[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
May 8, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-33
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-211PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
Terrorism
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
COLIN ALLRED, Texas ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey LEE ZELDIN, New York
DAVID TRONE, Maryland BRIAN MAST, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
JUAN VARGAS, California STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
Casey Kustin, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Lenderking, Mr. Timothy A., Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Arabian Gulf Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 7
INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Washington Post article submitted for the record from
Representative Lieu............................................ 20
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 37
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 38
Hearing Attendance............................................... 39
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Information submitted for the record from Representative Trone... 40
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Deutch.......................................... 45
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Chabot.......................................... 50
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Malinowski...................................... 52
Responses to questions submitted for the record from
Representative Trone........................................... 56
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES
Wednesday, May 8, 2019
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on the Middle East,
North Africa, and International Terrorism
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:33 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E.
Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Deutch. All right. If we could take our seats, this
hearing will come to order. Welcome, everyone. The subcommittee
is meeting today to hear testimony on U.S. relationships with
the Gulf States.
As you have heard, there are two votes on the floor. So I
am going to offer my opening statement and then we will run to
vote, and there are only two votes. We will come back for the
hearing.
I thank Mr. Lenderking for being here today. We are pleased
to have someone from the Administration discuss our policy and
relationships in this very important region and I will
recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
Thanks again, Mr. Lenderking, for testifying today and for
your service to our country. Our hearing today will examine
opportunities and challenges in our relationships with the
States in the Arabian Gulf region.
Our partnerships with these States are enduring and many
date back to the end of the Second World War. The Gulf has been
a focal point of U.S. foreign policy under both Democratic and
Republican administrations.
In his 1980 State of the Union Address, President Jimmy
Carter articulated the Carter doctrine, which stated that the
United States would use military force if necessary to defend
its national interest in the Gulf.
The late President George H. W. Bush acted on this doctrine
when he sent a half a million U.S. troops to liberate Kuwait in
1991.
In recent years, our relationships with the Gulf States
have faced many challenges, from 9/11 to the Iraq War to
disagreements over the Arab Spring.
Yet, these ties have endured. It is precisely because of
this region's importance that I am perplexed and concerned that
so many of our key partners lack U.S. Ambassadors.
We have no Ambassador in Qatar, we have no Ambassador in
the UAE, and only last month was an ambassador to Saudi Arabia
confirmed.
Mr. Lenderking, you are a talented and respected diplomat
but cannot be everywhere all the time addressing all of the
region's challenges.
I believe our partnerships with Gulf States are vital to
our national security and geopolitical stability. We are
grateful to the nations who host our service members.
Our forward-deployed presence is absolutely critical to
peace and stability in the region. However, we must view these
relationships through the prism of our own interests and values
as well.
Where do our priorities align? What types of actions
undermine our goals and our values? We should honestly evaluate
where our interests and values diverge, identify actions that
undermine our mutual objectives, and be willing to express our
opposition when our regional partners do not live up to these
standards.
We can never--we must never sacrifice our values even if it
makes our partners uncomfortable. Unfortunately, we have seen
senior members of this Administration turn a blind eye to
actions that run counter to our interests and our values.
Their motivation is unclear but the impacts are manifesting
themselves in numerous ways. Whether it be brutal human rights
violations like the horrific murder of Jamal Khashoggi or
troubling alliances of convenience with groups that have posed
a threat to the United States in Yemen, the Administration's
refusal to acknowledge the serious bipartisan concern with many
policy decisions like the veto of the bipartisan bicameral
legislation to remove U.S. support for the war in Yemen or the
refusal to comply with a congressional request for a
determination on Global Magnitsky sanctions with respect to the
Khashoggi murder raises even further questions about its
intentions and it is, quite frankly, unacceptable.
The focal point of the Administration's policy in the Gulf
appears to be countering Iran. This is an interest that we
share with States of the region. Even though we share this goal
and recognize the very real threat that Iran poses to our
partners and to our own interests, we cannot just give our
partners in the Gulf a free pass if their behavior damages
other U.S. interests or contradicts our values.
We cannot just look the other way while the Saudi-led war
in Yemen results in the loss of more and more innocent lives
and a growing humanitarian catastrophe and simply shift all of
the blame to the atrocities committed by Iran.
We cannot stay silent if the UAE hacks into the personal
information of activists and dissidents including U.S.
citizens. We cannot avert our eyes when regional partners from
Qatar to Saudi Arabia to Bahrain violate the human rights of
foreign workers and their own citizens.
And if we are serious about countering Iran, we must
resolve the GCC rift which has dragged on now for almost 2
years. We are stronger when there is unity among our partners
and when we do not give bad actors like Iran any space to
attempt to exploit discord.
I am worried that the Trump Administration has provided a
free pass for our regional partners on too many issues and that
ultimately that may undermine our goals.
I hope Mr. Lenderking can provide a clear assessment of the
opportunities and the challenges facing the United States and
how United States policy can foster an approach to the Gulf
that secures our interests and that does so without sacrificing
our values.
And with that, we will recess until after votes, come back
and give the ranking member the opportunity to present an
opening statement, and then we will turn to you, Mr.
Lenderking, and we will recess until then.
[Recess.]
Mr. Deutch. All right. I call this hearing back to order
and I recognize the ranking member for the purpose of making an
opening statement.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, for calling this
hearing today on relations between the U.S. and our allies in
the Gulf.
The United States is fortunate to have many friends in such
a critically important region of the world. Our country's
relationship with Saudi Arabia was solidified aboard the USS
Quincy in 1945 as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met with
the kingdom's founder, King Abdul Aziz.
Since that time, Washington and Riyadh have developed a
robust historical relationship and close security ties. U.S.-
Bahrain relations stretch back to 1903 in bilateral security
ties with Bahrain back to the end of World War II.
Bahrain hosts 7,000 U.S. military personnel and serves as
the headquarters for NAVCENT in the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet.
Kuwait now hosts over 13,000 U.S. military personnel. Only
Germany, Japan, and South Korea host more U.S. troops than
Kuwait. Extensive U.S.-Qatar defense and security relations
were recently highlighted by the U.S.-Qatar strategic dialog in
Washington in January 2018 and DOHA January 2019.
The United Arab Emirates host about 5,000 U.S. troops and
the UAE forces have served alongside U.S. troops in Somalia,
the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria.
Last, but certainly not least, Oman was the very first Gulf
State to prevent U.S. military use of its facilities in 1980.
Since that time, Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every
military operation in the Middle East.
I look forward to our discussion with Deputy Assistant
Secretary Lenderking today about how we can maintain these
partnerships while confronting the many challenges to the
region.
The ongoing war in Yemen between the Iran-backed Houthi
rebels and the internationally recognized government of Yemen
backed by a Saudi-led coalition has created a dire humanitarian
crisis affecting Yemeni citizens.
I look forward to hearing from Mr. Lenderking about the
status of the U.N. peace process and how Congress and the
Administration can work together to support that process.
I am also increasingly concerned that Iran, the Houthi
rebels' main backer, is simply not incentivized to see an end
to the hostilities in Yemen.
Iran seeks to exert its influence in the region by
fostering a network of armed groups and proxies loyal to
Tehran. Last summer, the State Department designated the al-
Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain as an Iranian-backed terrorist group
for their designs to overthrow the government in Manama.
Better understanding the threats that Iran poses to our GCC
partners can help Congress develop policy solutions to support
the Gulf countries against this threat.
Internal GCC divisions remain a serious challenge. The GCC
dispute resulting in Qatar's isolation has dragged on since
June 2017. It has proven immensely counterproductive and
problematic in both U.S. policy and regional stability.
I hope Mr. Lenderking can update us on mediation efforts
and how the crisis is affecting the region. Finally, members on
both sides of the aisle remain, of course, concerned by the
human rights situation across the region but particularly in
Saudi Arabia.
Concerning developments of the past year include the
reported imprisonment of several U.S. citizens, the murder of
Jamal Khashoggi, and the reported imprisonment and torture of
peaceful women's rights activists.
We support Saudi Arabia's efforts to modernize its economy
for long-term success but that modernization must include
improvement on human rights issues.
I welcome an update from Mr. Lenderking on efforts to
obtain justice for Mr. Khashoggi's murder and on United States
efforts to leverage human rights reforms in Saudi Arabia.
I look forward to hearing from our witness today. Thank you
again, Chairman Deutch, and I yield back my time.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ranking Member Wilson.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record
subject to the length limitations in the rules.
It is now a pleasure to introduce our witness, Mr. Tim
Lenderking. Mr. Lenderking currently serves as deputy assistant
secretary of State for Arabian Gulf affairs in the Near East
Bureau at the U.S. Department of State.
He is a career member of the senior Foreign Service having
served in U.S. embassies in Riyadh, Baghdad, Kuwait, and Rabat
and held numerous Foreign Service posts both domestically and
internationally.
Mr. Lenderking joined the Foreign Service after a career in
the refugee field where he held numerous positions with
American NGO's and with the United Nations in New York, Sudan,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Thailand.
He has had a most distinguished career and on top of that
distinguished career it is also DAS Lenderking's birthday,
which I am certain he is thrilled to be spending with all of us
here at the subcommittee.
So from all of us, Mr. Lenderking, we are glad you are here
and we wish you a very joyous birthday.
Before you begin, let me just remind you that if you could
limit your testimony to 5 minutes and, without objection, your
prepared written statement will be made part of the hearing
record.
I am really grateful that you are here with us today and I
will recognize you for your testimony.
Mr. Lenderking.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY A. LENDERKING, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ARABIAN GULF AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Lenderking. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson,
first of all, thank you for the very kind birthday wishes and
mine to yours, belatedly, but happy birthday to you.
Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify.
As you know, the Middle East is a critical region for U.S.
interests and the Arabian Peninsula remains a key focus of our
foreign policy.
As Secretary Pompeo said earlier this year in Cairo, a
strong, secure, and economically vibrant Middle East is in our
national interest.
It is clear that we have a considerable stake in the
region's stability. The most urgent challenge facing the region
and one of the greatest threats to our national security is
Iran's destabilizing activities.
Iran is the world's leading State sponsor of terror, spends
millions of dollars supporting terrorist groups, and proxy
organizations that threaten our interest and stoke deadly
conflict.
Iranian malign activity in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and
Iran's continued support for designated terrorist groups such
as Lebanese Hezbollah threatens Israel and prolongs regional
conflicts.
Iran is pursuing dangerous ballistic missile technology
that will potentially threaten our security. this
Administration has engaged in a powerful pressure campaign to
cutoff the revenues the Iranian regime uses to spread terror
and destruction throughout the world.
That pressure campaign is working. Our oil sanctions have
taken over 1.5 million barrels of Iranian oil exports off the
market since May 2018. Twenty-three entities have reduced their
purchases of Iranian crude to zero.
These actions deny critical revenue for Iran's malign
activities. We have designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps--IRGC--as a foreign terrorist organization.
The Trump Administration is focused on protecting America's
homeland and America's national security interests. We actively
counter the threat from terrorist groups in States that sponsor
terrorism.
We work to ensure natural resources and international
commerce flow freely and we continue to main our steadfast
commitment to the protection of our strongest partners
including Israel.
We firmly believe that the challenges and opportunities in
the Gulf region mandate continued U.S. engagement. One clear
challenge noted heretofore is in the area of human rights. At
the highest levels we regularly raise the importance of human
rights and respect for international obligations and
commitments.
We emphasize the importance of the humane treatment of
detainees and thorough investigation of and accountability for
allegations of abuse.
I know this subcommittee shares our concerns and we have
spoken out publicly about them. We continue to do so in our
private diplomatic engagement as well.
Our recently released human rights reports demonstrate the
concerns we have with each of our Gulf partners to varying
degrees.
For example, our policy in Bahrain is to encourage reform,
reconciliation, and respect for freedom of expression, peaceful
assembly and association.
We were also horrified by the murder of Saudi journalist
Jamal Khashoggi. It was a heinous act and we want to be clear
that full accountability for those responsible has not yet been
achieved.
We have been forthright with the Saudi leadership that
there must be honest credible justice for Mr. Khashoggi. We
also continue to press Riyadh on its detention of several U.S.
citizens and numerous human rights advocates.
Ambassador Abizaid arrived in Riyadh just this past week
and I know that one of his priorities will be addressing these
issues in the weeks ahead.
China's burgeoning economic influence in the Gulf is
another challenge. We have been candid in sharing our concerns
with governments in the region. This includes the
telecommunications sector and the rollout of 5G in particular.
To ensure a fair playing field for U.S. companies we
continue to stress the importance of market principles and
transparent market access requirements.
A third challenge is the Gulf dispute with Qatar involving
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. As Secretary Pompeo
has said, we need the Gulf countries working together on the
complex set of challenges that face each of our interests in
the region.
We view a resolution to the dispute as in the best
interests of the countries involved and in our national
security interests as well. We have emphasized that the Gulf
dispute benefits Iran.
We spend a lot of time talking about the challenges in the
Gulf and they are, no doubt, there. But let us remember the
opportunities for us that stem from our engagement.
Our shared interests countering terrorism, fostering
economic development, countering Iran's malign activity provide
an opportunity to bring our partners together. We are also
asking the GCC countries to do more to resolve regional crises
like Libya, Sudan, and Lebanon, and to partner with us in those
endeavors.
We stand ready to work with all of our partners to address
the challenges we face.
Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify and we
welcome the opportunity to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lenderking follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Lenderking, for your
testimony.
We will now move to member questions, under the 5-minute
rule. I will begin, followed by Ranking Member Wilson, and then
we will alternate between the parties.
Let me just begin by acknowledging, Mr. Lenderking, that we
ask a lot of some of our partners, often asking them to change
behavior on issues that we do not always see eye to eye on.
We want cooperation on Iran. We want help countering the
Russian and Chinese influence. We have asked in Syria and Libya
and we want responsible action to bring the war in Yemen to a
halt and we want to be clear that human rights is not a
secondary concern. All of these affect U.S. national security.
I, personally, do not believe that we are asking too much.
But it seems--it seems like the president and other top
advisors believe that in order to get cooperation in some areas
we have to push other issues further down the list.
So I would just ask you to--let me just give you the
opportunity to share with the subcommittee what are our
consistent messages to Gulf partners? If you could correct the
record, help us understand what those messages look like and
sound like.
Mr. Lenderking. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think, first and foremost, we talk about the threats that
we are facing together, which we believe that are also issues
that threaten the Gulf countries. I have mentioned Iran's
malign influence. This plays out in varying degrees to each of
the countries.
In Yemen, unfortunately, with the civil war continuing to
rage we see that the Houthis were aided and abetted, although
not proxies of the Iranians--that they, just as Ranking Member
Wilson said, the Iranians show no inclination, unfortunately,
to help bring that conflict to a close.
So we do see that the Iranians are supporting the Houthis
in ways that are fueling the conflict. So we have a host of
security issues.
We have talked about human rights and I think that is a
crucial area where we do a lot privately when necessary. As I
mentioned, our human rights reports, which are in the public
domain, we do a lot of very private messaging with the Saudi
leadership and I think Ambassador Abizaid will take that on as
a key challenge.
Another primary area for us----
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Lenderking, so I understand private
messaging you are not going to be willing to tell us exactly
what the wording of that messaging is. But if you could give us
some sense when it comes to human rights the general nature of
that private messaging.
Mr. Lenderking. Of course. I think in each of the countries
the messaging is different. I mean, their commonalities, I
would say, common principles--freedom of assembly, freedom of
speech, et cetera--that are part of our human rights dialog.
But if you take the case of Bahrain, we have had an ongoing
conversation stemming back to some of the concerns we felt
about their handling of the Shi'a population that goes back
several years.
That is a particular area of concern. On the other hand, we
were heartened to see the record turnout in the recent
parliamentary elections, the election of a female speaker of
Parliament very much on the positive side. Bahrain has a very
good track record in terms of trafficking in persons so that is
very much on the positive side.
Saudi Arabia, of course, the crucial issue has been the
ones I have mentioned--the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, which we
note in our human rights report was conducted by government
agents. So we are quite public and quite direct about that.
Secretary Pompeo has indicated, including most recently in
late April, we continue to investigate. We call on Saudi Arabia
to take measures against those responsible all the way up to
the highest levels.
Mr. Deutch. And what is the status of that investigation?
Mr. Lenderking. The status of the investigation is that the
Saudis have a legal process underway. We may not be totally
satisfied with the pace of it. They have a different legal
system. The Saudis have asked for our patience to let the legal
proceedings continue.
This is not something that we are going to allow to be
swept under the table or buried under other priority issues.
Mr. Deutch. So I appreciate that, Mr. Lenderking. But even
as that investigation plays out--we could talk about the
hurdles and the timing and why it takes so long--even as that
plays out, we have seen the human rights activists, more than
two dozen, detained since last May.
The question is how do we push back against--it is not just
that horrific case--how do we push back against the Saudis'
human rights violations.
Should the Administration consider applying Global
Magnitsky Act sanctions against Saudi officials responsible for
unjust treatment not just in connection with the Khashoggi case
but unjust treatment of these activists if there is credible
evidence, especially that--if there is credible evidence that
there has been abuse or torture?
Mr. Lenderking. Mr. Chairman, I think the Global Magnitsky
parameters are something that we constantly look at. So if we
feel that they apply in other cases we would, of course, take a
serious look at that.
We have, as noted, identified 17 individuals. We did that
sort of right off the bat within a month or so of Khashoggi's
killing. We have utilized other legal measures to block visas
for others whom we deem are--were involved in that case.
Mr. Deutch. But even--just as I wrap up--in addition to the
Khashoggi case, are there ongoing--is there an ongoing review
of Global Magnitsky Act sanctions and the potential application
of those sanctions to individuals in connection with either
abuse or torture if there is credible evidence that that
exists?
Mr. Lenderking. I will say that there is not directly at
this particular time. I would say we are prepared to go in that
direction should information come to us that would rise to that
level.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr.
Lenderking, thank you for being here today.
And in January, Representative Keating and I introduced
H.R. 554, the Saudi Educational Transparency and Reform Act,
which highlights Saudi Arabia's inflammatory education
curriculum.
Is the State Department working with Saudi Arabia on this
issue?
Mr. Lenderking. We are indeed. This has been an issue that
we have looked at--been looking at for several years.
Particularly problematic are textbooks that we have sought to
work with the Saudis on that has demeaning language toward, for
example, Shi'a, which we think is not in keeping, certainly,
with the direction that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia wants
to take the country.
He has talked about the importance of Saudi Arabia
returning to a moderate Islam. Educational reform--what kids
are taught in schools--we would see as a vital part of that. So
we have worked with the Saudis on that effort.
We have seen some improvement. More work to be done.
Mr. Wilson. And with the effort in Saudi Arabia, the focus
there of human rights and rule of law, what is the status of
working with Kuwait and its level of progress in developing
human rights and rule of law and what is the State Department
doing to promote the most open society that could be?
Mr. Lenderking. We also highlight a number of issues in our
human rights report pertaining to Kuwait. So that is very much
an active dialog. We do not have the same voracity, I would
say, on the human rights issues that we do with the Saudis at
this particular time.
But we have had concerns about freedom of assembly and
other issues that we continue to raise with the Kuwaiti
government.
Mr. Wilson. And also possibly detention issues of person in
that country?
Mr. Lenderking. Of detentions?
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Lenderking. Yes. We are aware of certain particular
cases right now that we are working on and that we are working
to resolve as quickly as we can.
Mr. Wilson. That is greatly appreciated.
And then the ongoing dispute with Qatar and its neighbors,
how does this affect American interests in the Middle East?
Mr. Lenderking. We believe that the blockade of Qatar's
airspace, its land border, is beneficial to Iran and we do not
believe that this blockade or dispute with Qatar serves even
the interests of those who are doing it.
We have thrown ourselves at it quite strongly at various
points. I have traveled with special envoys to the region on a
number of occasions and we have sought to deliver messages to
the leadership of all the countries concerned to work out their
differences.
We have supported the Kuwaitis as a mediator and very much
value the role that they have played. We are not there yet. We
would also like to look at other measures.
We have assumed that the blockade could not necessarily be
lifted in one bite, so to speak. Let us look at ways that
pilgrims moving to the Haj, for example, can be helped to
perform their religious duties.
Let us look at family reunification. There are numerous
ways that we think the Gulf countries could chip away at some
of the issues.
But I think the main point is that we are better united,
just as you said, Congressman, that these countries, when we
look at the region we count on them to work with us in
confronting, you know, regional challenges across the board.
Mr. Wilson. And including working together with us. Sadly,
there has been terror financing from the GCC countries. Have we
identified who the recipients--which terrorist groups are
receiving funds and what efforts are being made to deter
further financing?
Mr. Lenderking. We have a very strong dialog with the Gulf
countries on terrorism financing. We partner with our Treasury
colleagues who often have the lead on this particular issue.
We have seen some improvements. We have seen the Saudis
move up the ranking in this particular area. We are very glad
for that.
But I would say across the board there is more work that
could be done, particularly as we look at Iranian financial
flows in and out of the Gulf, and as we scrutinize that area
more, we will be going to our Gulf partners to do more heavy
lifting.
Mr. Wilson. And with your extraordinary background in the
Middle East, do you believe that progress is being made in
regard to human rights for the citizens of the region?
Mr. Lenderking. Oh, I think there is progress. We
oftentimes say there is three steps forward and two back. We
are trying to avoid that. It would be great to have five steps
forward and no back.
So that is very much the posture that we take is that the
human rights improvements that we are pushing for we think are
beneficial to those countries. We would not do it otherwise.
But we also think we have strong interests to advocate for
and I am sure we will continue to do so.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for your service.
Mr. Lenderking. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
We have been joined by the chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee.
Chairman Engel, you are recognized.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is strange to
be all the way over on this side. I have not been here in
years, you know.
But thank you and thanks to members of the subcommittee for
letting me speak. So let me say, Mr. Deutch--Chairman Deutch--
Ranking Member Wilson, Mr. Lenderking, members of the
subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity to address the many
challenges and opportunities in the U.S. relationship with the
Arabian Gulf.
Right now, our relationships have been consumed by human
rights and accountability issues. They have been hampered by
foreign policy concerns where our interests diverge.
In Saudi Arabia, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and the
imprisonment of an American physician, of two American
journalists, and of women activists and bloggers have certainly
hindered and made more difficult our relationship.
In order to move past these issues, the United States will
need to see real changes. I want to move past the issue--these
issues but we cannot really be business as usual.
With respect to the UAE, our security cooperation remains
strong. But serious concerns remain about reports that military
equipment made in the United States and sold to the Emiratis
has ended up in the hands of third parties, even extremists.
We are also closely monitoring how the UAE is influencing
various conflicts around the world from Sudan to Libya to
Somalia, and Yemen has been a major concern of this committee.
Unfortunately, we have not seen nearly enough
accountability for attacks against civilians--a funeral, a
fishing boat, a Save the Children's hospital.
Our partners must be better than this and we need to insist
on it and this committee, I believe, has a role to play. I
believe that the best approach, moving forward, is to limit
assistance to our partners including weapons transfers if they
cannot meet our expectations.
Let me be clear, though. The Houthis are equally at fault.
They have resisted implementation of the Stockholm Agreement,
blocked humanitarian assistance in getting to vulnerable
Yemenis, and committed atrocities against detainees.
But we cannot simply look the other way when our partner's
behavior has been so troubling. At the same time, we have a
real interest in continuing to work with these partners on
issues of mutual concern.
Our Gulf partners are playing a constructive role in the
Israeli-Palestinian context, reportedly building back-channel
cooperation with Israel, and backfilling U.S. commitments to
Palestinian assistance.
Qatar has made a positive impact in the stabilization of
Gaza, working through Israel, not counter to Israel, and this
is a welcome newer development.
The United States and Gulf partners share economic
opportunities, anti-terrorism concerns and can be working
together to counter the threat posed by Iran.
For this to happen, a unified Gulf is essential. But so
far, we have not seen, unfortunately, enough progress to end
the Qatar blockade.
It is in all parties' interests to end this blockade so
that we can work together to counter the real threats in the
region. At the very least, Gulf Countries should allow Qatar
overflight rights so that each flight out of Doha is not
putting money in Iran's pockets.
Again, I thank the members of the subcommittee,
particularly the chairman and ranking member, for devoting
much-needed attention to the opportunities and challenges in
the Gulf, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Deutch. The chairman yields back.
Mr. Lieu, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Secretary
Lenderking, for your service in both Democratic and Republican
administrations.
I note that you were the deputy chief of mission at the
U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, from 2013 to 2016. So I
am going to ask you some questions about Saudi Arabia and then
about Yemen.
Does the Trump Administration--so let me first ask about
Jamal Khashoggi. As you know, Saudi Arabian officials lured him
into a Saudi embassy, even though he was an American resident,
and they murdered him and then cut his body into parts using a
bone saw.
Does the Trump Administration know where Khashoggi body
parts are?
Mr. Lenderking. We do not.
Mr. Lieu. OK. Do you believe that Khashoggi's family should
have the dignity and respect of having his body?
Mr. Lenderking. Yes, I think we would support that, of
course.
Mr. Lieu. Has the Trump Administration made a request to
Saudi Arabia asking for Khashoggi's body?
Mr. Lenderking. We have.
Mr. Lieu. OK. And how has Saudi Arabia responded to that
request?
Mr. Lenderking. Thus far, the Saudis have responded that
they do not know where the body is.
Mr. Lieu. Do you believe that? They killed him.
Mr. Lenderking. I think there were--there are things that
we do not know about what went on in the consulate and
thereafter, and I speak honestly when I tell all of you that
when Secretary Pompeo says that there is more to be
investigated, that is--that is the case including on this
particular issue.
Mr. Lieu. Well, I am glad you raise that.
So I would like to enter into the record, Mr. Chair, an
article in the Washington Post that is titled, ``CIA Concludes
Saudi Crown Prince Ordered Jamal Khashoggi's Assassination.''
It is dated November 16, 2018.
Mr. Chair, if I could enter that into the record.
Mr. Deutch. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lieu. All right.
So the CIA has concluded that a Saudi conference ordered
Khashoggi's assassination. Do you share that view?
Mr. Lenderking. Mr. Congressman, I have not seen anything
nor, I believe, has Secretary Pompeo to corroborate that point
of view.
Mr. Lieu. So the article notes that the CIA has concluded
that with high assessment. Have you gotten a briefing from the
CIA on that issue?
Mr. Lenderking. I have had--I have had some conversations,
of course, with the CIA about this issue.
Mr. Lieu. So what is the State Department doing to try to
get more information either on who killed Khashoggi if it is
not the CIA saying the Crown Prince did it, and where his body
is?
Mr. Lenderking. Well, I would leave to intel channels the
way that--you know, some of those issues. But I would say that
in our--in our private engagement with the Saudis, this is very
much a live issue and, as I said in my statement, we are not
satisfied in a number of areas--accountability, credibility.
You mentioned the body. These are things that I think the
Saudis still owe us.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. I would like to move on to Yemen. On
March 26th, the 4-year anniversary of the conflict in Yemen, a
hospital in northern Yemen, supported by Save the Children with
funding from USAID, was partially destroyed in an air strike
and several children and health care workers were killed.
Has the Administration made any efforts to investigate this
incident?
Mr. Lenderking. Sometimes our efforts to investigate on our
own are quite limited, given the fact that we do not have a
large presence inside Yemen to investigate directly. So we are
reliant, to some extent, on the coalition.
But yes, we have pressed this issue with the Saudis, with
the Saudi-led coalition, and we understand that the strike was
on a hospital. It was not on--sorry, it was not on the hospital
but on a nearby facility which there was some indication that
there were Houthis elements. But we understand that Saudis have
acknowledged that there was some civilian casualties.
Mr. Lieu. All right. Thank you.
Now, if there--an investigation determines that the Saudis
and Emiratis are responsible for destroying part of a hospital
supported with U.S. taxpayer dollars, what actions would the
Administration plan on taking if that were the case?
Mr. Lenderking. Well, you are pointing to, you know, a very
live subject that we have with the Saudis--an ongoing
conversation, a set of training, a set of using our influence
to improve Saudi targeting techniques and overall conduct of
the war in Yemen.
And so this would be very much folded into it.
Unfortunately, it is not the first allegation of civilian
casualties. I wish I would say it would be the last.
But this is--this is an area that we take very seriously
and our leadership in Riyadh, you can imagine, under former
CENTCOM Commander John Abizaid that we will continue to do that
with the Saudis.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. This is my last question.
I commend the Trump Administration for stopping the
refueling of Saudi jets. I would like to know if you could tell
us what is the Administration doing in terms of support to the
Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen?
Mr. Lenderking. Part of our support is political, of
course, in the sense that we recognize that Saudi Arabia should
not lose this conflict in Yemen--that the other side is backed
by our enemies and that we need to continue to support the
Saudi-led coalition to, at times, when appropriate keep
military pressure on the Houthis.
And so we have a few limited ways that we do that. They are
not terribly significant and you are right to point out that we
did discontinue the refueling support.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Allred, you are recognized.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Lenderking, for being here and for your service across multiple
administrations.
I want to be clear, though, to followup on my colleague,
Mr. Lieu's, line of questioning that you do not accept the
CIA's assessment that Jamal Khashoggi's murder was directed by
the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Lenderking. I have no independent basis to confirm or
deny that one way or the other. I think what we are trying to
say is that we have not gotten to the bottom of it yet.
Mr. Allred. By we, do we not rely on our intelligence
services to make those assessments?
Mr. Lenderking. Of course, and we also are relying on
Saudis and Turks and others who might have information, and I
think the fact that we have continued to identify individuals
and whether it is restrict visas or look at certain individuals
under the GloMag--the Global Magnitsky parameters--indicates
that this is very much a live issue.
Mr. Allred. I just find that to be pretty remarkable--I
really do--that this Administration continues to not accept the
conclusions of its own intelligence services.
This is not the first instance of this on this committee.
We hear this all the time now, that our intelligence services
reach an assessment with high confidence that they do not do
very lightly, that they do with corroborating information and
they do in cooperation with our allies and with underlying
facts, and that our administration and the president of the
United States then says, I do not know if our intelligence
service is correct--I am going to go off my own gut and talk to
the Saudis or the Russians or whoever it might be and maybe
they will be right and not our own intelligence assessments.
And I--to me, this is a larger issue that faces us here,
which is who are we going to trust in our own government. Are
we going to trust the intelligence that we receive from our
American intelligence services that work very hard to assess
this information, to source it, who have people putting their
lives on the line at times to get that information?
Or are we going to trust the parties that have a self-
interest in our own determinations who then later are allowed
to get away with enormous violations of international law, of
human rights, and to me this is a larger national security
issue for the United States and this region is rife with
countries that have human rights violations.
I recognize that we need them as a counter balance to
Iranian influence. I recognize that we have a military presence
in every single one of these countries and that we use them for
many purposes.
But, in my opinion, when we undermine our values and allow
human rights violations to take place with our allies that
hurts our overall national security. It makes us less safe
because we then encourage extremism.
We encourage people to look at the United States as their
enemy when we should be encouraging the spread of the values
and rules-based order that rules the world and that we have
installed since World War II and that is now, I think, being
actively undermined around the world, at times with this
Administration just nodding along.
And so, to me, this is a larger issue and I want to in the
time that I have left talk about Bahrain because I have--
several of my constituents have reached out to me about this
and I want to thank them for reaching out to me about this and
about the crackdown on free speech, on any opposition to its
leadership, that has prevented any real development of any
internal democratic institutions.
The Obama Administration imposed a ban on arms sales to
Bahrain that has been lifted by the Trump Administration. Has
that improved the human rights situation and why did we reach
that decision?
Mr. Lenderking. Thank you, Congressman.
On Bahrain, I think we do have a pretty active dialog with
the Bahraini leadership about human rights issues. We also talk
to human rights advocates inside Bahrain, outside Bahrain. It
is helping to enrich and develop our understanding of what is
going on there.
I could not make a direct correlation between the arms
sales and the human rights situation. I know that, you know,
Bahrain remains a critical partner and that Bahrain is on the
front lines of the Iran, you know, threat network.
They are very close geographically to Iran. We see illicit
material flowing into Bahrain. There is a very legitimate
security concern that the Bahrainis have. So they got to
watch--they got to watch that space.
Mr. Allred. Yes. Well, thank you. Yes.
Thank you. I certainly recognize Bahrain's importance. I
want to finish by saying this, which is that private
conversations about human rights, putting it in reports that we
issue, is not the same as global leadership from the president
of the United States and that is what we need to have on human
rights issues.
It is a shame that the rest of world is now looking at the
United States no longer as an ally in combating human rights
violations and that we will not speak out more broadly and more
forcefully on these issues.
And the fact that you are having private conversations is
good. I am glad to hear that. But it is not enough, and the
United States is better than that.
Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Allred.
Mr. Malinowski, you are recognized.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Lenderking. Let me--let me actually pick up
with the Bahrain discussion, and I appreciate your opening
statement and your answer just now that we are apparently
trying to raise these issues.
But I am confused because the first and most prominent
statement on Bahrain policy that this Administration made was
made by the president at the very beginning of the
Administration.
He said, quote, ``Our countries have a wonderful
relationship together. But there has been a little strain. But
there won't be a strain with this Administration.''
And that statement coincided with the resumption of arms
sales and was interpreted by everybody in Bahrain as a
statement that human rights would no longer be an issue.
Has our policy changed since the president's statement?
Mr. Lenderking. No, it has not changed. I would say that
the president is right to herald the good relationship that we
have. It was mentioned that they host NAVCENT, a very important
resource for us, as we try to support security in this vital
waterway, the Persian Gulf.
But we do--let me assure you, Congressman, knowing of your
interest in our conversations on this topic in the past that we
do not give the Bahrainis a blank check.
We do have, you know, a pretty vital conversation both at
the foreign minister level and through our embassy in Manama
and back here when the Bahrainis visit.
This is very much a part of our discussion with the
Bahrainis and we are looking for improvements in some of the
areas that I have noted.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, we will continue that conversation.
Let me broaden this out a bit.
Your testimony and much of our policy is based on the
belief that Iran continues destabilizing activities throughout
the region and let me just State that is, of course, 100
percent correct, from Syria to Yemen to Lebanon and a perfectly
appropriate focus of our policy.
But let me ask you a series of questions about some other
countries. Is it correct to say that Saudi Arabia and the UAE
are blockading Qatar? Yes or no.
Mr. Lenderking. Yes, that is correct. That is part of the
Gulf----
Mr. Malinowski. Is it--would you agree that a short while
ago the Saudi government kidnapped the prime minister of
Lebanon in an effort to coerce that government to adopt
policies more friendly to Saudi interests?
Mr. Lenderking. I do not know that I would use the word
kidnapped. But there was an unfortunate extra bit of time spent
in Saudi Arabia and we have talked to the Saudis about this,
and I am glad we were able to help work this out.
Mr. Malinowski. You are a good diplomat.
Is it fair to say that the world's worst humanitarian
crisis right now is going on in Yemen and that the suffering is
due at least in part--not wholly, but in part--to actions by
the Saudi government and the UAE, that both--that two
successive U.S. administrations have urged them to moderate?
Mr. Lenderking. That is correct. Let us not give the
Houthis a pass on this, OK?
Mr. Malinowski. I am not. But is it correct to say that the
UAE has funded and armed militias in Libya that right as we
speak are trying to overthrow a government that both the United
States and United Nations has recognized?
Mr. Lenderking. I am not sure that is entirely accurate,
Congressman.
I think that UAE has an interest in what happens in Libya.
We have a very active dialog with them. We are coordinating
with them very closely and I think we are starting to push for
a political process, which is the desired outcome of the United
States.
Mr. Malinowski. As we should be.
Well, there is reporting that there are UAE--operated
drones flying over Tripoli--armed drones on behalf of Haftar,
who is in fact trying to overthrow the legitimate government.
Is it true that the Saudi government has operated a team--a
security unit dedicated to harassing, kidnapping, perhaps even
killing dissidents in other countries beyond even just the
Khashoggi case?
Mr. Lenderking. I believe there has been in the past some
such organizations. I do not know all the--you know, all the
parameters of them. I do not know the marching orders, et
cetera.
This would be something that we would be concerned about
and would address with the Saudis.
Mr. Malinowski. So, look, you can see where I am going with
this. I could go on to Somalia and Sudan and other examples but
it seems to me we have two powers in the Middle East that are
busy destabilizing the region because they are engaged in a
civilizational war with each other--Sunni versus Shi'a.
Is it in our interests to take one side in that cold war,
as we seem to be doing right now, when both sides are
destabilizing the region?
Mr. Lenderking. I think what we would like to see is Iran
to come back in the fold, and the secretary has laid out 12
points that he--that we hope that the Iranians will recognize
the wisdom of.
It may be a difficult leap for them. We are very concerned
about the way that Iran spreads its tentacles throughout the
Gulf into Syria. We have to support the Saudis and the Gulf
countries to withstand, I think, the pressure that they are
under from the Iranians.
Mr. Malinowski. Are they in the fold?
Mr. Lenderking. Sorry?
Mr. Malinowski. Are the Saudis and the Emiratis in the
fold, given the long list that we just went through of
destabilizing activities?
Mr. Lenderking. On many issues, they are, and where they
are not, that is where we are trying to maneuver them into
better positions.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Trone, you are recognized.
Mr. Trone. I just would followup with Mr. Allred's and Mr.
Malinowski's comments. The maneuvering does not appear to be
going too well.
I am just befuddled how you can say that our own CIA we are
not buying their intelligence. I am befuddled how you can say
he was not kidnapped--he was detained.
I mean, it must be hard for you to sit there and say that.
It would be hard for me to sit there and say that, given your
background and wonderful career.
That must be tough. Let us go back to Chairman Engel and
Chairman Royce have sent a letter to President Trump invoking
the Magnitsky Act that triggered a determination that was due
February the 8th.
We have not heard a word since then. We sent another
letter. Forty folks signed off on it. Can I enter this into the
record, please?
Mr. Deutch. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Trone. Thank you. So would not we expect to receive--it
is mandated that we receive an answer as to the determination a
who is responsible for Mr. Khashoggi's killing?
Mr. Lenderking. I believe we owe you--we do owe you a
response on that and I will certainly take that back and we
will be as responsive as we can to that letter.
Mr. Trone. February, March, April, May. When can we expect
that? When the prime minister detained? Is this going to be one
of those type things--detained, not kidnapped?
Mr. Lenderking. No, I do not think so, sir. I think we
will--we understand the obligation and we will move quickly on
it.
Mr. Trone. How is the Administration ensuring Saudi leaders
do not believe they are free to kill dissidents and use
diplomatic cover to do so? What is the top-to-top messaging?
Mr. Lenderking. Sir, what is our messaging to the Saudis?
Mr. Trone. That they do not have an open hand--a free hand,
which they, clearly, think they do?
Mr. Lenderking. Well, I think they do not get that from us,
to be honest, and I think we have put in an avalanche of
concern about that particular incident and where we would see
such other behavior operating we would move to stop it.
Mr. Trone. Yemen. Part of the Trump travel ban--36
plaintiffs sued Trump Administration March 2018 claiming the
government failed to follow its own guidelines, its own
procedures, for viewing the travel ban requests as required by
law, waivers.
Some plaintiffs reported State Department officials refused
to accept documents in support of their waiver requests. Others
said they were never given a chance to apply for a waiver.
According to Reuters, U.S. Government granted waivers only
6 percent of visa applicants subject to the travel ban. When
Secretary Pompeo was here, I asked him about this when he
testified in March. But we did not get a very clear answer.
What is the Administration's policy on reviewing and
granting waivers and why is that percentage so abysmally low?
Mr. Lenderking. Sir, I am sorry. I do not--I am not sure of
the context in which your question is. I would be happy to
respond but I am not quite sure I understand the question.
Mr. Trone. So there is a Trump travel ban, as ability to
get around the ban with waivers, and when folks apply for a
waiver there is no response and eventually 6 percent get
approved. It seems ridiculously low and, perhaps, punitive.
Mr. Lenderking. I would have to take that back, sir. I am
sorry. I cannot----
Mr. Trone. We would appreciate it. If you can look into
that, that would be good.
Mr. Lenderking. OK. Happy to do it.
Mr. Trone. Are you planning to increase your personnel and
resources to maybe process these quicker and address it?
Mr. Lenderking. I would be happy to look into that as well.
Mr. Trone. Yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Connolly. If my friend would yield.
Mr. Trone. I do.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend, and without objection, Mr.
Chairman, I would ask this time just be added to my 5 minutes.
Mr. Deutch. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
Mr. Lenderking--and I thank Mr. Trone--Qatar. I want to
make sure--I heard your answer earlier. I want to make sure I
understand the policy.
The policy is we are encouraging our friends to stop it
because the feuding with Qatar and the economic sanctions
against Qatar are actually strengthening the interests of Iran
in the region. Is that correct?
Mr. Lenderking. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Connolly. And we have given that direction that is our
official policy to our other allies in the region, Qatar being,
of course, an ally as well?
Mr. Lenderking. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. And have you gotten the warm fuzzies from the
Saudis in that direction?
Mr. Lenderking. Not really. I mean, we have understood that
the Saudis have concerns about Qatari behavior that dates back
a number of years. We have looked at those concerns. I think,
you know, the overwhelming sense in the Administration is that
we need to get on with Gulf unity.
It is important to our interests and we want to see those
countries working together to partner with us on the kind of
challenges that we are talking about here today.
Mr. Connolly. Just in terms of trade flows and, you know,
movement of goods and services, if the Saudis and their allies
in the Gulf block Qatar from, you know, air rights and border
crossings and the like, I just--obviously, Qatar has to turn to
Iran, correct?
Mr. Lenderking. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
Mr. Lenderking. And that is very unfortunate.
Mr. Connolly. All right. I just want to be real clear that
that is our policy and that is good to know.
Iran announced today that given the United States decision
to renounce and walk away from the JCPOA that it was going to
now limit one of the metrics set in the JCPOA, which is the
sale and transshipment of enriched uranium.
Our allies seem--and our adversaries who were party to the
JCPOA seem rather apoplectic about this and, frankly, hold us
responsible for creating an unstable situation where there had
been a stable one.
Our own government had admitted that heretofore all of the
metrics set--metrics set in the JCPOA had been met and that
Iran had not cheated.
What is the position of the Administration now? Do you
still believe that we can get a better deal, given the fact we
walked away from our own deal? Who is going to believe that? I
am just curious.
Mr. Lenderking. Congressman, I am not, unfortunately, an
expert in the JCPOA. I look at it in particular from sort of my
foxhole, which is the Iranian threat into the Gulf and I know
that the Administration is seeing a number of provocations that
are emanating from the Iranians and are moving to address the
immediate threat.
Of course, from where I sit, I have talked about the areas
such as Bahrain and Yemen where the Iranians are particularly
active. And so we look to thwart Iran extending its influence
into the Peninsula.
Mr. Connolly. Well, and I appreciate that and your
perspective and responsibilities, Mr. Lenderking.
I guess I would urge you to take back that at least this
Member of Congress, and I think I am not alone, believe the
Administration itself is fomenting some of the Iranian behavior
because we have renounced an agreement we wrote and encouraged
all parties to participate in, and the sanctions we have
reimposed are causing grief for our allies but, more
importantly, obviously, are having effects in Iran that lead to
the hardening of the positions, especially of the hardliners
who are saying, we told you so--we told you not to trust the
Americans--see what happens.
And I think that is self-defeating, speaking for myself.
You can feel free to take it back. But I think it is having a
very deleterious impact on our diplomacy in the region and the
things you care about are being adversely because of that
policy.
Khashoggi--Jamal Khashoggi was my constituent.
Mr. Lenderking. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Connolly. And he was brutally murdered in a consulate
of the Saudi government in Istanbul. They lied about it. They--
initially, their position was no, no, he left the consulate
healthy and fine.
That was a lie. They had to retract that. Well, then it
was, something happened--we are not quite sure what. Well, we
know that two teams flew in on airplanes controlled by the
Crown Prince with a bone saw, which is not normally a
diplomatic tool unless you want to correct me.
Mr. Lenderking. No corrections.
Mr. Connolly. Let the record show he did not correct me.
And they flew in, clearly, with malice aforethought, clearly
planned. The Turks, to their credit, kept on issuing
intelligence and even transcripts of the brutal murder, and
finally the Saudis had to admit, yes, no, he was murdered and
he was dismembered--things, you know, they denied earlier.
And now we are supposed to believe it was something that
went wrong, it was a rogue element, and it just comes as a
shock to the Crown Prince.
Our own intelligence and Turkish intelligence would suggest
otherwise--that he in fact was the architect of this brutal
murder.
What are we going to do if we finally have to confirm that
the--and I understand it is speculation, but this is not idle
speculation--that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the heir to
the throne, was in fact the architect of the murder of a U.S.
legal resident in that consulate?
Mr. Lenderking. Congressman, I think we will cross that
bridge when we come to it, to be honest. I think there are
things that we still do not know about what went down there,
who actually did what.
It underscores, I think, what the secretary has said, that
we are going to follow the trail as high as it goes and I know
he will keep to his word on that, and his instructions to me
and others are to continue to----
Mr. Connolly. I would just say in closing, Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate that and I asked Mr. Pompeo this series of questions
in more detail when he was here a few weeks ago and he did say
that.
We do not know what that means. What does that mean? There
cannot be surprise that he is, at best, a suspect. At worst,
much more than that.
And so crossing that bridge when we, you know, come to it,
well, there are those who would argue we have come to that
bridge long ago and we have crossed it, and I guess we are
hoping--I do not know--somebody falls off the bridge or I do
not know what.
But let me just say my constituent is dead. He was
murdered. He was a gentle man who cared about his country, and
for that he paid the price with his life. And it seems to me he
is entitled to justice and I want my government to insist on
it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lenderking. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Lenderking, there are just a handful of members who
have some additional questions, if that is OK with you.
Thank you. I will actually start with the ranking member,
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and just two
questions.
What milestones or goals are you hoping to achieve this
year in the path to forming the Middle East Strategic Alliance?
Mr. Lenderking. Thank you for raising that, Congressman.
We are keen to bind the region together, as we have been
talking, in a Middle East Strategic Alliance that brings
together strategic and political and economic and energy
interests.
We have had numerous meetings and I am glad to say that
during 2019 this year alone we have had three meetings on MESA
in which everybody has participated.
That means Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the Egyptians and
others, and we think that this is an important initiative and a
priority for us as a way of continuing to get at Gulf unity and
using this mechanism to address some of the regional challenges
that we have talked about.
Mr. Wilson. And then finally, an ongoing concern--what are
each of the GCC countries' current relationships with the Assad
regime? What strategies are you using to discourage these
countries from normalizing the relationship with the regime and
how can Congress help you?
Mr. Lenderking. Well, thank you.
The Gulf countries have taken different approaches to the
Assad regime. Some have reestablished relations, much to our
discontent. Others are taking a harder line against that and
would not--would not reestablish relations under current
circumstances.
And we are leading an effort to ensure that Syria is not
brought back into the Arab League and I think we have strong
support from the Gulf countries not to move on that step.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for your success.
I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Lieu, you are recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Lenderking, earlier you had said that after the
Trump Administration terminated refueling there was still some
support of the Saudi-led coalition. It was not very much,
mostly political.
Could you put in writing to this committee what support the
Trump Administration is still providing the Saudi-led
coalition, just so we know what it is?
Mr. Lenderking. Yes, of course.
Mr. Lieu. All right. Thank you.
And then you had also mentioned about the Jamal Khashoggi
issue that you all are in contact with other authorities
including Turkish authorities.
Public reporting is that Turkish authorities say that
Khashoggi's body parts were delivered to the home of the Saudi
consulate general in Turkey.
So you agree with that?
Mr. Lenderking. I do not know that that is true or not. I
am aware of the reports. I have seen that. But I do not know
that that is true.
Mr. Lieu. OK. So the CIA has already concluded with high
assessment that the Crown Prince ordered the killing of Jamal
Khashoggi.
Is the State Department doing its own investigation?
Mr. Lenderking. Yes, I mean in the sense of----
Mr. Lieu. Who is leading that investigation?
Mr. Lenderking. We do not have our own tools necessarily.
We have diplomatic tools. But we are relying on other agencies
in our government to support that effort and fill in the
blanks.
Mr. Lieu. So--all right. So Secretary Lenderking, you have
nine superior honor awards from the Department of State. You
have been in the Foreign Service since 1993. You know poppycock
when you see it. You do not have to shred your credibility for
the Trump Administration.
The CIA has an assessment of high credibility. If you all
do not want to believe that, then you need to go do your own
investigation. Tell us who is leading it and then tell us you
found something else.
But for now, I just find it hard to believe you are just
simply not agreeing to the intelligent professionals of our own
American intelligence agencies.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Malinowski, you are recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
your patience, Mr. Lenderking.
A couple of other issues that are a subject of ongoing
conversations amongst us. One, you and I have spoken about the
case of an American citizen detained in Saudi Arabia, Dr. Walid
Fitaihi, and I want to just ask you for an update on that case
and for your assessment of why, given, the harm that the
Khashoggi case has done to the U.S.-Saudi relationship the
Saudis continue to hold without due process, without charge, an
American citizen? It is sort of inexplicable to me.
Mr. Lenderking. It is inexplicable to us as well, to be
honest. We have raised this case. I have raised it personally
on my last trip to Riyadh just a few weeks ago.
As an American citizen, the Administration--we always take
these cases very seriously. We have not seen any justification
for why he is detained.
We are able to see him on a regular basis, which is very
important to verify his well-being, and we have sought to make
sure that his family can also have regular access to him.
We are hopeful for a resolution.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. And then the second quick
issue--a number of us have sent the secretary a letter on the
use of child soldiers by the coalition in Yemen.
There has been very, very significant public reporting that
large numbers of child soldiers from countries like Sudan are
doing the ground fighting.
If true, this would, obviously, violate the Child Soldiers
Protection Act and would require some action on our part. I am
wondering if we can expect an answer to that letter at some
point soon.
Mr. Lenderking. You can. The child support reports are very
concerning to us and we are looking into them and we will
respond.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski.
And finally, Mr. Lenderking, just a couple of questions
before we close out.
On the GCC rift, the State Department recently said a
United GCC is the backbone for regional peace, prosperity,
security, and stability and is essential to countering the
single greatest threat to regional stability, the Iranian
regime.
Does the Administration believe that the intra-GCC dispute
can be resolved in the near term or is this just now a part of
regional politics?
Mr. Lenderking. We do not think it is going to be just part
of the regional architecture. We do think that with proper
commitments and mediation, sticks and carrots, that we will get
to a resolution here in the near term. We are very hopeful of
that.
Mr. Deutch. Can you describe those sticks and carrots for
us?
Mr. Lenderking. Well, we have talked about how negative the
situation is for the Gulf and the fact that it pushes Qatar to
the unfortunate reality of having to use Iranian airspace,
which puts money in Iranian coffers.
I mean, I think that is certainly counter to what we
collectively are trying to do. We have called on the Kuwaitis
to continue to mediate. We are prepared to support that effort
in any way that we can.
So I can assure you we will keep at it.
Mr. Deutch. Well, I appreciate it. I think it is critical
that we do everything we can to try to end that rift.
And Mr. Trone, I will recognize you for 2 minutes.
Mr. Trone. Thank you.
It was recently in Republic that the Saudi government
repeatedly has helped Saudi citizens evade prosecution and
arrest in the United States and returned to the kingdom after
they are accused of serious crimes in the United States.
Successive U.S. administrations have not raised the subject
because of worries the confrontation might jeopardize U.S.
interests, particularly counterterrorism cooperation by the
Saudis.
The Trump Administration argues there is little the U.S.
can do because we have no extradition treaty with Saudi Arabia.
The State Department recently said the first time that it
raised--said for the first time that it raised the issue with
senior Saudi officials.
What specific concerns did the State Department raise and
with which officials?
Mr. Lenderking. Thank you.
This is--this is a concern for us and we have raised it
with the Saudis. There seem to be more cases becoming known
than originally thought. We are taking stock of each one of
those cases.
It is true, we do not have an extradition treaty that could
be an obstacle for us. But we do not think that this is a
proper comportment for a diplomatic ally of ours. And so this
is something that we will continue to press with the
leadership.
Mr. Trone. That is good. But what are the other--what are
options we could actually do, given we do not have the
extradition treaty? What are concrete steps?
Mr. Lenderking. Not 100 percent clear, Mr. Congressman, and
I think it may require some creative solutions. But first we
have to I think get better cooperation from the Saudis on this.
Mr. Trone. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. I thank the witness and all the members for
being here today.
Deputy Secretary Lenderking, thank you so much for your
testimony.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for you and we ask that you please respond to those
questions in writing and I ask that my colleagues submit any
questions for the witness to the subcommittee clerk within five
business days.
And with that and without objection, the subcommittee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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