[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IMPROVING THE FEDERAL RESPONSE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 13, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-7
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-396 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey John Katko, New York
Kathleen M. Rice, New York John Ratcliffe, Texas
J. Luis Correa, California Mark Walker, North Carolina
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Max Rose, New York Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Lauren Underwood, Illinois Mark Green, Tennessee
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Van Taylor, Texas
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Al Green, Texas Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Michael Guest, Mississippi
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Val Butler Demings, Florida
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
Donald M. Payne Jr., New Jersey, Chairman
Cedric Richmond, Louisiana Peter T. King, New York, Ranking
Max Rose, New York Member
Lauren Underwood, Illinois John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Al Green, Texas Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Michael Guest, Mississippi
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Mike Rogers, Alabama (ex officio)
officio)
Lauren McClain, Subcommittee Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Donald M. Payne Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Major Louis V. Bucchere, Commanding Officer, Emergency Management
Services, New Jersey State Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Steve Reaves, FEMA Local 4060, President, American Federation
of Government Employees:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Chief Martin ``Marty'' Senterfitt, Fire Deputy Chief & Director
of Emergency Management, Monroe County, Florida:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Chief James Waters, Counterterrorism, NYPD:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Louis V.
Bucchere....................................................... 37
Questions From Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Martin ``Marty''
Senterfitt..................................................... 38
Question From Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Steve Reaves..... 39
IMPROVING THE FEDERAL RESPONSE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
----------
Wednesday, March 13, 2019
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Payne,
Jr. [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Payne, Richmond, Rose, Underwood,
King, Joyce, Crenshaw, and Guest.
Mr. Payne. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery will come to order. The subcommittee is
meeting today to receive testimony on improving the Federal
response perspectives on the state of emergency management.
Good afternoon. I want to thank the witnesses for coming to
Washington, DC today to discuss the incredibly important topic:
The state of emergency management and preparedness in our
country.
I also would like to take the opportunity to welcome
Representative King to his first hearing as Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery. I look forward to the work that we'll do together
over this Congress.
As we have seen the last few years, disasters are affecting
communities across America more frequently and more intensely.
Storms are getting worse. Climate change will only continue
that trend, unfortunately. Congress has to ensure that the
Federal Government is doing everything possible to support
communities as they prepare for and recover from disasters.
Based on the outcomes from the 2017 storms, particularly in
Puerto Rico, there is no question that the Federal Government's
response needs improvement. That starts with investing more in
preparedness before a disaster occurs, with the hope of saving
lives and property and reducing costs after a disaster.
Research shows that for every dollar we invest in
mitigation funding, we save $6 from reduced damage after a
disaster. However, FEMA's Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund still
gets shortchanged every year. That needs to change.
This is not just true for disasters, but all aspects of
preparedness. States and local governments need more support in
preparing for terrorist attacks, too. As the nature of
terrorism threats are changing, with increasing lone-wolf and
domestic extremist attacks, State and local governments need
Federal assistance to build up their response capabilities.
Unfortunately, funding for preparedness grants, the
Homeland Security Grant Program, has not fully rebounded from
cuts imposed by the Republican-controlled House in fiscal years
2011 and 2012. That must change.
Moreover, we must be prepared to respond to complex,
concurrent events, as we saw in 2017, with multiple hurricanes
and wildfires. FEMA does not have enough workers to meet its
target goals. Additionally, FEMA has not kept pace in ensuring
its workers have adequate training.
This was a particular problem in 2017, where FEMA's own
assessment found that it placed staff in positions beyond their
experience and, in some instances, beyond their capabilities.
Our panel here today offers a range of diverse and unique
perspectives into how the Federal Government can improve in the
fields of emergency management and preparedness. I look forward
to hearing their views on this important topic, and to
discussing with the Ranking Member and my colleagues how we can
work together to ensure resilient communities.
[The statement of Chairman Payne follows:]
Statement of Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr.
March 13, 2019
As we have seen the last few years, disasters are affecting
communities across America more frequently and more intensely. Storms
are getting worse, and climate change will only continue that trend,
unfortunately. Congress has to ensure that the Federal Government is
doing everything possible to support communities as they prepare for
and recover from disasters.
Based on the outcomes from the 2017 storms, particularly in Puerto
Rico, there is no question the Federal Government's response needs
improvement. That starts with investing more in preparedness before a
disaster occurs, with the hope of saving lives and property and
reducing costs after a disaster.
Research shows that for every $1 we invest in mitigation funding,
we save $6 from reduced damage after a disaster. However, FEMA's Pre-
Disaster Mitigation Fund still gets shortchanged every year. That needs
to change. This is not just true for disasters, but all aspects of
preparedness.
States and local governments need more support in preparing for
terrorist attacks, too. As the nature of terrorism threats are
changing, with increasing lone-wolf and domestic extremist attacks,
State and local governments need Federal assistance to build up their
response capabilities. Unfortunately, funding for preparedness grants,
the Homeland Security Grant Program, has not fully rebounded from cuts
imposed by the Republican-controlled House in fiscal years 2011 and
2012.
That must change. Moreover, we must be prepared to respond to
complex, concurrent events, as we saw in 2017, with multiple hurricanes
and wildfires.
FEMA does not have enough workers to meet its target goals.
Additionally, FEMA has not kept pace in ensuring its workers have
adequate training. This was a particular problem in 2017, where FEMA's
own assessment found that it ``placed staff in positions beyond their
experience and, in some instances, beyond their capabilities.''
Our panel here today offers a range of diverse and unique
perspectives into how the Federal Government can improve in the fields
of emergency management and preparedness. I look forward to hearing
their views on this important topic, and to discussing with the Ranking
Member and my colleagues how we can work together to ensure safer, more
resilient communities.
Mr. Payne. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an
opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and like you I look
forward to working with you, your friend and neighbor, and I
think we can do some positive bipartisan work in this Congress.
I certainly look forward to it.
I find today's hearing especially important because
following the attacks of 9/11 FEMA was 1 of 22 agencies and
offices that were combined to form the Department of Homeland
Security. Today, FEMA stands with its primary mission to reduce
the loss of life and property and to protect the Nation from
all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism,
and other man-made disasters.
In recent years, you and I saw a Superstorm Sandy which
resulted in over 100 deaths. In 2017 we witnessed another, as
you said, another devastating disaster season, Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, Maria, wildfires that ravaged the West Coast and
just last month--yes, last month we saw the terrible tornado in
Alabama which devastated Ranking Member Rogers' district.
So strong Federal, State, and local coordination before,
during, and after a catastrophic event is key to effective
emergency preparedness. The first goal in FEMA's 2018 through
2022 strategic plan promotes the idea that everyone should be
prepared when disaster strikes, whether it is a hurricane,
tornado, or a terror attack.
As evidenced by the terror attacks on September 11, and
more recently the October 17 vehicle ramming in lower Manhattan
that killed 8 people, the December 2017 Port Authority bombing,
the 2016 Chelsea bombing, the New York City area, which
includes New York City, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester and a
great part of Rockland has been and remains our Nation's top
terror target.
FEMA's preparedness grants provide State, local, Tribal,
and territorial governments the ability to build, sustain, and
improve capabilities to prepare for, protect against, respond
to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards, including terrorism
threats.
Federal funds through vital grant programs such as the
State Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security
Initiative, Port Security Grant Program, and Transit Security
Grant Program enable local communities to support their first
responder workforce and to harden their defenses against
potential attacks.
Federal grant funding has enabled the New York City
Department of Emergency Management, the NYPD, and the FDNY to
conduct training and exercises, provide public education and
outreach and develop response protocols and safety initiatives
to significantly increase security preparedness.
For instance, grant funding has enhanced the Ready New York
Program, New York City's educational program to encourage
residents to prepare for all types of emergencies. Federal
grant programs have also supported the city's CERT program and
the City-wide Incident Management System among others.
The ability to utilize FEMA grant funding is critical in
the overall safety of communities. This hearing will provide a
broad overview of the current state of emergency preparedness
and will allow the witnesses here today to present their
insights and priorities for emergency preparedness moving
forward.
Additionally, I look forward to hearing suggestions from
our witnesses on how FEMA's new administrator can improve
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back to you.
[The statement of Ranking Member King follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Peter T. King
March 13, 2019
Following the horrific attacks on September 11, 2001, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was one of 22 disparate agencies and
offices combined to create the Department of Homeland Security. FEMA
stands today with its primary mission to ``reduce the loss of life and
property and to protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters.''
In 2012, Superstorm Sandy wreaked havoc on the States of New York
and New Jersey, as well as 10 other States, resulting in over 100
deaths, hundreds of thousands of impacted residents, and $65 billion in
damages.
In 2017, we witnessed another devasting disaster season. From
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, to the wildfires that ravaged the
West Coast, FEMA had its work cut out for it.
Strong Federal, State, and local coordination before, during, and
after a catastrophic event is key to effective emergency preparedness.
The first goal in FEMA's 2018-2022 Strategic Plan promotes the idea
that everyone should be prepared when disaster strikes whether it is a
hurricane or a terror attack.
As evidenced by the terrorist attacks on September 11, and more
recently, the October 2017 vehicle ramming in lower Manhattan that
killed 8 people, and the December 2017 Port Authority bombing, New York
City has been and remains our Nation's top terror target. FEMA's
preparedness grants provide State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments the ability to build, sustain, and improve capabilities to
prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate
all hazards, including terrorism threats.
Federal funds through vital grant programs such as the State
Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative, Port
Security Grant Program, and Transit Security Grant Program enable local
communities to support their first responder workforce and to harden
their defenses against potential attacks.
Federal grant funding has enabled the New York City Department of
Emergency Management, the NYPD, and the FDNY to conduct training and
exercises, provide public education and outreach, and develop response
protocols, and safety initiatives to significantly increase security
preparedness.
For example, grant funding has enhanced the Ready New York Program,
New York City's educational campaign to encourage residents to prepare
for all types of emergencies. Federal funding has also supported NYC's
CERT Program, Continuity of Operations Program, and the City-wide
Incident Management System, among others. The ability to utilize FEMA
grant funding is critical to the success of our first responders and
the overall safety of our communities.
This hearing will provide a broad overview of the current state of
emergency preparedness and will allow the witnesses here today to
present their insights and priorities for emergency preparedness moving
forward. Additionally, I look forward to hearing suggestions from our
witnesses on how FEMA's new administrator can improve disaster
preparedness, response, and recovery.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
March 13, 2019
Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Payne and Ranking Member King
for holding today's hearing.
I am pleased that the subcommittee's first hearing of the 116th
Congress is focused on the state of the Nation's emergency
preparedness. As we know all too well, in 2017, the hurricane season
and unprecedented wildfires exposed major gaps in our Nation's
emergency response capabilities and general preparedness.
FEMA's poor response to Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico highlighted
how far behind we are in emergency management and how much further we
must go to provide all Americans the help they need in times of
disaster.
Having witnessed the catastrophe that was Hurricane Katrina, I know
first-hand the horrors of a subpar emergency response from the Federal
Government and FEMA. For that reason, I am especially concerned that
FEMA has not made more significant improvements in its response in the
14 years since Hurricane Katrina.
FEMA is not only the leader of the Federal Government's emergency
response efforts, but the Agency also supports and provides critical
assistance to State and local governments in their time of need.
Simply put, State and local governments depend on FEMA's assistance
when disaster strikes.
In addition to natural disasters being a threat to our Nation,
other security threats such as school shootings and lone-wolf terrorist
attacks have been on the rise. These threats to our homeland underscore
the importance of emergency preparedness, and the need for us to
improve in this area. The consequences are too high for the status quo
to remain.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today about how the
Federal Government and, specifically FEMA, can improve its partnership
with State and local governments to ensure a more robust response to
disasters, both natural and man-made. Also, I look forward to hearing
from our witness from the American Federation of Government Employees
about the key role the workforce plays in protecting our Nation from
disasters.
I know FEMA continues to have staffing shortages and other
workforce challenges it must address to improve its response
capabilities and build a stronger agency. Congress needs to do its part
to ensure FEMA does just that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Payne. I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first
witness is Major Louise--Louis Bucchere. I am sorry. He is the
commanding officer of the Emergency Management Section with New
Jersey's State Police, which I should know better.
Next we have Mr. Steve Reaves, the FEMA Local 4060
president, part of the American Federation of Government
Employees.
Then Mr. Martin, is it Senterfitt, is the fire deputy chief
and director of Emergency Management for Monroe County,
Florida. Boy I am having a rough time here.
Last, I will relinquish to the Ranking Member to introduce
the final witness.
Mr. King. Our final witness will be Chief Jim Waters from
NYPD. I have known Jim for more than 15 years. He was the head
of the JTTF in New York from the NYPD side. He is now the chief
of counterterrorism. He has done a truly outstanding job. He
really personifies what the NYPD is all about, and I am proud
that he has agreed to testify here today. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement
for 5 minutes, beginning with Major Bucchere.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR LOUIS V. BUCCHERE, COMMANDING OFFICER,
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SERVICES, NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE
Major Bucchere. Good afternoon, Chairman Payne, Ranking
Member King, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
It is an honor to speak on behalf of the many dedicated
professionals at the New Jersey State Police and on behalf of
Colonel Patrick J. Callahan who also serves as the State
director of emergency management.
I am Major Louis Bucchere, commanding officer of the
Emergency Management Section which is also known as the New
Jersey Office of Emergency Management. NJOEM is co-located with
our State police office of the regional operations and
intelligence center at the State's fusion center, which allows
for seamless information sharing and cooperation between the
emergency management and intelligence functions.
The State plans for all hazards and all threats. In the
aftermath of Sandy, which displaced some coastal residents for
years, NJOEM's objective has been to enhance the State's
internal capacity to manage large-scale incidents.
We accomplish this with the support of Federal grants and
equipment and by leveraging relationships supporting the
emergency and management assistance compact, increasing our
cadre of trained emergency management professionals, and
enhancing community preparedness.
NJOEM facilitates regular meetings with emergency
management staff from key State agencies, nonprofit and
volunteer groups, county emergency management offices, and
Federal agencies. This group is the cornerstone of our
emergency management program.
In addition, we work directly with county emergency
management offices and also collaborate with the private
sector. We also maintain a critical partnership with the New
Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness to enhance
preparedness, prevention, and response efforts for terrorist
attacks and cyber incidents.
NJOEM also leverages task forces to address concerns for
the State such as sheltering, evacuation, and opioid use. New
Jersey's Task Force One has been deployed several times since
qualifying as a FEMA urban search-and-rescue team and provides
local search and rescue assistance in the State.
Four members of the FEMA integration team are assigned to
work with NJOEM to provide assistance with planning for
sheltering, housing, mitigation, and community emergency
response teams. We are appreciative of their support.
New Jersey actively participates in the emergency
management assistance compact. Recently, New Jersey supported
the deployment of personnel to the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto
Rico, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, California, and Hawaii.
In 2017 alone, New Jersey deployed over 800 personnel to EMAC
missions.
The State also deployed critical assets including
industrial generators to Georgia and a mobile field hospital to
the Virgin Islands. Our deployed first responders use their
skills and bring back best practices to New Jersey and fortify
relationships with other States.
However, EMAC deployments involve a significant financial
outlay and the reimbursement process is time-consuming. In New
Jersey's case, reimbursement of several million dollars from
2017 is still outstanding. While EMAC is a State-to-State
agreement, all parties, including the Federal Government would
benefit from a streamlined reimbursement process.
NJOEM strives to have the best-trained emergency management
staff at all levels within the State. Like many other States,
we face several challenges in meeting emergency management
workforce needs. One of our primary challenges is that staffing
is budgeted for blue-sky days. However, we must scale up
operations significantly to meet the requirements of gray-sky
incidents while still maintaining all critical functions.
Additional challenges exist at the local level where
emergency managers are often part-time employees or volunteers.
We meet these challenges through training and workforce
certification and the use of added contract staff.
NJOEM maintains a full-time training unit and has been
approved by FEMA to conduct advanced training in our home
State.
The State recently formed the New Jersey All-Hazards
Incident Management Team to increase our capacity for incident
management support. The team is composed of members from State
and local agencies, as well as nonprofits. The team has already
distinguished itself during its deployment to Georgia for
Hurricane Michael.
Individual preparedness is an on-going focus and a
challenge. We collaborate with partners across the State to
disseminate and amplify preparedness information. The State has
developed training to promote preparedness for individuals with
disability and others with access and functional needs.
The State is also assisting the counties with incorporating
the DAF and community in emergency response planning and
preparedness. To meet the challenge of individual and family
preparedness the NJOEM public information office works in
conjunction with partner agencies to ensure clear, consistent
public messaging.
NJOEM has built a large social media following with a
strong brand that the State's residents have come to know and
trust. The reality is that effective emergency management
requires a commitment from all stakeholders and the community.
I believe that New Jersey continues with forward momentum in
these areas and is on the path to achieve its emergency
management objectives.
With continued Federal support, New Jersey can be more
self-reliant and able to render assistance to other States and
territories.
I thank you for this opportunity to testify before this
subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Major Bucchere follows:]
Prepared Statement of Louis V. Bucchere
March 13, 2019
Good afternoon Chairman Payne, Ranking Member King, and Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. It is an honor to speak on behalf of the many dedicated
professionals at the New Jersey State Police (NJSP), and on behalf of
Colonel Patrick J. Callahan, who also serves as the State Director of
Emergency Management. I am Major Louis Bucchere, commanding officer of
the Emergency Management Section, which is also known as the New Jersey
Office of Emergency Management (NJOEM).
NJOEM is co-located with our State Police Office of the Regional
Operations and Intelligence Center at the State's fusion center, which
allows for seamless information sharing and cooperation between the
emergency management and intelligence functions. The State plans for
all hazards and all threats.
In the aftermath of Sandy which displaced some coastal residents
for years, NJOEM's objective has been to enhance the State's internal
capacity to manage large-scale incidents. We accomplish this with the
support of Federal grants and equipment, and by:
leveraging relationships;
supporting the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC);
increasing our cadre of trained emergency management
professionals; and
enhancing community preparedness.
partnerships
NJOEM facilitates regular meetings with emergency management staff
from key State agencies, non-profit and volunteer groups, county
emergency management offices, and Federal agencies. This group is the
cornerstone of our emergency management program. In addition, we work
directly with county emergency management offices, and also collaborate
with the private sector. We also maintain a critical partnership with
the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness to enhance
preparedness, prevention, and response efforts for terrorist attacks
and cyber incidents.
NJOEM also leverages task forces to address concerns for the State,
such as sheltering, evacuation, and opioid use. New Jersey's Task Force
One (NJ-TF1) has been deployed several times since qualifying as a FEMA
Urban Search & Rescue Team, and provides local search-and-rescue
assistance in the State.
Four members of the FEMA Integration Team are assigned to work with
NJOEM to provide assistance with planning for sheltering, housing,
mitigation, and Community Emergency Response Teams. We are appreciative
of their support.
emac
New Jersey actively participates in the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact. Recently, New Jersey supported the deployment of
personnel to the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Georgia, Florida,
North Carolina, California, and Hawaii. In 2017 alone, New Jersey
deployed over 800 personnel to EMAC missions. The State also deployed
critical assets, including industrial generators to Georgia, and a
mobile field hospital to the Virgin Islands. Our deployed first
responders use their skills and bring back best practices to New
Jersey, and fortify relationships with other States.
However, EMAC deployments involve a significant financial outlay,
and the reimbursement process is time-consuming. In New Jersey's case,
reimbursement of several million dollars from 2017 is still
outstanding. While EMAC is a State-to-State agreement, all parties,
including the Federal Government, would benefit from a streamlined
reimbursement process.
workforce
NJOEM strives to have the best-trained emergency management staff
at all levels within the State. Like many other States, we face several
challenges in meeting emergency management workforce needs. One of our
primary challenges is that staffing is budgeted for ``blue-sky'' days.
However, we must scale up operations significantly to meet the
requirements of ``gray-sky'' incidents while still maintaining all
critical functions. Additional challenges exist at the local level,
where emergency managers are often part-time employees or volunteers.
We meet these challenges through training and workforce
certification, and the use of added contract staff. NJOEM maintains a
full-time training unit and has been approved by FEMA to conduct
advanced training in our home State.
The State recently formed the New Jersey All-Hazards Incident
Management Team (NJ-AHIMT) to increase our capacity for incident
management support. The team is composed of members from State and
local agencies, as well as non-profits. The team has already
distinguished itself during its deployment to Georgia for Hurricane
Michael.
community preparedness
Individual preparedness is an on-going focus and a challenge. We
collaborate with partners across the State to disseminate and amplify
preparedness information. The State has developed training to promote
preparedness for individuals with disabilities and others with access
and functional needs (DAFN). The State is also assisting the counties
with incorporating the DAFN community in emergency response planning
and preparedness.
To meet the challenge of individual and family preparedness, the
NJOEM Public Information Office works in conjunction with partner
agencies to ensure clear, consistent public messaging. NJOEM has built
a large social media following with a strong brand that the State's
residents have come to know and trust.
The reality is that effective emergency management requires a
commitment from all stakeholders and the community. I believe that New
Jersey continues with forward momentum in these areas, and is on the
path to achieve its emergency management objectives. With continued
Federal support, New Jersey can be more self-reliant and able to render
assistance to other States and territories. I thank you for this
opportunity to testify before this subcommittee.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Major.
Next we will have testimony from Mr. Reaves for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEVE REAVES, FEMA LOCAL 4060 PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Mr. Reaves. Chairman Payne, Ranking Member King, and
Members of the subcommittee, my name is Steve Reaves. I am the
president of the American Federation of Government Employees,
FEMA's National-Local 4060.
When you speak to me--or I am speaking for the members of
all of the FEMA that are out there working in the field today.
We represent over 3,000 Federal employees Nation-wide. I thank
you for the opportunity to testify on FEMA's emergency
management.
I am a 23-year Army veteran. I was deployed to Iraq,
Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Somalia while in the Army. While in
the Army I learned the importance of maintaining high morale
and team building and brought those lessons with me to FEMA.
Today I will talk about three workforce issues that if
approved would strengthen FEMA's ability to carry out our
emergency management and preparedness responsibilities. Those
are recruitment, hiring, and retention.
FEMA employees serve Americans by making sure disaster
victims are made whole again after Nationally-declared
disasters. To improve emergency management preparedness, we
must improve how FEMA recruits qualified candidates. There is a
backlog of security clearances currently holding up recruitment
and hiring, which causes a significant obstacle when trying to
recruit qualified candidates.
FEMA struggles to recruit firefighters and police officers
at Mount Weather, our emergency operations center in Bluemont,
Virginia. Because of the delayed security clearance processes,
Mount Weather is understaffed and currently has a deficit of
firefighters and police officers.
Their schedules are erratic and their leave requests are
denied because of the low staffing levels. If FEMA hired more
permanent full-time security background investigators to
process security clearances we could expedite the hiring of
firefighters, police officers, and qualified FEMA employees
Nation-wide.
FEMA employees are hired through a rigorous competitive
merit-based examination process that includes application of
Veterans Preference. The number of permanent full-time
employees needed to carry out successful emergency management
preparedness cannot be short-changed.
Currently, there are 1,118 vacant permanent full-time
positions at FEMA. Our employees are overworked, under-
resourced and understaffed and are frequently deployed to
disaster zones without adequate recuperation time.
Permanent full-time employees are outnumbered at FEMA by
nonpermanent employees. In 1988 the Stafford Act created two
sets of nonpermanent employees to be hired during disasters.
These include a cadre of on-call recovery, response employees,
or CORE, and disaster response workers, DRWs, or temporary
workers.
CORE and DRWs are employed and are hired using an expedited
hiring process during disasters. For purposes of this testimony
I will refer to CORE and DRW employees as Stafford Act
employees.
There are currently 15,120 Stafford Act employees employed
at FEMA. They are used to supplement the permanent full-time
staff, which too often results in vacancies for permanent full-
time positions going unfilled for extensive periods of time.
The agency keeps Stafford Act employees on for far much
longer than their 2- to 4-year terms. Stafford Act employees
should be deployed to disaster zones for a specified amount of
time to respond to a specific disaster.
These positions were not designed to work with or replace
permanent full-time employees on non-disaster work. However,
because there is such a need for permanent full-time employees
at FEMA it is not uncommon to find Stafford Act employees
working outside their job descriptions.
Additional funding and resources are needed for more
permanent full-time staff. Identifying permanent full-time
vacancies would help improve FEMA emergency management and
preparedness and would allow FEMA to hire the number of
permanent full-time staff that is truly needed.
An adequate assessment of needs is necessary to calculate
the number of permanent full-time current employees to
determine where additional permanent full-time employees are
needed to address emergency management and preparedness.
Some Stafford Act employees have been working at FEMA far
longer than their designated employment term. Some have worked
longer than 10 years in Stafford Act positions. The agency
continues to transfer their contracts to new disasters without
giving them a permanent full-time position.
FEMA must hire more permanent full-time employees who are
emergency management safety and program management
professionals hired for their skills and expertise.
An accounting of the number of Stafford Act employees who
have worked for FEMA in extended, long-term period is also
needed. Positions where Stafford Act employees have been
employed for a long time should be made into permanent full-
time positions.
FEMA is unable to keep in-house talent at the agency.
Stafford Act employees do not have full union rights or
protections which help improve workplace safety, labor
management relations, and communications in the workplace.
When Stafford Act employees experience issues in the
workplace they often feel as though they have little to no
rights. FEMA should create a path to a permanent full-time
employment for Stafford Act employees so that all employees
have equal workplace rights and ensure FEMA is more disaster-
ready.
Again, I would like to thank the committee for asking me
here today and inviting me. It is a true honor.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reaves follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steve Reaves
March 13, 2019
Chairman Payne, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
subcommittee, my name is Steve Reaves and I am the president of the
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE) Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Local 4060, which represents over 3,000 Federal and District of
Columbia permanent full-time employees. In the aftermath of the most
active disaster season in recent history, I thank you for the
opportunity to testify on FEMA's emergency management and preparedness.
Today I will talk about three workforce issues that if improved would
strengthen FEMA's ability to carry out its emergency management and
preparedness responsibilities: Recruitment, hiring, and retention.
FEMA employees work to make victims whole again after natural and
human-created disasters. We are first responders, but we stay on the
ground, sometimes for months or years, to ensure that the Americans
affected by natural and human-made disasters can return to normalcy and
rebuild their lives. We are the urban search-and-rescue officers who
search for survivors and non-survivors in burning cars and flooded
homes. We are the safety officers who ensure downed power lines do not
electrocute survivors and toxins in flood waters do not infect
communities. FEMA firefighters and police officers work hand-in-hand
with State and local emergency management agencies to ensure crime is
mitigated and fires do not harm survivors. We are the claims adjusters
who work to make victims whole after their homes have been destroyed.
We are the logisticians who compile data and predict when and where
future disasters will occur. We are the grant and contract officers who
ensure needs are met in the aftermath of destruction.
The last 5 years have been historically active for FEMA's disaster
response. Our members responded to hundreds of disasters, including the
recent tornadoes in Alabama; Hurricane Harvey in Houston, Texas;
Hurricane Irma off the coast of Florida; Hurricane Maria in Puerto
Rico; Hurricane Michael, Tropical Cyclones in the Pacific Northwest in
Sai Pan, historic wildfires in California; the eruption of the Kilauea
volcano in Hawaii; and flooding in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland.
I came to FEMA as a 23-year Army veteran because of FEMA's mission
to reduce the loss of life and property and protect our institutions
from all hazards. I was deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and
Somalia. In the Army, I learned a lot about the importance of
maintaining high morale and team building and I brought those lessons
with me to FEMA. Both are essential to maximize performance and are
particularly critical in times of crisis. I, and most of my colleagues,
agree that FEMA's mission is too important to let the agency go without
the resources needed to serve, help, and protect the American public.
Now, allow me to address the top three workplace obstacles to improving
emergency management and preparedness I mentioned: (1) Recruitment, (2)
hiring, and (3) retention.
To improve emergency management and preparedness we must improve
how FEMA recruits qualified candidates. Candidates for employment wait
too long to receive a security clearance for employment at FEMA. This
backlog of security clearances is a significant obstacle when trying to
recruit qualified candidates.
For example, FEMA struggles to recruit firefighters and police
officers at Mount Weather Emergency Operations Center in Bluemont,
Virginia because of the delayed security clearance process and is
understaffed and currently has a deficit of firefighters and police
officers. Their schedules are erratic, and their leave requests are
denied because of the low staffing levels. The Mount Weather Emergency
Operations Center is used as a major relocation site for the highest
level of civilian and military officials in case of National disaster.
Firefighters and police officers are wary to apply because they know
their security clearance process is so lengthy.
If more permanent full-time security background investigators were
hired to process security clearances at FEMA, more firefighters and
police officers could be on-boarded at Mount Weather and elsewhere. If
FEMA hired more qualified and experienced permanent full-time
employees, the agency would be better able to recruit the workers
needed.
FEMA employees are hired through a rigorous, competitive, merit-
based examination process that includes application of veteran's
preference. The number of permanent full-time employees needed to carry
out successful emergency management and preparedness cannot be short-
changed. Our employees are over-worked, under-resourced, under-staffed,
and frequently deployed to disaster zones without adequate recuperation
time. Permanent full-time employees are outnumbered at FEMA by non-
permanent employees. In 1988 the Stafford Act created two sets of non-
permanent employees to be hired during disasters: These include (1)
Cadre of On-Call Recovery/Response Employees (CORE) and (2) Disaster
Response Workers (DRW) Temporary Workers. CORE and DRW employees are
brought on using an expedited hiring process during disasters. For
purposes of this testimony I will refer to CORE and DRW employees as
Stafford Act employees.
Stafford Act employees are used to supplement permanent employees,
which too often results in vacancies for permanent full-time positions
going unfilled for extensive periods of time. The agency keeps Stafford
Act employees on for much longer than their 2- to 4-year contracts.
Stafford Act employees should be deployed to disaster zones for a
specified amount of time to respond to a specific disaster. These
positions were not designed to work with or replace permanent full-time
employees on non-disaster work; however, because there is such a need
for permanent full-time employees at FEMA, it is not uncommon for
Stafford Act employees to work outside of their job descriptions.
Additional funding and resources are needed for more permanent
full-time staff. Identifying permanent full-time vacancies would help
improve FEMA emergency management and preparedness and would allow FEMA
to hire the number of permanent full-time staff that is truly needed. A
``desk audit'' is needed to accurately calculate the number of
permanent full-time current employees and determine where additional
permanent full-time employees are needed to address emergency
management and preparedness.
Some Stafford Act employees have been working at FEMA for much
longer than their designated employment period. Some have worked longer
than 10 years in Stafford Act positions. The agency continues to
transfer their contracts to new disasters without giving them a
permanent full-time position. There are discrepancies with regard to
the agency's count of the number of permanent full-time employees that
FEMA needs. Stafford Act employees are, in effect, permanently filling
vacant permanent positions. Stafford Act employees are filling vacant
permanent positions without the benefits and rights of Title 5
permanent full-time employees. Permanent full-time employees need to be
hired for these vacancies. These employees have on-the-job experience
and should be afforded the opportunity to apply for permanent positions
when they become available. FEMA must hire more permanent full-time
employees who are emergency management, safety, and program management
professionals hired for their skills and expertise.
An accounting of the number of Stafford Act employees who have
worked at FEMA for an extended long-term period is also needed.
Positions where Stafford Act employees have been employed for a long
time should be made into permanent full-time positions.
FEMA is unable to keep in-house talent at the agency. Stafford Act
employees do not have full union rights and protections which help
improve workplace safety, labor management relations and communication
in the workplace. When Stafford Act employees experience issues in the
workplace, they often feel as though they have little to no rights.
Title 5 permanent full-time employees do have these workplace rights
and protections and work with the union to help them ensure that they
have what is needed for them to successfully fulfill their job duties
with dignity and respect. The union cannot represent most Stafford Act
employees when they experience workplace discrimination and harassment.
FEMA should create a path toward permanent full-time employment for
Stafford Act employees, so that all agency employees have workplace
rights and ensure that FEMA is more disaster ready.
To improve emergency management and preparedness more permanent
full-time employees must be hired. Robust funding is needed to address
the on-going recruitment and retention issues. Too much is at stake for
American families across the Nation to allow anything less.
This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any
questions that you may have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Reaves.
I now recognize Mr. Senterfitt to summarize his statement,
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHIEF MARTIN ``MARTY'' SENTERFITT, FIRE DEPUTY
CHIEF & DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, MONROE COUNTY,
FLORIDA
Chief Senterfitt. Thank you Chairman Payne, Ranking Member
King, and Members of the subcommittee for holding this hearing
today.
I am Martin Senterfitt, the director of emergency
management for Monroe County, the Florida Keys.
I am pleased to be here to address coordination issues
between FEMA and County Emergency Management programs and to
perhaps offer a solution to improve our future and
interactions.
As we examine these issues and concerns, I want to first
recognize the incredible work being done within FEMA.
I could spend hours recounting positive stories of FEMA
successes and the incredible dedication and hard work of its
employees.
But I recognize today's discussion is focused on
improvement, and my time is limited. Therefore, I will move
forward and speak on an issue I feel is important--the
relationship dynamics between FEMA and local emergency
management.
A major role of FEMA is to expedite funding to disaster-
impacted areas. We all recognize the necessity of fiscal
oversight to prevent waste and fraud. Unfortunately, this
oversight occurs months or years after the disaster by persons
sitting in an office.
These individuals have limited context as to the
environment in which these decisions were made, or the
extenuating circumstances that may have existed.
Because of this lack of awareness, these individuals may
then make subjective decisions to deny reimbursements, which
then begins this chain reaction of appeals and delays, legal
fees, and stress.
Fortunately, in many of these circumstances, the two
parties are often able to work to a positive solution as high-
level executives are engaged to have authority within FEMA to
use discretion and common sense, and make case-by-case rulings.
Unfortunately, this means reimbursement is delayed months
or years, and the impacted county is forced to pay interest on
loans and face fiscal challenges while it is recovering from a
disaster.
Recognizing the need of oversight, I suggest we engage a
solution that is already right in front of us.
FEMA often inserts a FEMA representative into the local
emergency operation center, who then ride out the storm with us
and report situational awareness updates to the FEMA structure.
Unfortunately, this person is often limited by FEMA process
and policy, as to what they can say or what they can suggest.
They observe, but do not actively participate.
In my opinion, after watching many FEMA employees interact
in disaster environments, it appears ground-level FEMA
employees are not allowed to give suggestions or in any way
commit FEMA to action. This is, perhaps, due to a
hypersensitivity to the liability or fear of overcommitting.
Most issues must be pushed up the chain and then waited for
a decision or answer.
But let me emphasize. These FEMA employees are highly
competent and capable of providing local communities priceless
advice and input. But it appears they are limited by
organizational culture and policies in a top-down management
structure.
Imagine a different scenario. FEMA inserts a highly-trained
employee into the local EOC that partners with the county
emergency manager and provides advice, input, and a second set
of eyes to evaluate the decisions being made.
Fiscal oversight can occur real-time during the disaster,
and the FEMA representative will have full awareness of the
environment in which these decisions are being made.
Let me emphasize. Potential mistakes can be prevented,
instead of appealed. Once concurrence is reached, both parties
can sign off and our first level of oversight is complete.
A State employee can also be added to this process, which
will allow concurrence at the local, State, and Federal level.
This solution provides a sounding board for the local emergency
manager, and should provide enough oversight to expedite the
reimbursement process.
In my EOC, I require that all local agencies provide
individuals who have the authority to act on behalf of their
agencies. That is what makes an EOC effective. I want the same
level of commitment from FEMA.
If we implement this change, I will have a FEMA partner in
my EOC, not a FEMA observer. Mistakes can be avoided, not
disputed years later.
I thank you for your time, and look forward to answering
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Chief Senterfitt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martin ``Marty'' Senterfitt
March 13, 2019
introduction
Thank you Chairman Payne, Ranking Member King, and Members of this
subcommittee for holding this hearing today. I am Martin Senterfitt,
the director of emergency management for Monroe County, Florida--the
Florida Keys. I am pleased to be here to address coordination issues
between FEMA and County Emergency Management programs and to offer a
solution to improve our future interactions.
As we examine these issues and concerns I want to first recognize
the incredible work being done within FEMA. I could spend hours
recounting positive stories of FEMA successes and the incredible
dedication and hard work of its employees, but I recognize today's
discussion is focused on improvement and my time is limited, therefore
I will move forward and speak on an issue I feel is important; the
relationship dynamics between FEMA and local emergency management.
A major role of FEMA is to expedite funding to disaster impact
areas. We all recognize the necessity of fiscal oversight to prevent
waste and fraud. Unfortunately, this oversight occurs months or years
after the disaster by persons sitting in an office. These individuals
have limited context as to the environment in which the decisions were
made or the extenuating circumstances that may have existed. Because of
this lack of awareness, these individuals may then make subjective
decisions to deny reimbursements which then begins a chain reaction of
appeals and delays, legal fees, and stress.
Fortunately, in many of these circumstances, the two parties are
often able to work to a positive solution as higher-level executives
are engaged who have the authority to use discretion and common sense
and make case-by-case rulings. Unfortunately, this means reimbursement
is delayed months or years and the impacted county is forced to pay
interest on loans and face fiscal challenges while it is recovering
from a disaster.
Recognizing the need for oversight, I suggest we engage a solution
that is already right in front of us. FEMA often inserts a FEMA
representative into the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC), who
ride out the storm with us and then reports situational awareness
updates to the FEMA structure. Unfortunately, this person is often
limited by FEMA process and policy as to what they can say or suggest.
They observe but do not actively participate.
In my opinion, after watching many FEMA employees interact in
disaster environments, ground-level FEMA employees are not allowed to
give suggestions or in any way commit FEMA to action. This is perhaps
due to a hyper-sensitivity to liability or fear of over-committing.
Most issues must be pushed up the chain and then wait for a decision or
answer. But let me emphasize, these FEMA employees are highly competent
and capable of providing local communities' priceless advice and input,
but it appears they are limited by organizational culture and policies
and a top-down management structure.
Imagine a different scenario . . .
FEMA inserts a highly-trained employee into the local EOC that
partners with the County Emergency Manager and provides advice, input,
and a second set of eyes to evaluate the decisions being made. Fiscal
oversight can occur real-time, during the event, and the FEMA
representative will have full awareness of the environment in which the
decisions are being made. Let me emphasize, potential mistakes can be
prevented instead of appealed. Once concurrence is reached, both
parties can sign off and our first level of oversight is complete. A
State employee can also be added to this process which will allow
concurrence at the local, State, and Federal level. This solution
provides a sounding board for the local emergency manager and should
provide enough oversight to expedite the reimbursement process.
In my EOC I require that all local agencies to provide individuals
who have the authority to act on their agencies' behalf. That is what
makes an EOC effective. I want the same level of commitment from FEMA.
If we implement this change I will have a FEMA partner in my EOC,
not an FEMA observer, and mistakes can be avoided, not disputed years
later.
I thank you for your time and look forward to answering any
questions you may have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Chief Waters to summarize his statement,
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHIEF JAMES R. WATERS, COUNTERTERRORISM, NYPD
Chief Waters. Good afternoon, Chairman Payne, Ranking
Member King, Member Rose, and Members of the committee. I am
James Waters, chief of the Counterterrorism Bureau of the New
York City Police Department.
On behalf of Police Commissioner O'Neill and Mayor de
Blasio, I am pleased to testify before your subcommittee to
discuss emergency preparedness, as well as how our partnerships
and the funding you and your colleagues appropriate, has
supported the NYPD's efforts to secure New York City.
I believe we would all agree that the concept of emergency
preparedness should not imply a reactive posture.
With more than 38 years of service to the NYPD, including
16 years overseeing our counterterrorism operations, I can tell
you with the highest degree of certainty that the NYPD does not
take such an approach.
Our fundamental belief is that the emergency preparedness
is driven by the proactive posture aimed at preventing an
attack and building resilience into everything we do.
Our ability to do this is a direct result of successful
collaboration with our Federal partners and the significant
funding that the Federal Government provides our city.
Funding that, eliminated, reduced or, frankly, not
increased, will result in an erosion of our capabilities,
termination of many of our initiatives that I will talk about
today, and a significant limitation of our overall preparedness
posture.
The NYPD relies on Federal funding to strengthen emergency
preparedness in many important ways. This funding staffs our
counterterrorism and intelligence bureaus, and purchases
critical detection and response equipment, like vapor wake
dogs.
It places radiation and chemical sensors in fixed and
mobile locations, in order to find radioactive materials before
they reach our city limits.
It provides comprehensive training and safety equipment to
our offices responding to CBRN attacks, as well as active-
shooter incidents. Those are just a few examples of the key
counterterrorism priorities and strategies.
The bureau which I oversee has wide-ranging
responsibilities. It is comprised of specialized personnel and
assets dedicated to preventing acts of terrorism or mass
casualty events in New York City.
To this end, the Bureau conducts extensive planning,
training, and operational coordination within the NYPD and its
security partners, including deploying highly-skilled critical
response command teams, and advanced threat detection
technologies across the city.
Our intergovernmental partnerships are significant. We are
part of the joint terrorism task force, spearhead initiatives
like Operation Sentry, and a part of the Securing the Cities
initiative, funded by the Department of Homeland Security and
aimed at protecting against a radiological attack, like a dirty
bomb.
Our private-sector partnerships are unmatched. These joint
ventures support our Federally-funded Domain Awareness System,
or DAS.
This system receives data from real-time sensors, including
radiological and chemical sensors--information from 9-1-1
calls, and one-way live feed from CCTV cameras, and allows us
to view countless locations around the city from one
centralized location.
Our private-sector partners number approximately 20,000,
and as part of an initiative called NYPD Shield, represent
almost every sector of industry.
We provide information to private-sector partners to help
them secure their facilities and employees. In turn, they share
information and access to help us secure the city.
We continue to see greater funding levels that are
commensurate with the unique position in which New York City
finds itself, at the top of the terrorist target list.
In the 17 years since September 11, the NYPD and our
partners have uncovered over 2 dozen terrorist plots against
the city. In most cases, they have been thwarted by the efforts
of the NYPD and the FBI JTTF.
However, we are not able to stop all of them. Tragedies,
such as the West Side Highway vehicle-ramming attack, the
Chelsea bombing, and the subway bombing are examples of
continuing need to improve and expand our counterterrorism
apparatus.
Port and transportation, homeland security grants, have not
been increased for years, which could also counter terror--I am
sorry--counterterrorism apparatus.
The threat is ever-present. But as we have seen over the
past several years, it is also dynamic and becoming
increasingly decentralized. Thus, harder to detect.
As the nature of the threat changes, so must our response.
With additional funding above the current levels, the NYPD
would be able to enhance a proactive posture by expanding
intelligence-gathering capabilities, increasing deployments in
critical areas, purchasing and employing cutting-edge
technology, expanding collaboration and partnerships, all to
strengthen its emergency response capabilities.
We are facing a new and, potentially, lethal threat, one
that the NYPD is prohibited from effectively countering.
Though we have not yet seen it here in the United States,
terror groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, have incorporated
unmanned aircraft systems, or drones in battle overseas.
The NYPD recommends amending the Federal Code to allow
State and local governments to purchase jamming technology for
use against drones in select circumstances with proper
oversight.
Recently DHS and DOJ were empowered by law to use such
technology. However, our Federal partners simply do not have
the resources to ensure the level of coverage for New York
City.
The NYPD is ready, willing, and able to deploy this option
if given the authority, and will train select members of the
department to respond swiftly anywhere in the 5 boroughs. Mere
moments of delay could mean the difference between successfully
stopping an attack or catastrophe.
At the NYPD, our philosophy is simple. We have to gather
the best intelligence available, utilize the most up-to-date
technology, expand partnerships, take proactive measures to
identify and neutralize threats, and react to natural disasters
and other mass-scale events in a manner which ensures public
safety and prevents the loss of life, all while remaining
committed to protecting individual liberties.
Over 17 years since September 11, New York City enjoys the
distinction of being the safest big city in America. It is also
commercially vibrant, culturally diverse, and free.
We can claim these successes are due in no small measure,
to the approximately 58,000 uniformed and civilian members of
the New York City Police Department, the partnerships we have
built and the assistance we receive from the Federal
Government, which has proven itself a vital partner in the face
of an ever-present threat.
Thank you again for your opportunity to testify here today,
sir. I am happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Chief Waters follows:]
Prepared Statement of James R. Waters
March 13, 2019
Good afternoon Chair Payne, Ranking Member King, Member Rose, and
Members of the subcommittee. I am James Waters, chief of the
Counterterrorism Bureau of the New York Police Department (NYPD). On
behalf of Police Commissioner James P. O'Neill and Mayor Bill de
Blasio, I am pleased to testify before your subcommittee to discuss
emergency preparedness as well as how our partnerships and the funding
you and your colleagues appropriate has supported the NYPD's efforts to
secure New York City.
I believe we would all agree that the concept of emergency
preparedness should not imply a reactive posture. We cannot take a
posture that accepts there is nothing we can do to prevent an attack
and instead should merely prepare for the inevitability of it happening
and how we should respond. With more than 16 years of experience
overseeing NYPD's counterterrorism operations, first as the commanding
officer of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) then as chief of
counterterrorism, I can tell you with the highest degree of certainty
that the NYPD does not take such an approach. While we leverage every
one of our resources and partnerships to train and equip our personnel
and ready our city for man-made and natural catastrophes, our
fundamental belief is that emergency preparedness is driven by a
proactive posture aimed at preventing an attack on our city and
building resilience into our policies, procedures, people, and
infrastructure. However, there should be no mistaking it: Whether
proactive or reactive, our ability to prevent or be adequately prepared
for catastrophic events is dependent in no small part on our successful
collaboration with our Federal partners and the significant funding
which the Federal Government provides our city. Funding that, if
eliminated, reduced, or frankly not increased, will result in an
erosion of our capabilities, cessation of many of the initiatives that
I will talk about today, and a significant limitation of our overall
emergency preparedness posture.
Although New York City has become the safest big city in the
Nation, it remains the primary target of violent extremists, both
foreign and home-grown. The attacks of September 11, 2001, forever
changed how the NYPD views its mission, and following that tragedy, the
Department recognized that we must be an active participant in
preventing terrorist attacks. Soon after that horrific attack, the NYPD
became the first police department in the country to develop its own
robust counterterrorism infrastructure, operating throughout the city,
country, and the world to develop intelligence and techniques to combat
this ever-evolving threat and bolstering our ability to respond to
these attacks and other mass-scale emergency events. Vital to this
effort has been collaboration and information sharing with other city
and State agencies, neighboring States, the private sector and,
especially, the Federal Government.
We have worked meticulously to build this investigative and
emergency response infrastructure, while protecting and upholding the
Constitutional rights and liberties accorded to those who live, work,
and visit New York City--but we recognize that the specter of an attack
is always looming. In the last 17 years, the NYPD and our partners have
uncovered over 2 dozen terrorist plots against our city. In most cases,
they have been thwarted by the efforts of the NYPD and the FBI-NYPD
JTTF.
Tragically, we could not stop all of them. In September 2016, an
individual inspired by al-Qaeda set off home-made pressure cooker bombs
in the Chelsea neighborhood of Manhattan and in Seaside Park, New
Jersey, injuring 30 people. Multiple additional unexploded devices were
subsequently discovered. This case highlights that although our
proactive efforts could not prevent this attack, our reactive
preparedness resulted in the immediate activation of partnerships and
plans that quickly located the perpetrator and the other devices before
more havoc could be wreaked. Collaboration between the FBI, ATF, our
New Jersey partners, and the NYPD, among others, led to this
individual's capture and he is currently serving multiple life
sentences.
On October 31, 2017, an ISIS-inspired extremist used a rented truck
to mow down innocent cyclists and pedestrians on the West Side Highway
running path in Manhattan and near Ground Zero, killing 8. The
collaboration between the NYPD and the FBI led to a fruitful
investigation which resulted in Federal charges of lending support to a
terrorist organization, in addition to murder charges. This individual
will be tried later this year. In December 2017, an ISIS-inspired
extremist attempted a suicide bombing when he set off a home-made
explosive device at the Port Authority Bus Terminal subway station in
Manhattan that injured 3 individuals and himself. Once again, the
collaboration between the NYPD and its State and Federal partners
resulted in a successful investigation which led to a guilty verdict.
Most recently, between October 22 and November 2 of last year, an
individual sent explosive devices through the mail to numerous elected
officials and high-profile private citizens, in addition to a news
outlet. This attack spanned States up and down the East Coast and as
far west as California. We are grateful that there was no loss of life
as a result of this incident, and proud of the coordinated effort that
included law enforcement from multiple localities, States and the
Federal Government that located all of the devices, and which resulted
in the capture of the individual responsible. These attacks strengthen
our resolve to prevent future carnage.
The NYPD's Critical Response Command (CRC) is one of our first
lines of defense against any threat. An elite squad, with officers
trained in special weapons, long guns, explosive trace detection, and
radiological and nuclear awareness, who regularly respond quickly to
any potential terrorist attack across the city, including active-
shooter incidents. This team, which is central to the Counterterrorism
Bureau's proactive counterterrorism mission, conducts daily
deployments, saturating high probability targets with a uniformed
presence aimed at disrupting terrorist planning operations and
deterring and preventing attacks. But the Counterterrorism Bureau has a
mandate broader than the CRC's operations: The Bureau has wide-ranging
responsibilities that include designing and implementing large-scale
counterterrorism projects; conducting counterterrorism training for the
entire patrol force and other law enforcement agencies; identifying
critical infrastructure sites and developing protective strategies for
such sites; researching, testing and developing plans for the use of
emerging technologies used to detect and combat chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons; developing systems and
programs to increase harbor security, which includes the pro-active
deployment and mapping of background radiation in the Port of New York
and New Jersey; and interfacing with the NYC Office of Emergency
Management, which coordinates the city's response to mass-scale events.
Our emergency prevention apparatus is not limited to the important
work that our dedicated professionals conduct each day. We frequently
work with other Government agencies to help protect our city. Most
notably, the NYPD is a member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, led by
the FBI, which combines the resources of multiple law enforcement
agencies to investigate and prevent terrorist attacks. Additional
initiatives include Operation SENTRY, which consists of regular
meetings with law enforcement agencies from around the country in order
to share information and training techniques, and to pursue joint
investigative avenues. At last count there are 275 participating law
enforcement partners. Law enforcement in this country cannot be content
to merely focus on activity in their own jurisdictions. Terrorist plots
can be planned on-line or discussed in one part of the country and
executed in another. This is especially the case with attacks that are
perpetrated by those inspired to act by terrorist groups, rather than
receiving information, instructions, or directions from them (also
known commonly as ``directed'' attacks). Information silos can be
deadly and Operation SENTRY is designed to breakdown walls between
jurisdictions.
The NYPD also participates in Multi-Agency Super Surges which are
joint operations to focus manpower at sensitive transit locations
conducted with Port Authority Police, Amtrak Police, MTA Police, New
Jersey Transit Police, the FBI, TSA, and the National Guard SHIELD
Group. These collaborative efforts also include the Securing the Cities
Initiative, which is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funded
initiative between the NYPD and regional law enforcement partners to
protect against a radiological attack like a ``dirty bomb''. As a part
of this effort, radiation detection equipment was installed in
neighboring jurisdictions and at key points of entry into the 5
boroughs so that the city is virtually ringed with a radiological alarm
system. Additionally, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
certified a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) at NYPD
Headquarters that supports Classified information sharing integral to
the NYPD's counterterror mission. We also have personnel from I&A
assigned to New York City in addition to a DHS special security officer
assigned full-time to manage SCIF operations. The DHS intelligence
analyst assigned to the NYPD sits with our Intelligence Bureau's cadre
of intelligence research specialists and proactively shares DHS and
intelligence community information with the NYPD. This has resulted in
leads for existing investigations, new investigations being opened, and
two joint finished intelligence products over the past year alone. Our
civilian intelligence research specialists, who are also funded by DHS,
work hand-in-hand with our uniformed members to detect and disrupt
threats to the city, in addition to providing critical strategic
intelligence analysis.
In addition to partnerships with the Federal Government, other
States and localities, and foreign governments, we have increasingly
partnered with the private sector. These partnerships are instrumental.
Our public-private initiatives, interconnected yet distinct, begin with
our Federally-funded Domain Awareness System (DAS), which receives data
from real-time sensors, including radiological and chemical sensors,
ShotSpotter, information from 9-1-1 calls, and live feeds from CCTV
cameras around the city. Not all of these cameras are city-owned or -
operated. In fact, most of them are not. They belong to private
entities that have chosen to partner with us, providing encrypted one-
way access to their cameras as well as other information, in our
collective effort to keep the city and its millions of inhabitants
safe. This information, including camera feeds, can also be accessed by
NYPD officers on their Department-issued mobile devices in real time.
The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative and the Midtown Manhattan
Security Initiative are the backbones of DAS, and are great examples of
additional steps the NYPD takes, in partnership with the private
sector. Lower Manhattan and Midtown Manhattan contain many of the
country's most attractive locations for attacks, and businesses located
within these sensitive areas have allowed us to access their cameras,
technology, and security personnel as force multipliers, allowing the
NYPD to better prevent terrorist attacks. This collaboration includes
Operation Nexus, where the NYPD works with businesses throughout the
Nation to provide them with information to help them identify
suspicious transactions that may be linked to terrorist plots. Our
private-sector partnerships also includes an initiative called NYPD
SHIELD, which established a two-way line of communication and
information sharing between the NYPD and approximately 20,000 private-
sector members from businesses and organizations throughout the
country, representing almost every sector of industry and Government.
The information we share enables us to better secure our city and
allows businesses, both individually and collectively as industries, to
enhance their own security.
The NYPD relies on Federal funding to protect New York City against
terrorist attacks and to strengthen emergency preparedness, including
the security of critical transportation and port infrastructure. This
funding has helped staff our counterterrorism and intelligence bureaus
and purchase critical detection and response equipment. It allows the
Department to purchase, train, and deploy vapor wake dogs, who are able
to detect explosive particles. In addition, it enables us to place
radiation and chemical sensors in fixed high-profile locations and in a
variety of mobile conveyances in order to expand our coverage to
include likely points and paths of entry for these dangerous materials;
this allows us to find radioactive material before they ever reach our
city limits. These appropriations have also made it possible to provide
comprehensive training and safety equipment to our officers responding
to explosive, chemical, biological, and radiological incidents, as well
as training officers to respond to active-shooter incidents so they can
engage and end coordinated terrorist attacks. This vital funding also
provides critical instruction to officers in life-saving techniques
that can be implemented during an on-going attack, in the effort to
save lives before it is safe enough for medical personnel to enter an
active crime scene.
The support we receive from the Federal Government in the form of
funding, as well as our relationships with our Federal law enforcement
partners have been and continues to be invaluable. However, we continue
to seek greater funding levels that are commensurate with the unique
position in which New York City finds itself--at the top of the
terrorist target list. The identification of plots targeting our city
is becoming increasingly challenging as we are seeing more and more
attackers becoming inspired rather than directed. Extremist groups are
increasingly using this cost-efficient method to recruit, educate, and
operationalize their deadly agenda. The traditional terrorist
recruitment, training and plotting framework, where sympathizers would
be identified and brought to established locations around the globe for
training and where terror plots were conceived, prepared, and
operationalized, is quickly being substituted. These locations are
becoming less commonplace. Instead, the internet is used to identify,
influence, train, and instruct recruits. This emerging and expanding
decentralized methodology is making it increasingly more difficult for
law enforcement to identify and detect radicalized individuals, terror
plots in their planning stages and networks of conspirators, as plots
are hatched and attacks carried out by lone wolves. With additional
funding above and beyond the current levels, the NYPD could enhance its
proactive, preventative posture by expanding its intelligence-gathering
capabilities, increasing deployments in critical areas of the city,
purchasing and employing the most current and cutting-edge technology,
enhancing and expanding its collaborative efforts, as well as
continuing to develop its emergency response capabilities in the event
a tragic incident occurs.
While I have outlined the various steps the NYPD takes to address
the constant threat to our city and to manage emergencies, there is one
threat that has emerged which has the potential of being lethal and
which the Department is prohibited from effectively countering as a
matter of Federal law. Though we have yet to see it here in the United
States, terror groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda have incorporated
unmanned aircraft systems, or drones, in battle overseas. As we have
seen this past December in London, where illegal drone flights brought
an entire airport to a standstill for 17 hours, when we are unable to
disable or disrupt a drone posing a threat, we are at its mercy.
Currently, Federal law prohibits State and local governments from
using technology that could be used to jam a drone's signal.
Additionally, current law provides no pathway for State or local
governments to apply to the FCC for an exception from this prohibition.
The NYPD recommends amending Title 47 of the Federal Code to allow
State and local governments to purchase jamming technology to use
against unmanned aircraft systems in select circumstances with proper
oversight. Recently, DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) were
empowered by law to use such technology. However, our DHS and DOJ
partners simply do not have the resources to ensure the level of
geographic coverage New York City requires against this threat, no
matter their best efforts. The difficulty that DHS and DOJ will have
responding to this threat in NYC is magnified in places where they do
not have permanent field offices. The NYPD is ready, willing, and able
to deploy this option if given the authority. Select members of the
NYPD could be trained in its use and ready to respond swiftly anywhere
in the 5 boroughs. Mere moments of delay could mean the difference
between successfully stopping an attack and catastrophe.
Given that we are all here to speak about emergency preparedness, I
wish to highlight a vital component to any such preparation and
response: Effective communication systems that enable our first
responders to communicate. To this end I would be remiss if I did not
take a moment to talk about the T-Band and how vitally important it is
to the NYPD and its regional law enforcement and emergency response
partners, and first responders Nation-wide. Aside from large-scale
natural disasters and terrorist attacks, such as Hurricane Sandy and
the September 11 attacks, the Department receives nearly 10 million 9-
1-1 calls annually and patrols approximately 306 square miles of some
of the most densely-populated geography in the Nation. The T-Band is a
portion of the spectrum used in New York City and the surrounding
region to support critical communication and provide regional
interoperability among first responders. The NYPD and its regional
partners have spent years and hundreds of millions of local, State, and
Federal dollars to build and improve these T-Band networks, including
in the subway and train tunnels in and around the city, the largest
such tunnel system in the world. Under current law, portions of the T-
Band will be auctioned off to private interests beginning in 2021. This
would squeeze first responders into smaller and smaller sections of the
band, even as the demand on the band continues to increase. To be
blunt, this would be catastrophic to public safety and emergency
readiness and response. There is no viable alternative spectrum
available for us to move to. For example, the entire New York City
subway system is wired for T-Band and, learning from 9/11, the New York
City building code now requires all new high-rise construction to be
wired for T-Band as well. Cell phones do not allow the same type of
immediate, multi-point communication that a police radio does. Even if
there were a viable alternative, it would take years and billions of
dollars to build up another communication infrastructure alongside the
existing T-Band infrastructure. We would then have to seamlessly
transfer all communications to the new system wholesale without a break
in service, which would be, to put it lightly, next to impossible. And,
given all of this, we would not even be able to guarantee it would work
nearly as well as the T-Band systems we have spent years perfecting. On
behalf of the NYPD, the FDNY, and the city of New York, we urge the
House to pass the Don't Break Up the T-Band Act of 2019.
Additionally, while we certainly are encouraged by steps taken by
the FCC to improve the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, we urge
the FCC to adopt rules that better allow us to respond to the full
range of modern emergency scenarios, from hurricanes to terrorist
attacks. When the city issued a WEA notification regarding the Chelsea
Bomber in 2016 to every phone in the 5 boroughs, the millions of New
Yorkers who wanted to help were merely given several lines of text with
no picture. In this age of instant access to visual information via
social media, we need to enhance our ability to rapidly and securely
deliver comprehensive emergency information, including images, to the
public. This information must come from a trusted source, like WEA,
before unverified or incorrect information is shared widely on social
media networks, sowing further confusion and panic. Pictures provide
instant recognition and speak a universal language. They enable rapid
response from every potential witness who could save lives through fast
action. The lack of an ability to disseminate photographs and other
multimedia highlights a weakness in the system. In the face of emerging
threats, we need to remain on technology's cutting edge by using public
information systems to their fullest capacity and, where necessary,
improving those capabilities. In addition, as the nature of emergencies
is their lack of predictability, the city continues to strongly urge
Congress to eliminate the ability for mobile phone customers to opt out
of WEA messages. Our Nation's threat environment has changed
dramatically since the creation of WEA in 2006 and local public safety
officials must have the unfettered ability to reach our constituents at
a moment's notice.
At the NYPD, our philosophy is simple: We have to gather the best
intelligence available, utilize the most up-to-date technology, expand
our partnerships, take proactive measures to identify and neutralize
threats, and react to natural disasters and other mass-scale events in
a manner which ensures public safety and prevents the loss of life, all
while remaining committed to protecting individual liberties.
Over 17 years after September 11, 2001, New York City enjoys the
distinction of being the safest big city in America. It is also
commercially vibrant, culturally diverse, and free. We can claim these
successes are due, in no small measure, to the approximately 58,000
uniformed and civilian members of the New York City Police Department,
the partnerships we have built, and the assistance we receive from the
Federal Government, which has proven itself a vital partner in the face
of an ever-present threat.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. I am happy
to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Payne. I would like to thank all the witnesses for
their testimony, and remind each Member that he or she will
have 5 minutes to question the panel.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Major Bucchere and Mr. Senterfitt, I want to ask you about
a very troubling article last week from NPR that described how
Federal disaster aid increases inequality after a disaster and
how higher-income areas receive more aid than lower-income
areas after a disaster.
Another NPR story pointed to the Federal buy-outs of flood-
prone properties that have been concentrated in majority white
districts, even though disasters and flooding affect everyone?
Can you describe efforts that New Jersey takes on the State
level, and Monroe County takes on a local level, to make sure
that disaster recovery happens equitably across communities and
low-income individuals and aren't being left behind?
Major Bucchere. Yes, sir. In New Jersey, NJOEM takes a
whole-community approach to all phases of emergency management.
Prior to a disaster, we do several things to ensure that all
communities are taken into account.
We ensure that all 21 counties have a hazard mitigation
plan. That county hazard mitigation plan is paid for with grant
funding, without which the county and local municipalities
would be ineligible for hazard mitigation funding at all.
Some of the other things that we have done is, we have
distributed over 400 generators across all 21 counties and over
400 municipalities for power restoration across all
communities.
Last, we have re-engaged our community emergency response
teams, which has proven vital, dispensing over 120 community
emergency response team trailers, training 27,000 people and
have a core group of 10,000 to help all walks of life.
In regards to home buy-outs and elevations, New Jersey
takes a risk-based approach, based on 3 criteria: Severe,
repetitive loss, repetitive loss, and substantial damage.
As a home rule State, each municipality decides the
direction that they want to go in. Some municipalities take
elevations in order to keep their tax base. Some prefer home
buy-outs.
One of the proactive things that has just happened in the
State of New Jersey under Governor Murphy is, he has enacted
the Office of Environmental Justice under the Department of
Environmental Protection.
They are a critical key emergency management partner with
us, and we have begun to engage in meetings to ensure the fair
treatment of all people, and to give all communities a voice.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Senterfitt.
Chief Senterfitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In Monroe County, we recognize the simple reality that
disasters do have an adverse impact on the poorer populations
of the community. That is directly related to the diminishing
value of a dollar.
If you, you know, if you only have $1,000, and you take a
$1,000 impact, it changes your world. If you have $100,000 and
you take a $1,000 impact, it is not as much of an impact. We
recognize that.
So we focus heavily on the poorest parts of our community.
We have made sure that that is where we have placed our focus.
We have opened a long-term recovery group with, not only
the Government, but all of our non-profit partners, to make
sure that we are digging into those needs to find out what is
necessary and how we get these individuals back, you know, back
to a reasonable level of life.
In Monroe County we have seen a major impact on our
workforce housing. Quite often, it is your workforce that is
living at the ground level of these multi-story houses. When we
receive 4, 6, 10 feet of water in the Florida Keys, it was the
workforce housing that flooded out.
These were the people that had the adverse impact. That is
where we have been putting our focus and energy.
I can say that FEMA has been right there with us the whole
time, working with us, making sure that these needs are met.
This is a conscious thought in the forefront of our minds, to
make sure we are fair and equitable.
Mr. Payne. OK. From the two of you, do you think there is
anything FEMA could do to improve disaster relief for low-
income individuals very quickly?
Chief Senterfitt. If I may, part of the--I read the NPR
articles. Part of the challenge that I found with them is, they
are comparing, not even apples to oranges, but apples to
footballs.
On one hand, they talk about the repetitive flood loss
programs, but at the same time, they try to turn around and
talk about assistance, rental housing. It is two totally
different products.
That I have seen, FEMA is doing everything they possibly
can to be fair and equitable. But different programs are going
to impact different communities.
Repetitive flood loss is going to be more advantageous to
the homeowner versus the renter. Whereas, temporary sheltering
assistance is pretty much a process that only those that are at
the lower economic scales are going to benefit from.
So, I think, just to be careful, we have to look at all the
programs individually. I think there is more research that
needs to be done on this to make sure that we are not missing
the boat somewhere.
Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you.
I yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we saw with Sandy,
and also if there is ever another terrorist attack in
Manhattan, basically, New York and New Jersey are one region.
So, I would just ask Chief Waters and Major Bucchere, how
much cooperation is there between New York and New Jersey,
specifically with the NYPD and New Jersey as far as emergency
disasters, terrorist attacks, whatever?
Major, do you want to go first?
Major Bucchere. Yes, sir. We share a tremendous partner
with the State of New York and NYPD, in particular, from the
emergency management side of the house from our--and evacuation
planning, to our investigative branch or participation in the
JTTF, our regional operations and intelligence center and,
certainly, our investigative branch.
We feel like our partnership couldn't be stronger. We
actively monitor NYPD's posture in preparedness and, also, in
response to critical incidents and threats, and often similarly
respond on the other side of the river.
We have had several target-hardening operational responses,
specifically, some of which occurred during holiday season,
where members are going back and forth by rail and ferry across
the river.
So again, we share an extremely strong partnership. We
embed members into lower Manhattan Security Initiative. We have
a streamlined communication. I am glad to report that those
partnerships are incredibly strong.
Mr. King. Chief.
Chief Waters. Sir, I agree with the other witness. In a
word, seamless, sir. The transparency is there. It dates back
many years. We work very well with the State police and the
local police departments in New Jersey. We have members of the
Joint Terrorism Task Force that are on the Newark side of the
river working with New Jersey.
We have members of our Intelligence Bureau that are
assigned to New Jersey. We worked, going back to the Super Bowl
several years ago, we spent quite a bit of time--I spent a year
in the planning stages before the Super Bowl in 2014 with the
Jersey State Police and all of the partners.
As was already stated, we have members of New Jersey law
enforcement in the lower Manhattan security or the Domain
Awareness System residence. So it is seamless.
Mr. King. In New York we have, obviously, Yankee Stadium,
Citi Field, Arthur Ashe Stadium, Madison Square Garden. Jersey
has MetLife Stadium.
So recently the Dodgers had a drill in Dodgers Stadium. A
practiced evacuation of the stands, in case of an attack. So is
there anything similar to that, you know, not to give away any
trade secrets, but are you prepared for that in New York? Also,
will you be prepared for that in New Jersey?
Chief.
Chief Waters. So we are prepared. We do through a number of
different programs in counterterrorism, first through the
Shield program and the counterterrorism division.
A lot of training with all of the employees in the private
sector but, specifically, to your question, with all the
employees of the different venues at sporting arenas, we deploy
our critical response command and our strategic response group,
highly-trained, heavily-armed officers to those locations, as
well as our elite emergency service unit folks, and the bomb
squad, to all of those venues for every event. So we are well-
prepared.
Mr. King. Major.
Major Bucchere. I would concur with Chief Waters. We have
conducted several iterations of exercises over the years,
certainly in preparations for hosting the Super Bowl and since.
In addition, staffing MetLife with several members of our
special operations section and tactical forces, including our
bomb squad.
In addition, we have also brought up the entire detect-and-
render-safe taskforce, a Federally grant-funded taskforce
combined of explosive detection canine handlers and our bomb
squads. And work in conjunction with all of our partners on
contraflow and emergency evacuation procedures.
Mr. King. Give some idea of the commitment, Chief Waters.
How many personnel are in counterterrorism in NYPD? How many in
the intel unit? How many in JTTF?
Chief Waters. So the JTTF is the largest partner next to
the FBI, with over 100 strong detectives, sergeants,
lieutenants, all the way up to deputy chief.
There are 1,000 people in the Counterterrorism Bureau that
work each and every day through the bomb squad critical
response command, lower Manhattan Security Initiative, the
Counterterrorism Division, and the World Trade Center Command.
Additionally, the Intelligence Bureau has just under 1,000
strong, working and spread out throughout the region, not only
New York City, but in New Jersey, Connecticut, and elsewhere.
And around the world through their liaison program.
Mr. King. If we have a second round, I will invite you into
the issue of drones with you?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. King. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Next we have the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms.
Underwood.
Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Chairman Payne, for organizing
this hearing on the current state of our Nation's emergency
management.
I also want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today
and for the work that you do to ensure our communities are
better-prepared to respond to emergencies.
I am particularly appreciative of your work, given my
experience at the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response at HHS, where I helped to coordinate
preparedness and response efforts for natural disasters and
emerging infectious diseases and the like--so first let me ask
you, Mr. Reaves, right now, do you think you and your co-
workers at FEMA have all the resources and support that you
need to do your jobs well?
Mr. Reaves. Currently, we have 1,118 vacancies, just
staffing vacancies, full-time, permanent full-time staffing
vacancies so, of course, that negatively affects our
preparedness levels.
Do we have money dedicated to full-time funding? Yes. That
is the traditional hurricane preparedness and training
scenarios that we run through with our State and local partners
every year.
We have a shortened window because of the impact of the
furlough and the 36 days of--usually we have from the end of
November to the beginning of June to prepare for hurricane
season again. Then, on the interim, we have flood season and
tornado season between those.
So it has really shortened our window to prepare for
hurricane season. We are busting our butts trying to get ready.
Ms. Underwood. Yes, sir. In your testimony, you wrote that
this has been the, ``most active disaster season in recent
history''. Can you tell us what you mean by that?
Mr. Reaves. Yes, ma'am. The previous 5 years it is a better
window to look at.
We have been more active as a disaster response agency in
the last 5 years than we have the previous 10 prior to that.
We stayed deployed to one disaster or another. There has
not been a recovery season, as traditionally the, you know, the
traditional recovery season we get.
So our employees aren't getting a lot of down time anymore,
because of the volcanoes in Hawaii, or because of the wildfires
in California, or because of the floods that subsequently
follow the wildfires.
So there is a shortened window of recuperation recovery
time, and it is really impacting our membership.
Ms. Underwood. I see. Thank you. I am from Illinois, which
was hit by one of the worst tornado outbreaks in the State's
history, back in December. Flooding in my district in Lake
County and McHenry County, is a constant and growing threat.
We can't ignore the scientific consensus that increasing
the number and intensity of natural disasters are linked to
climate change. It is personal in my community because the EPA
has warned that climate change is likely to make flooding in
Illinois even more frequent.
This is for anybody on the panel. How are your
organizations preparing for the future, as climate change and
other factors contribute to this pattern? We are seeing a
bigger and more frequent natural disasters.
Major Bucchere. In New Jersey, as of 2019, our State hazard
mitigation plan is being updated to examine the effects of
climate change.
As a result, we are taking the lead on this. All 21
counties in the State of New Jersey's hazard mitigation plan
will also examine the role of climate change.
Chief Senterfitt. Further, we are partnering with the
Department of Environmental Protection on a coastal resiliency
plan. That plan is in development, and that will look at
climate change from a long-term perspective.
Moreover, it will, not only, with the hazard mitigation
plan, where we look at the elevation of homes, the buy-out of
homes, the coastal resiliency plan, we will look at critical
infrastructure, the roadways, and other infrastructure.
Ms. Underwood. What can Congress do to help you prepare for
these future threats as they emerge?
Major Bucchere. Certainly, any additional funding that
Congress can provide for us to increase our programs, would be
beneficial.
Ms. Underwood. Thank you. I am a nurse, so I am also very
aware of both the immediate and long-term public health
implications of disasters.
Even after debris is cleared, many people continue to
suffer from lasting physical and mental health issues.
As recent disasters have illustrated, the most vulnerable
among us, including young children, the elderly and people who
are mobility-impaired can be particularly susceptible to injury
and illness following a disaster.
So, Mr. Bucchere--sorry--I was interested to read about the
training New Jersey has developed to promote preparedness for
individuals with disabilities and others with access and
functional needs.
Can you just summarize what that training entails, and
would you suggest to other States who want to implement those
similar programs?
Mr. Payne. Very quickly.
Ms. Underwood. Sorry.
Major Bucchere. Sure. We have a very active and robust
training regimen.
We have a full-time DAFN coordinator who coordinates our
training. We also partner with our county and locals at the
municipal level with the development of core advisory groups to
take into account the entire DAFN community.
I will mention one other thing very quickly, which is, we
help assist and manage the register-ready program, and get the
word out, in order that all individuals with any disability or
access functional needs can register. Thereby, us being able to
prepare and respond in an expeditious way to serve our entire
community.
Ms. Underwood. Excellent. Thank you so much for your work.
Thank you all for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Now go to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Crenshaw.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King,
colleagues. I look forward to working with you and serving with
you on this very important subcommittee on disaster
preparedness response and recovery.
This is especially important to my district in Houston. As
you know, we suffered through Hurricane Harvey, dumped over 33
trillion gallons of rain over us.
To understand that magnitude it is a block of rain 3 miles
wide, 3 miles high and 3 miles long. That is a lot of water. A
lot of residents had 6 or 7 feet of water.
As we recovered from that disaster, it was quite amazing to
see how local and State and Federal entities work together, and
really, how the civic communities came out, the churches and
the non-profits.
I worked with Team Rubicon, specifically, which I know
works both in Florida and New Jersey and New York. It is
amazing to see the best of people come out when things go
wrong.
One thing I want to get at with all of you is--and I will
start with Mr. Senterfitt. In your experience, is there a clear
hierarchy and a unity of command in disaster management? I know
it is a broad question but----
Chief Senterfitt. Yes, there is. We use the incident
management system very well. We tie the municipals, the locals,
and the States together very well.
You know, as my comments alluded to earlier, the one thing
I want to do is get FEMA more engaged in that unity of command.
Mr. Crenshaw. Right.
Chief Senterfitt. Too often, they are kind-of at a distance
and we could really use them as a partner at the table.
Mr. Crenshaw. Right. My next question hits on that exactly.
So go into a little bit more detail. How does that partnership
look? What is the right way to think about it?
Chief Senterfitt. You know, I say I need a partner, not an
observer. I think it is just an organizational culture issue,
where the FEMA people on the ground aren't allowed to engage
and commit and actively participate, which then means we make
decisions.
We would love to have FEMA oversight right there. We make
the best decisions we can. Then later we get denied, and then
and reimbursement. Then we have to go through an appeals
process.
What I find most interesting is, I can watch the discomfort
of the FEMA employees. They know the answers. They want to
engage.
Mr. Crenshaw. Yes.
Chief Senterfitt. They want to be a part of the solution
but the policy and process doesn't allow them to.
Mr. Crenshaw. OK. Mr. Bucchere.
Major Bucchere. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crenshaw. We are all having trouble here. OK. In your
testimony you mentioned the recovery efforts after Hurricane
Sandy. In your experience would it be beneficial to consolidate
disaster recovery money into FEMA rather than the current
system which includes SBA, Army Corps of Engineers, DOD, HUD,
HHS and Mr. Senterfitt--I am sorry. If you want to add on after
Mr. Bucchere's answer that would be fine.
Major Bucchere. In terms of the specific finances I would
like to go back and take that to my recovery bureau and talk to
the subject-matter experts and provide you with a written
response for the record.
Mr. Crenshaw. OK.
Chief Senterfitt. Yes, sir, sometimes it is a challenge to
try to find where all the money is at. It does get spread
around a little bit and then we have to try to--as the disaster
victims try to find which program should we be addressing at
which time and for which amount. So anything we can do to
streamline that process.
The other big issue we are having there is the programs
from a project management time line perspective do not connect.
So a FEMA program will end at 18 months but the repetitive
flood loss process may not occur until 3 years. So the
homeowners or the renters may have a 12-month period where they
are just kind-of left out on their own.
So we need to get all those different programs and time
line them out and make sure there is no break in continuum of
care.
Mr. Crenshaw. If you could follow up with our offices with
more detail on that subject that would be much appreciated.
Texas is doing its own research on this and we would like to
come up with some solutions.
One thing that happened in the city of Houston was that the
city of Houston didn't modify local code allowing for
manufactured housing and RV units outside of mobile home parks
until more than 4 months later. That was a huge problem.
Do you guys have any other examples where city and State
laws get in the way of disaster recovery? What is the best way
to deal with that when those things conflict?
Chief Senterfitt. In Monroe County in the Florida Keys we
have got very strict building code and we found that we been
able to work through them pretty tight. But what we were
finding is there is just not enough capability to produce
modular homes quick enough to make up for the loss.
So it is more of a product of the environment than of the
capabilities.
Mr. Crenshaw. Anything to add? I guess I have to yield my
time.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman's time has expired.
Next we will have the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. First off, let me thank you all for what you
do. As going through both Katrina and Rita, you know, a named
storm usually touches us somehow, some way. Or if it is not a
named storm it could be BP or other disasters that we have.
I would like to just, you know, and it was just mentioned
about sometimes whether the local laws or State laws or zoning
kind-of hampers your response. I would like to flip it a little
bit to talk, if you want to give some examples of how the
Stafford Act just retards the whole process in terms of whole
community recovery.
So let me give you some examples and you can give--the
duplication of benefits was a humongous problem in terms of
people coming back. Then it was counterproductive. If you were
able to get a SBA loan then you had to take that money out of
what you were able to receive in grant.
Then if the bar against permanent fix, that any of the
money has to be spent on a temporary fix as opposed to
permanent. So if we want to talk about the climax of
foolishness, I will tell you what I saw in my area. I want our
members to really understand this.
In a trailer subdivision, so a trailer park, we spent up to
$60,000 to $100,000 to bring in temporary trailers to give
housing to people that if we just gave them $60,000 they would
have been able to go out and purchase a permanent one. So we
put temporary trailers when we could have put permanent ones
and saved the taxpayer money, sped up the recovery.
It was because you cannot give money for permanent fixes so
then we got creative and created the step program after
disasters so people could shelter in place as opposed to
putting them in a hotel.
So when you think of things that we need to be doing, you
know, what can we help you all with besides another bill that I
have is to make sure that the I.G. doesn't get to come play
Monday morning quarterback 5 years after a disaster when you
all are in the line of fire at the time and making decisions on
the go.
So any of you all, if you have any thoughts or
recommendations I would be very curious to hear them.
Chief Senterfitt. Yes, sir. That is exactly the type of
problems we run into. When you are telling a homeowner they
can't repair their house to make basic repairs because it
disqualifies them from Federal dollars, that is
counterproductive. We need them in their homes.
It has been a challenge and it has been difficult. Then
when you consider under the National Flood Insurance Program
you are telling people that no, you can't go in and repair your
home because you may be over 50 percent, which may require
elevation and new standards.
The whole program needs to be re-looked at and it is time
that we do a deep dive back into the Stafford Act to make sure
that there is some common sense in what we are trying to do. I
think over the years we have kind of gotten away from that.
Major Bucchere. I agree with Mr. Senterfitt and I would add
any way that we can reduce the complexity of some of the
Federal programs would be of great benefit I think at the State
and local levels. When you have homeowners are having on-going
issues with insurance companies to the point of litigation and
sometimes they are missing out on the maximum benefit or
benefit at all from available Federal programs.
In addition, on the back end of recovery we would certainly
like to see our partners at FEMA stay the course throughout the
disaster. What we are finding is that with the FEMA turnover,
moving from disaster to disaster, as new staff comes in to
help, which is needed, there is a difference in the
interpretation of policy. So we need FEMA to assist us, a core
group throughout.
Mr. Richmond. One of the things, which was the last
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that has still not been
adopted by this Congress when both Republicans and Democrats
have controlled Congress, was to give comprehensive
jurisdiction to someone to oversee disasters.
So if we are talking about a hurricane response, for
example, well, yes, we control FEMA and we ask for
jurisdiction. But Stafford Act is the law that governs
recovery. That goes to transportation. Well, the insurance
committee will cover financial services will cover insurance
and then you have HUD that plays a humongous role in terms of
disaster CDBG money.
So it would be my hope, and I think that maybe if our will
is not here to do it, maybe first responders and offices of
emergency preparedness around the country will come together
and kind-of force us to do it, but it would make sense to me
for us to adopt that last 9/11 Commission report which says,
create a committee in Congress that will have the jurisdiction
to comprehensively oversee disaster recovery.
I think that, you know, it doesn't fall on any of our
Chairmen and I think Chairman King was Chairman when I first
got here and I remember him almost echoing these same
sentiments. So hopefully, the private sector and our public
servants out there can put the force behind it to make it
happen.
With that, I will yield back.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Next we will have the gentleman from Mississippi Mr. Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Waters, first of all I want to thank you and the
nearly 58,000 both civilian and sworn officers of the New York
City Police Department for not only the protection that you
provide the citizens of your city, but the tens of millions of
visitors that come to your city each year.
In reading your testimony, I found it very interesting. I
was looking, you were talking about, and I believe that we
would all agree, that communications between first responders
is critical. Is that correct?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. I see that New York City has invested tens if
not hundreds of millions of dollars into a radio system that
uses T-band for first responders to communicate.
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Will you elaborate just a little bit for the
committee? I know in reading your testimony I believe that you
have invested heavily in putting communications devices both in
the subway tunnels and also in the high rises so that those
first responders can communicate effectively.
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Then you also mention in your testimony that
there is an auction of certain T-band spectrums that will be
coming on-line in 2021?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. What effect would that have upon your
department's ability to communicate?
Chief Waters. It would seriously hamper our ability and at
some point would put us out of business in the ability to use
our department radios to transmit to one another or receive
information from the 9-1-1 operators.
Mr. Guest. From your testimony, you have said that if your
department was having to switch to a different radio frequency
that it would take years and billions of dollars in
infrastructure cost to make that transition.
Chief Waters. That is correct.
Mr. Guest. I believe that you support the Don't Break Up
the T-band Act of 2019.
Chief Waters. I do.
Mr. Guest. Again, that would be to protect the men and
women of your department and to make sure that they can
adequately communicate in an emergency?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. I believe in 9/11, I believe reading or hearing
that there was communication issues between first responders
when the Twin Towers were attacked. Is that correct?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Do you believe that lack of communication
attributed to the loss of life to some first responders and the
fact that they were not able to get the evacuation order
quickly enough to be able to evacuate safely at the time the
towers collapsed?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Is that part of the reason that you and your
department have invested so heavily in the T-band system?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Briefly, Chief Waters, I also want to talk--you
talk briefly in your testimony about the use of CCTV or closed
circuit television cameras.
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Have you found that to be effective in the role
that you play in counterterrorism?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Have you found that to be an effective tool just
for law enforcement in general? Again, not things that are
necessarily related to counterterrorism but just a general law
enforcement officer who is seeking to prevent or reduce crime?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir, it is a great crime-fighting tool
and it is a great investigative tool.
Mr. Guest. OK. Do you believe that the CCTV system has been
able to help your department solve crime?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Do you believe it also serves as a deterrent
when individuals know that they are being monitored by closed
circuit TV? I know we can't quantify how many crimes we
prevent, but do you believe as a veteran of the police
department and your years of experience, do you believe that
the closed circuit television has prevented crime?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Do you believe that the closed circuit
television serves as a deterrent for those individuals who
might consider engaging in terroristic activity?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Then finally, one other thing that you talked
about and I believe you touched on very briefly in your opening
statement was the use of unmanned aircraft sometimes referred
to as drones.
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. You say in your testimony that we have seen
terror groups overseas use drones as an effort to obtain either
countersurveillance or in some cases they have been able to use
drones to cause harm or damage.
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Does the technology currently exist to allow the
Federal Government to block or to jam signals to drones?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. Do you or does your department have the ability
to access that technology?
Chief Waters. No--well, we can access it through our
Federal partners but we don't have the opportunity or the
authority to do it on our own now----
Mr. Guest. Do you believe----
Chief Waters. Which is very much necessary.
Mr. Guest. Yes, sir. Do you believe it would be beneficial
to your department for you to be able--your department
specifically, to be able to access that technology?
Chief Waters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Guest. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Next we have the gentleman from New York, Mr. Rose.
Mr. Rose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Waters, first of all thank you for being here. Thank
you for your service. As a New Yorker we are really blessed to
have you and your men and women with the NYPD.
I want to ask you just a few very, very simple questions.
First, looking back over the last decade have you seen Federal
money related to counterterrorism measures toward New York City
go down, up, or stay equal?
Chief Waters. They have gone down.
Mr. Rose. What have been the consequences of that?
Chief Waters. Well, we have to make some very serious
choices and decisions on what programs or initiatives that we
are either going to do away with or lessen the opportunities
for training for officers, to give you two examples.
Mr. Rose. If you could actually go into the specifics of
that though to really illuminate the ways in which budgetary
decisions here in the halls of Congress, many of which have an
anti-New York bias, what has that led to specifically?
Chief Waters. We have to work within the constraints of the
budget and we take that money and figure out exactly how many
officers we can train, how much equipment and technology we can
purchase, how many vapor wake dogs or explosive odor pursuit
dogs we can purchase with that money.
It is extremely challenging at times. We want to train as
many officers as we can as often as we can.
Mr. Rose. Sure.
Chief Waters. We want to be able to buy that cutting-edge
technology as it comes out so that we can stay ahead of the
enemy, if you will and be able to better protect the citizens
and the guests and visitors and all that work, live, and play
in New York.
Mr. Rose. What can we do for you to help improve your
counterterrorism measures at the NYPD?
Chief Waters. Well certainly we appreciate all the
partnership that we have already gotten from the Government and
this committee in particular. There are several programs.
Certainly we could use more money in the different grant
cycles, UASI, transit and port. The regional catastrophic grant
program would need more money for regional planning in terms of
preparedness for other disasters.
But, you know, money in this particular case in my bureau
it is a very thoughtful and it is very deliberate process how
we spend it. I realize that we are spending taxpayer money and
that is very important that we can justify what we are spending
it for and what the end product is.
Mr. Rose. Thank you. Moving to another subject, something
that I have been looking at with some more seriousness is
ferry-related security. Across the country we are shifting more
toward ferry-based modes of transportation as commuting times
get worse.
What has your department done to focus on maritime-related
counterterror measures and what can we do to support you?
Chief Waters. Thank you. So we have undergone, as you well
know, sir, the Staten Island ferry just underwent a review
directed by the police commissioner. He tasked me with doing a
full review of the personnel, equipment, training of the
members of the unit that protect the ferries, ride the ferries
each and every day.
As a result of that review we have given all of the
officers that are assigned to that unit additional
counterterrorism officer training, brought up their efficiency
in certain areas, active shooter, personal radiation detection
equipment, hostile surveillance, to name a few.
We also are adding at the police commissioner's direction
are adding personnel to that unit to better support that unit
and protect both sides of the water.
Mr. Rose. Just one thing, though, to the Staten Island
ferry specifically with what you all are doing, would you
support in theory a greater National Guard presence with the
Empire Shield, which does receive Federal funds to be a
presence on the Staten Island side as they are on the Manhattan
side? I know we are getting hyper-local here, but it is of
importance to my folks.
Chief Waters. Certainly. We welcome all of our partners.
Shield is one of them. They deploy at the transit facilities in
Grand Central, Penn Station. We do super searches with the
Guard all the time so they would be very welcome, yes, sir.
Mr. Rose. Thank you. That is very much appreciated. Thank
you again for your service.
Chief Waters. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Joyce.
Mr. Joyce. Chairman Payne, Ranking Member King, thank you
for holding this meeting. A sincere thanks to you for coming to
Washington and giving this serious input, which we need to
hear.
This is a brief question. We all recognize that emerging
technologies are becoming available to first responders. What
can FEMA and other Federal partners do to ensure that this
technology successfully gets to the end-users?
Chief Waters, I am going to ask you to address that first.
Chief Waters. So in my area of expertise, sir, the domain
awareness system is on the cutting edge of technology, our use
of cameras, license plate readers, chemical and biological
sensors are the key to our success, if you will, in protecting
New York. The constant and ever-changing technology is
something that we must keep in step in with or keep ahead of at
all times.
The cameras offer us a view of the city both proactively
and reactively in solving crimes and keeping people safe.
License plate readers add an additional investigative value and
capturing that information and being able to review that has
either protected and helped solve crimes.
Mr. Joyce. Mr. Senterfitt, can you add to that, please?
Chief Senterfitt. Yes, sir. Cellular service has become a
requirement in today's modern life. When the cell phone systems
go down the disaster really impacts all of us. The purchasing
cell phone technology is really not very--the cost-benefit
analysis for a small community we wouldn't use it enough to be
able to make a difference.
But I think if FEMA could invest in the cell phone
capability where they could provide that in disaster services
more quickly I think we could all benefit. That capability
could move to any disaster zone anywhere in the country.
Mr. Joyce. Mr. Reaves, do you feel that cell phone
technology is adequate?
Mr. Reaves. I know that our agency spends a lot of money on
cell phone technology. I know that it does help and assist in
great number of survivor sites and disaster sites. Again, it is
dependent upon the size of the disaster a lot of times, Mr.
Joyce.
So, you know, in order to know if it is truly cost-
beneficial for the Federal Government, and I would have to go
back to the agency and get that information for you.
Mr. Joyce. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bucchere, any additional comments?
Major Bucchere. I would concur with Mr. Senterfitt that
there is an increased need for additional cell phone technology
at the State level. In New Jersey we are working with our
partners in Department of Transportation on different
applications which can actively engage those in things as small
as a traffic queue to larger incidents. So any advances in cell
phone technology would be beneficial from the State's
perspective.
Mr. Joyce. I thank you all for your input.
I yield back my time.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and Members for their questions.
Members of the subcommittee may have an additional
questions for the witnesses and we ask that you respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days, without objection.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Louis V. Bucchere
Question 1a. Can you describe how New Jersey works to ensure pre-
disaster homeless individuals are incorporated into the disaster
planning process?
Question 1b. How was FEMA involved in making sure the needs of
homeless individuals were not left behind in the recovery process after
Sandy and other disasters?
Answer. In the emergency management community we operate on the
principle that all disasters start local and end local. It is important
for Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Coordinators to have an
understanding of the homeless population in their respective
jurisdictions in order to ensure that population is taken care of
during a disaster. By working with their rescue missions, non-profit
organizations, faith-based groups and those involved with Cold Weather
Sheltering (NJ Code Blue), the OEM coordinator has an estimate of the
number of homeless that would need care. During a disaster, the
homeless population is best served by the local OEM Coordinator who
better understands the population and how to connect them to local
available resources. In addition, the State of New Jersey, through the
Department of Human Services (NJDHS), has a number of programs that
offer assistance to low-income and homeless populations which, during a
disaster, will continue and they will make every effort to connect
those to the services they need.
During a Presidentially-Declared disaster FEMA will generally
initiate their Public Assistance (PA) and/or Individual Assistance (IA)
Grant Programs to support both communities and survivors in their
rebuilding/recovery efforts. The Individual Assistance Program is
limited to those households impacted by a disaster and there is a
finite dollar amount placed on the amount awarded to the survivor. None
of this funding is specifically allocated to support the homeless
population. It is contingent upon the State, the Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD), and the established Long-Term
Recovery Groups (LTRGs) to make a difference in assisting those
survivors with continued unmet needs. New Jersey is fortunate to have
strong ties with the VOAD community as well as the FEMA Voluntary
Liaison from Region II.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, 14 county-based LTRGs were
established throughout the State which made a difference assisting
those survivors when FEMA IA funding ran out. The Emergency Assistance
Group of the Mass Care Team coordinates programs to support disaster
survivors in providing temporary State aid, General Assistance or the
Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (DSNAP), Disaster
Legal Assistance, Temporary Disaster Unemployment and other necessary
State programs as necessary.
NJDHS continually works with the low-income and homeless
populations through their many Divisions and the County Welfare
Agencies or Boards of Social Services that assist those in need with
items such as financial assistance, food, or housing. During an
activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) the
Emergency Support Function No. 6 (ESF6) Plan is broken up into 5
distinct groups in order to efficiently coordinate Mass Care:
Sheltering
Feeding
Emergency Assistance
Disaster Housing
Human Services
The groups are tasked with assisting the homeless through
identifying needs and support for individuals and to assist with
expediting processing of new benefits claims. Even during a disaster
these programs continue and are sometimes expanded or have requirements
waived to support low-income or homeless populations.It is important to
note that any Federal Program coming to a State to offer disaster
support needs to be coordinated through the State's emergency
management system in order to ensure the disaster funds are used in the
most efficient and proper manner. Two examples of this are the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds and the Social Service
Block Grant (SSBG) funds that were introduced to New Jersey in the
aftermath of Sandy.
The CDBG funds came through the US Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to support rebuilding efforts in New Jersey. These
funds are managed by the NJ Department of Community Affairs (NJDCA) as
they are the lead agency tasked with coordinating long-term housing
post-disaster. The SSBG funds were managed by NJDHS through the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration of Children and
Families. The funds were utilized for 2 types of programs: (1)
Community-wide programs available to all members of the community in
the highly impacted areas including but not limited to clinical
counseling, service coordination, and outreach; and (2) programs
addressing uncovered costs related to the storm's damage of home or
property, including household repairs, restoration of accessibility
enhancements, and short-term housing subsidies for residents for whom
no other financial assistance is available or where gaps exist.
There are other support programs that New Jersey provides, such as
the Social Service for the Homeless (SSH) Program which is coordinated
through the NJDHS. This program can also be used to support at risk
persons during times of disaster. As an example, SSH was used to offer
assistance to those Puerto Rico evacuees who came to New Jersey in the
aftermath of Hurricanes Irma and Maria when their housing options ran
out.
During times of disaster recovery it is critical to partner with
emergency management programs so that funds can be utilized in the most
efficient way to aid survivors.
Questions From Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Martin ``Marty''
Senterfitt
Question 1. With the geographic location of the Florida Keys, I can
imagine that climate change is a major concern and informs the
preparedness plans of the county. Can you tell the subcommittee how
climate change plays a role in Monroe County's preparedness and
mitigation activities?
Answer. Monroe County, Florida, also known as the Florida Keys, an
archipelago of low-lying islands more than 100 miles long, is one of
the areas in our Nation most vulnerable to the effects of climate
change. With many of its' 300 miles of roads and facilities at or near
sea level and with sea level rise projections of 14-34 inches by the
year 2060, the county has already begun to plan and implement
mitigation and adaptation programs and projects in preparation.
The county prepared a GreenKeys Climate and Resilience Plan
(www.greenkeys.info), which focuses on 5 areas of recommendations
(www.greenkeys.info/focus-areas-recommendations) and listed specific
projects for mitigation and adaptation over a 5-year time frame
(www.templatemodifiers.com/monroe-wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
Appendix-I-5-Year-Work-Plan.pdf). By planning and implementing projects
and programs while sea-level rise effects are in the early stages, the
county will maximize the effectiveness and cost efficiencies of its
efforts over the long term. The ultimate goal is to focus its resources
on enabling the county and its residents to live with the effects of
climate change and to allow its many visitors continued access to this
beautiful sub-tropical island chain.
For its adaptation efforts, the county reviewed its infrastructure
including buildings, roads, bridges, parks, and utilities (water,
wastewater, and electrical) and determined that roads and buildings
were the two areas of infrastructure most vulnerable to sea-level rise.
Initial modeling was conducted to determine the potential effects of
climate change to roads and facilities and how the county, its
residents and visitors could be affected in the future. Based on this
research, the county has moved forward with elevating all new county
facilities to account for the anticipated sea-level rise over the next
50 years. In addition, 2 pilot road elevation projects are underway in
Big Pine Key and Key Largo, where a section of road in each community
will be elevated and have drainage features added to handle current and
future levels of sea-level rise anticipated over the next 25 years.
The county also recently completed mobile LiDAR elevation surveys
of all of its 300 miles of county-maintained roads. This LiDAR data
will be combined with the sea-level rise predictions over the next 30
to 40 years for the county to prepare a Roads Adaptation Plan that will
identify which roads need to be elevated, how high, and when. While
this Plan is being developed, the county will also analyze its policies
to determine which roads, if any, may not be able to be elevated and
how many days a year, if any, residents may anticipate experiencing
flooding on their neighborhood roads. The county has limited resources
available to pay for roads elevation implementation, which could cost
the county $1 billion or more. Therefore, without State and Federal
assistance, difficult policy decisions may need to be made to focus
these resources. In the interim while the Roads Plan is being
developed, the county adopted Resolution 028-2017 that includes an
``interim'' road design standard that: (1) Accounts for sea-level rise
for the 1`useful life'' of the road project (approximately 25 years)
and (2) includes a threshold not to exceed projected flooding more than
7 days annually.
For its mitigation efforts, Monroe County adopted a goal for
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction of 40% by 2030 from the 2012
inventory level. Monroe County also completed the STAR (Sustainability
Tools for Assessing and Rating Communities) community rating system
application and was ranked a 3-STAR community with a total score of
261.3 points (3-STAR Community 200-399 points) and was recognized for
sustainability leadership. Efforts at mitigation also include adopting
energy efficiency for county operations, fleet management goals, and
solid waste strategies. Mitigation is included in numerous policies
adopted by the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners including a
feasibility study for light rail, the GreenKeys Sustainability Action
Plan, Monroe County Comprehensive Plan--Energy and Climate Element,
recycling of yard waste, and adoption of GHG emission reduction goals
for the county. Following are examples of mitigation priorities:
Establishment of a solar feasibility study for all new and
existing county-owned buildings.
Development of a Green Purchasing Policy underway.
Adoption of the Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE)
program county-wide.
Adoption of Energy Awareness Month.
Adoption of a Transportation Study to reduce emissions.
Establishment of an internal Energy Reduction Task Force.
Adaptation Action Area criteria development.
Development of the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change
Action Plan with the Southeast Florida Regional Climate
Compact.
Creation of the Energy Efficiency Conservation Strategy for
municipal operations.
Adoption and implementation of Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Block Grant activities in 2010-2012.
Question 2. We've heard reports from communities in Puerto Rico
that many have been unable to start any permanent work Public
Assistance (PA) projects because the island was pressured into using
the Section 428, Alternative Procedures PA program. Can you tell us
where in the process Monroe County is with their permanent work
projects?
Answer. Monroe County has not elected to participate in the
Alternative Procedures for Permanent Work program (Section 428). To
date, Monroe County has identified 36 permanent work projects and all
36 projects have been submitted to FEMA for formulation. Of the 36
permanent work projects submitted to FEMA only one has been obligated.
Twenty-nine projects are currently with FEMA at the CRC and 6 are in
final review, 3 of those at the State level. At this time no funding
has been received for any permanent work projects.
Question From Chairman Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Steve Reaves
Question. As you know, FEMA has many different types of employees,
including full-time and on call, that can be deployed once disaster
strikes. These people are integral in having capable response and
recovery for communities. Can you describe the benefits of having
permanent, full-time workers at FEMA over temporary employees that do
not have the same labor protections or training?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]