratCom team has
focused a good bit of their energy on is on debunking specific
stories, false narratives.
I would suggest that the research shows that that is of
limited utility and that in fact it sometimes it risks actually
amplifying the content you are seeking to debunk.
I believe there is a threshold level at which it is
imperative for governments to step in and sort of demythologize
some of those narratives. But I would argue that that is not
path to go down.
The last point I would make, though, is while I think that
focusing on our children is extremely important, most of the
research shows that in fact it is senior citizens--people age
60 to 65 and older, depending on which study you look at--that
have been the most vulnerable to mis-and disinformation.
And so I think we cannot discount looking at that part of
the population, which has not grown up with so much technology
in their lives that may not be as accustomed to using it, and
that we need to make sure that we do not focus so much on just
the younger generation that we lose sight of the other parts of
the population that remain vulnerable.
Ms. Conley. Thank you again for the question, I think the
EU StratCom is a good thought. It is so under-resourced, sort
of buried. It is not proactive.
NATO's Strategic Communication Center, I would argue, is
certainly giving us leading tools of what is happening. But you
are right, the public education component is missing.
Sweden is the perfect model. I do not know of other EU
countries that have done sort of a similar education at the
grade school level. I think they see it as a part of what
they--their defense concept, as you may well know, is total
defense.
It is about civilian defense--that everyone is responsible
for defending the Nation and it begins with them individually.
That is preparing your home in case of disaste,r but that is
also preparing your mind for being influenced inappropriately.
So we have to somehow message that patriotism and public
awareness, that this is something that goes together. As I
mention in my written statement and my oral statement, we are
at war.
It is just a different kind of war and we have to convince
people that they have to take personal responsibility, making
sure that what they are reading and what they are hearing from
families and friends--is that right?
Do I have the right information? How can you be a truth
detective, if you will? That is part of our patriotic duty. But
we have to put it, I think, in those terms.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you very much.
I believe that, given its history, Estonia as well has
instituted from the first grade level even some of this
education on young people as well.
So I just want to thank our witnesses here. We have touched
upon the surface. Yet, I think we have done so in a way that
actually had us arrive at solutions and paths forward that we
can have.
So I want to thank all of you for making that part of your
testimony as well. There is a path forward. There are things we
can do domestically. There are things we can do, particularly,
information sharing with our allies in Europe. There are
lessons learned there that we can go forward to deal with what
is a major threat.
And today, we had the opportunity to amplify something that
is so often overlooked as a threat--the involvement of Russia
in public corruption, political corruption, and financial
corruption.
There is much to do going forward. But your testimony here
I think created a great foundation for us to pursue.
So with that, I want to adjourn this hearing and thank all
the members that took time out of an extremely busy day. You
saw people coming in and coming out. But we had great
participation.
I want to thank you and adjourn this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]