[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-6]
INF WITHDRAWAL AND THE
FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF
THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 26, 2019
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-232 WASHINGTON : 2019
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JACKIE SPEIER, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts MO BROOKS, Alabama
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma, Vice
Chair
Grant Schneider, Professional Staff Member
Sarah Mineiro, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
DeSutter, Hon. Paula, Former Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation................... 6
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., Former U.S. Senator from Indiana......... 1
Vershbow, Hon. Alexander, Former Deputy Secretary General of NATO 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 25
DeSutter, Hon. Paula......................................... 36
Lugar, Hon. Richard G........................................ 28
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces................... 26
Vershbow, Hon. Alexander..................................... 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 73
Mrs. Davis................................................... 74
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 78
Mr. Larsen................................................... 77
INF WITHDRAWAL AND THE FUTURE OF
ARMS CONTROL: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 26, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will come to order. First let
me ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be
allowed to participate in today's briefing, after all
subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions.
Is there objection? Hearing none, the subcommittee members who
are here--nonsubcommittee members will be recognized.
Thanks to the graciousness of the ranking member, we have
agreed in the interest of time to dispense with our opening
statements because this is, after all, a hearing, not a
speaking. But they will be inserted for the record with
unanimous consent. Hearing no objection, that will be
accomplished.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Cooper and Mr. Turner can
be found in the Appendix on pages 25 and 26.]
Mr. Cooper. We are fortunate today in the first hearing of
the subcommittee to have three very distinguished witnesses
and, in my opinion at least, the first witness is particularly
distinguished, one of the greatest U.S. Senators of our era,
Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana. We appreciate your being
here. But we are also deeply honored to have Ambassador Sandy
Vershbow here, former Deputy Secretary General of NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization]; and finally, the Honorable Paula
DeSutter, former Assistant Secretary of State for Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation. Having had a chance to look at
their testimony, we should all be grateful they did such an
excellent job preparing and informing this subcommittee. So
without further ado, let's hear from the witnesses, starting
with Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the
ranking member for this opportunity. My contribution----
Mr. Cooper. If you could get a little closer to the
microphone that would be great.
Senator Lugar. Yes, indeed. My contribution to the
discussion today is based [less] upon analyzing the technical
aspects of the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from
the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty than on
broader historical lessons that I have learned during 4 years
of intensive work on reducing the threat of weapons of mass
destruction.
I was one of the original co-chairs of the Arms Control
Observer Group, put together by President Ronald Reagan in the
1980s to ensure a unity of purpose between the executive and
legislative branches on arms control. I was a floor manager for
every arms control treaty that came before the Senate from the
INF Treaty in 1987 to the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction]
Treaty in 2010. In conjunction with the Nunn-Lugar program, I
have witnessed the safeguarding, or dismantling, of just about
every type of weapon of mass destruction imaginable from
Typhoon submarines and SS-18s, to Backfire bombers, millions of
VX artillery shells, and laboratories housing anthrax and
plague.
Our relationship with Russia and our mutual interests in
constraining the threat from weapons of mass destruction is a
long game, not a short one. That being said, there can be no
breaks in our determination each day to prevent disaster.
I would like to offer a few principles that should inform
deliberations on where we go from here.
First, the Russians are in violation of the INF Treaty, but
Russian violations are not a new phenomenon. A major feature of
every arms control debate since 1987 was discussion of actual
or potential Russian violations. Every President has dealt with
this. I believe it is easy to expose, counter, and reverse
those violations of the INF Treaty than without it--that is,
within the treaty than without it.
Second, arms control is not just about limits on weapons.
Much of the value of agreements comes from verification
provisions. There is safety in transparency. Our strategic
relationship with Russia was never better than when Russian and
American technicians were working together on Nunn-Lugar
projects to circumscribe the decaying Russian arsenal under
provisions of active arms treaties. We knew a lot about each
other, and we were talking about it every day. The worst thing
we can do is undercut verification procedures that give us a
window on Russian activities and capabilities.
Third, effective arms control is less about negotiating
brilliance than it is about the accumulation of leverage.
Withdrawing from the INF Treaty does nothing to bolster our
leverage. It foolishly plays into the hands of Russian
propagandists by focusing global attention on our rejection of
the treaty rather than Russian violations. It complicates
relations with allies, and it signals to the Iranians, North
Koreans, and others who would pursue a nuclear arsenal, that we
are devaluing our own historic legacy as the guarantor of legal
frameworks designed to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Finally, regardless of near-term decisions on the INF
Treaty, drifting towards unrestrained arms competition would be
an incredibly hazardous outcome. This does not mean the United
States cannot modernize elements of its nuclear deterrent. But
allowing verification procedures to expire and basing our
security on the hope of winning an expensive arms race would be
the height of irresponsibility. This isn't 1981. We live in an
increasingly [multipolar] world that features cyber warfare,
suicidal terrorism, additional nuclear states, and increased
avenues to nuclear proliferation. We also had a sobering budget
deficit of $779 billion in 2018.
The bottom line is that jettisoning treaties that provide a
legal framework for exposing Russian violations achieves
nothing. We should be pursuing a consistent strategy that
strengthens the Western alliance, makes sensible defense
investments, and builds leverage that could put the arms
control process back on track. To do that, we need much more
consistency of purpose. The successful launching of an era of
arms control by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev, and [George]
H.W. Bush, was achieved largely because Presidents rejected--or
rather, projected a consistent foreign policy that undergirded
international law, stood up to dictators, commanded respect,
and united the free world. The United States returning to that
posture would be a major setback for Russian oligarchs, and
would strengthen United States ability to press a new strategic
dialogue based on mutual interests. I thank the Chair.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar can be found in
the Appendix on page 28.]
Mr. Cooper. I thank the Senator. Ambassador Vershbow.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY
GENERAL OF NATO
Ambassador Vershbow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Turner, members of the subcommittee. Thanks very much
for the invitation to offer my views on the implications of the
imminent demise of the INF Treaty for the future of arms
control and strategic stability with Russia. It is an honor to
be here with Senator Dick Lugar, who has played such a
fantastic and prominent role in preventing nuclear
proliferation since the end of the Cold War, and it is also
good to be here with my former State Department colleague,
Paula DeSutter.
The INF Treaty had a transformational impact in ending the
Cold War and stabilizing relations between the West and Moscow
for more than three decades, and it came about thanks to the
determination and resolve shown by the United States and its
NATO allies when they adopted the dual-track decision in 1979
in response to Soviet deployment of the SS-20 intermediate-
range ballistic missile. And it followed 2 years of very
intense consultations within NATO, led by the United States.
The deployment of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched
cruise missiles restored the balance in Europe, and reinforced
the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, depriving the
Soviets of what the nuclear experts called escalation
dominance. And the NATO offer of an arms control alternative
was, of course, initially rejected by the Soviet Union, which
walked out of the talks when the first U.S. missiles went in in
1983, hoping to derail those deployments by fomenting popular
opposition. But NATO solidarity held, and Presidents Reagan and
Gorbachev had the vision not just to limit INF, but to
eliminate this entire class of systems.
So the dual-track decision was a powerful demonstration of
how to negotiate from a position of strength, and it gave
impetus to talks to reduce strategic weapons and conventional
armed forces in Europe.
All that progress is now at risk with the U.S. decision to
suspend its implementation of the INF Treaty, and withdraw from
the treaty, together with Russia's decision to follow suit by
suspending its implementation, as well.
The risk is only heightened by the significant
deterioration in the wider relationship between the West and
Russia as a result of Putin's aggression against Ukraine and
aggression against Western democracy writ large.
Today's Russian leaders may be more prepared to use their
nuclear weapons coercively than Soviet leaders in the 1970s and
1980s as part of their strategy to weaken NATO and reestablish
domination over Russia's neighbors.
Now, the administration's decision to withdraw from the
treaty is legally justified but I believe it was politically
questionable. Legally Russia is clearly in material breach of
its obligations and the administration has a certain logic in
arguing that it is difficult to justify continuing to comply
with a treaty that the other side is violating. And our NATO
allies, having seen the evidence of Russia's violation, have
supported the U.S. decision to withdraw as a legal matter, and
they haven't bought into Russia's dubious countercharges that
it is the United States, not Russia, that has violated the
treaty.
But our allies are concerned that politically we may have
given a gift to President Putin, who has long sought to escape
the INF Treaty's limitations so that Russia could counter INF
missiles of countries like China and Pakistan not subject to
the treaty's constraints. And it appears, based on the saber-
rattling we have heard just last week from President Putin,
that Russia is bent on deploying additional INF systems and
other new nuclear capabilities as part of a strategy of
intimidating NATO and recapturing the escalation dominance that
Russia lost when it scrapped the SS-20.
And our withdrawal from the treaty will give Russia free
rein to rapidly deploy ground-launch versions of its newest
cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons in addition to the
illegal 9M729. The U.S. and its allies have kept the door open
to a diplomatic solution. They have made clear that if Russia
agrees to dismantle its illegal missile, the U.S. could reverse
its decision to suspend and withdraw from the treaty. But last-
ditch negotiations have been going nowhere and it now seems
inevitable that the treaty will become a dead letter on August
2, 6 months after the administration gave its notice to
withdraw.
In my view, however, we shouldn't give up on other possible
arms control solutions that could at least mitigate the effects
of the loss of the INF Treaty. So far, it appears that Russia's
illegal cruise missile, while capable of carrying a nuclear
warhead, has only been deployed as a conventional system.
The United States and NATO, for their part, have downplayed
any intention to deploy new nuclear-armed missiles in Europe.
So one possible solution would be to challenge Russia to agree
to a mutual renunciation of all nuclear-armed, land-based INF-
range missiles, including the 9M729, and to agree to mutual
inspections to verify that no nuclear-armed versions are
deployed by either side.
And as part of this arrangement the U.S. and its allies
could agree to Russian inspections of the U.S. missile defense
sites in Romania and Poland to confirm that they have no
offensive capability as Moscow has alleged. The sides could
also, perhaps, agree to numerical limits on the permitted
conventionally armed systems.
Another solution would be for the United States and Russia
to agree to refrain from deploying any land-based INF systems
in or within range of Europe, while permitting some agreed
number of such systems in Asia. We could even invite China to
participate in such an arrangement, as President Trump
suggested in his State of the Union address.
A successor agreement along the above lines could help
maintain stability and avert an unconstrained competition in
intermediate-range systems, and it could improve the climate
for talks on an extension or strengthening of the New START
Treaty prior to its expiration in 2021, which I would strongly
favor.
Until we have exhausted the possibilities for a successor
to the INF Treaty, we should proceed cautiously on the question
of military countermeasures. We should review the options in
close consultation with our NATO allies as we did in the 1970s
in preparing the dual-track decision, since the allies are the
ones that could literally be caught in the cross fire of any
new U.S.-Russian missile competition in Europe.
NATO has a lot of work still to be done to strengthen its
overall defense and deterrence posture in Europe. Deploying new
intermediate-range land-based missiles in Europe is not
essential to these efforts and could be politically divisive
within the alliance. And, in fact, I think there are many
existing U.S. programs that could be adapted to negate the
military advantage the Russians hope to gain with the 9M729,
without developing a new intermediate-range ground-launch
cruise missile of our own, and I mentioned these in detail in
my prepared statement. We could also deploy additional missile
defense systems to protect key military installations against
Russian cruise missile threats.
Now, I strongly believe NATO's assessment of the options
should focus on conventional solutions, but we and our allies
should make clear to Moscow that if Russia deploys nuclear-
armed INF missiles along NATO's borders, we don't rule out new
nuclear arms systems of our own. We should keep the onus on
Moscow, however, for any new arms competition in Europe.
One final point: There may be a stronger case for deploying
conventionally armed intermediate-range missile systems, both
cruise and ballistic, in the Asia-Pacific region than in
Europe. They could counter China's significant INF
capabilities, and its threat to U.S. bases in Japan and Korea.
Having said this, it remains to be seen if our allies, the
Japanese and the Koreans, would agree to host these systems
once they were developed or whether it would be more realistic
to continue to rely on air- and sea-launch systems with these
missions. Thank you very much. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Vershbow can be found
in the Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. Ms. DeSutter.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAULA DeSUTTER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR VERIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION
Ms. DeSutter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Turner. It is an honor to be able to address you on what I
believe is an important issue, and I think it is timely. Arms
control agreements can be viewed as lines in the sand. The
better agreements have that line as far as possible from the
central elements of your national security and that of your
allies. It is also important that they be effectively
verifiable so that the U.S. can see if the line has been
crossed, and if so, how far? This is important in order to
provide time for the U.S. to detect and verify violations, seek
their reversal, or to undertake action alone or with allies to
take measures to deny the violator the benefits of his
violation.
When another party to an agreement crosses the line by
violating the agreement, either they made a mistake, and that
has happened numerous times across agreements, or they did it
deliberately. One way to tell the difference is that if it was
a mistake, once raised with them, you can expect them to take
corrective action. In the case of the Russians, throughout the
history of the INF Treaty we very often--they never admitted
that it was a violation, said they were sorry or did anything
like that, but they changed the behavior, they changed the
practice, and came back into compliance.
So if a country refuses to correct a violation, then it is
a safe bet that the action was deliberate. Deliberate
violations are undertaken to gain unilateral advantage over the
party or parties that are compliant, and it provides early
warning of a failure of deterrence. We all have heard that one
of the purposes of verification is to deter the other party
from violating the agreement and undertaking actions
inconsistent with it. When you have a pattern of violations, it
is a warning that deterrence writ large may be failing.
When the United States draws a line in the sand and tells a
country not to cross it, but then does not respond to willful
repeated crossings of that line, that line and every other line
we have drawn becomes more anemic. They are more likely to--
that country that has crossed the line and the other countries
observing it may calculate, perhaps correctly, that they can
violate the agreement, gain unilateral advantage, and will not
be forced to pay any price.
I am chagrined at the failure of the Obama administration
to raise Russia's violation of the INF Treaty between 2010 and
2013. The violation has been raised with Russia since 2013, but
to no avail. After years of acquiescence followed by more years
of diplomatic efforts to persuade Russia to eliminate the
missile and come back into compliance, in my view, unilateral
compliance was no longer an option.
Some have argued that rather than withdraw from what has
become a unilateral treaty, we should pursue the option of
suspending operation of the treaty, in whole or in part,
indefinitely. The problem with that is that we have an example
where that has been tried unsuccessfully for over a decade.
Russia suspended its implementation of the Conventional
Forces in Europe, or CFE, Treaty in 2007. It has continued to
violate it and has said it will not resume implementation of
the treaty over a decade. But I do not believe that withdrawal
from the INF Treaty is a sufficient response to Russian
violation and circumventions of the INF Treaty.
I believe that President Reagan's response to Soviet
noncompliance offers lessons. First, he reported all cases of
possible, probable, and certain violations to Congress and the
public. If the language of the legislation that mandates the
annual noncompliance report was read by the Obama
administration as meaning the only issues that are clear
violations need to be reported, or that only issues that have
already been raised with the other party need to be reported,
then perhaps the language needs to be clarified. Without this,
Congress cannot be the strong ally it needs to be on these
matters, particularly early on in the process.
Second, President Reagan created the Arms Control
Verification Committee, or ACVC as it was called, because we
are arms controllers and we can't talk without acronyms. It was
chaired by the National Security Adviser, and he did that in
order to ensure ongoing high-level attention to the problem of
noncompliance to ensure that verification is given high
priority before, during, and after negotiations, to ensure the
assessments of compliance and verification were robust and
timely, and that these matters would be integrated into U.S.
policies and programs. The high level of verifiability of the
START I and INF treaties reflected the awareness of the
importance the President placed on verification and compliance.
I believe President Trump should recreate the ACVC, and make my
successor, the Assistant Secretary for Verification and
Compliance, the co-chair of that group.
Third, President Reagan took action to deny the Soviet
Union the benefits of their violations. He pursued forced
modernization, but more importantly, he pursued missile
defense. It certainly would be the easiest course of action for
the Trump administration to just extend the New START Treaty,
but doing so would be neither sufficient to address the
ballistic missile threat to the U.S. and our allies from
nations such as China, Iran, and North Korea, nor, in my
opinion, would extending the new START be sufficient to
constrain the rapidly growing ballistic missile threat from
Russia.
As for new multilateral agreements to constrain the missile
threat to the U.S., I wonder what possible incentive other
countries might have? I found a fun quote from 2013 when then-
Deputy Prime Minister, now Kremlin Chief of Staff, Sergei
Ivanov explained, ``When I hear our American partners say let's
reduce something else, I would like to say to them excuse me,
but what we have is relatively new. They, the U.S., have not
conducted any upgrades for a long time. They still use Trident
missiles.''
So we are also talking about the possibility of
multilateral agreements with serial violators and
proliferators. The probability of cheating by some or all will
be significant and if the agreement is not effectively
verifiable, we are unlikely to verify the cheating until too
late to take effective action.
But missile defense is offering an insurance policy against
further and future cheating on arms control agreements, and so
then, to me, the answer is deploy as rapidly as possible an
effective layered missile defense to protect the American
people from the threat of nuclear attack by our enemies,
disincentivize investments by our current and future foes in
offensive missiles tipped by weapons of mass destruction, and
it is also true that deployment of a robust, expandable,
layered missile defense could make future strategic and theater
missile agreements, including multilateral ones, more viable as
an effective tool in America's tool kit. I believe that this is
a road that our country can take, and this committee can play a
central role in facilitating that path. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. DeSutter can be found in the
Appendix on page 36.]
Mr. Cooper. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. In
view of the upcoming votes probably within the next 15 minutes,
we will probably reconvene the hearing after votes, but I would
like to get in as many questions and questioners as possible
prior to that. So I will limit myself to one question
initially.
I would like to follow up with Ambassador Vershbow about
his suggestion that we separate conventional from nuclear
warheads in our consideration of salvaging what is left of the
INF Treaty, so that we can at least protect our European
friends from nuclear threats. Would you like to elaborate on
that?
Ambassador Vershbow. Yes, thank you, Chairman. It is not
necessarily an easy solution, I think, as Paula can explain
probably with more authority. When we signed the INF Treaty we
followed the ``looks alike, counts alike'' rule because it is
difficult to distinguish between versions of missiles, one with
the nuclear and one with the conventional warhead. But I think,
you know, we have gained a lot of experience both with the INF
Treaty itself and with the New START Treaty in terms of very
intrusive inspections. So if there were political will on the
Russians' part to cooperate, I think we could have sufficient
confidence that Russia honored an obligation only to deploy
conventionally armed versions of this 9M729 and any future INF
systems that they have in the pipeline.
So it would, I think, avoid the kind of nuclear instability
questions about the reliability of the U.S. guarantee. It would
avoid getting into scenarios where the Russians would use
nuclear-armed INF systems as part of their ``escalate to de-
escalate'' strategy, and limit the competition to
conventionally armed systems, which may be sufficient to
achieve most military tasks that we have in mind. I think that
is why the administration has made clear it is not looking at
nuclear options at this time as counterweight measures to the
Russian system. So it could make a virtue--or necessity of
virtue, or virtue of necessity, I am not sure which it would
be. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The ranking member is recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a series of
questions that all go together, so they are kind of bunched,
and of one theme. Senator Lugar, you had said that one of the
most important aspects of arms control treaties is their
verification provisions, and I agree with you. I do want to
point out that our understanding of the INF Treaty violations
by Russia were not necessarily disclosed under the verification
process of the INF Treaty. But I have a question for you that
goes to what Secretary General Rasmussen just testified about
before the Intelligence Committee this morning, and you have
knowledge of this. And that is, that the United States had
knowledge that the INF Treaty was being violated by Russia for
a period of time, and as Ms. DeSutter was indicating, that some
of this information wasn't even shared with the Senate, some of
it was not shared with our allies.
Secretary General--former Secretary General Rasmussen of
NATO indicated that there is a gap between the U.S. sharing
this type of information with our allies, and certainly that is
one of our trust issues. Senator Lugar, do you share a similar
concern about as we get information of violations in Russian
activities of our lack of, perhaps, speed or boldness in
sharing that information with our allies?
Senator Lugar. Yes, I do share that problem very much. I
indicated, as a matter of fact, that in this entire discussion
right now, by getting out of the INF Treaty, once again, in a
way, we undercut some of our leadership responsibilities with
regard to our NATO allies in particular and European allies
generally. This is not the first occasion of that sort during
this administration, and it is a serious difficulty because we
really need to be moving the other way. We need to be
indicating our leadership with regard to NATO, with regard to
our European alliances, and a good way of attempting to fortify
that, or maybe for them to change the attitude now, is to think
through precisely what you have suggested, that we make known
when violations occur, or the very best of our intelligence
about this situation because currently one of the reasons why
we have entered the INF Treaty was to stop development of
weapons that could cause grave destruction in Europe. And so we
really needed to do the other part of the project, and that is
to gain great support among European defense officials and
those involved in intelligence and particularly in missile
technology about new information that we receive.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Sandy, as you know, I have a high
regard for both your career and your contribution to, you know,
international security, and certainly our country's security.
In your opening statement you reference your work in the late
1970s on the INF Treaty, and, of course, its establishment in
1987 as a significant milestone.
When the treaty was signed in 1987, did Russia possess
weapons at that time that would have been in violation of the
treaty that required them to destroy or dismantle weapons? It
wasn't just a restriction on future capabilities, right? Wasn't
it actually a restriction on capabilities that they possessed?
Ambassador Vershbow. Yes, Congressman, absolutely. They
still had in their arsenal the SS-20, as well as earlier
generation intermediate-range ballistic missiles, SS-4s and SS-
5s, I think they were, and also some shorter range systems,
which were also subject to the treaty going down to the 500-
kilometer range threshold that captured, I think, some other
existing systems. So it was a--that is why the treaty was such
a significant event. It led to the destruction of several
different categories of missiles.
Mr. Turner. And, Sandy, they can do that now, right? Since
we have known since 2010 of the violations we have made it--
them aware of our assertion of the violations since 2013, and
this administration, prior to beginning the process of
withdrawing, gave Russia notice and said we want you to come
into compliance with the treaty. They could do that now, right?
They could destroy the weapons that are not in compliance, so
they could come into compliance.
Ambassador Vershbow. Yes, that is correct. The
administration has had several meetings with the Russians where
they have, you know, reaffirmed the judgment that this missile
is unequivocally in violation of the treaty, based on the
evidence we have of observing its flight test. It is not just
extrapolation; we have seen it fly the ranges in excess of the
INF limit. And that the only way to restore compliance, restore
the integrity of the treaty, would be to dismantle and destroy
all such missiles that have been produced, and I think they
have 100 at least fielded. There may be more in production.
Mr. Turner. And this violation has not just an element of
the treaty or a minor provision, it goes to the core of the
treaty itself, does it not?
Ambassador Vershbow. Indeed it does, and I think that is
why, in legal terms, we are using the very strong term material
breach. It goes to the essence of what the treaty was----
Mr. Turner. You can't have a treaty of one, that is why the
NAC [North Atlantic Council] at NATO and certainly the NATO
Summit, both the NAC and the world leaders at the NATO Summit
made very strong statements identifying that Russia was in
violation of the INF Treaty. Would you agree with that?
Ambassador Vershbow. Yes. Going back to several of the
ministerial meetings last year, also at the Summit in Brussels,
the communicator made a very strong statement about the treaty
violation. Although allies--coming back to this issue of
intelligence sharing, allies only this year kind of accepted
very conclusive unequivocal language because the U.S. finally
showed them the more sensitive details underpinning our
assessment that have been done either in the first year and a
half of the Trump administration or during the Obama
administration. And this is partly an intelligence community
issue about not compromising sources and methods, but I think
in this case it got in the way of an allied consensus.
Mr. Turner. Great. And then my final question. Many people
state that our allies are very concerned about the U.S.
withdrawal, but I know you are aware because we were in the
same hearing together that former Secretary General Rasmussen
of NATO said that he supports the decision of the United States
to withdraw. At the Munich Security Conference, Merkel,
Chancellor Merkel, made the statement that she supports the
United States withdrawal--not just that she supports the U.S.
determination that there is an INF violation, which they were
slow to come to, but supports the withdrawal and, in fact, went
the next step, which I thought was extraordinary, calling on
Russia and China to join with the United States to initiate a
new phase of INF. And, in fact, I believe--you know, I was just
at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and many members of the NAC
but certainly Secretary General Stoltenberg made similar
comments that this now represented an opportunity for Russia,
the United States, and China, all to come together.
So you are aware that some very significant allies of the
United States have made statements in support of our
withdrawal?
Ambassador Vershbow. Yes, that is absolutely true, and I
think the administration did a good job in--after perhaps a few
false steps at the beginning in how this decision was rolled
out, but they did a good job in consulting with allies and
step-by-step building a strong consensus which you heard at the
Munich Security Conference.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. DeSutter, I would
like to begin with you. You note in your prepared testimony
that Rose Gottemoeller, your successor at the State Department,
was responsible for producing a compliance report by law every
year. Is that correct?
Ms. DeSutter. Yes.
Mr. Moulton. So was the Department also legally obligated
to doing the same during your time as Assistant Secretary from
2002 to 2009?
Ms. DeSutter. Yes.
Mr. Moulton. And do you happen to know how many times the
Obama administration delivered a compliance report to Congress?
Ms. DeSutter. Mr. Moulton, I will be the first one to say
that my successor did a far, far better job than I did at
getting out the annual reports. I will also note, some of you
may remember that the intelligence community was in the
process, during some of that time, of reevaluating how they
were going to write intelligence reports and footnotes, and the
biggest mistake I made is that for years I was the one that
held the pen on the noncompliance report, and I was afraid as
Assistant Secretary that if I got too involved with it, I would
get swept back up and consumed by it.
It is one of the big mistakes I made as Assistant
Secretary, so they were far more significant. We had a report.
We just couldn't get it put to bed. And it was--it was massive,
and very thorough.
Mr. Moulton. I appreciate your candor. Thank you. Senator
Lugar, in your testimony, you specifically mention the
importance of leverage and verification in arms control. How
can the U.S. best develop leverage to get to and to negotiate
an INF replacement? What does follow-on verification look like?
Senator Lugar. Well, in addition to the comments that have
been made about better cohesion with our European allies, it
seems to me we need to be thinking more about missile defense
than about really the ways in which we negate the value of
these missiles or the warheads and what have you. This is a
very complex and controversial subject all by itself, but at
the same time, in response to your question, it has a way at
least of moving the subject along in terms of negotiation, and,
likewise, in terms of safety for the parties that are involved.
Mr. Moulton. May I ask the Ambassador, at an event in
Washington on December 14, Senator Tom Cotton said that the
Pentagon should rapidly develop new intermediate-range missiles
despite uncertainty about where they could be fielded, quote,
``Basing questions can obviously be controversial, but that
will be a decision to be made for the future.'' To your
knowledge, have any countries in Europe agreed to host U.S.
ground-launched intermediate systems within their border?
Ambassador Vershbow. None have agreed to host them, because
they haven't been asked. This is still a hypothetical
possibility, depending on how the review of the different
options unfolds inside NATO, but the administration has not
asked anyone to host these missiles, either in Europe or in
northeast Asia.
Mr. Moulton. Well, let me ask you this, I mean, do you
sincerely believe that NATO supports, quote, ``fully
withdrawing from the treaty''? You know, many foreign ministers
and key noted NATO leaders have previously made public
statements urging the U.S. not to withdraw. How do you square
that with what we have heard today?
Ambassador Vershbow. Well, I think different allies have
slightly different nuances in their position. I think they all
have come around to the conclusion that the Russians are in
material breach, and that there is a justification for
withdrawing, and that there is really no alternative. But I
think many of them are emphasizing the need to, you know, make
the last ditch effort before the treaty literally goes out of
business on August 2 to see if there is a way of rescuing the
treaty through arms control, and if not, many have also spoken
of some kind of successor agreement to keep some form of
constraint on this category of systems if we can't save the INF
Treaty itself.
Mr. Moulton. Senator Lugar, back to you, a successor
agreement like the Ambassador states is something that many of
us would like to see if the INF Treaty goes away. Many of us
would also like to see it expand into the Asia-Pacific region.
Walk us through how that might occur, how we might build an INF
Treaty to encompass the threat from China?
Senator Lugar. Well, first of all, I suspect that--first of
all I suspect that we would make that point to the Russians. We
would indicate literally that this isn't the end of the story,
and that even if the INF Treaty finally falls by the wayside,
something else is going to follow that is more comprehensive
and of greater safety to more countries.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Wilson,
we have a few minutes here before we have to go.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, and thank you, Chairman Jim Cooper, and I
would like to thank all of you for being here, but particularly
Senator Lugar. You have benefited my constituents. The family
of Chip Andre, your former Chief of Staff, Taylor Andre, you
inspired to become the legislative director in our office. He
was trained also by Senator Lindsey Graham, and now he is the
Chief of Staff to Congressman Mike Gallagher, because of your
inspiration, so thank you very much.
And indeed, Ms. DeSutter, in your written statement and you
stated when the United States draws the line in the sand and
tells the country not to cross it, but does not respond with
repeated willful crossing, that line and every other line we
will have drawn will become anemic. Russia has repeatedly and
willfully violated the treaty and it is irrational that we
remain the only actor in compliance. With that, the question I
am particularly concerned about the constraints of the INF
Treaty on our ability to execute the National Defense Strategy
with regard to great powers competition. We must be able to
counter strategic threats from our two competitors, Russia and
China. How is China exploiting our compliance in order to
advance their missile arsenal threatening the interests of the
Indo-Pacific region?
Ms. DeSutter. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. One of the things
about how the United States conducts itself with regard to arms
control is that not only would the U.S. never, by law and by
process, intentionally violate an arms control obligation.
Moreover, the process is designed to make sure that we never
even get close to that line. And so, it is not just that the
treaty would prohibit certain things, but more that it tells
the Pentagon, don't go in that direction.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And also with Russia
violating the treaty, and as pointed out by Congressman Turner,
NATO has supported withdrawal. What is the advantage of
remaining in an unenforced treaty? Won't the withdrawal
demonstrate peace through strength in that it would incentivize
Moscow to return to the negotiating table while enabling the
United States to better protect our allies and national
security interest?
Ms. DeSutter. Yes. I believe that the withdrawal--and I
must say that I don't recall a violation where there has been
such widespread consensus that it was not only a violation, but
a material breach. But the withdrawal, since we have been
unable since 2013 to get them to come back into compliance, and
it is very similar, disturbingly, to the situation with the CFE
Treaty: continued compliance by the United States, they would
believe that we won't really do it, we won't really get out,
and they will be able to continue to have us constrained and no
one else.
So while they wanted out of the treaty for a long time, it
was only after the United States indicated we might get out
that they suddenly thought the INF Treaty was a good thing that
they wanted. It is not only important for Russia, but it is
important for every other country that we might be concerned
about because they watch. These countries watch what happens.
And if they see Russia continue to get away with this,
especially since it has been public since 2013 and 2014, they
will believe that the United States does not take compliance
seriously, and does not--is not willing to belly up to the bar
to pay the price to either bring them back into compliance or
to respond to deny them the benefits.
Mr. Wilson. And we have seen the consequence of not
following a red line, and so thank you for raising that. How
does withdrawal from the INF Treaty impact Russia's ability to
acquire new systems and technological or strategic advances
with intermediate-range missiles? Would Russia have acquired
similar systems and weapons in continued direct violation of
the treaty if the U.S. had not withdrawn?
Ms. DeSutter. I believe that they--they've undertaken some
effort to try to muddy the waters about whether or not it was a
violation, and certainly, in preparation for this hearing, I
have been pretty amazed at how many programs they have where,
for example, they use the standard launcher for many different
systems that are very confusing. And one other thing that I
would mention is we did have experience with the issue of
nuclear versus nonnuclear warheads with the SS-23 missiles, and
so your staff can go back and look at that, but we had no idea
that Russia had given to the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany,
and Poland, SS-23 missiles. Originally, they said that they
were just conventional warheads. We did find conventional
warheads, but then we found that they had also been given the
connecting sections to deploy a nuclear warhead. Russia
obviously--Soviet Union certainly never would have given
command and control of the nuclear warheads to their allies
because they liked them even less than they liked us, but they
would have come in and taken control.
It is very difficult to do and, you know, the Verification
Commission that is part of the INF Treaty would have to be very
deliberate in trying to make new agreements in order to figure
out how to implement any subsequent limitations.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. My time is up.
Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will stand in recess. We will
return, and we will take at least 20 minutes, but immediately
after the last vote we will be back. Thanks.
[Recess.]
Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will come to order.
I apologize. I thought it was two votes we had. It turned
out to be four votes. It took a little longer than we thought.
Until other members come, I was going to ask a few
questions. We haven't focused as much on New START as we
probably need to. And it seems like the options are either to
extend it, to renegotiate it, to not extend it, and one where
the witnesses even suggested returning to the SORT [Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty] agreement previous.
So, Senator Lugar, I would like to start with you, and ask
what you think it would take to successfully negotiate either
an extension or an improvement on the New START agreement?
Senator Lugar. I believe that the verification provisions
of New START are important, to begin with, leaving aside
anything else. It seems to me to be really a safety net there.
But I think--I go back in my own memories to a debate on
the START, New START, to begin with.
It was quite a debate within the Republican Party at that
time. Senator McConnell, our leader, and Jon Kyl, particularly
outspoken, were not in favor, really, of reducing the number of
warheads and missiles and whatever were involved in New START.
We have been moving from the time of Nunn-Lugar all the way
down from roughly 10,000 warheads, and New START is 1,550 as it
wound up. And there were some in--not only the Congress, but
the administration, who thought it was time to rebuild some of
our armament, not to be reducing the number of weapons.
Now, fortunately, a two-thirds majority was finally found,
but not easily. I remember vividly that the vote on New START
occurred after Christmas in that year of 2010 over the protests
of many Members wanting not to come back for something of that
variety. And 23 days before the end of the year, a two-thirds
majority was found with a good number of Republicans voting
against it.
That I mention because subsequent to New START, there has
not really been any movement in the Senate, that I can recall,
for a reduction of the 1,550 to a lower total, quite apart from
many of the elements of the New START situation.
I think, in terms of the safety of the world, it would be a
good idea to consider that. But it has not been on the table
for 9 years. No one really has made any initiative in the
administration or in the Senate.
So we have left at least those limits and the verification
aspect of it that may back up some other arms control
agreements that could occur that we have been discussing
earlier in the hearing.
But it is important to be renewed. To absent, leave the INF
Treaty, and then to leave New START altogether, really calls
for a total new beginning. And right now, I don't see that kind
of initiative in the administration or the Congress.
So we had best hold onto what we have there, at least
offers, at least some, not necessarily safety net, but at least
some provisions that are helpful, it seems to me, in terms of
safety.
Mr. Cooper. The press has reported that the President is
interested in perhaps winning a Nobel Prize for his work with
North Korea. Perhaps he could be persuaded to win a Nobel Prize
by reducing nuclear weapons, because I think as Churchill said,
we already have enough to make the rubble bounce.
And perhaps 1,000 would be sufficient, or another number
like that, if other countries could also be persuaded to reduce
theirs.
Ambassador Vershbow, would you say that we should extend,
renew, improve, terminate the New START agreement?
Ambassador Vershbow. I favor extending it, which isn't
mutually exclusive from also seeking, over the longer term, to
improve it. But I think the treaty itself allows for a straight
extension for up to 5 years. It could be extended for a shorter
period if there was an effort to already begin work on a
follow-on agreement. I would worry that they were trying to get
a whole new agreement in the time remaining before the
expiration of New START might be insufficient.
But I think the agreement, as it stands, even with the
current ceilings, is a contribution to stability,
predictability. And as important as the limits in the
agreement, are the verification and transparency requirements,
which I know our military is very attached to because it gives
them far more understanding of Russian strategic forces and
where they are going, enables them to avoid worst-case
assessments of the Russian programs.
So I think it would be in our interest to extend it. If we
think that there is some technologies that need to be factored
into the treaty that aren't covered, then the treaty has some
provisions allowing for discussion and amendment of the treaty
to do that.
The INF issue, if it can't be resolved in a standalone
agreement, could conceivably be addressed in a follow-on
agreement. But I would start by extending it, building a little
more cushion of time to consider any additional constraints.
Paula DeSutter mentioned missile defense. There is no
contradiction between continuing to develop and deploy missile
defense systems while maintaining the New START agreement. I
think there is still questions about our ability to effectively
counter the sophisticated Russian strategic forces, which are
getting even more sophisticated with these hypersonic glide
vehicles and other things.
But missile defense does have a place in our overall
deterrence strategy, and it can be done while we maintain a new
START.
Mr. Cooper. My final question is whether the State
Department today is even staffed adequately to negotiate some
of these new agreements, because it is our impression that
several executive agencies are short-staffed.
Do either of you happen to know?
Ms. DeSutter. Mr. Cooper, my impression is that the
Verification Bureau not only had to take on responsibility for
some arms control negotiations, but I think that they are
losing staff. And I think that they are going to need--it can
be a very technical issue.
And so when the State Department came and said, you know,
Paula, you have to do a diversity report, I am, like, well,
what?
And he said, How many people, what color, and background.
And I said, Okay. I have four different kind of nuclear
people: Nuclear engineers, nuclear chemists. You know, I have
three different kinds of chemists. It is very diverse, and it
is very technical. And they are going to need to be bulked up
in a way that I think that they have not been.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And welcome to all the
witnesses here.
You know, first, there was the withdrawal of the JCPOA
[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] and now the INF.
Obviously, the message and the trend that we are establishing
go towards what I feel is damaging and destabilizing. These
agreements, these treaties, go beyond their objectives to
prevent development and proliferation of lethal weapons. And
more importantly, they continue a framework of communication
and access to information that we otherwise would not have. And
I am concerned that, without those treaties in place, we are at
a major disadvantage and going backwards instead of forward in
reducing proliferation.
This administration and some former officials have stated
that China is not limited by the INF Treaty and that U.S.
withdrawal would benefit U.S. military planning in the Pacific.
I have four questions, but I am going to ask two of them at
a time to not overwhelm you. The first question: Does the INF
prevent the United States from meeting its military
requirements against China? And, two, do you believe it is
militarily necessary for the United States to deploy INF
weapons in the Pacific region?
To any and all of you.
Ambassador Vershbow. I will go first.
First of all, I agree with you, Congressman, that the
erosion of all the different agreements and constraints on arms
competition and on proliferation is worrisome, particularly
when we are dealing with a far more aggressive Russia and a
more aggressive China as well.
But on the specific questions, there are already existing
systems in our arsenal or in development that can meet the
requirements in Asia-Pacific region. But there may be an
advantage to having ground-launch systems in addition to the
existing air-launched and sea-launched systems, just because
our naval vessels have multiple missions, and it is hard to do
all the roles on one platform.
But we can target military targets deep inside of Chinese
territory today, and, you know, we can deal with the Chinese
Navy. But INF-range missiles, over time, as Chinese
capabilities improve, could enhance our ability to do these
kinds of deep strike, or anti-ship missions.
So we can do it now, but we might be able to do it better
with INF. But it is choice whether this is the place to spend
our money or not. And as I said in my statement, whether we
would have an easy time convincing allies to host these systems
on their territory, particularly Japan and Korea, which would
be the logical place, is, in my view, doubtful. We saw
tremendous controversy when we put the THAAD [Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense] ballistic missile defense systems in
Korea, which are defensive systems, the Chinese freaked out,
and even imposed sanctions on Korea. And so, I think they will
be a bit wary of going through that again. We can put them in
Guam, but it is not the ideal location to deploy such systems.
So that is how I would respond to your question.
Ms. DeSutter. Well, I would like to say that, for me, and I
am not a Pentagon planner, I am not in the region making
decisions about this, and so there may be offensive-related
upgrades that need to be done. I don't know. But for me, the
answer to an offensive buildup of the kind that China has
pursued, which I must say, when all of this issue came up and I
was having to speak about it, I did some research into what
kind of ballistic missile deployments is China pursuing, and I
was amazed.
I cannot see how we could counter with offense the Chinese
buildup. And I don't think that is the way to go. I think the
way to go is defense. And I think that had we had 10 years ago
the kind of ballistic missile defense capabilities President
Reagan envisioned, we wouldn't be seeing that kind of buildup
in China.
What we need to do is deploy the missile defense so that
they will see that they have wasted their money, they and the
Russians.
Mr. Carbajal. I see I am out of time. I yield back.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just had a question for Senator Lugar.
In your testimony, you made it clear that Russia was in
violation of the INF Treaty. It is a belief I have and I think
most of us have. It is a belief our NATO allies have had. I was
there last week in Brussels, and they joined on with that
statement.
However, they had a strong feeling, at least in discussions
I was involved with, that they wanted to use a 6-month period
to reengage Russia into serious discussions about trying to
revive the treaty, or aspects of that treaty.
And could you just share some of your experience dealing
with other Presidents? Because violations of treaties are not--
it is not a new phenomenon. It happens. But you have had some
experience.
Can you share with us some possible inroads or techniques
that could be employed that you have seen other Presidents try
to use to try and revive some of these discussions the way I
think we are going to get great support if we begin doing that
with our European allies as well?
Senator Lugar. Well, first of all, I would comment that the
President has to want to get back into the discussions. At this
point, there is not evidence that that is the case. But leaving
aside his current attitude, I think some of the allies, and if
you have met with them recently, you would be well-informed,
really are very hopeful for a United States leadership in this
area, for some vision, some prospects of hope, as opposed to
simply indicating if we are going to go to the end of the line,
and that is it, and there is really nothing out there. There is
really a desire for something to be out there.
So ideally, there would be members of the administration,
maybe even Members of Congress, who would pick up the ball at
this point and say it is time to get ahold of some Russians.
What is occurring in the press is President Putin is making
all sorts of threats. He gave at least some type of press
release the other day that listed specific targets in the
United States that he found attractive to think about.
Well, this is a serious business. It really does require
right now at the highest levels that we get back in touch with
the Russians and discuss what is going on. It seems to me it
has been convenient for the administration to say, after all,
these violations have been going on now for several years and
it is simply time to wind that [inaudible] up. While at the
same time, Putin is coming back and saying that he is really
prepared to sock it to them. And we better take that seriously.
We really need to engage the Russians right now and reassure
our European allies that we are prepared to do that, maybe even
enlist some of them to be a part of that situation.
Mr. Keating. Yeah. I agree with you in your belief that--
there is no indication that I received last week that we are
taking this period and using it to try and revive talks or gain
further commitments, which is disappointing, but it is also
disappointing to our allies.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Mr. Keating. And there is something you touched upon
briefly that I think is worth emphasizing. And that is the fact
that even our attempt to do so would continue to put us in a
more mantle--a greater mantle of leadership on these rather
than being seen, even though they are the violators, even the
perception that we are the ones retreating from this.
And also, I was really struck with some of the real
fissures that are there with our allies right now. And to me,
there is a positive benefit in--for no other reason, showing
them that we want to work along lines that they so strongly
feel, as their allies, even if it is not successful.
Do you have any comments on that?
Senator Lugar. Well, we have already been through a period
in which the President attacked NATO in a way by saying the
allies have got to pay their fair share, that they are not
meeting their obligations, and almost implying that it is not
America's role to defend all these nations of NATO regardless
of World War II and subsequent developments. That is a very
dangerous attitude to take.
What we really need right now is a revival of NATO, a
revival of the spirit of the allies, clarity on our part that
we are prepared to be a leader. And their excitement, or, at
least, approval of the fact that that is the case, that they
want us around, they want us to be helpful in this respect.
This won't help to keep condemning treaties as the worst
one ever made. There really has got to be a time now in which
we get together with our partners.
Now, we could use this time because of this discussion we
are having about the INF Treaty to say this is a good time to
turn things around and begin to have these talks, begin to have
this planning.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
The last question will be the ranking member's.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Senator, following on what you have said about recently we
have had Putin making very aggressive statements that are also
coupled with his nuclear modernization.
I have a question for the Ambassador.
When we look at what Putin is doing in his modernization,
he is developing nuclear weapon systems that are outside of the
INF and New START, which he is bragging about and is obviously
very destabilizing. For example, his hypersonic weapons, a
nuclear-powered cruise missile, and a nuclear-powered
underwater drone called Poseidon, which apparently are outside
of the New START.
How do you believe we should respond to the fact that--
obviously there is significant proliferations, significant
increase that is occurring to the United States with these
weapons, these types of weapons, and instability as we approach
the renewal of New START.
Ambassador Vershbow. Thank you, Congressman.
Putin certainly has been making a lot of aggressive
statements lately, and he seems quite excited by all these new
technologies and wonder weapons that his scientists are
producing. Most of the other scientists in Russia are
emigrating. But at least in the military, they are going
strong.
But I think we will have to, first of all, assess whether
these new systems, if they do get deployed, whether they are
covered or not. I think, you know, the hypersonic weapons may
be delivered by ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, in which case we should try to insist that they are
covered and subject to numerical limits, although that still
doesn't address potential qualitative edge that the Russians
may gain.
The nuclear cruise missile, that one I am skeptical ever
will be fielded to have a nuclear reactor on each missile so it
can fly endlessly around the world. But the range clearly would
be intercontinental, so presumably, that would count as well.
And this Poseidon underwater drone that surfaces off the coast
and devastates everything within hundreds of miles, that one
does defy categorization.
So we do have to potentially look to expand the coverage of
the New START Treaty. That doesn't mean we shouldn't extend it
on its own terms, at least as a short-term stabilization
measure. But we are clearly going to have to figure out ways to
address these new technologies and others that may emerge in
the coming years.
A traditional paradigm for arms control goes back to the
1970s. Clearly, we will have to find ways to incorporate
restrictions and verification measures that work for new
technologies if arms control is to remain viable.
But I think it is worth pursuing that. Even with the
Russian violation of the INF Treaty, it is in our interest to
kind of limit their ability to deploy and to gain the
transparency about their new technologies so that we are not,
kind of, caught by surprise in the coming years.
Mr. Cooper. That concludes the questioning.
I would like to thank the witnesses for their expertise,
for their testimony, and for their patience.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 26, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 26, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 26, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. As the floor manager in the Senate for every arms
control agreement from INF through New START, did you ever think you
would see a Republican president follow the Russian lead in abandoning
the INF treaty and to create doubt about even extending New START?
Senator Lugar. Many things have happened in the past two and a half
years that I never thought I would see.
Mr. Cooper. Is there any way to persuade John Bolton and President
Trump that the U.S. should hold Russia's feet to the fire of having
breached the INF Treaty and even try to expand the Treaty to include
China instead of abandoning it?
Senator Lugar. As I noted in my testimony, ``jettisoning treaties
that provide a legal framework for exposing Russian violations achieves
nothing.'' However, I believe it is unlikely that this White House will
reverse course and go back to the negotiating table to try to save the
treaty. Russia has given no indication that it would meet U.S. demands
for an inspection of its noncompliant missiles; and the United States
is similarly unwilling to address Russia's concerns about U.S. treaty
compliance, notably the fielding of U.S. missile defense interceptor
launchers in Europe that Moscow says could be used to launch offensive
missiles in violation of the agreement. In his Feb. 6 State of the
Union address, Trump alluded to negotiating a new intermediate-range
missile agreement that would also include China, but the administration
has not yet raised the issue with China, which possesses hundreds of
land-based, intermediate-range missiles. Joining the INF Treaty would
mean that China would have to eliminate 95 percent of its missile
arsenal. Limits on Chinese military capabilities are worth pursuing,
but we will have to put something on the table in return.
Mr. Cooper. What would be the national security risks of allowing
the New START Treaty to expire without any serious effort to extend or
renegotiate it?
Senator Lugar. If New START is allowed to expire without a
replacement, there will be no legally binding limits on the world's two
largest strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972. The
collapse of the U.S.-Russia arms control architecture would mean
Russian nuclear forces were unconstrained, our ability to verify what
Russia is doing would be curtailed, and the incentives to engage in
costly nuclear competition would be magnified. I agree with the
conclusion of a recent Center for Naval Analyses report: ``If New START
expires without an imminent replacement treaty, the United States would
face increased risks and uncertainties in its relationship with Russia,
its nuclear non-proliferation strategy, and its ability to sustain
solidarity within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).''
Without the treaty's monitoring and verification regime, the United
States would probably need to divert resources to observing Russian
nuclear forces via national technical means but would not be able to
completely make up for the loss information provided by the treaty.
Without the treaty's constraints, the United States and Russia would
each have incentives to invest in costly increases to the size of their
arsenals.
Mr. Cooper. You noted in your testimony that the Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance Bureau is losing staff. In your view, what
are the reasons for staff leaving? Do you have ideas on ways to retain
and add the staff necessary to police current arms control treaties and
agreements, and to negotiate and implement future treaties and
agreements?
Ms. DeSutter. The short answer is that the Verification and
Compliance Bureau was created by Congress against the wishes of the
Department of State, and unfortunately the Department has generally
treated the Bureau, its mission, and its personnel as the ``skunks at
the garden party.'' It is demoralizing to work in an organization whose
efforts and accomplishments are unwanted, unappreciated, or outright
rejected by the Department of State Bureaucracy, especially the office
to which it reports, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security (T). The Bureau is a creature of Congress, and
only with ongoing Congressional interest, oversight, and support will
it stand any chance of fulfilling the mission for which Congress
created it.
The full answer to your question, Mr. Cooper, requires a bit of
historical perspective. When the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency was merged into the Department of State in 1997, Congress,
specifically the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman and
Ranking Member, Senators Helms and Biden, made clear that the
verification and compliance aspects of arms control agreements be given
a voice at the most senior level of the Executive Branch, through the
creation of an Assistant Secretary for Verification. Senators Lugar and
Biden continued to hold this view. In 1999, the Chair and Vice Chair of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senators Shelby and
Kerrey, underscored the importance of a State Department Bureau focused
on the verification and compliance function--and separated from the
arms control negotiation function. They noted that: ``previous efforts
to merge these functions were rejected in three previous
Administrations.'' The Bureau's creation was made law in the ``Arms
Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999'', contained in the omnibus
Appropriations Act, Public Law No: 106-113.
I served as the second Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary of
State for Verification and Compliance. In that capacity I welcomed a
close working relationship with both Houses of Congress, especially on
such matters as implementing Libya's decision to give up its weapons of
mass destruction, and in trying to get Russia to comply with its treaty
obligations. I hold the firm belief that when the Executive and
Legislative Branches are understood by other nations to have a common
view, other nations are far more willing to cooperate. This perspective
may be demonstrated in the 1991 unclassified Krasnoyarsk radar case
study provided to the Director of the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament
Agency and appended in answer to Mr. Garamendi's Question 15.
In 2005, the Department merged the functions of the State
Department Arms Control Bureau with the Departments Bureau of
Nonproliferation. Because the Verification and Compliance Bureau was
enacted in law, formal changes could not be made to its functions, but
it was determined that the Assistant Secretary would be responsible for
some negotiation and implementation functions, specifically, overseeing
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, including the Review
Conference, and negotiating a follow-on to START with the Russian
Federation. The name of the Bureau was changed within the Department to
the Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation. As a
verification purist, I neither sought out these missions nor wanted
them, explaining to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security that I would prefer to have my fingernails
broken below the quick. Although I of course sought to represent the
United States as best I could in these fora, these missions were a
significant drain on our efforts to focus on verification and
compliance assessment.
While the Bureau with responsibility for negotiating with North
Korea in the Six Party Talks, the East Asia and Pacific Bureau (EAP),
successfully kept Bureau personnel from having a direct influence on
the Talks throughout the Bush Administration, during the 2nd Bush
Administration term the acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security assisted EAP in its efforts. While I had
initially disagreed with the assessment of the Inspector General that
the VC Bureau should report directly to the Secretary, I subsequently
think that might be best.
Perhaps emboldened by the addition of some negotiating missions to
the Bureau while it was under my leadership, Secretary Clinton went
further by moving more negotiating functions to the Bureau under the
new title she gave it: the Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Bureau. I believe that the addition of the arms control negotiating
functions was a distraction from the legally mandated core missions and
thus a likely contributor to what I believe to be the low verifiability
of both the New Start Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive Program of
Action (JCPOA).
To reiterate, any organization will lose its best staff if their
work is ignored and rejected, and if senior personnel cut them out of
the action. As I noted in my oral statement, I believe the Trump
Administration should recreate the Reagan Administration's Arms Control
Verification Committee (ACVC) to enhance the strength and effectiveness
of the Bureau.
If Congress wants an organization, especially one that is a
creature of Congress like the Verification and Compliance Bureau, to
succeed and be able to not only exert the appropriate influence within
the Executive Branch but also to be able to provide Congress with the
best, most reasoned and rigorous analysis possible, all relevant
Committees must be--and be seen by the bureaucracy to be--its allies
and supporters.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
Mrs. Davis. Thank you all for your testimonies and for your past
and current efforts to make our world a safer place. I'd like to know
your respective opinions on where and how Congress should move forward
from here in working with this administration, given that the
Administration has functionally decided to withdraw from the Treaty.
Senator Lugar. Congress has the ability to press the administration
on its strategy to prevent a new Euro-missile race and increased
instability in the absence of the INF Treaty. Congress, via the power
of the purse, also has the ability to prevent the administration from
taking steps, such as testing and fielding new and unnecessary land-
based intermediate-range missile systems, that would result in a new
Euro-missile race and increased instability. Several members of
Congress have already proposed legislation along these lines. For
example, Congress could condition funding to develop new missiles on
receipt from the administration of a comprehensive military, economic,
and diplomatic strategy to bring Russia back into compliance with the
treaty. Congress could also condition funding for new missiles on
agreement among all NATO allies that such missiles are needed.
Mrs. Davis. Why do you think Russia decided to violate the INF
treaty and what are their motivations for alleging U.S. violation of
the treaty? As this Administration notes, they have not violated the
New START Treaty. What explains Russian behavior?
Senator Lugar. The reasons for Russia's violation are unclear. But
I believe the violation was likely due to a number of factors,
including a desire to augment Russia's theater strike capabilities,
provide another option to evade U.S. and NATO missile defenses,
internal inter-military service rivalry within Russia, and a
longstanding view that the INF Treaty disproportionally constrained
Russia given that several states that border or are near Russia are not
parties to the treaty and possess land-based intermediate-range
missiles. None of which is to excuse Russia's illegal and egregious
violation. Based on the information divulged publicly by the U.S.
government to date, it appears Russia believed it could covertly
develop the 9M729 without getting caught. If Russia believed that the
INF Treaty was no longer in its interest, it could have legally
exercised the withdrawal provision contained in the treaty.
Unfortunately, Russia's decision to violate the treaty is consistent
with other actions it has taken in contravention of international law.
I believe Russia continues to abide by New START because it benefits
from the legally-binding caps on U.S. nuclear forces and insight about
U.S. nuclear forces provided by the treaty's monitoring and
verification provisions. It should be noted that Russia is developing
new kinds of strategic weapons that it claims are not subject to New
START because the weapons fly on non-ballistic trajectories. I believe
the United States should seek engage Russia on limiting these systems
and that an extension of New START would provide the time and space to
do so.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you all for your testimonies and for your past
and current efforts to make our world a safer place. I'd like to know
your respective opinions on where and how Congress should move forward
from here in working with this administration, given that the
Administration has functionally decided to withdraw from the Treaty.
Ambassador Vershbow. As I stated in my testimony, the
Administration's decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty was legally
justified but politically questionable. Legally, Russia is clearly in
material breach of its obligations by developing, testing and now
deploying a ground-launched cruise missile, the 9M729, with a range
that far exceeds the Treaty limit of 500 kilometers. But instead of
continuing to pressure Moscow to reverse its violation of the Treaty,
the Administration has given Russia free rein to deploy more illegal
9M729s and other new ballistic and cruise missiles that could increase
the threat to U.S. forces in Europe and to the security of our NATO
Allies.
I would recommend that the Congress continue to urge the
Administration to pursue a successor agreement to the INF Treaty that
could, at least, mitigate the effects of the loss of the INF Treaty.
One possible solution would be to challenge Russia to agree to a mutual
renunciation of all nuclear-armed, land-based INF-range missiles
(including the 9M729) and to agree to mutual inspections to verify that
no nuclear-armed versions are deployed by either side. As part of this
arrangement, the United States and its allies could agree to Russian
inspections of the U.S. missile defense sites in Romania and Poland to
confirm that they have no offensive capability as Moscow has alleged.
In addition, the sides could agree to numerical limits on permitted
conventionally-armed systems.
Another solution would be for the United States and Russia to agree
to refrain from deploying any land-based INF systems in or within range
of Europe, while permitting some agreed number of such systems in Asia.
We could invite China to participate in such an arrangement as well.
A successor agreement along the above lines could help maintain
stability and avert an unconstrained competition in intermediate-range
systems. It could also improve the climate for negotiations on an
extension or strengthening of the New START Treaty prior to its
expiration in 2021 (which I strongly favor).
Until we have exhausted the possibilities for a successor to the
INF Treaty, we should proceed cautiously on the question of military
countermeasures. We should review the options in close consultation
with our NATO Allies, as we did in the 1970s in preparing the dual-
track decision, since the Allies could be caught in the middle of any
new U.S.-Russian missile competition in Europe.
Mrs. Davis. With respect to NATO and our Allied Partners: do you
have specific recommendations on a constructive manner to seek
stakeholder input in the face of an administration that has appeared to
question its existence? And given your experience in both Europe and
Asia, please describe the political challenges with attempting to base
intermediate range missiles on Allied territories. Do you believe they
are necessary to defend the United States and our Allies?
Ambassador Vershbow. The United States is likely to be more
successful managing the consequences of Russia's violation of the INF
Treaty if we act in close coordination with our NATO Allies. This is
the lesson to be drawn from the original INF dual-track decision taken
by NATO in 1979. The dual-track decision was a powerful demonstration
of how to negotiate from a position of strength. It not only led to the
elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, but gave impetus to
talks to reduce strategic weapons and conventional armed forces in
Europe as well.
In the wake of the Russian violation of the Treaty and deployment
of the illegal 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile, we should consult
closely with our Allies--in Europe and in Northeast Asia--on the full
range of potential response options, both conventional and nuclear.
There may be some responses involving air-launched and sea-launched
systems that could neutralize the deep-strike threat posed by the 9M729
but would not require Allied agreement to base new systems on their
territory, which could be politically controversial.
If the U.S. and its Allies decide that ground-based systems are
necessary to deprive the Russians of any military advantage from the
9M729, we should consider options that minimize the chances of a
popular backlash as much as possible--keeping in mind that Russia will
do everything possible to foster public opposition using threats and
disinformation, It may be easier to secure Allied agreement to base new
weapons on their territory if the systems are conventional and do not
require any change in NATO's existing nuclear posture or the U.S.
nuclear posture in the Pacific. As was the case in Europe in the 1980s,
to allay public anxieties our Allies may favor a dual-track approach in
which we offered to reduce or eliminate our deployments if Russia
agreed to reduce or eliminate its deployed 9M729s and other INF-range
systems.
Mrs. Davis. Why do you think Russia decided to violate the INF
treaty and what are their motivations for alleging U.S. violation of
the treaty? As this Administration notes, they have not violated the
New START Treaty. What explains Russian behavior?
Ambassador Vershbow. The INF Treaty was always controversial within
the Soviet Union and Russia. Gorbachev overruled Soviet military
leaders in agreeing to give up the then-new SS-20 missile and the
USSR's other INF systems. They considered retention of ground-based
missile systems as vital for the USSR, as a land power.
In 2005, senior Russian officials proposed that the United States
and Russia ``jointly withdraw'' from the INF Treaty, arguing that the
strategic situation in Eurasia had changed dramatically since the INF
Treaty was concluded in 1987. They pointed to the emergence of medium-
and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats on Russia's periphery,
and argued that Russia needed its own medium- and intermediate-range
systems to deter these threats. The United States declined to take
Russia up on its offer for a joint withdrawal from the INF Treaty.
Clearly, Russia did not abandon its ambition to break free of the
INF Treaty's restrictions in 2005. Moscow continued to modernize its
air- and sea-launched cruise missiles (which it has demonstrated to
great effect in Syria), and chose the clandestine route to the
development of an intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile,
the 9M729, perhaps expecting it would not get caught.
Even with the exposure of its violation, Russia appears determined
to retain these systems because of the capability they provide to
strike theater-level targets in both Europe and Asia. The 9M729 also
supports Russia's evolving Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) strategy,
which seeks to deny the United States and NATO access to key ports,
airfields, and command and control nodes during a conflict. As a mobile
system, the new system also improves the survivability of Russian
theater-strike systems.
As regards Russian allegations of U.S. violations, these are for
the most part attempts to deflect criticism of Russian non-compliance
and are largely specious. That said, the United States could afford to
be more transparent about the capabilities that Russia alleges are
inconsistent with the Treaty in order to convince publics--at home and
abroad--that Russia is primarily responsible for the demise of the INF
Treaty.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you all for your testimonies and for your past
and current efforts to make our world a safer place. I'd like to know
your respective opinions on where and how Congress should move forward
from here in working with this administration, given that the
Administration has functionally decided to withdraw from the Treaty.
Ms. DeSutter. Congress can make a significant contribution to
convincing Russia and other nations to comply with their obligations to
avoid such situations in the future.
For example, during a meeting I attended of the ABM Treaty's
Standing Consultative Commission, I handed over to the Soviet side a
copy of a Congressional Resolution on the Krasnoyarsk Radar. The
message to the violating party was that the strong view not only of the
Executive Branch, but also the Legislative Branch, that the violation
had to be reversed, carried significant sway in their eventual decision
to correct the violation. This was especially true since the Soviets
had tried to undermine the U.S. position by not only the usual
allegations of U.S. noncompliance but also by inviting a group of
Congressmen to visit the radar in 1987 to try to mislead them regarding
the violation.
On another occasion, when Russia was failing to provide accurate
declarations of their stocks of chemical weapons and impeding a visit
by U.S. experts to discuss the problem, I asked Senator Lugar and his
staff to weigh in with Russia, which they did via a letter to Russia
with, as I recall, references to Senator Lugar's ongoing leadership of
the Nunn/Lugar program. It helped.
Congress can endeavor, preferably working with the Department of
State's Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance and other
Executive Branch representatives, to identify ways, including passage
of resolutions and perhaps other legislation, to publicly demonstrate
to Russia and other nations that both the Executive and Legislative
Branches are committed to full compliance with all obligations of arms
control and nonproliferation agreements.
Mrs. Davis. With respect to NATO and our Allied Partners: do you
have specific recommendations on a constructive manner to seek
stakeholder input in the face of an administration that has appeared to
question its existence? And given your experience in both Europe and
Asia, please describe the political challenges with attempting to base
intermediate range missiles on Allied territories. Do you believe they
are necessary to defend the United States and our Allies?
Ms. DeSutter. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mrs. Davis. Why do you think Russia decided to violate the INF
treaty and what are their motivations for alleging U.S. violation of
the treaty? As this Administration notes, they have not violated the
New START Treaty. What explains Russian behavior?
Ms. DeSutter. Clearly Russia has believed that the cost of being in
verified violation with the INF Treaty was less than the benefits of
doing so. I believe that the Obama Administration's failure to report
the INF Treaty violations to Congress and failure to raise the issue
with Russia and demand that they come back into compliance starting
back in 2010 when they detected the noncompliance encouraged Russia to
believe that their violation of the INF Treaty would be cost free.
As to Russian allegations of U.S. noncompliance, since the very
first report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance in 1984 Russia has
consistently sought to divert attention from its own noncompliance by
alleging U.S. noncompliance. This was one reason behind the 1993 merger
of the President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance and the
Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements which mandated a
discussion of U.S. compliance.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. Does INF withdrawal make New START extension more or
less likely? What is your assessment of the impact on national security
if New START is not extended, both in terms of loss of warhead
restrictions and verification regimes?
Senator Lugar. In the likely event the INF Treaty collapses in
August, the only remaining bilateral U.S.-Russia arms control agreement
would be New START, which expires in 2021 but can be extended by up to
five years through agreement by both parties. I am concerned that the
Trump administration has yet to develop a position on whether to extend
the treaty and that some White House officials have in the past called
for abandoning the treaty. I am also concerned that the politicization
of Russian concerns about U.S procedures to eliminate certain U.S.
delivery systems from accountability under the treaty and U.S. concerns
about Russia's development of new kinds of strategic weapons. As was
the case with the INF Treaty, I worry that both sides are laying the
groundwork to blame the other for not extending the treaty. If New
START is allowed to expire without a replacement, there will be no
legally binding limits on the world's two largest strategic nuclear
arsenals for the first time since 1972. Which makes it all the more
important to extend the treaty and restart a serious U.S.-Russia arms
control dialogue. The collapse of the U.S.-Russia arms control
architecture would mean Russian nuclear forces were unconstrained, our
ability to verify what Russia is doing would be curtailed, and the
incentives to engage in costly nuclear competition would be magnified.
Mr. Larsen. What is the national security benefit of verification
regimes under arms control agreements, in terms of intelligence, trust,
and transparency?
Ambassador Vershbow. Verification regimes, if effectively designed
and implemented in good faith, provide the United States confidence in
the other side's compliance with its obligations under arms control
agreements. Together with good intelligence, they also help provide
early warning of any potential violation by the other side, enabling
the U.S. to raise the issues at an early stage and seek corrective
action before the other side can gain an unfair military advantage.
Verification regimes, by mandating additional transparency about the
sides' capabilities, can reduce reliance on worst-case assessments and
provide the additional predictability needed for long-term military
planning.
Mr. Larsen. Is it worth trying to negotiate a new INF treaty and if
so, what should it look like? Should it include China?
Ambassador Vershbow. A new agreement to replace the INF Treaty
could, at least, mitigate the effects on stability of the loss of the
Treaty. One possible solution would be to challenge Russia to agree to
a mutual renunciation of all nuclear-armed, land-based INF-range
missiles (including nuclear versions of the 9M729) and to agree to
mutual inspections to verify that no nuclear-armed versions are
deployed by either side. As part of this arrangement, the United States
and its allies could agree to Russian inspections of the U.S. missile
defense sites in Romania and Poland to confirm that they have no
offensive capability as Moscow has alleged. In addition, the sides
could agree to numerical limits on permitted conventionally-armed
systems.
Another solution would be for the United States and Russia to agree
to refrain from deploying any land-based INF systems in or within range
of Europe, while permitting some agreed number of such systems in Asia.
We could invite China to participate in such an arrangement as well,
although I do not consider that essential.
A successor agreement along the above lines could help maintain
stability and avert an unconstrained competition in intermediate-range
systems. It could also improve the climate for negotiations on an
extension or strengthening of the New START Treaty prior to its
expiration in 2021 (which I strongly favor).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. The Trump Administration's Nuclear Posture Review
also notes that the Administration will seek ``arms control agreements
that enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' Do you
believe the New START Treaty meets that threshold? The Administration
has also noted as recently as this month that Russia is in compliance
with the New START Treaty.
Senator Lugar. Yes, I believe New START meets this threshold with
one exception. Our military leadership continues to affirm the security
benefits provided by the treaty. Gen John Hyten, the head of U.S.
Strategic Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February
26 that the treaty allows him to ``understand what [Russia's] limits
are and . . . position my force accordingly,'' and provides
``unbelievably important'' insight about what Russia is doing through
the treaty's verification procedures. When asked whether the treaty
inspections, data exchanges, and notifications could be replaced in a
timely and cost-effective manner in the absence of the agreement, Hyten
noted that the United States has ``very good intelligence capabilities,
but there's really nothing that can replace the eyes-on, hands-on
ability to look at something.'' But no president has--or could have--
negotiated an arms control agreement that could be enforced on the
United States.
Mr. Garamendi. When Russia violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty in the 1980s by building the Krasnoyarsk radar, how did
the United States confront Russia about its violation? How long did it
take Russia to come back into compliance? What lessons can be learned?
Senator Lugar. There is precedent for using patient diplomacy to
resolve treaty violations. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan
continued to observe the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Moscow
despite its determination beginning in 1983 that a large radar located
at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia violated the treaty. It also engaged in
negotiations with the Soviet Union on the INF Treaty and what became
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty during this period. It took time,
but diplomacy worked, and the Soviets in 1989 pledged to tear down the
radar.
Mr. Garamendi. The Trump Administration's Nuclear Posture Review
also notes that the Administration will seek ``arms control agreements
that enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' Do you
believe the New START Treaty meets that threshold? The Administration
has also noted as recently as this month that Russia is in compliance
with the New START Treaty.
Ambassador Vershbow. Yes, I believe continued compliance with the
New START Treaty is in the U.S. interest. The Treaty places limitations
on the number of strategic nuclear systems that Russia can deploy
against the United States and our Allies and ensures strategic
stability. Through New START's on-site inspection regime, data
declarations and notifications, the Treaty provides the United States
with key insights into Russian strategic nuclear forces that we might
not have access to without the Treaty. According to the U.S. Department
of State, Russia is adhering to its obligations under the Treaty.
Mr. Garamendi. When Russia violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty in the 1980s by building the Krasnoyarsk radar, how did
the United States confront Russia about its violation? How long did it
take Russia to come back into compliance? What lessons can be learned?
Ambassador Vershbow. The Soviet Union's construction of the large
phased-array radar station near Krasnoyarsk was a bone of contention
between the United States and the USSR for several years. The Reagan
administration first detected the construction of the site in 1983 and
immediately raised it with Moscow--both at political levels and in the
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The SCC was the mechanism for
addressing compliance questions under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty. The U.S. charged that the facility in the heart of
eastern Siberia violated the ABM Treaty, which permitted early-warning
systems only on the country's periphery and oriented outward.
The Soviet government denied any violation until 1987, when Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev ordered construction halted and allowed the
U.S. to inspect the site. A year later the Kremlin announced it was
transferring Krasnoyarsk to the Soviet Academy of Sciences for
conversion into an international center of space research, a decision
that did not sufficiently address the treaty violation. In 1989 the
Soviet Union announced it would raze the facility after Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze admitted it violated the ABM treaty. The
radar's dismantlement was completed in 1992.
The lessons to be learned from this are mixed. On the one hand,
persistence and perseverance by the Reagan and Bush-41 Administrations
clearly paid off in achieving the unprecedented decision by Moscow to
admit and correct a serious Treaty violation. On the other hand, the
Soviet decision was taken by Mikhail Gorbachev, over the objections of
the Russian military. It is likely seen by today's Russian leaders as
an example of weakness that should not be repeated. Certainly, the
Russians' refusal to admit their violation of the INF Treaty, despite
ample evidence proving its culpability, suggests that Russia has drawn
the wrong lessons from the Krasnoyarsk radar.
Mr. Garamendi. The Trump Administration's Nuclear Posture Review
also notes that the Administration will seek ``arms control agreements
that enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' Do you
believe the New START Treaty meets that threshold? The Administration
has also noted as recently as this month that Russia is in compliance
with the New START Treaty.
Ms. DeSutter. I do not believe that the New START Treaty is
effectively verifiable, and therefore while it might be accurate for
the Administration to say that they ``have not found Russia to be in
violation with the New START Treaty,'' a statement that Russia is ``in
compliance'' with New START is not meaningful. As I said in my written
statement to the Committee, given the counting rules and other
weaknesses in New START, the legal break-out potential is limitless,
and while all the inspections may have given the impression of
effectiveness, many have no real verification benefit. I believe that
the weaknesses and flaws in New START were persuasively articulated in
the minority views in the Executive Report on the Treaty. The concerns
expressed in the minority report are underscored by the fact that
Russia is deploying so many new missiles with both strategic and
theater options without a finding of noncompliance in the years since
entry into force.
The easiest course of action for the Trump administration would be
to simply extend the New START Treaty for five years. But if the
administration does so, it should ensure that doing so does not create
a false sense of security here or abroad. It will be important to be
clear with all that extending New START will be neither sufficient to
constrain the rapidly growing ballistic missile threat from Russia nor
from nations such as China, Iran, and North Korea. Only U.S. deployment
of a robust multilayered missile defense to render their ballistic
missiles impotent offers any real promise of countering the threat, and
thereby demonstrate to other nations that their ballistic missile
programs are a waste of resources and that the United States will not
permit other nations to hold the American people hostage to their
threats.
Mr. Garamendi. When Russia violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty in the 1980s by building the Krasnoyarsk radar, how did
the United States confront Russia about its violation? How long did it
take Russia to come back into compliance? What lessons can be learned?
[Question #15, for cross-reference.]
Ms. DeSutter. Congress can make a significant contribution to
convincing Russia and other nations to comply with their obligations to
avoid such situations in the future.
For example, during a meeting I attended of the ABM Treaty's
Standing Consultative Commission, I handed over to the Soviet side a
copy of a Congressional Resolution on the Krasnoyarsk Radar. The
message to the violating party was that the strong view not only of the
Executive Branch, but also the Legislative Branch, that the violation
had to be reversed, carried significant sway in their eventual decision
to correct the violation. This was especially true since the Soviets
had tried to undermine the U.S. position by not only the usual
allegations of U.S. noncompliance but also by inviting a group of
Congressmen to visit the radar in 1987 to try to mislead them regarding
the violation.
Congress can endeavor, preferably working with the Department of
State's Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance and other
Executive Branch representatives, to identify resolutions and perhaps
other legislation designed to demonstrate to Russia and other nations
that both the Executive and Legislative Branches are committed to full
compliance with all obligations of arms control and nonproliferation
agreements. Congress can reinforce these messages during Co-Dels.
Mr. Garamendi. Since at least 2011, you have called for the United
States to leave the INF Treaty. Would you agree that, now, given the
Administration's withdrawal from the INF Treaty, having the RS-26, one
of Russia's newer nuclear ballistic missiles, counted against New START
limits is beneficial?
Ms. DeSutter. I do not know whether Russia has agreed or will agree
that the RS-26 be counted against New START limits, nor do I know
whether or when it will be included in the aggregate numbers.
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