[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 9, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-37
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
Terrorism
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
COLIN ALLRED, Texas ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey LEE ZELDIN, New York
DAVID TRONE, Maryland BRIAN MAST, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
JUAN VARGAS, California STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
Casey Kustin, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Alterman, Dr. Jon B., Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski
Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, Director of the
Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies........................................................ 8
Exum, Dr. Andrew, Executive, Hakluyt & Company, Former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy.......... 20
Wormuth, Honorable Christine, Director, International Security
and Defense Policy Center, Senior Fellow, Rand Corporation,
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy................... 31
Borshchevskaya, Ms. Anna, Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 43
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 66
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 67
Hearing Attendance............................................... 68
CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Thursday, May 9, 2019
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
Terrorism
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E.
Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Deutch. All right. This hearing will come to order.
Welcome, everyone. The subcommittee is meeting today to
hear testimony on Chinese and Russian influence in the Middle
East. I thank our witnesses for appearing here today. I will
now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
statement, and then will turn it over to the ranking member to
do the same.
Thanks so much to our witnesses for testifying today and
for helping us examine patterns of Russian and Chinese
influence in the Middle East and North Africa. In the fall of
2015, Russia launched a targeted military intervention in Syria
to save the regime of Bashar al-Assad and ensure access to
military bases on the Mediterranean Sea.
Moscow has used this foothold to assert its interests
throughout the region, to expand its political and military and
economic influence, to reclaim its status as a great power, and
to offer itself as an authoritarian alternative to the United
States.
In recent years, Moscow conducted military exercises with
Egypt and sold Cairo more than $2 billion worth of aircraft,
cooperated with Saudi Arabia to stabilize global oil prices,
expanded ties with Khalifa Haftar in Libya, engaged in
discussions to sell the S-400 Missile Defense System to Qatar,
and strengthened relations with both Iran and with Israel.
China has also expanded its influence in the Middle East
and North Africa in recent years, although in a different way.
China's engagement has been primarily economic rather than
military or political.
Since 1995, the region has been China's No. 1 source of
imported petroleum. China overtook the United States as the
largest net importer of crude oil from the Middle East in 2013.
By 2018, roughly 44 percent of China's crude oil imports came
from nine Middle Eastern countries.
Every major regional actor, including Israel, Saudi Arabia,
and Iran, has expressed interest in various projects of China's
Belt and Road Initiative. If history teaches us anything, China
is likely to increase its political engagement and expand its
military footprint to secure these economic interests.
Indeed, in 2017, Iran and China held a joint naval exercise
in the Persian Gulf, and just last month Egypt hosted the
Chinese and Russian navies in a training exercise.
China began operating its first overseas military base
located in Djibouti in 2017, providing it greater naval access
to the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea.
The expanding regional roles of both Russia and China are
of particular importance in light of the Trump administration's
national security strategy that prioritizes great power
competition. Under this paradigm, rivalry with both China and
Russia will become the organizing principle of U.S. foreign
policy, yet we continue to see unprincipled China policy and
deference to Russia.
The administration's announced withdrawal from Syria was a
gift to Putin at a time when clear-eyed American leadership is
what is clearly needed. The Middle East and North Africa may
become an arena of strategic competition to an extent not seen
since the early years of the cold war.
I hope our witnesses can draw upon their experience and
share their insight to help us understand Moscow and Beijing
strategies in the region, where our interests overlap or
diverge, and how the United States should approach Russia and
China's roles in the Middle East and North Africa.
And with that, I will turn it over to the ranking member,
Mr. Wilson, for his opening statement.
Mr. Wilson. Chairman Deutch, thank you for holding this
important hearing. China and Russia's increasing presence in
the Middle East underscores the necessity of American
leadership in the region. Beijing and Moscow are engaged on all
levels in the Middle East and North Africa, political,
military, economic, and beyond. And they are planning for the
long haul, raising serious questions for U.S. interest and
policy in the region.
As we delve into this discussion, we must also bear in mind
that China and Russia's engagement in the Middle East is not
only meant to increase their clout and influence in the region,
but to decrease America's influence. Indeed, China and Russia
are eager to take advantage of fissures between the U.S. and
our traditional allies. They seek to portray themselves to our
regional allies as viable alternatives to the U.S. while
deepening their involvement in the region at our expense.
Under Chinese President Xi's leadership, China has expanded
its engagement in the region dramatically. Beijing has
dedicated considerable focus on the Middle East as part of the
controversial Belt and Road Initiative. China has invested in
nearly every country in the region, including in Israeli ports
and railways and the expansion of the Suez Canal in Egypt.
Even more concerning are China's technology initiatives in
the region. While the United States has voiced concern about
Huawei, ZTE, and other technology firms, our friends in the
Middle East seem happy to integrate Chinese initiatives in
their technology sectors. In 2019 alone, Bahrain, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE have already engaged with China on telecom
and 5G infrastructure.
Although China's activity in the region has historically
focused on economics, under President Xi, Beijing has also
increased its military footprint, as Beijing deepens military
ties with traditional U.S. allies in the region, like Saudi
Arabia and Egypt, and the United States must make it clear to
our partners that collaboration with China comes at a
significant real-world consequence.
Late last year, the U.S. Navy announced it would reconsider
port calls to Haifa, Israel, once the Shanghai International
Port Group, a company in which the Chinese government has a
majority stake, takes over the civilian port in 2021. Like
China, Russia has been strengthening military and diplomatic
ties with our traditional Middle Eastern allies for years now,
seeking to submit its role as a regional power broker.
Since Russia's 2015 intervention in the Syrian civil war,
and support of the Assad regime, Moscow has also built strong
economic ties with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, sold billions of
dollars of arms to the UAE, and cultivated close ties to
President Sisi of Egypt.
Russia's Middle East strategy has been to cultivate those
ties with all actors, both U.S. friends and posts, in service
of its ultimate goal of dominating the region and undermining
U.S. interest. Moscow has depended on its relationships in
recent years with Iran, Hezbollah, Turkey, Israel, as well as
the rival Palestinian and Libyan factions.
And as Russia's role in the region continues to grow,
actors in the region will feel less inclined to heed to U.S.
interest, like respect for rule of law, democratic
institutions, and human rights. While Russia and China appear
to be real viable alternatives to the U.S., whether it be
military, politically, or economically, the region will move
toward authoritarianism and away from democracy.
I hope our expert witnesses today can address these crucial
issues. How can the United States continue to advocate for our
democratic values in the Middle East without pushing our
friends and partners into the arms of Russia and China?
There is simply no alternative to U.S. leadership. We must
redouble our efforts to deepen ties to the region and caution
our allies that full-scale engagement with Russia or China is
not in their interest.
The Middle East faces many challenges already, but if we
fail to face the increasing Chinese and Russian influence in
the region, things will only get worse for the people of the
Middle East and for the United States and its interest for
freedom and democracy.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Deutch. I thank the ranking member. I will now
recognize members of the subcommittee who wish to be recognized
for a 1-minute opening statement. Mr. Cicilline, you are
recognized.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
important hearing. And, of course, thank you to our witnesses
for being here today.
As it has in so many parts of the world, in the Middle
East, the Trump administration has forfeited American
leadership in an ongoing series of diplomatic and strategic
blunders that have set back our standing in the region, not to
mention the world.
The administration pulled out of the Iran deal with no
replacement, leaving an emboldened Iran that indicates it will
return to its nuclear program. The administration's Syria
policy is virtually non-existent. And Saudi Arabia, the Trump
administration has embraced a government that has had a
journalist hacked to deal.
And Yemen, the United States is supporting a conflict that
has led to unspeakable human suffering and inflamed tensions in
the region. The list of failures goes on and on.
The lack of a clear U.S. strategy and diplomatic engagement
in the region has created a vacuum--a vacuum China and Russia
are already exploiting. This is making the region less stable.
It is emboldening human rights offenders who take the
administration's ambivalence toward human rights as a green
light to crack down on civil society, further discriminate
against women and LGBTQ individuals, and silence free speech.
Today, I hope we can discuss the risk the American
security, as well as the risk to human rights, posed by a
rising Russia and China in the Middle East.
I look forward to examining what Congress can do to support
human rights activists in the region and to ensure the
administration promotes American interests as well as our
values. In the absence of a strategic vision by the
administration, Congress must step up on behalf of the American
people and set forth a path in the Middle East.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for calling this very
important hearing, and I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. Seeing no other
requests for opening statements, we will move on. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to
the length limitations in the rules.
It is now my pleasure to introduce our witnesses. Dr. Jon
Alterman is senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in
Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle
East Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
He previously served in multiple roles at the United States
Department of State, as an expert advisor to the Iraq Study
Group, and before entering government, he was a scholar at the
U.S. Institute of Peace and the Washington institute for Near
East Policy. In addition to his policy work, he teaches Middle
Eastern studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies and the George Washington University.
Next, I will turn to my colleague from Texas, Mr. Allred,
to introduce his constituent.
Mr. Allred. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am excited to
introduce Dr. Andrew Exum, a constituent of mine from Dallas.
Dr. Exum is an executive at Hakluyt & Company, a global
management consultancy. Before that, he served as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy, from
2015 until 2017.
And previously, he served active duty in Afghanistan and
Iraq where he led a light infantry and ranger platoons, and
later served as a civilian in the Department of Defense on a
fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations.
Dr. Exum, thank you so much for coming, sir. We have some
friends in common who have spoken highly of you. I am sure
everything they said is not true, but we are happy to have you
here. And thank you for sharing your expertise with us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Allred. It is worth pointing
out, as the member representing South Florida, that many, many
of the witnesses who appear before our committee 1 day will
ultimately reside in my district as well.
Next, I would--it is my honor to introduce Under Secretary
Christine Wormuth. Ms. Wormuth is the director of the RAND
International Security and Defense Policy Center and is a
frequent writer and speaker on foreign policy and national
security and homeland security issues.
Prior to joining RAND, she served as Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy at the United States Department of Defense
from 2014 to 2016. She previously served in multiple roles at
the Pentagon, including Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Strategy, Plans, and Forces, and senior director for defense at
the National Security Council. And she was a senior fellow at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Welcome, Ms. Wormuth.
Finally, Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya is a senior fellow at the
Washington Institute focusing on Russia's policy toward the
Middle East, a Ph.D. candidate at the George Mason University,
and a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy.
She was previously with the Atlantic Council and the
Peterson Institute for International Economics, a former
analyst for a U.S. military contractor in Afghanistan. She has
also served as communications director at the American Islamic
Congress. Welcome, Ms. Borshchevskaya.
Also, Dr. Exum, I would also extend my welcome to you as
well.
Thanks to all of you for being here today. Let me remind
our witnesses to limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Without
objection, your prepared written statements will be made part
of the hearing record.
Again, we thank you so much for being here today. And, Dr.
Alterman, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF JON B. ALTERMAN, PH.D., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI CHAIR IN GLOBAL SECURITY AND GEOSTRATEGY,
DIRECTOR OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Alterman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, it is an
honor for me to appear once again before this subcommittee. It
is important to grasp that China's approach to the Middle East
is both deliberate and limited. My understanding of Chinese
foreign policy is that alongside the overarching desire to
restore China to its rightful primacy among world powers is the
profound sense of China's vulnerability and insecurity. China
has no missionary zeal to persuade the world of the virtues of
Chinese civilization.
The Chinese government's goal is to secure itself, best
done in a world driven by the bilateral relations of States.
China, a country with no allies, is much stronger in a
bilateral world. The United States, a country with dozens of
allies, is much weaker in a bilateral world.
China feels especially vulnerable in the Middle East. It is
reliant on the Middle East for oil, dependent on its sea lanes,
and unable to change the fact that the United States is the
preponderant foreign power in the region.
In my judgment, China has no intention of displacing the
United States from the Middle East, confronting the United
States in the region, or engaging in a rivalry with the United
States there, and it sees no reason to do so. It feels that
stabilizing the region is beyond its reach, and doing so would
likely do more to antagonize potential partners than advance
stability. Instead, China is happy to have the United States
incur costs in the region while China derives benefits.
In the Middle East, China benefits from high hopes and low
expectations. China is a newcomer to the scene with relatively
little history but a domestic economic track record that is
enviable by almost any measure. In some ways, China is in the
place that the United States was after the first World War, a
dimly understood global power holding out the promise of a
better future untainted by an imperialist history.
China also promises not to disrupt social values in
societies undergoing profound change. That is, China promises
access to the Chinese economic miracle while expressing none of
the Western concerns about fostering systems that produce
resilient societies. The China model has become even more
attractive to Middle Eastern governments after the Arab
uprisings of 2011, which reminded governments of the perils of
more open political space.
Further, concern that growing U.S. energy self-sufficiency
will draw the United States away from the Middle East calls for
these countries to put in place a hedge.
You could argue that China is devising a new mode of
imperialism whereby Imperialism 1.0 was imperialism, or
European-style Imperialism; Imperialism 2.0 was the U.S.-led
rules-based international order; and Imperialism 3.0, or you
might call it Mercantilism 2.0, is a set of wholly interest-
based government-to-government ties that allow the rapid
exploitation of economic opportunities on what is, at least
initially, a consensual basis.
China represents a challenge for Western governments that
seek to push governments to fight corruption, pursue technical
excellence, and encourage environmental stewardship. China
advertises that it provides a quick shortcut to resources.
Of course, China is not relying on economics alone to
advance its interests. China also deploys traditional State
craft to advance its interests and confound its adversaries. As
I described in my written testimony, U.S. policy toward Iran is
a many splendored gift for China.
China is also pursuing close ties with four other Middle
Eastern countries--Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Israel.
Each offers something different. And despite differences among
all of them, China maintains close ties with all of them.
China's regional strategy is elegant in its simplicity, and
it seeks engagement based almost entirely on economic
cooperation. The United States, by contrast, is engaged broadly
and deeply around the world, seeking to foster the sort of
long-term changes that help generate economic growth and
political liberalization in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan,
Germany, and elsewhere.
The sting in the U.S. model is it has not led to similar
development everywhere. The Middle East, Latin America, and
Africa are full of examples where U.S. development efforts
failed to meet their goals. China is promising a different
approach and a different set of results.
We do not know yet how well this all will work. China has a
light military footprint around the world, and its
expeditionary capacity is limited. That means China may have
difficulty securing its interests--and protecting its large
overseas population, which numbers as many as 600,000 in the
Middle East alone.
China may find that being a global power with global
interest carries high global costs as well. In addition, a more
checkered track record may take the bloom off the image of
Chinese investment, and governments and populations may come to
feel coerced into accepting economic agreements that favored
Chinese interests over host country interests.
What neighbors interpret as Chinese aggression tends to
draw neighbors closer to each other and seek closer relations
with the United States. In addition, the whole Chinese economic
model may collapse under its own weight. But from a U.S.
perspective, we need to be mindful that the Chinese model may
pose a formidable challenge. As I see it, China sees us
pursuing an expensive and obsolete model of global influence.
They do not want to defeat us. They want to marginalize us.
To me, the biggest danger we face in the Middle East is
assuming our adversaries will confront us in the ways we are
most prepared to be challenged. Facing insecurity, we double
down on troops on materiel. Confronted with hostility, we
respond with force. For decades, our strategy has been
hegemony, which is becoming increasingly expensive to sustain.
We do not really have an economic strategy. China seems to
harbor no hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East and finds the
doors thrown open to its influence.
It seems to me that we have to rethink our approach to the
region, not do as we have done for 50 years. We have to--try to
lead the world to a better future rather than reinforce the
status quo. And, sir, I suggest that we need to continue to
make the world a better place now.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Alterman follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Dr. Alterman.
Dr. Exum, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW EXUM, PH.D., EXECUTIVE, HAKLUYT & COMPANY,
FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MIDDLE EAST
POLICY
Dr. Exum. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you so
much just for giving me the opportunity to come here to speak
to you today. It is a privilege to represent the great State of
Texas and the 32d congressional District, which is ably
represented by Colin Allred. Thank you so much for that warm
introduction.
If it is OK with you, I am just going to summarize my
prepared remarks before the committee.
As some of you know, from 2015 to 2017, I was the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy. I do not
have any type of background in Russia. I do not speak Russian.
I have never even been to Russia. But in the summer of 2015, we
assessed, as a department and as a government, that the Assad
regime in Syria was nearly something close to collapse.
And thanks to the benign guidance of Christine Wormuth, we
assembled a kind of tiger team within our office to go over
scenarios that we called catastrophic success. In other words,
what would it look like if the Assad regime collapsed, you
know, overnight or collapsed very rapidly in a way that would
in some ways be welcome but in other ways would seriously
endanger U.S. interests?
Now, that is what we saw from a five-sided concrete box in
Northern Virginia. I imagine that the Russians and the Iranians
saw something that was much more real and much more imminent
from their perspective, and that is what I believe led the
Russians to double down in Syria in the fall of 2015 and to
surge a lot of troops there.
Their stated motivations for going into Syria did not line
up, unsurprisingly, with their revealed motivations. stated,
they said it was all about counter terrorism. We assessed that
their revealed motivations for going into Syria at the time
ranged from, yes, counter terrorism was part of the reason why
they were there, but mainly they were there to prop up their
allies.
Tactically, they are dependent on the warm water ports in
Tartus and their presence. That allows them to project power
into the eastern Mediterranean.
We also assessed that kind of strategically this was about
the Russians saying enough, especially after U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1973 and the way that was used to overthrow
the regime in Libya.
Russia, which has always feared and has greatly resented
the color revolutions and the Arab revolutions, the Arab
Spring, which they saw the United States and its Western
partners as being behind, this was a way for them to draw a
line in the sand and say that is not going to happen anymore.
They also used it as an opportunity to build their own
coalitions. Part of this was to say, yes, America, you have,
you know, a 48-nation coalition, but we, Russia, we also have a
military coalition, and you need to look at us as a peer, as
somebody that is worthy of being taken seriously.
And then, second, and perhaps most importantly, this was in
some ways Russia's entre back into the international community
after the isolation which accompanied the invasion of Crimea.
The decision about whether to talk to the Russians about
Syria was a controversial one within the administration. I, and
many members of the Department of Defense, were not in favor of
this. From my perspective, I viewed Russia as arguably being
the least important member of their coalition--that coalition
which included Hezbollah, Iran, the Assad regime.
And even if we were able to reach some sort of
accommodation with the Russians, I did not think they would be
able to deliver on it. By contrast, we could deliver our
coalition.
Second, we believed that they would use these negotiations
as a way to buy time and space for them to pursue their true
military objectives. Again, they said this was about counter
terrorism. But in point of fact, we all knew where the
terrorists were. The Jabhat al-Nusra was in the northwest of
Syria. We had the Islamic State in the east. Russia
concentrated its military power in recapturing those key urban
areas, such as Aleppo and Damascus, that the regime valued.
They were 100 percent aligned with the regime's overall goals.
However, in the negotiations, I will confess that we found
the Russians to be relatively scrupulous. It is a quirk of
Russian bureaucracy that they will actually lie to one another.
So you could be talking to a Russian general or intelligence
officer or diplomat who will be presenting in good faith what
they believe to be the case when you know it is not the case.
And this leads to the second point, which is I also think
they use these negotiations, and we were very conscious of
those at the time, to not only find out what we knew about
Syria but find out how we knew what we knew about Syria,
because they were very interested in the sources and methods
that we have been able to develop, quite frankly, over the cold
war.
In the end, I have to say that, you know, although we in
2016 somewhat chuckled when we saw the Kuznetsov, Russia's only
aircraft carrier, belching across the Mediterranean en route to
Syria. The Russians were successful in Syria, and the way they
have used that success and the success of their coalition has
essentially been to tell our traditional partners in the region
the United States is a fair weather ally; we are with you fair
or foul weather. We are an all-weather ally, and Syria is the
proof.
And, you know, I remember when I left the Army and went to
graduate school and was studying the Middle East, when we
talked about the Russian presence in the Middle East, we talked
about it as a historical artifact. That is no longer the case
today.
It was not the case when I returned in 2015, but Russia is
here to stay. And for many of our traditional partners--the
Israelis, the Saudis, the Egyptians--dealing with Russia as a
member and as a presence in the region is, quite simply, not
optional.
I am happy to take your questions on more about the
negotiations or about how we view the Russians, but I will do
so during Q&A. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Exum follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Dr. Exum.
Ms. Wormuth, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE WORMUTH, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, SENIOR FELLOW, RAND
CORPORATION, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Ms. Wormuth. Good afternoon, Chairman Deutch, Ranking
Member Wilson, members of the committee. Thank you so much for
offering me the opportunity to be a part of this excellent
series of hearings. I really commend you for the light that you
are shining globally on the role of Russia and China.
China and Russia's increased engagement in the Middle East
in recent years underscores that the United States is in a new
era of strategic competition, one that is taking place at a
time when many Americans are understandably fatigued with the
role of the United States as leader and world's policeman.
So I wanted to offer a few thoughts as a bigger frame maybe
to talk about what is at stake at this competition and what are
the players competing for. For the United States, I think our
goal is to ensure our continuing prosperity and security in an
increasingly complicated and contested world.
Russia, on the other hand, a country with a very strong
military but a deteriorating economic picture, seeks to
preserve its status as a great power for as long as it can.
China, on the other hand, fueled by its tremendous economic
strength, is pursuing a long-term strategy aimed at restoring
what it sees as its rightful and traditional historic place as
a world power.
To prevail in the competition, Russia is basically trying
to disrupt the international order, reestablish what it sees as
its rightful sphere of influence, and to weaken the cohesion of
our trans-Atlantic relationship with Europe. China sees the
United States as trying to contain its rise and wants to both
reestablish its primacy in Asia relative to us and also adapt
the international order to better accommodate its preferences
and objectives.
Looking at Russia and the Middle East specifically, it sees
its presence there as a way to highlight its status as a great
power at a time when America's influence in the region is seen
as waning. Moscow's strategy, as my colleagues have said, rests
on maintaining good relationships with all of the countries in
the region and really focusing on maximizing its opportunities
while minimizing its potential for losses.
Moscow is deeply concerned about the potential for the
spread of Islamic extremism to Russia, and in Moscow's view,
the Arab Spring, as well as our interventions in the region,
have destabilized it significantly. Russia presents itself, in
contrast to the United States, as a reliable partner that will
not lecture about human rights or societal freedoms but is very
interested in trade, investment, and energy with the countries
there.
Sustaining its transactional approach to the relationships
in the region is getting harder, though, for Russia. While
Syria did not turn out to be the quagmire that former President
Obama and others predicted, Russia's military involvement there
is in its fourth year and there is no diplomatic resolution in
sight to the conflict.
While Russia's involvement in Syria could be seen as at
least partially successful, it does not appear to have the
economic power or the appetite, I would argue, for robust
expeditionary military operations that would enable it to
pursue a more comprehensive approach to the region.
For China, the Middle East is probably the most important
region of the world outside of Asia. China seeks recognition
from the countries there of its status as a rising power and
sees its relationships as an opportunity to balance U.S.
influence.
They appear to be pursuing a strategy grounded in Beijing's
policy of non-interference abroad, also, like Russia,
emphasizing positive relationships with everyone there while
avoiding becoming entangled in the region's many conflicts.
The engine of China's deepening involving in Middle East is
its continuous need for energy and its access to economic
markets. Countries in the region welcome China's investment,
but 5 years into the Belt and Road Initiative, there are some
emerging signs of concern, whether it is about debt
sustainability or environmental impacts or others.
While China is an economic heavyweight in the Middle East,
it is much more a lightweight, frankly, militarily, with really
only the small military base in Djibouti that the chairman
mentioned.
So before saying a little bit about what this means for
U.S. and the Middle East specifically, I would like to
emphasize that the United States needs an overarching vision
for success in the strategic competition. We need to develop a
comprehensive strategy that leverages all of the instruments of
our power, whether it is economic, diplomatic, military, or
cultural.
Discussions of our competition with Russia and China have
really emphasized the military dimension, and that is
important. But equally, if not more important, is the economic
piece. It is figuring out how are we going to reinvest in our
economic health and our educational system, so we can continue
to be a world leader in technology and innovation.
Similarly, we need to develop a more comprehensive approach
with our allies and partners to just thinking about how we are
going to compete with Russia and China, and we need different
approaches. Those competitions are not the same.
The current administration's preference for bilateral
approaches fails to take advantage, I would argue, of one of
our biggest strengths. I would agree that Russia and China,
while they want to demonstrate their status as a great power in
the Middle East, they do not want to displace us entirely.
We need to emphasize consistency in our approach, emphasize
that we are not leading. We need to pay attention to the BRI
projects and address concerns we may have to those projects
that may have implications for our presence in the region.
And, finally, I would argue we need to avoid overreach if
we are going to compete successfully. Almost 20 years of our
military operations, many of them in the Middle East, have led
to not only the deaths of thousands of American military
personnel, but they have also eroded our standing in the world,
and, frankly, created opportunities for Russia and China to
make gains at our expense.
So as we think about any future decisions for use of force
in the Middle East, I think we need to learn from our
experiences in Iraq and Libya and Afghanistan and think had
about our vital national interests.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wormuth follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Wormuth.
Ms. Borshchevskaya, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF ANNA BORSHCHEVSKAYA, SENIOR FELLOW, WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Thank you. Chairman Deutch, Ranking
Member Wilson, honorable members, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today.
In my written testimony, I have gone into detail about
Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategic objectives in the
Middle East and North Africa, how those work against our own
national security interest, and to that end, I touched very
briefly on China.
For the sake of brevity, let me summarize. Vladimir Putin
ensured Russia's long-term prominence in the Middle East and
North Africa. Washington must now take Moscow into account in
the region to a degree it has not had to for years.
The Kremlin is primarily concerned with its own survival,
which it views as intrinsically connected to its relationship
with the United States, and, more broadly, the West.
In a zero sum search for great power status, for Putin to
win, the U.S. has to lose. And Putin needs victories,
especially given the trajectory of Russia's domestic politics.
A long-term military presence on the Mediterranean appears
to be a critical component of Moscow's goal to deter the West.
Thus, in Syria, from the very beginning, Moscow's actions
showed it sought to create--to methodically create an anti-
access/area denial, so-called A2/AD layout, to deter the West.
This position provides Moscow with greater leverage over NATO's
southern flank and creates a springboard for further
activities.
Moscow benefits from low level conflict in the region and
has an interest in perpetuating it. This situation creates--
necessitates Moscow's presence, elevates its importance,
creates opportunities to sell weapons to all sides, and gain
leverage over all players to create dependence on the Kremlin.
Thus, Moscow manages conflict but does not bring a genuine
resolution.
It is, thus, wishful thinking that Moscow, for example,
will restrain Iran in the region. In this context, Moscow's
approach to the region is flexible to ensure position of a
power broker. The Kremlin courts every major player in the
region and increasingly they court Moscow.
American allies from Egypt to Turkey, Israel, the GCC, and
Morocco, to one degree or another, have come to see Putin as a
necessary reality, a mediator who can talk to all sides, and
offer a more reliable partner than the United States.
Key areas of cooperation are political, military, economic,
including energy, diplomatic, and soft power-focused. Not only
does Turkey continue the discussion about the purchase of the
S-400 from Russia, a purchase that appears to reflect reality
rather than mere posturing, but Russia is also building
Turkey's nuclear power plant while Sputnik plays an important
role in Russian information operations in the country.
Moscow has managed to pull Egypt closer into its orbit
through arms, nuclear energy, and economic deals. Russia also
entered agreements with Morocco that include cooperation on
nuclear energy. Moscow projects power without incurring
significant costs as it continues to improve Russia's military
capabilities, boost arms sales to the region, and develop
economic ties in the energy and other sectors. Meanwhile,
Washington's overall commitment to the region remains
ambiguous.
To touch very briefly on China, Beijing's involvement in
the Middle East thus far has been primarily economic. The
Russia-China dynamic is complex, but specifically in the Middle
East Beijing has sided with Russia and also seemed happy to
have Moscow take the lead in the region.
China's involvement holds major strategic implications for
the Middle East, but so far Moscow has not--Beijing has not
expressed a desire to be a power broker or a security provider
there.
I made a number of policy recommendations in my testimony,
which I would like to summarize. First, compete for the region.
What happens in the Middle East rarely stays in the Middle
East. We increasingly talk of realignment toward great power
competition, but in this context the overall retreat from the
region that began under the Obama Administration continues.
This situation makes it easier for our adversaries to step
in, and, indeed, this is what Putin has done.
Second, we need to craft a clear strategy of dealing with
Russia. Sanctions alone are no substitute for policy. And to be
sure, they are an important tool and we should keep utilizing
it. But as part of a broader strategic vision that involves
multiple tools.
To that end, we also have to promote a clear narrative.
Moscow has much appeal in the region. Putin's world view that
runs counter to democratic value resonates in the Middle East.
The U.S. has yet to counter it effectively, especially in the
context of our own internal polarization and self-doubt.
Last, we have to remember that there are no quick and easy
fixes. But with strategic and moral clarity, the U.S. can
reclaim its leadership position and succeed in the unfolding
great power competition.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Borshchevskaya follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Borshchevskaya.
We will now move to member questions under the 5-minute
rule. I am actually going to defer until later, and we will
start with the ranking member, Mr. Wilson, and then alternate
between the parties. Mr. Wilson, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And beginning with Dr.
Alterman, has China's treatment of the Uyghur population and
stance on Syria negatively impacted public opinion in the
Middle Eastern countries? I would like a view from each of you.
Dr. Alterman?
Dr. Alterman. Congressman, it is remarkable how little
public comment there has been outside of Turkey, which has an
ethnic tie to the Uyghur population. I think this is a
consequence of the fact that governments in the Arab world
generally have very tight control over the press. Governments
have decided, for reasons of diplomatic interest and economic
interest, they do not want to antagonize the Chinese.
And they have been pointedly silent in many cases about the
oppression of the Uyghurs and the collection of perhaps a
million Uyghurs into what appear to be concentration camps.
Mr. Wilson. And Dr. Exum?
Dr. Exum. I have nothing to add to that. I think that is
exactly right. I think the most notable thing has been the
silence of the large Arab States with respect to the interment
of the Uyghur population.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. And Ms. Wormuth?
Ms. Wormuth. I would just add, I think I would absolutely
agree with Dr. Alterman that because the government has such
control, there is not a lot of public discussion of it, but I
think to the extent that Arabs, if you will, on the street,
Muslims on the street are aware of it, it is probably quite
unpopular.
It is also worth noting I think that the Chinese diplomats
place a lot of emphasis in their interactions with officials in
Middle Eastern countries basically saying do not criticize us
publically. That is one of their diplomatic goals, and they
have been, sadly, very successful to date.
Mr. Wilson. And Ms. Borshchevskaya?
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Yes. I would agree with everything that
was said. The silence on this issue in the region has really
been quite remarkable, and I agree also that the Chinese
diplomats indeed push this--press this issue over and over
again.
What is also interesting is it is rare that the Chinese--
when in public, Chinese diplomats would talk about their own
Muslim minorities as if it does not exist.
Mr. Wilson. And, Ms. Borshchevskaya, you have referenced
this about the development of nuclear facilities by Russia.
What has been the level of involvement of Russian nuclear
energy sector investments? And is there any--what is our
ability--and I want each of you to answer this, too--for the
United States to compete?
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Sure. So with Turkey, as far as I
understand, the construction of a nuclear power plant has
already started. With Egypt, there was an agreement signed
several years ago, and there is plan to begin construction in
about 2 years. And Russia is helping Egypt finance the
construction. They are essentially giving them a loan.
With Morocco, the agreement is more tentative. There has
simply been an agreement on nuclear cooperation. It is unclear
where that is headed. But the fact--but the very fact that it
is taking place is significant.
Mr. Wilson. And back again--what can the United States do
to compete?
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Well, I think, again, it goes back to
being--for one--you know, to--Egypt, for example, Egypt used to
be our partner on nuclear energy security. That is not the case
anymore. I think, again, it goes back to our consistent
presence in the region, demonstrating to the region that we are
committed, that we are not leaving the Middle East. The major
issue is that so many of our allies are hedging bets that they
feel we are very much ambivalent in what we want to do.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. And Ms. Wormuth?
Ms. Wormuth. I think I would just add, one, the advantages
of having U.S. companies provide nuclear cooperation, energy
cooperation, for example, is that our technology comes with,
you know, a very high level of sort of safety and regulatory
standards. So I think that is on the positive side.
I think, you know, the really big competition right now, as
I understand it, is around Saudi Arabia's desire to build a
number of nuclear power plants. And I think the concern that I
would put on the table there is that in signing a 123
Agreement, we really would like the Saudis to basically say,
you know, we are interested in doing this, but we are not going
to enrich uranium.
And right now, as I understand it, Saudi Arabia has not
been willing to include that kind of a provision in a potential
123 Agreement, which is particularly concerning in light of the
fact that Mohammed bin Salman has indicated that if Iran gets a
nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would want to build one as well.
Mr. Wilson. Very insightful. Dr. Exum.
Dr. Exum. No, that is right. I actually think that U.S.
firms are doing a pretty good job in terms of marketing
themselves to the Saudis, and I think the administration has
helped with that. But I think as the Honorable Ms. Wormuth
noted, that there are sticking points that, frankly, the
administration should hold firm on.
We also have leverage. The Saudis are wanting to invest in
our energy infrastructure going forward. I think that is
largely a positive thing. The Saudis also want continued access
to advanced weapon system. That is also in large part--that
could be a potential chip for negotiations, but I would turn it
to Jon for further thoughts.
Dr. Alterman. Congressman, we could drop standards and
constraints, but I do not think we should. I think the reality
is that then the Saudis or the Egyptians or somebody else may
go to a supplier that does not impose those constraints. But I
am not sure we should stand in the way of that, because the
constraints are important.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you all very much.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Cicilline, you are recognized.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Exum, Brett McGurk, the former U.S. Special
Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS,
recently wrote, and I quote, ``The United States must recognize
that Russia is now the main power broker in Syria. Washington
has no relations with Damascus or Turan, so we will have to
work with Moscow to get anything done. Russia and the United
States have some overlapping interest in Syria. Both want the
country to retain its territorial integrity, deny safe haven to
ISIS and al-Qaeda, and both have close ties with Israel.''
Do you agree with that assessment? And, if not, why not?
And if you do, kind of what is the best way forward in light of
that observation?
Dr. Exum. Sure. Well, I mean, first off, let me just say a
few words about Brett McGurk, who I think is one of the most
significant U.S. diplomats over the past 20 years. I mean, the
things that Brett has done in Syria and in Iraq, really, he has
been a tremendous servant for the past three administrations.
Brett and I disagree on this particular issue for the
reasons that I think I just laid out. It is true that the
Hezbollah and Iran and the Syrian regime do not necessarily
want to speak to us. That does not mean necessarily that we
should speak to the Russians.
And, again, the sticking point that I would have is that
while it might be tempting to believe that the Russians can
deliver on cooperation in Syria, we did not see any of that
evidence in 2015 and 2016. Frankly, we saw the Russians and
their coalition partners use the cease-fires that we were able
to negotiate to rest, refit, and reprioritize for other
military objectives in Syria.
Frankly, I do believe that we do share some interests with
the Russians and we do have some key interests in Syria;
namely, countering terrorism, the security of the State of
Israel, especially in southwestern Syria. However, I do not
believe that Russia shares a broader interest with us going
forward, and I would have serious reservations about what that
cooperation would look like.
During 2016, we floated the idea of joint targeting of
terrorists with Russia, which caused a significant amount of
heartburn in my building in particular, because the idea of
sharing intelligence with the Russians--I mean, the idea of
marking intelligence secret while Russia was just--it was
almost impossible to even imagine.
I believe Russia desires to know a lot about our sources
and methods that we have spent decades developing. And with all
due respect, and I hold Brett in the highest regard, especially
for his service in Iraq, I would disagree with him strongly
about the conclusions that he has reached. I just do not think
that Russia can deliver, and I think they have a lot more to
gain than we do.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. Ms. Wormuth, I want to turn now
to the Iranian influence in the region. We heard from Secretary
Pompeo just about a year ago when he presented what he called a
new Iran strategy, laying out 12 very basic requirements. And
as best as I can tell, none of the conditions he set out has
actually been achieved. And I am wondering whether the
withdrawal from the Iran deal has done anything to limit
Iranian influence in the region, and whether or not this
maximum pressure policy is working at all, and frankly, and
more particularly, what message that has sent to Russia and
China in the region. I know that is multi-layered, but----
Ms. Wormuth. Yes. Well, my own sense, you know, (a) I did
not think it was in our national interest to withdraw from the
Iran nuclear deal. I think in light of the circumstances that
was the best deal we were going to get, and it did put off for
many years the possibility of the Iranians getting nuclear
weapons.
That said, what I think has happened now is the conditions
that Secretary Pompeo has laid out, (a) I do not think Iran has
any intention of meeting. By withdrawing from the nuclear
agreement, we, I think, have, you know, disappointed several of
our European allies. And, frankly, that has become a bit of a
wedge issue with them.
And the circumstances that we are in now, I do not see a
year into withdrawing from the nuclear arrangement that Iran
has abated any of its malign behavior in the region. If
anything, we seem to see that escalating. I think as they
become more and more frustrated with the economic pressure they
are under, they are lashing out more and more, and I think that
is very concerning.
So, you know, where we are right now, I think, again, as
Dr. Alterman alluded to, our policy I think has actually been
helpful to the Russians and the Chinese because it has created
so many wedges for us and has not really done anything to
address the instability.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And my final question--civil
society and democracy activists in the Middle East face
increased challenges from the suppression of opposition voices
to censorship of the press to discriminatory laws and
mistreatment of marginalized communities.
And over many administrations, our country has stood up to
balance our very strategic interest in the region with our need
to stand up for important democratic values.
The Trump administration has decided in many ways just to
ignore democracy and human rights altogether and cozying up to
governments such as Saudi Arabia, which jail women and hack
journalists to death and silence free speech.
And I am just wondering, with that kind of disregard for
human rights, whether the emergence of Russia and China in the
region--kind of how that impacts it. Dr. Alterman?
Dr. Alterman. Congressman, I think a very important part of
China's Middle East strategy is to make the future safe for
authoritarianism. We have had a different strategy for more
than a half-century, but the Chinese strategy is to make the
future safe for authoritarianism because that will help secure
the current government of China.
Mr. Cicilline. May I just have one quick followup?
Mr. Deutch. One quick followup.
Mr. Cicilline. I guess, how does the change in the kind of
behavior of the current American President impact that
strategy, if at al?
Dr. Alterman. I would hope that we would work through a
multilateral framework to build alliances with governments that
both have governments working with us in broad concert, and
also make clear to governments that there are standards and
issues and pressure that the U.S. will not compromise. And I
think we will--we have friends in that.
We should have friends, and people should want to be our
friends because they understand the U.S. package is a better
package, and the reality is that many governments, especially
in the Middle East, believe the Chinese package is a better
package for their future.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Mr. Mast, you are recognized.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman. Dr. Exum, rangers lead the
way. That is right.
Listen, I love this committee. It saddens me when I hear
just these irresponsible comparisons about the administration
cozying up to Saudi Arabia. You know, numerous administrations
going back forever have these relationships. Anybody could go
out there and say, ``President Obama, working a deal with Iran
is cozying up with, you know, the greatest human rights abuser
that has existed, you know, in this modern era.'' And so it
does sadden me to see that as part of this committee. I think
it is wholly irresponsible.
Beyond that, I would also say this. If any of my colleagues
on this committee think that we should go out there and have
further engagement in Syria, then I would encourage them to
author an authorized use of military force in which you very
specifically lay out exactly how many U.S. lives, U.S. limbs,
U.S. treasure, anything else that you are willing to risk in
advancement of anything that you see as a goal in Syria before
you go out there and spout your responsible remarks.
In that, I would like to move to the conversation of China
a little bit and some of the comments that were made across the
board. China is assessed by everybody to be a massive economic
strength. It has been mentioned in nearly everybody's comments.
As we have hearings like this across the board in different
subcommittees, everybody talks about China's economic prowess.
Dr. Alterman, you spoke a little bit about maybe the lack
of desire for China to go out there and play that hegemonic
stability role throughout the Middle East. No. 1, it costs them
in treasure. No. 2, they have to go out there and pick winners
and losers, and perhaps lose allies where otherwise they do not
have to pick a friend or a foe or an ally or otherwise.
So what I would love to hear you all comment on, really, is
hearing your analysis in that paradoxical situation is, is it
better or worse to let them or maybe force them into having to
play a hegemonic role throughout the Middle East? Does it push
them into a place that they do not want to be, which can be
good for the United States of America? Or is it better that we
continue to maintain that hegemonic role or spend our treasure
in our life to maintain that hegemonic role in your opinions?
You can start on whatever end you want.
Ms. Wormuth. I will take a swing at that, Congressman. I
think we should--I think we should, frankly, try to have China
take more responsibility and be more a part of the security
discussion in the region. I mean, they have basically been
free-riding off of U.S. security guarantees in the region for
some time.
They are able to get the energy they need out of the Middle
East because we have historically secured it and made sure that
there are free flows of oil.
Mr. Mast. Does that occur by asking nicely or by forcing
them into a position where they have to maintain stability?
Ms. Wormuth. Well, I would say this. I do not think--my own
view is we should not try to force them to participate in that.
I do not think you could do that. And, again, in many areas, we
do not necessarily share the same interest.
That said, I do think we could continue to do--for example,
under the Obama Administration, we did go to the Chinese and
say, ``Be a part of the anti-ISIS campaign.'' You know,
participate. You all tell us all the time you are worried about
terrorism, you are worried about the spread of Islamic
extremism, so come and work with us together, you know, to
fight this common threat.
They were not willing to do that at the time, but I think
we should continue to ask them. Again, we also asked them to be
a part of the response to ebola, which obviously was in Africa,
not the Middle East. But, again, our message--I think the
message of the United States to China should be, if you want to
be a great power, you need to act like a great power and work
on some of these common security challenges.
Mr. Mast. Certainly, Dr. Alterman.
Dr. Alterman. You know, when we started shared awareness
and deconfliction exercises off the coast of Somalia for
counter piracy, the Chinese first said, ``We do not want to
have anything to do with it.''
And then finally decided to start coming, and then we said,
``OK. We have got the problem fixed. We are going to stop
holding.''
And the Chinese said, ``Please keep holding them.''
So the Chinese have been willing to engage a little more
militarily. I am concerned that we and the Chinese are playing
very different games, and we continue to invest very heavily in
military presence, security ties, and we become hived off from
the genuine national interest of the governments in place.
I think in a way we have been carried too much by momentum.
And as I say in the written statement, having grown up in
Poughkeepsie, New York, a company--a town really nurtured by
IBM. I am particularly aware that IBM kind of lost the computer
market because they concentrated on the wrong piece of it, and
they let other companies develop things that were much more
remunerative.
I think we have to rethink what our role in the Middle East
is, what are our tools, and how do we make ourselves vital to
governments. I think we have to rethink part of how we engage
in the region.
Mr. Mast. Absolutely. Thank you all for your comments and
your testimoneys today.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Mast. Mr. Allred, you are
recognized.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our
panel. I read your written statements and learned a lot, and I
think this is a very important topic. I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this.
As we are kind of tilting now to world power competition, I
see the Middle East as just an extension of what we are seeing
even in our own hemisphere, but certainly around the world. And
so I want to, you know, talk about how we counter influence and
how we can do that in a way that is consistent with our
economic values as well, but also militarily.
And so I want to begin with arms sales because, as you are
aware, China and Russia are selling arms to our allies, and we
have even seen some of our arms in Yemen, for example, ending
up in the hands of al-Qaeda. And I am wondering if they are--if
we have any concerns or if you have any concerns about China
and Russia getting access to classified information or to any
of our military systems and better understandings of that and
how and what the Congress can do in mitigating the risk to U.S.
military equipment to try and prevent that.
Ms. Wormuth, do you want to take it first?
Ms. Wormuth. Sure. Happy to do that. I think what we see
with Chinese and Russian arms sales, more probably Russia than
China, of course it is a source of revenue for them. But what I
saw happen over the last few years is as the countries in the
Middle East become less confident of whether the United States
is going to be there become frustrated, frankly, sometimes with
the conditions that we put on our arms sales, which we do so in
most cases for very good reasons.
They have essentially engaged in hedging behavior and sort
of they look particularly at Russia as an alternative. You
know, when Egypt got really fed up with us for not telling them
things because of the conditions that Congress, among others,
put on those sales, they turned to Moscow. And I think that
will keep happening I think unless we do a better job of making
it clear that we are staying in the region and that we are
reliable.
They may not like everything that we have to say to them,
but I think right now countries are not really sure exactly
what our approach is.
I do think we want to be concerned any time we are engaging
with arms sales in putting in protections to make sure that the
technology is not leaking or being proliferated. And there are
a lot of mechanisms already in place. But I think to the extent
that Congress can emphasize the importance of those conditions
in the various sales that the administration may be
contemplating, those are very important.
Mr. Allred. And so just to followup really quickly on that,
because you touched a little bit on the restrictions that we
put in place and the things we ask of our allies. On this
committee, we have been talking about--a lot about our kind of
withdrawal from global leadership on human rights and standing
up for those, especially in this region.
Do you think it is possible to maintain that commitment and
to be--to, you know, carry that goal while also continuing to
partner in the way that we have on arms and others by perhaps,
as you were saying, making sure they understand that we are
here to stay, we are going to be part of this expressing some
sort of overall strategy?
Ms. Wormuth. I think it is important that we continue to
have human rights and basic freedoms be an important part of
our foreign policy, frankly, and I think that should be part of
our conversation with countries in the region.
So while, frankly, when I was in government, it was
sometimes a struggle as we were trying to work through
decisions about whether to go forward with sales, given
constraints that Congress had levied on us, those are important
things I think to weigh.
And I would encourage Congress to think about--I do think
you want to give the executive branch some wiggle room to make
judgments about what the right balance is between the human
rights conditions and others things, or democratization things,
and sales, because sales are an important part of our
relationship, but I think having some conditions in place, it
is good to have those guardrails for the executive branch.
Mr. Allred. Yes. Dr. Exum?
Dr. Exum. Yes. If I could just add one thing. I mean, I
think over the past 30 years we have had this theory of the
case that if we buildup Gulf--especially host nation security
capacity, then we will be able to remove some of those 35,000,
roughly, U.S. troops that are in the Gulf, I think 59,000
region in the alone, so it is a huge investment in our case.
The challenge--to my mind, the strategic challenge is if
you buildup that host nation security capacity, they might
actually use it. That has been the case in Yemen, right? Our
end use monitoring regimes are pretty darn good if the weapons
are in garrison. If they are deployed in an expeditionary
fashion, it gets tougher to keep track of exactly where all of
those weapons are going.
I would echo everything that Ms. Wormuth said. I think that
the Senate has done a good job in forcing a binary choice on
Turkey with respect to the F-35 and the S-400. Another area
that I would put on your radar is that the restrictions that we
have, some of them for very good reasons, on unmanned aircraft
and UAVs, means that they are bringing in Chinese or Russian
UAVs, often with Chinese or Russian engineers in close
proximity to advanced U.S. weapon systems.
That is something that I think the Congress can take a hard
look at to make sure that the U.S. Department of Defense and
the Department of State are keeping appropriate distance
between those weapon systems and foreign nationals.
Mr. Allred. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Mr. Trone, you are recognized.
Mr. Trone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. China, they built their
first overseas military base in Djibouti. How effective do you
think this base is in projecting power in the Arabian Sea and
the Red Sea? Who wants to take a stab?
Dr. Alterman. Congressman, I do not think they can really
project power, but it certainly helps their surveillance. They
partly are watching us because we are right next door. But they
care an awful lot about shipping through the Red Sea, through
Bab-el-Mandeb off the coast of Yemen, and then up through the
Suez Canal. And this is their first overseas base, of course.
It is a big thing to say.
And it is largely about just keeping track of the shipping.
I do not think it is really a force projection so much as it is
to understand the flow, to do surveillance, to be present, more
than to actually be able to act. The Chinese are still a little
bit scarred that they had to suddenly evacuate 30,000 people
out of Libya when Gaddafi fell. They had never done anything
like that before. They are not going to be able to do that out
of their base in Djibouti, but it begins to represent a
spreading out for the Chinese navy.
Mr. Trone. So if this is the first, which it is, where do
you think they are going to build a second, or will they be
building a second? And what are they trying to accomplish, just
more listening surveillance?
Dr. Alterman. They are certainly investing in a port in
Pakistan called Gwadar that has a sort of Chinese industrial
zone behind it. I do not know anybody who thinks that base
makes--or that port makes sense economically, given how much
the Chinese are putting into it. There is a Chinese-Pakistan
economic corridor that is part of their strategy.
One of the problems the Chinese have is they expand
westward and down through Pakistan. It partly takes them to the
Uyghur populations that we were talking about earlier with
Congressman Wilson, which is a security problem, but also
brings you into some nasty areas of Pakistan.
Certainly, one of the things that the Chinese strategists
have expressed concern to me about is, as you go west through
the Uyghur areas and down through Pakistan, you may be setting
up a highway for radicalists to come into China instead of get
goods out of China. So how well that is all going to work in
practice is unclear, but certainly the Gwadar port is something
that people--I wrote a book with--co-wrote a book with a
specialist on China more than 10 years ago. He was paying a lot
of attention to Gwadar.
Gwadar is still in the early stages, so it is not moving
that fast. But it is certainly something that draws a lot of
attention.
Mr. Trone. So if we looked at the container operations they
set up in Abu Dhabi--in addition, and we know Athens they have
done a port--the port in Athens, they have done two ports in
Israel. I mean, is this all part of--it seems like at the entry
points everywhere they are grabbing the ports. Is this
infrastructure part of Belt and Road still surveillance is your
best guess as where they are going with all of this?
Dr. Alterman. Well, they are certainly interested in trade.
The report gives an opportunity to talk about win-win. What
amazes me about the Belt and Road, frankly, is how little money
they have put into the Middle East and how much benefit they
have gotten out of the Middle East, because everybody projects
their country to be the central node for the Belt and Road in
the region.
So the Iranians I think are getting a lot of investment and
are very enthusiastic about it, and that is something I talk
about in my testimony, that this is sort of the way China
thinks about Iran.
But the Egyptians are very enthusiastic. The Emiratis are
very enthusiastic. The Saudis are enthusiastic. The Qataris are
enthusiastic. Everybody seems to think that Belt and Road is
going to put them front and center with a rising power in the
world.
And I think, frankly, the United States has not had a
counter to it. We tie people up in regulations. It all seems
tedious. This----
Mr. Trone. Let's just over the technology a second with
Huawei. We talked--you may have talked about that already
before. I missed it. But, I mean, with Huawei, they are taking
over the communications gear, they are low bidding it to get in
and get down--and I am a business guy--to buy into the market.
What dangers do you see in our intelligence in loss of data
privacy?
Dr. Alterman. I think some of my other colleagues might
talk better--it is a profound issue and gives them profound
insight should they choose to use it.
Ms. Wormuth. I think, Congressman, I would just add, the
concern I think that we have to have front and center with
Huawei is the fact that it is essentially a State--it is not a
State-owned Chinese company, but it is probably a State-
directed Chinese company. And, hence, you know, anything like
that that--you know, if they have a global presence, if you
will, on posture into the 5G network, for example, they are
going to have--the Chinese government is going to have access
to that as a result of the fact that Huawei is a State-directed
company.
And I think that is the reason we have to be so concerned
about that. I would encourage the administration to really
start thinking in a comprehensive way about how do we talk to
our allies and partners around the world, whether it is in
Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, to help level-set everyone
to what the threat is, so that we can have a more coordinated--
--
Mr. Trone. So you believe it compromises our data that is
being transmitted through the 5G eventually.
Ms. Wormuth. I am no IT expert, but I would be very
concerned about it based on what I know.
Mr. Trone. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks very much. Thanks again to the
witnesses. I want to just go back to Russia and comments that
were made earlier. Russia is an all-weather ally, a reliable
partner that will not leave. And, Ms. Borshchevskaya, you
talked about Iran. We can't expect them to affect Iran.
I want to talk about Russia and Iran. What do we make of
where the relationship is going? We know of Russia's
relationship with Israel and the agreement that they seem to
have reached where Israel is about to do what it needs to do to
protect itself. But what should we expect of Russia? Can we
expect Russia to play any role in helping long term with
Iranian presence, Iranian malign activities, or when you say
they do not lecture, should we just expect the relationship
between Russia and Iran to grow stronger? Yes.
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Sure. So first, you know, there is
oftentimes--oftentimes when a conversation starts about Russia
and Iran, there is an emphasis on the history between these two
countries, and the history is one of largely animosity. The
problem is that that is increasing--that has not been relevant
in the last several years, and certainly Syria, in particular,
brought the Russia-Iran partnership to new heights.
And, frankly, if you look at what Russia did in Syria, one
reason why they have been so successful in Syria is because
they have relied on Iran to do all of the heavy lifting.
So, you know, back when the intervention started, many had
thought that this would be another Afghanistan for Russia. The
reason why it was not is because Iran did the hard work.
And, you know, Russia is interested in trade with Iran.
Hezbollah has learned from Russia. They have operated side by
side. There have been reports of Hezbollah using a Russian flag
as a cover to avoid getting hit by Israel. Hezbollah have
traveled to Moscow. Putin had invited them to Moscow. So the
Russian-Iran partnership, really it is unprecedented in the
grand scope of the history of these two countries in 500 years.
Now, at the same time, Russia certainly has good relations
with Israel, and that is important for the Kremlin as well.
They have been able to--the Kremlin has been able to balance
these relationships. And as you said, they have reached an
agreement. Israel has been able to conduct its strikes, but at
the same time Russia, by its very presence, by its nature of
presence in Syria, is able to collect intelligence on Israel,
not just on the U.S. and the U.S. coalition but also on Israel.
And certainly, you know, the fact of the matter is,
Israel's freedom of action is dependent on Russia. Yes, they
have given it, but they are dependent, and I think that is the
point. So----
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Borshchevskaya.
Ms. Wormuth, let me just go to you on this. Is there--
longer term, should we expect this relationship to grow?
Ms. Wormuth. I am not sure that it is going to grow. It
strikes me that the Russia-Iran relationship is complicated.
You know, in the short term, Iran has been an expedient partner
to Russia and Syria for all of the reasons that Ms.
Borshchevskaya explained. But now you see a situation where I
think Russia is trying to get Assad to perhaps make some
concessions, but Iran is actively whispering in his ear to hold
firm and not make concessions, because they want to stay there.
So there are tensions there that I think to me do not
necessarily mean that that relationship will continue, much
less get much, much stronger.
Mr. Deutch. So then what do we do, Dr. Exum?
Dr. Exum. Well, actually, the one thing we haven't talked
about--and it surprises me--we haven't talked about oil and we
haven't talked about----
Mr. Deutch. I was getting there, but go ahead, please.
Dr. Exum [continuing]. Russia's relationship with OPEC in
particular. Saudi Arabia has absolutely pressured Russia to
distance itself from Iran and has thus far been unsuccessful.
But the relationship between OPEC and Saudi Arabia and Russia,
that is a relationship that has grown deeper over the past 2, 3
years.
I think if you were to poll, you know, analysts of the oil
markets and--you know, 2 years ago and ask them if they thought
that the near-term agreement between Russia and OPEC would have
endured as long as it had, I think they would have been a bit
surprised, but it has, and that is a relationship that is
increasingly important.
I think that the Saudis can be an important voice in terms
of balancing Russia's relationship with Iran.
Mr. Deutch. Yes. Dr. Alterman?
Dr. Alterman. And, frankly, the Saudis are looking to show
a tip toward Russia and China as a way to get us to back off.
One of the things I heard from some Saudis in recent weeks was
that Mohammed bin Salman especially is interested in
demonstrating to the United States that he has other options if
the United States is going to continue to talk about human
rights and other kinds of things.
And he is interested in showing that he can go toward
Moscow or Beijing. He does not have to rely on Washington.
Mr. Deutch. And Moscow may not lecture in the region, but
for the Saudis, if their relationship with Iran is there are no
strings attached, that is going to start to affect the
relationship between Saudi and Russia.
Let me just, Dr. Alterman, stick with you. On the issue of
oil, the administration has ended all waivers for purchases of
Iranian oil, including China. Do you expect China is going to
stop buying all oil--all of the oil it buys from Iran?
Dr. Alterman. I think there are a couple of things that are
going to happen. First, the Chinese are going to smuggle some
oil. They are probably going to smuggle a little more oil.
Exactly how much we will know about, I am not sure.
I think the Chinese also will pursue efforts to find
workarounds to our sanctions. It seems to me that every time we
use sanctions we run the same risk that hospitals develop and
having penicillin-resistant germs and everything else. If you
keep using it, people will find ways to get around it, and I
worry that we may be in the----
Mr. Deutch. So how is it going to do it this time?
Dr. Alterman. Excuse me?
Mr. Deutch. How is it going to do it this time, get around
the sanctions?
Dr. Alterman. Well, there are ways to do things with swaps.
I think the Russians, as I understand it, could do things with
swaps and be selling more Urals blend oil than they are
actually producing. You could set up some small things, not
enough to get Iran up to its normal level of sales. But I think
that the world is exploring ways to work around American
sanctions.
Mr. Deutch. Just one other question quickly. In recent
years, Chinese has rallied cooperation in the tech sector. In
2016, Chinese investment in Israeli high tech, VC, approached
$1 billion. Does their growing involvement--China's growing
involvement in Israel's high-tech industry raise security
concerns, and should it, and is there enough attention being
paid to that?
Dr. Alterman. It does. The Israelis are paying more
attention to it. There was a reform in Foreign Policy a couple
of months ago saying that the Israeli National Security Council
prepared a report about foreign investment, which was really
about Chinese investment in Israel.
I am going over there in a couple of weeks and will be
talking to people specifically about this issue. And, frankly,
I have been surprised at the level I have been able to set up
meetings to talk about this issue.
Mr. Deutch. All right. Terrific. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mast had an additional question or two.
Mr. Mast. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was worried after
13 minutes we stopped alternating sides here. So thank you for
the time.
Mr. Deutch. We just wanted to get through all of the
questions.
Mr. Mast. Yes. As would I. Thank you.
I would like to go back to Iran and Russia. I got to speak
earlier about China and Russia. Would love to hear from each of
you, in your opinion, did the Iran deal, the JCPOA, did it
bring the United States and Iran closer together, or did it
bring Russia and Iran closer together through the parameters of
the joint comprehensive plan of action?
Ms. Wormuth. I will take a swing at that again. I think one
of the things I think that the Iran nuclear deal did with the
United States and Iran is it did open a channel of
communications at very senior levels that I think had some
utility.
And I do not think we necessarily have the same channels at
the same levels right now. So, for example, you know, where it
had some utility was I am sure you will recall, Congressman
Mast, when our sailors found themselves in Iranian waters and
were taken prisoner essentially. That situation was resolved, I
believe, more quickly than it probably would have been because
there was dialog.
Beyond that, I am not sure--you know, I would not argue
that it brought the United States and Iran closer. I think, you
know, many of us who worked in government at the time did not
have a lot of illusions about the possibility that, you know,
peace and happiness is going to break out.
Mr. Mast. Did it bring Russia and Iran closer together?
Ms. Wormuth. My own sense is what brought Russia and Iran
closer together was, frankly, the cooperation in Syria more,
really, than JCPOA itself. That is my personal assessment.
Mr. Mast. Dr. Exum? Dr. Alterman?
Dr. Exum. Yes. I am doing this with some trepidation
because there are very few people I respect more than
Christine. But I think that the JCPOA was fine as far as
addressing Iran's nuclear issue. But there were some outsized
hopes within the last administration that it would open the
door for a broader dialog with Iran, and I think those hopes
were unfounded.
We saw plenty of evidence that the Iranians were happy to
talk to us about nuclear issues and about the JCPOA and about
enforcement, any issues around that. But Syria is the best
example of Iran not wanting to speak about issues that did not
have to do with the JCPOA.
I would agree with Ms. Wormuth that I do not see it really
affecting the Iranian-Russian relationship. I think Syria was
what cemented that. But I think the JCPOA, which I also
supported and which I think was fine for addressing one of the
three threats Iran posed--the other being its asymmetric
activities and its conventional weapons buildup--it is fine for
those purposes, but it did not lead toward any greater thaw in
the relationship. And I just think we have to be honest about
that.
Dr. Alterman. Congressman, I, frankly, think we are going
to have hostile relations with Iran for the rest of my
professional career. I do not think the JCPOA would have
changed that. But I think what it did is it got us on the side
with all of the economies of the world that matter, with a
number of allies to pressure the Iranians, and the fact is the
Russians and the Chinese were with us holding the Iranians to
account.
What it seems to me it partly explains Russia and Iran
coming together is they both have an interest in splitting us
off from our allies. And one of the things I really worry about
is that we are much more isolated in the world in carrying out
policy.
When the administration had their meeting in Poland, it
highlighted not the world's revulsion at excesses of the
Iranian government, but the fact is the U.S. was adopting a
policy that its allies did not, that our policy through the
JCPOA is shared by four countries in the world and all of our
allies are on the other side.
And that is what I really worry about in the region is for
so many of these hard problems it feels to me like we are
taking them on by ourselves, and that is exactly what opens the
door to the Russians and the Chinese doing better.
Where we are most powerful is when we speak for 100
countries at once. There is no country in the world besides the
United States that can gather 100 countries behind it, and we
are not trying to gather 100 countries behind us.
Mr. Mast. Thank you all for your thoughtful responses.
Ms. Borshchevskaya. Yes. If I could just--if I could just
add a comment. I agree that it was really Syria that mattered
more for bringing Russia and Iran together. With regard to the
JCPOA, you know, Russian officials complained for years that
tough sanctions hurt the Russian-Iran trade. They really wanted
trade.
And with the agreement, several important things happened.
The Kremlin had touted this as their diplomatic victory. In
fact, they have Tweeted, you know, that this was Russian
diplomacy. Russian diplomacy was so important in helping
achieve the JCPOA.
What they had also done is they sold the S-300 to Iran
immediately after the deal. That was an important element.
What is also interesting is that they certainly--you know,
and the Russia-Iran dynamic is very complex. It is a very
complex relationship. They were worried about the Iranian
nuclear program, but also at the same time they sort of
downplayed its seriousness.
So there was a very complex dynamic going on. And, yes, I
just want to highlight the sale of the S-300 after the JCPOA.
Mr. Deutch. Great. Thanks. I want to thank the witnesses
for being here today, and the members who have been here to ask
questions. Thanks for your testimony.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for you, and we ask our witnesses to please respond
to those questions in writing. I would ask my colleagues that
any witness questions for the hearing be submitted to the
subcommittee clerk within 5 business days.
And with that, without objection, the subcommittee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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