- EXAMINING THE PROPOSED ABAWD RULE AND ITS IMPACT ON HUNGER AND HARDSHIP

[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

EXAMINING THE PROPOSED ABAWD RULE AND ITS IMPACT ON HUNGER AND HARDSHIP

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUTRITION, OVERSIGHT, AND DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

----------

APRIL 3, 2019

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Serial No. 116-2

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture
agriculture.house.gov

________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

36-188 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota, Chairman

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas, Ranking
JIM COSTA, California Minority Member
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio GLENN THOMPSON, Pennsylvania
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
FILEMON VELA, Texas ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD,
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands Arkansas
ALMA S. ADAMS, North Carolina SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
Vice Chair VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
ABIGAIL DAVIS SPANBERGER, Virginia DOUG LaMALFA, California
JAHANA HAYES, Connecticut RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
ANTONIO DELGADO, New York TED S. YOHO, Florida
TJ COX, California RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota MIKE BOST, Illinois
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
JOSH HARDER, California TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
KIM SCHRIER, Washington JAMES COMER, Kentucky
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine ROGER W. MARSHALL, Kansas
CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois DON BACON, Nebraska
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota
AL LAWSON, Jr., Florida JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona JIM HAGEDORN, Minnesota
JIMMY PANETTA, California
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
CYNTHIA AXNE, Iowa

______

Anne Simmons, Staff Director

Matthew S. Schertz, Minority Staff Director

______

Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight, and Department Operations

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio, Chair

JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota,
ALMA S. ADAMS, North Carolina Ranking Minority Member
JAHANA HAYES, Connecticut SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
KIM SCHRIER, Washington RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey TED S. YOHO, Florida
AL LAWSON, Jr., Florida DON BACON, Nebraska
JIMMY PANETTA, California JIM HAGEDORN, Minnesota

Jasmine Dickerson, Subcommittee Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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Page
Johnson, Hon. Dusty, a Representative in Congress from South
Dakota, opening statement...................................... 5
Fudge, Hon. Marcia L., a Representative in Congress from Ohio,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Submitted letters............................................ 131
Submitted proposed rule...................................... 132
Hayes, Hon. Jahana, a Representative in Congress from
Connecticut:
Submitted comment letter; authored by Marc Egan, Director of
Government Relations, National Education Association....... 158
Submitted comment letter; authored by Lisa Davis, Senior Vice
President, No Kid Hungry Campaign, Share Our Strength...... 159
Lawson, Jr., Hon. Al, a Representative in Congress from Florida,
submitted comment letter; authored by Center for Law and Social
Policy......................................................... 356
McGovern, Hon. James P., a Representative in Congress from
Massachusetts:
Submitted letter............................................. 154
Submitted article............................................ 154
Panetta, Hon. Jimmy, a Representative in Congress from
California:
Submitted comment letter; authored by Abby J. Leibman,
President and Chief Executive Officer, MAZON: A Jewish
Response to Hunger......................................... 379
Submitted comment letter; authored by Keith Carson, Vice
President, Board of Supervisors, District 5; Chair,
Personnel, Administration and Legislation (PAL) Committee.. 387
Peterson, Hon. Collin C., a Representative in Congress from
Minnesota, submitted comment letter; authored by Tony Lourey,
Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Services........... 151
Schrier, Hon. Kim, a Representative in Congress from Washington:
Submitted comment letter; authored by Hon. Jay Inslee,
Governor, State of Washington.............................. 162
Submitted comment letter; authored by Stacy Dean, Vice
President, Food Assistance Policy, Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities.......................................... 165
Van Drew, Hon. Jefferson, a Representative in Congress from New
Jersey; submitted comment letter; authored by Kate Leone, Chief
Government Relations Officer, Feeding America.................. 346
Yoho, Hon. Ted S., a Representative in Congress from Florida,
submitted comment letter....................................... 392

Witnesses

Cunnyngham, Karen, Associate Director, Mathematica Policy
Research, Washington, D.C...................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Submitted questions.......................................... 398
Adolphsen, Sam, Vice President of Executive Affairs, Foundation
for Government Accountability, Naples, FL...................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Submitted questions.......................................... 399
Hamler-Fugitt, Lisa, Executive Director, Ohio Association of
Foodbanks, Columbus, OH........................................ 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Submitted questions.......................................... 401
Shambaugh, Ph.D., Jay C., Director, The Hamilton Project, and
Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution;
Professor of Economics, George Washington University,
Washington, D.C................................................ 55
Prepared statement........................................... 57
Submitted questions.......................................... 405

EXAMINING THE PROPOSED ABAWD RULE AND ITS IMPACT ON HUNGER AND HARDSHIP

----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 3, 2019

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight, and Department
Operations,
Committee on Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in
Room 1300 of the Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Marcia
L. Fudge [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Fudge, McGovern, Adams,
Hayes, Schrier, Van Drew, Lawson, Panetta, Johnson, DesJarlais,
Davis, Yoho, Bacon, Hagedorn, and Conaway (ex officio).
Staff present: Jasmine Dickerson, Kellie Adesina, Alison
Titus, Caleb Crosswhite, Ashton Johnston, Callie McAdams,
Jennifer Tiller, Dana Sandman, and Jennifer Yezak.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCIA L. FUDGE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM OHIO

The Chair. Good morning. This hearing of the Subcommittee
on Nutrition, Oversight, and Department Operations entitled,
Examining the Proposed ABAWD Rule and its Impact on Hunger and
Hardship, will come to order.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine proposed
changes to a long-standing USDA Able Bodied Adults Without
Dependents, or ABAWD, policy that will impact a significant
number of SNAP recipients. Such a change demands careful and
deliberate consideration. Today, we will have this long overdue
conversation.
On February 1, I sent a letter to Secretary of Agriculture,
Sonny Perdue, outlining my serious concerns with the
Department's proposed rule on ABAWDs. The proposed rule
included a 60 day comment period, which I now understand has
been extended for a few days. However, given the seriousness of
this topic, I requested an extension on the comment period so
that there may be more time to explore its potential impacts.
The Department rejected the request and, instead, Secretary
Perdue responded to me by saying, and I quote, ``The proposed
rule . . . would encourage broader application of the statutory
ABAWD work requirement, consistent with the Administration's
focus on fostering self-sufficiency and promoting the dignity
of work. I believe these proposed changes support our mutual
goal of improving the lives of those participating in SNAP.''
Well, Mr. Secretary, I disagree. The goal of improving
lives is mutual. Your methods, though, are harsh, arbitrary,
and mean. There is no dignity in taking food from the poorest
and most vulnerable of our citizens. It is dishonest and
immoral for anyone to assume or suggest that poor people do not
want to work, especially if that work only pays an average of
$125 per month.
And before we go any further, I want to make it very clear.
People want a hand up, not a hand out, and it is insulting to
suggest otherwise.
The proposal before us fails to consider that unemployment
is not the sole problem for ABAWDs. Many ABAWDs experience
other hardships, including lack of housing, undiagnosed mental
illness, learning disabilities, and poor health. The proposal
before us makes clear this Administration does not understand,
nor care, about the lack of access or barriers and hardships
that keep many from finding and securing long-term employment.
The proposal also tells me the Administration foolishly assumes
everybody has the same access to resources needed to escape the
cycle of poverty. If they just work 20 hours per week, it would
solve their problems and move them out of poverty, magically.
Lifting yourself up by your boot straps only works if you have
boots.
What I want to know is what USDA actually knows about those
who will be affected by this rule? Based on the reports from
our witnesses, Mathematica in particular, we are most likely
dealing with the poorest of the poor. In fact, I am still
waiting on my request for information during last month's
hearing with the Secretary where I asked what percentage of
ABAWD populations are veterans, homeless, have mental or
physical limitations, or lack access to public transportation?
Were any of these factors analyzed or data collected before
the release of the proposed rule? Does the Department even
internally track this kind of relevant information to better
inform its rulemaking and policy decisions? If they were,
please present it to us. It is time we call this what it is: a
rush to accomplish a conservative political wish-list. If this
was really about the dignity of work and efficiency of the
program, we would wait to see the final results from the 2014
Farm Bill, which provided $200 million for ten employment and
training pilot projects. It is ill-advised to issue a rule
without the supporting data or best practices learned from the
pilots, to better serve the ABAWD population.
USDA estimates that 755,000 people will lose benefits and
predicts a savings in Federal spending on SNAP benefits of $7.9
billion over 5 years. What will happen to the 755,000 people?
If the Department is so eager to get people into jobs, will the
Department hire them? The unemployment rate in my district is
9.8 percent. Where are the jobs? My Republican colleagues love
to talk about the surplus of jobs or low unemployment numbers,
but we should remember that there is a skills gap at play
within this population and many ABAWDs live in smaller, rural
communities where jobs are not as readily available. Was the
skills gap taken into consideration during formulation of this
proposed rule? Low unemployment rates do little to tell us
whether jobless individuals in a specific geographical area
lack the necessary skills to obtain gainful work in the
community. However, the Department proposes to limit existing
state flexibility, to submit a variety of credible resources,
and support materials to help tell the story a Bureau of Labor
Statistics unemployment rate is unable to tell. A low
unemployment rate does not erase the existence of significant
barriers to unemployment in our nation's poorest communities.
Without the skills necessary to obtain gainful employment
and meet SNAP work requirements, what other options are there
for these individuals to put food on the table?
I am very concerned about the added burden these proposed
cuts to SNAP place on other low-income services and charities
like food banks. Every time Republicans trot out calls for
welfare reform, they argue the private-sector will pick up the
slack. Let me ask this, what does $7.9 billion in savings from
SNAP mean if it increases the demand for other low-income
programs or local charities that are already stretched thin?
This proposed rule is nothing more than another attempt by the
GOP and the Trump Administration to reintroduce the thoughtless
House Republican SNAP provisions that were rejected in the 2018
Farm Bill. We passed a bill. Please follow the law.
The House and Senate passed a farm bill conference report
by a historic 369 votes, and the President signed it without
delay. Let's just follow the law. Rehashing failed policies is
an affront to the democratic process and an utter waste of
time. We have seen this Administration and my colleagues
reciting the same negative talking points about people who are
on SNAP time and again, and I am really very weary of it.
Instead of proposing cruel and unsound ideas without merit,
let's figure out how to help people in need.
Our job is to do the most for those who have the least.
Let's just follow the law.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fudge follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Marcia L. Fudge, a Representative in
Congress from Ohio
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine proposed changes to a
long-standing USDA Able Bodied Adults Without Dependents, or ABAWD,
policy that will impact a significant number of SNAP recipients. Such a
change demands careful and deliberate consideration. Today, we will
have this long overdue conversation.
On February 1st, I sent a letter to Secretary of Agriculture Sonny
Perdue outlining my serious concerns with the Department's proposed
rule on ABAWDs. The proposed rule included a 60 day comment period.
However, given the seriousness of this topic, I requested an extension
on the comment period so that there may be more time to explore its
potential impacts.
The Department rejected that request and, instead, Secretary Perdue
responded by saying, and I quote:

``The proposed rule . . . would encourage broader application
of the statutory ABAWD work requirement, consistent with the
Administration's focus on fostering self-sufficiency and
promoting the dignity of work. I believe these proposed changes
support our mutual goal of improving the lives of those
participating in SNAP.''

Well Mr. Secretary, I disagree. The goal of improving lives is
mutual--his methods are harsh, arbitrary and mean.
There is no dignity in taking food away from the poorest and most
vulnerable of our citizens.
It is dishonest and immoral for anyone to assume or suggest that
poor people do not want to work, especially if that work only pays an
average of $125 a month.
And before we go any further, I want to make it very clear: people
want a hand up, not a hand out, and it is insulting to suggest
otherwise.
The proposal before us fails to consider that unemployment is not
the sole problem ABAWDs face. Many ABAWDs experience other hardships,
including lack of housing, undiagnosed mental illnesses, learning
disabilities, and poor health.
The proposal before us makes clear this Administration does not
understand nor care about the lack of access or barriers and hardships,
that keep many from finding and securing long-term employment.
The proposal also tells me the Administration foolishly assumes
everybody has the same access to the resources needed to escape the
cycle of poverty. ``If they just work 20 hours per week, it would solve
their problems and move them out of poverty.''!?
``Lifting yourself up by your boot straps'' only works if you have
boots.
What I want to know is what USDA actually knows about those who
will be affected by their rule?
Based on the report from our witness, Mathematica, we are most
likely dealing with the poorest of the poor.
In fact, I'm still waiting on my request for information during
last month's hearing with Secretary Perdue, where I asked, ``what
percentage of the ABAWD population are veterans, homeless, have mental
or physical limitations, or lack access to public transportation?''
Were any of these factors analyzed or data collected before the
release of the proposed rule? Does the Department even internally track
this kind of relevant information to better inform its rulemaking and
policy decisions?
If they were, please present it to us.
It's time we call this what it is: a rush to accomplish a
conservative political wish-list.
If this was really about the dignity of work and efficiency of the
program, we would wait to see the final results from the 2014 Farm
Bill, which provided $200 million for ten Employment and Training pilot
projects.
It is ill-advised to issue a rule without the supporting data or
best practices learned from the pilots, to better serve the ABAWD
population.
USDA estimates that 755,000 people will lose benefits and predicts
a savings in Federal spending on SNAP benefits of $7.9 billion over 5
years.
What will happen to the 755,000 people? If the Department is so
eager to get people into jobs, will they hire them?
The unemployment rate in my district is 9.8 percent. Where are the
jobs?
My Republican colleagues love to talk about the surplus of jobs or
low unemployment numbers, but we should remember that there's a skill
gap at play within this population and many ABAWDs live in smaller,
rural communities where jobs are not as readily available.
Was the skills gap taken into consideration during formulation of
this proposed rule? Low unemployment rates do little to tell us whether
jobless individuals in a specific geographical area lack the necessary
skills to obtain gainful work in their communities.
However, the Department proposes to limit existing state
flexibility to submit a variety of credible resources and support
materials to help tell the story a Bureau of Labor Statistics
unemployment rate is unable to tell. A low unemployment rate does not
erase the existence of significant barriers to employment in our
nation's poorest communities.
Without the skills necessary to obtain gainful employment and meet
SNAP work requirements, what other options are there for these
individuals to put food on the table? I am very concerned about the
added burden these proposed cuts to SNAP place on other low-income
services and charities like food banks. Every time Republicans trot out
calls for welfare reform, they argue the private-sector will pick up
the slack.
Let me ask this, what does $7.9 billion in savings from SNAP mean
if it increases the demand for other low-income programs or local
charities that are already stretched thin?
This proposed rule is nothing more than another attempt by the GOP
and the Trump Administration to reintroduce the thoughtless House
Republican SNAP provisions that were rejected in the 2018 Farm Bill. We
passed a bill--follow the law!
The House and Senate passed a farm bill conference report by a
historic 369 votes, and the President signed the bill without delay.
Follow the law!
Rehashing failed policies is an affront to the democratic process
and an utter waste of time.
We have seen this Administration and my Republican colleagues
reciting the same negative talking points about people who are on SNAP
time and again; I am tired of it.
Instead of proposing cruel and unsound ideas without merit--let's
figure out how to help people in need.
Our job is to do the most for those who have the least.

The Chair. I would now turn to my colleague, my friend, the
Ranking Member, Mr. Johnson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUSTY JOHNSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I do
appreciate Ms. Fudge convening this hearing, and I want to
thank our witnesses for their participation.
For me, an important foundation of all of this
Subcommittee's work on nutrition is, first, that we all want to
improve the lives of Americans who are facing hard times. I
think that is obvious. Second, that SNAP is an important
poverty program. That is something worth maintaining, something
worth holding up. Third, that work and education are a
critically important, a necessary part of helping people
realize opportunities to move out of poverty.
And so, each of us today on this dais is fighting for the
same goal. Madam Chair mentioned that. We all want to see the
lives of Americans improve. And a number of us on the broader
Agriculture Committee on both sides of the aisle have
experienced welfare programs, poverty programs, on a personal
basis. But whether we have or we haven't, we all want to make
sure that we maintain an effective and efficient social safety
net.
And so, we are going to disagree about the best way to do
that, but the basic heart of the matter is intact. As a
country, we spend $1 trillion a year on 80 social safety net
programs, and we want to make sure they work. We are a nation
of giving. We want to be a nation of opportunity.
And so, able-bodied adults, the ABAWD population, we have
been talking about this population for a long time. I know
there have been a lot of hearings that have addressed this
issue. I am excited to have our witnesses today hit on them
even more. But from the welfare reform efforts of 1996, out of
the farm bill discussions of 2018, for decades, this group and
the broader Congress has been talking about ABAWDs, and we have
made some progress. But nobody here would say that our work is
done, and so, I am excited to work together to try to find a
way to do even better, to find data-driven solutions for how we
can improve the lives of these ABAWDs.
You may have heard me say--because I say it a lot--that
work has dignity. Work is opportunity. Work is an American
value that we all need help to achieve. And I am excited to
discuss today and in the future how we really can work with the
Administration, work throughout Congress to try to make sure
that able-bodied adults really do have a good pathway from
welfare to work, and that is going to help us preserve these
programs, this critically important SNAP Program, for our most
in need friends and our most in need neighbors.
As the Chair alluded to, my side of the aisle has talked a
lot about a record economy, record job openings, and I do think
that gives us a special opportunity to help people move out of
poverty and into work. For that reason, I want to applaud
Secretary Perdue and USDA in taking this regulatory action to
make work an even more central component of this important
program.
These proposed rules, they really are intended, honestly
intended to help work capable individuals seek new employment
opportunities and be in a better position to realize their
dreams. Now, some states have taken too much flexibility. They
have taken too much liberty with the flexibility that Congress
has given them, and I know that has been a bipartisan sentiment
in the past, that both Democratic and Republican Members of the
Agriculture Committee have said that, and so, I am looking
forward to working with my colleagues to right size the amount
of flexibility, to hold states accountable, and move more
people off poverty.
The term able-bodied, as we have talked about, is so key to
this discussion, and I want to make sure that we are working to
empower and not stigmatize the ABAWD population. Of course,
Madam Chair is exactly right, that these folks have a certain
number of challenges. There are barriers to unemployment. That
isn't arguable. But despite those barriers, with help, they can
still seek employment. They can stabilize their income. They
can move to a place of even greater personal autonomy. That is
the American dream.
I think about during the farm bill discussions, there was a
video that came out--and I was a private citizen at the time,
but I was captivated by the video. It was about Latasha, and
she was a former E&T participant here in Washington. She
completed a certification program back in 2012, has been
working successfully since. Her story is a story that should
make us all proud. And with help, with additional
accountability, with states doing a better job of managing
their programs, there can be thousands more Latashas out there
realizing a better life. And we all know that just ignoring the
need for improvement, ignoring the need for a forum doesn't
really improve anybody's life. That is not leadership. And so,
let's work with SNAP recipients. Let's work with this
Subcommittee. Let's work with the Administration to move even
more people from welfare to work.
And with that, Madam Chair, I yield and I welcome our
witnesses.
The Chair. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson. I would ask
that all Members submit their opening statements for the record
so that we can begin with our witnesses as quickly as possible.
I would like to introduce and welcome our witnesses. We
would begin today with Ms. Karen Cunnyngham, Associate
Director, Mathematica Policy Research, Washington, D.C. Mr. Sam
Adolphsen, Vice President of Executive Affairs, Foundation for
Government Accountability, Naples, Florida. Ms. Lisa Hamler-
Fugitt, Executive Director, Ohio Association of Food Banks,
Columbus, Ohio; and Dr. Jay Shambaugh, Director of The Hamilton
Project, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Ms. Cunnyngham, you may begin. I would just bring your
attention to the lighting system. The light will turn green
when you begin. You will have 5 minutes to give your testimony.
When you see the yellow light, it means you have 1 minute. When
you see the red light, we would like you to conclude as quickly
as possible.
Thank you very much, and welcome.

STATEMENT OF KAREN CUNNYNGHAM, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, MATHEMATICA
POLICY RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ms. Cunnyngham. Chair Fudge, Ranking Member Johnson, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify today. I am an associate director at
Mathematica, and have been conducting research on SNAP for
government agencies for 18 years.
I currently direct a project commissioned by the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation to develop rigorous and objective
estimates of the effects of proposed changes to SNAP. Much of
what I will present today is based on findings from that
project.
SNAP participants who are ages 16 to 59 that do not have a
disability, and are not working at least 30 hours per week must
register for work unless they meet certain criteria, such as
caring for an incapacitated person. Work registrants who are
ages 18 to 49 and don't live with a child must work an average
of at least 20 hours per week, or face a time limit of 3 months
of benefits in a 3 year period. They are exempt from the time
limit, however, if they participate in a qualifying employment
and training program, or other meaningful work activity, have a
percentage exemption from the state agency, or live in a waiver
area, an area for which the state agency requested and received
a Federal waiver from time limits because of high unemployment.
USDA's proposed regulatory change would eliminate or modify
some current waiver area criteria. For example, states would no
longer be able to request a waiver for counties with overall
unemployment rates less than seven percent. Table 1 in my
written testimony summarizes the proposed changes.
According to USDA's Regulatory Impact Analysis, among the
SNAP participants who are ages 18 to 49 without a disability
and childless SNAP households and in a waiver area in Fiscal
Year 2016, about \3/4\ would be newly subject to the additional
work requirement and time limit. USDA further estimates that
under the proposed changes, between 755,000 and 851,000 of
these people would not meet the work requirements in 2020, and
would therefore lose eligibility after 3 months.
Mathematica used Fiscal Year 2017 SNAP quality control data
to examine the characteristics of SNAP participants who would
be affected by the proposed changes. Specifically, we focused
on the estimated 1.2 million SNAP participants who lived in a
waiver area, could be newly subject to time limits, and were
not working at least 20 hours per week. Among these SNAP
participants, 97 percent lived in poverty, and 88 percent lived
in deep poverty, compared with 39 percent of other SNAP
participants living in deep poverty. Eleven percent were
working, although less than 20 hours per week, and another six
percent lived with someone else who was working. However, only
\1/3\ were living in SNAP households with any reported income.
Among those, the average household income was $557 a month, 43
percent of the poverty level. The average monthly SNAP benefit
was $181 per person. Finally, these SNAP participants were much
more likely to live alone than other SNAP participants, 78
percent compared with 23 percent.
The potential impact on these individuals would vary by
their circumstances and state. SNAP participants in the 17
states without waiver areas would not be affected by the
proposed changes. In other states, the state agency may offer
slots in qualifying employment and training programs, or
percentage exemptions to participants who would otherwise face
a time limit.
In many states, however, some SNAP participants would be
newly required to work an average of at least 20 hours per
week, or be subject to the time limit. Both SNAP participants'
job readiness and the local labor market will affect SNAP
participants' ability to find work.
Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates the
national overall unemployment rate was 3.9 percent in 2018,
some groups were less likely to find work. For example, the
unemployment rate for young adults ages 20 to 24 was 6.9
percent, and the rate for African American men was seven
percent.
Policy decisions should be informed by the best data
available, and this proposed rule is no exception. Policymakers
could gain a more complete picture of the likely effects of the
proposed regulatory change if detailed information on the areas
that would no longer qualify for a waiver were incorporated
into state estimates of the people potentially affected. In
addition, examining unemployment rates for subgroups of a state
population would provide valuable insights to the availability
of jobs for SNAP participants, and the potential for some
groups to experience a disproportionate impact from proposed
changes. New data collection on the circumstances of people who
lose eligibility for SNAP because of time limits also could
help policymakers understand whether and how well policy
objectives are being achieved.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cunnyngham follows:]

Prepared Statement of Karen Cunnyngham, Associate Director, Mathematica
Policy Research, Washington, D.C.
Addressing Proposed Changes to SNAP Waiver Area Criteria
Good morning, Chairwoman Fudge, Ranking Member Johnson, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to
testify at today's hearing, ``Examining the Proposed ABAWD Rule and its
Impact on Hunger and Hardship.'' I am an associate director in
Mathematica's Human Services Division and the director of a project,
commissioned by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, to develop credible
and objective estimates of the effect of proposed legislative and
regulatory changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--or
SNAP. My Mathematica colleagues and I are proud of this work, and
appreciate the opportunity to apply our combined expertise in data,
methods, policy, and practice to help enhance understanding of SNAP,
refine strategies for its implementation, and ultimately improve the
effectiveness of the program.
SNAP, the largest of the domestic nutrition assistance programs
administered by the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), provides nutrition assistance to eligible, low-
income people in need. The proposed regulatory change we are here to
discuss today would affect a subset of the overall SNAP population--
about three percent of the 41.5 million who participated in the program
in Fiscal Year 2017. According to our analysis of Fiscal Year 2017 SNAP
Quality Control (QC) data, the vast majority of SNAP participants who
could be affected by the proposed rule are in deep poverty, and many
live alone.
In my testimony today, drawn from a research brief produced for the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation project, I will (1) outline the proposed
regulatory changes, (2) discuss the estimated impacts, (3) summarize
the characteristics of SNAP participants potentially impacted, and (4)
suggest additional data collection and research to help inform this
discussion.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Cunnyngham, Karen. ``Proposed Changes to the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program: Waivers to Work-Related Time Limits.''
Issue brief submitted to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
Washington, D.C.: Mathematica Policy Research, March 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Understanding the Proposed Regulatory Changes
Currently, SNAP participants ages 16 to 59 must register for work
unless they are already working at least 30 hours per week; have a
disability; or meet other criteria, such as caring for a young child or
an incapacitated person. Work registrants who are ages 18 to 49 in
childless SNAP households are subject to additional work requirements
and a time limit: they must work an average of at least 20 hours per
week to continue receiving SNAP benefits for more than 3 months in a 3
year period. They are exempt from the time limits, however, if they (1)
participate in a qualifying employment and training program or other
meaningful work activity; (2) have a discretionary exemption from the
state agency; or (3) live in a waiver area, an area for which the state
agency requested and received a Federal waiver from time limits because
of high unemployment.
Table 1 shows how USDA's proposed regulatory change would eliminate
or modify some current waiver area policies and leave others unchanged.
In recent years, states based most of their requests for geographic
waivers on an area qualifying for the extended unemployment benefits
authorized during the Great Recession or experiencing an unemployment
rate at least 20 percent above the national average. After SNAP time
limits were reinstated following the Great Recession, some states have
requested and received waivers for all or parts of the state, while
others have not requested any time limit waivers at all. Table 2
illustrates how the prevalence of state time limit waivers changed from
2009 through 2018. Currently, 17 states have no waiver areas, either
because no area in the state qualified or the state agency chose not to
request a waiver (Table 3). Although states with the highest
unemployment rates in 2018--Alaska and New Mexico--had statewide
waivers, others with overall unemployment rates above the national
average of 3.9 percent chose not to apply for a waiver for any areas of
the state.

Table 1. Waiver Area Policies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current policy Proposed regulatory change
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criteria to establish waiver area
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Department of Labor Eliminated
designated the area as a Labor
Surplus Area based on a recent 24
month average unemployment rate that
is either (1) at least ten percent
or (2) at least six percent and at
least 20 percent above the national
average
The Department of Labor determined No change
that the area meets the criteria for
extended unemployment benefits,
available to workers who have
exhausted regular unemployment
insurance benefits during periods of
high unemployment
Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor No change
Statistics (BLS) show the area had a
recent 12 month average unemployment
rate greater than ten percent
Data from BLS show the area had a The unemployment rate also must
recent 24 month average unemployment be at least seven percent
rate at least 20 percent above the
national average
Alternate sources indicate a lack of The alternate criteria will be
sufficient jobs in an area, applicable only to areas for
including an unemployment rate which data from BLS or a BLS-
estimated with data from BLS and the cooperating agency are limited
Census Bureau's American Community or unavailable, such as a
Survey; a low and declining reservation area or U.S.
employment-to-population ratio; a territory
lack of jobs as a consequence of
declining occupations or industries;
or an academic study or other
publication describing the area's
lack of a sufficient number of jobs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other waiver area policies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waivers may be statewide Only waivers based on extended
unemployment benefits may be
statewide
State agencies may combine data from State agencies may combine data
sub-state areas, such as counties, only for areas collectively
that are contiguous, share an designated as Labor Market Areas
economic region, or both by BLS
Waivers may extend beyond the fiscal Waivers based on a 24 month
year average unemployment rate may
not extend beyond the fiscal
year
Approval by governor not explicitly Governor must approve waiver
required request
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 2. Waiver Area Timeline
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2009 to September 2010 Congress temporarily suspended the
time limits through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
October 2010 to December 2015 In Fiscal Year 2011, time limits
continued to be waived based on
extended unemployment benefits for
45 states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, the Virgin Islands,
and some areas of five additional
states.
By the end of Fiscal Year 2015, time
limits were re-implemented in nine
states and in some areas of 13
other states.
January 2016 to Fiscal Year 2017 Few areas still qualified for
extended unemployment benefits, but
many areas received time limit
waivers based on other indicators
of high unemployment, such as an
unemployment rate at least 20
percent above the national average.
Seventeen states had no waiver
areas for most of this time.
December 2018 Seventeen states have no waiver
areas; seven states, the District
of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands have time limit waivers for
their entire area; and the
remaining states have waivers for
some but not all areas of the
state.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 3. Current State Waiver Areas
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No waiver areas Some waiver areas Statewide waiver
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama Missouri Arizona Massachusetts Pennsylvania Alaska
Arkansas Nebraska California Michigan Rhode Island District of
Columbia
Delaware North Carolina Colorado Montana South Dakota Guam
Florida Oklahoma Connecticut Nevada Tennessee Louisiana
Indiana South Carolina Georgia New Hampshire Utah New Mexico
Iowa Texas Hawaii New Jersey Vermont Virgin Islands
Kansas Wisconsin Idaho New York Virginia
Maine Wyoming Illinois North Dakota Washington
Mississippi Kentucky Ohio West Virginia
Maryland Oregon
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: The Food and Nutrition Service's ``ABAWD Waiver Status'' reports available at https://www.fns.usda.gov/
snap/abawd-waivers.

Discussion of Estimated Impacts
According to USDA's Regulatory Impact Analysis of the proposed
rule, an estimated \3/4\ of ABAWDs currently living in a waiver area
would be newly subject to a 3 month limit on their benefits.\2\ Some of
them would increase their existing work to an average of 20 hours per
week, find work, or meet the work requirements by participating in an
employment and training program or workfare (that is, unpaid work
through a state-approved program). But USDA estimates that between
755,000 and 851,000 people in 2020, depending on future unemployment
rates, would not meet the additional work requirements and would
therefore lose eligibility after 3 months. For those living with others
unaffected by the policy change, the SNAP household could continue to
receive benefits, but the amount would be reduced; those living alone
would lose all SNAP benefits. Nationally, the proposed regulatory
changes would result in a 2.5 percent reduction in spending on SNAP
benefits, according to USDA estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ABAWDs, or ``able-bodied adults without dependents'' are SNAP
participants who are subject to work registration, ages 18 to 49,
without a disability, and living in childless SNAP households.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The potential impact would vary by state and depends on a variety
of factors, including state agency policies, the local labor market,
and the characteristics and circumstances of the participants. We used
Fiscal Year 2017 SNAP QC data to estimate state percentages of SNAP
participants ages 18 to 49, without a disability, and living in
childless SNAP households who could be newly subject to a time limit
(Figure 1). SNAP participants in the 17 states without waiver areas
would not be affected by the proposed changes because they already face
time limits unless they are engaged in meaningful work activities or
are exempt for other reasons. In other states, the state agency may
offer a slot in a qualifying employment and training program to
participants who would otherwise face a time limit or use Federal
``percentage exemptions'' to exempt some SNAP participants from the
time limit.
Figure 1. Estimated impact by state

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Percentage of SNAP participants ages 18 to 49, without a
disability, and living in childless SNAP households who were
potentially subject to a time limit, lived in a waiver area,
and did not work 20 hours per week.
Source: Fiscal year 2017 SNAP QC data.
Notes: States with a white background did not have waiver
areas in Fiscal Year 2017. See appendix table for state
percentages.

In many states with waiver areas, at least some SNAP participants
living in those areas would be newly required to work an average of at
least 20 hours per week to continue receiving benefits for more than 3
months. Both the local labor market and SNAP participants' job
readiness will affect their ability to find work. Although the national
overall unemployment rate was 3.9 percent in 2018, according to BLS
estimates, that rate represents an average, and some groups are much
less likely to find steady work. For example, the unemployment rate for
young adults ages 20 to 24 was 6.9 percent, and the rate for African
American men was 7.0 percent. Access to a well-funded and robust SNAP
employment and training program--which is not currently available in
many areas--could help participants meet the work requirements.
In addition, the characteristics and circumstances of SNAP
participants will influence whether they lose eligibility for SNAP
under the proposed change. For example, certain SNAP participants are
not required to register for work because they care for an
incapacitated person or meet other criteria; work requirements will not
change for these participants. On the other hand, some participants who
newly face a time limit might choose to forgo SNAP benefits and rely on
other available resources, such as food banks or family members, rather
than comply with work requirements.
Characteristics of SNAP Participants Potentially Impacted
Mathematica used Fiscal Year 2017 SNAP QC data to examine the
characteristics of SNAP participants who could face time limits on
receiving SNAP benefits under the proposed regulatory change. In Fiscal
Year 2017, eight percent of all SNAP participants (3.2 million people)
were ages 18 to 49, did not have a disability, and did not live with a
child. Twenty-one percent of this group were working an average of at
least 20 hours per week, with the percentage ranging from nine percent
to 36 percent across states. An estimated 1.2 million SNAP participants
were not working an average of at least 20 hours per week and would
have faced time limits but didn't because they lived in a waiver area.
Among these SNAP participants who could be affected by the proposed
regulatory changes:

97 percent lived in poverty, compared with 80 percent of
other SNAP participants.

88 percent had household income at or below 50 percent of
the poverty level, compared with 39 percent of other SNAP
participants.

Among the \1/3\ living in SNAP households with reported
income, the average monthly household income was $557, or 43
percent of the poverty level.

11 percent were working, although less than an average of 20
hours per week, and another six percent lived with someone else
who was working.

5 percent lived with a person with a disability.

The average monthly SNAP benefit was $181 per person,
compared with $120 for other SNAP participants.

78 percent lived alone (Figure 2), compared with 23 percent
of other SNAP participants.
Figure 2. Living situation of those potentially affected

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Fiscal year 2017 SNAP QC data.
Data-Driven Decision Making
Objective, rigorously derived estimates of the potential impacts of
proposed policy changes can provide additional insight for policymakers
like you, who are faced with difficult decisions about how to allocate
scarce resources in a way that helps the people who are most in need.
To conduct the analysis I just described, we used the Fiscal Year 2017
SNAP QC data available at https://host76.mathematica-mpr.com/fns/.
Details about the small amount of data cleaning we did to ensure that
state estimates aligned with state policy, and how we tabulated the
data, are available upon request.
Further analysis of existing data could provide additional insights
into the likely effects of the proposed regulatory change. For example,
state estimates of the number of people potentially affected could be
refined using county-level data from state and Federal sources,
incorporating more detailed information on which current waiver areas
would not qualify under the proposed criteria. Examining unemployment
rates for subgroups of a state population would also provide valuable
insights into the availability of jobs for SNAP participants and the
potential for some groups to experience a disproportionate impact from
proposed changes. In addition, new data collection on the circumstances
of people who lose eligibility for SNAP because of time limits could
help policymakers understand whether and how well policy objectives are
being achieved. Finally, Mathematica's evaluation of SNAP employment
and training pilots for USDA will provide important information on
innovative strategies for increasing employment and earnings among SNAP
participants.
I'm grateful for the opportunity to share this evidence, as well as
the companion issue brief attached to my written statement, with you
today. Thank you.

Table A.1. Estimated state percentage of SNAP participants that could
potentially be affected by proposed changes to waiver area criteria
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP participants
-------------------------------
Waiver areas Number (in Number (in
thousands) thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama None 0 0
4Alaska Statewide 7 72
8Arizona Some 15 200
Arkansas None 0 0
4California Statewide 300 65
8Colorado Some 3 12
4Connecticut Some 26 620
Delaware None 0 0
4District of Columbia Statewide 8 53
Florida None 0 0
4Georgia Some 81 66
6Guam Statewide 1 37
8Hawaii Some * 1
Idaho Some * 1
4Illinois Statewide 178 770
Indiana None 0 0
Iowa None 0 0
Kansas None 0 0
4Kentucky Some 32 54
Louisiana Statewide 56 730
Maine None 0 0
6Maryland Some 18 31
Massachusetts Some 18 28
Michigan Some 78 51
8Minnesota Some 2 60
Mississippi None 0 0
Missouri None 0 0
6Montana Some 3 280
Nebraska None 0 0
6Nevada Statewide 25 41
8New Hampshire Some * 2
New Jersey Some 1 2
4New Mexico Statewide 27 53
6New York Some 84 390
North Carolina None 0 0
8North Dakota Some * 4
Ohio Some 4 40
Oklahoma None 0 0
6Oregon Some 46 50
Pennsylvania Some 51 43
4Rhode Island Statewide 14 750
South Carolina None 0 0
6South Dakota Some 3 44
4Tennessee Some 69 670
Texas None 0 0
8Utah Some * 1
Vermont Some * 5
6Virgin Islands Statewide 1 39
Virginia Some 20 46
4Washington Some 60 53
6West Virginia Some 15 470
Wisconsin None 0 0
Wyoming None 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP participants ages 18 to 49, without a disability, and living in
childless SNAP households who were potentially subject to a time
limit, lived in a waiver area, and did not work 20 hours per week.

81-27 percent
628-52 percent
453-77 percent0

* Less than 500.
Source: Fiscal year SNAP Quality Control data.

Attachment

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

March 2019
Nutrition
Issue Brief
Karen Cunnyngham
Proposed Changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program:
Waivers to Work-Related Time Limits
A rule proposed (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/
01/2018-28059/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-requirements-
for-able-bodied-adults-without-dependents) by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) on February 2, 2019, would reduce the number of non-
disabled childless people age 18 to 49 who are receiving Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits. Currently, SNAP
participants in this group must engage in meaningful work activity or
face time limits on their benefits. However, if a geographic area has
an unemployment rate that is at least 20 percent above the national
rate or has other indicators of insufficient jobs, states can request
that USDA waive the time limit for SNAP participants living in the
area. The proposed rule would reduce the number of areas qualifying for
a waiver by imposing stricter standards--for example, states would not
be able to request a waiver for counties with unemployment rates less
than seven percent.
This issue brief, the third in a series of briefs analyzing the
impact of proposed changes to SNAP, provides background on SNAP work
requirements, time limits, and the proposed regulatory changes. The
brief also sheds light on the characteristics of SNAP participants who
could face time limits on receiving SNAP benefits under the proposed
regulatory change. With support from the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, Mathematica conducted this analysis using SNAP Quality
Control (QC) data from Fiscal Year 2017, the most recent year for which
data are available.
SNAP Participants Potentially Affected By Proposed Changes
In Fiscal Year 2017, an estimated 1.2 million SNAP participants
were not working an average of at least 20 hours per week and would
have faced time limits but did not because they lived in a waiver area.
Among these SNAP participants who could be affected by the proposed
regulatory changes:

88 percent had household income at or below 50 percent of
the poverty level.

About \1/3\ lived in SNAP households with reported income;
the average monthly household income of this group was $557, or
43 percent of the poverty level.

11 percent were working, although less than an average of 20
hours per week, and another six percent lived with someone else
who was working.

A greater share of these SNAP participants lived in poverty
(97 percent) compared to other SNAP participants (80 percent).

5 percent lived with a person with a disability.

The average monthly SNAP benefit was $181 per person.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Fiscal year 2017 SNAP QC data.

Under the proposed rule, an estimated \3/4\ of these SNAP
participants would be newly subject to a 3 month limit on their
benefits, according to USDA. Some of them would increase existing work
to an average of 20 hours per week, find work, or meet the work
requirements by participating in an employment and training program or
workfare (unpaid work through a state-approved program). However, USDA
estimates that \2/3\ (755,000 people in 2020) would not meet the
additional work requirements and would therefore lose eligibility after
3 months. For those living with others unaffected by the policy change,
the SNAP household could continue to receive benefits, but the amount
would be reduced; those living alone would lose all SNAP benefits.
SNAP Work Requirements and Current Waiver Policy
Currently, SNAP participants age 16 to 59 must register for work
unless they are already working at least 30 hours per week, have a
disability, or meet other criteria, such as caring for a young child or
an incapacitated person. Work registrants who are age 18 to 49 in
childless SNAP households are subject to additional work requirements
and a time limit: they must work an average of at least 20 hours per
week to continue receiving SNAP benefits for more than 3 months in a 3
year period. However, they are exempt from the time limits if they (1)
participate in a qualifying employment and training program or other
meaningful work activity, (2) have a discretionary exemption from the
state agency, or (3) live in a waiver area, an area for which the state
agency requested and received a Federal waiver from the time limits due
to high unemployment (see waiver area timeline). In recent years,
states based most requests for geographic waivers on the area
qualifying for the extended unemployment benefits authorized during the
Great Recession or experiencing a high unemployment rate. Currently, 17
states have no waiver areas, either because no area in the state
qualified or the state agency chose not to request a waiver (see map).

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Snapshot: Some SNAP Participants Age 18 To 21 Could Be Affected By the
Proposed Changes

In 2017, about 498,000 SNAP participants were age 18 to 21, did not
have a disability, and were in a childless SNAP household. Some of
these young adults would newly face time limits under the proposed rule
changes.

One-third lived in a waiver area and did not work an
average of at least 20 hours per week; these are the young adults
who might lose their SNAP benefit because of the proposed changes.

Slightly less than \1/2\ lived with a parent and ten
percent lived with another relative, a spouse, or a peer; the
remainder--about 40 percent--did not share food resources with
another person.

23 percent worked an average of 20 hours per week or more
(enough to avoid time limits on their benefits), six percent were
working fewer hours, and 17 percent were not working but lived with
someone who was.

The average monthly benefit was $142 per person.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Fiscal year 2017 SNAP QC data.

USDA's proposed regulatory change would eliminate or modify some
current waiver area policies and leave others unchanged, as shown in
the table below.

Waiver area policies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current policy Proposed regulatory change
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criteria to establish waiver area
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Labor (DOL) Eliminated
designated the area as a Labor
Surplus Area based on a recent 24
month average unemployment rate that
is either at least ten percent or at
least six percent and at least 20
percent above the national average
DOL determined that the area meets No change
the criteria for extended
unemployment benefits, available to
workers who have exhausted regular
unemployment insurance benefits
during periods of high unemployment
Data from the Bureau of Labor No change
Statistics (BLS) show the area had a
recent 12 month average unemployment
rate greater than ten percent
Data from BLS show the area had a The unemployment rate also must
recent 24 month average unemployment be at least seven percent
rate at least 20 percent above the
national average
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other waiver area policies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waivers may be statewide Only waivers based on extended
unemployment benefits may be
statewide
State agencies may combine data from State agencies may combine data
sub-state areas, such as counties, only for areas collectively
that are contiguous, share an designated as Labor Market Areas
economic region, or both by BLS
Waivers may extend beyond the fiscal Waivers based on a 24 month
year average unemployment rate may
not extend beyond the fiscal
year
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Estimated Impact
The proposed regulatory changes would result in a 2.5 percent
reduction in spending on SNAP benefits nationally, according to USDA
estimates. The potential impact varies by state and depends on a
variety of factors, including state agency policies, the local labor
market, and the characteristics and circumstances of the participants.
For example, SNAP participants in the 17 states without waiver areas
would not be affected by the proposed changes because they already face
time limits unless they are engaged in meaningful work activities or
are exempt for other reasons. In other states, the state agency may
offer a slot in a qualifying employment and training program to
participants who would otherwise face a time limit or use Federal
``percentage exemptions'' to exempt some SNAP participants from the
time limit.
In many states with current waiver areas, at least some SNAP
participants living in those areas will be newly required to work an
average of at least 20 hours per week to continue receiving benefits
for more than 3 months. Both the local labor market and SNAP
participants' job readiness will affect their ability to find work. To
provide some perspective, 21 percent of non-disabled childless SNAP
participants age 18 to 49 worked an average of at least 20 hours per
week, according to the Fiscal Year 2017 SNAP QC data. The percentage
ranged from nine percent to 36 percent across states.
In addition to job readiness, other characteristics and
circumstances of SNAP participants will influence whether they lose
eligibility for SNAP under the proposed change. For example, certain
SNAP participants are not required to register for work because they
are caring for an incapacitated person or meet other criteria; work
requirements will not change for these participants. On the other hand,
some participants who newly face a time limit may choose to forgo SNAP
benefits and rely on other available resources, such as food banks or
family members, rather than comply with work requirements.
Which states are more likely to be affected by the proposed changes?

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Percentage of non-disabled childless SNAP participants age 18
to 49 who were potentially subject to a time limit, lived in a
waiver area, and did not work 20 hours per week.
Source: Fiscal year 2017 SNAP QC data.
Note: States with a white background did not have waiver
areas in Fiscal Year 2017.
Differences in State Use of Waiver Areas
Since SNAP time limits were reinstated after the Great Recession,
some states have requested and received waivers for all or parts of the
state while others have not requested any time limit waivers. The
waiver area timeline illustrates how the prevalence of state time limit
waivers changed from 2009 through 2018; the call-out box on the left
shows state use of waiver areas in Fiscal Year 2017. While states with
the highest unemployment rates in 2017--Alaska and New Mexico--had
statewide waivers, others with overall unemployment rates above the
national average of 4.4 percent chose not to apply for a waiver for any
areas of the state.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Waiver Areas in Fiscal Year 2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No waiver areas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama Missouri
Arkansas Nebraska
Delaware North Carolina
Florida Oklahoma
Indiana South Carolina
Iowa Texas
Kansas Wisconsin
Maine Wyoming
Mississippi
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some waiver areas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona New Jersey
Colorado New York
Connecticut North Dakota
Georgia Ohio
Hawaii Oregon
Idaho Pennsylvania
Kentucky South Dakota
Maryland Tennessee
Massachusetts Utah
Michigan Vermont
Minnesota Virginia
Montana Washington
New Hampshire West Virginia
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statewide waiver
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska Louisiana
California Nevada
District of Columbia New Mexico
Guam Rhode Island
Illinois Virgin Islands
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Waiver area timeline
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2009-September 2010 Congress temporarily suspended the
time limits through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
October 2010-December 2015 In Fiscal Year 2011, time limits
continued to be waived based on
extended unemployment benefits for
45 states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands and in some areas of five
additional states. By the end of
Fiscal Year 2015, time limits were
re-implemented in nine states and
in some areas of 13 more states.
January 2016-Fiscal Year 2017 Few areas still qualified for
extended unemployment benefits, but
many areas received time limit
waivers based on other indicators
of high unemployment, such as an
unemployment rate at least 20
percent above the national average.
Seventeen states had no waiver
areas for most of this time.
December 2018 Seventeen states have no waiver
areas; seven states, the District
of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands have time limit waivers for
their entire area; and the
remaining states have waivers for
some but not all areas of the
state.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sources
Mathematica used Fiscal Year 2017 SNAP QC data to produce the
estimates shown in the second half of page 1, the Snapshot on page 2,
and the second paragraph and map on page 3. The underlying assumptions
and key variables used are available upon request. USDA's estimated
impact of the proposed regulatory changes, mentioned at the top of page
2 and the first sentence of page 3, are drawn from the Regulatory
Impact Analysis of the proposed rule. Finally, information on state
waiver areas was compiled from FNS's ``ABAWD Waiver Status'' reports.

This brief series was created by Mathematica in collaboration with
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to analyze the impact of proposed
changes to SNAP. Many individuals made important contributions,
including Carmen Ferro, Sarah Lauffer, Joshua Leftin, Gwyneth Olson,
and J.B. Wogan from Mathematica; Gina Hijjawi from RWJF; and Adam
Zimmerman from Burness. Two other briefs in this series can be
downloaded from Mathematica's website:

Proposed Changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program:
Heating and Cooling Standard Utility Allowances and Earned Income
(https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/
publications/proposed-changes-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-
program-heating-and-cooling-standard)
Simulating Proposed Changes to the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program: Countable Resources and Categorical Eligibility
(https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/
publications/simulating-proposed-changes-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-
assistance-program-countable-resources)

For more information about Mathematica's work in this area, contact
Senior Researcher Karen Cunnyngham at [email protected]
or (202) 264-3480.

The Chair. Thank you very much.
Mr. Adolphsen--obviously, you are not getting a yellow
light for some reason, so when you see the red light, just
please try to wrap up.

STATEMENT OF SAM ADOLPHSEN, VICE PRESIDENT OF
EXECUTIVE AFFAIRS, FOUNDATION FOR GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY, NAPLES, FL

Mr. Adolphsen. Chair Fudge, Ranking Member Johnson, Members
of the Nutrition Subcommittee, thank you for the privilege of
testifying.
I was brought up in a household that believed in hard work.
My dad was a landscaper. My mom cleaned houses. A job was a
point of pride, and I can still remember getting that first
paycheck from a tough day raking blueberries in rural Maine.
For many of us, that is our story. Work is central to our
lives. It provides dignity and purpose. The growth of our
communities is built on people living this experience, living
the American dream. And work is key to achieving the long-term
goal of the food stamp program, lifting people out of poverty.
That is why Congress and President Clinton passed bipartisan
work requirements for able-bodied adults on food stamps in
1996. They recognized the power of work, and they were right.
Where work requirements have been implemented, those leaving
the program doubled their incomes in just 1 year. And they
didn't just go to work in retail or fast food. They went back
to work in more than 1,000 different industries.
Now, these figures aren't extrapolations or anecdotes. Our
experts studied the actual earnings of 600,000 able-bodied
adults who left food stamps after work requirements were
implemented in Florida, Kansas, and Arkansas.
One young man in Arkansas--I will call him Nolan--reported
no income while on welfare, $0. After work requirements were
implemented, Nolan soon left the program. Then Nolan got a job.
Within 1 year, he was earning $63,000, and by the end of 2
years, he was making $93,000. Work requirements work.
Unfortunately for millions of able-bodied adults on food
stamps, this isn't the experience at all. And government bears
a big part of the blame. When I was Chief Operating Officer of
the food stamp agency in Maine, before we reinstated work
requirements, I had 1,000 state employees helping fill out food
stamp applications. But no one helping fill out job
applications. We were letting people like Nolan down.
Government should be giving a hand up, not just a hand out.
The loopholes created at the Federal agency level have
gutted the 1996 law, allowing work to be waived across the
country by gerrymandering areas and using old economic data.
I want you to remember two numbers, 2.6 million and 7.6
million.
First, 2.6 million. There are 2.6 million able-bodied
adults on food stamps who will be waived from the work
requirement this year, and three out of four don't work at all.
Second, 7.6 million. There are 7.6 million available jobs
today, and the lowest unemployment rate in 50 years. Employers
are desperate for workers.
To be clear, Federal law allows waivers only when there are
not enough jobs, or unemployment is at least ten percent. But
just 23 of the 1,100 counties and cities that waive work
requirements have unemployment at or above ten percent. One
California waiver county has 2.2 percent unemployment, and
Ohio's waiver has more than doubled since 2017, even as its
unemployment rate declined to near record low levels. Waivers
from work shouldn't be so easy to get in the best economy in
decades.
Some have claimed that Congress rejected the type of
changes proposed here by the Trump Administration, but the
bipartisan 2018 Farm Bill, like every other farm bill since
1996, reaffirmed the original work requirements, and it did not
codify the current regulations that have allowed the waiver
abuse.
It is clear that the status quo does not reflect
Congressional intent. Even Chairman Collin Peterson correctly
pointed out that the loopholes have allowed states to
``undermine Federal law.''
The Trump Administration has the authority and the duty to
fix the regulation and return waivers to their original purpose
of exempting only those individuals in truly economically
depressed areas. The track record of work requirements is
clear. They work. And when this rule is implemented, we can all
be confident that hundreds of thousands of Americans, people
just like Nolan, will move from welfare to work and experience
their own American dream.
Thank you. I am happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Adolphsen follows:]

Prepared Statement of Sam Adolphsen, Vice President of Executive
Affairs, Foundation for Government Accountability, Naples, FL
Examining the Proposed ABAWD Rule
Chair Fudge, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the privilege of testifying. I am Sam Adolphsen, the Vice
President of Executive Affairs at the Foundation for Government
Accountability (FGA). FGA is a non-partisan research organization
dedicated to helping millions of individuals achieve the American
Dream.
Prior to joining FGA, I served as the Chief Operating Officer of
the Maine Department of Health and Human Services. In that role, I
oversaw operations for Maine's welfare programs, including the food
stamp program. My duties included direct oversight of the food stamp
eligibility and policy office.
I was fortunate to be brought up in a household that believed in
hard work. My dad was a landscaper and my mom cleaned houses. I knew
from a young age that work is not a dirty word--it is a good thing. A
job was a point of pride, and I can still remember that first paycheck
from a tough day raking blueberries in coastal Maine. I'm sure you
remember your first job, too, and what it taught you.
For so many of us that's our story-work is central to our lives. It
provides us with dignity and purpose. The growth of our communities and
our nation as a whole is dependent on people experiencing this--living
their American Dream.
And it is the key to achieving the long-term goals of the food
stamp program: to help lift people out of poverty. Unfortunately, for
millions of able-bodied adults on food stamps, this isn't the
experience at all. Work isn't even in the picture and food stamp rules
allow long-term dependency with no accountability.
The law is clear: work requirements should be the standard for
able-bodied adults with no children. And where the law is followed,
work requirements have proven to move people from welfare to work and
leave them better off. But despite an economy desperate for workers,
loopholes in Federal food stamp rules continue to permit work
requirements to be waived in states across the country, leaving
millions of able-bodied adults with no kids on the sidelines.
Work Is Key to Achieving the Food Stamp Program's Goals
In 1996, Congress passed--and President Clinton signed--
commonsense, bipartisan welfare reform. As part of that reform, most
able-bodied, childless adults were required to work, train, or
volunteer part-time as a condition of food stamp eligibility.\1\ These
requirements applied to non-pregnant adults who are mentally and
physically fit for employment, who are between the ages of 18 and 50,
and who have no dependent children or incapacitated family members.\2\
Able-bodied adults who refused to meet these requirements were limited
to just 3 months of food stamp benefits every 3 years.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 7 U.S.C. 2015(o) (2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
USCODE-2016-title7/pdf/USCODE-2016-title7-chap51-sec2015.pdf.
\2\ Ibid.
\3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When it was first implemented in the 1990s, this commonsense work
requirement moved millions of able-bodied adults from welfare to work
and spurred rapid economic growth.\4\ Analyses of state-level
implementation have reached similar conclusions.^5-8 But this
progress has been undermined by Federal loopholes that have allowed
states to weaken and waive the requirements for millions of adults,
even during periods of sustained economic growth.^9-10
States, which bear little of the cost for the program, continue to take
advantage of these loopholes with regularity despite the booming
economy. United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Secretary Sonny
Perdue recently noted in a hearing before Congress that the waivers,
``were abused in Georgia,'' and he believes, ``are being abused in many
places.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Kenneth Hanson and Karen S. Hamrick, ``Moving public assistance
recipients into the labor force, 1996-2000,'' U.S. Department of
Agriculture (2004), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/
46832/49356_fanrr40.pdf.
\5\ Jonathan Ingram and Nicholas Horton, ``The power of work: How
Kansas' welfare reform is lifting Americans out of poverty,''
Foundation for Government Accountability (2016), https://thefga.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Kansas-study-paper.pdf.
\6\ Jonathan Ingram and Josh Archambault, ``New report proves
Maine's welfare reforms are working,'' Forbes (2016), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2016/05/19/new-report-proves-maines-
welfare-reforms-are-working.
\7\ Nicholas Horton and Jonathan Ingram, ``Work requirements are
working in Arkansas: How commonsense welfare reform is improving
Arkansans' lives,'' Foundation for Government Accountability (2019),
https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Work-Requirement-are-
Working-in-Arkansas-How-Commonsense-Welfare-Reform-is-Improving-
Arkansans-Lives-1-9-19.pdf.
\8\ Nicholas Horton and Jonathan Ingram, ``Commonsense welfare
reform has transformed Floridians' lives,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
FloridaTrackingStudyResearchPaper-3.1.19.pdf.
\9\ Sam Adolphsen, et al., ``Waivers gone wild: How states have
exploited food stamp loopholes,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2018), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/
Waivers-Gone-Wild-6-5-18-update.pdf.
\10\ Jonathan Ingram, et al., ``How the Trump administration can
cut down on waivers gone wild,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
LMA-Memo-FoodStampWaiversGoneWild-2.20.19.pdf.
\11\ House Committee on Agriculture, ``Full House Agriculture
Committee hearing with Secretary Perdue on the state of the rural
economy,'' U.S. House of Representatives (2019), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=m8t4etV1X8g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of these loopholes, most able-bodied adults receiving
food stamps are not required to work. According to state data, nearly
63 percent of able-bodied adults without dependents on the program--
some 2.6 million adults--will be waived from the work requirement in
Fiscal Year 2019.^12-13 With no work requirement in place,
few able-bodied adults on the program actually work. Just two percent
of able-bodied adults without dependents on food stamps work full-time,
while roughly \3/4\ do not work at all.^14-15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Jonathan Ingram, et al., ``How the Trump administration can
cut down on waivers gone wild,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
LMA-Memo-FoodStampWaiversGoneWild-2.20.19.pdf.
\13\ Jonathan Ingram and Nicholas Horton, ``How the Agriculture and
Nutrition Act of 2018 would rein in workrequirement waivers gone
wild,'' Foundation for Government Accountability (2018), https://
thefga.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/How-the-Agriculture-and-Nutrition-
Act-of-2018-would-rein-in-work-requirement-waivers-gone-wild.pdf.
\14\ Author's calculations based upon data provided by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture on enrollment and work status of able-bodied
adults without dependents. See, e.g., Food and Nutrition Service,
``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program quality control database,''
U.S. Department of Agriculture (2016), https://host76.mathematica-
mpr.com/fns/PUBLIC_USE/2015/qcfy2015_st.zip.
\15\ Council of Economic Advisers, ``Expanding work requirements in
non-cash welfare programs,'' Executive Office of the President (2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ExpandingWork-
Requirements-in-Non-Cash-Welfare-Programs.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These waiver loopholes have trapped millions of able-bodied adults
in dependency. But these loopholes have also allowed state agencies to
skip out on their duty to engage these adults and help put them back on
the path to self-sufficiency. The work requirement was designed not
just to require work or work activities by the recipient of the
program, but also to require the administering agency to engage with
able-bodied adults.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 7 U.S.C. 2015(d), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2016-
title7/pdf/USCODE-2016-title7-chap51-sec2015.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In my role as chief operating officer at the Maine Department of
Health and Human Services, I saw firsthand how--until we restored the
work requirement statewide-agency bureaucrats would simply send out
benefits on autopilot instead of engaging with adults to help reconnect
them with their community. By waiving the work requirement for able-
bodied adults, the food stamp agency's responsibility to help people
get back on their feet and move beyond welfare program dependency is
also waived, making that important assistance more optional for the
agency.
When Enforced, Work Requirements Promote Independence
These commonsense work requirements have a proven track record of
success. After Kansas restored these work requirements in 2013, the
number of able-bodied adults without dependents on the program dropped
by more than 75 percent.\17\ Those able-bodied adults went back to work
in hundreds of diverse industries and their incomes more than doubled
within a year.\18\ Better still, those higher incomes more than offset
lost welfare benefits, leaving them financially better off.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Jonathan Ingram and Nicholas Horton, ``The power of work: How
Kansas' welfare reform is lifting Americans out of poverty,''
Foundation for Government Accountability (2016), https://thefga.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Kansas-study-paper.pdf.
\18\ Ibid.
\19\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maine experienced similar successes after restoring the work
requirement in 2014.\20\ The number of able-bodied adults without
dependents on the program dropped by more than 90 percent and average
wages more than doubled within a year.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Jonathan Ingram and Josh Archambault, ``New report proves
Maine's welfare reforms are working,'' Forbes (2016), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2016/05/19/new-report-proves-maines-
welfare-reforms-are-working.
\21\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Arkansas followed suit in 2016, able-bodied adult enrollment
dropped by 70 percent.\22\ Those adults saw their incomes more than
double in the year after leaving the program and then more than triple
in the second year.\23\ Higher wages more than offset lost food stamp
benefits, leaving individuals better off than when they were trapped in
dependency.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Nicholas Horton and Jonathan Ingram, ``Work requirements are
working in Arkansas: How commonsense welfare reform is improving
Arkansans' lives,'' Foundation for Government Accountability (2019),
https://thefga.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/Work-Requirement-are-
Working-in-Arkansas-How-Commonsense-Welfare-Reform-is-Improving-
Arkansans-Lives-1-9-19.pdf.
\23\ Ibid.
\24\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These adults moved into many diverse industries, touching virtually
every corner of the American economy. After Florida restored the work
requirement in 2016, able-bodied adults without dependents found work
far beyond the fast food or big box retail industries.\25\ In fact,
these adults found work in more than 1,000 different industries.\26\
Better still, they used those initial jobs as stepping stones to other
jobs in higher-paid industries. Nearly 70 percent of those who
initially found work in the fast food industry or at temp agencies left
those industries within a year, moving from lower-wage industries to
higher-wage industries over time.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Nicholas Horton and Jonathan Ingram, ``Commonsense welfare
reform has transformed Floridians' lives,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
FloridaTrackingStudyResearchPaper-3.1.19.pdf.
\26\ Ibid.
\27\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work also provides powerful benefits far beyond the nominal value
of earned wages. Work can help build new and positive social
relationships, help individuals gain new skills, create new experiences
that lead to future employment opportunities and higher incomes, and
serves as the single best path out of poverty.\28\ It could even help
solve major public health concerns like the opioid crisis.\29\ Work is
a key predictor of success for someone recovering from substance abuse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Sam Adolphsen and Jonathan Ingram, ``Three myths about the
welfare cliff,'' Foundation for Government Accountability (2018),
https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Three-myths-about-the-
welfare-cliff-2-28-18.pdf.
\29\ Jonathan Ingram and Sam Adolphsen, ``How moving able-bodied
adults from welfare to work could help solve the opioid crisis,''
Foundation for Government Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/OpioidDeathsMemo-ResearchPaper-DRAFT4.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employers, and the Economy, Desperately Need Workers
At 3.8 percent, the nation's unemployment rate is hovering at its
lowest point since 1969.\30\ The unemployment rate has stayed at or
below four percent for 12 consecutive months, with some states seeing
unemployment rates as low as 2.4 percent.^31-32 Since June
2017, 19 states have hit new record-low unemployment levels, including
some who waive work requirements across their state.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Labor force statistics from the
current population survey,'' U.S. Department of Labor (2019), https://
data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000.
\31\ Ibid.
\32\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Current unemployment rates for
states and historical highs and lows, seasonally adjusted,'' U.S.
Department of Labor (2019), https://www.bls.gov/web/laus/lauhsthl.htm.
\33\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More Americans are working today than at any point since the Bureau
of Labor Statistics began tracking employment statistics.\34\ Average
earnings have reached nearly $28 per hour--the highest level ever
recorded.\35\ Nearly \3/4\ of all individuals now finding work were
pulled off the sidelines and back into the labor force--a record
high.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Labor force statistics from the
current population survey: Seasonally adjusted employment level,'' U.S.
Department of Labor (2019), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
LNS12000000.
\35\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Employment, hours, and earnings
from the current employment statistics survey: Average hourly earnings
of all employees,'' U.S. Department of Labor (2019), https://
data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES0500000003.
\36\ Council of Economic Advisers, ``Economic report of the
President together with the annual report of the Council of Economic
Advisors,'' Executive Office of the President (2019), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ERP-2019.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But even today's booming economy is not enough: employers are
searching desperately to fill a record-high 7.6 million open jobs.\37\
At least \1/3\ of small businesses have unfilled job openings, the
highest rate in 50 years.\38\ Employers are offering signing bonuses,
student loan repayment, company cars, relocation fees, and more to find
and retain talent--at all skill levels.\39\ For our economy to continue
growing and thriving, we need the adults currently receiving food
stamps and sitting on the sidelines to rejoin the workforce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Job openings and labor turnover
survey: Total nonfarm job openings,'' U.S. Department of Labor (2019),
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/JTS00000000JOL.
\38\ Sam Adolphsen, ``There has never been a better time for
welfare reform,'' Foundation for Government Accountability (2018),
https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Its-Time-To-Get-To-Work-
FINAL.pdf.
\39\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite some concerns of a ``skills gap,'' the reality is that
millions of jobs require little specialized education, training, or
experience. In fact, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
nearly \3/4\ of the job openings that will occur over the next decade
require a high school education or less.\40\ Nearly four out of five
job openings require no training or less than a month's training on the
job, while a whopping 87 percent require no prior experience.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Ibid.
\41\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loopholes Have Allowed States To Waive Work Requirements
When Congress passed the food stamp work requirements into law in
1996, it gave the Secretary of the United States Department of
Agriculture the authority to waive work requirements in areas that had
unemployment rates above ten percent or otherwise lacked job
opportunities for these able-bodied adults.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ 7 U.S.C. 2015(o)(4)(A) (2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/USCODE-2016-title7/pdf/USCODE-2016-title7-chap51-sec2015.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these narrow parameters set forth by Congress, Federal
rulemaking led to a regulation that is far more expansive than
intended, creating loopholes and gimmicks for states to continue
waiving work requirements for millions of able-bodied adults, even
during periods of record economic growth.\43\ As a result, these
commonsense requirements are waived wholly or partially in 33 states
and the District of Columbia.\44\ As a result, nearly 2.6 million able-
bodied adults who would otherwise be required to work, train, or
volunteer have those requirements waived altogether.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Sam Adolphsen, et al., ``Waivers gone wild: How states have
exploited food stamp loopholes,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2018), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/
Waivers-Gone-Wild-6-5-18-update.pdf.
\44\ Jonathan Ingram, et al., ``How the Trump administration can
cut down on waivers gone wild,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
LMA-Memo-FoodStampWaiversGoneWild-2.20.19.pdf.
\45\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the statute specifies that the waivers should only apply
to areas with high unemployment that lack a sufficient number of jobs,
regulatory loopholes allow states to waive work requirements in areas
with record-low unemployment by combining and gerrymandering them with
areas with somewhat higher unemployment rates.\46\ These loopholes also
allow states to use data from years ago, even when that data has no
connection to current economic conditions.\47\ If that weren't bad
enough, the regulation creates an alternative waiver option even in
areas with unemployment rates below ten percent. Under this option,
states can qualify for a waiver so long as their unemployment rates are
20 percent above the national average during a 2 year period, no matter
how low that rate is and no matter how many open jobs are
available.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Sam Adolphsen, et al., ``Waivers gone wild: How states have
exploited food stamp loopholes,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2018), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/
Waivers-Gone-Wild-6-5-18-update.pdf.
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of the more than 1,100 counties, towns, cities, and other
jurisdictions where work requirements are currently waived, just 23
have unemployment rates above ten percent.\49\ More than 800 of these
jurisdictions have unemployment rates at or below five percent and
nearly 200 have unemployment rates at or below three percent.\50\ The
waived jurisdictions have unemployment rates as low as zero percent--
meaning work requirements are waived in areas with literally no
unemployment.\51\ Despite claims that these areas are facing severe job
shortages, the 33 states currently waiving the work requirement have
more than a combined 3.7 million job openings posted online.\52\ These
states are expected to experience nearly 13 million job openings per
year over the next decade.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Jonathan Ingram and Sam Adolphsen, ``FNS-2018-0004-5999,''
Opportunity Solutions Project (2019), https://solutionsproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/OSP-Comment-and-supplement.pdf.
\50\ Ibid.
\51\ Ibid.
\52\ Author's calculations based upon data provided by Haver
Analytics on February 2019 job postings gathered from more than 16,000
Internet job boards, corporate boards, and other job sites.
\53\ Author's calculations based upon data provided by state labor
market information agencies on average annual projected job openings
over the next decade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loopholes Have Expanded Work Requirement Exemptions
Regulatory loopholes have also exempted hundreds of thousands of
able-bodied adults from the work requirement in direct conflict with
Congressional intent. Shortly before leaving office, the Clinton
Administration created new exemptions for able-bodied adults who reside
in households with children--regardless of whether they are parents or
caretakers--as well as 50 year old able-bodied adults who would
otherwise be required to work, train, or volunteer under the
statute.^54-55
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Jonathan Ingram, et al., ``Why the Trump administration should
move able-bodied adult siblings from welfare to work,'' Foundation for
Government Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/ABAWD-Siblings-to-Work-Research-Paper-DRAFT6.pdf.
\55\ Jonathan Ingram, et al., ``Closing the food stamp loophole
that allows 50-year-olds to avoid work,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
50-Year-Old-Food-Stamp-Loophole-Memo-1.24.19.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These exemptions conflict with the plain meaning of the food stamp
statute, Congressional intent, prior interpretation by state agencies,
and even Food and Nutrition Service's own interpretation of the same
terms.^56-57
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Jonathan Ingram, et al., ``Why the Trump administration should
move able-bodied adult siblings from welfare to work,'' Foundation for
Government Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/ABAWD-Siblings-to-Work-Research-Paper-DRAFT6.pdf.
\57\ Jonathan Ingram, et al., ``Closing the food stamp loophole
that allows 50-year-olds to avoid work,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
50-Year-Old-Food-Stamp-Loophole-Memo-1.24.19.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Proposed Rule Would Help Address Waiver Abuse
The proposed rule represents a significant improvement over the
status quo.^58-59 By closing some of the most egregious
loopholes that have led to widespread waiver abuse, the proposed rule
brings waiver guidance more in line with statutory requirements that
have been enshrined in law for more than 20 years. Under the proposal,
states can continue to request waivers in areas that lack sufficient
jobs but will not have as many avenues to abuse the process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Jonathan Ingram, et al., ``How the Trump administration can
cut down on waivers gone wild,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
LMA-Memo-FoodStampWaiversGoneWild-2.20.19.pdf.
\59\ Jonathan Ingram and Sam Adolphsen, ``FNS-2018-0004-5999,''
Opportunity Solutions Project (2019), https://solutionsproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/OSP-Comment-and-supplement.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first major area of change in the proposed rule is an attempt
to reduce gerrymandering abuse. Federal law allows the Secretary to
grant waivers in areas that lack sufficient jobs, but does not define
``areas'' for waiver purposes.\60\ States have used this ambiguous
language to gerrymander jurisdictions together to form ``areas'' solely
to maximize the number of able-bodied adults waived from the work
requirement.\61\ Illinois, for example, combines 101 of the state's 102
counties into a single ``area,'' while California combines all but
three counties into a single ``area'' for waiver purposes.\62\ These
waived jurisdictions do not form a single, local region with a shared
economy. Instead, they just happen to the jurisdictions that, when
combining data, just marginally meet the current regulatory thresholds
for waivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Sam Adolphsen, et al., ``Waivers gone wild: How states have
exploited food stamp loopholes,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2018), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/
Waivers-Gone-Wild-6-5-18-update.pdf.
\61\ Ibid.
\62\ Jonathan Ingram, et al., ``How the Trump administration can
cut down on waivers gone wild,'' Foundation for Government
Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
LMA-Memo-FoodStampWaiversGoneWild-2.20.19.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule attempts to limit this abuse by only allowing
states to combine jurisdictions together for waiver purposes if they
form labor market areas.\63\ The purpose of this change is to ``target
waivers to jurisdictions with a demonstrable lack of sufficient jobs,''
as required by the statute.\64\ But even this could be subject to
abuse. States could still seek waivers in jurisdictions that have
sufficient jobs and in areas where there are sufficient jobs within
commuting distance.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Ibid.
\64\ Ibid.
\65\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One solution the Trump Administration could take to solve this
remaining problem--and better align the proposed rule with the food
stamp statute--would be to prohibit states from combining jurisdictions
for waiver purposes at all and to eliminate waivers for jurisdictions
located in commuting zones with sufficient jobs.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second major change in the proposed rule sets a minimum
unemployment floor for states seeking waivers. Although Federal law
defines high unemployment as above ten percent, existing regulations
allow waivers whenever an area's unemployment rate is 20 percent above
the national average, with no minimum floor.^67-68 This
guarantees that at least some portion of the country will always be
granted waivers, even during periods of unprecedented economic growth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ 7 U.S.C. 2015(o)(4)(A) (2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/USCODE-2016-title7/pdf/USCODE-2016-title7-chap51-sec2015.pdf.
\68\ 7 CFR 273.24(f)(3)(iii) (2018), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CFR-2018-title7-vol4/pdf/CFR-2018-title7-vol4-sec273-24.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule attempts to address this abuse by setting a
minimum floor of seven percent unemployment.\69\ But even this may not
be enough to stop states from pursuing waivers in areas with sufficient
jobs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Food and Nutrition Service, ``Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program: Requirements for able-bodied adults without
dependents,'' U.S. Department of Agriculture (2018), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/ABAWDtoOFR.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A minimum unemployment rate of seven percent only truly matters
during a period of near full employment, as the threshold would only
activate when the national unemployment rate falls below 5.8 percent
for a sustained 2 year window.\70\ This threshold is just slightly
above the historical average ``natural'' unemployment rate--the level
most economists agree is ``full employment''--and just below the
average unemployment rate over the last 70 years.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Jonathan Ingram and Sam Adolphsen, ``FNS-2018-0004-5999,''
Opportunity Solutions Project (2019), https://solutionsproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/OSP-Comment-and-supplement.pdf.
\71\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Trump Administration could strengthen the rule even further--
and more closely align with the food stamp statute--by raising that
threshold to ten percent. This would better target waivers to areas
that have objectively high unemployment and lack sufficient jobs.
The Proposed Rule Better Reflects Congressional Intent
Although some have claimed the proposed rule was ``specifically
rejected'' by Congress in the 2018 Farm Bill, nothing could be further
from the truth. The House-passed version of the farm bill made
significant changes to the work requirement, but those changes were
materially different from the proposed rule. The House-passed bill
eliminated the time limit for able-bodied adults without dependents
entirely, focusing instead on strengthening the work registration
requirements for a broader group of able-bodied adults. It created new
waivers and exemptions from the work registration requirements, but the
qualifications for those waivers were materially different from those
in the proposed rule. In short, the changes in the proposed rule were
never even considered by Congress.
Far from rejecting the changes proposed by the Trump
Administration, the 2018 Farm Bill left in place the original work
requirements first enacted in 1996. Those statutory requirements serve
as the basis for the proposed rule, which simply seeks to close
unlawful loopholes created through regulatory guidance. It is
undisputed that the current regulatory framework does not reflect
Congressional intent. Even Chairman Collin Peterson noted last year
that the loopholes have allowed states to ``undermine Federal law'' by
abusing these waivers.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Chuck Abbot, ``Food stamp revisions possible but not radical
change, says key House Democrat,'' Fern's Ag Insider (2018), https://
thefern.org/ag_insider/food-stamp-revisions-possible-not-radical-
change-says-key-house-democrat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By leaving in place those statutory requirements exactly as first
enacted in 1996, Congress signaled that it did not wish to codify the
unlawful waiver expansions created through regulation. This left in
place the authority--and the duty--of the Trump Administration to
return these waivers to their original purpose.
Work Will Improve Lives and Boost the Economy
The proposed rule represents a significant step forward in moving
able-bodied adults from welfare to work and realigning Federal
regulations with statutory requirements. It would not simply require
millions of able-bodied adults without children to work--the rule will
also encourage state agencies to do a better job of actually engaging
with individuals and putting them back on the pathway to self-
sufficiency and better lives. The requirement will help connect able-
bodied adults who are out of work with employers who desperately need
workers to fill open jobs. For those who cannot work immediately, it
will connect individuals to available job training or educational
opportunities. Whether through work, training, or volunteering, these
adults will be better connected to their communities. This will
ultimately move millions more able-bodied adults from welfare to work
and from government dependence to independence.
Attachment
More Than 2,567,550 Able-Bodied Adults Have No Food Stamp Work
Requirements

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture.

The Chair. Thank you. Ms. Hamler-Fugitt.

STATEMENT OF LISA HAMLER-FUGITT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OHIO
ASSOCIATION OF FOODBANKS, COLUMBUS, OH

Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. Thank you. Good morning, Chair Fudge,
Ranking Member Johnson, and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee. Thank you for convening this hearing today and
inviting me to testify on the Trump Administration's proposed
rules related to unemployed or underemployed adults without
dependents participating in the SNAP Program.
My name is Lisa Hamler-Fugitt, and I serve as the Executive
Director of the Ohio Association of Food Banks, Ohio's largest
charitable response to hunger. We distributed over 200 million
pounds of emergency food last year in an attempt to fill the
gap for hungry Ohioans, but SNAP provides 12 times as much food
while infusing resources into local communities.
The Administration's proposed rule would limit access to
SNAP for adults with very limited resources without improving
their overall employment outlook or health outcomes. Based on
my Association's firsthand experience operating the SNAP Work
Experience Program, which provides services exclusively for
clients required to find work under the current SNAP rule, I am
here to provide you with my perspective on the impacts that
this proposed rule would have in Ohio.
Currently, 38 of Ohio's 88 counties have waived SNAP time
limits due to high unemployment. If the proposed rule were to
take effect today with the seven percent threshold for waiver
eligibility, only three Ohio counties would qualify for the
waiver. These three counties account for less than one percent
of Ohio's current SNAP population, meaning that nearly all
would be subject to the time limit if the proposed rule went
into effect.
Unfortunately, we know from our extensive experience that
those subject to the time limit have profound barriers to
employment. The Work Experience Program conducts in depth,
comprehensive client assessments to determine the client
employability and identify barriers to employment. Over the
first 2 years of our program, we completed over 5,000 in depth
interviews and gathered information on 5,500 self-reported
employment and skills assessments. Our results represent the
state's most comprehensive and up-to-date data available on
this population.
Our single largest and biggest takeaway is the term ABAWD
is a complete misnomer for who this population is. One in three
clients reported a physical or mental limitation ranging from
back injuries to heart conditions to depression to PTSD. Many
participants appear to be marginally or functionally
illiterate, and likely experiencing significant learning
disabilities. Additionally, many clients appear to have social
and/or cognitive impairments, difficulty communicating, and a
tendency to engage in repetitive behaviors, all signs of autism
spectrum disorder. We believe that there are high levels of
undiagnosed autism and other developmental disabilities in this
population. One in three clients have no high school diploma or
GED. Nearly \1/2\ reported that they do not have reliable
transportation, whether through a personal vehicle, public
transit, or ride sharing with family or friends. And 60 percent
report that they do not have a current, valid driver's license.
About \1/3\ of our clients had felony convictions, a stigma
which can follow someone for a lifetime, even if their release
is meant to suggest that they have been rehabilitated.
Many of our clients are parents or caregivers with
responsibilities that can serve as barriers to employment, and
one in four of our clients had children that were not in their
custody and many spent time parenting those children on a
regular basis while the custodial parent works. Additionally,
one in ten reported they are caregivers for family, friends, or
relatives. In addition to these issues, many of our clients
face other challenges which makes finding employment difficult.
We serve hundreds of individuals who have aged out of the
foster care system, only to find themselves living in homeless
shelters, with friends, or on the street. Many other clients
are experiencing challenges like homelessness and language
barriers. These individuals face daunting challenges in finding
employment, even when general unemployment rates are low, which
is exactly why Congress gave states the option to waive the
time limit in areas where there were insufficient jobs for
those who were subject to the requirement.
I would like to share just one story of a client, a
Somalian refugee who relies on public transportation and
requires an interpreter to fulfill his mandatory work
requirements. Due to a paperwork error, he was mistakenly cut
off his SNAP benefits and was sent to our local food pantry
network to get food, until his case could be sorted out. Sadly,
this case is not unique. Tens of thousands of real people like
him are slipping through the cracks.
We know all too well that harsh and arbitrary time limits
are misguided and only increase hunger and hardship. The
proposed rule would shift the burden of providing food from the
Federal Government on to cities, states, and local charities
like mine. It would be harmful to the local economies, grocers,
retailers, and the agriculture community by reducing the amount
of SNAP benefits and dollars available and economic activity.
The Chair. Please wrap up for me.
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. Most importantly, the rule sidesteps the
will of Congress, which rejected these changes when it enacted
the 2018 Farm Bill.
We hope that we can work together to stop these harmful
policies from taking effect, and I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hamler-Fugitt follows:]

Prepared Statement of Lisa Hamler-Fugitt, Executive Director, Ohio
Association of Foodbanks, Columbus, OH
The findings of our comprehensive assessment of able-bodied
adults without dependents can be found at our website at:
http://ohiofoodbanks.org/wep/WEP-2013-2015-report.pdf.

Good morning, Chair Marcia L. Fudge, Ranking Member Dusty Johnson,
and distinguished Members of the U.S. House Agriculture Subcommittee on
Nutrition, Oversight, and Department Operations.
My name is Lisa Hamler-Fugitt and I serve as the executive director
of the Ohio Association of Foodbanks, Ohio's largest charitable
response to hunger. My association represents Ohio's 12 Feeding America
food banks and their more than 3,500 member hunger relief charities.
Our mission is to provide food and resources to people in need and to
pursue areas of common interest for the benefit of people in need. Last
year, the association distributed 216 million pounds of food to more
than two million low-income Ohioans--one in six of our hungry friends
and neighbors.
Thank you for convening this hearing today and inviting me to
testify on the Trump Administration Proposed Rule: Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Requirements for Able-Bodied
Adults without Dependents RIN 0584-AE57.
This rule would limit the ability of states to waive the 3 month
time limit that applies to unemployed and underemployed Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents who receive benefits through the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).
I'm here today to provide you with our association's firsthand
experiences operating the SNAP Work Experience Program that serves only
work-mandated unemployed and underemployed Able-Bodied Adults without
Dependents in Franklin County, Ohio. The program began in SFY 2014,
when the Administration of then-Governor John Kasich eliminated the
statewide waiver and instead applied for a limited number of exemptions
for only 16 predominantly rural, white counties. The Administration did
not request exemptions for eligible cities where minority communities
are concentrated and unemployment is high. Ohio had a statewide waiver
that had been in place since mid-2000, when the Ohio General Assembly
enacted legislation to compel the State of Ohio to apply for and
implement the waiver.
Current Ohio Landscape

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio Counties Waived in FFY 2019
Adams, Ashtabula, Athens, Belmont, Brown, Carroll, Clinton,
Columbiana, Coshocton, Crawford, Cuyahoga, Erie, Gallia, Guernsey,
Harrison, Highland, Hocking, Huron, Jackson, Jefferson, Lawrence,
Lorain, Lucas, Mahoning, Meigs, Monroe, Morgan, Muskingum, Noble,
Ottawa, Perry, Pike, Richland, Ross, Scioto, Trumbull, Vinton, and
Washington
------------------------------------------------------------------------

In FFY 2019, there are 38 counties in Ohio where the time limit has
been waived due to high unemployment. Based on unemployment data
obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 24 month average
unemployment rate in each of the counties was greater than 120 percent
of the national unemployment rate during the same 24 month period.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Ohio Department of Job and Family Services FAL-171 Federal
Fiscal Year 2019: Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents, http://
jfs.ohio.gov/ofam/FAL-171-FFY-2019-ABAWD-090718.stm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the proposed rule were to take effect today with the seven
percent threshold for waiver eligibility, only three Ohio counties
would qualify for a time-limit waiver (according to BLS unemployment
data over the most recent 24 month period available).\2\ These three
counties--Adams, Meigs, and Monroe--account for less than one percent
of Ohio's SNAP population. If the geographic distribution of ABAWDs
matches that of the broader SNAP population, over 99 percent of Ohio's
ABAWDs would now be subject to the SNAP time limit (up from 52 percent
under current policy). In effect, the rule would add additional
barriers blocking Ohioans in the poorest parts of the state from
accessing basic nutrition.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2018). Local Area Unemployment
Statistics, January 2017-December 2018.
\3\ Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for
Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents [RIN 0584-AE57] The Center for
Community Solutions, March 26, 2019.

Current Policy If Proposed Rule Took Effect Today
Federal Fiscal Year 2019 Based on Most Recent BLS 24 Month
(10-1-2018 to 9-30-2019) Average Unemployment Data

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Map by The Center for Community Solutions.
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau. (2018) American Community Survey
5 year estimates, poverty status in the past 12 months. Feeding
America. (2018). Map the meal gap 2018: overall food insecurity
in Ohio by county in 2016. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2018).
Local Area Unemployment Statistics, January 2017-December 2018.
Author's analysis, assuming waiver eligibility floor of seven
percent county unemployment rates.

Americans want to work. The proposed SNAP able-bodied
restrictions will hurt many who want to work but can't for a
whole host of reasons--often because there are no jobs for
them.

However, living in a county where the time-limit has been waived
does not exempt ABAWDs from their obligation to participate in the
labor force. Ohio administers a mandatory SNAP Employment and Training
(SNAP E&T) program that is inclusive of ABAWDs. Under SNAP E&T, ABAWDs
must participate in education/job training, job search/job readiness
activities, or work experience or else be subject to a sanction,
regardless of whether the individual lives in a county where the time-
limit has been waived.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ http://jfs.ohio.gov/ofam/FAL-171-FFY-2019-ABAWD-090718.stm.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background: How Did We Get Here?
Under the 1996 welfare law, adults aged 18-49 who are not physically
or mentally unfit for work or caring for a minor child are eligible to
receive Food Stamp/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
benefits for only 3 months in a 36 month period, unless the individual
meets certain work requirements. These individuals are known as Able
Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWD) and are required to work at
least 20 hours a week, participate in qualifying work or training
program activities for at least 20 hours a week, or live in an area
with high unemployment where the 3 month limit is temporarily waived.
On the request of a state SNAP agency, the law also gives the USDA
the authority to temporarily waive the time limit in areas that have an
unemployment rate of over ten percent or a lack of sufficient jobs. The
law also provides state agencies with a limited number of percentage
exemptions that can be used by states to extend SNAP eligibility for
ABAWDs subject to the time limit. The Department proposes to amend the
regulatory standards by which the Department evaluates state SNAP
agency requests to waive the time limit and to end the unlimited
carryover of ABAWD percentage exemptions.
When signing the welfare law in 1996, President Clinton singled out
this as one of the bill's most harmful provisions and called for it to
be substantially changed.
The Administration's proposed rule RIN 0584-AE57 would encourage
broader application of the statutory ABAWD work requirement and is
intended to circumvent the will of Congress.[\5\]
[\5\] President William Clinton, Statement on Signing the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, August
22, 1996, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53219.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SNAP Is Essential for Ohio
The households served by our statewide emergency food assistance
network represent diverse circumstances and challenges. Clients face a
wide array of obstacles to food security, such as health issues,
education levels, housing instability, unemployment/underemployment,
disabilities, and insufficient income and resources.
Our association recognizes that hunger is merely a symptom of
poverty and we engage in other efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger.
For more than a decade, we have provided services to connect low-income
Ohioans with nutrition benefits and other work support programs.
Knowing first-hand that hunger and health are directly linked, the
association partners with the Ohio Department of Job and Family
Services and the USDA Food and Nutrition Service as the state's SNAP
outreach grantee. The association and our member food banks administer
and conduct outreach and education on this critical food assistance
program. We work on the front lines--reaching hungry Ohioans where they
work, live, pray, play and learn.
For more than 25 years, we have advocated for equitable public
policy at the state and Federal levels to decrease hunger in Ohio. We
work with local, regional, and national partners to inform
policymakers, media, and other stakeholders about the issues facing
Ohio's families.
We know that SNAP is the first line of defense against hunger in
our state and nation--in fact, our charitable network could never
respond to the lack of adequate access to nutritious food on our own.
In December 2018, Ohio SNAP issuance was $165 million, which provided
supplemental food assistance benefits to 1.3 million Ohioans living in
660,000 Assistance Groups. These households received an average of
$124.48 in SNAP benefits per person, per month. Nearly \1/2\ (43
percent) were children.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ http://jfs.ohio.gov/pams/Case-Load-Summary-Report--December-
(002).stm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To get SNAP benefits, households must meet certain tests, including
resource and income tests. Benefits are limited to a person with net
income at or below 100% FPL (monthly net income of no more than $1,041
per month for a household of one and $1,409 for a household of two
people). The program also has work and work registration requirements
for everyone 16 to 60 years of age.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 2013, 1.8 million Ohioans were receiving SNAP to help
feed their families.i As of December 2018, enrollment had fallen to 1.3
million, a decline of more than 26 percent.ii

i ``Statement on the November 1st Cuts to the SNAP Program,''
Food Research and Action Center. http://frac.org/statement-on-the-
november-1st-cuts-to-the-snap-program/.
ii Ohio Association of Foodbanks analysis of Ohio Department of
Job and Family Services Public Assistance Monthly Statistics. http:/
/jfs.ohio.gov/pams/index.stm.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Beginning and Approach of Ohio's Work Experience Program in
Franklin County, Ohio
The association was approached in late 2013 by the Franklin County
Department of Job and Family Services (FC[D]JFS) to assist them in the
development of a process to screen and evaluate an estimated 12,000
Franklin County SNAP recipients that would be affected by the state's
decision to reimpose the ABAWD work requirement and time limit.
The goals of this partnership, which began as a pilot program, were
multifaceted, including not only assisting recipients in meeting the
Federal work requirement in order to maintain their food assistance,
but also providing them with meaningful work experience and job
training and enhancing their ability to secure sustainable employment
in order to become economically self-sufficient. To do that we needed
to understand the barriers and challenges these Ohioans already face.
The association developed and utilized a Work Experience Assessment
Portal to conduct in-depth, comprehensive interviews and assessments
designed to determine employability and identify barriers to
employment. The data collected included: age and gender demographics,
access to reliable transportation, methods of communication and
identification, housing and living situations, criminal history,
education completion, physical and mental health disabilities and
limitations, employment history, and dependent and family
relationships. These findings provided us with a deeper understanding
of the issues and challenges participants face and provided us a
framework for identifying and recruiting the types of community
organizations that we needed to partner with that could help and host
participants in order for them to meet the work requirements.
Our recruitment process for developing new sites involved calling,
mailing, e-mailing, and visiting numerous nonprofit and faith-based
organizations in Franklin County. Each organization is required to sign
a Memorandum of Agreement, establishing a strong partnership that also
holds these organizations accountable for reporting hours for clients.
The Work Experience Program Host sites (WEP) provided each participant
with a volunteer assignment intended to provide training, education,
and on-the-job work experience that would be beneficial in their search
for future employment. Some sites even report hiring WEP participants
at their organizations when they had open positions available.
Prior to the participants being placed at a WEP host site, they
were required to attend a three-part clinic to conduct an FBI/BCI
background check and meet with possible employers and other employment
service providers who helped secure identification, develop resumes,
and demonstrate job search opportunities.
After clients complete the assessment and attend the clinic,
participants are placed at a qualified WEP host site to complete their
monthly work requirement which allows them to maintain their SNAP
benefit eligibility for the duration of their participation.
Our interest in the ABAWD participants did not end when they exit
our program. We are concerned about the well-being and long-term
outcomes of our clients. The association conducted a post-WEP client
study to examine the course of clients after they exited the program.
The findings of this report provide information about post-
participation employment status and the most common causes of failure
to comply with mandated ABAWD work requirements and WEP involvement.
During the project's pilot period, from December 10, 2013 through
September 1, 2015, WEP Assessment Specialists completed in-depth
interviews with 4,827 ABAWD participants and gathered information from
5,434 self-reported employability and skills assessments. Over the
nearly 2 year pilot, the information obtained represents the most
comprehensive and up-to-date information collected about this
misunderstood population. These findings offer instructive, meaningful
insight into who these individuals are and what is required in order to
help address the barriers and challenges they face as they attempt to
secure stable employment. These findings have provided the association
with a framework that continues to guide our Work Experience Program
partnership with the Franklin County Department of Job and Family
Services that is now in its sixth year of operation.
ABAWD--``Able-Bodied''--Is a Complete Misnomer for Who This Population
Really Is
``Able-bodied'' indicates that clients are not medically certified
and/or documented as physically or mentally unfit for employment. As
part of the association's assessment, clients are asked to self-report
disabilities or limitations, both physical and mental. Our findings
identified elevated rates of participants with undiagnosed and
untreated mental and physical limitations and disabilities. Clients who
self-reported they were disabled with a physical or mental condition
that rendered them unable to work required access to a doctor or
medical professional who could provide the necessary documentation.
Other clients were clearly disabled and required more intensive support
services to complete an application for SSI or SSDI.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Nearly one in ten clients requested special accommodations such as
work assignments that require no heavy lifting, or no standing/walking
for long periods of time.
One in six clients reported that they had filed for Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).
Most Common Types of Physical and Mental Limitations Reported:

18.3 percent--Back Injuries

6.0 percent--Respiratory Difficulties

5.9 percent--Knee Injuries

3 percent--Diabetes

2.8 percent--Shoulder Injuries

2.5 percent--Arthritis

2.3 percent--Heart Conditions

10.1 percent--Depression

9.3 percent--Bipolar Disorder

8.1 percent--Anxiety

3.1 percent--Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

1.5 percent--Schizophrenia

According to the Ohio Department of Health, Adverse Childhood
Experiences (ACEs) are a critical public health issue. ACEs are
potentially traumatic experiences and events ranging from abuse and
neglect to witnessing violent behavior and living with someone who has
a problem with alcohol or drugs. Ohio is among five states where as
many as one in seven children have experienced three or more ACEs--a
significantly higher ratio than the national average.
The association's WEP Assessment Specialist reported when
conducting assessments that many participants appeared to be marginally
and functionally illiterate, and likely experiencing significant
learning disabilities. This prompts a deeper examination of social
promotion policies that may exist in schools.
Additionally, while assessing and observing clients, WEP
Specialists noted that many clients appeared to have social and/or
cognitive impairments, difficulty communicating, and a tendency to
engage in repetitive behaviors, all signs of autism spectrum disorder.
Since autism is a more recently identified disorder and has become a
well-recognized ailment effecting one out of every 68 kids, it is
highly likely that the ABAWD population may have high levels of
undiagnosed autism, and certainly warrants further exploration.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Client Story: Mary is a 22 year old part-time college student who is
studying to earn a Pharmacy Technician degree in hopes of one day
becoming a Pharmacist. She is the first in her family to go to college
and she has applied for and receives student loans that cover the cost
of her tuition, books, and housing. She also receives SNAP and Medicaid
benefits. Mary doesn't own a car and relies on public transportation
and catches rides with family and friends or she walks. Mary also helps
her mother care for younger sisters. Mary works for a large drug store
chain which is on a bus line near the school she attends. When she was
hired for the job, the store manager promised Mary she would work
between 20 and 26 hours per week. Mary adjusted her class schedule to
accommodate her work schedule, but unfortunately when the store sales
began to lag behind projections, Mary's hours were cut in half, causing
her to lose her SNAP benefits and leaving her with no way to feed
herself. She has been pleading with the store manager to schedule her
for additional hours, as this is a 24 hour/7 day a week store. Mary was
told that she would need to be on call, but there are no guarantees
that she will be called into work. The loss of SNAP benefits now
threaten Mary's dreams and hopes and she is considering dropping out of
school if she can't secure additional hours and regain her SNAP
benefits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Employment
There is limited employer demand for the ``hardest to employ''
groups, such as those with criminal records, lengthy periods of
unemployment, or other barriers to works.
Working 20 or more hours of paid employment per week, every week,
qualifies an ABAWD to receive SNAP. Unfortunately, many clients were
unable to identify how many hours they work per week because they are
employed through a temporary employment agency (including day labor and
labor pool agencies), which means clients may not have consistent work
on a weekly basis.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
11.3% Currently working
8.3% Working in-kind for rent or housing
24% Dismissed or fired from a job
------------------------------------------------------------------------

While some have described this population as ``takers''--our
research found that nearly eight in ten ABAWD clients have never been
eligible for unemployment compensation benefits.
Education
While the unemployment rate in Ohio is declining, clients in this
population may not meet the educational standards for the jobs becoming
available. Analyzing the statistics collected on education, we find how
limited the prospects are for clients to enter the workforce in a
position that will pay a sustainable living wage.
Thirty percent of clients have no high school diploma or GED.
Although 69.2 percent of clients have graduated from high school or
have earned a GED, only 38.1 percent have attended college.
A very small portion of clients (11 percent) who have attended
college went on to earn a degree.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
More than one million adults in Ohio do not have high school
diplomas. Ohio's Adult Basic Education Programs only have the capacity
to serve approximately 7,000 Ohioans each year.
https://obm.ohio.gov/Budget/operating/doc/fy-20-21/
BlueBook_BookOne_PBudgetRecommendations_FY20-21.pdf.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Transportation
Clients are supposed to receive a monthly travel stipend from their
FCDJFS caseworker. Many clients report that they have not received the
stipend. This could be due to an inaccurate mailing address, the
inability to contact their caseworker, or a delay in dispersing of
funds. Some clients report that the travel stipend is not enough to
cover travel to and from work sites. Some clients do not have bank
accounts and have to pay a service fee to cash the check they receive
from FCDJFS, leaving an insufficient amount to purchase a monthly bus
pass which the stipend should cover.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Suspended Driver's Licenses

In 2017, 1.1 million Ohioans had a suspended driver's license--
nearly 12 percent of those old enough to drive in the state. Some
suspensions have nothing to do with driving. If you don't pay your
child support, you can lose your license. You can also lose it for
dropping out of high school or getting caught smoking as a juvenile. It
can be suspended if you miss a court date or fail to pay court fines on
misdemeanor charges.
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/state--regional/ohio-fee-
amnesty-for-suspended-drivers-has-started-but-only-lasts-six-months/
5qQck20Vl2e3Mm EFRI1NTM/
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Just 57 percent of clients report they have reliable access to
transportation. This can be a personal vehicle, public transit, or
utilizing friends and family members for transportation.
Only 40 percent of clients have a valid driver's license, which
indicates that clients are either using public transportation or are
driving without a license. Some clients may not be able to obtain a
driver's license if they owe child support and have had their driving
privileges suspended, or if they have outstanding tickets or unpaid
fines which they may be unable to resolve with their limited income.
Fewer than one in five clients report having car insurance,
inferring that some are driving without insurance which can be
attributed to a variety of factors, including affordability.
One in four clients do not live near a bus stop or bus line.
About 15 percent of clients report they have been documented as
Driving Under the Influence (DUI) or Operating a Vehicle Impaired
(OVI). Having a DUI/OVI on an individual's driving record can affect
their ability to obtain employment or housing, result in higher car
insurance which they may be unable to afford, and/or lead to loss of
driving privileges.
Criminal History
As part of the assessment, clients are asked to complete an FBI/BCI
background check. An overwhelming 96 percent of clients agreed to
comply with this request. Clients who declined a background check do
not qualify to participate in WEP with the Ohio Association of
Foodbanks.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long-term impact of encounters with criminal justice system

People with criminal justice (CJ) system involvement are more likely
than the general population to face poverty, homelessness,
unemployment, and poor health conditions, even before arrest. For
example, people returning to their communities after incarceration are
three to six times more likely to be diagnosed with a mental illness
and about 50 percent experience chronic health conditions such as
asthma and hepatitis.
http://www.georgetownpoverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
Unworkable-Unwise-20190201.pdf.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Domestic violence can happen in any household regardless of
socioeconomic status, race, age, or any other demographically defining
factor. Studies show that domestic violence is three times as likely to
occur when couples are experiencing financial strain. 11.2 percent of
clients reported having domestic violence charges.
A history of criminal activity or previous incarceration can have a
tremendously negative impact on someone. They miss out on many
opportunities, job related or otherwise. The stigma of a felony
conviction can follow someone for a lifetime, even if their release is
meant to suggest that they have been rehabilitated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Client Story: At 15 years old, David was sentenced to 15 years in
prison. Now, at 30 he has been released and was eager to start his life
over. He was nervous during the assessment, but the WEP Specialist was
able to get him to relax as he told his story. Later, he called our
office to thank the Specialist for being so kind and understanding
during the assessment and for also believing in him. He was thrilled to
tell her that he learned to drive and is now enrolled at Columbus State
Community College.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

35.8 percent of the clients in our program have felony convictions;
some clients have multiple felonies, or a combination of felonies and
misdemeanors.
12.8 percent of clients are on probation or parole which means they
may not qualify for services offered through legal aid, such as record
sealing.
A recent report from the Kirwan Institute found that one in four
people incarcerated in the State of Ohio were between the ages 18 to
24. The incarcerated population from the 18 to 24 age group in Ohio has
grown nearly 70 percent in recent years. Prison intake data from
Franklin County indicate that the median age of first arrest for those
entering the state correctional system in 2012 was 19 years old.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Other Issues Facing the ABAWD Population
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Youth Aging Out of the Foster Care system

5 percent of the clients had aged out of the foster care system and
reported they were living with friends, in homeless shelters, or on the
street.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Homelessness and Housing

Clients experiencing homelessness, health problems, language
barriers and a lack of stable employment to fit their skill set make up
nearly 12.7 percent of clients who reported other barriers standing in
the way of employment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Non-Custodial Parents and Caregivers

According to the USDA definition of an ABAWD, it is assumed that all
clients do not have dependents. We found that clients with children,
although not in their custody, still spend time parenting their
children on a regular basis while the custodial parent works.
One in four clients (23.5 percent) indicated that they had children
not in their custody.
Nearly one in five clients (18 percent) indicated that they owe
child support.
An under-employed or unemployed noncustodial parent who loses SNAP
may need to divert his or her income from child support payments in
order to stay afloat financially. This would be devastating given that
child support represents more than \1/2\ of the income of the families
in poverty who receive it.
Having the status of caregiver to a relative should potentially
exempt an individual from the work requirement. Caregivers can often
replace the services of a Medicaid or Medicare home-healthcare
provider. Nearly 13 percent of clients indicated that they are
caregivers for a parent, friend, or relative.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Employment & Job Seeking Needs

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Client Story: Dahman speaks only Somali and requires an interpreter
or translator to fulfill his mandatory work activities and assignment.
He has no transportation and relies on public transportation. Dahman
returned to the JFS office attempting to find out about his food
assistance benefit. Dahman had a large open wound on his arm that is
draining, making it impossible for him to participate in any form of
activity. Unfortunately, his County caseworker had not changed his
employability plan or there had been an administrative delay in
updating his care record, causing him to be sanctioned and to lose his
SNAP benefits. Dahman was sent to a local food pantry to get food until
his case could be sorted out and a new WEP placement could be located
for him.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ohio Means Jobs Registration
In an effort to offer more job seeking resources to clients, they
are referred to Ohio Means Jobs (www.ohiomeansjobs.com). When asked if
clients were already registered with Ohio Means Jobs 74.1 percent
reported they were not registered, and most clients reported they have
never heard of the website.
Additional Barriers
To ensure a client is able to perform the duties assigned to them,
we inquire about any supportive services they may need to successfully
complete their work assignment. Over 15.7 percent of clients report
needing supportive services. The most common services requested were
language interpretation (especially for Somalian refugees) and help
with transportation.
Churn Rates Are High
When a client is no longer a participant in WEP due to a sanction,
they may need to apply for a state hearing to overturn their sanction.
Nearly 66 percent of clients reported taking this step to overturn
their sanction, or reapplied for food assistance in another way after
exiting WEP. It is estimated that there is a 3 month churn window,
which is the average amount of time it takes for WEP participants to
reenter SNAP after exiting the program.
The amount of churn generated by the most common causes of
noncompliance creates increased work as an average two out of every
three participants, including those who identified some form of
employment, must restart the entire process by reapplying through their
case worker for SNAP benefits.

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Food Sourcing Strategies of Clients Who No Longer Received SNAP
Benefits
If a client is not receiving food assistance due to a loss of SNAP
benefits, they look for food elsewhere. When asked, ``How are you
providing food for yourself in the absence of food benefits,'' clients
gave multiple answers to the question, reflecting an increased demand
on our emergency food network.
Conclusion
Based on our experience, we know that harsh and arbitrary time
limits are misguided and only increase hunger and hardship. This
proposed rule is harsh and unfair. It denies vulnerable people food
benefits at a time when they most need it and it does not result in
increased employment and earnings. By time-limiting food assistance to
this group, Federal law clearly intends to shift the burden of
providing food to these unemployed individuals off of SNAP and onto
states, cities, and local charities like ours. We can't meet the demand
for emergency food assistance now--this rule will make a bad situation
far worse. This rule will increase food insecurity among populations
that are suffering from a lack of services, opportunities, and access
to basic human needs.
These individuals face daunting challenges in finding employment
even when general unemployment rates are low. Our findings illustrate
why Congress gave states the option to waive the time limit in areas
where there are insufficient jobs for those subject to the rule.
Without providing any evidence to the contrary, the rule proposes to
limit the ways in which a state can demonstrate a lack of sufficient
jobs for the individuals subject to the time limit. It does this by
eliminating Labor Surplus Areas, low and declining employment-to-
population ratios, and seasonal unemployment, and requiring recent
unemployment rates to be at least seven percent. But the Department
fails to explain how it determined that the proposed new standards
relate to employment opportunities for those subject to the rule,
particularly given the significant barriers to employment facing this
population that I've just shared with you.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Proposed rule undermines existing law

The proposed rule would:

Take food away from 755,000 low-income Americans, cutting
food benefits by $15 billion over 10 years (based on the
Administration's own estimates).

Not result in improvements in health or employment among
the affected population (based on the Administration's own
estimates).

Fuel rates of hunger and poverty by denying vulnerable
people nutrition assistance at a time when they most need it.

Harm the economy, grocery retailers, and agricultural
producers by reducing the amount of SNAP dollars available to spur
local economic activity.

Sidestep Congress, which rejected these changes when it
enacted the 2018 Farm Bill.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department's commissioned reports as well as other research,
including the association's WEP program results, paint a clear picture
of individuals in this targeted group who have common characteristics
that distinguish the group from other unemployed adults. These
characteristics--including high poverty rates, health issues, and few
supports--make finding and keeping employment a unique challenge. The
Department simply asserts that the time limit will increase employment
for this population but does not acknowledge its own research showing
that this is not the case. While all aspects of the rule strike us as
arbitrary, this disconnect between the agency's basic knowledge of the
affected population and the assertions about how the proposed policy
would increase employment is particularly surprising.
Additionally, adequate work training slots do not exist even for
the ABAWDs already impacted by the work requirements as currently
imposed. This rule would subject hundreds of thousands of additional
people to a requirement to fulfill work training if unable to secure
paid employment, without acknowledging that availability of work
training slots is grossly inadequate.
In closing, the Department's proposed rule does not provide the
analytical information needed to justify the policy change and to
evaluate the proposed rule's likely impacts. Because of the
deficiencies in reasoning and analysis, the proposed rule fails to
answer basic questions related to the impact of the change and the
people whom the proposed rule would affect, and so does not contain the
information and data necessary to fully evaluate the proposed rule or
to comment on key aspects on the Department's justification for the
rule.
The proposed rule would increase food insecurity and poverty in
Ohio, as well as stifle economic activity. By scaling back one of the
nation's most effective poverty-reduction programs, the rule would
exacerbate hardship and reduce economic activity in areas that are
already economically disadvantaged compared to the rest of the country.
The proposed rule undermines states' ability to respond to economic
hardship. By imposing artificial definitions of what it means for an
area to ``lack sufficient jobs,'' the rule would undermine states'
discretion to provide hunger relief in economically disadvantaged
areas.
The intent of the proposed rule is not supported by evidence.
Though the USDA predicts that subjecting more SNAP recipients to work
requirements would result in higher workforce participation rates,
there is a lack of evidence to support this theory. In fact, existing
evidence suggests that SNAP enrollment improves employment outcomes.
The proposed rule would have a disparate impact on people of color
in Ohio. The rule would make it even more unlikely that Ohio counties
where people of color are concentrated would receive a time limit
waiver.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The Center for Community Solutions: Public Comment to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Food & Nutrition Service.

The Ohio Association of Foodbanks requests that USDA consider each
of these points and withdraw the proposed rule.
Attachment
Franklin County_Work Experience Program *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Work Experience Program, Ohio Association of Foodbanks, 101 E.
Town St. Ste, 540, Columbus, OH 43215, www.ohiofoodbanks.org,
614.221.4336.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comprehensive Report_Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents

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Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Assessment of ABAWDS in Franklin County
Age & Gender
Veteran Status
Communication
Criminal History
Forms of Identification
Transportation
Disabilities & Limitations
Children & Families
Education
Employment
Work Experience Program
WEP Volunteer Host Sites
Recommendations
Host Site Partner Organizations
Executive Summary
For almost 2 years, the Ohio Association of Foodbanks has been
assisting able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) receiving
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits in Franklin
County with meeting the Federal work requirement to maintain their food
assistance as part of an ongoing partnership with the Franklin County
Department of Job and Family Services (FCDJFS). The association has
been able to grow this Work Experience Program (WEP), offering more
services and resources to ABAWDs in need. WEP provides work experience
and job training for participants who are currently unemployed or
underemployed, as a means to enhance their ability to secure
sustainable employment.
Prior to assigning a client in a job placement within our network
of partner nonprofit and faith-based organizations, the association
meets with each ABAWD to perform an in-depth assessment. To date, we
have assessed close to 5,000 individuals. The data we have collected
through these assessments continue to reinforce what we have been able
to identify as key barriers for many of our clients as they seek
gainful employment. Our findings indicate that many of our clients
struggle with accessing reliable transportation, unstable living
situations, criminal records, education, and both physical and mental
health problems. Our deeper understanding of these issues has led us to
partner with organizations that can help ABAWDs navigate through many
of their challenges, giving our clients a better chance at improving
their lives and supporting themselves.
The data has prompted many recommendations to FCDJFS including but
not limited to: providing additional funding for programs that support
WEP participants and low-income households; expanding enrollment of
nationally certified educational programs as well as programs for youth
aging out of foster care; and creating an employment pipeline into
strategic aspects of the job market.
Assessment of ABAWDS in Franklin County
When Franklin County Department of Job and Family Services (FCDJFS)
caseworkers make the determination that a client receiving SNAP
benefits meets the criteria to be considered an able-bodied adult
without dependents (ABAWD) and is required to work under Federal
regulations, the client is referred to their local opportunity center
to meet with an Ohio Association of Foodbanks Work Experience Program
(WEP) assessment specialist. Each specialist completes a comprehensive
interview with each client using a series of questions on the Work
Experience Assessment Portal. The assessment is designed to determine
employability and identify barriers to employment.
The assessment process is part of an ongoing contract targeting
clients who are subject to a strict, 3 month time limit in every 36
month period for SNAP eligibility. As we approach the second
anniversary of this program, we have closely examined the data
collected from 4,827 ABAWDs and gathered from 5,434 self-reported
employability and skills assessments that took place between December
10, 2013 and September 1, 2015. Over the past 2 years the information
obtained for this ongoing project represents the most comprehensive and
up-to-date information collected about this misunderstood population.
These findings offer instructive, meaningful insight into who these
individuals are and what will be needed to address the barriers and
challenges faced by these individuals as they attempt to secure stable
employment.
Monthly Assessments

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The chart depicts the number of ABAWD assessments performed by
association staff for each month. Clients coming in for an initial
assessment each month appear in blue, second time visits in any given
month appear in orange, and clients who are completing the assessment
for the third or more times appear in gray.
Age & Gender
Gender & Age Distribution

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From the total population of 4,827 ABAWDs surveyed, 1,880 clients
(38.9%) were female, and 2,945 clients (61.0%) were male. Two clients
preferred to be identified as transgender.
The chart represents a distribution of the ABAWDs based on age and
gender. This distribution does not include the 507 clients (176 female
and 331 male) for which there was no age listed, nor does it include
the 83 clients (31 female and 52 male) who were over 50 at the time of
the assessment and therefore exempted from the program.
Veteran Status
Percentage of Clients Reporting Military Service

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Only 156 clients (3.2%) reported that they were veterans. While
veterans make up a relatively small percentage of all ABAWD clients,
they represent a significant portion of the male population over the
age of 35 as represented in the chart. As we encounter veterans, we are
able to help them find resources designated to assist them with
housing, employment, and shelter.
Communication
Communication is critical to clients participating in WEP, and
maintaining a reliable form of communication with clients has continued
to be a challenge as FCDJFS and the association communicate with
clients primarily by mail. Since we started collecting mailing
information in April 2014, 65 clients have indicated that they do not
have a mailing address, while 31 clients provided a mailing address and
identified themselves as homeless. Additionally, 152 clients have
provided a mailing address that is known to be a homeless shelter,
check-in center, or mental health facility.

Faith Mission (245 N Grant Ave ) 16 Clients

Friends of the Homeless (924 E. Main St.) 21 Clients

Open Shelter (61 E. Mound St.) 24 Clients

Holy Family Soup Kitchen and Shelter (57 S. Grubb St.) 17
Clients

Star House (1621 N. 4th) 4 Clients

YWCA (595 Van Buren) 17 Clients

YMCA (40 W. Long) 39 Clients

Southeast Community Mental Health Center (16 W. Long St.) 10
Clients

North Central Mental Health (1301 N. High St.) 4 Clients

This indicates that at least 248 clients (5.1%) of our ABAWD
clients are dealing with housing insecurity. These numbers do not
capture the homeless clients who provide the mailing address of a
relative or friend, and do not specifically identify that they are
homeless.
Types of Communication Reported
Communication Avenues

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4,625 clients (95.8%) listed phone numbers

1,800 clients (37.3%) listed e-mail addresses

4,381 clients (90.8%) listed mailing addresses

65 clients (1.3%) reported not having an address

380 clients (7.9%) were assessed before address information
was asked

While 95.8% of clients reported having phone numbers, this does not
mean that they have continuous access to a phone. Clients using
subsidized government provided cell phones often run out of wireless
minutes before the end of the month, or in many other cases their
personal phones have been disconnected, or phone numbers are frequently
changed due to using prepaid cellular devices. We can only assume that
if we are unable to contact clients via phone, potential employers are
also unable to reach them.
The association always offers clients the opportunity to register
for an e-mail address as a viable, dependable alternative to a phone.
Because most major employers require clients to fill out job
applications online, having an e-mail address is critical to the
application process. We encourage clients to visit their local
libraries to check their messages, but find that some clients may not
have reliable or readily available community-based access to the
Internet. In this process, we also find that many clients struggle with
using technology and computers.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Additional information gleaned from the 531 repeat ABAWD clients
reinforces our findings, and provides insight into other forms of
stable communication for this population. This 11% of ABAWD clients who
have taken the assessment more than once shows:

47% (253) have changed their phone number between
assessments

34% (181) have changed their addresses between assessments

This transiency can have real consequences for ABAWD clients who are
sanctioned (cut off from their benefits) because they did not receive
an appointment or assignment notice from FCDJFS which required action
to avoid a disruption in their benefits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Client Locations
While the clients who have reported addresses represent 58
different [ZIP C]odes in Franklin County, over 55% of clients come from
nine [ZIP C]odes:

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43223: 141 clients (7.0%)

43224: 140 clients (6.9%)

43211: 137 clients (6.8%)

43232: 133 clients (6.6%)

43204: 123 clients (6.1%)

43206: 117 clients (5.8%)

43207: 116 clients (5.7%)

43205: 112 clients (5.5%)

43219: 104 clients (5.1%)
Criminal History
As part of the ABAWD assessment, clients are asked if they are
willing to complete an FBI/BCI background check. Over 96% of clients
agree to comply with this request.
A history of criminal activity or previous incarceration can have
an incredibly damaging impact. The stigma of a felony conviction can
follow someone for a lifetime, even if their release is meant to
suggest that they have been rehabilitated. These restored citizens miss
out on many opportunities, job related or otherwise.

Over 35.8% of the clients in our program reported having a
felony conviction. Some clients have multiple felonies, or a
combination of felonies and misdemeanors.

Close to 12.8% of clients are on probation or parole which
means they may not qualify for services offered through legal
aid, such as record sealing.

541 clients (11.2%) have indicated that they have domestic
violence charges.

709 clients (14.7%) reported having DUI or OVI violation.
These types of violations can severely limit a client's ability
to secure employment.
Percentage of Clients Reporting Felonies

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Forms of ID
To apply for jobs, housing, and government benefits, to vote, or to
obtain a driver's license, most agencies usually require two forms of
Identification (ID). Because the association requires all participants
to have an FBI and BCI background check to be placed at one of our host
organizations we offer vouchers for clients to receive government
issued state IDs when they indicate that they do not already have an
ID.

4,578 clients (94.8%) have some form of state
Identification.

1,963 (40.7%) of clients have indicated that they have
a driver's license.

2,615 have indicated that their primary form of
identification is a state ID.

206 clients 4.3% indicated that they did not have any
form of state identification.

4,369 clients (90.5%) reported having access to their Social
Security card.

370 clients (7.7%) do not have access to their Social
Security card.

3,969 clients (82.2%) reported having access to their birth
certificate.

An additional 752 (15.6%) do not have a birth
certificate.
Forms of ID

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Transportation
To assist with transportation, clients receive a monthly travel
stipend from FCDJFS in the form of a $62 check. Many clients report
that they have not received the travel stipend. This could be due to an
inaccurate mailing address, the inability to contact their caseworker,
or a delay in dispersing of funds. Some clients report that the travel
stipend is not enough to cover travel to and from work sites. Some
clients do not have bank accounts and have to pay a service fee to cash
the check they receive from FCDJFS, leaving an insufficient amount to
purchase a monthly bus pass which the stipend should cover.
2,749 clients (57.0%) said they have access to reliable
transportation, whether it is their own vehicle, the COTA bus system,
or a ride from friends and family members. It is important to note that
the use of a friend or family member's vehicle may not always be
reliable. Owning a vehicle may pose its own challenges for low-income
populations, as the car could break down and the client may not have
the means to fix it.

40% of clients said they do not have reliable
transportation.

3,565 clients (73.9%) indicated that they live near a bus
stop.

610 clients (12.6%) indicated that they did not live near a
bus stop.

Only 40% of clients indicated that they have a valid
driver's license, which indicates that clients are either using
public transportation or are driving without a license.

Some clients may not be able to obtain a driver's
license if they owe child support and have had their
driving privileges suspended, or if they have outstanding
tickets or unpaid fines which they may be unable to resolve
with their limited income.

904 clients (18.7%) indicated that they did have car
insurance.

An additional 3,232 clients (67.0%) indicated that
they did not have car insurance, inferring that some are
driving without insurance which can be attributed to a
variety of factors, including affordability. As it is the
law to maintain car insurance for any vehicles owned, some
clients could be making the tough choice to pay for
utilities, food, or medicine instead of car insurance.
Disabilities & Limitations
``Able-bodied'' indicates that clients should not be medically
certified and documented as physically or mentally unfit for
employment. As part of the assessment, clients are asked to self-report
disabilities or limitations, both physical and mental.

598 ABAWD clients (12.4%) have self-reported a disability.
Of these clients, 261 clients (44%) have indicated that they
are not able to work and earn $1,010 a month, which could make
them eligible for disability benefits.

74 clients (12%) indicated that they are able to work
and earn $1,010 per month.
Percentage of Clients Reporting Disability

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1 in 3 ABAWD clients (32.5%) have self-reported some type of
physical or mental limitation. Of these clients, 25% (392) have
indicated that their condition limits their ability to perform
daily activities.

70.3% (1,102) indicated some type of physical limitation.

30.1% (471) indicated some type of mental limitation.

Most Common Types of Physical and Mental Limitations Reported:

Back Injuries 18.3% Depression 10.1%
Respiratory Bipolar Disorder 9.3%
Difficulties 6.0%
Knee Injuries 5.9% Anxiety 8.1%
Diabetes 3% Post-Traumatic Stress
Arthritis 2.5% Disorder (PTSD) 3.1%
Shoulder Injuries 2.8% Schizophrenia 1.5%
Heart Conditions 2.3%

Additionally, a small percentage of clients reported physical
difficulties due to crimes of violence.

27 reported physical difficulties as the result of gunshot
wounds.

4 clients reported physical difficulties as the result of
stab wounds.
Physical or Mental Limitations

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Social Security and Health Care
One in five ABAWD clients (18.6%) have reported filing for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI). Of these clients, most have reported filing in the
last 2 years:

82 (9%) reported filing in 2015

333 (37%) reported filing in 2014

155 (17%) reported filing in 2013

114 (13%) applied in 2012

223 (25%) applied in 2011 or earlier

One in four clients (25.0%) indicated said they were under a
doctor's care, and 1,347 clients (27.9%) indicated that they were
currently on medications.
Nearly six in ten clients (58.2%) have reported already applying
for Medicaid, although all clients may be eligible to receive this
expanded necessary health coverage due to their low-income status.
1,950 clients (40.4%) said they had not applied for Medicaid. As part
of our outreach process, we invite health care navigators to our
monthly WEP events to help clients sign up for health coverage.
Children & Families
According to the USDA definition of an ABAWD, it is assumed that
all clients do not have dependents. We found that clients with
children, although not in their custody, still spend time parenting
their children on a regular basis while the custodial parent works.

1 in 4 clients (23.5%) indicated that they had children not
in their custody.

868 clients (18.0%) indicated that they owe child support.

86 clients (1.8%) indicated that they need childcare.

Having the status of caregiver to a relative should potentially
exempt an individual from participating in WEP. Caregivers can often
replace the services of a Medicaid or Medicare home-healthcare
provider. 618 clients (12.8%) indicated that they are caregivers for a
parent, friend, or relative.
Education
Percentage of Clients Reporting Not Completing HS or GED

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Many of the clients in this population have not earned a degree or
certification to work in industries that pay more than entry level
wages.

3,342 clients (69.2%) report having earned a high school
diploma or GED.

1,424 (29.5%) of clients report never having graduated high
school.

Of those students that did not earn a GED or high school diploma:

121 (2.5%) report having attended last in the 12th grade

404 (8.4%) report having attended last in the 11th grade

316 (6.5%) report having attended last in the 10th grade

190 (3.9%) report having attended last in the 9th grade

86 (1.8%) report having left school before high school

5 clients (0.1%) report never having attended school before
College Education
Of the students who earned either a high school diploma or GED, an
additional 1,324 (28%) attended college, and an additional 520 (11%)
earned some type of degree or certification.
Highest Level of Education of ABAWD Clients

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Employment
Working 20 or more hours of paid employment per week, every week
can exempt an ABAWD from participating in WEP.

547 clients (11.3%) indicated that they are currently
working.

16 clients (2.9%) indicate that they are working less
than 10 hours per week

62 clients (11.3%) indicate that they are working 10-
20 hours per week

75 clients (13.7%) indicate that they are working 20-
30 hours per week

34 clients (6.2%) indicate that they are working 30-40
hours per week

23 clients (4.2%) indicate that they are working over
40 hours a week

337 clients (61.1%) did not indicate how many hours
they were working

At least 91 clients (1.9%) reported that they generally work for
temporary employment agencies (including day labor and labor pool
agencies). These clients may be unable to identify how many hours they
work per week due to inconsistent scheduling and availability of
consistent job assignments. Because of this, clients may not be able to
regularly fulfill the 20 hour work requirement to qualify for an
exemption.
Most Common Employment Industry

Warehouse Work (including pick/pack, forklift)

Customer Service

Food Service (including fast food, restaurants, cooking, and
food preparation)

Janitorial and Cleaning

Construction (including carpentry, masonry, drywall, and
electric)
Employment History
Having gaps in a resume can influence an employer's decision in the
hiring process, which can negatively impact a client's chances of
obtaining employment. Of the 4,284 clients who reported the time since
they were last employed, 1,579 (36.8%) reported working last sometime
within the current year. An additional 1,216 clients (28.4%) reported
working last in the previous year, 665 clients (15.5%) reported working
last within the last 2-3 years, 429 (10.1%) reported working last
within 4-6 years, 204 (4.8%) reported working last within the last 7-10
years, 109 clients (2.5%) reported working last between 11-15 years, 34
clients (0.7%) reported working last within the last 16-20 years, 12
clients (0.3%) reported working last over 20 years ago, and 36 clients
(0.8%) reported having never worked before.
Year Client was Last Employed

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In-Kind Work
Just as traditional employment can exempt a client from
participating in WEP, in-kind work may qualify clients from an
exemption as well. 402 clients (8.3%) reported working in-kind for food
or housing.

67 clients (16.7%) reported working less than 10 hours per
week

84 clients (20.9%) reported working 10 to 19 hours per week

82 clients (20.4%) reporting working 20 to 29 hours per week

21 clients (5.2%) reported working 30 to 39 hours per week

28 clients (7.0%) reported working 40 or more hours per week

120 clients (29.8%) did not report the number of hours they
were working per week
Employment Assistance
The ABAWD assessment screens for additional assistance or equipment
clients may need to perform tasks at their worksite.

435 clients (9.0%) indicated that they needed special
accommodations at their worksite in order to do a job. The most
commonly requested accommodations were no heavy lifting and no
standing or walking for long periods of time.

757 clients (15.7%) indicated that they need supportive
services to obtain employment. The most commonly requested
services were language interpretation (especially for Somalian
refugees) and help with transportation.
Workforce Development
In an effort to offer more job seeking resources to clients, they
are referred to Ohio Means Jobs (www.ohiomeansjobs.com). 7 in 10
clients indicated that they were not registered to work through Ohio
Means Jobs website. This shows that the outreach for the Ohio Means
Jobs website has been ineffective in reaching this population.
We assist clients with creating resumes so they are able to take
them to career fairs and apply for jobs that require resumes.

2,594 clients (53.8%) indicated that they did not have a
current resume.

2,183 clients (45.2%) indicated that they would like help to
write or update their resume.

2,410 clients (49.9%) indicated that they were not
interested in help to write or update their resume.
Unemployment Compensation Benefits
Many job applications ask if applicants have ever been fired or
dismissed from a previous position. One in four clients (24.0%)
reported having been previously fired or dismissed from a job. When
this question appears on a job application it can be a deterrent for
employers to hire an applicant.
We inquire if clients have ever received unemployment compensation
benefits, as this can qualify them for an exemption in participating in
WEP if they are still receiving it. Nearly eight in ten clients (78.3%)
reported that they have never received unemployment compensation
benefits.

886 clients (18.4%) reported that they are receiving or have
received unemployment compensation, ranging in time from 1984
to February 2015.
Work Experience Program
Immediate program goals for WEP participants are to actively ensure
viable work opportunities for ABAWDs in Franklin County to fulfill the
work requirement to maintain their SNAP benefits and prepare ABAWDs for
reentry into the workforce. The long-term goals and objectives for WEP
participants are focused on decreasing unemployment among Franklin
County ABAWDs to break systemic cycles of poverty and hunger and ensure
clients can become economically self-sufficient.
Consistent Outreach

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During the initial ABAWD assessment at the FCDJFS opportunity
centers, clients are given information about job openings and job fairs
in Franklin County. When we find that one of the many barriers the
assessment is meant to capture is stifling a client in their attempt to
secure employment, we refer them to clothing banks, resources for
homelessness, mental health facilities, educational opportunities, and
food pantries.
All new clients are required to attend a WEP employment and
resource fair their first month in the program. We bring together
employers (with assistance from FCDJFS Workforce Development and
Franklin County Economic Development), health care navigators and
certified application counselors, Legal Aid Society of Columbus
lawyers, workforce development agencies, GED and adult education or
vocational training organizations, and many more stakeholders to ensure
we are able to offer clients a variety of valuable services.
At this event, clients also receive a required background check for
their job placements. They participate in hands-on activities and
receive assistance with filling out job applications and creating or
updating resumes, assistance with using computers, and referrals to
obtain suiting for job interviews.
WEP Volunteer Host Sites
Type of Host Sites

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The recruitment process for developing new sites involves calling,
mailing, e-mailing, and visiting numerous nonprofit and faith-based
organizations in Franklin County. Each organization is required to sign
a Memorandum of Agreement, establishing a strong partnership that also
holds these organizations accountable for reporting hours for clients.
Each volunteer experience through WEP is intended to give
participants training, education, or experience that would be
beneficial in an ABAWD's search for future employment. Some sites even
report hiring WEP workers when they have open positions available.
A list of possible volunteer roles could include but is not limited
to:

Janitorial Work

Painting

Grounds Maintenance & Landscaping

Warehouse Positions

Office and Clerical Work

Manual Labor

Customer Service

Food Preparation and Service

``One of our WEP clients began working at the Broad Street
Food Pantry in October 2014 as part of the Ohio Association of
Foodbanks Work Experience Program. From the time she started,
she demonstrated excellent work ethics--never missing a day,
always working hard and making sure that customers were served
efficiently, the shelves kept full, and the pantry kept clean
and neat. Last winter when our assistant moved on to another
job, our WEP client was one of the first candidates we
identified. After a thorough search, we hired her for the
permanent position.''
Kathy Kelly-Long, Broad Street Food Pantry Director.

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WEP participants paint a mural at Fusion Bakery and Cafe.
Placements
Our network of nonprofits, workforce development partners, and
faith-based organizations make it possible for Franklin County ABAWDs
to obtain their required work hours through volunteer service or job
readiness activities, while also offering work experience. Placements
are made at these organizations after clients have completed a
background check at the WEP monthly employment and resource fair.
The Ohio Association of Foodbanks requires clients to have a
background check to ensure that we are not placing clients in
situations that may compromise the integrity of our partners, and to
protect their clients and staff in the event of a known conflict of
interest. Clients are not eligible to be placed at a volunteer host
site until their FBI/BCI background check is received.
Through the assessment process we gather an inventory of job skills
from each clients. We are able to determine what jobs would best suit
that client, and strategically place them at sites where we believe
they will thrive. We do make accommodations for any client that is
already volunteering in the community, and make an attempt to bring
their volunteer site on as a host organization so that the client can
maintain their relationship with that organization.
AB[A]WD Placement Compliance
At times, it can be very difficult to place clients at a volunteer
site. If the host location is not on the bus line or if it is not
easily accessible by public transportation, clients can have a hard
time getting to their placement. Some host sites even require a college
education or degree, which many of our clients do not have. Some sites
have a list of restricted felonies which would limit a large portion of
our clients from volunteering with those sites. The same is true for
workforce development programs. Many clients do not meet the minimum
education requirements to enroll in such programs, or struggle with
passing an entrance exam.
The Ohio Association of Foodbanks placement specialist makes every
effort to place all clients, no matter how limiting their personal
situations may be. Even with the best effort to make sure that a
client's skills match the site's needs, and that the location is less
than an hour bus ride from their address, not all clients report to
their assigned placements each month. In order for a client to remain
compliant with WEP they must report to their worksite for 23 hours per
month. When a client fails their work requirement hours they are
sanctioned and at risk of losing their monthly SNAP benefits.
ABAWD Placement Compliance

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Recommendations
As we bring light to the situations this population faces, we are
able to make the following insightful recommendations which are
supported by the findings of the WEP assessment data. These
recommendations have been presented to FCDJFS after the first analysis
of this information. They are meant to encourage other government
organizations to consider a further examination of the implication of
programs like WEP.
Program Next Steps
The specific program needs of the Ohio Association of Foodbanks
will enhance the overall client experience while strengthening
relationships with our partners.

Coordinate with other Departments of Job and Family Services
statewide in an effort to replicate the positive results we
have seen in Franklin County, to expand this program to other
metro and rural areas.

Increase the efficiency of our program in order to enhance
client satisfaction and success while working with very limited
resources.

Coordinate with Franklin County to offer more opportunities
for clients to connect with available employment and training.

Improve quality assurance measures and outcomes as well as
communication channels between the Ohio Association of
Foodbanks, clients, host sites, and Franklin County Department
of Job and Family Services.
Increase Oversight To Improve Effectiveness
Analyze the expenditures of Workforce Development Programs
funded by FCDJFS compared to outcomes. WEP at the Ohio
Association of Foodbanks has proven a 24% success rate,
compared to a 16% success rate of similar government funded
workforce programs in Franklin County.
Provide Additional Funding to Organizations Supporting WEP
When clients fail a WEP assignment and do not have access to
their food stamp benefits, they may begin utilizing the
services of their local emergency food programs. This warrants
more emergency funding to be provided to Mid-Ohio Foodbank to
support the purchase, acquisition, and distribution of
additional food for Franklin County food pantries, soup
kitchens, shelters, and churches who are feeding the
individuals affected.

Ut[il]ize banked months of exemptions (estimated at 405,000)
to re-enroll participants in the food assistance program while
Departments of Job and Family Services work to establish
additional work experience program infrastructure.

Provide additional funding to the Ohio Association of
Foodbanks to support the cost of emergency vouchers for
transportation, travel vouchers, and basic needs.

To increase interest in becoming a part of the host site
network, there needs to be more incentive for organizations to
serve ABAWDs through WEP. By offering operating support to the
nonprofit and faith-based organizations that are providing WEP
services and slots, we can motivate more sites to partner with
the Ohio Association of Foodbanks, while current sites may be
able to effectively increase their capacity to serve more
ABAWDs.

Provide supplemental support for the continuation,
expansion, and analysis of workforce development programs
operated by the Ohio Association of Foodbanks for young adults
aging out of the foster care system. All youth who successfully
complete these programs either enroll in school or start
working, which in many cases exempts them from partic[i]pating
in WEP as ABAWDs.

Improve the funding and training of a specialized unit
dedicated to the implementation of this work requirement and
the ABAWD population's specific needs.
Study the Social and Economic Impact of WEP
Monitor and report on the impacts to well-being, health, and
safety of clients, WEP host site staff/volunteers, and the
community at large.

Conduct an Economic Impact Analysis on the loss of food
assistance/SNAP benefit issuance on the Franklin County
economy.

Provide funding for comprehensive case-management,
longitudinal tracking of employment, wages, public assistance
participation, and well-being of the ABAWD population.
Provide More Work Support Opportunities for ABAWDs
Expand enrollment, participation, and successful completion
of nationally certified programs such as the FastPath program
at Columbus State Community College, including ServSafe,
customer service, advanced logistics, and STNA.

Create an employment enterprise or pipeline into strategic
aspects of the job market. This will help harder-to-employ
individuals find opportunities to gain sustainable employment.

Prioritize Workforce Investment Act funding to provide
education, training, and supportive services to ensure a
seamless delivery of services.

Establish a relationship with the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction in order to address the specific
concerns of the employer community in regard to the future
employment of felons.

Examine opportunities to secure additional USDA/SNAP
Employment and Training funds to enhance service delivery.
Examine and Evaluate the Needs of Special Populations
Provide support and funding for a study on the mental and
physical health status and outcomes of the ABAWD population and
their utilization of Medicaid.

Fund person-centered, community-based case management of
ABAWDs applying for SSI/SSDI, and supportive services including
Legal Aid assistance to non-custodial parents and individuals
with criminal charges and felony convictions.

Convene a study group to examine the impact of temporary and
day labor employment services and its effects on this
population.

The Ohio Association of Foodbanks will continue to analyze
assessments and data including current and previous encounters
with the criminal justice system, community impact, and these
associated costs.
Host Site Partner Organizations
Without the support of our wonderful network of nonprofit and
faith-based organizations we could not offer so many meaningful
volunteer opportunities to ABAWDs in Franklin County. We extend our
sincere gratitude to each organization for their continued partnership
and dedication to serving the community.

Agora Ministries J. Ashburn, Jr. Youth Center
Authority of the Believers King Arts Complex MLK
Beatty Recreation Center Kingdom Alive Word Church
Brice UMC Libraries for Liberia Foundation
Bridge Community Center Long Lasting Community Development
Broad Street Food Pantry Loving Hands Learning Center
Broad Street UMC Lutheran Social Services Ohio
Benefit Bank--South
Calhoun Memorial Temple Lutheran Social Services Ohio
Benefit Bank--West
Cat Welfare Association Magic Johnson Bridgescape Academy--
New Beginnings
Catique Mock Rd University for Children
Center for Family Safety National Parkinson Foundation
Central & Southeast OH
Chalmers P. Wylie VA Ambulatory New Salem Baptist Church and
Care Center Community Development
Charitable Pharmacy of Central NNEMAP, Inc.
Ohio, Inc.
Child Development Council of Ohio Association of Foodbanks
Franklin County
Christ Harvest Church Ohio Business Development Center
City of Whitehall Ohio Empowerment Coalition
Clintonville Beechwold Pri-Value Foundation
Colony Cats (& dogs) Project Redeem
Columbus Arts Technology Academy R.F. Hairston Early Learning Center
Columbus Chosen Generation Reeb-Hossack Community Baptist
Ministries Church
Columbus Growing Collective Seven Baskets Community Development
Corp
Columbus Humanities Arts & Shiloh Christian Center
Technology Academy
Columbus Urban League Short North Stage at The Garden
Theater
Community Kitchen, Inc. Society Of St. Vincent De Paul
Core Resource Center, Inc. Soldiers of Life Food Pantry
East Columbus Development Company Somali Bantu Youth Community of
Ohio
EL Hardy Center Southeast Friends of the Homeless
Family Missionary Baptist Church Southeast, Inc.
Franklinton Gardens St. Dominic Roman Catholic Church
Genesis of Good Samaritans St. Marks United Methodist Church
Ministries
Glory Praise & Help Center St. Philip Episcopal Church Food
Pantry
Greater Ebenezer Cathedral of St. Stephens Community House
Praise and Kingdom Kids Daycare
Habitat for Humanity's ReStore Stoddart Avenue Community Garden
Hands On Central Ohio Temple Israel
Heart Food Pantry Trinity Assembly
Heart of Christ Community Church United House of Prayer
Helping Hands Health And Wellness Unity of Columbus
Center, Inc.
Holy Family Soup Kitchen Welcome Home Ohio
House of Refuge for All People Wesley Church of Hope UMC
HUB Community Development
Corporation

The Chair. Thank you very much. Dr. Shambaugh.

STATEMENT OF JAY C. SHAMBAUGH, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, THE HAMILTON
PROJECT, AND SENIOR FELLOW, ECONOMIC STUDIES, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION; PROFESSOR OF
ECONOMICS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dr. Shambaugh. Chair Fudge, Ranking Member Johnson, and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to join
in this important discussion. My name is Jay Shambaugh. I serve
as the director of The Hamilton Project, the Senior Fellow of
Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution, and as a
professor of economics at George Washington University. I am
here to provide evidence regarding SNAP, a program that lifts
millions of Americans out of poverty, reduces food insecurity,
improves economic security, and acts as a crucial fiscal
automatic stabilizer.
Research shows that SNAP is a highly effective program. It
also shows that work requirements keep people out of the SNAP
Program, but have little or no impact on work. The proposed
rule takes a number of steps to reduce the flexibility of
states in using waivers or exemptions from work requirements.
The proposed rule and its impact analysis are correct, that the
changes will reduce SNAP participation, but provide literally
zero evidence that the changes would increase employment.
Agencies may change regulations when there is compelling
public need and when benefits outweigh costs. In my remaining
time, I would like to highlight three areas where the proposed
rule fails to meet this standard.
First, in theory, work requirements are in place to
motivate those who do not want to work to do so. But very few
ABAWDs on SNAP, 1.4 percent, are ``not interested'' in working.
The vast majority are, in fact, in the labor force. However,
their labor market experience, as is true for many low paid
workers, is highly unstable as participants tend to cycle in
and out of full-time employment.
In the research I have conducted with my Brookings
colleague, Lauren Bauer, which has been provided to the
Committee, we find that 75 percent of ABAWDs over 2 years are
labor force participants. Over \1/3\ of those in the labor
force would satisfy the work requirements at some points in
time, but not at other points in time over that 2 year window,
almost as many would consistently satisfy the work requirement.
Of those who generally work but sometimes do not, the
majority are not working due to ``work related reasons.'' That
is, they lost a job or couldn't get enough hours in a given
month to satisfy the work requirement. We also find that the
title ``able-bodied'' is a misnomer for some of this group, as
80 percent of ABAWDs who were not in the labor force at all
over the 2 year window list health and disability as the reason
they are not working. These are people who should be eligible
for exemptions but could fail to receive them.
Based on the characteristics of the targeted population,
the Federal Government should not be impeding states' ability
to apply for waivers from work requirements in areas where
there is evidence of a lack of sufficient jobs or limiting
states' ability to use exemptions to address individual cases.
Second, the proposed rule fails to consider the effect of
the proposed changes in the face of a deteriorating economy.
Consider that when the economy was shedding 300,000 jobs a
month in 2008, states successfully applied for waivers to work
requirements statewide or for distressed regions using
geographies and indicators that USDA would deem invalid under
the proposed rule. Our analysis provided to the Committee
demonstrates that the rule would have reduced waiver
eligibility early in the Great Recession.
In 2008, the State of Ohio was granted a work requirement
waiver for the entire state for 2 years. By the proposed rule,
Ohio could not apply for the statewide waiver, the 20 percent
rule they used would be compromised by an excessively high
unemployment rate floor, and the extended time period granted
would be denied. Our submitted analysis shows the proposed rule
takes a waiver system that is already too slow to respond to an
economic downturn and makes it worse.
Last, the goal of the proposed rule is to incentivize work,
but the consequences of the rule is to, in fact, incentivize
ABAWDs to reside in distressed economies if they want to avoid
time limits. Work requirements are applied to places of
residence. Individuals wanting to move to places with a
stronger economy would risk their food resources because they
would suddenly face work requirements. Reducing the statewide
or geographic grouping waivers could lower labor mobility.
In conclusion, the evidence recommends against expanding
work requirements, whether through restricting states' ability
to apply for waivers or extending exposure to sanction to
parents or older Americans. There are better ways to encourage
work within the SNAP Program, such as adjusting the earnings
disregard, expanding wrap-around services, and improving
training and placement. There are also better ways to improve
waiver eligibility, such as automatically granting waivers in
the event Congress authorizes emergency unemployment
compensation. These reforms would strengthen and support SNAP
as well as the economy.
I am also happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Shambaugh follows:]

Prepared Statement of Jay C. Shambaugh, Ph.D., Director, The Hamilton
Project, and Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution;
Professor of Economics, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Chair Fudge, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to join this important discussion
regarding the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Proposed Rule: SNAP
Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents.
My name is Jay Shambaugh, and I serve as the Director of The
Hamilton Project and as a Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at the
Brookings Institution and a Professor of Economics at George Washington
University. I am here to provide evidence regarding SNAP, a program
that lifts millions of Americans out of poverty, reduces food
insecurity, improves economic security, and acts as a crucial fiscal
automatic stabilizer.
Research shows that SNAP is a highly effective program. It also
shows that work requirements keep people out of the SNAP program but
have little or no impact on work. The proposed rule takes a number of
steps to reduce the flexibility of states in using waivers or
exemptions from work requirements. The USDA's Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and its Regulatory Impact Analysis are correct that the
changes will reduce SNAP participation, but provide no evidence that
the changes would increase employment.
Agencies, such as USDA, may issue regulations when there is a
compelling public need and when the benefits outweigh the costs. In my
remaining time, I would like to highlight three areas where the
proposed rule fails to meet this standard.

(1) The proposed rule ignores the reality of the population that
receives SNAP and the volatility they face within the labor
market.

In theory, work requirements are in place to motivate those who do
not want to work to do so. But very few ABAWDs on SNAP, 1.4 percent,
are ``not interested in working.'' The vast majority are in the labor
force. However, the labor market experience of SNAP participants--as it
is for many low-paid workers--is highly unstable, and participants tend
to cycle in and out of full-time employment.
In research that I have conducted with my Brookings colleague
Lauren Bauer, which has been provided to the Committee, we find that 75
percent of ABAWDs are labor force participants. Over \1/3\ of those in
the labor force would satisfy the work requirements at some points but
not at others over a 2 year window, almost as many as would
consistently satisfy them. Of those who generally work but sometimes do
not, the majority don't work due to ``work related reasons.'' That is,
they lost a job or couldn't get enough hours. We also find that the
title ``Able-bodied'' is a misnomer given that 80 percent of ABAWDs who
were not in the labor force said it was due to health and disability;
these are people who should be eligible for exemptions but could fail
to receive them.
Based on the characteristics of the targeted population, the
Federal Government should not be impeding states' ability to apply for
waivers from work requirements in areas where there is evidence of a
lack of sufficient jobs or limiting states' ability to use exemptions
to address individual cases.

(2) The proposed rule fails to consider the effect of proposed
changes in the face of a deteriorating economy.

USDA's proposed rule and Regulatory Impact Analysis also fail to
weigh the detrimental effect of their proposal during economic
downturns. Consider that when the economy was shedding 300,000 jobs a
month in 2008, states successfully applied for waivers to work
requirements state-wide or for distressed regions using geographies and
indicators that the USDA would deem invalid under the proposed rule.
Our analysis shows the rule would have reduced waiver eligibility early
in the Great Recession.
For example, in 2008, the State of Ohio was granted a work
requirement waiver for the entire state for 2 years. By the proposed
rule, Ohio could not apply for a statewide waiver, the 20 percent rule
they used would be compromised by an excessively high unemployment rate
floor, and the extended time period granted based on evidence of dire
economic conditions would be denied.
Our submitted analysis shows the proposal takes a waiver system
that is already too slow to respond to an economic downturn and makes
it even worse.

(3) This proposed rule could reduce labor mobility and trap people
in areas with less economic opportunity.

The goal of the proposed rule is to incentivize work, but the
consequence of the rule is to incentivize ABAWDs to reside in
distressed economies if they want to avoid time limits. Work
requirements are applied to the place of residence. Individuals wanting
to move to places with a stronger economy would risk their food
resources because they would suddenly face work requirements. Reducing
statewide or geographic grouping waivers could lower labor mobility.
In conclusion, the evidence recommends against expanding work
requirements, whether through restricting states' ability to apply for
waivers or extending exposure to sanction to parents or older
Americans. There are better ways to encourage work within the SNAP
program, such as adjusting the earnings disregard, expanding wrap-
around services, and improving training and placement. There are also
better ways to improve waiver eligibility, such as automatically
granting waivers in the event that Congress authorizes Emergency
Unemployment Compensation. These reforms would support and strengthen
SNAP as well as the economy.
Attachment
Good Afternoon:

Thank you for inviting me to testify before the Nutrition
Subcommittee on the topic ``Examining the ABAWD Rule and its Impact on
Hunger and Hardship.'' My written testimony is attached.
For your reference, you will also find recent Hamilton Project
research regarding this issue that we submit for the record, including:
Comment on USDA's Proposed Work Requirement Rules: In response to
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Lauren Bauer, Jana Parsons, and Jay Shambaugh analyze the effect of
changing eligibility for work requirement waivers on coverage over time
and describe the characteristics and employment statuses of Able-Bodied
Adults without Dependents. In this comment, we provide evidence and
analysis that the USDA has proposed a rule that is arbitrary, that the
rule runs counter to the compelling public need for waivers to work
requirements during economic downturns, and that the rule fails to
consider much less prove that the benefits to participants and the
economy outweigh the costs.
Work Requirements and Safety Net Programs: In this paper, Lauren
Bauer, Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, and Jay Shambaugh describe who
would be impacted by an expansion of work requirements in SNAP and an
introduction of work requirements into Medicaid. We find that most SNAP
and Medicaid participants who would be exposed to work requirements are
attached to the labor force, but that a substantial share would fail to
consistently meet a 20 hours per week threshold. Among persistent labor
force non-participants, health issues are the predominant reason given
for not working. There may be some subset of SNAP and Medicaid
participants who could work, are not working, and might work if they
were threatened with the loss of benefits. This paper adds evidence to
a growing body of research that shows that this group is very small
relative to those who would be sanctioned under the proposed policies
who are already working or are legitimately unable to work.
For more than a decade The Hamilton Project has produced evidence-
based policy proposals on how to create a growing economy that benefits
more Americans. We believe this can be accomplished by promoting
strong, sustainable, long-term economic growth; recognizing the
mutually reinforcing roles of economic security and economic growth;
and, embracing a role for effective government in making needed public
investments.
We welcome the opportunity to share more of our research and policy
proposals with you. Your staff can contact me at [Redacted] or
[Redacted] as well as The Hamilton Project's Managing Director Kriston
McIntosh at [Redacted] or [Redacted].
Warm regards,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Jay Shambaugh,
Director, The Hamilton Project;
Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution.
attachment 1
March 28, 2019

Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture
7 CFR Part 273
Docket Number: FNS-2018-0004
Docket RIN 0584-AE57

Certification Policy Branch, Program Development Division,
Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
3101 Park Center Drive,
Alexandria, Virginia 22302

To whom it may concern:

We are writing in response to the Department of Agriculture's
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) regarding Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults with Dependents
(Docket ID FNS-2018-0004).
Given that SNAP is a highly effective automatic stabilizer,
proposals that change the conditions by which economically distressed
places become eligible for work requirement waivers should be held to
the highest evidentiary standards.
This comment summarizes and provides evidence relevant to the
rulemaking. The USDA's Proposed Rule does not meet an evidentiary
standard and would weaken SNAP's responsiveness to an economic downturn
without increasing labor force participation rates.
Based on the research produced and attached herein, we find no
evidence of a compelling public need for regulation nor that the
benefits outweigh the costs. We ask that the USDA review and address
each evidentiary point herein, as well from the research attached, as
part of the notice and comment process. The existing rules should be
sustained.
Sincerely,

Lauren Bauer,
Fellow, Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution;
Jana Parsons,
Senior Research Assistant, The Hamilton Project;
Jay Shambaugh,
Director, The Hamilton Project; Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, The
Brookings Institution; Professor, The George Washington University.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

A. SNAP and Incentives to Work
B. SNAP Effectiveness
C. Macroeconomic Stabilization

III. Modeling Waiver Eligibility

A. Regulatory Impact Analysis

1. Waiver Take-up
2. Statewide Waivers and Geographic Areas
3. 20 Percent Rule
4. Labor Surplus Areas
5. Effect on Society and Uncertainties

B. Analysis Based on Eligibility

1. Work Requirement Waiver Eligibility during the Great Recession
2. Modeled Eligibility Versus the Proposed Rule
3. Eligibility Versus The Proposed Rule

IV. Employment Status Changes
V. Conclusion
VI. References
VII. Appendix
I. Introduction
The goals of safety net programs are to provide insurance
protection to those who are experiencing poor economic outcomes and to
support those who are trying to improve their situation. The
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food
Stamp Program) ensures that eligible participants and families have
access to food when they have no or low income. SNAP does so by
providing participants with resources to raise their food purchasing
power and, as a result, improve their health and nutrition. SNAP lifts
millions out of poverty and supports work while reducing food
insecurity. Evidence shows that SNAP increases health and economic
security among families in the short term as well as economic self-
sufficiency in the long-term.
SNAP is designed to expand as unemployment rates rise and household
income falls, and in fact, caseloads increase as the unemployment does
(Ganong and Liebman 2018). SNAP, Medicaid, and Unemployment Insurance
provide the majority of automatic spending fiscal stabilization during
economic downturns (Russek and Kowalewski 2015) and SNAP's
responsiveness to downturns has increased over time (Bitler and Hoynes
2010). Studies show that when SNAP payments increase to a local area in
response to an economic downturn, they serve as an effective fiscal
stimulus to the local area (Blinder and Zandi 2015; Keith-Jennings and
Rosenbaum 2015).
In accordance with the law, including the recently reauthorized
farm bill, Congress authorizes states to manage the work requirement
for so-called able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) in
accordance with the needs of their state. After 1996, certain non-
disabled SNAP participants ages 18-49 without dependent children are
limited to 3 months of benefits out of 36 months if they do not work or
participate in a training program at least 20 hours per week or
participate in workfare. States have had the option to impose work
requirements on certain beneficiaries since the 1980s. See Rosenbaum
(2013) and Bolen, et al. (2018) for a detailed description of SNAP work
requirements. States are not required to assign these participants or
provide slots in training programs, so for many participants, this
provision functions as a time limit rather than a work requirement.
Exempt from ABAWD work requirements are those outside the age
range, those who are medically certified as unfit for employment, those
with dependents or who reside in a household with a minor, those who
are pregnant, and those who are otherwise exempt. States must exempt
certain individuals, such as those who are ``unfit'' for work, and are
permitted to exempt a share of individuals for other reasons.
States are permitted to apply to the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) for waivers to the time limit provisions for the entire state as
well as sub-state geographic areas if their economic conditions meet
certain standards. The state must be able to provide evidence that the
state or a state-determined sub-state area has (1) a recent 12 month
average unemployment rate over ten percent, (2) a recent 3 month
average unemployment rate over ten percent, (3) a historical seasonal
unemployment rate over ten percent, (4) is designated as a Labor
Surplus Area (LSA), (5) qualifies for Extended Benefits to Unemployment
Insurance (EB), (6) has a low and declining employment-to-population
ratio, (7) has a lack of jobs in declining occupations or industries,
(8) is described in an academic study or other publications as an area
where there is a lack of jobs, (9) has a 24 month average unemployment
rate 20 percent above the national average for the same period,
starting no earlier than the start of the LSA designation period for
the current fiscal year.
The intent of the work requirement waivers is to ensure that
participants are not penalized for not working when it is difficult to
find a job. As there is no one way to measure job finding difficulty,
there are a variety of ways to measure labor market weakness in the
current rules. The current waivers can be at the county, regional, or
state level. They are both absolute (above certain levels of
unemployment) and relative (compared to national average) as both may
be an important signal to a state that economic conditions warrant
waiving work requirements.
The USDA proposes to disallow states from applying for statewide
waivers except on the basis of the state qualifying for EB (option 5)
and from making regional determinations. USDA proposes to maintain
options 1 and 5 and eliminate waiver eligibility options 3, 4, 6, 7,
and 8 of the preceding paragraph with regard to counties or Labor
Market Areas (LMAs). It proposed to modify option 2 (an unemployment
rate of ten percent in a recent 3 month period) to only be used in
support of ``an exceptional circumstance (p. 983),'' ``the rapid
disintegration of an economically and regionally important industry or
the prolonged impact of a natural disaster (p. 985).'' The USDA
proposed to modify option 9 (the so-called ``twenty-percent rule'')
such that ``an area must have an average unemployment rate at least 20
percent above the national average and at least seven percent for a
recent 24 month period (p. 984).'' USDA also requests feedback on using
six and ten percent unemployment as rate floors.
The proposed rule also reduces states' ability to use exemptions
for individuals by limiting states ability to accumulate those
exemptions. The exemptions allow states to shield individuals from work
requirements if state administrators feel the work requirements are
inappropriate for that individual, for example due to temporary
problems with hours, health, caregiving, or other issues that restrict
their ability to work.
The USDA proposes new rules that are arbitrary. The USDA and its
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) fail to fully consider the costs and
benefits of the proposed rule, including the costs and benefits under
alternative economic conditions.
The proposed rule limits a state's ability to apply for work
requirement waivers when its economy is weak or relatively weak
compared to the overall national economy. The USDA and the RIA do not
consider the benefits to program participation for individuals nor
SNAP's role as an automatic stabilizer when weighing proposed changes.
The rule is likely to push a considerable number of current
beneficiaries who are either in the labor market or unable to work off
the SNAP rolls while failing to expand for newly eligible participants
at the onset of a recession. It does so absent evidence that labor
force attachment among ABAWDs would increase as a result of this
proposal even in a strong economy and without consideration to the
costs both for individuals and the economy in any circumstance.
The analyses reported in this comment show that the proposed rule
would weaken one of the strongest automatic stabilizers in the fiscal
policy toolkit. The analysis presented below that fewer counties would
be eligible for waivers at the start of a recession relative to current
rules. Instead of SNAP participation expanding promptly, rapidly, and
expansively as the unemployment rate rises, the proposed rule would
slow eligibility for geographic waivers, and in fact, could cause the
program to contract. The proposed rule undermines the role that SNAP
plays at the onset of a recession, during poor economic times, and in
mitigating the effects of recessions. While the stated goal is to limit
waiver eligibility in a strong economy, the proposed rule fails to
ensure waivers are available to states in a weak economy. The USDA and
its RIA have failed to consider this critical issue, much less weigh
the costs and benefits to these changes.
The proposed work requirements would make regional waivers more
difficult to obtain and state-wide waivers difficult to obtain in the
absence of EB. By making it more difficult for states to apply for a
statewide waiver and by limiting state's ability to determine
economically-linked areas, USDA reduces the geographic mobility of
program participants and ties their benefit receipt to maintained
residency in an area that, by its own definition, is economically
lagging. This seems likely to reduce employment and labor force
participation of SNAP program participants as it effectively traps them
in lagging economic areas. No analysis in the RIA is presented to
consider these costs.
While proposing to eliminate evidentiary standards that are not
based on federally-produced data, the USDA proposes eliminating two
that are (LSAs and seasonal unemployment) and introduce uncertainty
into what is currently a standard with clear and universal applications
(3 month unemployment rate over ten percent.) No analysis in the RIA is
presented to consider these costs.
The analyses reported in this comment suggest that the proposed
changes to work requirement regulations will put at risk access to food
assistance for millions who are working, trying to work, or face
barriers to working. We find the USDA provides no evidence that
limiting waivers from work requirements makes this population more
likely to work or more self-sufficient. Our analysis shows that the
overwhelming majority of SNAP participants subject to work
requirements, ABAWDs, are in fact in the labor force; but, most have
volatile employment experiences that would leave them failing the work
requirements from time to time. Our analysis also shows that labor
force participants experiencing a gap in employment do so for work-
related reasons outside their control. Furthermore, the vast majority
of ABAWDs not in the labor force are not in fact able-bodied, but
suffer from serious health problems or have a disability. By further
proscribing the individual waiver eligibility pool and the use of
exemptions, the proposed rule limits state's discretion to provide food
assistance. No analysis in the RIA is presented to consider the work
experiences and health conditions of ABAWDs, the benefits to them for
SNAP program participation, and the costs to them and to society of
time limits.
This comment summarizes and provides evidence relevant to the
rulemaking. Based on the research produced and attached herein, we find
no evidence of a compelling public need for regulation nor that the
benefits outweigh the costs. We ask that the USDA review and address
each evidentiary point herein, as well from the research attached, as
part of the notice and comment process. The existing rules should be
sustained.
II. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
In this section we review published evidence on SNAP and work
requirements.
A. SNAP and Incentives to Work
SNAP is the most near universal of means-tested transfer programs
in the United States. Certain households' SNAP eligibility is
determined by meeting a gross income test whereby all sources of income
fall below 130% of the Federal poverty level (FPL) for its household
size. The net income test requires that a household's net income, i.e.,
gross income minus the earnings disregard and other deductions, is
below 100% FPL.
Subject to meeting the income and asset limits, benefits are
allocated to households through the following formula:

Household SNAP benefit = maximum benefit^0.3 * net income.

Households without any net income receive the maximum benefit for
their household composition. Those with positive net income see their
benefit levels reduced by 30 cents on the dollar of net income.
While one might worry that providing income support decreases the
incentive to work, SNAP currently addresses work disincentives in a
variety of ways. SNAP has an earnings disregard of 20 percent as part
of the net income calculation, meaning that the value of the earnings
disregard increases as income does and that those with earned income
receive larger SNAP benefits than those with no earned income (Wolkomir
and Cai 2018). This means that when a person moves from being a labor
force non-participant to working while on SNAP, total household
resources will increase; as a beneficiary earns more up to the
eligibility threshold, total household resources continue to increase.
The combination of the earnings disregard and a gradual phase-out
schedule--that states have the option to further extend and smooth--
ameliorate but do not eliminate work disincentives.
Work requirements in SNAP are meant to force work-ready individuals
to increase their work effort and maintain that work effort every month
by threatening to withhold and subsequently withholding food assistance
if a person is not working a set number of hours. In practice, the
application of work requirements sanctions many groups: those who are
unable to work, those who are able to work but who do not find work,
those who are working but not consistently above an hourly threshold,
and those who are meeting work or exemption requirements but fail to
provide proper documentation.
During the Food Stamp Program's introduction in the 1960s and
1970s, reductions in employment and hours worked were observed,
particularly among female-headed households (Hoynes and Schanzenbach
2012). But in general, there is little evidence that SNAP receipt
itself depresses work effort substantially (Fraker and Moffitt 1988;
Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2012). Whether work requirements could offset
the small work disincentive would depend on their targeting and whether
those who are not working could readily increase their labor supply. In
fact, the evidence suggests that work requirements decrease SNAP
participation, including at times when roll expansion is aligned with
automatic stabilization (Ganong and Liebman 2018; Harris 2019; Ziliak,
Gundersen, and Figlio 2003). Recent analysis published as a working
paper suggests that SNAP participation by ABAWDs is substantially
reduced by work requirements but that increase in work is minimal
(Harris, 2019). Even the specifications that find the largest increases
in work suggest five participants would lose SNAP benefits for every
one that becomes employed due to work requirements.
The USDA and RIA provided no evidence that there would be any
increase in labor supply resulting from a change in what areas would
qualify to apply for a waiver. Projections for increased labor supply
are tied to the 2019 President's Budget projections for an ever-
decreasing national unemployment rate. In fact, because there is no
evidence that ABAWDs will increase their labor supply in response to
work requirements, USDA also ``estimated the impacts under an alternate
scenario that assumes instead that rate of employment remains at 26
percent (p. 26).'' Failure to prove that labor supply would increase as
a result of the proposal in good economic times, much less bad,
suggests that there is no compelling public need for new regulation.
B. SNAP Effectiveness
Several studies have found that SNAP reduces the likelihood that a
household will experience food insecurity or very-low food security
(Collins, et al., 2014; Kreider, et al., 2012; Mabli, et al., 2013;
Nord and Prell 2011; Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Zhang 2011; Shaefer and
Gutierrez 2013; Schmidt, Shore-Sheppard, Watson 2016). Moreover,
evidence from safety net expansions--such as the temporary benefit
increase under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA) and a pilot program that provided additional benefits to
families of children during the summer months when school meals were
not available--shows reductions in rates of food insecurity and very-
low food security (Collins, et al., 2013; Schanzenbach, Bauer, and
Nantz 2016; Smith and Valizadeh 2018). Recent studies have shown that
SNAP improves health outcomes and households' financial well-being, and
even improves the later-life outcomes of individuals who had access to
the program as children (Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach 2011;
Hinrichs 2010; Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond 2016; Shaefer and
Gutierrez 2013).
For example, a recent study by Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond
(2016) finds long-term positive effects from consistently providing
access to the Food Stamp Program (now called SNAP) during early life.
Taking advantage of the relatively long rollout period when the program
was originally introduced, the study compares children who lived in
different counties within a state and who were born at different times
to measure the long-term impacts of access to the program. Access to
the Food Stamp Program at early ages--starting before birth in cases
where the mother received food stamps during pregnancy, and continuing
through age five--leads to a number of positive long-run health and
economic outcomes.
As shown in figure 1, access to the Food Stamp Program over this
age range has substantial positive impacts on later health, lowering
women's and men's incidence of metabolic syndrome--a health measure
that includes diabetes, high blood pressure, obesity, heart disease,
and heart attack--by 0.3 and 0.5 standard deviations, respectively.
Women are also 34 percentage points more likely to report excellent or
very good health if they had access to food stamps from before birth
through age 5.
These gains also extend to economic outcomes. Women with access to
the Food Stamp Program over the full early life period have much higher
economic self-sufficiency--a measure that includes completed education,
employment status, earnings, and financial success--than those who did
not. Furthermore, access to food stamps increased high school
graduation rates by more than 18 percentage points.
Figure 1. Impact of Access to Food Stamps During Early Life on Adult
Health and Economic Outcomes

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond 2016.
Note: Hollowed bars are not statistically significant.

In addition to reducing food insecurity, SNAP participation may
also reduce households' risk of suffering financial hardships (Figure
2). Shaefer and Gutierrez (2013) use variation in state-level policies
that affect SNAP access to study the impact of SNAP participation on a
variety of outcomes. They find that receiving SNAP reduces the
likelihood of food insecurity by 13 percentage points.
SNAP also has spillover impacts on other aspects of families'
financial well-being. Households have more resources available for
other essential expenses, such as housing, utilities, and medical
bills. Shaefer and Gutierrez estimate that SNAP participation reduces
the risk of falling behind on rent or mortgage payments by seven
percentage points and on utility bills (gas, oil, and electricity) by
15 percentage points. Participants are also less likely to experience
medical hardship: SNAP participation decreases the likelihood of
forgoing a necessary visit to a doctor or hospital by nine percentage
points.
Figure 2. Impact of SNAP Participation on Food Insecurity and Other
Financial Hardships

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Shaefer and Gutierrez 2013.
Note: Sample includes low-income households with children.
Medical hardship is measured as whether the interviewee
reported that in the past 12 months someone in the household
chose not to see a doctor or go to the hospital when needed
because of cost.

The USDA and RIA fail to consider the costs and benefits to
restricting access to SNAP on food security, economic security, and
health. While labor force attachment is a path to economic self-
sufficiency as the rule states, the evidence shows that SNAP benefit
receipt also leads to economic self-sufficiency, household budget
stabilization, and improved health. The rule states that imposing
additional work requirements ``would also save taxpayers' money (p.
982)'' but does not provide an analysis that considers the
countervailing costs to limiting access to SNAP. The USDA and RIA fail
to consider the costs to nonparticipation on both individual households
and, as we will show throughout, the economy as a whole.
C. Macroeconomic Stabilization
While the safety net should expand to provide resources to
households experiencing firsthand economic losses, governments may use
fiscal policy--additional government spending or tax cuts--to stimulate
the economy during a recession. A fiscal multiplier is an estimate of
the increased output caused by a given increase in government spending
or reduction in taxes. Any multiplier greater than zero implies that
additional government spending (or reduced taxes) adds to total output.
Fiscal multipliers greater than one indicate an increase in private-
sector output along with an increase in output from government
spending. This can occur because the additional spending can turn into
increased employment or wages which subsequently increase output.
Although there is disagreement among economists over the exact size
of various fiscal multipliers (see Auerbach, Gale, and Harris [2010]
for a discussion), multipliers are generally believed to be higher
during recessions than they are under normal economic conditions when
the economy is near its full potential, and they are in particular
thought to be higher when the central bank is not raising rates in
response to economic fluctuations (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012;
Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska 2014; see Ramey and Zubairy 2014 for a
dissenting view). This is likely because downturns are characterized by
slack in both labor and capital markets (i.e., available resources are
not fully employed), thereby allowing fiscal stimulus to increase total
output. Multipliers are also higher when the spending program or tax
cut targets lower-income people, who are more likely to spend the
stimulus (Parker, et al., 2013; Whalen and Reichling 2015).
Not all spending or tax cuts are created equal, as indicated by the
variation in fiscal multipliers shown below in Figure 3. But during the
depths of the recession, each spending multiplier analyzed by Blinder
and Zandi (2015) was greater than one, indicating that spending on
these programs raised output by more than their costs. Note that the
multipliers reported here are broadly similar to those estimated by CBO
(Whalen and Reichling 2015).
As shown in the below figure, the most stimulative type of spending
during the recession was a temporary increase in the SNAP maximum
benefit: for every $1 increase in government spending, total output
increased by $1.74. Work-share programs and UI benefit extensions were
also relatively stimulative. Consistent with economic theory, the
programs with the largest multipliers were those directed at low-income
or newly unemployed people. More recently, as the economy has improved,
the multipliers have diminished. However, the multipliers for SNAP
benefits, workshare programs, and UI benefits remain above one,
indicating that these programs remain highly effective as forms of
stimulus, generating additional private-sector economic activity. SNAP
multipliers were also estimated to be greater than 1 in 2015Q1, well
after the recession had ended.
Figure 3. Fiscal Stimulus Multipliers (Spending Programs), 2009 and
2015

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Blinder and Zandi 2015.

Poverty and economic hardship typically increase in recessions and
decrease in economic expansions. In particular, households with few
resources are especially affected by the business cycle. Among poor
households, the effect of the Great Recession was particularly severe
relative to previous recessions. The unemployment rate rose notably
more for lower education workers. This is a typical feature of
recessions: less-educated workers face larger employment losses when
the economy turns down (see Aaronson, et al., 2019 for a review). The
safety net plays an important role in mitigating these effects, partly
by automatically expanding during economic downturns as eligibility for
safety net programs increases.
Over the course of the Great Recession, SNAP rightly expanded to
provide more benefits to eligible and newly eligible participants,
including ABAWDs. Part of this expansion was the result of Bush
Administration, Congressional, and Obama Administration action at
several points over the course of the recession to expand waiver
eligibility because existing policy was not sufficient to meet economic
goals. These actions were necessary for macroeconomic stabilization and
because the existing rules for ``lack of sufficient jobs evidence'' in
applying for ABAWD work requirement waivers insufficiently responded to
economic circumstances.
The USDA and its RIA fail to model and consider the costs and
benefits to the proposed rule during any alternate economic conditions.
USDA proposes making changes to existing policy that would weaken
responsiveness to indicators of an economic downturn (statewide waiver;
20 percent rule; 3 month lookback), its persistence (statewide waiver;
3 month lookback), and sluggish recoveries in particular places
(statewide waiver; 20 percent rule). Our analysis provides evidence
that existing policy (20 percent rule without a floor, ten percent rule
with two lookback periods) provided coverage more in keeping with the
economic conditions at various points in time than the proposed
changes. Furthermore, the USDA fails to offer proposals, such as
linking waiver eligibility to Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC)
in the event that EUC is authorized, that would make waiver eligibility
more responsive during the onset of a recession.
III. Modeling Waiver Eligibility
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
The USDA's proposed rule makes several changes for which the
Regulatory Impact Analysis must account. The USDA proposes to disallow
states from applying for statewide waivers except in the case of EB
eligibility and to define regions at their discretion. The USDA
proposed maintaining eligibility for geographic areas qualifying for EB
and with 12 month unemployment rates above ten percent. USDA proposes
to modify eligibility for those places with an unemployment rate of ten
percent in a recent 3 month period to only be used in support of ``an
exceptional circumstance p. 985.'' USDA proposes to put an unemployment
rate floor of seven percent to the 20 percent rule. We provide evidence
that the RIA does not properly analyze the effects of these proposed
changes, thus substantially underestimating the impacts.
1. Waiver Take-up
The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) is based on areas that have
taken up a waiver in a single contemporaneous period. The RIA failed to
consider eligibility for waivers in its analysis for the single time
period it did analyze. The RIA did not consider the effect of their
proposal under alternative macroeconomic conditions, either in actual
take-up or in eligibility. In doing so, it materially underestimates
the number of program participants who would be subject to time limits
during recessions.
The RIA writes that they chose to model actual waiver take-up
rather than eligibility because ``States do not always seek waivers for
eligible areas. Some States seek no time limit waivers; others only
seek waivers for a portion of qualifying areas within the State.
Therefore, the Department assumed that if a county was not currently
waived, the State would not seek a waiver for that area under the
revised criteria (p. 20).''
This logic is faulty and false by recent evidence. States that have
declined to take-up waivers for which they are eligible are assumed to
have made a choice that they would never make differently--even if
economic conditions in their state deteriorated. Similarly, states that
have applied for waivers for which they are eligible are assumed to be
the only places where the impacts of more stringent eligibility would
be felt in perpetuity.
By this logic, we could look at waiver status in any preceding year
as the expression of a state's policy preference--preferences that
change based on economic conditions. As USDA noted in the RIA, in July
2013, 44 states and D.C. applied for statewide waivers and six states
had waivers for part of their state. Had the RIA used recently
expressed actual preferences for rather than the single time period
that they considered or modeled the effect based on eligible areas,
they would have found larger impacts in Federal spending and the number
of individuals denied access to resources to purchase food.
In 2017,\1\ each of the 17 states that did not avail themselves of
time limit waivers had at least one county that was eligible. This does
not mean they would always choose to decline to use waivers. In fact,
of the 17 states currently eligible for waivers that are not using
them, 14 were using waivers to cover counties not individually eligible
in 2008 (shown later in figure 8) and every state received waivers for
at least a part of the state in 2009. The existing waiver process
allows states to determine when it makes sense to apply for them based
on their understanding of their local economy. It is incumbent on the
NPRM to explain why limiting that discretion furthers program goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 2017 is the last year for which there is publicly available
data on waiver take-up by county.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Statewide Waivers and Geographic Areas
The RIA does not consider the effect of eliminating statewide
waivers except as downstream to other policy changes. It does not model
whether a state would ever qualify for a waiver based on each
underlying geographic unit's qualification. It does not model state
eligibility for EB, or in relation to EUC. In doing so, the NPRM and
RIA fail to justify proposed restrictions on statewide waivers.
Statewide waivers are particularly critical during serious economic
downturns. Any heterogeneity in the use of waivers impedes the
geographic mobility of program participants. Unlike in UI, where
individuals retain benefits if they move to a better labor market, SNAP
ties benefit receipt to their place of residence. In order to maintain
benefits, participants are incentivized not to move to find work, but
to maintain residency in an area that is economically lagging but
waiver eligible. This reduces employment and labor force participation
of SNAP program participants and does not increase economic self-
sufficiency. USDA does not provide analysis to consider these costs.
The RIA does not consider Labor Market Areas (LMAs) in its
analysis, though a county can become eligible for a waiver due to being
a part of an LMA. It writes, ``Because a small number of areas
estimated to lose eligibility may actually qualify as part of a larger
LMA, the Department rounded the impact from 77.4% down to 76 percent
(p. 22).'' There is no justification for this rounding nor for
excluding counties eligible as part of an LMA from their analysis. The
result is misattribution of some counties otherwise eligible to the
state-selected geographic group or statewide standard and an
unspecified effect on policy impacts. Our analyses show that more than
five percent of counties qualify only through being a part of an LMA.
The RIA does not include most of New England--Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont--in its analysis. Failure to
do so both affects the validity of the estimates and calls into
question whether counties and LMAs are an appropriate level of
geography as is argued.
3. 20 Percent Rule
The Regulatory Impact Analysis failed to correctly model the 20
percent rule. They write: ``The Department obtained monthly
unemployment and labor force data from BLS . . . for the 24 month
period from January 2016 to December 2017 for 3,077 counties and
county-equivalents (p. 21).'' The Department therefore determined that
any waived county that was waived but not by the 20 percent rule was
part of a contiguous state-determined geographic group or through a
statewide waiver.
This is incorrect because the RIA fails to accurately model the 20
percent rule or consider other paths to eligibility. The 20 percent
rule states that the first month of the 24 month period used to
identify whether an area's unemployment rate is 20 percent above cannot
be earlier than the first month BLS uses to determine LSAs. The RIA
does not say what period it is calculating 20 percent eligibility, but
it does so using only one 24 month period. Within a window for
applications, there are in fact ten distinct 24 month periods against
which a state can submit a waiver application.
The RIA states that in linking the 20 percent rule to LSA
designations states will be prevented ``from using older data (p.
16).'' This is false. The proposed rule does not make any changes with
regard to the time period over which data can be taken, only that the
waiver expiration date would be proscribed.
The NPRM defends a six percent unemployment rate floor by noting
that if there is agreement the ``natural rate'' of unemployment hovers
near five percent, then 20 percent above that would be six percent.
But, the Department does not choose a six percent floor, instead
preferring a seven percent floor (in part because of a concern that
``too few individuals would be subject to ABAWD work requirements''
without explaining why the number would be too few.) In addition, the
Administration's forecast suggests the unemployment rate will stabilize
at 4.2 percent and never rise above it this decade. Twenty percent
above that rate would be a floor of five percent. No attempt to justify
a higher floor like seven percent is made beyond noting it will subject
more people to work requirements.
4. Labor Surplus Areas
By failing to provide sufficient evidence for the seven percent
floor to the 20 percent rule, the USDA consequently fails to justify
removing Department of Labor (DOL) designation as a Labor Surplus Area
(LSA) as a waiver qualification. Essentially, LSAs are also determined
by the 20 percent rule and the ten percent rule, but have a floor of
six percent unemployment. A city with a population of at least 25,000,
a town or township of at least 25,000, counties, balances of counties,
and county-equivalents can all qualify as LSAs. Under exceptional
circumstances, civil jurisdictions, Metropolitan Statistical Areas and
Combined Statistical Areas are geographies that could qualify as LSAs.
The justifications for removing LSAs run counter to stated goals: high-
quality and federally-produced data and clear standards for areas with
insufficient jobs should determine waiver eligibility. The USDA and RIA
fail to provide sufficient evidence for removing waiver eligibility
based on LSA designation.
5. Effect on Society and Uncertainties
The RIA acknowledges that it fails to consider actual impacts under
any alternative economic conditions, ``(including cyclical (p. 29).''
They also acknowledge that meeting work requirements is a function of
both the availability of jobs and the ``extent that States offer
qualifying E&T or workfare opportunities (p. 29).''
The RIA acknowledges that ``there may be increases in poverty and
food insecurity (p. 28)'' for those who fail to meet work requirements,
``those ABAWDs who become employed will likely see increased self-
sufficiency and an overall improvement in their economic well-being (p.
28),'' and that ``a number of those affected by strengthened work
requirements are able to secure employment in a wide range of different
industries (p. 28).''
The effect of the proposed regulatory changes were inadequately
analyzed, failing to take into account the costs and benefits of
restricting access to the program. The RIA does not provide estimates
for increases in rates of poverty or food insecurity and its attendant
costs. In particular, it does not engage with the evidence of the long-
run benefits of SNAP, the effect of SNAP on reductions in food
insecurity and poverty, nor with the concerns regarding reducing
resources to the children of non-custodial parents. It does not provide
evidence for increased labor supply among ABAWDs, and in fact the RIA
acknowledges elsewhere that employment rates may not increase at all as
a result of the policy change. ``A number of those affected (p. 28)''
is not a specific analysis on which to base a regulatory change.
Without evidence that any affected program participant would become
employed as a result of the policy, it remains unclear whether there
are any benefits to the proposed rules.
B. Analysis Based on Eligibility
In this section, we provide evidence for the share of counties that
would have been eligible for a waiver based on each trigger from 2007
to the present (1) in existing regulation, (2) through policy changes
throughout the Great Recession, and (3) in the proposed rules including
for each unemployment rate floor to the twenty-percent rule. Modeling
eligibility and take-up over time is appropriate for identifying
program effects.
The geographic unit considered in each of the following models are
the share of counties eligible for a waiver. These counties can gain
eligibility individually, as a county in a labor market area (LMA) that
is eligible, or because the county is in a state that has a statewide
waiver.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ To understand maximum eligibility, we look at county
eligibility based on the county-level data as well as the LMA-level
data. Because the LMAs in New England States are made up of minor civil
divisions and not counties, eligibility in counties in ME, MA, NH, VT,
and CT is only modeled on county data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are unable to show the share eligible based on state-selected
geographic areas under current rules.\3\ We do not model triggers based
on the following rules: a historical seasonal unemployment rate above
ten percent; Labor Surplus Area designation by the Department of
Labor's Employment and Training Administration; a low and declining
employment-to-population ration; a lack of jobs in declining
occupations or industries; or, is described in an academic study or
other publication as an area where there is a lack of jobs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Regulatory Impact Analysis conducted by USDA also does not
model sub-state groups for eligibility optimization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our model, a geographic unit can be eligible for a waiver based
on three unemployment rate thresholds (in addition to other policy
mechanisms discussed below). First, a geographic unit is eligible if it
has a 24 month average unemployment rate that is 20 percent above the
national average for the same 24 month period.\4\ Second, a geographic
unit is eligible for a waiver if it has a 12 month average unemployment
rate above ten percent. Third, a geographic unit is eligible for a
waiver if it has a 3 month unemployment rate above ten percent. A state
can generally request a 12 month waiver and specify the implementation
date on the waiver request.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ We follow the USDA guidance and rounded national and local
unemployment rates to the nearest tenth.
\5\ The window for a waiver application based on the 20 percent
rule is based on Section V of the USDA guidance. We assume that states
will apply for waivers on the last possible application date, i.e., the
end of a fiscal year period as defined in the guidance. The guidance
states that ``For example, the 24 month period for the Fiscal Year 2017
LSA list runs from January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2015. Thus, a
waiver that would start in Fiscal Year 2017 could be supported with a
24 month period beginning any time after (but not before) January 1,
2014.'' Therefore, if a geographic unit has a 24 month average that
starts on January 1, 2014 and ends on January 1, 2016, the latest they
could apply for the waiver would be September 30, 2017. The waiver
period extends 12 months from the application date. We therefore assume
that the geographic unit in question is eligible for a waiver from
January 1, 2016 through September 30, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If a state qualifies under any of these triggers or if a state's
unemployment insurance extended benefits program triggers on, then the
state is eligible for a statewide SNAP waiver. In this analysis, we
model EB eligibility based on the first date that a state is shown to
be eligible on a Department of Labor EB trigger notice.\6\ We also
model eligibility based on EUC and ARRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ We follow USDA guidance with regard to EB-based eligibility. A
state is eligible for a work requirement waiver based on EB if a state
has (1) a 13 Week Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) of five percent and
120 percent of each of the last 2 years; (2) an IUR of six percent; (3)
a 3 Month Total Unemployment Rate (TUR) of 6.5 percent and 110 percent
of either of the last 2 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the following sections, we model waiver eligibility and waiver
take-up as a share of counties from 2007 to present.
1. Work Requirement Waiver Eligibility during the Great Recession
Work requirement waivers in a recession are important for two
reasons. First, job finding rates fall in recessions and difficulty
finding work may mean many individuals who are trying to be labor force
participants will be sanctioned for failure to work the required number
of hours. This is counter to program goals. It is well-known that
recessions strike marginalized populations in the labor force more
harshly than higher income, higher education individuals. Because
during a recession more people become eligible for and would benefit
from program participation due to recent job or income loss as well as
the inability to find sufficient work, it is particularly important to
waiver time limits for the SNAP-eligible population. Second, removing
individuals from SNAP during a recession shrinks SNAP's role as an
automatic stabilizer by providing spending in depressed areas during a
downturn.
In order to expand access to geographic waivers in response to the
recession, executive and Congressional action was necessary. None of
the automatic triggers were sufficient to turn on the waivers for much
of the country promptly. The Bush and Obama Administrations, Congress,
and states took action throughout the Great Recession to increase
geographic eligibility for waivers, directly and through clarifying
ties to Unemployment Insurance (UI).
During the Great Recession, Congress enacted Emergency Unemployment
Compensation (EUC), a temporary program that extended the amount of
time during which an eligible UI participant could retain benefits.
Congress authorized EUC on June 30, 2008, extending the expiration date
to January 1, 2014 (American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012).
Additionally, the Bush Administration clarified on January 8, 2009
that eligibility for Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) also
qualified states for SNAP waivers.\7\ EUC established several tiers of
additional weeks of UI benefits, with each tier contingent on a state
having a total unemployment rate that exceeded a given threshold. EUC
tier qualifications interacted in different ways with SNAP Waiver
eligibility over the EUC period. Importantly, states were eligible for
SNAP waivers if they were eligible for particular tiers of EUC, and not
just if they took EUC (see table 1 for eligibility thresholds and the
interaction of SNAP waivers and EUC tiers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ EUC trigger notices are issued on a weekly basis. Our analysis
is on a monthly basis. If a state was eligible for EUC in at least 2
weeks in a month, we consider it to be eligible for EUC in that month.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARRA was enacted on February 17, 2009. It stated that for the
remainder of FY2009 and through FY2010 ABAWDs were waived from work
requirements to maintain access to the program. While a few localities
declined this authorization, every county in the U.S. was eligible for
waiver from February 17, 2009 to September 30, 2010.
Figure 4 models each component of work requirement waiver
eligibility that was operational from 2006 to present. The unit is the
share of counties eligible for a waiver, whether individually, as part
of an LMA, or as part of an eligible state. The set of triggers and
eligibility standards are based on standing regulation as well as
policy changes made over the course of the Great Recession to increase
waiver eligibility. The criteria that did not change over the course of
the Great Recession were eligibility based on EB, the twenty-percent
rule, and the ten percent unemployment rate by two look-back period
rules.
Figure 4. Counties Eligible for A Work Requirement Waiver by Trigger,
2007-present

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Local Area Unemployment Statistics, BLS (2000-2018);
EB and EUC Trigger notices (DOL); Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2000-2018).

The 20 percent rule (light blue) slowly increases the availability
of waivers at the start of the recession in the absence of
Congressional action as some parts of the country had its unemployment
rate rising before the rest. This analysis shows that the vast majority
of areas waived from the rules in the third quarter of 2008--a period
when the economy was losing over 300,000 jobs a month--was due to the
20 percent rule. Since 2016, the vast majority of counties eligible for
an ABAWD waiver is due to qualifying under the 20 percent rule. Still,
it is not a perfect trigger. If the entire country is facing rising
unemployment rates, the waivers would not be available anywhere until
local 3 month (or 12 month) unemployment rates exceed ten percent or
EB-based triggers come on under standing rules. This analysis shows
that the 20 percent rule plays a critical part in SNAP's role as an
automatic stabilizer and should not be weakened.
Standing policy with regard to statewide waivers would have
provided wider coverage in the event that eligibility based on EUC and
ARRA did not occur. The Extended Benefit (EB) trigger for UI in-law has
failed to trigger on during recessions without Congressional and state
action since its enactment (Wandner 2018), though work requirement
waivers are based on eligibility by USDA-determined thresholds that
ameliorate this issue. For a short period of time in late 2008 and the
first week of 2009, EB eligibility provided the widest amount of
coverage, but its acceleration in 2008 was not sufficiently early or
fast enough to reduce the value of the 20 percent rule. USDA proposes
to maintain EB-based eligibility, and the evidence presented here shows
this is a necessary but not sufficient waiver eligibility condition.
During the Great Recession, Emergency Unemployment Compensation was
authorized in June 2008 but it was not until January 2009 that the Bush
Administration clarified that states eligible for a particular tier of
EUC were also eligible for SNAP work requirement waivers. About 90
percent of counties became eligible based on this measure, and through
ongoing memorandums linking work requirement waiver eligibility to
different EUC tiers, a high level of waiver eligibility was maintained
through 2016. Given that roughly 35 percent of counties were already
eligible based on the 20 percent rule in 2008, the expansion of waiver
eligibility based on EUC dramatically expanded waiver eligibility. Had
waiver eligibility been tied to EUC upon enactment, work requirement
waivers would have been an even more effective counter-cyclical tool.
An improvement to the rules would be to clarify that in the event EUC
is authorized, states become immediately eligible for work requirement
waivers.
Combining these indicators into three bins--eligibility based on
standing policy as of 2006, additional eligibility based on EUC, and
additional eligibility based on ARRA--we can model the effect of
existing waiver policy and of the policy preferences of Administrations
of both parties and Congress with regard to waiver eligibility (figure
5).
Figure 5. Counties Eligible for ABAWD Work Requirement Waiver, 2007-
present

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Local Area Unemployment Statistics, BLS (2000-2018);
EB and EUC Trigger notices (DOL), Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2000-2018).

Current policy with regard to waiver eligibility provided all the
coverage until the Bush Administration linked waiver eligibility to
EUC. Existing and recession-responsive policy functioned to provide
close to 100 percent waiver eligibility from 2009 to 2014. The scope of
coverage was driven by policy actions taken at the Federal and state
levels to increase eligibility for EUC and EB, which had downstream
effects on SNAP work requirement waivers. In the absence of such
actions, the 20 percent rule is the most effective of standing rules at
providing waiver eligibility at the start of the recession and EB is
the most effective during recovery. No standing rules provide coverage
of the scale and speed instigated by policy actions taken during the
Great Recession.
2. Modeled Eligibility Versus the Proposed Rule
We compare existing standing policy (purple) for waiver eligibility
with the proposed rules including three options proposed by the USDA
for the 20 percent rule as they would have performed not just ``now,''
as the RIA showed, but over the course of the Great Recession (figure
6). The model for the proposed rule also maintains eligibility for
areas having an unemployment rate above ten percent over a recent 12
month period and for areas in which EB would have triggered
eligibility.
Because eligibility based on EB is consistent across standing and
proposed rules, we focus on how the different floors to the 20 percent
rule (no floor, six, seven, and ten percent unemployment floors) affect
access to SNAP at the onset and during the Great Recession before
discussing considerations of when, whether, and how to have waivers
trigger off.
USDA's preferred modification is to implement a seven percent floor
for the 20 percent rule and eliminate the 3 month lookback and
statewide waivers (light green).\8\ Had this rule been in place in the
first quarter of the Great Recession, when the economy was losing
300,000 jobs a month and when SNAP rolls should be expanding, waivers
would have been limited to less than 20 percent of counties. The ten
percent floor (teal) would have performed worse, with less than ten
percent of counties eligible. The six percent standard (dark green)
covered less than 30 percent of counties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The new regulations state that for the 20 percent rule, the
period of eligibility for a state will only last through the end of the
fiscal year in which a state applied, as opposed to 1 year from the
date of the application. We have assumed that the waiver application
limits are the same as the current regulations, and have extended the
period of waiver through the end of the fiscal year. Additionally, we
have applied the same rounding standards to the respective floors as to
the 20 percent cutoff above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 6. Counties Eligible for ABAWD Work Requirement Waiver, Existing
and Proposed Regulations

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Local Area Unemployment Statistics, BLS (2000-2018);
EB and EUC Trigger notices (DOL), Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2000-2018).
Note: Because eligibility for waivers due to EB status is
included in each line, the lines converge once widespread EB
status occurs in early 2009.

By standing and proposed rules, waiver eligibility dissipate
measurably in 2013. But, the revealed preference of the policymakers at
the time was that the current rules were too restrictive and needed to
be relaxed. A number of decisions were made to expand and extend waiver
eligibility, both early in the recession and afterwards. Figure 7
highlights the difference between the revealed preferences of
policymakers working to stabilize the economy during the recession and
how waiver eligibility would have worked based on the proposed rules.
The purple line shows eligibility for work requirement waivers
based on standing regulations, EUC, and ARRA. This line contrasts with
eligibility for the proposed rules: EB eligibility, ten percent
unemployment with a 12 month lookback, and the 20 percent rule with
varying floors. The revealed preferences on policymakers during the
Great Recession was to use policy tools relevant to identifying areas
with insufficient jobs to expand SNAP work requirement waiver
eligibility, in part because existing rules were insufficient to the
task. Both at the start of the recession and in the event of a sluggish
recovery, the proposed rules diminish SNAP's role as an economic
stabilizer and safety net.
Figure 7. Counties Eligible for ABAWD Work Requirement Waiver, Proposed
Regulations versus Actual Eligibility during the Great
Recession

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Local Area Unemployment Statistics, BLS (2000-2018);
EB and EUC Trigger notices (DOL); Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2000-2018).

As this analysis emphasizes, if there is a problem with the current
rules, it is in the beginning of a recession because existing rules do
not allow states to respond promptly to a recession. The proposed rule
does not address or fix waiver responsivity to the onset of an economic
downturn. Thus, the fact that the proposed rule would make the waiver
process less responsive to an economic downturn and less able to
accomplish the goals of the program is absent from considerations of
costs and benefits. It is incumbent on the proposed rule to ensure that
it does not make responsiveness to an economic downturn worse.
3. Eligibility Versus The Proposed Rule
In the preceding sections, we have modeled waiver eligibility to
the extent possible and clearly articulated the ways in which we would
not be able to model legitimate features of the existing rules. Most
notably, we were unable to model regional eligibility and were unable
to model eligibility based on Labor Surplus Areas. By adding to these
models data from publicly available maps produced by the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, we are able to identify counties that are
eligible for work requirement waivers by triggers that we were unable
to model through our method for those states that implemented these
standards.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The data on work requirement waiver eligibility can be found at
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/States-have-requested-
waivers-from-snaps-time-limit-in-high-unemployment. The data on county
eligibility was copied by hand and duplicated by a second researcher
using mapchart.net to produce a JSON, which converted the visualization
into data used to produce the analyses. We did not have access to any
waiver application information or to USDA-produced information
regarding waiver eligibility. If any area of a county received a
waiver, we counted the entire county as receiving a waiver due to an
inability to be more precise. These maps are predicated on waiver take-
up; we continue to be unable to identify waiver eligibility based on
regional eligibility or LSAs for states that chose not to apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For focal years 2008 and 2017, we produce maps of the continental
United States to identify differences in waiver eligibility by the
proposed rule, the existing rules as modeled, and the existing rules as
waived. Figures 8 and 9 are maps showing which counties would be
eligible for work requirement waivers under both current rules (which
do not model eligibility based on grouping of contiguous areas) and the
proposed rules (EB, ten percent rule with a 12 month lookback, 20
percent rule with the seven percent unemployment rate floor [purple]),
which counties would lose eligibility due to changes in standing rules
(blue), and which counties would lose eligibility because they are
regionally eligible or eligible by one of the criteria (like LSAs) that
we are unable to model (orange).
In 2008, during the Great Recession, most states used the
flexibility afforded to them by standing rules to quickly respond to
changing economic conditions and cover areas that would not be
individually eligible--either by applying for statewide waivers or
through regional eligibility. For example, Ohio applied for and was
granted a 2 year statewide waiver in June of 2008 to cover July 1, 2008
to June 30, 2010 based on the state qualifying under the 20 percent
rule (Ohio Job and Family Services 2008) and parts but not all of
Pennsylvania qualified regionally (Pennsylvania Department of Human
Services 2008). As economic conditions deteriorated, existing
flexibility with regard to both geographic unit and economic indicators
allowed states to respond more quickly to the recession than Congress
or the Executive Branch.
Figure 8. Waiver Eligibility by Standing and Proposed Rules, 2008
2008

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

The NPRM states ``a significant number of states continue to
qualify for and use ABAWD waivers under the current waiver standards
(p. 981).'' Based on the USDA waiver status notifications, over the
course of 2017, eight states and D.C. were approved to receive a
statewide waiver, 26 states had a partial waiver, and 16 states were
implementing time limits statewide. Figure 10 shows that six states
would have no eligible areas for work requirements under the proposed
rules, of which three (Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut) have
currently eligible areas that would lose coverage. The states who
submitted waiver applications, in doing so expressing their preference
for waiver flexibility, and who would have seen coverage reduced based
on the proposed rules had they been implemented in 2017 are Alabama,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
According to USDA and affirmed in our analysis, 17 states declined to
submit a waiver for eligible areas: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware,
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
(USDA 2017a).
Figure 9. Waiver Eligibility and Take-up, 2017
2017

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Table 1 shows where in the U.S. and through which eligibility
trigger would counties have lost eligibility in 2017. We show RIA Table
3 for comparison and assume that Table 3 refers to 2018. By our
calculations, in 2017, 1,322 counties were eligible and 1,012 counties
took up a waiver.
Table 1. Impact of Rule Provisions

RIA Table 3. Impact of Rule Provisions on Currently-Waived Areas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Areas still
Currently waived areas = qualifying for Reduction in Percent
975 waivers waived areas reduction
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eliminate other 621 ^354 ^36%
eligibility criteria
Eliminate statewide 582 ^39 ^4%
waivers
Implement 7% UR 220 ^362 ^37%
threshold
-----------------------------------------------
Total 220 ^755 ^76%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impact of Rule Provisions on Take-up Areas, 2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current areas taking up Areas still Reduction in Percent
waivers = 1,012 taking up waiver areas, reduction
waivers take-up
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eliminate 10% UR, 3 1,011 ^1 0%
month lookback
Implement 7% UR 853 ^158 ^16%
threshold
Eliminate EUC 853 0 0%
Eliminate ARRA-related 853 0 0%
triggers
Eliminate statewide 820 ^33 ^4%
waivers
Eliminate other 574 ^246 ^30%
eligibility criteria
-----------------------------------------------
Total 574 ^438 ^43%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Looking first at counties that would qualify individually or as
part of an LMA, one county would lose eligibility due to the
elimination of the 3 month lookback on ten percent unemployment and 158
counties would lose eligibility based on the implementation of a seven
percent floor to the 20 percent rule. This is substantially smaller
than the 362 counties that the RIA states would lose eligibility due to
the implementation of a seven percent unemployment rate floor to the 20
percent rule. This is evidence that the RIA incorrectly modeled the 20
percent rule and that failing to account for LMA-based eligibility has
substantially affected their estimates.
Next, we look at the effect of eliminating statewide waivers on
eligibility. In 2017, the following states had statewide work
requirement waivers: Alaska, California, District of Columbia,
Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, and New Mexico. Alaska would maintain
statewide eligibility based on EB, but 33 counties would lose
eligibility because of the loss of these statewide waivers.
Like the RIA, we do not directly model the remaining eligibility
criteria. Unlike the RIA, we assign the remainder of take-up counties
to this category, rather than starting with it. We find that 246
counties taking up waivers would lose eligibility by eliminating the
remaining eligibility criteria, compared with 354 for the RIA. We find
that 574 counties among those actually waived in 2017 would retain
eligibility, while the RIA finds that 220 counties would.
The NPRM has misspecified the justification for the NPRM and has
failed to properly analyze the regulatory impact. This analysis finds a
deleterious effect of the new rules at the onset of a recession and
less reduction in coverage ``today.'' For these reasons, the current
rules should be maintained.
IV. Employment Status Changes
When an area is not subject to a waiver, work requirements subject
Able-bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWDs) to a time limit for
receiving SNAP benefits under the law. The exemptions to this rule are
at the participant level, for example, those receiving disability
income or who are ``unfit'' for employment based on a physical or
mental disability, those who have dependent minor children, and those
outside the targeted age range are not subject to the work
requirements.
This section provides evidence that suggests waivers from work
requirements at both the individual and geographic area should be more
readily available. We show that economic conditions beyond the control
of program participants are driving whether they can meet the 20 hour a
week standard consistently, as work-related reasons explain a
substantial share of gaps in working for pay. ABAWDs also appear to be
in substantially poorer health than non-SNAP recipients. Furthermore,
about 20 percent of ABAWDs are non-custodial parents, potentially
exposing children to benefit loss from which the law protects them.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 20 percent of ABAWDs in the SIPP reported having a child under
the age of 21 who lived in a different household or who reporting being
a parent but who did not have a child living at home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule would make it more difficult for geographic areas
to qualify to apply for waivers. This will mean that some areas where
states have weak enough economies to warrant the waivers would not be
able to use them. We show that during 2013 and 2014, when only seven
states and the District of Columbia had annual unemployment rates above
seven percent:

A plurality of ABAWDs experience labor force status
transitions over an extended period of time that would expose
workers to benefit loss even though they are in the labor
force;

More than \1/3\ of workers who experienced a period of not
working said that it was due to a work-related reason, such as
failure to find work or being laid off while less than \1/2\ of
one percent of ABAWDs were not working due to lack of interest;
and,

Four out of five ABAWDs who are out of the labor force are
not in fact able-bodied: while they do not receive disability
income, they report health or disability as the reason for not
working.

The decline in labor force participation--especially among prime-
age males--has drawn extensive attention in academic and policy circles
(e.g., Abraham and Kearney 2018; Juhn 1992; White House 2016). Some
recent academic work has emphasized the fact that participation may be
declining in part because an increasing number of labor force
participants cycle in and out of the labor force: a pattern with direct
relevance to proposed work requirements. The most comprehensive look at
the behavior of people cycling through the labor force is Coglianese
(2018). He documents that, among men, this group he refers to as ``in-
and-outs'' take short breaks between jobs, return to the labor force
fairly quickly (within 6 months), and, crucially, are no more likely
than a typical worker to take another break out of the labor force. See
also Joint Economic Committee (2018) for a discussion of the in-and-out
behavior of nonworking prime-age men and reasons for their non-
employment.
SNAP participants who are employed but who work in jobs with
volatile employment and hours would be at risk of failing work
requirements. This group includes those who lose their job, sanctioning
those who were recently employed and are searching for a new job.
Similarly, those who work in jobs with volatile hours would be
sanctioned in the months that their average hours fell below 20 hours
per week, whether due to illness, lack of hours offered by the
employer, or too few hours worked by the participant if they fail to
receive a good-cause waiver. By making it more difficult for states to
provide waivers when they feel conditions warrant, the proposed rule
will cause more people to lose SNAP benefits.
Low-wage workers in seasonal industries such as tourism would
potentially be eligible for SNAP in the months when they are working,
but not in the months without employment opportunities. In other words,
while benefits are most needed when an individual cannot find adequate
work, under proposed work requirements these are the times that
benefits would be unavailable. Disenrollment could make it more
difficult for an individual to return to work--for example, if a person
with chronic health conditions is unable to access needed care while
they are between jobs. Any work requirement that banned individuals
from participation for a considerable amount of time after failing the
requirements would be even more problematic for those facing churn in
the labor market.
In a set of analyses, Bauer (2018), Bauer and Schanzenbach (2018a,
2018b) and Bauer, Schanzenbach, and Shambaugh (2018) found that
although many SNAP beneficiaries work on average more than 20 hours a
week every month, they frequently switch between working more than 20
hours and a different employment status over a longer time horizon.
For this comment, we examine labor force status transitions and the
reasons given for not working among ABAWDs over 24 consecutive months,
January 2013-December 2014. The data used are from the first two waves
of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). By using a
data set that allows us to track workers over time, we identify the
share of program participants who are consistently out of the labor
force, the share who would consistently meet a work requirement, and
the share who would be at risk of losing benefits based on failing to
meet a work requirement threshold.
We assume that to comply with a program's work requirement,
beneficiaries would have to prove each month that they are working for
at least 20 hours per week, or at least 80 hours per month, which is
the typical minimum weekly requirement among the SNAP work requirement
proposal. We calculate the share of program participants who would be
exposed to benefit loss because they are not working sufficient hours
over the course of 24 consecutive months. Among those who would be
exposed to benefit loss and who experienced a gap in employment, we
describe the reasons given for not working to help quantify potential
waiver eligibility.
We remove from the analysis all those who have a categorical
exemption, excluding those outside the targeted age range, those with
dependent children, full- or part-time students, and those reporting
disability income. Program participants are those who reported
receiving SNAP at any point between January 1, 2013, and December 31,
2014. The vast majority of states over time period covered by the
analysis had unemployment rates below seven percent in either 2013,
2014, or both.\11\ The preponderance of evidence presented shown here
is thus occurring in labor markets that the proposed rule says has
sufficient jobs available to ABAWD SNAP participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The states which had an unemployment rate above seven percent
in both 2013 and 2014 were: Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, California,
Mississippi, Rhode Island, Washington D.C., and Nevada.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We categorize each individual in each month into one of four
categories: (1) employed and worked more than 20 hours a week, (2)
employed and worked less than 20 hours a week, (3) unemployed and
seeking employment, or (4) not in the labor force. If a worker was
employed at variable weekly hours but maintained hours above the
monthly threshold (80 hours for a 4 week month and 120 hours for a 5
week month) then we categorize them as (1) employed and worked more
than 20 hours a week for that month. Individuals are considered to have
a stable employment status if they do not change categories over 2
years, and are considered to have made an employment status transition
if they switched between any of these categories at least once. There
is no employment status transition when a worker changes jobs but works
more than 20 hours a week at each job.
Among working-age adults, SNAP serves a mix of the unemployed, low-
income workers, and those who are not in the labor force (USDA 2017b
(https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/facts-about-snap)). Figure 10 describes
employment status of ABAWDs. Those receiving SNAP benefits who are in
the demographic group currently exposed to work requirements--adults
aged 18-49 with no dependents--generally participate in the labor
market, with just 25 percent consistently not in the labor force
(discussed below). While 58 percent worked at least 20 hours per week
in at least 1 month over 2 years, 25 percent were over the threshold at
some point but fell below the 20 hour threshold during at least 1 month
over 2 years. Very few are always working less than 20 hours a week or
always unemployed (less than two percent in either case), and 14
percent move across these categories.
These findings give a markedly different impression than a snapshot
in time--1 month. When we compare the 1 month (December 2013) against
24 months (January 2013-December 2014), we find that using 1 month of
data, more program participants appear to be labor force non-
participants and more appear to meet the work requirement threshold.
That is, looking only at 1 month of data, an observer would both think
there is a bigger problem of labor force non-participation in SNAP than
there really is, and would think that fewer labor force participants
would lose benefits in a state or county with work requirements.
There is a meaningful portion of SNAP participants in the labor
force and working, but not all are working above the monthly work
requirement threshold consistently. Coglianese's (2018) finding that
workers who are in and out of the labor force are not more likely to
take another break later on suggests it is unclear how much more
consistently work requirements would attach these people to the labor
force. In our work, too, we find that frequent movement between labor
status categories over time increases the number of people exposed to
losing benefits for failing to consistently meet a work requirement and
decreases the number of people who are entirely out of the labor
market.
Figure 10. Employment Status in One Month versus Two Years, SNAP
Participants 18-49 with No Dependents

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation; authors'
calculations.

It is helpful to consider specifically what types of individuals
would be affected by proposed work requirements and why they are not
currently working if they are not in the labor force to better
understand the possible impacts of expanded work requirements. It is
clear that some people face barriers to working outside the home and as
such, many work requirements exempt people receiving disability income,
people with young dependents, or students; but, accurately exempting
all those who are eligible can be challenging and is likely to result
in terminating coverage for many people with health conditions or
caregiving responsibilities that fall outside of states' narrow
definitions.
We next examine the reasons ABAWDs gave for not working over the 2
year period (figure 11). Those in solid green were in the labor force
but experienced at least one spell of unemployment or labor force
nonparticipation. Among the labor force participants who were asked why
they were not working for pay during at least 1 week, we report the
reason for not working in months they were not working. For
perspective, the share of the population that worked consistently over
the 2 years and therefore was never asked why they were not working,
are shown in the green crosshatch. Those in the blue were out of the
labor force for the entire 2 year period. Each person is assigned one
reason--their most frequent reason--for not working.
Figure 11. Most-Frequent Reason for Not Working for Pay, SNAP
Participants 18-49 with No Dependents

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation; authors'
calculations.

Focusing first on the 25 percent of the SNAP ABAWD population that
was not in the labor force over the full sample, we find almost 85
percent reported that the reason that they were not working was poor
health or disability (this is about 20 percent of all ABAWDs). Another
quarter of the sample is in stable work. The remaining 50 percent,
though, were in the labor force at some point, but at other times not
working. Among that group, more than \1/2\ (28 percent of all ABAWDS)
reported that a work-related reason, such as not being able to find
work or being laid off, was their reason for not working for pay.
As shown in figure 12 below, a substantially larger share of adult
SNAP participants were not working due to work-related reasons than the
overall population, even during this time period (2013-14) when the
economy was on an upswing. More than a quarter of ABAWDs experienced a
period of not working for pay or nonparticipation due to labor market
conditions outside their control. This share is 80 percent larger than
the share of work-related reasons among the overall population. That
is, even when the economy is improving, SNAP participants may be in
particularly vulnerable occupations and find themselves frequently
unable to work due to their local job markets. This is the group that a
waiver for economic reasons is most directly intended to help, and this
evidence shows that even when the economy is over 4 years after a
recession, this group may still be at risk of losing benefits not
because they do not want to work, but because they are unable to either
find a job or get the requisite number of hours.
Figure 12. Share Not Working for Pay for Work-Related Reasons Overall
versus SNAP, by Demographic Characteristics

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation; authors'
calculations.

This evidence presented thus far shows that those who are most at
risk to losing benefits under the proposed rules are workers
experiencing normal labor market fluctuations and those who should be
eligible for exemptions but often fail to receive them. Among
persistent labor force non-participants, we find that health issues are
the predominant reason given for not working even though the analysis
excludes program participants who reported disability income because
they would be eligible for a categorical exemption from a work
requirement. This group would also lose SNAP benefits if work
requirement waivers were removed.
Some have questioned whether survey respondents are likely to
provide accurate information about their health. This criticism stems
from social desirability bias; survey respondents might feel pressure
to report a more publicly acceptable reason for not working than what
might actually be true. In this case, a respondent who simply does not
want to work would say that they are not working because of a health
condition; a health problem is a socially acceptable reason for not
working, but the real reason is not.
In this analysis, we show that those reporting health as a reason
for not working do appear to be in poor health. We investigate the
prevalence of reported health conditions among ABAWD SNAP
participants.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Those who were not working due to health or disability
reported that they were not working for pay because they were unable to
work because of chronic health condition or disability, temporarily
unable to work due to injury, or temporarily unable to work due to
illness. Those in the stable work category did not experience a period
of unemployment or nonparticipation over the 2 year period. Those in
the period of unemployment or nonparticipation group were at least once
not working for pay during the 2 year period. Labor force non-
participants did not work for pay at all during the 2 year period.
Those in the labor force non-participant due to health group did not
work for pay at all during the 2 year period and the most frequent
reason given for their nonparticipation was health.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using the information from the prior analyses, we divide the SNAP
participants into five groups:

Stable work--those who worked consistently for 2 years;

Transitioned in and out of work due to health--those who
were in the labor force but experienced a period of
unemployment or nonparticipation due to a health condition or
disability;

Transitioned in and out of work, other--those who were in
the labor force but experienced a period of unemployment or
nonparticipation for a reason other than health or disability;

Labor force non-participant due to health--those who did not
work at all for 2 years due to a health condition or
disability; and,

Labor force nonparticipation, other--those who did not work
at all for 2 years for a reason other than health or
disability.
Figure 13. Health Characteristics of ABAWDs, by Employment Status

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation; authors'
calculations.

We look at whether SNAP participants who would be exposed to work
requirements are in self-reported fair or poor health, take a
prescription medication daily, respond affirmatively to at least one in
a battery of questions about disability, or spent more than 30 days
over a 2 year period in bed due to ill health.\13\ These questions
about health are self-reported, but are considerably less subject to
the social desirability bias that may affect how a respondent answers
the question as to why they are not working. In fact, these questions
are asked in the survey long before the respondent is asked about their
labor force status, reducing the likelihood they are manipulating their
response to justify not working.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Those in self-reported poor health responded ``poor'' to the
question ``what is your health status?'' Those in the daily
prescription medication group responded affirmatively to the question
``Did you take prescription medication on a daily basis?'' Those in the
any disability responded affirmatively to at least one of the following
questions: Do you have serious difficulty walking or climbing stairs;
do you have difficulty dressing or bathing; do you have serious
difficulty concentrating, remembering, or making decisions; do you have
a serious physical or mental condition or a developmental delay that
limits ordinary activity; do you have difficulty doing errands alone;
do you have difficulty finding a job or remaining employed; are you
prevented from working; are you deaf or do you have serious difficulty
hearing; are you blind or do you have serious difficulty seeing? Those
who spent more than 30 days in bed responded to the question ``How many
days did illness or injury keep you in bed more than half of the day''
for at least 30 days over the 2 year period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ninety-nine percent of ABAWD labor force non-participants who
reported the reason for their nonparticipation was due to health in
fact reported health problems; 91 percent reported a disability, 86
percent reported taking medication daily, 82 percent reported being in
self-reported fair or poor health, and 39 percent reported spending
more than 30 days in bed. For those labor force non-participants
reporting a different reason for their nonparticipation, three in five
reported a health problem. More than \1/3\ reported a disability,
almost \1/2\ took daily medication, and 15 percent spent more than 30
days in bed. Among those who were labor force participants but
experienced a period of unemployment or nonparticipation due to health,
nine out of ten reported a health condition. About seven in ten
reported a disability and taking a daily prescription, about 60 percent
were in self-reported fair or poor health, and a quarter spent more
than 20 days in bed.
The prevalence of health conditions among ABAWD labor force non-
participants as well as labor force participants working unstably due
to health contrasts with those working stably. But to be clear, even
among this group, a quarter report a disability, 44 percent are taking
a daily prescription medication, \1/5\ are in self-reported fair or
poor health, and six percent spent substantial time in bed.
Those who are SNAP participants with health issues who are unable
to work and who would be exposed to work requirements would be required
to obtain documents verifying their health problems frequently in order
to retain an exemption. These people could lose access to the program
due to paperwork requirements unless administrative capacity were
expanded greatly to monitor and adjudicate these health concerns. Even
then, administrative failures could lead to loss of access to food
benefits.
There may be some SNAP participants who might join the labor force
if they were threatened with the loss of benefits. Recent evidence
shows that this group is very small relative to those who would be
improperly sanctioned by work requirements who are already working or
are legitimately unable to work. This evidence is directly relevant to
claims in the NPRM and RIA that exposing more areas to work
requirements would increase self-sufficiency. The USDA has failed to
provide evidence that this would be the case, and the evidence produced
in this section make it clear that work requirement would harm labor
force participants who experience market volatility and labor force
non-participants, the vast majority of whom have a health condition.
V. Conclusion
Executive Order 12866 states that agencies, such as USDA, may issue
regulations when there is a compelling public need and when the
benefits outweigh the costs in such a way as to maximize net benefits.
We find that both the NPRM and its RIA insufficiently analyze the
proposed rule and fail to consider the costs and benefits under
alternate economic conditions or to the participants in any
circumstance. In this comment, we have provided evidence and analysis
that the USDA has proposed a rule that is arbitrary, that the rule runs
counter to the compelling public need for waivers to work requirements
during economic downturns, and fails to consider much less prove that
the benefits outweigh the costs. The existing rule should be sustained.
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VII. Appendix

Appendix Table 1. Interactions between Emergency Unemployment
Compensation and SNAP Waiver Eligibility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EUC threshold for
Date range SNAP Waiver Tier eligibility Source
eligibility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 8, Tier II 3 month seasonally The Bush
2009-Novembe adjusted total Administration
r 5, 2009 unemployment rate clarified \2\
(TUR) of at least that EUC
six percent; or 13 counted for
week insured SNAP waivers
unemployment rate on January 8,
(IUR) of at least 2009. Any
4.0 percent (CRS state that was
2014 \1\) eligible for
Tier II EUC
was eligible
for SNAP
waivers based
on EUC
eligibility.
From January
9, 2009 to
November 6,
2009,
eligibility
for Tier II
was
conditional on
having a TUR
of at least
six percent or
an IUR of at
least four
percent. Tier
II was not
universal
among states
before
November 6,
2009 (Table 1
in Rothstein
2011 \3\).
November 6, Tier III 3 month seasonally When all states
2009-May 31, adjusted TUR of at were eligible
2012 least six percent; for Tier II
or 13 week IUR of benefits,
at least 4.0 states had to
percent (CRS 2014 additionally
\1\) qualify for
Tier III
benefits in
order to be
eligible for a
SNAP waiver
application
(CBPP \4\
2018). State
eligibility
for EUC tier
II became
unconditional
on November 6,
2009
(Rothstein
2011 \3\).
June 1, 2012- Tier II 3 month seasonally On June 1, 2012
Dec. 31 2013 adjusted TUR of at \5\ Tier II
least six percent qualifications
(CRS 2014 \1\) go back to a 3
month
seasonally
adjusted TUR
of at least
six percent
and therefore
Tier II is no
longer a
universal
tier.
According to
DOL, as of
January 12,
2014 EB is not
currently
available in
any state (DOL
\6\).\14\
\14\ Because
we round to
the nearest
month, we
end the EUC
eligibility
period in
December
2013.
Waivers
based on EUC
were granted
through
2016.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42444.pdf.
\2\ https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
ABAWD%20Statewide%20 Waivers.pdf.
\3\ https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
2011b_bpea_rothstein.pdf.
\4\ https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-24-17fa.pdf.
\5\ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unemployment_extension.
\6\ https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/docs/supp_act_eb-euc-expired.pdf.

attachment 2

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Economic Analysis D October 2018
Work Requirements and Safety Net Programs *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Lauren Bauer, The Hamilton Project and the Brookings Institution;
Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, The Hamilton Project, the Brookings
Institution, and Northwestern University; and Jay Shambaugh, The
Hamilton Project, the Brookings Institution, and The George Washington
University.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acknowledgments

We thank reviewers John Coglianese, Jason Furman, Heather
Hahn, Kriston McIntosh, Ryan Nunn, and the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities. We also thank the following who provided
research assistance: Patrick Liu, Jimmy O'Donnell, Jana
Parsons, Becca Portman, and Areeb Siddiqui.

Mission Statement

The Hamilton Project seeks to advance America's promise of
opportunity, prosperity, and growth.
We believe that today's increasingly competitive global
economy demands public policy ideas commensurate with the
challenges of the 21st Century. The Project's economic strategy
reflects a judgment that long-term prosperity is best achieved
by fostering economic growth and broad participation in that
growth, by enhancing individual economic security, and by
embracing a role for effective government in making needed
public investments.
Our strategy calls for combining public investment, a secure
social safety net, and fiscal discipline. In that framework,
the Project puts forward innovative proposals from leading
economic thinkers--based on credible evidence and experience,
not ideology or doctrine--to introduce new and effective policy
options into the national debate.
The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the nation's
first Treasury Secretary, who laid the foundation for the
modern American economy. Hamilton stood for sound fiscal
policy, believed that broad-based opportunity for advancement
would drive American economic growth, and recognized that
``prudent aids and encouragements on the part of government''
are necessary to enhance and guide market forces. The guiding
principles of the Project remain consistent with these views.
Abstract
Basic assistance programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program) and Medicaid
ensure families have access to food and medical care when they are low-
income. Some policymakers at the Federal and state levels intend to add
new work requirements to SNAP and Medicaid. In this paper, we analyze
those who would be impacted by an expansion of work requirements in
SNAP and an introduction of work requirements into Medicaid. We
characterize the types of individuals who would face work requirements,
describe their labor force experience over 24 consecutive months, and
identify the reasons why they are not working if they experience a
period of unemployment or labor force nonparticipation. We find that
the majority of SNAP and Medicaid participants who would be exposed to
work requirements are attached to the labor force, but that a
substantial share would fail to consistently meet a 20 hours per week-
threshold. Among persistent labor force non-participants, health issues
are the predominant reason given for not working. There may be some
subset of SNAP and Medicaid participants who could work, are not
working, and might work if they were threatened with the loss of
benefits. This paper adds evidence to a growing body of research that
shows that this group is very small relative to those who would be
sanctioned under the proposed policies who are already working or are
legitimately unable to work.
Introduction
Basic assistance programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program) and Medicaid
ensure families have access to food and medical care when they are low-
income. These programs lift millions out of poverty while reducing food
insecurity and increasing access to medical care. They also support
work, and increase health and economic security among families in the
short term as well as economic self-sufficiency in the long-term.
Today, some policymakers at the Federal and state levels intend to
add new work requirements in order for beneficiaries to receive SNAP
benefits and participate in the Medicaid health insurance program. In
general, those exposed to a work requirement would be required to prove
that they are working or participating in a training program for at
least 20 hours per week each month. Failure to prove that they have met
the work requirement or are eligible for an exemption would mean that a
program participant would lose food assistance benefits or health
insurance for a time, or until they met the standard.
Work requirements are meant to force work-ready individuals to
increase their work effort and maintain that work effort every month by
threatening to withhold and subsequently withholding food assistance or
health coverage if a person is not working a set number of hours. The
strategy presumes that the reasons that many low-income individuals are
not working or meeting an hourly threshold every month is either due to
their own lack of effort or to work disincentives theoretically
inherent to means-tested programs. It is clear that some people face
barriers to working outside the home and as such, many work
requirements exempt people that receive disability income, people with
young dependents, or students; but, accurately exempting all those who
are eligible can be challenging and is likely to result in terminating
coverage for many people with health conditions or caregiving
responsibilities that fall outside of states' narrow definitions.
Proponents of work requirements would ideally only like to sanction
individuals who are able to work, but choose not to. But in practice
strict enforcement of proposed work requirements will sanction many
groups, including: those who are unable to work, those who are able to
work but who do not find work, those who are working but not
consistently above an hourly threshold, and those who are meeting work
or exemption requirements but fail to provide proper documentation.
Evidence suggests that the vast majority of those exposed to proposed
work requirements for SNAP and Medicaid fall into these groups.
In this paper, we analyze those who would be impacted by an
expansion of work requirements in SNAP and an introduction of work
requirements into Medicaid. Our principal contribution is to
characterize the types of individuals who would face work requirements,
describe what their work experiences are over a 2 year period, and
identify the reasons why they are not working if they experience a
period of unemployment or labor force nonparticipation. We find that
most of those who fail the new work requirements are either those who
are in the labor force already but who experience unstable employment,
or those who might be eligible for hardship exemptions, such as those
with health problems who are not already receiving disability income.
The compositional and labor market analyses reported below suggest that
the proposed work requirements will put at risk access to food
assistance and health care for millions who are working, trying to
work, or face barriers to working.
Adding explicit work requirements to assistance programs must be
analyzed in the context of program goals and from many angles. Who
would be impacted by an expansion of work requirements? What are the
administrative costs and challenges of managing the work requirements?
How do the requirements interact with the realities of the low-wage
work experience? And how would the requirements impact the health and
economic benefits to program participation? For example, removing
Medicaid coverage may have little positive work-incentive effect for
the currently healthy but may undermine public health goals and reduce
the labor supply of those who do encounter health problems and have
lost their coverage. Removing SNAP benefits from working-age adults may
impact resources available not just to them, but also to any seniors
and dependents in the household. Finally, tight work requirements can
undermine the automatic stabilizer aspect of these programs. Instead of
SNAP expanding as the unemployment rate rises, the work requirements
would cause the program to contract, resulting in more people losing
benefits when work becomes difficult for them to find.
There may be some subset of individuals who could work, are not
working, and might work if they were threatened with the loss of
benefits. This paper adds evidence to a growing body of research that
shows that this group is very small relative to those who would be
sanctioned under the proposed policies who are already working or are
legitimately unable to work (Bauer and Schanzenbach 2018a, 2018b;
Garfield, et al., 2018; Goldman, et al., 2018).
The goals of safety net programs are to provide insurance
protection to those who are experiencing poor economic outcomes and to
support those who are trying to improve their situation. Our analysis
suggests that work requirements will harm more individuals and families
than they would help the small share who might increase their labor
supply.
SNAP, Medicaid, and Incentives to Work
The social safety net is intended to provide insurance against bad
outcomes. But, for means-tested benefit programs, economic theory
suggests it may reduce the incentive to work because (1) individuals
are only eligible for a program when their income remains below a given
threshold and (2) participants stand to lose benefits as income
increases or reaches the eligibility threshold. In addition, any time
someone receives unearned income of sufficient size, it may
theoretically reduce the amount of work that an individual wants to
supply to the market. In some cases, worries about work disincentives
have led to the implementation of time limits or work requirements for
a set of individuals as a condition for program eligibility.
Such work requirements can undermine the insurance value of the
programs, though, if people who are not working either cannot work due
to individual limitations or are unable to find steady work due to
economic fluctuations. Evaluating whether work requirements are an
appropriate policy lever--as opposed to addressing work disincentives
through other means--thus depends on the goals of the program overall,
the characteristics of the target population, the design of the work
requirements, the cost of administering the program, the likelihood of
erroneously limiting access, and the strength of the incentive effects.
Work requirement policies often have difficulty distinguishing
between those who are able to work and those who are unable to work,
because both groups can be hard to observe and verify. As a result,
strict enforcement of work requirements will sanction those who are
unable to work, as well as those who could work but do not obtain
employment in response to the requirements. They may also sanction some
who are able to work but who are not able to find work, as well as
those who are working but fail to provide proper documentation.
In order to evaluate whether a work requirement is in keeping with
the purpose of a means-tested program, there are a number of dimensions
by which a proposal should be evaluated. One would want to exempt those
whom society does not feel should be forced to work, accommodate
changes in the business cycle that make work more difficult to find,
and have a system of verification and exemption that does not raise
barriers to entry or remove program participants who should maintain
access. But, one would have to ensure that work requirements do not
punish those who cannot obtain a job due to economic conditions in
their area, penalize those who are actually working but have
temporarily lost hours, limit access to programs for an extended period
of time after failing a work requirement, or, compromise the insurance
goals of the program in question. These parameters can be quite
difficult to meet and they set the criterion by which policymakers can
determine whether work requirements are inappropriate for the program
in question.
There is an extensive literature on whether work requirements can
in fact push people into the labor force, principally studying the
impacts of the 1996 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
reform (see Blank 2002 and Ziliak 2016 for reviews). The labor supply
of the TANF population did in fact rise, but this took place amidst a
strong economy and support from the Earned Income Tax Cred[i]t (EITC)
expansion as well (Schanzenbach 2018). For example, Fang and Keane
(2004) find that while work requirements were the most important factor
driving the decline in participation in welfare programs, the EITC
expansion and macroeconomic factors were more important in driving the
increase in work participation (they find work requirements had a
positive impact as well, but the contribution was smaller). Work
requirements often come with a variety of supports and involve
different enforcement mechanisms and levels of stringency. See
Hamilton, et al., (2001) for a detailed review as part of the National
Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies. Many of the work requirement
programs that have generated positive results also had substantial
education and skills training components (Pavetti and Schott 2016).
Other studies, such as Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Grogger (2004)
suggest a smaller or negligible role for the TANF reforms compared with
other factors, especially the EITC expansion.
In this analysis, we focus more on the people who would be impacted
by new work requirements and the reasons why they are not working, as
opposed to the question of the labor supply response. Given the extent
to which the labor market conditions--in particular for potentially
impacted populations--are different than those in the 1990s (Black,
Schanzenbach, Breitwieser 2017; Butcher and Schanzenbach 2018), it is
helpful to consider specifically what types of individuals would be
affected by proposed work requirements and why they are not currently
working to better understand the possible impacts of expanded work
requirements. In this section we describe the SNAP and Medicaid
programs, the structure of their work incentives, and evidence of the
programs' incentive effects on labor supply.
SNAP
Since the 1960s SNAP has provided resources to purchase food for
millions of low-income households. The goal of the program is to
provide beneficiaries with resources to raise their food purchasing
power and, as a result, improve their health and nutrition. Households
are eligible for SNAP if they meet an asset and income threshold, or if
they receive assistance from programs like Supplemental Security
Income. SNAP benefit levels are targeted based on a given household's
income and expenses.
SNAP currently addresses work disincentives in a variety of ways.
Similar to the EITC, SNAP addresses work disincentives through an
earnings disregard of 20 percent and a gradual benefit reduction
schedule. This means that the size of the earnings disregard increases
as income increases and that those with earned income receive larger
SNAP benefits than those with no earned income (Wolkomir and Cai 2018).
When a person moves from being a labor force non-participant to working
while on SNAP, total household resources will increase; as a
beneficiary's earnings approach the eligibility threshold, total
household resources continue to increase. The combination of the
earnings disregard and a gradual phase-out schedule--that states have
the option to further extend and smooth--ameliorate but do not
eliminate work disincentives.
States have had the option to impose work requirements on certain
beneficiaries since the 1980s. Most SNAP participants between the ages
of 18 and 59 without dependents under 6 are required to register for
work, accept a job if one is offered to them, and not reduce their work
effort. States are required to operate an employment and training
program, and may require some SNAP recipients to participate or suffer
sanctions. See Rosenbaum (2013) and Bolen, et al., (2018) for a
detailed description of SNAP work requirements. After 1996, SNAP work
requirements and benefit time limits were imposed on individuals aged
18-49 without dependents under the age of 18, requiring them to
register for work and accept a job if one is offered to them. If they
work or participate in a training program for at least 20 hours per
week, they can maintain access to the program. This population is
allowed to receive 3 months of benefits out of 36 months if they do not
work or participate in a training program. States are permitted to
exempt a share of individuals and apply to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) for a waiver to the time limit provisions, an
essential capacity for SNAP's function as an automatic stabilizer.
Studies show that when SNAP payments increase to a local area in
response to an economic downturn, they serve as an effective fiscal
stimulus to the local area (Blinder and Zandi 2015; Keith-Jennings and
Rosenbaum 2015). Among other changes, the proposed work requirements
would make these regional waivers more difficult to obtain.
SNAP improves health and economic outcomes in both the near and
long terms (see Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2016 for a review), but had a
negative effect on employment in the past. During the Food Stamp
Program's introduction in the 1960s and 1970s, reductions in employment
and hours worked were observed, particularly among female-headed
households (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2012). Whether work requirements
could offset this disincentive would depend on their targeting and
whether those who are not working could readily increase their labor
supply.
Medicaid
Since 1965, the Medicaid program has been administered in
partnership between Federal and state governments to provide medical
assistance to eligible individuals. The core goal of the program is to
provide health services and to cover health-care costs in order to
improve health. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA), the eligible population expanded to include low-income adults
under the age of 65 who previously did not qualify.
Although some SNAP beneficiaries have been subject to work
requirements since the 1980s, Medicaid work requirements are being
rolled out for the first time in certain states. The ACA does not allow
work requirements to be imposed as a condition for program
participation in Medicaid, but states may apply for a waiver under
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act to introduce work requirements
if the Department of Health and Human Services determines doing so
advances program objectives. Though the Obama Administration and the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (which rejected
Kentucky's proposal for work requirements in Medicaid) did not view
work requirements as supporting core program goals, the Trump
Administration has expressed its conviction that work requirements are
allowable (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2018; Garfield,
Rudowitz, and Damico 2018; Stewart v. Azar).
In the case of Medicaid, there are societal costs to taking health
insurance away from an otherwise eligible person due to work
requirements. For example, since there are rules requiring hospitals to
provide medical care to those experiencing life-threatening emergencies
regardless of the individual's ability to pay, those without insurance
will in many cases seek and receive treatment in ways that are more
expensive for society (Institute of Medicine 2003). Second, care
delivered via insurance may include preventive care, check-ups, and
other care that is more efficient than delaying care until a medical
problem becomes severe enough to be treated in an emergency room. Thus,
denying insurance may not reduce costs for society. Finally, evidence
suggests that health insurance is valued by participants at less than
its cost, making proposed work requirements less effective at raising
employment (Finkelstein, Hendren, and Luttmer 2015).

Box 1.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trends in Prime-Age Labor Force Participation

For a number of decades labor force participation in the United
States rose. This was especially true for prime-age (25-54) workers,
whose participation rose from 65 percent in the middle of the 20th
century to a peak of 84 percent in 1999. This persistent trend obscured
an offsetting force: Prime-age men were steadily working less while
prime-age women were working more. In 1949 97 percent of prime-age men
were in the labor force, but only 36 percent of women were. By 1999
those figures were 92 percent for men and 77 percent for women.
Although women's labor force participation rose in the 1980s and
early 1990s, policymakers were concerned about the low labor force
participation for single women with children, which remained relatively
flat over that period. But for the past 20 years single women who head
households with children have participated in the labor market at
nearly the same rate as single women without children or married women
without children. In fact, for the first time, in 2017 the labor force
participation rate of single women with children was higher (79.09
percent) than single women without dependents (79.06 percent.) Married
women with children are still more likely to be out of the labor force
(box figure 1). More recently, overall labor force participation has
declined, in part due to the aging population. Older working-age
Americans (55-64) are less likely to work, with a labor force
participation rate in 2017 around 72 percent for those aged 55-59 and
57 percent for those aged 60-64, compared to the current 82 percent for
those aged 25-54.
These trends provide context for who is not currently working that
society might prefer to work. Most prime-age men work, though nearly
ten percent do not. Most unmarried prime-age women with children also
work. A much smaller share of older Americans work.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Box Figure 1.
Prime-Age Women's Labor Force Participation, by Marital Status and
Presence of Children under Age 18

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (ASEC) (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 1977-2017);
authors' calculations.

Evidence of the effect of Medicaid participation on employment for
childless adults is decidedly mixed, with population differences and
prevailing economic conditions as potential explanations for why
studies have shown positive, negative, and no effects on employment
(Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard 2016). Nevertheless, in the years
since Medicaid expansion through the ACA, the preponderance of evidence
suggests that Medicaid receipt has had little or positive effects on
labor supply (Baicker, et al., 2014; Duggan, Goda, and Jackson 2017;
Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo 2014; Gooptu, et al., 2016;
Kaestner, et al., 2017), with notable exceptions (e.g., Dague, DeLeire,
and Leininger 2017).
While there is no research evidence regarding the effect of work
requirements in Medicaid, last month, as the first state to implement a
plan, Arkansas disenrolled program participants for failing to comply
with work requirements. Arkansas terminated coverage for 4,353 citizens
for failing to qualify for an exemption or to meet work requirements,
while an additional 1,218 reported 20 hours per week of work activities
and 2,247 reported an exemption in the month of August (Rudowitz and
Musumeci 2018).
For these programs to accomplish their goals, eligible people
should not be dissuaded from applying for or improperly prevented from
receiving those benefits. Evidence suggests that, under a variety of
scenarios, the vast majority of those losing access to Medicaid would
not lose access because they failed to meet a work requirement, but
because they failed to successfully report their work/training activity
or exemption (Garfield, Rudowitz, and Musumeci 2018; Goldman, et al.,
2018). For example, in Arkansas, the only state currently implementing
a work requirement in Medicaid, beneficiaries are required to report
through an online portal, Access Arkansas (Arkansas Department of Human
Services n.d.), despite a large number of program-eligible Arkansans
who lack Internet access (Gangopadhyaya, et al., 2018).
Characteristics of Those Who Would Face New Work Requirements
Potential loss of access to SNAP and Medicaid on the basis of a
work requirement is a function of whether the person is qualified for
and verified as exempt from working and, if not, whether the person
works sufficient hours each month to meet the requirement. Those who
have a categorical exemption from work requirements--students, for
example--are not required to work unless their status changes.
Exemptions from work requirements can be applied individually for a
variety of reasons, including temporary health problems, or, more
broadly, when the unemployment rate for a location is high. Certain
educational or training activities can also qualify for meeting hourly
thresholds.

Box 2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Expansion of Work Requirements

In April 2018 President Trump issued an Executive Order requiring
that all means-tested programs be reviewed for the presence of current
work requirements, the current state of enforcement and exemption, and,
for those programs without current work requirements, whether such
requirements could be added (White House 2018).
This Executive Order builds on executive action to implement work
requirements in Medicaid for the first time. In letters to governors
(Price and Verma 2017) and state Medicaid directors (Neale 2018), the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has offered guidance
for states considering submitting a waiver request to apply work
requirements for those receiving Medicaid. Since the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services offered guidance to the states with regard
to Medicaid in 2017, 14 states have submitted work requirement
proposals to HHS. HHS has approved four states' plans, though
Kentucky's plan was vacated. The state of Arkansas has begun to enforce
work requirements (Urban Institute 2018). State proposals vary in terms
of the age range and household composition of exposure, who is exempt,
and the hours required for work or approved activities.
Additionally, in reauthorizing the farm bill, in June 2018 the House
voted to expand the scope of who is required to work in order to
receive SNAP benefits to include adults 18-59 with dependent children
aged 6-18 as well as those aged 50-59 without dependents under the age
of 6. As of publication, the conference committee is considering this
proposal.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

To highlight one difficulty in designing a work requirement policy,
consider the group of SNAP and Medicaid participants who usually are
not working. Many individuals in this group are not expected to work,
including the elderly, disabled, children, students, caregivers, and
the infirm. In fact, nearly \2/3\ of individuals who participate in
SNAP are elderly, disabled, or children (USDA 2017a).
Some of these characteristics are straightforward to observe and
verify, such as age, school enrollment, and receipt of disability
benefits. Other characteristics are difficult to observe and costly to
verify, such as those with temporary medical conditions that make it
impossible for them to work, those who have a chronic health condition
but do not meet the high standard set for disability benefits (or have
not applied for disability benefits), and those who do not have the
skills, childcare, or transportation to obtain a job in their local
economy at present. Another share of this group might be capable of
employment but not willing to work; in that case the work requirements
might or might not provide enough incentive for them to get jobs.
Using data from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC), we quantify exposure to work requirements
in 2017 based on broad demographic characteristics. To do so, we
separate those who would likely qualify for a categorical exemption
from those who would be required to work or who would qualify for a
waiver to maintain eligibility. To be clear, while we model who is
eligible for a categorical exemption, evidence suggests that not
everyone in these groups will successfully navigate the system and
obtain the exemption; in fact, estimates suggest that most people who
lose coverage under this policy will be eligible for an exemption or
already be working. For SNAP we followed the Federal guidelines for
categorical exemption; for Medicaid we created a composite from among
the different plans put forth by the states based on how frequently
such groups are exempt.
For SNAP, minors, those who are older than 59 years, students,
those receiving disability benefits, and those with a child under the
age of 6 are exempt from both current and new, proposed work
requirements. The samples are further limited to U.S. citizens and non-
active military. For simplification, we describe those aged 18-49
without dependents as being currently exposed to work requirements and
those aged 18-59 with a dependent between the ages of 6 and 17
(inclusive) as well as those between the ages of 50 and 59 with no
dependents under the age of 6 as newly required to meet work
requirements or to participate in a training program in order to
receive SNAP benefits. For the current group, some may live in places
exempt from work requirements or have an unobserved good-cause
exemption.
Figure 1.
Exposure to Work Requirements among Adult SNAP Participants, 2017

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: ASEC (BLS 2018); authors' calculations.

How many adult SNAP participants are--or would be--exposed to work
requirements? Figure 1 shows the entire adult population (18 or older)
who reported SNAP participation in 2017. Each rectangle represents a
share of the total population and whether the individuals in that share
were eligible for a categorical exemption to work requirements (teal),
were in a population currently exposed to a work requirement (green),
or would be newly exposed to work requirements under the House proposal
(purple). The shaded rectangles sum to 100 percent, the total adult
SNAP participant population.
Under the House bill parameters (described in box 2), combined with
current work requirements, \1/3\ of all adults who reported receiving
SNAP benefits during 2017 would be exposed to work requirements, though
a portion of those impacted could apply for exemptions based on
verified health- or work-related concerns. Some already face work
requirements, but 22 percent of all participants would be newly exposed
to work requirements under the House bill (purple).
Figure 1 also shows the reasons some participants would be exempt
from new requirements. The majority (67 percent) of adults currently
receiving SNAP benefits would still be exempt from work requirements
based on age, having a dependent under the age of 6, or having student
or disability status. Some would be exempt for multiple reasons; we
group them first by age, then by the presence of dependents, and then
by student or disability status. For example, while figure 1 shows just
14 percent exempt due to disability, 24 percent of all adult SNAP
recipients report receipt of disability benefits.
In 2017, 2.2 million people who reported SNAP benefit receipt were
exposed to work requirements during the year based on their demographic
characteristics. Under the House proposal and based on 2017 numbers,
this would more than double with 2.5 million adults aged 18-49 with
dependent children aged 6-17 and 1.6 million adults aged 50-59 who
would be exposed to work requirements nationally for the first time.
In any household, there may be others who rely on the benefits, and
not just the individual facing work requirements. The solution to
concerns for other individuals in the household has typically been to
waive work requirements for those who likely cannot work or who reside
with those for whom shielding from benefit loss is a priority. Any
reduction in SNAP benefits to adults would reduce the total amount of
resources available to them to purchase food, including food for
children. There are 3.5 million children and 710,000 seniors in these
households that would be exposed to possible benefit loss due to work
requirements.
Figure 2.
Exposure to Work Requirements among Adult Medicaid Participants, 2017

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: ASEC (BLS 2018); authors' calculations.

We perform the same exercise to show the share of Medicaid
beneficiaries who are targeted by the policy based on potential new
rules (figure 2). Minors, seniors (those over the age of 64), students,
those receiving disability benefits or Medicare, and those with a child
under the age of 6 are those who are generally eligible to be exempt
from work requirements based on the plans that states submitted, though
there is variation across states. We apply these categories to the
entire adult Medicaid population, acknowledging that not every state
has submitted a work requirement proposal and that the affected
population varies by state plans. A nationwide expansion of these rules
would target 22.4 million Americans for a possible loss of Medicaid
coverage.
Almost \1/2\ of all adult Medicaid beneficiaries would be targeted
by work requirements if the composite rules were applied nationwide.
The largest share of those exempt from work requirements are parents
with young children (22 percent) followed by those reporting disability
income (13 percent) and Medicare/Medicaid dual enrollees (12 percent).
About six percent of Medicaid participants are students.
Volatility in the Low-Wage Labor Market
The decline in labor force participation--especially among prime-
age males--has drawn extensive attention in academic and policy circles
(e.g., Abraham and Kearney 2018; Council of Economic Advisers [CEA]
2016; Juhn 1992). Some recent academic work has emphasized the fact
that participation may be declining in part because an increasing
number of labor force participants cycle in and out of the labor force:
a pattern with direct relevance to proposed work requirements. The most
comprehensive look at the behavior of people cycling through the labor
force is Coglianese (2018). He documents that, among men, this group--
which he refers to as ``in-and-outs''--takes short breaks between jobs,
returns to the labor force fairly quickly (within 6 months), and,
crucially, is no more likely than a typical worker to take another
break out of the labor force. See also Joint Economic Committee (2018)
for a discussion of the in-and-out behavior of nonworking prime-age men
and reasons for their non-employment.
SNAP or Medicaid participants who are employed but who work in jobs
with volatile employment and hours would be at risk of failing work
requirements. This group includes those who lose their job; for
example, the House bill sanctions participants for months they are not
working or in training for at least 20 hours per week, even if they
were recently employed and are searching for a new job. Similarly,
those who work in jobs with volatile hours would be sanctioned in the
months that their average hours fell below 20 hours per week, whether
due to illness, lack of hours offered by the employer, or too few hours
worked by the participant if they fail to receive a good cause waiver.
Low-wage workers in seasonal industries such as tourism would
potentially be eligible for SNAP in the months when they are working,
but not in the months without employment opportunities. In other words,
while benefits are most needed when an individual cannot find adequate
work, under proposed work requirements these are the times that
benefits would be unavailable. Disenrollment could make it more
difficult for an individual to return to work--for example, if a person
with chronic health conditions is unable to access needed care while
they are between jobs. Any work requirement that banned individuals
from participation for a considerable amount of time after failing the
requirements would be even more problematic for those facing churn in
the labor market.
In a set of analyses, Bauer and Schanzenbach (2018a, 2018b) found
that although many SNAP beneficiaries work on average more than 20
hours a week every month, they frequently switch between working more
than 20 hours and a different employment status over a longer time
horizon. Using the ASEC, those authors found that, over the course of
16 months between 2016 and 2018, about 20 percent of individuals aged
18-59 without a dependent child under age 6 switched between working
more than 20 hours a week and working fewer than 20 hours per week,
seeking employment, or being out of the labor force.
In this economic analysis we examine labor force status transitions
and the reasons given for not working among those targeted for work
requirements over 24 consecutive months, January 2013-December 2014,
using the first two waves of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP).\1\ By using a dataset that allows us to track
workers over time, we identify the share of program participants who
are consistently out of the labor force, the share who would
consistently meet a work requirement, and the share who would be at
risk of losing benefits based on failing to meet a work requirement
threshold.
We assume that to comply with a program's work requirement,
beneficiaries would have to prove each month that they are working for
at least 20 hours per week averaged over the month, which is the
typical minimum weekly requirement among the SNAP and Medicaid work
requirement proposals. Looking first at SNAP and then at Medicaid, we
calculate the share of program participants who would be exposed to
benefit loss because they are not working sufficient hours would be
exposed to benefit loss and who experienced a gap in employment, we
describe the reasons given for not working to help quantify potential
waiver eligibility.
We remove from the analysis all those who have a categorical
exemption. For SNAP and Medicaid, we exclude those outside the targeted
age range, those with children under 6, full- or part-time students,
and those reporting disability income. Those receiving Medicare are
additionally excluded from the Medicaid analysis. As an instructive
example, the labeled group ``18-49, no dependents'' is additionally
exclusive of students and those reporting disability income. Program
participants are those who reported receiving SNAP or Medicaid at any
point between January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014.
We categorize each individual in each month into one of four
categories: (1) employed and worked more than 20 hours a week on
average, (2) employed and worked less than 20 hours a week on average,
(3) unemployed and seeking employment, or (4) not in the labor force.
If a worker was employed at variable weekly hours but maintained hours
above the monthly threshold (80 hours for a 4 week month and 120 hours
for a 5 week month), then we categorize them as ``employed and worked
more than 20 hours a week for that month.'' Individuals are considered
to have a stable employment status if they do not change categories
over 2 years, and are considered to have made an employment status
transition if they switched between any of these categories at least
once. There is no employment status transition when a worker changes
jobs but works more than 20 hours a week at each job.
Exposure To Proposed Work Requirements in SNAP
Among working-age adults, SNAP and Medicaid serve a mix of the
unemployed, low-income workers, and those who are not in the labor
force (USDA 2017b). Figure 3 describes employment status by those
groups who are currently exposed to work requirements and who would be
newly subject to work requirements under the House proposal.
During the Great Recession, waivers to work requirements were
implemented nationwide. During the time period covered by the SIPP
(2013-14), eight states stopped implementing these waivers fully, and
ten states partially (Silberman 2013).\2\ For analytic purposes, we
look at employment status transitions among 18 to 49 year olds without
dependents as the demographic group currently exposed to work
requirements, regardless of whether they lived in state in which
waivers were implemented during 2013 and 2014. Those receiving SNAP
benefits who are in the demographic group currently exposed to work
requirements--adults aged 18-49 with no dependents--generally
participate in the labor market, with just 25 percent consistently not
in the labor force (discussed below). While 58 percent worked at least
20 hours per week in at least 1 month over 2 years, 25 percent were
over the threshold at some point but fell below the 20 hour threshold
during at least 1 month over 2 years. Very few are always working less
than 20 hours a week or always unemployed (less than two percent in
either case), and 14 percent move across these categories.
Figure 3.
Employment Status over Two Years, SNAP Participants

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
(U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors' calculations.

Those aged 18-49 who are not subject to the 3 month time limit
because they have a dependent aged 6-17 but who would face it under the
House proposal demonstrate a similar distribution of employment status
as those without a dependent, but they are more likely to work. There
are fewer individuals who are always out of the labor force (14
percent) and more that consistently work 20 hours a week or more (46
percent).\3\ There is also substantial month-to-month churn (16
percent) between working above 20 hours per week and less than 20 hours
per week and churn (12 percent) between working above 20 hours per week
and being either unemployed or not in the labor force. This highlights
the number who are actively in the workforce and meeting the 20 hour
threshold in at least 1 month, but who might fail new work requirements
from time to time.
Older SNAP participants (aged 50-59 without dependents under age 6)
who would also be newly exposed to work requirements and time limits
have a distinct employment status pattern from those aged 18-49. Almost
\1/2\ were permanently out of the labor force in large part due to
their health. While 23 percent worked consistently above the threshold
of 20 hours a week, nearly as many (18 percent) worked above the
threshold at some point but also below the threshold at some point,
meaning they would fail the work requirement despite having sometimes
met the threshold.
There is a meaningful portion of SNAP participants in the labor
force and working, but not all are working above the monthly work
requirement threshold consistently. Coglianese's (2018) finding that
workers who are in and out of the labor force are not more likely to
take another break later on suggests it is unclear how much more
consistently work requirements would attach these people to the labor
force.
We next examine the reasons given for not working over the 2 year
period, first for those aged 18-49 with a dependent between the ages of
6 and 17, and second for those 50 to 59 without a dependent under age 6
(figures 4a and 4b). The green crosshatch shows the share of the
population that did not experience a gap in employment over the 2 year
period, and thus were never asked why they were not working. Among
those who were asked why they were not working for pay during at least
1 week, we report the reason for not working in months they were not
working. Those in solid shades of green were in the labor force but
experienced at least one spell of unemployment or labor force
nonparticipation. Those in the blue were out of the labor force for the
entire 2 year period. Each person is assigned one reason--their most
frequent reason--for not working.
Figure 4a.
Most-Frequent Reason for Not Working for Pay, SNAP Participants Aged
18-49 with Dependents Age 6-17

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors'
calculations.
Figure 4b.
Most-Frequent Reason for Not Working for Pay, SNAP Participants Aged
50-59 with No Dependent under Age 6

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors'
calculations.

Among those aged 18-49 with dependents aged 6-17 who are newly
exposed to work requirements (figure 4a), 86 percent were in the labor
force at some point over 2 years but not all worked stably. Among those
who did not work for pay for at least 1 week but were in the labor
force, the overwhelming majority gave work-related reasons (68
percent), such as temporary loss of job, temporary loss of hours (e.g.,
weather-related, not getting enough shifts, etc.), or a company
shutting down a plant or location. Other large groups include those who
are caregivers and those with health concerns. In a program with
extensive good-cause waivers, it appears the bulk of these workers
would not lose benefits if waivers were implemented with fidelity; but
the administrative burden required to sort those with work-related
problems from those who choose to not work could be quite high.
Among those out of the labor force for the entire 2 year period,
more than \1/2\ cite health reasons for being out of the labor force.
In total, 0.3 percent of those aged 18-49 who would be newly exposed to
work requirements and who were labor force non-participants said that
they were not interested in working.
Among individuals aged 50-59 (figure 4b), far more are out of the
labor force consistently and far fewer have stable work. Overall,
health (87 percent) and work-related (eight percent) issues dominate.
The prevalence of health problems is striking considering we have
already limited the sample to those not receiving disability payments.
Fewer than one percent were retired or not interested in working.
The share of older SNAP participants listing caregiving as a reason
for being not in the labor force is notably smaller than the share of
the younger SNAP participant population.
Roughly 11 percent of SNAP participants aged 18-49 with a dependent
6-17 that were out of the labor force for the entire 24 month period
list caregiving as a reason for not being in the labor force. However,
even 11 percent is smaller than many might expect. Many caregivers who
are not in the labor force are in two-adult households where the other
adult is working. In addition, many are in households with dependents
aged 0-5, and those households are exempt from work requirements.
In summary, based on 2013-14 data, 5.5 million adult SNAP
participants would be newly exposed to work requirements with 3.8
million who would have failed them at some point in this 2 year window.
Notable among those who were asked about a spell of not working, 2.1
million report health or disability issues and 1.5 million report work-
related issues. Only about 90,000 list a lack of interest or early
retirement as their reason for not working.
Exposure to Proposed Work Requirements in Medicaid
We study the work participation of Medicaid beneficiaries in a
similar manner. Unlike SNAP, there is no current population of
participants who face work requirements across the country to use as a
comparison group. As noted above, previous Administrations and the
courts have not viewed Medicaid work requirements as supporting core
program goals; there are substantive doubts about whether work
requirements for health insurance are appropriate. Nevertheless, we
consider the employment status of Medicaid beneficiaries to illuminate
how such requirements would function.
Since Medicaid beneficiaries do not currently face work
requirements, we do not separately examine the population aged 18-49
without dependents. It is instructive to differentiate the work status
transitions of younger (aged 18-49) and older (aged 50-64) Medicaid
beneficiaries, restricted to those who either have a dependent 6-17 or
no dependents, i.e., no dependents under the age of 6. We identify
employment status transitions and the reasons given for not working
among those targeted for work requirements over 24 consecutive months
(January 2013-December 2014).
Figure 5 shows that over 2 years (2013 and 2014), 80 percent of
Medicaid beneficiaries aged 18-49 without a dependent child under age 6
were in the labor force at some point. While about 40 percent
consistently worked over the 20 hour threshold, 25 percent worked more
than 20 hours at some point but would potentially lose benefits for
falling below the 20 hour threshold for a month at another point.
The picture is quite different for older Medicaid beneficiaries (50
to 64) who would be exposed to work requirements. Of that population,
44 percent were out of the labor force for all 24 months. About 29
percent worked consistently more than 20 hours a week and about 17
percent worked more than 20 hours at least once but failed to do so
every month. The reasons given among working-age adult Medicaid
beneficiaries not working for pay suggest that labor market reasons
dominate among labor force participants and health reasons dominate
among labor force non-participants (figures 6a and 6b). Once again,
only a small number of labor force non-participants are not interested
in work or are retired.
Figure 5.
Employment Status over Two Years, Medicaid Participants

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors' calculations.
Figure 6a.
Most-Frequent Reason for Not Working for Pay, Medicaid Participants
Aged 18-49 with No Dependents under Age 6

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 6b.
Most-Frequent Reason for Not Working for Pay, Medicaid Participants
Aged 50-64 with No Dependents under Age 6

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors'
calculations.

Among older participants of Medicaid (aged 50-64 without a
dependent under age 6, the population making up 37 percent of the
sample population), 35 percent of those with Medicaid coverage are out
of the labor force for health reasons; this group represents 79 percent
of those who were not in the labor force for the full 2 years. It is
worth noting that work requirements for this group would necessitate
either lax requirements with a very large portion of the population
getting waivers, or an administratively burdensome process to determine
which individual's health concerns truly limit them from work.
Work Status in a Snapshot vs. Two Years
In its report on work requirements, the Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA 2018) looked at employment among adult program
participants for the month of December 2013 using the SIPP and found
that about three in five participants worked fewer than 20 hours per
month. The CEA concludes that this level of work--or lack thereof--
``suggest[s] that legislative changes requiring them to work and
supporting their transition into the labor market, similar to the
approach in TANF, would affect a large share of adult beneficiaries and
their children in these non-cash programs''.^1-2
A critical empirical takeaway from the analysis presented herein is
that frequent movement between labor status categories over time
increases the number of people exposed to losing benefits for failing
to consistently meet a work requirement, and decreases the number of
people who are entirely out of the labor market. We now examine how the
analysis of work experiences differs when we compare a snapshot in
time--one month--with analysis that includes transitions across status
over 2 years. When we compare the 1 month of SIPP data cited in the CEA
report (December 2013) against 24 months, we find that fewer program
participants are labor force non-participants and fewer meet the work
requirement threshold.
Figure 7 demonstrates how observed employment status is different
in 1 month versus 2 years. The first two bars show employment status
categories for the full population aged 18-59 without dependents aged
0-5, disability payments, or status as students. The second two bars
show employment status categories in 1 month and 2 years for SNAP
participants aged 18-59 with no dependents aged 0-5, disability
payments, or status as students. An ``other'' transition during a 1
month period are those who report being unemployed and a labor force
non-participant during different weeks within December 2013.
Figure 7.
Employment Status in One Month vs. Two Years, SNAP

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors' calculations.

The first feature that jumps out of the data is that far fewer
people are out of the labor force than is generally assumed. While a 1
month snapshot shows that 20 percent of the overall population is not
working (either out of the labor force or unemployed), over the course
of 2 years more than 90 percent of the overall population is employed
at some point. Many people are not truly on the sidelines as much as
they are cycling in and out of the game. Furthermore, fewer people are
solidly in the 20+ hours workforce. The share of the overall population
that stably works more than 20 hours per week falls from 76 percent in
the 1 month snapshot to 69 percent over 2 years.
Looking only at those who participated in SNAP at any point during
the 2 year period, the 1 month snapshot is also different from the 2
year, both in terms of the number of participants out of the labor
force and the number who would retain benefits under the work
requirement proposal. Instead of 42 percent being out of the labor
force and roughly 11 percent unemployed in the 1 month snapshot--
leading to more than \1/2\ of the group being labeled ``not working''
in the 1 month snapshot--roughly 29 percent are out of the labor force
and just one percent are persistently unemployed over 2 years, meaning
fewer than \1/3\ are not working consistently. Recall that the higher
``not working'' rate among SNAP beneficiaries is largely driven by
those aged 50-59. SNAP recipients aged 18-49 without dependents have a
``not working'' rate of 25 percent over 2 years, and those with
dependents aged 6-17 have a ``not working'' rate of just 14 percent.
Almost a quarter of SNAP participants would fail the work requirements
some months and pass them in others, with the majority giving work-
related reasons for their change in status.
A similar pattern holds for Medicaid beneficiaries: the monthly
snapshot overstates the number of labor force non-participants and
understates those who would meet a work requirement. There is a ten
percentage point-reduction in the share of those not working over 1
month (39 percent) versus 2 years (29 percent). Forty-two percent would
meet the work requirement in 1 month, but only 36 percent do over 2
years. In addition, in the 2 year sample 22 percent of participants
work over 20 hours in at least 1 month in the sample but fail to in
other months (figure 8).
Figure 8.
Employment Status in One Month vs. Two Years, Medicaid

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors' calculations.
Conclusion
The combination of a strong labor market, work requirements to
receive cash benefits through TANF, and work incentives generated by
the EITC raised labor force participation rates among single mothers in
the mid-1990s (Ziliak 2016), leading some to believe that further
participation gains could be obtained by extending only the work
requirement component to other programs (Haskins 2018; CEA 2018).
Work requirements are intended to counter any work disincentives
that come from a social safety net and to ensure that society is not
unnecessarily supporting people who could otherwise support themselves.
At the same time, such work requirements add administrative complexity
to social programs and risk keeping benefits from parts of the
population that should be receiving them. This economic analysis
establishes a set of facts that are relevant when considering the
expansion of work requirements.
What types of populations will face these new work requirements?
How many would fail to meet the requirements? Do program participants
appear to already be in the labor force facing work-related constraints
on hours or do they choose not to work? And how many would in theory be
eligible for waivers relative to those individuals that society would
like to push toward work?
A large number of SNAP and Medicaid participants who would face new
work requirements cycle in and out of the labor force and would thus
lose benefits at certain times. Among those who are in the labor force,
spells of unemployment are either due to job-related concerns or health
issues. Very few reported that they were not working due to lack of
interest.
Among those out of the labor force for the entire 2 year period,
health concerns are the overriding reason for not working, even after
removing those who receive disability benefits from the sample. The
older portion of the population newly exposed to work requirements is
more likely to be out of the labor force for extended periods of time.
Among this group, again, health reasons are the overriding factor in
not working. Work requirements for this group might push more onto
disability rolls, make the disability adjudication even more
consequential, and require a separate health investigation to settle
all the necessary waivers. Failure to receive a waiver would result in
disenrollment; losing access to these programs would reduce resources
available to purchase food and health insurance among otherwise
eligible households.
For those who qualify for exemptions, satisfy waiver requirements,
or work enough to meet the requirements, there are still significant
informational and administrative barriers to compliance. Program
participants must understand how the work requirement policy relates to
them, obtain and submit documentation, and do so at the frequency
prescribed by the state (Wagner and Solomon 2018). Frequent exposure to
verification processes, such as the monthly reporting periods
prescribed in the Agricultural Act of 2014 (the farm bill) and many
states' Medicaid proposals, increases the administrative burden on
participants and enforcers, the likelihood of error, and cost (Bauer
and Schanzenbach 2018b). These continuing roadblocks to participation,
with attendant informational and transactional costs, are likely to
result in lower take-up among the eligible population and disenrollment
(Finkelstein and Notowidigdo 2018).
Looking at snapshots of work experience, such as a single month,
inflates both the number of SNAP and Medicaid participants who are out
of the labor force and the number of people who work sufficient hours
to satisfy work requirements. Over 24 consecutive months the number of
SNAP and Medicaid program beneficiaries not working or seeking work as
well as those working consistently above 20 hours fall substantially.
There are safety net levers that can be used to pull those out of
the labor force into work. Steps such as increasing the EITC might be a
very effective way to increase work participation in this group without
the same administrative burdens and negative spillovers to vulnerable
populations. (See Hoynes, Rothstein, and Ruffini 2017 for a specific
proposal along these lines.) That proposal is estimated to increase
participation by 600,000 people. Raising the returns to work via the
EITC or other measures, creating training or educational opportunities
that can increase individuals' human capital, and providing child care
or improved treatment and medical care to reduce health barriers to
work could make full attachment to the labor force more viable for many
individuals.
Endnotes
1. See technical appendix tables 1 and 2 for additional work status
transition statistics.
2. The states not implementing able-bodied adult without dependents
waivers at some point during 2013-14 are: Delaware, Guam, Iowa, Kansas,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. States implementing a
partial waiver (partial referring to different parts of the state or
only part of the year): Colorado, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin.
3. Those who meet the 20 hour threshold monthly hours variable
include both those who meet the threshold every week and those whose
hours varied each week but averaged to 20 hours per week each month.
The volatility of their hours may suggest they are more likely to fail
the work requirement threshold but they did not do so over the 2 year
window.
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Appendix

Appendix Table 1.
Employment Status, SNAP Participants
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transitioned
Transitioned between 20+ hours
Stable (not in Stable Stable (employed Stable (employed between 20+ hours and unemployment Other
labor force) (unemployed) 20+ hours) <20 hours) and <20 hours or not in labor transition
force
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age 18-49, no dependents
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 34.3% 5.5% 33.3% 4.1% 7.9% 4.9% 10.0%
2014 32.6% 5.5% 37.4% 3.5% 9.1% 7.2% 4.7%
2013-14 24.6% 1.7% 32.6% 1.7% 16.0% 9.3% 14.1%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age 18-49, dependent 6-17
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 20.4% 4.9% 49.9% 2.4% 8.9% 6.0% 7.5%
2014 21.0% 4.2% 50.2% 2.4% 8.6% 9.9% 3.8%
2013-14 14.0% 0.7% 45.6% 0.4% 15.9% 12.3% 11.3%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age 50-59, no dependent under 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 50.4% 4.6% 25.8% 2.6% 5.7% 3.9% 7.0%
2014 53.3% 3.5% 26.1% 2.5% 5.9% 5.1% 3.6%
2013-14 45.7% 1.3% 23.0% 1.4% 10.1% 7.9% 10.7%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors' calculations.
Note: The sample is limited to U.S. citizens, non-active military, who reported receiving SNAP benefits at any point between January 2013 and December
2014. Only respondents with 24 months of data were included. Those with children under age 6, full- or part-time students, and those who reported
receiving disability benefits were excluded from the sample based on categorical work requirement exclusions. Those who were assigned to ``stable''
categories were observed as not in the labor force, unemployed, above the 20 hour threshold, or below the 20 hour threshold per week. Those who were
stable and employed more than 20 hours a week were assigned either by meeting the threshold every week or because the monthly hours total averaged to
above 20 hours per week. Regardless of the number of transitions made, each person who was observed as switching between work statuses was assigned to
one group in the following order: first, transitioned between more than and less than 80 hours per month; second, transitioned between more than 80
hours per month and unemployment or labor force nonparticipation; third, other. ``Other'' includes those who transitioned between less than 80 hours
per month and unemployment or labor force nonparticipation as well as those who transitioned between unemployment and labor force nonparticipation.

Appendix Table 2.
Employment Status, Medicaid Participants
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transitioned
Transitioned between 20+ hours
Stable (not in Stable Stable (employed Stable (employed between 20+ hours and unemployment Other
labor force) (unemployed) 20+ hours) <20 hours) and <20 hours or not in labor transition
force
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age 18-49, no dependent under 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 27.7% 3.8% 42.6% 3.6% 8.1% 4.1% 10.0%
2014 26.4% 4.2% 46.1% 3.3% 7.3% 7.6% 5.1%
2013-14 19.6% 1.1% 39.6% 1.1% 14.8% 10.9% 12.8%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age 50-64, no dependent under 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 48.4% 3.2% 32.9% 3.8% 5.5% 2.2% 4.0%
2014 51.2% 2.7% 29.9% 3.5% 5.0% 4.6% 3.1%
2013-14 44.1% 0.8% 28.5% 1.8% 11.7% 5.0% 8.2%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors' calculations.
Note: The sample is limited to U.S. citizens, non-active military, who reported receiving Medicaid benefits at any point between January 2013 and
December 2014. Only respondents with 24 months of data were included. Those with children under age 6, full- or part-time students, those who reported
receiving Medicare, and those who reported receiving disability benefits were excluded from the sample based on categorical work requirement
exclusions. Those who were stable labor force non-participants are contrasted with those who were in the labor force (working or seeking work) at
least once during the 2 year period. Those who were assigned to ``stable'' categories were observed as not in the labor force, unemployed, working
above the 20 hour threshold, or working below the 20 hour threshold per week. Those who were stable and employed more than 80 hours per week were
assigned either by meeting the 20 hours per week threshold every week or because the monthly hours total averaged above 20 hours per week. Regardless
of the number of transitions made, each person who was observed as switching between work statuses was assigned to one group in the following order:
first, transitioned between more than and less than 80 hours per month; second, transitioned between more than 80 hours per month and unemployment or
labor force nonparticipation; third, other. ``Other'' includes those who transitioned between less than 80 hours per month and unemployment or labor
force nonparticipation as well as those who transitioned between unemployment and labor force nonparticipation.

Technical Appendix
Box Figure 1. Prime-Age Women's Labor Force Participation, by
Marital Status and Presence of Children under Age 18

Source: Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (ASEC) (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 1977-2017);
authors' calculations.
Note: ``Prime-age'' indicates ages 25 to 54, inclusive.
``Married'' is defined by women who have a spouse in the
household or not in the household. ``Single'' is defined as all
other women, including divorced and widowed women. ``With
children'' is defined as having at least one child in the
household under the age of 18. ``No children'' is defined as
having no children in the household under the age of 18.
Population counts calculated using the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement weight.

Figure 1. Exposure to Work Requirements among Adult SNAP
Participants, 2017

Source: ASEC (BLS 2018); authors' calculations.
Notes: Those who would be exempt from work requirements if
the House bill work requirements were passed include those over
the age of 59, those with a dependent under the age of 6, full-
or part-time students, and those who receive disability
benefits. While in some states work requirements are waived for
those aged 18-49 with no dependents, state-level differences
are not accounted for in identifying those who are currently
exposed to work requirements. Population counts calculated
using the Annual Social and Economic Supplement weight among
U.S. citizens over the age of 18 who reported receiving SNAP
benefits at some point during 2017.

Figure 2. Exposure to Work Requirements among Adult Medicaid
Participants, 2017

Source: ASEC (BLS 2018); authors' calculations.
Note: States applying for waivers to add work requirements to
Medicaid have identified different categorical exemptions and
conditions for waivers. For this exercise, we identified the
most frequent categorical exemptions and applied those rules
nationally. Those who are over the age of 64 or who are dual
Medicare enrollees are exempt, those receiving disability
income are exempt, those with a dependent under the age of 6
are exempt, and full- or part-time students are exempt.
Population counts are calculated using the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement weight among U.S. citizens over the age of
18 who reported receiving Medicaid benefits at some point
during 2017.

Figure 3. Employment Status over Two Years, SNAP Participants

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
(U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors' calculations.
Note: The sample is limited to U.S. citizens, non-active
military, aged 18-59 who reported receiving SNAP benefits at
any point between January 2013 and December 2014. Only
respondents with 24 months of data were included. Those with
children under age 6, full- or part-time students, and those
who reported receiving disability benefits were excluded from
the sample based on categorical work requirement exclusions.
Those who were assigned to ``stable'' categories were observed
as not in the labor force, unemployed, working above the 20
hour threshold, or working below the 20 hour threshold per
week. Those who were stable and employed more than 20 hours a
week were assigned either by meeting the threshold every week
or because the monthly hours total averaged to above 20 hours
per week. Regardless of the number of transitions made, each
person who was observed as switching between work statuses was
assigned to one group in the following order: first,
transitioned between more than and less than 80 hours per
month; second, transitioned between more than 80 hours per
month and unemployment or labor force nonparticipation; third,
other. ``Other'' includes those who transitioned between less
than 80 hours per month and unemployment or labor force
nonparticipation as well as those who transitioned between
unemployment and labor force nonparticipation.

Figures 4a and 4b. Most Frequent Reason for Not Working for Pay,
SNAP Participants

Source: SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors'
calculations.
Notes: The sample is limited to U.S. citizens, non-active
military, aged 18-59 who reported receiving SNAP benefits at
any point between January 2013 and December 2014. Only
respondents with 24 months of data were included. Those with
children under age 6, full- or part-time students, and those
who reported receiving disability benefits were excluded from
the sample based on categorical work requirement exclusions.
Figure 4a is further restricted to those between the ages of 18
and 49 with a dependent between the ages of 6 and 17 while
figure 4b is limited to those between the ages of 50 and 59
with no dependents under the age of 6. Each person's most
frequent response for why they were not working was used to
calculate the distribution; ties were assigned in descending
order by work-related, health or disability, caregiving,
student, early retirement, not interested in working, and
other. The ``stable work, not asked'' group indicates that the
respondent was never asked this survey question because they
were working for pay every week. ``Work-related'' includes not
being able to find work, being laid off, or working for more
than 15 hours for no pay at a family business or farm. ``Health
or disability'' includes being unable to work because of an
injury, illness, or chronic health condition or disability.
``Caregiving'' includes those not working due to pregnancy or
recent childbirth, or taking care of children or other persons.
Students included in the sample are those who did not report
that they were enrolled full- or part-time but reported not
working because they were going to school.

Figure 5. Employment Status over Two Years, Medicaid Participants

Figures 6a and 6b. Most Frequent Reason for Not Working for Pay,
Medicaid Participants

Source: SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors'
calculations.
Note: The sample is limited to U.S. citizens, non-active
military, aged 18-64 who reported receiving Medicaid benefits
at any point between January 2013 and December 2014. Only
respondents with 24 months of data were included. Those with
children under age 6, full- or part-time students, those who
reported receiving Medicare, and those who reported receiving
disability benefits were excluded from the sample based on
categorical work requirement exclusions. Those who were stable
labor force non-participants are contrasted with those who were
in the labor force (working or seeking work) at least once
during the 2 year period. Figure 6a is further restricted to
those between the ages of 18 and 49 with a dependent between
the ages of 6 and 17, whereas figure 6b is limited to those
between the ages of 50 and 64 with no dependents under the age
of 6. See technical appendix entry for figures 4a and 4b with
regard to reason assignment.

Figure 7. Employment Status in One Month vs. Two Years, SNAP

Source: SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors'
calculations.
Note: The sample is limited to U.S. citizens, non-active
military, aged 18-59. Only respondents with 24 months of data
were included. Those currently exposed to work requirements,
those with children under age 6, full- or part-time students,
and those who reported receiving disability benefits were
excluded from the sample. The 1 month and 2 year samples differ
by reported SNAP benefit receipt. In the 1 month sample,
``other'' refers to those who switched between labor force
nonparticipation and unemployment during the month of December
2013, the month chosen in the SIPP by CEA for its report on
work requirements.

Figure 8. Employment Status in One Month vs. Two Years, Medicaid

Source: SIPP (U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors'
calculations.
Note: The sample is limited to U.S. citizens, non-active
military, aged 18-64. Only respondents with 24 months of data
were included. Those with children under age 6, full- or part-
time students, those who reported receiving Medicare, and those
who reported receiving disability benefits were excluded from
the sample based on categorical work requirement exclusions.
The 1 month and 2 year samples differ by reported Medicaid
benefit receipt. In the 1 month sample, ``other'' refers to
those who switched between labor force nonparticipation and
unemployment during the month of December 2013.
Advisory Council

George A. Akerlof, University Professor, Georgetown University
Roger C. Altman, Founder & Senior Chairman, Evercore
Karen L. Anderson, Senior Director of Policy & Communications, Becker
Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, The University of Chicago
Alan S. Blinder, Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics &
Public Affairs, Princeton University; Nonresident Senior Fellow, The
Brookings Institution
Robert Cumby, Professor of Economics, Georgetown University
Steven A. Denning, Chairman, General Atlantic
John M. Deutch, Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Christopher Edley, Jr., Co-President & Co-Founder, The Opportunity
Institute
Blair W. Effron, Partner, Centerview Partners LLC
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dean & Don K. Price Professor of Public Policy,
Harvard Kennedy School
Judy Feder, Professor & Former Dean, McCourt School of Public Policy,
Georgetown University
Roland Fryer, Henry Lee Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Jason Furman, Professor of the Practice of Economic Policy, Harvard
Kennedy School;Senior Counselor, The Hamilton Project
Mark T. Gallogly, Cofounder & Managing Principal, Centerbridge Partners
Ted Gayer, Executive Vice President Joseph A. Pechman Senior Fellow,
Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution
Timothy F. Geithner, President, Warburg Pincus
Richard Gephardt, President & Chief Executive Officer, Gephardt Group
Government Affairs
John Gray, President & Chief Operating Officer, Blackstone
Robert Greenstein, Founder & President, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities
Michael Greenstone, Milton Friedman Professor in Economics & the College
Director of the Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics;
Director of the Energy Policy Institute, University of Chicago
Glenn H. Hutchins, Co-founder, North Island
James A. Johnson, Chairman, Johnson Capital Partners
Lawrence F. Katz, Elisabeth Allison Professor of Economics, Harvard
University
Melissa S. Kearney, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland;
Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Lili Lynton, Founding Partner, Boulud Restaurant Group
Howard S. Marks, Co-Chairman, Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
Mark McKinnon, Former Advisor to George W. Bush; Co-Founder, No Labels
Eric Mindich, Chief Executive Officer & Founder, Eton Park Capital
Management
Alex Navab, Former Head of Americas Private Equity, KKR; Founder, Navab
Holdings
Suzanne Nora Johnson, Former Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Peter Orszag, Vice Chairman & Global Co-Head of Healthcare, Lazard;
Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Richard Perry, Managing Partner & Chief Executive Officer, Perry Capital
Penny Pritzker, Chairman, PSP Partners
Meeghan Prunty, Managing Director, Blue Meridian Partners Edna McConnell
Clark Foundation
Robert D. Reischauer, Distinguished Institute Fellow & President
Emeritus, Urban Institute
Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Center for Health
Policy, The Brookings Institution
David M. Rubenstein, Co-Founder & Co-Executive Chairman, The Carlyle
Group
Robert E. Rubin, Former U.S. Treasury Secretary, Co-Chair Emeritus,
Council on Foreign Relations
Leslie B. Samuels, Senior Counsel, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
Sheryl Sandberg, Chief Operating Officer, Facebook
Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Margaret Walker Alexander Professor,
Director, The Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University;
Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Stephen Scherr, Chief Executive Officer, Goldman Sachs Bank USA
Ralph L. Schlosstein, President & Chief Executive Officer, Evercore
Eric Schmidt, Technical Advisor, Alphabet Inc.
Eric Schwartz, Chairman & CEO, 76 West Holdings
Thomas F. Steyer, Business Leader & Philanthropist
Lawrence H. Summers, Charles W. Eliot University Professor, Harvard
University
Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Professor of Business Administration & Economics
Director, Institute for Business & Social Impact, Berkeley-Haas School
of Business
Jay Shambaugh, Director

Abstract
Basic assistance programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamps Program) and
Medicaid ensure families have access to food and medical care when they
are low-income. Some policymakers at the Federal and state levels
intend to add new work requirements to SNAP and Medicaid. In this
paper, we analyze those who would be impacted by an expansion of work
requirements in SNAP and an introduction of work requirements into
Medicaid. We characterize the types of individuals who would face work
requirements, describe their labor force experience over 24 consecutive
months, and identify the reasons why they are not working if they
experience a period of unemployment or labor force nonparticipation. We
find that the majority of SNAP and Medicaid participants who would be
exposed to work requirements are attached to the labor force, but that
a substantial share would fail to consistently meet a 20 hours per
week-threshold. Among persistent labor force non-participants, health
issues are the predominant reason given for not working. There may be
some subset of SNAP and Medicaid participants who could work, are not
working, and might work if they were threatened with the loss of
benefits. This paper adds evidence to a growing body of research that
shows that this group is very small relative to those who would be
sanctioned under the proposed policies who are already working or are
legitimately unable to work.
Figure 3.
Employment Status over Two Years, SNAP Participants

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
(U.S. Census Bureau 2013-14); authors' calculations.

The Chair. Thank you all for your testimony.
We will now begin questioning. Members will be recognized
for questioning in the order of seniority for Members who were
here at the beginning of the hearing. After that, Members will
be recognized in order of their arrival.
I will now yield 5 minutes to Mr. McGovern.
Mr. McGovern. Thank you very much, and thank you for your
testimony.
Last Congress, Republicans held 23 hearings on SNAP, and I
disagree with Mr. Johnson. We didn't talk about this issue at
all. In fact, they intentionally avoided a hearing on this. I
requested a hearing and it never happened, and I now know why,
because the bottom line is the ABAWD population is a
complicated population. It doesn't fit into a nice, neat
category that you can stigmatize, that you can demonize. This
is a population that includes returning veterans, people with
limited educational experiences, some who are aging out of
foster care, people who have undiagnosed mental illnesses,
people who live in rural areas who don't have access to
transportation. I mean, there are lots and lots of issues
involved in this population.
And I should also point out for the record that the
majority of able-bodied adults on SNAP right now actually work.
They earn so little they still qualify for SNAP. And the notion
that somehow this population is just lazy and just wants to
benefit from this benefit, I will remind people that the
average SNAP benefit is about $1.40 per person per meal, and
so, it doesn't provide very much of anything.
I asked Secretary Perdue when he was here in February to
provide me the demographic data that the USDA used to justify
this new rule. I have received nothing to date. Maybe it is
lost in the mail, but hopefully we will get that at some point.
But my frustration is we passed a farm bill and it was a
bipartisan farm bill. It rejected all the cruel provisions that
were contained in the House bill, but it passed overwhelmingly
when it came back to the House, and yet, we have the
Administration ignoring what Congress decided, which is
frustrating.
I want to also point out that in terms of the consequences
of what the Administration is trying to do. I mean, Maine
tightened up on the work requirements. There was an article in
The Washington Post in May of 2017. Let me read the beginning
of it. It said, ``For a period last year after he lost his food
stamps, Tim Keefe, an out-of-work and homeless Navy veteran,
used his military training to catch, skin and eat squirrels,
roasting the animals over an open fire outside the tent he
pitched in frigid Augusta, Maine. The new additions to Keefe's
diet resulted from a decision by state authorities to tighten
work requirements for recipients of the social safety net--
forcing the 49 year old who lost his job at a farm equipment
factory because of an injury, off the food stamp rolls.'' I
mean, this is the kind of stuff that can happen if we are not
thoughtful about how we approach this issue. Yes, we want to
help people get into the workforce. We ought to be investing in
worker training, education, and transportation. There are a
whole bunch of things we should be doing. Not cutting of their
benefit because they find themselves in a difficult
circumstance.
I don't know how cutting off somebody's SNAP benefit is
going to make it easier for them to get to a job where there is
no transportation or somebody who, again, has an undiagnosed
mental illness, how that is going to help them get into the
workforce. This is a simple-minded approach to a complicated
problem, I believe it is red meat to the right-wing base, who
it seems, never tires of demonizing this population.
Let me ask Ms. Hamler-Fugitt, Ms. Cunnyngham, and Dr.
Shambaugh, I understand that a lot of your work has explored
the complexities that arise from ABAWDs and low-income workers.
Just for the record, again, do you believe that low-income
persons who work less than 20 hours a week do so by choice, is
this something they desperately want to do, or is it because of
disadvantages?
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. To the Chair, to the Congressman, today
in America, a job doesn't mean a living. There are people that
work and they work hard; but, unfortunately in the current
economy, jobs don't provide full time benefits. The folks who
are part of our program, they work, they want a job.
I would also point out that we have done longitudinal
studies of the levers in our program. What we found is that
when they do work, they generally work less than 30 hours a
week for about $10 an hour with no benefits, and the average
length of employment is 79 days, which is very interesting.
Seventy-nine days would not trigger their eligibility for
unemployment compensation. SNAP is a hunger lifeline for these
individuals. A hungry worker is not a healthy worker, is not a
productive worker.
Dr. Shambaugh. I would just say, Congressman, not only do
they want to work, but the evidence shows that most of them do
work. And so, most of them are cycling in and out of jobs and
the small portion who are not cycling in and out of jobs
typically face significant barriers, health and otherwise, to
work.
Ms. Cunnyngham. I examine evidence and it is true that we
know that, as you mentioned, that SNAP participants cycle in
and out of work, that time limits can--well, to directly answer
your question, yes, I believe people want to work and the
evidence shows that most of them do work.
Mr. McGovern. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ranking Member Johnson, you are now recognized.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Adolphsen, remind me. You had analyzed 600,000 ABAWDs
in maybe three states. What were those three states?
Mr. Adolphsen. Florida, Kansas, and Arkansas.
Mr. Johnson. In Florida, Kansas, and Arkansas, did your
research indicate that there were SNAP recipients who had
learning disabilities?
Mr. Adolphsen. Well by definition, an ABAWD is not
disabled, but then the Department when they intake that person,
particularly when the requirements are in place, will screen
them for those types of barriers to make sure that they are
directed to a place where they can get assistance for those.
Mr. Johnson. In Florida, Kansas, and Arkansas, were there
SNAP recipients who were not fully literate?
Mr. Adolphsen. I think that is probably likely. With
600,000 sample size, there were people that had issues that the
Department would work with them on to help them get back to
work.
Mr. Johnson. In Florida, Kansas, and Arkansas, do you
believe that there were SNAP recipients within your studied
population who were caregivers for family members at home?
Mr. Adolphsen. If they are actually responsible for the
care of a child, they wouldn't be considered an ABAWD, so they
wouldn't have been in that population.
Mr. Johnson. In Florida, Kansas, and Arkansas, do you
believe that there were returning veterans within the studied
population?
Mr. Adolphsen. Certainly.
Mr. Johnson. Do you believe within Florida, Kansas, and
Arkansas that within the studied population there would be
people who lacked access to reliable transportation?
Mr. Adolphsen. Yes, there certainly would be. For the folks
that left the program, they would have had to earn more income
and then come off the program. Because if they lacked
transportation and therefore could not get to a job or
training, they wouldn't have been in the group that we studied
that left the program, because they would be exempt from the
work requirement.
Mr. Johnson. I guess I'm a little confused, sir. If the
populations within those states--they sound an awful lot like
the populations in my state and an awful lot like the
populations in the states that the other witnesses described. I
thought you said that there were successes for those
populations that moved off the program? Did I misunderstand
you?
Mr. Adolphsen. No, absolutely, and I think that is what is
concerning about the way the waivers operate right now is you
have states doing very well with implementing the work
requirement fully, in Florida, for example. And then you go to
California and you have nearly one million people who have no
work requirement. They are similar populations. They are
similar income levels. They are the same age, same type of
household situation. The waiver makes for a very uneven
application of the program rules.
Mr. Johnson. This has worked in some states, is that what
your research indicates?
Mr. Adolphsen. Absolutely. It has been very effective.
Mr. Johnson. Give me a sense of the types of support that
exist, things that states can do to help ABAWDs find meaningful
employment?
Mr. Adolphsen. Sure. There is a whole number of things. The
Federal Government funds employment and training portions of it
at 100 percent. States can get a 50/50 match for things like
job search, education, job training. They can get funding for
transportation, even buy equipment, things like boots if they
need those for their job. States really can be very hands-on in
helping people.
The challenge is when you don't have the requirement in
place, it also waives the requirement for the government to
help them. They are simply sending them the benefit month after
month, maybe checking in once a year for recertification. But
they never really engage with them to find out where they can
help.
Mr. Johnson. Well, this is a population that clearly does
have challenges, and no one should dispute that. I think you
did a nice job, sir, of explaining that in the states you
studied, there were people who had challenges. And I know my
friends--Patty who works as a retail clerk in Mitchell who has
some serious barriers. Mike and Paul, my friends who work in
Mitchell, they have some challenges that I don't have. They
have found meaningful employment. It is a meaningful part of
their life. It is important that we remember that nobody is
denigrating these folks. Nobody is suggesting that their path
forward is easy. We are called to do an even better job than we
are doing in helping them and work is a critically important
part of that process.
I want to thank you for your research, sir. I yield back,
ma'am.
The Chair. Thank you. Ms. Adams is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Adams. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the
Ranking Member as well, and to the individuals who are here
testifying. Thank you.
Before I begin, I just want to reiterate that USDA is
unilaterally changing rules around requirements for ABAWDs,
despite Congress' negotiating a farm bill at the end of 2018
which explicitly avoids changing these requirements.
While North Carolina does not currently have a waiver,
lawmakers in my state are assessing the need to authorize
waivers for some counties that meet current requirements. But
you know, because states can do doesn't mean they will do or
that they are able to.
But I am deeply concerned that the proposed changes will
take away needed flexibility for my state to help communities
and individuals who are struggling with unemployment, opioid
addiction, and other barriers to work.
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt, Mecklenburg County is a part of my
district. It is an area with a strong economic and population
growth, and even in our county, we have more than 7,500 ABAWD
individuals who are unable to find work, full-time work, and
they are receiving SNAP benefits. If you can imagine the
countless regions, especially in rural areas, that are seeing
years of stagnant growth and continue to have high
unemployment. The lack of access to work and the chronic
barriers to work that many of these individuals face are some
of the reasons that USDA estimates that 755,000 people will
lose food assistance. And so, the rule would really force
people who haven't been able to find work to enroll in E&T, or
somehow find work when it has been impossible before.
With your experience in this space, do you think that it
makes sense to ask E&T Programs to do more than double their
enrollment in programming with no funding, and what do you
think the impacts will be to the quality of training?
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. To Congresswoman Adams, I can assure you
that based on our firsthand experience in Ohio, slots just
don't materialize. You have to have an infrastructure that is
set up by the county or the state that does require funding as
well to provide these services, and then the support services
to get individuals into those work and training slots and
ensuring that if they are available, that they are being
trained for jobs that are currently available. It is a very
expensive endeavor, and I have just done some numbers based on
Ohio. If Ohio were to lose its current waivers in 35 counties,
an estimated about 75,000 individuals would have to have a slot
made available to them. The cost associated with that would be
about $600 million. On average, the cost of a good Employment
and Training Program varies from $4,500 on the low end to about
$12,000 on the high end.
Ms. Adams. Thank you very much. Let me just move onto ask
Ms. Cunnyngham and Dr. Shambaugh, according to the National
Education Association, more than 2.5 million children are being
raised by their grandparents or other relatives because
families are dealing with parental alcohol, substance abuse
issues, and others. As a result, they face obstacles in
securing an exemption from ABAWD time limits. How do you see
this rule impacting those struggling with opioid and other
forms of addiction, and do you expect that there will be
unexpected consequences for the children? This is to Dr.
Shambaugh and Ms. Cunnyngham.
Dr. Shambaugh. Well, as has already been mentioned today,
we know that there are people who are in the ABAWD population
who sometimes are taking care of children, and so they are not
considered a caregiver because they are not the primary
caregiver in some cases, but they have some responsibility for
children. Having them lose SNAP benefits would take resources
away from a family with kids. I think that is something that is
certainly is a concern.
Ms. Adams. Okay. Ms. Cunnyngham?
Ms. Cunnyngham. Sure. Well, another population that would
be affected are non-custodial parents, so not only
grandparents, but if you are looking for non-custodial parents
to contribute to their children's well-being, it is important
that they have a job. It is important that they are supported
while looking for a job.
Ms. Adams. Unexpected consequences. I have about 23
seconds.
Ms. Cunnyngham. Unexpected consequences, non-custodial
parents are critical to the well-being of their children, and
so we want to support them.
Ms. Adams. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back.
The Chair. Thank you very much. Mr. DesJarlais, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Madam Chair.
We live in a country that takes care of people who can't
take care of themselves, and that is the right thing to do. The
SNAP Program is there to help people who are hungry, make sure
that they have food in their mouths and that hunger is reduced,
and it is our responsibility in Congress to make sure that we
have the funding to take care of those in need.
Thankfully, our economy is doing much better. Unemployment,
as mentioned in your oral statement, Mr. Adolphsen, is at 50
year lows. In fact, in my home State of Tennessee, about the
only thing holding back economic growth is an adequate
workforce. It is fortuitous that we are having this hearing
today that Mr. McGovern had asked for.
It seems like we probably agree on a lot of things that we
are just not even seeing here. The fact that able-bodied people
who can work, should work, is a pretty common concept. I asked
Secretary Perdue when he was here last month if he had any idea
why there is so much pushback to this idea, and he responded,
``I have no clue.'' I can understand that when you look
statistically that across all political spectrums, about 80
percent of people believe that able-bodied people who can work,
should work. We just have to figure out how to get that done.
And I guess I would like to ask our witnesses, in concept,
do you agree that able-bodied people who can work, should work?
We will start at this end.
Ms. Cunnyngham. Yes, I agree it is best for everyone, for
the individuals.
Mr. DesJarlais. Okay. Mr. Adolphsen?
Mr. Adolphsen. Yes, I do.
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. Yes, sir.
Dr. Shambaugh. Yes, I do.
Mr. DesJarlais. That is a great place to work from. We all
agree that that should happen, and the problem is, how do we do
that? And we have heard of all kinds of barriers that stand
before us, it is our job to solve that.
Mr. Adolphsen, within the framework of the existing funding
for employment and training, what changes have been made to
increase the effectiveness of those funds, or how are we making
it easier for people to find work and transition into the
workforce?
Mr. Adolphsen. Sure. Well, the funds in programs that you
mentioned, Congressman, are really critical, and we can't leave
that piece out. We put a lot of money into employment and
training, not just in the SNAP Program, but also across the
board. As was mentioned, we have adult ed, community colleges,
Department of Labor career one-stops. There are a lot of
resources designed to help these precise individuals, and for
them to really be effective, the key is that people actually
utilize them. We have seen problems where when these programs
are purely voluntary, there is a type of requirement in place,
there has been very little participation. And what we really
want to see is these folks utilizing all those great resources
that are being provided.
That is one of the key values of the work requirement being
in effect is it connects them to those resources, where
otherwise, we are just loading the EBT card every month and we
are not really working with them on getting back to work.
Some of the places where it has been really effective
recently, there has been a real urgency on connecting folks to
a job and taking that first step. We saw in Florida, in
particular, a lot of people took an initial first step and
maybe landed at a temp agency or in fast food or retail, but
that was just the first step. They quickly moved on to higher
paying industries with more wages. The best way to make these
programs effective is to get them in the door.
Mr. DesJarlais. All right. It seems that at these hearings
we always hear the best case scenarios from one side and the
worst case scenarios from the other side, and I have heard that
here today. You can be the group that wants to talk about
successes. You can be the group that wants to talk about
failures. I want to be the group that talks about successes,
and we want more successes.
Some of the other witnesses have talked extensively about
all the barriers for able-bodied adults joining the workforce.
Do you agree that these barriers are as bad as they say, or are
you more optimistic?
Mr. Adolphsen. Congressman, my experience at the agency,
that was one of the things that was most disappointing is the
whole system was revolved around this point of view of what
people can't do. And it is really important that we flip that,
and when someone walks through our door asking for help with
the food benefit, right away we say, ``All right, here is your
benefit. What can we do to get you moving forward? What are you
able to do?'' Where can we help you maybe remediate some
skills, things we talked about. But we really need to come at
it from the point of view that these individuals are very
capable. They can work. They can improve their skills, their
education, and meet them at that point instead of starting
right off the bat by having a long list of everything they
can't do, moving forward.
Mr. DesJarlais. I would agree. I think that we need to try
to succeed, not just accept failing. Thank you for your
testimony, all of you for being here.
I yield back.
The Chair. Thank you. Ms. Schrier, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Schrier. Thank you to all of our witnesses. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
I wanted to first just repeat some of the really
interesting things that I heard, because they really deserve
emphasis.
I believe it was you, Dr. Shambaugh, who said work
requirements keep people out of SNAP, but have little to no
effect on employment. And I thought that was a really profound
statement. Another that I believe you said, but others said as
well, was that the able-bodied workers without dependents is
really a misnomer, that it misses a lot of people with
undiagnosed mental illness, learning disabilities, and people
on the autism spectrum who really are not truly able-bodied. I
thought another really important point was that the average
benefit is a $1.40 per meal, and I think about how we are
nickel and diming over this benefit that is providing nutrition
to people in need.
I heard that only 1\1/2\ percent truly don't want to work,
which is a small number, and in my opinion, not enough to throw
the baby out with the bath water, and that the unemployment
rates just don't paint a true picture, because the skill sets
needed may not match where the job openings are.
I wanted to talk a little bit about the State of
Washington. The State of Washington is firmly committed to
improving the lives of those on SNAP through work, by helping
beneficiaries become self-sufficient through good paying jobs.
In fact, in 2018 alone, the state spent $22 million of its own
money on top of Federal funds on SNAP Employment and Training
Programs, otherwise known as SNAP E&T. And making this
investment among the top five states in the country, and in
addition, we were granted one of ten SNAP E&T pilots that were
funded in the 2014 Farm Bill. In 2016, our Assistant Secretary
for Economic Services, David Stillman, testified before this
Committee about our state's successful Education and Training
Program, and under his leadership, the best practices learned
are now being shared with others throughout the country.
We have also engaged employers like Amazon, Microsoft,
Providence Health, and others to be active partners in this
training program, and the bottom line is that that part is
working, and we know what we are doing.
Now, the proposed rule will completely undermine all of
that work. Our governor agrees, and in fact, I would like to
enter into the record Governor Jay Inslee's letter of comment
on the proposed rule, because it talks about the devastating
impact that this will have on our state's 91,000 ABAWDs.
[The letter referred to is located on p. 162.]
Ms. Schrier. I had a question for Ms. Hamler-Fugitt, which
is this: In Washington, we estimate that more than 43 percent
of our state's ABAWD population currently experience
homelessness, disproportionately higher than the broader SNAP
population in the country at 11 percent. Nearly 60 percent of
our ABAWD population is suffering from behavioral or physical
health conditions, including substance use disorder. For these
individuals, the USDA proposal would do nothing to help them
find work, while adding yet another obstacle in their way,
which is food insecurity and hunger. And the proposed rule
would not achieve the goal of promoting self-sufficiency and
jobs. It would make it more difficult to find employment.
How does this description fit your experience in Ohio?
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. To the Congresswoman, very similar,
except Washington State is to be commended for its commitment
of $22 million of state general revenue funds to expand your
program. Again, Washington residents are very fortunate to have
that kind of leadership. Unfortunately, it is the luck of the
draw. Other states or counties, in our situation, a county
devolved system, that is up to local county commissioners. I
would say it is very similar.
One final remark. What is really missing from this is a
standardized set of data. We need to be measuring the same
thing. The assessments should be standardized across all states
on the information, upon intake. These are not social workers
that are doing this intake. These are clerks. They are not
qualified to make determinations about one's mental or physical
disabilities.
Ms. Schrier. I appreciate that comment, especially as a
medical professional myself, that these can be difficult
diagnoses to make, and that we need to consider that the rate
of undiagnosed everything, including learning disabilities in
certain populations.
Dr. Shambaugh, I had a question for you, and I would love
to hear your thoughts on this excerpt from Governor Inslee's
letter. ``While the unemployment rate does provide essential
data, it does not take into account a community's
individualized workforce needs or that its residents may not be
well-suited to find and keep locally available jobs due to a
lack of housing, hard skills, certifications, and employers in
Washington.''
Dr. Shambaugh. I think that is exactly right, and one thing
that is important to recognize is even when the aggregate
unemployment rate is low, it doesn't mean it is low for all
groups or in all areas. As mentioned, in some places it is as
high as ten percent. When it first crossed under seven percent
nationally, it was still 10.7 for people with less than a high
school degree. There are some people are going to be struggling
a great deal, even when the overall rate is low.
Ms. Schrier. Thank you. I appreciate that. Thank you to all
of you.
The Chair. Thank you very much. I now recognize Mr.
Hagedorn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hagedorn. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member. I
appreciate the opportunity. Thanks for this hearing, and thanks
to the witnesses.
This is an issue that has been important to me for over 30
years. I used to work for Congressman Arlan Stangeland, who was
a Member of this Committee, and he and Congressman Stenholm of
Texas at that time introduced bipartisan Work for Welfare
legislation in the 1980s. We had broad support. Couldn't get a
vote from the Majority party at that time, but a few years
later, Newt Gingrich and some others picked up the provisions
of that bill and passed it three times. It finally made it to
the President's desk where he signed it, and the Clinton/
Gingrich--however you want to put it--welfare reform bill was
highly successful. We drove down the cost of government. We
empowered people and got them back into private-sector work.
Most people would recognize, including even President Clinton,
that that was quite a success.
But over time, those work requirements went away, and we
have had some issues with waivers and things of that nature and
some loopholes that need to be closed.
In my district we went around and we talked to all sorts of
thought leaders, including mayors and social workers and
others, and time after time, I was told there are people on the
sidelines who could work, but for a number of reasons, are not
working. I have never used the word lazy. That comes from the
other side. Sometimes there are impediments. They lose benefits
and so forth as they get in the workforce, and we need to look
at that.
But the Chairman himself, Chairman Peterson, who
interestingly enough succeeded my old boss, Congressman
Stangeland, in 1990. He has made comments to say that these
waivers aren't working, particularly in the State of Minnesota.
And he has talked not just here in Committee, but in press as
well. And I would ask any of you, does anybody disagree with
the Chairman's comments as it refers to the State of Minnesota
and these waivers? Anyone? I guess not. Okay, we have some
uniformity on that.
What I would say is this: Work for Welfare is a concept
that is empowering for people. It is a fairness issue for the
taxpayers, because if people are able-bodied to work, they
should do so, just like the taxpayers do to make it possible.
It eliminates fraud. It drives down the cost of benefits.
Now, if we want to talk in a serious way about helping
folks, let's talk about the concept of transition wages. When
people are moving from welfare into the workforce and they
reach that cliff where they are going to lose medical benefits
and other things, how do we transition them to keep them in
private-sector work so they can continue to be upwardly mobile?
That, to me, is important. I hope the Chair and others will
work with me on those issues.
Technical training: there are lots of jobs out there just
begging, and we have to look at people's potential. That is the
highest calling. What is the potential of each individual? Not
just able-bodied folks, disabled people, people that want to be
in the workforce and contribute. What is their potential? We
have to have confidence in them and do whatever we can in order
to promote that.
And last, the Secretary was here a few weeks ago. He talked
about this regulation, and I told him in my opinion--it was on
the record--that it is God's work because it is moving people
in the right direction. It is showing confidence in folks and
it is not allowing states to cut them short and to do that.
And I just say to my friends on the other side, if you
don't like this regulation, you think the Executive Branch has
gone too far, then join us in enacting the REINS Act. Let's
make sure that every regulation coming out of the Executive
Branch has to receive the vote of the House and the Senate and
be affirmed before it goes live. That is only fair for all
industries.
With that, I would yield back.
The Chair. Thank you very much. Mrs. Hayes, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Hayes. Thank you, Madam Chair.
In my home State of Connecticut, we have 107 towns,
including 13 towns in my own district, that would lose the 2018
waivers proposed under this rule. This would translate to about
26,000 people in Connecticut automatically becoming vulnerable
to losing the Federal help they need to simply put food on
their tables.
I will say to my friends on the other side that I was a
SNAP beneficiary. I worked two jobs, was grossly underemployed,
and was a full-time college student. It was temporary. It took
much longer than 3 months, but it was temporary. While this 3
month time limit for SNAP benefits for ABAWDs in theory should
only impact adults who do not have children, in practice, it
will inevitably and disproportionately impact children and
young people.
As a teacher, this damaging impact is personal for me. SNAP
is the first line of defense amongst childhood hunger. It is
also the first line of defense against economic instability and
hunger for young people, especially for the 20,000 kids aging
out of the foster care system every year.
Madam Chair, I ask to submit two letters into the record,
one from the NEA that talks about the effects on young children
in the classroom, and the other one from Share Our Strength and
No Kid Hungry.
The Chair. Without objection.
[The letters referred to are located on p. 158 and p. 159.]
Mrs. Hayes. I have seen what a hungry 16 year old looks
like, and it is not much different than a hungry 19 year old.
Hunger is merely a symptom of poverty. The reality is that very
few ABAWD recipients of SNAP are not interested in working.
Rather, they are desperately underemployed, undereducated, or
in low wage work that is highly unstable.
The unemployment rate for young adults is nearly seven
percent. According to a national survey of youth who aged out
of the foster care system, only 12 percent were employed full
time at age 19. Forty-four percent had not obtained a high
school diploma or GED equivalent at age 19, leaving them at a
significant disadvantage in seeking stable employment and
livable wages.
Instead of punishing people for being poor or for being in
foster care, we need to further invest in job training and
education as a way out of poverty so that people can, in fact,
help themselves.
By ripping away a lifeline of an already vulnerable
population, this Administration is making yet another
unconscionable attack on young people and poor people. This
Administration is telling this population, one that has already
struggled enough, that they don't deserve help the day they
turn 18 and age out of the foster care system, that they don't
deserve compassion from the Federal Government, and that they
don't even deserve a hot meal.
My question is for you, Dr. Shambaugh. What are the long-
term social and economic cost effects of ripping away this
safety net for food security for young people aging out of the
foster care system?
Dr. Shambaugh. Thank you for the question. We have very
good evidence, certainly for children in particular, that
spending time in a household with SNAP relative to people in
the same economic situation without SNAP benefits has
substantial positive impacts on health, income, and earnings
later in life. I think that would probably translate that type
of result to that next population just a few years older, as
you mentioned.
We know that in many ways, you are making investments that
make people more employable, better workers, healthier later in
life, and in that sense, you wind up saving money in the long
run.
Mrs. Hayes. Well, I appreciate that because I have seen
that. Because, in my experience, these young people do cycle
back into the system, and it is not always with SNAP benefits.
It is the criminal justice system. It is the unemployment
system. It is all of these other programs that could have been
prevented if the investment was made on the front end to help
them to support themselves.
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt, can you think of ways that we can
increase outreach so that foster youth or young people who were
formerly in foster care know about the benefits that are
available to them and are better positioned to help themselves?
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. Congresswoman, we need to understand
that as they are in the foster care system, that they are
getting the kind of life skills and support necessary. They are
being exposed to opportunities of higher education and
training. We need to make sure that there are also transitional
benefits.
I know our state is continuing to do some more support
around a bridges program that will provide that transition, but
again, a lot of these children as they age out of the foster
care system, they are dumped on their 18th birthday onto the
street. That is wrong. I know for a fact that we have spent, in
some cases, hundreds of thousands of dollars getting these
young people to adulthood, only to turn our back on them. We
can do better. I know we can.
Mrs. Hayes. We can do better.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
The Chair. Thank you. Mr. Bacon, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate our
four folks here today. I appreciate you sharing your
perspective. It is a very important topic.
I just want to take a moment to thank Chairman Peterson who
has weighed in on this, in recent years, talking about some of
the abuses of the state waiver process. I appreciate his
candor, especially his candor coming from the other side of the
aisle.
The ABAWDs are just that. We are talking about able-bodied
adults without young children, and in a time of record low
unemployment, 2.7 percent in Nebraska, where we have more job
openings than people seeking jobs right now, there is an
expectation by most for folks to seek that work and there is an
expectation of having some time limits within the SNAP Program,
which there are. There is that expectation there that we should
try to enforce that to the best of our ability.
And so, my question for Mr. Adolphsen, if I may. In your
studies, have you seen a contrast of those states who are
enforcing these time limits versus those who are not or they
are doing the waivers, and helping the ABAWDs get out of
poverty? Is there some direct correlation between these
individuals who are struggling, but once they get back in the
workforce, how does that affect their prosperity or their
getting out of poverty? Thank you.
Mr. Adolphsen. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, for the
question.
What we looked at with those more than \1/2\ million adults
that we tracked individually with their incomes, their incomes
within a year doubled. In Arkansas, we had another year of data
and their incomes tripled within the 2 year period. What you
have is they are actually moving not just up in income, but out
of poverty. The amount they were earning actually replaced the
benefitted amount as well. In total, they were earning more
than they were before, even when you count the benefit. We are
seeing real upward economic mobility from that population.
You contrast that with states where the waiver is in place,
and there is no work requirement for this population. They are
still on the program. By definition, they are still in poverty,
right, they are in that income bracket that would keep them
eligible. We know that three out of four of them aren't
working. We are not seeing that same movement in those states.
Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you. Really, full time work is the
best way out of poverty, and often a year or 2 later, there are
raises and promotions. It is the first step for getting people
out of that poverty area.
I just want to point out in Nebraska, we have such a
shortage in some of our more technical career fields, whether
it is welding, electrical work. There is a shortage of folks
and they are being offered $40,000 a year jobs in training,
while they are in training, with health insurance, just to get
them started. We are having a hard time filling those
positions.
Thank you very much. I yield back, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Thank you very much. Mr. Lawson, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lawson. Thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome, witnesses,
to the Committee.
A perception of people who are receiving SNAP benefits that
extend across America and dealing with the issue when I was in
the state legislature to come into Congress was that people
were lazy, they did not want to work, they just wanted
government assistance.
But when you go a little bit deeper into the situation, you
find out that this is not true. In listening to your testimony
this morning, one would think that because of all of the
knowledge that you all have in dealing with people who are
receiving SNAP benefits, that we could possibly learn a great
deal as lawmakers about how the programs really should be
established instead of some people saying what programs should
be without any knowledge of it.
I represent an area that has two major urban areas, and the
rest of it is rural, and the rural community extends maybe for
a distance of about 150 miles between from Gaston County--I
would like to say from the Chattahoochee River to the St.
John's River in Jacksonville. And in those areas, there is high
unemployment and transportation issues where people have
difficulty in trying to get into the city. And Florida in
itself doesn't utilize the waivers.
Now my question would be simply that food insecurity within
college student population, which you know, I have a lot of
student populations at universities and in the community
colleges, is growing. And not only in the areas in Florida, but
throughout the United States, especially at community colleges
where many of these students are part-time and they are working
and trying to make ends meet to really better themselves.
Can you discuss any experience that you have had, Ms.
Hamler-Fugitt, and am I saying that right, Fugitt? Okay. At
Ohio Association of Foodbanks where part-time students have
benefitted from their food stamps status while working hard to
complete their degree?
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. Yes. To the Congressman, yes, that is
one of the struggles. In fact, in my written testimony I talk
about Mary, a young woman who is balancing both a pharmacy tech
career track at a local community college, trying to work for a
drugstore chain, trying to maintain that 20 hours of employment
while also assisting her mother to care for her younger
sisters. And unfortunately, she fell into a situation where
because the sales weren't there in the store, she wasn't able
to get her 20 hours that then put her SNAP benefits in peril,
which then her lifelong dream of becoming a pharmacy tech, the
first generation to graduate from high school or from college
was left in the peril, where she was looking at having to drop
out of college.
I also want to say, as Ohio's largest charitable response
to hunger, I am sure that your food banks are in a similar
situation. The greatest demand we are currently having is for
colleges and universities, both technical schools and 4 year
institutions, as well as our K-12, to come on site and set up
food pantries, not only to feed their students, but also to be
able to feed the families of those students as well.
Hunger is a problem in America. In my great state, it
affects one in six. Hunger looks a whole lot like you and me,
and it lives just six doors down.
Mr. Lawson. That is incredible, and I noticed that many of
the universities now are setting up food banks and working with
some of the local grocery chains. One would think that once you
are in college and you have this ambition to go to college,
that there would be resources there with the financial aid so
forth you get would help you through this. But most of those
students who are also receiving financial aid and assistance--I
know my time is running out--also have to rely heavily on food
banks in the community as well as other people who are working
in those communities.
With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
The Chair. Thank you. Thank you very much.
We will now recognize Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you.
The Chair. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to the panel.
I am starting my fourth term here as a Member of the House
Agriculture Committee, and we can probably all agree as
Republicans and Democrats that the issue isn't about getting
people off of SNAP benefits. The issue is about making sure
that people who are on SNAP benefits have access to the jobs
that we know are available in this country right now. And we
can all agree, it may not be our Committee's jurisdiction, but
there are some loopholes that still exist within our workforce
training programs that perpetuate families staying on SNAP
benefits, which is why we have right now nine million more
people on SNAP benefits in this country today, when there are
6.1 million jobs available, less than four percent
unemployment, than when we had 9.5 percent unemployment.
Today is a day that I certainly hope we can take your
testimony and come together and try to find solutions. In the
2018 Farm Bill, obviously a lot of us here in the House wanted
to try and close what we saw as a loophole in our workforce
investment programs by allowing for investment within SNAP
education and training to allow families to go get training for
jobs that we know are available in our communities. If we don't
do it now when unemployment is at 3.9 percent, we are never
going to do it when unemployment is at 9.5 percent. Help us
come up with some solutions. Help us come up with some
solutions to allow families to get money to go back and get
training so they don't have to worry about what they can or
cannot buy at the grocery store anymore, when they are doing
everything they can to get a job in our communities that we
know that are available.
It is very frustrating to me that this debate becomes more
about politics than clearly it does about policy. That is a
very frustrating point for me as a legislator, and I certainly
hope now that we have the other side in charge that we can come
up with some solutions, because that loophole in our workforce
investment system still exists. And if we do nothing, we are
not helping those families who want to get off of SNAP
benefits. That is my point.
Being from Illinois, I also have an issue with the waiver
process. Following the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill, I sent a
letter to our then-Governor of Illinois, Bruce Rauner, asking
what justification that the State of Illinois had to waive the
ABAWD time limit in 101 of 102 counties. While individuals
should not be penalized if jobs are unavailable, I inquired
regarding what steps the state had taken to encourage the SNAP
recipients to get training for employment. And the Governor's
Administration at the time claimed a need for a waiver was due
largely to administrative burdens, not out of any particular
necessity in all of the 101 of 102 counties. Administrative
governmental burdens.
Again, it is cruel to do nothing to help a system recover.
It is cruel not to help families get training for jobs that we
know are available, even in the rural communities that I serve.
That is what is cruel.
Now, Mr. Adolphsen, I have a quick question for you. Why in
the world a State like Illinois, where we have low
unemployment, why in the world did our governor ask for a
waiver for 101 of 102 counties?
Mr. Adolphsen. Thank you, Congressman. You hit on it
already. One reason is it is driven by the workload on their
end, or perceived workload on their end. The other reason is
simply to maximize the number of people that are waived. We
have heard that explicitly from states. That is what they are
doing. They are not looking strategically at where are people
actually unable to get work or get into training. They are just
looking at how do we maximize this waiver to cover as many
people as possible so they don't have to be engaged, which is a
problem. That is exactly what the rule tries to do, it is not
getting rid of the waiver. The waiver exists. It is in Federal
law. It is just making sure that it can only be used where it
is actually targeted.
On the administrative side, I heard the same thing in
Maine. I have heard it in many other states. Well, that is a
lot of work. Well first of all, that is the job of the
government agency so yes, it is going to take some work. That
is the job. On the other hand, it really hasn't proven to be an
administrative burden in any way. The systems are all set up to
do it because of the 1996 law, and it is work that they are
already able to do.
And I would just say, Congressman, quickly. I have heard a
couple times the mention of college students. There are other
ways to meet this requirement, other than working part-time.
Individuals who are enrolled at least half time in any
recognized school, training program, or institution of higher
education are exempt from the requirement. That really doesn't
come into play with this particular population or waiver.
Mr. Davis. Great point. Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chair. Thank you. Mr. Van Drew?
Mr. Van Drew. I want to thank you, Madam Chair, and thank
you all for being here today.
This is obviously an issue of great concern all across the
country in so many of our communities, and I find an
interesting and intriguing part of the conversation is it seems
as if we have almost gotten to a point we are saying we either
are going to have programs to train individuals or we are going
to give them SNAP benefits. And I don't really believe that is
the issue. I believe the issue is that at certain points in
people's lives, they need benefits in order to move on to the
next point of their life, and that is really the hope and the
desire of what we should be doing here.
This proposed rule is going to have a major effect in many
communities across the country. I come from an interesting
district. I come from the State of New Jersey, and everybody
always assumes because New Jersey is generally a wealthy state
with a high per capita income that a lot of these issues don't
exist. They exist in our urban areas up north, and they exist
in my district, which is 40 percent of the state. I have 40
percent of the state. I have eight counties and 92 towns, much
of it rural, much of it seasonal, so we have a lot of shore
communities. And what does that all mean? That means that a lot
of folks don't have an easy opportunity to find access to full
time good employment year-round. We certainly don't have the
type of transportation that makes it easy, and we don't have
some of the other amenities.
I would point out in one of my deep south counties down in
south Jersey, it was only a number of years ago that we got our
first county college. It is different. It depends upon where
you live. It depends on what the issues are. Unemployment is
not unemployment everywhere. It is not the same. The numbers
don't mean the same thing, and employment numbers don't mean
the same thing everywhere.
In northern New Jersey, if you are in the financial
industry, that is a whole different thing if you are picking
cranberries down in south Jersey. And everybody has to realize
that and understand that.
It isn't either/or. You can do both. We do have to train
people. We do need more transportation. We do need more
opportunity. Every single person up here wants everybody to
work all the time. That is the goal. But in the process, people
fall through the cracks and that is what we are talking about.
Jobs just aren't always as easy to come by as some of the
statistics show. One of the interesting parts of this is the
Administration expects about \3/4\ of a million people to lose
food assistance under this proposed rule, and probably would
save, if my understanding is correct, about $15 billion in
Federal savings from the cuts presented as a primary benefit of
change. But what are the costs or what is the involvement going
to be to those food pantries?
We have food pantries and I deal with them and I visit
them, and there are lots of good people who work real hard.
They really are. They are hardworking people. They are just not
making as much money, and they go to the food pantry and that
helps them get through while they are trying to educate their
kids more and they are trying to work harder, and they are
working their two jobs, and God help them, sometimes three
jobs. They are going to be getting hit more. They are going to
have greater requirements upon them, and who is going to fill
that? How are we going to take care of that? What is going to
happen there? Or do you believe anything is going to happen at
these food pantries and these types of facilities that exist
out there? And I guess that is a question for Ms. Hamler-
Fugitt.
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. To the Chair, to the Congressman, food
pantries can't do it. Our food banks and 3,540 member charities
are already overwhelmed. Eighty percent of our member charities
are faith-based organizations operating on budgets of less than
$25,000 a year. They are overwhelmed with the demand, not only
from working people who work every day and play by the rules
but aren't earning enough to meet their basic needs, more
senior citizens than we have ever seen, we are an aging state.
They are the canary in the coal mine. More grandparents raising
grandchildren, and now we place this additional burden on top
of folks who have lost their SNAP benefits through no fault of
their own because they can't find paid employment or work
experience opportunity or SNAP Employment and Training Program.
We can't do it. SNAP is the first line of defense against
hunger in this country, not food banks.
Mr. Van Drew. It is your considered opinion, then, that we
are going to fall short? That they literally are not going to
be able to keep up, and their shelves, at times, are going to
be empty?
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. Yes, Congressman. It happens every day
in your community and my community and across the U.S.
Mr. Van Drew. And the last point--I know I am running out
of time here, I am out of time. I might as well just admit it,
right? Thank you, Chair. Oh, and Chair, also real quick, may I
have unanimous consent to enter into the record Feeding
America's comments on the proposed rule regarding able-bodied
adults without dependents, and its impact on hunger and
hardship?
The Chair. Without objection.
[The letter referred to is located on p. 346.]
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. Mr. Yoho?
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Dusty, I appreciate
it. Thank you guys for being here. I know it has been a long
day, and before I get started, Madam Chair, I would like to
insert a February 19 letter signed by myself and 64 other
Members in support of the Administration's proposed rule.
The Chair. Without objection.
[The letter referred to is located on p. 392.]
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, ma'am.
It shameful that politics gets involved in this, because it
shouldn't. We are looking to reform programs that make America
stronger. Our ultimate goal is we want a strong economy. We
want strong job markets. We want people thriving and living the
American dream, and I am not going to bore you with my story
going from being broke as a church mouse to being on food
stamps to where I am today.
The programs are there for the people that truly need it,
and we want to make sure the integrity of those programs are
there. And Florida is one of the many states focused on work-
oriented reforms, and a new report shows the incredible impact
they are having on our state, as you brought out, Mr.
Adolphsen. Since the state implemented a food work requirement
in 2016, nearly 94 percent of able-bodied childless adults have
left Florida's food stamp program. Alabama saw 85 percent
reduction. Maine saw more than 80 percent. And when we talk
about able-bodied adults with no dependents, we are talking
about a small group of people. We are looking for no physical
disabilities, no mental disabilities, just a small section. And
if we focus on that, what can we do? With these kinds of
results, what can we do to implement these somewhere else in
other states?
And I guess the question for the panel is, was there any
detriment that you know of people moving off in these states? I
will take Florida, since that is where I am from. Can anybody
say, ``Well, since 94 percent got off of that, there was this
massive malnutrition or starvation''? Anybody? I will take that
as a no. You were going to say something?
Dr. Shambaugh. I would just say, we know what SNAP does to
provide food security, and so, we know if not everyone is
finding jobs, then there are people who are losing resources
and are then left with food insecurity.
Mr. Yoho. Is there any evidence that people that moved off
of these programs fell into a bigger food insecurity? I mean,
is there documented peer review articles?
Dr. Shambaugh. There is also, just for the record,
absolutely no documented evidence that the people moving to
work were moving to work because of the work requirements. The
only documented studies that have actually tried to study it
carefully by looking at populations that face work requirements
compared to those that didn't find literally no impact on the
propensity to work, based on exposure to work requirements.
Mr. Yoho. But if we have a reduction of 94 percent, 85
percent in Alabama, 80 in Maine, we know that is a measurable--
--
Dr. Shambaugh. We also know, though, that in the places
that don't have work requirements, people cycle off SNAP all
the time.
Mr. Yoho. At what percent?
Dr. Shambaugh. In 2008 to 2012, when the economy was
terrible and work requirements were waived almost everywhere,
the Department of Agriculture reports that 80 percent were off
SNAP within 2 years. And that is with almost no----
Mr. Yoho. Okay. I am glad you brought that up, because in
the late 1990s, the share of Americans living in the country or
city waived from SNAP work requirements was under 20 percent.
It climbed a bit under the George Bush Administration to \1/3\.
In 2009 a waiver program designed to accommodate exceptional
circumstances became a national panacea. As part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act signed in by President
Obama that February, Congress temporarily suspended the
conditions on ABAWDs, SNAP, nationwide. The suspension was
supposed to extend only though 2010, but no government
initiative is temporary, and 8 years later, ABAWD time limit
waivers are still in effect in at least part of 36 counties.
The point that I want to get across is we are at full
employment, pretty much, in this country. And we know prior to
the recession, there was about 17, 18 million people on the
SNAP Program. With the waivers, it went up to 41 to 42 million.
It has come down to around 38 to 39 million. We should see, I
would think, a ratio of decrease with the full employment. And
we should take the politics out of this. Let's get people into
higher paying jobs. As we have seen, there are 6.3 million
unfulfilled jobs. In my district, we have people starting
minimum wage, $15 an hour, through competition because the
economy is so good. Let's maximize that and let's help people
transition off and move from aid on a program, get them
educated, and off a program. I am out of time, so I have to go.
Thank you.
The Chair. Thank you. Mr. Panetta, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is good to be here.
Ranking Member Johnson, good to see you, too.
Thanks to all the witnesses for being here, as well as your
preparation to be here. I know it takes a lot of work, so thank
you very much.
First of all, just some housekeeping. I would like to enter
into the record this letter from MAZON, a national advocacy
organization working to end hunger. It is a pretty extensive
letter, almost a 20-page letter that talks about how this
proposed rule would cause certain groups, like rural Americans,
working poor, and veterans, to lose out on many of their
benefits and the difficulties that they may undergo if this
rule is in place. If I could enter that into the record?
The Chair. Without objection.
[The letter referred to is located on p. 379.]
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I understand what Mr. Yoho and Mr. Davis are saying, and I
agree with them partly. Not just because they are my friends,
but because I agree that we have to start looking at policy
when it comes to this issue. We know it can be very political
on both sides, and I saw it last term as a freshman Member
sitting right down there in the Agriculture Committee and
dealing with the farm bill and the presentation of significant
changes to the SNAP Program without any significant evidence
supporting such changes. And when I sat there and I asked the
Chairman about the evidence that he had in support of these
changes that would actually work, the Chairman's response to me
was well, we have 2 years to figure that out. And I believe
that on this type of issue that is very sensitive, that is very
important to my 74,000 recipients of SNAP in my district on the
central coast of California, we don't have 2 years just to
figure it out. We need to basically lay a foundation of
evidence to do so.
Now, part of that is my background. I am a prosecutor and I
learned that I just couldn't go into court early on as a young
misdemeanor deputy prosecutor and stand up and say he is guilty
and sit back down. I had to prove my case with evidence, and
then I could make my argument based on that evidence.
That is something that obviously we need to do, not just on
this Committee and the Agriculture Committee--not just on this
Subcommittee. Obviously, it should be something done in
Congress, to be frank. I think that is a common sense
statement. But, this is the type of issue where you see the
effects, where you see the politics at play, and I just hope,
moving forward, we can continue to look at the evidence to
support these types of programs, because we want to help
people. That is wholehearted, that is important, and that is
why we are here.
We understand that the evidence is missing, and what we are
seeing is that we can't just base one metric, a 20 hour work
week--we can't just use that to tell us everything that we need
to know about a recipient of SNAP benefits. We have to look at
everything, and unfortunately, I do believe that this proposed
rule does just that. It reduces benefits by singling out a
group that USDA assumes is less deserving, those who are deemed
able-bodied but are unable to work.
We are learning today that there is more to this story
about these recipients' stories than meets the eye, and that
this proposed rule will harm those with vulnerabilities that we
may not be able to see at first glance. And some of those
deemed able-bodied may actually not be and others may face
difficulties we would not otherwise anticipate.
That is what this hearing is demonstrating, and why the
USDA should rethink this proposal, gather more data, gather
more evidence, and learn more about the challenges these
targeted SNAP beneficiaries really face.
Now obviously, one of those groups is veterans. In my
district on the central coast, we have about 30,000 veterans
for a number of reasons, but I just would like to throw out
there to Ms. Hamler-Fugitt, basically with this proposed rule,
what would be some of the obstacles that veterans would face in
trying to find employment?
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt. To Congressman Panetta, what we see in
Franklin County in our vets population, we have a vets outreach
worker that works specifically with this population. We are
seeing servicemen and -women who have been on multiple tours of
deployment returning to the community with a lot of issues,
mental health issues, jobs that were promised that are not
there for them to transition back into, and a desperate need
for mental health treatment, as well as the transitional
supports and housing supports. Again, just prioritizing that.
If I could just reiterate what you said about the policy
needs to be driven by empirical evidence. We have been having
this conversation for more than 20 years, since this provision
went into the 1996 Welfare Reform Act. And that is one thing
that I urge all of you to do is to set the standard for data
collection so we can measure this information, measure the
participants, measure their outcomes across all states by using
the same data sets.
Mr. Panetta. Outstanding. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield
back.
The Chair. Thank you very, very much. I thank all of you
for being here today and your testimony.
The Chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
If I didn't know better, I would think that this was a
hearing about waivers. It is not. If I didn't know better, I
would think that there were no job requirements or training
requirements for ABAWDs. There are. It is the law now.
I listened to one of the witnesses talk about what happened
in 2006. This is 2019. In 2006, we were a manufacturing society
in most major cities in this country. Today, we are more
service and we don't make anything in this country anymore.
There was a time you could come out of high school and go into
a factory and get a job. That doesn't exist today, because the
same corporations we give big tax breaks to take all of their
business and make everything offshore. Yes, there were jobs in
2006. There aren't today for low-skilled and unskilled workers.
Let's just talk about who really are ABAWDs. They are the
people who clean these buildings that we work in every day and
that some people sleep in every night. They are the people who
serve us in the cafeteria, who fix our food. Those are ABAWDs.
They work every single day, and even this government doesn't
pay them enough to make a living. There are people who work in
this building who qualify for SNAP every month, that $1.40 a
meal. Let's talk about what it really is, and let's also talk
about jobs.
We know that over the next 20 years, 80 percent of all jobs
will require some form of STEM education. Most of the people we
are talking about, the poorest of the poor, don't have those
skills, don't have that education. There may be jobs, but they
don't qualify for them.
If I had grown up maybe around a blueberry patch, I might
have done that, too. There is not one in my neighborhood. My
neighborhood is one where people just try to survive every day.
I think that we have to be realistic about who we are talking
about.
I got into an elevator in this building. A person who
cleans the building gets on with me, which is not really
allowed for them to put their carts on with us. She wanted to
tell me in tears how much it meant for her to get the SNAP
benefits she gets every month.
But no, we want to make this some big deal about being
partisan, and it is not partisan. Hungry people are hungry
people. People who work are people who work. If we are really
honest with ourselves, and we started to talk to the people who
are in these situations instead of believing that they are
invisible and they are unworthy and undeserving, we might have
a different outcome. Maybe we would sit down, as my colleague
said here, and find a way to get them to the jobs that are
available. Maybe we provide some transportation. Maybe we
provide some training. Not just filling out an application,
actually training them to do a job that exists.
If I just didn't know better, I wouldn't even think I was
in this country, if I didn't know better.
And so, I just want to say to all of my colleagues, I know
we all care about the people we represent, but maybe sometimes
we need to come out of these buildings and talk to them. Maybe
we need to go into a food bank and see who comes. That might be
helpful, and not just assume who they are and what they are.
And until the USDA can tell me who they are, then I am never
going to support something like this, because not only does it
not rely on any data when they could just wait a little while
and get the data from the trials we have already done, but more
importantly, because they don't know who they are talking
about. They have no idea. And so, you just make up something
for people.
It is time that this Congress, the people's House, the
Representatives of the people of this country, find out what
our people want.
And with that, I would close and ask my colleague if he has
a closing statement. Oh, before that, Chairman Peterson asked
that I enter into the record a letter of comment from
Commissioner Tony Lourey with the Minnesota Department of Human
Services. Without objection.
[The letter referred to is located on p. 151.]
Mr. Johnson. Yes, it is indeed true that the people who
clean this building at night are worthy and deserving, and they
are ABAWDs. And of course, it is absolutely true that the
people who make the food in the cafeteria, they are worthy and
they are deserving and they are ABAWDs.
It is just as important to acknowledge that they are
working and that their work is important, and that it is worthy
of our respect. They are working and they are doing what they
can to try to eke out a living and put themselves in a position
where tomorrow can be better than yesterday. Work does that,
and if a couple of things came out loud and clear that there is
basis for agreement, it is first off that people who can work,
should work. I want to thank the panelists for bringing that to
the fore.
Another thing that came out, particularly with Mr. Van
Drew's comments and others, is the importance of data, the
importance of evidence. Evidence is powerful and data can light
our way forward, and that is why I am concerned that there was
resistance on the part of some Members of this Committee to a
robust data capture component championed by Chairman Conaway
and others during the last farm bill discussion. I am hopeful
that since we all acknowledge the importance of data, we can
work together to have better data capture opportunities in days
to come.
I would close by saying this, Madam Chair. I have heard
that you run a tight ship and a fair one. You do. Thank you for
a good hearing.
The Chair. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson. I appreciate
it and I appreciate your ability to work with me and
willingness to do so.
Thank you all very much for being here. I appreciate your
testimony.
Under the Rules of the Committee, the record of today's
hearing will remain open for 10 calendar days to receive
additional material and supplementary written responses from
the witnesses to any questions posed by a Member.
This hearing of the Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight,
and Department Operations is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
Submitted Letters by Hon. Marcia L. Fudge, a Representative in Congress
from Ohio
February 1, 2019

Hon. Sonny Perdue,
Secretary,
U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary Perdue:

As Chair of the Nutrition, Oversight, and Department Operations
Subcommittee of the House Agriculture Committee, I write to request an
extension of the 60 day comment period for the proposed rule regarding
the treatment of Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs) in the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) entered into the
Federal Register today. Given the complexity of and the significant
interest in this topic, I request an immediate extension of the comment
period from 60 to 120 days to allow for meaningful and robust comments.
The proposed rule includes assumptions about ABAWDs and state
administrative agencies that have been recently and thoroughly
considered by Congress, and overwhelmingly rejected. In fact,
legislative language similar to the proposed rule was included in the
initial version of H.R. 2. This language was vetted in detail for 5
months by Members of the 2018 Farm Bill Conference Committee before
being struck from the final bill. As you know, the House and Senate
ultimately passed a farm bill conference report by historic margins,
and the President signed the bill without delay.
During the farm bill signing ceremony, you said that USDA would do
its ``best to implement that bill'' as Congress intended. This proposed
rule does just the opposite. Therefore, I ask for an immediate
extension of the comment period from 60 to 120 days to allow Members of
Congress, and the countless other advocates in favor of protecting SNAP
from unwarranted attacks, the opportunity to better inform USDA of the
hardships that will result if the Department moves forward with this
harmful and intolerable proposed rule.
Respectfully,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Hon. Marcia L. Fudge,
Chair,
Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight, and Department Operations.

February 26, 2019

Hon. Marcia L. Fudge,
Chair,
Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight, and Department Operations,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chair Fudge:

Thank you for your letter dated February 1, 2019, requesting an
extension of the public comment period for the recently proposed rule
affecting Supplemental Nutrition Program (SNAP) work requirements and
the participation time limit for able-bodied adults without dependents
(ABAWDs).
The proposed rule includes administrative actions within the
authority delegated to the Secretary within the Food and Nutrition Act
of 2008. It would encourage broader application of the statutory ABAWD
work requirement, consistent with the Administration's focus on
fostering self-sufficiency and promoting the dignity of work. I believe
these proposed changes support our mutual goal of improving the lives
of those participating in SNAP.
I appreciate your interest in ensuring that the U.S. Department of
Agriculture is able to receive meaningful and robust comments to this
rule. Before the rule was published in the Federal Register on February
1, 2019, and before the 60 day comment period began, the proposed rule
was available on our website beginning December 20, 2018, thereby
providing interested stakeholders additional time to review the
proposal and begin formulating their comments. Given the additional
amount of time that the rule has been on public display, I believe that
a 60 day comment period is a sufficient amount of time to receive
meaningful and robust comments.
Thank you for your support. If you need further assistance, please
have your staff contact Erin Wilson with the Office of Congressional
Relations at (202) 720-7095 or [email protected].
Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Hon. Sonny Perdue,
Secretary.
______

Submitted Proposed Rule by Hon. Marcia L. Fudge, a Representative in
Congress from Ohio
Federal Register
Vol. 84, No. 22
Friday, February 1, 2019
Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Food and Nutrition Service
7 CFR Part 273
[FNS-2018-0004]
RIN 0584-AE57
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents
agency: Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), USDA.

action: Proposed rule.

summary: Federal law generally limits the amount of time an able-
bodied adult without dependents (ABAWD) can receive Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits to 3 months in a 36 month
period, unless the individual meets certain work requirements. On the
request of a state SNAP agency, the law also gives the Department of
Agriculture (the Department) the authority to temporarily waive the
time limit in areas that have an unemployment rate of over ten percent
or a lack of sufficient jobs. The law also provides state agencies with
a limited number of percentage exemptions that can be used by states to
extend SNAP eligibility for ABAWDs subject to the time limit. The
Department proposes to amend the regulatory standards by which the
Department evaluates state SNAP agency requests to waive the time limit
and to end the unlimited carryover of ABAWD percentage exemptions. The
proposed rule would encourage broader application of the statutory
ABAWD work requirement, consistent with the Administration's focus on
fostering self-sufficiency. The Department seeks comments from the
public on the proposed regulations.

dates: Written comments must be received on or before April 2, 2019
to be assured of consideration.

addresses: The Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, invites interested
persons to submit written comments on this proposed rule. Comments may
be submitted in writing by one of the following methods:

Preferred Method: Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for
submitting comments.

Mail: Send comments to Certification Policy Branch, Program
Development Division, FNS, 3101 Park Center Drive, Alexandria,
Virginia 22302.

All written comments submitted in response to this proposed
rule will be included in the record and will be made available
to the public. Please be advised that the substance of the
comments and the identity of the individuals or entities
submitting the comments will be subject to public disclosure.
FNS will make the written comments publicly available on the
Internet via http://www.regulations.gov.

for further information contact: Certification Policy Branch,
Program Development Division, FNS, 3101 Park Center Drive, Alexandria,
Virginia 22302. [email protected].

supplementary information:
Background
Acronyms or Abbreviations
[Phrase, Acronym or Abbreviation]
Able-Bodied Adult without Dependent(s), ABAWD(s)
Advanced Notice of Public Rulemaking, ANPRM
Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS
Census Bureau's American Community Survey, ACS
Code of Federal Regulations, CFR
Department of Labor, DOL
Employment and Training Administration, ETA
Employment and Training, E&T
Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, Act
Food and Nutrition Service, FNS
Labor Market Area(s), LMA(s)
Labor Surplus Area(s), LSA(s)
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, PRWORA
U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Department or USDA
References
The following references may be useful to help inform those wishing
to provide comments.

(1) Section 6(d) and section 6(o) of the Food and Nutrition Act of
2008, as amended

(2) Title 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations, parts 273.7 and
273.24

(3) Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Proposed Rule, 64 FR 70920 (December 17,
1999). Available at: https://www.federalregister.gov/
?documents/?1999/?12/?17/?99-32527/?food-stamp-program-
personalresponsibility-provisions-of-the-
personalresponsibility-and-work

(4) Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Final Rule, 66 FR 4437 (January 17, 2001).
Available at: https://www.federalregister.gov/?documents/
?2001/?01/?17/?01-1025/?foodstamp-program-personal-responsi
bilityprovisions-of-the-personal-responsibilityand-work

(5) Guide to Serving ABAWDs Subject to Time-limited Participation,
2015. Available at: https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/
default/files/Guide_to_
Serving_ABAWDs_Subject_to_Time_Limit.pdf

(6) Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive the Time Limit for Able-
Bodied Adults without Dependents, 2016. Available at:
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
SNAP-Guide-to-Supporting-Requests-to-Waive-the-Time-Limit-
for-ABAWDs.pdf

(7) Expiration of Statewide ABAWD Time Limit Waivers, 2015.
Available at: https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/snap/SNAP-Expiration-of-Statewide-ABAWD-Time-Limit-
Waivers.pdf

(8) ABAWD Time Limit Policy and Program Access, 2015. Available at:
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
ABAWD-Time-Limit-Policy-and-Program-Access-Memo-Nov2015.pdf

(9) ABAWD Questions and Answers, 2015. Available at: https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/ABAWD-
Questions-and-Answers-June%202015.pdf

(10) ABAWD Questions and Answers, 2013. Available at: https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/ABAWD-
Questions-and-Answers-December-2013.pdf

(11) BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Available at: https://
www.bls.gov/lau/

(12) BLS Labor Surplus Area. Available at: https://www.doleta.gov/
programs/lsa.cfm
The Rationale for Modifying Waiver Standards
The President's Executive Order on Reducing Poverty in America by
Promoting Opportunity and Economic Mobility (April 10, 2018) provided
guiding principles for public assistance programs, one of which was to
improve employment outcomes and economic independence by strengthening
existing work requirements for work-capable individuals. The Executive
Order directed Federal agencies to review regulations and guidance
documents to determine whether such documents are consistent with the
principles of increasing self-sufficiency, well-being, and economic
mobility. Consistent with the Executive Order and the Administration's
focus on fostering self-sufficiency, as well as the Department's
extensive operational experience with ABAWD waivers, the Department has
determined that the standards for waivers must be strengthened so that
the ABAWD work requirement is applied to ABAWDs more broadly. The
Department is confident that these changes would encourage more ABAWDs
to engage in work or work activities if they wish to continue to
receive SNAP benefits.
The Department believes that the proposed changes reinforce the
Act's intent to require these individuals to work or participate in
work activities in order to receive SNAP benefits for more than 3
months in a 36 month period. Section 6(o) of the Act, entitled, ``Work
Requirements,'' allows these individuals to meet the ABAWD work
requirement by working and/or participating in a qualifying work
program at least 20 hours per week (averaged monthly to 80 hours per
month) or by participating in and complying with workfare. For the
purposes of meeting the ABAWD work requirement, working includes unpaid
or volunteer work that is verified by the state agency. The Act
specifically exempts individuals from the ABAWD time limit and
corresponding work requirement for several reasons, including, but not
limited to, age, unfitness for work, having a dependent child, or being
pregnant.
The Act authorizes waivers of the ABAWD time limit and work
requirement in areas in which the unemployment rate is above ten
percent, or where there is a lack of sufficient jobs. The Department
believes waivers of the ABAWD time limit are meant to be used in a
limited manner in situations in which jobs are truly unavailable to
ensure enforcement of the ABAWD work requirements as much as possible
to promote greater engagement in work or work activities.
Immediately following the Great Recession, the vast majority of the
states, including the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands, qualified for and implemented statewide ABAWD time limit
waivers in response to a depressed labor market. In the years since the
Great Recession, the national unemployment rate has dramatically
declined. Despite the national unemployment rate's decline from 9.9
percent in April 2010 to 3.9 percent in April 2018, a significant
number of states continue to qualify for and use ABAWD waivers under
the current waiver standards. Right now, nearly \1/2\ of ABAWDs live in
areas that are covered by waivers despite a strong economy. The
Department believes waiver criteria need to be strengthened to better
align with economic reality. These changes would ensure that such a
large percentage of the country can no longer be waived when the
economy is booming and unemployment is low.
The Department is committed to enforcing the work requirements
established by Congress and is concerned about the current level of
waiver use in light of the current economy. The regulations afforded
states broad flexibility to develop approvable waiver requests. The
Department's operational experience has shown that some states have
used this flexibility to waive areas in such a way that was likely not
foreseen by the Department.
Some of the key concerns have stemmed from the combining of data
from multiple individual areas to waive a larger geographic area (e.g.,
a group of contiguous counties) and the application of waivers in
individual areas with low unemployment rates that do not demonstrate a
lack of sufficient jobs. For example, some states have maximized the
number of areas or people covered by waivers by combining data from
areas with high unemployment with areas with low unemployment. This
grouping has resulted in the combined area qualifying for a waiver when
not all individual sub-areas would have qualified on their own. States
have combined counties with unemployment rates under five percent with
counties with significantly higher unemployment rates in order to waive
larger areas. For example, current regulations required the Department
to approve a state request to combine unemployment data for a populous
county with a high unemployment rate of over ten percent with the
unemployment data of several other less populous counties with very low
unemployment rates that ranged between three and four percent. Other
states have combined data from multiple areas that may only tenuously
be considered an economic region. In some cases, states have grouped
areas that are contiguous but left out certain low-unemployment areas
that would otherwise logically be considered part of the region. In
this manner, states have created questionable self-defined economic
areas with gaping holes to leverage the flexibility of the regulations.
The Department has also noted that, despite the improving economy,
the lack of a minimum unemployment rate has allowed local areas to
qualify for waivers based solely on having relatively high unemployment
rates as compared to national average, regardless of how low local
areas unemployment rates fall. Since the current waiver criteria have
no floor, a certain percentage of states will continue to qualify for
waivers even if unemployment continues to drop.
It is the Department's understanding that the intent of Congress in
passing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 was to provide SNAP to unemployed ABAWDs on a temporary
basis (3 months in any 3 year period) with the expectation that they
work and/or engage in a work program at least 20 hours per week, or
participate in workfare, to receive SNAP on an ongoing basis. The
Department is committed to implementing SNAP as Congress intended and
believes that those who can work should work. The widespread use of
waivers has allowed some ABAWDs to continue to receive SNAP benefits
while not meeting the ABAWD work requirement for longer than 3 months.
The proposed rule addresses these areas of concern and places
safeguards to avoid approving waivers that were not foreseen by
Congress and the Department, and to restrict states from receiving
waivers in areas that do not clearly demonstrate a lack of sufficient
jobs.
As stated above, given the widespread use of ABAWD waivers during a
period of historically low unemployment, the Department believes that
the current regulatory standards should be reevaluated. Based on the
Department's approximately 2 decades' experience with reviewing ABAWD
waivers, the Department is proposing that the standards for approving
these waivers be updated to ensure the waivers are applied on a more
limited basis. The application of waivers on a more limited basis would
encourage more ABAWDs to take steps towards self-sufficiency.
The Department proposes stricter criteria for ABAWD waiver
approvals that would establish stronger, updated standards for
determining when and where a lack of sufficient jobs justifies
temporarily waiving the ABAWD time limit. The proposed rule would also
ensure the Department only issues waivers based on representative,
accurate, and consistent economic data, where it is available. Limiting
waivers would make more ABAWDs subject to the time limit and thereby
encourage more ABAWDs to engage in meaningful work activities if they
wish to continue to receive SNAP benefits. The Department recognizes
that long-term, stable employment provides the best path to self-
sufficiency for those who are able to work. The Department believes it
is appropriate and necessary to encourage greater ABAWD engagement with
respect to job training and employment opportunities that would not
only benefit ABAWDs, but would also save taxpayers' money. The
Department and the states share a responsibility to help SNAP
participants--especially ABAWDs--find a path to self-sufficiency.
Through the stricter criteria for waiver approvals, the Department
would encourage greater engagement in meaningful work activities and
movement toward self-sufficiency among ABAWDs, thus reducing the need
for nutrition assistance.
Waiver Standards Framework
Current regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(f) set standards and
requirements for the data and evidence that states must provide to FNS
to support a waiver request. States enjoy considerable flexibility to
make these waiver requests pursuant to the current regulations. For
example, these regulatory standards give states broad flexibility to
define the waiver's geographic scope. The discretion for states to
define areas allows waivers based on data for combined areas that are
not necessarily economically tied. An economically tied area is an area
within which individuals can reside and find employment within a
reasonable distance or can readily change employment without changing
their place of residence. In addition, while the current regulations
establish criteria for unemployment data that rely on standard Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) data or methods, the regulations also allow
states to rely on alternative, less robust economic indicators, which
include data other than unemployment data from BLS, to demonstrate a
lack of sufficient jobs. Moreover, the waiver standards allow areas
within states to qualify for waivers as a result of unemployment rates
relative to the national average, without consideration for whether the
national or local area unemployment rate is high or low. Put
differently, under the current regulations, which do not include a
local unemployment rate floor, even if the national unemployment rate
falls, a particular area's unemployment rate may support a waiver if
that area's unemployment rate is low but sufficiently higher than the
national average. As a result of these and other shortcomings, the
current regulations give states an opportunity to qualify for waivers
and avoid the ABAWD time limit when economic conditions do not justify
such relief. For these reasons, the Department believes that the waiver
standards under this proposed rule will better identify areas that do
not have a sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for ABAWDs.
As of September 2018, the national unemployment rate is the lowest
unemployment rate since 1969; however, states continue to request and
qualify for ABAWD waivers based on the current waiver criteria, which
define the lack of sufficient jobs in an area too broadly. In April
2010, the national unemployment rate stood at 9.9 percent. From 2010
through 2013, the vast majority of states qualified for and continued
to implement statewide ABAWD time limit waivers. SNAP participation
peaked at an average of 47.6 million recipients per month in FY 2013
and has gradually declined since then. In July 2013, the national
unemployment rate was 7.3 percent; 45 ABAWD time limit waivers covered
the entire state,\1\ and six waivers covered specific areas within the
state. In April 2018, SNAP participation totaled 39.6 million
participants, and the national unemployment rate stood at 3.9 percent.
In April 2018, eight waivers applied to an entire state, and 28 covered
specific areas within a state. Although the national unemployment rate
has dropped from 9.9 percent in April 2010 to 3.9 percent in April
2018, many states continue to qualify for and use ABAWD time limit
waivers under the current waiver standards, and nearly \1/2\ of all
ABAWDs live in areas that are covered by waivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The term ``state'' refers to any of the 50 states, the District
of Columbia, and the U.S. territories[.]
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The Department is concerned that ABAWD time limit waivers continue
to cover significant portions of the country and are out of step with a
national unemployment rate hovering at less than four percent. Since
the current waiver criteria have no floor, a certain percentage of
states will continue to qualify for waivers even if unemployment
continues to drop. In other words, regardless of how strong the economy
is, the criteria are written in such a way that areas will continue to
qualify even with objectively low unemployment rates. Many currently-
waived areas qualified based on 24 month local unemployment rates below
six percent.
The current criteria for waiver approval permit states to qualify
for waivers without a sufficiently robust standard for a lack of
sufficient jobs. The waiver criteria should be updated to ensure states
submit data that is more representative of the economic conditions in
the requested areas. Such reforms would make sure the Department issues
waivers based on representative, accurate, and consistent economic
data.
This proposed rule would set clear, robust, and quantitative
standards for waivers of the ABAWD time limit. The proposal would also:
Eliminate waivers for areas that are not economically tied together;
eliminate the ability of an area to qualify for a waiver based on its
designation as a Labor Surplus Area (LSA) by the Department of Labor;
limit the use of alternative economic indicators to areas for which
standard data is limited or unavailable, such as Indian Reservations
and U.S. Territories; and provide additional clarity for states
regarding the waiver request process. The proposed changes would ensure
the Department issues waivers only to provide targeted relief to areas
that demonstrate a lack of sufficient jobs or have an unemployment rate
above ten percent and that the ABAWD time limit encourages SNAP
participants to find and keep work if they live in areas that do not
lack sufficient jobs.
Background
Previous Action
On February 23, 2018, the Department published an Advanced Notice
of Public Rulemaking (ANPRM) entitled ``Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program: Requirements and Services for Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents'' (83 FR 8013) to seek public input to inform
potential policy, program, and regulatory changes that could
consistently encourage ABAWDs to obtain and maintain employment and
thereby decrease food insecurity. The Department specifically asked
whether changes should be made to: (1) The existing process by which
state agencies request waivers of the ABAWD time limit; (2) the
information and data states must provide to support the waiver request;
(3) the Department's implementation of the waiver approval; and (4) the
waiver's duration. The ANPRM generated nearly 39,000 comments from a
range of stakeholders including private citizens, government agencies
and officials, food banks, advocacy organizations, and professional
associations.
The comments addressed the broad scope of topics covered by the
ANPRM. Comments about the ABAWD waiver included diverse perspectives,
ranging from those who supported stricter waiver approval requirements
to those who favored maintaining or expanding the criteria for waiver
approval. Many commenters favored no change or expressed support for
greater flexibility. Other commenters identified a number of areas of
concern with current practices, including the use of waivers by states
to waive the ABAWD work requirement and avoid promoting work, waiving
areas with relatively low unemployment rates, and allowing the use of
certain metrics for waiver approvals.
The Department received more than 3,500 comments regarding
potential reforms to the ABAWD time limit and waivers of the time limit
through the Department's request for information (RFI) entitled,
``Identifying Regulatory Reform Initiatives'' published July 17, 2017
(82 FR 32649). This RFI requested ideas on how the Department can
provide better customer service and remove unintended barriers to
participation in the Department's programs in ways that least interfere
with the Department's customers and allow the Department to accomplish
its mission. The Department specifically requested ideas on
regulations, guidance documents, or any other policy documents that
require reform. While commenters disagreed with certain SNAP provisions
outlined previously, specific changes to regulations and policies were
not provided. The Department received a range of comments to the RFI in
addition to the comments listed above that are not relevant to this
proposed rule.
Summary of Proposed Changes
The Department believes current regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(c) and
7 CFR 273.24(f) should be updated and strengthened. The proposed rule
focuses on updating the standards for ABAWD waivers. Current
regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(f) set standards and requirements for the
data and evidence that states must provide to FNS to support an ABAWD
waiver request. States enjoy considerable flexibility to make these
waiver requests pursuant to the current regulations. This flexibility
has resulted in the widespread use of waivers during a period of low
unemployment, which reduces the application of the work requirement.
The Department proposes several changes. First, the proposed rule
would limit the ability of areas to qualify for waivers as local
economies and the overall national economy improve. Second, the
proposed rule would no longer allow state agencies to combine
unemployment data from areas with high unemployment with areas with
lower unemployment and more plentiful employment opportunities in order
to maximize the area waived. Instead, the proposed rule would ensure
the Department issues waivers only to economically tied areas that meet
the new criteria defining what is meant by a lack of sufficient jobs.
The proposed rule would also limit the duration of waivers to 1 year,
and curtail the use of less robust data to approve waivers. The
subsequent sections provide details about the changes proposed in this
rule.
Discussion of Proposed Changes
General
The Department proposes that the rule, once finalized, would go
into effect on October 1, 2019, which is the beginning of Federal
Fiscal Year 2020. All waivers in effect on October 1, 2019, or
thereafter, would need to be approvable according to the new rule at
that time. Any approved waiver that does not meet the criteria
established in the new rule would be terminated on October 1, 2019.
States would be able to request new waivers if the state's waiver is
expected to be terminated. The Department requests feedback from states
regarding the implementation date. In addition, the Department proposes
clarifying that any state agency's waiver request must have the
Governor's endorsement to ensure that such a critical request is
supported at the highest levels of state government.
Establishing Core Standards for Approval
The Department proposes updating criteria for ABAWD time limit
waivers to improve consistency across states and only allow approvals
in areas where waivers are truly necessary. These revisions would
include the establishment of core standards that would allow a state to
reasonably anticipate whether it would receive approval from the
Department. These core standards would serve as the basis for approval
for the vast majority of waiver requests, save for areas with
exceptional circumstances or areas with limited data or evidence, such
as Indian Reservations and U.S. Territories. The proposed rule would
continue to allow approvals for waivers based on data from BLS or a
BLS-cooperating agency that show an area has a recent, 12 month average
unemployment rate over ten percent.
The proposed rule emphasizes that the basis for approval of waivers
would be sound data and evidence that primarily relies on data from BLS
or BLS-cooperating agencies. Any supporting unemployment data provided
by the state would need to rely on standard BLS data or methods. BLS
unemployment data is generally considered to be reliable and robust
evidence for evaluating labor market conditions. BLS is an independent
Federal statistical agency that is required to provide accurate and
objective statistical information and is the principal fact-finding
agency for the Federal Government in the broad field of labor economics
and statistics. It collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates
essential statistical data for the public and Federal agencies.
The proposed core standards for waiver approval would be codified
in 7 CFR 273.24(f)(2).
Core Standards: Retaining Waivers Based On An Unemployment Rate Over
Ten Percent
The Department does not propose changes to the regulations for
waivers when an area has an unemployment rate over ten percent. The
proposed rule would continue to allow approvals for waivers based on
data from BLS or a BLS-cooperating agency that show an area has a
recent, 12 month average unemployment rate over ten percent.
Core Standards: Establishing a Floor for Waivers Based On the 20
Percent Standard
Current regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(f)(2) and (3) provide for
waiver approvals for requested areas with an average unemployment rate
at least 20 percent above the national average for a recent 24 month
period, beginning no earlier than the same 24 month period that DOL
uses to determine LSAs for the current fiscal year (otherwise known as
the ``20 percent standard''). Under the current regulations, the
Department adopted the 20 percent standard, in addition to LSA
designation, to provide states with the flexibility to support waivers
for areas in the country that are not considered by DOL for LSA
designation and to allow states to use a more flexible 24 month
reference period.
There are key differences between the two standards. DOL's criteria
for LSAs require an average unemployment rate that is at least 20
percent above the national average and at least six percent for the
preceding 2 calendar years (a 24 month period). DOL's local
unemployment rate floor of six percent prevents areas with unemployment
rates below that threshold from qualifying as LSAs. The 20 percent
standard is the same, except that it allows for a flexible 24 month
data reference period (no earlier than that which is used for LSAs) and
it does not include any unemployment rate floor.
Based upon operational experience, the Department has observed
that, without an unemployment rate floor, local areas will continue to
qualify for waivers under the Department's 20 percent standard based on
high unemployment relative to the national average even as local
unemployment rates fall to levels as low as five to six percent
(depending upon the national rate). The Department believes that
amending the waiver regulations to include an unemployment floor is a
critical step in achieving more targeted criteria. While the 20 percent
standard is similar to the calculation of an LSA, the Department
believes it is appropriate to request public comment to explore a floor
that is designed specifically for ABAWD waivers.
The Department believes a floor should be set for the 20 percent
standard so that areas do not qualify for waivers when their
unemployment rates are generally considered to be normal or low. The
``natural rate of unemployment'' is the rate of unemployment expected
given normal churn in the labor market, with unemployment rates lower
than the natural rate tending to result in inflationary pressure on
prices. Thus, unemployment rates near or below the ``natural rate of
unemployment'' are more indicative of the normal delay in unemployed
workers filling the best existing job opening for them than a ``lack of
sufficient jobs'' in an area. Generally, the ``natural rate of
unemployment'' hovers around five percent. The Department believes that
only areas with unemployment rates above the ``natural rate of
unemployment'' should be considered for waivers. The Department seeks
to establish a floor that is in line with the Administration's effort
to encourage greater engagement in work and work activities. The
Department believes that the seven percent floor for the 20 percent
standard would strengthen the standards for waivers so that the ABAWD
work requirement would be applied more broadly and fully consider the
``lack of sufficient jobs'' criteria in the statute. Furthermore, this
aligns with the proposal in the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018,
H.R. 2, 115th Cong. 4015 (as passed by House, June 21, 2018). As
stated previously, the Department seeks to make the work requirements
the norm rather than the exception to the rule because of excessive use
of ABAWD time limit waivers to date. Using the proposed rule's seven
percent floor for this criterion and eliminating waiver approvals based
on an LSA designation (as well as utilizing the proposed limit on
combining areas discussed below), an estimated 11 percent of ABAWDs
would live in areas subject to a waiver. Currently, approximately 44
percent of ABAWDs live in a waived area. The Department views the
proposal as more suitable for achieving a more comprehensive
application of work requirements so that ABAWDs in areas that have
sufficient number of jobs have a greater level of engagement in work
and work activities, including job training. In sum, the proposed rule
modifies the current waiver criterion so that an area must have an
average unemployment rate at least 20 percent above the national
average and at least seven percent for a recent 24 month period,
beginning no earlier than the same 24 month period that DOL uses to
determine LSAs for the current fiscal year, to qualify for a waiver.
The seven percent floor prevents a requested area with an unemployment
rate 20 percent above the national average, but below seven percent,
from qualifying for a waiver.
Although the Department believes the local unemployment floor
should be set at seven percent to best meet its goals of promoting
self-sufficiency and ensuring areas with unemployment rates generally
considered normal are not waived, it is requesting evidence-based and
data-driven feedback on the appropriate threshold for the floor.
Specifically, the Department requests feedback on which unemployment
rate floor--six percent, seven percent, or ten percent--would be most
effective at limiting waivers consistent with the Act's requirement
that waivers be determined based on a lack of sufficient jobs.
The Department is interested in public comments on establishing an
unemployment floor of six percent, which would be consistent with DOL
standards for LSAs. A six percent floor would require that an area
demonstrate an unemployment rate of at least 20 percent above the
national average for a recent 24 month period and at least a six
percent unemployment rate for that same time period in order to receive
waiver approval. The six percent floor also bears a relationship to the
``natural rate of unemployment.'' in that it is approximately 20
percent higher. As previously noted, the ``natural rate of
unemployment'' generally hovers around five percent, meaning that 20
percent above that rate is 6.0 percent. In combination with other
changes in the proposed rule, the Department estimates that a six
percent floor would reduce waivers to the extent that approximately 24
percent of ABAWDs would live in waived areas. The Department is
concerned that too many areas would qualify for a waiver of the ABAWD
time limit with a six percent floor and that too few individuals would
be subject to the ABAWD work requirements, which can be met through
working or participating in a work program or workfare program, thereby
moving fewer individuals towards self-sufficiency.
The Department would also like to receive comments on establishing
a floor of ten percent for the 20 percent standard. A ten percent floor
would allow for even fewer waivers than the other options and would
result in the work requirements being applied in almost all areas of
the country. In combination with other changes in the proposed rule,
the Department estimates that a ten percent floor would reduce waivers
to the extent that approximately two percent of ABAWDs would live in
waived areas.
It is important to note that a ten percent floor would be distinct
from the criteria for approval of an area with an unemployment rate of
over ten percent. The ten percent unemployment floor would be attached
to the 20 percent standard, which would mean an area would require an
average unemployment rate 20 percent above the national average for a
recent 24 month period and at least ten percent for the same period;
the other similar, but separate standard requires an area to have an
average unemployment rate of over ten percent for a 12 month period.
Based on the Department's analysis, nearly 90 percent of ABAWDs
would live in areas without waivers and would be encouraged to take
steps towards self-sufficiency if a floor of seven percent was
established. In comparison, a six percent floor would mean that 76
percent of ABAWDs would live in areas without waivers and a ten percent
floor would mean that 98 percent of ABAWDs would live in areas without
waivers. A higher floor allows for the broader application of the time
limit to encourage self-sufficiency.
The Department is thus requesting comments on the various proposed
options for setting a floor for the 20 percent standard. This will
ensure that the Department fully considers the range of evidence
available to establish a floor that meets the need of evaluating
waivers.
Core Standards: Retaining the Extended Unemployment Benefits
Qualification Standard
Under the proposed rule, the Department would continue to approve a
state's waiver request that is based upon the requesting state's
qualification for extended unemployment benefits, as determined by
DOL's Unemployment Insurance Service. Extended unemployment benefits
are available to workers who have exhausted regular unemployment
insurance benefits during periods when certain economic conditions
exist within the state. The extended benefit program is triggered when
the state's unemployment rate reaches certain levels. Qualifying for
extended benefits is an indicator, based on DOL data, that a state
lacks sufficient jobs. Current regulations include this criterion as
evidence of lack of sufficient jobs. The Department has consistently
approved waivers based on qualification for extended unemployment
benefits because it has been a clear indicator of lack of sufficient
jobs and an especially responsive indicator of sudden economic
downturns, such as the Great Recession. Therefore, the Department
proposes to continue to include this criterion, reframed as a core
standard for approval in this proposed regulation.
The three provisions described above (the unemployment rate over
ten percent standard, the 20 percent standard, and the qualification
for extended unemployment benefits standard), would be considered the
core standards for approval and, thus, the basis for most conventional
waiver requests and approvals. The core standards would be codified in
7 CFR 273.24(f)(2).
Criteria Excluded From Core Standards
The proposed core standards would not include some of the current
ABAWD time limit waiver criteria that are rarely used, sometimes
subjective, and not appropriate when other more specific and robust
data is available, such as unemployment rates from BLS. These excluded
criteria include a low and declining employment-to-population ratio, a
lack of jobs in declining occupations or industries, or an academic
study or other publication(s) that describes an area's lack of jobs.
These standards would no longer suffice for a waiver's approval if BLS
data is available. These proposed changes would ensure that ABAWD time
limit waiver requests are only approved in areas where waivers are
truly necessary.
The proposed rule would emphasize sound data and evidence that
primarily relies on BLS and other DOL data for waiver approvals. Any
supporting unemployment data that a state provides must, under the core
standards, rely on standard data from BLS or a BLS-cooperating agency.
Other Data and Evidence in Exceptional Circumstances
The proposed core standards would form the primary basis for
determining waiver approval. However, the rule also proposes that the
Department can approve waiver requests in exceptional circumstances
based on other data and evidence. The Department proposes that other
data and evidence still primarily rely on BLS unemployment data. Such
alternative data would only be considered in exceptional circumstances
or if BLS data is limited, unavailable, or if BLS develops a new method
or data that may be applicable to the waiver review process. Given that
economic conditions can change quickly, the Department believes it is
appropriate to maintain a level of flexibility to approve waivers as
needed in extreme, dynamic circumstances. Such waiver requests must
demonstrate that an area faces an exceptional circumstance and provide
data or evidence that the exceptional circumstance gives rise to an
area not having a sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for
the individuals in the area. For example, an exceptional circumstance
may arise from the rapid disintegration of an economically and
regionally important industry or the prolonged impact of a natural
disaster. A short-term aberration, such as a temporary closure of a
plant, would not fall within the scope of exceptional circumstances.
For waiver requests in exceptional circumstances, the state agency may
use additional data or evidence other than those listed in the core
standards to support its need for a waiver under exceptional
circumstances. In these instances, the state may provide data from the
BLS or a BLS-cooperating agency showing an area has a most recent 3
month average unemployment rate over ten percent. This provision to
strengthen the standards for waivers would be codified in 7 CFR
273.24(f)(3).
Restricting Statewide Waivers
Current regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(f)(6) and the Department's
policy guidance provide states with the discretion to define the areas
to be covered by waivers. A state may request that a waiver apply to
the entire state (statewide) or only to certain areas within the state
(e.g., individual counties, cities, or towns), as long as the state
provides data that corresponds to each requested area showing that the
area meets one of the qualifying standards for approval.
The proposed rule would eliminate statewide waiver approvals when
sub-state data is available through BLS, except for those waivers based
upon a state's qualification for extended unemployment benefits as
determined by DOL's Unemployment Insurance Service. The Department
proposes this change so that waivers of the ABAWD time limit are more
appropriately targeted to those particular areas in which unemployment
rates are high. Since statewide unemployment figures may include areas
in which unemployment rates are relatively low, the Department believes
that a more targeted approach would ensure that waivers exist only in
areas that do not have a sufficient number of jobs to provide
employment for the individuals living in that specific area. This
proposed change further supports the Department's goal that more
individuals are subject to the ABAWD time limit and work requirement,
which can be met through working or participating in a work program or
workfare program, consistent with the intent of the Act.
The Department requests public comment specific to the proposed
restriction on statewide waivers, especially with consideration to how
the change may affect different states in different ways based upon
geographic size, population, and other factors.
These changes would be codified in 7 CFR 273.24(f)(4).
Restricting the Combining of Data to Group Sub-State Areas
Current regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(f)(6) and the Department's
policy guidance provide states considerable flexibility to define areas
covered by ABAWD waivers. This flexibility allows states to combine
data to group two or more sub-state areas, such as counties, together
(otherwise referred to as ``grouped'' areas or ``grouping''). In order
to meet the requirement for qualifying data or evidence that
corresponds to the requested area, states use the unemployment and
labor force data from the individual areas in the group to calculate an
unemployment rate representative of the whole group. States can only
group areas and support approval based on qualifying unemployment data.
Under current regulations, states must demonstrate that the areas
within any such group are contiguous and/or share the same Federal- or
state-recognized economic region. For example, two or more contiguous
counties could be grouped together, and the group's average
unemployment rate could be calculated, by combining the unemployment
and labor force data from each individual county.
The Department's existing general conditions for the grouping of
areas--that the areas must be either contiguous and/or share the same
economic region--were intended to ensure that the areas grouped
together are economically tied. However, in practice, the Department
has learned that its standards for combining areas provide too much
flexibility for state agencies and are often ineffective at ensuring
that states are only grouping areas that are economically tied. For
example, some states have grouped nearly all contiguous counties in the
state together while omitting a few counties with relatively low
unemployment in order to maximize the waived areas in the state. In
other cases, states have grouped certain towns together that share the
same economic region while omitting others with relatively low
unemployment from the group, thereby maximizing the waived areas in the
state.
The proposed rule would prohibit states from grouping areas, except
for areas that are designated a Labor Market Area (LMA) by the Federal
Government.\2\ This change would ensure that only areas that are
economically tied are grouped together. Moreover, the proposed rule
would require states to include the unemployment data representative of
all areas in the LMA in the state. As a result, states would be unable
to omit certain areas within the LMA in the state for the purposes of
achieving a qualifying unemployment rate for part of an LMA. These
changes would be codified in 7 CFR 273.24(f)(5).
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\2\ An LMA is an economically integrated geographic area within
which individuals can reside and find employment within a reasonable
distance or can readily change employment without changing their place
of residence. LMAs include Federally-designated statistical areas such
as metropolitan statistical areas, micropolitan statistical areas, and
other combined statistical areas. A nationwide list of every LMA is
maintained by BLS.
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The Department requests public comments on whether it should
include Labor Market Areas (LMAs) defined by the Federal Government as
the basis for grouping areas or whether it should prohibit grouping
entirely. If grouping were prohibited entirely, waived areas would be
limited to individually qualifying jurisdictions with corresponding
data (for example, counties and their equivalents, cities, and towns).
The Department requests comments on the potential impacts of either
policy. The Department believes that only allowing the use of Federally
designated LMAs will limit the combination of areas that are not
contiguous and economically integrated. The Department is interested in
feedback on whether the LMA definition will target waivers to
jurisdictions with a demonstrable lack of sufficient jobs without
including jurisdictions that do not lack sufficient jobs.
Duration of Waiver Approvals and Timeliness of Data
The proposed approach would limit the duration of waiver approvals.
Under the current regulations, the Department typically approves
waivers for 1 year. However, the current regulations allow the
Department to approve shorter or longer waivers in certain
circumstances. The Department proposes limiting a waiver's duration to
1 year, but continuing to allow a waiver for a shorter period at a
state's request. The Department believes that a 1 year waiver term
allows sufficient predictability for states to plan and implement the
waiver; at the same time, a 1 year waiver term ensures that the waiver
request reflects current economic conditions.
The proposed rule would also prioritize recent data by preventing
states from requesting to implement waivers late in the Federal fiscal
year, which broadens the available data reference period. Through
operational experience, the Department has observed that several states
that have historically requested 12 month waivers on a fiscal year
basis (i.e., October 1 of 1 year through September 30 of the following
year), have shifted their waiver request and implementation dates to
later in the fiscal year (e.g., September 1 through August 31). The
states that have made this shift have supported their waivers based on
the 20 percent standard. In the current regulations, the 24 month data
reference period for this waiver is tied to the fiscal year and only
updates each year on October 1. The Department has noticed that as the
unemployment rates have improved, states that shift the waiver
operational period to later in the fiscal year have been able to
capitalize on older data and qualify for waivers of the ABAWD time
limit for additional time. States are able to take advantage of this
loophole if their unemployment rates for the requested areas have been
improving relative to the national average. As a result, these states
are able to obtain a waiver and maximize the areas waived into the next
fiscal year, using data that is no longer appropriate as of the October
1 update.
To curtail this practice, the Department proposes that waivers
based on the 20 percent standard would not be approved beyond the
fiscal year in which the waiver is implemented. In addition, these
waivers must utilize data from a 24 month period no less recent than
that DOL used in its current fiscal year LSA designation. Such an
approach ensures waivers rely on sufficiently recent data for the
current fiscal year and prevents states from using older data, which
may not accurately reflect current economic conditions.
This provision would streamline the implementation of the program
and would be codified in 7 CFR 273.24(f)(6).
Areas With Limited Data or Evidence
Current practices provide flexibility to state agencies to rely on
alternative data sources regardless of whether the area has
corresponding BLS unemployment data available. Currently, the
Department may approve requests supported by an estimated unemployment
rate of an area based on available data from BLS and Census Bureau's
American Community Survey (ACS), a low and declining employment-to-
population ratio, a lack of jobs as a consequence of declining
occupations or industries, or an academic study or other publication
describing the area's lack of a sufficient number of jobs. At times,
state agencies will use these alternative data sources to justify a
waiver request even when the corresponding BLS data shows that the
unemployment rate in the area is relatively low. As stated previously,
the Department believes that waivers of the ABAWD time limit should be
limited to only circumstances in which the area clearly does not have a
sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals. By
not restricting the use of these alternative to areas with limited data
or evidence, the Department has permitted states to take advantage of
these alternative data sources, when BLS employment data is readily
available.
Under the proposed rule, all of these criteria would only be
applicable to areas for which BLS or a BLS-cooperating agency data is
limited or unavailable, such as a reservation area or U.S. Territory.
In these areas, the Department could approve requests supported by an
estimated unemployment rate of an area based on available data from BLS
and ACS, a low and declining employment-to-population ratio, a lack of
jobs as a consequence of declining occupations or industries, or an
academic study or other publication describing the area's lack of a
sufficient number of jobs. Waiver requests for an area for which
standard data from BLS or a BLS-cooperating agency is limited or
unavailable would not be required to conform to the criteria for
approval proposed under paragraphs (f)(2), (f)(3), (f)(4), (f)(5), and
(f)(6). Additionally, the Department would consider other data in line
with BLS methods or considered reliable. This allows for flexibility if
new methods or data are developed for Indian Reservation or U.S.
Territory regions currently with limited or no data.
Using an estimated unemployment rate based on available data from
BLS and ACS is part of current practice. The Department proposes
codifying this criteria in the regulations only for areas with limited
data or evidence, such as a reservation area or U.S. Territory.
Currently, states often estimate unemployment rates for reservation
areas by applying data from ACS to available BLS data. In addition,
some Tribal governments generate their own labor force and/or
unemployment data, which would remain acceptable to support a waiver.
These changes would be codified in 7 CFR 273.24(f)(7).
Other Changes to Waivers
The proposed rule would eliminate three provisions in current
regulations: The designation as an LSA as a criterion for approval; the
implementation of waivers before approval; and the historical seasonal
unemployment as a criterion for approval. These provisions are
eliminated to ensure that the ABAWD work requirement is applied in
accordance with the Department's goal to strengthen work requirements.
The proposed rule would no longer allow an area to qualify for a
waiver based on DOL's Employment and Training Administration (ETA)
designation of the area as an LSA for the current fiscal year. This
change is central to the Department's efforts to raise the standards by
which it determines whether an area is lacking a sufficient number of
jobs to provide employment for ABAWDs in order to require more ABAWDs
to engage in work, work training, or workfare if they wish to receive
SNAP. As explained in a previous section, DOL's criteria for LSAs
require an average unemployment rate that is at least 20 percent above
the national average and at least six percent for the preceding 2
calendar years (a 24 month period). The Department is eliminating LSA
designation as a basis for waiver approval because LSAs are determined
using a minimum unemployment rate floor of six percent, whereas the
Department proposes using a minimum unemployment rate of seven percent
for its similar, but more flexible, 20 percent standard. Continuing to
allow LSA designation as a basis for waiver approval would be
inconsistent. Moreover, LSAs are not designated for all different types
of areas across the country, and having an LSA criteria separate from
the 20 percent criteria could be seen as unnecessary moving forward.
The proposed rule would bar states from implementing a waiver prior
to its approval. Though rarely used, current regulations allow a state
to implement an ABAWD waiver as soon as the state submits the waiver
request based on certain criteria.\3\ By removing the current pertinent
text in 273.24(f)(4), the proposed rule would require states to request
and receive approval before implementing a waiver. This would allow the
Department to have a more accurate understanding of the status of
existing waivers and would provide better oversight in the waiver
process. It would also prevent waivers from being implemented until the
Department explicitly reviewed and approved the waiver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Under current regulations, the state must certify that data
from the BLS or the BLS-cooperating agency show a most recent 12 month
average unemployment rate over ten percent or that ETA designated the
area as an LSA for the current fiscal year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule would also remove the criterion of a historical
seasonal unemployment rate over ten percent as a basis for approval.
Historical seasonal unemployment does not demonstrate a prolonged lack
of sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals.
Historical seasonal unemployment rates, by definition, are limited to a
relatively short period of time each year. Nor does a historical
seasonal unemployment rate indicate early signs of a declining labor
market. Historical seasonal unemployment rates are cyclical rather than
indicative of declining conditions. Based on operational experience,
the Department has not typically seen the use of this criterion by
states. The Department has not approved a waiver under this criterion
in more than 2 decades. For these reasons, the Department proposes
removing a historical seasonal average unemployment rate as a way to
qualify for a waiver.
In addition, as stated previously, the proposed rule would no
longer provide for statewide waivers except for those waivers approved
based upon a state's qualification for extended unemployment benefits.
Ending the ``Carryover'' of ABAWD Exemptions
The proposed rule would end the unlimited carryover and
accumulation of ABAWD percentage exemptions, previously referred to as
15 percent exemptions before the enactment of the Agriculture
Improvement Act of 2018. Upon enactment, Section 6(o)(6) of the Act
provides that each state agency be allotted exemptions equal to an
estimated 12 percent of ``covered individuals,'' which are the ABAWDs
who are subject to the ABAWD time limit in the state in Fiscal Year
2020 and each subsequent fiscal year. States can use these exemptions
available to them to extend SNAP eligibility for a limited number of
ABAWDs subject to the time limit. When one of these exemptions is
provided to an ABAWD, that one ABAWD is able to receive 1 additional
month of SNAP benefits. The Act and current regulations give states
discretion whether to use these exemptions, and, as a result, some
states use the exemptions that are available to them and others do not.
Each fiscal year, the Act requires the Department to estimate the
number of exemptions that each state be allotted and to adjust the
number of exemptions available to each state. Based on the Act's
instructions, the regulations provide the specific formulas that the
Department must use to estimate the number of exemptions, which are
referred to as ``earned'' exemptions, and to adjust the exemptions
available to the state each year. The proposed rule would not change
any part of the calculation that the Department follows to estimate
earned exemptions, or any other part of 273.24(g). The proposed rule
would only change the calculation that the Department uses to adjust
the number of exemptions available for each fiscal year at 7 CFR
273.24(h).
The regulation's current interpretation of Section 6(o)(6)(G) of
the Act, which requires the adjustment of exemptions, causes unused
exemptions to carry over and accumulate from 1 year to the next, unless
the state uses all of its available exemptions in a given year. For FY
2018, states earned approximately 1.2 million exemptions, but had about
an additional 7.4 million exemptions available for use due to the
carryover of unused exemptions from previous fiscal years. The
Department views the carryover of significant amounts of unused
exemptions to be an unintended outcome of the current regulations. The
Department is concerned that such an outcome is inconsistent with
Congressional intent to limit the number of exemptions available to
states each year. Concerns about the carryover of exemptions were also
expressed by the September 2016, USDA Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) audit report ``FNS Controls Over SNAP Benefits for Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents.'' Therefore, the Department proposes
revising 7 CFR 273.24(h) to end the unlimited carryover of unused
percentage exemptions. The Department proposes this change to implement
the Act more effectively and to advance further the Department's goal
to promote self-sufficiency.
In order to address the carryover issue, the proposed rule would
change the adjustment calculation that the Department uses to increase
or decrease the number of exemptions available to each state for the
fiscal year based on usage during the preceding fiscal year. The
proposed rule would no longer allow for unlimited carryover from all
preceding years. Instead, each state agency's adjustment would be based
on the number of exemptions earned in the preceding fiscal year minus
the number of exemptions used in the preceding fiscal year. The
resulting difference would be used to adjust (by increasing or
decreasing) the earned exemption amount. In addition, the adjustment
will apply only to the fiscal year in which the adjustment is made.
The three examples below show how the proposed rule's adjustment
calculation would work in practice based on no exemption use, varied
exemption use, and exemption overuse. These examples assume that a
state earns five new exemptions every year over a 4 year period.
Example 1, No Exemption Use
Example 1 shows how the proposed adjustment calculation would work
for a state that uses zero exemptions, and how it would end the
carryover and accumulation of unused exemptions. The state earned five
exemptions for the current fiscal year (FY) of 2021 in this example
(row A). The state's adjustment for FY 2021 is based on the number of
exemptions earned in the previous year (FY 2020) minus the number of
exemptions used for the previous year (FY 2020). In this example, we
assume the state earned five exemptions in FY 2020 and used no
exemptions in FY 2020, so the adjustment for FY 2021 is five (row B).
The adjustment of five (row B) is then added to the five earned for FY
2021 (row A) to obtain the state's total of ten exemptions after
adjustment for FY 2021 (row C). In FY 2021, the state uses zero
exemptions (row D), so it does not have any overuse liability for that
year because row E results in a positive number. In FY 2022, FY 2023,
and FY 2024, the calculation is the same and results are the same each
year. The number of exemptions available to the state is increased
based on the number earned for and used in the preceding fiscal year,
but the state does not carryover accumulated exemptions indefinitely.
Whereas the state would have 25 total exemptions after adjustment for
FY 2024 under the current regulations, the state would have ten total
exemptions after adjustment for FY 2024 under the proposed regulation.

Example 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year (FY) 2021 2022 2023 2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A......................................... Earned for current FY....... 5 5 5 5
B......................................... (+) Adjustment for current 5 5 5 5
FY (earned minus used for
previous FY).
C......................................... (=) Total after adjustment 10 10 10 10
for current FY.
D......................................... (^) Used in current FY...... 0 0 0 0
E......................................... (=) Liability for overuse? 10 (No) 10 (No) 10 (No) 10 (No)
(Yes or No).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Example 2, Varied Exemption Use
Example 2 shows how the proposed adjustment calculation would work
for a state that uses different amounts of exemptions each fiscal year
and therefore receives an increase or decrease in the exemptions
available to it each subsequent fiscal year. In other words, the number
of exemptions available to the state is adjusted for an increased total
exemptions 1 year, then a decreased total exemptions the next. The
state earned five exemptions for the current FY of 2021 (row A). The
state's adjustment for FY 2021 is based on the number of exemptions
earned in the previous year (FY 2020) minus the number of exemptions
used for the previous year (FY 2020). We assume the state earned five
exemptions in FY 2020 but used zero exemptions in FY 2020, so the
state's total after adjustment for FY 2021 is ten (row C). In FY 2021,
the state uses eight exemptions (row D), so it does not have any over-
usage liability for that year (row E). That is, though the state only
earned five exemptions for FY 2021, the adjustment allowed the state to
avoid any over usage liability for FY 2021. However, for the purposes
of adjustment in FY 2022, the eight used exemptions are subtracted from
the five earned exemptions for FY 2021, not from the ten adjusted
exemption amount available in FY 2021. Therefore, the adjustment amount
for FY 2022 is negative three. In FY 2022, the state again earns five
exemptions but the adjustment is negative three (the result of
subtracting row D, FY 2021 from row A, FY 2022). The state then has a
total of two exemptions for FY 2022. The state chooses to use two
exemptions for FY 2022, therefore it has no overuse in FY 2022. This
example shows how the proposed regulation increases or decreases the
number of exemptions available to states while also limiting the
average number of exemptions in effect to 12 percent over time. As
shown in row D, the state can use no more than ten exemptions over the
course of any 2 year period, which is equal to the ten exemptions
earned over every 2 year period.

Example 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year (FY) 2021 2022 2023 2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A......................................... Earned for current FY....... 5 5 5 5
B......................................... (+) Adjustment for current 5 ^3 3 ^3
FY (earned minus used for
previous FY).
C......................................... (=) Total after adjustment 10 2 8 2
for current FY.
D......................................... (^) Used in current FY...... 8 2 8 2
E......................................... (=) Liability for overuse? 2 (No) 0 (No) 0 (No) 0 (No)
(Yes or No).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Example 3, Exemption Overuse
Example 3 shows how the proposed adjustment calculation would work
for a state that overuses exemptions. In this example, we again assume
the state earned five exemptions in FY 2020 but used zero exemptions in
FY 2020, so the state's total after adjustment for FY 2021 is ten (row
C). In FY 2021, the state uses six exemptions (row D); once again, it
does not have any over-usage liability for that year (row E), but the
adjustment for FY 2022 will be negative one (the result of subtracting
row D, FY 2021 from row A, FY 2022). Put differently, the five
exemptions earned for FY 2022 offset the adjustment of negative one.
The state then has a total of four exemptions for FY 2022 (row C).
However, the state uses six exemptions in FY 2022. Because the state
used more exemptions in FY 2022 than its total after adjustment for FY
2022, it has an overuse liability of two for FY 2022. The Department
would consider the exemption overuse an over-issuance and would hold
the state liable for the total dollar value of the exemptions, as
estimated by the Department.

Example 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year (FY) 2021 2022 2023 2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A........................................ Earned for current FY....... 5 5 5 5
B........................................ (+) Adjustment for current 5 ^1 ^1 1
FY (earned minus used for
previous FY).
C........................................ (=) Total after adjustment 10 4 4 6
for current FY.
D........................................ (^) Used for current FY..... 6 6 4 4
E........................................ (=) Liability for overuse? 4 (No) ^2 (Yes) 0 (No) 2 (No)
(Yes or No).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Under the proposed rule, the Department would continue to provide
states with its estimated number of exemptions earned for each upcoming
fiscal year as data becomes available, typically in September. The
Department would also continue to provide states with the exemption
adjustments as soon as updated caseload data is available and states
have provided final data on the number of exemptions used in the
preceding fiscal year, typically in January.
The Department also seeks comments from states on how to treat
state agencies' existing total number of percentage exemptions, which
in some cases have carried over and accumulated over many years, and on
when the proposed change should be implemented. Under the proposed
rule, these accumulated percentage exemptions would not be available to
states once the change is implemented. Additionally, because the
adjusted number of exemptions is based on the preceding fiscal year,
the change in regulatory text will impact state's ability to use
exemptions in the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year that the
provision goes into effect. Therefore, the Department seeks comment on
how to best handle these issues.
The proposed rule would not change or affect the ``caseload
adjustments'' at 273.24(h)(1), which apply to any state that has a
change of over ten percent in its caseload amount. However, the
Department is taking this opportunity to correct the cross-reference
that this paragraph makes to 273.24(g)(2) for accuracy. The proposed
regulation cross-references 273.24(g)(3), instead of (g)(2). The
Department is making this change because it is more accurate and
precise to cross-reference to 273.24(g)(3), given that the caseload
adjustments apply to the number of exemptions estimated as earned for
each state for each fiscal year.
Procedural Matters
Executive Order 12866 and 13563
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess all
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public
health and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive
Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and
benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting
flexibility. This proposed rule has been determined to be economically
significant and was reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) in conformance with Executive Order 12866.
Regulatory Impact Analysis
As required for rules that have been designated as economically
significant by the Office of Management and Budget, a Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) was developed for this proposed rule. It follows this
rule as an Appendix.* The following summarizes the conclusions of the
regulatory impact analysis:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Editor's note: the document referred to was not published in the
Federal Register; and therefore, is not published in this hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department has estimated the net reduction in Federal spending
associated with the proposed transfer rule to be approximately $1.1
billion in fiscal year (FY) 2020 and $7.9 billion over the 5 years
2020-2024. This is a reduction in Federal transfers (SNAP benefit
payments); the reduction in transfers represents a 2.5 percent decrease
in projected SNAP benefit spending over this time period.
Under current authority, the Department estimates that about 60
percent of ABAWDs live in areas that are not subject to a waiver and
thus face the ABAWD time limit. Under the revised waiver criteria the
Department estimates that nearly 90 percent of ABAWDs would live in
such an area. Of those newly subject to the time limit, the Department
estimates that approximately \2/3\ (755,000 individuals in FY 2020)
would not meet the requirements for failure to engage meaningfully in
work or work training.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612) requires Agencies
to analyze the impact of rulemaking on small entities and consider
alternatives that would minimize any significant impacts on a
substantial number of small entities. Pursuant to that review, it has
been certified that this rule would not have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
This proposed rule would not have an impact on small entities
because the proposed rule primarily impacts state agencies. As part of
the requirements, state agencies would have to update their procedures
to incorporate the new criteria for approval associated with requesting
waivers of ABAWD time limit. Small entities, such as smaller retailers,
would not be subject to any new requirements. However, all retailers
would likely see a drop in the amount of SNAP benefits redeemed at
stores if these provisions were finalized, but impacts on small
retailers are not expected to be disproportionate to impact on large
entities. As of FY 2017, approximately 76 percent of authorized SNAP
retailers (nearly 200,000 retailers) were small groceries, convenience
stores, combination grocery stores, and specialty stores, store types
that are likely to fall under the Small Business Administration gross
sales threshold to qualify as a small business for Federal Government
programs. While these stores make up the majority of authorized
retailers, collectively they redeem less than 15 percent of all SNAP
benefits. The proposed rule is expected to reduce SNAP benefit payments
by about $1.7 billion per year. This would equate to about a $100 loss
of revenue per small store on average per month ($1.7 billion 15%/
200,000 stores/12 months). In 2017, the average small store redeemed
more than $3,800 in SNAP each month; the potential loss of benefits
represents less than three percent of their SNAP redemptions and only a
small portion of their gross sales. Based on 2017 redemption data, a
2.7 percent reduction in SNAP redemptions represented between 0.01 and
0.5 percent of these stores gross sales.
Executive Order 13771
Executive Order 13771 directs agencies to reduce regulation and
control regulatory costs and provides that the cost of planned
regulations be prudently managed and controlled through a budgeting
process.
This proposed rule is expected to be an Executive Order 13771
deregulatory action. The rule does not include any new costs. FNS is
proposing a reduction in burden hours since state agencies are no
longer able to group areas together for waiver approval. The reduction
would result in an estimated collective savings of $12,092 for state
agencies.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Public
Law 104-4, establishes requirements for Federal agencies to assess the
effects of their regulatory actions on state, local and Tribal
governments and the private sector. Under section 202 of the UMRA, the
Department generally must prepare a written statement, including a cost
benefit analysis, for proposed and final rules with ``Federal
mandates'' that may result in expenditures by state, local or Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or the private sector, of $100 million
or more in any 1 year. When such a statement is needed for a rule,
Section 205 of the UMRA generally requires the Department to identify
and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and adopt
the most cost effective or least burdensome alternative that achieves
the objectives of the rule.
This proposed rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the
regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for state, local and
Tribal governments or the private sector of $100 million or more in any
1 year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the requirements of sections
202 and 205 of the UMRA.
Executive Order 12372
SNAP is listed in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance under
No. 10.551. For the reasons set forth in the Final Rule codified in 7
CFR part 3015, subpart V and related Notice (48 FR 29115), this Program
is excluded from the scope of Executive Order 12372, which requires
intergovernmental consultation with state and local officials.
Federalism Summary Impact Statement
Executive Order 13132 requires Federal agencies to consider the
impact of their regulatory actions on state and local governments.
Where such actions have Federalism implications, agencies are directed
to provide a statement for inclusion in the preamble to the regulations
describing the agency's considerations in terms of the three categories
called for under Section 6(b)(2)(B) of Executive Order 13132.
The Department has determined that this rule does not have
Federalism implications. Therefore, under Section 6(b) of the Executive
Order, a Federalism summary impact statement is not required.
Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform
This proposed rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 12988,
Civil Justice Reform. This rule is not intended to have preemptive
effect with respect to any state or local laws, regulations or policies
which conflict with its provisions or which would otherwise impede its
full and timely implementation. This rule is not intended to have
retroactive effect unless so specified in the Effective Dates section
of the final rule. Prior to any judicial challenge to the provisions of
the final rule, all applicable administrative procedures must be
exhausted.
Civil Rights Impact Analysis
FNS has reviewed the proposed rule, in accordance with the
Department Regulation 4300-4, ``Civil Rights Impact Analysis'' to
identify and address any major civil rights impacts the proposed rule
might have on minorities, women, and persons with disabilities. While
we believe that a reduction in the number of ABAWD waivers granted to
state agencies will adversely affect potential program participants in
all groups who are unable to meet the employment requirements, and have
the potential for disparately impacting certain protected groups due to
factors affecting rates of employment of members of these groups, we
find that the implementation of mitigation strategies and monitoring by
the Civil Rights Division of FNS will lessen these impacts.
Executive Order 13175
This rule has been reviewed in accordance with the requirements of
Executive Order 13175, ``Consultation and Coordination with Indian
Tribal Governments.'' Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies
to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government
basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations,
legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy
statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or
more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government
and Indian Tribes or on the distribution of power and responsibilities
between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.
The USDA's Office of Tribal Relations (OTR) has assessed the impact
of this rule on Indian Tribes and determined that this rule has Tribal
implications that require Tribal consultation under E.O. 13175. FNS
invited Tribal leaders to a consultation held on March 14, 2018. Tribal
leaders did not provide any statement or feedback to the Department on
the rule. FNS and OTR will determine if a future consultation is
needed. If a Tribe requests consultation, FNS will work with the Office
of Tribal Relations to ensure meaningful consultation is provided where
changes, additions, and modifications identified herein are not
expressly mandated by Congress
Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chap. 35; 5 CFR
1320) requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approve all
collections of information by a Federal agency before they can be
implemented. Respondents are not required to respond to any collection
of information unless it displays a current valid OMB control number.
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, this proposed
rule will contain information collections that are subject to review
and approval by the Office of Management and Budget; therefore, FNS is
submitting for public comment the changes in the information collection
burden that would result from adoption of the proposals in the rule.
Comments on this proposed rule must be received by April 2, 2019.
Comments are invited on: (a) Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of
the agency, including whether the information shall have practical
utility; (b) the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information, including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used; (c) ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (d) ways
to minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who
are to respond, including use of appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms
of information technology.
All responses to this notice will be summarized and included in the
request for OMB approval. All comments will also become a matter of
public record.
Title: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Waivers of Section
6(o) of the Food and Nutrition Act.
OMB Number: 0584-0479.
Expiration Date: [July 31, 2021].
Type of Request: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Abstract: Section 6(o) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, (the
Act, as amended through Pub. L. 113-xxx), limits the amount of time an
able-bodied adult without dependents (ABAWD) can receive Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits to 3 months in a 36 month
period, unless the individual is working and/or participating in a work
program half-time or more, or participating in workfare. The Act
exempts individuals from the time limit for several reasons, including
age, unfitness for work, or having a dependent child. The ABAWD time
limit and work requirement currently apply to people ages 18 through
49, unless they are already exempt from the general work requirements,
medically certified as physically or mentally unfit for employment,
responsible for a child under 18, or pregnant. ABAWDs are also work
registrants and must meet the general work requirements. In addition,
ABAWDs subject to the time limit must work and/or participate in a work
program 80 hours per month or more, or participate in and comply with
workfare to receive SNAP for more than 3 months in a 36 month period.
Participation in SNAP E&T, which is a type of work program, is one way
a person can meet the 80 hour per month ABAWD work requirement, but
other work programs are acceptable as well.
The Act also provides state agencies with flexibility to request a
waiver of this time limit if unemployment is high or the area does not
have a sufficient number of jobs to provide employment. State agencies
can request to waive the ABAWD time limit if an area has an
unemployment rate of over ten percent or the state can meet one of the
regulatory options to show it does not have a sufficient number of jobs
to provide employment. If the time limit is waived, individuals are not
required to meet the ABAWD work requirement to receive SNAP for more
than 3 months in a 36 month period. This collection of information is
necessary for FNS to perform its statutory obligation to review waivers
of the SNAP ABAWD time limit.
This is a revision of a currently approved information collection
request associated with this rulemaking. In the previous submission,
the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) estimated 35 hours for each waiver
request for a total of 1,198 hours. Based on the experience of FNS
during calendar year 2018, FNS projects that 36 out of 53 state
agencies would submit requests for a waiver of the time limit for ABAWD
recipients based on a high unemployment rate or lack of sufficient
number of jobs. FNS estimates a response time of 28 hours for each
waiver request based on labor market data, which require detailed
analysis of labor markets within the state. FNS projects a total of
1,008 hours, which would be a reduction of 190 hours compared to the
1,198 hours estimated provided in the pending approval.
FNS is proposing a reduction in burden hours since state agencies
are no longer able to group areas together for waiver approval. The
reduction will burden hours would result in an estimated collective
savings of $12,092 for state agencies. This rule does not require any
recordkeeping burden. Reporting detail burden details are provided
below.
Respondents: State agencies.
Estimated Number of Respondents: 36.
Estimated Number of Responses per Respondent: 1.
Estimated Total Annual Burden on Respondents: 1,008.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response Differences
Requirement (7 Estimated annually Total Hours per Annual Previous due to Differences
OMB No. 0584-0479 CFR 273.24(f) number of per annual response burden submission program due to
respondents respondent responses hours total hours changes adjustment
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected Public: State Agencies
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reporting burden.............. Submissions of 36 1 36 28 1,008 1,190 ^182 0
waiver request
based on labor
market data..
7 CFR 273.24(f)-- 0 0 0 0 0 8 ^8 0
Submission of
waiver request
based on Labor
Surplus Area
designation..
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reporting totals.............................. 36 1,008 ^190
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Reporting Burden due to Rulemaking...... 1,008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

E-Government Act Compliance
The Department is committed to complying with the E-Government Act
of 2002, to promote the use of the Internet and other information
technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to
government information and services, and for other purposes.
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 273
Able-bodied adults without dependents, Administrative practice and
procedures, Employment, Indian reservations, Time limit, U.S.
territories, Waivers, Work requirements.
Accordingly, FNS proposes to amend 7 CFR part 273 to read as
follows:
part 273--certification of eligible households
1. The authority citation for part 273 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2011-2036.

2. In 273.24, revise paragraph (f) to read as follows:
273.24 Time Limit for able-bodied adults.
* * * * *
(f) Waivers--.(1) General. The state agency may request FNS
approval to temporarily waive the time limit for a group of individuals
in the state in the area in which the individuals reside. To be
considered for approval, the request must be endorsed by the state's
governor and supported with corresponding data or evidence
demonstrating that the requested area:

(i) Has an unemployment rate of over ten percent; or
(ii) Does not have a sufficient number of jobs to provide
employment for the individuals.

(2) Core standards. FNS will approve waiver requests under (1)(i)
and (ii) that are supported by any one of the following:

(i) Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) or a BLS-
cooperating agency that shows an area has a recent 12 month
average unemployment rate over ten percent;
(ii) Data from the BLS or a BLS-cooperating agency that shows
an area has a 24 month average unemployment rate 20 percent or
more above the national rate for a recent 24 month period, but
in no case may the 24 month average unemployment rate of the
requested area be less than seven percent. The 24 month period
must be no earlier than the same 24 month period used by the
Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration to
designate Labor Surplus Areas for the current fiscal year; or
(iii) Evidence that an area qualifies for extended
unemployment benefits as determined by the Department of Labor
(DOL).

(3) Other data and evidence. FNS may approve waiver requests that
are supported by data or evidence other than that listed under
paragraph (f)(2) of this section if the request demonstrates an
exceptional circumstance in an area. In addition, the request must
demonstrate that the exceptional circumstance has caused a lack of
sufficient number of jobs, such as data from the BLS or a BLS-
cooperating agency that shows an area has a most recent 3 month average
unemployment rate over ten percent. Supporting unemployment data
provided by the state must rely on standard BLS data or methods.
(4) Restriction on statewide waivers. FNS will not approve
statewide waiver requests if data for the requesting state at the sub-
state level is available from BLS, except for waivers under paragraph
(f)(2)(iii) of this section.
(5) Restricting the combining of data to group sub-state areas. The
state agency may only combine data from individual areas that are
collectively considered to be a Labor Market Area by DOL.
(6) Duration of waiver approvals. In general, FNS will approve
waivers for 1 year. FNS may approve waivers for a shorter period at the
state agency's request and waivers under paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this
section will not be approved for a period beyond the fiscal year in
which the waiver is implemented.
(7) Areas with limited data or evidence. Waiver requests for an
area for which standard BLS data or a BLS-cooperating agency data is
limited or unavailable, such as a reservation area or U.S. Territory,
are not required to conform to the criteria for approval under
paragraphs (f)(2), (f)(3), (f)(4), (f)(5) and (f)(6) of this section.
The supporting data or evidence provided by the state must correspond
to the requested area.

(i) FNS may approve waivers for these areas if the requests
are supported by sufficient data or evidence, such as:

(A) Estimated unemployment rate based on available
data from BLS and Census Bureau's American Community
Survey;
(B) A low and declining employment-to-population
ratio;
(C) A lack of jobs in declining occupations or
industries; or
(D) An academic study or other publication describing
the area as lacking a sufficient number of jobs to
provide employment for its residents.

(ii) In areas with limited data or evidence, such as
reservation areas or U.S. Territories, FNS may allow the state
agency to combine data from individual areas to waive a group
of areas if the state agency demonstrates that the areas are
economically integrated.
* * * * *
3. In 273.24, revise paragraph (h) to read as follows:
* * * * *
(h) Adjustments. FNS will make adjustments as follows:

(1) Caseload adjustments. FNS will adjust the number of
exemptions estimated for a state agency under paragraph (g)(3)
of this section during a fiscal year if the number of SNAP
recipients in the state varies from the state's caseload by
more than ten percent, as estimated by FNS.
(2) Exemption adjustments. During each fiscal year, FNS will
increase or decrease the number of exemptions allocated to a
state agency based on the difference between the number of
exemptions used by the state for the preceding fiscal year and
the number of exemptions estimated for the state for the
preceding fiscal year under paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(1) of
this section. The increase or decrease will only apply for the
fiscal year in which the adjustment is made. For example:

(i) If the state agency uses fewer exemptions in the
preceding fiscal year than were estimated for the state
agency by FNS for the preceding fiscal year under
paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(1) of this section, FNS will
increase the number of exemptions allocated to the
state agency for the current fiscal year by the
difference to determine the adjusted exemption amount.
(ii) If the state agency uses more exemptions in the
preceding fiscal year than were estimated for the state
agency by FNS for the preceding fiscal year under
paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(1) of this section, FNS will
decrease the number of exemptions allocated to the
state agency for the current fiscal year by the
difference to determine the adjusted exemption amount.
* * * * *
Dated: December 20, 2018.

Brandon Lipps,
Acting Deputy Under Secretary, Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services.

[FR Doc. 2018-28059 Filed 1-31-19; 8:45 a.m.]

billing code 3410-30-p
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Collin C. Peterson, a Representative
in Congress from Minnesota; Authored by Tony Lourey, Commissioner,
Minnesota Department of Human Services
March 29, 2019

Brandon Lipps,
Administrator, Food and Nutrition Service
U.S. Department of Agriculture;

Certification Policy Branch,
Program Development Division,
United States Department of Agriculture--Food and Nutrition Service,
Alexandria, Virginia 22302

Re: Docket No. FNS-2018-0004, RIN 0584-AE57, Comments in Response to
Proposed Rulemaking: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program: Requirements and Services for Able-Bodied Adults
without Dependents

Dear Mr. Lipps:

The Minnesota Department of Human Services (MN DHS) oversees the
state's Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to provide
critical food assistance to low-income families. As Commissioner of the
department, I have serious concerns about the proposed rule regarding
SNAP waivers that the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) published in the
Federal Register on February 1, 2019. This rule will likely increase
hunger and deprivation among thousands of people in Greater Minnesota
by causing them to lose their benefits.
Under current law, working-age adults who do not have dependent
children must either have a job or be enrolled in officially-recognized
employment training for 20 hours per week in order to receive more than
3 months of SNAP benefits in a 3 year time period. States can waive the
time limit for this population in geographic areas that have an
unemployment rate that is 20 percent above the national average. In
Minnesota, 30 counties and 11 American Indian reservations and Tribal
areas, all of which are in rural areas, currently receive these SNAP
waivers.\1\ The proposed rule would limit the existing criteria for
granting SNAP waivers in a way that would cause much of the population
in these areas to lose SNAP benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The following counties are currently eligible for a waiver from
the 3 month time limit: Aitkin, Becker, Beltrami, Carlton, Cass,
Clearwater, Cook, Cottonwood, Crow Wing, Hubbard, Isanti, Itasca,
Kanabec, Kittson, Koochiching, Lake, Lake of the Woods, Mahnomen,
Marshall, Mille Lacs, Morrison, Murray, Norman, Pennington, Pine, Red
Lake, Roseau, St. Louis, Todd, Wadena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Understanding the low-wage labor market is critical to
understanding the role that SNAP plays in helping workers mitigate the
instability of low-wage work. SNAP is a critical support for workers
who earn wages that are so low that they live in poverty despite
working. It also helps these workers when they experience a spell of
unemployment. The vast majority of working-age SNAP recipients in
Minnesota work in low-wage jobs that offer little employment security,
erratic and unpredictable schedules, and few benefits. These industries
include hotels and restaurants, retail, temporary placement agencies,
and health care's low-wage occupations. The jobs in these industries
are much more likely than other sectors to be part-time and have high
worker turnover. Many of the adults subject to SNAP time limits lack
basic skills in reading, math, and writing and face other barriers to
employment which can limit their job prospects. This group of SNAP
recipients is also more likely than the larger SNAP population and the
overall statewide population to be homeless, lack transportation, have
an addiction, or experience domestic violence.\2\ SNAP helps mitigate
the effects of low pay and job unpredictability to help workers weather
the inevitable unemployment spells that come with low-wage jobs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. Government Accountability Office (2003). Food Stamp
Employment and Training Program Better Data Needed to Understand Who Is
Served and What the Program Achieves: https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/
237571.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The concerns outlined below highlight changes proposed in the rule
that would further undermine the well-being of low-wage workers
receiving SNAP in Minnesota:

(1) The rule proposes to eliminate statewide waivers, which would
leave Minnesota vulnerable during severe economic crises.
In addition to providing a nutrition safety net during
periods of economic volatility, the use of SNAP benefits
also boosts local economies by providing economic stimulus
to grocers, farmers, and others in the food pipeline. The
Great Recession which began in 2008 eliminated 160,000 jobs
in Minnesota. When people lose their jobs, the wider
economy is vulnerable because those individuals can no
longer make purchases or pay bills. SNAP not only ensures
that people who are unemployed can purchase groceries, but
also that local food retailers still have customers and can
keep their staff employed during difficult economic times.

A USDA Economic Research Service analysis estimated that each
$1 in Federal SNAP benefits generates $1.79 in economic
activity. Those dollars help food retailers (many of which
are operating on thin margins) improve food access for all
residents. Historically, Minnesota has had a relatively
strong economy and only had a statewide waiver during the
2008 recession. That is exactly the sort of scenario in
which programs like SNAP must respond quickly and
effectively to diminish the impact of the crisis on
individuals and slow a widening economic crisis.

(2) The proposed rule changes the criteria used to qualify a region
for a SNAP waiver based on high unemployment. The current
standard for ``insufficient jobs'' that can qualify an area
for a waiver is an unemployment rate of at least 20% above
the national average. This rule would create an additional
standard by requiring waivered areas to also have a minimum
unemployment rate of either 6%, 7%, or 10% (the proposed
rule asks for public comment on the impact of each of these
unemployment rates).

The unemployment rate is not a complete measure of economic
stress and establishing a minimum unemployment rate in this
arbitrary manner lacks the evidence-based rigor needed when
making a major policy change. Minnesota has very distinct
regions, some of which rely primarily on agriculture,
mining, food processing, health care, or mixed sectors
which each follow distinct economic cycles. Some regions
can be flourishing in our state while others are struggling
economically. If FNS were to apply a minimum unemployment
rate of 7%, only four of the 30 counties \3\ that are
included in the waiver would continue to qualify. All
American Indian reservations and Tribal areas would
continue to qualify. Under such a change, 2,650 Minnesotans
would be subject to the 3 month time limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The counties that would still qualify under an unemployment
rate floor of seven percent are: Clearwater, Itasca, Koochiching, and
Marshall.

(3) The proposed rule would limit local control and state
flexibility in defining areas of high unemployment by
forcing states to make the determinations using only small
Labor Market Areas recognized by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). This approach fails to recognize the
economic reality in rural areas of Minnesota. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics designated a small Labor Market Area by
measuring whether at least 25% of a county's residents or
employees are associated with a neighboring county.
Applying that narrow methodology to SNAP waivers misses
that fact that in some counties, workers may have to travel
in all directions and often beyond a contiguous county for
their job. States have the best understanding of the
regional patterns in their labor markets and can best
account for that when applying for waivers. Using the BLS
small Labor Market Area for such determinations is
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
misguided.

(4) While the 2018 Farm Bill modified the number of exemptions from
SNAP time limits that states can receive each year from 15%
to 12%, it did not change their ability to carry over
unused exemptions. The proposed rule would no longer allow
states to carry over all unused exemptions from 1 year to
another. This change restricts states' ability to use the
program's policies to respond to shifts in the labor market
and the economy. Minnesota would naturally use fewer
exemptions when the labor markets across the state are
relatively strong and would increase the use of exemptions
when the labor markets weaken. That ability to respond
should not be restricted.

The proposal would also allow FNS to apply this aspect of the
rule change retroactively, which would also be harmful to
Minnesota. States that have earned exemptions and were
allowed to carry them over across Federal fiscal years
should be able to continue to do so. Our current
accumulations from previous years should not be dismissed.
States know their residents and their geographic regions
best, and should be allowed to determine how these
exemptions could be used to address continued challenges
for some of their low-wage workers.

(5) Implementing the proposed rule changes by October 1, 2019 would
undoubtedly lead to errors and confusion. Major changes in
complex systems need to be well-planned so they can be
well-implemented. If any of the provisions of the proposed
rule are enacted, they should not be implemented any sooner
than October 1, 2020.

If the changes outlined in this proposed rule go into effect, they
would force many workers in areas with unemployment rates at least 20%
more than the national rate to lose their SNAP benefits. They would be
forced to find jobs that are not available or to enroll in employment
services that do not exist. There is not enough funding in the SNAP
Employment and Training program to serve the people currently subject
to time limits, much less thousands of new workers subject to the time
limit. If Minnesota were to apply the small increase in funding for the
SNAP Employment and Training program from the 2018 Farm Bill to all the
individuals affected by this rule change, we estimate that we would
only have $35 per person to spend on employment and training services
for people that face multiple barriers to work.
Congress had the opportunity to include these policy changes in the
recently passed farm bill but chose to not do so. To make these changes
through executive action, without providing the resources to help low-
wage workers improve their odds of getting jobs, only increases
hardship for people who are already struggling to afford the basics.
The rules governing eligibility for waivers and individual exemptions
have been in place for nearly 20 years. In that time, they have proven
to be reasonable, transparent, and manageable for states to
operationalize.
Although this rule may be meant to increase the number of people
engaged in work, these changes would actually undermine low-wage
workers' ability to reach stability. Minnesota's economic well-being
depends on all workers being able to meet their basic needs and provide
local businesses with customers, even when the economy weakens. I urge
you, for the benefit of working people in Greater Minnesota, to reject
the changes proposed in this rule.
Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Tony Lourey,
Commissioner.
______

Submitted Letter by Hon. James P. McGovern, a Representative in
Congress from Massachusetts
February 27, 2018

Hon. Glen Thompson,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Nutrition,
House Committee on Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chairman Thompson:

It has been a pleasure serving with you on the Nutrition
Subcommittee, and I have appreciated the Majority's diligence in
conducting a thorough review of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) over the past several years.
During the 23 hearings our Committee has held on SNAP, we've heard
from experts--conservative and liberal--that SNAP works. We've learned
that benefits should not be cut, and that current benefits are
inadequate. We also learned that SNAP does not discourage work, and
that eliminating work waivers will hamper state flexibility and
increase hunger.
Despite all of these hearings and findings, I'm concerned by
reports that the Committee is drafting a bill, behind closed doors,
that will seek to dramatically undermine access to SNAP benefits for
the population of very vulnerable able-bodied adults without
dependents, known as ABAWDs. My concern has only grown in the past
several weeks as the Administration has proposed drastic changes to
this population through its budget proposal and solicited feedback on
advancing its goal of moving ABAWDs out of the SNAP program.
I am now respectfully requesting that the Nutrition Subcommittee
hold a hearing on the ABAWD population before making any changes to
current SNAP law impacting this group of vulnerable adults.
Members of this Committee deserve the opportunity to learn more
about the ABAWD population from expert witnesses before voting on any
legislation that could limit their access to modest food benefits.
Thank you for your consideration of this request, and I look
forward to hearing from you soon.
Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Hon. James P. McGovern,
Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Nutrition.
______

Submitted Article by Hon. James P. McGovern, a Representative in
Congress from Massachusetts
Trump to poor Americans: Get to work or lose your benefits
The Washington Post
Wonkblog/Analysis
By Caitlin Dewey and Tracy Jan
May 22, 2017

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

A group of homeless men and women receive meals from
volunteers on May 18 in Morgantown, West Virginia. West
Virginia is one of the nation's poorest states where nearly one
in five struggled to afford basic necessities in 2015. (Spencer
Platt/Getty Images)

For a period last year after he lost his food stamps, Tim Keefe, an
out-of-work and homeless Navy veteran, used his military training to
catch, skin and eat squirrels, roasting the animals over an open fire
outside the tent he pitched in frigid Augusta, Maine.
The new additions to Keefe's diet resulted from a decision by state
authorities to tighten work requirements for recipients of the social
safety net--forcing the 49 year old, who lost his job at a farm
equipment factory because of an injury, off the food stamp rolls.
``I was eating what I could find, and borrowed from friends and
strangers,'' Keefe said in testimony to the Maine legislature. ``There
were many times . . . when I would go 2 or even 3 days without food. If
one was inclined to lose a lot of weight, I could recommend this diet
wholeheartedly.''
Now the Trump Administration in its first major budget proposal has
proposed more stringent work requirements--similar to those in effect
in Maine and other states--to limit eligibility for food stamps and a
host of other benefits as part of sweeping cuts to anti-poverty
programs.
The White House budget proposal, due to be unveiled on Tuesday,
would reduce spending on anti-poverty programs from food stamps to tax
credits and welfare payments by $274 billion over a decade, largely by
tightening eligibility for these programs, according to Administration
officials. With additional reforms on Medicaid and disability
insurance, total safety net cuts would top $1 trillion over 10 years.
Making low-income Americans work to qualify for so-called welfare
programs is a key theme of the budget. ``If you are on food stamps and
you are able-bodied, we need you to go to work,'' said budget director
Mick Mulvaney during a White House briefing on Monday.
He said the strengthened requirements in the budget focuses on
putting the 6.8 million unemployed or underemployed Americans back to
work. ``There is a dignity to work,'' he said, ``and there's a
necessity to work to help the country succeed.''
The White House did not offer details Monday on how the work
requirements would be implemented, other than saying it would be
``phased in'' for able-bodied adults without dependent children.
The White House estimated the combined reforms to the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program, better known as food stamps, would
generate nearly $193 billion in savings over a decade.
In addition to SNAP reforms, Trump will propose taking the earned
income and child tax credits away from undocumented immigrants working
in the United States, many of whom pay taxes or have American born-
children. That reform alone would save $40 billion over a decade,
according to the White House.
Anti-poverty advocates say the White House could implement its
desired reforms to SNAP in two ways: require recipients to work more
than the current minimum of 20 hours a week, or cut the unemployment
waivers in areas with high joblessness rates.
The influential Heritage Foundation, as well as a number of House
conservatives have championed a crackdown on waivers, leading many
anti-poverty advocates to conclude that is the most likely way the
White House would implement its proposed reforms.
Robert Rector, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation
who has asked the White House to prioritize work requirements, said the
Trump Administration needs to ``go after'' the four million able-bodied
adults without dependents in the food stamp program.
``You say to them, `We will give you assistance, but come to the
office 1 day a week to do job search or community service,' '' Rector
said. ``When Maine did that, they found almost immediately that their
caseload dropped 85 percent.''
Critics say such a change could endanger people like Keefe, a
veteran who has been unable to find a job after injuring his wrist on
the job at a plow factory in Rockland, Maine. As a result, Keefe now is
medically unable to lift more than 25 pounds--which disqualifies him
from other work in manufacturing.
The Navy veteran was one of several thousand former food stamp
recipients who lost benefits when Maine, in 2015, declined to renew its
waiver and reinstated statewide work requirements. He has spent much of
the last year living in a tent.
``I don't wanna worry no one,'' said Keefe, who recently testified
to Maine's Committee on Health and Human Services about the impact the
work requirement had on him. But, he added: ``I hope they understand
that people fall through the cracks.''
The Trump Administration is considering other changes to SNAP.
While details remain sparse, Mulvaney said the Federal Government would
be asking states to share in the costs for the food stamps program,
through a phased-in ``state match'' so they have a ``little more skin
in the game.''
``We believe in the social safety net. We absolutely do,'' Mulvaney
said. ``What we've done is not to try and remove the safety net for
folks who need it, but to try and figure out if there's folks who don't
need it that need to be back in the workforce.''
Suspending employment waivers would hit hard in areas with high
unemployment such as southern and central California, where the
unemployment rate can spike as high as 19 percent, as well as cities
such as Detroit and Scranton, Pa., where joblessness remains rampant.
The change would also hit hard in large portions of New Mexico, Oregon,
Washington, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, Idaho and
Michigan.
``It's unconscionable, cruel and ineffective,'' said Josh Protas,
the Vice President of Public Policy at MAZON, a national anti-hunger
organization. ``I'm honestly not sure what their goal is.''
Critics say the changes in unemployment waivers would be
devastating for Native American families living on reservations in
North and South Dakota, Arizona and Montana where there is chronic
poverty and high unemployment.
``The President's budget proposal will force kids in rural America
to go hungry while wasting billions of taxpayer dollars on misplaced
priorities like a wall that won't keep us safe,'' said Senator Jon
Tester (D-MT), in a statement to the Post. ``Parents in Montana and
across Indian Country should not have to choose between food for their
tables, gas for their cars, and shoes for their kids.''
The number of Americans on SNAP remains high, however. In 2016, 44
million Americans receive the benefits, compared to just 28 million
people in 2008.
``They have not come down like we would expect them to do,''
Mulvaney said. ``That raises a very valid question: Are there folks on
SNAP who shouldn't be?''
Anti-hunger advocates argue that, generally speaking, there are
not. Because SNAP benefits decrease gradually with increased income,
there is no incentive for people to avoid work to get benefits--a
phenomenon economists call the ``welfare cliff.'' And benefits are too
small for people to subsist on them without working: The average food
stamp benefit was $465 a month for a family of four in 2015. Most
people are on the program for between 7 and 9 months on average.
``The notion that people would prefer not to work to get that
benefit, give me a break,'' said U.S. Representative Jim McGovern, (D-
Mass.) a longtime anti-hunger advocate. ``This is a lousy and rotten
thing to do to poor people. They look at SNAP as an ATM to pay for
their other priorities.''
Additionally, \3/4\ of households using SNAP contain children,
seniors, or people with disabilities, said Elaine Waxman, a senior
fellow in the Income and Benefits Policy Center at the Urban Institute.
Without SNAP, the country would have had three to 4.5 million more
people in poverty during the recession, she said.
More than \1/4\ of able-bodied adults without dependents on SNAP do
not have a high school diploma, Waxman said; another 57 percent don't
have college degrees--putting them at a disadvantage when it comes to
finding work.
A number are also veterans, young adults aging out of the foster
care system, and felons recently released from jail. SNAP recipients
who cannot find work, for these or other reasons, are supposed to
attend job training programs--but they're not widely available because
of lack of funding.
``This is the trick. On the one hand, you want people to do
something, when in fact a lot of folks may not realistically be able to
find a job,'' Waxman said. ``Most states don't want to put the money
in. This is a dilemma that we're in.''
The evidence that stricter work requirements actually cause people
to get jobs is mixed, at best. In Kansas, which reinstated the
requirements in October 2014, 40 percent of unemployed adults were
still unemployed a year after being kicked off SNAP. Among former SNAP
participants who lost benefits, the average annual income was only
$5,562, according to the Foundation for Government Accountability, a
right-wing think tank based in Florida.
Progress has also been hotly debated in Maine, a state that
conservatives regularly hold up as evidence that stricter work-
requirements are effective. When the state dropped its waiver in 2015,
the number of unemployed adults in the program immediately fell by
nearly 80 percent.
But a May 2016 report by the state found that nearly 60 percent of
those affected individuals did not report any income in the year after
they left the program--suggesting they were still unemployed or
underemployed a year later.
On the national level, Michael Tanner, a senior fellow who focuses
on social welfare issues at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think
tank, said he doesn't think similar mandates will have a huge impact on
moving large numbers of recipients into employment or result in
significant budget savings. Most SNAP recipients who can work are
already working, and many of those who are not meet one of the various
exemptions such as being disabled.
``It's making a statement that Republicans think people who are on
public assistance should be doing all they can to get off,'' Tanner
said, ``and that means working whenever possible.''
McGovern, who sits on the House Agriculture Committee, said he was
surprised to learn about the White House proposal given Agriculture
Secretary Sonny Perdue's testimony before the Committee last week
saying he did not favor any major changes to the food stamps program.
``It's been a very important, effective program,'' Perdue said,
according to a recording of the hearing. ``As far as I'm concerned we
have no proposed changes. You don't try to fix things that aren't
broken.''
The Trump Administration is advocating other ``fixes'' to the
safety net, as well. The budget will also propose requiring people to
have a Social Security [N]umber to collect tax credits. Mulvaney said
it is unfair that taxpayers support immigrants working illegally in
this country.
``How do I go to somebody who pays their taxes and say, `Look, I
want you to give this earned income tax credit to somebody who is
working here illegally? That's not defensible,'' Mulvaney said.
Rector, of the Heritage Foundation, said he also hopes Trump will
prioritize work requirements for those receiving housing subsidies.
Mulvaney did not address that on Monday.
Diane Yentel, President of the National Low Income Housing
Coalition, said the majority of Americans receiving housing subsidies
are elderly, disabled or already include someone who works. Of the
remaining households, nearly \1/2\ include a preschool child or an
older child or adult with a disability who needs the supervision of a
caregiver.
Establishing work requirements for the remaining six percent of
households who are `work able' but not employed would require state and
local housing agencies already facing funding shortfalls to establish
cumbersome monitoring and enforcement systems for a very narrow segment
of rental assistance recipients, she said.
``This is neither cost effective nor a solution to the very real
issue of poverty impacting millions of families living in subsidized
housing or in need,'' Yentel said in a statement to the Post.

Correction: This story incorrectly stated the average annual
income for SNAP participants in Kansas who had lost and then
found jobs was $5,562. That figure applied to all SNAP
participants who had lost the benefit.

Caitlin Dewey is the food policy writer for Wonkblog.
Subscribe to her daily newsletter: tinyletter.com/cdewey,
@caitlindewey.
Tracy Jan covers the intersection of race and the economy for
The Post. She previously was a national political reporter at
The Boston Globe, @TracyJan.
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Jahana Hayes, a Representative in
Congress from Connecticut; Authored by Marc Egan, Director of
Government Relations, National Education Association
March 19, 2019

Certification Policy Branch,
SNAP Program Development Division,
Food and Nutrition Service, USDA,
Alexandria, Virginia

RE: Proposed Rule: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP):
Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents RIN
0584-AE57

Dear Certification Policy Branch:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment in opposition to USDA's
Proposed Rule on Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents
(ABAWDs).
In theory, the 3 month time limit for Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits for ABAWDs impacts only adults who
do not have children. In practice, it also harms children living in
low-income, food-insecure households. Making it more difficult for
states to waive the 3 month time limit for low-income individuals
facing barriers to employment, as the proposed rule would do, makes it
more likely that vulnerable children will go hungry or be poorly
nourished.
First line of defense against childhood hunger
SNAP, our nation's largest Federal food assistance program, is the
first line of defense against childhood hunger. The program provides
low-income households with monthly funds specifically designated for
food purchases. Research links participation in SNAP for 6 months with
an 8.5 percentage point decrease in food insecurity in households with
children, according to USDA itself (Measuring the Effect of
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Participation on Food
Security, (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/
Measuring2013.pdf) Aug. 2013).
Food insecurity is a major threat to the health and well-being of
the 12.5 million children in America--one in six--living in food-
insecure households. The consequences are devastating. Every day,
educators like the three million members of the National Education
Association (NEA) see firsthand how hungry children struggle to learn.
Access to enough healthy food is essential to academic success.
In 2015, 19.2 million children relied on SNAP for consistent access
to food--44 percent of the program's participants. In addition to
fighting food insecurity, SNAP significantly reduces child poverty and
helps struggling families make ends meet: the program lifted 1.5
million children out of poverty in 2017 alone.
Overly tight requirements are cruel and counterproductive
Federal law limits SNAP eligibility for childless, unemployed or
underemployed adults age 18-50 (except those who are exempt) to just 3
months out of every 3 years unless they obtain and maintain an average
of 20 hours a week of employment--and can prove it. These requirements
are often already untenable for individuals who face structural
barriers to employment and/or sufficient regular work hours. Data from
2013 and 2014 show that the overwhelming majority of SNAP participants
struggling to work 20 hours a work are not uninterested in working--
they are experiencing the consequences of volatile low-wage labor
markets, caregiving duties, or personal health issues.
The proposed rule would limit states' flexibility and tighten
requirements for waiving this 3 month time limit for ABAWDs, causing an
estimated 750,000 individuals to lose access to SNAP--an approach that
is counterproductive as well as cruel. Denying people critical food
assistance harms their health and productivity, hindering their ability
to find and keep employment and achieve economic self-sufficiency.
Proposed changes do not reflect today's realities
Technically, children under age 18 and the adults who live with
them are exempt from the 3 month time limit for SNAP. This approach
does not fully reflect the complex arrangements necessary for low-
income families to put food on the table. Specifically:

Children with non-custodial parents (NCPs). Some 4.5 million
poor and low-income custodial parents rely on child support
payments from NCPs and use SNAP to put food on the table for
their children. NCPs are often low-income themselves: 2.1
million were below the poverty line in 2015 and 1.5 million
accessed SNAP to supplement their resources. Since NCPs are not
exempt from the 3 month time limit for ABAWDs, the proposed
rule threatens them as well as their children. An NCP who loses
SNAP benefits may no longer be able to make child support
payments.

Children whose extended family members provide financial
support. Some low-income children receive food, financial
assistance, or care from extended family members, family
friends, or a parent's significant other who is receiving SNAP
benefits--people who are often struggling financially
themselves. The most economically precarious households are the
most likely to rely on such networks. So-called ABAWDs who lose
their SNAP benefits may have to stop providing support for
children they previously helped.

Children impacted by the opioid crisis: Today, more than 2.5
million children are being raised by their grandparents or
other relatives, in part because families are dealing with
parental alcohol and substance abuse issues, which are growing
rapidly due to the opioid epidemic. The adults who provide
informal kinship care for children impacted by substance abuse
issues may not do so on a consistent schedule, however. As a
result, they may face obstacles in securing an exemption from
ABAWD time-limits. If they lose access to SNAP in the face of
tightened waiver requirements, the children they care for could
experience increased poverty and food insecurity as a result.

Youth aging out of foster care and unaccompanied homeless
youth: SNAP plays a significant role in the health and well-
being of youth in foster care and unaccompanied homeless youth
who often lack support systems. They disproportionately
experience significant barriers to obtaining a high school
diploma, entering college, obtaining a driver's license,
accessing health insurance, maintaining housing stability,
obtaining steady employment, and accessing sufficient food.
SNAP can help address their food insecurity, but because former
foster youth and unaccompanied homeless youth often meet the
definition of an Able-Bodied Adult Without Dependents, they
face obstacles accessing this critical assistance and would
likely disproportionately suffer under tightened state waiver
requirements. This is of particular concern after recent
changes made by the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L.
115-334) that reduced states' automatic exemption threshold
from 15 percent to 12 percent.
Conclusion
SNAP time limits for ABAWDs adversely affect children and
vulnerable youth, even though they are not the policy's intended
targets. The proposed rule would exacerbate this problem. Furthermore,
it flies in the face of Congressional intent. Congress just concluded a
review and reauthorization of SNAP in the Agriculture Improvement Act
of 2018, and explicitly rejected the proposed changes. This proposed
rule is executive overreach that clearly disregards Congressional
intent. The National Education Association represents educators who
will see in their classrooms every day how vulnerable children, as a
result of this rule, will experience a reduction in important resources
that help meet their basic needs. NEA strongly opposes the proposed
rule because it would limit SNAP benefits for more low-income adults,
as well as children who may rely on them to help meet basic needs.
Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Marc Egan,
Director of Government Relations.
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Jahana Hayes, a Representative in
Congress from Connecticut; Authored by Lisa Davis, Senior Vice
President, No Kid Hungry Campaign, Share Our Strength
March 29, 2019

Certification Policy Branch,
SNAP Program Development Division,
Food and Nutrition Service, USDA,
Alexandria, Virginia

Re: Proposed Rulemaking: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP): Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents; RIN 0584-AE57, Docket ID: FNS-2018-0004

Dear Certification Policy Branch:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on USDA's Proposed
Rulemaking on Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs).
Share Our Strength is a national anti-hunger and anti-poverty
organization. Through our No Kid Hungry campaign, we work to end
childhood hunger in the United States by ensuring children have access
to healthy food, every day all year round.
While we support the stated goal of fostering self sufficiency, we
are deeply concerned that the proposed changes to further restrict
ABAWD's ability to receive SNAP benefits would cause significant
hardship to very low-income individuals, restrict state flexibility and
do nothing to help those struggling to find employment and secure jobs.
To the contrary, the loss of food assistance will likely create
additional financial and emotional stress making it harder to achieve
this goal. The proposed rule also circumvents the will of Congress by
attempting to implement, through executive action, policy changes
Congress rejected in the bipartisan Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018
(the farm bill) which was recently enacted by an overwhelming majority.
Current law limits individuals between the ages of 18 through 49,
who have not received a disability certification or are raising minor
children, to just 3 months of SNAP benefits out of every 3 years unless
they can document they are working or participating in a job training
program at least 20 hours per week. However, states aren't required to
offer work or training options to those impacted and most states do
not. When several states began re-instating time limits that had been
waived during the recession, at least 500,000 ABAWDs lost SNAP.\1\ And,
mostly recently, reinstatement of the time-limit for ABAWDs in Kentucky
led to an estimated 13,000 individuals to lose their SNAP benefits, not
because they found employment, but because they reached their benefit
time-limit.\2\ This represented a 20 to 22 percent decline in ABAWDs
caseload in the state between January 2017 and September 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Bolen, Ed, et al., 2016. More than 500,000 Adults Will Lose
SNAP Benefits in 2016 as Waiver Expire (https://www.cbpp.org/research/
food-assistance/more-than-500000-adults-will-lose-snap-benefits-in-
2016-as-waivers-expire). Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
\2\ Waxman, Elaine and Nathan Joo. 2019. Reinstating SNAP Work-
Related Time Limits: A Case Study of Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents in Kentucky (https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/100027/reinstating_snap_time_limits_1.pdf). Urban
Institute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recognizing that communities across the United States often face
specific local challenges around employment and that state leaders are
better equipped than their Federal counterparts to evaluate local
economic conditions, states have long had the ability to seek waivers
from the strict 3 month limit in areas where jobs are lacking and to
waive the requirements for portions of their caseload who face
particular challenges meeting the work requirement. This flexibility
allows states to be responsive to local labor market variables and to
protect individuals who live in areas of high unemployment, areas where
economic conditions are lagging, and/or areas impacted by catastrophic
events such as a natural disaster. The proposed rule would undermine
states' flexibility, implementing a one-size-fits-all approach that
eliminates some waiver grounds and restricts others.
We agree that the best pathway from poverty to self-sufficiency is
through adequate and stable employment. However, even though national
unemployment has dropped to about four percent, millions of people in
communities across the country continue to struggle to make ends meet
due to difficulty finding a job, low wages and inadequate hours,
limited skills, poor health or inadequate transportation. This rule
would do nothing to help those impacted obtain employment. To the
contrary, it would increase hunger and economic hardship by eliminating
SNAP benefits for more than 750,000 \3\ unemployed and underemployed
Americans according to USDA's own calculations. Other studies estimate
the impact to be higher--with 1.2 million individuals loosing food
access.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ United States Department of Agriculture. 2018. Proposed
Rulemaking: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for
Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-
inspection.federalregister.gov/2018-28059.pdf). FNS-2018-0004, RIN
0584-AE57. PP40.
\4\ Cunnyangham, Karen. 2019. Proposed Changes to the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program: Waivers to Work-Related Time Limits
(https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/
publications/proposed-changes-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-
program-waivers-to-work-related-time). Mathematica Policy Research;
Federal Poverty Level for a single individual is $12,490 for 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those hit hardest would be those facing the greatest challenges in
the labor market, including people of color, young adults aging out of
foster care, veterans, homeless individuals, and those with limited
education or skills or under-diagnosed physical or mental health
issues. Research shows that only \1/2\ of ABAWDs nationally have a high
school diploma or the equivalent,\5\ making it difficult to find and
maintain stable employment in today's knowledge-based economy. Children
aging out of foster care are particularly vulnerable. By age 24, only
\1/2\ of these youths will obtain employment and only three to four
percent will have earned a college degree by age 26, making them
especially vulnerable to hunger and poverty.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Bolen, Ed. 2015. Approximately 1 Million People Would Lose Food
Assistance Benefits in 2016 As State Waivers Expire: Affected
Individuals Are Very Poor: Few Qualify for Other Help. Center On Budget
and Policy Priorities.
\6\ Shared Justice. 2017. Aging Out of Foster Care: 18 and On Your
Own (http://www.sharedjustice.org/most-recent/2017/3/30/aging-out-of-
foster-care-18-and-on-your-own).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those impacted by SNAP time limits are often living in extreme
poverty. According to latest research, 88 percent of ABAWDs that would
be impacted by the proposed rule are making less than $6,245 per year
per individual.\7\ They constitute a relatively small portion of all
SNAP recipients--representing 12 percent or seven million individuals
nationwide--and their numbers do not appear to be increasing despite
claims to the contrary.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Supra note at 9.
\8\ Center on Poverty and Social Policy. 2018. Understanding Recent
Trends In Food Stamp Usage and implications for Increased Work
Requirements (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5743308460b5e922a25a6dc7/t/5b69b61970a6adeee8860dc8/1533654555824/
Poverty+and+So
cial+Policy+Brief_2_5.pdf). Columbia University
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further restricting benefits for ABAWDs is poor public policy and
counterproductive, particularly in light of the growing body of
research demonstrating SNAP's effectiveness and short and longer-term
impact on health and economic security. In 2015 alone, SNAP lifted 8.4
million people out of poverty.\9\ SNAP does this by freeing up
resources that participants can spend on other critical needs such as
housing, childcare, health care costs and transportation. In addition,
studies found that SNAP participation was tied to an annual reduction
of $1,400 in health care costs among low-income adults.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Wheaton, Laura and Victoria Tran. 2018. The Anti-Poverty
Effects of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (https://
www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/96521/
the_antipoverty_effects_of_the_supplemental_nutrition_assistance_program
_3.pdf). Urban Institute.
\10\ Berkowitz, Seth, et al., 2017. Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) Participation and Health Care Expenditure
Among Low-Income Adults (https://jamanetwork.com/journals/
jamainternalmedicine/article-abstract/2653910?redirect=true). JAMA
Internal Medicine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP already functions as an effective work support program. Most
SNAP participants who can work are working or have worked in the past
year, often for limited hours or in seasonal employment. This is
particularly true for those considered ABAWDs: 25 percent are working
while receiving benefits and 75 percent worked the year before or after
receiving benefits. The experience of Franklin County, Ohio,
demonstrates the challenges ABAWDs face in meeting the 20 hours per
week work requirement due to unpredictable work schedules and lack of
stable jobs.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Ohio Association of Food Banks. 2015. Franklin County: Work
Experience Program, Able-Boded Adults Without Dependents (http://
admin.ohiofoodbanks.org/uploads/news/ABAWD_Report_2014-2015-v3.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no evidence to suggest that restricting state waiver
authority and thus eliminating benefits for hundreds of thousands of
current SNAP beneficiaries would serve to increase employment and
earnings among ABAWDs. Instead, it would punish those who were unable
to find stable employment of at least 20 hours per week by denying them
food benefits at a time when they most need it. The effect would be
increased hunger and hardship. In fact, SNAP is one of the only
supports available to individuals who fall under the ABAWD definition,
as childless adults are not eligible for most other safety-net
programs.
Rather than reducing state flexibility and further restricting SNAP
benefits for ABAWDs, policy change should be focused on addressing the
underlying barriers to employment among those impacted such as limited
education and skills, physical and mental health issues, unstable
housing and lack of access to transportation. Investments in effective
employment and training programs that are based on an individualized
assessment of the beneficiary and tailored to their skills and
challenges would be a much more effective way to help SNAP ABAWDs move
from poverty to self-sufficiency. Research shows that SNAP Employment
and Training (E&T) programs remain limited in their capacity to meet
current needs, serving only a small percentage of those who are subject
to work requirements,\12\ reinforcing the challenges facing ABAWDs who
would be impacted by the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Waxman, Elaine, et al., 2019. Poverty, Vulnerability, and the
Safety Net (https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/social-safety-net-2019-
four-trends-watch-snap). Urban Institute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the SNAP Employment and Training pilots authorized and funded
through the 2014 Farm Bill will offer important learnings and best
practices, work requirements should not be expanded unless adequate and
effective job training programs and supports are in place to ensure
meaningful pathways to self-sufficiency.
We encourage strong coordination between SNAP Employment and
Training with other federally funded job training and placement
programs, as well as adequate funding for programs and services that
support work, such as child-care, transportation, mental health
counseling and casework management.
Work requirements or benefit time limits that are not accompanied
by the resources to ensure those impacted can find and sustain
employment run counter to the objective of achieving economic self-
sufficiency and serve only to restrict benefits, thus increasing hunger
and poverty rather than increasing employment and wages.
We urge you to maintain states' flexibility to both request time
limit waivers when jobs and employment supports are not available and
to waive the work requirements for portions of their caseload who face
particular challenges in meeting the work requirement. The rules
governing areas eligibility for waivers were enacted with bipartisan
support, have been in place for nearly 20 years and every state except
Delaware has availed themselves of waivers at some point since the time
limit became law. The waiver rules are reasonable, transparent, and
manageable for states to operationalize. Thus, any change that would
restrict, impede, or add uncertainty to states' current ability to
waive areas with high unemployment should be avoided.
Therefore, we respectfully request USDA to withdraw this harmful
proposal. Congress has deliberated on these issues and rejected the
restrictions included in the proposed rule in the 2018 Farm Bill,
opting instead to including provisions to strength, encourage, and
prioritize effective job training and employment-related activities.
Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Lisa Davis,
Senior Vice President, No Kid Hungry Campaign,
Share Our Strength.
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Kim Schrier, a Representative in
Congress from Washington; Authored by Hon. Jay Inslee, Governor, State
of Washington
March 29, 2019

The Honorable Sonny Perdue,
Secretary,
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary Perdue:

On behalf of the State of Washington, I write to express my grave
concerns with the Food and Nutrition Service's (FNS) proposed rule,
``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Requirements for
Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs).'' This misguided and
harmful policy would severely restrict access to food assistance for
those who need it most, exacerbating hunger and making it even more
difficult for people in poverty to find work. It removes state
flexibility, rips away food assistance from 755,000 vulnerable
Americans, worsens our homelessness crisis, and fails to achieve the
Administration's stated goal of improving self-sufficiency. I strongly
urge that it be withdrawn.
Evidence shows that SNAP is one of the most important lifelines for
families and communities facing economic hardship, lifting millions of
Americans out of poverty and food insecurity every year. More than 42
million people across the country rely on SNAP for food assistance,
including more than 920,000 in Washington alone.\1\ It is a
particularly significant safety net for our most vulnerable, as 75
percent of SNAP households include a child, an elderly person, or a
person with disabilities.\2\ The program is also a key economic driver
that supports food producers, farmers' markets, and retailers. Every
dollar spent on nutrition assistance expands the economy by
approximately $1.70, boosting local economies and supporting 260,000
individual retailers nationwide.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), March 2018.
\2\ Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA), January
2018.
\3\ CBPP, April 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This Administration's proposal would radically alter the SNAP
program for certain populations and take away needed flexibility from
states, imposing a top-down, one-size-fits-all approach that prevents
Washington from addressing the unique and individualized needs of our
local communities. It would directly harm our people and our economy,
threatening to rip away food assistance from more than 91,000
individuals who currently receive an average monthly benefit of
$210.40, while reducing annual total revenue for Washington by over
$32.6 million. Nationally, the proposed changes would result in a loss
of $85 billion in economic activity for grocery stores, farmers, and
other local food retail suppliers. It is a cruel and mean-spirited
policy that damages people and businesses alike.
Congress rejected these exact changes on a bipartisan basis last
year. In considering the 2018 Farm Bill (P.L. 115-[334]), which was
approved by large majorities in both chambers and signed by the
President on December 20, 2018, Congress debated and subsequently
excluded these changes to the SNAP program that would strip state
flexibility and impose harsh, inflexible requirements on beneficiaries.
To any objective observer, it is clear that these changes were not
intended to be made and that USDA's proposal runs counter to
Congressional intent. I encourage USDA to heed the advice of Congress
in withdrawing this deeply harmful policy.
I appreciate the opportunity to share our state's concerns and hope
you give them the attention and consideration they deserve. Below,
please find additional feedback from our state on specific questions
raised by USDA in the proposed rule.
Labor Market Areas for Grouping
In USDA's proposal, the Department specifically requested comments
on the use of Labor Market Areas (LMAs) for grouping areas. We believe
LMAs defined by the Federal Government should be included as the basis
for grouping areas, and that grouping should not be prohibited
entirely. States are currently given discretion to define groups or
areas to be combined, provided the areas are contiguous or considered
part of the same economic region. Availability of jobs is examined when
counties are in close proximity to counties where individuals often
commute. Washington uses this discretion for LMA groupings because we
understand our residents are disadvantaged when they are required to
travel unreasonable distances for employment. People should be able to
readily change jobs without being forced to change their place of
residence, particularly as most ABAWDs have limited resources and
cannot easily commute or change residences to obtain employment.
If LMAs are not a basis for grouping, participants may not be able
to reside and find employment within a reasonable distance or change
jobs without also having to change their residence. Denying states the
ability to group counties would negatively impact an estimated 91,203
individuals in Washington identified as ABAWDs. The loss of waivers for
these counties would also cause a negative impact on our local
economies.
Setting a Floor for the 20 Percent Standard
Washington does not support USDA's proposal to establish a floor
for the 20 percent standard, which would further limit state
flexibility and restrict necessary waivers to appropriately serve SNAP
beneficiaries. We do not believe that a floor of six percent, seven
percent or ten percent is needed or advisable. (See Table 2 for
additional data on how these changes would adversely affect our state.)
We believe the current floor setting that has been established at 20
percent above the average national unemployment rate is appropriate and
necessary.
The current standard is essential to allow flexibility in
requesting necessary waivers. This flexibility is granted with the
knowledge that state and local leaders are best equipped to develop
solutions for their specific labor markets and industries. While the
unemployment rate does provide essential data, it does not take into
account a community's individualized workforce needs or that its
residents may not be well-suited to find and keep locally available
jobs due to lack of housing, skills, training, or other barriers. To
illustrate this, Table 1 highlights the top ten occupations, hard
skills, certifications, and employers in Washington according to our
Employment Security Department (ESD):

Table 1: Employmer Demand in Washington State
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Occupations Hard Skills Certifications Employers
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Software Microsoft Driver's License Amazon
Developers Office
Registered Nurses Quality Commercial Driver's Providence
Assurance License Health &
Services
Retail Microsoft Class A Commercial State of
Salespersons PowerPoint Driver's License Washington
Computer Freight+ Peace Health
Occupations
First-Line Software Basic Life Support University of
Supervisors of Development Certified Registered Washington
Retail Sales Java Nurse Microsoft
Workers
Marketing Managers Structured Certification in Catholic Health
Stock Clerks and Query Cardiopulmo-nary Initiatives
Order Filers Language Resuscitation MultiCare
Python Health System
Customer Service Bilingual Security Clearance Schweitzer
Representatives Forklifts Continuing Education Engineering
Laboratories
Heavy and Tractor- First Aid Kaiser
Trailer Drivers Certification Permanente
HAZMAT
First-Line
Supervisors of
Food Preparation
and Serving
Workers
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Job readiness in these fields can be an insurmountable goal for
individuals who must navigate numerous and repetitive barriers on a
daily basis. From homelessness and housing instability to domestic
violence, mental health, and substance use disorder, there are myriad
and significant barriers facing ABAWDs that prevent them from
effectively seeking and obtaining employment. In many cases, these
barriers must be addressed first for an individual to be ready for job
training and the workforce. A person experiencing homelessness must
primarily focus on where they are going to sleep and eat, for example,
not where are they going to find work.
In Washington, we estimate that more than 43 percent of our state's
ABAWD population is currently experiencing homelessness--
disproportionately higher than the broader SNAP population, of which
only 11 percent are experiencing homelessness. Nearly 60 percent of the
ABAWD population is suffering from behavioral or physical health
conditions, including substance use disorder.\4\ For these individuals,
USDA's proposal would do nothing to help them find work, while adding
yet another obstacle in their way--food insecurity. It would not
achieve USDA's stated goal of promoting self-sufficiency and in fact
would make it more difficult for ABAWDs to find employment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) Economic
Services Administration (ESA), January 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large percentages of SNAP recipients also experience labor market
fluctuations due to seasonal employment, part-time work, or
underemployment, and would be directly harmed by USDA's proposal
despite their participation in the workforce. The vast majority of
those who transition between working more than 20 hours a week and a
different employment status--less than 20 hours a week, seeking
employment, or not in the labor force--are working on a monthly basis
but still may not meet USDA's one-size-fits-all work requirement. Under
the proposed rule, a large number of individuals would lose food
assistance as a result of volatility in the labor market and through no
fault of their own.
We support current Federal regulations that allow states to waive
the 3 month time limit in geographic areas with high unemployment or
insufficient jobs. Creating an unemployment rate floor would negatively
impact a large number of counties across our state, including wide
swaths of rural and economically disadvantaged communities. The loss of
waivers would affect SNAP eligibility for tens of thousands of
Washington citizens who may otherwise not qualify for food assistance.
Table 2 below illustrates how the proposed changes would impact
SNAP recipients in Washington under USDA's proposed changes. A review
of data shows that there is no difference in the number of counties and
SNAP recipients adversely affected at seven or ten percent.

Table 2: Impact of Proposed Changes to Washington State 5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Change Loss of Grouping 6% Floor 7% or 10% Floor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP Recipients 15,321 75,407 91,203
Adversely
Affected
\5\ DSHS ESA,
January 2019.
Counties Adversely Asotin, King, San Adams, Asotin, All counties
Affected Juan, Snohomish, Benton, except Ferry
Walla Walla, Chelan, Clark, (38 counties)
Whitman (6 Columbia,
counties) Cowlitz,
Douglas,
Franklin,
Island,
Jefferson,
King, Kitsap,
Kittitas,
Klickitat,
Lincoln,
Pierce, San
Juan, Skagit,
Skamania,
Snohomish,
Spokane,
Thurston,
Walla Walla,
Whatcom, and
Whitman (26
counties)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Eliminating the Carryover Exemption Provision
Washington strongly disagrees with USDA's interpretation of the
ABAWD exemption provision of the 2018 Farm Bill, which decreases ABAWD
exemptions granted to states from 15 percent to 12 percent It is our
interpretation that the law did not intend for USDA to limit the
carryover of exemptions for ``covered individuals,'' and only lowered
the percentage of exemptions granted to each state. We believe this
proposal is contrary to Congressional intent and should be withdrawn.
The 2018 Farm Bill and current regulations give states flexibility
over whether and when to use and carryover these exemptions. Washington
depends on this flexibility to effectively operate our program. In
2015, Washington was one of ten states awarded a SNAP Employment and
Training (E&T) pilot, which tests innovative approaches to employment
for work registrants. Participants were randomly assigned to a control
and treatment group. Washington was able to use our 15 percent
exemptions to ensure participants assigned to the control group
remained engaged and eligible for food assistance to ensure accuracy of
our pilot. The elimination of carryover exemptions would significantly
impact our state's ability to carry out the E&T pilot and effectively
operate our SNAP program.
Conclusion
Washington strongly opposes USDA's proposal threatening food
assistance for more than 91,000 individuals in our state and 755,000
Americans nationwide. We understand that obtaining employment can be
difficult for many ABAWDs working to reach their full potential, many
of whom face significant barriers--including homelessness and substance
use disorder--with little or no resources. We also understand that
state flexibility is necessary to meet the unique needs of the ABAWD
population and our local economies. The current rules, which have been
in place for 20 years, are reasonable, transparent, manageable, and
effective. We see no rational justification for this Administration's
sweeping changes that would undermine our state's success in reducing
hunger and moving people to employment. I urge that it be withdrawn.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), July 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We appreciate your consideration of our state's perspective. If you
have any questions, please contact the Director of my Washington, D.C.
Office, Casey Katims, at [email protected]. Thank you.
Very truly yours,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Hon. Jay Inslee,
Governor.

CC:

Washington Congressional Delegation;
Cheryl Strange, Secretary, Department of Social and Health Services
(DSHS);
David Stillman, Assistant Secretary, DSHS Economic Services
Administration;
Babette Roberts, Director, DSHS Community Services Division.
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Kim Schrier, a Representative in
Congress from Washington; Authored by Stacy Dean, Vice President, Food
Assistance Policy, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
April 1, 2019

Ms. Sasha Gersten-Paal,
Chief,
Certification Policy Branch,
Program Development Division,
Food and Nutrition Service,
Alexandria, VA

Re: Proposed Rule: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program:
Requirements and Services for Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents RIN 0584-AE57

Dear Ms. Gersten-Paal:

We are writing to provide comments on USDA's Notice of Proposed
Rule Making (NPRM) regarding the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program's (SNAP) Requirements and Services for Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents. The proposed rule would restrict longstanding state
flexibility to waive areas from SNAP's 3 month time limit as well as
limit states' ability to exempt certain individuals from the time
limit. As a result, USDA estimates that when fully implemented in a
typical month some 755,000 individuals would lose food assistance
benefits because they could not document an average of 80 hours per
month of employment or that they qualify for an exemption. USDA does
not provide any evidence to support its assertion that the policy would
result in greater employment or earnings. This is likely because such
evidence does not exist. Instead, there is an extensive body of
research that suggests the very likely outcome of the proposed policy
is that more individuals will experience hardship and poverty,
including a risk of hunger. Moreover, given available research on work
requirements and the labor market, the proposed policy is very likely
to have even worse outcomes for African Americans, Native Americans,
Latinos, and individuals with disabilities.
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities is a nonpartisan
research and policy institute. We pursue Federal and state policies
designed both to reduce poverty and inequality and to restore fiscal
responsibility in equitable and effective ways. We apply our deep
expertise in programs and policies that help low-income people in order
to help inform debates and achieve better policy outcomes. We work to
protect and strengthen programs that reduce poverty and inequality and
increase opportunity for people trying to gain a foothold on the
economic ladder. Our work on Federal nutrition programs, including
SNAP, is a core component of our organization's work. Our food
assistance analyst team includes nine people, including eight analysts
and researchers who work on SNAP policy and operations. We have deep
expertise on SNAP time limit policy including waivers and individual
exemptions. Three members of our team, as well as our organization's
President, have worked on SNAP for more than 2 decades, including
during the time period when the law governing the time limit was
enacted and the current regulations were proposed and codified.
We have deep concerns with the proposed policy and offer extensive
comments to support our strong recommendation that USDA withdraw the
NPRM and maintain current policy. In addition to causing harm to
vulnerable individuals who are in between jobs or underemployed, the
proposed policy runs counter to Congressional intent. When legislating
the time limit policy, Congress established a waiver authority that
allows for states to waive the rule for areas with insufficient jobs
for individuals subject to the rule. Given that individuals who fall
into the group subject to the time limit face extreme difficulty in the
labor market, a fact validated by extensive research, the proposed rule
would undercut Congressional intent by setting arbitrary limits
unrelated to the purpose of the waiver.
The proposed rule is also poorly argued, internally inconsistent,
and wildly out of sync with extensive research findings. It offers
little, and in some cases, no reasoning or evidence to support such a
dramatic change in a longstanding Federal policy that would have
significant consequences on participants, states and other key
stakeholders such as retailers and small business. The Department also
provided flawed and contradictory analysis in the NPRM and did not
include information available to the agency that would have informed
the rulemaking process. USDA's rationale for such a sweeping and
harmful change was cursory at best making it almost impossible to
comment in a way that is responsive to its thinking. Because USDA did
not make its reasoning transparent or provide evidence to support its
position, we feel obligated to review and provide years of well-known
research and data (some of which USDA funded) that provides evidence
counter to USDA's proposed policy. We strongly encourage USDA to review
these materials as we are concerned the Department is unaware of the
overwhelming evidence that undermines their assertions and poorly
formed conclusions in the proposed rule. This has resulted in lengthy
comments in which we conclude that the best course of action for the
proposed policy and under the rulemaking process would be for USDA to
withdraw the NPRM. We strongly urge that course of action.
In this proposed rule, USDA proposed many damaging and ill-advised
changes to waivers and individual exemptions from the 3 month time
limit. The major changes include:

Mandating that areas must have a minimum of a seven percent
average unemployment rate over a 2 year period in order to
qualify for a waiver from the time limit;

Restricting states' flexibility to define the area they wish
to waive;

Eliminating several waiver criteria that have been part of
program rules for over 20 years, including a low and declining
employment-to-population ratio;

No longer allowing states to implement waivers that meet
USDA's criteria while not requiring that USDA approve waivers
in a timely manner;

Requiring states to seek their governor's written consent;
and

Restricting states' ability to accumulate unused individual
exemptions.

Our comments on the proposed regulation fall into several major
categories:
Proposed Changes to Waiver Criteria
Chapter 1: Overview of Waivers from the Three-Month Time
Limit--Their Purpose and History

Chapter 2: FNS Waiver Policy Has Been Consistent for the
Last 22 Years

Chapter 3: Setting a Floor for Waivers for Areas With 20%
Above National Unemployment Is Inconsistent with Congressional
Intent and Would Be Harmful to Vulnerable Individuals

Chapter 4: Dropping Several Key Criteria from the
Insufficient Jobs Criteria Is Inconsistent with the Statute

Chapter 5: Restricting State Flexibility on Grouping Areas
Is Counter to Evidence

Chapter 6: Taking Away Food Benefits from Individuals Who
Cannot Document 20 Hours a Week of Work Will Not Increase Labor
Force Participation for This Population

Chapter 7: Proposed Rule's Requirement That State Waiver
Requests Have the Governor's ``Endorsement'' Violates
Congressional Intent

Chapter 8: Proposed Rule Would Make Implementing Time Limit
Harder by Removing Provisions That Give States Certainty Around
Approval
Proposed Changes to Individual Exemptions
Chapter 9: Eliminating the Carryover of Unused Individual
Exemptions Would Cause Hardship and Exceeds Agency Authority
Problems with the Proposed Rule Process
Chapter 10: The Proposed Rule Fails to Provide Sufficient
Rationale or Supporting Evidence for the Proposed Policy

Chapter 11: The Proposed Rule's ``Regulatory Impact
Analysis'' Highlights FNS' Faulty Justification and Includes
Numerous Unclear or Flawed Assumptions

Chapter 12: The Proposed Rule Would Disproportionately
Impact Individuals Protected by Civil Rights Laws, Violating
the Food and Nutrition Act's Civil Rights Protections

Chapter 13: The Proposed Rule Fails to Adequately Estimate
the Impact on Small Entities
Appendix that includes all cited studies and references
Appendix A: CBPP Bios

Appendix B: Materials Cited in Comments

We strongly urge USDA to withdraw the rule and maintain current
policy. If you have any questions regarding our comments, please do not
hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Stacy Dean,
Vice President, Food Assistance Policy.
center on budget and policy priorities comments on rin 0584-ae57:
supplemental nutrition assistance program: requirements and services
for able-bodied adults without dependents
Table of Contents
Proposed Changes to Waiver Criteria
Chapter 1: Overview of Waivers from the Three-Month Time
Limit--Their Purpose and History

Chapter 2: FNS Waiver Policy Has Been Consistent for the
Last 22 Years

Chapter 3: Setting a Floor for Waivers for Areas With
Percent Above National Unemployment Is Inconsistent with
Congressional Intent and Would Be Harmful to Vulnerable
Individuals

Chapter 4: Dropping Several Key Criteria From Waiver
Criteria Is Inconsistent With the Statute

Chapter 5: Restricting State Flexibility on Grouping Areas
Is Counter to Evidence

Chapter 6: Taking Away Food Benefits from Individuals Who
Cannot Document 20 Hours a Week of Work Will Not Increase Labor
Force Participation for This Population

Chapter 7: Proposed Rule's Requirement That State Waiver
Requests Have the Governor's ``Endorsement'' Violates
Congressional Intent

Chapter 8: Proposed Rule Would Make Implementing The Time
Limit Harder by Removing Provisions That Give States Certainty
Around Approval
Proposed Changes to Individual Exemptions
Chapter 9: Eliminating the Carryover of Unused Individual
Exemptions Would Cause Hardship and Exceeds Agency Authority
Problems with the Proposed Rule Process
Chapter 10: The Proposed Rule Fails to Provide Sufficient
Rationale or Supporting Evidence for the Proposed Policy Change

Chapter 11: The Proposed Rule's ``Regulatory Impact
Analysis'' Highlights FNS' Faulty Justification and Includes
Numerous Unclear or Flawed Assumptions

Chapter 12: The Proposed Rule Would Disproportionately
Impact Individuals Protected by Civil Rights Laws, Violating
the Food and Nutrition Act's Civil Rights Protections

Chapter 13: The Proposed Rule Fails to Adequately Estimate
the Impact on Small Entities
Appendix that includes all cited studies and references
Appendix A: CBPP Bios

Appendix B: Materials Cited in Comments

Note, throughout these comments, we use the terms: Food and
Nutrition Service (FNS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and
``the Department'' somewhat interchangeably. We are not aware of a
particular convention and it is not our intent to suggest difference
when we use one term vs. the other. In addition, when we refer to
``state'' or ``states'' we intend to include counties in their role
administering the program in county-administered states.
Chapter 1: Overview of Waivers from the Three-Month Time Limit--Their
Purpose and History
The time limit is one of the harshest rules in the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp
Program). Childless adults on SNAP are extremely poor. Like adults with
children, childless adults often turn to SNAP for assistance when they
are no longer able to make ends meet, especially as they lose jobs,
their hours are cut, or their wages hover at the Federal minimum. While
participating in SNAP, their income averages 29 percent of the poverty
line, the equivalent of about $3,400 per year for a single person in
2016.\1\ The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which administers
SNAP, has established standards that have remained consistent over the
last 20 years under which states can request a waiver of the time limit
for areas with consistently high unemployment. States request waivers
for multiple reasons, including to ease administrative burden,
implement more effective work programs, and exempt vulnerable
individuals who likely will struggle to find work. The proposed rule
would severely weaken this flexibility, increasing administrative
burden for states and hardship for SNAP participants who struggle to
find work. This chapter describes the history of these waivers,
Congressional intent and early implementation of waiver rules, and the
reasons why states choose to waive areas in their state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Steven Carlson, et al., ``Who Are the Low-Income Childless
Adults Facing the Loss of SNAP in 2016?'' Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, February 8, 2016, http://www.cbpp.org/research/food-
assistance/who-are-the-low-income-childless-adults-facing-the-loss-of-
snap-in-2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of SNAP's harshest rules limits unemployed individuals aged 18
to 50 not living with children to 3 months of SNAP benefits in any 36
month period when they aren't employed or in a work or training program
for at least 20 hours a week.\2\ Under the rule, implemented as part of
the 1996 welfare law, states are not obligated to offer affected
individuals a work or training program slot, and most do not. SNAP
recipients' benefits are generally cut off after 3 months irrespective
of whether they are searching diligently for a job or willing to
participate in a qualifying work or job training program. As a result,
this rule is, in reality, a time limit on benefits and not a work
requirement, as it is sometimes described.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For a more comprehensive discussion of the time limit rule,
see: Ed Bolen, et al., ``More Than 500,000 Adults Will Lose SNAP
Benefits in 2016 as Waivers Expire,'' Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, updated March 18, 2016, http://www.cbpp.org/research/food-
assistance/more-than-500000-adults-will-lose-snap-benefits-in-2016-as-
waivers-expire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to being harsh policy that punishes individuals who are
willing to work but can't find a job, the rule is one of the most
administratively complex and error-prone aspects of SNAP law. Many
states also believe that the rule undermines their efforts to design
meaningful work requirements, as the time limit imposes unrealistic
dictates on the types of job training that can qualify. For these
reasons, many states and organizations that represent SNAP participants
have long sought the rule's repeal.
The time limit law does provide states with the ability to seek
waivers from USDA to temporarily suspend the 3 month limit for
individuals in areas with insufficient jobs. These waivers are the
primary subject of the proposed rulemaking along with states' authority
to use flexible individual exemptions to exempt individuals of their
choosing from the time limit. Since passage of the welfare law, many
states have sought waivers for counties, cities, or reservations with
relatively high and sustained unemployment. Every state except Delaware
has sought a waiver at some point since the time limit's enactment.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``FNS Controls Over SNAP Benefits for Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents,'' USDA Office of Inspector General, Audit Report
27601-0002-31, September 2016, https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/27601-
0002-31.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
States can choose (or choose not) to request a waiver. In some
cases, states with areas that have a persistently struggling labor
market, such as the Central Valley in California or rural West
Virginia, have sought waivers to avoid penalizing those who cannot find
a 20 hour per week job within 3 months. In other cases, governors have
sought waivers because extraordinary events have hurt their local labor
markets, such as the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, Hurricane Katrina,
or layoffs from a major local employer.
Many states also seek waivers from the time limit because they
would prefer to devote the resources needed to implement the
administratively complex time limit to implementing a more rational and
appropriate work requirement tailored to their local economy and to
available job training programs.
Figure 1
Estimated Impact of USDA Proposed Rule
Share of U.S. Waived from SNAP's 3 Month Time Limit

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Note: Represents share of U.S. population living in a waived
area, i.e., county or city.
* Estimated [share] of U.S. population living in a waived
area under USDA proposed rule, if rule were in effect in 2018.
Source: CBPP analysis of state waivers; U.S. Census Bureau
population estimates.

USDA's guidelines regarding waiver criteria, articulated in
guidance and regulations, have set clear, consistent standards for
waivers since soon after the statute adopted the time limit and waiver
provisions in 1996. A review of waivers over the last 20 years shows
that just over \1/3\ of the country (as measured by the share of the
total population living in waived counties) is waived in a typical
year.\4\ (See Figure 1.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ During the recession and its aftermath, Congress made a large
portion of the country temporarily eligible for a waiver in recognition
of widespread elevated unemployment. Some have misinterpreted this
temporary expansion of waivers as a permanent expansion of the policy
or an Obama Administration-led effort to eliminate the time limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM, USDA states that the current rate of waivers was
unforeseen, which is inconsistent with the historical record that
demonstrates that USDA's original estimate of the extent of waiver
coverage under its rules was in line with current actual coverage. In
the NPRM preamble, the Department states: ``The proposed rule addresses
these areas of concern and places safeguards to avoid approving waivers
that were not foreseen by Congress and the Department, and to restrict
states from receiving waivers in areas that do not clearly demonstrate
a lack of sufficient jobs.'' \5\ This statement stands in contrast to
USDA's own documents. USDA was fully cognizant that its original
proposed waiver policy, which it later codified into final regulations,
could result in more than \1/3\ of the country being waived. In an
internal summary of waivers from April 23, 1997 entitled, ``Time Limit
Waivers for Able-bodied Food Stamp Participants,'' FNS staff wrote to
Office of Management and Budget staff that ``Thirty percent to 45
percent of the able-bodied caseload may be waived. However, USDA's best
estimate is that the areas that have been waived represent
approximately 35 percent of the able-bodied caseload in the nation as a
whole.'' \6\ This was written at a time of relatively low unemployment
and early in the implementation of waivers when take up of waivers was
relatively low. This would suggest that current policy, which has
resulted in 36 percent of the general population living in waived areas
except during the Great Recession and its aftermath, is consistent with
what USDA originally intended rather than something that has exceeded
its vision. Moreover, the memo does not suggest any concern with the
share of the country waived. And, these criteria were nearly exact to
those codified in final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements and
Services for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 980
(proposed rule February 1, 2019) found at https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/01/2018-28059/supplemental-
nutrition-assistance-program-requirements-for-able-bodied-adults-
without-dependents#p-45, hereafter we will refer to this as the
``NPRM.''
\6\ FNS White Paper, ``Time Limit Waivers for Able-Bodied Food
Stamp Recipients,'' April 23, 1997. Faxed from FNS to OMB analyst
Lester Cash on April 25, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under USDA's proposed rule, however, areas eligible for waivers
would be dramatically reduced. Our organization applied the proposed
rule to the areas waived in 2018 and determined that:

Of the 985 counties (or county equivalents) waived in 2018,
639 counties (65 percent of all waived counties) in 28 states
would have lost their waivers.

Of the 309 towns located outside of waived counties in 2018,
285 towns (92 percent of all waived towns) would have lost
their waivers, including 259 New England towns.

170 out of the 273 reservations (62 percent of all waived
reservations) waived in 2018 would have lost their waivers.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Based on CBPP internal analysis of unemployment data from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau. The list of
areas is included in Appendix B as ``CBPP Summary of Areas That Would
Have Lost Their Waivers form the SNAP Three-Month Time Limit in 2018 if
the Proposed Rule Were Implemented in 2018.''

Under the proposed policy, we estimate that the share of the U.S.
population living in waived areas would have declined by over 80
percent in 2018, from 36 percent to 6.1 percent of the U.S. population.
The proposed rule would therefore result in a dramatic reduction in
states' ability to waive areas from the time limit. Unfortunately, that
appears to be USDA's goal rather than designing and implementing a
policy consistent with the statute, i.e., setting waiver criteria and
policy that would allow states to waive areas with insufficient job for
individuals subject to the time limit.
A. Current Rules Governing Waivers for Areas With Insufficient Jobs for
Individuals Subject to the Time Limit
The SNAP time limit provision is based in substantial part on an
amendment successfully offered on the House floor on July 18, 1996, by
Reps. Robert Ney and John Kasich. When considering the appropriateness
of some of the proposals in the proposed rule, it is illuminating to
example the floor debate to see what Congress did--and did not--think
it was requiring.
The floor debate indicates that the amendment's cosponsors believed
that then food stamp workfare (participation in which would have
exempted an individual from benefit termination) to be widespread and
assumed that large numbers of those who cannot find a private-sector
job would be offered a workfare slot. For example, Rep. Kasich stated
on the floor: `` . . . let me be clear what the amendment does so that
there is no confusion. If you are [able]-bodied, single, between the
ages of 18 and 5-, and you get food stamps, we are saying you have to
work . . . If you cannot get a job, you go to a workfare program; 45
out of 50 states have a workfare program.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 142 Cong. Rec. H7905 (daily ed. July 18, 1996). In fact, only
about ten states had food stamp workfare programs at that time, and
most such programs were very small. Many of them operated in only a few
counties in these states, an some were only open to families with
children. Even today, SNAP workfare is unavailable to a great many
people subject to the time limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The sponsors heatedly disputed the statements by opponents of the
amendment that the amendment would cause substantial hardship by
denying assistance to people who want to work but cannot find a job or
a workfare slot. And, they emphasized that the amendment contains
waivers and other means to avert such situations. For example:

Rep. Ney stated: `` . . . if we read the text, there are
hardship exemptions. It can be waived. There are safeguards in
this.'' \9\ Mr. Ney also noted: `` . . . it is an amendment
that provides some safety, it provides a course of a safety net
[sic], it has the ability to have waivers from the state
department of human services.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ 142 Cong. Rec. H7905 (daily ed. July 18, 1996).
\10\ 142 Cong. Rec. H7905 (daily ed. July 18, 1996).

Rep. Kasich also addressed this issue. ``It is only if you
are able-bodied, if you are childless, and you live in an area
where you are getting food stamps and there are jobs available,
then it applies. So, if you are able-bodied, you go and you
have to work 20 hours to get your food stamps. The of course if
you cannot find a job then you do workfare. That is what it is.
But there are a number of exemptions in here for people who
find themselves in particularly difficult circumstances . . .''
\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ 142 Cong. Rec. H7905 (daily ed. July 18, 1996) (emphasis
added).

As their statements indicate, the amendment's sponsors visualized
the amendment largely as one under which people were prodded to look
for work, were generally provided a workfare slot if a private sector
jobs was not available and would be protected by a waiver if there were
insufficient jobs and workfare slots for them. The sponsors did not see
their amendment as one under which large numbers of individuals who
want to work but cannot fund a job end up with neither work nor food
stamps. It should be noted that the sponsors were not cognizant of the
extremely limited number of food stamp workfare slots throughout the
country.
In the final legislation Congress established that states could
waive areas lacking jobs. USDA has established criteria to implement
that authority that have been consistent for 2 decades. The rule was
designed to permit states to seek waivers in areas where jobs aren't
available. To qualify for a waiver, states must provide detailed
evidence of high unemployment in local areas, in accordance with
rigorous requirements set by USDA. USDA has consistently used the same
criteria to define high unemployment since the late 1990s.
The Federal law gives states the option to request a waiver of the
time limit if they can document that a given geographic area has an
insufficient number of jobs (or has an unemployment rate over ten
percent). The standards that define how a state may document
``insufficient jobs'' were first outlined in FNS Guidance issued in
December 1996.\12\ In the guidance, USDA offered several reflections on
its understanding of Congressional intent at the time. First, USDA
shared its belief that Congress understood that this group of
individuals could find it especially challenging to find permanent
employment and that waivers are intended recognize this problem. ``USDA
believes that the law provided authority to waive these provisions in
recognition of the challenges that low-skilled workers may face in
finding and keeping permanent employment. In some areas, including
parts of rural America, the number of employed persons and the number
of job seekers may be far larger than the number of vacant jobs. This
may be especially so for person with limited skills and minimal work
history.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS) ``Guidance for States Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp Limits,''
FNS guidance to states, December 3, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the guidance provided key background on some of the
policy that USDA seeks to restrict in the NPRM. With respect to how
states can set or define the area within the state that it seeks to
waive, USDA said, ``USDA will give states broad discretion in defining
areas that best reflect the labor market prospects of program
participants and administrative needs.'' \13\ The guidance also
recognized that the statute seeks to identify whether or not there are
sufficient jobs for individuals subject to the time limit. ``The
guidance that follows offers some examples of the types and sources of
data available to states as the consider waiver requests for areas with
insufficient jobs. Because there are not standard data or methods to
make the determination of the sufficiency of jobs, the list that
follows is not exhaustive. States may use these data sources as
appropriate, or other data as available, to provide evidence that the
necessary conditions exist in the area for which they intend the waiver
to apply. The absence of a particular data source or approach (for
example, data or statistics compiled by a university is not meant to
imply that it would not be considered by USDA if requested by a
state.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS) ``Guidance for States Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp Limits,''
FNS guidance to states, December 3, 1996. Copy included in the
appendix.
\14\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its original NPRM that covered how USDA would regulate the
waiver authority, FNS included the conceptual framework of the criteria
detailed guidance but did not include all of the specifics in the
actual regulation language.\15\ Commenters, including the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities comments that USDA should include and
codify the details of the guidance into rule in order to prevent
changes in how waiver policy was interpreted and applied, allowing for
consistency.\16\ Other commenters expressed appreciation for the
substance of the waiver criteria as articulated in the guidance and
provided for in the NPRM.\17\ USDA adopted the suggestion and included
the guidance almost verbatim in the final rule. These criteria were
modified only slightly in USDA's final regulation waivers based on the
experience learned during the waiver application and approval process
(for example, states were allowed to apply to more recent time periods
the criteria the Labor Department uses to identify Labor Surplus Areas
in order to determine if an area qualifies for a waiver). The
regulations were proposed by the Clinton Administration and fully
codified in regulations under the Bush Administration in 2001. In
setting the waiver criteria, USDA adhered to longtime Labor Department
standards to identify areas with labor-market weakness. To qualify for
the insufficient jobs standard, a state must demonstrate that a
geographic area (as defined by the state) meets specified criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ 64 Fed. Reg. No. 242, page 70920, RIN: 0584-AC39 (proposed
rule December 17, 1999.)
\16\ CBPP Comments on 64 Fed. Reg. No. 242, page 70920, RIN: 0584-
AC39, February 17, 2000.
\17\ Comments submitted by the Greater Upstate Law Project, Center
for Civil Justice and the American Public Human Services Administration
on 64 Fed. Reg. No. 242, page 70920, RIN: 0584-AC39, February 17, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal regulations deem waiver requests that are based on certain
criteria as ``readily approvable''--meaning USDA approves them once it
confirms that the data are correct--because the data clearly establish
high unemployment in the area. (In other words, USDA cannot arbitrarily
deny a state that provides adequate documentation showing that the
area's unemployment rate would qualify it for a waiver.) These criteria
are:

Designation as a Labor Surplus Area--a criterion that
several Federal agencies use to prioritize government contracts
or assistance.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ U.S. Department of Labor, ``Labor Surplus Area: Frequently
Asked Questions,'' updated August 21, 2015, https://www.doleta.gov/
programs/lsa_faq.cfm.

An average unemployment rate at least 20 percent above the
national average over a recent 24 month time period. This
standard tracks the Labor Department's definition of a Labor
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Surplus Area but can use more recent data.

An average 12 month unemployment rate over ten percent.

In recognition of the Great Recession's impact on job loss
and increased hardship for unemployed workers, Congress enacted
the Federal Emergency Unemployment Benefits (EUC) program in
2008. EUC, like the Federal emergency unemployment insurance
programs enacted in every major recession since 1958, was a
temporary program that provided additional weeks of UI to
qualifying jobless workers during periods when jobs were hard
to find.\23\ EUC established several ``tiers,'' with each tier
making a specified number of additional weeks of UI benefits
available to jobless workers in the state, depending on the
state's unemployment rate. Workers in states with higher
unemployment rates would be in higher tiers and hence could
receive more weeks of UI benefits. Because qualifying for
higher tiers of benefits under EUC signified higher
unemployment and a lack of jobs, the Bush Administration
allowed states to qualify for a waiver based on qualifying for
at least the second tier of EUC.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Chad Stone, ``Congress Should Renew Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Before the End of the Year,'' Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, November 21, 2013, http://www.cbpp.org/research/congress-
should-renew-emergency-unemployment-compensation-before-the-end-of-the-
year.
\24\ USDA Memo, ``SNAP--ABAWD Statewide Waivers--New Criteria for
Unemployment Insurance Extended Benefits Trigger,'' January 8, 2009,
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
ABAWD%20Statewide%20Waivers.pdf. When all states were eligible for both
the first and second tiers of EUC, USDA required states to be eligible
for at least the third tier to qualify for a waiver.

Congress extended and modified the EUC program several times,
allowing it to operate through January 1, 2014.\25\ Many states
qualified for at least the second tier of EUC through December
2013. As a result, they qualified for waivers from the time
limit into 2015 (since USDA approved waivers for up to 1 year
from the date a state qualified for EUC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ U.S. Department of Labor, ``Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Expired on January 1, 2014,'' updated July 1, 2015, http:/
/ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/supp_act.asp.

Meanwhile, the 2009 Recovery Act suspended the time limit
nationwide for part of 2009 and all of Fiscal Year 2010. States
had the option to retain the time limit if they offered work
opportunities, such as job training and workfare, to all
individuals subject to the rule. During this time, states
didn't have to request a waiver (though almost every state
qualified for a statewide waiver due to the exceptionally high
levels of unemployment across the country). The suspension of
the time limit ended in September 2010. After that, most states
continued to qualify for statewide waivers for a few years
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
under EUC-related and other, longstanding USDA waiver criteria.

The requirement that states demonstrate to USDA that an area
exceeds a high threshold of persistent unemployment in order to qualify
for a waiver has limited the waivers' scope. A review of waivers over
the last 20 years shows that just over \1/3\ of the country (as
measured by share of the total population living in waived counties)
has been waived in a typical year.\26\ Only during the recession and
its aftermath was more than \1/2\ the county temporarily waived from
the time limit, and that was due to widespread elevated unemployment.
Some have mistakenly interpreted the temporary suspension of the time
limit in 2009-2010, or the temporary expansion of waivers during the
aftermath of the recession when job growth remained sluggish for some
time, as a permanent expansion of the policy or an Obama
Administration-led effort to eliminate the time limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``SNAP Time Limits: Waivers from the Time Limit Are Back to
Historic Norms,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 24,
2017, http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-24-
17fa1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Why Do States Seek Waivers?
Individual state decisions to seek a time-limit waiver have varied
over time depending on states' leadership and the economic
circumstances at the time of their request. Nevertheless, the reasons
remain consistent with those put forward by USDA in their early
guidance. USDA's Office of Inspector General documented states'
motivation in a recent audit of this policy.\27\ Because states waive
the time limit to exempt individuals in areas lacking jobs and to ease
administrative burden, the proposed rule would significantly increase
the burden on states and make the time limit less reflective of areas
lacking jobs, as we explain in greater depth later.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ ``FNS Controls Over SNAP Benefits for Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents.''

The time limit provision is very complicated and difficult
to administer. State administrators have expressed strong
concern with the complexity of the time-limit provision since
its passage in 1996. The rule requires them to track
individuals with a level of specificity that is inconsistent
with how they otherwise operate SNAP and other low-income
assistance programs. States find the rule to be error-prone and
believe that it can increase their payment error rate. Some
states seek waivers, in part, to ease the administrative burden
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
associated with the rule.

Waiving the time limit allows states to set a genuine work
requirement. Under the time limit, states are not required to
offer a job or training program to every individual (or, for
that matter, to any affected individuals), and they do not
receive sufficient funds through the SNAP Employment and
Training (E&T) program to do so. In addition, the law limits
the types of slots a state can provide, making them expensive
and out of sync with the needs of much of this population. As a
result, very few states commit to offering work opportunities
to all individuals subject to the time limit.

Waivers, by contrast, can make meaningful work requirements a
reality. A state requesting a waiver of the 3 month time limit
can still require individuals to engage in work-related
activities as a condition of receiving benefits through the
SNAP E&T program. Every state operates a SNAP E&T program,
through which the state can provide a wide range of employment-
related activities to a broad range of individuals who are able
to work. While there is little evidence that SNAP E&T
requirements lead to long-term sustainable jobs, they do allow
a state to require a SNAP participant to engage in work
activities in order to remain eligible.
Some states require SNAP participants to participate in a job
search program, as a way of testing an individual's willingness
to work, to remain eligible. These job search programs are
relatively inexpensive to operate. But stand-alone job search
is explicitly prohibited from being a qualifying E&T activity
for childless adults subject to the time limit. The only
activities states are allowed to offer to individuals subject
to the time limit are job training, education, and workfare
programs, which typically are too expensive to offer to all
such individuals.\28\ Moreover, this population often isn't a
state's priority for such investments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Hours spent in job search can count toward an individual's
required 20 hours per week, so long as they constitute less than \1/2\
of the total number of hours spent in E&T activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, if a childless adult searches diligently for work but
is unable to find a job or a slot in a work or training
program, he or she loses benefits after 3 months, despite
showing effort and willingness to work. Waivers, by contrast,
allow states to ensure that they are denying benefits based
only on bad conduct, not bad luck.

States wish to protect individuals living in relatively high
unemployment areas. Even in states with relatively low
statewide unemployment rates, parts of the state may have
significantly weaker labor markets, with few jobs available.
The flexibility that allows states to apply for area waivers
recognizes that parts of a state may have insufficient jobs for
low-income workers. For example, some states may seek waivers
for areas where a dominant industry is struggling.

States frequently use waiver authority for rural areas, where
about \3/4\ of adults say good jobs are hard to come by where
they live.\29\ Urban areas as a whole have fully recovered the
jobs lost in the recession, while the number of jobs in rural
areas continued to remain below pre-recession levels in
2017.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ ``The State of American Jobs,'' Pew Research Center, October
6, 2016, http://www.ledevoir.com/documents/pdf/
etude_travail_pewresearch.pdf.
\30\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, ``Rural America at a Glance:
2017 Edition,'' November 2017, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/85740/eib-182.pdf?v=43054.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Current Waiver Authority Is Insufficient to Address Needs of
Unemployed Workers
While a waiver offers a necessary, temporary reprieve from the time
limit for individuals living in areas with high unemployment, both the
waiver authority and the underlying time limit are not responsive to
the immediate employment challenges that many people subject to the
rule face, even in areas of more modest unemployment. That, in part, is
why USDA's proposed rule to restrict states' ability to seek waivers is
so surprising and ill-informed. Geographic waivers provide needed but
inadequate protection for individuals subject to the time limit. While
the underlying rule exempts some individuals from the time limit (such
as people with physical or mental conditions and those caring for
incapacitated individuals) and states can exempt a limited number of
additional individuals in unique circumstances, the waiver flexibility
allows states the option to fully exempt all individuals who face
insufficient job opportunities for reasons other than area
unemployment.\31\ As noted above, USDA indicated in their early
guidance on waivers that the unemployment rate can mask the labor
market realities for individuals subject to this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Federal regulations identify certain individuals as exempt
(see 7 CFR 273.24(c)) and states receive a limited number of
individual exemptions they can use to exempt any individual subject to
the rule, though these are underutilized in most states (see 7 CFR
273.24(g)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many of the individuals subject to the time limit struggle to find
employment even in normal economic times. States utilize waivers in
recognition of this fact, which also demonstrates why the proposed rule
is so harsh. Those subject to this rule are extremely poor, tend to
have limited education, and sometimes face barriers to work such as a
criminal justice history or racial discrimination. While participating
in SNAP, childless adults have average incomes of 33 percent of the
poverty line--the equivalent of about $4,000 per year for a single
person in 2019. About a quarter have less than a high school education,
and \1/2\ have at most a high school diploma or GED.\32\ SNAP
participants subject to the 3 month cutoff are more likely than other
SNAP participants to lack basic job skills like reading, writing, and
basic mathematics, according to the Government Accountability
Office.\33\ As we will discuss in much greater depth, an extensive body
of research shows why these adults likely face much higher unemployment
rates than their area's unemployment rate and why the proposed rule
would severely curtail waivers in areas where these individuals do not
have access to adequate job opportunities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Steven Carlson, Dorothy Rosenbaum, and Brynne Keith-Jennings,
``Who Are the Low-Income Childless Adults Facing the Loss of SNAP in
2016?'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February 8, 2016,
http://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/who-are-the-low-income-
childless-adults-facing-the-loss-of-snap-in-2016.
\33\ ``Food Stamp Employment and Training Program,'' United States
General Accounting Office (GAO-3-388), March 2003, p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A much preferable alternative to the USDA's proposed rule would
have been an effort to make it more possible for states to waive the
time limit for more individuals who live in areas with insufficient
jobs for those subject to its eligibility restriction. Restricting this
flexibility would be counter to the intent of the law, inconsistent
with more than 2 decades of practice, and would not produce the stated
outcomes USDA claims its proposal would achieve.
Chapter 2: FNS Waiver Policy Has Been Consistent for the Last 22 Years
A. Current Rules Governing Waivers for Areas with Insufficient Jobs for
Individuals Subject to the Time Limit
Congress established that states could waive areas lacking jobs,
and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has established criteria that
have been consistent for 2 decades. When the time limit was being
debated in Congress as part of the 1996 welfare law, its proponents
claimed that the proposed rule was not intended to take effect in areas
where jobs weren't available. Then-Congressman and co-author of the
provision John Kasich said, ``It is only if you are able-bodied, if you
are childless, and if you live in an area where you are getting food
stamps and there are jobs available, then it applies.'' \34\ The rule
was designed to permit states to seek waivers in areas where jobs
aren't available. To qualify for a waiver, states must provide detailed
evidence of high unemployment in local areas, in accordance with
rigorous requirements set by USDA. USDA has consistently used the same
criteria to define high unemployment since the late 1990s.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Congressional Record, 104th Congress, Welfare and Medicaid
Reform Act of 1996 (House of Representatives--July 18, 1996), page
H7905, https://www.congress.gov/crec/1996/07/18/CREC-1996-07-18.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Federal law gives states the option to request a waiver of the
time limit if they can document that a given geographic area has an
insufficient number of jobs (or has an unemployment rate over ten
percent). The standards that define how a state may document
``insufficient jobs'' for individuals subject to the time limit were
first outlined in FNS guidance issued in December 1996.\35\ In the
guidance, USDA offered several reflections on its understanding of
Congressional intent at the time. First, USDA shared its belief that
Congress understood that this group of individuals could find it
especially challenging to find permanent employment and that waivers
are intended to recognize this problem:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS) ``Guidance for States Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp Limits,''
FNS guidance to states, December 3, 1996.

USDA believes that the law provided authority to waive these
provisions in recognition of the challenges that low-skilled
workers may face in finding and keeping permanent employment.
In some areas, including parts of rural America, the number of
employed persons and the number of job seekers may be far
larger than the number of vacant jobs. This may be especially
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
so for persons with limited skills and minimal work history.

In addition, the guidance provided key background on some of the
policy that USDA seeks to restrict in the NPRM. With respect to how
states can set or define the area within the state that it seeks to
waive, USDA said, ``USDA will give states broad discretion in defining
areas that best reflect the labor market prospects of program
participants and administrative needs.'' \36\ The guidance also
recognized that the statute seeks to identify whether or not there are
sufficient jobs for individuals subject to the time limit:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Ibid.

``The guidance that follows offers some examples of the types
and sources of data available to states as they consider waiver
requests for areas with insufficient jobs. Because there are
not standard data or methods to make the determination of the
sufficiency of jobs, the list that follows is not exhaustive.
States may use these data sources as appropriate, or other data
as available, to provide evidence that the necessary conditions
exist in the area for which they intend the waiver to apply.
The absence of a particular data source or approach (for
example, data or statistics compiled by a university) is not
meant to imply that it would not be considered by USDA if
requested by a state.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Ibid.

These criteria were modified only slightly in USDA's final
regulation on waivers based on the experience learned during the waiver
application and approval process (for example states were allowed to
apply to more recent time periods the criteria the Labor Department
uses to identify Labor Surplus Areas in order to determine if an area
qualifies for a waiver.) The regulations were proposed by the Clinton
Administration and fully codified in regulations under the Bush
Administration in 2001. In setting the waiver criteria, USDA adhered to
long-time Labor Department standards to identify areas with labor-
market weakness. To qualify for the insufficient jobs standard, a state
must demonstrate that a geographic area (as defined by the state) meets
specified criteria.
Federal regulations deem waiver requests that are based on certain
criteria as ``readily approvable''--meaning USDA approves them once it
confirms that the data are correct--because the data clearly establish
high unemployment in the area. (In other words, USDA cannot arbitrarily
deny a state that provides adequate documentation showing that the
area's unemployment rate would qualify it for a waiver.) These criteria
are:

Designation as a Labor Surplus Area--a criterion that
several Federal agencies use to prioritize government contracts
or assistance.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ U.S. Department of Labor, ``Labor Surplus Area: Frequently
Asked Questions,'' updated August 21, 2015, https://www.doleta.gov/
programs/lsa_faq.cfm.

An average 12 month unemployment rate over ten percent.

In addition, waivers based on unemployment rates that meet the
criteria to qualify for additional weeks of Extended Benefits (EB)
under the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system may also be approved by
USDA.\39\ States may also make the case for a waiver for a given area
based on certain other criteria; approval of these waivers is left to
the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture. One example is a low
and declining employment-to-population ratio,\40\ a measure that labor
economists use to capture weak labor markets in areas where there is a
notable lack of jobs relative to the size of the working-age
population. States have used this criterion sparingly, and USDA
requires states to demonstrate additional evidence of weak labor
markets for approval, such as a spike in unemployment or a significant
company layoff that affects local labor markets.\41\ Typically, only a
handful of rural counties and Indian reservations receive waivers under
this criterion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ The EB program has criteria in law under which unemployed
workers in a state are eligible to receive extended unemployment
benefits, and states can opt to offer EB benefits under certain
additional criteria. (For more information, see ``Conformity
Requirements for State UI Laws,'' Department of Labor, https://
workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilaws_
extended.pdf.) Because these unemployment criteria (known as
``triggers'') establish high unemployment, a state is eligible for a
waiver if it meets the criteria under the triggers, even if the state
does not elect to provide EB benefits under that trigger.
\40\ The employment-to-population ratio is the share of the non-
institutional, civilian adult population (over age 16) that is
employed. The employment-to-population ratio provides useful
information in assessing labor market conditions over the business
cycle because it takes into account changes in labor market ``slack''
(insufficient jobs) due to changes in both unemployment and labor-force
participation. For more information, see Sarah Donovan, ``An Overview
of the Employment-Population Ratio,'' Congressional Research Service,
May 27, 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44055.pdf.
\41\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS), ``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--Guide to Supporting
Requests to Waive the Time Limit for Able-Bodied Adults without
Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/snap/SNAP-Guide-to-Supporting-Requests-to-Waive-the-Time-
Limit-for-ABAWDs.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA has not issued major policy changes since the criteria were
initially published via guidance in 1996, and state waiver requests
have consistently been evaluated according to these criteria. The
agency has provided guidance to states on the specifics of how to do
the required calculations and what information to attach.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ For example, see: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and
Nutrition Service (FNS), ``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--
Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive the Time Limit for Able-Bodied
Adults without Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016, https://
www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-Guide-to-Supporting-
Requests-to-Waive-the-Time-Limit-for-ABAWDs.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Department Claims to Return to Original Policy Intent and That
Current Waiver Standards are Inconsistent
In the 2019 NPRM, the Department declared its commitment to
``implement SNAP as Congress intended,'' \43\ implying that waiver
policy has diverged significantly from the original policy set in the
1996 welfare reform law. It also claims that the rule will ``improve
consistency across states,'' \44\ but fails to define what the current
inconsistency is, why the current standards are causing such
inconsistency, does not provide any evidence to support its claim of
inconsistency, or explain why and how it is a problem. Two possible
interpretations of the ``inconsistency'' claim are that current waiver
standards do not apply consistently to all states, or that the current
standards produce inconsistent waived areas across states. Neither of
these claims holds up to scrutiny.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ 2019 NPRM, p. 8.
\44\ 2019 NPRM, p. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FNS Waiver Criteria Have Not Changed Significantly Since 1996
The Department's suggestion that waiver policy has deviated from
Congressional intent suggests that either the Department now knows
something that it did not 22 years ago when it put forward guidance to
implement the law or that the final regulations deviated from the
original guidance set in December 1996.
On the first count, the Department provided no information or
evidence from legislative history that would suggest that its knowledge
or understanding of Congressional intent has improved since it issued
its first guidance on waiver policy just a few short months after the
welfare law passed. In fact, the NPRM does not provide any reference to
legislative history to help reviewers understand why current policy is
out of sync with the goal of the statute. It is impossible to respond
to the Department's reasoning other than to provide the available
legislative history as we have in Chapter 1 (Overview of Waivers From
the Three-Month Time Limit--Their Purpose and History) which explains
how legislative history runs counter to the Department's assertions.
Similarly, we observe no significant policy shift in the waiver
policy that the Department originally set forth in its December 1996
guidance from current policy. In fact, comparing waiver standards from
1996 to the current standards can provide insight into how much waiver
policy has significantly changed over the past 2 decades. The best
evidence for this comes from FNS' 1996 guidance, which describes in
detail the waiver criteria that were available to states at the time.
Table 2.1 below compares the key waiver criteria included in FNS'
December 1996 guidance to the current criteria described in FNS'
December 2016 guidance (which is the most recent articulation of the
rules set forth in the 2001 Federal regulations).

Table 2.1
FNS Waiver Policy Has Been Consistent Since 1996
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2001 December 2016
December 1996 FNS Final Rule FNS Guidance
Guidance \45\ \46\ \47\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waiver Eligibility Criteria
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor Surplus Area Yes Yes Yes
Designation (LSA)
\45\ U.S. Department
of Agriculture,
Food and Nutrition
Service (FNS)
``Guidance for
States Seeking
Waivers for Food
Stamp Limits,'' FNS
guidance to states,
December 3, 1996.
LSA-Like: 24 month No Yes Yes
average
unemployment rate
20 percent above
the national
average using more
current data than
LSA
\46\ 66 Fed. Reg.,
No. 11, 4438
(January 17, 2001).
Qualification for Yes Yes Yes
Extended
Unemployment
Benefits
\47\ ``SNAP--Guide
to Supporting
Requests to Waive
the Time Limit for
Able-Bodied Adults
without Dependents
(ABAWD),'' FNS
guidance issued
December 2, 2016,
https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/
sites/default/files/
snap/SNAP-Guide-to-
Supporting-Requests-
to-Waive-the-Time-
Limit-for-
ABAWDs.pdf.
12 month average Yes Yes Yes
unemployment rate
over ten percent
3 month average Yes Yes Yes
unemployment rate
over ten percent
Historical seasonal Yes Yes Yes
unemployment rate
over ten percent
Employment-to- Yes Yes Yes
Population Ratios
Demonstration of Yes Yes Yes
lack of jobs in
declining
occupations or
industries
Demonstration of Yes Yes Yes
lack of jobs in an
area
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Waiver-Eligibility Policy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combining data for Yes Yes Yes
geographic and
economic regions
Estimating Yes Yes Yes
unemployment rates
for Tribal lands
Requesting 2 year No No Yes
waivers
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 2.1 demonstrates that the waiver criteria set in the 1996
welfare reform law have remained remarkably consistent over the past 2
decades. For example, FNS' 1996 guidance indicated that high
unemployment areas can be waived by being designated as Labor Surplus
Areas (LSA), qualifying for extended unemployment benefits, or having
average unemployment rates of over ten percent. These are the same
criteria described in current FNS guidance. Moreover, criteria that are
seldom used by states, such as demonstrating historical seasonal
unemployment or a lack of jobs in declining occupations are described
in the 1996 guidance and remain the same today. The meaningful change
was to allow states to use more recent unemployment data when
considering whether an area met the LSA criteria of having average
unemployment rates at least 20 percent above the national average for a
recent 24 month period. This variation of the LSA criteria also permits
areas to qualify with 24 month average unemployment rates below six
percent. This criterion is informally known as ``LSA-like.'' Using more
recent unemployment data allows for a more current assessment of the
unemployment situation of an area and is an enhancement of the LSA
criteria, not a significant change. This was added in the early 2000s
and is codified in current Federal regulations.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ 66 Fed. Reg., No. 11, 4438 (January 17, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, the 1996 guidance included other waiver policies such as
the ability to combine data and estimating unemployment rates for
Tribal lands, urging states to ``consider areas within, or combinations
of counties, cities and towns'' and to ``consider the particular needs
of rural areas and Indian reservations.'' \49\ These policies remain in
place in current guidance, with small changes made over the years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS) ``Guidance for States Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp Limits,''
FNS guidance to states, December 3, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The small changes that have occurred are largely refinements of the
original criteria, not major additions to waiver policy. For example,
FNS guidance issued in December 2004 revised the method for calculating
average unemployment rates over 24 month periods.\50\ Current FNS
guidance also provides specific instructions on how to round 24 month
average unemployment rates, and a standard methodology for estimating
unemployment rates for Native American reservations.\51\ FNS also
offered states ``the option of 2 year waiver approvals'' in a February
2006 memorandum; while this was an addition to waive policy at the
time, it was not a major revision of waiver standards--the criteria for
2 year waivers are more restrictive than those for shorter waivers.\52\
(See Chapter 8 for more.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ ``ABAWD Waivers--New Method for Calculating Average
Unemployment Rates,'' FNS Northeastern Region Food Stamp Regional
Letter, April 28, 2004.
\51\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS), ``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--Guide to Supporting
Requests to Waive the Time Limit for Able-Bodied Adults without
Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/snap/SNAP-Guide-to-Supporting-Requests-to-Waive-the-Time-
Limit-for-ABAWDs.pdf.
\52\ ``FSP--2-Year Approval of Waivers of the Work Requirements for
ABAWDs under 7 CFR 273.24,'' FNS memorandum issued February 3, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule published in January 2001 offers clear evidence that
the Department at the time intended to codify the waiver policies from
its 1996 guidance, so that they would become a consistent set of rules
that states use to determine their waiver eligibility in the future. In
the final rule, the Department discussed the comments issued in
response to its NPRM on the waiver policy, and why this influenced its
codification of waiver criteria. It acknowledged that it did not
include the 1996 guidance in its initial regulations, not because it
deviated from the Department's intent, but because ``[the guidance] was
extensive and detailed.'' \53\ The Department also explained that it
``received several comments suggesting [the Department] include all or
some of the guidance in the regulations. Commenters argued that unless
the guidance is incorporated into the regulations, a subsequent
Administration could abolish it without public comment. Based on these
comments, [it] decided to incorporate some of the more pertinent
aspects of the guidance into the regulation. More specifically, [it]
modified the regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(f) to include a non-exhaustive
list of the kinds of information a state agency may submit to support a
claim of ten percent unemployment or `lack of sufficient jobs.' '' \54\
The final rule goes on to list the same waiver eligibility criteria
described in Table 2.1 as part of the December 2016 guidance, and shows
that Department recognized at the time that a consistent and
predictable waiver policy would be an essential asset to states in the
future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ 66 Fed. Reg., No. 11, 4438 (January 17, 2001).
\54\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This evidence demonstrates that current waiver criteria are not
wildly out of step with the original intent of waiver policy at its
inception. The original guidance set the flexibility that states
currently have in waiving areas, contrary to the Department's claim in
the proposed rule that they use their flexibility ``in a way that was
not likely foreseen.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ NPRM, p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the consistency in waiver policy over the decades has
been important for states, which have relied on it for 20 years. The
Department's claim that its proposed rule will allow ``States to
reasonably anticipate whether it would receive approval'' ignores the
reality that current waiver policy already accomplishes this goal. In
reality, the rule would make it harder for states to obtain waivers and
would disrupt their long-standing waiver implementation procedures.
The Proposed Rule Does Not Provide Evidence of Inconsistency in Current
Waiver Standards
As noted earlier, the Department does not explain or justify in the
rule its implication that current waiver standards are inconsistent,
and reasonable interpretations of what it meant do not hold up to
scrutiny. For example, the Department may have meant that there is not
a consistent set of waiver standards that apply to all states. This is
not the case, as waiver standards apply uniformly to all states. States
might use different criteria to show their eligibility for waivers; for
example, a state with unemployment well above ten percent might request
a waiver based on the ten percent threshold, whereas another state with
rapidly rising unemployment might request a waiver based on qualifying
for extended unemployment benefits. The fact that states use different
criteria reflects differences in their demographic composition and
economies, among other factors. It does not mean, as the Department
might be implying, that states do not have the option of using any of
the criteria to show their waiver eligibility, particularly as their
local economic conditions change over time.
Over the past 2 decades, FNS has regularly updated its guidance to
states to inform them of their options as the economy changed. One of
the strengths of the current rules and USDA's application of them is
the extraordinary consistency with which USDA applied the rules across
the years and states. Until 2017, states could predict with extreme
accuracy whether the Department would approve a waiver based on the
listed criteria and guidance. It was only after the current
Administration took office that USDA began denying waivers that it had
long approved--such as no longer approving 2 year waivers for areas
that met the standards set in guidance or for areas eligible under the
Employment-to-Population ratio.\56\ While there were not a lot of these
types of requests historically, it was the new Administration that
introduced uncertainty into the process. Similarly, waiver requests
that would typically be approved in 1 to 3 months can now take upwards
of 6 months to approve. This has resulted in USDA sometimes not
approving waivers until after the requested start date. FNS regional
and national office staff have not known what would and would not be
approved or when. The political leadership at USDA has introduced
uncertainty and inconsistency in the review and approval process.
Moreover, they have been inconsiderate of states' need for certainty
and predictability in order to implement waivers after approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS), ``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--Guide to Supporting
Requests to Waive the Time Limit for Able-Bodied Adults without
Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/snap/SNAP-Guide-to-Supporting-Requests-to-Waive-the-Time-
Limit-for-ABAWDs.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Department meant instead that the current waiver standards
do not produce consistent waived areas across states, then it is making
an unreasonable argument. The only inconsistency across states is the
Department's own application of the flexibility afforded to it, not in
USDA's application of the rules (until recently). It is incumbent upon
USDA to define and demonstrate the inconsistency it observes given that
this argument is a core element of its reason to re-regulate these
long-standing rules.
The evidence shows how little of the Department's proposed rule is
based on a clear knowledge of the waiver policy's history and an
intimate understanding of the waiver standards' application to states.
This clearly demonstrates the brittle nature of the Department's
justifications of the changes to current waiver policy contained in the
proposed rule.
Chapter 3: Setting a Floor for Waivers For Areas With 20 Percent Above
National Unemployment Is Inconsistent With Congressional Intent
and Would Be Harmful to Vulnerable Individuals
The most significant change of the proposed rule would drastically
roll back waivers of the time limit by requiring states to show that
areas meet an unemployment rate threshold of 20 percent above the
national average (which the Department of Agriculture, or the
Department, and we will refer to as the ``20 percent standard'') and,
if the 20 percent standard is below a specific threshold, meet this
specific threshold, referred to as the ``unemployment rate floor'' to
qualify for a waiver. We believe this proposal is out of sync with the
goal and purpose of the underlying legislation. Furthermore, the
Department did not discuss whether it considered a substantial body of
relevant research that contradicts the claims it made in support of
this change and provided little to no evidence to back up its proposal,
making it difficult for us to comment on the process the Food and
Nutrition Service (FNS) used to develop this regulation. Below we
discuss each of the following reasons in detail that explain the flaws
in this process:

This proposal is contrary to Congressional intent, which
clearly was to allow states flexibility to use a variety of
metrics to demonstrate that the population subject to the time
limit does not have access to enough jobs. Congress has
rejected past proposals to impose an unemployment rate floor
and otherwise restrict the current waiver criteria.

Considerable evidence shows that the adults without
dependent children potentially subject to the rule face
overlapping labor market disadvantages, and therefore
experience significantly higher unemployment rates than the
general unemployment rate for their area. Because an area's
overall unemployment rate overstates job availability for the
individuals subject to the time limit, imposing an unemployment
rate floor would disqualify many areas from eligibility for a
waiver where childless SNAP participants have very few job
opportunities. The statute clearly gives states that want to
the ability to waive the time limit for some or all individuals
in areas where there aren't enough jobs to employ these
individuals.

The Department misleadingly cites the unemployment rate
floor used by the Department of Labor in establishing Labor
Surplus Areas (LSAs) to support the proposal, without
recognizing that LSAs are meant for different purposes, and
that LSAs also include an unemployment rate ceiling.

The Department uses the concept of a ``natural rate of
unemployment'' to support the proposed unemployment rate floor
of seven percent, which is a misinterpretation of a
macroeconomic concept that is not a fixed or precisely
identifiable unemployment rate. Furthermore, the Department
then suggests a significantly higher unemployment rate floor
than what it states the natural rate is without explaining how
the natural rate relates to the proposed unemployment rate
floor of seven percent. This lack of explanation for choosing
the substantially higher rate of seven percent demonstrates how
this specific unemployment rate floor was chosen arbitrarily.

While no specific rate of unemployment would properly
reflect these individuals' circumstances, evidence shows that
seven percent unemployment specifically is too high, given that
many of these individuals are often in groups that experience
unemployment rates significantly above that level and they
often face barriers to employment.

The proposal would fail to adequately provide states with
waiver coverage during times of rising unemployment, as the
combination of the high unemployment rate with the lengthy 24
month lookback would preclude many states with rising
unemployment from eligibility. The Department lacked
transparency in not referencing whether they examined the
potential impact of this proposal at other times in the
business cycle besides the current moment.

The Department attempts to support its proposed unemployment
rate floor by explaining that such a floor would decrease the
share of who it refers to as ``ABAWDs'' living in a waived
area. This justification ignores Congressional intent and lacks
transparency in the underlying assumptions and methodology used
to estimate this metric.

The Department also sought feedback on alternative
unemployment rate floors of six and ten percent, which are both
unworkable and an inappropriate reading of the statute. Its
proposal of these alternate floors demonstrates the
arbitrariness of the proposed seven percent floor, but also
shows that it is impossible to designate a specific
unemployment rate floor that would adequately interpret the law
by accurately reflecting jobs available to childless adults.

In proposing an unemployment rate floor for waivers based on the 20
percent standard, the Department ignores the intent of Congress and
uses misleading justifications with no transparent evidence to support
its claims. While the current 20 percent standard may not perfectly
represent areas that lack jobs for childless adults because the overall
unemployment rate masks divergent labor market opportunities for sub-
groups such as these individuals, the proposed rule would only
exacerbate the shortcomings of current policy.
A. Unemployment Rate Floor Proposal Inconsistent With Congressional
Intent
When Congress established the 3 month time limit in the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Public Law 104-193, it established that a state may seek a
waiver for a geographic area. Congress gave states this authority in
recognition that individuals may not have success in finding a job if
there are limited job opportunities. When the House Committee on Budget
reported the original bill, the report stated:

The Committee understands that there may be instances in
which high unemployment rates in all or part of a state or
other specified circumstances may limit the jobs available for
able-bodied food stamp participants between 18 and 50 years
with no dependents. Therefore the Secretary, upon request from
a state, is provided with the authority to waive job
requirements in these circumstances or if unemployment rates
are above ten percent.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ H.R. Report 104-651, Welfare and Medicaid Reform Act of 1996,
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/house-
report/651.

Congress created waiver authority to enable states to waive areas
with ``high unemployment rates'' or ``otherwise specific
circumstances,'' indicating that a range of circumstances may be
indicative of depressed labor market conditions. The welfare reform law
established that a state could seek a waiver for an area if it: ``(i)
has an unemployment rate of over ten percent; or (ii) does not have a
sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals.''
\58\ (Herein, as with the current regulations, we will use ``area'' to
refer to geographic areas, which generally refers to areas for which
states generally seek waivers, such as counties, cities, towns, Tribal
areas, or metropolitan areas.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Food and Nutrition Act, 7 U.S.C. 2015(o)(4). This language
is identical to the language in P.L. 104-193, PRWORA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress therefore created two distinct categories to establish the
circumstances under which a state can request a waiver:

The first criterion establishes that an area with an
unemployment rate of ten percent may qualify for a waiver. The
unemployment rate measures the share of the labor force that is
actively looking for work. Historically, a ten percent
unemployment rate is an indicator of severe labor market
distress, such as during an economic downturn. Since the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) began publishing monthly unemployment
rates in 1948, the national unemployment rate has equaled or
exceeded ten percent only during the 1981-1982 recession and
during the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Congress recognized
that a local area with such a high unemployment rate likely
would not offer adequate job opportunities so that people who
are subject to the time limit could find work. With such high
unemployment, even the most readily employable jobseekers will
likely struggle to find work, and those who are more
disadvantaged will face even more challenges. States that
prefer to waive only areas with extremely high unemployment
rates can also request waivers based on this criterion.

The second criterion is focused on measuring employment
opportunities for the specific individuals affected by the time
limit. Congress recognized that while useful for measuring the
health of a local labor market, the unemployment rate may not
give a complete picture of job availability for all workers in
that area, particularly for individuals facing labor market
disadvantages. An area may not have a sufficient number of jobs
because the share of jobseekers who are out of work is
relatively high, as indicated by the employment rate. Even with
a low unemployment rate, however, there can be instances where
there aren't enough jobs to provide employment for specific
individuals or groups. Even if there are enough jobs in number
to match the number of jobseekers, the individuals' skills
might not match the requirements of the available jobs, the
jobs may be inaccessible due to geographic or transit
limitations, or employers may discriminate against some
jobseekers based on their race, work history, disability, or
other characteristics, for example.

In its original interpretation, the Department recognized that
Congress intended for the ``insufficient jobs'' criterion to include a
range of metrics that are targeted towards the individuals subject to
the time limit. The Department published guidance on December 3, 1996,
which stated:

The statute recognizes that the unemployment rate alone is an
imperfect measure of the employment prospects of individuals
with little work history and diminished opportunities. It
provides states with the option to seek waivers for areas in
which there are not enough jobs for groups of individuals who
may be affected by the new time limits in the Food Stamp
Program.
To some extent, the decision to approve waivers based on an
insufficient number of jobs must be made on an area-by-area
basis. Examples of such situations include areas where an
important employer has either relocated or gone out of
business. In other areas there may be a shortage of jobs that
can be filled by persons with limited skills and work
experience relative to the number of persons seeking such
jobs.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ USDA, ``Guidance for States Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp
Limits,'' December 3, 1996.

The Department therefore originally (in 1996) interpreted the
intent of Congress in creating the second category for waiver authority
as a recognition of the shortcomings of the unemployment rate for
measuring job opportunities for the individuals subject to the time
limit, and established that it could use flexibility in determining
whether a state demonstrates a lack of jobs. In response to comments,
when preparing the original final rule, the Department balanced the
need to provide specific guidance that would be codified in regulation
so that it would remain consistent across subsequent Administrations
with the need to retain the flexibility that the Department recognized
that Congress had created in its original lawmaking. The final rule
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
stated:

Based on these comments, we have decided to incorporate some
of the more pertinent aspects of the guidance into the
regulation. More specifically, we have modified the regulations
at 7 CFR 273.24(f) to include a non-exhaustive list of the
kinds of information a state agency may submit to support a
claim of ten percent unemployment or `lack of sufficient jobs.'
\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ 66 Fed. Reg., No. 11, 4438 (January 17, 2001), p. 4462.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/01-1025/p-205.

FNS' original (2001) interpretation therefore was clear that in
providing guidance about specific methods states can use to demonstrate
a lack of jobs in an area, it was not precluding states from using
other data or metrics to demonstrate insufficient jobs, given that it
is a concept not easily shown by any one numeric quantity or metric.
By proposing an unemployment rate floor, the Department is
proposing to restate the waiver criteria in a manner that is
inconsistent with the intent of the statute. Currently, states can
waive areas with insufficient jobs to employ a specific, more
disadvantaged, population. The current 20 percent standard already has
limitations in its ability to reflect jobs available for individuals
subject to the time limit, who likely experience much higher
unemployment rates than the overall unemployment rate in their area. As
we discuss in detail below, areas with unemployment rates that are 20
percent above the national average may still lack jobs for those with
barriers to unemployment. As we will explain, there are several reasons
why current aspects of the 20 percent standard in the context of the
current regulations allow for a greater ability to demonstrate a lack
of sufficient jobs than the proposed regulation would allow. The
proposed regulations would therefore significantly worsen the problem
with the current 20 percent standard as a measure of ``insufficient
jobs.''
First, under the current regulation, an area with elevated
unemployment compared to national unemployment can qualify for a
waiver, without meeting a specific unemployment rate standard. Defining
high unemployment at a relative level rather than a specific
unemployment rate threshold allows for greater consideration of trends
such as those in labor force participation, which may affect low
unemployment rates, especially relevant for disadvantaged groups. If
workers who are not employed stop looking for work and therefore exit
the labor force, measures of labor force participation will decline.
Because the unemployment rate measures the share of the labor force
that is not employed but is actively seeking work, lower labor force
participation may be a signal of weak labor markets that is not
reflected in the unemployment rate (for example, if discouraged workers
stop looking for work).
Overall labor force participation has fallen over the last 2
decades, including particularly sharply during the Great Recession, and
only began rebounding in about 2015. Labor force participation fell
sharply among prime-age workers (thus less affected by population aging
and retirement) with lower educational attainment from 2000 to 2015 and
in 2018 were still below 2000 levels.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Audrey Breitwieser, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh. ``The recent
rebound in prime-age labor force participation,'' Brookings
Institution, August 2, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/
2018/08/02/the-recent-rebound-in-prime-age-labor-force-participation/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lower unemployment rates are thus less indicative of strong labor
markets in recent years than in the past, and particularly so for a
group that tends to fare worse in the labor market, such as those with
lower levels of education. The 20 percent standard, which currently
does not have a floor, relies on unemployment rates, which are an
imperfect proxy of jobs available for this population. Because the
current unemployment rate threshold needed to qualify for a waiver
varies along with national trends, however, the current standard gives
more flexibility to capture those trends. Not having a specific
unemployment rate floor therefore allows for the 20 percent standard to
better capture insufficient jobs than it would with a specific floor.
In addition, currently states have the ability to group together
counties to better represent local labor market opportunities, which
the proposed rule would also restrict. (We discuss these changes in
more detail in Chapter 5.) This flexibility also helps mitigate some of
the shortcomings in the current 20 percent standard.
Second, the Department is also proposing to eliminate other
criteria existing in current regulations that can serve as an
alternative to measuring ``insufficient jobs'' in cases where the 20
percent standard does not adequately reflect job opportunities. In the
context of these changes, the 20 percent standard takes on increasing
importance as one of the sole methods to demonstrate a lack of
sufficient jobs. The effect of these proposed changes largely results
in a requirement that states demonstrate a specific unemployment rate
threshold to qualify for a waiver under the ``insufficient jobs''
criterion, when Congress expressly intended for this criterion to
encompass a broader range of metrics.
The Department proposes to eliminate most of the remaining
alternatives to metrics based on the unemployment rate that current
regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(f)(2)(ii) allow, such as the elimination
of the option to demonstrate a ``low and declining employment-
population ratio'' or to demonstrate declining industries. The
Department would also sharply reduce the ability of states to request
waivers for groups of neighboring counties, which may be useful in
cases where the unemployment rate is a particularly poor proxy for
labor market opportunities for individuals subject to the time limit.
(We discuss the changes to employment-population ratio and other means
of showing a lack of sufficient jobs in Chapter 4, and changes to
grouping in Chapter 5.) With these changes, for the most part an area
could only qualify for a waiver by demonstrating that it has a 12 month
unemployment rate average of at least ten percent, a 2 year
unemployment rate of at least seven percent, or that it qualifies for
extended unemployment insurance benefits, the eligibility for which is
based on a recent 3 month insured or total unemployment rate.
The proposal does allow for states to demonstrate ``exceptional
circumstances,'', but even then suggests that it must support this
claim with evidence, such as of a ten percent unemployment rate: ``the
request must demonstrate that the exceptional circumstance has caused a
lack of sufficient number of jobs, such as data from the BLS or a BLS-
cooperating agency that shows an area has a most recent 3 month average
unemployment rate over ten percent.'' \62\ Under the proposed rule,
states will largely be limited to demonstrating that an area meets a
specific unemployment rate threshold to qualify for a waiver under the
``insufficient jobs'' category of waivers, which does not align with
the intent of Congress to provide for multiple metrics under this
category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ NPRM, p. 992.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress regularly includes specific unemployment rate thresholds
for policy purposes when that is its intent. Congress included ten
percent unemployment as one of the criteria to qualify for a waiver of
SNAP's 3 month time limit, as stated above. Similarly, in the same
legislation, Public Law 104-193, Congress created a specific definition
of a ``needy state'' under the TANF program, which allows states
additional weeks of job search and readiness. One of the qualifications
for a ``needy state'' was a 3 month unemployment rate of at least 6.5
percent that exceeds 110 percent of the unemployment rate for the same
period in either of the last 2 years.\63\ Congress clearly understood
that unemployment rates may be an appropriate threshold in some
instances, but chose to include a criterion that was more loosely
defined and allowed for alternative economic measures to demonstrate a
lack of jobs. Congress also chose to allow waivers based on economic
circumstances that reflect jobs available for a targeted population,
the individuals subject to the time limit. Had Congress intended to
allow states to qualify for waivers only based on unemployment rates,
it would have only included waiver criteria with those unemployment
rate parameters, rather than including the second criteria targeted
towards childless adult SNAP participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, P.L. 104-193, 403(b)(6), https://www.congress.gov/104/
plaws/publ193/PLAW-104publ193.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the original final rule, published in 2001, the Department made
clear that they interpreted the ``lack of sufficient jobs'' as
encompassing a broad range of metrics and not exclusively tied to
demonstrating a high unemployment rate. By proposing a specific
unemployment rate threshold for the 20 percent standard, reducing the
ability of states to group together areas, and eliminating most of the
alternative criteria that would let states use alternative information,
the Department has substantially changed its interpretation of how
states can demonstrate that an area lacks jobs for the individuals
subject to the time limit. In practice, except during times when states
qualify for extended benefits, under the proposed regulation, states
would largely be limited to showing that an area has a seven percent
unemployment rate over 2 years to show it lacks enough jobs to employ
people subject to the time limit. The Department did not attempt to
demonstrate that a specific unemployment rate threshold shows an area
lacks jobs for these individuals, instead discussing the unrelated fact
that the proposal would have the effect of narrowing the number of
waived areas, which we explain below. The Department therefore provides
no evidence that the changes in the rulemaking are aligned with the
intent of the statute to allow waivers in areas lacking sufficient
jobs, a broader concept than areas meeting specific unemployment rate
thresholds.
Congress Recently Rejected Proposals to Limit Current Waiver-Approval
Standards
Congress also has rejected attempts to narrow waiver-approval
criteria to impose an unemployment rate floor for the ``20 percent
standard.'' H.R. 2, the House Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, as
passed by the House on June 21, 2018, included a restriction similar to
the Administration's proposal, requiring an area to have an
unemployment rate of at least seven percent to qualify based on having
a 2 year unemployment average greater than the national average. The
Senate did not include such a restriction on waivers. The Conference
Committee adapted the Senate's approach, which then passed and was
signed into law. As Rep. Marcia Fudge, a conferee, noted in the
Congressional Record:

The Conference Committee also rejected House provisions that
would shorten SNAP's 3 month time limit to 1 month and expand
the population subject to the rule to a broader group of
recipients. We also rejected the House's proposal to limit
states' flexibility to waive high-unemployment areas from the 3
month limit.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ See the floor statement by Congresswoman Fudge, 164 Cong. Rec.
H10149 (daily ed. December 12, 2018), https://www.congress.gov/
congressional-record/2018/12/12/house-section/article/H10142-3.

Similarly, the Conference Report noted that Congress chose not to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
change the underlying statute:

The Managers also acknowledge that waivers from the ABAWD
time limit are necessary in times of recession and in areas
with labor surpluses or higher rates of unemployment. The
Managers intend to maintain the practice that bestows authority
on the state agency responsible for administering SNAP to
determine when and how waiver requests for ABAWDs are
submitted.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ H.R. Rept. 115-1072, Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018,
Title IV (3), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/115th-
congress/house-report/1072.

Congress therefore chose not to change the criteria by which states
could request area waivers. While the Administration cited the House-
passed version of the H.R. 2 to support the proposed seven percent
unemployment floor, Congress ultimately rejected this proposal in favor
of the Senate approach, demonstrating intent to keep the current
interpretation of the ``insufficient jobs'' criterion intact.
B. Unemployment Rates Overstate Jobs Available to Childless Adult SNAP
Participants
By proposing an unemployment rate floor for the ``20 percent
standard,'' the Department argues that areas with unemployment rates
below this threshold offer enough jobs so that those individuals can
find work. For example, when describing its support for its proposed
unemployment rate floor, the Department states, ``The Department views
the proposal as more suitable for achieving a more comprehensive
application of work requirements so that ABAWDs in areas that have
sufficient number of jobs have a greater level of engagement in work
and work activities, including job training.'' \66\ The Department
therefore states that areas with unemployment rates below its proposed
floor of seven percent over 2 years offer a sufficient number of jobs
to the individuals subject to the time limit. This interpretation that
areas with lower unemployment have enough jobs to employ adults without
dependent children ignores the reality that overall unemployment rates
overstate jobs available to disadvantaged individuals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ NPRM, p. 984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department states that the unemployment rate floor proposal
would prevent areas with low unemployment from qualifying for a waiver
but ignores evidence that the individuals subject to the time limit are
in demographic groups that experience higher unemployment rates than
their area's average. In explaining why it chose to propose an
unemployment rate floor, the Department noted:

Based upon operational experience, the Department has
observed that, without an unemployment rate floor, local areas
will continue to qualify for waivers under the Department's 20
percent standard based on high unemployment relative to the
national average even as local unemployment rates fall to
levels as low as five to six percent (depending upon the
national rate).

The Department is therefore stating that the floor is necessary to
prevent areas with unemployment rates it considers ``low'' from
qualifying for a waiver. Adult SNAP participants without dependent
children, however, are likely to face barriers to employment that
result in fewer jobs available for those individuals than for the
general population. It is unrealistic to set a specific threshold that
guarantees that the labor market creates a sufficient number of jobs to
provide employment to this group, and any such threshold based on the
overall unemployment rate in an area would guarantee that many areas
where childless adult SNAP participants could not find work were
ineligible. When it explained its position that it does not believe
areas with low unemployment rates should qualify for waivers, the
Department did not provide any research to support its position that
areas with low unemployment rates provide enough jobs so that the
individuals subject to the time limit can find work, nor did it address
the extensive research that demonstrates that these individuals
struggle to find work even when unemployment rates are low. Because the
Department did not provide this information, it is difficult for
commenters to understand how they are interpreting a specific
unemployment rate as measuring job availability for this population and
to respond to this reasoning.
The unemployment rate is a broad labor market metric that masks
differences in the labor market outcomes experienced by different
groups. Some groups, such as African American workers, have
historically and consistently higher unemployment rates. The recent
Great Recession also demonstrated how less-advantaged groups fared more
poorly in the recession, losing more jobs and recovering more slowly.
Evidence shows that the adults targeted by the time limit often
face barriers to work. While these low-income adults without dependents
are a diverse group and there has been limited research on this
specific population, the available evidence demonstrates that many face
greater struggles to find work than the overall population. This group,
while diverse, has many characteristics that, as we will explain below,
are associated with worse labor market outcomes:

Over \3/4\ of this group have a high school diploma or less,
and studies show that many lack skills sought by employers.

This group is demographically diverse. Of adult SNAP
participants aged 18 through 49 who do not receive disability
income or have children in the household, about 53 percent are
male, and 47 percent are female. About \2/5\ are aged 18
through 29, \1/4\ are aged 30 to 39, and \1/3\ are aged 40 to
49. About \2/5\ are white, over \1/4\ are African American, and
approximately 20 percent are Latino.\67\ They live in a range
of areas: about \2/5\ live in urban areas, \2/5\ live in
suburban areas, and about 15 percent live in rural areas.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ We looked at U.S. Agriculture Department's Fiscal Year 2017
SNAP Households Characteristic data (QC), the 2017 American Community
Survey (ACS) 1 year estimates, and the March 2018 Community Population
Survey (CPS). Reporting of race/ethnicity is voluntary and is missing
for 13 percent of ABAWDs in QC. About 12 percent of ABAWDs self-
identified or were coded by an eligibility worker as ``Latino or
Hispanic'', but the share increased to 17 percent in high-reporting
states (missing for less than ten of SNAP participants). CPS and ACS
capture more Hispanics than QC. Hispanics account for 22 percent of
ABAWDs in CPS and 20 percent in ACS. Compared to ACS, the disability
income questions are much more detailed and comprehensive in CPS.
\68\ CBPP analysis of the March 2018 Current Population Survey.
Some 12 percent are unknown.

Like most SNAP participants, this group largely works, but
in low-wage jobs that provide little stability, and as a
result, many move in and out of work and experience periods
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
when they are out of work.

Research indicates that many of these individuals face
barriers to employment, including low skills, inconsistent work
history, health conditions that limit their ability to work,
inadequate access to transportation, criminal justice history,
or unstable access to housing.

Because this population is distinct from the United States
population, and faces greater disadvantages with regards to accessing
employment, an overall unemployment rate or other overall labor force
metric will largely overstate the jobs available to this group. The
section below explains the research documenting the unique barriers to
employment that childless adult SNAP participants face, and the higher
unemployment rates associated with many of these characteristics.
Childless and Non-Custodial Parent Adult SNAP Participants Are Likely
to Have Lower Levels of Educational Attainment, Which Is
Associated With Higher Unemployment Rates and More Sensitivity
to Labor Market Shocks
The majority of adult SNAP participants without dependents have a
high school education or less. According to 2017 USDA Household
Characteristics data, about \1/4\ (24 percent) of non-disabled
individuals aged 18 through 49 in households without children report
having less than a high school education, and about 54 percent report a
high school diploma or a GED. (Some eight percent do not report
educational attainment.) \69\ They are more likely than other SNAP
participants to lack basic job skills like reading, writing, and basic
mathematics, according to a 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO)
study.\70\ A more recent study of SNAP employment and training (E&T)
participants, which includes many childless adults ages 18 through 49,
but did not separately report results for that population, found that
\3/4\ of employment and training providers surveyed found that at least
some of the E&T participants they serve lack basic skills when they
enter the program, over \1/2\ said some participants have low literacy
levels or were high school dropouts, and over \2/5\ cited that
participants' skills were mismatched to industry needs or were out of
date. Over \1/4\ of E&T participants surveyed identified limited
education as a barrier to employment.\71\ Caseworkers in a work
experience program in Ohio found signs of functional illiteracy even
among those with a high school degree.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ CBPP analysis of FY 2017 USDA Household Characteristics data.
\70\ ``Food Stamp Employment and Training Program,'' United States
General Accounting Office, revised March 2003, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/240/237571.pdf.
\71\ Gretchen Rowe, Elizabeth Brown, and Brian Estes, ``SNAP
Employment and Training (E&T) Characteristics Study: Final Report,''
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Services,
revised October 2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/SNAPEandTCharacteristics.pdf.
\72\ ``A Comprehensive Assessment of Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents and Their Participation in the Work Experience Program in
Franklin County, Ohio,'' Ohio Association of Foodbanks, revised 2014,
http://admin.ohiofoodbanks.org/uploads/news/WEP-2013-2014-report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research shows that adults with lower educational attainment have
higher unemployment rates than those with more education. (Figure 3.1.)
For example, in 2018, while the unemployment rate for workers with a
bachelor's degree or more was 2.1 percent, the unemployment rate for
high school graduates was 4.1 percent, and for those with less than a
high school education, 5.6 percent. African Americans with less than a
high school diploma had an unemployment rate of 10.4 percent.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ ``Employment Status of the Civilian Population 25 Years and
Over by Educational Attainment,'' Bureau of Labor Statistics, revised
February 1, 2019, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t04.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3.1
Unemployment Higher Among Those With Less Education
Monthly unemployment rate

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Workers with less education are more likely to lose jobs during an
economic downturn and will recover more slowly in the aftermath of a
recession. Researchers have found that an increase of one percentage
point in the state unemployment rate leads to almost a two-percentage-
point increase in unemployment for workers with less than a high school
degree compared to less than 0.5-percentage-point increase for those
with a college degree.\74\ Workers with a high school diploma had lower
employment rates in 2007 than college graduates: 55 percent for those
with only high school education, compared to 72.5 percent for those
with a bachelor's degree. Employment rates, or the share of the
population with a job, fell more sharply for the group with lower
levels of educational attainment, and in 2018 had yet to return to pre-
recession levels.\75\ Counties with large shares of workers with less
than a high school degree also saw greater employment losses during the
Great Recession.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Hilary Hoynes, Douglas L. Miller, and Jessamyn Schaller, ``Who
Suffers During Recessions?'' Journal of Economic Perspectives (Summer
2012), pp. 27-48. https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/
jep.26.3.27.
\75\ Lauren Bauer and Jay Shambaugh, ``Workers with Low Levels of
Education Still Haven't Recovered From the Recession,'' The Hamilton
Project (September 2018), pp. 1-4, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/blog/
employment_rate_gap_workers_with_low_levels_of_education_
still_havent_recov.
\76\ Brian Thiede and Shannon Monnat, ``The Great Recession and
America's Geography of Unemployment'' Demographic Research (September
2016), pp. 891-928. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC5486972/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Workers with less education may be hit harder by recessions in part
because when unemployment rises, employers may raise the skill
requirements for positions: one study found that a one-percentage-point
increase in the local unemployment rate raises the fraction of jobs
requiring a bachelor's degree by about 0.4 percentage points and the
fraction of jobs requiring 2 or more years of experience by about 0.8
percentage points.\77\ Evidence also suggests that for workers entering
the labor market during a recession, the effects can be long-lasting:
those workers had reduced earnings that persisted up to 10 years into
workers' careers, and the effect was most pronounced for those with
less than a high school education, driven by greater losses in
employment.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ Alicia Modestino, Daniel Shoag, and Joshua Balance,
``Upskilling: Do Employers Demand Greater Skill When Skilled Workers
are Plentiful?'' Harvard Kennedy School Taubman Center for State and
Local Government (May 2015), pp. 1-4. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/
sites/default/files/centers/taubman/files/Upskilling.pdf.
\78\ Hannes Schwandt and Till von Wachter, ``Unlucky Cohorts:
Estimating the Long-Term Effects of Entering the Labor Market in a
Recession in Large Cross-Sectional Data Sets,'' Journal of Labor
Economics, Vol. 37, No. 51 (January 2019), S161-S198, https://
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/701046.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The majority of adult SNAP participants without dependents have a
high school diploma or lower educational attainment. Evidence shows
that workers with a high school diploma or less have higher
unemployment rates, lower employment rates, experience greater
employment losses during economic downturns, and recover more slowly.
The overall unemployment rate therefore will significantly overstate
the employment opportunities available to less-educated workers,
particularly during a recession and the aftermath. FNS does not appear
to have considered any of this research in developing this proposal. We
urge FNS to carefully review this literature, which demonstrates that
because adults with less education, typically have higher unemployment
rates than the overall average in their area, the proposed unemployment
rate floor would be a much higher rate for adults with less education,
the majority of childless adults.
Over Two-Fifths of Childless Adult SNAP Participants Aged 18-49 Are
African American or Latino, Groups That Experience Higher
Unemployment Rates and More Employment Discrimination
Over \1/4\ of childless adult SNAP participants targeted by the
time limit are African American and approximately 20 percent are
Latino.\79\ These groups, particularly African Americans, also have
higher unemployment rates than white Americans and are more affected by
recessions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ CBPP analysis of FY 2017 USDA Household Characteristics data,
the March 2018 Current Population Survey, and 2017 American Community
Survey (ACS) 1 year estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Black and Latino workers generally have higher unemployment rates
than white Americans. According to data published by the BLS, in the
fourth quarter of 2018, for example, the overall unemployment rate was
3.6 percent and 3.2 percent for white workers, but Latinos had an
unemployment rate of 4.3 percent, and the unemployment rate for African
Americans was 6.1 percent.\80\ In fact, for about the past 4 decades,
unemployment rates among black workers have been about double those of
white workers.\81\ This relationship is true even when comparing
unemployment rates for those with similar education levels. The
unemployment rate among African American workers with less than a high
school education in 2018 was 10.4 percent, more than double the
unemployment rate of whites with the same education level, which was
5.1 percent. Black high school graduates had unemployment rates of 6.7
percent in 2018, close to double the unemployment rate for white high
school graduates in 2018, of 3.5 percent.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ ``Table E-16. Unemployment Rates by age, sex, race, and
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity,'' Bureau of Labor Statistics, revised
January 4, 2019, https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm.
\81\ Valerie Wilson, ``Before the State of the Union, a fact check
on black unemployment,'' Economic Policy Institute, February 2019, pp.
1-4. https://www.epi.org/blog/before-the-state-of-the-union-a-fact-
check-on-black-unemployment/.
\82\ ``Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey,
Table 7. Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional population
25 years and over by educational attainment, sex, race, and Hispanic or
Latino ethnicity,'' Bureau of Labor Statistics, revised January 18,
2019, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat07.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These disparities are also found at the local level. Researchers
have found significant racial disparities in labor force statistics
within the same city, which may be explained in part by complex and
deeply rooted factors such as industry concentration, investments in
housing and infrastructure, and demographic trends. Chicago, San
Francisco, Washington, and the borough of Manhattan all had relatively
low black employment rates in 2015 (56, 53, 64, and 62 percent,
respectively), and white employment rates that were at least 20
percentage points higher (83, 84, 88, and 85 percent,
respectively).\83\ It is unclear if the Department considered the
consistently high unemployment rates among African American and Latino
workers when proposing a minimum unemployment rate floor of seven
percent, which would essentially be an unemployment rate that is close
to 14 percent for African Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Martha Ross and Natalie Holmes, ``Employment by Race and
Place: Snapshots of America,'' Brookings Institution, February 2017,
pp. 1-16. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/02/27/
employment-by-race-and-place-snapshots-of-america/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employment outcomes for African Americans are also more affected by
the business cycle than white Americans. One study found that over the
period of 1990 through 2004, as the unemployment rate increased by one
percentage point, men were 0.16 percentage points more likely to become
unemployed, but this rate rose to 0.27 percentage points for African
American men. Black men were also less likely to transition from
unemployment to employment than white men, though the researchers found
that this relationship didn't change significantly during the business
cycle, the same study found. These results control for differences in
education and other characteristics.\84\ Another study found that black
and Latino workers are more likely to work part-time for economic
reasons than white workers, even after controlling for other
demographic and economic differences between the groups. This analysis
found that this involuntary part-time work rose for all groups during
the Great Recession, but recovered much more quickly for white men than
for black men, with black men much less likely to transition from part-
time to full-time work in the years following the recession than white
men.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Kenneth Couch and Robert Fairlie, ``Last Hired First Fired?
Black-White Unemployment and the Business Cycle,'' Demography (February
2010), pp. 227-247. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3000014/.
\85\ Tomaz Cajner, et al., ``Racial Gaps in Labor Market Outcomes
in the Last Four Decades and over the Business Cycle,'' Federal Reserve
Board, June 2017, pp. 1-33, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2996084.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple deep-rooted factors contribute to these employment
disparities. For example, decades of discriminatory housing policies
have contributed to unequal access to quality education for black
children, which may affect employment opportunities later in life.\86\
In addition to these complex causes, a large body of research also
demonstrates that employer discrimination contributes to higher
unemployment rates among African Americans, especially compared to
white Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ Richard Rothstein, ``The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated
Schools, and Segregated Neighborhoods--A Constitutional Insult,''
Economic Policy Institute, November 12, 2014, https://www.epi.org/
publication/the-racial-achievement-gap-segregated-schools-and-
segregated-neighborhoods-a-constitutional-insult/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Researchers have conducted dozens of field studies over the past 3
decades in which they have compared outcomes for otherwise identical
job applications that differ only by racial or ethnic markers (such as
identical resumes with distinct names). One meta-analysis of such
studies found that white applicants receive 36 percent more callbacks
than African Americans with the same qualifications, and 24 percent
more callbacks than Latinos. They found there was little change in the
callback disparities between white and black Americans over the 25
years studied, from 1990 to 2015, and a slight reduction in the
disparities between Latino and white applicants, though barely
statistically significant.\87\ We strongly urge FNS to review all of
these studies, as they help explain why an unemployment rate is an
especially poor predictor of job availability for African American
workers, who may not be hired for available jobs due to discrimination.
For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ Lincoln Quillian, et al., ``Meta-Analysis of Field Experiments
Shows No Change in Racial Discrimination in Hiring Over Time,''
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America (April 2017), pp. 1-6, https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/
09/11/1706255114.

Two field studies, in Milwaukee and New York City, found
consistently higher callbacks for white applicants compared to
African American applicants. Both studies had young men (ages
21 to 24) play the role of job applicants. They were matched
with applicants with similar appearance and verbal and social
skills, and presented with similar resumes demonstrating
similar levels of education and job experience, and they
received job interview training to be similarly prepared. In
both Milwaukee and New York, white applicants received
callbacks or job offers at roughly double the rate of African
American applicants.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Devah Pager and Bruce Western, ``Identifying Discrimination at
Work: The Use of Field Experiments,'' Journal of Social Issues (2012)
pp. 221-237, http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/pager/files/
identifying_discrimination_pager_western.pdf?m=1462807104.

Another field study found that black applicants were about
\1/2\ as likely to receive a callback as white applicants. This
study also found that white applicants who were recently
released from prison had similar levels of callbacks as black
and Latino applicants: whites with criminal records obtained
positive responses in 17.2 percent of job applications,
compared to 15.4 percent for Latinos and 13.0 percent for
blacks.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Bart Bonikowski,
``Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment,''
American Sociological Review (October 2009), pp. 777-799, http://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/bonikowski/files/pager-western-bonikowski-
discrimination-in-a-low-wage-labor-market.pdf.

One field experiment found that when comparing outcomes of
identical resumes with names that were typically associated
with white or black identities, white applicants had a 50
percent higher chance of being called back.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, ``Are Emily and
Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on
Labor Market Discrimination,'' National Bureau of Economic Research
(July 2003), pp. 1-27 https://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.

While they make up a small share of childless adults subject to the
time limit, Native Americans are likely to be disproportionately
affected by this proposed rule given the estimate that many Tribal
reservations may lose waiver eligibility, as outlined in Chapter 1.
Native Americans also traditionally have higher unemployment rates and
worse labor force outcomes than white Americans, in part due to sparse
job opportunities on or near Tribal and other rural areas and the
legacy of historical factors contributing to lower educational
attainment and other barriers to employment. (Figure 3.2.) \91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Ed Bolen and Stacy Dean, ``Waivers Add Key State Flexibility
to SNAP's Three-Month Time Limit,'' Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, updated February 6, 2018, https://www.cbpp.org/research/
food-assistance/waivers-add-key-state-flexibility-to-snaps-three-month-
time-limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3.2
Native Americans Face Higher Unemployment
2006-2018 annual averages

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Note: ``Native American'' refers to individuals identifying
as American Indian or Alaska Native alone or in combination
with some other racial category. ``White'' refers to
individuals identifying as white alone. Both Native American
and white data includes Hispanics.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population
Survey.

This evidence shows that black and Latino workers as well as Native
American workers, have historically and consistently higher
unemployment rates than white workers, and that these outcomes cannot
be explained solely by differences in education or other
characteristics. Significant numbers of individuals subject to the time
limit therefore are in groups that experience unemployment rates that
are significantly higher than that of their state or local area. An
unemployment rate floor would therefore disallow states from requesting
waivers from areas where black and Latino workers have few job
opportunities, even if the general unemployment rate for their area is
relatively low. If implemented, this proposal would therefore
disproportionately harm black, Latino and Native American adults
subject to the time limit. This disparate impact of this policy is
therefore in conflict with 7 U.S.C. 2020(c)(2), which establishes
that program administration of SNAP must be consistent with existing
civil rights law.
Childless Adult SNAP Participants Are More Likely to Work in Jobs With
High Rates of Un- And Underemployment and Instability
The individuals who are targeted by the time limit do work, but in
occupations where workers experience instability, including
underemployment, gaps in employment, and higher unemployment rates. The
general unemployment rate for the area therefore does not reflect the
unemployment rates for workers such as those in service occupations,
who are more likely to be unemployed at any given time than other
workers.
SNAP participants who work generally work in service or sales
occupations, such as cashiers, cooks, home health aides, janitors, or
drivers.\92\ A recent study of SNAP E&T participants, which includes
many childless adult SNAP participants ages 18-49, found that sales and
service occupations, such as cashiers and food preparation workers,
were among the most common reported by participants.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ ``SNAP Helps 1 in 10 Workers in the United States Put Food on
the Table,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised November
2018, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
factsheets_11-27-18fa_us.pdf.
\93\ Gretchen Rowe, Elizabeth Brown, and Brian Estes, ``SNAP
Employment and Training (E&T) Characteristics Study: Final Report,''
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Services,
revised October 2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/SNAPEandTCharacteristics.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are higher unemployment rates among workers in many of these
occupations. People who report their occupation as a service occupation
had unemployment rates about 23 percent higher than the general
unemployment rate in 2018, with food preparation and serving workers
reporting unemployment rates about 56 percent higher than the overall
average.\94\ One analysis that looked at working-age workers who did
not receive disability income and did not have young children in the
household found that unemployment rates among those individuals were
especially high for cashiers, housekeepers, and laborers in 2017.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ ``Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey,
Table 25, Annual Averages, Unemployed persons by occupation and sex,''
Bureau of Labor Statistics, revised January 18, 2019, https://
www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat25.htm.
\95\ Kristin Butcher and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, ``Most
Workers in Low-Wage Labor Market Work Substantial Hours, in Volatile
Jobs,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised July 24, 2018,
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-24-18pov.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low-skill and low-wage workers are also more likely to be working
part time for economic reasons, and to cycle in and out of the labor
force. For example, one study found that the share of workers in low-
skill jobs (classified by the types of tasks required, which are manual
and routine, as opposed to cognitive and non-routine) who were working
part time involuntarily was about three times that of workers in the
highest-skill occupations (11 percent versus 3 percent), and another
found that involuntary part-time workers were concentrated in the
retail trade and hospitality industries.\96\ Another study observed a
broader trend of workers cycling in and out of the labor force.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ Maria E. Canon, Marianna Kudlyak, Guannan Luo, and Marisa
Reed, ``Flows To and From Working Part Time for Economic Reasons and
the Labor Market Aggregates During and After the 2007-09 Recession,''
Economic Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 2, Second Quarter 2014, Pp.87-111.
https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/
research/economic_
quarterly/2014/q2/kudlyak.pdf; Lonnie Golden, ``Still falling short on
hours and pay,'' Economic Policy Institute, December 5, 2016, https://
www.epi.org/publication/still-falling-short-on-hours-and-pay-part-time-
work-becoming-new-normal/#epi-toc-8.
\97\ John Coglianese ``The Rise of In-and-Outs: Declining Labor
Force Participation of Prime Age Men,'' Working Paper, February 28,
2018, https://scholar.harvard.edu/coglianese/publications/rise-of-in-
and-outs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the reasons why these workers might have higher rates of un-
and underemployment and non-labor force participation is higher
turnover: because these occupations lack stability, workers are
likelier to move in and out of jobs, and likelier to be unemployed or
out of the labor force at a given time or take a part-time job when
they would desire a full-time job. Low-paying jobs often have irregular
schedules that change from week to week. Workers in low-wage jobs are
sometimes given little notice of schedule changes or are expected to be
on call, and are more likely to work part-time hours when they would
prefer a full-time schedule.\98\ Low-wage jobs are also more likely to
lack paid sick leave or other paid leave. For example, only 46 percent
of workers in jobs with average hourly wages in the bottom 25 percent
of the wage distribution had paid sick leave in 2016, compared to 91
percent of workers in the highest-paid jobs (and 72 percent
overall).\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ For more information, see Brynne Keith-Jennings and Vincent
Palacios, ``SNAP Helps Millions of Workers,'' Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, May 10, 2017, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-
assistance/snap-helps-millions-of-low-wage-workers.
\99\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits Survey, https://
www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ownership/civilian/table32a.htm. This
survey constructs hourly wage percentiles by looking at average
reported hourly wages for workers by occupation. (Because these
averages are for occupations, workers may fall into a different
percentile than their occupation as a whole if they earn more or less
than the average for their occupation.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Workers in jobs with lower wages, more volatility, and fewer
benefits are more likely to experience turnover, research shows. For
example, a study found that workers with access to paid sick leave or
paid vacation were more likely to stay in their current job. This study
found these effects even when controlling for other characteristics of
workers, such as education level or income, or characteristics of jobs
(such as the size of the firm and other benefits provided) that are
associated with more job separations.\100\ Another study that examined
data from a large chain of retailers found that workers who earned
lower wages and had more schedule volatility (which was driven by
changes in consumer demand, not by employee choice) were more likely to
leave their jobs; this study found that these effects were not due to
worker ability.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Heather Hill, ``Paid Sick Leave and Job Stability,'' Work and
Occupations, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 2013, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3825168/.
\101\ Saravanan Kesavan and Camelia Kuhnen, ``Demand fluctuations,
precarious incomes, and employee turnover,'' working paper, May 2017,
http://public.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/faculty/kuhnenc/research/
kesavan_kuhnen.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to job conditions, the lack of key supports such as
stable housing may also contribute to volatility or periods of
joblessness among low-income workers. For example, recent research
finds that low-income renters who experience a forced move (such as
following an eviction) are more likely to be laid off from their jobs,
compared to similar renters who did not experience a forced move.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ Matthew Desmond and Carl Gershenson, ``Housing and Employment
Insecurity Among the Working Poor,'' Social Problems, Vol. 63, Issue 1,
February 2016, https://academic.oup.com/socpro/article-abstract/63/1/
46/1844105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At least in part because of these conditions, workers in low-wage
jobs are more likely to be employed at jobs for shorter periods and to
experience periods of non-work. Workers with lower levels of education
(who are more likely to work in low-wage jobs) spend more weeks
unemployed than those with more education and they experience less wage
growth over the course of their lifetimes, according to studies by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics that follow workers over time. These studies
also find that younger workers with less education are more likely to
have short-term jobs of 6 months or less, compared to workers of a
similar age with more education.\103\ Workers in jobs that tend to have
low wages, such as in the leisure and hospitality industry and service
occupations, also tend to stay at jobs for shorter lengths than workers
in other jobs.\104\ We strongly urge FNS to carefully review this
research, which helps explain why unemployment rates may not capture
the dynamic nature of work for low-wage workers, who comprise the vast
majority of SNAP participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``America's Young Adults at 29:
Labor Market Activity, Education and Partner Status: Results from a
Longitudinal Survey,'' April 8, 2016, [https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/nlsyth_04082016.pdf]; Bureau of Labor Statistics,
``Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings Growth Among
the Youngest Baby Boomers: Results from a Longitudinal Survey
Summary,'' August 24, 2017, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
nlsoy.nr0.htm.
\104\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Employee Tenure in 2016,''
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Working SNAP participants often work in occupations and industries
with low wages and more volatility. Compared to all workers, a greater
share of workers who participate in SNAP are employed in service
occupations and in industries such as retail and hospitality, where
jobs are more likely to pay low wages and have other features of low
quality.\105\ Childless adults are also likely to experience gaps in
employment, despite being employed regularly. For example, one study
that compared a snapshot, December 2013, with the 24 month period
surrounding that month (January 2013 through December 2014), found that
while \3/4\ of childless adult SNAP participants were in the labor
force at some point during this period, only about \1/3\ consistently
worked at least 20 hours per week throughout the entire period.\106\
Because childless adult SNAP participants work in jobs that contribute
to periods of non-employment, unemployment rates in their area likely
do not capture their labor trends. The Department did not say whether
it considered the unemployment rate floor in the context of the types
of jobs that childless adults are likely to work in. Its lack of
transparency makes it difficult to assess the claim that individuals
subject to the time limit have access to a sufficient number of jobs in
an area with seven percent unemployment over a 2 year period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Brynne Keith-Jennings and Vincent Palacios, ``SNAP Helps
Millions of Workers,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 10,
2017, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-helps-
millions-of-low-wage-workers.
\106\ Lauren Bauer, ``Workers Could Lose SNAP Benefits Under
Trump's Proposed Rule,'' The Hamilton Project, December 2018, http://
www.hamiltonproject.org/blog/workers_could_lose_
snap_benefits_under_trumps_proposed_rule.
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Many Childless Adult SNAP Participants Have Health Conditions That
Limit Their Ability to Work
While adults are exempt from the time limit if they are ``medically
certified as physically or mentally unfit for employment,'' \107\
evidence suggests that many childless adult non-elderly SNAP
participants have health conditions that serve as a barrier to
employment. These adults may not fit the state's definition of ``unfit
for work'' or may struggle to understand the rules or document their
condition in order to obtain an exemption. Research shows that adults
with disabilities and other health issues tend to have higher
unemployment rates and fewer employment opportunities than individuals
without such conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ 7 CFR 273.24(c)(2).
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Various sources illustrate the health conditions that many
childless adult SNAP participants have. Survey data indicate that among
individuals aged 18 through 49 who do not receive disability benefits
or identify as disabled, nor have children in their household, about
\1/5\ report a health problem or disability that prevents them from
working or limits the type of work they can do, report leaving the job
or the labor force due to disability, or report not having worked in
the last year due to disability.\108\ Research funded by FNS reports
that state caseworkers found multiple barriers to employment among
individuals subject to the time limit as they worked to implement
welfare reform's time limits and work requirements. The most frequently
cited barriers included medical or mental health issues, or substance
use disorders.\109\ A detailed study of childless adults who were
referred to a work experience program in Franklin County (Columbus),
Ohio found that \1/3\ have a mental or physical limitation, including
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, mental or learning
disabilities, or physical injuries.\110\ A more recent study of
characteristics of employment and training participants, which includes
many childless adults ages 18-49, found that about 30 percent of E&T
participants identified health issues as a barrier to employment.\111\
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\108\ CBPP analysis of the March 2018 Current Population Survey.
\109\ John L. Czajka, et al., ``Imposing a Time Limit on Food Stamp
Receipt: Implementation of the Provisions and Effects on Food Stamp
Program Participation, Volume I,'' U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food
and Nutrition Service, September 2001, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/
sites/default/files/abawd.pdf.
\110\ ``A Comprehensive Assessment of Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents and Their Participation in the Work Experience Program in
Franklin County, Ohio,'' Ohio Association of Foodbanks, revised 2015,
http://ohiofoodbanks.org/wep/WEP-2013-2015-report.pdf.
\111\ Gretchen Rowe, Elizabeth Brown, and Brian Estes, ``SNAP
Employment and Training (E&T) Characteristics Study: Final Report,''
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Services,
revised October 2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/SNAPEandTCharacteristics.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research finds that people with disabilities tend to face greater
barriers to employment and have worse labor force outcomes than
individuals without disabilities. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, for
example, finds that the unemployment rate among working-age individuals
with a disability (ages 16 to 64), was ten percent in 2017, more than
double the unemployment rate for working-age individuals without a
disability, which was 4.2 percent.\112\ Earlier BLS research describes
some of the barriers to employment that individuals with disabilities
identified. About \1/2\ of the individuals who were out of the labor
force or unemployed in May 2012 identified experiencing these
challenges, with the most common being that their own disability
limited their work ability, and with smaller shares identifying a lack
of training, lack of transportation, or the need for
accommodations.\113\ Other research has identified challenges
jobseekers with disabilities face, such as difficulty finding
appropriate jobs (which could include difficulty finding jobs that
provide appropriate accommodations), lack of social networks to
facilitate job connection, or lack of accessible transportation for
job-seeking.\114\ Research has also documented that employers'
attitudes may also harm jobseekers with disabilities, as employers may
inadvertently underestimate the capacity of individuals with
disabilities.\115\
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\112\ ``Economic News Release: Table 1, Employment status of the
civilian noninstitutional population by disability status and selected
characteristics, 2018 annual averages,'' Bureau of Labor Statistics,
revised June 21, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.t01.htm.
\113\ ``Persons With a Disability: Barriers to Employment, Types of
Assistance, and Other Labor-Related Issues,'' Bureau of Labor
Statistics, revised April 24, 2013, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/dissup.pdf.
\114\ Pamela Loprest and Elaine Maag, ``Barriers to and Supports
for Work Among Adults with Disabilities: Results from the NHIS-D,'' The
Urban Institute, January 2001, pp. 1-22, https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/dissup.pdf.
\115\ Katrina Vornholt, et al., ``Disability and Employment--
Overview and Highlights,'' European Journal of Work and Organizational
Psychology (2018), pp. 40-55, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/
10.1080/1359432X.2017.1387536.
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Many childless adults report physical or mental health conditions
that limit their ability to find a job and to work, and research shows
that adults with disabilities face higher unemployment rates. While
some of these individuals may be exempt from the time limit based on
disability, others face difficulty documenting their health conditions,
or have conditions that fall short of the ``unfit for work'' standard.
Imposing an unemployment rate floor for 20 percent standard waivers
would therefore cause many areas to lose waivers where individuals with
health conditions are unable to find jobs. The Department did not
address the disparate impact of the proposed rule on people with
disabilities and other health conditions.
Childless Non-Elderly Adults Seeking Work May Face Geographic or
Transportation Limitations With Respect to Available Jobs
As stated above, about \2/5\ each of childless adult SNAP
participants without disabilities live in urban or suburban areas, and
about 15 percent live in rural areas. Many rural areas have stalled
economic development, which may result in relatively few job
opportunities available. Even in urban or suburban areas where jobs may
be more plentiful, many workers face transportation limitations to
access those jobs. Some childless adults may face obstacles to finding
work based on geographic factors.
Individuals living in rural areas are less likely to be employed
than other areas. Factors such as out-migration of younger workers and
the aging of the remaining workforce, and declining infrastructure and
investment have contributed to this trend. Beginning in the 1970s, the
share of men with less than a high school education who are employed
has declined more in rural areas than in urban areas. By 2016, only
about 50 percent of these men with lower educational attainment were
employed, about 15 percentage points lower than men without a high
school diploma in urban areas.\116\ While both rural and urban counties
saw steep employment losses that began recovering in 2010, the recovery
stalled for rural counties, contributing to a significant employment
gap between rural and urban counties, according to a 2014 USDA study.
Counties with large share of African Americans saw greater impacts from
the recession, which can only partially be explained by factors such as
industry mix or educational composition of those counties, this study
found.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ James Ziliak, ``Restoring Economic Opportunity for `The
People Left Behind': Employment Strategies for Rural America,'' Aspen
Institute, revised 2019. https://www.aspeninstitute.org/longform/
expanding-economic-opportunity-for-more-americans/restoring-economic-
opportunity-for-the-people-left-behind-employment-strategies-for-rural-
america/.
\117\ Tom Hertz, et al., ``Rural Employment Trends in Recession and
Recovery,'' U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service,
revised August 2014, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/
45258/48731_err172.pdf?v=0.
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In addition to individuals living in rural areas may facing
significant challenges to finding work, many individuals in all types
of areas do not have access to available jobs, either because their
skills do not align with the job requirements, or because
transportation options to those jobs are inadequate. In these areas,
the area unemployment rate is an especially poor proxy for jobs
available to those individuals, if such jobs are inaccessible. We
strongly urge FNS to carefully review all of the below studies, which
are key to understanding why an unemployment rate for an area does not
accurately portray the number of jobs available to the individuals
subject to the time limit.

The number of jobs within a typical commuting distance in
major metro areas fell by seven percent between 2000 and 2012,
with steeper losses for Latino and African American residents,
which fell by 17 and 14 percent respectively, and for residents
with income below the poverty line, which fell by 17 percent,
compared to six percent for non-poor residents. The majority of
Census tracts with high poverty rates or a majority of
residents of color experienced losses in accessible jobs.\118\
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\118\ Elizabeth Kneebone and Natalie Holmes, ``The Growing Distance
Between People and Jobs in Metropolitan America,'' Metropolitan Policy
Program at Brookings, March 2015, pp. 1-24, http://kedc.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/Brookings_JobCommuteDistance2015.pdf.

In a number of metropolitan areas, low-income workers live
far from available jobs, one recent study found by comparing
the distance between the residence of low-wage jobseekers and
job postings based on data from an online marketplace for
hourly jobs. This study found, for example, that in 12 major
metropolitan areas, within at least nine percent of [ZIP C]odes
in each area, job postings far exceeded jobseekers in those
[ZIP C]odes.\119\ In some of these cities such as San
Francisco, jobs may be clustered in areas of the city where
housing costs are high, and low-wage job-seekers live farther
away and have limited transit options. For example, in Boston,
low-wage job postings far exceed the number of applicants in 41
percent of [ZIP C]odes, and in New York, San Francisco,
Chicago, Minneapolis, and Denver, available jobs far outnumber
job seekers in about \1/4\ or more of [ZIP C]odes. There are
also many pockets of metropolitan areas with the opposite
issue, where many job seekers are clustered, but available jobs
are far from where they live. This is the case for over \1/2\
of the [ZIP C]odes in Atlanta and Miami, where job applicants
far outweigh open jobs (measured as [ZIP C]odes in the bottom
quintile of job seekers minus job postings within 6.3 miles of
the [ZIP C]ode's center). In cities such as Columbus, Detroit,
Austin, and Nashville, there are far more job applicants then
there are available jobs in over \1/4\ of [ZIP C]odes. In many
cities in the study such as Columbus, Nashville, Dallas, and
Washington, D.C., sizable shares of [ZIP C]odes have both
problems, demonstrating the mismatch between the distribution
of available jobs and workers.\120\
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\119\ The researchers identified [ZIP C]odes where job postings
``far exceeded'' jobseekers as [ZIP C]odes that are in the top quintile
of job seekers minus job postings within 6.3 miles of the [ZIP C]ode's
population-weighted centroid, which is the average distance between job
seekers and applicants in their dataset.
\120\ Christina Stacy, Brady Meixell, and Serena Lei. ``Too Far
from Jobs: Spatial Mismatch and Hourly Workers,'' Urban Institute,
February 21, 2019, https://www.urban.org/features/too-far-jobs-spatial-
mismatch-and-hourly-workers.

Increasing job accessibility, a measure of proximity to
employment opportunities relative to other nearby jobseekers,
significantly increases the chance of finding a job for African
Americans and Latinos, a 2006 study that looked at jobseekers
in three major metropolitan areas found. This shows how
disparities in access to jobs contribute to disparities in
labor market outcomes. The authors identified several factors
as contributing to this phenomenon, including that African
Americans were more likely to live in central cities farther
from suburban areas with more jobs and were less able to move
to a new neighborhood due to housing segregation and
residential discrimination; jobs were located in cheaper
suburban areas due to land use policy; and that there was a
lack of public transit options and lower car ownership rates
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
among African Americans.

This study found that increasing accessibility by one standard
deviation above the mean value would increase the probability
of completing a job search within 6 months by 61 percent for
black non-college graduates, while not increasing this effect
for white workers with similar levels of education. Having
access to a car, searching in a job-rich area, being able to
accept a longer commute, having a higher-quality social
network, and having more education were all associated with an
increase in the probability of finding a job within 6 months,
while being black or having child care concerns were associated
with a decrease in this probability. The cumulative effects of
spatial job search variables such as job accessibility or car
ownership rates accounted for about 40 percent of the gap
between the time it takes black and white jobseekers to find a
job.\121\
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\121\ Rucker Johnson, ``Landing a job in urban space: The extent
and effects of spatial mismatch,'' Regional Science and Urban Economics
(February 2006), pp. 331-372, https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/gwallace/
Papers/Johnson%20(2006).pdf.

Increased job accessibility reduced the length of time it
took recently laid-off workers in nine metropolitan areas to
find a job. This study looked specifically at jobseekers who
had been employed but laid off to ensure that these individuals
were searching for reasons unrelated to characteristics
associated with higher unemployment. It found that ``an
increase in one unit in job accessibility (from ^0.5 to 0.5) is
approximately equal to an increase from the 20th to the 80th
percentile of job accessibility. Such an increase is associated
with a 5.0 percent reduction in search duration for finding any
job, and a 6.6 and 8.3 percent reduction for accessions to a
new job with 75 and 90 percent of prior job earnings,
respectively.'' Black and Hispanic workers were more sensitive
to job accessibility than were white workers.\122\
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\122\ Fredrik Andersson, et al., ``Job Displacement and the
Duration of Joblessness: The Role of Spatial Mismatch,'' National
Bureau of Economic Research (April 2014), pp. 1-50. https://
www.nber.org/papers/w20066.pdf.

An analysis of job accessibility in the Chicago metropolitan
area found that increasing job accessibility is linked with
lower unemployment. At the mean, an increase in job
accessibility of one standard deviation was associated with a
0.43-point reduction in the unemployment rate overall, a 0.57-
point reduction in the African American unemployment rate, and
a 0.47-reduction in the unemployment rate for low-income
households.\123\
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\123\ Jangik Jin and Kurt Paulsen, ``Does Accessibility Matter?
Understanding the Effect of Job Accessibility on Labour Market
Outcomes,'' Urban Studies (2018), pp. 92-115. https://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0042098016684099.

Research shows how geographic factors can influence labor market
outcomes such as employment for individuals in ways that are not
readily apparent based on unemployment rates. An individual living in
an area with a relatively low unemployment rate may not have access to
jobs for which they are qualified due to transportation limitations.
Some rural areas may have relatively low unemployment rates due in part
to low labor force participation, and individuals living there may have
relatively few job opportunities. We are concerned that when
considering an unemployment rate floor for the purposes of time limit
waivers, the Department did not appear to consider whether job
accessibility may limit the potential for childless SNAP participants
to obtain a job, even if the area in which they live has a relatively
low unemployment rate.
Childless Adult SNAP Participants Report Other Barriers That Are
Associated With Higher Unemployment Rates
The unemployment rate for the area does not reflect the
availability of jobs for adult SNAP participants because these
individuals face many disadvantages compared to the overall labor
force. In addition to some of the characteristics already discussed
that are associated with higher unemployment rates and other worse
labor force outcomes, many individuals face barriers to work that may
make it more difficult to find available jobs, complete a job search,
be selected by employers, or maintain a job once employed. Here again,
FNS' proposed rule seemed to either ignore or dismiss without
explanation the considerable research that finds that unemployment
rates do not reflect job availability for the individuals subject to
the time limit. We encourage FNS to carefully review these research,
which demonstrates how barriers to employment limit job availability
for people subject to the time limit even if the unemployment rate is
low.

Housing instability and homelessness. Several studies have
reported that some childless adult SNAP participants lack
access to stable housing and some experience homelessness. A
USDA research report looking at individuals first subject to
the time limit found that homelessness was among the barriers
that case managers reported.\124\ A GAO study that looked at
employment and training programs for childless adults also
found that some case managers reported housing difficulties as
a barrier to work; for example, Colorado officials estimated
that about 40 percent of their employment and training
participants experienced homelessness.\125\ Similarly, a more
recent USDA study of employment and training providers found
that over \2/5\ of these providers identified a lack of stable
housing as a barrier for at least a quarter of participants in
these programs, which include many adults targeted by the time
limit.\126\
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\124\ John L. Czajka, et al., ``Imposing a Time Limit on Food Stamp
Receipt: Implementation of the Provisions and Effects on Food Stamp
Program Participation, Volume I,'' U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food
and Nutrition Service, September 2001. https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/
sites/default/files/abawd.pdf.
\125\ ``Food Stamp Employment and Training Program,'' United States
General Accounting Office, revised March 2003, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/240/237571.pdf.
\126\ Gretchen Rowe, Elizabeth Brown, and Brian Estes, ``SNAP
Employment and Training (E&T) Characteristics Study: Final Report,''
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Services,
revised October 2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/SNAPEandTCharacteristics.pdf.

Barriers to work among individuals experiencing homelessness are
well-documented, including limited skills and inconsistent work
histories, lack of transportation, or physical or mental health
conditions.\127\ Those who are homeless may lack consistent
access to resources needed to maintain personal hygiene and
meet dress codes, and the sleep deprivation and stress of
lacking housing may also affect these workers. People
experiencing homelessness also lack access to a reliable
mailing address and may not have consistent access to a phone
or computer for job application and communication needs.\128\
Individuals who experience evictions are also more likely to be
laid off, research finds.\129\
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\127\ David Long, John Rio, and Jeremy Rosen. ``Employment and
Income Supports for Homeless People,'' 2007 National Symposium on
Homelessness Research, https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/180356/
report.pdf.
\128\ ``Taking Away Medicaid for Not Meeting Work Requirements
Harms People Experiencing Homelessness,'' Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, revised December 14, 2018, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/4-18-18health.pdf.
\129\ Matthew Desmond and Carl Gershenson, ``Housing and Employment
Insecurity among the Working Poor,'' Social Problems (January 2016),
pp. 1-22. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mdesmond/files/
desmondgershenson.sp2016.pdf?m=1452638824.

Criminal records. Some childless adult SNAP participants may
face additional barriers to work due to having a criminal
record. For example, a study of childless adults referred to a
work experience program in Franklin County, Ohio found that
about \1/3\ reported having a criminal record.\130\ Over \1/2\
of SNAP E&T providers reported that a significant share of
participants reported a criminal record as a barrier to
work.\131\ An in-depth interview study of SNAP participants who
experienced periods of time with no other income, approximately
\1/2\ of whom were ages 18 through 49 and who did not have
dependent children, found that about \1/5\ of study
participants had a criminal record that served as a barrier to
employment.\132\ While many of these studies have relatively
small study populations and some are focused on populations who
are more likely to have criminal justice records and are
therefore not always representative samples, it is clear that
there are individuals potentially subject to the time limit who
have experience with the criminal justice system.
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\130\ ``A Comprehensive Assessment of Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents and Their Participation in the Work Experience Program in
Franklin County, Ohio,'' Ohio Association of Foodbanks, 2014, http://
admin.ohiofoodbanks.org/uploads/news/WEP-2013-2014-report.pdf.
\131\ Gretchen Rowe, Elizabeth Brown, and Brian Estes, ``SNAP
Employment and Training (E&T) Characteristics Study: Final Report,''
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Services,
revised October 2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/SNAPEandTCharacteristics.pdf.
\132\ Claire Wilson and Brian Estes, ``Examining the Growth of the
Zero-Income SNAP Caseload: Characteristics, Circumstances, and Dynamics
of Zero-Income SNAP Participants,'' U.S. Department of Agriculture,
revised October 2014. https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/ZeroIncome-Vol2.pdf.

Formerly incarcerated individuals face steep barriers to work,
and as a result, on average face periods of unemployment
following release. Longitudinal studies that have tracked
prisoners upon their release, for example, find that up to \1/
2\ remain without a job 12 months after release.\133\ A recent
CBPP paper summarizes some of this research: \134\
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\133\ National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the
United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences, (Washington, D.C.:
The National Academies Press, 2014), pp. 233-259. https://www.nap.edu/
catalog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-states-
exploring-causes.
\134\ Elizabeth Wolkomir, ``How SNAP Can Better Serve the Formerly
Incarcerated,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised March
16, 2018. https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-6-
18fa.pdf.

Studies document that the majority of individuals
returning from incarceration face health conditions. For
example, one study found that \1/2\ of men and \2/3\ of
women had been diagnosed with chronic physical ailments
such as asthma, diabetes, hepatitis, or HIV/AIDS.\135\
People leaving jail and prison are three to six times
likelier than others to suffer from mental illness, another
study found.\136\
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\135\ Kamala Mallik-Kane and Christy A. Visher, ``Health and
Prisoner Reentry: How Physical, Mental, and Substance Abuse Conditions
Shape the Process of Reintegration,'' Urban Institute Justice Policy
Center, revised February 2008. https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/31491/411617-Health-and-Prisoner-Reentry.PDF.
\136\ Henry J. Steadman, et al., ``Prevalence of Serious Mental
Illness Among Jail Inmates,'' Psychiatric Services (June 2009), pp. 1-
5. https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/pdf/10.1176/ps.2009.60.6.761.

Formerly incarcerated individuals also tend to lack
education and training sought by employers. They have an
average of fewer than 12 years of education and in some
cases limited cognitive capacity, a history of behavioral
problems, or a low level of functional literacy.\137\
Furthermore, they miss out on opportunities to gain work
experience while in prison, and often do not have access to
training programs.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the
United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences, (Washington, D.C.:
The National Academies Press, 2014), pp. 233-259. https://www.nap.edu/
catalog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-states-
exploring-causes.
\138\ Bruce Western, ``Collateral Costs: Incarceration's Effect on
Economic Mobility,'' The Pew Charitable Trusts, revised 2010. https://
www.pewtrusts.org//media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/
collateralcosts1pdf.pdf.

Evidence also suggests that employers are more averse
to hiring those with criminal convictions than any other
disadvantaged group, and formerly incarcerated individuals
can also face occupational licensing and other
restrictions.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ Elizabeth Wolkomir, ``How SNAP Can Better Serve the Formerly
Incarcerated,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised March
16, 2018. https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-6-
18fa.pdf.
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Unemployment Rates Significantly Overstates Jobs Available to Childless
Adult SNAP Participants, Evidence Suggests
The preamble to the proposed rule suggests that adding an
unemployment rate floor to qualify for a waiver is necessary because
``the Department believes a floor should be set for the 20 percent
standard so that areas do not qualify for waivers when their
unemployment rates are generally considered to be normal or low.''
\140\ The Department proposes this unemployment floor to interpret the
statute which provides that states can waive areas that lack a
``sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for the
individuals,'' therefore suggesting that areas with unemployment rates
below the proposed threshold do have enough jobs to provide employment
for the individuals who are subject to the time limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ NPRM, p. 984.
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A significant body of research, provided above, demonstrates why
FNS' reasoning is flawed and lacks transparency. The area unemployment
rate is a poor proxy for employment opportunities available to adult
SNAP participants without dependent children. These individuals on
average are more likely than other workers to have limited education
and skills, experience discrimination, lack geographic access to jobs,
face housing instability, and experience other barriers to employment.
Many of these individuals likely experience multiple barriers that
affect their ability to find a job. For example, an African American
worker with less than a high school education living far from available
jobs with no reliable transportation options will likely have access to
far fewer jobs than their area unemployment rate suggests. A rural area
may have a low unemployment rate in part because of low labor force
participation, where many have given up searching for work due to few
job opportunities. Not only did FNS not provide any evidence on whether
it considered research showing how the unemployment rate overstates
jobs available based on different demographic characteristics, it also
did not provide research that shows how these economic conditions may
interact with each other and affect the opportunities to find work for
the very disadvantaged population that is subject to the time limit.
Because these adults are in many groups that have significantly
higher unemployment rates than the overall unemployment rate for their
area, the proposed unemployment rate floor would likely disqualify many
areas where these individuals have few opportunities. The unemployment
rate among the group of individuals subject to the time limit in a
county with a seven percent unemployment rate is likely much higher
than seven percent. Under the proposed regulation, states would be much
less effective at identifying areas where there are not enough jobs for
the individuals subject to the time limit, as many of these areas would
have overall unemployment rates below the proposed threshold. The
Department did not discuss how the unemployment rate relates to job
availability for individuals subject to the time limit. It appears FNS
ignored the considerable research that shows how the individuals
subject to the time limit belong to demographic groups with much higher
unemployment rates than the average or face barriers to accessing jobs.
Without this research, it is difficult to understand how it came to the
conclusion that a seven percent 2 year unemployment rate (or a 1 year
unemployment rate of ten percent) accurately captures the number of
jobs available to this population.
C. Citation of Labor Surplus Area Unemployment Floor Inappropriate for
this Population
The Department cites the fact that the Department of Labor (DOL)
has an unemployment floor in its classification of Labor Surplus Areas
(LSAs) as support for its proposal to impose a similar floor for the
purposes of waiver criteria, implying its approach is consistent with
DOL's. The Department, however, proposes a higher floor than DOL uses
without providing evidence, when research suggests if anything the
floor for this population would be substantially lower than DOL's. The
Department also fails to acknowledge that DOL uses a ten percent
ceiling in its identification of LSAs, demonstrating that its citation
of LSAs is either misleading or based on incomplete information.
In the preamble for the rule, the Department explained how the DOL
has an unemployment rate floor for Labor Surplus Areas, implying that
implementing an unemployment rate floor for an area to qualify for a
waiver based on having unemployment rates 20 percent above the national
average would be appropriate to be consistent with DOL's approach.\141\
Labor Surplus Areas are areas that DOL identifies as having a ``surplus
of labor'' based on having an unemployment rate of 20 percent higher
than the national average for a designated 24 month period. Federal,
state, and local agencies use LSA designations for multiple purposes.
Executive Order 12073 required executive agencies to ``emphasize
procurement set asides in order to strengthen our nation's economy.''
\142\ DOL lists several other agencies that use Labor Surplus Areas,
such as ``The Small Business Administration uses the LSA list for bid
selections for small business awards in Historically Underutilized
Business Zones (HUBZones).'' \143\
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\141\ NPRM, p. 983.
\142\ Executive Order 12073, Federal procurement in labor surplus
areas, 43 FR 36873, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 216, https://
www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/
12073.html.
\143\ U.S. Department of Labor, ``Labor Surplus Areas: Frequently
Asked Questions,'' https://www.doleta.gov/programs/lsa_faq.cfm.
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DOL has an unemployment rate floor so that the minimum unemployment
rate used for identification of LSAs is at least six percent. DOL also
has an unemployment rate ceiling; when national unemployment is high
enough that 20 percent above the national average exceeds ten percent
unemployment over 2 years, DOL will designate LSAs that have
unemployment rates above ten percent.\144\ DOL also allows states to
demonstrate that areas meet alternative criteria to demonstrate an
exceptional circumstance, such as a recent 3 month unemployment rate at
the threshold required for LSA designation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department established identification of Labor Surplus Areas as
one of a non-exhaustive list of methods of demonstrating ``insufficient
jobs'' in its original 1996 guidance, and it was codified as an example
in the final 2001 regulation.\145\ The guidance and final rule also
allowed states to use similar data demonstrating unemployment rates
that are 20 percent above the national average for a 24 month period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ USDA, ``Guidance for States Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp
Limits,'' December 3, 1996 and Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 11,
January 17, 2001. P. 4462. https://www.federalregister.gov/d/01-1025/p-
205.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FNS decided, in its 1996 guidance and 2001 regulation, to include
LSA designation as one of many ways that states can demonstrate that an
area lacks sufficient jobs. This decision likely reflects the fact that
unemployment rates are readily available on a monthly basis and are
statistically reliable for sub-state areas. There are few alternative
measures available at the state and local level that states can use to
demonstrate a lack of jobs. For example, at the national and state
level there are measures such as ``alternative measures of labor
underutilization,'' a broader set of metrics that include ``discouraged
workers,'' who are workers who want a job but have not recently
searched for work because they believe no jobs are available to them,
as well as others such as workers who would like to work full time but
can only find a part-time job.\146\ Those metrics cannot be reliably
calculated at the sub-state level. It is reasonable to use metrics
developed by DOL for the express purposes of identifying areas with
excess labor compared to jobs, given that these metrics can facilitate
the process for states. It is also reasonable, however, to adapt these
criteria to more accurately capture the intent of the law, which is to
capture jobs available for a sub-population. Current regulations make
such an adaptation by adopting the ``20 percent standard'' without a
floor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Alternative Measures of Labor
Underutilization for States, 2018 Annual Averages.'' https://
www.bls.gov/lau/stalt.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In proposing to use a similar unemployment floor to that used by
DOL in the LSA designation, the Department does not consider that while
a specific floor may be appropriate for DOL's purposes in establishing
LSAs, the waiver criteria are meant to represent a fully distinct
concept from LSAs and therefore adapting them to the different purpose
of waiver criteria is necessary and appropriate. The Department
correctly notes that waiver criteria do not currently require an area
to meet a specific threshold if the area's unemployment rate is above
the national average, unlike the LSA criteria.
These measures are meant to serve different purposes, however:

The suggested criteria for waivers of the time limit are
meant to establish a lack of ``sufficient jobs'' for a specific
sub-population, childless adult SNAP participants, which faces
labor market disadvantages. As noted in section B above,
childless adult SNAP participants belong to groups that have
higher unemployment rates than their local area, which makes
defining a specific unemployment rate at which those
individuals have access to enough jobs difficult, if not
impossible. For example, since this group may experience
unemployment rates that are double the rates of their area, a
six percent or seven percent unemployment rate ``floor'' would
mean a 12 or 14 percent unemployment rate for this group of
individuals. At any unemployment rate threshold, it is likely
that large groups of childless adult SNAP participants would
not have access to available jobs given their serious barriers
to work. Given the uncertainty and difficulty in establishing
whether there are jobs available for this population, not
requiring a specific unemployment rate threshold appropriately
allows for greater flexibility in determining areas with
insufficient jobs.

LSAs, on the other hand, establish the economic condition of
an area to enable prioritization of procurement contracts and
economic development purposes. In creating the threshold for
LSAs, DOL does not need to consider whether jobs are available
for specific types of individuals, and instead is focused on
understanding the macroeconomic conditions of an area in order
to direct economic stimulus. It therefore may be reasonable for
the Department of Labor to establish specific thresholds that
meet those criteria for those purposes, given that the criteria
attempt to establish levels at which economic stimulus is
needed.

In citing Labor Surplus Areas as a reason to implement an
unemployment rate floor, the Department also fails to acknowledge the
unemployment rate ceiling that DOL uses in LSA designation. Not only
does DOL have an unemployment rate floor of six percent unemployment in
its criteria for LSA designation, it also has an unemployment rate
ceiling of ten percent unemployment. This means that when designating
LSAs, the unemployment rate threshold DOL uses is 20 percent above the
national average but not more than ten percent. The Department not only
does not acknowledge this fact, it suggests this unemployment rate as a
possible floor for the time limit:

The Department would also like to receive comments on
establishing a floor of ten percent for the 20 percent
standard. A ten percent floor would allow for even fewer
waivers than the other options and would result in the work
requirements being applied in almost all areas of the
country.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ NPRM, p. 984.

DOL establishes this unemployment rate ceiling for LSA designation
in recognition that a sustained level of unemployment at ten percent is
adequately high to demonstrate that an area has severe labor market
weakness. These criteria ensure that during times of widespread
elevated unemployment, areas can qualify without having exceptionally
high unemployment rates. For example, the LSA list in Fiscal Year 2012
was based on unemployment rates between January 2009 and December 2010,
during the height of the Great Recession when national unemployment was
9.5 percent, and 20 percent above that would have been 11.4
percent.\148\ Areas were also eligible in Fiscal Year 2013 and Fiscal
Year 2014 with ten percent unemployment for the same reason.\149\
Without a ceiling, many areas that were struggling during the height of
the recession and recovery would have been ineligible for LSA
designation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ Department of Labor, ``Labor Surplus Area Classification
under Executive Orders 12073 and 10582 2012,'' https://www.doleta.gov/
lsa/Archived/2011-2012/Federal_Register_
2012_Final.pdf.
\149\ Department of Labor, ``Labor Surplus Area Classification
under Executive Orders 12073 and 10582 2013'' https://www.doleta.gov/
lsa/Archived/2012-2013/Federal_Register_
2013_Final.pdf; Department of Labor, ``Labor Surplus Area
Classification under Executive Orders 12073 and 10582 2014,'' https://
www.doleta.gov/lsa/Archived/2013-2014/2013-
2014_LSA_Federal_Register_Notice.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FNS therefore is proposing to pick and choose which features of LSA
designation to adapt to the proposed regulation without discussion of
why it made this choice, or even acknowledgement of this choice. The
Department proposes on one hand to implement an unemployment rate floor
for an area to qualify under the ``20 percent standard,'' but does not
propose a similar unemployment rate ceiling. In fact, the Department
proposes what DOL recognizes as a sufficiently high unemployment rate
to qualify for a ceiling, ten percent unemployment, as a possible
unemployment rate floor. The Department therefore proposes to ensure
that unemployment rates in an area must meet a standard to demonstrate
they are high but is not proposing a means of limiting this threshold
during a recession to ensure that the unemployment rate threshold does
not provide too high a bar that it would substantially bar areas
suffering from a recession. The Department does not explain why it
chose to adopt an unemployment rate floor similar to that used in LSA
criteria but not an unemployment rate ceiling, and it does not mention
the LSA ceiling. This oversight is particularly perplexing given our
research review which indicates if anything, the LSA criteria as is are
very stringent for waiver criteria given the barriers to employment
childless adult SNAP participants face, which would recommend no floor
or a very low floor if any at all.
Without any explanation, it appears that by imposing a floor and
not a ceiling for the 20 percent standard, the Department considers for
the purposes of measuring whether an area lacks adequate jobs for
childless adult SNAP participants that there is a level of unemployment
that is low enough to ensure that adequate jobs are available, but not
a level high enough to signify that there likely are not enough jobs.
Again, without this information, it is difficult to assess the evidence
that the Department used in proposing an unemployment rate floor,
especially given that the Department's choice seems to contradict all
available economic evidence indicating that unemployment rates are a
poor proxy for jobs for this population.
D. Citation of ``Natural Rate of Unemployment'' Incorrectly Assumes
This Is a Fixed and Accurately Measurable Concept
The Department uses the macroeconomic concept of the ``natural rate
of unemployment'' to justify its proposed unemployment rate threshold.
This use of this concept inappropriately applies a macroeconomic
concept and inaccurately displays economic consensus. The preamble
states:

The Department believes a floor should be set for the 20
percent standard so that areas do not qualify for waivers when
their unemployment rates are generally considered to be normal
or low. The ``natural rate of unemployment'' is the rate of
unemployment expected given normal churn in the labor market,
with unemployment rates lower than the natural rate tending to
result in inflationary pressure on prices. Thus, unemployment
rates near or below the ``natural rate of unemployment'' are
more indicative of the normal delay in unemployed workers
filling the best existing job opening for them than a ``lack of
sufficient jobs'' in an area. Generally, the ``natural rate of
unemployment'' hovers around five percent. The Department
believes that only areas with unemployment rates above the
``natural rate of unemployment'' should be considered for
waivers.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ NPRM, p. 984.

The Department appears to be suggesting that the natural rate of
unemployment is a specific unemployment rate figure that can be used in
setting a waiver floor to examine job opportunities for childless adult
SNAP participants. This reasoning is deeply flawed.
First, the so-called natural rate of unemployment is not a known or
even an observable jobless rate. It is a concept that derives from the
theoretical construct that there exists an unemployment rate that is
consistent with stable inflation. If unemployment falls below this
``natural rate,'' inflation would rise, and vice versa. More
colloquially, too low an unemployment rate, where ``too low'' means the
actual rate is below the natural rate, and the economy will overheat;
too high a jobless rate relative to the natural rate and inflation will
fall.
In theory, an estimate of the natural rate should be derivable from
observing the (negative) correlation between changes in the rate of
unemployment and that of inflation. However, because this correlation
appears to have moved toward zero over time, our ability to reliably
identify a policy-relevant natural rate, meaning one that could
fruitfully be referenced as the Department suggests in terms of their
proposal, is much diminished.
Note, for example, a recent article about this problem by economics
journalist Neil Irwin. In the article, former Fed Vice-Chairman Alan
Blinder notes that the ``confidence interval''--the band of statistical
uncertainty around the estimate--is such that the concept cannot be
usefully employed as a policy benchmark: ``If your range is 2.5 to 7,
that doesn't tell you anything.'' \151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ Neil Irwin, ``How Low Can Unemployment Really Go? Economists
Have No Idea,'' New York Times, Feb. 28. 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/02/28/upshot/how-low-can-unemployment-really-go-economists-have-
no-idea.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3.3 below reveals the problem using a standard statistical
procedure to measure the inflation/unemployment correlation. The figure
represents the coefficient from a regression of core inflation on
lagged inflation and the gap between the unemployment rate and the
Congressional Budget Office's estimate of the natural rate. The
estimates are made using ``rolling regressions,'' meaning we estimate
the model over 20 year periods, beginning with 1959-79, and advance the
sample 1 year at a time. We then plot the coefficient on the
unemployment gap variable.
In this area of economics, the measure is considered to be the
slope of the Phillips Curve, which is the curve that plots the
unemployment/inflation tradeoff. The two lines surrounding the estimate
represent the bounds of a 95 percent confidence interval around the
estimate. When these lines include zero, as they do for most of the
figure, the estimate of the slope is insignificant. In other words, in
these years, the ``natural rate'' cannot be reliably distinguished from
a range of rates that includes zero.
Figure 3.3
The ``Natural Rate'' of Unemployment Is Not Identifiable

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: CBPP Analysis of Congressional Budget Office, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, and Bureau of Economic Analysis Data.

In other words, at least by this conventional approach, the
Department cannot reliably use five percent (or any other level) as an
estimate of the natural rate, because the diminished correlation
between unemployment and inflation renders such an estimate
statistically insignificant.
Department Proposes Arbitrary Unemployment Rate Floor
Not only does the Department improperly support its proposed
unemployment rate floor with a flawed discussion of the ``natural rate
of unemployment,'' it proposes a floor that is arbitrarily and
significantly higher than what it states is the unemployment rate
consistent with the natural rate of unemployment. The Department
proposes an unemployment rate floor that is 40 percent above what it
states is ``generally'' considered the natural rate of unemployment, of
five percent. This difference is not insignificant. With a labor force
of about 160 million people, a difference of two percentage points is
equivalent to more than three million people nationwide, employed or
not. In a recent 24 month period of January 2017 through December 2018,
795 counties (or equivalent entities) had unemployment rates above five
percent, while only 155 counties had 24 month unemployment rates above
seven percent.
Considering the difference between those two metrics, it is not
clear how the Department used the concept of the natural rate in
developing this floor. These two unemployment rates, five and seven
percent, are so different that it is difficult to understand how they
are linked without more information. Furthermore, if the Department
were actually basing the proposed unemployment rate floor on a concept
that describes the level of unemployment at which inflation increases,
it would need to demonstrate how this concept relates to the specific
population or the purpose of establishing waiver criteria, which is to
interpret the ``insufficient jobs'' criterion in the law targeted
towards a disadvantaged group of individuals.
The Department's proposal for this seven percent unemployment floor
therefore suggests that it did not in fact use the natural rate of
unemployment to develop the seven percent unemployment rate floor
proposal. Either the Department used economic data relating the goals
of the unemployment rate floor to the natural rate, in which case it
lacked transparency by not providing this research, or the rate is an
arbitrary selection unrelated to the statute that the rule is
interpreting, in which case the discussion of the natural rate is
irrelevant to the actual proposal. Without an explanation of how and
why the Department used the natural rate concept to come up with a
seven percent unemployment rate floor that is related to the purposed
of the underlying statute, it is impossible to meaningfully comment.
E. Evidence Suggests That a Seven Percent Unemployment Floor Is
Inappropriately High for This Population
Not only does the Department not provide economic evidence to
support its proposed seven percent floor, evidence shows why this floor
would be inappropriate for this population. While this comment argues
that we cannot assume that any particular unemployment floor will
provide the necessary labor market opportunities to some groups of
workers, the proposed floor of seven percent is surely too high. As
Figure 3.4 below shows, using national BLS data, there were 106 months
since 1972 when the overall unemployment was between 6.5 and 7.5
percent. The average rate was 7.1 percent, about the level of the
proposed floor. But unemployment for African American and Latino
workers was a much higher 13.9 percent and 10.2 percent. White
unemployment was 6.2 percent.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ The results are very similar: blacks, 13.5 percent;
Hispanics, ten percent--when looking at minority unemployment rates
conditional on the 2 year average of overall unemployment centered on
seven percent to more closely simulate the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3.4
A 7 Percent Unemployment Floor Is Substantially Higher for Black and
Latino Workers
Unemployment rates by race/ethnicity when national unemployment is
between 6.5 and 7.5 percent

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1972-2018.

Consider that at the depth of the Great Recession (2009-10),
broadly recognized as the deepest recession since the Depression, the
overall unemployment rate hit ten percent. This was widely, and
correctly, seen as evidence of a huge, negative demand shock, one
requiring an aggressive response from both fiscal and monetary
authorities. And yet, the proposal suggests an unemployment floor that
corresponds historically to a black unemployment rate well above the
overall rate at the worst of the recession.
Other rates that have been floated suffer from the same problem
that even in the best of overall labor markets, certain groups face a
much less welcoming set of job opportunities. Table 3.1 below shows the
results from a simple regression of total rates on a constant and rates
for black and Latino workers. Even at five percent unemployment, the
African American jobless rate is predicted to be almost ten percent,
and the Latino rate is at seven percent. At rates above seven percent,
both black and Latino workers have jobless rates close to and in double
digits.

Table 3.1
Unemployment Rates and Predicted Black and Latino Unemployment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Predicted Unemployment Rates
Unemployment -----------------------------------------------
Black Latino
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% 9.6% 7.0%
7% 13.2% 9.8%
10% 18.5% 13.9%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Black and Latino unemployment rates are predicted by regressing
total unemployment rate on race-specific rates.

Turning from minorities to other less advantaged groups in the
labor market reveals similarly wide disparities between their
unemployment rates and the floor in the proposed rule.

Since 2008, the BLS has tracked unemployment among those who
self-report as disabled. In months when the unemployment rate
averaged seven percent, the disabled rate was 13 percent.

Doing the same comparison by education level (for job
seekers 25 and older, per BLS published data), yields jobless
rates of 11 percent for those with less than high school
degrees.
F. Local Areas With High Unemployment Rates for Sub-Groups
We can also see how in local areas, when the overall unemployment
rate is five, six, or seven percent, some sub-groups face much higher
unemployment rates. Of the 239 large labor market areas (metropolitan
areas) with average overall unemployment rates below seven
percent,\153\ 85 have unemployment rates that are at least 14 percent
for particularly vulnerable groups, such as adults ages 25 to 64 with
very low education, people with self-reported disabilities, and/or
black and Latino residents. The data this analysis includes are
published Census Bureau figures from the American Community Survey and
average together 5 years of data from 2013 through 2017 in order to
increase reliability.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey Table S2201.
The United States has 389 metropolitan areas overall, without regard to
unemployment rate.
\154\ To further increase reliability, we impose two additional
requirements on the comparisons. First, subgroup unemployment rates in
a given metropolitan area are only included in our analysis if they are
statistically significantly higher than the overall unemployment rate
for the area. Second, we only include estimated unemployment rates that
are at least twice as large as their margins of error.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 metropolitan areas in 2013-2017 had unemployment rates of seven
percent or less overall but at least 14 percent for the least educated
workers. For example, in the Springfield, IL metro area, for example,
the overall unemployment rate was 6.7 percent, but was 21.2 percent for
those with less than a high-school diploma. (Table 3.2.)

Table 3.2
Metropolitan Areas With 5 Year Average Unemployment Rates Less Than 7 Percent Overall but Greater Than or Equal
to 14 Percent for Workers With Less Than a High School Education
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Unemployment Unemployment Rate for
State Metropolitan Area Rate for Population 16 Workers With Less Than
Years and Over High School Education
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FL Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 6.9 16.3
ID Pocatello, ID 6.3 15.2
IL Springfield, IL 6.7 21.2
IL Peoria, IL 6.6 15.6
IN Kokomo, IN 6.5 14.2
KY Elizabethtown-Fort Knox, KY 6.7 16
MI Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 6.6 17.2
MI Monroe, MI 5.9 16.7
MO-IL St. Louis, MO-IL 6.3 14.7
NY Syracuse, NY 6.6 14.4
NY Elmira, NY 5.3 14.5
OH Canton-Massillon, OH 6.6 15.7
OH-PA Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 6.9 14.1
VA Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA 5.2 15.5
WV Parkersburg-Vienna, WV 6.1 17.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

59 metro areas in 2013-2017 had unemployment rates of seven percent
or less overall but at least 14 percent for workers with any
disability. For example, in the Peoria, IL metro area, the overall
unemployment rate was 6.6 percent, but was 18.4 percent for those with
any disability. (Table 3.3.)

Table 3.3
Metropolitan Areas With 5 Year Average Unemployment Rates Less Than 7 Percent Overall but Greater Than or Equal
to 14 Percent for Workers With Any Disability
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Unemployment Unemployment Rate for
State Metropolitan Area Rate for Population 16 Workers With a
Years and Over Disability
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AL Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL 6.7 16.3
AL Decatur, AL 6.6 17.6
AL Birmingham-Hoover, AL 6.8 15.4
AL Daphne-Fairhope-Foley, AL 5.5 14.3
CA Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA 6.6 14.5
CA Salinas, CA 6 14.4
CA Napa, CA 5.4 16
CT Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 6.8 15.6
DE Dover, DE 6.7 14.9
FL Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL 6.7 15.6
FL Gainesville, FL 6.7 14.4
FL Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 6.9 15.1
FL Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 6.8 16.2
FL Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 6.8 15.1
FL North Port-Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 6.1 14.9
ID Pocatello, ID 6.3 15.3
IL Springfield, IL 6.7 17.4
IL Peoria, IL 6.6 18.4
IL Champaign-Urbana, IL 5.2 14.2
IN Fort Wayne, IN 5.9 14
KY-IN Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 6 14
LA Houma-Thibodaux, LA 6.5 16.2
LA Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 6.8 15.6
LA Baton Rouge, LA 6.7 14.9
MA-CT Worcester, MA-CT 6.3 14.5
MD Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 6 14.8
ME Lewiston-Auburn, ME 5.2 15.2
ME Bangor, ME 6.5 18.1
MO Springfield, MO 5.2 14
MO-IL St. Louis, MO-IL 6.3 14.2
MO-IL Cape Girardeau, MO-IL 5.4 14.7
NC Burlington, NC 6 15.2
NC Greensboro-High Point, NC 6.6 15.2
NC Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 6 14.1
NY Utica-Rome, NY 6.5 17.2
NY Syracuse, NY 6.6 15.4
NY Rochester, NY 6.3 14.8
NY Ithaca, NY 4.8 14
NY-NJ-PA New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 6.9 14.5
OH Canton-Massillon, OH 6.6 14.9
OH-KY-IN Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 5.8 14
OH-PA Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 6.9 14.5
OR Corvallis, OR 6.7 14.1
OR-WA Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 6.2 14.5
PA Pittsburgh, PA 5.7 14.4
PA-NJ Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 6.7 14.1
RI-MA Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 6.9 15.9
TX Sherman-Denison, TX 6.5 14.7
TX Tyler, TX 6.5 15.8
TX Waco, TX 5.2 14.7
VA Richmond, VA 6.3 14.3
VA Roanoke, VA 5.4 14.6
VA Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA 5.2 16.1
WA Walla Walla, WA 6.1 14
WA Kennewick-Richland, WA 5.9 15.1
WI Sheboygan, WI 4.4 15.4
WI Janesville-Beloit, WI 6.4 14.1
WI-MN La Crosse-Onalaska, WI-MN 4.4 14.9
WV-KY-OH Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 6.6 16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29 metro areas in 2013-2017 had unemployment rates of seven percent
or less overall but at least 14 percent for African American residents.
For example, in the Canton-Massillon, OH metro area, the overall
unemployment rate was 6.6 percent, but was 16.9 percent for black
workers. (Table 3.4.)

Table 3.4
Metropolitan Areas with 5 Year Average Unemployment Rates Less Than 7 Percent Overall but Greater Than or Equal
to 14 Percent for Black/African American Subgroup
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Unemployment
State Metropolitan Area Rate for Population 16 Black/African American
Years and Over Unemployment Rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AR Jonesboro, AR 5.9 14.3
IA Dubuque, IA 3.9 17
IA Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 4.9 19.7
IL Springfield, IL 6.7 16.4
IL Peoria, IL 6.6 18.1
IN Elkhart-Goshen, IN 5.6 15
IN Terre Haute, IN 6.9 16.9
IN Fort Wayne, IN 5.9 15.2
IN-MI South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 6.6 14.3
KY Owensboro, KY 6.1 15.6
MA Pittsfield, MA 6.8 19.6
ME Lewiston-Auburn, ME 5.2 17.7
ME Bangor, ME 6.5 28.9
MI Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 6.6 15.3
MN Mankato-North Mankato, MN 4.2 23.3
MN Rochester, MN 3.9 20.2
MN St. Cloud, MN 4.5 17.2
NY Utica-Rome, NY 6.5 15.2
NY Syracuse, NY 6.6 15.1
NY Rochester, NY 6.3 14.8
OH Canton-Massillon, OH 6.6 16.9
OH-PA Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 6.9 17.2
PA Altoona, PA 5.2 18.7
PA Scranton-Wilkes-Barre-Hazleton, PA 6.4 19.2
PA Pittsburgh, PA 5.7 14.1
PA Williamsport, PA 6.2 23
WI Janesville-Beloit, WI 6.4 17
WI Green Bay, WI 4.4 18.1
WV-OH Wheeling, WV-OH 6.1 15.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Six metro areas had unemployment rates of seven percent or less
overall but at least 14 percent for Hispanic or Latino adults. For
example, in the Bloomsburg-Berwick, PA metro area, the overall
unemployment rate was 4.9 percent, but it was 26.9 percent for
Hispanic/Latino workers (who may be of any race). (Table 3.5.)

Table 3.5
Metropolitan Areas With 5 Year Average Unemployment Rates Less Than 7 Percent Overall but Greater or Equal to 14
Percent for Latino/Hispanic Subgroup
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Unemployment
State Metropolitan Area Rate for Population 16 Hispanic or Latino
Years and Over Unemployment Rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NY Utica-Rome, NY 6.5 15.5
OH Canton-Massillon, OH 6.6 20.1
PA Bloomsburg-Berwick, PA 4.9 26.9
PA Erie, PA 6.5 15.8
PA Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA 5.7 14.8
PA Lebanon, PA 5.8 14.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fourteen percent unemployment, averaged over 5 years, is a
strikingly high rate that matches the unemployment rate estimated for
the overall labor force in 1937 during the Great Depression.\155\ Under
the proposed rule, some communities would be ineligible for a waiver
where some individuals subject to the time limit are likely to face
unemployment rates of this level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ The U.S. Department of Labor estimates 7.7 million persons
(or about 14.2 percent) were unemployed in 1937 out of a labor force of
54.0 million. U.S. Department of Labor, ``Labor Force, Employment, and
Unemployment, 1929-39: Estimating Methods,'' Technical Note, Monthly
Labor Review, July 1948, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1948/article/pdf/
labor-force-employment-and-unemployment-1929-39-estimating-methods.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A recent analysis by the Center on Poverty and Social Policy at
Columbia University also demonstrates how sub-populations face
significantly higher unemployment rates than the area average. This
analysis looked at over 200 metropolitan areas that could potentially
lose waiver eligibility: areas with unemployment rates 20 percent above
the national average, but below seven percent unemployment rates. As
the authors stated:

The median unemployment rate for non-white individuals is
closer to ten percent, and in some metro areas the unemployment
rate is greater than 20 percent for non-white individuals. For
those with a high school education or less, over \3/4\ of all
metropolitan areas have a higher unemployment rate than the
seven percent floor, which is a particularly dire statistic for
the relevant population of ``lower-skilled'' workers. Given
that close to \3/4\ of ``ABAWDs'' have a high school education
or less and close to \1/2\ are non-white, this evidence
suggests that the proposed rule would disqualify many areas
where the individuals subject to the time limit face
substantially higher unemployment rates than seven percent.

This analysis also looked at complementary labor force metrics,
finding that non-white individuals and workers with a high school
education or less had significantly lower employment-population ratios,
with over \1/2\ of individuals with less education living in areas with
employment-population ratios lower than 50 percent. This research shows
how the unemployment rate hides the variation for sub-groups.\156\ We
strongly encourage FNS to review these data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ Robert Paul Hartley, Christopher Wimer, and Jane Waldfogel,
``Limiting States' Ability to Waive Federal SNAP Work Requirements: A
Closer Look at the Potential Implications,'' Columbia University Center
on Poverty and Social Policy Research Brief, Vol. 3 No. 4, March 25,
2019. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5743308460b5e922a25a6dc7/
t/5c9a2d43652dea22023c
9492/1553608003521/
Poverty+%26+Social+Policy+Brief+3_4_+SNAP+Work+Requirements+
and+Unemployment.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given this evidence, the proposal to restrict states' ability to
waive areas except with very high overall unemployment rates will have
a disproportionate impact on subgroups with rates much higher than
overall unemployment, including groups belonging to protected classes
under 7 U.S.C. 2020(c).
Many ``Distressed Communities'' Have Relatively Low Unemployment
Another way of considering how areas with relatively low
unemployment may provide insufficient jobs for individuals subject to
the time limit is to look at other economic indicators, which provide
other information that could indicate a paucity of jobs. The nonprofit
organization Economic Innovation Group calculates a measure of
community well-being called the ``Distressed Community Index'' that
combines seven metrics for the 2012-2016 period: the share of adults
ages 25 and up without a high school diploma; the percent of habitable
housing that is unoccupied; the share of the prime-age (25-64)
population that is not employed; the poverty rate; median household
income as a percent of the state's median households income; the change
in employment; and the change in business establishments.
While these measures do not strictly measure job availability, they
do provide a snapshot of economic health, and present a snapshot of how
divergent the economic conditions are, and recovery from the Great
Recession has been, at the local level. For example, most of the job
growth from 2007 to 2016 has occurred in the [ZIP C]odes in the top
quintile of the index. Over \2/3\ of [ZIP C]odes in that quintile,
termed ``prosperous,'' added jobs since 2007 (adding an average of
1,300 jobs); meanwhile, over \2/3\ of [ZIP C]odes in the lowest
quintile, called ``distressed,'' have fewer jobs since 2007, and those
that did add jobs only added an average of 400 over the period studied.
While about \1/5\ of prime-age adults were out of work in
``prosperous'' [ZIP C]odes, that share was double for adults in
``distressed'' [ZIP C]odes.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ Economic Innovation Group, ``From Great Recession to Great
Reshuffling: Charting a Decade of Change Across American Communities,''
October 2018, https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2018-DCI.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We looked at counties that had a waiver in 2018 but would not have
qualified if the proposed rule were in place because they did not meet
the seven percent unemployment rate threshold. Of these over 600
counties, over 100 were considered ``distressed.'' Todd County, South
Dakota, for example, had a 6.6 unemployment rate for the January 2016-
December 2017 period. According to this index, nearly \1/2\ of the
residents in this county lived in poverty in the 2012-2016 period, and
close to \1/2\ of prime-age adults were not employed. The number of
jobs in this county declined by over \2/5\ from 2012 to 2016, and the
number of business establishments also declined by over five percent.
Another example is Stewart County, Georgia, where over \1/3\ of adults
have less than a college degree, household median income is only about
\2/5\ of the state's median income, and over \2/3\ of prime-age adults
are not employed. Stewart County also lost both jobs and business
establishments between 2012 and 2016.
While an area's unemployment rate may mask differences between
unemployment rates within that area, it also may fail to reflect
economic conditions more broadly, which may contribute to job
availability for the individuals potentially subject to the time limit.
Here again, we are concerned that FNS did not appear to offer any
evidence to support its contention that unemployment rates are a
reliable predictor of jobs available for low-income individuals.
Underemployment Rates Also Higher For Sub-Groups
Along with the impossibility of identifying an unemployment rate
that reliably implies the absence of available jobs, it is also the
case that the unemployment rate is an insufficient indicator of labor
market slack. For one, it leaves out those who have left the labor
market, in some cases due to slack labor demand or to personal labor
market barriers, including skill deficits and discrimination. Second,
the unemployment rate leaves out a significant group of part-time
workers who would prefer to be full-timers. Such workers are literally
under-employed, as they want to work more hours than their current job
offers them. For families with low incomes, working too few hours can
put pressure on family budgets and lead to nutritional hardship.
Table 3.6 shows underemployment rates associated with unemployment
rates of five, seven, and ten percent for all workers and by race/
ethnicity (see note under the table for methodology). At the proposed
rule's suggested level of seven percent unemployment, overall
underemployment is predicted to be 12.5 percent, with rates of about 20
and 18 percent for African American and Latino workers, respectively.
In other words, the rule suggests that SNAP waivers should be
disallowed in places where about \1/5\ of black and Latino workers
could be un- or underemployed.
Higher unemployment of course corresponds to even higher
underemployment rates, but even at five percent unemployment, black and
Latino underemployment is around 15 and 13 percent, respectively.

Table 3.6
Predicted Underemployment Rates at Different Unemployment Rates, by Race/
Ethnicity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Predicted Underemployment
Unemployment ---------------------------------------------------------
All White Black Hispanic
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% 9.1% 7.4% 14.9% 13.0%
7% 12.5% 10.2% 20.4% 17.9%
10% 17.7% 14.4% 28.8% 25.2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Rates for ``all'' are derived from regression of U-6
underemployment rate on the overall unemployment rate. Racial
underemployment rates are then derived from ratios of the overall
unemployment to underemployment rates by race using Economic Policy
Institute data from 1994-2018.

While the ``20 percent standard'' currently uses unemployment
rates, which do not capture aspects such as labor force participation
or part-time work, FNS proposes making these criteria even less
responsive to economic conditions by requiring a specific unemployment
rate. Given the severe racial disparities that exist in labor force
measures, the fact the Department did not address whether it considered
how an unemployment rate varies in relation to other labor force
metrics is another reason why we cannot comment on how it supported
this rule.
G. Unemployment Rate Floor of Seven Percent Fails to Protect Areas
During Recessions
The Department does not discuss how the seven percent unemployment
rate floor would affect waiver eligibility during an economic downturn,
or at any other point in the business cycle besides a time of
relatively low unemployment. An unemployment rate of seven percent is
relatively high for any area; for example, during the 2001 recession,
the national unemployment rate never reached seven percent.\158\ An
area with a 24 month unemployment rate averaging at least seven percent
signifies that an area has experienced a prolonged depression. The
Department does not acknowledge the unemployment rate of seven percent
in relation to other economic indicators, but also does not discuss how
the length of time its proposal would require such a high unemployment
rate to qualify for a waiver would affect states entering an economic
recession.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ ``National Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Business Cycle
Contractions and Expansions,'' https://www.nber.org/cycles.html.
Monthly unemployment rates are from BLS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When unemployment rates rise rapidly when the economy is entering
into a recession and jobs are quickly declining, individuals likely
face many challenges finding or keeping work. By requiring a very high
2 year average unemployment rate, the proposed rule, however, would
keep many areas from qualifying for a waiver during this time. The
proposed rule would continue to allow an area to qualify for a waiver
when it qualifies under any of the criteria (including optional
criteria) for Extended Benefits (EB) in the Unemployment Insurance
program, which would often allow states with rapidly rising
unemployment to qualify for a waiver.\159\ Among other criteria, under
EB, states can qualify for a waiver if they meet optional indicators
that include a 3 month unemployment rate of 6.5 percent that is at
least 110 percent of the same 3 month period in either of the previous
2 years.\160\ We agree with the Department's proposal to continue to
allow states to request waivers when they qualify for EB, as these are
times when unemployment rates are high and rising and individuals
likely have difficulty finding jobs. Because the seven percent
unemployment rate floor is so high and because the NPRM would prohibit
states from requesting statewide waivers based on the 20 percent
standard, many states would experience a gap between when their
unemployment rates begin to rise during a recession and when they
qualify for a waiver based on meeting the EB criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ NPRM, p. 992.
\160\ While the criteria mentioned are the criteria to establish
additional weeks of Extended Benefits under an optional trigger (called
the Total Unemployment Rate trigger), FNS guidance establishes that
states only have to qualify based on the unemployment measures, even if
the state chooses not to provide EB benefits under these criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, consider the experience of two states, South Carolina
and Oregon, who would have been left with a gap between their
unemployment rates rising and their qualification for a waiver based on
the EB criteria in the beginning of the Great Recession. During the
beginning of the Great Recession, which officially started in December
2007, these states both had unemployment rates that were rising and
would have qualified for 2007 statewide waivers under the existing 20
percent standard (as in, without the seven percent unemployment rate
floor).\161\ These states, like others, would have had to wait several
months before they would have qualified for a waiver under Extended
Benefits: South Carolina qualified for a waiver based on Extended
Benefits beginning in August 2008 and Oregon qualified for a waiver
based on Extended Benefits in November 2008.\162\ Under the proposed
rule, they could not have requested statewide waivers based on the ``20
percent standard,'' as we discuss in Chapter 5, as the rule would only
allow statewide waivers based on EB. Even if they could have requested
statewide waivers, however, these states would have been well into the
recession before they qualified for a waiver based on having 24 month
unemployment rates above seven percent. Therefore, under the proposed
rule, at least some areas in both states would have been ineligible for
a waiver at a time when unemployment was high and rising.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ Oregon would not have qualified for a 2008 waiver.
\162\ In November 2008, Congress passed a temporary expansion of
Extended Benefits, called the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
program, that in January 2009 the Bush Administration stated could
qualify states for a 1 year statewide waiver. These states would have
qualified for statewide waivers immediately then, as both qualified
beginning with the first EUC trigger notice November 23, 2008 (https://
oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/euc_trigger/2008/euc_
112308.pdf). In addition, Congress passed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which waived all states statewide beginning in
April 2009. Because these are both temporary measures requiring action
by Congress, there is no guarantee under the proposed rule that they
would be available in the future, and as we note, they weren't
available in the beginning of the recession in early 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department repeatedly explains how its rulemaking would prevent
states from requesting waivers when unemployment is low. For example,
it states:

Right now, nearly \1/2\ of ABAWDs live in areas that are
covered by waivers despite a strong economy. The Department
believes waiver criteria need to be strengthened to better
align with economic reality. These changes would ensure that
such a large percentage of the country can no longer be waived
when the economy is booming and unemployment is low.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ NPRM, p. 981.

The Department has clearly considered the role of waivers at a time
when national unemployment is low, though this analysis of course does
not take into account the fact that unemployment rates can vary across
the country and even with low unemployment rates, individuals subject
to the time limit may lack available jobs. Even more concerning,
however, is that the Department did not indicate whether it considered
the effect of the proposed rule at different parts of the business
cycle, such as entering into a recession, and how climbing unemployment
rates affect job availability. (The Regulatory Impact Analysis also
fails to include analyses of the impact of the provision using
historical data to assess how it would fare differently in different
economic times.) Without such a discussion, it is impossible to assess
the economic considerations it made in proposing a policy that would
result in many areas remaining ineligible for waivers at a time of
rising unemployment.
H. Department Does Not Explain Claim That Suggested Floor Is ``Designed
Specifically for ABAWDS''
The Department proposes a seven percent unemployment floor for
areas to qualify for a waiver under the 20 percent standard,
significantly higher than the floor used by Labor Surplus Areas. The
Department suggests this floor would be more ``targeted'' towards the
specific individuals subject to the time limit, but provides no
evidence to support this assertion. The preamble states:

The Department believes that amending the waiver regulations
to include an unemployment floor is a critical step in
achieving more targeted criteria. While the 20 percent standard
is similar to the calculation of an LSA, the Department
believes it is appropriate to request public comment to explore
a floor that is designed specifically for ABAWD waivers.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ NPRM, p. 984.

The Department suggests that having a higher unemployment rate
floor than that used by DOL in its identification of LSAs would be more
appropriate for this population than the general LSA floor of six
percent unemployment. Evidence shows that the childless adult SNAP
participants face labor market disadvantages, and likely experience
higher unemployment rates than their area. This evidence would
recommend against a specific unemployment rate floor, given the
difficulty in assessing a specific rate that would reflect available
jobs for this population. For example, a city or county may have an
unemployment rate of seven percent, but the unemployment rate for
childless adult SNAP participants is 12 or 14 percent. The difficulty
in establishing available jobs is especially true in local areas where
local labor market conditions may yield differing opportunities for
this population for different levels of unemployment. For example, even
if two areas had the same unemployment rate, an area where individuals
live close to jobs that match their skills will have more opportunities
than an area where there is considerable spatial mismatch.
Given this evidence, if the Department did want a floor ``designed
specifically for ABAWD waivers,'' it would follow that they would want
to explore a floor that is considerably lower than that used by the
Department of Labor in designating Labor Surplus Areas. By suggesting
that a higher floor would be ``designed specifically for ABAWD
waivers,'' the Department is suggesting that unless unemployment is at
a relatively high level, substantially higher than what the Department
of Labor considers sufficiently high in designating Labor Surplus
Areas, there are sufficient jobs available for childless adult SNAP
participants. All available evidence suggests the opposite is true:
unemployment has to fall to very low levels before more disadvantaged
workers can find jobs. The Department does not provide any evidence to
support its conclusion that a seven percent unemployment rate bears any
relationship to available jobs for this specific population. By
referencing that such a floor would be ``targeted,'' the Department
indicates that there are considerations that it took when establishing
a floor substantially higher than the LSA floor. Without any discussion
of those considerations, however, it is impossible to follow the
Department's logic and thus meaningfully comment on it. The robust
review we did to understand the availability of jobs as related to the
unemployment rate finds that the unemployment substantially overstates
job opportunities for the individuals subject to the time limit, which
would recommend flexibility, not imposing a specific unemployment rate
floor. The Department is claiming an opposite finding without providing
any evidence to support its conclusions.
I. Reasoning for Specific Unemployment Rate Floor Not Consistent With
Congressional Intent
The Department's stated rationale for proposing the seven percent
unemployment rate floor for waivers for areas with unemployment rates
20 percent above the national average is to ensure that time limit
waivers cover a reduced population compared to current standards. This
rationale is inconsistent with the intent of Congress. Congress
intended for FNS to develop criteria to measure a lack of jobs, and did
not specify intended limits to the usage of waivers, provided they
reflect economic conditions.
In the preamble, the Department establishes that the justification
for the proposed rule is not based on an analysis of the relationship
of the unemployment rate floor to job availability for childless adult
SNAP participants. The Department states it instead weighed the effect
of the proposal on the breadth of waiver coverage:

The Department seeks to establish a floor that is in line
with the Administration's effort to encourage greater
engagement in work and work activities. The Department believes
that the seven percent floor for the 20 percent standard would
strengthen the standards for waivers so that the ABAWD work
requirement would be applied more broadly and fully consider
the ``lack of sufficient jobs'' criteria in the statute.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ NPRM, p. 984.

The Department therefore states that the goal of the NPRM is to
apply the time limit to more childless adults. The Department states
that applying the time limit to more unemployed adults would ``fully
consider the `lack of sufficient jobs' criteria in the statute,'' but
does not explain how restricting areas and would better reflect
employment opportunities for this population. Moreover, this reasoning
is completely contrary to Congressional intent, which was to allow
states to waive areas with insufficient jobs without imposing limits on
the share of areas covered by waivers by state or nationally. We are
confused as to why FNS believes it has the authority to purposefully
expose more people to the time limit as a rationale.
Available evidence suggests that restricting waivers to only areas
with very high unemployment would actually make waivers less likely to
reflect available jobs for this population, given that it would exclude
from eligibility many areas where these individuals lack jobs (such as
an area with an unemployment rate of 6.7 percent, but unemployment
rates well above ten percent for childless adult SNAP participants).
Congress intended for the Administration to develop economic
criteria to measure job opportunities for childless adult SNAP
participants. Congress did not propose any measure to limit waivers
based on the number or share of individuals subject to the time limit.
If Congress had intended for waivers to be limited so that a specific
share of childless adults live in an area with a waiver, it could have
written legislation to achieve that goal. For example, in the 2017 Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97), Congress created Opportunity Zones,
which are low-income Census tracts designated by the chief executive of
a state that are eligible for tax incentives for investment. While
Congress created several criteria to identify areas that are nominated,
such as the poverty rate or median family income, Congress also limited
the number of potential eligible Opportunity Zones each state is
allowed to designate based on the total number of low-income
communities in the state. For example, in areas with over 100 low-
income census tracts, no more than 25 percent of the number of those
low-income tracts can be designated as Opportunity Zones.\166\ This law
serves as an example of one way that Congress can establish criteria to
limit a particular sub-state designation, if that is indeed its intent.
In establishing waiver criteria in the welfare reform law, Congress did
not establish any mechanism to limit the scope of waivers, which it
could have done by various means, had that been its goal. Instead, the
law allows for the Department to develop measures to evaluate available
jobs for childless adult SNAP participants, which are not limited in
scope. The number of areas lacking jobs can expand or contract with
economic conditions, and Congress allowed for states to waive areas in
response to these changing economic conditions. Congress has not
changed this approach since the original 1996 legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ Congressional Research Service, ``Tax Incentives for
Opportunity Zones: In Brief,'' R45152, November 20, 2018, https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45152.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the Department uses provisions of the House-passed
version of H.R. 2 to support its proposed unemployment rate floor,
ignoring that Congress ultimately rejected such provisions. In
providing support for the seven percent unemployment rate floor, the
preamble states, ``Furthermore, this aligns with the proposal in the
Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. 4015 (as
passed by House, June 21, 2018).'' \167\ While this bill did contain a
similar provision, the Senate bill did not include this provision, and
the Conference Committee chose to align with the Senate version,
passing both chambers without any restrictions on waivers. While the
Department may consider Congressional bills, offering this as support
while ignoring that these provisions were ultimately excluded from the
final bill, the Department is offering an incomplete interpretation of
Congressional intent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ NPRM, p. 984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department Provides Little Explanation to Support Stated Goal to Limit
Waiver Coverage
The Department establishes that its intent is to limit waiver
coverage and therefore expand the time limit to the extent possible.
The Department does not explain how this goal is related to the intent
of the statute to identify areas that lack jobs for childless adults.
Even if it had clarified how its stated goal related to the underlying
statute it is interpreting, the Department also does not provide clear
explanation of the assumptions used in determining the metric used
repeatedly to support its conclusions, the share of ``ABAWDs'' living
in a waived area. Without any explanation of the analysis used to
understand what it believes the relationship between the unemployment
rate floor and waiver coverage is, and how waiver coverage relates to
the ``insufficient jobs'' law, the Department has limited our ability
to comment on these specific assertions.
The Department explains that the principal criteria it considered
when proposing the specific seven percent unemployment rate floor was
not based on an economic argument about the relationship between the
general unemployment rate and jobs available for disadvantaged
individuals, but rather a desire to limit waivers of the time limit:

As stated previously, the Department seeks to make the work
requirements the norm rather than the exception to the rule
because of excessive use of ABAWD time limit waivers to date.
Using the proposed rule's seven percent floor for this
criterion and eliminating waiver approvals based on an LSA
designation (as well as utilizing the proposed limit on
combining areas discussed below), an estimated 11 percent of
ABAWDs would live in areas subject to a waiver. Currently,
approximately 44 percent of ABAWDs live in a waived area. The
Department views the proposal as more suitable for achieving a
more comprehensive application of work requirements so that
ABAWDs in areas that have sufficient number of jobs have a
greater level of engagement in work and work activities,
including job training.\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ NPRM, p. 984.

The Department suggests that not only would limiting waivers be
preferable to keeping the current regulations, but also suggests that
the more the rules result in limited waivers, the more SNAP
participants will be led towards self-sufficiency. (The Department also
makes the claim that current waiver coverage is ``excessive without
providing explanation of the criteria used to judge appropriate waiver
coverage.'') It states that a seven percent floor, which it indicates
would result in a decline from 44 percent of ``ABAWDs'' living in a
waived area to 11 percent, would be ``more suitable'' than the current
rules. In the proposed rule, the Department asks for feedback on
alternative floors to the seven percent unemployment rate floor of six
percent or ten percent (see Section I, below), explaining how the
higher the unemployment rate floor, the more preferable according to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
their standards:

Based on the Department's analysis, nearly 90 percent of
ABAWDs would live in areas without waivers and would be
encouraged to take steps towards self-sufficiency if a floor of
seven percent was established. In comparison, a six percent
floor would mean that 76 percent of ABAWDs would live in areas
without waivers and a ten percent floor would mean that 98
percent of ABAWDs would live in areas without waivers. A higher
floor allows for the broader application of the time limit to
encourage self-sufficiency.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ NPRM, p. 984.

The Department therefore believes that expanding the time limit to
more people is a desirable outcome. The Department states that the
greater the unemployment rate threshold, the fewer childless adults
will live in waived areas, suggesting that its goal is to minimize
waiver coverage to the extent possible. Setting aside the issue that
there is no evidence that applying the time limit more broadly
encourages self-sufficiency, which we address comprehensively in
Chapters 6 and 11, the Department leaves several unanswered questions
with regards to how this rulemaking will further the intent of the law
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in defining areas with insufficient jobs:

The Department does not explain how imposing a higher
unemployment rate floor would better approximate a lack of
jobs. The purpose of the regulation is to define areas that
lack ``a sufficient number of jobs to provide employment'' to
childless adult SNAP participants. To interpret this
regulation, it would follow that the specific waiver criteria
the Department develops would best allow states to identify
areas lacking jobs, and best enable the Department to approve
those waivers based on consistent criteria. Operating under the
framework that these regulations interpret the statute, the
appropriate amount of waiver coverage is related to the share
of this population facing limited employment opportunities
(i.e., a lack of sufficient jobs) in their area. For example,
if about \1/3\ of counties did not have sufficient job
opportunities for childless adults, then about \1/3\ of
counties would be eligible for a waiver, if there were a way to
perfectly capture job availability for this population. If this
share rises during a recession to 75 percent, then the share of
the country eligible for a time limit waiver could also rise
accordingly.

The Department is therefore proposing an alternative
interpretation of the statute, though it is not clear what this
interpretation is or what the authority it has to drastically
change this interpretation. The Department does not explain
whether it believes that there is an economic argument
supporting limiting waivers, or instead if it believes that the
goal of limiting waivers is separate from establishing areas
with insufficient jobs, and if so, the authority under which it
can establish new criteria for waivers that are not found in
the statute. Without more explanation as to why its goal for
limiting waivers is relevant to this rulemaking, it is
difficult to assess the merits of the underlying arguments.

The Department does not explain whether there are any
parameters to its stated goal of limited waivers, and under
what criteria it judges the appropriate level of waiver
coverage. In regard to the proposed six percent unemployment
rate floor, the preamble states that ``the Department is
concerned that too many areas would qualify for a waiver of the
ABAWD time limit with a six percent floor and that too few
individuals would be subject to the ABAWD work requirements.''
\170\ The language of ``too many'' or ``too few'' implies that
there is a desired level of waiver coverage, and that the
waiver coverage that they estimate a six percent unemployment
rate floor would yield (24 percent of ``ABAWDs'' living in
waived areas) is too high. The Department therefore has
implicit criteria by which it is judging an appropriate share
of individuals living in a waived county that it does not
explain. While it is not clear how the share of ``ABAWDs''
living in a waived area is relevant to the rulemaking, even if
it were, the Department does not allow commenters the ability
to provide input on this metric without establishing the
criteria it is using to judge the appropriate level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ NPRM, p. 984.

Relatedly, the Department does not explain if it believes
that limiting waivers would be an equally important goal during
an economic recession, when the share of areas with limited
jobs would expand considerably. Again, if the Department states
that 24 percent of ``ABAWDs'' in waived areas is ``too high,''
would that also be true during an economic recession, if most
areas of the country offered few jobs to those individuals, and
a majority of childless adults lived in an area covered by a
waiver? Without explaining how its stated goal of limiting
waivers is related to assessing the economic conditions in an
area, it is impossible to tell if the Department considers this
goal to be a relative goal (as in, it believes it is acceptable
to expand the time limit in response to higher unemployment),
or if it believes there is a desired percentage of ``ABAWDs''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
living in waived areas regardless of economic conditions.

Finally, the Department's calculation of the share of
``ABAWDs'' living in a waived area does not take several
important factors into account.

When the Department calculates the share of what it
terms ``ABAWDs'' living in waived areas under the different
scenarios it lays out, it is not clear if it is considering
how this share will change as the overall denominator
changes and what other assumptions are embedded in its
analysis. In a time when fewer areas are waived, childless
adults will be more disproportionately concentrated in
waived areas, as they will lose benefits in non-waived
areas. At any time, childless adults include a combination
of participants who are living in waived areas; exempt from
the time limit (but who the data does not allow us to
identify as exempt); in their first 3 months of SNAP
participation; or working or complying with the
requirements through training. Other variables at the local
level, such as state or county implementation of the time
limit, the composition of childless adults (for example, in
some areas, there may be proportionately more disadvantaged
individuals), and the amount of job or training
opportunities that are suitable for childless adults, will
also affect how likely childless adults are to continue
participating in SNAP in non-waived areas. Therefore, what
share of childless adult SNAP participants living in waived
areas is not just a function of the share of counties
covered by a waiver, but also how they are distributed
among those counties. It is not clear if the Department is
using this statistic as a proxy for measuring overall
waiver coverage, or if it is meant to convey an analysis
modeling these dynamic variables.

Consider a simplified example. Here, we will look to see how
the distribution of childless adults living in certain
waived areas changes as overall nationwide waiver coverage
changes, using eight states, Guam and Virgin Islands that
had statewide waivers in 2017, and 13 states that had
statewide waivers at least from 2010 through 2013 but had
dropped them by 2017. (This illustrative analysis therefore
is not looking at childless adults living in all waived
areas, but rather choosing to look at states when they had
a statewide waiver or no waiver in 2017 to simplify the
analysis.) In 2010, almost all areas of the country were
waived in the aftermath of the Great Recession, which
prompted Congress to include a provision in the Recovery
Act (P.L. 111-5) that waived the time limit nationwide.
(About five states continued to implement the time limit in
parts of their state, but they offered work opportunities
for individuals subject to the time limit.) About 89
percent of the general population lived in an area that was
waived.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, ``States Have
Requested Waivers from SNAP's Time Limit in High Unemployment Areas for
the Past Two Decades,'' https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/
states-have-requested-waivers-from-snaps-time-limit-in-high-
unemployment.

Because of this widespread waiver coverage, the share of
childless adult SNAP participants living in waived areas
would be expected to be very similar to the share of all
SNAP participants living in those areas. To the extent that
this distribution differed, it would likely be due to
compositional differences, such as areas with greater
shares of children or elderly individuals. Waiver coverage
would not be the main driver of differences, as waiver
coverage was similar nationwide. Indeed, in 2010, about 20
percent of the total U.S. population lived in states that
had statewide waivers continuously through 2017, and a
slightly smaller share, 17 percent, of SNAP participants
lived in those states. (This may be because these states'
populations had slightly smaller shares of individuals with
income below SNAP's income eligibility limits, reduced
access to SNAP, or increased barriers for eligible people,
or other reasons.) The share of all adults ages 18-49 in
childless households who lived in those states in 2010 was
similar to the distribution of SNAP participants; about 18
percent of childless adults lived in those eight states.
Similarly, for states that had earlier had statewide
waivers, but dropped them by 2017, the share of childless
adults living in those states was similar to the share of
SNAP participants living in those states in 2010. Those
states had about 24 percent of the total U.S. population,
but a slightly higher share of SNAP participants (26
percent), and a slightly higher share of childless adults
(28 percent). (Table 3.7.)

Table 3.7
Distribution of Childless Adults Living in Waived Areas Changes as Overall Waiver Coverage Changes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP
Participants Share of
SNAP Ages 18-49, Participants
Total Share of Total Participants Share of SNAP Without Ages 18-49,
Population Population (program data, Participants Disabilities, Without
(millions) millions) in Childless Disabilities,
Households in Childless
(millions) Households
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2010: 89% of U.S. Population Lives in Waived Area
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
States with statewide waivers in at least 2010- 72.9 24% 10.4 26% 1.1 28%
2013 and no waivers 2017
States with statewide waivers in at least 2010- 62.1 20% 6.7 17% 0.7 18%
2013 and 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total all states 309.3 100% 40.3 100% 3.9 100%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2017: 36% of U.S. Population Lives in Waived Area
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
States with statewide waivers in at least 2010- 77.0 24% 10.6 25% 0.6 19%
2013 and no waivers 2017
States with statewide waivers in at least 2010- 64.7 20% 8.3 20% 0.9 29%
2013 and 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total all states 325.1 100% 42.1 100% 3.2 100%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: The states with statewide waivers from the time limit in 2013 but no waivers at all in 2017 (which represented about \1/4\ of SNAP participants
in 2013) were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Wisconsin. The states with statewide waivers in both 2013 and 2017 (which represented about 20 percent of SNAP participants) included Alaska,
California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Guam, and Virgin Islands.
Sources: CBPP analysis of FY 2010 and FY 2017 SNAP household characteristics data; USDA program data; Census population estimates as of July 1st 2010
and 2017.

By 2017, the share of waived areas had declined dramatically as
the economy improved. About 36 percent of the U.S.
population lived in an area that was waived.\172\ Given
that the eight states who continued to waive the time limit
statewide were the only states remaining with statewide
waivers and overall waiver coverage was much lower, it
would be likely that childless adults would be
disproportionately living in states that continued to be
waived statewide, as they would be more likely to be
subject to the time limit in other states with partial or
no waivers. Similarly, we would expect the share of
childless adults living in states without waivers to have
declined relative to the share of all SNAP participants in
those states. As Table 3.7 shows, the share of childless
adult SNAP participants who lived in states with statewide
waivers (29 percent) was about 50 percent greater than the
share of overall SNAP participants who lived in those areas
(19 percent). This share also represents a significant
increase from the 2010 share of 18 percent. We see the
opposite trend for states that had no waiver by 2017: while
in 2010, states that had no waivers by 2017 had a slightly
greater share of SNAP participants and childless adults
than they did of overall U.S. population, by 2017,
proportionately fewer childless adults lived in those
states. While about 25 percent of SNAP participants lived
in those states in 2017, only 19 percent of childless
adults lived in states with the time limit statewide in
2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The distribution of childless adults essentially flipped
between these two groups of states between 2010 and 2017,
as the overall number of areas waived declined and
childless adults became more concentrated in states with
waivers and much less so in areas without waivers.
It is not clear if the Department incorporated these factors
into its analysis, or assumed a more static relationship.
The complexity of analyzing childless adults in waived
areas raises the question of why the Department chose this
particular statistic to measure waiver coverage,
particularly given that it provided little explanation of
some of these assumptions behind this calculation. Without
more information, it is difficult to evaluate how relevant
this statistic is to their overall point, which is to
measure childless adults in a waived area as a measure of
the proposed rule's effect.

Similarly, as we explain in our comments on the
Regulatory Impact Analysis in Chapter 11, the term
``ABAWD'' lacks specificity, particularly when describing
changes in waiver coverage. The data do not allow us to
tell which of the larger group of adults without dependent
children, ages 18 to 49, without disabilities, might be
exempt from the time limit, so many of these adults are not
subject to the time limit. Others are only subject to the
time limit if they live in an area without a waiver. When
fewer areas are waived, more of these adults will be
subject to the time limit and lose benefits, and the
overall number of these adults participating in SNAP will
decline. Therefore, when the Department describes how 11
percent of ``ABAWDs'' would live in a waived area with a
seven percent floor and 24 percent would live in a waived
area with a six percent floor, it is unclear if the
Department is considering the decline in overall childless
adults participating in SNAP that would occur with the
reduction in waivers.

As we also discuss in our comments on the Regulatory
Impact Analysis in Chapter 11, it is unclear why the
Department used the number of participants in non-public
assistance households in the FNS-388 form as a proxy for
childless adults in estimating the share of ``ABAWDs''
living in waived areas under different scenarios.

Instead of providing evidence that the Department's proposal will
interpret the statute in a more effective manner by improving on the
measurement of jobs available for low-income childless adult SNAP
participants, the Department instead uses a confusing and unexplained
metric to support its proposal, the share of childless adults living in
an area covered by a waiver. This metric is seemingly unrelated to the
intent of the statute. Because the Department provided little evidence
to support the assumptions made in estimating this metric and to
explain why it is relevant to the underlying law, it is impossible to
provide more detailed discussion.
J. Proposed Alternative Unemployment Rate Floors Also Problematic
In addition to the Department's preferred unemployment rate floor
of seven percent, the Department also sought comment on unemployment
rate floors of six or ten percent. Both of these proposals are flawed,
demonstrating why selecting a specific unemployment rate floor to
reflect available jobs for this population is a misguided approach.
Department's Proposed Six Percent Floor Demonstrates Why No Specific
Unemployment Rate Floor Is Appropriate
The Department explains that a six percent unemployment rate floor
would both be consistent with Labor Surplus Areas and bears a similar
relationship to what it erroneously considers to be the natural rate of
unemployment, stating ``As previously noted, the ``natural rate of
unemployment'' generally hovers around five percent, meaning that 20
percent above that rate is 6.0 percent.'' \173\ The Department
therefore at least provides evidence that is somewhat more consistent
with current standards such as relying on Department of Labor criteria,
though undermines its seven percent unemployment rate proposal, for
which it does not provide any such evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\ NPRM, p. 984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This unemployment rate floor would still exclude many areas where
childless adult SNAP participants face considerably higher unemployment
or underemployment rates and where they will not have access to jobs,
however. As stated above, even at five percent unemployment rates,
black and Latino workers nationally face unemployment rates of 9.6
percent and seven percent, respectively, and underemployment rates of
14.9 percent and 13 percent, respectively. Some local metropolitan
areas had 2013-2017 average unemployment rates below six percent, but
unemployment rates for sub-populations well above 14 percent, the
unemployment rate of the Great Depression. (See Tables in Section E
above.) For example, Monroe, MI, had an unemployment rate of 5.9
percent, but workers without a high school degree faced unemployment
rates of 16.7. In Fort Wayne, Indiana, the area unemployment rate was
5.9 percent, but workers with a disability had unemployment rates of 14
percent. In the Pittsburgh, PA metro area, while the unemployment rate
was 5.7 percent, the unemployment rate among African American workers
was 14.1 percent. Again, these figures demonstrate why it is impossible
to set a specific unemployment rate threshold at which it can be
reasonably assured that childless adults subject to the time limit can
readily find a job with steady hours. Evidence shows that this group is
likely to face unemployment rates much higher than their local area,
and the unemployment rate floor is an inadequate proxy to measure jobs
available to them.
The Department's suggestion that a ten percent unemployment rate
floor is in any way a reasonable proposal highlights many of the
internal inconsistencies and inadequate explanations in this proposed
rule.
Ten Percent Floor Inconsistent with Congressional Intent and Based on
Obscure and Inconsistent Reasoning
Congress clearly designated a ten percent unemployment rate as one
way for a state to qualify for a waiver, and a second, more flexible
and targeted criterion of ``insufficient jobs'' as an alternative to
demonstrating a ten percent unemployment rate. Had Congress intended
for ten percent unemployment to be the only way for a state to qualify
for a waiver, it would not have included an alternative. This proposal
therefore runs afoul of Congressional intent.
The Department also ignores the LSA standard's ten percent ceiling,
demonstrating how its reasoning is inconsistent. As explained
elsewhere, the Department picks and chooses when and how it will aim to
be consistent with the DOL's approach in assessing unemployment. The
Department of Labor clearly considers ten percent to be a sufficiently
high level of unemployment that an area with ten percent unemployment
over 24 months demonstrates a surplus of labor. The Department ignores
this fact by proposing a ten percent unemployment rate floor for the 20
percent standard, while also citing the LSA standard as support for the
unemployment rate floor concept in general.
As with the proposed seven percent floor, the Department suggests
that the ten percent standard would achieve its goal of greatly
curtailing waiver coverage, which as explained above, is a goal not
aligned with the intent of the underlying statute and for which it does
not offer a transparent rationale. The Department states, ``the
Department estimates that a ten percent floor would reduce waivers to
the extent that approximately two percent of ABAWDs would live in
waived areas.'' \174\ While the Department may consider reducing the
population of ``ABAWDs'' living in waived areas a priority, the
Department provides little explanation of how this priority relates to
the underlying statute and identifies areas lacking jobs for childless
adults. It also provides little transparency with regards to the
assumptions used in estimating the effects of these unemployment rate
floors on the population living in waived areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ NPRM, p. 984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ten Percent Floor Would be Duplicative of Existing Ten Percent Criteria
This proposal would also be largely duplicative of existing
criteria. The Department does discuss how the time frame used would be
different from the existing regulations regarding waivers based on ten
percent unemployment rates: ``the ten percent unemployment floor would
be attached to the 20 percent standard, which would mean an area would
require an average unemployment rate 20 percent above the national
average for a recent 24 month period and at least ten percent for the
same period; the other similar, but separate standard requires an area
to have an average unemployment rate of over ten percent for a 12 month
period.'' \175\ Ten percent unemployment is extremely high at the
national level. Only during a deep recession, such as immediately
following the Great Recession, would 20 percent above the national
average be close to or above ten percent, which would require the
national average to be at least 8.4 percent for a 24 month period.
Since the BLS began tracking monthly unemployment statistics since
1948, out of 830 total 24 month periods there have been only 64 24
month periods when the national average would have met this standard.
There were 28 periods from November 1980 through January 1985, during
and following the 1981-1982 recession, and 36 24 month periods around
the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and its long, slow recovery, from May
2008 through March 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ NPRM, p. 984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For most of the time barring these prolonged economic crises, then,
this regulation would simply extend the time frame for demonstrating
ten percent unemployment, essentially eliminating the 20 percent
standard most of the time. There may be some areas that are recovering
from a deep economic shock that have more recent unemployment rates
just below ten percent, but unemployment over the past 2 years high
enough over that rate to nudge the average up above ten percent.
Because ten percent is such a high level of unemployment, however, it
is unlikely that many areas would qualify that would not have otherwise
qualified under the ten percent criterion.
For example, we analyzed all 12 month time periods that a state
could use to examine waiver eligibility based on either having a 12
month unemployment rate over ten percent or a 24 month unemployment
rate 20 percent above the national average but at least ten percent
from 2008 to 2019. With the exception of the years capturing peak
unemployment rates immediately following the Great Recession, from 2014
to 2016, when capturing a longer time frame allowed for more months
during peak unemployment, only a handful of counties would qualify
under the 24 month average but not the 12 month average. (Even during
those years from 2014-2016, fewer than 150 counties, or less than five
percent of counties, would have qualified under the 24 month but not
the 12 month standard.)
It is not clear if the Department more fully considered the
practical differences between these measures, such as comparing how
many areas would have qualified in past years based on having 12 months
of ten percent unemployment or 24 months of ten percent unemployment.
Its rationale for essentially replacing the 20 percent standard, which
measures high unemployment relative to the national average, with
additional criteria for the ten percent standard, is therefore not
transparent.
Department's Alternative Floors Highlight Arbitrary Choice of Seven
Percent Floor
The Department's discussion of alternate unemployment rate floors
also demonstrates how its proposed floor of seven percent is an
arbitrary figure. When proposing the six percent and ten percent floors
as alternatives to the seven percent floor, the Department gives little
discussion of the relevance to these floors to the underlying statute,
which is to identify areas where individuals subject to the time limit
do not have access to enough jobs. For example, the Department could
have provided economic evidence that indicates how these specific
unemployment rates relate to job availability for childless adult SNAP
participants. The only such discussion Department includes is when it
explains a relationship between the natural rate of unemployment and
the six percent floor by stating that it the six percent floor is
roughly 20 percent above five percent, which the Department
inaccurately states is consistent with the ``natural rate of
unemployment'' concept.\176\ The Department therefore uses no economic
discussion to support its proposed seven percent floor but gives some
discussion to explain the six percent floor, which is its alternate
proposal. The discussion of the relationship of the six percent floor
to the natural rate of unemployment therefore undermines the
Department's proposal for the seven percent floor, as it demonstrates
that the Department either did not consider any economic evidence, or
did not provide any evidence to allow us to meaningfully comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\ NPRM, p. 984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The only discussion the Department gives to justify choosing the
seven percent floor (or to support the alternative of ten percent) is
to limit the share of the population covered by a waiver, which as
discussed above, is not what Congress intended when creating the waiver
authority. Without any discussion to explain how the seven percent
unemployment rate is an appropriate measure of available jobs for the
individuals subject to the time limit, the seven percent floor appears
to be a completely arbitrary choice.
The Department proposes alternative unemployment rate floors for
the ``20 percent standard.'' These proposed floors would also be
problematic, as would any specific unemployment floor, because it is
impossible to demonstrate that an area with an unemployment rate below
a specific threshold lacks jobs for the individuals subject to the time
limit.
K. Conclusion: Proposal for Unemployment Rate Floor Is Deeply Flawed
The Department proposes to change one of the most frequently used
standards for waiver approval, the ``20 percent standard,'' to require
a minimum unemployment rate. With this proposal, a state could request
a waiver with an unemployment rate 20 percent above the national
average for a 24 month period only if it was above this unemployment
rate floor. The Department proposed an unemployment rate floor of seven
percent, but also sought input on proposed floors of six or ten
percent.
The Department provides little economic evidence to support the
claim that imposing this floor would better interpret the statute,
which allows states to request waivers for areas that lack ``a
sufficient number of jobs to provide employment'' for the individuals
subject to the time limit. The Department instead appears to work
backwards from its stated goal of applying the time limit to more SNAP
participants by limiting waivers, and proposes an unemployment rate
floor as a means of achieving this goal. The Department does not
explain how this goal relates to the purpose of the law it is
interpreting, or how the specific floors it proposes would better
reflect available jobs for participants.
Research shows that the childless adults who may be subject to the
time limit if they are not exempt or living in a waived area tend to
have many characteristics that are associated with higher unemployment
rates. The majority have lower levels of educational attainment, they
are disproportionately people of color, many have health conditions or
barriers such as unstable housing that limit their ability to work, and
many likely experience spatial mismatch and lack access to the jobs
that are available in their communities. Because of these features, it
is difficult to find a labor force metric that accurately portrays the
job opportunities available to these individuals. Current regulations
allow states to show that an area has elevated unemployment compared to
the national average. The current ``20 percent standard'' therefore
already disqualifies many areas with unemployment similar to or below
the national average where there are not enough jobs for these
individuals to find employment that are not reflected in the
unemployment rate.
While current regulations could be improved, this proposal would
substantially worsen the existing inadequacies. The proposal would
require an area has an unemployment rate consistent with weak labor
markets for the overall labor force, seven percent, to qualify for a
waiver. Given that the unemployment rates for the group of these
individuals are likely substantially higher than their area, this
proposal would disqualify many areas where individuals face much higher
rates than six or seven percent unemployment. The proposal would not
align with Congressional intent, which purposefully did not specify a
specific unemployment rate to signify that an area lacks jobs in
recognition that the unemployment rate cannot capture job availability
for this specific group.
States frequently request waivers based on the current ``20 percent
standard,'' given that data are readily available and consistent across
states, and FNS standards for approval are transparent and consistently
applied. While the current standard falls short of accurately
reflecting jobs available for this population, we believe the proposed
unemployment rate floor would be inconsistent with the intent of
Congress and would make the current criteria substantially less
effective at measuring insufficient jobs. We therefore urge FNS to drop
the unemployment rate floor proposal, keep the 20 percent standard as
it is, and explore metrics based on evidence that would more
effectively reflect jobs available to the population in recognition of
the likely substantially higher unemployment rates they face.
Chapter 4. Dropping Several Key Criteria From Waiver Criteria Is
Inconsistent With the Statute
The NPRM proposes several significant changes to longstanding SNAP
policy that would restrict states to one limited measure of labor
market conditions, the unemployment rate, when providing evidence of
lack of sufficient jobs. It would eliminate the ability of states to
use valuable, readily available labor market indicators, such as a low
and declining employment-to-population ratio, a lack of jobs in a
declining industry, or an academic study or other publication(s) that
describes an area's lack of jobs. The NPRM fails to provide reasons for
limiting states' ability to use widely accepted labor market measures
to support requests for waivers, to discuss the implications of relying
on a single measure of labor market conditions, or to acknowledge the
valuable information provided by other measures. Without knowing what
evidence justifies this change in longstanding policy and an adequate
discussion of alternative methods for assessing labor market
conditions, it is impossible to assess the potential impact of the
changes on SNAP participants and their ability to achieve self-
sufficiency. The sections below provide an overview of existing
statutes, regulations, and guidance, address limitations of the general
unemployment rate, and discuss alternative measures of labor market
conditions.
A. Current Statute, Regulations, and Guidance Acknowledge That There Is
No Perfect Measure of an Area's ``Lack of Sufficient Jobs''
According to the statute, a state may waive the applicability of
the work requirement ``to any group of individuals in the state if the
Secretary makes a determination that the area in which the individuals
reside has an unemployment rate above 10% or does not have a sufficient
number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals.'' The statute
does not limit the type of information that can be used to support a
claim of lack of sufficient jobs.
According to the current rule (7 CFR 273.24 (f)(2)(ii)), states
are not limited to using unemployment rates to support a claim of lack
of sufficient jobs. States may provide evidence that an area has a low
and declining employment-to-population ratio, has a lack of jobs in
declining occupations or industries, or is described in an academic
study or other publications as an area where there are lack of jobs. In
the preamble to the current rule, FNS stated that ``State agencies
could submit requests with no limit on the supporting documentation,
and every request would be weighed on its own individual merits.'' The
final rule included a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of information a
state agency may submit to support a claim of ``lack of sufficient
jobs.''
Below are excerpts from FNS guidance and rulemaking that give
states flexibility in using other types of data to provide evidence of
a lack of sufficient jobs, acknowledging that unemployment rates may
not adequately capture the local labor market prospects of individuals
subject to the time limit.

December 3, 1996 guidance: According to FNS, the statute
``recognizes that the unemployment rate alone is an imperfect
measure of the employment prospects of individuals with little
work history and diminished opportunities. It provides states
with the option to seek waivers for areas in which there are
not enough jobs for groups of individuals who may be affected
by the new time limits.'' \177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\ USDA, ``Guidance for states Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp
Limits,'' December 3, 1996.

``Lack of jobs due to lagging job growth. Job seekers may have a
harder time finding work in an area where job growth lags
behind population growth. A falling ratio of employment-to-
population may be an indicator of an adverse job growth rate.
When the number of jobs in an area grows more slowly than the
working age population, the local economy is not generating
enough jobs.
``The employment-to-population ratio complements measures of
unemployment by taking into account working age persons who may
have dropped out of the labor force altogether. The ratio can
be computed by dividing the number of employed persons in an
area by the area's total population. A decline in this ratio
over a period of months could indicate an adverse job growth
rate for the area . . .
``Lack of jobs in declining occupations or industries. Employment
markets dominated by declining industries could lead to the
presence of large numbers of people whose current job skills
are no longer in demand. This can be especially true in
smaller, rural areas where the loss of a single employer can
immediately have a major effect on local job prospects and
unemployment rates.''

1999 proposed rule: In the preamble, FNS noted that ``the
legislative history does not provide guidance on what types of
waivers the Department should approve under this standard, and
there are no standard data or methods to make the determination
of the sufficiency of jobs. States requesting waivers are
therefore free to compile evidence and construct arguments to
show that in a particular area, there are not enough jobs for
individuals who are affected by the time limit.'' \178\ FNS
reiterated that one possible indicator that an area has
insufficient jobs is a falling ratio of employment-to-
population, but that ``no particular approach is required.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\ Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996; 64 Federal Register 242, p. 70946 (December 17, 1999) (to be
codified at 7 CFR pts. 272 and 273).

August 2006 guidance: ``Waivers may also be submitted based
on the following criteria: (1) areas having a low and declining
employment-to-population ratio; (2) areas having a lack of jobs
in declining occupations or industries; (3) areas described in
an academic study or other publications as an area where there
is a lack of jobs. The state may submit whatever data it deems
appropriate to support requests based on this data. FNS will
evaluate the data and determine if it is acceptable to justify
a waiver.'' \179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ USDA, ``Guidance on Requesting ABAWD Waivers,'' August 2006.

December 2016 guidance: FNS provided additional detail on
``other potential types of waiver requests'' beyond those based
on the LSA designation or unemployment rates: \180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ USDA, ``Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive the Time Limit
for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016.

A low and declining employment-to-population ratio. Employment-
to-population (ETP) ratio can be a meaningful economic
indicator for an area where the unemployment rate may not
provide a complete picture of the labor market due to people
leaving the workforce--but demographic changes, such as an
aging population, can influence these data. Historically, low
and declining ETP data have been used successfully to waive
Indian reservations or Tribal lands where unemployment
statistics and other economic data are limited or unavailable.
ETP data can also be used to request waivers for non-Tribal
areas, such as counties, but it is uncommon because BLS
unemployment data is readily available for these areas.
Therefore, FNS has approved requests based on ETP data for non-
Tribal areas, such as rural counties, on a limited basis when
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the state has demonstrated that the area's ETP ratio is:

Low: at least one percentage point below the national
average for the most recent year of the reference period;

Declining: best demonstrated by a decline year after
year;

Covering at least a 4 year reference period, ending no
earlier than 2 years prior to the year in which the waiver
is effective; and

Complemented by a recent 24 month unemployment rate at
least ten percent above the national average in the
requested area.

A lack of jobs in declining occupations or industries. Employment
markets dominated by declining industries could impact large
numbers of people whose current job skills are no longer in
demand. This can be especially true in smaller, rural areas in
which the loss of a single job provider, such a major
manufacturing plant or mining industry, can have a major effect
on local job availability. The state might consider providing
studies, reports, or other analysis from credible sources in
demonstrating that an area has a lack of jobs in declining
occupations or industries.
Description in an academic study or other publication as an area
where there is a lack of jobs. The state might consider
providing an academic study or other credible publication that
documents a lack of sufficient jobs in an area.
The state may submit whatever data or evidence it deems
appropriate to support these types of requests. FNS will
evaluate such requests on a case-by-case basis and will approve
those that provide compelling support of a lack of sufficient
jobs in the area. FNS strongly encourages the state to work
closely with its regional offices for technical assistance if
it is considering requesting a waiver based on the less common
support mentioned above.
B. The Proposed Rule Would Restrict the Evidence to Support Lack of
Sufficient Jobs to a Single, Imperfect Measure of Labor Market
Conditions
The NPRM says the proposed core standards would not include other
labor market information, such as a low and declining employment-to-
population ratio, a lack of jobs in a declining industry, or an
academic study or other publication(s) that describes an area's lack of
jobs. It would eliminate the ability of states to support a waiver
request using other available information about the labor market,
unless BLS unemployment data for the area is limited or unavailable,
such as a reservation area or U.S. territory. FNS proposes to eliminate
these other criteria on the grounds that they are ``rarely used,
sometimes subjective, and not appropriate when other more specific and
robust data are available,'' but does not provide further
substantiation of this claim.
The proposed rule would replace an approach that allows for
multiple measures to capture labor market conditions experienced by
individuals subject to the time limit with a single, limited, and
imperfect measure, the unemployment rate. FNS has stated in its
guidance that using the unemployment rate is an imperfect measure for
the job prospects for individuals subject to the time limit. Labor
market researchers routinely use other labor market measures in
addition to, or instead of, the unemployment rate, such as the
employment-to-population ratio.
Other Measures, Including the Employment-To-Population Ratio, Provide
Important Information About Labor Market Conditions That the
General Unemployment Rate Does Not
The employment-to-population ratio is a well-defined and widely
used measure that is far from subjective. The employment-to-population
ratio is the proportion of the civilian noninstitutional population
aged 16 and over that is employed. As the 1996 guidance describes,
employment data for areas is available from BLS. Population estimates
for areas are available from the Bureau of Census. The calculation of
the employment-to-population ratio is a standard BLS procedure, which
is a measure it reports on a regular basis at the regional and state
level.\181\ In many instances, researchers use employment-to-population
ratio as a more appropriate measure for labor market conditions for
low-skill workers who face serious barriers to employment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\ See for instance: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
srgune.nr0.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current regulations allow states to demonstrate that an area lacks
sufficient jobs by showing that it has a low and declining employment-
to-population ratio. The rule proposes eliminating this criterion as a
means for an area to qualify for a waiver. This would be a mistake, as
it would throw away valuable information about the state of the labor
market and the likely availability of jobs that cannot be gleaned from
the unemployment rate alone. The unemployment rate is the number of
people actively looking for a job as a percentage of the labor force
(the number of people who have a job plus the number of people who
don't have a job but are actively looking for one). In a job market
with limited job opportunities for any of a number of reasons, such as
weak demand due to a national economic recession, a local business
slump, or the closing of a major plant, there could be a number of
people who would like to work but for reasons such as discouragement
due to a failed job search, experience with discrimination, or a
general sense that their job prospects are limited haven't looked
recently enough to be counted as in the labor force but unemployed.
These individuals are classified as ``marginally attached to the
labor force'' and are included in broader measures of labor market
underutilization, including the U-6 measure, which includes the
unemployed, the marginally attached to the labor force, and those who
are working part-time but want to be working more hours.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ See for instance ``How the Government Measures
Unemployment,'' Bureau of Labor Statistics, online at https://
www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm#unemployed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 4.1
Job Market Indicators in the Great Recession

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

In a national recession, a local economic slump, or in localities
with limited job opportunities, the unemployment rate can paint a very
incomplete picture of the availability of jobs. This was illustrated
dramatically at the national level in the Great Recession. Between the
start of the recession in December 2007 and early 2010, the share of
the population with a job (the employment-to-population ratio) fell
sharply. That was mostly due to the sharp rise in the unemployment
rate, but some of it reflected a drop in labor force participation as
the number of people marginally attached or otherwise not in the labor
force rose.
The unemployment rate then began a long decline but the labor force
participation rate continued to fall as well. As a result, the share of
the population with a job remained depressed and did not begin to rise
again until 2014 (see Figure 4.1, above).
The U-6 measure of unemployment came down more slowly than the
official unemployment rate as jobs, especially full-time jobs, remained
scarce. Even as the unemployment rate dropped below seven percent, the
employment-to-population ratio remained well below where it was at the
start of the recession.
Researchers Routinely Use Employment-to-Population Ratio to Measure
Local Labor Market Conditions
Researchers routinely use the employment-to-population ratio in
addition to, or instead of, the unemployment rate to measure labor
market conditions. According to Bartik, it is ``unclear whether the
availability of labor is best measured by employment-to-population
ratios or employment to labor force ratios.'' \183\ Bartik finds that
employment-to-population ratios are more strongly related to job growth
than employment to labor force ratios.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ The unemployment rate can be derived from the employment to
labor force ratio by subtracting the latter from 1.
\184\ Timothy J. Bartik, ``How Do the Effects of Local Growth on
Employment Rates Vary with Initial Labor Market Conditions,'' Upjohn
Institute Staff Working Paper 09-148 (Nov. 4, 2006), pp. 1-35, https://
www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/64401/1/607052678.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For individuals subject to the time limit, the employment-to-
population ratio may be more appropriate than the unemployment rate.
According to Western and Pettit, for groups who are weakly attached to
the labor market and who face significant barriers to labor force
participation, like young men with little education, economic status is
often measured by the employment-to-population ratio. This measure
counts as jobless those who have dropped out of the labor market
altogether. The unemployment rate is more restrictive and does not
account for individuals who are not currently in the labor force.\185\
A study by Cadena and Kovak illustrates this approach, using
employment-to-population ratios to estimate the probability of
employment in the less-skilled labor market.\186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ Bruce Western and Becky Pettit, ``Incarceration and Social
Inequality,'' D#dalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts &
Sciences (Summer 2010), pp. 8-19, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/
pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00019%20.
\186\ Brian C. Cadena and Brian K. Kovak, ``Immigrants Equilibrate
Local Labor Markets: Evidence From the Great Recession,'' National
Bureau of Economic Research (August 2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w19272.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An improved (or deteriorating) unemployment rate does not directly
correspond to an improvement (or deterioration) of the employment
situation, because it does not take into account changes in the labor
force participation rate due to the movement of discouraged jobseekers
in and out of the labor market. Only a stable participation rate allows
for unambiguous conclusions from a rising (or falling) unemployment
rate. Unemployed people who have been adversely affected by economic
restructuring may give up hope of working again and withdraw from the
labor force. Job booms may only be a boom for certain kinds of workers.
Watson argues that a more useful indication of the quantity of
employment in the economy is provided by employment-to-population
ratios, which remove the confounding influence of labor force
participation and give a more accurate indication of the amount of
employment available to the population.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\ Ian Watson, ``Beyond the Unemployment Rate: Building a Set
Indices to Measure the Health of the Labour Market,'' Australian
Bulletin of Labour (September 2000), pp. 175-190, http://
www.ianwatson.com.au/pubs/health%20of%20labour%20market.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hoynes estimated the effect of local labor markets on Aid to
Families with Dependent Children participation in California using
several measures of labor market conditions, including unemployment
rates, log of employment, employment-to-population ratios, and
earnings. Results showed that higher unemployment rates, lower
employment growth, lower employment-to-population ratios, and lower
wage growth are associated with longer welfare spells and shorter
periods off welfare. Models that controlled for labor market conditions
using employment-based measures, such as employment-to-population
ratios, performed better than unemployment rates. ``Unemployment rates
are less desirable measures of labor market opportunities because they
fluctuate not only with employment but also with changes in labor force
participation.'' \188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ Hilary W. Hoynes, ``Local Labor Markets and Welfare Spells:
Do Demand Conditions Matter?'' The Review of Economics and Statistics
(August 2000), pp. 351-368, https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/
research/pdf/Hoynes-RESTAT-2000.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dranove, Garthwaite, and Ody used employment-to-population ratio to
examine the impact of the economic slowdown that began in 2007 on the
rate of growth in health spending. They used the employment-to-
population ratio, rather than unemployment rate, because it is not
affected by decisions to enter the labor force and instead provides a
local measure of changes in economic activity resulting from the
slowdown. Their results were broadly consistent with results using the
local unemployment rate instead of employment-to-population ratio.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ David Dranove, Craig Garthwaite, and Christopher Ody,
``Health Spending Slowdown is Mostly Due to Economic Factors, not
Structural Change in the Health Care Sector,'' Health Affairs (Aug.
2014), pp. 1399-1406, https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/
hlthaff.2013.1416.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The General Unemployment Rate May Not Adequately Measure Weak Labor
Demand at the State and Sub-State Level
During this period when the national employment-population ratio
was flat, there were many local and regional labor markets where labor
market conditions remained weak even as the general unemployment rate
fell.
In a 2017 speech that partially focused on the geographical
variance of labor markets across the country (and on policies to
ameliorate such differences), then Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen,
pointed out the following: \190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ Janet Yellen, ``Addressing Workforce Development Challenges
in Low-Income Communities,'' Federal Reserve Board of Governors, March
28, 2017, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/
yellen20170328a.pdf.

While the job market for the United States as a whole has
improved markedly since the depths of the financial crisis, the
persistently higher unemployment rates in lower-income and
minority communities show why workforce development is so
essential. For instance, unemployment rates averaged 13 percent
in low- and moderate-income communities from 2011 through 2015,
compared with 7.3 percent in higher-income communities . . . .
The challenges for workers in minority communities are even
greater. The average unemployment rate across all census tracts
where minorities made up a majority of the population averaged
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14.3 percent from 2011 through 2015.

Labor economist Danny Yagan added an important insight about the
geographical dispersion of employment conditions following the
historically large, negative demand shock from the Great
Recession.\191\ As Figure 4.2 below shows, states that were harder hit
by the downturn saw significantly larger losses in employment rates,
even years after the recession was over. Yagan argues that his findings
provide evidence of ``hysteresis,'' meaning lasting economic damage to
persons and communities from periods of economic weakness. As he
summarizes, ``These findings reveal that the Great Recession imposed
long-term employment and income losses even after unemployment rates
signaled recovery.'' \192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ Danny Yagan, ``Employment Hysteresis from the Great
Recession,'' NBER Working Paper No. 23844, August 2018, https://
www.nber.org/papers/w23844.
\192\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As shown in the next section, even at low rates of national and
regional unemployment (meaning rates well below seven percent), there
are areas of the country where economic weakness persists. Yagan's
findings suggest that these areas may suffer from more lasting damage
to workers' ability to find gainful jobs. In the context of the
proposed rule, such dynamics speak to the importance of taking a much
more nuanced approach to the waiver process, examining local labor
markets from both the demand side (i.e., the extent of job
availability, both quantity and quality) and the supply side (i.e., the
skills and abilities of members of the local workforce to respond to
labor demand).
Figure 4.2
State-Level Great Recession Employment Shocks and 2007-2015 Employment
Rate Changes

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Note: Yagan defines employment shocks as the sum of state-
level employment growth forecast errors for 2008 and 2009.
These forecast errors represent the difference between each
state's actual employment growth and its predicted employment
growth based on pre-recession trends. Values on the x-axis
represent the inverse of 2007-2009 employment growth forecast
errors.

Geographical Variation of Weak Labor Demand, Even at Low
Unemployment

Echoing the Yagan findings referenced above, a recent paper by
Austin, et al., illustrates that labor demand, particularly for low-
wage workers, varies significantly from place to place.\193\ In their
recent analysis of regional disparities, these authors find pockets of
persistently weak labor markets across America, citing what they label:
``a hardening of America's geographic divisions.'' Their paper
identifies three findings particularly germane to the shortcomings of
the new rule: ``the decline of geographic mobility,'' ``increased
sorting by skills across space,'' and ``persistent pockets of non-
employment.'' The combination of these three negative developments
imply a larger share of lower-wage workers stuck in various locations
without enough work. We find these disparities very much present in the
labor market over the current expansion, even at historically low rates
of unemployment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ Benjamin Austin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence Summers, ``Jobs
for the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st Century America,''
March 8, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
AustinEtAl_Text.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many labor economists consider the prime-age employment rate to be
a proxy for labor demand. As part of their ``Distressed Community
Index,'' the Economic Innovation Group (EIG) provides county-level data
on non-employment rates, or 1 ^ the employment rate. Thus, higher non-
employment rates correspond to weaker labor demand.
Between 2012 and 2016, the average national non-employment rate for
prime-age workers was 23 percent, meaning 77 percent of such workers
had jobs. EIG's data, to which we appended county-level unemployment
data from the BLS, reveal that in counties with unemployment rates
between 6.5 and 7.5 percent, the average non-employment rate for prime-
age adults was about 34 percent, more than ten percentage points above
the national average.\194\ Note that even at the worst of the Great
Recession, the non-employment rate peaked at about 25 percent.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ To be clear, employment (and non-employment) rates are
mechanically correlated as higher unemployment means lower employment.
Our focus here, however, is on the levels of these variables and what
they imply for labor demand.
\195\ EIG and BLS have slightly different definitions for ``prime-
age''--BLS uses adults 25-54, and EIG uses adults 25-64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The scatterplot in Figure 4.3 below shows the correlation between
un- and non-employment at the county level. Note that the scatterplot
expands at higher unemployment, implying greater dispersion of labor
demand across counties at higher rates of unemployment. For example,
the plot shows that at ten percent county unemployment, there are some
counties with quite low non-employment rates and some with very high
rates. This dispersion further underscores the need to avoid the single
number approach proposed in the rule. Second, the scatterplot shows
that at seven percent unemployment, as noted above, non-employment is
above 30 percent.
Figure 4.2
County-Level Unemployment and Non-Employment

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Using the same procedure employed in the previous section, a
regression of county-level non-employment rates on the county's
unemployment rate, predicts that at five, seven, and ten percent
unemployment rates, county-level non-employment rates would range from
27 to 41 percent. (Table 4.1.) In other words, such high levels of non-
employment demonstrate significant labor market slack at the jobless
rates proposed by the Department.

Table 4.1
Predicted County-Level Prime-Age Non-Employment Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Predicted Prime-Age Non-Employment
Unemployment Rate Rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5% 27%
7% 33%
10% 41%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: County-level prime-age non-employment rates are predicted by
regressing county-level unemployment rates on non-employment rates.

The Federal Reserve recognized that there was still considerable
``slack'' in the labor market not captured by the unemployment rate and
kept short-term interest rates effectively at zero until December 2015
before it began to raise them cautiously in small increments.
C. Information About Declining Occupations or Industries Can Help
Identify Smaller Areas Experiencing a Lack of Sufficient Jobs
According to current regulations and guidance, states can support a
claim of lack of sufficient jobs by providing evidence of a lack of
jobs in declining occupations or industries. This can be especially
true in smaller, rural areas in which the loss of a single job
provider, such a major manufacturing plant or mining industry, can have
a major effect on local job availability. In the December 1996
guidance, FNS suggested that states could use BLS monthly data
published in the ``Employment and Earnings'' report on state and sub-
state employment figures by major industry.\196\ A declining trend
within a particular industry or sector may be taken as evidence of
declining employment prospects for persons with experience in or skills
appropriate to that sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ https://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/home.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although states have not frequently used occupation or industry
employment data to support claims of lack of sufficient jobs, FNS has
approved them on a limited case-by-case basis. For example, FNS
approved waivers for a county (Polk) in Arkansas and a county (Coos) in
New Hampshire that were significantly affected by plant closures during
the recession that started in 2001. The state agencies provided
evidence of the adverse labor force impacts due to a major factory or
plant closing, such as the number of workers affected by layoffs and
rapidly increasing unemployment rates (ten percent and higher) over a
short period of time. The impact of a plant closure may not show up in
24 month unemployment rates until several months, or even a year, have
passed. Information indicating the decline of particular industries,
such as significant plant closures, gives states the ability to quickly
adapt their waiver policy to respond to rapidly deteriorating labor
market conditions.
D. Eliminating Criteria of Three-Month Average Unemployment Rate Over
Ten Percent and Historical Seasonal Unemployment Rate Over Ten
Percent Is Inconsistent With the Statute
The proposed rule would restrict states' ability to use an
unemployment rate over ten percent as the basis for waiver approval. It
would limit the use of the criterion of a recent 3 month average
unemployment rate over ten percent to ``exceptional circumstances'' and
eliminate the criterion of an historical seasonal unemployment rate
over ten percent.\197\ This would leave just one criterion--having a 12
month average unemployment rate over ten percent--as the basis for
approval using an average unemployment rate over ten percent. These
changes are inconsistent with the statute and regulations that clearly
establish that areas with an unemployment rate over ten percent qualify
for a waiver. If the Department proceeds to publish a final rule it
must reject these changes to be consistent with the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ NPRM, p. 985, 987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the statute, a state may waive the applicability of
the work requirement ``to any group of individuals in the state if the
Secretary makes a determination that the area in which the individuals
reside has an unemployment rate above 10% or does not have a sufficient
number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals.'' \198\ The
statute clearly establishes the ten percent unemployment rate criterion
as a basis for approval. The statute does not specify requirements
regarding the duration of time that an area must have an unemployment
rate above ten percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ Food and Nutrition Act, 7 U.S.C. 2015(o)(4). This language
is identical to the language in P.L. 104-193, PRWORA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three-Month Average Unemployment
In guidance issued in December 1996 and then reinforced in the
preamble of the 1999 proposed rule,^199-200 the Department
stated that it would not require a 12 month average to approve a waiver
because of two shortcomings. ``A 12 month average will mask portions of
the year when the unemployment rate rises above or falls below ten
percent. In addition, requiring a 12 month average before a waiver
could be approved would necessitate a sustained period of high
unemployment before an area became eligible for a waiver.'' To address
these shortcomings and to ensure that waivers are granted as quickly as
possible where needed, the Department explained that ``states have
several options. First, a state might opt to use a shorter moving
average. A moving average of at least 3 months is preferred. In periods
of rising unemployment, a 3 month average provides a reliable and
relatively early signal of a labor market with high unemployment. A
state might also consider using historical unemployment trends to show
that such an increase is not part of a predictable seasonal pattern to
support a waiver for an extended period (up to 1 year).'' \201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ USDA, ``Guidance for states Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp
Limits,'' December 3, 1996.
\200\ Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996; 64 Federal Register 242 (December 17, 1999) (to be codified at 7
CFR pts. 272 and 273).
\201\ USDA, ``Guidance for states Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp
Limits,'' December 3, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the preamble to the proposed rule, the Department expressed its
preference that waivers reflect current economic conditions.\202\ Yet
by eliminating the ability of states to use a recent 3 month average
unemployment rate over ten percent as the basis for waiver approval, it
is eliminating one of the criteria that most closely aligns with
current economic conditions and signals deteriorating labor market
conditions in an area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\ NPRM, p. 986.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Historical Seasonal Unemployment
In guidance issued in December 1996 and in the preamble of the 1999
proposed rule,^203-204 the Department confirmed the
applicability of waivers to ``areas with predictable seasonal
variations in unemployment.'' The Department provided a detailed
example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ USDA, ``Guidance for states Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp
Limits,'' December 3, 1996.
\204\ Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996; 64 Federal Register 242 (December 17, 1999) (to be codified at 7
CFR pts. 272 and 273).

States may use historical trends to anticipate the need for
waivers for certain periods. For example, if the pattern of
seasonal unemployment is such that an area's unemployment rate
typically increases by two percentage points in January,
February, and March, and the area's unemployment rate is
currently nine percent, a state may request a waiver for this
area based on its current rate and historical trends. The
period covered by the waiver will then coincide with the period
of high unemployment.
Aligning the Period Covered by the Waiver and the Period of Projected
High Unemployment Does Not Require Data of a Particular
Duration
The 2001 final rule codified criteria related to unemployment rates
over ten percent at 7 CFR 273.24(f)(2)(i) and provided flexibility to
meet these criteria using data of varying duration. ``To support a
claim of unemployment over ten percent, a state agency may submit
evidence that an area has a recent 12 month average unemployment rate
over ten percent; a recent 3 month average unemployment rate over ten
percent; or an historical seasonal unemployment rate over ten
percent.''
The intent of current regulations was to align the period covered
by the waiver to the period when unemployment is high, rather than
designate an arbitrary duration requirement:

Therefore, the Department is proposing that in general, the
duration of a waiver should bear some relationship to the
documentation provided in support of the waiver request. FNS
will consider approving waivers for up to 1 year based on
documentation covering a shorter period, but the state must
show that the basis for the waiver is not a seasonal or short
term aberration.\205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\ Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996; 64 Federal Register 242 (December 17, 1999) (to be codified at 7
CFR pts. 272 and 273).

In the preamble of the NPRM, the Department arbitrarily adds a
duration requirement of 12 months to the ten percent criterion.\206\
Only areas with a recent, 12 month average unemployment rate over ten
percent would be considered for approval. Under the proposed rules, the
Department may approve a waiver for an area with a recent 3 month
average unemployment rate over ten percent only if an ``exceptional
circumstance has caused a lack of sufficient number of jobs.'' \207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\ NPRM, p. 983.
\207\ NPRM, p. 985, 992.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department does not discuss the rationale for restricting the
ten percent criterion to a 12 month duration. It does not adequately
explain what represents an exceptional circumstance and what economic
measures might signal this circumstance. It does not discuss what
economic measures a state might be able to use as an alternative to the
3 month average unemployment rate, which it has described as a
``reliable and relatively early signal of a labor market with high
unemployment'' in past guidance.
The Department argues for eliminating the historical unemployment
rate criterion because it does not demonstrate ``prolonged'' lack of
sufficient jobs, that it is ``limited to a relatively short period of
time each year,'' and that it is ``cyclical rather than indicative of
declining conditions.'' \208\ The Department acknowledges that, by
definition, historical seasonal unemployment is contradictory with
prolonged duration. Rather than drop the newly introduced and
contradictory requirement on duration (which is inconsistent with
existing statute and regulation), the Department argues for the
elimination of the historical seasonal unemployment criterion (which is
upheld in existing statute and regulations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ NPRM, p. 987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department also proposes to eliminate the historical seasonal
unemployment criterion because it has not approved a waiver using this
criterion. This is not sufficient ground for the proposed change, as
the Department has no way of knowing if states intend to use this
criterion in the future. To maintain consistency with the statute, we
urge the Department to leave the regulation as is and retain the 3
month average unemployment rate over ten percent and historical
seasonal unemployment rate over ten percent as criteria for waiver
approvals.
E. We Recommend Rejecting Proposed Changes That Would Ignore Important
Information About Labor Market Conditions Not Captured by the
General Unemployment Rate
These studies and analyses illustrate how the unemployment rate
alone may not tell the full story of how abundant or scarce jobs are in
the labor market. FNS would be mistaken to rely solely on unemployment
rates as the basis for demonstrating that an area has a lack of
sufficient jobs. The unemployment rate does not account working-age
persons who may have dropped out of the labor force altogether. Other
labor force measures, such as the employment-to-population ratio or
industry-specific employment data, complement unemployment rates in
capturing the labor market conditions faced by individuals subject to
the time limit, who often face significant barriers to labor force
participation. In the Great Recession a low or depressed employment-to-
population ratio was often a better measure of labor market slack and
lack of job opportunities than the unemployment rate. Thus, a low or
falling employment-to-population ratio is a valuable indicator and data
are available for local areas.
The proposed rule is based on insufficient reasons to change
current regulations by prohibiting states from using average
unemployment rates over ten percent and other available information
about labor market conditions, except for areas that have limited or
unavailable unemployment data from BLS or a BLS-cooperating agency. It
fails to discuss the reasons why it is restricting the use of average
unemployment rates over ten percent during periods of acute or seasonal
high unemployment or the limitations of the general unemployment rate
in assessing the labor market conditions, particularly those faced by
individuals subject to the time limit. It does not acknowledge the
valuable information that will be lost if measures such as the
employment-to-population ratio are excluded as evidence of lack of
sufficient jobs. Given the lack of supporting information, the public
has an insufficient opportunity to comment meaningfully on the proposed
rule and we recommend rejecting the proposed changes to the rules.
Chapter 5. Restricting State Flexibility on Grouping Areas Is Counter
to Evidence
The NPRM proposes several significant changes to longstanding SNAP
policy that would significantly restrict state flexibility to develop
and implement waiver policy that aligns with state operations,
priorities, and resources. The NPRM fails to provide reasons for
limiting states' ability to consider relevant factors when grouping
areas covered by waivers, fails to acknowledge decades of state
discretion in grouping areas (including statewide areas) for waivers,
and fails to identify the data and evidence that justify the
elimination of statewide waivers and the use of one narrow, inflexible,
federally prescribed method for grouping areas. Without knowing what
evidence justifies such a drastic change in longstanding policy and an
adequate discussion of alternative methods for grouping, it is
impossible to assess the potential impact of the changes on SNAP
participants and their ability to achieve self-sufficiency. The
sections below provide an overview of existing statutes, regulations,
and guidance, and discuss factors that states consider when grouping
areas, alternative grouping methods used by states to group areas, and
limitations of the method for grouping proposed by the Department.
A. States Have Had Broad Discretion to Define Areas for More Than Two
Decades
Since the passage of the 1996 welfare law (P.L. 104-193) and the 3
month time limit, FNS has given states broad discretion to determine
which geographic areas the state would like to waive from the 3 month
time limit, including an area spanning the entire state or sub-state
areas. While every state-defined area as a whole must meet the waiver
eligibility criteria as set forth in 7 CFR 273.24(f), states may
define areas that best align with local and regional labor force
conditions, resources, and administrative needs. The Federal rules do
not limit waivers to specific sub-state areas, such as cities or
counties. As states define areas to request waivers for, they often
consider a range of factors within geographic regions, such as labor
market characteristics, job opportunities, availability of SNAP
Employment and Training (E&T) services, housing and transportation,
workforce and economic development resources and strategies, and SNAP
agency administrative capacity.
States have had discretion to define areas in accordance with the
law, regulation, and guidance over the past 22 years. For nearly as
long, USDA has approved waivers for entire states or those that group
sub-state areas.\209\ The proposed rule would take flexibility away
from states to define what areas they wish to waive and restrict states
to one narrow, inflexible, federally prescribed criteria. The proposed
criteria are likely outdated and disconnected from local and regional
factors that states consider when developing and implementing policies
to connect low-skilled workers to job and training opportunities. By
prohibiting states from grouping areas according to their needs, FNS
would hamper their ability to deliver integrated support to SNAP
participants in gaining the skills and work experience needed to secure
jobs leading to self-sufficiency. The proposed rule would severely
restrict, and potentially eliminate, state flexibility to define areas
for waivers, without providing evidence that the changes would help
increase self-sufficiency among SNAP participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ In 2000, FNS approved a waiver requested by Florida for the
combined area of Broward and Dade Counties, which belong to the same
Metropolitan Statistical Area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the statute, a state may waive the applicability of
the work requirement ``to any group of individuals in the state if the
Secretary makes a determination that the area in which the individuals
reside has an unemployment rate above 10% or does not have a sufficient
number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals.'' The statute
does not identify or require a geographic definition of ''area.'' The
2018 Farm Bill did not change this and the House bill proposal that
sought to limit states' ability to define areas was rejected.
According to the current rule (7 CFR 273.24(f)(6)), ``States may
define areas to be covered by waivers. We encourage state agencies to
submit data and analyses that correspond to the defined area. If
corresponding data does not exist, state agencies should submit data
that corresponds as closely to the area as possible.'' The current rule
gives states broad discretion in defining regions, requiring only that
the data and analysis that states submit to support the waiver request
correspond to the defined area.
Below are excerpts from USDA guidance and rulemaking that uphold
state flexibility in defining areas:

December 3, 1996 guidance: The initial USDA guidance on
waivers from the 3 month time limit gives states flexibility to
define areas and goes a step further by encouraging states to
consider combining sub-state areas. ``USDA will give states
broad discretion in defining areas that best reflect the labor
market prospects of program participants and state
administrative needs.'' \210\ While USDA encouraged states to
consider sub-state waivers over statewide, the flexibility was
left completely to states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\ USDA, ``Guidance for states Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp
Limits,'' December 3, 1996.

1999 proposed rule: In the preamble, USDA noted its intent
to ``balance the competing goals of ensuring consistent
national application of these requirements, and providing state
agencies with appropriate implementation flexibility'' to
implement the time limit.\211\ ``The Department is allowing
states broad discretion in defining areas that best reflect the
labor market prospects of Program participants and state
administrative needs. In general, the Department encourages
states to consider requesting waivers for areas smaller than
the entire state. Statewide averages may mask slack job markets
in some counties, cities, or towns. Accordingly, states should
consider areas within, or combinations of, counties, cities,
and towns. The Department also urges states to consider the
particular needs of rural areas and Indian reservations.
Although the Department is proposing to allow states
flexibility in defining areas to be covered by waivers, the
supporting data must correspond to the requested area (e.g., a
county-wide waiver must be supported by county-wide data). In
other words, states may define areas to be covered by waivers,
but the data and analysis used to support the waiver must
correspond to the defined area.'' [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996; 64 Federal Register 242 (December 17, 1999) (to be codified at 7
CFR pts. 272 and 273).

2001 final rule: In the preamble of the final rule, USDA
noted that it had ``proposed that state agencies have complete
discretion to define the geographic areas covered by waivers so
long as they provide data for the corresponding area'' and that
most of the comments received supported this proposal. USDA
explained that, ``for simplicity sake, we encourage states to
define areas for which corresponding data exists. We believe
this is very easily done, especially since unemployment data
goes down to the census tract level.'' \212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996; 66 Federal Register 11 (January 17, 2001). (to be codified at 7
CFR pts. 272 and 273).

August 2006 guidance: ``Jurisdictions or a cluster of areas
or counties may be combined to waive an area larger than one
county. States have authority to define the cluster of areas to
be combined. If a state defines its own jurisdiction or cluster
of areas, the boundaries or clusters must be thoroughly
documented to expedite review of the waiver request. The
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is
one source that can be used to identify economic areas. This
data may be found at the website www.bea.gov/bea/regional/docs/
econlist.cfm. These areas define the relevant regional markets
surrounding metropolitan or micropolitan statistical areas.
They consist of one or more economic nodes--metropolitan or
micropolitan statistical areas that serve as regional centers
of economic activity--and the surrounding counties that are
economically related to the nodes. Other sources or methods may
be used to combine a cluster of areas.'' \213\ The guidance
also provided an example illustrating the use of the Department
of Commerce economic areas to create groups of counties in
Montana. It also explained that ``the state could request a
waiver for all counties or a sub-area of the economic areas as
long as the data for the combined area meets the waiver
criteria.''
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\213\ USDA, ``Guidance on Requesting ABAWD Waivers,'' August 2006.

December 2, 2016 guidance: In its most recent guidance on
waivers, USDA repeated that ``the state agency has discretion
to define the area(s) in which it requests to waive the time
limit.'' According to this latest guidance, ``the state can
request that a waiver apply statewide or at the sub-state
level, as statewide averages may mask slack job markets in some
counties, cities, or towns. However, in order to receive FNS
approval to waive the ABAWD time limit the state must support
its request with evidence that corresponds to the requested
area (e.g., a county-wide waiver must be supported by county-
wide data). The state must also clearly identify which areas
are being requested and under which criteria. Unemployed and
labor force data from individual areas can be combined to waive
a larger group of areas, whether based upon a recent
unemployment rate over ten percent or a 24 month unemployment
rate 20 percent above the national average.'' \214\
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\214\ USDA, ``Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive the Time Limit
for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016.

USDA provided guidance on how states could combine areas. The
guidance requires that combined areas must be contiguous or
must belong to an economic region. The guidance provides
flexibility in defining an economic region. ``In order to be
combined, the areas must be contiguous or considered parts of
the same economic region. For example, two or more contiguous
counties could be grouped together in order to consider their
aggregate average unemployment rate. If the counties in the
sub-area all belong to the same region, they do not need to be
contiguous to be defined as an area. The state has discretion
to define the group of areas to be combined, provided that the
areas are contiguous or can be considered to be part of an
economic region. If the state defines its own group, the
rationale for the boundaries of the group must be thoroughly
documented. For example, state or local labor departments often
have defined economic regions based upon shared industries or
other factors. Other sources, methods, or rationale to support
that areas share an economic region may also be considered.''
The guidance repeated the example from the August 2006 guidance
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of using BEA economic areas as a guide for grouping counties.

Without providing justification or rationale, the proposed rule
would end over 2 decades of consistent guidance and support for state
flexibility to determine the geographic scope of waivers that best
aligns with state SNAP policies and capacity, training and workforce
service delivery, funding and resources, and regional planning and
strategies. The Department did not discuss or reference over 2 decades
of consistent regulation and guidance it has issued on grouping areas.
The Department did not go back to review the comments it received on
the 1999 proposed rule supporting the proposal to give states complete
discretion to define areas. The Department did not elaborate on any
shortcomings it believes exist with the current flexibility that states
have to define geographic areas. This makes it difficult for people who
wish to comment to critique the Department's proposal to restrict the
ability of states to define areas they would like to waive from the 3
month time limit.
The proposed rule significantly restricts the ability of states to
waive groups of areas. Without providing a discussion, the Department
arbitrarily eliminates the ability of states to waive the entire state
even when statewide unemployment rates have risen significantly during
an economic downturn, except for situations when the state qualifies
for extended unemployment benefits.
The Department introduces a specific definition of labor market
areas as the only acceptable method for grouping areas and does not
acknowledge past guidance it has issued that encouraged states to
explore different sources and methods for grouping areas. It proposes
these labor market areas to ensure that grouped areas are economically
tied, yet this approach only captures one way (commuting patterns) that
areas might be economically tied. This proposal ignores all the other
ways areas may be economically integrated, such as through workforce
development initiatives, economic development investments, employer
recruiting practices, and migration patterns.
For example, guidance issued in 2006 and 2016 both use the BEA
economic areas (either entire economic areas or sub-areas) to
illustrate how a state can combine unemployment data to support a
waiver for grouped areas. The guidance suggests that states explore
other sources or methods for combining areas, including economic
regions defined by state or local labor departments. Even if the
Department had provided reasons for requiring a very specific method
for combining areas, it is difficult for the public to understand why
the Department would disregard or minimize other economic or
administrative factors, such as SNAP E&T service provision, that it
currently gives great consideration to in other aspects of program
operations.
B. States Use the Current Flexibility to Align SNAP Policies With
Administrative Needs, Job Opportunities, Training Funding and
Resources, and Economic and Workforce Development Strategies
States consider multiple factors when grouping areas for waivers to
align resources, administrative policies and capacity, and service
delivery. A state may consider a range of local, sub-state (regional),
and statewide factors:

SNAP E&T service delivery

TANF work programs

Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) regional
workforce development funding and strategies

Office locations (SNAP, workforce development centers)

Community college locations

Employer and industry recruiting patterns

Regional economic development funding and strategies

Commuting patterns

Housing and transportation patterns
Aligning With SNAP E&T Coverage
By limiting state flexibility to define areas, the proposed rule
would restrict a state's ability to allocate and coordinate SNAP E&T
resources and service delivery to meet the needs of its SNAP
participants. States have used their discretion to define areas to help
align the geographic scope of waivers with areas where they are unable
to provide sufficient work or training opportunities to work
registrants, including those subject to the time limit. A state that
can only provide SNAP E&T slots in certain counties may request waivers
for (eligible) counties where SNAP E&T slots are not available or
guaranteed. As Maryland was preparing to lose its statewide waiver in
January 2016, the state agency requested a waiver for multiple sub-
state areas, including the nine-county Eastern Shore recognized by the
state as an economic region. In areas not covered by waivers, Maryland
offered SNAP E&T services to individuals subject to the time
limit.\215\ Similarly, Colorado operated a mandatory SNAP E&T program
for all work registrants, including individuals subject to the time
limit, in 40 of its 64 counties. Individuals in the remaining counties
were not subject to the time limit because of waivers or the use of
individual exemptions, but could still participate in the E&T program
on a voluntary basis.\216\
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\215\ Maryland Department of Human Resources, ``Maryland
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Employment and
Training (E&T) Program: state Plan of Operations,'' Revised September
22, 2015, https://dhr.maryland.gov/documents/Data%20and%20Reports/FIA/
YR2016%20SNAP%20E&T%20State%20Plan%20of%20Operations%20(revised).pdf.
\216\ Colorado Department of Human Services, ``Colorado SNAP E&T
State Plan: Federal Fiscal Year 2017,'' 2016, http://
coemploymentfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Colorado-SNAP-E_T-
State-Plan-FFY17.pdf.
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Aligning With Workforce and Economic Development Regions
Restricting or eliminating waivers for grouped areas would deny
states the ability to align SNAP and Workforce Innovation and
Opportunity Act (WIOA) regional service delivery, funding, and planning
efforts. Coordinating service delivery with WIOA can help SNAP agencies
make more qualified work activities available to SNAP participants
because participation in a WIOA program is considered a qualifying
activity for purposes of meeting work requirements for individuals
subject to the time limit.
Both USDA and the Department of Labor (DOL) recognize the
opportunity to coordinate these two programs to integrate services and
resources and avoid duplication. In a joint letter issued in March
2016, USDA and DOL encouraged SNAP and the workforce system to work
together to develop shared strategies to better connect SNAP
participants, specifically individuals subject to the time limit, to
job and training services through WIOA American Job Centers
(AJCs).\217\ The letter cited the shared goal of helping low-skilled,
low-income, or low-wage individuals find work through training
activities and workforce programs.
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\217\ U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of Labor,
``Partnering to Help Connect Low-Income Able-bodied Adults to the
Public Workforce System,'' March 31, 2016, https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/USDA-DOL-joint-ABAWD-
letter.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A state may want to align its waivers and SNAP E&T service delivery
with WIOA regions, workforce development regions, or economic
development regions in order to best plan and coordinate service
delivery related to training and job opportunities for the population
subject to the time limit. States may be able to maximize
administrative capacity by aligning service delivery, case management,
and data tracking by multi-county regions, such as WIOA Local Workforce
Development Areas.
For example, Tennessee SNAP E&T services are delivered through the
workforce system. SNAP E&T participants are referred to the WIOA
program for training provided through partnerships with technical and
community colleges. SNAP participants have access to on-the-job
training (OJT) opportunities not available outside of the WIOA-SNAP E&T
partnership.\218\ Tennessee organizes its workforce activities into
three regions: East, Middle, and West. These regions are further broken
down into Local Workforce Development Areas (LWDAs). In 2007, before
Tennessee eventually became eligible for a statewide waiver during the
most recent recession, the state requested waivers for groups of
counties belonging to the same LWDAs (known as Local Workforce
Investment Areas before the passage of WIOA in 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, ``SNAP to Skills: Policy
Brief 8,'' June 2018, https://snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/2018-06/Brief_June2018_508comp.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
States sometimes adjust the regional alignment of programs to
reflect changes to the labor force, resources, service delivery, and
administrative capacity. Federal agencies may not be aware of these
changing circumstances or be able to make adjustments in a timely
manner. In 2018, Tennessee realigned its LWDAs by consolidating 13
areas into nine.\219\ The Tennessee Workforce Development Board
realigned the LWDAs to match the regional organization of other
programs, such as the Tennessee Department of Economic and Community
Development base camps, Tennessee Reconnect Communities, and Tennessee
Pathways regions.\220\
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\219\ Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development,
``Map of Realignment of Local Workforce Development Areas,'' 2018,
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/workforce/documents/
ProgramManagement/RealignmentMaps.pdf.
\220\ ``TN Realigns Workforce Development Areas,'' The
Chattanoogan, June 28, 2018, https://www.chattanoogan.com/2018/6/28/
371092/TN-Realigns-Workforce-Development-Areas.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alignment With Other Regional Factors
Beyond the alignment opportunities between SNAP E&T and WIOA, there
are many other reasons why a state might group sub-state areas. States
may combine different streams of funding to delivery SNAP E&T services
regionally. Some funding opportunities may be available as regional
grants, such as some CDBG grants or workforce development grants. In
Portland, Oregon, the regional Workforce Development Board integrates
WIOA, SNAP E&T, Community Development Block Grant, and other funding
streams, to provide workforce development activities serving SNAP
recipients and others in the Portland region.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, ``SNAP to Skills: Policy
Brief 8,'' June 2018, https://snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/2018-06/Brief_June2018_508comp.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
States may have administrative reasons for grouping areas.
According to a 2016 report by the USDA Office of Inspector General, the
requirements related to the time limit are difficult to implement.\222\
Some state officials said that waivers can help reduce the burden of
tracking individuals subject to the time limit. A state may request a
waiver to cover areas that have reduced administrative capacity and
give areas more time to acquire staff, training, or upgrade case
management or data systems. For example, San Francisco County in
California used the time while it was covered by the waiver to upgrade
its data systems and secure new E&T partnerships.\223\
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\222\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General.
``FNS Controls Over SNAP Benefits for Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents,'' Audit Report 27601-0002-31, https://www.usda.gov/oig/
webdocs/27601-0002-31.pdf.
\223\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, ``State Highlights:
California,'' Retrieved Feb. 15, 2019, https://
snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/state-highlights/state-highlights-california.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
States may want to align waivers with the geographic scope of other
resources. A state may align Information Technology (IT) systems, such
as eligibility, case management, or data tracking systems within
geographic regions. Counties in California are grouped into eligibility
system consortia (with 40 counties belong to the CalACES consortium and
18 counties belonging to the CalWIN consortium). Within each
consortium, counties are further organized into regions (eight CalACES
regions and four CalWIN regions). Each of these consortia systems
support TANF work programs, SNAP E&T activities, and county-specific
employment programs. Waivers for groups of counties could be organized
by consortia regions to help align service delivery, case management,
and data tracking.
The Department did not explain why it was eliminating states'
ability to use relevant methods for grouping areas, such as workforce
development service delivery, to inform how they group areas covered by
waivers. From 2 decades of experience reviewing state waiver requests,
the Department is aware of how states use their existing flexibility to
balance multiple priorities, resources, and policies, such as SNAP E&T
policies and services, housing and transportation planning, and
workforce and economic development strategies. The Department did not
provide reasons for ignoring these other considerations, making it
difficult for the public to comment on the proposed changes. As a
Federal agency, USDA may not be aware of all the local and sub-state
factors that impact the development and delivery of employment and
training services. The proposed rule makes sweeping and arbitrary
changes that will hamper states' ability to integrate and coordinate
resources to provide employment and training to SNAP recipients. By
prohibiting states from grouping sub-state areas, the agency would
limit states' ability to coordinate and align SNAP ABAWD policies with
training opportunities and resources, workforce and economic
development strategies, and other factors within the state.
C. Eliminating a State's Ability to Adjust to Rising Unemployment
Across the State
The proposed rule would eliminate statewide waivers when sub-state
unemployment data is available, except for situations when a state
qualifies for extended unemployment benefits. The Department provides
no discussion of the rationale for eliminating this flexibility, other
than asserting that the use of sub-state unemployment data helps target
particular areas with high unemployment. This ignores the statistical
principle of weighted averages--in order for an entire state to qualify
under current rules, unemployment rates throughout the states must have
risen dramatically, particularly in the most populous areas of the
state.
While we commend the Department for retaining the qualification of
a state for extended unemployment benefits (EB) as a core standard for
approval, this criterion does not adequately detect states with high
unemployment rates that are not rising rapidly. States must meet both
the minimum 3 month unemployment threshold of 6.5 percent and have
rising unemployment over at least 1 year in order to qualify for
extended benefits. States that only meet one of these conditions would
not be able to obtain a waiver. For example, a state with a consistent
unemployment rate of eight percent over time would not qualify for
extended benefits because its rate, by definition, is not rising.
Similarly, a state with rapidly rising unemployment, but whose rate has
not yet reached 6.5 percent, would also not qualify. In both examples,
states can have high or worsening unemployment and would not be able to
obtain a waiver to help SNAP participants working in these economic
conditions.
To illustrate this, consider the experience of South Carolina and
Oregon in 2007, prior to the Great Recession. These states had high
unemployment in the months preceding the recession, but under the
proposed rule would have had no options for statewide waivers until
well into the recession. South Carolina qualified for extended benefits
in August 2008, 8 months into the recession that started in December
2007. Had the state sought a waiver for 2007 based on statewide
unemployment rates,\224\ it would have qualified based on 24 month
average unemployment rates that ranged between 6.6 and 6.8 percent for
the various periods relevant for such a waiver. Similarly, the state
would have qualified for a 2008 statewide waiver under existing rules,
based on 24 month average unemployment rates that ranged between 6.1
and 6.6 percent for the various periods relevant for such a waiver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\224\ South Carolina had a 2 year statewide waiver that expired in
February 2009.
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Oregon qualified for extended benefits in November 2008, 11 months
after the start of the recession. Had Oregon sought a waiver for 2007
based on statewide unemployment rates,\225\ it would have qualified
based on 24 month average unemployment rates that hovered between 5.8
and 6.7 percent for the relevant period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\ Oregon was waived under a 2 year statewide waiver that ended
in April 2008.
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The proposed rule only allows waivers for sub-state geographies,
and not the entire state, until statewide labor market conditions
become so dire that the state qualifies for extended benefits. The
Department argues that statewide unemployment figures may include areas
in which unemployment rates are relatively low and that eliminating
statewide waivers will help target areas in which unemployment rates
are high. The Department does not discuss the dynamic nature of labor
market conditions across time and across geographic areas. Unemployment
rates do not change uniformly within a state. A state may include areas
with persistently high unemployment, areas with relatively low but
rapidly rising unemployment rates, areas with high unemployment rates
that are slowly creeping higher, as well as areas with relatively low
unemployment rates.
Current rules allow a state to detect deteriorating economic
conditions across the state even before it qualifies for extended
unemployment benefits. The Department makes an arbitrary decision to
eliminate statewide unemployment analysis because of potential
variation in unemployment rates within the state. Variation in
unemployment rates exists at all geographic levels, including at small
scale Census tract and Census block group levels. The Department's
failure to provide a robust assessment of the impact of this change on
the ability of states to cushion the blow of deteriorating economic
conditions across their borders makes it difficult to comment on the
proposed rule.
Arbitrary Standard for Grouping Areas
The proposed rule would limit the ability of states to request
waivers for groups of geographic areas, such as multi-county areas,
except for areas that are ``economically tied.'' The Department
provides a limited definition of an ``economically tied'' area based on
commuting patterns--an area within which individuals can reside and
find employment within a reasonable distance or can readily change
employment without changing their place of residence. The preamble says
that ``existing general conditions for grouping of areas--that the
areas must be either contiguous and/or share the same economic region--
were intended to ensure that the areas grouped together are
economically tied.'' Yet in statutes, regulations, and guidance over
the past 2 decades, USDA has given states broad discretion to define
areas and has never expressed the requirement of that grouped areas be
``economically tied'' based solely on commuting patterns. The proposed
rule arbitrarily imposes this requirement without providing
justification or acknowledging the many other ways areas can be
economically tied apart from commuting patterns, such as employer
recruiting practices, regional workforce development strategies, and
regional economic development and investment patterns.
More specifically, the proposed rule would limit grouping to areas
that are designated labor market areas (LMAs) based on a narrow
statistical definition used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
USDA has requested public comment on whether it should be even more
restrictive and prohibit grouping entirely. USDA proposes taking away
state discretion to define areas, arguing that the application of
waivers on a more limited basis will encourage more individuals subject
to the time limit to take steps towards self-sufficiency, but does not
explain how restricting the grouping of areas will help achieve this
goal. USDA did not offer any other alternative frameworks for grouping
areas for discussion, even the Bureau of Economic Analysis economic
areas that it has used as an example for grouping in past guidance.
D. Using a Narrow, Statistical Definition of Labor Market Areas
The Department uses the BLS definition of a labor market area,
which is an area within which individuals can reside and find
employment within a reasonable distance or can readily change
employment without changing their place of residence.\226\ It defines
an ``economically tied area'' the same way. By using the same
definition for ``labor market area'' and ``economically tied area,''
the Department is conflating the two concepts and makes it confusing
and challenging for the public to respond. The Department appears to be
taking the BLS definition of labor market areas and applying it to the
more general concept of ``economically tied'' areas. Using the
relatively narrow definition of labor markets to also define
economically tied areas ignores the various ways areas can be connected
economically beyond commuting patterns. For example, areas can share
economic ties through investment patterns, service delivery models, and
migration patterns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Local Area Unemployment
Statistics Geographic Concepts: Labor Market Areas,'' 2018, https://
www.bls.gov/lau/laugeo.htm#geolma.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule establishes BLS labor market areas as the only
standard by which sub-state areas may be grouped together and covered
by a waiver from the 3 month time limit. To delineate the entire United
States into mutually exhaustive and exclusive labor market areas, BLS
uses a narrow operational definition that relies solely on measures of
population size and commuting flows between counties. BLS LMAs include
both the metropolitan and micropolitan areas defined by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the small labor market areas maintained
by the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program.
Major labor market areas include Core Based Statistical Areas
(CBSAs), which can be either Metropolitan Statistical Areas or
Micropolitan Statistical Areas. Metropolitan Statistical Areas have at
least one urbanized area with a population of 50,000 or more, along
with adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic
integration with the core (as measured by commuting patterns).
Micropolitan Statistical Areas have at least one urban cluster with a
population of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000, along with adjacent
territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration
with the core (as measured by commuting patterns).
An outlying county is combined with the central county or counties
of the CBSA if it meets the following commuting requirements:

At least 25 percent of the workers living in the county work
in the central county or counties of the CBSA; or

At least 25 percent of the employment in the county is
accounted for by workers who reside in the central county or
counties of the CBSA.

Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas are delineated in
terms of whole counties (or equivalent entities) and counties can only
belong to one CBSA.\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\227\ Office of Management and Budget, Revised Delineations of
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Micropolitan Statistical Areas, and
Combined Statistical Areas, and Guidance on Uses of the Delineations of
These Areas, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/omb/bulletins/2015/15-01.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For counties that do not belong to metropolitan or micropolitan
areas, counties are combined into a small LMA if either or both of the
following conditions are met: \228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Local Area Unemployment
Statistics Geographic Concepts: Labor Market Areas,'' 2018, https://
www.bls.gov/lau/laugeo.htm#geolma.

At least 25 percent of the employed residents of one county
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
commute to work in another county; and

At least 25 percent of the employment (persons working) in
one county are accounted for by workers commuting from another
county.

Labor market areas can vary in geographic scope, ranging from a
single county to multi-county metropolitan areas. LMAs can also span
multiple states and in New England, they are composed of cities and
towns. The proposed rule requires states to group all areas within an
LMA together (leaving no areas out), but multi-state LMAs would require
states to treat areas within their state borders separately from the
rest of its LMA.
Based on the conditions described earlier, the BLS labor market
area definition only considers aggregated commuting patterns between
county of residence and county of employment--and does not take into
account sub-county variations by industry or by an individual's
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. It also does not take
into account the many other dynamics beyond commuting patterns that may
impact an individual's ability to find and secure a job, such as
housing and transportation, the location of new or future employment
opportunities, the location of training providers (such as community
colleges), industry-specific recruitment practices, or regional
workforce or economic development strategies. It also does not reflect
the ability of some individuals to relocate within a state to pursue a
job opportunity.
According to OMB guidance, the purpose of the Metropolitan and
Micropolitan Statistical Area standards is to provide nationally
consistent delineations for collecting, tabulating, and publishing
Federal statistics for a set of geographic areas. OMB establishes and
maintains these areas solely for statistical purposes and does not take
into account or attempt to anticipate any non-statistical uses that may
be made of the delineations, nor will OMB modify the delineations to
meet the requirements of any non-statistical program. OMB cautions that
Metropolitan Statistical Area and Micropolitan Statistical Area
delineations should not be used to develop and implement Federal,
state, and local non-statistical programs and policies without full
consideration of the effects of using these delineations for such
purposes.\229\ While this does not preclude the Department or states
from using LMAs to inform the grouping of areas covered by waivers, the
Department did not explain the rationale for, and effect of, using LMAs
as the only framework for grouping areas and its reasons for excluding
other methods for grouping.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\ Office of Management and Budget, ``Revised Delineations of
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Micropolitan Statistical Areas, and
Combined Statistical Areas, and Guidance on Uses of the Delineations of
These Areas,'' 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/omb/bulletins/2015/15-01.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the following section, we discuss some of the other approaches
for grouping areas that capture regional dynamics that BLS LMAs don't
account for and that FNS did not explain whether it considered. We also
discuss how FNS failed to address why it believes LMAs are preferable
to the many possible alternatives.
BLS LMA Definition Based on Outdated Data
BLS LMAs are limited in their ability to capture current and local
workforce dynamics. They are relatively static and do not account for
sub-county variation. The BLS LMAs are revised each decade following
the census. The current list of BLS LMAs are based on population data
from the 2010 Census and commuting data from the American Community
Survey 5 year dataset for 2006-2010 (issued on February 28, 2013,
through OMB Bulletin No. 13-01 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/bulletins/2013/b13-01.pdf)).\230\ In other
words, current BLS LMAs reflect population data from 9 years ago and
commuting data from 9 to 14 years ago. The BLS LMAs are not updated
frequently enough to capture current or recent labor market trends and
may not line up with more current labor force patterns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\ Office of Management and Budget, ``Revised Delineations of
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Micropolitan Statistical Areas, and
Combined Statistical Areas, and Guidance on Uses of the Delineations of
These Areas,'' 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/omb/bulletins/2013/b13-01.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The BLS LMAs are based on population and commuting data aggregated
at the county level. The commuting patterns between counties may vary
depending on the industry or type of occupation. For instance,
commuting flows for workers working at an automotive assembly plant
(which may be relatively focused around the plant location) will tend
to vary from commuting flows for workers in food retail (relatively
dispersed). Goetz and Han note that a given county may belong to
multiple commuting sheds and give the example of a commuter county on
the east coast with residents who commute to Washington, D.C.,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore and may be located in the border region
between the cores of multiple LMAs.\231\ Another example is Mercer
County, Pennsylvania, which could be considered part of Philadelphia's
LMA or New York's LMA based on the commuting patterns of residents. In
these situations, it is not obvious which commuting regions or labor
market areas the county should be considered a part of and will vary
depending on the industry or type of worker.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\ Stephan J. Goetz and Yicheol Han, ``Identifying Labor Market
Areas Based on Link Communities,'' paper prepared for presentation at
the 2015 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association and Western
Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA,
July 26-28, 2015, https://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/publications/published-
papers/identifying-labor-market-areas-based-on-link-communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some BLS LMAs include areas from more than one state. For example,
the Philadelphia LMA includes counties belonging to Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. The proposed regulatory language says
that ``the state agency may only combine data from individual areas
that are collectively considered to be a Labor Market Area by DOL.''
\232\ The Department did not discuss how states should handle multi-
state LMAs, making it difficult for the public to comment on the
implications of using only BLS LMAs to group areas. Consider an LMA
that spans two states, but with 90 percent of its population residing
in one state. Suppose the county with ten percent of the population has
an unemployment rate that is slightly lower than the threshold needed
to qualify for a waiver, but the unemployment rate for the entire LMA
exceeds the threshold needed to qualify. Would that county qualify for
a waiver, recognizing that the LMA that it belongs to may lack
sufficient jobs?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\ NPRM, p. 992.
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Alternative Definitions of Labor Market Areas
Unlike a county or state, which are political and administrative
units with defined borders, a labor market area is an analytical
concept and the definition used by BLS is only one of several ways that
labor economists and other researchers approximate labor market areas.
``Researchers examining labor markets in the United States often turn
to one of several standard geographic definitions that are widely known
and compatible with publicly available economic data, including:
states, metropolitan areas, and counties.'' \233\ Definitions of labor
market areas that are based on single or multiple counties, such as the
one used by BLS, have the advantage of having unemployment data readily
available. However, the political or administrative boundaries that are
used to delineate labor market areas may not always align well with the
notion of a labor market as ``a set of relationships between employers
and workers that are spatially bounded by places of work and
residence.''^234-235
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\ Andrew Foote, Mark J. Kutzbach, and Lars Vilhuber,
``Recalculating . . . How Uncertainty in Local Labor Market Definitions
Affects Empirical Findings,'' Center for Economic Studies Working Paper
CES 17-49, August 2017, https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2017/CES-WP-17-
49.pdf.
\234\ Erik Scherpf, et al., ``Participation in USDA's Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Effect of Local Labor Market
Conditions in Oregon,'' United [S]tates Department of Agriculture
(September 2018), pp. 1-50, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/90038/err-257.pdf?v=0.
\235\ Charles M. Tolbert and Molly Sizer, ``U.S. Commuting Zones
and Labor Market Areas: A 1990 Update, AGES-9614,'' U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1996, https://usa.ipums.org/
usa/resources/volii/cmz90.pdf.
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For example, a definition of a local labor market area that
attempts to better capture an area in which individuals both live and
work is the Commuting Zone (CZ). CZs group counties based on commuting
flow data and hierarchical cluster analysis.\236\ Noting that there is
no consensus definition of LMAs, economists at the Economic Research
Service, Scherpf, et al., tested multiple definitions of LMAs (BLS
LMAs, Commuting Zones, and Workforce Innovation Areas) in their
examination of the relationship between labor market area conditions
and length of SNAP participation spell.\237\ Their preferred definition
of LMAs used the CZ definition and had the largest estimated effects.
They found that a ten percent increase in county-level employment
raised the share of recipients who finished their SNAP spell in 12
months or less by about 5.3 percentage points (or about 8.8 percent).
Using alternative definitions of labor market areas resulted in
smaller, but still positive, estimated effects: a ten percent increase
in county-level employment raised the probability that a SNAP recipient
would finish a spell in 12 months or less by between 1.5 and 2
percentage points (or between two and three percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\ Hierarchical cluster analysis is a method for exploring
similarities between objects. An algorithm is used to group similar
objects into a cluster. Each cluster is distinct from other cluster and
the objects within each cluster share similar features.
\237\ Erik Scherpf, et al., ``Participation in USDA's Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Effect of Local Labor Market
Conditions in Oregon,'' United [S]tates Department of Agriculture
(September 2018), pp. 1-50, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/90038/err-257.pdf?v=0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although CZs are delineated using more sophisticated analytical
methods, they share a similar limitation to BLS LMAs. Like BLS LMAs,
CZs are based on commuting patterns and do not account for other
administrative or economic factors a state would like to consider when
grouping areas covered by waivers. In proposing the BLS LMAs as the
only acceptable framework for grouping areas, the Department did not
discuss alternative frameworks for grouping and the implications of
using a framework based on commuting data to shape SNAP policy.
Commuting Patterns Are Not the Only Factor Connecting Labor Markets
BLS LMAs only look at commuting patterns and ignore other economic
factors that may be related to spatial correlation of unemployment.
Spatial correlation is a measure of the relationship between ``close''
spatial units, such as neighboring counties. Using county-level monthly
price data from the real estate service Zillow, Fogli, Hill, and Perri
examined trends in housing prices across geographic areas. They
observed that the housing price decline from early 2007 to early 2009
appeared to follow the same spatial patterns as unemployment.\238\
Looking at the example of Florida, they show that early 2007 prices
fell in scattered locations around the coasts and over time prices fell
in nearby locations until they reached a uniformly low level across the
state. Spatial diffusion of housing prices and unemployment were
strikingly similar across the whole period of housing boom and bust,
suggesting that housing prices might be one of the factors that states
may implicitly or explicitly consider when grouping areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\ Alessandra Fogli, Enoch Hill, and Fabrizio Perri, ``The
Geography of the Great Recession,'' National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 18447, October 2012, https://www.nber.org/
papers/w18447.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department did not provide an explanation why it is restricting
states from considering other rationale that might be relevant to their
SNAP population when requesting waivers. We strongly encourage the
Department to review the research we have outlined in this chapter
related to commuting patterns and to explain its rationale relative to
the evidence that demonstrates the flaws of this approach.
WIOA Regions
As discussed earlier, states may seek to align SNAP waivers with
workforce development regions. Under WIOA, states are required to
identify regions for regional workforce planning. States shall identify
regions after consultation with elected officials and Local Workforce
Development Boards and take into account the following factors:

1. The extent to which regions are consistent with labor market
areas in the state;

2. The extent to which regions are consistent with regional economic
development areas in the state; and

3. An assurance that regions have available the Federal and non-
Federal resources necessary to effectively administer
activities under subtitle B and other applicable provisions
of the WIOA, including whether the areas have the
appropriate education and training providers, such as
institutions of higher education and area career and
technical education schools.

Under WIOA, states have discretion to define regions and are
encouraged to take an integrated approach to account for a range of
different factors. States are encouraged to use LMAs as the starting
point for determining workforce development regions, but also need to
consider workforce and economic development framework, funding streams,
and service (training) delivery.
E. States Have Used Their Discretion to Create Groupings Informed by
Multiple Factors
States use grouping methods, such as BLS LMAs and WIOA Local
Workforce Development Areas, as the starting point for developing
workforce development plans and policy, but modify them based on
multiple additional factors. Below are some examples of how and why
states group areas using a variety of factors.

When designating areas for workforce development planning,
the Virginia Board of Workforce Development considers the BLS
LMAs, regional economic development areas, funding streams and
service providers for training, community college regions, and
industry- and sector-specific strategies.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\239\ Virginia Board of Workforce Development, ``Designation of
Regions and Planning Requirements,'' June 2016, https://
virginiacareerworks.com/wp-content/uploads/Policy-200-06-Designation-
of-Regions-and-Planning-Requirements-FINAL-Signed.pdf.

Rhode Island has treated the entire state as a region for
the purposes of workforce development planning. The state
considered geographic boundaries, LMA analysis, and funding and
resource realities in determining the geographic scope of its
workforce development plan. From its labor market area
analysis, it found that of the 39 cities and towns in Rhode
Island, 36 fell within the ``Providence-Warwick, RI-MA
Metropolitan NECTA'' LMA as determined by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. One additional community was its own LMA due to the
fact it is an island, and two additional communities fall
outside of the Providence-Warwick, RI-MA Metropolitan NECTA.
The governor concluded that the entire state will be a single
planning region for workforce development purposes.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\ Rhode Island, Governor's Workforce Board, ``Regional Planning
Policy,'' March 16, 2017, https://gwb.ri.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/
06/17-01-3-16-2017.pdf?189db0.

As discussed earlier, Tennessee implements SNAP E&T in
coordination with WIOA and Local Workforce Development Areas.
The delineation of these areas is different from the BLS LMAs.
For instance, Lauderdale County, located on the western border
of Tennessee north of Memphis, is its own BLS LMA, but is
grouped with Shelby, Fayette, and Tipton Counties into the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater Memphis Local Workforce Development Area.

The Department did not explain why it was taking away states'
ability to consider multiple factors when grouping areas covered by
waivers. It did not discuss how the use of BLS LMAs would improve
states' ability to meet the needs of individuals subject to the time
limit and help move them to self-sufficiency.
BEA Economic Areas
In two separate guidance memoranda (August 2006,\241\ December 2016
\242\), the Department provided an example of grouping based on BEA
economic areas, yet the 2019 NPRM preamble did not offer this framework
for grouping areas for consideration. In the example provided, the
Department explained that Montana could group the counties of Blaine,
Cascade, Chouteau, Glacier, Hill, Liberty, Phillips, Pondera, Teton,
and Toole that comprise the North Central Montana Economic Area (or
Area 65: Great Falls, MT Economic Area) and analyze the data to see if
the grouped area would qualify for a waiver. The guidance also
suggested that the state could consider grouping a sub-area such as
Glacier, Liberty, and Toole. The Department did not explain why it is
eliminating this grouping approach, even though this was a grouping
policy it has suggested that states could use in the past.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\ USDA, ``Guidance on Requesting ABAWD Waivers,'' August 2006.
\242\ USDA, ``Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive the Time Limit
for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requiring Areas to Be Contiguous Ignores the Reality That Proximity to
Job Opportunities Is Decreasing
The proposed rule establishes BLS LMAs as the only scenario where
states can request waivers for combined geographic areas (counties). In
doing so, the agency seeks to limit waivers that combine areas that are
not contiguous. This suggests an assumption that individuals will only
respond to job opportunities in their county or in counties adjacent to
their county of residence. From the perspective of workers in search of
job opportunities, requiring contiguity of geographic areas is an
assumption that does not hold up under empirical scrutiny. Using
county-level data for eight states between 1969 to 1994, Khan, Orazem,
and Otto found that local county population responded to economic
growth within the county, in adjacent counties, and even two counties
away.\243\ The effect decreased as the distance from the reference
county increased. Workers look beyond their county and adjacent
counties for job opportunities.
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\243\ Romana Khan, Peter F. Orazem, and Daniel M. Otto, ``Deriving
Empirical Definitions of Spatial Labor Markets: The Roles of Competing
Versus Complementary Growth,'' Journal of Regional Science (2001), pp.
735-756.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other research has found that proximity to jobs has decreased in
metropolitan areas in recent years and that poor, minority residents
experienced a bigger decline in proximity to jobs compared to non-poor
white resident. Kneebone and Holmes looked at the number of jobs within
a typical commuting distance (median within-metro commuting distance)
for residents of the 96 largest metropolitan areas and found that the
number of jobs within a typical commuting distance declined by seven
percent between 2000 and 2012.\244\ Poor residents experienced a 17
percent decline in nearby jobs compared to six percent for non-poor
residents. Hispanic residents had a 17 percent decline and black
residents had a 14 percent decline compared to six percent for white
residents. Individuals have to look farther from their local
neighborhoods for job opportunities, requiring longer commutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\ Elizabeth Kneebone and Natalie Holmes, ``The Growing Distance
Between People and Jobs in Metropolitan America,'' Metropolitan Policy
Program at Brookings (March 2015), pp. 1-24, https://www.brookings.edu/
research/the-growing-distance-between-people-and-jobs-in-metropolitan-
america/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requiring Areas to Be Contiguous or to Comprise Entire LMAs Ignores the
Reality That Unemployment Rates Rise and Fall at Different
Rates Even in Neighboring Areas
The general unemployment rate does not account for variations in
unemployment rates for sub-populations and for variations in the
increase or decrease in unemployment rates across geographic areas. The
proposed rule would require that states request waivers for BLS LMAs in
their entirety, without omitting certain areas. The Department offers
no rationale for proposing this and no discussion of the implications
of this arbitrary requirement. This requirement prevents states from
responding to variations in unemployment patterns within an LMA.
Fogli, Hill, and Perri examined how the relationship in
unemployment in neighboring areas changes over time as a recession
starts and ends.\245\ The relationship in unemployment between
neighboring areas (spatial correlation) is high overall, falls at the
start of the recession, increases sharply during the recession, and
then stabilizes at the end of the recession. They found that
unemployment does not increase in all counties simultaneously, but
initially increases in a few specific counties, not necessarily located
close to each other. As the recession deepens, the geographic
distribution of unemployment follows an epidemic pattern, with
unemployment tending to increase in counties that are closer to
counties initially hit with high unemployment, so that unemployment is
high in some concentrated areas and relatively low in others, and this
results in an increase in the degree of spatial correlation and of
spatial dispersion. As the recession reaches its peak, high
unemployment is spread all over the country and both the degree of
spatial correlation and spatial dispersion stabilize (and eventually
decline).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\ Alessandra Fogli, Enoch Hill, and Fabrizio Perri, ``The
Geography of the Great Recession,'' National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 18447, October 2012, https://www.nber.org/
papers/w18447.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department does not discuss the implications of requiring that
states request waivers for BLS LMAs in their entirety, without omitting
areas. This requirement ignores variations in labor market conditions
within a labor market area. Consider an LMA that does not qualify for a
waiver, but has high unemployment everywhere except for one county. The
proposed rules would prevent a state from requesting a waiver for a
sub-area of the LMA that lacks sufficient jobs, even if most of the
residents in that LMA reside in that sub-area and the sub-area had
unemployment rates that met or exceeded the threshold to qualify for a
waiver. Even if the LMA qualified for a waiver, the state may have
reasons why it only wants to waive a sub-area of the LMA. For instance,
the state may be able to guarantee SNAP E&T slots in most areas of the
LMA, but wants to request a waiver to cover counties in the LMA where
it cannot guarantee enough slots. Even if the areas the state wants to
waive qualified for a waiver based on unemployment rates, because it
comprises only a part of the LMA, it would not be eligible for a
waiver.
F. Conclusion: We Recommend Rejecting Proposed Changes That Restrict
State Flexibility to Waive Groups of Areas
The proposed rule is based on insufficient reasons to change
current regulations by prohibiting states from seeking statewide
waivers and from grouping areas, except for areas that are designated
as BLS labor market areas. It fails to discuss the ways that states
have used existing flexibility to align waiver policy with state
operations, policy, and resources. It does not discuss the implications
and limitations of its proposed framework for grouping, nor does it
address alternative methods for grouping, including those suggested by
the Department in past guidance. Given the lack of supporting
information, the public has an insufficient opportunity to comment
meaningfully on the proposed rule and we recommend rejecting the
proposed changes to the rules.
Chapter 6. Taking Away Food Benefits from Individuals Who Cannot
Document 20 Hours a Week of Work Will Not Increase Labor Force
Participation for This Population
USDA offered little rational for changing the decades-old criteria
for requesting waivers of the time limit. The primary reasoning it
provided is that fewer waivers will result in more individuals subject
to the time limit. The agency believes that if the state threatens to
withhold food benefits from these individuals, they will work more and
have higher participation rates in meaningful work activities. The NPRM
often describes this as a ``belief.'' For example, the NPRM states,
``the Department believes the local unemployment floor should be set at
seven percent to best meet its goals of promoting self-sufficiency''
\246\ (emphasis added). But the NPRM provides no evidence to support
the belief that taking away food from unemployed individuals will
result in higher labor force attachment or greater participation in job
training. Because the NPRM includes no supporting data or research,
commentators are left to accept as unequivocally true that the time
limit has an instrumental role in moving ``ABAWDs'' from non-work to
work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\ NPRM p. 984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet the claim that subjecting additional individuals to the time
limit will result in more meaningful work activities is wildly out of
synch with what we know from the evidence. Research shows that a
significant share of individuals subject to the time limit work when
they can find employment (including while on SNAP) and will work after
leaving SNAP even in the absence of the time limit. The claim also
ignores research showing that time limits generally fail to encourage
employment. And, the NPRM does not account for the particular
challenges facing this population--barriers and challenges to
employment that differ from those faced by the general public and
justify the current approach to providing waivers and individual
exemptions to unemployed childless adults. Because the agency did not
provide any evidence that would demonstrate the time limit is likely to
increase employment, earnings, or self-sufficiency, the agency's claim
that the time limit should be applied to more individuals in order to
increase labor force attachment is without merit. We offer findings
from numerous studies to illustrate our points. We strongly recommend
that the Department review and reflect on each of these studies before
moving forward with a final rule.
A. Individuals Subject to the Time Limit Already Have Significant Work
Effort, Raising Doubt as to Whether the Rate Can Be Increased
by Withholding Food
The NPRM repeatedly claims that a primary goal of the proposed
changes is to subject more individuals to the time limit. Terminating
food assistance to more people (some 755,000 more, by the agency's own
estimates), the NPRM argues, will increase work effort, job placement,
and earnings among those subject to the rule. But it fails to include
any information about the employment of individuals subject, or
potentially subject, to the time limit either while on SNAP or before
or after participation in the program. The absence of any information
is striking because research shows that many low-income adults without
children who receive SNAP in any given month work while on SNAP or soon
after, regardless of the existence of the time limit. Other factors,
such as personal circumstances and local economic conditions, play
important roles in an individual's employment, but are not taken into
account by FNS in this proposed change.
In this section, we review the research that describes both the
significant work effort of childless adults without disabilities, as
well as the unique challenges they face in the labor market. Because
workers turn to SNAP during periods of unemployment, employment rates
among childless adults while receiving SNAP might be expected to be
relatively low. Still, in a typical month, almost \1/3\ and perhaps as
many as \1/2\ of all SNAP households with childless adults work. USDA's
administrative data show that 31 percent of all SNAP households with
non-disabled childless adults worked in a typical month of 2017.\247\
USDA's administrative data may underestimate earnings because some work
may not be required to be reported for SNAP, either because it is
irregular or not expected to continue or because, under SNAP's
``simplified reporting'' rules, changes in circumstances need only be
reported at 6 month intervals unless they raise household income above
130 percent of the poverty level. Work that households aren't required
to report for SNAP purposes may be captured by the other data but not
the SNAP data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ Food and Nutrition Service, Characteristics of Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program Households: Fiscal Year 2017, Tables A.14
and A.16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, data from other sources suggest the work rate could be
closer to 50 percent. Tabulations generated by CBPP from the Census
Bureau's 2008 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) show employment rates for SNAP households with non-disabled
childless adults close to 50 percent in a typical month between 2011
and 2013.\248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, ``Unemployed adults
without children who need help buying food only get SNAP for three
months,'' https://www.cbpp.org/unemployed-adults-without-children-who-
need-help-buying-food-only-get-snap-for-three-months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2017 data from USDA does not identify whether a childless adult
is subject to the time limit or not (because he or she is exempt or
living in a waived area). But work rates among this population have
been consistent, even as the percentage of the country covered by
waivers has varied widely. Comparing 2017 data (when 37 percent of the
population lived in a waived area) to 2014 data (when 75 percent of the
population did) shows very similar levels of employment. In 2014, when
the national unemployment rate was over six percent, 35 states had
statewide waivers and nine had areas waived. That year, 27 percent of
all SNAP households with non-disabled adults and no children worked in
a typical month.\249\ That is close to the 31 percent of non-disabled
adults without children who were working in 2017, when far more of the
country had the time limit in place. This suggests factors other than
waivers or the time limit itself play a more important role in the
ability of adults without children to find work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\249\ See Food and Nutrition Service, Characteristics of
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Households: Fiscal Year 2014,
Table A.16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even more important, childless adults have high work rates prior to
and after a spell on SNAP, but the NPRM fails to account for how
subjecting more individuals to the time limit would impact this. About
72 percent of SNAP households with a childless, working-age adult
worked in the year before or after receiving SNAP.\250\ And many of
those not working while receiving SNAP were actively looking for work.
USDA's administrative data suggest that, in a typical month in 2017,
close to \1/2\ (46 percent) of all childless adults on SNAP who were
not working were looking for work (and of those who reported not
participating in the labor force, many likely had health conditions or
other barriers to employment that prohibited labor force
participation). Although this statistic should be viewed with caution
as the data may not be sufficiently reliable to draw firm conclusions,
it's noteworthy that Urban Institute researchers, using National Survey
of American Families data, found that \3/4\ of all low-income, able-
bodied adults without dependents (not just those on SNAP) worked in
1997 and 86 percent were in the labor force (that is, either working or
actively looking for work).\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\250\ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, ``Unemployed adults
without children who need help buying food only get SNAP for three
months,'' https://www.cbpp.org/unemployed-adults-without-children-who-
need-help-buying-food-only-get-snap-for-three-months.
\251\ See Stephen Bell and Jerome Gallagher, ``Prime-Age Adults
without Children or Disabilities: The `Least Deserving of the Poor'--or
Are They? Assessing the New Federalism Policy,'' Urban Institute,
February 2001, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/
61286/310269-Prime-Age-Adults-without-Children-or-Disabilities.PDF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the consistent evidence of work among individuals likely to
be subject to the time limit regardless of waiver status or general
unemployment rates, the claim that the time limit itself leads to
increased employment is not supported. Instead, it suggests that the
rule's sole purpose is to take away food assistance from struggling
unemployed or underemployed workers.
Further undermining the assertion that the time limit is necessary
to increase work effort among SNAP participants, most childless adults
on SNAP who work have substantial work. Among SNAP households that
worked in a typical month while receiving SNAP or worked at some point
during the following year, nearly \1/2\ (49 percent) worked full time
(at least 35 hours a week) for 6 months or more of the following year.
Twelve percent worked at least 20 hours per week for 6 or more months.
Another 24 percent worked full time in at least 1 month over that
period. Only about 15 percent worked 20 or more hours per week for less
than 6 months or worked fewer hours than that.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\ Steven Carlson, et al., ``Who Are the Low Income Childless
Adults Facing the Loss of SNAP in 2016?'' Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, February 8, 2016, p. 9, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/2-8-16fa.pdf. An updated analysis that looked at all
SNAP households with an adult without disabilities (with and without
children), found similar rates of full- and part-time work among the
broader group that the earlier analysis found. See Brynne Keith-
Jennings and Raheem Chaudhry, ``Most Working-Age SNAP Participants
Work, But Often in Unstable Jobs,'' March 15, 2018, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/most-working-age-snap-
participants-work-but-often-in-unstable-jobs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, childless adults participating in SNAP are generally
low-income, low-skill workers with limited job prospects. More than 80
percent have no more than a high school education or GED. They are more
likely than other SNAP participants to lack basic job skills like
reading, writing, and basic mathematics.\253\ A work experience program
in Ohio designed to help individuals subject to the time limit find
work or qualifying work activities found signs of functional illiteracy
even among those with a high school degree.\254\ As a result, wages of
childless working-age adults on SNAP are quite low: one study found
that 90 percent of those aged 25-49 earned less than twice the minimum
wage, compared to 47 percent of all workers aged 25-49.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\ ``Food Stamp Employment and Training Program,'' United States
General Accounting Office (GAO-3-388), March 2003, p. 17, http://
www.gao.gov/assets/240/237571.pdf.
\254\ See ``A Comprehensive Assessment of Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents and Their Participation in the Work Experience
Program in Franklin County, Ohio,'' Ohio Association of Foodbanks,
2014, http://admin.ohiofoodbanks.org/uploads/news/WEP-2013-2014-
report.pdf.
\255\ Stephen Bell and Jerome Gallagher, ``Prime-Age Adults without
Children or Disabilities: The `Least Deserving of the Poor'--or Are
They? Assessing the New Federalism Policy,'' Urban Institute, February
2001, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/61286/
310269-Prime-Age-Adults-without-Children-or-Disabilities.PDF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA did not provide any information or analysis in the NPRM that
suggested it had reviewed this evidence. Nor did it offer any research
to the contrary--and we believe no such research exists. That leaves us
to wonder whether the Department was aware that the work rates for
individuals subject to the time limit appear to be similar whether or
not they live in a waived area.
B. The NPRM Fails to Account for the Distinct Characteristics of
Unemployment Childless Adults on SNAP
Because the group of individuals subject to the rule are, when
compared to the general public, poorer, less educated, and more likely
to have medical conditions or other factors affecting their ability to
find employment, states have long found the 3 month time limit in
statute harsh and unfair. To mitigate the harm caused by taking food
assistance away from this group, states have routinely relied on the
option to request a waiver based on demonstrating a lack of sufficient
jobs for the individuals affected by the time limit.
The NPRM seeks to restrict this state option in order to end food
assistance for unemployed adults without children in the hope that this
will result in increased employment among this group. The NPRM offers
no information about the individuals affected by the rule--whether they
have the skills, training, and support to find and keep employment, and
whether they disproportionately face barriers to work like undiagnosed
health conditions, a lack of transportation, or a criminal history. The
NPRM neglects to address research findings from multiple sources,
including USDA itself, showing that this population does face a
different labor market environment than the general public. We are
surprised that USDA did not draw upon this wide body of research and
urge the agency to review the studies we cite--all of which are
included in the appendix.
We review the research to show that the job prospects for these
individuals are not accurately captured by the general unemployment
rate. Even when unemployment is low due to a strong economy, adult SNAP
participants without children face a very different labor market than
higher-income adults. This population is also under-served by other
support programs, often lacks stable housing, and struggles to be hired
into stable jobs. States wisely use the flexibility provided by law to
assess the availability of jobs for this population and request waivers
when there are insufficient jobs.
Childless adults on SNAP are extremely poor. Like many others,
childless adults often turn to SNAP for assistance when they are no
longer able to make ends meet, especially if their jobs are lost, hours
are cut, or wages hover at the Federal minimum. While participating in
SNAP, their income averages 33 percent of the poverty line, the
equivalent of about $4,000 per year for a single person in 2019.
Average incomes are even lower--just 18 percent of poverty--for those
not working 20 or more hours a week, who are most likely to be cut off
due to the 3 month limit.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\ CBPP analysis of FY 2017 USDA SNAP Household Characteristics
data adjusted to FY 2019 dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The struggles of poor adults are vividly portrayed in $2.00 a Day:
Living on Almost Nothing in America, which draws detailed portraits of
households with little access to substantial employment and public
benefits.\257\ The descriptions illustrate the complexities of
poverty--the psychological and emotional costs, the uncertainty and
lack of options available, and the work effort of those in poverty. We
strongly urge the Department to familiarize itself with the real lived
experiences of those portrayed in the book.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\ Kathryn J. Edin and H. Luke Shaefer, $2.00 a Day: Living on
Almost Nothing in America, 2015, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. We
especially highlight descriptions of the struggles of finding and
keeping work (pp. 42-47 and 112-114), the challenges facing people of
color in the job market (pp.52-56), and barriers to employment like
transportation (pp. 51-52, 138-139).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unemployed childless adults have few resources other than SNAP to
rely on while looking for work. In general, adults without children are
not eligible for most government assistance. In the past, state General
Assistance programs have provided small monthly cash allotments to
singe adults to meet basic shelter and other needs, but these programs
have weakened considerably. Few childless adults qualify for
unemployment insurance, and childless adults are ineligible for
Medicaid in states that haven't adopted the Affordable Care Act's
Medicaid expansion. In addition, childless workers are the only
demographic group that the Federal tax system taxes into, or deeper
into, poverty, in part because they are eligible only for a tiny Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC). Federal income and payroll taxes pushed about
7.5 million childless workers into or deeper into poverty in 2015.\258\
Given how little Federal support is available to the group subject to
the time limit, it is surprising that USDA believes the group is able
to survive while avoiding work. Their SNAP benefits are minimal to meet
basic food needs, let alone housing, health, and other basic expenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ Chuck Marr, et al., ``Lone Group Taxed Into Poverty Should
Receive a Larger EITC,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April
19, 2016, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/childless-adults-
are-lone-group-taxed-into-poverty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many childless adults have disabilities that make working difficult
or impossible but don't meet the severe disability standard for
receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI). If not identified as having a physical or
mental condition that prevents them from working 20 or more hours per
week, they would be subject to the time limit, yet unable to
realistically find work in many cases.
There's more evidence that people subject to the time limit face
multiple challenges to independence and self-sufficiency, including
homelessness, physical and mental health limitations, language
barriers, unstable employment histories, and criminal records. A
detailed study of individuals identified by the local SNAP agency as
ABAWDs subject to the time limit who were referred to a work experience
program in Franklin County (Columbus), Ohio found that: \259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\ See ``Comprehensive Report on Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents, Franklin County Ohio Work Experience Program,'' Ohio
Association of Foodbanks, 2015, http://admin.ohiofoodbanks.org/uploads/
news/ABAWD_Report_2014-2015-v3.pdf. The Ohio Association of Foodbanks
gathered the information for the report as a result of a partnership
with the county SNAP agency to help place individuals identified as
subject to the time limit in qualifying work activities after screening
them.

Many have extremely unstable living situations, evidenced by
residence in short-term shelters or with friends and family and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
limited telephone service.

One-third have a mental or physical limitation, including
depression, post-traumatic stress disorders, mental or learning
disabilities, or physical injuries. Some of these disabilities,
though not severe enough to qualify for Federal disability
benefits, may still limit a person's ability to work more than
20 hours a week.

Nearly \1/4\ are non-custodial parents, and 13 percent are
caregivers for a parent, relative, or friend.

More than 40 percent lack access to reliable private or
public transportation; 60 percent lack a valid driver's
license.

Fifteen percent need supportive services like language
interpretation or help with transportation to obtain
employment.

Nearly \1/4\ have been dismissed from a job in the past and
others have gaps in their employment records--both of which can
deter potential employers. More than \1/3\ have felony
convictions, making it hard to find jobs and pass background
checks.

These individuals face daunting challenges in finding employment
even when general unemployment rates are low. The Ohio study
illustrates why Congress gave states the option to waive the time limit
in areas where there are insufficient jobs for those subject to the
rule. Without providing any evidence to the contrary, the NPRM proposes
to limit the ways in which a state can demonstrate a lack of sufficient
jobs for the individuals subject to the time limit. It does this by
eliminating Labor Surplus Areas, low and declining employment-to-
population ratios, seasonal unemployment and requiring recent
unemployment rates to be at least seven percent. But the Department
fails to explain how it determined that the proposed new standards
relate to employment opportunities for those subject to the rule,
particularly given the characteristics outlined in the list above.
One reason states were given flexibility to define the areas which
could be waived due to a lack of sufficient jobs for the individuals
subject to the rule is that even in the late 1990s, a growing body of
research showed that the labor market situation for low-skilled workers
had grown worse over time, and that low-skill workers faced limited
employment options. As summarized by a report commissioned by USDA in
1998, ``a relatively large body of research indicates that the labor
market situation of the low-skilled has become considerably worse in
recent decades and that their current employment prospects are limited.
This suggests that even if ABAWDs are willing to work, they may be
unable to do so because there are not enough jobs for low-skilled
workers.'' \260\ The report, which reviewed studies on the employment
prospects of low-income adults fitting the ``ABAWD'' description (but
not necessarily participating in SNAP), also found that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\260\ Michael Stavrianos and Lucia Nixon, The Effect of Welfare
Reform on Able-Bodied Food Stamp Recipients, Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., July 1998, pp. 56-57.

Job prospects for ABAWDs do not look promising, due to
changes in the U.S. economy that have resulted in the decline
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of industries and skill types in which ABAWDs are concentrated.

Many ABAWDs face a spatial mismatch between their residence
and the location of low-skill jobs, as well as a skills
mismatch, especially for urban residents.

The job prospects of ABAWDs depend significantly on local
economic conditions, tied not to county-level unemployment but
to the location of employers needing low-skill workers and the
quality and availability of local institutions supporting
workforce development.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\ Michael Stavrianos and Lucia Nixon, The Effect of Welfare
Reform on Able-Bodied Food Stamp Recipients, Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., July 1998, p. 56-57.

The Department's commissioned reports as well as other research
paint a clear picture of individuals in this targeted group who have
common characteristics that distinguish the group from other unemployed
adults. These characteristics--including high poverty rates, health
issues, and few supports--make finding and keeping employment a unique
challenge. The Department simply asserts that the time limit will
increase employment for this population but does not acknowledge its
own research showing that this is not the case. While all aspects of
the rule strike us as arbitrary, this disconnect between the agency's
basic knowledge of the affected population and the assertions about how
the proposed policy would increase employment is particularly
surprising. This is one of numerous reasons why the proposed rule
should be withdrawn.
C. Reports Commissioned by USDA Show Subjecting More Individuals to the
Time Limit Will Not Increase Their Likelihood of Gaining
Employment
In order to understand the impact of the time limit on individuals'
well-being, USDA, along with the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, funded studies in four states: Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, and
South Carolina. While the studies varied in scope and focus and were
not able to identify individuals who left SNAP because of the time
limit, they do reveal the policy's limited impact on employment
outcomes, coupled with low earnings and increased hardship.
A 2001 study of individuals leaving SNAP in Illinois showed that
far more families than ABAWDs left SNAP due to increased earnings, even
though the time limit was in effect. The study found that the
percentage of ABAWDs who left SNAP and remained off the program and
employed did not vary between counties that had waivers and counties
that did not.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\ See Exhibit ES-1, page ES-4, Philip Richardson, et al., Food
Stamp Leavers Research Study--Study of ABAWDs Leaving the Food Stamp
Program in South Carolina, https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/45220/
PDF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The study looked at those who left SNAP in areas where the time
limit was in effect and areas where it was not (due to a waiver). It
found that in the sample who left SNAP in 1998-1999, a majority of
individuals (53 percent) were off SNAP in 2001 and not working or back
on SNAP. Of those that were working after leaving SNAP, the study did
not attempt to identify the role of the time limit in employment gains.
In fact, the study shows that employment rates among ABAWDs leaving
SNAP were highest in areas exempt from the time limit due to high
unemployment rates--higher than the employment rates in areas using the
individual exemptions and areas in which the time limit was in
effect.\263\ This shows that factors other than the time limit have
more impact on employment outcomes for ABAWDs. FNS fails to address
this in the NPRM. Here we again recommend that FNS review and consider
this research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\ See Exhibit IV-I, Philip Richardson, et al., Food Stamp
Leavers Research Study--Study of ABAWDs Leaving the Food Stamp Program
in South Carolina Final Report, page IV-2, https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/
download/45220/PDF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Arizona study commissioned by USDA to understand the outcomes
of people leaving SNAP showed that ABAWDs had worse outcomes on a
number of employment-based metrics. They were less likely to have
achieved self-sufficiency, less likely to have improved their
employment situation, and more likely to be at risk of hardship or
deprivation. The study grouped SNAP participants in Arizona in 1997
into three categories: ABAWDs, non-ABAWD individuals on TANF, and non-
ABAWD, non-TANF adults. Upon leaving SNAP, employment rates for each
subgroup were over 50 percent, but by one year later, ABAWDs who had
been cut off SNAP had experienced the greatest drop in employment.\264\
This suggests that: (1) the 3 month time limit may not be an important
factor in causing employment, since SNAP participants not subject to
the time limit had similar levels of employment as those subject to the
time limit when leaving SNAP; and (2) ABAWDs struggle to maintain
employment. The report identifies several reasons why the ABAWD group
might see a sharp decline in employment. In a survey of ABAWDs who were
no longer on SNAP and not working, more than 60 percent reported being
ill or having health problems or a disability--circumstances not
identified by the SNAP agency as qualifying an individual to an
exemption.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\ See Exhibit 2-6, Covered Employment, in Gregory Mills and
Robert Kornfeld, Study of Arizona Adults Leaving the Food Stamp
Program, Final Report, Dec. 2000, page 36, https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/
download/45673/PDF.
\265\ Gregory Mills and Robert Kornfeld, Study of Arizona Adults
Leaving the Food Stamp Program, Final Report, Dec. 2000, page 51,
https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/45673/PDF. Individuals with a
medically certified physical or mental condition that prevents them
from working are exempt from the 3 month time limit, but states have
struggled with correctly identifying these individuals. The study did
not look at whether some of the ABAWDs who left SNAP should have been
exempt from the time limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Across all four studies, many who lost SNAP benefits were employed
but had low earnings. Between 41 and 76 percent of the former
recipients in the four states were working after leaving SNAP, but
earnings were low and many remained in poverty.\266\ Most of those who
were not working in Arizona and Illinois were in poor health or caring
for a family member in poor health. Given the complexity of SNAP's
rules governing work effort, disability, and time limits, some may not
have realized that they may again qualify for SNAP and failed to
reapply for benefits.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\ Elizabeth Dagata, ``Assessing the Self-Sufficiency of Food
Stamp Leavers,'' Economic Research Service, USDA, September 2002,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=46645.
\267\ Elizabeth Dagata, ``Assessing the Self-Sufficiency of Food
Stamp Leavers,'' Economic Research Service, USDA, September 2002,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=46645.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the studies of individuals leaving SNAP looked at all types
of individuals, the studies yielded important results for ABAWDs that
are relevant to this proposed rule but do not appear in the
Department's rationale for the NPRM. For example, in Illinois in 1997,
the single largest category of individuals losing benefits was ABAWDs.
The impact varied widely among groups. For example, \2/3\ of the ABAWDs
leaving the program were African American, well above the percentage of
all leavers (which was 50 percent).\268\ As discussed more fully in
Chapter 12, the NPRM acknowledges the proposed rule would have a
disparate impact by noting the ``potential for disparately impacting
certain protected groups due to factors affecting rates of employment
of members of these groups.'' \269\ But the Food and Nutrition Act
makes clear that the regulations implementing Title VI and other civil
rights statutes are fully applicable to SNAP. These regulations
prohibit actions in Federal programs that have disparate impacts on
members of protected groups as well as intentional discriminatory acts.
Therefore, the proposed rule's disparate impact on these individuals,
as demonstrated by the research and acknowledged in the NPRM itself, is
inconsistent with the Act. Given the requirement under 7 U.S.C.
2020(c)(2)(D) that the Department ensure the protections of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply to all SNAP households, we are
stunned that the Department did not review its own research results
that clearly suggest that the proposed policy would have widely
disparate impacts on African Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\ Anu Rangarajan and Philip M. Gleason, Food Stamp Leavers in
Illinois: How Are They Doing Two Years Later?, Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., January 2001, p. 21, https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/
our-publications-and-findings/publications/food-stamp-leavers-in-
illinois-how-are-they-doing-two-years-later.
\269\ NPRM, p. 990.
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D. The Loss of SNAP Due to the Time Limit Fails to Raise Income and
Increases Hardship
Childless adults who lose SNAP benefits struggle without food
assistance benefits. As noted, USDA's most comprehensive assessment of
former SNAP recipients in four states in the early 2000s suggests that
their life circumstances are quite difficult.\270\ A significant
minority don't find work, and among those who are employed after
leaving SNAP, earnings are low. Most remain poor. Many struggle to
acquire enough food to meet their needs, lack health insurance,
experience housing problems, and/or have trouble paying their bills.
(These studies include people who leave SNAP because of the 3 month
time limit or for other reasons, for example, because they found a job
or mistakenly believed they were no longer eligible.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\ Elizabeth M. Dagata, ``Assessing the Self-Sufficiency of Food
Stamp Leavers,'' Economic Research Service, USDA, September 2002,
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/262256/files/31106_fanrr26-
8_002.pdf. This is a summary of in-depth studies in Arizona, Illinois,
Iowa, and South Carolina.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite relatively high levels of work effort, between \1/3\ and
roughly \2/3\ of SNAP leavers in the four states had household incomes
below the poverty line--well above the overall poverty rate of 13
percent. Many of these households experienced severe poverty after
leaving SNAP: about 40 percent of the leavers in two states were below
half of the poverty line.
Many struggled to acquire adequate food. Between 17 and 34 percent
of the SNAP leavers in the four states reported very low food security
(meaning they had to skip or reduce the size of their meals or
otherwise disrupt their eating patterns at times during the year
because they couldn't afford enough food), compared with three percent
of all households without children.
USDA's study of adults in Arizona leaving SNAP found that the
incidence of moderate or severe hunger was greatest among the ABAWD
subgroup, at 34 percent, compared to 23 percent for the TANF subgroup
and 18 percent for the non-TANF subgroup.\271\ By comparison, 3.5
percent of all Arizona households were classified as facing moderate or
severe hunger. The Arizona study concludes by pointing out that
individuals who might appear to be self-sufficient or better off after
leaving SNAP, because they receive fewer public benefits and report
less private support, might still be facing significant hardship:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\ Gregory Mills and Robert Kornfeld, Study of Arizona Adults
Leaving the Food Stamp Program, Final Report, Dec. 2000, page 85,
https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/45673/PDF.

The high rate of food insecurity with hunger found among
ABAWD exiters--34 percent--is noteworthy. This incidence is
more than twice the 1999 national rate of 14 percent estimated
by USDA for households at or below 50 percent of the poverty
level, even though most ABAWDs have incomes above the poverty
level. The ABAWD finding highlights the importance of
considering (in this and other exit studies) whether exiters
who appear self-sufficient, in terms of their reduced reliance
on public and private support, are able to avoid hardship and
deprivation.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\ Gregory Mills and Robert Kornfeld, Study of Arizona Adults
Leaving the Food Stamp Program, Final Report, Dec. 2000, page 94,
https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/45673/PDF.

This cautionary note is not found in the NPRM. The agency simply
asserts that it believes expanding the number of individuals subject to
the time limit will improve their self-sufficiency, without
acknowledging what the agency-funded research revealed--that the
outcome for ABAWDs leaving because of the time limit may be increased
hunger and hardship.
The studies also showed that many lacked health insurance, had
housing problems, or had trouble paying their utility bills. About 30
to 40 percent of the SNAP leavers in the four states faced housing
issues, including falling behind on rent, moving in with relatives, or
becoming homeless. Between 20 and 65 percent reported problems paying
for utilities. Just over \1/2\ of the SNAP leavers in two of the states
were uninsured.\273\ These are all characteristics, as we illustrate
elsewhere in the comments, associated with much higher rates of
unemployment. We continue to be baffled about how or whether USDA
factored its own research into the NPRM. It would appear that the
Department ignored its own studies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\ Elizabeth M. Dagata, ``Assessing the Self-Sufficiency of Food
Stamp Leavers,'' Economic Research Service, USDA, September 2002,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=46645. This is
a summary of in-depth studies in Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, and South
Carolina.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Evidence From Other Benefit Programs Shows That Time Limits Do Not
Increase Employment and Have a Disproportionate Impact on
Certain Populations
The stated rationale for proposing a change to the long-standing
waiver process is to expose more individuals to the time limit, in the
belief that this will result in increased labor market attachment. The
NPRM provides no evidence to support this assertion. But, research on
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, which
imposes both work requirements and a time limit for benefits,
undermines the claim that work requirements and time-limited benefits
increase employment.
A review of the many studies on families whose TANF monthly direct
financial support was reduced or taken away due to work requirements
shows that these policies harm individuals and families, most of whom
face significant obstacles to employment, while producing few lasting
gains in employment. While the studies described in this section are
about families with children--often single-mother-headed households--
the findings are relevant because they review the circumstances of very
poor households, similar in important respects to households on SNAP.
In addition, many ABAWDs are parents of non-minor children or have
children not in the SNAP household. TANF and SNAP households live in
similar circumstances and face similar challenges finding employment,
so the outcomes from one group can inform the likely outcomes for the
other.
A time limit ignores the fact that public assistance recipients
often vary in their needs and circumstances; many often live with one
or multiple significant barriers to employment. Those barriers range
from low cognitive functioning, to mental and physical health problems,
to criminal justice issues, to low measures of human capital. These
barriers make it hard to find or keep a job or fulfill other work
requirements. Extensive research on the effect of time limits in TANF,
which provides modest cash assistance and requires a portion of the
caseload to engage in work activities, shows that the time limit did
not notably increase employment, but it did result in increased
hardship. We strongly recommend that USDA read these studies and
consider the findings when developing final regulations. We are
confident the results demonstrate the problems with the proposed
policy.
F. Most Low-Income People Sanctioned From Public Assistance Due to Work
Requirements Face Barriers Finding Employment
Studies show that many parents who lose TANF benefits due to work
requirements have significant employment barriers. Those losing
benefits are more likely than other TANF parents to have physical,
mental health, or substance use issues; to be fleeing domestic
violence; to have low levels of education and limited work experience;
or to face significant logistical challenges, such as lack of access to
or funds to pay for child care and transportation.\274\ Below are
summaries of several TANF studies finding that many adults losing
assistance due to sanctions face significant employment barriers:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\ LaDonna Pavetti, Michelle K. Derr, and Heather Hesketh,
``Review of Sanction Policies and Research Studies,'' Mathematica
Policy Research (March 2003).

A 2007 study of regional variation of full-family
sanctioning practices in Florida's TANF cash assistance program
gives evidence that sanctions are significantly related to
various barriers to employment. TANF parents with lower income
and lower levels of education were more likely to be sanctioned
than those with higher income and education levels. For
example, recipients with a high school degree were more likely
to be sanctioned than those with more education--however,
sanctions were the most common among those with less than a
high school degree. Community traits can matter too: families
were more likely to be sanctioned in counties with higher
poverty rates than other counties, after controlling for other
characteristics.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\ Richard C. Fording, Joe Soss, and Sanford F. Schram,
``Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of Local Political Values on
TANF Sanctioning,'' Social Service Review (June 2007), pp. 285-316.

A 2006 study of women in Wisconsin receiving TANF found that
the state was more likely to sanction mothers with lower levels
of education. Specifically, mothers with at least a high school
diploma or equivalent were less likely to be sanctioned than
mothers with less than a high school diploma, and those with
education beyond high school were even less likely to be
sanctioned, even when controlling for how long each individual
received TANF grants. The study also concluded that those ``who
may be least able to succeed in the labor market are most
likely to be sanctioned.'' Specifically, the authors examined
sanction activity against the mothers' employment status in the
2 years preceding entry to the TANF program. The authors'
estimates show a monotonic trend with the number of quarters of
work: those with no work in the past 2 years were most likely
to be sanctioned, those with 1-4 quarters of employment were
less likely to be sanctioned, those with 5-7 quarters of
employment were even less likely to be sanctioned, and mothers
who had been employed for all eight quarters were the least
likely to be sanctioned.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\276\ Chi-Fang Wu, et al., ``How Do Welfare Sanctions Work?,''
Social Work Research (March 2006), pp. 33-50.

A 2002 comparison of sanctioned and non-sanctioned TANF
recipients in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio found sanctioned
recipients were less likely than other TANF recipients to have
a high school degree or its equivalent, a working telephone at
home, or a car. They were more likely to report being in fair
or poor health, have a substance use issue, or have a partner
who interfered with their employment, training, or schooling.
They also had less work experience, lived in neighborhoods with
undesirable qualities (such as abandoned houses, assaults and
muggings, gangs, and open drug dealing), and reported living in
housing of poor quality.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\ Andrew J. Cherlin, et al., ``Operating within the Rules:
Welfare Recipients' Experience with Sanctions and Case Closings,''
Social Service Review (September 2002), pp. 387-662.

A study of women in Michigan receiving TANF shows that those
with educational barriers to employment were more likely to be
sanctioned than those without such barriers. Women with less
than a high school education were 2.06 times more likely to be
sanctioned than women with higher levels of formal
education.\278\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ Ariel Kalil, Kristin S. Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang,
``Sanctions and Material Hardship under TANF,'' Social Service Review
(December 2002), pp. 642-662.

The same study of women in Michigan receiving TANF shows
those with transportation-related barriers to employment were
more likely to be sanctioned than those without such barriers.
Specifically, recipients who lacked either a car or a driver's
license were disproportionately sanctioned relative to
recipients without these transportation barriers. In addition,
those with trauma-related barriers to employment were more
likely to be sanctioned than those without such barriers.
Specifically, women who reported experiencing severe domestic
violence (being hit, kicked, shoved, etc.) within the past year
were disproportionately sanctioned relative to recipients who
did not report experiences of that type.\279\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\279\ Ariel Kalil, Kristin S. Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang,
``Sanctions and Material Hardship under TANF,'' Social Service Review
(December 2002), pp. 642-662.

A California study of a random sample of [CalWORKs] (TANF)
recipients in four counties (two large urban counties and two
large semi-rural counties) found that recipients without a car
were roughly 1.5 times more likely to incur sanctions than
recipients who owned a car. Recipients who were sanctioned were
less likely to own a car (39 percent of respondents) in
comparison to non-sanctioned recipients (52 percent of
respondents).\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\ Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Toorjo Ghose, and Kandyce Larson, ``The
Logic of Sanctioning Welfare Recipients: An Empirical Assessment,''
Social Science Review (June 2004), Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 304-319, http://
repository.upenn.edu/spp_papers/88/.

In Illinois, parents who had ever been sanctioned were
significantly less likely than those never sanctioned to have a
high school diploma or its equivalent and more likely to have
limited recent work experience. They also were significantly
more likely to be dealing with a physical or mental health
issue, to have been arrested multiple times, and to have
experienced a child care issue. In South Carolina, parents ever
sanctioned were significantly more likely to have a physical
health problem, show signs of a learning disability, and have a
family member or friend with a health care issue or special
need. \281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\ LaDonna Pavetti, et al., ``The Use of TANF Work-Oriented
Sanctions in Illinois, New Jersey, and South Carolina,'' Mathematica
Policy Research (April 2004).

A study of 656 TANF leavers from the 1999 and 2002 data of
the National Survey of America's Family (NSAF) found that TANF
leavers who reached their lifetime limits had a higher chance
of having problems with employment due to work barriers or
vulnerable characteristics such as old age, physical or mental
health problems. They experienced greater hardship because they
had less income and less EITC receipt, most had experienced a
cutoff of SNAP, and fewer received child care assistance. The
author concluded that time limits can lead low-income families
to endure greater economic hardships.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\282\ Kyoung Hag Lee, ``Effect on Lifetime Limits and Differences
between TANF Leavers Who Had Reached Their Lifetime Limits and Those
Who Had Exited Voluntarily,'' Poverty & Public Policy (2010), pp. 1-22.

A study that examined time limits on the receipt of welfare
in both the United States and British Columbia, Canada found
that time limits are an ineffective policy tool as they
increase barriers to employment and result in recipients
needing more support and access to specific programs.
Recipients who exhausted their benefits struggled financially
and had a difficult time finding a job. While some recipients
had several barriers to work, others who had fewer barriers
were still unable to find a job. Low cognitive functioning,
limited education, and physical and mental health problems were
some of the barriers that recipients faced.\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\ Dean Herd, Ernie Lightman, and Andrew Mitchell, ``Welfare
Time Limits: Symbolism and Practice'', U-Toronto: Social Assistance in
the New Economy (SANE) Project (2008), pp. 1-26.

A 2006 study of Minnesota's TANF program explored in detail
the circumstances of those at or near 60 months, the Federal
time limit. It found about 16 percent of cases had a case head
with an IQ of less than 80, about 20 percent were caring for
ill or incapacitated family members, and about 21 percent were
ill or incapacitated themselves for 30 days or more. Long-term
TANF recipients also had mental illness (which is often
untreated or inadequately treated), were developmentally
disabled or learning disabled, were leaving domestic violence
situations, or were otherwise ``unemployable.'' Some recipients
suffered from chronic and debilitating health problems because
they had worked physically demanding jobs.\284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\ LaDonna Pavetti and Jacqueline Kauff, ``When Five Years Is
Not Enough: Identifying and Addressing the needs of Families Nearing
the TANF Time Limit in Ramsey County, Minnesota,'' Mathematica Policy
Research (March 2006), pp. 1-24, https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-
publications-and-findings/publications/when-five-years-is-not-enough-
identifying-and-addressing-the-needs-of-families-nearing-the-tanf-time-
limit-in-ramsey-county-minnesota.

Another report on Minnesota's TANF program shows the percent
of persons with a severe mental health diagnosis at 60 months,
the Federal time limit, to be about 52 percent and those with a
chemical dependency diagnosis to be 27 percent. Among American
Indian recipients, about 60 percent of those near the time
limit had a mental health diagnosis and/or a chemical
dependency diagnosis.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\ Dana DeMaster, ``At the Limit: December 2006 Minnesota Family
Investment Program (MFIP) Cases that Reached the 60 Month Time Limit,''
Minnesota Department of Human Services (January 2008), pp. 1-18,
https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/lfserver/Legacy/DHS-5092B-ENG.

A more recent Washington State study compared families who
left TANF due to time limits and those who left for other
reasons. The state found that time-limited families were more
likely to be unstably housed in the year prior to losing
assistance. They were also more likely to have chronic health
issues and visit the emergency room. And, they were more likely
to have a range of behavioral health needs, from mental health
issues to substance abuse disorders.\286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ Christina McHugh and J. Taylor Danielson, ``TANF Time Limit
Analysis Comparing Cases Closed Due to Time Limits with Other Case
Closures,'' Washington State Department of Social and Health Services
(February 2019).

In a survey of 276 West Virginia TANF recipients cut off due
to time limits, respondents identified several barriers to
employment. Most of the respondents were unemployed after
leaving TANF. More than \1/2\ (56.2 percent) of respondents
were not working because of a physical or mental illness or
disability problem; more than \1/3\ (37.1 percent) had no
transportation; \1/3\ (32.6 percent) did not have the right
education; and a little less than \1/3\ (29.8 percent) simply
could not find a job. Most of these respondents had multiple
barriers to employment.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\ Robert Jay Dilger, et al., ``WV WORKS 2003: Perspectives of
Former Recipients Who Have Exhausted Their 60 Months of Program
Eligibility,'' West Virginia University Interdisciplinary Task Force on
Welfare Reform (Summer 2004), pp. 1-24.

A California study of the cases that reach the time limit
found families often struggle with one major barrier to work
and often multiple barriers. One-third of respondents cited
major health issues as a big barrier to work. A smaller share
said they were caring for a family member with a major health
issue. More than \1/5\ of respondents said they suffered from
depression or anxiety or had experienced at least one stressful
event in the past year. About 11 percent experienced a domestic
violence situation. More than \1/2\ of all respondents noted
having at least one barrier and 28 percent cited having two or
more barriers. Forty-three percent said they had trouble paying
rent; 54 percent said they had trouble paying utility bills; 39
percent reported having trouble paying for food; and 40 percent
noted they had to use a food bank.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\ Rebecca A. London and Jane G. Mauldon, ``Time Running Out: A
Portrait of California Families Reaching the CalWORKs 60-Month Time
Limit in 2004,'' Welfare Policy Research Project (November 2006), pp.
1-6. http://escholarship.ucop.edu/uc/item/37g3510z.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Imposing Time Limits and Sanctions for Failure to Meet Work
Requirements Has a Disparate Impact on Communities of Color
States' application of work requirements in the TANF cash
assistance program has exacerbated racial inequities, research shows.
On the whole, research on TANF suggests that policies to take away SNAP
from individuals who are not working or participating in work
activities for a specific number of hours each month will hurt, not
help, the individuals most in need of assistance. Nearly every study
comparing the race and ethnicity of sanctioned and non-sanctioned TANF
recipients finds that African Americans are significantly more likely
to be sanctioned than their white counterparts.\289\ For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\ LaDonna Pavetti, Michelle K. Derr, and Heather Hesketh,
``Review of Sanction Policies and Research Studies,'' Mathematica
Policy Research (March 2003).

A 2011 study of Minnesota TANF recipients found that the
state sanctioned a disproportionate number of American Indian
or Alaskan Native recipients and sanctioned them more often
than other racial groups during a 24 month observation period.
While American Indian or Alaskan Natives only comprised around
10.9 percent of the families receiving TANF in Minnesota, they
made up 12.2 percent of all families that the state sanctioned.
Further, the average number of sanctions was 3.54 for American
Indian and Alaskan Native families, while it was only 3.18 for
White, non-Hispanic families.\290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\ Anita M. Larson, Shweta Singh, and Crystal Lewis, ``Sanctions
and Education Outcomes for Children in TANF Families,'' Child & Youth
Services (September 2011), pp. 180-199.

A 2007 study of Florida's TANF program showed black families
were more likely to be sanctioned than White families after
several months of continuous TANF receipt. Specifically, the
study estimated that among families who received TANF benefits
for at least 9 months continuously, black families were 22 to
35 percent more likely to be sanctioned than White
families.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\ Richard C. Fording, Joe Soss, and Sanford F. Schram,
``Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of Local Political Values on
TANF Sanctioning,'' Social Service Review (June 2007), pp. 285-316.

A 2006 study of women in Wisconsin receiving TANF found that
black women were more likely to be sanctioned than their white
counterparts. This result was statistically significant under
both a simple analysis and an analysis that took into account
the duration of each individual's receipt of TANF grants.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\ Chi-Fang Wu, et al., ``How Do Welfare Sanctions Work?,''
Social Work Research (March 2006), pp. 33-50.

A 2002 study of women receiving TANF in Michigan found that
black women were disproportionately sanctioned compared to
white women. The authors found similar results under two
different specifications. One analysis, looking at mean
differences, found that black women made up a disproportionate
number of the total number of women that the state sanctioned.
The other model, a multivariate logistic regression, provided
similar evidence: African American women were 1.73 times more
likely to be sanctioned than White women.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\ Ariel Kalil, Kristin S. Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang,
``Sanctions and Material Hardship under TANF,'' Social Service Review
(December 2002), pp. 642-662.

A 2011 study of TANF recipients in Maryland found evidence
that African Americans were more likely to lose benefits due to
sanctions compared to other recipients. The study found that
African Americans were disproportionately represented among
families that had been sanctioned as a result of work
requirements relative to respondents of other races.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\ Sarah Williamson, ``Full-Family Sanctions & Economic
Recession,'' University of Maryland Family Research and Training Group
(January 2011). https://familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports1/
sanctionsbrief.pdf.

A New Jersey study found that among TANF recipients entering
the program between July 2000 and June 2001, 36 percent of
African American recipients had their TANF grants reduced and
16 percent had their grant eliminated due to a work-related
sanction; the comparable figures for white recipients were 27
percent and ten percent, respectively.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\295\ LaDonna Pavetti, et al., ``The Use of TANF Work-Oriented
Sanctions in Illinois, New Jersey, and South Carolina,'' Mathematica
Policy Research (April 2004).

Data from the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development shows a
consistent pattern of racial and ethnic discrepancies in TANF
sanctions. Statewide, 42 percent of African American participants and
45 percent of Hispanic participants were sanctioned, compared to just
24 percent of white participants.\296\ Researchers in several states
have looked at the demographics of the share of their caseload
approaching or at the time limit. In a number of examples, including a
national survey, families and recipients of color--and particularly
black recipients--are more likely to lose benefits due to the time
limit. This evidence suggests that expanding time limits in other
programs will disproportionally affect black recipients. Other research
cited below highlight the unique challenges African Americans face in
the labor market. Loss of assistance, paired with the difficulty of
securing or maintaining a job, could make the hardship experienced by
this group even worse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\ Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, ``Wisconsin
Works (W-2) Sanctions Study,'' (December 2004).

The Minnesota TANF agency found that black women, including
African Americans, Somali immigrants, and other African
immigrants, made up about \1/2\ of the adult recipients who
reached 60 months, the Federal time limit. African Americans in
particular were the most likely to reach the Federal time
limit.\297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\297\ Dana DeMaster, ``At the Limit: December 2006 Minnesota Family
Investment Program (MFIP) Cases that Reached the 60 Month Time Limit,''
Minnesota Department of Human Services (January 2008), pp. 1-18,
https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/lfserver/Legacy/DHS-5092B-ENG.

A study in Maryland found most of the caseload consisted of
black women and they were the most likely of any racial group
to reach the time limit.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\ Pamela Ovwigho, Kathryn Patterson, and Catherine E. Born,
``The TANF Time Limit: Barriers & Outcomes among Families Reaching the
Limit,'' Family Welfare Research and Training Group (November 2007),
pp. 1-34, https://familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports1/tl_barriers.pdf.

In Virginia, black families were more likely to reach the
limit than white families.\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\ Anne Gordon, et al., ``Experiences of Virginia Time Limit
Families After Case Closure: An Interim Report,'' Mathematica (2002),
pp. 1-177, https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/-/media/publications/pdfs/
expvafinal.pdf.

In Washington State, families cut off by the time limit
tended to be black or American Indian.\300\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\ Christina McHugh and J. Taylor Danielson, ``TANF Time Limit
Analysis Comparing Cases Closed Due to Time Limits with Other Case
Closures,'' Washington State Department of Social and Health Services
(February 2019).

Using the Women's Employment Study for one Michigan urban
county, researchers analyzed factors associated with increased
time on TANF. They found that black women were far more likely
to have accumulated more months, and thus be closer to the time
limit, than white women.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\301\ Kristin S. Seefeldt and Sean M. Orzol, ``Watching the Clock
Tick: Factors Associated with TANF Accumulation,'' National Poverty
Center Working Paper Series (May 2005), http://www.npc.umich.edu/
publications/workingpaper04/paper9/04-09.pdf.

SNAP participants of color also face discrimination when looking
for work. Investigations in job discrimination uncovered strong
employer preferences for white candidates over candidates of color. One
study found that resumes with white-sounding names are more likely to
get call-backs than resumes with equal qualifications but with black-
sounding names. Other research shows that generally, those with a
criminal record are less likely to get call-backs or requests for
interviews from employers. Furthermore, black applicants without
criminal records are less likely to receive favorable treatment than
white applicants without criminal records, but white applicants with a
criminal record are more likely to receive favorable treatment than
black applicants with no criminal history.\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\ Devah Pager, ``The Mark of a Criminal Record,'' American
Journal of Sociology (2003), pp. 937-975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Households That Lose TANF Benefits Because of Sanctions or Time
Limits Experience Higher Levels of Material Hardship and
Increased Hardship
People with incomes low enough to qualify for SNAP also often have
few or no assets to lean on in difficult times and a limited amount of
cash to meet basic needs like rent and utilities, clothes, personal
care items, and gas or bus fare, among other things. SNAP helps meet
food costs, but when that assistance is taken away, individuals
struggle to make ends meet and some are unable to avoid a downward
spiral. Studies examining sanctioned TANF families show that many
people experience increased hardships after facing a sanction: a 2004
longitudinal study of TANF recipients in Illinois found that sanctioned
families who faced grant reductions had higher levels of food hardship
after being sanctioned than those who did not have their grants reduced
by sanctions. Researchers defined food hardship as sometimes or often
not having enough to eat. Recipients who had sanctions in the period
January 1999 to March 2001 reported between February 2002 and September
2002 a higher incidence of food hardship and perceived overall hardship
than other TANF recipients who did not experience grant reductions
resulting from sanctions during the period. A multivariate analysis
conducted with the same data indicated respondents who had their grants
reduced due to sanctions were over three times more likely to report
food hardship in the final period of the study (after the sanction)
compared to those who were never sanctioned during the study, after
controlling for demographic and other factors.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\303\ Bong Joo Lee, Kristen S. Slack, and Dan A. Lewis, ``Are
Welfare Sanctions Working as Intended? Welfare Receipt, Work Activity,
and Material Hardship among TANF-Recipient Families,'' Social Service
Review (September 2004), pp. 370-403.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 2004 longitudinal study of TANF recipients in Illinois found
those who had their grants reduced due to sanctions reported higher
levels of perceived overall hardship. Perceived overall hardship was
determined by the extent to which respondents agreed with statements
like, ``I worry about having enough money in the future.'' Respondents
who saw grant reductions as a result of sanctions between January 1999
and March 2001 showed more perceived overall hardship following the
sanctions (between February and September 2002) than those who were
never sanctioned during the former, 51 month period.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\ Bong Joo Lee, Kristen S. Slack, and Dan A. Lewis, ``Are
Welfare Sanctions Working as Intended? Welfare Receipt, Work Activity,
and Material Hardship among TANF-Recipient Families,'' Social Service
Review (September 2004), pp. 370-403.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 2002 study of women in Michigan receiving TANF suggests those who
were sanctioned were more likely to experience hardship and have to
prioritize hardship-mediating activities than those who were not
sanctioned. Specifically, 21 percent of sanctioned families (compared
to nine percent of non-sanctioned families) reported having their gas
or electricity turned off in the previous year because they could not
afford to make their utility payments.\305\ Researchers found that 34
percent of sanctioned families (compared to 14 percent of non-
sanctioned families) had resorted to hardship-mitigating activities
such as pawning, stealing food, searching in trash cans, or
begging.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\ Ariel Kalil, Kristin S. Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang,
``Sanctions and Material Hardship under TANF,'' Social Service Review
(December 2002), pp. 642-662.
\306\ Ariel Kalil, Kristin S. Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang,
``Sanctions and Material Hardship under TANF,'' Social Service Review
(December 2002), pp. 642-662.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2002 study of Michigan TANF households suggests women who were
sanctioned are more likely to expect future hardship--such as
inadequate housing, food, or medical care in the next 2 months--than
those who were not sanctioned. Women who were sanctioned were 2.41
times more likely to expect future hardship compared to women who were
not sanctioned, the researchers found.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\ Ariel Kalil, Kristin S. Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang,
``Sanctions and Material Hardship under TANF,'' Social Service Review
(December 2002), pp. 642-662.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is evidence from a study of people who frequented a food
pantry in upstate New York that people who lost TANF benefits due to
sanctions were more likely to experience hardship than others.
Specifically, it was more common for people who had been sanctioned--
relative to those who had not been sanctioned--to report having more
difficulty in the past 6 months paying for food, rent, adult health
care, and other bills. Similarly, the number of sanctioned respondents
who indicated they had moved within the past 6 months due to inability
to pay rent was disproportionately high relative to the responses from
those who were not sanctioned. Access to a telephone told a similar
story of increased hardship, with a disproportionate number of
sanctioned people lacking access to a phone, relative to those who were
not sanctioned.\308\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\ Jean Oggins and Amy Fleming, ``Welfare Reform Sanctions and
Financial Strain in a Food-Pantry Sample,'' The Journal of Sociology &
Social Welfare (June 2001), pp. 101-123, https://
scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2725&context=jssw.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A study using data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
survey, which surveys mothers from 20 cities in 15 states, evaluated
the level of hardship among those who had been sanctioned in the prior
12 months and non-sanctioned mothers who received TANF. Researchers
found that those who had been sanctioned in the prior 12 months were 85
percent more likely to report any material hardship compared to non-
sanctioned mothers receiving TANF (42 percent of those sanctioned
reported one or more material hardships, compared to 27 percent of
those not sanctioned). Researchers found that those sanctioned were 63
percent more likely than non-sanctioned mothers to report maternal or
child hunger and 76 percent more likely to report having their
utilities shut off in the 12 months prior to the interview. The study
also found that sanctioned mothers were 79 percent more likely to
report being unable to receive medical care, for either themselves or a
child, due to cost. The study controlled for sociodemographic factors
known to be associated with being sanctioned and controlled for
hardship levels mothers faced prior to being sanctioned.\309\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\309\ Nancy E. Reichman, et al., ``TANF Sanctioning and Hardship,''
Social Service Review (June 2005) Vol. 79 No. 2, pp. 215-236.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Washington State study using predictive modeling to identify the
factors likeliest to cause a new spell of homelessness for TANF parents
found that sanctioned recipients were about 20 percent more likely than
non-sanctioned parents to begin a new spell of homelessness in the next
month.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\ Melissa Ford Shah, et al., ``Predicting Homelessness among
Low-Income Parents on TANF,'' Washington State Department of Social &
Health Services (August 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Underlying the NPRM's proposal to restrict waivers is the claim
that subjecting more individuals to the 3 month time limit will
increase employment. But research on public benefit programs that have
time limits demonstrates that arbitrary time limits do not lead to
self-sufficiency. Instead, some research finds families cut off TANF
because of time limits have significant barriers to employment and
experience hardship. Without cash, the challenge for parents to support
their children becomes even harder and a downward spiral emerges.
Finding employment becomes even harder when parents need to scramble to
make ends meet. The studies below offer examples of time-limited
families unable to maintain stable housing and/or pay their bills and,
in some instances, afford enough food.

A Washington State study comparing families who left TANF
due to time limits and those who left for other reasons found
that time-limited families were more likely to be unstably
housed 1 month after losing assistance.\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\ Melissa Ford Shah, et al., ``Predicting Homelessness among
Low-Income Parents on TANF,'' Washington State Department of Social &
Health Services (August 2015).

According to a survey of 276 former West Virginia TANF
recipients cut off because of time limits, 59 percent reported
that they were either worse off or much worse off financially
since leaving WV WORKS; 65 percent did not have enough money to
pay the electric, gas, or water bill; and 51 percent did not
have enough money to pay for heat. These percentages were much
lower when the recipients were on WV WORKS. After losing
assistance because of the time limit, 61 percent of respondents
reported that the amount of stress in their lives was either
worse or much worse since being removed from WV WORKS. They
were also more pessimistic about their own personal and
financial futures. These financial burdens stem from their very
low level of employment: only 26.9 percent of recipients were
employed and more than \1/2\ of the employed were working part-
time.\312\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\ Robert Jay Dilger, et al., ``WV WORKS 2003: Perspectives of
Former Recipients Who Have Exhausted Their 60 Months of Program
Eligibility,'' West Virginia University Interdisciplinary Task Force on
Welfare Reform (Summer 2004), pp. 1-24.

A survey of dozens of Maine TANF recipients cut off by the
time limit found that families experienced increased reliance
on food banks, inability to pay utilities and other bills, and
overcrowded housing conditions or reliance on homeless
shelters.\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\313\ Sandra Butler, ``TANF Time Limits and Maine Families:
Consequences of Withdrawing the Safety Net,'' Maine Equal Justice
Partners (April 2013), pp. 1-16, http://www.mejp.org/sites/default/
files/TANF-Study-SButler-Feb2013.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Work Requirements in TANF Do Not Work
The rationale for reducing or eliminating benefits for not meeting
a work requirement is that this will compel unemployed adults to find
work. Evidence suggests that work requirements (along with other policy
changes that accompanied TANF's implementation) contributed to a modest
increase in employment during the late 1990s, but that work often was
not steady, a pattern reflected in recent studies as well.
Research on adults who lost TANF due to sanctions for failure to
meet a work requirement found that these individuals have trouble
finding employment after their exit. The personal, family, or community
barriers that kept them from finding a job while on TANF also prevent
these parents from finding work after TANF. Findings from TANF suggest
that even if the NPRM intends to impose work requirements only on
``work able'' individuals, substantial numbers of SNAP recipients who
face personal or family challenges would likely fall through the cracks
and have their benefits reduced or taken away. Evidence from studies
that show that employment rates tend to be lower for these populations
include the following:

A 2004 longitudinal study of TANF recipients in Illinois
found that those respondents who were sanctioned during the
study period were more likely to be unemployed after the study
period than those who were not sanctioned and had, on average,
significantly lower levels of earnings post-sanction than those
who were not sanctioned. More specifically, respondents who
received sanctions that reduced cash grants between January
1999 and March 2001 were 44 percent less likely to be engaged
in formal work during the period April 2001 through September
2001 than the respondents who did not receive sanctions during
the preceding period, even after controlling for previous work
experience and other characteristics associated with
employment. And, TANF families receiving sanctions that were
carried out through grant reductions between January 1999 and
March 2001 had lower average earnings during the next 6 months
than those respondents who were not sanctioned.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\314\ Bong Joo Lee, Kristen S. Slack, and Dan A. Lewis, ``Are
Welfare Sanctions Working as Intended? Welfare Receipt, Work Activity,
and Material Hardship among TANF-Recipient Families,'' Social Service
Review (September 2004), pp. 370-403.

The study also helps explain why those sanctioned had worse
outcomes and were less likely to be working. Working-age adults
who have their grants reduced due to sanctions had higher
barriers to employment than those who were not sanctioned. The
group had higher levels of engagement in job training and other
work activities and had a higher incidence of participation in
informal work such as babysitting and odd jobs in the final
period of the study than those with no grant reductions due to
sanctions. This indicates the lower levels of formal employment
among sanctioned respondents is not easily attributed to an
unwillingness to work, since this population engages more
heavily than those who did not experience grant reductions from
sanctions in job training and informal work. A stronger
explanation is that those who are sanctioned have more
significant barriers to formal employment than those who are
not.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\315\ Bong Joo Lee, Kristen S. Slack, and Dan A. Lewis, ``Are
Welfare Sanctions Working as Intended? Welfare Receipt, Work Activity,
and Material Hardship among TANF-Recipient Families,'' Social Service
Review (September 2004), pp. 370-403.

A 2011 study of Maryland TANF recipients who were sanctioned
found that these recipients had consistently lower post-exit
employment rates relative to those who left TANF for reasons
other than work sanctions, throughout the 9 year post-exit
period that the study covered. Similarly, the average earnings
for the group that left due to work sanctions was lower than
the average earnings of those who left for other reasons.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\ Sarah Williamson, ``Full-Family Sanctions & Economic
Recession,'' University of Maryland Family Research and Training Group
(January 2011), https://familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports1/
sanctionsbrief.pdf.

A 2018 study of state-collected data on the employment of
Kansas parents leaving TANF cash assistance due to work-related
sanctions and time limits between October 2011 and March 2015
indicates that a lower share of these parents worked in the
year after their exit compared to families exiting TANF for
other reasons. They also found it more difficult to find steady
work compared to the other families exiting the program. In the
average quarter of the year after exiting, only 49 percent and
47 percent of the sanctioned and time-limited families,
respectively, were working, compared to 72 percent of families
exiting due to the income limit and 53 percent for all other
reasons. Moreover, only about a quarter of the sanctioned and
time-limited families worked between seven and nine quarters in
the year before and after their exit, compared to \1/3\ of
families overall.\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\ Tazra Mitchell, LaDonna Pavetti, and Yixuan Huang, ``Life
After TANF in Kansas: For Most, Unsteady Work and Earnings Below Half
the Poverty Line,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (February
2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/life-after-
tanf-in-kansas-for-most-unsteady-work-and-earnings-below.

A 2001 study of people who frequented a food pantry in
upstate New York found that employment rates were lower for
people who had lost TANF benefits due to sanctions. Among those
surveyed in 1997, 13 percent of those sanctioned reported
having had wage earnings in the previous 6 months, while 22
percent of unsanctioned respondents reported earnings over the
same period. Moreover, because of the effects of sanctions,
sanctioned respondents were far more likely to report being
disconnected both from work and from TANF benefits. A full
quarter of the sanctioned sample in 1997 reported no work and
no TANF benefits, compared with three percent reporting the
same in the unsanctioned sample.\318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\318\ Jean Oggins and Amy Fleming, ``Welfare Reform Sanctions and
Financial Strain in a Food-Pantry Sample,'' The Journal of Sociology &
Social Welfare (June 2001), pp. 101-123, https://
scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2725&context=jssw.

A 3 year study of TANF recipients in two California counties
provides evidence that employment rates are lower for those
with significant barriers to employment. The study excluded
individuals who received disability benefits and focused on
mental health issues such as major depression, generalized
anxiety disorder, panic attacks, social phobia, or
posttraumatic stress disorder. Those who reported functional
impairment over the previous month were far more likely not to
have worked over the previous year. In the first follow-up
year, 54.2 percent of functionally impaired respondents had
worked in the previous year, compared to 75.2 percent of those
without such difficulties. In the second follow-up year, 58.5
percent of those with functional impairments worked in the
previous year, compared to 79.2 percent of those without such
difficulties. The researchers found a statistically significant
association between having a mental health issue and having no
earned income over the previous year. The most reasonable
interpretation of this result is not that the respondents who
were not working had some other source of support, but that
they were unable to secure work due to their significant
barrier to employment.\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\319\ Daniel Chandler, et al., ``Mental Health, Employment, and
Welfare Tenure,'' Journal of Community Psychology (September 2005), pp.
578-609.

A California study of CALWORKS recipients found that
recipients who had been sanctioned were much less likely to
report obtaining full-time employment over 3 years (38 percent
of respondents) compared to non-sanctioned clients (60 percent
of respondents). Researchers measured employment history by
asking respondents about previous full- or part-time
employment, and whether they were without work throughout the 3
years prior to the survey.\320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\ Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Toorjo Ghose, and Kandyce Larson, ``The
Logic of Sanctioning Welfare Recipients: An Empirical Assessment,''
Social Science Review (June 2004), Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 304-319, http://
repository.upenn.edu/spp_papers/88/.

Studies consistently find lower employment rates among TANF
leavers whose cases were closed due to a work-oriented sanction
than among families that left TANF for other reasons. For
example, in Arizona, 40 percent of sanctioned leavers were
working in the first quarter after exit, compared to 55 percent
of non-sanctioned leavers.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\321\ Karen L. Westra and John Routley, ``Arizona Cash Assistance
Exit Study,'' Arizona Department of Economic Security Office of
Evaluation (January 2000).

In Maryland, 6 months after exit, 38 percent of sanctioned
leavers were employed, compared to 58 percent of non-sanctioned
leavers.\322\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\ Catherine Born, Pamela Caudill, and Melinda Cordero, ``Life
After Welfare: A Look at Sanctioned Families,'' University of Maryland
School or Social Work (November 1999).

A study of TANF recipients nationwide using the Census
Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation indicates
those who are disconnected from both work and cash assistance
are more likely to have a significant barrier to employment
than those who either work or receive cash assistance. Those
who had both no household earned income or any cash assistance
during the survey month were about twice as likely to report
having a physical or mental health condition that limits one's
ability to work compared to those who either worked or received
cash assistance. Results were consistent across geographic
regions. In southern states, 15.8 percent of disconnected
respondents reported a physical or mental health work-limiting
condition, while only 7.4 percent of non-disconnected
respondents had such a condition; in non-southern states, 24.3
percent of disconnected respondents had a work-limiting
condition, while among non-disconnected respondents, 10.4
percent reported having such a condition. It should be noted
that these respondents with physical and mental health
conditions were not receiving support from SSI; SSI recipients
(and those who reported school as their major activity) were
excluded from the sample.\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\323\ Andrea Hetling, ``The Importance of Region and State Welfare
Rules for Disconnected Single Mothers,'' University of Kentucky Center
for Poverty Research Discussion Paper Series (September 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most TANF Recipients Who Lose Benefits Due to Time Limits Do Not Find
Steady Employment
Cutting off families because they have reached some arbitrary time
limit ignores whether they can actually support themselves or if the
job market is welcoming to them. Several studies have found that
parents cut off of TANF due to the time limits have trouble finding
employment. The health, familial, and behavioral circumstances that
kept them from finding a job while on TANF also prevent these parents
from finding work after TANF. Black families are not only the most
likely to be cut off by time limits, but also very likely to be
discriminated against in the job market, the evidence shows. In some
instances, parents who can find work may be working inconsistently and
thus still fall short of a stable income.

In Washington State, time-limited parents were less likely
to be employed in the year before leaving TANF.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\ Christina McHugh and J. Taylor Danielson, ``TANF Time Limit
Analysis Comparing Cases Closed Due to Time Limits with Other Case
Closures,'' Washington State Department of Social and Health Services
(February 2019).

Researchers from the University of Maryland's School of
Social Work found that compared to other people leaving TANF,
those leaving because they reached the time limit had less
employment history while on TANF and worked fewer quarters in
the year after leaving assistance.\325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\325\ Andrea Hetling, Kathryn Patterson, and Catherine Born, ``The
TANF Time Limit: Comparing Long-Term and Other Welfare Leavers,''
Family Welfare Research and Training Group (February 2006) pp. 1-19,
https://familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports1/timelimitleavers.pdf.

Other researchers of Maryland's TANF program found that
recipients who reported having a criminal record were more
likely to reach the time limit than those who did not report
having a criminal background. While recipients with a criminal
conviction are as likely to be employed as other recipients,
their employment is more unstable. These women are often more
likely to have other barriers as well, such as human capital
deficits and situational barriers.\326\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\326\ Valerie Head, Catherine Born, and Pamela Ovwigho, ``Criminal
History as an Employment Barrier for TANF Recipients,'' Family Welfare
Research Training Group (March 2009), pp. 1-39. https://
pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2c12/
a0663bd8249586c000a82122cc2e6c796e23.pdf?_ga=
2.3188080.1987654092.1552314136-1225174621.1551994502.

An analysis of the Building Wealth and Health Network pilot
program found depression is often a barrier to employment among
TANF recipients, and that adverse childhood experiences (ACEs)
and exposure to community violence are often associated with
depression. The study investigated how resilience affects the
relationship between ACEs, community violence, and depression.
TANF families have a high prevalence of health impediments and
significant barriers to employment, such as domestic violence,
food insecurity, utility shut offs, homelessness, child
hospitalizations, and child developmental risks.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\327\ Seth L. Welles, Falguni Patel, and Mariana Chilton, ``Does
Employment-Related Resilience Affect the Relationship between Childhood
Adversity, Community Violence, and Depression?'' Journal of Urban
Health (2017), Vol. 94, pg. 233-243, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC5391326/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most TANF Recipients Who Lose Benefits Due to Sanctions Do Not Find
Steady Employment
The rationale for reducing or eliminating benefits for not meeting
a work requirement is that this will compel parents to find work.
Evidence suggests that work requirements (along with other policy
changes that accompanied TANF's implementation) contributed to a modest
increase in employment during the late 1990s, but that work often was
not steady[,] a pattern reflected in recent studies as well.
Another consequence of work requirements in TANF raises concerns
about the NPRM's goal of subjecting more unemployed adults to SNAP's
time limit. As it has become harder for single mothers to get direct
financial assistance when they cannot find work, the number with
neither jobs nor TANF has grown substantially over time. In 1995, the
number of families receiving cash assistance in an average month
exceeded the number of jobless single mothers by about a million. By
2016, the number of families receiving cash assistance in an average
month was roughly two million below the number of jobless single
mothers. As a result, work requirements in TANF fueled an increase in
deep poverty (measured as income at or below \1/2\ of the poverty
line).
J. Evidence from Medicaid Work Requirements Shows Beneficiaries Lose
Benefits But Don't Gain Employment
Additional evidence that taking benefits away from individuals who
are unable to meet strict work requirements does not lead to increased
work rates comes from the recent state waivers to apply such policies
in Medicaid. In June 2018, Arkansas became the first state to condition
receipt of Medicaid benefits on meeting a work requirement. Certain
beneficiaries must participate in and report 80 hours of work or work-
like activity each month.\328\ Those that fail to meet the requirement
for 3 months in a calendar year lose coverage.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\ In 2018, non-disabled adult beneficiaries ages 30 through 49
who do not have minor children in their homes were subject to the work
requirement in Arkansas. The state has begun phasing in the requirement
for beneficiaries 19 through 29 in 2019.
\329\ Jennifer Wagner, ``Commentary: As Predicted, Eligible
Arkansas Medicaid Beneficiaries Struggling to Meet Rigid Work
Requirements,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 30, 2018,
https://www.cbpp.org/health/commentary-as-predicted-eligible-arkansas-
medicaid-beneficiaries-struggling-to-meet-rigid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2018, over 18,000 Arkansas Medicaid beneficiaries--nearly 25
percent of the total population the state identified as potentially
subject to the work requirement--lost coverage for failing to meet the
requirement.\330\ This far exceeds the population that the state's
articulated policy intended to target with the requirement:
beneficiaries who were able to work but were not working. Many
individuals who qualified for an exemption for being unable to work or
who were working are among those who lost coverage. Many beneficiaries
were unaware of the requirement, did not understand what they had to do
to meet the requirement, or were unable to navigate the reporting
requirement.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\ Jennifer Wagner, ``Medicaid Coverage Losses Mounting in
Arkansas From Work Requirement,'' Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, January 17, 2019, https://www.cbpp.org/blog/medicaid-
coverage-losses-mounting-in-arkansas-from-work-requirement.
\331\ Jennifer Wagner, ``4,109 More Arkansans Lost Medicaid in
October for not Meeting Rigid Work Requirement,'' Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, October 16, 2018, https://www.cbpp.org/blog/4109-
more-arkansans-lost-medicaid-in-october-for-not-meeting-rigid-work-
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, there is no evidence that the work requirement has led to
increased employment. Although the state has cited data from the New
Hire Database as evidence that beneficiaries are starting new jobs, it
has not provided any evidence that the work requirement caused these
new hires; low-income workers frequently begin new jobs or change jobs.
Further, the data source includes individuals who worked for only a few
hours or 1 day, doesn't show if the job is temporary (such as seasonal
work around the holidays), and doesn't indicate if the employee had
been previously unemployed as opposed to just recently changed
jobs.\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\ Jennifer Wagner, ``Fact Checking Arkansas Governor's Claims
About Jobs and Medicaid Waiver,'' Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, January 28, 2019, https://www.cbpp.org/blog/fact-checking-
arkansas-governors-claims-about-jobs-and-medicaid-waiver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, other evidence from state Medicaid administrative data
indicates that at most a few hundred people may have found jobs due to
the Federal waiver. Most Medicaid beneficiaries don't face monthly
reporting requirements, mainly because they're already working or
qualified for exemptions. Only the remaining group, which has to report
hours of work each month, faces any new work incentive due to the new
policy. And of that group, only a few hundred each month have met the
requirement by reporting some work hours, the state reports. What's
more, many of them likely would have found jobs anyway.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These data are consistent with focus group interviews showing that
the work requirement isn't changing Medicaid beneficiaries' behavior.
Beneficiaries already had enough reasons to work: they need to pay
their bills. But they often struggle with unstable work hours, live in
rural areas with few jobs, or face other barriers to employment--and
the state hasn't invested any new money in job training programs,
services to address barriers, or supports like transportation to help
beneficiaries connect to jobs.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meanwhile, the work requirement has even proved counterproductive
for some. News reports describe working beneficiaries who struggled
with the reporting requirement and lost Medicaid coverage.
Consequently, some have gone without needed medication, worsening their
health and in some cases costing them their jobs. Moreover, any small
increase in employment must be viewed in light of the 18,000
beneficiaries who lost coverage.\335\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\335\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Numerous other states are in the process of implementing Medicaid
work requirements, and estimates show similar coverage losses are
likely. For example, the waiver in Michigan may lead up to 27 percent
of the state's Medicaid expansion population to lose coverage the first
year.\336\ Kentucky's own projections say its work requirement, which
has been challenged in court, would cause 95,000 enrollees to lose
coverage in 5 years.\337\ A group of health care providers and
advocates filed an amicus brief in the Kentucky litigation pointing out
that its work requirement will worsen health and won't promote
work.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\336\ Cindy Mann and April Grady, ``Potential Enrollment Impacts of
Michigan's Medicaid Work Requirement,'' Manatt Health, February 6,
2019, https://www.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Media/Images/White%20Papers/
Manatt_MI-Work-Req-Estimates_20190206-Final.pdf.
\337\ Phil Galewitz, ``Judge Blocks Kentucky Medicaid Work
Requirement,'' Kaiser Health News, June 29, 2018, https://khn.org/news/
judge-blocks-kentucky-medicaid-work-requirement/.
\338\ Steward v. Azar amicus brief, January 24, 2019, https://
www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Directories/Library-
and-Archive/amicus-briefs/amicus-2019-Stewart-v-Azar-DC-No18-152.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The experience thus far with Medicaid work requirements
demonstrates that such policies take coverage away from large portions
of beneficiaries, including those who are working or qualify for an
exemption but cannot navigate the red tape of the requirement. At the
same time, they fail to lead to increased work activity or employment.
Chapter 7: Proposed Rule's Requirement That State Waiver Requests Have
the Governor's ``Endorsement'' Violates Congressional Intent
The proposed rule would require that state requests to waive the
time limit in areas with insufficient jobs ``be endorsed by the State's
Governor'' \339\ (emphasis added). This change is in direct violation
of Congressional intent, as clearly expressed less than 2 months before
publication of the proposed rule. If FNS proceeds to publish a final
rule it must reject this change and conform to the intent of Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\ NPRM, p. 992.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current regulations regarding state requests to waive the 3 month
time limit say simply that such requests are made to FNS ``on the
request of the state agency.'' \340\ The presumption is that state
agencies will be acting under the direction of their political
leadership, including the Governor. CBPP has worked with states on
their waiver requests for more than 20 years. We cannot remember ever
working with a state agency that knowingly sought a waiver against the
wishes of the Governor. It is true, however, that Governors are not
typically aware of every detailed policy option and choice that their
cabinet Secretaries adopt for SNAP. Similarly, Governors do not
typically sign waivers, review nutrition education plans, or even
personally review large scale procurements. Governors serve as chief
executives rather than detailed policy implementers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\340\ 7 CFR 273.24(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The House-passed 2018 Farm Bill sought to require the ``approval of
the chief executive officer of the state'' \341\ for waiver requests
(emphasis added). The final conference agreement on the 2018 Farm Bill
rejected the House approach, and instead requires ``the support of the
chief executive officer of the state''\342\ (emphasis added). The 2018
Farm Bill, The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, passed the Congress
in mid-December and was signed by the President on December 20, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\ Section 4015 of House-passed H.R. 2, https://
www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr2/BILLS-115hr2eh.pdf.
\342\ Section 4005 of H.R. 2 as enacted, https://www.congress.gov/
115/bills/hr2/BILLS-115hr2enr.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The conferees in the conference report that accompanied the bill
were very clear about their intent in making this change:

The Managers intend to maintain the practice that bestows
authority on the state agency responsible for administering
SNAP to determine when and how waiver requests for ABAWDs are
submitted. In response to concerns that have been raised by
some Members that state agencies have not fully communicated to
the chief executive their intent to request a waiver under
section 6(o), the Managers have included a provision to
encourage communication between the state agency and the chief
executive officer of the state. The Managers agree that state
agencies should have the support of these officials in their
application for waiver, ensuring maximum state coordination. It
is not the Managers' intent that USDA undertake any new
rulemaking in order to facilitate support for requests from
state agencies, nor should the language result in any
additional paperwork or administrative steps under the waiver
process.\343\ (Emphasis added.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\ Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2, pp. 616-617, https://
www.congress.gov/115/crpt/hrpt1072/CRPT-115hrpt1072.pdf.

Thus, the conferees were clear that they did not intend for FNS to
engage in new rule-making based on the change and did not want to
introduce any new ``paperwork or administrative steps.'' State
Administrators are left on their own to ensure that they have the
support of their Governor. The change in statute simply clarifies this
practice for those who were unduly concerned that state agencies were
acting against the wishes of the Governor.
By requiring the ``endorsement'' of the state's governor in the
proposed rule, FNS ignored this expressed intent of Congress and went
too far. The only explanation FNS gives in the NPRM is a short sentence
in the preamble:

The Department proposes clarifying that any state agency's
waiver request must have the Governor's endorsement to ensure
that such a critical request is supported at the highest levels
of state government.\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\ NPRM, p. 983.

The Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary definition of
``endorsement'' suggests that the term implies a signature, which would
necessarily require additional paperwork. Such a step would directly
contradict Congressional intent. From other aspects of the NPRM it is
clear that FNS was aware of the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill.\345\ So
the only reasonable conclusion is that FNS chose to ignore
Congressional intent and intends to add paperwork burden and steps to
the process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\345\ See, for example, p. 987 of the NPRM: ``The proposed rule
would end the unlimited carryover and accumulation of ABAWD percentage
exemptions, previously referred to as 15 percent exemptions before the
enactment of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018. Upon enactment,
Section 6(o)(6) of the Act provides that each state agency be allotted
exemptions equal to an estimated 12 percent of ``covered individuals .
. .''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter 8: Proposed Rule Would Make Implementing The Time Limit Harder
by Removing Provisions That Give States Certainty Around
Approval
The proposed rule would eliminate the ability of states to
implement a waiver at the time a request is submitted, requiring FNS
approval prior to any waiver implementation. The proposed rule would
also remove language that identifies waivers that meet certain
standards as ``readily approvable.'' Currently, these two provisions
give states certainty of approval that enables them to better plan for
waiver implementation while waiting for approval. Given that FNS can
substantially delay approval (and recently has done so), this proposal
would put an undue burden on states preparing for the complex and
error-prone process of implementing the time limit. FNS also failed to
articulate a need for these changes, making it difficult for commenters
to weigh in on any potential benefit. We therefore urge the Department
to keep current regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(f)(3) and 7 CFR
273.24(f)(4), which establish the ``readily approvable'' standard and
allow states to implement waivers upon submission of the waiver request
in some instances.
Current regulations have two provisions that give states more
certainty in the waiver approval process. These provisions allow them
time to prepare for implementation of the time limit while waiting for
FNS approval. The first provision, at 7 CFR 273.24(f)(3), establishes
that waivers that meet certain standards are ``readily approvable.'' A
readily approvable waiver includes data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics showing a 12 month unemployment rate of ten percent, a 24
month unemployment rate 20 percent above the national average, or
designation as a Labor Surplus Area (LSA) by the Department of Labor's
Employment and Training Agency. The final rule, published in 2001,
stated that the Department decided to designate that it would approve
those waivers ``to facilitate the waiver process.'' \346\ The second
provision, at 7 CFR 273.24(f)(4), allows states to implement waivers
based on having either a 12 month unemployment rate of ten percent or
LSA designation for the current fiscal year upon waiver submission,
rather than waiting for FNS approval. With those two provisions, states
can plan on implementing the waiver submitted under the first provision
while awaiting FNS approval, and can actually implement prior to
approval if it is one of the waivers specified in 7 CFR 273.24(f)(4).
(FNS can contact the state to modify the waiver if needed.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\346\ 66 Fed. Reg., No. 11, 4438 (January 17, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Certainty About Waiver Approval Process Is Crucial Due to Lengthy
State Implementation Process
With a reasonable amount of certainty about FNS waiver approval,
states can begin to plan earlier than if they had to wait for FNS to
process waiver approval, which can take months and substantially delay
planning. Having time to plan for implementation is crucial for states
because of the demands of thoroughly implementing the time limit. As
several documents from USDA--including memos, guidance, and a report
from USDA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG)--make clear, before a
state can implement the time limit in a new area, states must:

Identify individuals subject to the time limit: as one FNS
memo explains, ``Prior to waiver expiration, states must review
case file information to identify individual ABAWDs and
determine whether or not the ABAWD is subject to the time
limit.'' \347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\347\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--Expiration of Statewide
ABAWD Time Limit Waivers,'' March 4, 2015, https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-Expiration-of-
Statewide-ABAWD-Time-Limit-Waivers.pdf.

Inform individuals subject to the time limit: state agencies
have minimum requirements for notifying people who are subject
or potentially subject to the time limit (such as an individual
a state has identified as likely subject to the time limit
based on age and other characteristics, but who may be eligible
for an exemption). As one memo explains, states must ``inform
ABAWD and potential ABAWD households of the time limit,
exemption criteria (including exemptions from the general work
requirements), and how to fulfill the ABAWD work requirement,''
as well as the requirement to report when work hours fall below
20 hours per week.\348\ The law requires caseworkers to explain
these rules during the individual's eligibility interview, but
given the complexity of the policy, FNS recommends providing
written notice to clients at least 30 days before the waiver
ends. FNS encourages states to write notices in clear,
understandable language, develop public information materials
for websites and waiting rooms, and leverage partnerships in
the community such as service providers.\349\ To properly
implement the time limit, states must therefore train staff to
ensure they can effectively explain the requirements to
individuals subject to the time limit, develop written
notifications, and use other resources such as community
partnerships--all well before a waiver ends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\348\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``SNAP--Requirements for Informing Households of ABAWD Rules,'' April
17, 2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
Requirements_for_Informing_Households_of_ABAWD_Rules.pdf.
\349\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``SNAP--Best Practices and Resources for Informing Households of ABAWD
Rules,'' May 25, 2018, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/snap/BestPracticesforInformingABAWDS.pdf.

Develop policies: States must develop policies for many
aspects of the time limit, such as whether they will use a
fixed or rolling clock, what procedures they will use to screen
individuals for exemptions and what verifications are required,
whether they will count unpaid or volunteer work towards the
requirement, and how they will use 15 percent exemptions, among
many others.\350\ States must also communicate these policies
to caseworkers and other relevant staff, and ensure that
computer systems reflect their policy choices. While some of
these policy decisions may not change depending on the waiver
outcome if the state has developed these policies for areas
that already have the time limit, states or counties preparing
to implement the time limit for the first time will need time
to ensure that policies are ready for implementation prior to
the expiration of a waiver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\350\ USDA Office of Inspector General, FNS Controls Over SNAP
Benefits For Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents, September 2016,
https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/27601-0002-31.pdf; U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, ``Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program--Expiration of Statewide ABAWD Time Limit Waivers,''
March 4, 2015, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
SNAP-Expiration-of-Statewide-ABAWD-Time-Limit-Waivers.pdf; https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-Expiration-of-
Statewide-ABAWD-Time-Limit-Waivers.pdf; U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Food and Nutrition Service, ``Guide to Serving ABAWDs Subject to Time-
limited Participation,'' 2015 https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/
default/files/Guide_to_Serving_ABAWDs_Subject_to_Time_
Limit.pdf; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--ABAWD Time Limit Policy
and Program Access,'' November 19, 2015, https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/ABAWD-Time-Limit-Policy-
and-Program-Access-Memo-Nov2015.pdf.

Ready computer systems for tracking: as the OIG report
explains, ``Each month, the states are responsible for tracking
an ABAWD's status; countable months; fulfillment of the work
requirement; exemption status with respect to age, pregnancy,
and mental or physical capacity to perform work; 15 percent
exemption status; and good cause for not meeting the work
requirement.'' \351\ Setting up computer systems to accurately
perform this complex monthly tracking, which may require states
to work with contractors to re-program systems and test for
errors, can be a time-consuming process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\ USDA Office of Inspector General, FNS Controls Over SNAP
Benefits For Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents, September 2016,
https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/27601-0002-31.pdf.

Train caseworkers: states must build in adequate time to
ensure that eligibility workers thoroughly understand and can
implement related policies, which may take months. For example,
workers must be prepared to follow procedures to assess
individuals' fitness for work in order to screen for exemptions
from the time limit \352\ and must be prepared to explain the
requirements to those individuals during the eligibility
interview,\353\ among other tasks instrumental to implementing
the time limit. The OIG report states, ``FNS national officials
informed us that the ABAWD provisions were very complex and
that it takes months of extensive training for new staff to
fully understand the ABAWD requirements. A state official said
the ABAWD laws and regulations are the `most complicated SNAP
policy in existence' and are `fraught with the potential for
case errors.' '' \354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\ USDA Office of Inspector General, Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program--Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWD)
Questions and Answers--June, 2015, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/
sites/default/files/snap/ABAWD-Questions-and-Answers-June%202015.pdf.
\353\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``SNAP--Requirements for Informing Households of ABAWD Rules,'' April
17, 2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
Requirements_for_Informing_Households_of_ABAWD_Rules.pdf.
\354\ USDA Office of Inspector General, FNS Controls Over SNAP
Benefits For Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents, September 2016,
https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/27601-0002-31.pdf.

Identify providers for qualifying work activities: Most
states are not required to provide individuals subject to the
time limit with spots in work programs that can fulfill the 20
hour a week requirement (called ``qualifying activities''). The
exceptions are ``pledge states,'' which receive additional
funding for employment and training (E&T) programs if they
commit to providing a work training spot to individuals subject
to the time limit in their last month of SNAP benefits. FNS has
in the past encouraged states to provide qualifying activities
to individuals subject to the time limit.\355\ States that do
wish to provide these services must identify current E&T
providers that can offer work placements for participants, and/
or develop new relationships with providers to offer
placements.\356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\355\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--ABAWD Time Limit Policy
and Program Access,'' November 19, 2015, https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/ABAWD-Time-Limit-Policy-
and-Program-Access-Memo-Nov2015.pdf.
\356\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Guide to Serving ABAWDs Subject to Time-limited Participation,''
2015, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/
Guide_to_Serving_ABAWDs_Subject_to_Time_Limit.pdf.

Preparing for implementation is therefore a lengthy and difficulty
process, given that states must identify and notify individuals subject
to the time limit, develop policies and guidance to support
implementation, train workers, ready computer systems, and (if they
choose) develop slots in work programs. Ensuring that local offices are
ready to implement when a waiver changes or when a state or county
implements the time limit for the first time is important not only to
ensure that needy individuals don't mistakenly lose access to food
assistance, but also to prevent incorrect implementation of the time
limit from causing case errors.
Unclear if Proposed Rule's Core Standards Are Different From ``Readily
Approvable'' Standard
The proposed rule would weaken both provisions that currently
provide states with more certainty of FNS approval. First, the NPRM
would remove the language establishing that waivers with certain
criteria are ``readily approvable.'' The preamble to the NPRM explains
that the waivers requested under the ``core standards'' are likely to
be approved, stating: ``These revisions would include the establishment
of core standards that would allow a state to reasonably anticipate
whether it would receive approval from the Department.'' \357\ While
the preamble therefore suggests that states may understand that waivers
requested under the ``core standards'' can be reasonably be expected to
be approved (provided they include the correct data and are calculated
accurately), the actual rule lacks the specificity of the ``readily
approvable'' language in current regulations at 7 CFR 273.24(f)(3).
The proposed rule states: ``(2) Core standards. FNS will approve waiver
requests under (1)(i) and (ii) that are supported by any one of the
following.'' If these core standards are indeed ``readily approvable,''
then clarifying that USDA will approve waiver based on those standards
would enable states to continue to plan for implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\357\ NPRM, p. 983.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule would also eliminate the current provision at 7
CFR 273.24(f)(4) that allows states to implement the waiver upon
submission. The preamble states:

The proposed rule would bar states from implementing a waiver
prior to its approval. Though rarely used, current regulations
allow a state to implement an ABAWD waiver as soon as the state
submits the waiver request based on certain criteria. By
removing the current pertinent text in 273.24(f)(4), the
proposed rule would require states to request and receive
approval before implementing a waiver. This would allow the
Department to have a more accurate understanding of the status
of existing waivers and would provide better oversight in the
waiver process. It would also prevent waivers from being
implemented until the Department explicitly reviewed and
approved the waiver.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\ NPRM, p. 987.

The Department's rationale for eliminating this provision is
unclear given that the proposed rule also establishes ``core
standards'' and current regulations require states to submit a detailed
waiver request before implementing. The Department claims that
eliminating the provision would allow the Department to ``have a more
accurate understanding of the status of existing waivers,'' but the
Department does not explain why it lacks this clarity under current
rules (given that states must submit waiver requests with the proposed
waiver date of implementation) and cannot instead clarify requirements
around informing FNS about implementation, rather than limit states'
ability to implement a waiver while waiting for FNS approval. The
Department also states that removing this provision would allow the
Department to ``provide better oversight in the waiver process,'' but
again does not explain what current issue this proposal would address.
If states can only submit waivers based on very clear criteria with
clear methods, and FNS has the ability to modify the waiver, why does
the Department suggest it currently lacks oversight in this process?
The provision does not remove the ability of FNS to review and approve
waivers, but instead moves up the timeline to give states the ability
to more effectively implement waivers they know will be approved. FNS
does not explain what need or deficit this proposal seeks to remedy,
which makes it very difficult for comments to respond.
Department Does Not Address Impact of Its New, Lengthy Approval Process
on State Implementation
The most problematic aspect of the Department's proposal to remove
the ability of states to implement waivers prior to approval is that
the Department does not make any proposal that will ensure that the
Department approves waivers in a timely enough fashion to give states
the certainty they need to properly implement the time limit. Current
regulations and guidelines require waivers to be based on recent
economic data, which by definition narrows the window of time between a
state's waiver submission and the implementation date.
For example, as recent guidance explains, for waivers based on a 12
month unemployment rate of ten percent, the data must include at least
1 month in the year prior to implementation; therefore the ``furthest a
state could look back in requesting a waiver for January 1, 2018,
implementation would be the 12 month period of February 2016 through
January 2017.'' \359\ Local unemployment data is generally available
with a lag of about 2 months, so January 2017 data would be available
in early March 2017 or so.\360\ In addition, annual revisions from BLS
that typically occur in April can substantially change recent estimates
of unemployment and thus substantially alter waiver eligibility, so
states often have to confirm waiver requests submitted before the April
revision to ensure that the waiver request reflects the most up-to-date
data.\361\ The state would therefore have at most 10 months total (or 9
months if waiting for the BLS update) to: analyze the data, prepare a
waiver request, receive approval through the state's internal process
(a process that the deeply flawed proposal to require the Governor's
endorsement could substantially lengthen), submit the waiver request to
FNS (including through the regional office, which must review and then
forward it to the national office), receive approval from FNS after its
review, and prepare for implementation of the waiver by taken the steps
outlined above, such as identifying and notifying participants,
programming computer systems, and training caseworkers.
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\359\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive the Time Limit for Able-Bodied
Adults without Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016, https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-Guide-to-Supporting-
Requests-to-Waive-the-Time-Limit-for-ABAWDs.pdf.
\360\ For reference, on March 15, 2019, the BLS website stated it
would release February 2019 state data on March 22 and local data (such
as counties and metropolitan areas) on April 3, 2019, a typical lag of
around 2 months for local unemployment data. https://www.bls.gov/
lau/, accessed March 15, 2019.
\361\ BLS updates sub-state data annually, typically in April.
https://www.bls.gov/lau/launews1.htm.
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Given that the waiver preparation and internal review process may
take at least a month or 2 within a state, if FNS review extends into
several months, that can leave states with very little time for
preparation given the complexities of implementation outlined above.
The certainty that they can implement the requested waiver allows
states to plan more effectively, while also allowing FNS time to review
and issue an approval, knowing that its review does not hinder the
state from preparing for implementation. Given that FNS seeks to
eliminate the provisions that currently allow states this certainty
without committing to approval within a certain timeframe, this
proposed rule will instead make it harder for states to plan
effectively.
One recent example of why this ability helps states is California's
experience with its 2018 waiver, which the state began to implement
prior to approval when waiting for an extensive and lengthy FNS review
process. As mentioned in Chapter 2, any uncertainty has arisen due to
the most recent Administration substantially delaying the waiver review
process. In September 2017, California submitted a waiver request for
areas with unemployment rates 20 percent above the national average
(one of the categories of ``readily approvable'' areas), with an
implementation date of September 2018. Given that California was
transitioning off a statewide waiver and implementing the time limit
for the first time in several years in some counties, and given the
complexities with a large, county-administered state, the state needed
at least 6 months to prepare for waiver implementation. By February
2018, about 5 months after the state had submitted the request, FNS
still had neither approved nor denied the request. California wrote FNS
that it would prepare to implement based on its waiver request, given
that the request was based on data that fit the ``readily approvable''
standard, and requested that FNS advise the state by March 2018 if it
wished to modify the waiver. Though FNS approval took over 5 months in
this instance, the ``readily approvable'' standard enabled the state to
properly plan for implementation. Unless FNS plans to impose deadlines
on its own review and approval process that will ensure a timely
response to states via the regulation, taking away these provisions
will result in substantially less certainty for states as they await
FNS approval.
The Department claims that the NPRM would improve consistency in
the waiver approval process, but eliminating these provisions would
introduce more uncertainty and inconsistency. The Department several
times makes clear that one of the motivating factors for the NPRM is to
improve consistency, such as stating, when introducing ``core
standards,'' that ``The Department proposes updating criteria for ABAWD
time limit waivers to improve consistency across states.'' \362\
Reducing the ability of states to predict approvals and await FNS
approval, therefore cutting into implementation planning time, would
result in states' planning becoming more contingent on the length of
time that various steps in the waiver preparation and approval process
take. Factors such as the length of the approval process within the
state and the length of FNS approval would have even more weight on the
length of time states have to implement. A state waiting 6 months for
approval would have significantly less effective implementation time
than a state waiting 3 months. It is not clear if the Department
considered the effect of the elimination of these provisions on the
consistency of time limit implementation outcomes. If so, the
Department did not explain how eliminating these provisions could
affect implementation and how it weighed those costs against what it
perceived to be the benefits of improved oversight, for which it did
not articulate a need.
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\362\ NPRM, p. 983.
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FNS proposes substantially limiting the ability of states to plan
for implementation while waiting for waiver review. In proposing this
change, FNS makes statements about the intended effect of the proposal
to increase oversight without explaining why this change is necessary
or acknowledging the substantial burden it could impose on states and
clients subject to the time limit. We recommend that FNS keep the
current language in regulation that gives states more certainty around
approval, which lets states better plan for waivers.
B. Proposed Implementation Date Would Cause Severe Burden for States
The Department also proposes that the rule take effect in October
2019, only 6 months after the end of the comment period for the NPRM--
an extremely short period following the final rule's publication. The
preamble states:

The Department proposes that the rule, once finalized, would
go into effect on October 1, 2019, which is the beginning of
Federal Fiscal Year 2020. All waivers in effect on October 1,
2019, or thereafter, would need to be approvable according to
the new rule at that time. Any approved waiver that does not
meet the criteria established in the new rule would be
terminated on October 1, 2019. States would be able to request
new waivers if the state's waiver is expected to be
terminated.\363\
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\363\ NPRM, p. 983.

The Department clearly is not considering the length of time states
need to prepare a waiver request, the time it takes states and FNS to
review and approve waivers, or the substantial time it takes states to
ensure that they can prepare for implementation and properly notify
individuals subject to the time limit. Given that the comment period
ends in April 2019, it is not plausible that there would be anywhere
near enough time for any one step of this process, let alone all of
them. In the past, when many states have waivers due at the same time,
this has substantially delayed FNS review; with this rule
implementation, at least 30 states would likely attempt to submit a
waiver request at the same time. FNS does not acknowledge the
additional resources it would need to designate to review these
requests, which would need to happen within a very short time frame.
Nor does FNS acknowledge the burden this proposal would place on
states, which would need to devote resources to quickly analyzing the
data to put forward new requests and to implementing the time limit in
new areas, and on the participants who would be harmed by a likely
chaotic implementation in many states.
In addition, FNS does not put forward any need that would justify
this short timeline. As we have explained, the current regulations
changed little since the 1996 guidelines; in practice, then, states
have been operating under current waiver criteria for more than 20
years. FNS proposes to make significant changes to longstanding policy
without articulating a need for this change, but also proposes an
extremely short timeline that it does not attempt to justify. The lack
of explanation for the proposed implementation date suggests that in
proposing this rule, the Department did not fully grapple with the
realities of implementing these changes. Without any explanation of why
such a drastic change would be necessary under such a short timeline,
and without any consideration of the downside of forcing states to
implement the time limit in new areas with very little preparation
time, the Department leaves us with little opportunity to address the
unstated need motivating this change. Withdrawing the proposed rule
would be the best solution to avoid a rushed implementation of an ill-
considered and harmful policy.
C. Limiting the Duration of Certain Waivers to the Fiscal Year in Which
They Are Implemented is Unnecessarily Restrictive
The Department proposes that waivers based on the 20 percent
standard outlined in paragraph (f)(2)(ii) would not be approved beyond
the fiscal year in which the waiver is implemented. Since most waivers
are currently and likely would continue to be requested under the
criteria specified in 7 CFR 273.24(f)(2)(ii), it's likely that this
shift would mandate that most waivers shift to a fiscal year cycle.
As of March 2019, 36 states (including Guam and the Virgin Islands)
have ABAWD time limit waivers. Nine states are on the Federal Fiscal
Year 2019 cycle, 19 states are on the calendar year 2019 cycle, and
eight states are covering parts of both Fiscal Year 2018 and 2019. This
grouping of waivers around calendar year and fiscal year is a
relatively new phenomenon that is an outgrowth of two pieces of
legislation that motivated states to pursue waivers along those time
cycles:

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009.
That legislation suspended the time limit, with a state opt
out, through FY 2010.

The Emergency Unemployment Compensation program (EUC) that
operated through December 2015. Many states sought statewide
waivers through their eligibility for Extended Benefits (EB)
under EUC.

As the statutory suspension of the time limit (set under a fiscal
year cycle) expired and as state eligibility for waivers under EUC
phased out in 2016 (set under a calendar year cycle), states sought to
renew their waivers using alternative criteria but according to the new
time cycles. Prior to the passage of ARRA and EUC, states waiver cycles
were spread throughout the year with many running from April to May.
In the NPRM, FNS claims that the proposed rule would prioritize
recent data by preventing states from requesting to implement waivers
late in the Federal fiscal year. This proposal would actually have a
different outcome because states would have fewer recent periods of
data available to use under this criterion. Under the proposed rule
waivers beginning in Fiscal Year 2020 can use unemployment data
starting no earlier than January 2017, so approximately five 24 month
time periods would be available to states. In contrast, for a waiver
starting in January 2020, states would have eight 24 month time periods
of unemployment data to use (including three more recent than under the
fiscal year calendar scenario). Shifting states to a fiscal year waiver
calendar removes the current option that states have to avail
themselves of the most recent data.
For example, states typically submit waiver requests 3 to 6 months
prior to the waiver implementation date to give FNS sufficient time to
process waiver requests. For a waiver to begin on October 1, states are
recommended to submit the waiver in June, when approximately five 24
month time periods would be available. For a waiver to begin on January
1, states would have about three additional and more recent time
periods to use.
The proposed rule would also force states to have short waivers
under some circumstances. States are permitted to submit a waiver at
any point during the year. This is an important feature in times of
rising unemployment when states may wish to submit new waivers for
newly eligible areas. If a state wants to request a new waiver or
modify a waiver after October 1 based on more recent unemployment data,
a waiver would need to be approved for less than a year under the
proposed rule. This would impose addition paperwork for waiver renewals
on states during an economic downturn because states that submit new
waivers during the fiscal year would not get a 12 month approval
regardless of how distressed their local labor market is.
Also, this limitation does not give states sufficient time to plan
and implement waivers. As noted above, states typically submit waiver
requests well in advance of their start date to allow for needed
implementation planning as well as FNS' slow processing. States do not
know their eligible areas until late April when BLS revises historical
estimates for sub-state areas from the Local Area Unemployment
Statistics (LAUS) program. These revisions reflect new population
estimates from the Census Bureau, updated input data, and
estimation.\364\ If states need to submit a waiver in June (for an
October 1 start), they would only have 1 to 2 months to plan and
request the subsequent waivers. This would likely be particularly
challenging for states pursuing a thoughtful and thorough
implementation of the new waiver.
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\364\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, Annual Revisions, https://
www.bls.gov/lau/launews1.htm.
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Consider states that have to shift from a statewide waiver using
the EB criteria (which would not be limited to a fiscal year cycle
under the proposed rule) to a 20 percent above the national average
criterion (which would operate on a fiscal year cycle only under the
proposed rule). For example, consider a state that has a statewide
waiver based on the EB criteria running from September to August. For
the next waiver (which would likely be based on the criteria listed in
paragraph (f)(2)(ii)), the waiver could only be for 1 month because the
fiscal year runs through September. If the state wanted continuous
waiver coverage, it would have to request a one 1 month waiver for the
month of September, then a 1 year waiver starting in October. These
multiple requests would create additional administrative work for
states and FNS.
Moreover, FNS does not have enough capacity to process waivers if
they are all on the fiscal year cycle. And, as we comment elsewhere,
the Department is not imposing a timely review on itself which has
resulted in delayed approvals. These delays would only grow worse if
virtually all waivers were on the same cycle for review.
This proposal is flawed and should not be included in the final
rule.
D. Limiting Waivers to One Year Would Impose an Unnecessary
Administrative Burden on states
The proposed rule would limit the duration of waiver approvals to 1
year. We believe this would impose an additional administrative burden
on states that is unjustified and unnecessary. In the NPRM, the
Department asserts that limiting waivers to 1 year would ensure that
the waiver request reflects current economic conditions, but it
provides no evidence or discussion to support this assertion. This
makes it difficult to comment on the proposed change and its potential
impact on both the alignment of waivers with current labor market
conditions and state agencies. This section provides an overview of
existing requirements for 2 year waivers and explains why the proposed
change is unnecessary.
Existing Requirements for Two-Year Waivers Are Already Restrictive
The Department generally approves waivers for 1 year. Existing
regulations state that the Department reserves the right to approve a
waiver for a longer period if the reasons are compelling.\365\ In
previous guidance, the Department acknowledged the role of 2 year
waivers in minimizing administrative burdens on states from preparing
annual requests for waivers covering areas with chronic high
unemployment.\366\ Areas that qualify for 2 year waivers are those that
have had chronic high unemployment and are likely to continue to
experience high unemployment. Two-year waivers have also been used to
cover states and sub-state areas hit hard by the Great Recession of
2007 to 2009.
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\365\ 7 CFR 273.24(f)(5).
\366\ USDA, ``2-Year Approvals of Waivers of the Work Requirements
for ABAWDs under 7 CFR 273.24,'' February 3, 2006. USDA, ``Guidance on
Requesting ABAWD Waivers,'' August 2006. USDA, ``Guide to Supporting
Requests to Waive the Time Limit for Able-Bodied Adults without
Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016.
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The data requirements to support a request for a 2 year waiver are
much more restrictive than those required for a 1 year waiver. The area
must satisfy at least one of the following:

Have an unemployment rate above ten percent for the 2 year
period immediately prior to request;

Be designated as a Labor Surplus Area for at least 2
consecutive years; or

Have an unemployment rate more than 20 percent above the
national average for a 36 month period ending no earlier than 3
months prior to the request.

The data requirements are more restrictive in several ways. First,
an area eligible for a 2 year waiver must have evidence of high
unemployment sustained over a significantly longer period of time than
that required for a 1 year waiver. For instance, under the third
criterion above, the area must have elevated unemployment over a period
that is 50 percent longer than that required to support a 1 year waiver
(36 months compared to 24 months). These are areas with persistent,
chronic high unemployment and are likely to continue to experience
adverse labor market conditions. As we saw during the Great Recession,
areas eligible for 2 year waivers included those that experienced a
rapid rise in unemployment rates before the rest of the country or
experienced slower recovery.
Second, a request for a 2 year waiver must be supported by very
recent data. To be eligible under the third criterion above, the 36
month period must end no earlier than 3 months prior to the request.
Given that there already is a time lag of 1 to 2 months before BLS
Local Area Unemployment Statistics becomes available at the sub-state
level, this is a very restrictive requirement.
To support a 1 year waiver requested on October 2018, for example,
a state could submit data for the period January 2016 to December 2017.
This corresponds with the time period used to compile the LSA list for
FY 2019. To request a 2 year waiver, the state would have to submit
data no older than June 2018 and the 35 previous months, a period that
starts July 2015. Data supporting a 2 year waiver incorporates data
both earlier and later than what is required for a 1 year waiver. To
qualify, the area would have to have chronic high unemployment and be
likely to continue having it within the time frame of a 2 year waiver.
Use of Two-Year Waivers Has Been Very Limited
Under existing rules and guidance, waivers longer than 1 year in
duration have only been requested and approved under limited
circumstances, reflecting their more restrictive and extensive data
requirements. Over the 2 decades of waiver approvals, FNS has approved
approximately 900 waiver requests.\367\ Of those approved requests,
only about six percent (50 waiver requests) were based on the 36 month
unemployment rate criteria.\368\ Nearly \1/2\ of the 50 waiver
approvals were in effect during Federal Fiscal Years 2007 to 2009,
helping states that were hit hard by the Great Recession, like Alaska,
Mississippi, Oregon, and South Carolina, weather the economic
downturn.\369\
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\367\ A waiver request includes one or more jurisdictions in a
state and may even cover the entire state. Each approved waiver request
is given a distinct waiver serial number by FNS. States may not
implement waivers in all areas approved by FNS.
\368\ A waiver request includes one or more jurisdictions in a
state and may even cover the entire state. Each approved waiver request
is given a distinct waiver serial number by FNS. Based on CBPP internal
records and summary of 2 year waivers from SNAP 3 month time limit.
Prepared in March 2019.
\369\ A table with the states that have had 2 year waivers from the
time limit is included in Appendix B as, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities. ``Summary of 2-Year Waivers from SNAP Three-Month Time
Limit.''
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States have also requested 2 year waivers to cover jurisdictions
and Native American Tribal areas that have had chronic high
unemployment. For example, Nebraska prepared, applied for, and received
2 year waivers for Tribal areas in FFY 2002 (waiver in effect May 2002
to April 2004), FFY 2004 (waiver in effect May 2004 to April 2006), FFY
2006 (waiver in effect May 2006 to April 2008), and FFY 2008 (waiver in
effect May 2008 to April 2010). Had the proposed rule been in effect,
Nebraska would have had to apply for 1 year waivers for these Tribal
areas every year. The Nebraska state agency only had to apply four
times instead of eight times to cover these areas with chronic high
unemployment from May 2002 to April 2010.\370\
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\370\ The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act went into effect
April 1, 2009, suspending the time limit in all states through
September 30, 2010 unless state agencies chose to impose specific work
requirements.
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The Department has also approved waivers longer than a year on a
case-by-case basis to accommodate states facing unusual administrative
constraints. For example, it approved a 17 month waiver (from May 2007
to September 2008) for Utah to ease administrative burdens while the
state was transitioning to a new eligibility system.
Limiting Waiver Duration to One Year Is Inefficient
Given the more restrictive data requirements, areas eligible for a
2 year waiver are experiencing chronic high unemployment and would
likely be eligible for 1 year waivers in 2 or more consecutive years.
By prohibiting waivers longer than a year, the Department would be
requiring states to prepare and submit waiver requests twice over the
course of a 2 year period, instead of submitting a request once. Our
analysis finds that most areas approved for 2 year waivers in FFY16-17
would have qualified for the second year,\371\ so requiring the state
to submit--and FNS to review--the information would have been
inefficient and burdensome.
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\371\ The Department approved 2 year waivers covering 19
jurisdictions (seven states, one island, and eleven Indian
reservations) in Federal Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017. Of the 19
jurisdictions, 17 would have been eligible for back-to-back 1 year
waivers.
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The existing data requirements for a 2 year waiver capture high
unemployment using data that is very current. The Department did not
substantiate its assertion that a 1 year time frame would ensure that
waiver requests reflect current economic conditions. Nor did it discuss
why the proposed change is warranted given that it would add
administrative burdens both to state agencies preparing waiver requests
and the Department itself. The option to request a 2 year waiver is
already very restrictive and limited in use. We therefore recommend
that the Department abandon its proposal to limit waivers to 1 year and
keep the existing rules allowing 2 year waivers as they are.
Chapter 9. Eliminating the Carryover of Unused Individual Exemptions
Would Cause Hardship and Exceeds Agency Authority
In addition to significantly restricting the ability of states to
request waivers of the 3 month time limit, the NPRM proposes to
eliminate the accrual of unused individual exemptions for more than 1
fiscal year. As a result, some individuals who might otherwise be
exempted from the time limit would lose SNAP benefits and the program's
integrity would be undermined as states would be less able to
judiciously exempt particularly vulnerable individuals. The NPRM fails
to define a problem it is addressing with this proposal, incorrectly
reads the intent of Congress, and proposes a less effective
alternative.
Under current law, states can exempt a limited number of
individuals who are, or would be, subject to the time limit. Each year,
FNS is required to estimate the number of exemptions available to each
state, based on a percentage (currently 12 percent as revised from 15
percent in the 2018 Agricultural Improvement Act) of ``covered
individuals.'' These ``covered individuals'' are SNAP participants
subject to the time limit during the fiscal year or individuals denied
eligibility in SNAP because of the time limit.
It is disconcerting to note that the NPRM incorrectly describes the
way in which exemptions are calculated. The preamble describes
``covered individuals'' as ``the ABAWDs who are subject to the ABAWD
time limit in the state in Fiscal Year 2020 and each subsequent fiscal
year.'' But this is not a correct description of ``covered
individuals.'' Section 6(o)(6)(A)(ii) of the Food and Nutrition Act (7
U.S.C. 2015(o)(6)(A)(ii)) defines a ``covered individual'' as ``a
member of a household that receives [SNAP], or an individual denied
eligibility for [SNAP] benefits solely due to paragraph (2)'' (emphasis
added), with several additional clarifications. As we discuss in our
comments on the Regulatory Impact Analysis, the imprecise use of
``ABAWD'' makes it unclear whether the NPRM is accurately describing
the group of SNAP participants who form part of the pool that is used
to determine the number of exemptions, but the NPRM also fails to
include individuals denied eligibility due to failure to meet the time
limit requirements. As most ``ABAWDs'' subject to the rule lose
benefits over time, this can be a significant number of individuals.
A. There Is No Statutory or Legislative Support for the Claim That
Unused Exemptions Cannot Be Kept By States
The NPRM suggests that Congress did not explicitly intend for
states to maintain and accrue unused exemptions, but this is not
supported by the record. The NPRM describes the accrual of unused
exemptions as an ``unintended outcome of the current regulations.''
\372\ It further expresses concern that ``such an outcome is
inconsistent with Congressional intent to limit the number of
exemptions available to states each year.'' The NPRM does not provide
any evidence supporting this claim of Congressional intent. We are
unable to find any record of Congressional intent to limit the
carryover of unused exemptions. The historical evidence and recent
actions by Congress show the opposite.
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\372\ NPRM, p. 987.
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Congressional history shows that exemptions were enacted in
legislation approximately 1 year after the time limit was enacted
precisely due to concerns that the policy was too harsh and states did
not have enough tools to mitigate the impact of the time limit for
vulnerable individuals living outside of waived areas. Adding this
resource gave states an additional way to protect vulnerable residents
not specifically identified in the exemptions from the time limit
provided under 7 U.S.C. 2015(o)(3), based on the priorities and
concerns of the state or local agency.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 contained two major changes in SNAP
to ameliorate the impact of the 3 month time limit. One was an increase
in funding for ABAWD training slots in the Employment and Training
(E&T) program. The other was providing states with the authority to
exempt a limited number of individuals from the time limit.\373\
Commonly referred to as hardship exemptions, these gave states the
ability to continue to provide SNAP to individuals subject to the time
limit who could not find jobs or training slots after 3 months of
participation. Just after passage of this change, FNS clarified in an
October 1997 guidance to states that unused exemptions could be carried
over or saved for future use.\374\
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\373\ Section 1001 of P.L. 105-33.
\374\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Implementation of the Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
Relating to Exemptions for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents
(ABAWDs),'' October 27, 1997.
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The current individual exemption policy has been in place for over
20 years. Congress did recently intend to limit exemptions, but not in
the way proposed in the NPRM. Instead Congress reduced the percentage
of exemptions created each year, but explicitly left the longstanding
accrual policy in place. In the 2018 Farm Bill, Congress reduced the
annual percentage of exemptions from 15 percent to 12 percent, but
notably did not propose ending the practice of accruing unused
exemptions. In fact, the Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2, the
Agricultural Improvement Act, clarified that ``States will maintain the
ability to exempt up to 12% of their SNAP population subject to ABAWD
work requirements, down from 15%, and continue to accrue exemptions and
retain any carryover exemptions from previous years, consistent with
current law.'' \375\ (emphasis added). Congressional intent as recently
as several months ago shows a deliberate expectation that states can
carryover an unlimited number of unused exemptions.
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\375\ House of Representatives, Conference Report to Accompany H.R.
2, December 10, 2018, p. 616, https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/CRPT-115hrpt1072.pdf.
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The Statute Clearly Allows States to Accrue Unused Exemptions
By drastically reducing the way in which states that choose not to
use exemptions in the year in which they are issued are able to accrue
these exemptions, the NPRM suggests that the current policy is an
interpretation of the intent of the underlying statute. However, the
statute is less confusing than it appears. It authorizes states to
exempt up to 12 percent of the caseload (formerly 15 percent) but does
not mandate that states use the exemptions over any particular time
period. It then, separately, authorizes the Secretary to adjust the
number of exemptions based on the state's use of exemptions in the
prior fiscal year. Under the provision, if a state does not use all
exemptions, the Secretary increases the number of exemptions available
in the current year. If the state overuses exemptions, then the
Secretary reduces the number of exemptions available in the current
year. The statute reads:

. . . the Secretary shall increase or decrease the number of
individuals who may be granted an exemption by a state agency
under this paragraph to the extent that the average monthly
number of exemptions in effect in the state for the preceding
fiscal year under this paragraph is lesser or greater than the
average monthly number of exemptions estimated for the state
agency for such preceding fiscal year under this paragraph.

The language sets out that the Secretary adjusts one way for one
circumstance (too many exemptions used), and in another way for the
other condition (fewer exemptions used than issued). The Secretary
shall increase the number of individual exemptions to the extent that
the average monthly number used in the previous year is less than then
number estimated for that year. Similarly, the Secretary shall decrease
the number of individual exemptions to the extent that the average
monthly number used in the previous year is more than the number
estimated for that year.
Note that the Secretary is required to adjust the number of
exemptions, but that the use of exemptions remains a state option
(``individuals who may be granted an exemption''). And, if the state
uses fewer exemptions than allotted in the previous fiscal year, the
Secretary should increase the number of exemptions in the following
year. The provision requires the Secretary to ``increase or decrease''
exemptions depending on whether the state's use of exemptions is
``lesser or greater than'' the allotment for the previous year. So,
it's an increase if the state uses fewer exemptions and a decrease if
the state uses more exemptions than allotted. This makes sense. By
decreasing the allotment to a state that overuses the exemptions, the
statute ensures that states cannot routinely use more than the yearly
allotted amount. But that means that a state does increase its
allotment each year that it does not use that year's amount. States
that repeatedly under-use allotments will accrue a bank of exemptions.
This approach, codified in the current regulations, is a
straightforward and fair reading of the statute's directive.
The proposed rule, in contrast, makes several unsupported
assertions. First, it claims without support, that the intent was not
to accrue exemptions for more than 1 year. Second, by eliminating the
existing supply of unused exemptions, it treats them as having no value
to the state even though many states have accessed these accrued
exemptions for a variety of allowable and sensible reasons. Third, it
fails to explain why the current procedure to adjust exemptions each
year is a flawed reading of the underlying statute.
Legislative History Demonstrates That Congress Fully Understood and
Approved of the Uncapped Accrual of Exemptions
The guidelines explaining the calculation and use of individual
exemptions were first promulgated in the September 3, 1999 interim rule
implementing two SNAP provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of
1997.\376\ In that interim rule, the Department outlined how it would
comply with the statutory requirement that the Secretary adjust the
number of individuals who may be granted an exemption to account for
any difference between the average of exemption used and the number
estimated by the Agency for the preceding fiscal year. If a state uses
more exemptions than estimated, the state's subsequent allocation is
reduced. Likewise, if a state uses fewer exemptions than estimated in
the previous year, the state's subsequent allocation is increased by
the amount not used. As the Department explained ``if this level of
exemptions is not used by the end of the fiscal year, the state may
carry over the balance.'' \377\
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\376\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Food Stamp Program: Food Stamp Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997,'' Interim rule, Federal Register Vol. 64, No. 171, Sept. 3,
1999, p. 48246, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-09-03/pdf/
99-23017.pdf.
\377\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Food Stamp Program: Food Stamp Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997,'' Interim rule, Federal Register Vol. 64, No. 171, Sept. 3,
1999, p. 48249, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-09-03/pdf/
99-23017.pdf.
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This longstanding implementation of the statutory directive is
clear, reasonable, and fair to states. It addresses the reasonable
concern that an annual allotment of exemptions could be either overused
or underused. The continual overuse of individual exemptions has an
impact on overall program integrity because individuals not eligible
under an exemption are issued benefits, which is an over-issuance and
error. To address this, the regulation treats this issue in a sensible
way, by reducing future exemptions. The continual under-use of
individual exemptions does not create the same problem, and the
regulation's treatment is similarly reasonable.
The statute does not direct the Secretary to make adjustments
beyond a 1 year period. In other words, the statute does not give the
Secretary the authority to adjust the number of exemptions issued more
than 1 year prior ago. Combining the requirement that the Secretary
adjust exemptions from the previous fiscal year with the limitation on
looking further back to adjust exemptions based on use means that a
state can accrue unused exemptions in multiple years, and these
exemptions can accrue over multiple years.
States Have Relied on Current Policy: USDA Has Never Emphasized the
Need to Use Exemptions Each Year
The Department has not, in the past, suggested that unused
exemptions would not accrue. Developing a reasonable exemption policy
is difficult--states must identify the circumstances when an individual
exemption should be used, the procedures for identifying when that
circumstance has occurred, and a tracking mechanism to ensure that the
usage does not exceed the allotment. This implementation challenge has
discouraged states from experimenting with ways of using the
exemptions. But it does not indicate that states have no need for them.
Instead of eliminating earned-but-unused exemptions, the Department
could provide guidance to states on effective ways to use them. The
Department could take steps to understand states' concerns or problems
with using exemptions. Such a response would be much more in keeping
with Congressional intent and the law. Instead, via the NPRM, the
Department has taken sweeping measures to curtail a state resource
counter to the law.
States Have Compelling Reasons to Accrue Individual Exemptions
The recent statutory change from 15 percent to 12 percent makes the
banked or unused exemptions more important for some states. While not
every state uses its annual allotment of exemptions, some states do or
come close to doing so. Many states use the ability to rollover
exemptions to build a ``bank'' that gives states options that would be
unavailable if exemptions expired.
States use individual exemptions for a variety of purposes, as the
original provision intended. Some identify certain vulnerable
populations, such as victims of domestic violence, veterans, young
adults aging out of foster care, or those with acute barriers to
employment like a lack of education or limited proficiency in English.
States have also used exemptions to allow individuals in limited areas
to remain eligible for SNAP, often because of circumstances that are
not reflected in a way that qualifies the area for a waiver or due to
administrative demands. In all cases, states must estimate the number
of individuals who would receive an exemption and for how long in order
to ensure that the state does not exceed the number of available
exemptions. Building up some unused exemptions gives states important
flexibility and confidence to implement these targeted approaches
without running afoul of over-issuing exemptions. The buffer provided
by accrued exemptions is critical in that process.
Because of the recent change in the percentage of exemptions made
available to states, these states that are using exemptions would be at
risk of exceeding their allotment and being subject to error
determinations and overpayments under the NPRM. Between 2014 and 2017,
28 states used more exemptions than they had been issued for the fiscal
year, meaning they used at least some of the exemptions they had
accrued in previous years. During that time period, some states did so
for more than 1 year. Several of the states used all of their multi-
year exemptions which demonstrates the importance of accruing
exemptions over several years.
For example, Washington used 28,886 exemptions in Fiscal Year
2016.\378\ It had earned no exemptions in the prior year (because it
had a statewide waiver in 2015). It had accrued 11,530 exemptions in
previous years. It did not overuse exemptions because it was allocated
26,784 exemptions that year (meaning that it started 2017 with over
9,000 unused exemptions). The state relied on exemptions that year
because it was transitioning off of the statewide waiver and was
developing training programs and operational procedures for childless
adults subject to the rule. Other states used banked exemptions in a
similar way. For example, in 2016, Maryland earned no exemptions for
the year (based on having a statewide waiver in 2015) but issued 18,871
exemptions to aid in its transition to the time limit. It could do so
only because it had a ``bank'' of unused exemptions from prior years of
18,915. Under the proposed rule, neither state would have had been able
to take this approach.
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\378\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``SNAP--FY 2017 Allocations of 15 Percent Exemptions for ABAWDs--Totals
Adjusted for Carryover,'' March 15, 2017, https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/FY2017-ABAWD-15%25-
Exemption-Totals.pdf.
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The 3 month time limit is complex and difficult to administer, as
is documented in the USDA Inspector General's report.\379\ A majority
of states have used individual exemptions to ensure that particularly
vulnerable individuals are not inappropriately terminated from the
program. Allowing states to keep unused exemptions enables states to
plan in advance and prepare for major events affecting the unemployed
childless adult population on SNAP (such as an area transitioning from
waived to unwaived status).
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\379\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General,
``FNS Controls Over SNAP Benefits for Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents,'' September 2016.
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Congress Knows How to Limit Carryover and Has Repeatedly Declined to Do
So for Unused Exemptions
Congress has the authority and ability to limit the carryover of
allocated resources in the legislation it crafts. This authority is
exercised frequently, in order to prevent unused funds or resources
from accruing. In fact, the Food and Nutrition Act demonstrates that
Congress, when it deems it appropriate, can limit or reallocate
resources, though it has not done so for individual exemptions. For
example, in allocating funding for SNAP Employment and Training
program, Section 16(h) (7 U.S.C. 2025(h)) reads:

(i) In General.--If a state agency will not expend
all of the funds allocated to the state agency for a
fiscal year under subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall
reallocate the unexpended funds to other states (during
the fiscal year or the subsequent fiscal year) as the
Secretary considers appropriate and equitable.

Here, Congress not only directs the Secretary to reallocate unspent
funds but indicates when such reallocation occurs. Further subsections
provide more detail on the mechanics of the reallocation.
There is no similar provision in the Food and Nutrition Act
indicating that Congress intended to limit the accrual of unused
exemptions, or indeed, any directive for the states once exemptions are
provided.\380\
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\380\ Section 6(o) (7 U.S.C. 2015(o)) of the Act does direct the
Secretary to make limited adjustments to exemptions each year, but
these are limited to changes in caseload and not based on whether or
not a state used the exemptions issued. The E&T funding, by contrast,
is adjusted based on state decisions to spend the allocation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. The Proposed Rule Change Fails to Provide a Legitimate Reason for
the Change
The NPRM states that the change would result in administering the
program more efficiently and to further the Department's goal to
promote self-sufficiency. However, the NPRM provides no explanation or
information on how the proposed change would achieve either goal. The
current exemption policy has worked well for 20 years and FNS has never
identified issues with the efficiency of the policy. Nothing in the
proposed replacement policy would make it easier for state to
administer. Indeed, because the safety valve of a bank of exemptions is
eliminated, states will find it more difficult to fine-tune policies
that authorize the use of exemptions.
For example, a state may decide to provide an exemption to any
individual who is working, but not enough hours to meet the 20 hour per
week requirement for those subject to the time limit. It can estimate
the number of individuals, and hence the number of exemptions. But
inaccuracies in the calculation of the estimate or changes in the
composition of the group can significantly change the number of
exemptions needed. The existing policy provides states with a pool of
unused exemptions a way to adjust; the proposed rule almost completely
eliminates this ability to adjust. As a result, every state would be
more at risk of exceeding its annual allocation of individual
exemptions.
In the NPRM, the Department references the September 2016 report
from the Office of Inspector General to support the proposed change in
the accrual of unused exemptions. While it is true that the report
notes the large number of accrued exemptions, the report very
explicitly declines to recommend any change in current policy. The
report states ``OIG generally agrees that FNS has the discretion to
interpret and implement the exemption provisions as it has done, so we
do not have a recommendation for FNS with respect to exemptions.''
\381\
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\381\ USDA Office of Inspector General, FNS Controls Over SNAP
Benefits For Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents, September 2016, p.
11.
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The Proposed Method of Calculating Exemptions and Adjusting From Prior
Years Will Discourage States From Using Them and Increase the
Potential for Errors
The proposed adjustment procedure in the NPRM is needlessly
confusing, will discourage the use of exemptions and is likely to
increase errors. The varied exemption use example provided in the NPRM
(Example 2 on page 988) shows how this proposed approach would
discourage the use of allocated exemptions and contradicts the
statutory requirements. In 2021, the state uses eight exemptions.\382\
In 2022, use plummets to two. In 2023, use quadruples to eight, and in
2024, it drops again to two. While the math works out to meet the
proposed rule, the implementation of a policy that varies this widely
in scope is hard to conceive. The state must be able to estimate the
number of exemptions that would be used each year, design a policy and
the procedures to implement to meet that target number, correctly train
staff, and actually implement and track. Then, the following year, the
state must design a policy that uses four times fewer (or greater) the
number of exemptions, retrain staff, and properly implement. The NPRM
offers no assurance that a state could successfully resdesign important
program elements on a yearly basis. The history of state administration
of SNAP also offers no assurance.
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\382\ NPRM, p. 988.
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In 2022, the state does not have its yearly allocation available,
because in the prior year it tapped into previously earned exemptions.
The state is paying back exemptions despite not overusing the total
available exemptions in any year in the example. That conflicts with
the statutory authority granting states exemptions in each year in
which individuals are subject to the time limit or ineligible because
of it. And, averaging over 2 years so that the average is equal to 12
percent of the ``ABAWDs'' does not fulfill the statutory requirement
that states can allocate an average of 12 percent per year.
Chapter 10. The Proposed Rule Fails to Provide Sufficient Rationale or
Supporting Evidence for the Proposed Policy Change
The NPRM proposes several significant changes to long-standing SNAP
policy that would affect an estimated 1.1 million low-income Americans,
including 755,000 who would lose food assistance and face increased
financial and food insecurity. Despite the far-reaching impact of the
proposed rule, and contrary to requirements in the rulemaking process,
the NPRM fails to provide a meaningful rationale for most of the
proposed changes and fails to identify or summarize any research and
data to support the rationale for such sweeping and consequential
changes. Without knowing what evidence justifies such a drastic change
in long-standing policy, it is impossible to assess the validity of the
claim or the soundness of the evidence used to support it.
The goal of the Department's proposed changes in policy appears to
be to subject more people to the time limit by shrinking the portion of
the country that can request waivers from it. To achieve this goal, the
proposed rule would prohibit waivers of the time limit to those that
are based on a general unemployment rate of at least seven percent and
at least 20 percent above the national average and would restrict the
ways in which a state can define the area it seeks to waive. In
addition, the NPRM eliminates several ways in which a state can
demonstrate a locale has an insufficient number of jobs for those
subject to the rule and ends the ability of states to save unused
exemptions to the time limit. In each case, the Department fails to
identify a desired goal or outcome (such as a certain percentage of the
target group gaining employment) or explain how the proposed rule would
lead to the desired goal, and consistently fails to provide any
empirical support for the proposal. These failures prevent the public
from understanding why the existing rule needs to be modified so
drastically.
A. The Proposed Rule Fails to Support the Justification for New
Rulemaking--That Too Many Unemployed Adults on SNAP Are Not
Subject to the Time Limit
The preamble to the proposed rule states that the Department now
believes that the time limit for unemployed adults was intended to
apply to more individuals than it currently does. The Department thus
believes that too many individuals live in areas that are waived by
states and not subject to the rule. But the Department fails to make
several important connections to justify the need for new rulemaking.
The Department fails to show that the intent of Congress was to
subject the Department's preferred number of individuals to the time
limit. In fact, the NPRM fails to establish that Congress had any
interest in subjecting a target number of individuals to the rule.
Rather, the goal was to allow states to protect individuals in areas
without a sufficient number of jobs, regardless of how many individuals
that would be. We are unable to identify any statutory reference to a
policy goal of protecting only a certain percentage of individuals
subject to the rule.
The legislative record does not reveal Congressional debate over
the appropriate percentage of individuals subject to the rule. In fact,
the Members of Congress introducing the proposed time limit emphasized
that adequate protections were included to ensure that individuals were
not cut off of SNAP if opportunities for work or workfare were not
available. Representative Robert Ney, one of the authors, stated on the
floor of the House of Representatives that his amendment ``provides
some safety; it provides a course of a safety net [sic], it has the
ability to have waivers from the state department of human services.''
\383\ Representative John Kasich clarified that the key was that the
time limit applied only in areas where jobs were available to those
subject to the time limit--otherwise, the time limit would not apply.
``It is only if you are able-bodied, if you are childless, and you live
in an area where you are getting food stamps, and there are jobs
available, then it applies.'' The key issue, of course, is whether jobs
are available for these individuals, as the statute requires.
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\383\ 142 Congressional Record, H7904 (daily ed. July 18, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We address the serious concerns with the way in which the NPRM
incorrectly interprets the standard that waivers are available in
places with insufficient jobs for the individuals subject to the rule
in Chapter 3. Here, we simply note that the authors of the original
legislation did not have a targeted number of individuals they thought
should be subject to the rule; nor did Congress establish, or even
debate, a targeted percentage of individuals to be subject to the rule.
Instead, the co-authors of the original legislation were careful to
point out that there were adequate protections for all individuals if
jobs were not available. Given this clear history, it is incumbent upon
the Department to substantiate its claim that the legislative history
somehow suggests that the current regulations must be changed because
too many individuals live in waived areas. Without explaining the
underlying claim, the rule leaves commenters with little ability to
meaningfully respond.
We would also note that the temporary nature of setting such a
coverage goal strongly suggests such a goal is not intended or
practical. As economic circumstances change, the ability of ABAWDs
subject to the time limit to find work will change, meaning that at
different points in the economic cycle, the portion of individuals
subject to the rule who are able to find 20 hours of work per week will
change significantly, as will the portion of individuals living in
areas eligible for waivers under any set of criteria. And other
factors, besides the existence of a waiver, affect an individual's
participation in SNAP, such as the accessibility of the application
process, other eligibility rules and processes, and the availability of
training opportunities for unemployed adults.
B. Despite Claiming That General Unemployment Rates Are the Best
Available Measure of Job Sufficiency for Low-Income Adults on
SNAP, the Proposed Rule Fails to Support the Claim with
Evidence
The proposed rule asserts that low general unemployment rates
indicate sufficient jobs are available for those subject to the time
limit. But it offers no reason why a general unemployment rate of seven
percent is a good proxy measure for establishing that there are
sufficient jobs for the individuals subject to the rule. This lack of
an explanation makes it difficult for interested parties to critique
the Department's conclusion that no waivers should be permitted below
seven percent. In contrast, as discussed in Chapter 3, there is a deep
body of research that shows unemployment rates are much higher for
groups that make up SNAP's ABAWD caseload.
Current regulations allow waiver requests that demonstrate a recent
local unemployment rate significantly above the national average but do
not set a minimum unemployment rate. The NPRM fails to explain why the
reasoning behind the current rule no longer applies, and why it
believes another rulemaking process would result in a justifiable
change. Indeed, for the most substantial proposed change--to prohibit
waivers for areas with unemployment below seven percent--the NPRM seeks
input for changing the number to six or ten percent but does not
explain why those thresholds are of particular importance, aside from
noting that a larger or smaller group of individuals might be protected
at the different levels. It does not explicitly seek input on other
levels, such as five or eight percent. The rule offers a very weak
explanation, unsupported by research, for the seven percent that is
proposed or the alternatives for which it seeks comment. Since
interested stakeholders do not have adequate information to determine
why the unemployment rate floor is set where it is, it is difficult to
provide useful feedback on the appropriateness of the proposed
threshold. In the rulemaking process, an agency that promulgates a rule
change needs to explain why the original rationale is no longer
sufficient when proposing to change the rule.
The Proposed Rule Makes Arbitrary Changes to Long-Standing Regulations
That Were Initially Promulgated Based on Sound Reasons
Until this proposed rule, FNS has always acknowledged that the
statute requires several different ways for states to document a lack
of sufficient jobs for the individuals subject to the time limit. In
its original guidance, the Department noted, ``[t]he statute recognizes
that the unemployment rate alone is an imperfect measure of the
employment prospects of individuals with little work history and
diminished opportunities.'' \384\ It then proceeds to describe the use
of Labor Surplus Areas (LSAs) as a reliable waiver criteria. However,
without providing a reason or evidence that LSAs are not a useful
measure, the proposed rule eliminates LSAs as a possible way of
qualifying for a waiver. We are at a loss as to why a measure relied
upon for so long by so many states is simply eliminated.
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\384\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Guidance for States Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp Limits,'' Dec. 3,
1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Areas designated as LSAs by the Department of Labor have been
eligible for waivers because in order to qualify as an LSA, an area
must have sufficiently high unemployment (120 percent of the national
average so long as the area rate is at least six percent). LSAs are
recognized as weak labor markets. Federal, state, and local government
use LSAs to target contracts and allocate employment-related assistance
and training. LSAs provide a reasonable indicator that there is a lack
of sufficient jobs for unemployed SNAP participants, who
disproportionately struggle to overcome barriers to employment.
To support the inclusion of LSAs as a way to demonstrate a lack of
sufficient jobs for the unemployed adults subject to the rule, the
original 1999 rulemaking process established that LSAs were a
reasonable measure of labor market weakness and were based on sound and
relevant data from a trusted source (the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
The original 1996 guidance explained one reason why:

Labor surplus areas are classified on the basis of civil
jurisdictions rather than on a metropolitan area or labor
market area basis. By classifying labor surplus areas in this
way, specific localities with high unemployment rather than all
civil jurisdictions within a metropolitan area, (not all of
which may suffer from the same degree of unemployment) can be
identified. This feature also makes the classification
potentially useful to identify areas for which to seek waivers
[emphasis added].\385\
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\385\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Guidance for States Seeking Waivers for Food Stamp Limits,'' Dec. 3,
1996.

The original rulemaking process emphasized the importance of
relying on BLS data (much as the NPRM does). But the original
rulemaking identified LSA status as a reliable indicator of
insufficient jobs based on BLS data and as recent enough to be used to
meet the waiver criteria. In fact, the preamble to the final rule noted
that an LSA designation was reliable enough to allow for ``immediate
implementation of waivers for areas where the Employment and Training
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor (ETA), has designated such
areas as LSAs.'' \386\ In other words, the Department made a reasoned
decision to allow states to immediately implement (before approval by
FNS) any waiver based on an area's designation as an LSA. The proposed
rule both eliminates the LSA criteria and the immediate implementation
of certain waivers without explaining why the current process is flawed
or could be improved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\386\ 66 Fed. Reg., No. 11, 4438, ``Food Stamp Program: Personal
Responsibility Provision of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,'' January 17, 2001, p. 4463.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule drops LSAs but provides no explanation for why
this change is needed; nor does it identify deficiencies in the current
criteria (aside from determining that there should be a seven percent
unemployment floor). Because we do not know what faults the Department
now believes exist with the use of LSAs as credible indicator of a lack
of sufficient jobs for the individuals subject to the time limit, we
are unable to assess the validity of the claim. It is unclear what
information the Department now has that invalidates its decision of
more than 20 years ago--a decision the Department has followed and
subscribed to until very recently. This prevents the public from
providing relevant information that supports or refutes the reasons
behind the proposed rule.
The Proposed Rule Attempts to Achieve Through Regulation a Policy That
Congress Explicitly Rejected
The Administration's aim with this rule appears to be to do through
rule-making what Congress rejected through legislation. The Trump
Administration proposed restricting waivers from the time limit through
legislation in its Fiscal Year 2018 budget proposal and promoted
exposing more people to the time limit throughout the 2018 Farm Bill
process.\387\ In the budget, the Administration proposed restricting
waivers to just areas with an average unemployment rate of ten percent.
In that proposal, the Administration described current policy as,
``States can request waivers from the ABAWD time limit that cover the
entire state, or only parts of the state where unemployment is
particularly high. States decide whether or not to request a time limit
waiver, and generally make this assessment annually.'' The proposed
policy was described as, ``This proposal limits ABAWD waivers to
counties with an unemployment rate greater than ten percent averaged
over 12 months.'' While this proposed legislative policy would be
stricter than the policy in the proposed rule, the actual near-term
impact of a seven percent floor would be similar as there are very few
counties in the country with average unemployment rates between seven
and ten percent.
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\387\ Food and Nutrition Service, 2018 Explanatory Notes for the FY
2018 President's Budget, pages 32-92 to 32-93 https://
www.obpa.usda.gov/32fnsexnotes2018.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout the farm bill process, the President and Secretary
Perdue were quoted in the press as saying that they were frustrated
that Congress would not expose more individuals to the time limit or
``work requirement.'' \388\ At the 2018 Farm Bill signing ceremony, the
President remarked that he wanted to implement policy counter to what
Congress had decided. He said, ``Therefore, I have directed Secretary
Perdue to use his authority under the law to close work requirement
loopholes in the food stamp program. Under this new rule, able-bodied
adults without dependents will have to work, or look for work, in order
to receive their food stamps. Today's action will help Americans
transition from welfare to gainful employment, strengthening families
and uplifting communities. And that was a difficult thing to get done,
but the farmers wanted it done; we all wanted it done. And I think, in
the end, it's going to make a lot of people very happy. It's called
`work rules.' And Sonny is able, under this bill, to implement them
through regulation.'' \389\ As noted, the farm bill legislation which
the President refers to as ``the bill'', did not provide any new
authority to the Secretary to change waiver policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\ Emily Birnbaum and Julie Grace Brufke, ``Trump Attacks Dems
on farm bill'', The Hill, September 13, 2018, https://thehill.com/
homenews/administration/406561-trump-calls-out-dems-for-opposing-farm-
bill-over-work-requirements; Phillip Brasher, ``Farm Bill Delayed, but
Perdue signals administration support'', Agripulse, December 3, 2019,
https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/11703-farm-bill-delayed-but-perdue-
signals-administration-support.
\389\ Remarks by President Trump at Signing of H.R. 2, the
Agriculture Improvement A[c]t of 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-h-r-2-agriculture-
improvement-act-2018/.
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Congress expressly rejected the Administration's proposal to
substantially limit waivers in favor of the Senate approach,
demonstrating intent to keep the current interpretation of the
``insufficient jobs'' criterion intact. Given that the agency did not
put forward a coherent evidenced-based argument, we are left to believe
that the goal of this rule is to defy Congressional intent and the
agency's own rulemaking to achieve a failed legislative effort.
C. The Failure to Provide a Relevant Explanation or Supporting Data to
Justify a Change in Current Regulations Occurs Repeatedly
Throughout the Proposed Rule
Under the NPRM, USDA would simply eliminate several existing
criteria for requesting waivers because the Department claims they are
``rarely used, sometimes subjective and not appropriate when more
specific and robust data is available.'' Under the proposed rule,
waivers would not be available for areas with low and declining
employment-to-population ratios, a lack of jobs in declining
occupations or industries, or a lack of jobs as demonstrated by an
academic study or other publication. The claim that the data available
is not rigorous enough to support a request is not explained, given
that states can submit a wide range of data to support a request.
Especially concerning is the elimination of the employment-to-
population (E:P) ratio standard. It is a well-established metric that
has several features that make it preferable to general unemployment
rates in assessing the health of the labor market. In some ways and
under some circumstances, particularly in rural areas, the E:P ratio
may be a better measure of the availability of sufficient jobs for low-
income adults participating in SNAP. The Department fails to establish
that the E:P ratio relies on questionable or non-specific data. The
proposed rule insists that sound data be used in supporting waiver
requests, emphasizing that data from BLS is the standard to be used in
requesting waivers.
The employment-to-population ratio has not been widely used, but
that, by itself, is not a sufficient reason to eliminate the option for
states. As BLS itself notes, the ratio is ``especially useful for
evaluating demographic employment trends.'' \390\ In particular, it is
important to rural areas, which often have less dynamic job creation
and fewer resources available for the types of training activities that
allow ABAWDs subject to the time limit to meet the 20 hour requirement.
For example, South Dakota has waived both whole counties and
reservations under the employment-to-population criteria. Even in the
last few years, other states, like New York and Maryland have waived
counties. The option may not be frequently used, but it represents an
important measure of labor market weaknesses in some areas and should
remain available to states. The NPRM does not explain why frequency of
request is a meaningful reason to keep or drop criteria.
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\390\ Carol Boyd Leon, The employment-population ratio: its value
in labor force analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor
Review, February 1981, pp. 36-45, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1981/02/
art4full.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Department offers no insight into whether it considers
the employment-to-population ratio to be ``sometimes subjective.''
Under each of the listed concerns used to justify dropping the
employment-to-population criterion (that it is rarely used, sometimes
subjective, and not appropriate if more specific and robust data is
available), the NPRM provides no explanation or information that allows
the general public to respond to the proposal.
D. The Public Input Resulting From Last Year's Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking Does Not Appear to Inform This Proposed
Rule
In March 2018, the Department issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rule Making (ANPRM), seeking public input on ``potential regulatory
changes or other changes that might better support states in accurately
identifying ABAWDs subject to the time limit and providing meaningful
opportunities for them to move towards self-sufficiency.'' \391\ Tens
of thousands of comments were submitted, but the agency makes only a
cursory reference to a subset of the comments and does not adequately
recognize or summarize the public input. While the preamble of the NPRM
contains a brief and inconclusive summary of the submitted comments,
the Department provides no explanation for how the ANPRM informed the
policy making process or whether the Department chose to ignore input
provided through the public process. Potential commenters are at a loss
for how the ANPRM informed the development of the proposed rule, what
the public response to the ANPRM was, or how to engage without any
information about the comments.
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\391\ Fed. Reg., Vol. 83, No. 37, ``Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program: Requirements and Services for Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,'' February
23, 2018, p. 8013.
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The failure to respond to ANPRM raises serious concerns about the
current rulemaking proposal. We are left to wonder whether the bulk of
the comments sought, or did not seek, a change in policy. There is no
summary of the reasons for supporting a change. Nor is there a summary
of the input from commentators who opposed a change in policy, or a
response from the agency as to why it concluded that these commentators
were incorrect.
The ANPRM asked numerous questions about helping ABAWDs gain work.
But the NPRM only references the questions about waivers. This is
deeply misleading as it suggests comments were focused only on that
question.
The failure to adequately respond to the ANPRM also raises concerns
that the current rulemaking process will fail to take the comments on
the NPRM into account as the Department decides whether to proceed with
the current proposed rule or change or withdraw it. If the public's
input was ignored or outright dismissed in the previous process, why
should the public have confidence that the NPRM will not yield the same
result?
E. Alternatives to the Proposed Rule Are Not Discussed
Under the rulemaking process, USDA is obligated to explain why the
particular policy is proposed and why alternative approaches are
inadequate. Given that the agency estimates 755,000 people will lose
benefits and provides no estimate for how many will gain employment,
less harmful alternatives exist and the Department has an obligation to
consider these alternatives.
In establishing seven percent unemployment as a floor under which
no area can qualify for a waiver, the Department claims this is ``more
suitable for achieving a more comprehensive application of work
requirements so that ABAWDs in areas that have sufficient number of
jobs have a greater level of engagement in work and work activities,
including job training.'' \392\ No information is provided as to why
current policies are not comprehensive and what the current level of
engagement in work and work activities is, much less what a ``greater
level of engagement'' would look like. This makes it difficult for
commenters to provide input on these unsupported assertions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\392\ NPRM, p. 984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The claim that a seven percent floor strengthens the work
requirement is repeated throughout the preamble. As discussed in detail
[below], the NPRM fails to adequately support the proposed floor.
Without knowing what research or data the Department relied upon to
conclude that seven percent was the appropriate floor, the public is
unable to directly comment on the validity of the Department's action.
The Department does seek input on setting the unemployment floor--
at seven, six, or ten percent--but offers no explanation why six or ten
percent are the two alternatives rather than, say, five or eight
percent. Aside from a cursory mention of the natural rate of
unemployment, no discussion or information is provided to inform the
public's comments.
Other alternatives to grouping areas together also exist. For
example, the proposed rule limits waiver requests that group sub-state
areas together to those based entirely on BLS Labor Market Areas
(LMAs). There are serious limitations to relying solely on LMAs as the
basis of such waivers, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. LMAs
rely on older data, use a narrow definition of a labor market area that
does not reflect the challenges facing low-income SNAP participants,
and do not account for other factors relevant to ABAWDs subject to a 3
month time limit--such as the availability of training programs. In
fact, one of the key components of the current grouping policy--that
states largely define the area of the waiver request--is largely
eliminated with no explanation or evidentiary support. Other
alternatives do exist, but the NPRM fails to provide any reason why
these alternatives are not appropriate and why the proposed grouping
change is the best available option.
The proposed rule is based on insufficient reasons to change
current regulations, fails to provide evidence supporting the change,
and lacks any discussions of alternatives considered in developing the
proposed rule. Given this lack of supporting information, the public
has an insufficient opportunity to comment meaningfully on the proposed
rule.
Chapter 11. The Proposed Rule's ``Regulatory Impact Analysis''
Highlights FNS' Faulty Justification and Includes Numerous
Unclear or Flawed Assumptions
The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) \393\ that accompanies the
proposed rule contradicts the Department's justification for the
proposed rule. The Department repeatedly asserts in the preamble that
the proposed rule would ``encourage more ABAWDs to engage in work'' and
would ``promote self-sufficiency.'' But the RIA finds instead that
755,000 individuals would be cut from SNAP in 2020 for ``failure to
engage meaningfully in work or work training,'' \394\ and it provides
no evidence or estimates that other individuals would be induced to
work because of the proposed changes or would experience any benefit
from the changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\ The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), which includes the
detailed cost-benefit analysis and information about the methodology,
is included in a separate online document here: https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FNS-2018-0004-6000, p. 4-7 and 18-31.
The NPRM includes only a short summary of the analysis. Hereafter in
citations we will refer to the Regulatory Impact Analysis as the
``RIA.''
\394\ NPRM, p. 989; RIA, pp. 4, 26, 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the methodology for deriving the impact of the
proposed rule ignores available research evidence, uses imprecise
terms, includes numerous unclear or inappropriate assumptions, and
excludes all together any explanations for several other key
assumptions. The information that is provided in the RIA is
fundamentally flawed, imprecise, incomplete, and incoherent.
The result is that the proposed rule does not provide the
analytical or conceptual information needed to justify the policy
change and to evaluate the proposed rule's likely impacts. Because of
the deficiencies in reasoning and analysis of the RIA, the proposed
rule fails to answer basic questions related to the impact of the
change and the people whom the proposed rule would affect, and so does
not contain the information and data necessary to fully evaluate the
proposed rule or to comment on key aspects on the Department's
justification for the rule.
No agency could explain every nuance and assumption, but the RIA
that accompanies the proposed changes in this NPRM is so deeply flawed
that we cannot comprehend the basic reasoning behind it. Because
individuals who wish to comment on the changes cannot understand or
follow the agency's justification, this rulemaking and comment process
is compromised.
A. The RIA Does Not Provide Any Evidence to Support the Proposed Rule's
Stated Rationale
The NPRM argues repeatedly that ``the Department is confident that
these changes would encourage more ABAWDs to engage in work or work
activities,'' \395\ implying that, as a result of the changes proposed,
individuals newly subject to SNAP's 3 month time limit in areas no
longer qualifying for waivers would be likely to work more, have higher
earnings, or otherwise be better off. But the NPRM provides no evidence
to support these assertions, and no estimates of any quantifiable
benefits for any individuals resulting from the changes. The NPRM's
failure to justify the stated rationale is a serious deficiency and
makes it impossible for commenters to assess the impact of the proposed
rule or to comment on the Department's justification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ NPRM, pp. 981, 982, 987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RIA, which is included as supplementary materials accompanying
the NPRM, contradicts the Department's stated rationale. The analysis
in the RIA provides that the only benefit of the rule is budgetary
savings from lower SNAP benefits resulting from 755,000 individuals
``not meeting the requirements for failure to engage meaningfully in
work or work training.'' \396\ The RIA does not claim that any
individuals would be induced to find work or have increased earnings as
a result of the proposed rule. The RIA does provide a confusing
assertion that a higher share of ``ABAWDs'' would be working in 2020
(34 percent) than in 2016 (26 percent), and estimates the impact under
a different scenario where that increase does not occur.\397\ According
to the RIA, however, the assumed increase in employment (from 26
percent with any earnings to 34 percent working at least 20 hours a
week) is ``based on the projected decline in the unemployment rate'' in
the President's 2019 budget forecast, not on more work among low-income
households because of the regulatory change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\ NPRM, p. 989.
\397\ RIA, pp. 4, 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The loss of SNAP benefits as a result of fewer areas qualifying for
waivers from the time limit is included in the RIA as a benefit because
of the reduction in Federal spending, but the RIA does not quantify any
benefits to individuals from the change. There is only a small mention
in the RIA of the harm, or cost that might occur for low-income
individuals who lose SNAP:

To the extent that ABAWDs newly subject to the time limit are
unable to find work or otherwise meet work requirements, and
thus lose SNAP there may be increases in poverty and food
insecurity for this group. However, those ABAWDs who become
employed will likely see increased self-sufficiency and an
overall improvement in their economic well-being. The
Department believes that a number of those affected by
strengthened work requirements are able to secure employment in
a wide range of different industries.\398\ [Emphasis added.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\ RIA, p. 28.

Thus, the analysis included in the RIA asserts that the Department
believes people are likely to get jobs because of the rule, but
provides no evidence to support that belief and quantifies only the
Federal budgetary savings from the estimated reduction in SNAP benefits
associated with individuals' ``failure to engage meaningfully in work
or work training.'' \399\ It further mentions, but does not quantify,
the secondary effects on SNAP retailers from lower SNAP
redemptions,\400\ and on community-based organizations (i.e., food
banks and others that provide emergency assistance) from increased
demand for food and services.\401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\ NPRM, p. 989.
\400\ NPRM, p. 990.
\401\ RIA, p. 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the RIA and its cost-benefit analysis are lacking in
internal logic or transparency, the public cannot see clearly how the
Department arrived at its conclusions about the need for the proposed
regulation or its impact.
B. Available Research Evidence Contradicts the Articulated Aims of the
Proposed Rule
The research evidence that is available on the question of the
effects of policies that take food assistance or other benefits away
from individuals who don't meet rigid work requirements is not
mentioned in the RIA. This is a serious omission and constrains the
public from being able to adequately assess and comment on the
potential impacts of the proposed rule.
The loss in benefits, and the related increase in poverty and
hardship that results from policies that take away food assistance or
other benefits from individuals who do not meet rigid work requirements
is well-documented in the research. The research also finds very little
gain in longer-term employment as a result of such policies. In other
words, the research supports the findings of the RIA that many
individuals would be cut off SNAP as a result of fewer areas qualifying
for waivers from the time limit under the proposed rule, but does not
support the overall stated purpose of the regulatory change.
The proposed rule ignores strong research evidence from independent
researchers that contradicts the stated justification for the proposed
change. Below we discuss the available relevant research on the impact
of taking benefits away from individuals who are unable to meet rigid
work requirements.
The NPRM Ignores Research That Finds That the Characteristics of the
Low-Wage Labor Market Contribute to Periods of Unemployment
The proposed rule implicitly assumes that taking away food
assistance will cause people not currently working to get jobs. But
this assumption ignores research evidence about the realities of the
low-wage labor market that contribute to periods of unemployment and
mischaracterizes the work patterns of many people who need and receive
assistance.

Features of the Labor Market Contribute to Periods of Unemployment

The basic characteristics of low-wage jobs are well-documented:
low-paid jobs often don't last; low-wage industries that employ workers
with limited education or work experience tend to expand and shrink
their workforces frequently based on demand, resulting in part-time
jobs that have unstable hours and high turnover; and low-paid workers
often lack the health coverage, paid leave, and reliable child care
that can help a worker keep her job. These realities help explain why
many workers in low-wage jobs need assistance while they are working
and when they are in between jobs. The nature of low-wage jobs can make
it hard for a worker to meet rigid work requirements.
Recent work by economists Kristen F. Butcher and Diane Whitmore
Schanzenbach used the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey to show
that the occupations of SNAP or Medicaid recipients who work at least
part of the year feature instability and low wages overall (not just
for SNAP or Medicaid recipients). These occupations include personal
care and home health aides, maids and housekeepers, dishwashers, food
preparers, and laundry and dry cleaning workers. Looking at all workers
in the ten occupations most prevalent among SNAP recipients, the
researchers found that these workers faced more periods of joblessness
and were less likely to be stably employed from year to year than
better-paid workers in other occupations. The researchers conclude,
``Together, these results suggest that it will be difficult for
individuals who work and participate in benefit programs to meet
proposed work requirements in the private sector alone. Although
employment levels are high among many of these types of workers,
employment volatility is also quite high. Much of this volatility
reflects characteristics of these types of occupations and is not
necessarily due to decisions made by the workers.'' \402\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\402\ Kristen F. Butcher and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, ``Most
Workers in Low-Wage Labor Market Work Substantial Hours, in Volatile
Jobs,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 24, 2018, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/most-workers-in-low-wage-
labor-market-work-substantial-hours-in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another study of the jobs that are common among SNAP participants
found that, ``because SNAP participants work in many industries (such
as retail and hospitality) and occupations (such as service and sales)
where features such as involuntary part-time work and irregular
scheduling are common, they may participate in SNAP to supplement their
low incomes due to insufficient or fluctuating hours. Similarly,
because workers often cycle in and out of these jobs, workers may
participate in SNAP during periods of unemployment or
underemployment.'' \403\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\403\ Brynne Keith-Jennings and Vincent Palacios, ``SNAP Helps
Millions of Low-Wage Workers,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
May 10, 2017, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-helps-
millions-of-low-wage-workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, there is evidence that low-wage jobs have higher
turnover and are far less likely to have access to paid sick leave or
paid family leave.

According to a 2018 study by the Economic Policy Institute,
``the monthly rate of churn into and out of employment for low-
wage workers is roughly twice as high as it is for the typical
worker in the middle of the wage distribution.'' \404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\ David Cooper, Lawrence Mishel, and Ben Zipperer, Economic
Policy Institute, April 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/bold-
increases-in-the-minimum-wage-should-be-evaluated-for-the-benefits-of-
raising-low-wage-workers-total-earnings-critics-who-cite-claims-of-job-
loss-are-using-a-distorted-frame/.

Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that low-wage
workers are far less likely to have access to paid sick leave
or paid family leave.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``National Compensation Survey:
Employee Benefits in the United States, March 2017,'' Bulletin 2787,
September 2017.

The Rationale of the NPRM Ignores Research on The Work Patterns of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
People Who Are Low-Skilled, Low-Wage Workers Subject to The Time Limit

The NPRM states that ``The application of waivers on a more limited
basis would encourage more ABAWDs to take steps towards self-
sufficiency.'' \406\ Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue on February
28, 2019 in testimony before the Senate Agriculture Committee defended
the proposed rule, saying that ``We think the purpose is to help people
move to independency . . . . We should help people when they are down
but that should not be interminably.'' \407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\406\ NPRM, p. 981.
\407\ ``Perdue Reiterates Need to Restore Original Intent of SNAP:
A Second Chance, Not a Way of Life,'' Food and Nutrition Service, USDA,
Press Release USDA 0025.19, February 28, 2019, https://
www.fns.usda.gov/pressrelease/2019/usda-002519.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The belief that unemployed adults who participate in SNAP are
dependent on SNAP for long periods ignores research that finds that
large numbers of recipients who are not working at a point in time have
recently worked or will work soon. A CBPP analysis of SNAP recipients
shows that in a typical month in mid-2012, some 52 percent of adult
recipients not receiving disability benefits were working, but that 74
percent worked in the year before or after that month.\408\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\ For similar households with just childless adults, 46 percent
were working in a typical month and 72 percent worked within a year
before or after that month. https://www.cbpp.org/unemployed-adults-
without-children-who-need-help-buying-food-only-get-snap-for-three-
months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The analysis examined adults who weren't receiving disability
benefits and who participated in SNAP for at least a month in a period
of almost 3.5 years. This allowed us to observe their work both while
they participated in SNAP and in the months when they did not, and to
observe employment among SNAP recipients over a longer period.
The adults in the analysis worked the majority of the months in the
analysis, but they were more likely to participate in SNAP in the
months when they were out of work and their income was lowest. They
participated in SNAP in about 44 percent of the months that they were
working and in 62 percent of the months in which they were not working.
This helps explain why an analysis that only looks at work in a single
point-in-time month while people are receiving SNAP will show them
working less than they do over time: many of them are workers who
temporarily receive SNAP when they are between jobs.\409\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\409\ Brynne Keith-Jennings and Raheem Chaudhry, ``Most Working-Age
SNAP Participants Work, But Often in Unstable Jobs,'' Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, March 15, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While these figures apply to all adults, not just those without
children in the household, the research finding about the difference
between point-in-time employment and employment over several years is
still relevant and the NPRM does not address it. While individuals
subject to the time limit may, in any given month, not have sufficient
work hours to pass a rigid work test, many will be working (or working
more hours) within a short time, with or without a work requirement.
Moreover, when SNAP participants are working, it's often unstable work
with low wages that does not lead to self-sufficiency, contrary to the
framing included in the NPRM.
Research From the TANF Program Found That Employment Impacts Are Modest
and Fade Over Time
The rigorous random-assignment evaluations of programs that imposed
work requirements on cash assistance (AFDC/TANF) recipients in the late
1990s contradicts the stated rationale for the proposed rule, but
supports the finding from the RIA that under the proposed rule one
would not expect to see increased employment or earnings. While these
evaluations generally found modest, statistically significant increases
in employment early on, the effects faded over time, and people with
significant barriers to employment were not helped. In fact, many were
hurt.

In Portland, Oregon, the site of the largest earnings impact
among the evaluations, the share of recipients with stable
employment (defined as being employed in 75 percent of the
calendar quarters in years 3 through 5 after the pilot project
began) rose only from 31.2 to 38.6 percent.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\410\ Gayle Hamilton, et al., ``National Evaluation of Welfare-to-
Work Strategies: How Effective Are Different Welfare-to-Work
Approaches? Five-Year Adult and Child Impacts for Eleven Programs,''
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, December 2001, Appendix
Table C-6.

Within 5 years, employment among people subject to and not
subject to work requirements was about the same in nearly all
the programs evaluated.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\ Ibid., Table C.1.

Even when the programs provided specially tailored services,
the vast majority of participants facing significant employment
barriers did not find employment as a result of work
requirements.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\ Dan Bloom, Cynthia Miller, and Gilda Azurdia, ``Results from
the Personal Roads to Individual Development and Employment (PRIDE)
Program in New York City,'' MDRC, July 2007.

The California GAIN program, the so-called ``Riverside
Miracle,'' which focused on getting recipients into any job as
quickly as possible, was outperformed in the long run by
programs that focused on increasing participants' skills and
building their human capital.\413\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\ V. Joseph Hotz, Guido Imbens, and Jacob Klerman, ``Evaluating
the Differential Effects of Alternative Welfare-to-Work Training
Components: A Reanalysis of the California GAIN Program,'' Journal of
Labor Economics, Volume 24 Number 3, 2006, pp. 521-566.

One TANF expert researcher commented on the House Agriculture
Committee's work requirement proposals from the 2014 Farm Bill, which
would have expanded the existing approach for SNAP for childless adults
to adults with children, that, ``[t]here is no credible evidence to
suggest that the specific work requirements developed by the House
Agriculture Committee would `work.' In fact, they are not likely to do
much in the way of promoting employment and could push millions of
families/individuals deeper into poverty.'' \414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ Peter Germanis, ``Who Killed Work Requirements for SNAP in
the Farm Bill? Answer: Conservative Ideologues,'' January 1, 2019,
https://mlwiseman.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Farmbill.120118.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On balance, as we discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, this
rigorous research supports the findings of the RIA that many people
lose benefits when required to comply with work requirements, but
contradicts the stated purpose of the proposed rule to increase self-
sufficiency.
Strong Evidence That Many Subject to the Time Limit Face Employment
Barriers and Would Lose Needed Help
Based on the TANF experience from the 1990s, as well as the
existing experience with the time limit in SNAP and the early
experience from Arkansas (the only state so far to terminate Medicaid
for individuals who fail to document that they are meeting Medicaid
work requirements), many people subject to work requirements would lose
benefits, and poverty and hardship would increase. This, again, is
consistent with the analysis in the RIA, but not with the justification
for the proposed rule.

Research shows that many of the people who would be newly
subject to the time limit have circumstances that may limit the
amount or kind of work that they can do. A large share face
physical or mental health conditions or a cognitive impairment
that would be difficult for state agencies to identify or for
individuals to obtain paperwork to prove.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ Rachel Garfield, Robin Rudowitz, and Anthony Damico,
``Understanding the Intersection of Medicaid and Work,'' Kaiser Family
Foundation, January 5, 2018; MaryBeth Musumeci, Julia Foutz, and Rachel
Garfield, ``How Might Medicaid Adults with Disabilities Be Affected By
Work Requirements in Section 1115 Waiver Programs?'' Kaiser Family
Foundation, January 26, 2018; Bauer, Schanzenbach, and Shambaugh;
Keith-Jennings and Chaudhry.

Research shows that many TANF recipients who lost financial
assistance due to work requirements had serious barriers to
employment. They were likelier than other recipients to have
physical or mental health issues, have substance use disorders,
be victims of domestic violence, have low education and skill
levels, have prior criminal justice records, or lack affordable
child care.\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\ LaDonna Pavetti, Michelle K. Derr, and Heather Hesketh,
``Review of Sanction Policies and Research Studies: Final Literature
Review,'' Mathematica Policy Research, March 10, 2003.

The rigorous experiments from the 1990s that required cash
assistance recipients to participate in work-related activities
found that the resulting loss in benefits raised ``deep
poverty'' rates (the share of households with income below \1/
2\ the poverty line).\417\ Similar results were found with
careful non-experimental analyses of leaver studies and
household survey data. Moreover, studies of TANF recipients
whose assistance was taken away found that they were likelier
to experience serious hardship, such as seeing their utilities
shut off, becoming homeless, or lacking adequate food.\418\ In
line with these findings, numerous scholars using a variety of
data and methods have concluded that cash assistance has
weakened as a guard against deep poverty under TANF,\419\ and
that some families are worse off as a result.\420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\ Stephen Freedman, et al., ``National Evaluation of Welfare-
to-Work Strategies--Evaluating Alternative Welfare-to-Work Approaches:
Two-Year Impacts for Eleven Programs,'' Manpower Demonstration Research
Corporation, June 2000; Pavetti, Derr, and Hesketh; Marianne Bitler,
Hilary Hoynes, and Jonah Gelbach, ``What Mean Impacts Miss:
Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Experiments,'' American
Economic Review, Volume 96, Number 4, 2006, pp. 988-1012.
\418\ Ariel Kalil, Kristin Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang, ``Sanctions
and Material Hardship under TANF,'' Social Service Review, December
2002, pp. 642-662; Melissa Ford Shah, et al., ``Predicting Homelessness
among Low-Income Parents on TANF,'' Washington State Department of
Social and Health Services, August 2015, https://www.dshs.wa.gov/sites/
default/files/SESA/rda/documents/research-11-224.pdf; Andrew Cherlin,
et al., ``Sanctions and Case Closings for Noncompliance: Who Is
Affected and Why,'' Johns Hopkins University, Policy Brief 01-1, 2001.
\419\ Gene Falk, ``Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF):
Size of the Population Eligible for and Receiving Cash Assistance,''
CRS Report No. R44724, Congressional Research Service, Washington,
D.C., January 3, 2017.
\420\ Ron Haskins, ``Welfare Reform at 20: Work Still Works,''
Journal of Policy and Management 35(1), 2016, 223-224; Robert A.
Moffitt, ``The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare
System,'' Demography 52(3), 2015, 729-749; Hilary W. Hoynes and Diane
W. Schanzenbach, ``Safety Net Investments in Children,'' March 8, 2018,
Brookings BPEA Article, https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/safety-
net-investments-in-children/; James P. Ziliak, ``Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families,'' 2015 NBER Working Paper 21038; Kristin S.
Seefeldt and Heather Sandstrom, ``When There Is No Welfare: The Income
Packaging Strategies of Mothers Without Earnings or Cash Assistance
Following an Economic Downturn,'' 2015. Russell Sage Foundation Journal
of the Social Sciences 1(1), 139-158; H. Luke Shaefer, Kathryn Edin,
and Elizabeth Talbert, ``Understanding the Dynamics of $2-a-Day Poverty
in the United States.'' (2015) Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the
Social Sciences 1(1), 120-138; Christina Paxson and Jane Waldfogel,
``Welfare Reforms, Family Resources, and Child Maltreatment,'' Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management 22(1), 2003, 85-113.

Research has shown that African American TANF recipients are
far likelier to have their benefits taken away than white
recipients.\421\ Caseworkers' decisions about when to impose a
sanction involve some discretion; one study, using fictitious
case examples, showed that caseworkers were likelier to
sanction African American recipients than white recipients.
Recipients of color may also be likelier to be sanctioned
because they face greater challenges in the labor market,
including discrimination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\ Sanford F. Schram, et al., ``Deciding to Discipline: Race,
Choice, and Punishment on the Frontlines of Welfare Reform,'' American
Sociological Review, January 2009; Kalil, et al.; Richard C. Fording,
Joe Soss, and Sanford F. Schram, ``Devolution, Discretion, and the
Effect of Local Political Values on TANF Sanctioning,'' Social Service
Review, June 2007, pp. 285-316; Chi-Fang Wu, Maria Cancian, and Daniel
R. Meyers, ``Sanction Policies and Outcomes in Wisconsin,'' Focus,
Volume 23, Number 1, Winter 2004, https://www.irp.wisc.edu/
publications/focus/pdfs/foc231f.pdf; Pavetti 2004.

Evidence from SNAP and Medicaid shows that administrative
hurdles can lead people to lose assistance even when they are
working or may qualify for an exemption, because they do not
understand or cannot comply with the requirement or because the
state agency fails to properly process the paperwork.\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\ Rachel Garfield, Robin Rudowitz, and MaryBeth Musumeci,
``Implications of a Medicaid Work Requirement: National Estimates of
Potential Coverage Losses,'' Kaiser Family Foundation, June 27, 2018;
Nader S. Kabbani and Parke E. Wilde, ``Short Recertification Periods in
the U.S. Food Stamp Program,'' Journal of Human Resources, Volume 38,
2003; David Ribar, Marilyn Edelhoch, and Qiduan Liu, ``Watching the
Clocks: The Role of Food Stamp Recertification and TANF Time Limits in
Caseload Dynamics,'' Journal of Human Resources, Volume 43, Number 1,
2008, pp. 208-238; Mark Edwards, et al., ``The Great Recession and SNAP
Caseloads: A Tale of Two States,'' Journal of Poverty, Volume 20 Issue
3, December 11, 2015; Colin Gray, ``Why Leave Benefits on the Table?
Evidence from SNAP,'' Upjohn Institute Working Paper 18-288, May 21,
2018; Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
``Understanding the Rates, Causes, and Costs of Churning in the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),'' November 2014.

Recent evidence from Arkansas's implementation of work
requirements for Medicaid is sobering. Arkansas is taking
Medicaid coverage away from certain adult beneficiaries who
fail to report at least 80 hours of work or work-related
activities per month for 3 months. More than 18,000 Arkansans
have lost coverage after just 7 months of implementation, and
thousands more are at risk over the coming months. Data from
the state show that a very small share of those required to
report hours of participation (many beneficiaries are exempt
from the reporting requirement) have reported their hours, with
very few successfully navigating the exemption and ``good
cause'' processes.\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\423\ Jennifer Wagner, ``Commentary: As Predicted, Arkansas'
Medicaid Waiver Is Taking Coverage Away From Eligible People,'' Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, updated March 12, 2019, https://
www.cbpp.org/health/commentary-as-predicted-arkansas-medicaid-waiver-
is-taking-coverage-away-from-eligible-people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RIA Cites Only One Study, Which Does Not Support the Proposed Rule
As mentioned, the NPRM cites no research to support that the
proposed rule would achieve its purported goal: i.e., that taking food
assistance away from certain low-income childless adults would
encourage more self-sufficiency and employment. The one study
referenced in the entire RIA document instead examines the relationship
between the duration of unemployment and future employment and
earnings.\424\ The study finds that long-term unemployment has a
negative effect on the likelihood of future employment and that the
fact that someone experiences long-term unemployment is the main reason
(as opposed to inherent characteristics of individuals who experience
long-term unemployment.) Strangely, the study offers little support for
the NPRM and raises important cautionary notes suggesting that the
proposed rule would worsen, not improve, outcomes for the targeted
population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\ Katharine G. Abraham, et al., ``The Consequences of Long-term
Unemployment: Evidence from Linked Survey and Administrative Data,''
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 22665, September
2016, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22665. The citation appears on p. 3
of the RIA.

The one study cited in the RIA does not support the proposed
rule. The RIA suggests that because longer unemployment spells
are associated with a lower likelihood of future employment,
the proposed rule is justified. But the study does not mention
SNAP and does not address whether taking food assistance away
from low-income individuals would either decrease unemployment
spells or directly increase the likelihood of future
employment. In fact, it is difficult to understand what
connection could be made. The RIA estimates that 755,000
individuals would lose SNAP under the proposed rule, but
provides no estimate for increased employment. Much of the
research in this area shows that those individuals will face
increased hardship and may have a more difficult time finding
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
work.

The population studied is not the population subject to the
SNAP policy. The study cited looked at long-term bouts of
unemployment by looking at a sample of all workers in state
unemployment insurance systems. But the childless adult
population subject to the SNAP time limit is a distinct group
that includes many individuals not included in the study group
because many adults who participate in SNAP do not receive
unemployment compensation, even if they are working or had
worked. A study of ABAWDs subject to the time limit in Ohio
found that nearly 80 percent had never been eligible for
unemployment benefits.\425\ More importantly, as discussed in
detail elsewhere in these comments, other research shows that
most childless adults who receive SNAP work when they can find
employment. Based on Census Bureau SIPP data, about 75 percent
of SNAP households with a childless, working-age adults worked
in the year before or after receiving SNAP. Many of these
individuals would not be in the pool of adults considered long-
term unemployed in the study, so the conclusions drawn in the
cited study do not directly apply to ABAWDs as a group and do
not justify a policy change directed at them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\ Ohio Association of Food Banks, ``Franklin County
Comprehensive Report on Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents, 2014-
2015,'' October 14, 2015, p. 15, http://admin.ohiofoodbanks.org/
uploads/news/ABAWD_Report_2014-2015-v3.pdf.

Finally, the study's findings suggest that support for
individuals to improve their skills or participate in work
programs would be a better approach. The study finds that ``the
longer-term unemployed experience substantially worse
employment and earnings losses than the short term
unemployed.'' The methodology, ``allows us to rule out the `bad
apple' explanation for why the long-term unemployed fare worse
. . . and [is] consistent with duration dependence as the
explanation for their poorer outcomes.'' This means that it is
not the characteristics of the individuals that cause them to
be long-term unemployed that are behind the results, but rather
the fact of their long-term unemployment. So, if FNS were
serious about wanting to help improve the longer-term outcomes
for individuals who experience long-term unemployment, it would
focus on helping to improve their education and skills or
providing slots in work experience programs that allow them to
demonstrate their desire to work, rather than cut their food
assistance.
C. Reports That Purport to Find Positive Effects From the Time Limit
Are Deeply Flawed
The only studies that claim to find substantial positive impacts
when low-income individuals are faced with losing food assistance or
other benefits if they do not meet rigid work requirements are deeply
flawed. FNS does not cite this research either, but we include here
some discussion of why FNS should not rely on these kinds of assertions
in any future policy development. The faulty results come from the
researchers making causal claims without a random-assignment design (or
other analytically sound comparison-group methods), ignoring program
participants' work experience prior to receiving assistance, and
excluding the impact on households of losing benefits.\426\ Below we
explain how two such reports, citing data from Kansas and Maine, have
inaccurately touted the alleged success of reimposing a 3 month time
limit on SNAP participation for childless adults.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ Dottie Rosenbaum and Ed Bolen, ``SNAP Reports Present
Misleading Findings on Impact of Three-Month Time Limit,'' Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, December 14, 2016; Tazra Mitchell,
LaDonna Pavetti, and Yixuan Huang, ``Study Praising Kansas' Harsh TANF
Work Penalties Is Fundamentally Flawed,'' Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, updated February 20, 2018.
\427\ See Jonathan Ingram and Nic Horton, ``The Power of Work, How
Kansas' Welfare Reform is Lifting Americans Out of Poverty,'' The
Foundation for Government Accountability, February 16, 2016, https://
thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Kansas-study-paper.pdf; Maine
Office of Policy and Management, ``Preliminary analysis of work
requirement policy on the wage and employment experiences of ABAWDs in
Maine,'' April 19, 2016, http://www.maine.gov/economist/opm/pub/
ABAWD_analysis_final.pdf; and accompanying Maine Department of Health
and Human Services May 11, 2016 press release and other related
materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the recession decimated the labor market and unemployment
spiked, most states, including Kansas and Maine, requested the time
limit be waived statewide. Kansas reimposed the time limit statewide
beginning in October 2013 and Maine reinstated the time limit statewide
in October 2014, even though both states qualified for a statewide
waiver at the time the time limit returned.
In both states total SNAP caseloads already were declining, but
they dropped significantly 4 months after the time limit was put in
place, as Figure 11.1 shows. Data from Kansas and Maine that are
limited to the childless adults who were potentially subject to the
time limit show that SNAP participation fell among that group by 70 to
80 percent after the time limit returned.
Figure 11.1
States Implementing SNAP Time Limit Experienced Sudden Drops in SNAP
Participation
Kansas
SNAP Participants (in thousands)

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Maine
SNAP Participants (in thousands)

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Agriculture Department SNAP participation data.

The reports assert that, as a result of the SNAP time limit, work
rates and wages have increased dramatically and the individuals subject
to the time limit are better off. The reports, however, misrepresent or
omit data and, as a result, make claims about the impact of the time
limit on work and earnings that the facts do not support.\428\ The
analyses also rest on faulty assumptions about why some childless
adults receiving SNAP are not working.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\ Peter Germanis has also written extensively on the
methodological shortcomings of these types of studies. Peter Germanis,
``How Do the Foundation for Government Accountability's Evaluations of
Welfare Reform Measure Up? A Report Card (Hint: The FGA Fails),'' June
24, 2018, https://mlwiseman.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Evaluating-
Welfare-Reform.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The reports' three largest problems are:

They do not take into account that many SNAP recipients
already work, or would work soon even without the time limit.
The studies attribute rising work rates and earnings to the
return of the time limit even though most, if not all, of the
changes would have happened without it. The authors fail to
acknowledge that many SNAP recipients who are subject to the
time limit were working already, or would soon be working, and
as a result, their work rates and wages would likely have risen
without the time limit. They make claims that can only be
identified through a rigorous evaluation that isolates the
impacts of the time limit from what would have happened without
it (see box below).

They do not consider the potentially severe impact of the
time limit on those cut off SNAP. The studies fail to discuss
the circumstances of the individuals who are subject to the
time limit and the consequences for increased hardship and food
insecurity when they lose SNAP benefits. Without addressing
this side of the equation, the studies misrepresent the effect
of reinstating the time limit on the well-being of those cut
off SNAP. Their figures on the average income of those cut off
SNAP are highly misleading because they do not include the loss
of SNAP benefits. They do not discuss or attempt to assess what
happens to individuals who lose their food assistance and are
unable to find employment, who are a large share of those cut
off.

They do not adequately consider the likely explanations for
why childless SNAP participants may not work. The authors
advance the theory that individuals are avoiding work and
remaining in poverty in order to qualify for modest SNAP
benefits of only about $5 a day. But research and experience in
states with the time limit in effect offer evidence of
alternative explanations. Many such individuals do work when
they can, but they often face significant barriers to work,
such as low education and skills or physical or mental health
issues.

A careful look at the data presented in the reports, taking these
factors into account, strongly suggests that not much changed related
to work and earnings when the time limit took effect, but the time
limit did cause thousands of the states' poorest residents to lose
essential SNAP benefits.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conventional Evidence-Based Research Uses a ``Comparison Group''

One of the central tenets of sound, evidence-based research is the
need to have a ``comparison group'' so that the results can properly
account for what would have happened in the absence of a change.
For example, consider researchers who are testing the efficacy of a
new medicine designed to speed recovery from the common cold. The
researchers would need to know how fast people would have gotten better
without the medicine. Without a comparison group there would be no way
to know what to make of results that showed, for example, that 30
percent were better after 2 days and 85 percent were better after 5
days. Many, perhaps all, of these people would have gotten better
without the medicine.
The gold standard for comparison groups is ``random assignment,'' an
experimental approach where people who are otherwise the same are
randomly assigned to different ``treatment'' groups and the effects of
the change are measured on each group so the study can isolate the
effect of the ``treatment.'' These types of studies are expensive,
though some are underway in SNAP, funded by the 2014 Farm Bill.
In the case of low-income childless adults, two important factors
are critical for interpreting the information in the Kansas and Maine
reports. First, many low-skill, low-wage workers do work, but they work
in high-turnover jobs with low job security and often experience
sporadic employment. SNAP acts as a safety net, providing assistance
during periods of unemployment or when work hours are cut. It is common
for SNAP recipients to have higher employment and wages in the future.
Second, both Kansas' and Maine's economies were improving between 2013
and 2015, the period in which the two states implemented the time limit
and purport to measure the results. Without controlling for these
factors, it is difficult to isolate the effects of the time limit on
employment.
The authors of the reports for Kansas and Maine could have
established less complicated and less costly alternative ``comparison
groups'' by conducting the same analysis in the year before the cutoff
to observe the work rates and earnings for similar SNAP recipients
during a period when the time limit was not in effect. Such an approach
would not have been perfect--it would be impossible to take the
differences in the labor market and all other factors into account--but
it would have been a more informative comparison than these reports
provide.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reports Don't Acknowledge That Many SNAP Recipients Subject to the Time
Limit Already Work
The studies from Kansas and Maine assert that reimposition of the
time limit resulted in higher work rates and earnings for individuals
who lost SNAP benefits after exhausting 3 months of eligibility.

For Kansas, the authors claim, ``These reforms immediately
freed nearly 13,000 Kansans from welfare on December 31, 2013.
Nearly 60 percent of those leaving food stamps found employment
within 12 months and their incomes rose by an average of 127
percent per year.'' \429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\ Ingram and Horton, op. cit., p. 2.

For Maine, the Department of Health and Human Services'
press release reported that among the individuals whose SNAP
was cut off, ``Incomes rose 114 percent within a year of
leaving the program,'' and ``nearly \1/2\ (48%) worked at least
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
one quarter in 2015.''

These reports, however, dramatically overstate the increase in work
rates and wages that resulted from the reimposition of the time limit
because many of the SNAP recipients affected were working, or would
have started working anyway, albeit mostly in low-wage jobs with high
turnover. Moreover, both states reimposed the time limit when their
unemployment rates were dropping and unemployed individuals were
somewhat more likely to be able to find work or higher wages as a
result.\430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\ In Kansas, where the time limit went into effect in October
2013, the overall unemployment rate fell from 5.3 percent in 2013 to
4.6 percent in 2014 and 4.2 percent in 2015. In Maine, where the time
limit was reimposed 1 year later, the unemployment rate fell from 5.6
percent in calendar year 2014 to 4.4 percent in calendar year 2015. For
SNAP recipients, especially those with the lowest education and skills,
employment opportunities are highly sensitive to economic conditions
and the availability of jobs. See Hilary Hoynes, Douglas Miller, and
Jessamyn Schaller, ``Who Suffers During Recessions?'' NBER Working
Paper No. 17591, March 2012, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17951.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kansas Report Misrepresents Several Key Indicators
The authors of the Kansas report overstate the degree to which work
rates increased after the time limit and misrepresent the effect of the
time limit on numerous outcomes for SNAP recipients while they are
receiving SNAP.

Work Rates Were Essentially Unchanged Before and After the Time
Limit Returned

The Kansas authors claim that ``nearly 60 percent of those leaving
[SNAP after the 3 month time limit went into effect] found employment
within 12 months.'' (The authors' estimate of 60 percent is the share
who had ever worked in any quarter of 2014.) The claim implies that the
policy change reimposing the time limit was the reason that these
people found work, but it's misleading, as explained below.
However, work rates before and after the time limit were very
similar, as Figure 11.2 shows. Almost 40 percent of those whose SNAP
was cut off already worked in each of the last two quarters before the
time limit returned (the third and fourth quarters of 2013).\431\ The
share working each quarter in the year after the time limit was
implemented rose slightly, to just over 40 percent. This modest
increase could be explained by two factors: (1) low-wage workers are
more likely to apply for and participate in SNAP when they lose a job
or their incomes drop, so they often experience improvements in the
future as their employment situation improves; and (2) Kansas' economy
was improving during 2014, so a slightly larger share of recipients may
have been able to find jobs or higher pay. The time limit does not
appear to have dramatically affected work rates for the group subject
to it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\431\ CBPP calculates that almost 40 percent of the people who left
the program on December 31, 2013 worked in the two quarters just before
the cutoff based on data on average wages per person from table 8 of
the Kansas report. (The same calculation is used to estimate the shares
working in the later quarters as well.) Instead of reporting these
accurate data, the authors misleadingly report lower rates from
national data sources as though they applied to the Kansas group. See
p. 6: ``Currently few able-bodied adults receiving food stamps actually
work. . . . In 2013 just \1/4\ of childless adult households receiving
food stamps had any earned income. . . . An analysis of food stamp
recipients conducted when work requirements first went into effect
found that fewer than five percent of all able-bodied childless adults
on the program were meeting those requirements.'' This latter five
percent is extremely misleading because it excludes a large number of
individuals who were working more than 30 hours a week as ``exempt''
from the time limit. If the authors included the share of non-disabled
childless adults who were working, the figure would be larger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 11.2
Kansas Work Rates Nearly the Same Before and After Time Limit
Share of non-disabled childless adults cut off SNAP who earned wages in
each quarter (Q) of a calendar year

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Note: CBPP derived the share with wages from information on
average quarterly wages among those cut off SNAP from table 8
of Ingram and Horton.
Source: Jonathan Ingram and Nic Horton, ``The Power of Work,
How Kansas' Welfare Reform is Lifting Americans Out of
Poverty.'' The Foundation for Government Accountability.
February 16, 20106; Table 8.

The authors, however, reached the opposite conclusion--that work
rates grew significantly after the time limit returned. Instead of
comparing the average work rates in each quarter for this population
before and after the policy change, they report the share of
individuals whose SNAP was ended after December 2013 who ever worked in
a quarter over the following year. This captures typical movement in
and out of the labor force--given that this group tends to work in
high-turnover jobs, in any quarter some people lose jobs and some get
new jobs, so the share that ever worked increases--rather than an
isolated impact of the policy change. The trends in the share who ever
worked likely followed a very similar pattern in earlier years when the
time limit was not in effect (though the authors do not present such
data). As discussed below, other research about labor force
participation among childless adults who receive SNAP finds work rates
over time similar to those in the Kansas report.
Improvements for SNAP Recipients Reflect SNAP Caseload Changes, Not
Improved Circumstances
The Kansas report presents highly misleading information about
other changes among individuals subject to the time limit who receive
SNAP. For example:

[S]ince restoring work requirements, the employment rate
among able-bodied adults on food stamps has doubled. As a
result their incomes have more than doubled on average, they
are spending less time on welfare, and the need for assistance
has significantly declined.\432\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ Ingram and Horton, op. cit., p. 8.

These claims, which the report makes across a range of measures,
are misleading because the childless adults who remained as SNAP
participants after the time limit went into effect were significantly
different from those who participated before because of the policy
change. The state cut off SNAP those participants who were not working
at least 20 hours a week, so the work rates, average earnings, and
other characteristics of those who remained SNAP participants after the
return of the time limit were better, not because those individuals
became better off, but because they were better off to begin with and
were the only ones still eligible for and participating in SNAP.
Those who may still participate in SNAP are more likely to have
earnings and, as a result, lower SNAP benefits and appear better off on
a range of other characteristics. In fact, the number of childless
adult SNAP recipients working at least 20 hours a week, and thus the
only non-exempt childless adult SNAP recipients eligible for the
program, dropped modestly in the year after the time limit took
effect.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\ The drop in the number of childless adults who worked at
least 20 hours a week and received SNAP could have occurred because
those individuals who qualified for SNAP (because they were working at
least 20 hours a week) had recently been cut off SNAP (at a time when
they were not working at least 20 hours a week) and did not know they
would be eligible if they reapplied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an example of this misleading representation, consider the
authors' assertion that, ``[p]rior to restoring work requirements, just
21 percent of childless adults on food stamps were working at all. Two-
fifths were working less than 20 hours per week. But since work
requirements have gone back into effect, that employment rate has risen
to nearly 43 percent.'' \434\ The change was driven by a drop in the
number of SNAP recipients who are childless adults subject to the time
limit, not an increase in the number of recipients who are working. The
number of such SNAP recipients who were working fell by more than 40
percent (from 6,300 to 3,600), as those who were working less than 20
hours a week were cut off, while the total number of non-disabled
childless adults receiving SNAP dropped by more than 70 percent (from
almost 30,000 to 8,500). (See Figure 11.3.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ Ingram and Horton, op. cit., p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 11.3
Kansas SNAP Benefit Cutoff Did Not Boost Work
Non-disabled childless adult SNAP participants before and after January
2014 cutoff of those not working 20+ hours per week
Number of such SNAP participants who worked fell . . .

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

. . . but the work rate rose only because there were fewer such SNAP
participants overall

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Jonathan Ingram and Nic Horton, ``The Power of Work,
How Kansas' Welfare Reform is Lifting Americans Out of
Poverty.'' The Foundation for Government Accountability.
February 16, 20106; Tables 1-3.
Maine Also Inappropriately Attributes Changes to the Policy Change That
Likely Would Have Occurred Anyway
Maine's data on work rates and wages among individuals who lost
SNAP are similar in magnitude to Kansas, and, as in the Kansas report,
the authors of the Maine report and the accompanying materials from the
state's Department of Health and Human Services overstate the impact of
the time limit by failing to take into account the fact that changes
would have occurred even without it.
As Figure 11.4 shows, before the reimposition of the time limit in
October 2014, about 30 percent of the childless adults whose SNAP was
cut off were working. That proportion peaked in the months after the
time limit went back into effect at 36 percent in the third quarter
(the summer, a time when employment in Maine tends to be higher). But,
though the report includes these quarterly rates, like for Kansas, the
Maine report and accompanying materials emphasize a different figure:
that 48 percent had wages some time in 2015 and 58 percent had wages at
some time ever in 2014 or 2015. But again, like for Kansas, the higher
numbers count any time anyone had worked in any quarter, and thus
largely reflect employment instability at a time that the state's
economy was improving, rather than a change that could be attributed to
the reimposition of the time limit.
Figure 11.4
Maine Work Rates Nearly the Same Before and After Time Limit
Share of non-disabled childless adults cut off SNAP who earned wages in
each quarter (Q) of a calendar year

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Maine Office of Policy Management, ``Preliminary
analysis of work requirement policy on the wage and employment
experiences of ABAWDs in Maine of Health and Human Services,''
April 19, 2016; figure 1.
No Consideration of the Well-Being of Those Cut Off or the Support SNAP
Provides
The one-sided pictures in these reports fail to discuss the well-
being of the individuals whose SNAP benefits were cut off. But research
suggests that many childless adults who lose SNAP as a result of the
time limit continue to struggle after losing SNAP, in contrast to the
reports' portrayals of circumstances for recipients who lost benefits.
The most comprehensive assessment of former SNAP recipients in four
states in the early 2000s suggests that their life circumstances are
quite difficult. A significant minority don't find work, and among
those who are employed after leaving SNAP, earnings are low. Most
remain poor. Many struggle to acquire enough food to meet their needs,
lack health insurance, experience housing problems, and/or have trouble
paying their bills.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\ Elizabeth M. Dagata, ``Assessing the Self-Sufficiency of Food
Stamp Leavers,'' Economic Research Service, USDA, September 2002,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=46645, a
summary of in-depth studies in Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, and South
Carolina. These studies include people who leave SNAP because of the 3
month time limit or for other reasons, for example, because they found
a job or mistakenly believe they are no longer eligible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a serious omission the Kansas and Maine reports do not consider
the impact of the time limit on the large number of people who lost
SNAP and are among the nation's very poorest adults.

In Kansas the number of non-disabled childless adults
receiving SNAP dropped by 75 percent (from about 30,000 in late
2013 to about 7,500 in late 2015).

The Maine report does not present comparable numbers, but an
earlier Heritage Foundation report cited Maine Department of
Health and Human Services data showing that the number of
``able-bodied adults without dependents on food stamps''
dropped by 80 percent (from about 13,300 in late 2014 to 2,700
in March 2015).\436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ Robert Rector, Rachel Sheffield, and Kevin D. Dayaratna,
``Maine Food Stamp Work Requirement Cuts Non-Parent Caseload by 80
percent,'' The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 3091, February 8,
2016, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/02/maine-food-
stamp-work-requirement-cuts-non-parent-caseload-by-80-percent.

The individuals whose SNAP was cut off lost about $5 a day, or $150
to $170 per person per month in SNAP benefits for purchasing food. Many
of them worked in the year after losing benefits, but for some their
wages were low enough that they could have continued to qualify for
SNAP benefits, which could have helped them make ends meet. Some others
with no earnings for some or all of the subsequent year may have had
virtually no resources available for food after they were cut off SNAP.
The Kansas and Maine reports cite average income figures for the
year after recipients lost SNAP, but they fail to account for the lost
SNAP benefits. To accurately compare income for a household that used
to be on SNAP to income after losing SNAP, the lost value of the SNAP
benefits must be included. When they are accounted for, total income
does not increase substantially (or actually decreases slightly).
In Kansas, the authors rest their claim that SNAP recipients were
better off after the cutoff on a point that the group's income rose by
127 percent between before the time limit took effect and 1 year later.
There are three problems with this claim:

First, as discussed above, it implies that the time limit
was responsible for the earnings increase, when most, if not
all, of it likely would have occurred anyway;

Second, it excludes the value of SNAP benefits from the
calculation. Total resources available to the household were
higher before the time limit because the household received
SNAP benefits; and,

Third, the authors picked a low comparison quarter prior to
the time limit returning to exaggerate the increase--wages for
the group cut off were more than 30 percent lower two quarters
before the cutoff (third quarter of 2013, the quarter used in
the report) than they were in the quarter immediately preceding
the cutoff (the fourth quarter of 2013). They do not explain
why they chose this particular quarter as the baseline.

It is not possible to adjust for the first issue without a rigorous
evaluation (see above box), but even adjusting only for the other two
issues makes a large difference. If $178 a month in SNAP benefits (the
average SNAP benefit among those cut off in December 2013) is included
in the base period, and if we compare the quarter immediately before
the cutoff (the fourth quarter of 2013) as the base period instead of
the quarter earlier, the total resources (including earnings and SNAP
benefits) available to SNAP participants who were cut off was three
percent lower a year after the cutoff, rather than 127 percent higher.
Had the SNAP recipients who remained income-eligible been able to
keep receiving SNAP (rather than being cut off by the time limit) more
of them would be better off because they could have received SNAP while
working (though their SNAP benefits would be lower because income
counts in determining SNAP benefit levels).
A similar contrast applies to the Maine report. The press release
that accompanied the report claims that total income for those cut off
rose by 114 percent within a year. However, if the state had included
the value of SNAP benefits in the base, the increase would be much
smaller--only about ten to 20 percent.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\ The Maine report does not include information about the
average SNAP benefits received by childless adults who were cut off, so
the ten to 20 percent range reflects a lower ($150 a month) and higher
($180 a month) assumption. As with Kansas, we cannot account for the
large portion of the effect that would have happened anyway and we are
not including any SNAP benefits for the workers who would have income
low enough to continue participating in SNAP were there no time limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No Consideration of Factors Affecting SNAP Participants' Ability to
Work
If a better picture of the data shows that the time limit doesn't
have a strong role getting people into work, what do we know about why
this group struggles to find employment? The research that exists on
this population shows that adults who participate in SNAP work when
they can, but often in jobs with high turnover and low job security,
and most struggle with multiple barriers to employment, as discussed
above.
Adults on SNAP work when they can. However, the work tends to be
low wage and unstable, with individuals cycling through periods of work
and unemployment. Nearly \3/4\ of non-disabled adults who participate
in SNAP in a typical month work either that month or within a year of
that month. Over \1/2\ of individuals who were participating in SNAP in
a typical month in mid-2012 were working in that month. Furthermore, 74
percent worked in the year before or after that month.\438\ (See Figure
11.5.) Limited education, lack of training, and a sporadic work history
make it difficult to compete for anything other than low-skill, low-
wage jobs that do not lift them out of poverty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\ Brynne Keith-Jennings and Raheem Chaudhry, ``Most Working-Age
SNAP Participants Work, But Often in Unstable Jobs,'' Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, March 15, 2018. As mentioned above, for similar
households with just childless adults, 46 percent were working in a
typical month and 72 percent worked within a year before or after that
month. https://www.cbpp.org/unemployed-adults-without-children-who-
need-help-buying-food-only-get-snap-for-three-months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 11.5
Most SNAP Participants and Households Work

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Note: Individuals and households include those who were
participating in SNAP in a typical month in mid-2012. A working
household refers to a household in which either the household
head or spouse worked. Individuals include any non-disabled
adult who reported participating in SNAP.
Source: CBPP analysis of SIPP data from 2011-2013.

Childless adults on SNAP face barriers. Many low-income childless
adults face multiple challenges to independence and self-sufficiency,
including homelessness, physical and mental health limitations,
language barriers, unstable employment histories, and criminal records.
A detailed study of childless adults who were referred to a work
experience program in Franklin County (Columbus), Ohio found that:
\439\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\439\ See ``Comprehensive Report on Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents, Franklin County Ohio Work Experience Program,'' Ohio
Association of Foodbanks, 2015, http://admin.ohiofoodbanks.org/uploads/
news/ABAWD_Report_2014-2015-v3.pdf. The Ohio Association of Foodbanks
gathered the information for the report as a result of a partnership
with the county SNAP agency to help place individuals identified as
subject to the time limit in qualifying work activities after screening
them.

Many have extremely unstable living situations, illustrated
by residence in short-term shelters or with friends and family
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and limited telephone service.

One-third have a mental or physical limitation, including
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, mental or learning
disabilities, or physical injuries. Some of these disabilities,
though not severe enough to qualify for Federal disability
benefits, may still limit a person's ability to work at least
20 hours a week.

About \1/4\ have less than a high school education, and more
than \1/2\ have only a high school diploma or GED.

Nearly \1/4\ are non-custodial parents, and 13 percent are
caregivers for a parent, relative, or friend.

More than 40 percent lack access to reliable private or
public transportation; 60 percent lack a valid driver's
license.

Fifteen percent need supportive services like language
interpretation or help with transportation to obtain
employment.

More than \1/3\ have felony convictions, making it hard to
find jobs and pass background checks.
D. FNS' Research, Policies, and Practices Show FNS Knows but Ignored
That Impact of the Proposed Rule Is Out of Line With the Stated
Rationale
FNS' Own Research from 1998 on the Employment Prospects of ``ABAWDs''
Contradicts the Stated Justification of the NPRM
In 1998 FNS published a study called, ``The Effect of Welfare
Reform on Able-Bodied Food Stamp Recipients'' to provide information
that ``[I]s critical to informing policy decisions, issuing guidance to
states, implementing new policies, as well as estimating effects of the
[new provisions.]'' It concluded in the forward to the study, ``the
report offers a sound picture of what able-bodied adult recipients
without children look like and what will happen to them--they are an
extremely poor population with limited employment prospects and few
sources of support outside the Food Stamp Program.'' \440\ This
research directly contradicts the stated justification for the proposed
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\ Michael Stavrianos and Lucia Nixon, ``The Effect of Welfare
Reform on Able-Bodied Food Stamp Recipients,'' prepared by Mathematica
Policy Research for the USDA, Food and Nutrition Service, July 23,
1998, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/finalrep.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The study used SNAP QC household characteristics data and the
Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participants (SIPP) to
describe the characteristics of individuals subject to the time limit,
including their limited educational attainment and workplace skills,
their high poverty rates, and their patterns of SNAP participation
prior to the time limit going into effect. It also estimated how many
at that time had likely hit the time limit and been cut off SNAP.
The study also included information about the research available at
that time on the employment prospects of ``ABAWD'' SNAP participants,
which is summarized as follows:

Research indicates that the employment prospects of adults
who are demographically similar to ABAWDs are not promising,
and so we can assume the same to be true for ABAWDs. Largely
for two reasons, job opportunities for less-educated job
seekers are severely limited, especially for non-whites and in
urban areas, where most ABAWDs live. First, recent research
suggests that many large employers of low-skill workers have
moved out of the cities to the suburbs. Therefore, many ABAWDs
will face a ``spatial mismatch'' between the location of their
residence and the location of low-skill jobs. Second, since
employment in inner cities has become increasingly concentrated
in high-skill jobs, ABAWDs will also likely face a ``skills
mismatch'' between what employers require and what ABAWDs can
offer.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\441\ Ibid, p. xii and pp. 51-69.

As we review in Chapter 3, while the nature of spatial mismatch has
changed, more recent literature has found that there still exists
mismatch between low-wage jobs and where low-wage workers live,
particularly with regards to transportation access.
The 1998 FNS study also points out that low-skilled job seekers in
many places may have difficulty finding employment even when the
national unemployment rate is low:

Implicit in PRWORA's work requirement is the assumption that
there are enough employment opportunities for ABAWDs--that is,
they can find work if they seek it. . . . However, a relatively
large body of research indicates that the labor market
situation of the low-skilled has become considerably worse in
recent decades and that their current employment prospects are
limited. This suggests that even if ABAWDs are willing to work,
they may be unable to do so because there are not enough jobs
for low-skilled workers.\442\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\ Ibid, p. 56-57.

Despite arguing repeatedly in the preamble and RIA that the low
national unemployment rate justifies the proposed rule,\443\ FNS does
not refute this earlier research it published in 1998, nor address
whether the landscape has changed in the intervening 20 years to
justify the change in waiver policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\443\ NPRM, p. 981, 982, 983; RIA, p. 2, 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA Research on Individuals Who May Have Been Cut off SNAP Because of
the Time Limit Does Not Support the Assertion That the Time
Limit Improves Self-Sufficiency
After the 3 month time limit was enacted in 1996, USDA's Economic
Research Service (ERS) joined with the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services to fund studies in four states (Arizona, Illinois, Iowa,
and South Carolina) that examined the well-being of people who exited
SNAP in the late 1990s after the time limit went into effect.\444\ The
studies included people who had left SNAP because of the 3 month time
limit or for other reasons, for example, because the found a job or
mistakenly believe they no longer are eligible. Even though the studies
were not able to isolate the individuals who left SNAP because of the
time limit, the picture they offer of the hardship such individuals
face suggest that the time limit has not spurred many to self-
sufficiency, or even resulted in their life circumstances improving
modestly, and contradict the stated rationale behind the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\ Elizabeth Dagata, ``Assessing the Self-Sufficiency of Food
Stamp Leavers,'' Economic Research Service, USDA, September 2002,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=46645, a
summary of in-depth studies in Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, and South
Carolina. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&
article=1013&context=card_staffreports--Iowa. https://www.mathematica-
mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/publications/food-stamp-leavers-
in-illinois-how-are-they-doing-two-years-later--Illinois. https://
naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/45220/PDF--South Carolina.

Many were employed but had very low earnings. In the four
states, employment rates among the individuals who were
unemployed childless adults potentially subject to the time
limit who left SNAP (or ``leavers'') ranged from 41 percent in
Illinois to 76 percent in Iowa, ``but earnings and incomes are
low and their poverty rates are high.'' \445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\445\ Dagata, p. 2.

Most remain poor. Despite relatively high levels of work
effort, between \1/3\ and \2/3\ of SNAP leavers in the four
states had household incomes below the poverty line--well above
the overall poverty rate of 13 percent at the time. About 40
percent of the Illinois and Iowa SNAP leavers had income below
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1/2\ the poverty line.

Many struggled to afford adequate food. ``Between 17 and 34
percent of the [SNAP leavers in the four states] reported food
insecurity with hunger, compared with 11 percent of U.S. low-
income childless households.'' \446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\446\ Dagata, p. 4. Food insecurity ``with hunger'' was how USDA
then referred to the most severe form of food insecurity where
households had to skip or reduce the size or their meals or otherwise
disrupt their eating patterns at times during the year because they
couldn't afford sufficient food.

Many had housing problems, or had trouble paying their
utility bills. About 20 to 40 percent of SNAP leavers faced
housing issues, including falling behind on the rent, moving in
with relatives, or becoming homeless. Between 20 and 65 percent
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
reported problems paying for utilities.

Finally, the studies raise an important question about exemptions
from the time limit. ``In two of the studies, the majority of
nonworking [SNAP leavers] cited health problems as the reason they were
not working . . . it is important to know whether the standards for
being categorized as `able-bodied' are set appropriately.'' \447\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\ Dagata, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FNS' SNAP Employment and Training Best Practices and the Department's
SNAP to Skills Initiative Do Not Promote Cutting People Off
SNAP
FNS' position that taking food assistance away from people who do
not meet rigid work requirements will lead to stable employment and
self-sufficiency also conflicts with the agency's approach to
employment and training (E&T). For more than 30 years, since the mid-
1980s, SNAP has included an employment and training (E&T) component,
``for the purpose of assisting members of households participating in
the supplemental nutrition assistance program in gaining skills,
training, work or experience that will . . . increase the ability of
the household members to obtain regular employment.'' \448\ States
operate the program within Federal rules and FNS oversight, but have
substantial flexibility about which non-exempt SNAP recipients they
serve in the program, the services they offer participants, and whether
the program primarily recruits volunteers who are interested in help
finding a job or improving their education and skills, or whether the
program is mandatory, meaning individuals will lose SNAP benefits
(i.e., be subject to sanction) if they do not comply with the state's
assigned E&T activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\448\ The Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, as amended, 7 U.S.C.
2015(d)(4)(A)(i).

E&T Best Practices Research Review Does Not Include Sanctions or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cutting People Off SNAP

While over the years Congress has amended and modified the focus of
SNAP E&T somewhat, it has always included a state option for programs
that are mandatory and include sanctions for non-compliance. According
to a 2016 FNS-sponsored literature review of SNAP E&T best practices,
the only time FNS conducted a rigorous study of the effectiveness of
SNAP E&T, was in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the time, SNAP E&T
was primarily ``a high-volume, `light-touch' program to encourage
mandatory work registrants to find jobs quickly, primarily by requiring
participation in job search and job-search training components,'' \449\
that is, it consisted primarily of components that included taking SNAP
benefits away from individuals who did not meet the program's
requirements. The 2016 literature review described the findings from
the study that was published in 1994 as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\ Deborah Kogan, et al., ``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) Employment and Training (E&T) Best Practices Study:
Final Report,'' prepared by Social Policy Research Associates for the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, November
2016, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/snap-employment-and-training-et-
best-practices-study-final-report.

[T]here was no evidence that the SNAP E&T program--in its
high participation/low investment per-participant model--
increased the likelihood of participants finding jobs. It also
found the program had no significant effects on the hourly
wages, hours worked per week, or length of job retention for
those who did find employment . . .
The observed effect of a statistically significant decrease
in the level of food stamp benefits receipt was described as
most likely the result of `voluntary withdrawals and
administrative sanctions' rather than of any increase in
household income or earnings . . .
[A]lthough some members of the treatment group did find jobs,
members of the control group were also able to obtain similar
job search assistance and find employment.\450\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\ Ibid, p. III-1.

Thus, the only rigorous evaluation FNS has ever conducted of
policies that take food assistance away from individuals who are unable
to meet work requirements found no improvement in participants finding
jobs or increases in wages or hours worked, but did find a significant
decrease in food assistance benefits. The literature review quoted here
was published in 2016, so was certainly available to FNS as it
formulated the proposed rule, but FNS ignored its findings. FNS
promulgated the proposed rule that would take food assistance away from
people who do not comply with rigid work requirements without ever
again testing or studying the effectiveness of such an approach in a
rigorous random assignment study. Moreover, the E&T pilots from the
2014 Farm Bill, which do incorporate a rigorous random assignment
evaluation, include three states with mandatory SNAP E&T approaches,
but FNS promulgated this regulation without waiting for the results of
those pilots.
Overall, the 2016 SNAP E&T best practices report had as its
objective providing ``Congress, FNS, and individual states with
information that can be used to shape the services provided by the SNAP
E&T program and thereby improve the employability, self-sufficiency,
and well-being of individuals receiving nutrition support from SNAP.''
\451\ These are the very same goals as the stated intention and
justification of the proposed rule in the NPRM, and yet the SNAP E&T
best practices report does not mention taking SNAP benefits away from
individuals who are unable to meet work requirements as an effective
strategy. The report includes an annotated bibliography of 160 relevant
studies from the literature review. The best practices report
recommendations are summarized in the executive summary:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\451\ Ibid, p. ES-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The findings from the research synthesized in this report suggest
that SNAP recipients will benefit most from SNAP E&T-funded services if
the services offered by state programs

Are based on an individualized assessment of the workforce-
related strengths and weaknesses of SNAP clients;

Comprehensively address an individual's need for skills
training, basic skills education, and overcoming barriers to
employment;

Help participant earn credentials valued by employers in
their chose industry or sector; and

Develop skills that are closely linked to labor market
demands in the local area.

In view of these findings . . . States that enroll a relatively
large number of mandatory work registrants in SNAP E&T services
or that emphasize self-reported job search as the most
frequently prescribed program activity are less likely to see
an increase in self-sufficiency among SNAP participants.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\ Ibid, p. ES-4.

Thus, the most recent research available to FNS about what works
for SNAP E&T for meeting the objectives of increasing employment, self-
sufficiency, and well-being does not include sanctions or cutting
people off SNAP. But FNS ignored this evidence in promulgating the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
regulation. We urge FNS to consider its own best practices study.

FNS' Most Recent E&T Efforts Also Have Not Promoted Sanctions or
Cutting People Off SNAP

Moreover, in the past several years FNS has placed a new emphasis
on SNAP E&T. It has created an Office of Employment and Training with
several additional staff members, brought on consultants and
collaborated with other partners, formed a ``learning academy,''
produced new training materials, and provided additional technical
assistance to select states. The cornerstone of the E&T efforts has
been a ``SNAP to Skills'' initiative that follows closely the
recommendations from the SNAP E&T best practices report cited above.
Under a ``Why SNAP to Skills'' section of its website, FNS makes
the following case for its SNAP to Skills approach: \453\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, ``Why SNAP to Skills,''
https://snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/why-snap-to-skills.

The need of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
participants to secure the education and training required to
transition to economic self-sufficiency is growing increasingly
urgent. The vast majority of jobs in the future will require at
least some education beyond high school . . . yet many SNAP
participants have not reached this level of educational
attainment. Without the skills to meet rapidly changing labor
market demand, the chances of SNAP participants getting a good
job and reducing their need for SNAP are extremely
low . . .
The SNAP Employment & Training (SNAP E&T) program, a skills
and job training program for SNAP participants administered by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS), is a key resource states and their partners can utilize
to help SNAP participants meet this urgent need for skills and
better jobs. SNAP E&T has historically been under-utilized, but
a renewed focus on the program amid greater urgency for job
training for SNAP participants has created new momentum for
states seeking to build bigger, better, and stronger E&T
programs.
There is no more opportune, or critical, time for states to
build robust, job-driven SNAP E&T programs. ``Job-driven''
means that programs are responsive to employer demand so that
they place ready-to-work participants in good, available jobs
or provide skills training and credentials participants require
to obtain these jobs. SNAP E&T is increasingly recognized as a
critical part of each state's skilled workforce strategy. USDA
and other policy makers herald SNAP E&T as an important part of
the national conversation about the need to invest in building
a skilled workforce while addressing the nation's growing
economic inequality.\454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\454\ Ibid.

Like the best practices report cited earlier, FNS' signature
Employment and Training initiative does not include sanctions or
cutting individuals off of SNAP as an effective strategy for increasing
employment or earnings.
E. FNS Knows That Research and Experience Shows That People Newly
Subject to the Time Limit Won't Get a Job or Be Better Off, But
It Promulgated the Proposed Rule Nonetheless
As we have laid out in this section, there is a large body of
research evidence that finds that policies that take benefits away from
individuals who do not meet rigid work requirements result in lost
benefits and increased poverty and hardship, but very little gain in
longer-term employment. The realities of the low-wage labor market,
including high turnover and lack of sick time and other benefits
contribute to individuals' turning to SNAP during temporary periods of
unemployment. Many other individuals face various employment barriers.
FNS has for more than 20 years supported the waiver policy
currently in regulation, and there is no new research that contradicts
or provides new information. The RIA conspicuously lacks any
countervailing research evidence to justify that the narrowing of
waivers will improve individuals' work rates or earnings, and the
impact analysis included in the RIA assumes that 755,000 individuals
will lose SNAP benefits under the change, but there will be no
quantifiable increases in earnings or work.
We believe that the only conclusion one can draw is that contrary
to the stated rationale in the NPRM, FNS knows that the primary effect
of the regulatory change, if it were finalized, would be that a large
number of individuals would lose SNAP assistance, with no, or very
little positive impact. We strongly urge FNS to review the research
summarized here and included in the Appendix B.
F. The Proposed Rule Uses an Imprecise Definition of ``ABAWDs,'' and
the RIA Includes Numerous other Unsubstantiated Assumptions
In addition to the fact that the proposed rule is not supported by
available research, the analysis that is included in the RIA includes
numerous imprecise, illogical, and unsubstantiated assumptions,
starting with the use of the term ``ABAWDs.'' Since shortly after the
passage of the 1996 welfare law, FNS has described the group of SNAP
participants whose eligibility is at issue because of the 3 month time
limit as ``ABAWDs,'' or able-bodied adults without dependents. The
proposed rule uses this term throughout, but never defines it, and
seems to include in it many individuals who are exempt from the time
limit, who live in an area that is under a waiver, or who are
participating in SNAP during periods when they are eligible (for
example, in their first 3 months or when they are working or
participating in a qualifying employment and training program.) The
methodology for assessing the impact of the proposed rule indefensibly
treats everyone who is an ``ABAWD'' by this broad definition as though
they would be subject to the time limit under the proposed rule (i.e.,
that they live in an area that would no longer qualify for a waiver.)
The rule also excludes from the analysis individuals who are ``ABAWDs''
subject to the time limit, but who are no longer SNAP recipients
because they have been cut off.
The imprecise use of the undefined term ``ABAWD'' is confusing and
makes it difficult for readers to understand and comment on the
described impacts of the proposed rule. It also appears that the
Department in its estimates of the impact of the regulation has derived
percentages for this entire population of SNAP recipients potentially
subject to the time limit and then applied those percentages to
individuals who would be newly subject to the time limit under the
proposed rule, resulting in a methodology that cannot be substantiated.
This section will first explain the analytical problem in the way
the RIA defines and categorizes ``ABAWDs,'' and then provide additional
examples of specific assumptions in the methodology that cannot be
substantiated, often because of the imprecise use of the term
``ABAWD.''
Use of the Undefined Term ``ABAWD'' Is Confusing and Misleading
Section 6(o) (7 U.S.C. 2015(o)) of the Food and Nutrition Act
limits SNAP eligibility for certain non-exempt adults who are aged 18-
49 to 3 months of SNAP benefits in any 36 month period if they are not
working 20 hours a week or participating in a qualifying employment and
training program, and if the area they live in is not waived from the
rule because of insufficient jobs.\455\ Because of the rule's
complexity, the individuals subject to the time limit cannot be
identified in SNAP or Census Bureau data because much of the
information that would need to be known is not available in the data.
Analysts often have modeled SNAP eligibility for these individuals to
the best of their ability and then described the individuals as
``potentially subject to the time limit,'' because only state
eligibility workers have access to the information that is needed to
make a full assessment. In a 2016 paper we explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\ Individuals who have been cut off SNAP can qualify for a
second 3 months of eligibility if they work at least 80 hours (or
participate in a qualifying program) for a month and reapply for SNAP.

About 4.7 million non-elderly, non-disabled adults aged 18-49
in childless households participated in SNAP in Fiscal Year
2014. All were ``subject'' to the time limit in the sense that
all could, in theory, have lost benefits after 3 months of
participation. The number affected by the time limit in
practice, however, is much smaller.\456\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\ In the 2016 paper CBPP used this methodology and included a
box explaining the difference between the larger number potentially
subject to the time limit and the smaller number affected by the time
limit in practice. See, Steven Carlson, Dorothy Rosenbaum, Brynne
Keith-Jennings, ``Who are the Low-Income Childless Adults Facing the
Loss of SNAP in 2016,'' February 8, 2016, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/2-8-16fa.pdf, p. 4.

We also explained in the 2016 paper the various reasons why the
larger figure, which we represent as individuals potentially subject to
the time limit based on existing data, applies to ``the characteristics
of the larger group of childless adults, all of whom would face the
time limit if their circumstances or local labor market conditions
change.'' \457\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\457\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In estimates that FNS published in the years immediately following
passage of the 1996 welfare law, it is clear that the agency understood
both the limitations in the data (``The QC database does not contain
all the information needed to determine whether an individual loses
eligibility under the able-bodied provisions of PRWORA'' \458\) and the
distinction between those potentially subject to the time limit and
those who would actually be affected (``the QC-based estimates
presented in this chapter may overstate the number of people subject to
the 3 month time limit.'' \459\)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\458\ Mike Stavrianos, et al., ``Characteristics of Childless
Unemployed Adult and Legal Immigrant Food Stamp Participants: Fiscal
Year 1995,'' prepared by Mathematica Policy Research for the USDA, Food
and Nutrition Service, February 13, 1997, p. 6.
\459\ Ibid, Stavrianos, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But the NPRM, RIA, and Agriculture Department materials that
accompanied the December posting of the proposed rule portray this
larger group that is potentially subject to the time limit as the
number who actually would be newly subject under the proposed rule.
This misidentification is confusing and results in unsubstantiated
assumptions. It identifies as newly subject to the time limit many
individuals who are exempt, complying with the time limit, or living in
an area that is under a waiver from the time limit, and it excludes
individuals who would qualify for SNAP but have been cut off after 3
months in areas that are not under a waiver from the time limit.
The Department asserts that ``[i]n 2016 there were 3.8 million
individual ABAWDs on the SNAP rolls.'' \460\ We are able to reproduce
this number using the public use 2016 SNAP Household Characteristics
Quality Control (QC) file,\461\ and below recreate how we believe FNS
derived the number. (See Table 11.1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\460\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, ``Regulatory Reform at a
Glance, Proposed Rule: SNAP Requirements for ABAWDs,'' December 2018,
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
ABAWDSFactSheet.pdf. We believe this 3.8 million is the starting point
for all of the estimates in the RIA regarding the number of ``ABAWDs,''
but the RIA does not make that clear, as we discuss later in our
comments.
\461\ The 2016 public use Quality Control Data are available at
https://host76.mathematica-mpr.com/fns/. All figures we cite based on
this data are for an average month in the fiscal year.

Table 11.1
CBPP Understanding of FNS' Estimate That 3.8 million SNAP Recipients
Were ``ABAWDs'' in 2016
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of Total
FNS' 3.8 million ``ABAWD'' Number SNAP
estimate Participants
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total SNAP Participants 43.5 million 100%
Age 18-49 15.0 million 34.4%
Not receiving disability benefits 12.8 million 29.5%
a
No minor children in household 3.8 million 8.8%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other factors that need
to be taken into
account for an
individual to be
subject to the time Is this information available in the QC data?
limit that were not
factored into FNS'
estimate:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Is the individual:

in his or Variable not reliable b
her first 3 months
of SNAP
participation out
of 36?
physically Variable not reliable c
or mentally unfit
for employment?
living in Variable not reliable b
a waived area? But may be knowable if state was under a
statewide waiver
working 20 Can be estimated using earnings or other
hours a week or variables
more?
participat Variable not reliable d
ing in a
qualifying E&T
activity?
pregnant? Not available
otherwise Variable not reliable c
exempt from
employment and
training?
exempted Variable not reliable b
by an individual
exemption?
in a Variable not reliable b
second 3 month
period after
requalifying?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: CBPP analysis of FY 2016 USDA SNAP Household Characteristics
data and Mathematica Policy Research, ``Technical Documentation for
the Fiscal year 2016 [or other year] Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program Quality Control Database and the QC Minimodel,'' October 2017.
a The SNAP QC data set includes a personal-level disability variable
(DISi). An algorithm is used to identify individuals with disabilities
based on SSI receipt, medical expenses, age, work registration status,
and other factors. The technical documentation flags that ``DISi
likely underestimates the number of non-elderly individuals with
disabilities'' and therefore, the 3.8 million likely overestimates the
number of adults without disabilities.
b The SNAP QC data includes an individual-level variable called
``ABWDSTi'' that is intended to collect this information, but the
technical documentation ``[recommends] caution when
using . . . due to inconsistencies.''
c For the variable intended to capture exemptions for disability and
other factors (``WRKREGi'') the documentation states, ``we found
continued evidence . . . of likely miscoding of this variable.''
d The variable intended to capture participation in employment and
training (``EMPRGi'') is also among the variables the documentation
``recommend[s] using with caution.''

As Table 11.1 shows, there are many eligibility factors that the
Department's analysis did not take into account when estimating the
number of people who are subject to the time limit. As a result, the
3.8 million individuals the Department classifies as ``ABAWDs''
includes many individuals who, in fact, are not subject to the time
limit. The Department's analysis also excludes many individuals who
would be SNAP recipients except they have been cut off because of the
time limit, so they do not appear in SNAP data because they are not
SNAP recipients.\462\ These are individuals who do not live in waived
areas but are subject to the time limit because they did not meet any
of the other criteria in Table 11.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\462\ Stavrianos and Nixon (1998, p. 4) and Czajka, et al., (2001,
p. 30) both include flow charts that makes clear FNS had information
available that made clear which ``ABAWDs'' would be subject to the time
limit and the various reasons individuals who might be identified in
the data as ``ABAWDs'' might not be affected by the time limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department's imprecise use of the term ``ABAWD'' results in a
lack of transparency. It is difficult to determine what point FNS (in
the NPRM and RIA), and the Administration more broadly, in its
materials about the proposed rule, are making when they call
individuals ``ABAWDs'' when they are not, in fact, subject to the time
limit, or when they are complying with the time limit. They are
implying that far more SNAP participants are subject to the time limit
and not in compliance with it than in fact is the case, and they are
not counting people who have been cut off because of the time limit.
In addition, several of the major assumptions in the RIA's
methodology for assessing the impact of the proposed rule rely on
shares of this larger ``ABAWD'' group, as defined nationwide using the
2016 data, but apply those shares to individuals who would be newly
subject to the time limit because of the proposed changes in the rules
for areas to qualify for waivers. For example, the RIA's assumption
about the share of ``ABAWDs'' who are working is derived from the SNAP
data for 2016 including both waived areas and not-waived areas. Using
shares that are derived from a group that includes many individuals who
are not subject to the time limit, and that excludes many individuals
who have been cut off SNAP in areas that were not waived in 2016 is
extremely misleading and illogical. The denominator for these
percentages matters for assessing the soundness of using certain
percentages for deriving or estimating the impact of the proposed
changes.
To help elucidate the problem, we conducted an analysis comparing
the number and share of SNAP participants for two different categories
of states regarding waivers from the time limit in 2 different fiscal
years. The two types of states were those with statewide waivers in
Fiscal Year 2013, but no waivers in Fiscal Year 2017 and those with
statewide waivers in both years.\463\ The difference between the 2
years for the two types of states can help explain how the denominator
changes when many people are cut off as a result of the time limit. We
will use figures from this analysis to help explain some of the serious
methodological problems with the RIA's analysis of the impact of the
proposed rule. It is easier to see the issue when considering these two
types of states, but it is present in other states that have had
different patterns and scope of waivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\463\ The states with statewide waivers from the time limit in 2013
but no waivers at all in 2017 (which represented about a quarter of
SNAP participants in 2013) were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, and Wisconsin. The states with statewide waivers in
both 2013 and 2017 (which represented about 20 percent of SNAP
participants) included Alaska, California, District of Columbia,
Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Guam, and Virgin
Islands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We use fiscal 2017 instead of Fiscal Year 2016 for this analysis
because many states reimplemented the time limit beginning on January
1, 2016, which means that for Fiscal Year 2016 the time limit was in
effect for just the latter 6 months of the fiscal year (April through
September, once the 3 months of eligibility for January to March are
taken into account.) By Fiscal Year 2017 those states had no waiver the
entire fiscal year. Under the definition of ``ABAWD'' that FNS appears
to use, the 3.8 million national figure cited in the FNS materials and
that we recreate above in Table 11.1 fell to 3.2 million in Fiscal Year
2017.
Table 11.2, shows the number of SNAP participants in the two types
of state in each year and the number and share that are ``ABAWDs''
under our understanding of how FNS is defining ABAWDs for purposes of
the RIA--as SNAP participants aged 18-49, with no disability benefits
and no minor children in the household.

Table 11.2
Waivers Affect the Number and Share of SNAP ``ABAWDs''
Fiscal Years 2013 and 2017 by whether the state had a statewide waiver
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total SNAP ABAWDs as a Share
Participants (in Total ``ABAWDs'' of Total
000s) (in 000s) Participants
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Participants 12,439 1,496 12%
residing in
states with
statewide
waivers in
2013 and no
waivers in
2017
Participants 8,346 953 11%
residing in
states with
statewide
waivers in
both 2013 and
2017
--------------------------------------------------------
Total 47,098 4,943 10%
participants
all states a
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Participants 10,325 609 6%
residing in
states with
statewide
waivers in
2013 and no
waivers in
2017
% change ^17% ^59%
2013 to
2017
Participants 8,164 927 11%
residing in
states with
statewide
waivers in
both 2013
and 2017
% change ^2% ^3%
2013 to
2017
--------------------------------------------------------
Total 41,491 3,221 8%
participants
all states a
--------------------------------------------------------
% change ^12% ^35%
2013 to
2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CBPP analysis of FY 2013 and FY 2017 USDA SNAP Household
Characteristics data
a Includes participants in the two types of states identified above, as
well as participants residing in other states.

Table 11.2 shows:

The number of both SNAP recipients and ``ABAWDs'' declined
in both types of states between 2013 and 2017 but fell
substantially more in states that had reimposed the time limit
by 2017. The number of ``ABAWDs'' potentially subject to the
time limit fell by 59 percent in states that reimposed the time
limit, from 1.5 million in 2013 to 600,000 in 2017. The economy
may have been stronger in these states, and there may be other
reasons for a larger drop, but the fact that eligibility rules
changed and many people in this group could not participate for
more than 3 months was likely a major factor in the larger
drop.

The share of total SNAP participants who were ``ABAWDs'' in
the states that reimposed the time limit by 2017 fell from 12
percent to six percent but was flat at 11 percent in the states
that had a statewide waiver in both years. So, although the
number and share of ``ABAWDs'' fell substantially in states
that reimposed the time limit by 2017, six percent of SNAP
participants still fit into the ``ABAWD'' category as defined
by the RIA. These individuals likely meet one of the
eligibility criteria in Table 11.1 and so were not cut off.

The share of ``ABAWDs'' working also changes as the denominator
changes when individuals are cut off SNAP. In Table 11.3 we compare the
work rates among SNAP participants who were ``ABAWDs'' under the FNS'
definition in the same two types of states as above for the same 2
years.

Table 11.3
Waivers Affect the Number and Share of SNAP ``ABAWDs'' Who Are Working Fiscal Years 2013 and 2017 by whether the
state had a statewide waiver
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``ABAWDs'' Share of
Total ``ABAWDs'' Share of working at ``ABAWDs''
``ABAWDs'' (in working (in ``ABAWDs'' least 20 hrs/wk working at
000s) 000s) working (in 000s) least 20 hrs/wk
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
States with statewide 1,496 331 22% 187 13%
waivers in 2013 and no
waivers in 2017
States with statewide 953 165 17% 63 7%
waivers in both 2013 and
2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total all states a 4,943 1,087 22% 587 12%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
States with statewide 609 207 34% 138 23%
waivers in 2013 and no
waivers in 2017
States with statewide 926 219 24% 111 12%
waivers in both 2013 and
2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total all states a 3,221 897 28% 534 17%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CBPP analysis of FY 2013 and FY 2017 USDA SNAP Household Characteristics data.
a Includes participants in the two types of states identified above, as well as participants residing in other
states.

In the states that had reimposed the time limit by 2017, although
the number of ABAWDs dropped between 2013 and 2017, the share of
``ABAWDs'' working went up substantially, from 22 percent in 2013 to 34
percent in 2016, and the share estimated to be working at least 20
hours a week nearly doubled, from 13 percent to 23 percent. In part
this could be a function of a stronger economy in these states, or
other factors, but the fact that many people who were not working were
cut off also contributed significantly to the change in work rate. In
the states that had statewide waivers both years, the share working
went up, but by less, from 17 percent to 24 percent, and the share
estimated to be working at least 20 hours a week went from seven
percent to 12 percent.
Between 2013 and 2017 the number of ``ABAWDs'' in areas without
waivers went down in large part because individuals were cut off of
SNAP in areas without waivers. And because individuals could continue
to receive SNAP if they were working more than 20 hours a week, the
share of ABAWDs working at least 20 hours a week went up in areas
without waivers, in large part because the denominator used in
calculating the share (the number of ABAWDs who received SNAP) went
down. In a 2016 report responding to a misleading report that claimed
the circumstances of SNAP recipients in Kansas improved after they
reinstated the time limit we explained this math as follows:

. . . the childless adults who remained as SNAP participants
after the time limit went into effect were significantly
different from those who participated before because of the
policy change. The state cut off SNAP those participants who
were not working at least 20 hours a week, so the work rates,
average earnings, and other characteristics of those who
remained SNAP participants after the return of the time limit
were better, not because those individuals became better off,
but because they were better off to begin with and were the
only ones still eligible and participating in SNAP.\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\464\ Dorothy Rosenbaum and Ed Bolen, ``SNAP Reports Present
Misleading Findings on Impact of Three-Month Time Limit,'' Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, December 14, 2016, https://www.cbpp.org/
sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-14-16fa.pdf.

The RIA methodology includes numerous imprecise, confusing,
inaccurate, or misleading assumptions, some that push in opposite
directions. We cannot tell if FNS has intentionally produced an
analysis that inflates (or deflates) the results or if the individuals
charged with producing the RIA do not understand the policy and
therefore were unable to produce a coherent analysis of the population
subject to the current policy and what the impact of the proposal would
be. Either way, the lack of transparency and coherency in the RIA
raises serious questions about the validity of the NPRM process.
The RIA Does Not Explain the Claim That There Would Be 3.4 Million
``ABAWDs'' in 2020
The methodology evidently assumes that there would be 3.4 million
``ABAWDs'' in 2020 under current law, but never explains where that
figure comes from. This is a serious omission because this is the
starting point FNS uses for all of the subsequent assumptions about the
number of individuals who would be affected by the proposed changes in
waiver rules. Excluding information on this foundational point
compromises all that follows.
The only time the 3.4 million figure is mentioned, on page 25 of
the RIA, the document says, ``As noted previously, the Department
estimated that approximately 44 percent of the projected 3.4 million
ABAWDs . . . would live in waived areas in FY 2020 if waiver authority
were unchanged.'' It is possible that the figure comes from the 3.8
million from the SNAP QC data for 2016 cited above, adjusted to reflect
the FNS' baseline number of participants for 2020 compared to the
number of participants in 2020, but we cannot comment on this figure as
the RIA provides no justification for it whatsoever.
If the 3.4 million is the 3.8 million from 2016 adjusted only for
baseline changes, then the FNS has made no further adjustments to
account for the fact that states qualified for and applied for waivers
for fewer areas in 2018 and 2019 than in 2016 and will likely qualify
for still fewer waivers in 2020 even without any changes to the waiver
rules.
The RIA Assumption That 44 Percent of ``ABAWDs'' Are in Waived Areas Is
Based on a Proxy That Is Indefensible
As one step in its estimate of the impact of the proposed rule, the
analysis in the RIA assumes that 44 percent of the 3.4 million
``ABAWDs,'' or 1.5 million individuals, would live in waived areas in
FY 2020 if the regulation were unchanged. According to RIA (page 19):

The Department used state-reported data from form FNS-388A to
estimate the number of non-public assistance SNAP participants
living in currently waived areas. Since the FNS-388A does not
report ABAWD participation separately, non-public assistance
SNAP participants are used as a proxy when estimating the
proportion of ABAWDs living in waived areas.

The RIA does not explain what the form FNS-388A is or why it is
appropriate to use it and what its shortcomings might be. Based on a
review of the July 2018 data that states submitted, it appears that the
388A does not include all SNAP participants (Oregon and Vermont are
missing) and that there are no county-level data for several states,
including all of New England, Alaska, Idaho, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New York, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\465\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program Data, https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-
nutrition-assistance-program-snap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But even if the 388A included county data for all states, it does
not make sense to use the number of participants in non-public
assistance households (those that do not receive TANF cash assistance,
Supplemental Security Income, or General Assistance) as a proxy for the
number of ABAWDs. ABAWDs are much more likely to be subject to the time
limit and cut off SNAP than non-public assistance households overall.
ABAWDs are a small fraction of non-public assistance households (less
than 15 percent) and their distribution across counties will depend on
whether the time limit is in effect.
To show that the time limit matters for the distribution of ABAWDs
across counties, we again used the SNAP QC data for 2013 and 2017 and
again compared the states that had a statewide waiver in 2013 and not
in 2017 to states that had a statewide waiver in both years. As can be
seen in Table 11.4, in 2013 when both types of states had statewide
waivers, the share of non-public assistance participants was not a bad
proxy for the share of ABAWDs--their shares differed by only two to
three percentage points. But in 2017 using the share of non-public
assistance individuals as a proxy for ABAWDs would overstate the share
in areas that were not waived--because many ABAWDs had been cut off in
2017--and understate the number in waived areas. The share of ABAWDs in
states with statewide waivers in 2017 was ten percentage points higher
in 2017 than the share of non-public assistance SNAP participants (29
percent vs. 19 percent.) Thus, the methodology in the RIA is likely to
have substantially underestimated the share of ABAWDs living in waived
areas in 2016, and projected to live in waived areas in 2020.

Table 11.4
Waivers Affect the Number and Share of Non-PA SNAP Participants Fiscal Years 2013 and 2017 by whether the state
had a statewide waiver
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-PA Share of
Participants National Non-PA ABAWDs (in Share of ABAWDs
(in millions) Participants millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
States with statewide waivers in 2013 and no 10.9 28% 1.5 30%
waivers in 2017
States with statewide waivers in both 2013 6.4 16% 1.0 19%
and 2017
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Total all states 39.0 100% 4.9 100%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
States with statewide waivers in 2013 and no 9.1 26% 0.6 19%
waivers in 2017
States with statewide waivers in both 2013 6.6 19% 0.9 29%
and 2017
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Total all states 35.2 100% 3.2 100%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CBPP analysis of FY 2013 and FY 2017 USDA SNAP Household Characteristics data.
Note: ``Non-PA'' means not pure public assistance (PA) household. A household is considered to be pure PA if
each member of the household receives Supplemental Security Income, a cash TANF benefit, or General Assistance
income.

FNS' Methodology for Determining the Share of Areas That Would Lose
Eligibility for Waivers Is Incomplete and Confusing
The RIA includes FNS' estimate of the number and share of currently
waived areas that would no longer qualify for a waiver under the
proposed rule (755 areas, representing 76 percent of areas currently
waived), and the share of the impact that is attributable to each of
the major proposed changes to waiver rules. It also provides an
explanation of its methodology for deriving these estimates. However,
the explanations are incomplete, confusing, and misleading. FNS omits
fundamental information needed to assess the integrity of its analysis.
For example, it bases the analysis on inconsistent periods of time, and
provides unclear explanations of its methodological assumptions.
Understanding which areas and how many areas would lose waivers under
the proposal is central to understanding the impact of the proposed
changes, but the analysis FNS included in the RIA has significant flaws
and lacks sufficient explanation to allow commenters to understand the
analysis.
The proposed rule makes three major changes to the existing rules
for determining waiver eligibility:

1. It sets a minimum unemployment rate of seven percent as a floor
for waiver eligibility. It makes areas with average
unemployment rates below this floor ineligible for a
waiver, even if their unemployment rates are 20 percent
above the national average unemployment rate. In contrast,
there is no floor under current Federal regulations. (See
Chapter 3 for more.)

2. It restricts states' flexibility to define combined areas, making
federally designated labor market areas the only
geographical groups that can be eligible for a waiver. In
contrast, under current regulations states have the
discretion to combine areas into larger geographic regions
that are eligible for a waiver if the regional unemployment
rates still meet the eligibility thresholds.\466\ (See
Chapter 5 for more.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\466\ USDA, ``Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive the Time Limit
for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016,
page 10.

3. It narrows the allowable criteria for states to request statewide
waivers. Under current Federal regulations and FNS
guidance, states can request statewide waivers based on
average state-level unemployment rates that are 20 percent
above the national average over a recent 24 month period;
average statewide unemployment rates above ten percent for
a recent 3 month or 12 month period; or based on qualifying
as a state for extended unemployment benefits.\467\ In
contrast, the proposed rule permits to states to request
statewide waivers only when they qualify for extended
unemployment benefits. (See Chapter 4 for more.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\ 7 CFR 273.24(f)(2), and FNS guidance, ``Supporting Requests
to Waive the Time Limit for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents,''
December 2016, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
SNAP-Guide-to-Supporting-Requests-to-Waive-the-Time-Limit-for-
ABAWDs.pdf.

The problems with FNS' estimates fall into two main categories:
first, the methodology is confusing and incomplete, and second, the
discussion of the relative impact of the different changes on areas'
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
eligibility for waivers is misleading.

The Methodology Is Confusing and Incomplete

Below are specific problems with the RIA's methodology that call
into question the reliability of its estimated impact of the rule
provisions on waived counties.

FNS' use of the term ``currently'' is inconsistent; as a
result it is not clear what year FNS used for the analysis.
Under both current law and the proposed rule an area's
eligibility for a waiver for a given fiscal year is based on
whether the area's unemployment rate for a specific earlier
time period exceeds a threshold that applies to that same time
period. Throughout the RIA's discussion of the methodology for
determining the impact of the proposed changes, FNS uses the
term ``currently'' to refer to the year on which it is basing
its estimates. For example, on page 20, where FNS discusses its
estimates of the number of areas that would lose eligibility
for waivers under the proposed rule, FNS asserts that ``975
counties and county-equivalents currently have a time limit
waiver'' (emphasis added).\468\ Since FNS issued the NPRM on
February 1, 2019, the start of the fifth month of Fiscal Year
2019, it would be reasonable to assume that the term
``currently'' refers to Fiscal Year 2019. However, nine pages
later in a discussion of ``uncertainties'' associated with all
the estimates in the RIA, FNS notes that ``these estimates are
based on current waiver eligibility as of FY 2018.'' \469\
Moreover, as discussed below, it appears that the time period
FNS used for the data on local area unemployment rates is the
time period that applies to waiver eligibility for FY 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\468\ RIA, p. 20.
\469\ RIA, p. 29.

FNS' lack of clarity about the year for which it estimated the
change in waiver eligibility calls into question whether it is
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
assessing accurately the impact of the proposed changes.

There are inconsistencies in FNS' methodology to estimate of
the number of counties that would lose waivers under the
proposed rule. The analysis reveals inconsistencies in the
methodology:

1. According to current and proposed waiver rules,\470\ the
calculation to deter-
mine whether an area is eligible for a waiver for a given
fiscal year looks
at the area's 24 month average unemployment rate over a
defined
earlier time period and compares it to 20 percent above
the national aver-
age for the same earlier 24 month period.\471\ States
have to compare
their areas' unemployment rates for a 24 month period to
an unemployment
threshold calculated over the same 24 month period. In
addition, states
need to use a 24 month time period that falls within an
earlier window that
is consistent with the year for which the waiver will be
implemented.\472\
Contrary to its own guidance, FNS fails to use consistent
periods in its
analysis:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\470\ 7 CFR 273.24(f)(2)(ii).
\471\ The proposed rule would add the additional condition that the
area's unemployment rate under this calculation be at least seven
percent.
\472\ USDA, ``Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive the Time Limit
for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWD), December 2, 2016,''
page 7.

a. The 24 month period FNS says it used for the unemployment
data
is inconsistent with the year FNS says it calculated
the number of
waived areas. On page 21, FNS notes that it obtained
data ``for the 24
month period from January 2016 to December 2017 for
3,077 counties
and county-equivalents.'' As mentioned, elsewhere the
RIA asserts that
it based its estimates on eligibility for waivers in
2018, but the 24
month period used for the unemployment data is not
the correct period
for a waiver implemented in 2018. The January 2016
through Decem-
ber 2017 period that the Department used applies to
waivers imple-
mented in 2019. The correct period of unemployment
data that applied
to areas eligible for 2018 waivers is January 2015
through December
2016. If FNS is estimating eligibility for waivers in
2018, it should have
used unemployment data that is applicable to that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
year.

b. The Department notes on page 21 that it used unemployment
data ``to
identify currently-waived counties [that] did not
have a 24 month [un-
employment rate] that exceeds the current waiver
threshold.'' This
threshold is calculated as 20 percent above the
national average unem-
ployment rate for a 24 month period. FNS did not
specify which 24
month period it used to calculate this ``current''
threshold. This creates
additional confusion, given that it is already
unclear which year the
Department is using for waived counties and the
potential inconsist-
ency with the period for which the unemployment data
were collected.
This also matters because the thresholds are
different depending on the
waiver year FNS is analyzing. For the 24 month period
of January
2016 through December 2017, which corresponds to a
2019 waiver, the
threshold is 5.5 percent. For the 24 month period of
January 2015
through December 2016, which corresponds to a 2018
waiver, the
threshold is higher at 6.1 percent. If FNS is
comparing county unem-
ployment data that apply to a 2019 waiver to the
threshold for a 2018
waiver, instead of the lower threshold for a 2019
waiver, then it is po-
tentially underestimating the number of waived
counties that would
lose eligibility as a result of restricting area
combinations. Although as
mentioned above, it should have been using data for a
2018 waiver if
it is evaluating eligibility for 2018.

2. FNS only collected unemployment data for a single 24 month
period, but
states are allowed to use any 24 month period that is
later than the 24
month period FNS used. FNS' estimate assumes that all
states would use
the same period of data as the basis of their requests,
and that this period
is representative of the other periods of data that
states could use. This is
unlikely to be the case as unemployment trends change
over the course of
a year, and the first 24 month period is unlikely to
accurately represent
unemployment conditions in other periods that states
could use for a waiver
request. In addition, the decline in unemployment rates
in recent years
means that the threshold for eligibility in subsequent 24
month periods
generally decreased over the course of 2018. As a result,
the restriction
of area combinations would result in fewer waived
counties losing eligibility
than would be estimated under a single 24 month period.
The Department's
omission of multiple periods means that it is potentially
overestimating the
number of waived counties that would lose eligibility as
a result of restrict-
ing area combinations.

3. Both inconsistencies create opposite biases, the net effect of
which FNS
could demonstrate if it had taken into them into account.
The fact that it
ignores these factors and does not provide a rationale
for doing so shows
the serious lack of rigor in its analysis.

FNS fails to adequately explain its exclusion of certain
areas from its analysis. Footnote 8 on page 21 indicates that
FNS excluded five New England states (Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont) when it compiled the
unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
but FNS does not indicate if it also excluded these states from
the list of areas that it is counting as currently waived. FNS
also does not mention these states in the rest of its analysis.
As a result of these exclusions, its estimate of the number of
currently waived areas is too low.

The same footnote further explains that FNS excluded these five
states because New England counties (also known as NECTAs) are
conceptually dissimilar to counties in the rest of the United
States. However, Rhode Island, which contains the Providence-
Warwick, RI-MA NECTA, does not appear on the list of excluded
states. The Department fails to mention why it included Rhode
Island, which shares the same New England dissimilarities with
the other states.\473\ It briefly notes that ``some NECTAs are
quite small'' and ``BLS data was not consistently available for
these areas,'' which appears to be a reference to the BLS'
discontinuation in 2018 of unemployment data for all cities and
towns with populations below 1,000 for all New England
states.\474\ As Rhode Island does not contain towns with
populations below 1,000, BLS data would be available for all
areas. If this were the reason for its inclusion in the FNS
analysis, this would be consistent with its rationale. But FNS
provides no information to help understand its rationale.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\473\ U.S. Census Bureau, ``New England City and Town Areas (NECTA)
Maps,'' https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/nectas.html.
\474\ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Local Area Unemployment
Statistics,'' https://www.bls.gov/lau/laugeo.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Department does not explain how it treats Guam
and the Virgin Islands in its analysis. Although the Bureau of
Labor Statistics does not produce employment data for these
U.S. territories, these areas were also waived in 2018 but it
is unclear if they are included in the number of currently
waived areas or in the number that would lose waivers under the
proposed rule.

FNS fails to adjust the number of waived areas for 2020, the
year in which the proposed rule would be in effect if
implemented. FNS unrealistically assumes no changes in waivers
in future years. It fails to adjust for the fact that the
number of areas is likely to be lower in FY 2020, the year in
which the proposed rule would first apply if implemented. As
unemployment rates have declined, states have applied and
qualified for fewer areas in 2017, 2018, and 2019. It would be
realistic to assume a decline in waived areas in 2020 and later
years as well.

FNS only examined the impact of the proposal in a year when
unemployment rates declined. FNS only examined the impact of
its proposal in 2018, a year in which the unemployment rates
declined. It did not analyze the proposal's impact during a
time of rising unemployment rates, such as prior to or during a
recession. FNS did not offer any rationale for this exclusion.
Expanding its analysis to many periods with rising and
decreasing unemployment trends would have provided a fuller
understanding of the impact of the proposed rule in different
economic conditions.

FNS does not explain its estimation of the number of areas
losing eligibility due to the narrowing of statewide waivers.
FNS provided no details about its methodology for estimating
the effect of narrowing the criteria that can be used for
statewide waivers, beyond noting that it ``estimated the number
of counties and county-equivalents that would lose waiver
eligibility due to the elimination of statewide waivers.''
\475\ It identified an additional 39 counties eligible only
because of a statewide waiver and subtracted those from its
total of waived areas that would still be eligible under the
rule after already eliminating the areas that were eligible
only based on states' ability to combine data. Based on the
explanations in the analysis, it is unclear why FNS needed to
subtract out these 39 counties since all of them would already
be ineligible for waivers under the rule because their data
could not be combined with the data of other areas in the
state. The description of the methodology is confusing. It is
possible that FNS was estimating the impact of the narrowing of
statewide waivers separately from the impact of combining data
or the seven percent threshold. Table 3 on page 22 of the RIA
presents the results as if FNS included the narrowing of
statewide waivers as one step within the estimation. If that is
not the case, then the methodology is poorly explained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\475\ RIA, p. 21.

On the other hand, if the narrowing of statewide waivers is a
step in its overall estimation, then it appears that FNS
subtracted the same counties twice. The elimination of counties
that did not meet the waiver threshold (described in the second
paragraph on page 21) would already have removed counties that
are ineligible based on their own unemployment rates. This
would not leave any counties that are eligible based only on
being in a state with a statewide waiver. This additional
subtraction would inflate FNS' estimate of counties that would
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
lose their waivers due to narrowing of statewide waivers.

FNS ignores extended benefits as a standard for qualifying
for statewide waivers. FNS does not mention that some states
would remain eligible for statewide waivers under the proposed
rule, based on qualifying for extended unemployment benefits
(EB). Under current FNS guidance on qualifying for a waiver
based on qualifying for EB, which the proposed rule does not
change, states can request statewide waivers that start no
later than 1 year after the date that the state qualified for
EB.\476\ Alaska and the District of Columbia qualified for EB
in January 2018, and therefore would have been able to request
statewide waivers in 2018 (and 2019). For either year these two
areas count as an additional nine county-equivalents. FNS
omission of this factor also inflates the estimate of counties
that would lose their waiver under the proposed rule because
these two areas would not have lost their waivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\476\ USDA, ``Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive the Time Limit
for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWD),'' December 2, 2016,
page 3.

FNS does not analyze the impact of its rules on Native
American reservations or on New England towns. FNS does not
provide any analysis of the impact of the proposed rule on
Native American reservations or on New England towns and
cities. This is a glaring omission, because Native American
reservations tend to have high poverty rates well above the
national average, and over 200 reservations were waived or were
located inside a waived area in 2018. This is an important
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
segment of the population that FNS analysis ignores completely.

Similarly, 281 towns and cities in the New England states of
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode
Island were waived in 2018, constituting nearly a quarter of
all towns in these states. Although the Bureau of Labor
Statistics has stopped publishing unemployment data for New
England towns with populations below 1,000 people, it continues
to provide data for towns above 1,000 people. It is unclear why
the Department does not examine the rule's impact on those
towns with higher populations.

The methodological problems listed above cast serious doubt on the
reliability of the FNS overall estimate of the impact of the proposed
rule on ``currently waived'' areas.

FNS' Estimates of the Relative Impacts of the Rule Provisions on
Waived Areas Is Misleading

In Table 3 on page 22 of the RIA, FNS indicates that the three
different changes in the proposed rule result in a cumulative 76
percent reduction in the number of waived areas. FNS then describes the
relative impact of the three different changes in the proposed rule,
asserting that the change to restrict area combinations reduces the
number of areas waived by 36 percentage points, the change to statewide
waivers reduces the number by four percentage points, and the seven
percent unemployment rate floor reduces the number by 37 percentage
points. However, the order FNS uses for these calculations presents
misleading results.
FNS' presentation suggests that the proposed change to restrict
area combinations and the seven percent floor have a roughly equal
impact. The presentation is misleading, however, because, although
restricting the ability to combine areas would have a substantial
impact by itself relative to current rules, the seven percent floor has
a far larger effect on areas' eligibility for waivers because seven
percent is substantially higher than the national average unemployment
threshold. As a result, all of the areas that would lose because they
cannot be combined with adjacent areas would also lose under a seven
percent floor. An example using FNS' own numbers (despite their flaws)
can be helpful to understand why:
Under FNS' estimates, out of 975 counties currently waived, 220
have ``a 24 month [unemployment average] of at least seven percent and
would continue to qualify for a waiver under the proposed waiver
criteria.'' \477\ That means 755 waived counties, or 76 percent of all
counties currently waived would lose their waiver due solely to the
seven percent floor. The additional impact of restricting area
combinations would be zero at that point.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\477\ RIA, p. 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This occurs because seven percent is higher than the 20 percent
above the national 24 month average threshold (which would be 6.1
percent for 2018 or 5.5 percent for 2019, though as discussed above,
it's not clear which year FNS used for the analysis.) Implementing a
seven percent minimum unemployment rate automatically eliminates any
waived counties with rates below 5.5 and 6.1 percent, and the waived
counties with rates above 5.5 and 6.1 percent but below seven percent.
The impact of the floor is therefore greater, as it eliminates counties
that are eligible based on their own 24 month average unemployment
rates but do not meet the floor, in addition to the counties waived
through area combinations.
The RIA Assumes That All ABAWDs in Areas That Lose Waivers Will Lose
SNAP; An Assumption That Ignores That Many Will Be Exempt or
Able to Participate for Other Reasons
As mentioned above, in determining the impact of the change in
waivers on SNAP participants, the RIA assumes that 1.5 million ABAWDs
would live in areas that would be waived under current rules. Under the
proposed changes, the RIA assumes that:

Because waived areas are estimated to be reduced by 76
percent under the revised waiver criteria, the department
assumes that 76 percent of currently-waived ABAWDs would be
newly subject to the time limit. This equals approximately 1.1
million of the estimated 1.5 million currently waived
individuals.\478\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\478\ RIA, p. 25.

Under this assumption, no individuals who are defined as ``ABAWDs''
(using the Department's definition) in the areas that lose waivers
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
would be:

exempted from the time limit because of being physically or
mentally unfit;

pregnant;

participating because they are eligible during the first 3
months of participation or qualify for a second 3 month period;

exempt using individual ``percentage'' exemptions;

participating in a qualifying work program; or

working (or complying with a qualifying work program), for
less than the required 20 hours per week.

This assumption defies logic and ignores the evidence from other
states that have a time limit in effect. In every state without waivers
there are ``ABAWDs'' who are able to continue to participate for these
reasons. As we showed above, in Tables 11.1 and 11.2, in the states
that reinstated the time limit by 2017, the number of ``ABAWDs''
declined substantially, from 1.5 million in 2013 to 600,000 in 2017,
but even if we subtract out the number of ``ABAWDs'' who were working
at least 20 hours a week (138,000), that still leaves almost \1/2\
million ``ABAWDs'' participating in SNAP in 2017 after the time limit
went back into effect.
The assumption that none would continue to participate for any of
these reasons is a glaring error in the RIA methodology. As a result,
the public is left not knowing how many people who are potentially
subject to the time limit will be able to continue to participate and
for which reasons, and whether the Department knows or cares.
The RIA's Assumption That One-Third (34 Percent) of ABAWDs Subject to
the Time Limit in Areas That Lose Waivers Will Remain Eligible
Because They Would Be Working 20 Hours a Week Is Flawed
Of the 1.1 million ``ABAWDs'' the Department estimates would be
newly subject to the time limit under the proposed rule, the RIA
assumes \1/3\ would be working and \2/3\ would ``lose their eligibility
for SNAP for failure to engage meaningfully in work or work training:''

Using FY 2016 QC data, approximately 26 percent of ABAWDs
were working. The Department assumes that this proportion would
increase to about 34 percent in FY 2020 if the UR [unemployment
rate] declines as projected in the 2019 President's Budget and
that these individuals will work at least 20 hours per week.
Under this scenario, the Department estimates that
approximately \1/3\ of ABAWDs newly subject to the time limit
will work and maintain their SNAP eligibility. The remaining
\2/3\ (755,000 individuals) would lose their eligibility for
SNAP for failure to engage meaningfully in work or work
training.\479\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\479\ RIA, p. 26.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This assumption is flawed for several reasons:

First, the assumption being used (the 26 percent working in
2016, rising to 34 percent in 2020) was derived from the entire
SNAP population of ``ABAWDs'' nationally, including both areas
that currently are waived and those that are not waived. As we
demonstrated above, the work rates of SNAP participants who
live in areas without waivers are higher simply because many
people who are not able to find jobs or document their work
have been cut off. It is confusing to apply a percentage
derived from the entire caseload, where many states have a
large share of individuals who live in area without waivers, to
areas with waivers.

Second, in 2017 only 12 percent of ``ABAWDs'' in states that
had statewide waivers in 2017 were working at least 20 hours a
week--the threshold for individuals subject to the time limit
to remain eligible for SNAP. The RIA assumes a share almost
triple that (34 percent) would be able to meet the 20 hours a
week threshold, with no explanation for why or how that would
occur.
The RIA's Assumes That All Individuals Who Lose Eligibility Will
Reapply Every Three Years
When estimating the effect of the change on Federal spending the
RIA assumes the impact will be felt over only 9 months in 2020 and
2023, presumably based on an assumption that people who have been cut
off because of the 3 month time limit will reapply immediately when
they become eligible again after 3 years, but it provides no evidence
that this occurs. To the contrary, a study FNS published in 2001 of
state implementation of the time limit found:

Many ABAWDs who left the program have not returned. ABAWDs
who used up their time-limited benefits in 1997 became eligible
again in 2000, creating the potential for a sharp upswing in
participation, yet the trend in participation shows no such
change.\480\ (Bold emphasis in original.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\480\ John L. Czajka, et al., ``Imposing a Time Limit on Food Stamp
Receipt: Implementation of the Provisions and Effects on Food Stamp
Program Participation: Final Report,'' prepared by Mathematica Policy
Research for the USDA, Food and Nutrition Service, September 4, 2001,
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/abawd.pdf, p. xxv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. The RIA Lacks Transparency About the Reasons Individuals May Lose
SNAP and Other Possible Impacts If Waivers Are Narrowed
As noted, the proposed rule's fundamental rationale is that taking
away (or threatening to take away) food assistance will cause people
not currently working to get jobs. The NPRM asserts that ``these
changes would encourage more ABAWDs to engage in work or work
activities if they wish to continue to receive SNAP benefits,'' \481\
and, ``[t]he application of waivers on a more limited basis would
encourage more ABAWDs to take steps towards self-sufficiency.'' \482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\481\ NPRM, p. 981.
\482\ NPRM, p. 981.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the only impact that FNS quantifies in the RIA comes from
the estimated, ``755,000 individuals . . . [who] would not meet the
requirements for failure to engage meaningfully in work or work
training.'' The rationale and the estimated impact are inconsistent.
Moreover, the assessment lacks transparency about what the impact would
be and it over-simplifies the possibilities. Other FNS materials
indicate that FNS is aware that when the time limit is in effect it
results in different outcomes for different groups of people. Many
people participate in SNAP for a period of time and then leave when
their circumstances change. But, when faced with a time limit there are
a range of possible outcomes and impacts. For example:

Some individuals may find work or additional hours and as a
result their SNAP benefits may go down as a result of income
they would not have otherwise had.

Others may wish to comply but be unable to find a job. For
these individuals there is a question of whether a qualifying
slot in an Employment and Training program would be available.
If there is no slot then that individual would likely lose
SNAP. If there is, FNS and states would potentially incur a
cost for the E&T services. FNS does not contemplate any changes
in E&T that might be caused by the proposed rule.

Other individuals may qualify for an exemption for
``unfitness for work,'' or another reason, but may lose SNAP if
they don't realize they could qualify for an exemption because
it was not properly explained to them, or if they are unable to
get documentation of their health issue because they lack
medical coverage.

Others may actually be working, but not comply with
paperwork requirements to document their hours of work.

And, although unlikely, other individuals who are able to
work may intentionally choose not to comply with the time limit
and lose SNAP benefits.

This list is not exhaustive. But FNS guidance in recent years makes
clear that it is aware of both the range of possible outcomes and the
fact that the distribution of outcomes can be influenced by state
implementation choices. For example, in November 2015, FNS issued
guidance that reminded states that in addition to tracking months of
participation, ``States must also carefully screen for exemption from
the time limit and connect ABAWDs to the information and resources
necessary to maintain eligibility consistent with Federal
requirements.'' \483\ The guidance covered several areas where state
implementation could affect individuals' eligibility, for example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\483\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--ABAWD Time Limit Policy
and Program Access,'' November 19, 2015, https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/ABAWD-Time-Limit-Policy-
and-Program-Access-Memo-Nov2015.pdf.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Screening for Exemptions and Fitness for Work'';

``Maintaining Eligibility through Work Programs and
Workfare'':

``Maintaining Eligibility through Unpaid or Volunteer
Work''; and

``Good Cause for Failure to Meet the ABAWD Work
Requirement.''

Another FNS guidance focused on states' responsibilities to
adequately notify individuals who are potential ABAWDs on the details
of the time limit, work requirement, exemptions, and their
responsibility to report changes in work hours.\484\ FNS followed this
with another guidance that outlined best practices and provided model
language to ``help state agencies effectively inform Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) households of the requirements for
able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWD) and to enrich training
for eligibility workers.'' \485\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\484\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``SNAP--Requirements for Informing Households of ABAWD Rules,'' April
17, 2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
Requirements_for_Informing_Households_of_ABAWD_Rules.pdf.
\485\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
``SNAP--Best Practices and Resources for Informing Households of ABAWD
Rules,'' May 25, 2018, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/snap/BestPracticesforInformingABAWDS.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RIA oversimplifies the various impacts of the rule. Research
has found, and FNS is aware, that in practice work requirements result
in individuals experiencing benefit cuts for a variety of reasons,
including when they cannot find jobs, when they should have been found
exempt from the requirement, and when they are working but fail to
comply with paperwork requirements. FNS failed to adequately reflect
the various possible reasons why individuals would lose SNAP under the
proposed rule and as a result failed to adequately explain or consider
its impact.
H. The RIA's Estimate of No Impact From Eliminating the Carryover of
Exemptions Is Confusing and Misleading
The proposed rule would eliminate states' ability to ``carry over''
exemptions that go unused in 1 year into future years. The RIA includes
two confusing and misleading assumptions about state use of
exemptions--one about current state use of exemptions and the other
about how states would use exemptions under the proposed rule.
The RIA dramatically overstates the number of exemptions states
have used in recent years. The RIA methodology includes an assumption
that ``states use approximately 65 percent of their earned exemptions
in an average year.'' This assumption implies that many states use a
large share of their annual exemptions each year. This is a significant
misrepresentation of the pattern of state use of exemptions.
A closer look at the data FNS posts about the pattern of state use
and accrual of exemptions \486\ shows that the actual pattern is that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\486\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, ABAWD 15 Percent Exemptions
Data, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/abawd-15-percent-exemptions.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
many states have not used any exemptions in most years;

some states have used a small share of the exemptions they
earned for that year;

a few states have used the majority of the exemptions they
earned for that year;

a few states have not earned exemptions for a year but have
dipped into their accrued exemptions; and

a handful of states have used more exemptions than they
earned in a given year.

The last two categories result in the number of used exemptions as
a share of earned exemptions for that year exceeding 100 percent in
that state. Across all states this will raise the total share of
exemptions used because the denominator for the percentage is the
number of exemptions earned for that year (as it appears to be for the
FNS assumption.) See Table 11.5, below, for the distribution of states
across these categories. You can see that the small number of states in
the last two categories is playing an outsized role in raising the
total share across all the states.

Table 11.5
State use of exemptions 2014-2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number
of 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 a
States
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using 43 41 21 19 N/A
no
exempt
ions
Using 4 7 15 26 N/A
less
than
50% of
earned
exempt
ions
Using 1 2 0 5 N/A
51-100
% of
earned
exempt
ions
Using 2 0 2 1 N/A
more
than
100%
of
earned
exempt
ions
Used 3 3 15 2 N/A
exempt
ions
but
earned
none
for
that
year
Average 93% 27% 149% 23% N/A
exempt
ions
used
as a
share
of
earned
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total 230,000 115,000 730,000 300,000 1,300,000
exem
ptio
ns
used
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CBPP analysis of FNS-posted data on exemptions https://
www.fns.usda.gov/snap/abawd-15-percent-exemptions.
a According to the RIA (p. 23), ``In FY 2019 state carried over
approximately 6.1 million unused exemptions from the prior year.''
Since, according to FNS data, states carried 7.4 million exemptions
into FY2018 they must have used about 1.3 million exemptions in FY
2018 (7.4 million^1.3 million = 6.1 million.)

Thus, FNS' statement that ``States use approximately 65 percent of
their earned exemptions in an average year'' is highly misleading. In
fact, across all states and the 4 years between 2014 and 2017 only
eight states used between 51 and 100 percent of their exemptions. The
vast majority used none, some used less than 50 percent, and a handful
used more than 100 percent.
FNS' assumption that eliminating the exemption carryover would have
no impact is indefensible. FNS estimates the number of exemptions that
would be taken away from states and concludes that the rule would
eliminate 6.6 million case-months of carryover exemptions the first
year (FY 2020) and 160,000 to 180,000 a year in later years.
FNS estimates no impact from the proposed change to eliminate
states' past and future exemptions from prior years, saying:

It is difficult to estimate the impact of such a change on
transfer spending because there is no historical record to
support an estimate of if and when such a ``run on the bank''
may occur. Current practice by the states suggests that
elimination of the carryover will have no change on transfers
as the exemptions that will expire represent exemptions that
were not distributed to covered individuals (i.e., no transfer
is occurring, so no transfer can be reduced.) However,
elimination of the carryover will give the Federal Government
greater predictability over potential spending requirements
because the number of exemptions subject to the sole discretion
of the states is smaller.\487\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\487\ RIA, p. 24.

The assumption of no change in Federal spending from eliminating so
many exemptions is highly misleading and contrary to the experience of
the last 23 years. Virtually every state has used waivers at some point
since 1996, and most states have used exemptions in some years, making
clear that in some economic situations and under some political
leadership states wish to shield some SNAP recipients who are subject
to the time limit from losing SNAP.
Some states have used exemptions to suspend the time limit in areas
where no E&T services are available or to transition counties from
waiver status to non-waiver status and give the area time to establish
or expand employment and training opportunities to meet the needs of
individuals subject to the time limit. Other states have used
exemptions to continue to provide SNAP to certain SNAP participants who
would be cut off because of the time limit but who they determine
should continue to receive SNAP, such as individuals who are working,
but less than 20 hours in a particular month, or individuals who
recently have been released from incarceration.
The information that FNS makes public about exemption usage in
recent years shows that as many areas have no longer been waived in
recent years, states have increased their use of exemptions. It seems
highly likely that if the rule went into effect and states faced losing
waivers for a large share of the counties in their state with the
highest unemployment rates, many would opt to draw down more
exemptions, and, over time, to draw down the balances of their
exemptions that they have been allowed to carry over.
Another example of when states may use exemptions is when the
political leadership in a state changes to be more sympathetic to the
harshness of the time limit. In that case states might establish a
policy that begins to use exemptions and use them at a higher rate than
the number that are accrued each year. The carryover exemptions would
allow such a state to sustain a larger exemption policy for several
years.
The assumption that no carried over exemptions would ever be used
is indefensible, especially in combination with the changes the
proposed rule would make to the share of the United States that could
qualify for waiver.
I. The RIA Fails to Accurately Reflect the Impact of the Proposed Rule
on Medicaid and Health Coverage and Other Secondary Impacts
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the Department of
Health and Human Services, the agency that administers the Medicaid
program, has required some alignment between SNAP and Medicaid work
requirements. Specifically, states must count enrollment in SNAP as an
automatic exemption from Medicaid work requirements since individuals
enrolled in SNAP are either exempt from or complying with SNAP work
requirements.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\488\ State Medicaid Director Letter, January 11, 2018, https://
www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, the proposed rule's changes to SNAP waiver and
exemption policy would have a direct ripple effect on individuals'
Medicaid eligibility and coverage. More people in states with Medicaid
work requirements would be subject to those work requirements, and a
large number would very likely lose Medicaid coverage. The per-person
cost of health coverage often is higher than the monthly SNAP benefit.
The Federal budget savings and the impact on individual's health
coverage from this direct link between SNAP and Medicaid under the
Administration's policies should have been reflected in the RIA's cost-
benefit analysis. The RIA's failure to mention and quantify these
effects is a serious oversight that fails to accurately reflect the
full impact of the proposed rule.
Moreover, the RIA does not mention nor quantify several secondary
effects that SNAP benefit cuts could have. For example:

SNAP benefits are one of the fastest, most effective forms
of economic stimulus when the economy is weak. Low-income
individuals generally spend all of their income meeting daily
needs such as shelter, food, and transportation, so every
dollar in SNAP that a low-income family receives enables the
family to spend an additional dollar on food or other items.
Moody's Analytics estimated that every $1 increase in SNAP
benefits during 2009, when the economy was in a recession,
generated about $1.70 in economic activity.

SNAP has been found to improve some recipients' health
outcomes. SNAP is associated with better health and lower
health care costs, according to a growing body of
evidence.\489\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\489\ Steven Carlson and Brynne Keith-Jennings, ``SNAP is Linked
with Improved Nutritional Outcomes and Loer Health Care Costs,'' Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, January 17, 2018, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-is-linked-with-improved-
nutritional-outcomes-and-lower-health-care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter 12. The Proposed Rule Would Disproportionately Impact
Individuals Protected by Civil Rights Laws, Violating the Food
and Nutrition Act's Civil Rights Protections
According to FNS estimates, under the proposed rule some 755,000
individuals would lose eligibility for SNAP because of a ``failure to
engage meaningfully in work or work training.'' \490\ As described in
detail in Chapter 3, evidence from the research on the impact of work
requirements and time limits, as well as the disparities in
unemployment in the labor market make clear that the cuts to SNAP
eligibility from the proposed rule would fall disproportionately on
African Americans, Latinos, and people with disabilities. In addition,
Native Americans also would experience a disproportionate impact from
the proposed rule because individuals who are Native American, whether
or not they reside on Indian reservations, also have poverty and
unemployment rates well above the national average, and many of the
over 200 reservations that were waived or were located inside a waived
area in 2018 would likely lose their waivers under the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\490\ NPRM, p. 989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the civil rights impact analysis included in the NPRM, FNS
recognizes the disproportionate impact, citing the rule's ``potential
for disparately impacting certain protected groups due to factors
affecting rates of employment of members of these groups.'' \491\ But
the analysis finds that ``the implementation of mitigation strategies
and monitoring by the Civil Rights Division of FNS will lessen these
impacts,'' without providing any evidence or examples of how that
mitigation could occur. It is not clear how the Civil Rights Division
of FNS could mitigate an eligibility policy that inherently results in
a disproportionate impact on certain groups. We cannot comment on the
potential effectiveness of such efforts when the NPRM does not provide
any information about what they might be and no similar interventions
have occurred in the history of the program. If FNS envisions giving
the Civil Rights Division a role in determining eligibility for
waivers--which the Division apparently has not had to date--it says
nothing about that in the NPRM and we cannot readily imagine how that
would work. Even if it did, without anything in the rule varying the
effects of the new standards it imposes, states would be unlikely to
request the kinds of waivers that might mitigate the rule's disparate
impact on members of protected groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\491\ NPRM, p. 990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, even if mitigation of the disparate impact were possible,
the fact that the proposed rule still would have a disproportionate
impact on these protected groups directly violates Section 11(c)(2) of
the Food and Nutrition Act (7 U.S.C. 2020(c)(2)). In the 2008 Farm
Bill Congress reasserted its commitment to nondiscrimination and made
clear that certain civil rights laws apply to SNAP: \492\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\492\ The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-
246), section 4117.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Civil Rights Compliance.--

(1) In general.--In the certification of applicant
households for the supplemental nutrition assistance
program, there shall be no discrimination by reason of
race, sex, religious creed, national origin, or
political affiliation.
(2) Relation to other laws.--The administration of
the program by a state agency shall be consistent with
the rights of households under the following laws
(including implementing regulations):

(A) The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42
U.S.C. 6101 et seq.).
(B) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (29 U.S.C. 794).
(C) The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.).
(D) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.).\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\493\ Section 11(c) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C.
2020(c).

Of particular note is that, under this amended language, the
regulations implementing Title VI and other civil rights statutes are
fully applicable to SNAP. These regulations prohibit actions in Federal
programs that have disparate impacts on members of protected groups as
well as intentional discriminatory acts. Therefore, the proposed rules'
disparate impact on these individuals, as demonstrated by the research
and conceded in the NPRM itself, is inconsistent with the Act. Key
Members of Congress made unmistakably clear that this is what the 2008
amendments sought to accomplish.
In his floor statement on the 2008 Farm Bill, Representative Joe
Baca, who at the time was the Ranking Member of the House Agriculture
Subcommittee on Departmental Operations, Oversight, Nutrition and
Forestry, explained:

. . . this legislation makes clear that the [Agriculture]
Department's civil rights regulations are among those which
have the full force of law and which households have the right
to enforce. Discrimination is not acceptable in any form or at
any point in the food stamp certification process. Households
should not be assisted, or not assisted, approved or denied for
any reason other than an individual assessment of their need
for help or their eligibility by the state.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\ Congressional Record, May 22, 2008, p. H3814, https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2008-05-14/pdf/CREC-2008-05-14-pt1-
PgH3801-3.pdf#page=13.

Senator Dick Durbin, a leading Member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, in his floor statement on the 2008 Farm Bill similarly
stated that ``This legislation also makes explicit that various civil
rights laws are binding in the Food Stamp Program. This is not a
change--these laws and their regulations have applied since they were
written, and both have been intended to be fully enforceable.'' \495\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\495\ Congressional Record, May 22, 2008, p. S4747, https://
www.congress.gov/crec/2008/05/22/CREC-2008-05-22-pt1-PgS4743-3.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given this clear expression of Congressional intent, FNS may not by
regulation exacerbate discrimination within SNAP based on race,
ethnicity, or disability. Since FNS recognizes that the proposed rule
would have discriminatory effects, it must withdraw the rule.
Chapter 13. The Proposed Rule Fails to Adequately Estimate the Impact
on Small Entities
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612) requires
agencies to analyze the impact of a proposed rule specifically on small
businesses and entities through an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis. The Regulatory Flexibility Act specifically mandates that the
analysis must contain a series of arguments including, but not limited
to: why action by the agency is being considered, what the legal basis
is for the proposed rule, and an estimate to the number of small
entities to which the rule would apply.\496\ The FNS failed to
undertake the necessary research regarding the impact of this rule on
all small entities, with the proposed rule offering only a brief impact
report with minimal analysis that fails to accurately or adequately
assess the impact of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\496\ Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 603, https://
www.sba.gov/advocacy/regulatory-flexibility-act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FNS claims that aside from program participants, the proposed
rule would primarily impact state agencies. This assessment leaves out
a key group of impacted stakeholders--small SNAP retailers, who rely on
SNAP purchases for consistent and dependable revenue. The Department
incorrectly assumes that after losing benefits, people would replace
their monthly SNAP allotment with cash. The individuals impacted by
this NPRM are a very low-income group, as approximately 70 percent of
all ``ABAWD's'' are below \1/2\ of the Federal poverty line.\497\ They
do not tend to have disposable income, and taking away their SNAP
benefits would take away their ability to purchase food. Additionally,
SNAP benefits normally run out for most households before the end of
the month.\498\ Many households spend their benefits rapidly because
they are funds designated specifically for food. Cash cannot be used to
replace SNAP because these dollars are needed to pay other expenses
such as rent, clothing, gasoline, and many other necessities.\499\ The
Department's primary and false assumption that SNAP is supplemental
rather than essential lays an untrue foundation for the argument that
small retailers would not be disproportionately impacted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, ``Unemployed adults
without children who need help buying food only get SNAP for three
months,'' https://www.cbpp.org/unemployed-adults-without-children-who-
need-help-buying-food-only-get-snap-for-three-months.
\498\ Dottie Rosenbaum, ``Many SNAP Households Will Experience Long
Gap Between Monthly Benefits Despite End of Shutdown,'' Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, revised February 4, 2019, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/many-snap-households-will-
experience-long-gap-between-monthly-benefits.
\499\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the NPRM includes an inaccurate estimate of the
number of small retailers that would be impacted. This leaves the
public and stakeholder groups ill-informed about the potential
implications of the rule. A small retailer at risk of being
significantly harmed by the proposed rule would not understand the
importance of the issue solely by reading the NPRM and Regulatory
Impact Analysis due to the failure to scale the estimation exclusively
to the impacted areas. This section will review which pieces of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act were not adequately covered, the impact and
magnitude of the inaccurate estimation of impacted small businesses in
the NPRM, and which areas would be disproportionately or significantly
impacted across the United States.
A. Inadequately Addressed Sections of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
The primary area of concern within the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(R.F.A.) is 603--Initial regulatory flexibility analysis.\500\
According to the R.F.A. 603, an agency publishing an NPRM is required
to do the following: \501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\500\ Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 603, https://
www.sba.gov/advocacy/regulatory-flexibility-act.
\501\ Ibid.

(b) Each initial regulatory flexibility analysis required
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
under this section shall contain--

(1) a description of the reasons why action by the
agency is being considered;
(2) a succinct statement of the objectives of, and
legal basis for, the proposed rule;
(3) a description of and, where feasible, an estimate
of the number of small entities to which the proposed
rule will apply;
(4) a description of the projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance requirements of the
proposed rule, including an estimate of the classes of
small entities which will be subject to the requirement
and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record;
(5) an identification, to the extent practicable, of
all relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap
or conflict with the proposed rule.

(c) Each initial regulatory flexibility analysis shall also
contain a description of any significant alternatives to the
proposed rule which accomplish the stated objectives of
applicable statutes and which minimize any significant economic
impact of the proposed rule on small entities. Consistent with
the stated objectives of applicable statutes, the analysis
shall discuss significant alternatives such as--

(1) the establishment of differing compliance or
reporting requirements or timetables that take into
account the resources available to small entities;
(2) the clarification, consolidation, or
simplification of compliance and reporting requirements
under the rule for such small entities;
(3) the use of performance rather than design
standards; and
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any
part thereof, for such small entities.

The provided regulatory flexibility analysis in the NPRM fails to
include a detailed description required by 603(b)(1) and 603(b)(2),
as the analysis includes no legal basis for the proposed rule or why
the agency is considering the action. Additionally, 603(b)(3)
mandates an estimate of the number of small entities impacted. The
agency provides an estimate, but that estimate is flawed as we show
below.\502\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\ CBPP Internal Analysis of U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Food Environment Atlas Data 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By inaccurately estimating the number of small entities that would
be impacted by the proposed rule, the Department assumed it was not
required to satisfy other requirements in the Act. For example,
609(a)(1) states that when a rule is introduced that will have a
significant economic impact on small entities; the respective agency
must provide a statement or notice to the effect on small
entities.\503\ Providing an imprecise estimate, the Agency is able to
argue that no significant impact will be made, keeping small entities
uninvolved with the rulemaking process. In addition, 603(c) of the
RFA requires a description of potential alternatives to the proposed
rule. The NPRM fails to provide any possible alternatives because the
proposed rule inaccurately asserts that there is no disproportionate
impact on small entities, falsely excusing them from additional
requirements. Incorrectly estimating the number of small businesses not
only represents a lack of specificity, it more importantly exempts the
Agency from providing an advanced notice to small entities, allowing
them to submit comments and address concerns in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\503\ Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 609(a)(1) https://
www.sba.gov/advocacy/regulatory-flexibility-act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Impact of the NPRM on Small SNAP Retailers
Perhaps the most troubling of the agency's regulatory flexibility
analysis is the inadequate estimate of the total number of small SNAP
retailers. The NPRM does accurately estimate that there are nearly
200,000 retailers that fall under the Small Business Administration's
gross sales threshold, but it is imprecise to assume that all of these
stores would be impacted by the proposed rule.\504\ As a result, the
lost sales per store are too low, failing to signal to small entities
the magnitude of their losses from the NPRM. An internal analysis at
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has shown that a total of
639 counties across 28 states would be impacted by the proposed
rule.\505\ Within these counties, there are only a total of about
67,000 SNAP retailers of all sizes.\506\ If the same percentage of
these businesses were considered to be small entities under the Small
Business Administration gross sales threshold used in the NPRM (76
percent), then it can be estimated that a total of nearly 51,000 small
entities would be impacted, significantly less than the NPRM's estimate
of 200,000.\507\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\504\ NPRM, Regulatory Flexibility Act https://
www.federalregister.gov/d/2018-28059/p-118.
\505\ CBPP Analysis of BLS Unemployment data, 2019.
\506\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Environment Atlas Data
2018 https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-environment-atlas/
data-access-and-documentation-downloads/.
\507\ CBPP Internal Analysis of U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Food Environment Atlas Data 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By making an estimate based off the total number of small SNAP
retailers in the United States (200,000) versus the number of small
retailers impacted by the NPRM (51,000), FNS has artificially lowered
the average of the sales lost by four times.\508\ FNS has conducted a
cursory analysis regarding the impact of the proposed rule on small
businesses. Using an estimate of nearly four times the true number of
stores potentially impacted minimizes the reality that small SNAP
retailers would face from the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\508\ CBPP Internal Analysis of U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Food Environment Atlas Data 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the NPRM, SNAP benefit payments are expected to be
reduced by about $1.7 billion per year.\509\ By conducting the same
calculation as FNS in the NPRM while including a more accurate estimate
of the amount of impacted small businesses ($1.7 billion 15% redeemed
at small retailers / 51,000 stores losing waivers / 12 months), we can
estimate that the loss of revenue per small store on average each month
would be $417, compared to the NPRM estimate of $106.\510\ The NPRM
subsequently states that the average small store redeemed $3,800 in
SNAP each month in 2017, making the NPRM estimate representative of
three percent of monthly store sales.\511\ In evaluating the impact on
small stores with the true loss of revenue per store ($417/month), the
average small store would realistically face an 11 percent reduction in
the amount of SNAP benefits redeemed at each store. Not only is 11
percent a significant portion of a store's SNAP revenue, more
importantly it is nearly four times greater than the estimated impact
from the initial regulatory flexibility analysis of three percent in
the NPRM.\512\ Using the more accurate estimate would have properly
signaled the implications of the rule to small entities, allowing them
the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\509\ NPRM, Regulatory Flexibility Act https://
www.federalregister.gov/d/2018-28059/p-118.
\510\ Ibid.
\511\ Ibid.
\512\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Businesses Located in Rural Areas Will Be Disproportionately
Impacted
The small business impact assessment in the NPRM claims that small
retailers are not expected to be disproportionately impacted by the
proposed rule. This is not correct. Using 2018 as an illustrative year,
a total of 639 counties or county-equivalents would have lost access to
the waiver across 28 states.\513\ Of those impacted areas (which
include counties, reservations, and small cities), 405 areas have a
population of fewer than 50,000 people, where the Census Bureau defines
the cutoff for urbanized areas.^514-515 Research has shown
that rural areas with lower population levels often rely on corner and
convenience stores for food, many of which are individually owned small
businesses.\516\ When nearly \2/3\ of the counties impacted by an
arbitrary rule depend on small businesses for SNAP purchases, the rule
is certain to have a substantial impact on small business in the
impacted areas. As a result, the claim that small entities will not be
substantially impacted is incorrect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\ CBPP Analysis of BLS Unemployment data, 2019.
\514\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Environment Atlas Data
2018, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-environment-atlas/
data-access-and-documentation-downloads/.
\515\ Michael Ratcliffe, et al., ``Defining Rural at the U.S.
Census Bureau,'' United States Census Bureau, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Dec 2016, pp. 1-8, https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/
reference/ua/Defining_Rural.pdf.
\516\ Joseph Sharkey, et al., ``Association between neighborhood
need and spatial access to food stores and fast food restaurants in
neighborhoods of Colonias,'' International Journal of Health
Geographics, 2009, pp. 1-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Individuals living in rural areas must travel longer distances to
supermarkets and grocery stores than their urban or suburban
counterparts.\517\ As a result, they visit corner and convenience
stores frequently for their daily food and nutrition needs.\518\ A
study conducted by USDA found that new-entrant SNAP households along
with SNAP households that had participated in the program for less than
6 months lived, on average, 4 miles from a grocery store and 1.6-1.8
miles from a convenience store.\519\ While this may not appear to be a
substantial difference in distance, individuals living in rural areas
are less likely to have access to public transportation and a private
vehicle.\520\ Because lack of transportation is a common issue across
low-income rural areas, residents rely on the closest store to spend
their monthly SNAP benefits.\521\ As mentioned, these closest stores
are typically convenience stores or small businesses, offering a
limited selection of foods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\517\ Joseph Sharkey, ``Measuring Potential Access to Food Stores
and Food-Service Places in Rural Areas in the U.S.,'' American Journal
of Preventive Medicine, April 2009, pp. S151-S155.
\518\ Renee Walker, Christopher Keane, and Jessica Burke,
``Disparities and access to healthy food in the United States: A review
of food deserts literature,'' Health & Place, 2010, pp. 876-884.
\519\ James Mabli, ``SNAP Participation, Food Security, and
Geographic Access to Food,'' Food and Nutrition Service, Office of
Policy Support--U.S. Department of Agriculture, March 2014, pp. 1-50.
\520\ Kevin Matthews, et al., ``Health-Related Behaviors by Urban-
Rural county Classification--United States, 2013,'' Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
February 2017, pp. 1-12.
\521\ C. Pinard, et al., ``An integrative literature review of
small food store research across urban and rural communities in the
U.S.,'' Preventive Medicine Reports, April 2016, pp. 324-332.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to many of the impacted counties being rural and facing
issues around food access, a significant portion of the impacted
counties suffer from extremely low access to food.\522\ Sixty-three
counties (ten percent of those impacted by the proposed rule) have five
or less SNAP retailers across the county.\523\ While the impact of the
proposed rule on retailers across all rural counties would be
considerable, these 63 counties with such few SNAP vendors would be
disproportionately impacted. In these cases particularly, rural
residents are often required to travel longer than the previously
mentioned average distances to access a supermarket or superstore.\524\
Table 13.1 shows some of the impacted rural counties with few or lone
SNAP retailers:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\522\ Lisa Powell, et al., ``Food store availability and
neighborhood characteristics in the United States,'' Preventive
Medicine (2007), pp. 189-195.
\523\ CBPP Internal Analysis of U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Food Environment Atlas Data 2018.
\524\ C. Pinard, et al., ``An integrative literature review of
small food store research across urban and rural communities in the
U.S.,'' Preventive Medicine Reports, April 2016, pp. 324-332.

Table 13.1
Examples of Rural Counties Disproportionately Impacted by the NPRM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP
Participants as Average Monthly
State County of July 2018 SNAP Retailers in
\525\ 2016 \526\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Dakota Eddy County 167 1
\525\ U.S.
Department of
Agriculture,
SNAP State
Issuance and
Participation
Estimates (FNS-
388 & FNS-
388A), data as
of July 2018,
https://
www.fns.usda.go
v/sites/default/
files/pd/SNAP-
FNS388A.zip.
Kentucky Robertson County 290 2
\526\ USDA, Food
Environment
Atlas, last
updated on
March 27, 2018,
https://
www.ers.usda.go
v/data-products/
food-
environment-
atlas/data-
access-and-
documentation-
downloads/.
Virginia Charles City 827 2
County
South Dakota Mellette County 655 3
Nevada White Pine 1,131 5
County
West Virginia Doddridge County 1,187 5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CBPP Internal Analysis of U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food
Environment Atlas Data, 2018.

Table 13.1 shows that rural counties impacted by the NPRM with few
SNAP retailers, or a single SNAP retailer, would face significant harm
if sales were lost. These are solely a few illustrative examples of the
counties impacted. These examples validate the potential of the NPRM on
rural counties with minimal SNAP retailers. A loss of sales for any of
these isolated SNAP retailers would inhibit their ability to provide
for the surrounding community. A much more robust nationwide assessment
ought to have been included in the NPRM in order to meet the
requirements of the law and to allow small entities the opportunity to
meaningfully engage on what the proposed rule might mean to their sales
and business. It is not representative of the Department to ignore its
own research and knowledge of the location of small businesses impacted
by the rule. This failure and lack of discussion on the impact of small
businesses leaves that constituency and others unable to comment
effectively on the proposed rule.
Small Retailers in Urban Areas Will Be Significantly Impacted
While many of the counties that will lose waivers under the
proposed rule are rural, a noteworthy portion of the counties that
would no longer be eligible to be waived is considered urban. Some of
the counties with the highest population in the country would be
impacted, subjecting a great number of recipients in a condensed area
to the proposed rule. The following are a few of the impacted urban
counties and cities:

Table 13.2
Examples of Urban Locales Significantly Impacted by the NPRM
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP Estimated
Participants as Statewide Share Estimated Monthly
State County Primary City of July 2018 of ``ABAWD'' ``ABAWD'' ``ABAWD''
\527\ Population Population * Benefits **
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CA Los Angeles Los Angeles 1,055,314 11.3% 120,000 $19,444,000
County
\527\ U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture
, FNS 2018
County
level SNAP
data.
IL Cook County Chicago 813,465 12.3% 100,000 $16,295,000
MI Wayne County Detroit 416,321 11.4% 47,000 $7,685,000
NV Clark County Las Vegas 352,675 13.9% 49,000 $7,984,000
PA Philadelphia Philadelphia 473,269 6.6% 31,000 $5,040,590
County
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CBPP analysis of USDA SNAP Household Characteristics data, FY 2017, where the average monthly ``ABAWD''
benefit is $162.4.
* Estimated ``ABAWD'' Population is derived from share of ``ABAWDs'' in each state applied to county caseload.
** Estimated Monthly ``ABAWD'' Benefit is calculated from average ``ABAWD'' benefit and ABAWD share of
population.

The cities shown in Table 13.2 represent some of the largest cities
impacted by the proposed rule. Across the five cities listed, an
internal analysis estimates a total of 347,000 ``ABAWDs'' residing
within these cities. While not all of these individuals are necessarily
subject to the proposed rule due to exemptions and other factors, it is
critical to recognize that the average ``ABAWD'' SNAP monthly benefit
in FY2017 was $162.4, or an estimated annual contribution of
$677,383,000 in SNAP benefits from ``ABAWDs'' to the combined economies
of these cities.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\528\ ``Characteristics of Able-bodied Adults without Dependents,''
Food and Nutrition Services, United States Department of Agriculture,
2016, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/
nondisabled-adults.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar to rural residents, individuals living in low-income urban
areas often depend on convenience stores for groceries because of the
lack of accessibility to full-sized supermarkets and grocery
stores.\529\ In 2009, a study found that ``ZIP [C]odes representing
low-income areas had only 75% as many chain supermarkets available as
ZIP [C]odes representing middle-income areas.'' \530\ With some urban-
dwelling SNAP recipients essentially being forced to redeem benefits at
small retailers because of the lack of access, the argument that urban
small retailers would not be impacted by the proposed rule is
representative of the lack of consideration that FNS has presented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\529\ Melissa Nelson Laska, et al., ``Healthy food availability in
small urban food stores: a comparison of four U.S. cities,'' Public
Health Nutrition, December 2009, pp. 1031-1035.
\530\ Nicole Larson, Mary Story, and Melissa Nelson, ``Neighborhood
Environments: Disparities in Access to healthy Foods in the U.S.,''
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 2009, pp. 74-81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There have been additional studies conducted concerning food access
in individual cities that would be impacted by the proposed rule. For
example, the food environment of Philadelphia has a wealth of research
demonstrating food access issues across the city. A study from 2014
interviewed hundreds of low-income individuals in Philadelphia and
found that residents often shopped at convenience stores because of
``easy parking, accommodation of physical disabilities or special
needs, and the integration of food shopping into other daily
activities.'' \531\ With potentially impacted cities having published
information about how their residents rely on small food retailers, it
is remiss of the literature that exists in the field to argue that
small retailers would not be unduly impacted by the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\531\ Carolyn Cannuscio, et al., ``The social dynamics of healthy
food shopping and store choice in an urban environment,'' Social
Science & Medicine, October 2014, pp. 13-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
As demonstrated, the NPRM fails to adequately address the
disproportionate and significant impact on small entities across the
country. First, significant portions of the Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis were either not completed or completed incorrectly, failing to
signal to small entities the importance of the NPRM. Second, the
analysis in the proposed rule incorrectly calculates the number of
impacted small entities, suggesting that small entities would face an
impact four times smaller than the reality of what the NPRM would
prescribe. Lastly, both the rural and urban areas impacted by the rule
would see significant losses. Rural small retailers would see
disproportionate losses in sales, while urban small retailers would
experience substantial losses in sales. Until FNS conducts further
research regarding the impact of the proposed rule on small entities
and the communities that house these businesses, implementation of this
rule would be unwarrantable and detrimental to those who reside within
the impacted areas.
Appendix A: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities' Contributors to Our
Public Comments
For more than 3 decades, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
has been at the forefront of national and state debates to protect and
strengthen programs that reduce poverty and inequality and increase
opportunity for people trying to gain a foothold on the economic
ladder. The Center is a high-caliber strategic policy organization that
shapes critical policies for low-income families and individuals. To
these ends, we conduct highly skilled strategic and analytic work to
develop and advance specific, actionable proposals, to achieve the
maximum possible policy gains, and to ensure their effective
implementation on the ground. We also build effective partnerships and
help a diverse array of organizations and constituencies to engage more
effectively in these debates.
As part of this overall mission, we work to strengthen policies and
programs that reduce hunger and poverty and improve the lives of the
nation's poorest families and individuals. Since our founding in 1981,
we have worked on Federal nutrition programs, most notably the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as
food stamps. We have extensive experience in and knowledge of SNAP's 3
month time limit and state waiver authority within that rule. Examples
of our efforts on this front include:

Issuing reports and analyses on the time limit and the
population impacted by the rule, as well as policy options
available to states via waiver and individual exemption
policies;

Assisting states in assessing which areas of their states
are eligible for waivers and developing waiver requests that
meet the Federal criteria. The Center has supported an average
of 30-40 states each year, completing or assisting with a total
of over 600 waiver applications since the late 1990s;

Educating anti-hunger nonprofits and other community
organizations about the time limit rule, including about the
availability of waivers based on the underlying unemployment
trends in the state and individual exemptions; and

Training state agency officials as well as local anti-hunger
and poverty advocates about judicious practices in implementing
the time limit policy. For years we have worked to help state
officials implement the time limit in a way that conforms with
Federal law and protects as many individuals with low incomes
as possible and avoids (to the degree possible) cutting off
individuals who are not actually subject to the limit.

Over time, the Center's work on waivers and time limit policy has
evolved into a multi-faceted and complex approach. The Center has
provided in-person trainings and direct supervision to state officials
in nearly ten states, while providing support to advocates and working
on issues of implementation for many more. The Center has also given
multiple presentations to FNS staff at several regional meetings across
the United States regarding waivers, along with a series of annual
presentations to the American Association of SNAP Directors. Additional
support from the Center has included assistance regarding program
integrity and payment accuracy implications, writing of manuals for
dozens of states, and constantly monitoring all 50 states' statuses and
ability to apply for ``ABAWD'' waivers. The food assistance team's
experience in combination with the economic expertise of other members
of the Center provides CBPP with the greatest amount of experience and
knowledge concerning ``ABAWD'' waivers and the implications of the
proposed rule.
Below is a listing of the individuals at CBPP who contributed to
these comments:
Jared Bernstein joined the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
in 2011 as a Senior Fellow. From 2009 to 2011, Bernstein was the Chief
Economist and Economic Adviser to Vice President Joe Biden, Executive
Director of the White House Task Force on the Middle Class, and a
member of President Obama's economic team. Bernstein's areas of
expertise include Federal and state economic and fiscal policies,
income inequality and mobility, trends in employment and earnings,
international comparisons, and the analysis of financial and housing
markets.
Prior to joining the Obama Administration, Bernstein was a senior
economist and the director of the Living Standards Program at the
Economic Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. Between 1995 and 1996, he
held the post of Deputy Chief Economist at the U.S. Department of
Labor. Bernstein holds a Ph.D. in Social Welfare from Columbia
University.
He is the author and coauthor of numerous books for both popular
and academic audiences, including Getting Back to Full Employment: A
Better Bargain for Working People, Crunch: Why Do I Feel So Squeezed?,
nine editions of The State of Working America, and his latest book, The
Reconnection Agenda: Reuniting Growth and Prosperity. Bernstein has
published extensively in various venues, including the New York Times
and Washington Post. He is an on-air commentator for the cable stations
CNBC and MSNBC, contributes to the Washington Post's PostEverything
blog, and hosts On The Economy (jaredbernsteinblog.com).
Thompson Bertschy received his Master's in Social Work from the
University of North Carolina and began working with the Center as an
intern in 2019. In North Carolina, Thompson worked with the Carolina
Farm Stewardship Association to advocate for sustainable and equitable
food policy while organizing food policy councils across the state. At
CBPP, Thompson focuses on research and analysis regarding ``ABAWD''
exemptions and state legislative proposals around SNAP, TANF, and
Medicaid.
Ed Bolen joined the Center in 2010 as a Senior Policy Analyst. At
the Center, Ed focuses on SNAP Employment & Training and ``ABAWD''
waivers. He has provided trainings to multiple states regarding their
loss of waivers, including Alabama, California, Michigan, Illinois,
Alaska, and Mississippi. Additionally, Ed has given presentations to
Food and Nutrition Service staff at the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic
regional meetings. Since 2011, Ed has consistently worked with
advocates and state officials concerning implementation issues in
Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, California, and other states. He has also
presented to the American Association of SNAP Directors for 4
consecutive years and created a toolkit on implementing the ``ABAWD''
time limit including technical writing on implementation issues. He has
had many interactions with media and has written multiple blog posts
and papers concerning ``ABAWDs.'' Throughout his time at the Center, Ed
has written multiple pieces concerning Employment and Training for SNAP
recipients.
Prior to joining the Center, Bolen was a Senior Policy Analyst at
California Food Policy Advocates. While there, he advocated for
administrative and legislative improvements to food assistance programs
and provided training and technical assistance to community-based
organizations. He also has worked in public health law, most recently
consulting on legal strategies to combat childhood obesity with the
National Policy and Legal Analysis Network. Prior to that, Bolen was
senior staff attorney at the Child Care Law Center, specializing on
licensing, subsidy and legislative issues affecting low-income families
in child care and early education settings.
Kathleen Bryant is a Research Assistant in the Federal Fiscal team
at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Previously, she interned
for EMILY's List, the Economic Policy Institute, and the Center's
Legislative Affairs team. She also conducted independent research on
school segregation for her honors thesis and was selected as a fellow
in the Advanced Empirical Research on Politics for Undergraduates
Program for this research by the Society for Political Methodology.
Kathleen has a B.A. in Public Policy from The College of William &
Mary.
Ashley Burnside is a Research Assistant with the Center's Family
Income Support division. Before joining the Center, she was an Emerson
National Hunger Fellow with the Congressional Hunger Center, where she
advocated for anti-hunger and anti-poverty solutions, led voter
registration and community engagement efforts for food pantry clients,
and conducted research on tax credit programs. Burnside has also served
as a public policy fellow at AIDS United, a national HIV/AIDS advocacy
organization. She holds a B.A. in Social Theory and Practice from the
University of Michigan.
Lexin Cai is a Research Analyst with the Center's Food Assistance
Division, where she focuses on data analysis for nutrition assistance
programs. Lexin first joined the Center in May 2015 as an intern. Prior
to joining the Center, she interned with the World Wildlife Fund,
focusing on international agricultural trade. At the Center, Lexin
conducts analyses, compiles historical data and records, and uses
mapping and modeling to support states with the waiver application
process.
Over the last several years, Lexin has worked with Catlin Nchako in
completing waiver applications for multiple states and providing
assistance with the process to others, helping an average of 32 states
per year. She holds a Master of Science in Social Policy from the
University of Pennsylvania and a Bachelor of Management from Renmin
University of China.
Steven Carlson provided background research for these comments as a
consultant to CBPP. He was a Federal employee at the Food and Nutrition
Service for 37 years. During his time there, he led their Office of
Analysis and Evaluation and oversaw research studies and analysis on
SNAP.
Maritzelena Chirinos is a recent graduate of Meredith College and
began working with The Center as an intern in 2019 on The State Fiscal
Project Team. She holds a B.A. in Criminology and Sociology. She
previously worked at The Indivisible Project and Democrats For
Education Reform.
Stacy Dean is the Vice President for Food Assistance Policy at the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. She directs CBPP's food
assistance team, which publishes frequent reports on how Federal
nutrition programs affect families and communities and develops
policies to improve them. Dean's team also works closely with program
administrators, policymakers, and nonprofit organizations to improve
Federal nutrition programs and provide eligible low-income families
with easier access to benefits. She brings her deep programmatic and
operational knowledge along with a strong strategic sense to help
advance CBPP's priorities.
Dean has over 20 years of experience in working in great detail
with the USDA and dozens of states concerning ``ABAWD'' waivers. In
1997, she began writing and distributing information to a majority
states regarding specific Labor Surplus Areas in the state and their
ability to apply for a waiver. She has written multiple papers on
``ABAWDs'' and waiver requests dating back to the early 2000s. In
addition to writing the papers, Dean has worked closely with many
states providing supervision, training, and general policy support for
both application and implementation.
In addition to her work on Federal nutrition programs, Dean directs
CBPP efforts to integrate the delivery of health and human services
programs at the state and local levels. Dean has testified before
Congress and spoken extensively to national and state nonprofit groups.
She has been quoted in such publications as the New York Times,
Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Politico, as well as the
Associated Press. Dean joined CBPP in 1997 as a Senior Policy Analyst
working on national policy issues such as the Federal budget, SNAP, and
benefits for immigrants.
Previously, at the Office of Management and Budget, Dean served as
a budget analyst for food stamps. In this role, she staffed the White
House work on the 1996 food stamp program changes, reviewed and cleared
the ABAWD waiver guidance, and worked on policy development, regulatory
and legislative review, and budgetary process and execution for a
variety of income support programs.
Ife Floyd joined the Center in June 2011 as a Research Associate
with the Family Income Support Division, and is now Senior Policy
Analyst.
Prior to joining the Center, Floyd served as an AmeriCorp VISTA
with Culture Connect, Inc. and developed a cultural competency workshop
series for professional workplaces in the Atlanta area. In addition,
she also worked with the Atlanta Community Food Bank's Prosperity
Campaign as a benefits screener to increase access to programs like
SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid for low-income families. Floyd holds a B.A. in
Sociology from Northwestern University and a M.P.P. degree from Georgia
State University.
Brynne Keith-Jennings obtained her Master's in Public Policy from
the University of Southern California and joined the Center in June
2011. Her work focuses on Federal and state SNAP policies and research.
As a Senior Policy Analyst, Brynne works closely with the USDA and
regularly offers guidance with ABAWD waiver policy. She provides states
with technical assistance regarding waiver requests and has developed a
suite of products around the farm bill, SNAP, and employment. Since
2013, Keith-Jennings has been one of the primary food assistance team
members concerned with ``ABAWD'' waivers, assisting with the process of
completing or assisting with 30-40 waivers each year.
Prior to joining the Center, she worked as an educator and policy
analyst for Witness for Peace and as a consultant for other NGOs in
Nicaragua. She has also worked at the Public Welfare Foundation
supporting human rights and criminal justice reform organizations, at
the Government Accountability Office, and at the Tomas Rivera Policy
Institute, where she analyzed language access policies and other issues
affecting Latino communities in Southern California.
Joseph Llobrera is a Senior Policy Analyst on the Food Assistance
team. As a research associate at the Center between 2002 and 2007,
Llobrera supported the Food Assistance, State Fiscal, and Housing
Policy teams. During these years, Joseph managed the Center's ``ABAWD''
waiver support process through data analysis and extraction, assisting
nearly 150 states with the waiver process. He also interacted with and
provided operational support to state advocates and agencies. Before
returning to the Center in 2019, he served as an Associate Director of
Learning and Improvement at Insight Policy Research, providing
technical assistance and training to Federal, state, and local human
service agencies that administer SNAP and the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families program. During this time, Llobrera reviewed notices
that states would send to SNAP recipients who were subject to the time
limit. He also worked as a researcher at IMPAQ International and the
Urban Institute, focusing on food assistance policy, workforce
development, and health policy.
Currently at the Center, Llobrera provides operational support and
technical assistance to advocates and state agencies in an effort to
streamline the SNAP and Medicaid enrollment process. Llobrera holds a
Ph.D. in Nutrition from the Friedman School of Nutrition Science and
Policy at Tufts University, a master's degree in Geography from the
University of Washington (Seattle), and a bachelor's degree in
Mathematics and Urban Studies from Brown University.
Rachel Mbassa is an intern with the Data team. She graduated with a
Master of Public Health in Biostatistics from Loma Linda University.
She then went on to work at the University of California San Francisco
Medical Center, conducting epidemiological/clinical research centered
on the effects of cumulative psychosocial stressors on cardiovascular
disease outcomes. She recently moved to Washington, D.C. to transition
into a career in policy data analysis. She has a strong interest in
health economics and policy and hopes to pursue a terminal degree in
this field.
Tazra Mitchell joined the Center in 2016 as a Policy Analyst in the
Family Income Support Division. Previously she worked as a State Policy
Fellow and Policy Analyst with the North Carolina Budget & Tax Center,
where she conducted analysis of work and income supports as well as
fiscal and economic policies that enable low-income people and
disadvantaged communities to thrive. In addition, she worked as a
Research Assistant in the nonpartisan Fiscal Research Division of the
North Carolina General Assembly where she analyzed legislative
proposals to determine the fiscal impact on state government resources
and worked directly with legislators to develop the state budget.
Mitchell holds a B.A. in Political Science from North Carolina
State University and an M.P.P. from the Sanford School of Public Policy
at Duke University.
Catlin Nchako joined the Food Assistance Division as a Research
Associate in November 2013. His work focuses on data analysis and
research for the food stamp, school meals, and WIC programs. Over the
last several years, Nchako has worked with Lexin Cai in completing
waiver applications for multiple states and aiding with the process to
others, helping an average of 32 states per year. He has also tracked
employment benefit trigger notices for all states and territories,
notifying areas when they qualify for an exemption. He has completed
multiple analyses and contributed to many of the Center's papers
concerning ``ABAWDs.''
Nchako worked for the Center as a Food Assistance intern prior to
joining the organization on a full-time basis. He previously interned
for the Center for Law and Social Policy. He also worked for several
years as a labor researcher for the United Food and Commercial Workers
Union, where he evaluated wage proposals during labor contract
negotiations, analyzed companies' financial performance, and provided
campaign research support. He holds a Master's in Public Policy from
Georgetown University and a B.A. in Africana Studies from Cornell
University.
LaDonna Pavetti is the Vice President for Family Income Support
Policy at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. In this capacity,
she oversees the Center's work analyzing poverty trends and assessing
the nation's income support programs, including the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. For the last several
years, she has been working on a special initiative to identify
opportunities to build executive function and self-regulation skills in
TANF and other work programs.
Before joining the Center in 2009, Dr. Pavetti spent 12 years as a
researcher at Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., where she directed
numerous research projects examining various aspects of TANF
implementation and strategies to address the needs of the hard-to-
employ. She has also served as a researcher at the Urban Institute, a
consultant to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on
welfare reform issues, and a policy analyst for the District of
Columbia's Commission on Social Services. Across these positions, Dr.
Pavetti conducted research on how states were implementing TANF, how
sanctions were implemented, and conducted a study in St. Paul,
Minnesota analyzing which populations were primarily impacted by TANF
work requirements. In recent years, she has worked with Vermont, New
York, Minnesota, Colorado, California, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Oregon.
In addition, for several years she was a social worker in Chicago
and Washington, D.C. Dr. Pavetti has an A.M. in social work from the
University of Chicago and a Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government.
Dottie Rosenbaum is a Senior Fellow who joined the Center in 2000.
She has worked extensively on Federal and state issues in SNAP as well
as issues that involve the coordination of SNAP and other state-
administered health and income security programs, such as Medicaid,
TANF, and child care. In addition, Rosenbaum has expertise on the
Federal budget and budget process. With over more than 20 years of
experience with SNAP, she written multiple papers regarding SNAP and
SNAP Employment and Training.
Before joining the Center, Rosenbaum was a budget analyst at the
Congressional Budget Office. In this role, she conducted the cost
estimate of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act which included the time limit. She projected Federal
spending and provided Congress with cost estimates for a variety of
programs including: SNAP, Medicaid, the State Children's Health
Insurance Program, Child Nutrition, and Elementary and Secondary
Education. Rosenbaum holds a Master's in Public Policy from Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government.
Andrew Scanlan is a recent graduate of Brown University and began
working with the Center as an intern in 2019 on the Family Income
Security team. At Brown, he worked as a research assistant in the
political science department and received a combined degree in
philosophy and mechanical engineering. He previously worked in the
Rhode Island state government and the New York City government.
Arloc Sherman's work focuses on family income trends, income
support policies, and the causes and consequences of poverty. He has
written extensively about the effectiveness of government poverty-
reduction policies, the influence of economic security programs on
children's healthy development, the depth of poverty, tax policy for
low-income families, welfare reform, economic inequality, material
hardship, parental employment, and the special challenges affecting
rural areas.
He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on
National Statistics Panel to Review and Evaluate the 2014 Survey of
Income and Program Participation's Content and Design. Prior to joining
the Center in 2004, Sherman worked for 14 years at the Children's
Defense Fund and was previously at the Center for Law and Social
Policy. His book Wasting America's Future was nominated for the 1994
Robert F. Kennedy Book Award.
Chad Stone is Chief Economist at the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, where he specializes in the economic analysis of budget and
policy issues. Stone has conducted notable research around measures of
economic slack that are indicative of a weaker labor market, primarily
concerning labor force participation and the employment population
ratio. He was the acting executive director of the Joint Economic
Committee of the Congress in 2007 and before that staff director and
chief economist for the Democratic staff of the Committee from 2002 to
2006. He was chief economist for the Senate Budget Committee in 2001-02
and a senior economist and then chief economist at the President's
Council of Economic Advisers from 1996 to 2001.
Stone has been a senior researcher at the Urban Institute and
taught for several years at Swarthmore College. His other Congressional
experience includes two previous stints with the Joint Economic
Committee and a year as chief economist at the House Science Committee.
He has also worked at the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the Office of Management and Budget.
Stone is co-author, with Isabel Sawhill, of Economic Policy in the
Reagan Years. He holds a B.A. from Swarthmore College and a Ph.D. in
economics from Yale University.
Jennifer Wagner joined the Center in 2015 as a Senior Policy
Analyst with the health team. She focuses primarily on Medicaid
eligibility and implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
including analyzing opportunities to align Medicaid with other low-
income support programs for greater access and efficiency.
Before joining the Center, Wagner served for 5 years as an
Associate Director with the Illinois Department of Human Services. In
that capacity, she oversaw SNAP and cash assistance policy as well as
the local offices throughout the state that determined eligibility for
cash, SNAP, and medical assistance. She assisted Illinois with Medicaid
expansion under the ACA and improved customer service through business
process re-engineering in the local offices. Prior to that, she was a
staff attorney at the Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law,
where she focused on public benefits.
Wagner received her B.S. from the University of Wisconsin--Madison
and her J.D. from the Northwestern University School of Law.
Appendix B: Materials Cited in Comments
Appendix B includes all of the resources and materials cited in
these comments to help ensure that the Department will have complete
and simple access to the relevant research. The documents in Appendix B
are listed in alphabetical order by first author's last name or entity
where appropriate.

[The documents are retained in Committee file.]

1. 5 U.S.C., Chapter 6, The Analysis of Regulatory Functions
(Regulatory Flexibility Act) (https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/USCODE-2017-title5/pdf/USCODE-2017-title5-
partI-chap6.pdf)

2. 7 CFR, Part 273, Certification of Eligible Households (https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2018-title7-vol4/pdf/CFR-
2018-title7-vol4-part273.pdf) \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This includes 7 CFR 273.24.

3. Regulatory Impact Analysis, 7 CFR Part 273 for Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents, FNS-2018-0004 (https://
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FNS-2018-0004-6000)

4. Abraham, Katharine G., John C. Haltiwanger, Kristin Sandusky,
James Spletzer, The Consequences of Long-Term Unemployment:
Evidence from Linked Survey and Administrative Data,
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper
22665, September 2016 (https://www.nber.org/papers/w22665)

5. Andersson, Fredrik, John C. Haltiwanger, Mark J. Kutzbach, Henry
O. Pollakowski, Daniel H. Weinberg, Job Displacement and
the Duration of Joblessness: The Role of Spatial Mismatch,
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper
20066, April 2014 (https://www.nber.org/papers/w20066)

6. Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, Lawrence Summers, Jobs for the
Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st-Century America
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2018, p. 151-
255 (https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
AustinEtAl_Text.pdf)

7. Bartik, Timothy J., How Do the Effects of Local Growth on
Employment Rates Vary With Initial Labor Market Conditions?
Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper 09-148, November 4,
2006 (https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/148/)

8. Bauer, Lauren, The Hamilton Project, Workers Could Lose SNAP
Benefits Under Trump's Proposed Rule, Brookings Up Front,
December 12, 2018 (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/
2018/12/20/workers-could-lose-snap-benefits-under-trumps-
proposed-rule/)

9. Bauer, Lauren, Jay Shambaugh, The Hamilton Project, Workers with
Low Levels of Education Still Haven't Recovered From the
Recession, September 6, 2018 (http://
www.hamiltonproject.org/blog/employment_rate_gap_workers_
with_low_levels_of_education_still_havent_recov)

10. Bell, Stephen H., and L. Jerome Gallagher, Prime-Age Adults
without Children or Disabilities: The ``Least Deserving of
the Poor''--or Are They? The Urban Institute, Series B, No.
B-26, February 2001 (https://www.urban.org/research/
publication/prime-age-adults-without-children-or-
disabilities)

11. Bertrand, Marianne, Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment
on Labor Market Discrimination, National Bureau of Economic
Research, NBER Working Paper 9873, July 2003 (https://
www.nber.org/papers/w9873)

12. Bitler, Marianne P., Jonah B. Gelbach, and Hilary W. Hoynes,
What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare
Reform Experiments, American Economic Review Vol. 96 No. 4,
2006, p. 988-1012 (https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/scholz/
Teaching_742/Bitler_Gelbach_Hoynes.pdf)

13. Bloom, Dan, Cynthia Miller, Gilda Azurdia, Results from the
Personal Roads to Individual Development and Employment
(PRIDE) Program in New York City, MDRC, (https://
www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/full_547.pdf)

14. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Americans at Age 31: Labor Market Activity, Education and
Partner Status Summary, Economic News Release, April 17,
2018 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/nlsyth.nr0.htm)

15. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Regional and State Unemployment, 2018 Annual Average
Summary, Economic News Release, February 28, 2019 (https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/srgune.nr0.htm)

16. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Persons with a Disability: Labor Force Characteristics,
Economic News Release, February 26, 2019 (https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.htm) \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ This includes Table 1. Employment status of the civilian
noninstitutional population by disability status and selected
characteristics, 2018 annual averages.

17. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Leave
benefits: AccessTable 32. Leave benefits: Access, private
industry workers, Employee Benefits Survey, March 2017
(https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ownership/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
private/table32a.htm)

18. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Employee Tenure in 2018, Economic News Release, September
20, 2018 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm)

19. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, The
Employment Situation--March 2019, Economic News Release,
April 5, 2019 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.htm)
\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ This includes Household Data Table A-4. Employment status of
the civilian population 25 years and over by educational attainment.

20. Birnbaum Emily, and Juliegrace Brufke, Trump attacks Dems on
farm bill, The Hill, September 13, 2018 (https://
thehill.com/homenews/administration/406561-trump-calls-out-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
dems-for-opposing-farm-bill-over-work-requirements)

21. Brasher, Philip, Farm bill delayed, but Perdue signals
administration support, AgriPulse, December 3, 2018
(https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/11703-farm-bill-
delayed-but-perdue-signals-administration-support)

22. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Household Data, Annual Averages, 7. Employment status of
the civilian noninstitutional population 25 years and over
by educational attainment, sex, race, and Hispanic or
Latino ethnicity, Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey, January 18, 2019 (https://www.bls.gov/
cps/cpsaat07.htm)

23. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Household Data, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Quarterly
Averages, E-16. Unemployment rates by age, sex, race, and
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, Labor Force Statistics from
the Current Population Survey, January 4, 2019 (https://
www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm) \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Note: the table on the webpage has been subsequently updated as
of April 5, 2019.

24. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Labor
Market Activity, Education, and Partner Status Among
America's Young Adults at 29: Results From a Longitudinal
Survey, Economic News Release, April 8, 2016 (https://
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/nlsyth_04082016.pdf)

25. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Local
Area Unemployment Statistics, (https://www.bls.gov/lau/)

26. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization for States,
2018 Annual Averages, Local Area Unemployment Statistics,
(https://www.bls.gov/lau/stalt.htm) \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Note: the table on the webpage has been subsequently updated as
of April 26, 2019.

27. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Geographic Concepts, Local Area Unemployment Statistics,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 15, 2019 (https://www.bls.gov/lau/laugeo.htm)

28. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Important Information, Local Area Unemployment Statistics,
March 15, 2019 (https://www.bls.gov/lau/launews1.htm) \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Note: the webpage has been subsequently updated as of April 19,
2019.

29. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the
United States, March 2017, September 2017, Bulletin 2787
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ebbl0061.pdf)

30. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings
Growth Among the Youngest Baby Boomers: Results from a
Longitudinal Survey Summary, Economic News Release, August
24, 2017 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/nlsoy.nr0.htm)

31. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment & Earnings Online, Office of Publications &
Special Studies, February 28, 2019 (https://www.bls.gov/
opub/ee/home.htm)

32. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Persons With a Disability: Barriers to Employment, Types of
Assistance, and Other Labor-Related Issues--May 2012,
Economic News Release, April 24, 2013 (https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/dissup_04242013.pdf)

33. Bolen, Ed, Dorothy Rosenbaum, Stacy Dean, and Brynne-Keith
Jennings, More Than 500,000 Adults Will Lose SNAP Benefits
in 2016 as Waivers Expire Affected Unemployed Childless
Individuals Are Very Poor; Few Qualify for Other Help,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 18, 2016
(https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/more-than-
500000-adults-will-lose-snap-benefits-in-2016-as-waivers-
expire)

34. Bolen and Stacy Dean, Ed, Waivers Add Key State Flexibility to
SNAP's Three-Month Time Limit, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, February 6, 2018 (https://www.cbpp.org/
research/food-assistance/waivers-add-key-state-flexibility-
to-snaps-three-month-time-limit)

35. Born, Catherine E., Pamela J. Caudill, Melinda L. Cordero, Life
After Welfare: A Look At Sanctioned Families, University of
Maryland School of Social Work, November 1999

36. Breitwieser, Audrey, Ryan Nunn, Jay Shambaugh, The Hamilton
Project, The recent rebound in prime-age labor force
participation, Brookings Up Front, August 2, 2018 (https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/08/02/the-recent-
rebound-in-prime-age-labor-force-participation/)

37. Butcher, Kristin F. and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Most
Workers in Low-Wage Labor Market Work Substantial Hours, in
Volatile Jobs SNAP or Medicaid Work Requirements Would Be
Difficult for Many Low-Wage Workers to Meet, Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, July 24, 2018 (https://
www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/most-workers-
in-low-wage-labor-market-work-substantial-hours-in)

38. Butler, Sandra, TANF Time Limits and Maine Families:
Consequences of Withdrawing the Safety Net, Maine Equal
Justice Partners, March 2013

39. Cadena, Brian C., Brian K. Kovak, Immigrants Equilibrate Local
Labor Markets: Evidence From the Great Recession, National
Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 19272,
August 2013 (https://www.nber.org/papers/w19272)

40. Cajner, Tomaz, Tyler Radler, David Ratner, and Ivan Vidangos,
Racial Gaps in Labor Market Outcomes in the Last Four
Decades and over the Business Cycle, Finance and Economics
Discussion Series, 2017-071, Divisions of Research &
Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board 2017
(https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/
2017071pap.pdf)

41. Cannuscio, Carolyn C., Amy Hillier, Allison Karpyn, Karen Glanz,
The social dynamics of healthy food shopping and store
choice in an urban environment, Social Science & Medicine,
Volume 122, December 2014, p. 13-20 (https://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/
S0277953614006510)

42. Canon, Maria E., Marianna Kudlyak, Guannan Luo, and Marisa Reed,
Flows To and From Working Part Time for Economic Reasons
and the Labor Market Aggregates During and After the 2007-
09 Recession, Economic Quarterly, Volume 100, Number 2,
Second Quarter 2014, p. 87-111 (https://
www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/
research/economic_quarterly/2014/q2/kudlyak.pdf)

43. Carlson, Steven, and Brynne Keith-Jennings, SNAP Is Linked with
Improved Nutritional Outcomes and Lower Health Care Costs,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, January 17, 2018
(https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-is-
linked-with-improved-nutritional-outcomes-and-lower-health-
care)

44. Carlson, Steven, Dorothy Rosenbaum, and Brynne Keith-Jennings,
Who Are the Low-Income Childless Adults Facing the Loss of
SNAP in 2016?, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
February 8, 2016 (https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-
assistance/who-are-the-low-income-childless-adults-facing-
the-loss-of-snap-in-2016)

45. Letter from Robert Greenstein, Executive Director, CBPP and
attached comments, Comments on Rules Proposed to Implement
the Food Stamp Penalty Provisions of the 1996 Welfare Law,
February 17, 2000, in response to 64 Fed. Reg. No. 242,
page 70920

46. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, SNAP Helps 1 in 10
Workers in the United States Put Food on the Table,
November 2018, Fact Sheet (https://www.cbpp.org/snap-helps-
low-wage-workers-in-every-state#National)

47. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, SNAP Time Limits:
Waivers from the Time Limit Are Back to Historic Norms,
March 24, 2017, Fact Sheet (http://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/3-24-17fa1.pdf)

48. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, States Have Requested
Waivers from SNAP's Time Limit in High Unemployment Areas
for the Past Two Decades, May 12, 2017, Interactive Map
(https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/states-have-
requested-waivers-from-snaps-time-limit-in-high-
unemployment)

49. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, CBPP Summary of Two-Year
Waivers from SNAP Three-Month Time Limit, March 2019

50. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, CBPP Summary of Areas
That Would Have Lost Their Waivers from the SNAP Three-
Month Time Limit in 2018 if the Proposed Rule Were
Implemented in 2018, March 2019

51. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Taking Away Medicaid for
Not Meeting Work Requirements Harms People Experiencing
Homelessness, March 14, 2019, Fact Sheet (https://
www.cbpp.org/research/health/taking-away-medicaid-for-not-
meeting-work-requirements-harms-people-experiencing)

52. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Unemployed adults
without children who need help buying food only get SNAP
for three months, April 6, 2018 Infographic (https://
www.cbpp.org/unemployed-adults-without-children-who-need-
help-buying-food-only-get-snap-for-three-months)

53. Chandler, Daniel, Joan Meisel, Pat Jordan, Beth Menees Rienzi,
Sandra Naylor Goodwin, Mental Health, Employment, and
Welfare Tenure, Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 33,
No. 5, p. 587-609 (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/
10.1002/jcop.20070)

54. Cherlin, Andrew J., Karen Bogen, James M. Quane, Linda Burton,
Operating within the Rules: Welfare Recipients' Experiences
with Sanctions and Case Closings, Social Service Review,
Vol. 76, No. 3 (September 2002), p. 387-405 (https://
www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/341181)

55. Cherlin, Andrew, Linda Burton, Judith Francis, Jane Henrici,
Laura Lein, James Quane, and Karen Bogen, Sanctions and
Case Closings for Noncompliance: Who Is Affected and Why,
Policy Brief 01-1, Johns Hopkins University (http://
web.jhu.edu/threecitystudy/images/publications/
09_18058_Welfare_
Policy_Brief.pdf)

56. Ronnie Maurice Stewart, et al., v. Alex M. Azar II, et al.,
Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-152-JEB, January 24, 2019, Brief
for the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
College of Physicians, the American Medical Association,
the American Psychiatric Association, the Catholic Health
Association of the United States, March of Dimes, and the
National Alliance on Mental Illness as Amici Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs (https://www.psychiatry.org/
File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Directories/Library-and-
Archive/amicus-briefs/amicus-2019-Stewart-v-Azar-DC-No18-
152.pdf)

57. Coglianese, John, The Rise of In-and-Outs: Declining Labor Force
Participation of Prime Age Men, Harvard University (https:/
/scholar.harvard.edu/files/coglianese/files/
coglianese_2017_in-and-outs.pdf)

58. Colorado Department of Human Services, Colorado SNAP E&T State
Plan Federal Fiscal Year 2017, January 10, 2017 (http://
coemploymentfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Colorado-
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59. Committee of Conference, H.R. 2, Agriculture Improvement Act of
2018, 115th Congress, H. Rept. 115-1072, Agriculture
Improvement Act of 2018, December 10, 2018 (https://
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115hrpt1072.pdf) \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the conference report,
p. 616-617.

60. Congressional Record, Vol. 142, No. 106, Thursday, July 18, 1996
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-1996-07-18/pdf/
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\8\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the Congressional
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61. Congressional Record, Vol. 164, No. 196, Wednesday, December 12,
2018 (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2018-12-12/
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\9\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the Congressional
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62. Congressional Record, Vol. 148, No. 67, Wednesday, May 22, 2002
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63. Lowry, Sean, Donald J. Marples, Tax Incentives for Opportunity
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64. Cooper, David, Lawrence Mishel, and Ben Zipperer, Bold increases
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65. Couch, Kenneth A., Robert Fairlie, Last Hired, First Fired?
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66. Czajka, John L., Sheena McConnell, Scott Cody, Nuria Rodriguez,
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67. Dagata, Elizabeth, Assessing the Self-Sufficiency of Food Stamp
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68. DeMaster, Dana, At the Limit: December 2006 Minnesota Family
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69. Desmond, Matthew, Carl Gershenson, Housing and Employment
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70. Dilger, Robert Jay, Eleanor Blakely, Melissa Latimer, Barry
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71. Donovan, Sarah A., An Overview of the Employment-Population
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72. Dranove, David, Craig Garthwaite, and Christopher Ody, Health
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73. Economic Innovation Group, From Great Recession To Great
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74. Edin, Kathryn J., H. Luke Shaefer, $2.00 a Day: Living on Almost
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75. Edwards, Mark, Colleen Heflin, Peter Mueser, Suzanne Porter,
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of Two States, Rural Studies Program Working Paper Series
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76. Falk, Gene, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Size
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77. U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Surplus Area Classification
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78. Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food
Stamp Program; Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
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January 17, 2001, p. 4437-4471 (https://www.govinfo.gov/
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79. Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food
Stamp Program: Food Stamp Provisions of the Balanced Budget
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3, 1999 p. 48246-48258 (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
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80. Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food
Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Federal Register, Vol. Vol. 64, No. 242,
December 17, 1999, p. 70920-70954 (https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-1999-12-17/pdf/99-32527.pdf) \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Note: the submission is a scanned version of the Federal
Register including marginalia presumably by submitting organization.

81. Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements and
Services for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents; Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Register, Vol. 83,
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03752.pdf)

82. Fogli, Alessandra, Enoch Hill, Fabrizio Perri, The Geography of
the Great Recession, National Bureau of Economic Research,
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83. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2018 USDA Budget Explanatory
Notes for Committee on Appropriations, May 25, 2017 (http:/
/www.obpa.usda.gov/32fnsexnotes2018.pdf) \12\
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\12\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the Explanatory Notes,
p. 32-92 to 32-93.

84. Foote, Andrew, Mark J. Kutzbach, Lars Vilhuber, Recalculating .
. . : How Uncertainty in Local Labor Market Definitions
Affects Empirical Findings, CES 17-49, Center for Economic
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August 2017 (https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2017/CES-WP-17-
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49.pdf)

85. Fording, Richard C., Joe Soss, Sanford F. Schram, Devolution,
Discretion, and the Effect of Local Political Values on
TANF Sanctioning, Social Service Review, June 2007, p. 285-
316 (http://urban.hunter.cuny.edu/schram/FSSSSR.pdf)

86. Freedman, Stephen, Daniel Friedlander, Gayle Hamilton, JoAnn
Rock, Marisa Mitchell, Jodi Nudelman, Amanda Schweder,
Laura Storto, Evaluating Alternative Welfare-to-Work
Approaches: Two-Year Impacts for Eleven Programs, MDRC,
June 2000 (https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/
full_93.pdf)

87. Galewitz, Phil, Judge Blocks Kentucky Medicaid Work Requirement,
Kaiser Health News, June 29, 2018 (https://khn.org/news/
judge-blocks-kentucky-medicaid-work-requirement/)

88. Garfield, Rachel, Robin Rudowitz, MaryBeth Musumeci,
Implications of a Medicaid Work Requirement: National
Estimates of Potential Coverage Losses, Issue Brief, Kaiser
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attachment/Issue-Brief-Implications-of-a-Medicaid-Work-
Requirement-National-Estimates-of-Potential-Coverage-
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89. Garfield, Rachel, Robin Rudowitz and Anthony Damico,
Understanding the Intersection of Medicaid and Work, Issue
Brief, Kaiser Family Foundation, January 5, 2018 (https://
www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/understanding-the-
intersection-of-medicaid-and-work/)

90. Germanis, Peter, Who Killed Work Requirements for SNAP in the
Farm Bill? Answer: Conservative Ideologues, https://
mlwiseman.com/, January 1, 2019 (https://mlwiseman.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Farmbill.120118.pdf)

91. Germanis, Peter, How Do the Foundation for Government
Accountability's Evaluations of Welfare Reform Measure Up?
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, June 24, 2018 (https://mlwiseman.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/05/Evaluating-Welfare-Reform.pdf)

92. Goetz, Stephan J., Yicheol Han, Identifying Labor Market Areas
Based on Link Communities, Agricultural and Applied
Economics Association (AAEA), 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual
Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California, (https://
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93. Golden, Lonnie, Still falling short on hours and pay: Part-time
work becoming new normal, Economic Policy Institute,
December 5, 2016 (https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/114028.pdf)

94. Gordon, Anne, Susanne James-Burdumy, Renee Loeffler, Barbara
Guglielmo, Carole Kuhns, Experiences of Virginia Time Limit
Families After Case Closure: An Interim Report: Final
Report, Mathematica Policy Research, January 2002 (https://
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95. Gray, Colin, Why Leave Benefits on the Table? Evidence from
SNAP, Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 18-288, May 21,
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96. Weiner, Barbara, Summary of the Proposed Rule Implementing
Provisions of PRWORA and Published by USDA on December 17,
1999 at 64 Fed. Reg. 70920, et seq., Greater Upstate Law
Project, January 26, 2000

97. Letter from Joanne Werdel, Policy Analyst/Communications
Specialist, Center for Civil Justice, February 14, 2000,
Re: 7 CFR Part 273; Proposed Rules Implementing Food Stamp
Program Personal Responsibility Provisions of the 1996
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act

98. Letter from William Waldman, Executive Director, American Public
Human Services Association, and attached comments, Food
Stamp Program--Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act [PRWORA] of 1996, February 15, 2000, in response to 64
Fed. Reg. No. 242, page 70920

99. Letter from William Waldman, Executive Director, American Public
Human Services Association, and attached comments, Food
Stamp Program--Work Provisions of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
[PRWORA] of 1996, February 22, 2000, in response to 64 Fed.
Reg. No. 246, page 72196

100. H.R. 2, Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Enrolled, 115th
Congress, December 12, 2018 (https://www.congress.gov/115/
bills/hr2/BILLS-115hr2
enr.pdf) \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the enrolled bill, p.
138-145.

101. H.R. 2, Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Engrossed in
House, 115th Congress, June 21, 2018 (https://
www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr2/BILLS-115hr2enr.pdf) \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the engrossed bill, p.
266-289.

102. House Committee on the Budget, 104th Congress, H. Rept. 104-
651, Welfare and Medicaid Reform Act of 1996, June 27, 1996
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt651/pdf/
CRPT-104hrpt651.
pdf) \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the report, p. 67.

103. Hamilton, Gayle, Stephen Freedman, Lisa Gennetian, Charles
Michalopoulos, Johanna Walter, Diana Adams-Ciardullo, Anna
Gassman-Pines, Sharon McGroder, Martha Zaslow, Surjeet
Ahluwalia, Jennifer Brooks, How Effective Are Different
Welfare-to-Work Approaches? Five-Year Adult and Child
Impacts for Eleven Programs, MDRC, December 2001 (https://
www.mdrc.org/publication/how-effective-are-different-
welfare-work-approaches/file-full) \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the report Appendix
Table C.1, Impacts on Employment in Years 1 to 5, p. 352-354; and
Appendix Table C.6, Impacts on Longer-Term Employment Stability and
Earnings Growth, p. 363.

104. Hartley, Robert Paul, Christopher Wimer, and Jane Waldfogel,
Limiting States' Ability to Waive Federal SNAP Work
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Poverty & Social Policy Brief, Vol. 3 No. 4, March 25, 2019
(https://www.povertycenter.columbia.edu/s/Poverty-Social-
Policy-Brief-3_4_-SNAP-Work-Requirements-and-Unemployment-
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105. Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, Toorjo Ghose, Kandyce Larson, The Logic of
Sanctioning Welfare Recipients: An Empirical Assessment,
Social Service Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, June 2004 p. 304-319
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106. Haskins, Ron, TANF at Age 20: Work Still Works, Journal of
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107. Head, MPP, Valerie, Catherine E. Born, Ph.D., Pamela C.
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for TANF Recipients, Family Welfare Research and Training
Group, School of Social Work, University of Maryland, March
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108. Herd, Dean, Ernie Lightman, Andrew Mitchell, Welfare Time
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109. Hertz, Tom, Lorin Kusmin, Alex Marre, Tim Parker, Rural
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110. Hetling, Andrea, The Importance of Region and State Welfare
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111. Hetling, Ph.D., Andrea, Kathryn W. Patterson, Catherine E.
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112. Hill, Heather D., Paid Sick Leave and Job Stability, Work and
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113. Hotz, V. Joseph, Guido W. Imbens, Jacob A. Klerman, Evaluating
the Differential Effects of Alternative Welfare-to-Work
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114. Hoynes, Hilary Williamson, Local Labor Markets and Welfare
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115. Hoynes, Hilary W., Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Safety Net
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116. Hoynes, Hilary, Douglas L. Miller, and Jessamyn Schaller, Who
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117. Ingram, Jonathan, Nic Horton, The Power of Work: How Kansas'
Welfare Reform Is Lifting Americans Out of Poverty,
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118. Irwin, Neil, How Low Can Unemployment Really Go? Economists
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119. Jensen, Helen H., Steven B. Garasky, Cory Robert Wessman, Sarah
M. Nusser, A Study of Households in Iowa that Left the Food
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120. Jin, Jangik, Kurt Paulsen, Does accessibility matter?
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121. Johnson, Rucker C., Landing a job in urban space: The extent
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122. Kabbani, Nader S., Parke E. Wilde, Short Recertification
Periods in the U.S. Food Stamp Program, Journal of Human
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123. Kalil, Ariel, Kristin S. Seefeldt, Hui-chen Wang, Sanctions and
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124. Keith-Jennings, Brynne, Raheem Chaudhry, Most Working-Age SNAP
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125. Keith-Jennings, Brynne, Vincent Palacios, SNAP Helps Millions
of Low-Wage Workers: Crucial Financial Support Assists
Workers in Jobs with Low Wages, Volatile Income, and Few
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2017 (https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
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126. Kesavan, Saravanan, Camelia M. Kuhnen, Demand fluctuations,
precarious incomes, and employee turnover, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Kenan-Flagler Business
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127. Khan, Romana, Peter F. Orazem, Daniel M. Otto, Deriving
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of Competing Versus Complementary Growth, Journal of
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128. Kneebone, Elizabeth, Natalie Holmes, The growing distance
between people and jobs in metropolitan America, Brookings
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129. Kogan, Deborah, Anne Paprocki, Hannah Diaz, Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Employment and Training
(E&T) Best Practices Study: Final Report, Social Policy
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tices.pdf)

130. Larson, Anita M., Shweta Singh, Crystal Lewis, Sanctions and
Education Outcomes for Children in TANF Families, Child &
Youth Services, 32: 2011, 180-199 (https://
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605305#.Uu6IlPldV8E)

131. Larson, Ph.D., M.P.H., RD, Nicole I., Mary T. Story, Ph.D., RD,
Melissa C. Nelson, Ph.D., RD, Neighborhood Environments:
Disparities in Access to Healthy Foods in the U.S.,
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1, January 2009, Pages 74-81 (https://www.ajpmonline.org/
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132. Laska, Melissa Nelson, Kelley E. Borradaile, June Tester, Gary
D. Foster, Joel Gittelsohn, Healthy food availability in
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133. Lee, Bong Joo, Kristen S. Slack, Dan A. Lewis, Are Welfare
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2004, 370-403 (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/
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134. Lee, Kyoung Hag, Effect of Lifetime Limits and Differences
between TANF Leavers Who Had Reached Their Lifetime Limits
and Those Who Had Exited Voluntarily, Poverty & Public
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48 (https://doi.org/10.2202/1944-2858.1072)

135. Leon, Carol Boyd, The employment-population ratio: its value in
labor force analysis, Monthly Labor Review, Bureau of Labor
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136. Leparulo, Paul A., Amanda K. Rector, Preliminary Analysis of
Work Requirement Policy on the Wage and Employment
Experiences of ABAWDs in Maine, Maine Governor's Office of
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137. London, Rebecca A., Jane G. Mauldon, Time Running Out: A
Portrait of California Families Reaching the CalWORKs 60-
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138. Long, MA, M.P.P., David, John Rio, MA, CRC, Jeremy Rosen,
Employment and Income Supports for Homeless People, 2007
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139. Loprest, Pamela, Elaine Maag, Barriers to and Supports for Work
Among Adults With Disabilities: Results from the NHIS-D,
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basic-report/barriers-and-supports-work-among-adults-
disabilities-results-nhis-d)

140. Mabli, James, SNAP Participation, Food Security, and Geographic
Access to Food, Mathematica Policy Research, March 2014
(https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/
SNAPFS_FoodAccess.pdf)

141. Maine Department of Health and Human Services. Media Advisory:
LePage Administration Welfare Reform Leads to Increased
Wages, Press Release, May 11, 2016 and attached study,
Preliminary analysis of work requirement policy on the wage
and employment experiences of ABAWDs in Maine (https://
www.maine.gov/dhhs/press-release/DHHS-OPM-Analyses.pdf)
\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Note: the Media Advisory part of the submission is a scanned
version of the Media Advisory including marginalia presumably by the
submitting organization.

142. Mallik-Kane, Kamala, Christy A. Visher, Health and Prisoner
Reentry: How Physical, Mental, and Substance Abuse
Conditions Shape the Process of Reintegration, Urban
Institute, February 2008 (https://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/publication/31491/411617-Health-and-Prisoner-
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Reentry.PDF)

143. Mann, Cindy, April Grady, Potential Enrollment Impacts of
Michigan's Medicaid Work Requirement, Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips, LLP, February 6, 2019 (https://www.manatt.com/
Manatt/media/Media/Images/White%20
Papers/Manatt_MI-Work-Req-Estimates_20190206-Final.pdf)

144. Marr, Chuck, Bryann DaSilva, Childless Adults Are Lone Group
Taxed Into Poverty: Expanding Earned Income Tax Credit
Would Address Problem, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, April 19, 2016 (https://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/3-2-16tax.pdf)

145. Maryland Department of Human Resources, Maryland Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Employment and Training
(E&T) Program: State Plan of Operations, October 1, 2015
through September 30, 2016, September 22, 2015 (https://
dhr.maryland.gov/documents/Data%20and%20
Reports/FIA/YR2016%20SNAP%20E&T%20State%20Plan%20of%20Opera
tions%20(revised).pdf)

146. Matthews, MS, Kevin A., Janet B. Croft, Ph.D., Yong Liu, MD,
MS, Hua Lu, MS, Dafna Kanny, Ph.D., Anne G. Wheaton, Ph.D.,
Timothy J. Cunningham, Sc.D., Laura Kettel Khan, Ph.D.,
Ralph S. Caraballo, Ph.D., James B. Holt, Ph.D., Paul I.
Eke, Ph.D., M.P.H., Wayne H. Giles, MD, MS, Health-Related
Behaviors by Urban-Rural County Classification--United
States, 2013, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report,
Surveillance Summaries, Vol. 66, No. 5, February 3, 2017
(https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/ss/pdfs/
ss6605.pdf)\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Note: the submission does not include the erratum (https://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6607a5.htm?s_cid=mm6607a5_w) published
for this report. However, the report in Committee file does contain the
erratum.

147. McHugh, M.A., M.P.P., Christina, J. Taylor Danielson, Ph.D.,
TANF Time Limit Analysis: Comparing Cases Closed Due to
Time Limits with Other Case Closures, Washington State
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Social and Health Services, February 2019

148. Mills, Gregory, Robert Kornfeld, Study of Arizona Adults
Leaving the Food Stamp Program, Final Report, Abt
Associates Inc., E-FAN-01-001, December 2000 (http://
azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/feddocs/id/1050/
rec/efan-01-001.pdf)

149. Mitchell, Tazra, LaDonna Pavetti, and Yixuan Huang, Study
Praising Kansas' Harsh TANF Work Penalties Is Fundamentally
Flawed, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February
16, 2018 (https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/1-23-18tanf_rebuttal_0.pdf) \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Note: there is a discrepancy with the date of the report as
posted on the CBPP website (https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-
income-support/study-praising-kansas-harsh-tanf-work-penalties-is-
fundamentally) and the pdf of the report. The website lists the report
as being updated on February 20, 2018, while the pdf of the report is
dated as February 16, 2018.

150. Mitchell, Tazra, LaDonna Pavetti, and Yixuan Huang, Life After
TANF in Kansas: For Most, Unsteady Work and Earnings Below
Half the Poverty Line, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, February 20, 2018 (https://www.cbpp.org/sites/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
default/files/atoms/files/1-23-18kstanf.pdf)

151. Modestino, Alicia Sasser, Daniel Shoag, Joshua Ballance,
Upskilling: Do Employers Demand Greater Skill When Skilled
Workers are Plentiful?, Harvard Kennedy School, Taubman
Center for State and Local Government, Policy Brief, May
2015 (https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shoag/files/
modestino_shoag_and_ballance_022316_final.pdf)

152. Moffitt, Robert A., The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the
U.S. Welfare System, Demography (2015) 52: p. 729-749
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/43699160)

153. Musumeci, MaryBeth, Julia Foutz, Rachel Garfield, How Might
Medicaid Adults with Disabilities Be Affected By Work
Requirements in Section 1115 Waiver Programs?, Kaiser
Family Foundation, Issue Brief, January 26, 2018 (http://
files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-How-Might-Medicaid-
Adults-with-Disabilities-Be-Affected-By-Work-Requirements)

154. Executive Office of the President, Executive Order 12073--
Federal procurement in labor surplus areas, August 16, 1978
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1978-08-18/pdf/FR-
1978-08-18.pdf) \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Note: the submission is a pdf of the National Archives webpage
(https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-
order/12073.html). In addition to the pdf of the webpage a copy of the
actual Federal Register publishing of the EO is also included in
Committee file.

155. National Bureau of Economic Research, U.S. Business Cycle
Expansions and Contractions (https://www.nber.org/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cycles.html)

156. National Research Council, Chapter 8, Consequences for
Employment and Earnings, in The Growth of Incarceration in
the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences
(2014), The National Academies Press, 2014 (https://
www.nap.edu/catalog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-
the-united-states-exploring-causes) \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the book, p. 233-259.

157. Donovan, Shaun, Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Revised Delineations of Metropolitan Statistical Areas,
Micropolitan Statistical Areas, and Combined Statistical
Areas, and Guidance on Uses of the Delineations of These
Areas, OMB Bulletin No. 15-01, July 15, 2015 (https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
bulletins/2015/15-01.pdf)

158. Oggins, Jean, Amy Fleming, Welfare Reform Sanctions and
Financial Strain in a Food-Pantry Sample, Journal of
Sociology & Social Welfare, Volume 28, Issue 2, June 2001,
p. 101-123 (https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol28/iss2/
7/)

159. Ohio Association of Foodbanks, A Comprehensive Assessment of
Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents and Their
Participation in the Work Experience Program in Franklin
County, Ohio, 2014, December 8, 2014 (http://
admin.ohiofoodbanks.org/uploads/news/WEP-2013-2014-
report.pdf)

160. Ohio Association of Foodbanks, A Comprehensive Assessment of
Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents and Their
Participation in the Work Experience Program in Franklin
County, Ohio, 2015

161. Ohio Association of Foodbanks, Franklin County Work Experience
Program: Comprehensive Report Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents 2014-2015, October 14, 2015 (http://
ohiofoodbanks.org/wep/WEP-2013-2015-report.pdf)

162. Ovwigho, Ph.D., Pamela C., Kathryn Patterson, BFA, Catherine E.
Born, Ph.D., The TANF Time Limit: Barriers & Outcomes Among
Families Reaching the Limit, Family Welfare Research and
Training Group, School of Social Work, University of
Maryland, November 2007 (https://
familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports1/tl_barriers.pdf)

163. 104th Congress of the United States, Public Law 104-193,
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-
104publ193/pdf/PLAW-104publ193.
pdf)

164. 105th Congress of the United States, Public Law 105-33,
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/PLAW-105publ33/pdf/PLAW-105publ33.pdf) \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the Public Law, p. 111
Stat. 251-111 Stat. 252.

165. 110th Congress of the United States, Public Law 110-246, Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-110publ246/pdf/PLAW-
110publ246.pdf) \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the Public Law, p. 122
Stat. 1872-122 Stat. 1873.

166. Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of
Representatives, Statute Compilation: Food and Nutrition
Act of 2008, January 15, 2019 (https://www.govinfo.gov/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
content/pkg/COMPS-10331/pdf/COMPS-10331.pdf)

167. Pager, Devah, The Mark of a Criminal Record, American Journal
of Sociology, Volume 108, Number 5, March 2003, p. 937-975
(https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/pager/files/
pager_ajs.pdf)

168. Pager, Devah, Bruce Western, Identifying Discrimination at
Work: The Use of Field Experiments, Journal of Social
Issues, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2012, p. 221-237 (https://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/pager/files/pdf_5.pdf)

169. Pager, Devah, Bruce Western, Bart Bonikowski, Discrimination in
a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, American
Sociological Review, 2009, Vol. 74 October 2009, p. 777-799

170. Pavetti, LaDonna A., Jacqueline Kauff, When Five Years Is Not
Enough: Identifying and Addressing the Needs of Families
Nearing the TANF Time Limit in Ramsey County, Minnesota,
Mathematica Policy Research, March 30, 2006 (https://
www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/
publications/when-five-years-is-not-enough-identifying-and-
addressing-the-needs-of-families-nearing-the-tanf-time-
limit-in-ramsey-county-minnesota)

171. Pavetti, LaDonna, Michelle K. Derr, Heather Hesketh Zaveri,
Review of Sanction Policies and Research Studies: Final
Literature Review, Mathematica Policy Research, March 10,
2003 (https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-
findings/publications/review-of-sanction-policies-and-
research-studies-final-literature-review)

172. Pavetti, LaDonna, Michelle K. Derr, Gretchen Kirby, Robert G.
Wood, Melissa A. Clark, The Use of TANF Work-Oriented
Sanctions in Illinois, New Jersey, and South Carolina:
Final Report, Mathematica Policy Research, April 30, 2004
(https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-
findings/publications/the-use-of-tanf-workoriented-
sanctions-in-illinois-new-jersey-and-south-carolina)

173. Paxson, Christina, Jane Waldfogel, Welfare Reforms, Family
Resources, and Child Maltreatment, Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, Vol. 22, No. 1, Winter, 2003, p.
85-113 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/3325847)

174. Pew Research Center, The State of American Jobs: How the
shifting economic landscape is reshaping work and society
and affecting the way people think about the skills and
training they need to get ahead., October 2016 (https://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/10/
ST_2016.10.06_Future-of-Work_FINAL4.pdf)

175. Pinard, Ph.D., Courtney A., Carmen Byker Shanks, Amy Yaroch, An
integrative literature review of small food store research
across urban and rural communities in the U.S., Preventive
Medicine Reports, 3, April 2, 2016, p. 324-332 (https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4929238/pdf/main.pdf)

176. Powell, Lisa M., Sandy Slater, Donka Mirtcheva, Yanjun Bao,
Frank J. Chaloupka, Food store availability and
neighborhood characteristics in the United States,
Preventive Medicine, 44, March 2007, p. 189-195 (https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2006.08.008)

177. Quilliana, Lincoln, Devah Pager, Ole Hexela, Arnfinn H.
Midtboenf, Meta-analysis of field experiments shows no
change in racial discrimination in hiring over time,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, October
10, 2017 (https://www.pnas.org/content/114/41/10870)

178. Rangarajan, Anu, Philip M. Gleason, Food Stamp Leavers in
Illinois: How Are They Doing Two Years Later? Final Report,
Mathematica Policy Research, January 30, 2001 (https://
www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/
publications/food-stamp-leavers-in-illinois-how-are-they-
doing-two-years-later)

179. Ratcliffe, Michael, Charlynn Burd, Kelly Holder, Alison Fields,
Defining Rural at the U.S. Census Bureau, ACSGEO-1, U.S.
Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, December 8,
2016 (https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
publications/2016/acs/acsgeo-1.pdf)

180. Rector, Robert, Rachel Sheffield, Kevin D. Dayaratna, Jamie
Bryan Hall, Maine Food Stamp Work Requirement Cuts Non-
Parent Caseload by 80 Percent, Backgrounder, No. 3091,
Heritage Foundation, February 8, 2016 (https://
www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/BG3091.pdf)

181. Reichman, Nancy E., Julien O. Teitler, Marah A. Curtis, TANF
Sanctioning and Hardship, Social Service Review, 79, no. 2,
June 2005, p. 215-236 (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/
doi/abs/10.1086/428918)

182. Governor's Workforce Board, Regional Planning Policy, State of
Rhode Island, June 2017 (https://gwb.ri.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/17-01-3-16-2017.pdf?189db0)

183. White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of H.R. 2,
the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, press release,
December 20, 2018 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-h-r-2-
agriculture-improvement-act-2018/)

184. Ribar, David C., Marilyn Edelhoch, Qiduan Liu, Watching the
Clocks: The Role of Food Stamp Recertification and TANF
Time Limits in Caseload Dynamics, Journal of Human
Resources, Vol. 43, No. 1, Winter 2008, p. 208-238 (http://
jhr.uwpress.org/content/43/1/208.full.pdf+html)

185. Richardson, Philip, Gregg Schoenfeld, Susan LaFever, Frances
Jackson, Mark Tecco, Food Stamp Leavers Research Study--
Study of ABAWDs Leaving the Food Stamp Program in South
Carolina: Final Report, E-FAN-03-002, MAXIMUS, Inc., March
2003 (https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/45220/PDF)

186. Rosenbaum, Dorothy, Many SNAP Households Will Experience Long
Gap Between Monthly Benefits Despite End of Shutdown,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February 4, 2019
(https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/many-snap-
households-will-experience-long-gap-between-monthly-
benefits)

187. Rosenbaum, Dorothy, The Relationship Between SNAP and Work
Among Low-Income Households, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, January 30, 2013 (https://www.cbpp.org/
research/the-relationship-between-snap-and-work-among-low-
income-households)

188. Rosenbaum, Dorothy, Ed Bolen, SNAP Reports Present Misleading
Findings on Impact of Three-Month Time Limit, Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, December 14, 2016 (https://
www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-reports-present-
misleading-findings-on-impact-of-three-month-time)

189. Ross, Martha, Natalie Holmes, Employment by race and place:
snapshots of America, Brookings The Avenue, February 27,
2017 (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/02/27/
employment-by-race-and-place-snapshots-of-america/)

190. Rothstein, Richard, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated
Schools, and Segregated Neighborhoods--A Constitutional
Insult, Race and Social Problems, November 12, 2014
(https://www.epi.org/publication/the-racial-achievement-
gap-segregated-schools-and-segregated-neighborhoods-a-
constitutional-insult/)

191. Rowe, Gretchen, Elizabeth Brown, Brian Estes, SNAP Employment
and Training (E&T) Characteristics Study: Final Report,
Mathematica Policy Research, October 31, 2017 (https://
www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/
publications/snap-employment-and-training-e-t-
characteristics-study-final-report)

192. Scherpf, Erik, Bruce Weber, Deana Grobe, Mark Edwards,
Participation in USDA's Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP): Effect of Local Labor Market Conditions in
Oregon, ERR-257, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, September 2018 (https://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/pub-details/?pubid=90037)

193. Schram, Sanford F., Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording, Linda Houser,
Deciding to Discipline: Race, Choice, and Punishment at the
Frontlines of Welfare Reform, American Sociological Review,
Vol. 74, No. 3, Jun. 2009, p. 398-422 (https://
www.jstor.org/stable/27736070)

194. Schwandt, Hannes, Till von Wachter, Unlucky Cohorts: Estimating
the Long-term Effects of Entering the Labor Market in a
Recession in Large Cross-sectional Data Sets, Discussion
Paper Series, IZA DP No. 11926, IZA--Institute of Labor
Economics, October 2018 (http://ftp.iza.org/dp11926.pdf)

195. Seefeldt, Kristin S., Sean M. Orzol, Watching the Clock Tick:
Factors Associated with TANF Accumulation, National Poverty
Center Working Paper Series, No. 04-9, NPC, University of
Michigan, May 2004 (Revised May 2005) (http://
www.npc.umich.edu/publications/workingpaper04/paper9/04-
09.pdf)

196. Seefeldt, Kristin S., Heather Sandstrom, When There Is No
Welfare: The Income Packaging Strategies of Mothers Without
Earnings or Cash Assistance Following an Economic Downturn,
Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences,
Vol. 1, No. 1, Severe Deprivation in America, November
2015, p. 139-158 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7758/
rsf.2015.1.1.08)

197. Shaefer, H. Luke, Kathryn Edin, Elizabeth Talbert,
Understanding the Dynamics of $2-a-Day Poverty in the
United States, Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the
Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 1, Severe Deprivation in
America, November 2015, p. 120-138 (https://www.jstor.org/
stable/10.7758/rsf.2015.1.1.07)

198. Shah, MPP, Melissa Ford, Qinghua Liu, Ph.D., David Mancuso,
Ph.D., Barbara Felver, MES, MPA, Predicting Homelessness
among Low-Income Parents on TANF, Washington State
Department of Social and Health Services, August 2015
(https://www.dshs.wa.gov/sites/default/files/SESA/rda/
documents/research-11-224.pdf)

199. Sharkey, Ph.D., MPH, RD, Joseph R., Measuring Potential Access
to Food Stores and Food-Service Places in Rural Areas in
the U.S., American Journal of Preventive Medicine, Volume
36, Issue 4, Supplement: Measurement of the Food and
Physical Activity Environments: Enhancing Research Relevant
to Policy on Diet, Physical Activity, and Weight, April
2009, p. S151-S155 (https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/
S0749-3797(09)00012-9/pdf)

200. Sharkey, Joseph R. Scott Horel, Daikwon Han, John C. Huber,
Jr., Association between neighborhood need and spatial
access to food stores and fast food restaurants in
neighborhoods of Colonias, International Journal of Health
Geographics, 8:9, February 16, 2009 (https://ij-
healthgeographics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1476-
072X-8-9)

201. Stacy, Christina, Brady Meixell, Serena Lei, Too Far from Jobs:
Spatial Mismatch and Hourly Workers, Urban Institute,
February 21, 2019 (https://www.urban.org/features/too-far-
jobs-spatial-mismatch-and-hourly-workers)

202. Stavrianos, Michael, Lucia Nixon, The Effect of Welfare Reform
on Able-Bodied Food Stamp Recipients, Mathematica Policy
Research, July 23, 1998 (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/
sites/default/files/finalrep.pdf)

203. Stavrianos, Mike, Scott Cody, Kimball Lewis, Characteristics of
Childless Unemployed Adult and Legal Immigrant Food Stamp
Participants: Fiscal Year 1995, Mathematica Policy
Research, February 13, 1997 (https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ABAWDOAE.PDF)

204. Steadman, Ph.D., Henry J., Fred C. Osher, M.D., Pamela Clark
Robbins, B.A., Brian Case, B.A., Steven Samuels, Ph.D.,
Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates,
Psychiatric Services, June 2009 Vol. 60 No. 6, p. 761-765
(https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176/
ps.2009.60.
6.761)

205. Stone, Chad, Congress Should Renew Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Before the End of the Year, Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, November 20, 2013 (https://
www.cbpp.org/research/congress-should-renew-emergency-
unemployment-compensation-before-the-end-of-the-year)

206. Letter from Hon. Bill Haslam, Governor, Tennessee and attached
maps, May 24, 2018, Re: Realignment of Local Workforce
Development Board Areas (https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/
workforce/documents/ProgramManagement/RealignmentMaps.pdf)
\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the webpage posting
the Governor's letter (https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/workforce/
documents/ProgramManagement/SignedLetterRe
alignment_May24.pdf).

207. ____, TN Realigns Workforce Development Areas, The
Chatanoogan.com, June 28, 2018 (https://
www.chattanoogan.com/2018/6/28/371092/TN-Realigns-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Workforce-Development-Areas.aspx)

208. Thiede, Brian C., Shannon M. Monnat, The Great Recession and
America's Geography of Unemployment, Demographic Research,
Volume 35, Article 30, September 27, 2016, 891-928 (https:/
/www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5486972/pdf/
nihms867734.pdf)

209. Tolbert, Charles M., Molly Sizer, U.S. Commuting Zones and
Labor Market Areas: A 1990 Update, Staff Reports No. 9614,
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
September 1996 \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Note: the submission does not include the attached
appendicies, the copy retained in Committee file does.

210. Letter from Brian Neale, Director, Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, January 11, 2018, Re: Opportunities to Promote
Work and Community Engagement Among Medicaid Beneficiaries,
SMD: 18-002 (https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf)

211. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, Food Stamps/
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): 2012-2016
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (https://
factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?src=bkmk)

212. Letter from Arthur T. Foley, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA,
January 8, 2009, Re: SNAP--ABAWD Statewide Waivers--New
Criteria for Unemployment Insurance Extended Benefits
Trigger

213. Letter from Mary Ann Ferris, Chief, State Program Improvement,
Food Stamp Program, Northeast Region, Food and Nutrition
Service, USDA, April 28, 2004, Re: ABAWD Waivers--New
Method for Calculating Average Unemployment Rates

214. Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director, Program Development
Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, May 25, 2018,
Re: SNAP--Best Practices and Resources for Informing
Households of ABAWD Rules

215. Gray, Kelsey Farson, Shivani Kochhar, Characteristics of
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Households:
Fiscal Year 2014, Report No. SNAP-15-CHAR, Mathematica
Policy Research, December 21, 2015 (https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/
Characteristics2014.pdf)

216. Office of the Inspector General, USDA, FNS Controls Over SNAP
Benefits For Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents, Audit
Report 27601-0002-31, September 2016 (Released October 24,
2016) (https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/27601-0002-31.pdf)
\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Note: this document was included in the 27th attachment for
Appendix B, as well as in the 28th attachment. However, it was not
listed in the table of contents for attachment 27.

217. Facsimile from Office of Advocacy and Enterprise, Food and
Nutrition Service, USDA, April 23, 1997, Re: Time Limit
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waivers for Able-Bodied Food Stamp Recipients

218. Cronquist, Kathryn, Sarah Lauffer, Characteristics of
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Households:
Fiscal Year 2017, Report No. SNAP-18-CHAR, Mathematica
Policy Research, February 3, 2019 (https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/
Characteristics2017.pdf) \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Note: the submission is an excerpt from the report Table A.14.
Distribution of participating households, individuals, and benefits by
household composition, p. 52; and Table A.16. Distribution of
participating households by countable income type and household
composition, p. 54.

219. Letter from Arthur T. Foley, Director, Program Development
Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, February 3,
2006, Re: FSP--2-Year Approval of Waivers of the Work
Requirements for ABAWDs under 7 CFR 273.24 (https://
www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/snap/2-
Year%20Approval%20
of%20Waivers%20of%20the%20Work%20Requirements%20for%20
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABAWDs.pdf)

220. Letter from Sasha Gersten-Paal, Chief, Certification Policy
Branch, Program Development Division, Food and Nutrition
Service, USDA, March 15, 2017, Re: SNAP--FY 2017
Allocations of 15 Percent Exemptions for ABAWDs--Totals
Adjusted for Carryover (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/
sites/default/files/snap/FY2017-ABAWD-15%25-Exemption-
Totals.pdf)

221. Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, Guidance for States Seeking
Waivers for Food Stamp Limits, December 3, 1996 \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Note: the submission is a scanned version of the Guidance
including marginalia presumably by the submitting organization.

222. Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, Guidance on Requesting ABAWD
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waivers, August 2006

223. Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, Guide to Serving ABAWDs
Subject to Time-limited Participation: A Guide on Serving
Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents (ABAWDs), 2015

224. Letter from Arthur T. Foley, Director, Program Development
Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, October 27,
1997, Re: Implementation of the Provisions of the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 Relating to Exemptions for Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs)

225. Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, Perdue Reiterates Need to
Restore Original Intent of SNAP: A Second Chance, Not A Way
of Life, Press Release, February 28, 2019 (https://
www.fns.usda.gov/pressrelease/2019/usda-002519)

226. Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, Regulatory Reform at a Glance
Proposed Rule: SNAP Requirements for ABAWDs, December 20,
2018, Fact Sheet (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/
default/files/snap/ABAWDSFact
Sheet.pdf)

227. Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director, Program Development
Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, April 17, 2017,
Re: SNAP--Requirements for Informing Households of ABAWD
Rules (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/
snap/Requirements_for_Informing_Households_of_
ABAWD_Rules.pdf)

228. Cromartie, John Rural America At A Glance, 2017 Edition,
Economic Information Bulletin No. EIB-182, Economic
Research Service, USDA, November 16, 2017 (https://
www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/85740/eib-
182.pdf?v=0)

229. Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director, Program Development
Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, June 26, 2015,
Re: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--Able-Bodied
Adults without Dependents (ABAWD) Questions and Answers--
June 2015 (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/snap/ABAWD-Questions-and-Answers-June%202015.pdf)

230. Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director, Program Development
Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, March 4, 2015,
Re: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--Expiration
of Statewide ABAWD Time Limit Waivers (https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-
Expiration-of-Statewide-ABAWD-Time-Limit-Waivers.pdf)

231. Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director, Program Development
Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, and attached
Guidance, December 2, 2016, Re: Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program--Guide to Supporting Requests to Waive
the Time Limit for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents
(ABAWD) (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/snap/SNAP-Guide-to-Supporting-Requests-to-Waive-the-
Time-Limit-for-ABAWDs.pdf) \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Note: this submission was duplicated in attachment 29.

232. Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, SNAP E&T and WIOA: Partnering
to Raise Skills and Employment, Policy Brief 8, June 8,
2018 (https://snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/2018-06/Brief_June2018_508
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
comp.pdf)

233. Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, Why SNAP To Skills? (https://
snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/why-snap-to-skills) \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Note: the submission is a ``snapshot'' of the webpage.

234. Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director, Program Development
Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, November 19,
2015, Re: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program--ABAWD
Time Limit Policy and Program Access (https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/ABAWD-Time-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Limit-Policy-and-Program-Access-Memo-Nov2015.pdf)

235. Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, State Highlights: California
(https://snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/state-highlights/state-
highlights-california) \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Note: the submission is a ``snapshot'' of the webpage.

236. Letter from Hon. Kevin W. Concannon, Under Secretary, Food,
Nutrition and Consumer Service, USDA; and Portia Wu,
Assistant Secretary, Employment & Training Administration,
U.S. DOL, March 31, 2016, Re: Partnering to Help Connect
Low-Income Able-bodied Adults to the Public Workforce
System (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
snap/USDA-DOL-joint-ABAWD-letter.pdf)

237. Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, February 26, 2018, Fact
Sheet, Characteristics of Able-bodied Adults without
Dependents (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/snap/nondisabled-adults.pdf)

238. Mills, Gregory, Tracy Vericker, Heather Koball, Kye Lippold,
Laura Wheaton; Sam Elkin,* Understanding the Rates, Causes,
and Costs of Churning in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) Final Report, Urban Institute (*
MEF Associates), November 4, 2014 (https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/
SNAPChurning.pdf)

239. Employment and Training Administration, U.S. DOL, Conformity
Requirements for State UI Laws, Fact Sheet, January 6, 2016
(https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilaws_extended.pdf)

240. Employment and Training Administration, U.S. DOL, Emergency
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) Expired on January 1, 2014
(https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/supp_act.asp) \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Note: the submission is a ``snapshot'' of the webpage.

241. Employment and Training Administration, U.S. DOL, EUC 2008
Trigger Notice No. 2008-45, Second Tier EUC 2008 Triggers
Under P.L. 110-449, November 23, 2008 (https://
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/euc_trigger/2008/euc_112308.pdf)

242. Leberg, Stanley, Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment,
1929-39: Estimating Methods, Monthy Labor Review, July 1948
(https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1948/article/pdf/labor-force-
employment-and-unemployment-1929-39-estimating-methods.pdf)

243. Employment and Training Administration, U.S. DOL, Labor Surplus
Area Classification under Executive Orders 12073 and 10582,
Federal Register, Vol. 76, Iss. 167, August 29, 2011, p.
53699-53700 (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-
08-29/pdf/2011-22003.pdf)

244. Employment and Training Administration, U.S. DOL, Labor Surplus
Area: Frequently Asked Questions, April 5, 2018 (https://
www.doleta.gov/lsa/lsa_faq.cfm) \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Note: the webpage has been subsequently updated as of October
5, 2018. Note: the submission is a ``snapshot'' of the webpage.

245. Nilsen, Sigurd R., Director, Education, Workforce, Income
Security Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, Food Stamp
Employment and Training Program: Better Data Needed to
Understand Who Is Served and What the Program Achieves, No.
03-388, March 12, 2003 (https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
237571.pdf)

246. Virginia Board of Workforce Development, Designation of Regions
and Planning Requirements, Policy Memorandum No. 200-06
(2016), July 1, 2016 (https://virginiacareerworks.com/wp-
content/uploads/Policy-200-06-Designation-of-Regions-and-
Planning-Requirements-FINAL-Signed.pdf)

247. Vornholt, Katharina, Patrizia Villotti, Beate Muschalla, Jana
Bauer, Adrienne Colella, Fred Zijlstra, Gemma Van
Ruitenbeek, Sjir Uitdewilligen & Marc Corbiere, Disability
and employment--overview and highlights, European Journal
of Work and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 27 No. 1,
October 10, 2017, p. 40-55 (https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/1359432X.2017.1387536)

248. Wagner, Jennifer, 4,109 More Arkansans Lost Medicaid in October
for Not Meeting Rigid Work Requirements, Off the Charts
Blog, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 16,
2018 (https://www.cbpp.org/blog/4109-more-arkansans-lost-
medicaid-in-october-for-not-meeting-rigid-work-
requirements)

249. Wagner, Jennifer, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
Commentary: As Predicted, Eligible Arkansas Medicaid
Beneficiaries Struggling to Meet Rigid Work Requirements,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 30, 2018
(https://www.cbpp.org/health/commentary-as-predicted-
eligible-arkansas-medicaid-beneficiaries-struggling-to-
meet-rigid)

250. Wagner, Jennifer, Commentary: As Predicted, Arkansas' Medicaid
Waiver Is Taking Coverage Away From Eligible People, Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 12, 2019 (https://
www.cbpp.org/health/commentary-as-predicted-arkansas-
medicaid-waiver-is-taking-coverage-away-from-eligible-
people)

251. Wagner, Jennifer, Fact Checking Arkansas Governor's Claims
About Jobs and Medicaid Waiver, Off the Charts Blog, Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, January 28, 2019 (https://
www.cbpp.org/blog/fact-checking-arkansas-governors-claims-
about-jobs-and-medicaid-waiver)

252. Wagner, Jennifer,Medicaid Coverage Losses Mounting in Arkansas
From Work Requirement, Off the Charts Blog, Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, January 17, 2019 (https://
www.cbpp.org/blog/medicaid-coverage-losses-mounting-in-
arkansas-from-work-requirement)

253. Walker, Renee E., Christopher R. Keane, Jessica G. Burke,
Disparities and access to healthy food in the United
States: A review of food deserts literature, Health & Place
Volume 16, Issue 5, September 2010, p. 876-884 (https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2010.04.013)

254. Watson, Ian, Beyond the Unemployment Rate: Building a Set
Indicies to Measure the Health of the Labour Market,
Australian Bulletin of Labour, Vol. 26, No. 3, September
2000, p. 176-190 (http://www.ianwatson.com.au/pubs/
beyond%20the%20unemployment%20rate.pdf)

255. Welles, Seth L., Falguni Patel, Mariana Chilton, Does
Employment-Related Resilience Affect the Relationship
between Childhood Adversity, Community Violence, and
Depression?, Journal of Urban Health, April 2017, 94(2): p.
233-243 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC5391326/)

256. The Pew Charitable Trusts, Collateral Costs: Incarceration's
Effect on Economic Mobility, September 28, 2010 (https://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/0001/01/
01/collateral-costs)

257. Western, Bruce, Becky Pettit, Incarceration & social
inequality, D#dalus Summer 2010, p. 8-19

258. Westra, Ph.D., Karen L., John Routley, Arizona Cash Assistance
Exit Study, First Quarter 1998 Cohort, Final Report,
Administrative and Survey Data Results, Arizona Department
of Economic Security, Office of Evaluation, January 2000
(https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/177096/AZ-CAExit
Study00.pdf)

259. Williamson, MPP, Sarah, Full-Family Sanctions & Economic
Recession, Family Welfare Research and Training Group,
University of Maryland School of Social Work, January 2011
(https://familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports1/
sanctionsbrief.pdf)

260. Wilson, Claire, Brian Estes, Examining the Growth of the Zero-
Income SNAP Caseload: Characteristics, Circumstances, and
Dynamics of Zero-Income SNAP Participants, Volume II: In-
Depth Interview Findings, Insight Policy Research, Inc.,
October 2014 (https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/ZeroIncome-Vol2.pdf)

261. Wilson, Valerie, Before the State of the Union, a fact check on
black unemployment, Working Economics Blog, February 1,
2019 (https://www.epi.org/blog/before-the-state-of-the-
union-a-fact-check-on-black-unemployment/)

262. Department of Workforce Development, State of Wisconsin,
Wisconsin Works (W-2) Sanctions Study, December 2004
(https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/civilrights/
activities/examples/TANF/wi_tanf_w2study.pdf)

263. Wolkomir, Elizabeth, How SNAP Can Better Serve the Formerly
Incarcerated, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March
16, 2018 (https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/
how-snap-can-better-serve-the-formerly-incarcerated)

264. Wu, Chi-Fang, Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer, Sanction policies
and outcomes in Wisconsin, p. 38-40; and Lee, Bong Joo,
Kristen Shook Slack, Dan A. Lewis, Sanctions policies and
outcomes in Illinois, p. 41-43: Focus Vol. 23, No. 1,
Winter 2004 (https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/
pdfs/foc231f.pdf) \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Note: this submission consists of two sub-articles. The full
article entitled, How do welfare sanctions work? New findings from
Wisconsin and Illinois, has a one-page introduction p. 37.

265. Wu, Chi-Fang, Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer, Geoffrey L.
Wallace, How Do Welfare Sanctions Work?, Social Work
Research, Volume 30, Number 1, March 2006, p. 33-50
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/gwallace/Papers/(5).pdf)

266. Yagan, Danny, Employment Hysteresis from the Great Recession,
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper
No. 23844 (https://www.nber.org/papers/w23844.pdf)

267. Yellen, Janet L., Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Addressing Workforce Development Challenges
in Low-Income Communities, ``Creating a Just Economy,'' the
2017 annual conference of the National Community
Reinvestment Coalition, March 28, 2017 (https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/
yellen20170328a.pdf)

268. Ziliak, James P., Restoring Economic Opportunity for ``The
People Left Behind'': Employment Strategies for Rural
America, in Part II: Increasing Prime-Age Labor Force
Participation, of Expanding Economic Opportunity for More
Americans: Bipartisan Policies to Increase Work, Wages, and
Skills, Aspen Institute Economic Strategy Group, February
2019, p. 100-126 (https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/
content/uploads/2019/01/2.2-Pgs.-100-126-Restoring-
Economic-Opportunity....pdf) \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Note: this submission consists of one policy memo in the
report Expanding Economic Opportunity for More Americans: Bipartisan
Policies to Increase Work, Wages, and Skills (https://
assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2019/01/ESG_Report_Expanding-
Economic-Opportunity-for-More-Americans.pdf). The full report is
retained in the Committee file.

269. Ziliak, James P., Temporary Assistance For Needy Families,
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper
No. 21038 (https://www.nber.org/papers/w21038)
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew, a Representative
in Congress from New Jersey; Authored by Kate Leone, Chief Government
Relations Officer, Feeding America
April 2, 2019

Ms. Sasha Gerstan-Paal,
Chief,
Certification Policy Branch,
SNAP Program Development Division,
Food and Nutrition Service, USDA,
Alexandria, Virginia

RE: Proposed Rule: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP):
Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents RIN
0584-AE57

Dear Ms. Gerstan-Paal:

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on USDA's Proposed
Rulemaking on requirements and services for Able-Bodied Adults Without
Dependents (ABAWDs). The proposed changes would make it harder for
individuals facing food insecurity to have the resources they need to
purchase healthy food. The changes would harm those individuals and
their community, putting an unnecessary burden on food banks and other
service providers. We strongly encourage USDA to rescind this rule.
Feeding America is the nationwide network of 200 food banks that
leads the fight against hunger in the United States. Together, we
provide food to more than 46 million people through 60,000 food
pantries and meal programs in communities across America. Feeding
America also supports programs that improve food security among the
people we serve; educates the public about the problem of hunger; and
advocates for legislation that protects people from going hungry. This
includes working to ensure people understand and are able to access
Federal nutrition assistance programs like SNAP, through education and
outreach, and related support services such as nutrition education and
work support services, including SNAP Employment and Training.
Feeding America cares about the 3 month time limit for ABAWDs
because this policy has cut off food assistance to so many in
communities across the country who are in need just because they are
unable to find a reliable 20 hour a week job or otherwise document
their 20 hours of qualifying activities. Feeding America released a
statement in April 2016 (online here (http://www.feedingamerica.org/
about-us/press-room/feeding-america-food-banks.html) and below)
expressing our concern as the state waivers were going away, either
naturally or due to state decisions, that policies like these that take
important food resources away from vulnerable individuals will only
make it harder to ensure community members are nourished and ready for
the workforce. We subsequently released statements in December 2018
(online here (https://www.feedingamerica.org/about-us/press-room/
feeding-america-statement-able-bodied-adults-without-dependents-
proposed-rule) and below) and February 2019 (online here (https://
www.feedingamerica.org/about-us/press-room/feeding-america-opposes-
harmful-snap-proposed-rule-released-usda) and below) expressing
concerns about this notice of proposed rulemaking which we are
commenting on today.
We strongly encourage USDA to rescind this rule.
SNAP Matters
SNAP plays a critical role in addressing hunger and food insecurity
in our community. It is the first line of defense against hunger.
Based on USDA Economic Research Service analysis, it is estimated
that each $1 in Federal SNAP benefits generates $1.79 in economic
activity. Those dollars help many food retailers operating on thin
margins to remain in business; something that improves food access for
all residents.
Access to healthy food is a critical social determinant of health
and food insecurity is associated with poorer health outcomes.\1\ Food
insecurity is associated with higher rates of some of the most serious
and costly chronic conditions, including hypertension, coronary heart
disease, cancer, asthma, diabetes, and many other serious health
conditions. Adults who experience food insecurity are also more likely
to report lower health status overall.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/hia/evidence/
doh/en/index3.html, see also Craig Gundersen and James P. Ziliak,
``Food Insecurity and Health Outcomes,'' Health Affairs, November 2015,
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.0645.
\2\ Christian A. Gregory and Alisha Coleman-Jenson, ``Food
Insecurity, Chronic Disease, and Health Among Working-Age Adults,''
United States Department of Agriculture, July 2017, https://nopren.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ERS-Report-Food-Insecurity-Chronic-Disease-
and-Health-Among-Working-Age-Adults.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP plays a critical role in addressing hunger and food insecurity
in our communities: it is the first line of defense against hunger for
low-income residents. Research shows that SNAP reduces poverty and food
insecurity, and that over the long-term, these impacts lead to improved
health and economic outcomes, especially for those who receive SNAP as
children.
Limiting access to nutrition assistance could be particularly
harmful for people with significant health care needs, such as diabetes
or hypertension, who may also have trouble maintaining their health
while keeping a job. Many people turn to public assistance programs
because they face significant health or family challenges that limit
their ability to work or reduce their ability to compete for a limited
supply of jobs. Physical and mental health conditions that limit an
individual's ability to work or limit the amount or kind of work the
individual can do are much more common among public benefit recipients
than among the general population, research shows.\3\ Taking access to
nutrition assistance away from people with serious health conditions
could negatively affect their health, which could make it even more
difficult for them to maintain employment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pamela L. Loprest and Elaine Maag, ``Disabilities among TANF
Recipients: Evidence from the NHIS,'' Urban Institute, May 2009, http:/
/www.urban.org/research/publication/disabilities-among-tanf-recipients-
evidence-nhis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Food insecurity increases the risk of negative physical and mental
health outcomes
Food insecurity is a risk factor for negative psychological and
health outcomes.\4\ (The U.S. Department of Agriculture defines food
insecurity as a ``lack of consistent access to enough food for an
active, healthy life.'' \5\) Food insecurity has deleterious impacts on
health through increases in the prevalence and severity of diet-related
disease, such as obesity, type 2 diabetes, heart disease, stroke, and
some cancers.^6-8
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Hartline-Grafton, H. (2017). The Impact of Poverty, Food
Insecurity, & Poor Nutrition on Health and Well-Being. Washington,
D.C.: Food Research & Action Center.
\5\ Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
(2018). Definitions of Food Security. Available at https://
www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-
us/definitions-of-food-security.aspx Accessed October 3, 2018.
\6\ Franklin B. Jones, A., Love, D., Puckett, S., Macklin, J., &
White-Means, S. (2012). Exploring mediators of food insecurity and
obesity: a review of recent literature. Journal of Community Health.
37(1), 253-264.
\7\ Berkowitz, S., A., Karter, A., J., Corbie-Smith, G., Seligman,
H. K., Ackroyd, S.A., Barnard, L.S., Atlas, S.J., & Wexler, D.J.
(2018). Food insecurity, food ``deserts,'' and glycemic control in
patients with diabetes: a longitudinal analysis. Diabetes Care, 19,
171981.
\8\ Gregory, C., A., & Coleman-Jensen, A. (2017). Food insecurity,
chronic disease, and health among working-age adults. Economic Research
Report, 235. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic
Research Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, because of limited financial resources, those who are
food-insecure--with our without existing disease--may use coping
strategies to stretch budgets that are harmful for health, such as
engaging in cost-related medication underuse or non-adherence;
^9-11 postponing or forgoing preventives or needed medical
care; ^12-13 and forgoing the foods needed for special
medical diets (e.g., diabetic diets).\14\ Not surprisingly, research
shows that household food insecurity is a strong predictor of higher
health care utilization and increased health care
costs.^15-16
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\9\ Herman, D., Afulani, P., Coleman-Jensen, A., & Harrison, G.G.
(2015). Food insecurity and cost-related medication underuse among
nonelderly adults in a nationally representative sample: American
Journal of Public Health, 105(10), 48-59.
\10\ Afulani, P., Herman, D., Coleman-Jensen, A., & Harrison G.G.
(2015). Food insecurity and health outcomes among older adults: The
role of cost-related medication underuse. Journal of Nutrition in
Gerontology and Geriatrics, 34(3), 319-343.
\11\ Knight, C.K., Probst, J.C., Liese, A., D., Sercy, E., & Jones,
S.J. (2016). Household food insecurity and medication ``scrimping''
among U.S. adults with diabetes. Public Health [Nutrition], 19(6),
1103-1111.
\12\ Mayer, V.L., McDonough, K., Seligman, H., Mitra, N., & Long,
J.A. (2016). Food insecurity, coping strategies and glucose control in
low-income patients with diabetes. Public Health Nutrition, 19(6),
1103-1111.
\13\ Kushel, M.B., Gupta, R., Gee, L., & Haas, J.S. (2006). Housing
instability and food insecurity as barriers to health care among low-
income Americans. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 21, 71-77.
\14\ Seligman, H.K., Jacobs, E.A., Lopez, A., Tschann, J., &
Fernandez, A. (2012). Food insecurity and glycemic control among low-
income patients with type 2 diabetes. Diabetes Care, 35(2), 233-238.
\15\ Tarasuk, V., Cheng, J., de Oliveira, D., Dachner, N.,
Gundersen, C., & Kurdyak, P. (2015). Association between household food
insecurity and annual health care costs. Canadian Medical Association
Journal, 187 (14), E429-436.
\16\ Berkowitz, S.A., Basu, S., Meigs, J.B., & Seligman, H. (2017).
Food insecurity and health expenditures in the United States, 2011-
2013. Health Services Research, 53(3), 1600-1620.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP decreases food insecurity
Overall, research shows that SNAP is effective at reducing food
insecurity.^17-19 According to one estimate, SNAP reduces
food insecurity by approximately 30 percent.\20\ SNAP, therefore, is an
effective anti-hunger program, and more eligible people need to be
connected to the program given the current high rates of food
insecurity in the nation. Nearly one in eight American households
experience food insecurity during the year.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Mabli, J., & Worthington, J. (2014). Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program participation and child food security. Pediatrics,
133(4), 1-10.
\18\ Ratcliffe, C., McKernan, S.M., & Zhang, S. (2011). How much
does the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program reduce food
insecurity? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 93(4), 1082-
1098.
\19\ Nord, M. (2012). How much does the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program alleviate food insecurity? Evidence from recent
programme leavers. Public Health Nutrition, 15(5), 811-817.
\20\ Ratcliffe, C., McKernan, S.M., & Zhang, S. (2011). How much
does the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program reduce food
insecurity? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 93(4), 1082-
1098.
\21\ Coleman-Jensen, A., Rabbit, M.P., Gregory, C.A. & Singh, A.
(2018). Household food insecurity in the United States in 2017.
Economic Research Service Report, 256, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP is associated with decreased health care costs
Research demonstrates that SNAP reduces health care utilization and
costs.^22-24 For example, a national study revealed that SNAP
participation was associated with lower health care costs.\25\ On
average, low-income adults participating in SNAP incurred nearly 25
percent less in health care costs in 12 month, including those paid by
private or public insurance, than low-income adults not participating
in SNAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Gregory, C.A., & Deb, P. (2015). Does SNAP improve your
health? Food Policy, 50, 11-19.
\23\ Berkowitz, S.A., Seligman, H.K., Rigdon, J., Meigs, J.B., &
Basu, S. (2017). Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
participation and health care expenditures among low-income adults.
JAMA Internal Medicine, 177(11), 1642-1649.
\24\ Seligman, H.K., Bolger, A.F., Guzman, D., Lopez, A., &
Bibbins-Domingo, K. (2014). Exhaustion of food budgets at month's end
and hospital admissions for hyperglycemia. Health Affairs, 33(1), 116-
123.
\25\ Berkowitz, S.A., Seligman, H.K., Rigdon, J., Meigs, J.B., &
Basu, S. (2017). Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
participation and health care expenditures among low-income adults.
JAMA Internal Medicine, 177(11), 1642-1649.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP is associated with improved physical and mental health
SNAP improves children, adult, and senior health outcomes,
including physical and mental health.\26\ For instance, SNAP increases
the probability of self-reporting ``excellent'' or ``good health,''
\27\ lowers the risk of poor glucose control (for those with
diabetes),\28\ and has a protective effect on mental health.\29\
Journal SNAP also helps reduce stress for struggling individuals and
families worried about finances, and stress is highly correlated with
poor health outcomes.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Hartline-Grafton, H. (2017). SNAP and Public Health: The Role
of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program in Improving the
Health and Well-Being of Americans. Washington, D.C.: Food Research &
Action Center.
\27\ Gregory, C.A., & Deb, P. (2015). Does SNAP improve your
health? Food Policy, 50, 11-19.
\28\ Mayer, V.L., McDonough, K., Seligman, H., Mitra, N., & Long,
J.A. (2016). Food insecurity, coping strategies and glucose control in
low-income patients with diabetes. Public Health Nutrition, 19(6),
1103-1111.
\29\ Leung, C.W., Epel, E.S., Willett, W.C., Rimm, E.B., & Laraia,
B.A. (2015). Household food insecurity is positively associated with
depression among low-income Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
participants and income-eligible nonparticipants. Journal of Nutrition,
145(3), 622-627.
\30\ Juster, R.-P., McEwen, B.S., & Lupien, S.J. (2010). Allostatic
load biomarkers of chronic stress and impact on health and cognition.
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35(1), 2-16.
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Area Waivers and Individual Exemptions Provide Ways to Modestly
Ameliorate the Harsh Impact of Arbitrary Time Limits
Federal law limits SNAP eligibility for childless unemployed and
underemployed adults age 18-50 (except for those who are exempt) to
just 3 months out of every 3 years unless they are able to obtain and
maintain an average of 20 hours a week of employment. This rule in its
current form is harsh and unfair. It harms vulnerable people by denying
them food benefits at a time when they most need it and it does not
result in increased employment and earnings.\31\ At least 500,000 low-
income individuals nationwide lost SNAP in 2016 due to the time limit.
This put their food security at risk. And, by time-limiting food
assistance to this group, Federal law has shifted the burden of
providing food to these unemployed individuals from SNAP to local
charities, states, and cities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ A 2002 study that looked at recipients after leaving SNAP
found that while many were employed, they had low earnings, and between
\1/3\ and roughly \2/3\ of SNAP leavers had household incomes below the
poverty line. (This study did not examine the effects of the time limit
on employment.) See Elizabeth M. Dagata, ``Assessing the Self-
Sufficiency of Food Stamp Leavers,'' Economic Research Service, USDA,
September 2002 , https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/
?pubid=46645. More recent research finds small increases in employment,
but much larger decreases in SNAP participation. For example, one
recent working paper found that the time limit increased work by two
percentage points, but decreased participation by ten percentage
points. (Timothy Harris, ``Do SNAP Work Requirements Work?'' Upjohn
Institute Working Paper, 19-297, https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1315&context=
up_workingpapers.)
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Under the law, states have some flexibility to ameliorate the
impact of the cutoff. They can request a waiver of the time limit for
areas within the state that have ten percent or higher unemployment
rates or, based on other economic indicators, have ``insufficient
jobs.'' Moreover, states have discretion to exempt individuals from the
time limit by utilizing a pool of exemptions (referred to as ``15
percent'' exemptions). While the 2018 Farm Bill modified the number of
exemptions that states can receive each year from 15 percent to 12
percent, it did not change their ability to carry over unused
exemptions forward.
Proposed Rule Undermining Law's Safety Valves Should Be Rejected
Feeding America strongly opposes the proposed rule changes that
would expose even more people to the arbitrary food cutoff policy by
limiting state flexibility regarding area waivers and individual
exemptions. By the Administration's own calculations, the proposed rule
would take food away from 755,000 low-income Americans, cutting food
benefits by $15 billion over 10 years. This is the equivalent of around
8.5 billion meals lost from the tables of individuals. The
Administration does not estimate any improvements in health or
employment among the affected population.
The proposed rule would make it harder for areas with elevated
unemployment rates to qualify for waivers of the time limit by adding a
seven percent unemployment rate floor as a condition.
The proposed rule would make it harder for states to obtain and
implement area waivers by dropping statewide waivers except when a
state triggers extended benefits under Unemployment Insurance. It would
unduly limit the economic factors considered in assessing an area's
eligibility for a waiver (e.g., by no longer allowing employment to
population ratios that demonstrate economic weakness to qualify areas
for waivers). It would undermine efficient state implementation of area
waivers by limiting their duration to 12 months and delaying their
start dates until after USDA processes the request. In addition, the
proposed rule would remove states' ability to use exemptions
accumulated prior to the rule's implementation as well limit the time
states' have to use exemptions they receive in the future. [Add any
examples or details about how these proposals would affect your state,
or a region in your state.]
The Department provides little analysis to explain its conclusions
about the impacts the changes would have on individuals and population
groups nor of realistic plans to avert harm from those changes. USDA
merely asserts its expectation that \2/3\ of those individuals made
newly subject to the time limit ``would not meet the requirements for
failure to engage meaningfully in work or work training.'' Moreover,
while the Department concedes that the proposed changes ``have the
potential for disparately impacting certain protected groups due to
factors affecting rates of employment of these groups, [it] find[s]
that implementation of mitigation strategies and monitoring by the
Civil Rights Division of FNS will lessen these impacts.'' But no
explanation of the mitigation strategies and monitoring is provided, so
there is no opportunity for us to comment on whether the acknowledged
disparate impact will in fact be mitigated.
Proposal Does Not Improve Employment Outcomes--and Would Undermine
Investments in Programs that Do
Time Limits and Work Reporting Requirements Do Not Encourage Employment
The proposed rule does not require states to offer any work
opportunities or employment and training activities to individuals
subject to the time limit. Historically, many states have chosen not to
help people subject to the time limit find qualifying work or training
activities.\32\ Many people who are willing to participate in such
activities will lose SNAP if they cannot find a countable activity--
which does not include job search--on their own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Nune Phillips, ``SNAP and Work,'' Center for Law and Social
Policy, January 2018, https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/
publications/2018/01/2018_snapandwork.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some state and local leaders have worked hard over the past decade
to intentionally engage SNAP participants in high-quality programs and
develop partnerships for SNAP Employment & Training (E&T). However,
these efforts, still in early stages, require substantial resources and
capacity to deliver outcomes. This investment in quality, high-
intensity programs will likely shift as some states seek to spread
limited SNAP E&T resources thinly to help more people meet SNAP time
limit rules. The resulting low-intensity SNAP E&T programs have proven
to be ineffective in moving SNAP recipients into jobs that will allow
them to achieve economic security.
If SNAP recipients do manage to find low-wage jobs to meet work
reporting requirements, they do not fare any better in the long run
than those in low-intensity SNAP E&T programs. Lessons learned from
TANF, SNAP, and other programs demonstrate that work reporting
requirements are not effective in connecting people to living-wage
jobs.\33\ As laid out by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in
a review of rigorous evaluations, research shows that employment
increases among individuals subject to work reporting requirements were
modest and faded over time. In nearly all of the approximately dozen
programs evaluated, employment among recipients not subject to work
reporting requirements was the same as or higher than employment among
individuals subject to work reporting requirements within 5 years.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Ladonna Pavetti, Work Requirements Don't Cut Poverty, Evidence
Shows, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 2016, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/work-requirements-dont-
cut-poverty-evidence-shows.
\34\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work reporting requirements are not only ineffectual but have
opportunity costs: the time that a SNAP recipient loses in low-
intensity programs or low-wage jobs simply to meet requirements could
have been spent obtaining skills and credentials, finding a quality
job, and increasing their earnings. A much better focus for public
policy is to invest in strategies that support people to develop skills
and access training that prepares them for jobs that pay living wages
and foster an economy that creates more quality jobs with fair wages.
Workforce Systems to Serve those Subject to the Time Limit are
Underfunded
Even if states offer services to individuals newly subject to the
time limits, many will offer low-intensity services, aimed primarily at
providing recipients with enough hours of participation to meet the
requirements, rather than high quality services.
Existing workforce systems, which are chronically under-funded, are
not often designed to serve the range of needs of all those subject to
the time limit. Some struggling workers will have substantial
stabilization needs, e.g., emergency housing, transportation, and
dependent care. As people surmount those barriers, meeting a need as
basic as food is paramount. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
found that SNAP participants subject to the time limit are more likely
than other SNAP participants to lack basic job skills like reading,
writing, and basic math.\35\ People should not be punished for
grappling with hardship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Food Stamp Employment and Training Program: Better Data Needed
to Understand Who Is Served and What The Program Achieves, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, March 2003, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/240/237571.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instead of penalizing people for needing assistance to put food on
the table, USDA should consider ways to create a foundation for long-
term economic success. Voluntary SNAP E&T programs, for instance, do
not subject individuals to sanctions that increase food insecurity. In
fact, research shows that voluntary programs can significantly increase
employment, while mandatory SNAP E&T programs withhold basic assistance
if individuals cannot meet participation requirements in a given
month.\36\ To attract SNAP recipients to voluntary SNAP E&T programs,
states can partner with trusted service providers that operate programs
with a successful track record. Furthermore, mandating participation in
employment or training programs requires participating organizations to
spend time tracking attendance and not serving clients with the
programs they need to succeed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Ibid., 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Proposed Rule Would Harm People Who Already Struggle to Afford
Housing
The lack of affordable housing is a nationwide crisis, with more
than eight million households paying more than \1/2\ of their income on
rent.\37\ People whose rent is unaffordable have less money to spend on
other necessities, such as food, healthcare, and transportation. For
example, families that spend more than \1/2\ of their income on rent in
order to avoid eviction and homelessness spend on average $190 less per
month on food compared to families that spend less than 30 percent of
their income on rent.\38\ In fact, from 2001 to 2016, many low-income
households across the country saw their rents increase as their incomes
stagnated or decreased, meaning they have less money left over each
month and are likely at higher risk of food insecurity. People
experiencing homelessness also face difficulty affording food, which is
often compounded by not having places to safely store and prepare food
items. For people struggling to afford a place to live, SNAP is a vital
lifeline that helps prevent food insecurity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ ``Worst Case Housing Needs 2017 Report to Congress,'' U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, August 9, 2017, https://
www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Worst-Case-Housing-
Needs.pdf.
\38\ ``The State of the Nation's Housing 2018,'' Joint Center for
Housing Studies of Harvard University, 2018, 31, https://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_
State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule would limit states' flexibility to mitigate the
harmful effects of the time limit. Without this flexibility, it's
likely that many people could lose access to nutrition assistance. For
people with severe housing cost burden--or those who spend 50 percent
or more of their income on rent--limiting access to nutrition
assistance could have serious repercussions for their housing
stability, food security, and health.
Limiting access to nutrition assistance could be particularly
harmful for people who face housing instability or homelessness. Many
people turn to public assistance programs such as SNAP because they
face significant challenges with affording everyday necessities,
including a safe place to live. Three in four people who qualify for
Federal rental assistance that would make rent affordable don't receive
it because of limited funding, making SNAP even more vital.\39\ In
addition, low-income individuals with poor health are oftentimes one
injury or illness away from falling into homelessness. Without food
assistance, people who were already struggling to pay rent may have to
choose between paying rent or putting food on the table, increasing
their risk of eviction and homelessness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ ``Three Out of Four Low-Income At-Risk Renters Do Not Receive
Federal Rental Assistance,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
August 8, 2017, https://www.cbpp.org/three-out-of-four-low-income-at-
risk-renters-do-not-receive-federal-rental-assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homelessness--which is primarily caused by the lack of affordable
housing--can contribute to new health issues and worsen existing ones.
For example, people who live outdoors or in a homeless shelter
oftentimes don't have a secure place to store medication or prepare the
foods needed to manage health conditions, such as diabetes.
Furthermore, soup kitchens and shelters are often not conducive to
maintaining a healthy diet since many offer meals with high sugar,
salt, and starch content.\40\ Homelessness itself also creates
additional barriers to employment, because individuals do not have easy
access to computers and phones to apply for jobs, or showers and
laundry facilities to maintain personal hygiene. Taking nutrition
assistance away from people experiencing homelessness could therefore
make it even more difficult to find and maintain employment and become
stably housed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ ``Homelessness and Health: What's the Connection?'' National
Health Care for the Homeless Council, 2011, https://www.nhchc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/Hln_health_fact
sheet_Jan10.pdf.

Restricting a state's waiver authority and use of individual
exemptions will harm women who want to work but face challenges in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
receiving and reporting 20 hours of work each week.

Women with low incomes may face particular barriers to consistently
working (and reporting) 20 hours of work per week. Women are over-
represented in the low-wage workforce,\41\ which is plagued by unstable
and unpredictable work schedules.\42\ Compared to women's
representation in the overall workforce, women of virtually all races
and ethnicities are over-represented in low-wage jobs (typically paying
less than $11.50 per hour).\43\ Of the nearly 22.6 million people
working in low-wage jobs, \2/3\ are women.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., Interactive Map: Women And Men In The
Low-Wage Workforce (July 20, 2018), https://nwlc.org/resources/
interactive-map-women-and-men-low-wage-workforce/.
\42\ See generally Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., Collateral Damage:
Scheduling Challenges for Workers in Low-Wage Jobs and Their
Consequences (Apr. 2017), available at https://nwlc-
ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Collateral-
Damage.pdf (hereinafter ``Collateral Damage'').
\43\ Nat'l Women's Law Ctr. calculations based on IPUMS 2018, supra
note 4.
\44\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The unpredictable and unstable work schedules that are common in
retail, food service, and other low-wage jobs can prevent women from
working 20 hours per week, every week. Many low-wage jobs lack paid
leave,\45\ which presents another obstacle for women with caregiving
responsibilities \46\ for people outside of the narrow time limit
caregiving exemption. In addition, many low-wage jobs offer only part-
time work, despite many workers' need and desire for full-time
hours.\47\ And the combination of insufficient hours and variable
schedules can impede women from working more than one job to make ends
meet.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Andrea Johnson, et al., Stepping Up: New Policies and
Strategies Supporting Parents in Low-Wage Jobs and Their Children 22
(Aug. 2018), available at https://nwlc-
ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/
v2_final_nwlc_SteppingUp
KelloggReport.pdf.
\46\ Women perform the majority of caregiving. See Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, American Time Use Survey, Table A-1.
Time spent in detailed primary activities and percent of the civilian
population engaging in each activity, averages per day by sex, 2017
annual averages (2018), available at https://www.bls.gov/tus/
a1_2017.pdf.
\47\ Collateral Damage, supra note 19, at 2.
\48\ Collateral Damage, supra note 19, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, many women, particularly those in low-wage jobs, face
discrimination and harassment at work.\49\ Between 2012 and 2016, 36
percent of women who filed sexual harassment charges also alleged
retaliation, such as lost hours or job loss.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ See, e.g., Rest. Opportunities Ctrs. United & Forward
Together, The Glass Floor: Sexual Harassment in the Restaurant Industry
5 (2014), available at http://rocunited.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/
REPORT_The-Glass-Floor-Sexual-Harassment-in-the-Restaurant-Industry
2.pdf; Human Rights Watch, Cultivating Fear: The Vulnerability of
Immigrant Farmworkers in the U.S. to Sexual Violence and Sexual
Harassment (May 2012), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/
15/cultivating-fear/vulnerability-immigrant-farmworkers-us-sexual-
violence-and-sexual (documenting pervasive sexual harassment and
violence among immigrant farmworker women); Irma Morales Waugh,
Examining the Sexual Harassment Experiences of Mexican Immigrant
Farmworking Women, 16 Violence Against Women 237, 241 (Jan. 2010),
available at http://vaw.sagepub.com/content/16/3/237.abstract (80% of
female farmworkers in California's Central Valley reported experiencing
some form of sexual harassment); Unite Here Local 1, Hands Off, Pants
On: Sexual Harassment In Chicago's Hospitality Industry (July 2016),
available at https://www.handsoffpantson.org/wp-content/uploads/
HandsOffReportWeb.pdf (58% of hotel workers and 77% of casino workers
surveyed reported being sexually harassed by a guest); Hart Res.
Assoc., Key Findings From a Survey of Women Fast Food Workers (Oct. 5,
2016), available at http://hartresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/
Fast-Food-Worker-Survey-Memo-10-5-16.pdf (nationwide survey of workers
in the fast food industry found nearly 40% of the women reported
experiencing unwanted sexual behaviors on the job, and 21% of those
workers reported that they suffered negative workplaces consequences
after raising the harassment with their employer).
\50\ Amanda Rossie, Jasmine Tucker & Kayla Patrick, Nat'l Women's
Law Ctr., Out of the Shadows: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment Charges
Filed By Working Women 8 (Aug. 2018), available at https://nwlc-
ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/
SexualHarassmentReport.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of these factors can make it difficult for low-income working
women to satisfy SNAP's 20 hour per week reporting requirement. As a
result, women struggling with underemployment face a double risk: if
their employer schedules them for fewer hours, then their wages
decrease, and they are at risk of losing SNAP benefits. Even women who
happen to receive enough hours to meet the time limit reporting
requirement are still at risk of losing benefits if they are unable to
meet burdensome administrative requirements to document their hours of
work.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ See Robin Fudowitz, MaryBeth Musumeci & Cornelia Hall, Kaiser
Family Found., Year End Review: December State Data for Medicaid Work
Requirements in Arkansas (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/
issue-brief/state-data-for-medicaid-work-requirements-in-arkansas/
(noting that nearly all of the Arkansas Medicaid enrollees not exempt
from the reporting requirement did not report any work activities,
which could result from difficulty accessing the online reporting
portal).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Proposed Rule Is Likely to Have a Disparate Impact on People of
Color
People of color face significant disparities in access to and
utilization of care, and often fare worse than white people on measures
of health status and health outcomes.\52\ In the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the Department concedes that the proposed changes ``have
the potential for disparately impacting certain protected groups due to
factors affecting rates of employment of these groups, [it] find[s]
that implementation of mitigation strategies and monitoring by the
Civil Rights Division of FNS will lessen these impacts.'' The
Department is correct in noting that a consequence of restricting the
ability of states to request waivers will disproportionately affect
certain groups, because people of color have far higher unemployment
rates than white adults.\53\ But no explanation of the mitigation
strategies and monitoring is provided, so there is no opportunity for
us to comment on whether the acknowledged disparate impact will in fact
be mitigated. However, if the proposed rule results in higher rates of
people of color losing SNAP benefits, this could exacerbate existing
racial and ethnic disparities in health status.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Samantha Artiga, et al., ``Key Facts on Health and Health care
By Race and Ethnicity,'' Kaiser Family Found[a]tion, June 07, 2016,
https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/report/key-facts-on-health-and-
health-care-by-race-and-ethnicity/.
\53\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/
unemployment-rate-and-employment-population-ratio-vary-by-race-and-
ethnicity.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waivers Should Not Be Determined Predominantly by The Unemployment Rate
The Department suggests that insufficient jobs are reflected in
unemployment data, but that data excludes key evidence, such as
unemployed persons who searched for work in the previous year but not
in the past 4 weeks, and workers who are part-time for economic
reasons. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, Blacks are twice
as likely than Whites to have searched for work in the previous year
but not in the past 4 weeks, and Latinos are 66 percent more likely
than Whites to work part-time for economic reasons.\54\ These and other
data points suggest that the proposed core standard for determining
lack of sufficient jobs, unemployment data, disproportionately impacts
protected classes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ ``People in the Labor Force and Not in the Labor Force by
Selected Characteristics, 2017 Annual Averages,'' U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2017/
home.htm; ``Employed and Unemployed Full- and Part-time Workers by Age,
[Sex], Race, and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity,'' U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, December 2018, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat08.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
The Administration proposed rule seeks to make changes explicitly
not intended by Congress, which just concluded a review and
reauthorization of SNAP in the 2018 Farm Bill and did not make the
changes proposed.
We strongly oppose any administrative action by USDA that would
expose more people to this time limit policy that cuts people from the
program, thereby cutting their benefits, and putting them at greater
risk for food insecurity and the host of associated negative
consequences. Under the law, states have the flexibility to waive areas
within the state that have experienced elevated unemployment. The rules
governing areas' eligibility for waivers have been in place for nearly
20 years and the waiver rules have proven to be reasonable,
transparent, and manageable for states to operationalize. Adding
additional barriers to accessing nutritious food will make it even more
difficult for individuals already facing economic inequity to find and
maintain employment. By failing to consider existing disparities, the
proposed policy will only exacerbate food insecurity in our county. Any
change that would restrict, impede, or add uncertainty to states'
current ability to waive areas with elevated unemployment should not be
pursued.
Feeding America strongly opposes the proposed rule that would
expose even more people to the arbitrary SNAP food cutoff policy and
harm our individuals facing food insecurity.
The only action we encourage USDA to take with respect to this time
limit rule that impacts Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents is to
propose its elimination. Restoring SNAP's ability to provide food
assistance to impoverished unemployed people would be a powerful policy
improvement that would reduce food insecurity among those seeking work.
Sincerely,

Kate Leone,
Chief Government Relations Officer,
Feeding America.
attachment 1
Feeding America Food Banks Brace for Increased Need for Food Assistance
As Up to One Million Americans Lose Access to Food Stamps
April 8, 2016

Feeding America, the nation's largest domestic hunger-relief
organization, today warned that many food banks across the country will
struggle to meet a significant increase in the need for emergency food
assistance as between 500,000 and one million Americans are cut from
the Supplement Nutrition Assistance Program (http://
www.feedingamerica.org/about-us%20press-room%20feeding-america-food-
banks.html) (SNAP, commonly known as food stamps) due to the return in
many states of a harsh 3 month time limit on SNAP benefits for certain
SNAP recipients.
``This is the equivalent of approximately $75-150 million in lost
SNAP benefits per month on average, which equates to between 27 and 54
million meals per month that SNAP recipients will lose,'' said Diana
Aviv, CEO of Feeding America. ``These totally unnecessary cuts would
increase demand on the nation's charitable food system at a time when
food banks and other hunger-relief groups are stretched to meet
sustained high need.''
These cuts will affect unemployed adults aged 18-49 who are not
disabled or raising minor children, also known as ``Able Bodied Adults
Without Dependents'' ([ABAWDs]). [ABAWDs] are limited to 3 months of
SNAP benefits in any 36 month period unless they are employed or
participating in a training program for at least 20 hours a week. Even
SNAP beneficiaries who are diligently looking for work and whose state
does not offer them a slot in a work or training program are faced with
losing their benefits.
This year 22 states chose to, or were required to, re-impose time
limits in all or part of the state for the first time since 2008.
States are not required to offer SNAP recipients a place in a work
or training program and only five states have pledged to offer a
qualifying work slot to every individual subject to the 3 month time
limit. Those impacted by the time limit face significant barriers to
finding work or enrolling in training programs--25 percent do not have
a high school degree, 33 percent face physical and mental limitations,
and 38 percent were formerly incarcerated. They are also among the
poorest SNAP recipients with an average income of about $2,000 per
year.
``We are deeply concerned about the impact on some of the poorest
and most vulnerable people in our communities. SNAP is often the only
program providing benefits to unemployed adults without dependent
children, and the loss of benefits will be catastrophic for those
affected. The notion that we can readily make up for this unnecessary
loss is just not realistic'' Aviv said.
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) helps millions
of low-income Americans put food on the table, providing benefits that
are timely, targeted and temporary. SNAP responds quickly to changes in
need, growing in response to increases in poverty and unemployment and
shrinking as need abates. The nutrition assistance program is targeted
at our most vulnerable citizens, predominantly serving households with
children, elderly and disabled members.
attachment 2
Feeding America Statement On Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents
Proposed Rule
Attributed to Kate Leone, Chief Government Relations Officer
December 20, 2018

``Today, the Administration released a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking regarding Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs) and
their receipt of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
benefits. Feeding America, the nation's largest domestic hunger-relief
organization, is deeply dismayed by this proposal, which will force
more adults into food insecurity by creating unreasonable restrictions
on food assistance.
``According to recent reports, the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) projects that the proposed rule would cut $15
billion in benefits from the program over a decade, which Feeding
America calculates would result in a loss of more than 8.5 billion
meals from the tables of individuals facing hunger. USDA's most recent
figures cite 40 million Americans across the United States facing food
insecurity.
``Presently, unemployed or underemployed adults without dependents
face strict time limits for receiving benefits if they are unable to
find work. Specifically, adults ages 18 to 50 who do not receive
disability benefits and do not have children are only able to receive
SNAP benefits for 3 months, over the course of a 3 year period, unless
they are working at least 20 hours a week or taking part in a
comparable workforce program or training.
``Current law permits states to waive this rule temporarily in
areas with elevated unemployment. Nearly every state has opted to use
these waivers at some time. The proposed rule would effectively do away
with state waivers by restricting the underlying criteria upon which
waiver requests can be granted and expanding the grounds upon which
they can be denied.
``By restricting access to ABAWD waivers, this rule would increase
the risk of food insecurity for nearly one million people. In turn,
that puts pressure on hunger-relief organizations and it is unlikely
that our network of food banks can shoulder this burden. For each meal
provided by Feeding America, SNAP provides 12 meals. Private charity
simply cannot compensate for the breadth of the impact of cuts to the
program.
``This rule is aimed at individuals who are most in need of our
help--people who without resources who are unemployed. While
participating in SNAP, the average income of an unemployed or
underemployed adult without a family is just 18 percent of the poverty
line, or about $2,171, per year, for a single-person household in 2018.
On average, that person's SNAP benefit equates to $170 per month. It is
inconceivable that we would deny food assistance to a person trying to
live on just over $2,000 annually.
``Today, we anticipate the farm bill being signed into law. During
the years of debate and negotiations to develop that legislation, there
were many ideas similar to the Administration's proposed rule. Congress
soundly rejected all of them, and the farm bill makes improvements to
SNAP by increasing investments in job training and proven workforce
management approaches.
``Once published in the Federal Register in the coming days, the
public will have 60 days to generate comments on this proposal, in
which Feeding America will actively participate. It is imperative that
the Administration hear just how dangerous this proposal is to the
health and well-being of many Americans. We encourage the
Administration to rescind this rule.''
attachment 3
Feeding America Opposes Harmful SNAP Proposed Rule Released by USDA
Attributed to Kate Leone, Chief Government Relations Officer
February 1, 2019

``Feeding America is disappointed that the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) continues to push a policy that will take
billions of meals away from people struggling with hunger with the
publication of their proposed rule to restrict states' ability to waive
time limits on Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
benefits in high unemployment areas. USDA projects that the proposed
rule would cut $15 billion in benefits from the program over a decade.
Feeding America, the nation's largest domestic hunger-relief
organization, calculates that this would result in a loss of more than
8.5 billion meals from the tables of people facing hunger. This rule
would increase the risk of food insecurity for nearly one million
people, which would put additional pressure on our network of 200
member food banks. Private charity simply cannot compensate for the
breadth of the impact of cuts to the program, as SNAP provides 12 meals
for each meal provided by Feeding America.
``Presently, unemployed or underemployed adults without dependents
face strict time limits for receiving benefits if they are unable to
find work. Specifically, adults ages 18 to 50 who do not receive
disability benefits and do not have children are only able to receive
SNAP benefits for 3 months, over the course of a 3 year period, unless
they are working at least 20 hours a week or taking part in a
comparable workforce program or training.
``Current law permits states to waive this rule temporarily in
areas with elevated unemployment. Nearly every state has opted to use
these waivers at some time. The proposed rule would effectively do away
with state waivers by restricting the underlying criteria upon which
waiver requests can be granted and expanding the grounds upon which
they can be denied.
``This rule is aimed at individuals who are in great need of our
help--people without resources who are unemployed. While participating
in SNAP, the average income of an unemployed or underemployed adult
without dependents is just 18 percent of the poverty line or about
$2,171 per year in 2018. On average, that person's SNAP benefit equates
to $170 per month. It is inconceivable that we would deny food
assistance to a person trying to live on just over $2,000 annually.
``The reality of low-wage employment is that individuals often face
volatile job schedules and insufficient work hours, even if they are
willing to work more. Over the past several weeks, the government
shutdown provided a stark illustration of the impact one missed
paycheck can make, and how little control workers have over their
schedules. Ironically, this rule poses a threat to low-income workers,
including Federal employees and contractors, who in the event of
another extended shutdown could find their hours insufficient to meet
program rules, threatening access to critical nutrition they need. SNAP
by increasing investments in job training and proven workforce
management approaches.
``Once published in the Federal Register in the coming days, the
public will have 60 days to generate comments on this proposal, in
which Feeding America will actively participate. It is imperative that
the Administration hear just how dangerous this proposal is to the
health and well-being of many Americans. We encourage the
Administration to rescind this rule.''
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Al Lawson, Jr., a Representative in
Congress from Florida; Authored by Center for Law and Social Policy
March 29, 2019

Ms. Sasha Gerstan-Paal,
Chief,
Certification Policy Branch,
Program Development Division,
Food and Nutrition Service,
Alexandria, Virginia

Re: Proposed Rule: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP):
Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents RIN
0584-AE57

Dear Ms. Gerstan-Paal:

I am writing on behalf of the Center for Law and Social Policy
(CLASP). CLASP is a national, nonpartisan, anti-poverty nonprofit
advancing policy solutions for low-income people. We work at both
Federal and state levels, supporting policy and practice that makes a
difference in the lives of people living in conditions of poverty.
CLASP submits the following comments in opposition to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's proposed regulation regarding the time
limits within the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) that
apply to working-age adults without minor children. We are deeply
concerned by attempts to restrict food assistance to individuals for
whom SNAP is essential to meeting their basic needs and providing a
work support. While we strongly support the goal of helping SNAP
recipients obtain and keep quality jobs that enable them to achieve
economic security, we believe the proposed restrictions will not
advance this goal. In fact, because the changes will result in more
people losing their SNAP benefits, they will make it harder to achieve
this goal.
SNAP already has harsh time limits in place requiring states to
limit food assistance to just 3 months out of every 3 years for most
working-age adults without minor children, unless they have a
documented disability or report 20 hours of work or related activities
each week. This policy alone cuts off hundreds of thousands of
unemployed people from food assistance when they need it most. The
proposed rule would make the policy even harsher by taking away food
from even more people struggling to find steady work. By the Trump
Administration's own estimates, approximately 755,000 to 851,000
individuals are at risk of losing food assistance through SNAP under
the proposed rule.
In the general comments that follow, we explain in more detail the
reasons why the Department should immediately withdraw this proposed
regulation. At the close of our general comments, we address major
elements of the proposed rule section by section.
1. Background
SNAP is our nation's most important anti-hunger program. It
provides food assistance to youth, working families, people with
disabilities, seniors, and many more. SNAP helps approximately 39
million people in nearly 20 million households put food on the
table.\1\ In 2015, SNAP lifted approximately 2.1 million Black people
(including one million children) \2\ and an estimated 2.5 million
Latinos (including 1.2 million children) out of poverty.\3\ More than
ten percent of Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) families
receive SNAP benefits,\4\ while many more are likely eligible but
unenrolled due to cultural stigma and insufficient program outreach to
AAPI groups.\5\
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\1\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, ``SNAP Participation,'' Food
and Nutrition Service, September 2018, https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/
sites/default/files/pd/34SNAPmonthly.pdf.
\2\ SNAP Helps Millions of African Americans, Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, updated February 2018, https://www.cbpp.org/
research/food-assistance/snap-helps-millions-of-african-americans.
\3\ SNAP Helps Millions of Latinos, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, updated February 2018, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-
assistance/snap-helps-millions-of-latinos.
\4\ ``Congressional Tri-Caucus Denounces Cuts to the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),'' Congressional Asian Pacific
American Caucus, September 2013, https://capac-chu.house.gov/press-
release/congressional-tri-caucus-denounces-cuts-supplemental-nutrition-
assistance-program-snap.
\5\ Victoria Tran, ``Asian Americans are Falling Through the Cracks
in Data Representation and Social Services,'' Urban Institute, June
2018, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/asian-americans-are-falling-
through-cracks-data-representation-and-social-services.
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In addition to fighting hunger, SNAP encourages work in several
ways.\6\ First, SNAP's structure encourages work because as earnings
rise, benefits phase out gradually. And because of the earned income
disregard, earnings are treated more favorably than other income when
benefits are calculated. Second, SNAP promotes employment by ensuring
people have their basic needs met. Those working and seeking work on
SNAP do not have to worry about when they will get their next meal.
Instead, they can focus their energy on finding and keeping a job.
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\6\ Nune Phillips, SNAP and Work, Center for Law and Social Policy,
January 2018, https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/
2018/01/2018_snapandwork.pdf.
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Access to SNAP Has Positive Effects on Individuals' Long-Term Economic
and Educational Attainment, Which in Turn Contribute to Self-
Sufficiency
The face of hunger in working-age adults is often hidden. It can
look like a single mother denying herself her medication so she can buy
groceries for her family, a college student unable to focus in his
classes, a hungry young adult unsuccessfully trying to find a job in a
competitive labor market without money for interview clothes, or even a
veteran with Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome choosing between rent,
heating, and food after serving our country. Studies have shown that
lack of access to food and proper nutrition exacerbates stress,
anxiety, and depression,\7\ causes sleep disturbances and fatigue, and
impairs cognitive functioning \8\--conditions that are a significant
barrier to finding a job, keeping a job, or getting training to improve
wages.
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\7\ Adrienne O'Neil, Shae E. Quirk, Siobhan Housden, et al.,
``Relationship Between Diet and Mental Health in Children and
Adolescents: A Systematic Review,'' American Journal of Public Health
vol. 104, 10 (2014): e31-42, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC4167
107/.
\8\ Michael W. Green, Peter J. Rogers, Nicola A. Elliman, and Susan
J. Gatenby, ``Impairment of Cognitive Performance Associated with
Dieting and High Levels of Dietary Restraint,'' Physiology & Behavior
55.3 (1994): 447-452, http://www.seven-health.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018/08/Impairment-of-Cognitive-Performance-Associated-with-Dieting-
and-High-Levels-of-Dietary-Restraint-.pdf.
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SNAP is the antidote that helps hungry people become more
employable \9\ and increase wages.\10\ The SNAP program has also been
shown to stimulate economic growth,\11\ improve academic outcomes,\12\
and improve health outcomes.\13\ SNAP benefits allow recipients to
spend less money on food and be better able to afford other basic needs
such as medicine and housing. Subjecting SNAP recipients to time limits
makes it harder, not easier, for them to become self-sufficient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Dottie Rosenbaum, ``The Facts on SNAP, Part 2: SNAP Supports
Work,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 2013, https://
www.cbpp.org/blog/the-facts-on-snap-part-2-snap-supports-work.
\10\ Ibid., 6.
\11\ Nune Phillips, SNAP Contributes to a Strong Economy, Center
for Law and Social Policy, August 2017, https://www.clasp.org/sites/
default/files/SNAP-Contributes-to-a-Strong-Economy.pdf.
\12\ Nisha Beharie, Micaela Mercado, and Mary McKay, ``A Protective
Association between SNAP Participation and Educational Outcomes Among
Children of Economically Strained Households,'' Journal of Hunger &
Environmental Nutrition vol. 12, 2 (2016): 181-192, https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5513186/.
\13\ Steven Carlson and Brynne Keith-Jennings, SNAP Is Linked with
Improved Nutritional Outcomes and Lower Health Care Costs, Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, January 2018, https://www.cbpp.org/
research/food-assistance/snap-is-linked-with-improved-nutritional-
outcomes-and-lower-health-care.
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Further, although pregnant woman are exempt from the time limit on
SNAP benefits, the restrictions will still impact the health of
pregnant women and babies, because they apply to women who do not yet
know that they are pregnant, or who do not yet have medical
documentation of their pregnancies. The U.S. Centers for Disease
Control strongly recommends that even before conceiving, women achieve
a healthy weight and nutritious diet in order to maximize their odds of
a healthy pregnancy.\14\
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\14\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ``Before
Pregnancy: Women'' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://
www.cdc.gov/preconception/women.html.
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Nutrition assistance has been documented to promote healthy birth
outcomes as well as to have long-term benefits for the children of
recipients. Researchers compared the long-term outcomes of individuals
in different areas of the country when SNAP expanded nationwide in the
1960s and early 1970s and found that mothers exposed to SNAP during
pregnancy gave birth to fewer low-birth-weight babies.\15\ If women in
early pregnancy are cut off from nutrition services, the negative
outcomes would extend decades into the future, diminishing their
children's opportunity to thrive in tangible and entirely preventable
ways.\16\ Low-income women are already more likely to have poorer
nutrition and greater stress, which can impair fetal brain development
and health during pregnancy.\17\ Economic stressors, combined with
inadequate prenatal care for low-income pregnant women, are associated
with higher rates of pre-term births and infant mortality.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Douglas Almond, Hillary Hoynes, and Diane Schanzenbach,
``Inside the War on Poverty: The Impact of Food Stamps on Birth
Outcomes,'' The Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(2), May 2011,
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/REST_a_00089; and
Hilary Hoynes, Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, and Douglas Almond, ``Long-
Run Impacts of Childhood Access to the Safety Net,'' American Economic
Review, 106(4): 903-934, April 2016, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
c94b/26c57bb565b566913d2af161e555edeb7f21.pdf.
\16\ Sharon Parrot, et al., Trump ``Public Charge'' Rule Would
Prove Particularly Harsh for Pregnant Women and Children, Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, (May 1, 2018), available at https://
www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/trump-public-charge-rule-
would-prove-particularly-harsh-for-pregnant.
\17\ Tess Lefmann, Terri Combs-Orme, ``Prenatal Stress, Poverty,
and Child Outcomes,'' Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal 31
(2014), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10560-014-0340-x.
\18\ Maternal and Child Health Bureau, Child Health USA 2014:
Prenatal Care, Health Resources and Services Administration, 2014,
https://mchb.hrsa.gov/chusa14/dl/chusa14.pdf; Maternal and Child Health
Bureau, Child Health USA 2013: Barriers to Prenatal Care, Health
Resources and Services Administration, 2014, https://mchb.hrsa.gov/
sites/default/files/mchb/Data/Chartbooks/childhealth2013.pdf; Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Preterm Birth, 2016, https://
www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/MaternalInfantHealth/PretermBirth.htm;
Child Trends, Preterm Births, 2015, https://www.childtrends.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/indicator_1434209915.291.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNAP Already Has Harsh Time Limits and Work Reporting Requirements in
Place
Federal law currently limits adults ages 18-49 without dependent
children or documented disabilities to just 3 months of SNAP in a 36
month period unless they engage in work or work-related activities at
least half time or participate in workfare.\19\ The current rule is
harsh and unfair. When several states reinstated this time limit in
2016 after suspending it due to the Great Recession, at least 500,000
people lost SNAP benefits.\20\ For instance, in a recent Urban
Institute study of the effects of Kentucky's reinstatement of time
limits, researchers found that at least 13,000 adults without dependent
children or documented disabilities lost SNAP benefits because they
reached the 3 month time limit, representing 20 to 22 percent of the
caseload subject to time limits.\21\ If the proposed rule goes into
effect, many more geographic regions will now be required to reinstate
the time limit. Time limits harm vulnerable people by denying them food
benefits at a time when they most need it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, ``Unemployed Adults
Without Children Who Need Help Buying Food Only Get SNAP For Three
Months,'' https://www.cbpp.org/unemployed-adults-without-children-who-
need-help-buying-food-only-get-snap-for-three-months.
\20\ Ed Bolen, Dottie Rosenbaum, Stacy Dean, et al., More Than
500,000 Adults Will Lose SNAP Benefits in 2016 as Waivers Expire,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 2016, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/more-than-500000-adults-will-
lose-snap-benefits-in-2016-as-waivers-expire.
\21\ Elaine Waxman and Nathan Joo, Urban Institute, ``Reinstating
SNAP Work-Related Time Limits,'' March 2019 https://www.urban.org/
research/publication/reinstating-snap-work-related-time-limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
People subject to the time limit are a demographically diverse
population in terms of race, education, and geography. Nearly \1/2\ (47
percent) of the individuals subject to the time limit are ages 18 to
29. Approximately 85 percent have at most a high school diploma or
equivalent. Approximately 45 percent of the people subject to the time
limit are women and, among those who report race, an estimated 48
percent are White, 35 percent are Black, and 13 percent are Latino.\22\
People subject to the time limit face particular employment challenges,
including a lack of reliable transportation, unstable housing
arrangements, engagement with the criminal justice system, unstable
work histories, or undiagnosed physical or mental limitations.\23\ In
particular, those who reside in states that have not expanded Medicaid
are likely to have trouble getting access to a doctor to document their
disability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Steven Carlson, Dorothy Rosenbaum, and Brynne Keith-Jennings,
Who Are the Low-Income Childless Adults Facing the Loss of SNAP in
2016?, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February 2016, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/who-are-the-low-income-childless-
adults-facing-the-loss-of-snap-in-2016.
\23\ Ibid.
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2. Proposal Does Not Encourage Employment and Would Weaken Economy as a
Whole
Time Limits and Work Reporting Requirements Do Not Support Employment
Unlike work reporting requirements in most public assistance
programs, SNAP time limit rules do not require states to offer options
for meeting work reporting requirements before cutting people off
benefits. Historically, most states have chosen not to help people
subject to the time limit find qualifying work or training
activities.\24\ Many individuals will lose SNAP if they cannot find a
qualifying activity--which does not include job search--on their own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ United States Government Accountability Office ``Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program: More Complete and Accurate Information
needed on Employment and Training Programs,'' November 2018, https://
www.gao.gov/assets/700/695632.pdf.
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Lessons learned from TANF, SNAP, and other programs demonstrate
that work reporting requirements are not effective in connecting people
to living-wage jobs.\25\ As laid out by the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities in a review of rigorous evaluations, research shows that
employment increases among individuals subject to work reporting
requirements were modest and faded over time. In nearly all of the
approximately dozen programs evaluated, employment among recipients not
subject to work reporting requirements was the same as or higher than
employment among individuals subject to work reporting requirements
within 5 years.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Ladonna Pavetti, Work Requirements Don't Cut Poverty, Evidence
Shows, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 2016, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/work-requirements-dont-
cut-poverty-evidence-shows.
\26\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work reporting requirements are not only ineffectual but have
opportunity costs: the time that a SNAP recipient loses in low-
intensity programs or low-wage jobs simply to meet requirements could
have been spent obtaining skills and credentials, finding a quality
job, and increasing their earnings. A much better focus for public
policy is to invest in strategies that support people to develop skills
and access training that prepares them for jobs that pay living wages
and foster an economy that creates more quality jobs with fair wages.
Proposal Would Grow Government Bureaucracy
Under the Work Support Strategies (WSS) project, CLASP worked
closely with six states that sought to dramatically improve the
delivery of key work support benefits to low-income families, including
health coverage, nutrition benefits, and child care subsidies through
more effective, streamlined, and integrated approaches. From this work,
we learned that reducing unnecessary steps in the application and
renewal process both reduced burden on caseworkers and made it easier
for families to access and retain the full package of supports that
they need to thrive in work and school. Conversely, additional steps
are burdensome to both caseworkers and participants.
In order to remain compliant with work reporting requirements,
recipients must show proof of work. Failure to submit paperwork, even
if the person meets work reporting requirements, can result in
terminated SNAP benefits and increased caseload churn. For SNAP
oversight agencies, tracking work hours, reviewing proof of work, and
keeping track of who is and is not subject to the work reporting
requirement every month is a considerable undertaking and is prone to
caseworker error. Moreover, because the time limit rules are distinct
from the work registration requirements, states may need to track
compliance separately and provide participants with separate sets of
notices informing them of the consequences for non-compliance, which
further adds to the complexity of administration.
The complexity of the processes and the ensuing churn will also
impose administrative costs on social service offices. People who lose
benefits may later re-apply, which consumes more staff time. One of the
key lessons of the Work Support Strategies project is that every time
that a client needs to bring in a verification or report a change adds
to the administrative burden on caseworkers and increases the
likelihood that clients will lose benefits due to failure to meet one
of the requirements.\27\ The WSS states found that reducing
administrative redundancies and barriers used caseworkers' time more
efficiently and helped with Federal timeliness requirements.\28\ These
administrative requirements in the proposed rule are unnecessarily
burdensome to SNAP agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Julia B. Isaacs, Michael Katz, Ria Amin, Improving the
Efficiency of Benefit Delivery Outcomes from the Work Support
Strategies Evaluation, Urban institute, November 2016, https://
www.urban.org/research/publication/improving-efficiency-benefit-
delivery.
\28\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In particular, USDA's Office of Inspector General found that SNAP's
provisions regarding time limit rules are difficult to implement. The
report finds that states have difficulty implementing time limit rules
because the requirements are very complex. As a result, implementation
of time limit rules can be error prone. The report also quoted state
officials as using terms like ``administrative nightmare'' and
``operational nightmare'' in describing the time limit rules. State
officials also expressed concerns regarding the amount of time and
resources spent implementing time limit provisions.\29\ Many states
have chosen to waive the maximum areas from the time limits in order to
simplify program administration and preserve resources for meaningful
services for participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector
General ``FNS Controls Over SNAP Benefits For Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents'' https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/27601-0002-
31.pdf.
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Proposal Would Undermine Efforts to Provide Meaningful Training Through
Voluntary E&T Programs
Mandated work programs are harmful because they threaten to take
away benefits from people who are unable to comply with arbitrary
rules.\30\ Instead of spending time receiving necessary skills,
resources, and education, recipients must spend time complying with
regulations to keep food on their tables, and states must spend time
and resources on government bureaucracy rather than serving clients
with the programs needed to succeed. Furthermore, mandatory work
programs encourage recipients to enter into the labor market sooner,
with less necessary tools to be successful in finding a stable position
with livable wages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Julia B. Isaacs, Michael Katz, Ria Amin, Improving the
Efficiency of Benefit Delivery Outcomes from the Work Support
Strategies Evaluation, Urban institute, November 2016, https://
www.urban.org/research/publication/improving-efficiency-benefit-
delivery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the past decade, some state and local leaders have worked hard
to intentionally engage SNAP recipients in high-quality, voluntary
programs that give participants the skills and credentials to achieve
lasting economic security and develop partnerships for SNAP Employment
& Training (E&T). The effort to expand high-quality SNAP E&T programs,
still in early stages, require substantial resources and capacity to
deliver outcomes. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) study
notes that ``many states have reported to [FNS] that offering employer-
driven, skills-based, intensive employment and training services, such
as vocational training or work experience, through voluntary programs
yields more engaged participants with stronger outcomes.'' FNS
explained to GAO that ``voluntary programs are less administratively
burdensome than mandatory programs, as they allow states to focus on
serving motivated participants rather than sanctioning non-compliant
individuals.'' \31\ Under the proposed rules, this investment in
quality, high-intensity programs will likely be reduced as some states
will seek to spread limited SNAP E&T resources thinly to help more
people meet SNAP time limit rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instead of penalizing people for being poor and requiring
assistance to put food on the table, USDA should consider ways to
create a foundation for long-term economic success. Voluntary SNAP E&T
programs, for instance, do not subject individuals to sanctions that
increase food insecurity. In fact, research shows that voluntary
programs can significantly increase employment, while mandatory SNAP
E&T programs withhold basic assistance if individuals cannot meet
participation requirements in a given month.\32\ To attract SNAP
recipients to voluntary SNAP E&T programs, states can partner with
trusted service providers that operate programs with a successful track
record. Given these outcomes, in recent years, states have increasingly
moved from mandatory to voluntary SNAP E&T programs.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Ibid., 9.
\33\ United States Government Accountability Office ``Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program: More Complete and Accurate Information
needed on Employment and Training Programs,'' November 2018, https://
www.gao.gov/assets/700/695632.pdf.
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Proposal Would Weaken the Economy as a Whole
SNAP has historically served as an economic stabilizer in changing
times. It helps to shorten recessions and dampen the effects of an
economic cycle in downturn. Without the mitigating effects of SNAP, the
impact of recessions can escalate. The proposed rule inhibits SNAP from
rapidly responding to changing economic conditions, and the resulting
impact on the economy will affect all job seekers. In addition, by the
Administration's own calculations, the proposed rule would take food
away from 755,000 to 851,000 low-income Americans, resulting in a loss
of at least $15 billion in SNAP benefits over 10 years. These cuts will
also have negative economic ripple effects, as SNAP benefits have been
shown to have positive multiplier effects on state and local economies
and to create new agricultural jobs.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Mark M. Zandi, Assessing the Macro Economic Impact of Fiscal
Stimulus 2008, January 2008, https://www.economy.com/markzandi/
documents/Stimulus-Impact-2008.pdf; Kenneth Hanson, The Food Assistance
National Input-Output Multiplier (FANIOM) Model and Stimulus Effects of
SNAP, U.S. Department of Agriculture, October 2013, https://
www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44748/7996_err103_1_.pdf?v=41056;
``The Benefits of Increasing the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program Participation in Your State,'' U.S. Department of Agriculture,
December 2011, https://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/
bc_facts.pdf; ``Chart Book: SNAP Helps Struggling Families Put Food on
the Table,'' Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 2017,
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/chart-book-snap-helps-
struggling-families-put-food-on-the-table#part8.
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3. Proposal Would Have a Disparate Impact on People Trying To Make Ends
Meet
We strongly oppose the proposed rule due to its disproportionate
impact on certain protected classes, including communities of color,
immigrants, and people with disabilities. The Department acknowledges
that the rule will have a disparate impact on some populations. It
notes that the proposed changes ``have the potential for disparately
impacting certain protected groups due to factors affecting rates of
employment of these groups, [it] find[s] that implementation of
mitigation strategies and monitoring by the Civil Rights Division of
FNS will lessen these impacts.'' But no explanation of the mitigation
strategies and monitoring is provided, and we do not believe that
mitigation strategies can be significant enough to fully address the
disproportionate impact of increased food insecurity and poverty on
protected classes.
Harm to Communities of Color
Many people of color face considerable employment challenges and,
under the proposed rule, would be disadvantaged from accessing critical
food assistance. Compared to the national average, rates of food
insecurity are already higher for Black and Latino headed
households.\35\ Work reporting requirements are also part of a long
history of racially-motivated critiques of programs supporting basic
needs, with direct harms to people of color. As discussed in more
detail in the sections that follow, the proposed rule would
disproportionately impact communities of color.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Alisha Coleman-Jensen, Matthew P. Rabbitt, Christian A.
Gregory, et al., Household Food Security in the United States in 2016,
U.S. Department of Agriculture, September 2017, https://
www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/84973/err-237.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Racial Income Disparities Persist in the United States
Due to persisting racial economic disparities and discrimination in
hiring practices, average hourly wages for Black and Latino workers are
substantially lower than their white counterparts.\36\ In 2017, for
adults age 18-64, the poverty rate of the general population is 11%.
That percentage is significantly higher for Latinos who have a poverty
rate of 15% and even higher for Black Americans who have a poverty rate
of 18%.\37\ This makes it more likely that Black and Latino individuals
will benefit from programs that support work by helping them access
nutritious food. The same is true for certain subgroups of Asian and
Pacific Islanders that are particularly at risk of poverty, such as
Marshallese (41% poverty rate), Burmese (38%), Hmong (26.1%) and
Tongans (22.1%).\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Eileen Patten, ``Racial, Gender Wage Gaps Persist in U.S.
Despite Some Progress,'' Pew Research Center, July 2016, http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-gender-wage-gaps-
persist-in-u-s-despite-some-progress/.
\37\ ``POV-01. Age and Sex of All People, Family Members and
Unrelated Individuals Iterated by Income-to-Poverty Ratio and Race,''
U.S. Census Bureau, 2017, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pov/pov-01.html.
\38\ ``American Community Survey 2015 Five Year Estimates, table
DP03,'' U.S. Census Bureau, 2015, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
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Employment Discrimination Limits Access to the Workforce for Many
Immigrants and People of Color
Studies show that racial discrimination remains a key force in the
labor market.\39\ In a 2004 study, researchers randomly assigned names
and quality to resumes and sent them to over 1,300 employment
advertisements. Their results revealed significant differences in the
number of callbacks each resume received based on whether the name
sounded stereotypically White or Black. More recent research indicates
that this racial bias persists. A study from 2013 submitted fake
resumes of nonexistent recent college graduates through online job
applications for positions based in Atlanta, Baltimore, Portland,
Oregon, Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis. Black people were 16%
less likely to get called in for an interview.\40\ Similarly, a 2017
meta-analysis of field experiments on employment discrimination since
1989 found that white Americans applying for jobs receive on average
36% more callbacks than Black people and 24% more callbacks than
Latinos.\41\
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\39\ Robert Manduca, Income Inequality and the Persistence of
Racial Economic Disparities, Sociological Science, March 2018, https://
www.sociologicalscience.com/download/vol-5/march/
SocSci_v5_182to205.pdf.
\40\ Brett Arends, ``In Hiring, Racial Bias is Still a Problem. But
Not Always for Reasons You Think,'' Fortune, November 2014, http://
fortune.com/2014/11/04/hiring-racial-bias/.
\41\ Lincoln Quillian, Devah Pager, Ole Hexel, et al., Meta-
Analysis of Field Experiments Shows No Change in Racial Discrimination
in Hiring over Time, PNAS October 10, 2017 114 (41) 10870-10875,
September 2017, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1706255114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Latino and Black Workers Have Been Hardest Hit by the Structural Shift
Toward Involuntary Part-Time Work
Despite wanting to work more, many low-wage workers struggle to
receive enough hours from their employer to make ends meet. A report
from the Economic Policy Institute found that 6.1 million workers were
involuntary part-time; they preferred to work full-time but were only
offered part-time hours. According to the report, ``involuntary part-
time work is increasing almost five times faster than part-time work
and about 18 times faster than all work.'' \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Lonnie Golden, ``Still Falling Short on Hours and Pay,''
Economic Policy Institute, December 2016, http://www.epi.org/
publication/still-falling-short-on-hours-and-pay-part-time-work-
becoming-new-normal/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Latino and Black workers are much more likely to be involuntarily
part-time (6.8 percent and 6.3 percent, respectively) than whites, of
whom just 3.7 percent work part time involuntarily. And Black people
and Latinos are a higher proportion of involuntary part-time workers,
together representing 41.1 percent of all involuntary part-time
workers. The greater amount of involuntary part-time employment among
Black people and Latinos is primarily due to their having greater
difficulty finding full-time work and more often facing work conditions
in which hours are variable and can be reduced without notice.\43\
Historical racial bias and work conditions, in which hours are variable
and can be reduced without notice, disparately impacts Black people and
Latinos and increases their likelihood of experiencing involuntary
part-time employment.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Ibid.
\44\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
People of Color Are More Likely to Live in Neighborhoods with Poor
Access to Jobs
In recent years, majority-minority neighborhoods have experienced
particularly pronounced declines in job proximity. Proximity to jobs
can affect the employment outcomes of residents and studies show that
people who live closer to jobs are more likely to work.\45\ They also
face shorter job searches and fewer spells of joblessness.\46\ As
residents from households with low-incomes and communities of color
shifted toward suburbs in the 2000s, their proximity to jobs decreased.
Between 2000 and 2012, the number of jobs near the typical Latino and
Black resident in major metropolitan areas declined much more steeply
than for white residents.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Scott W. Allard and Sheldon Danziger, Proximity and
Opportunity: How Residence and Race Affect the Employment of Welfare
Recipients, Housing Policy Debate, September 2000, https://
pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4936/dfd925b78d9e81f8d5d44b95b6a15f8ba0ab.pdf.
\46\ Elizabeth Kneebone and Natalie Holmes, ``The Growing Distance
Between People and Jobs in Metropolitan America,'' Brookings
Institution, March 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-
growing-distance-between-people-and-jobs-in-metropolitan-america/.
\47\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to Overcriminalization Of Neighborhoods of Color, People of Color
Are More Likely to Have Previous Histories of Incarceration,
Which in Turn Limits Their Job Opportunities
People of color, particularly Black people and Latinos, are
unfairly targeted by the police and face harsher prison sentences than
their white counterparts.\48\ National data show that Black people and
Latinos are three times more likely to be searched than whites \49\ and
people of color are significantly over-represented in the U.S. prison
population, making up more than 60 percent of people behind bars.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Jamal Hagler, ``8 Facts You Should Know About the Criminal
Justice System and People of Color.'' Center for American Progress, May
2015, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2015/05/28/
113436/8-facts-you-should-know-about-the-criminal-justice-system-and-
people-of-color/.
\49\ Lynn Langton, Matthew Durose, et al., Police Behavior during
Traffic and Street Stops, 2011, U.S. Department of Justice, October
2016, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf.
\50\ ``United States profile,'' Prison Policy Initiative, https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/US.html#disparities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After release, formerly incarcerated individuals fare poorly in the
labor market, with most experiencing difficulty finding a job after
release. Research shows that roughly \1/2\ of people formerly
incarcerated are still unemployed 1 year after release.\51\ For those
who do find work, it's common to have annual earnings of less than
$500.\52\ Further, during the time spent in prison, many lose work
skills and are given little opportunity to gain useful work
experience.\53\ People who have been involved in the justice system
struggle to obtain a driver's license, own a reliable means of
transportation, acquire relatively stable housing, and maintain proper
identification documents. These obstacles often prevent formerly
incarcerated persons from successfully re-entering the job market and
are compounded by criminal background checks, which further limits
their access to employment.\54\ A recent survey found that 96 percent
of employers conduct background checks on job applicants that include a
criminal history search.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Adam Looney and Nicholas Turner, Work and Opportunity Before
and After Incarceration, The Brookings Institution, March 2018, https:/
/www.brookings.edu/research/work-and-opportunity-before-and-after-
incarceration/; Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and
Prisoner Reentry, Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2003,
https://www.amazon.com/When-Prisoners-Come-Home-Prisoner/dp/0195386124;
Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Facing the Challenges of
Prisoner Reentry, Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 2005,
https://www.amazon.com/But-They-All-Come-Back/dp/0877667500.
\52\ Ibid., 40.
\53\ Christy Visher, Sara Debus, and Jennifer Yahner, Employment
after Prison: A Longitudinal Study of Releasees in Three States, The
Urban Institute, October 2008, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/32106/411778-Employment-after-Prison-A-Longitudinal-
Study-of-Releasees-in-Three-States.PDF.
\54\ Marina Duane, Nancy La Vigne, Mathew Lynch, et al., Criminal
Background Checks: Impact on Employment and Recidivism, Urban
Institute, March 2017, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/88621/2017.02.28_criminal_background_checks_report_final
ized_blue_dots_1.pdf.
\55\ Thomas Ahearn, ``Survey Finds 96 Percent of Employers Conduct
Background Screening,'' Employment Screening Resources, August 2017,
http://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2017/08/03/survey-finds-96-percent-
of-employers-conduct-background-screening/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
People of Color May Be Less Likely to Receive Exemptions Based on
Health Conditions
Research suggests that people of color, in particular Black people,
may be negatively impacted by racial bias in pain assessment and
treatment recommendations, which would affect their ability to receive
exemptions based on health conditions. One study found individuals with
at least some medical training hold false beliefs about race that
inform medical judgements, which may contribute to racial disparities
in pain assessment and inadequate treatment recommendations for Black
patients' pain.\56\ Further, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
found in the early-1990s that Black people with serious ailments were
much more likely than White people to be rejected for benefits under
Social Security disability programs.\57\ While this particular analysis
has not been repeated recently, there remains widespread evidence of
disparities in medical treatment. These findings suggest that people of
color may be less likely to receive exemptions based on health
conditions, potentially subjecting more people to time limit rules than
would otherwise be the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Kelly M. Hoffman, et al., ``Racial bias in pain assessment and
treatment recommendations, and false beliefs about biological
differences between blacks and whites'' https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4843483/.
\57\ Stephen Labaton, ``Benefits Are Refused More Often To Disabled
Blacks, Study Finds'' New York Times, May 1992, https://
www.nytimes.com/1992/05/11/us/benefits-are-refused-more-often-to-
disabled-blacks-study-finds.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Work Reporting Requirements Are Part of a Long History of Racially-
Motivated Critiques of Programs Supporting Basic Needs
False race-based narratives have long surrounded people
experiencing poverty, with direct harms to people of color. For decades
these narratives have played a role in discussions around public
assistance benefits--including SNAP--and have been employed to garner
support from working-class White people.\58\ Below are a few examples
of the relationship between poverty, racial bias, and access to basic
needs programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Josh Levin, ``The Welfare Queen,'' Slate, December 2013,http:/
/www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2013/12/
linda_taylor_welfare_queen_ronald_reagan_made_her_a_
notorious_american_villain.html.

When the ``Mother's Pension'' program was first implemented
in the early 1900s, it primarily served white women and allowed
mothers to meet their basic needs without working outside of
the home. Only when more African American women began to
participate were work reporting requirements implemented.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Rachel Black and Aleta Sprague, ``Republicans' Fixation on
Work Requirements is Fueled by White Racial Resentment,'' Slate, June
2018, https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/06/trump-administrations-
fixation-on-work-requirements-for-snap-benefits-is-part-of-a-long-
racist-policy-history.html.

Between 1915 and 1970, over six million African American
people fled the south in the hope of a better life. As more
African Americans flowed north, northern states began to adopt
some of the work reporting requirements already prevalent in
assistance programs in the South.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Kali Grant, Funke Aderonmu, Sophie Khan, et al., Unworkable
and Unwise: Conditioning Access to Programs that Ensure a Basic
Foundation for Families on Work Requirements, Economic Security and
Opportunity Initiative at Georgetown Law, February 2019, http://
www.georgetownpoverty.org/issues/tax-benefits/unworkable-unwise/.

As civil rights struggles intensified, the media's portrayal
of poverty became increasingly racialized. In 1964, only 27
percent of the photos accompanying stories about poverty in
three of the country's top weekly news magazines featured Black
people; by 1967, 72 percent of photos accompanying stories
about poverty featured Black people.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Rachel Black and Aleta Sprague, ``The Rise and Reign of the
Welfare Queen,'' New America, September 2016, https://
www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-135/rise-and-reign-welfare-queen/.

Many of Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign speech
anecdotes centered around a Black woman from Chicago who had
defrauded the government. These speeches further embedded the
idea of the Black ``welfare queen'' as a staple of dog whistle
politics, suggesting that people of color are unwilling to
work.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Gene Demby, ``The Truth Behind the Lies of the Original
'Welfare Queen','' National Public Radio, December 2013, https://
www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/12/20/255819681/the-truth-behind-
the-lies-of-the-original-welfare-queen.

In 2018, prominent sociologists released a study looking at
racial attitudes on welfare. They noted that white opposition
to public assistance programs has increased since 2008--the
year that Barack Obama was elected. The researchers also found
that showing white Americans data suggesting that white
privilege is diminishing led them to express more opposition to
spending on programs like SNAP. They concluded that the
``relationship between racial resentment and welfare opposition
remains robust.'' \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Rachel Wetts and Robb Willer, Privilege on the Precipice:
Perceived Racial Status Threats Lead White Americans to Oppose Welfare
Programs, Social Forces, Volume 97, Issue 2, 1 December 2018, Pages
793-822, May 2018, https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/97/2/793/
5002999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Unemployment Rate Does Not Reflect Opportunities Available to
People of Color and, Because of Barriers to Employment, there
is a Disproportionate Rate of Employment for People of Color
A reduction in time limit waivers and the resulting loss in SNAP
benefits will disproportionately affect certain protected classes based
on (a) an inadequate method for determining lack of sufficient jobs, a
criterion for approving time limit waivers; and (b) the
disproportionate rate of unemployment and underemployment for people of
color.
First, the Department suggests that insufficient jobs are reflected
in unemployment data, but that data excludes key evidence, such as
unemployed persons who searched for work in the previous year but not
in the past 4 weeks, and workers who are part-time for economic
reasons. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, Black people are
twice as likely than White people to have searched for work in the
previous year but not in the past 4 weeks, and Latinos are 66 percent
more likely than White people to work part-time for economic
reasons.\64\ These data points suggest that the proposed core standard
for determining lack of sufficient jobs, unemployment data,
disproportionately impacts protected classes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ ``People in the Labor Force and Not in the Labor Force by
Selected Characteristics, 2017 Annual Averages,'' U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2017/
home.htm; ``Employed and Unemployed Full- and Part-time Workers by Age,
[Sex], Race, and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity,'' U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, December 2018, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat08.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, because of the systemic barriers to employment facing
communities of color described in detail above, there is a
disproportionate rate of employment for people of color. For instance,
nationwide, the unemployment rate for Black people was 9.5 percent and
6.0 percent for Latinos, compared to 4.5 percent for their White
counterparts in 2017.\65\ Further, even within states, unemployment
rates for Black people and Latinos are still relatively higher than
their White counterparts. For example, in California--a state with a
statewide time limit waiver in place--the unemployment rate was 5.9
percent in 2017.\66\ However, the unemployment rate was considerably
higher for Black people and Latinos in California in 2017; 10.7 percent
for Black people and 6.7 percent for Latinos, compared to 5.5 percent
for their White counterparts.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Census Bureau, American FactFinder, 2017 American Community
Survey 1-Year Estimates, Table S0201 https://factfinder.census.gov/
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
ACS_17_1YR_S0201&prodType=table.
\66\ Ibid.
\67\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harm to Immigrants
Immigrant Eligibility for SNAP is Extremely Limited and Current SNAP
Participation Is Already Declining
The Trump Administration's relentless anti-immigrant rhetoric and
policies are driving low-income immigrant families away from SNAP.\68\
The requirements for eligibility in SNAP haven't changed recently but
immigrant households legally eligible for SNAP benefits stopped
participating in the program at a higher-than-average rate in 2018.\69\
Following welfare reform in 1996, a person must be a U.S. citizen or an
eligible, lawfully-present non-citizen to qualify for SNAP
benefits.\70\ Recent data presented at the 2018 American Public Health
Association Annual Conference shows that after a decade of steady
increases, enrollment nationwide among immigrant families eligible for
SNAP has dropped by ten percent.\71\ The study's lead researcher said
in a press release, ``We believe the drop in participation may be
related to more nuanced changes in national immigration rhetoric and
increased Federal action to deport and detain immigrants. These
findings demonstrate that rhetoric and the threat of policy changes,
even before changes are enacted, may be causing families to forego
nutrition assistance.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Helena Bottemiller Evich, ``Immigrant Families Appear to be
Dropping Out of Food Stamps,'' POLITICO, November [2018], https://
www.politico.com/story/2018/11/14/immigrant-families-dropping-out-food-
stamps-966256.
\69\ Allison Bovell-Ammon, ``Trends in Food Insecurity and SNAP
Participation Among Immigrant Families of U.S. Born Young Children,''
Children's HealthWatch, November 2018, http://childrenshealthwatch.org/
study-following-10-year-gains-snap-participation-among-immigrant-
families-dropped-in-2018/.
\70\ Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Guidance on Non-
Citizen Eligibility, U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 2011, https:/
/fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/Non-
Citizen_Guidance_063011.pdf.
\71\ ``Study: Following 10-year gains, SNAP participation among
immigrant families dropped in 2018,'' American Public Health
Association, November 2018, https://www.apha.org/news-and-media/news-
releases/apha-news-releases/2018/annual-meeting-snap-participation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, immigrants are often unaware of the SNAP program or
are confused about their eligibility for benefits.\72\ Many immigrants
in mixed-status families are not aware that some of their family
members are eligible for SNAP, and immigrants face complicated
administrative burdens due to caseworkers' lack of familiarity with
foreign identity documents.\73\ In fact, most Federal agencies have
been working to overcome the barriers immigrants face to enrolling in
benefits rather than adopting policies such as this proposal, which
will only exacerbate current disparities in immigrant access to the
SNAP program.\74\ Given SNAP's record of alleviating poverty and food
insecurity and improving health and employment outcomes, the USDA
should be working to remove the barriers immigrant families face in
accessing SNAP rather than further restricting access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Susan Bartlett, Nancy Burstein, William Hamilton, et al., Food
Stamp Access Study: Final Report, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
November 2004, https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/45671/PDF.
\73\ Krista M. Perreira, Robert Crosnoe, Karina Fortuny, et al.,
Barriers to Immigrants' Access to Health and Human Services Programs,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, May 2012, https://
aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/76471/rb.pdf.
\74\ Robert Crosnoe, Juan Manuel Pedroza, Kelly Purtell, et al.,
Promising Practices for Increasing Immigrants' Access to Health and
Human Services, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, May 2012,
https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/promising-practices-increasing-
immigrants-access-health-and-human-services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harm to People with Disabilities
People who are unable to work due to disability or illness are
likely to lose food assistance under the proposal. Although the statute
and regulations both provide for exemptions from the time limit for
individuals with work limitations, the reality in practice is that many
individuals with disabilities are not identified and granted
exemptions. In many states, only individuals who are receiving
government disability benefits are exempted from the time limit.
Many individuals characterized as able-bodied adults have
significant physical or mental barriers to employment. In a Franklin
County, Ohio report, approximately \1/3\ of individuals characterized
as able-bodied reported having a ``physical or mental limitation.''
\75\ Of those, 25 percent indicated that the condition limited their
daily activities, and nearly 20 percent had filed for Disability/SSI
within the previous 2 years.\76\ Although some conditions may not meet
the stringent standard to qualify the individual for a Federal
disability benefit, they still may have significant barriers to working
20 hours or more per week. For instance, BLS reported that \1/2\ of
working-age adults with a disability who were not working reported
barriers to employment, including a lack of transportation and the need
for accommodations in a workplace.\77\ Another BLS report shows that
workers with disabilities are nearly twice as likely as workers with no
disability to be employed part-time.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Franklin County Work Experience Program, Ohio Association of
Foodbanks, 2015, http://admin.ohiofoodbanks.org/uploads/news/
ABAWD_Report_2014-2015-v3.pdf.
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ U.S. Department of Labor, ``Persons with a Disability:
Barriers to Employment, Types of Assistance, and Other Labor-Related
Issues--May 2012,'' Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 2013, https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/dissup_04242013.pdf.
\78\ U.S. Department of Labor, ``Persons with a Disability: Labor
Force Characteristics--2016,'' Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 2017,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/disabl.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, we know that many disabilities go undiagnosed either
because they are difficult to diagnose or the person does not have the
resources to seek out a diagnosis. Moreover, many people who are unable
to work due to disability fail to receive an exemption because of the
complexity of paperwork required for exemptions. A Kaiser Family
Foundation study found that 36 percent of unemployed adults receiving
Medicaid reported illness or disability as their primary reason for not
working but were not receiving Disability/SSI.\79\ Because of the
historic unemployment and underemployment of people with disabilities--
which workforce and SNAP employment systems are not adequately
structured or funded to solve--a reduction in time limit waivers would
result in the loss of crucial nutrition assistance for large numbers of
low-income people with disabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Rachel Garfield, Robin Rudowitz, and Anthony Damico,
Understanding the Intersection of Medicaid and Work, February 2017,
http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/understanding-the-intersection-of-
medicaid-and-work/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harm to College Students
Many Students Cannot Meet Requirements of Proposed Rule
Students enrolled at least half-time are not subject to the time
limit, and this will not change under the proposed rule. However,
students enrolled less than half-time and not otherwise exempt will now
be at increased risk of losing benefits under the proposed rule if they
are unable to meet SNAP time limit rules. Many low-income students must
work part-time to support themselves and their families, and therefore
enroll in college less than half-time. However, an 80 hours per month
requirement does not allow enough time for many students to be able to
attend classes and complete their homework.
Given these challenges, this rule stands in direct contradiction to
its stated principle of `` . . . improv[ing] employment outcomes and
economic independence.'' This rule will limit the ability of students
with low incomes to successfully maintain SNAP and complete a post-
secondary education that can lead to quality employment with family-
sustaining wages \80\ and employer sponsored healthcare and retirement
savings.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ ``Measuring the Value of Education,'' U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, April 2018, https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2018/data-on-
display/education-pays.htm.
\81\ Teresa Kroeger and Elise Gould, The Class of 2017, Economic
Policy Institute, May 2017, https://www.epi.org/publication/the-class-
of-2017/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposal Would Exacerbate Confusion about Students' Eligibility for
SNAP
SNAP has specific rules that determine which low-income students
can receive food assistance. Low-income post-secondary students who are
enrolled at least half-time and not otherwise exempt must meet all of
the standard SNAP eligibility rules, as well as one of several
additional qualifications, such as working at least 80 hours a month,
participating in work-study, or participating in an employment and
training program.\82\ According to the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), post-secondary officials and students report being confused by
these student rules. This leads to misinformation about the
availability of SNAP on campus and low SNAP enrollment. A reported 57
percent of potentially eligible students (those who have low incomes,
and at least one additional risk factor for food insecurity) are not
presently accessing SNAP.\83\ The proposed time limit rule will add to
the confusion by imposing harsh restrictions on students who are
enrolled less than half-time and trying to meet their basic need for
food through SNAP. The proposed rule compounds the challenges of
maintaining SNAP and undermines education activities that could lead to
greater economic contributions and increased productivity.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ ``Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),'' Food and
Nutrition Service, n.d., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/students; Carrie
Welton, SNAP and Students: Food Assistance Can Support College Success,
Center for Law and Social Policy, January 2019, https://www.clasp.org/
publications/fact-sheet/snap-and-students-food-assistance-can-support-
college-success.
\83\ Food Insecurity: Better Information Could Help Eligible
College Students Access Federal Food Assistance Benefits, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, December 2018, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/700/696254.pdf.
\84\ Noah Berger and Peter Fisher, A Well-Educated Workforce Is Key
to State Prosperity, Economic Policy Institute, August 2013, https://
www.epi.org/publication/states-education-productivity-growth-
foundations/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Rule Does Not Reflect Recent Changes in the Student Body
Students who enroll full-time right after high school, receive help
from their parents, and do not work during the school year are no
longer the norm on college campuses.\85\ A recent report from the GAO
demonstrated that 71 percent of undergraduate students now have at
least one characteristic that complicates their ability to attend
classes such as being financially independent from their parents. The
additional financial strain of independence can contribute to lower
retention and graduation rates as compared to their ``traditional''
counterparts, emphasizing the need for more robust and diverse
supports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ Ibid., 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A reported 39 percent of all undergraduate students have a
household income at or below 130 percent of the Federal poverty line.
The GAO reported that the highest student risk of food insecurity is
being low-income and the second is being a first-generation college
student.\86\ In spite of the risk of food insecurity, low-income
students are enrolling in college at rates that now exceed that of
their middle-income peers.\87\ But this proposed rule would increase
food insecurity and interfere with students' ability to attend and
complete college.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ Ibid.
\87\ Table 302.30. Percentage of Recent High School Completers
Enrolled in College, by Income Level: 1975 through 2016, National
Center for Education Statistics, July 2017, https://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_302.30.asp?current=yes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposal Would Undermine Students' Completion of Post-Secondary
Education
Analyses of the labor market over the past decade illustrate the
considerable barriers to getting and maintaining employment without
some form of post-secondary education. Research shows workers with a
high school diploma or less lost 5.6 of the 7.2 million jobs wiped out
in the Great Recession. These workers have recovered less than 80,000
jobs in the decade since, while those with a bachelor's degree gained
4.6 million jobs in the recovery. Ninety-nine percent of the jobs
created since the Great Recession have gone to those with some form of
post-secondary education.\88\ Workers with a post-secondary education
also have the majority of jobs with livable wages and employer provided
benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Anthony P. Carnevale, Tamara Jayasundera, and Artem Gulish,
America's Divided Recovery College Haves and Have-Nots, Center on
Education and the Workforce, 2016, https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Americas-Divided-Recovery-web.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low-income individuals continue to enroll in post-secondary
programs at increasing rates because they understand that post-
secondary education is the most reliable pathway to economic security.
Without access to SNAP, low-income students who are food-insecure may
struggle to persist in and successfully complete their post-secondary
education.\89\ The proposed rule is therefore incredibly short-sighted
in limiting student success in post-secondary education.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ Duy Pham, Benefits Access for College Completion: Lessons
Learned from a Community College Initiative to Help Low-Income
Students, Center for Law and Social Policy, July 2016, https://
www.clasp.org/blog/benefits-access-college-completion-lessons-learned-
community-college-initiative-help-low-income.
\90\ Ibid., 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harm to Young Adults
The proposed rule would have a disparate impact on youth and youth
of color, given the considerable barriers they face in entering the
labor market and maintaining employment. Nationwide, approximately 4.6
million young adults ages 16 to 24 are out of school and
unemployed.\91\ In 2018, the youth unemployment rate (9.2%) was more
than double the overall unemployment rate of 3.9 percent.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Sarah Burd-Sharps and Kristen Lewis, More than a Million
Reasons for Hope Youth Disconnection in America Today, Measure of
America, March 2018, http://measureofamerica.org/youth-disconnection-
2018/.
\92\ Table 2. Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional
Population 16 to 24 Years of Age by Sex, Race, and Hispanic or Latino
Ethnicity, July 2015-2018, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, August
2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/youth.t02.htm; Household Data
Annual Averages: 1. Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional
Population, 1948 to Date, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed
March 2019, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat01.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among young adults, Black people (16.5 percent) and Latinos (10.8
percent) have considerably higher rates of unemployment.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ Ibid., 83a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even when employed, young adults are more likely than older workers
to have jobs with low wages and no benefits.\94\ Some struggle to
receive enough hours from their employer to make ends meet. According
to the Economic Policy Institute, young workers 16 to 24 years of age
are more likely to be working part-time involuntarily among all age
groups and account for approximately 28 percent of all involuntary part
time workers, despite comprising 13 percent of those at work.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Alleviating Poverty for Opportunity Youth, JFF, December 2018,
https://www.jff.org/resources/alleviating-poverty-opportunity-youth/.
\95\ Ibid., 40.
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Furthermore, young adult workers are more likely to experience
fluctuating work hours common to youth-hiring sectors such as retail,
restaurants, agriculture, construction, and other services. For
example, approximately 90 percent of young food service workers
reported that their hours fluctuated in the last month by 68 percent,
on average. In addition, \1/2\ of retail workers reported that they
know their work schedule just 1 week or less in advance, and \1/2\ of
janitors and housekeepers reported that their employer completely
controls the timing of their work.\96\
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\96\ Susan J. Lambert, Peter J. Fugiel, and Julia R. Henly,
Schedule Unpredictability Among Early Career Workers in the U.S. Labor
Market: A National Snapshot, University of Chicago: Employment
Instability, Family Well-being, and Social Policy Network, August 2014,
http://www.academia.edu/21504026/
Schedule_Unpredictability_among_Early_Career_Workers_in_the_
US_Labor_Market_A_National_Snapshot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Young adults in these jobs use SNAP to help them cover basic needs,
but many youths will lose SNAP under the proposed rule when their hours
fall below 20 hours per week. The proposed rule penalizes young adults
who struggle to find stable employment by increasing food insecurity.
4. Analysis of Major Elements of the Proposed Rule
The majority of our comments to this point have addressed the
harmful impact of the rule as a whole because different sections
interact in ways that have a greater impact than any individual
section. In order to ensure that our input is fully captured in the
Department's analysis of the comments received, the following section
addresses key elements of the proposed rule.
Conformance with the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (Farm Bill)
The just enacted Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 maintains
current law regarding SNAP time limit rules. The explanation given by
the Act's Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference
is, ``the Managers . . . acknowledge that waivers from the ABAWD time
limit are necessary in times of recession and in areas with labor
surpluses or higher rates of unemployment.''
While the NPRM states that applying SNAP time limit rules more
broadly is in alignment with the House-passed Agriculture and Nutrition
Act of 2018, H.R. 2, that bill did not ultimately become law. The final
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 retains the SNAP time limit in
current law and strikes the House bill modifications. In a letter to
Secretary P[e]rdue requesting that the proposed rule be withdrawn,
Senators Stabenow and Murkowski as well as 45 more Senators clarify
Congressional intent. The letter from U.S. Senators states:

In addition to being out line with Congressional intent
related to waivers, this rule also directly contradicts
Congressional direction related to waiver submissions and
carry-over exemptions included in the 2018 Farm Bill report.
This report, written by Chairman Pat Roberts, Ranking Member
Debbie Stabenow, Chairman Mike Conaway and Ranking Member
Collin Peterson and approved by the 369 Members of the House
and 87 Members of the Senate, explicitly directs the Department
not to make the changes made in this rule. This unilateral
Administrative action is in direct contradiction to the will of
Congress.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ Senator Stabenow and Senator Murkowski, U.S. Senate, Letter to
Secretary P[e]rdue, March 28, 2019, http://www.frac.org/wp-content/
uploads/19-03-28-Letter-to-Perdue-re-ABAWD-Rule.pdf.

In contrast to the new law, the NPRM often cites the goal of
ensuring that more people are subject to SNAP time limits and work
reporting requirements as a justification for policy changes. For
example, in describing options for a six percent floor, the NPRM states
that, ``the Department is concerned that too many areas would qualify
for a waiver of the ABAWD time limit and that too few individuals would
be subject to the ABAWD work requirements.'' The Department's proposed
floor of seven percent seems arbitrary and devised to produce the
desired result of more individuals being subject to work reporting
requirements, a goal that does not reflect the goals of Congress.
Setting policy goals inconsistent with the intent of the final law
is an over-reach of Departmental authority. The Department is expected
to ensure that waivers for SNAP time limit rules are adequately
responsive to nationwide recessions and relative areas of higher
unemployment or labor surpluses. The three core standards proposed by
the Department do not allow that role to be performed adequately.
Federalism Summary Impact Statement
The proposed rule has federalism implications that contradict the
intent of both the 2018 Farm Bill and Executive Order 13132. The Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference of the farm bill
states that ``the Managers intend to maintain the practice that bestows
authority on the state agency responsible for administering SNAP to
determine when and how waiver requests for ABAWDs are submitted.''
Executive Order 13132 Section 7(b) states that, ``Each agency
shall, to the extent practicable and permitted by law, consider any
application by a state for a waiver of statutory or regulatory
requirements in connection with any program administered by that agency
with a general view toward increasing opportunities for utilizing
flexible policy approaches at the state or local level in cases in
which the proposed waiver is consistent with applicable Federal policy
objectives and is otherwise appropriate.'' The Federal policy
objectives stated above specifically maintain state agency
responsibility for determining when and how waivers are submitted.
State flexibility is critical to appropriate implementation of SNAP
time limit rules. Consistent with the view of many researchers and
agencies including the National Bureau of Economic Research, no single
measure can truly identify economic downturns and a lack of sufficient
jobs.\98\ Individual states have in-depth knowledge of their
communities that allows them to identify qualitative data, Census
Bureau data, Bureau of Labor Statistics employment-population data and
U-6 measures, and other high-quality data to best make a case for the
need for a waiver. The sections below highlight some of the strengths
of these different measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ ``The NBER's Business Cycle Dating Committee,'' The National
Bureau of Economic Research, September 2010, https://www.nber.org/
cycles/recessions.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Use of Bureau of Labor Statistics Data for Core Standards
The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics produces two measures
of labor under-utilization based on the Current Population Survey that
will be discussed in this section.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ The Current Population Survey universe is the non-
institutionalized civilian population at least 16 years of age.

1. U-3 measure: The U-3 measure is the official unemployment rate,
which is proposed by the Department as the basis for two of
three core standards: the fixed measure of unemployment
rate over ten percent, and the relative measure of 20
percent over the average unemployment rate over a 24 month
period. The U-3 calculates the unemployed as a percentage
of the labor force. The labor force includes employed as
well as unemployed, which is defined as those who have no
job and have made an attempt to look for work in the past 4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
weeks.

2. U-6 measure: The U-6 is an alternative measure of labor
underutilization that captures:

i. the percentage of people who want and are available for full-
time work but
have had to settle for a part-time schedule for
economic reasons, such as
their hours being cut back or being unable to find
full-time jobs (termed
``employed part-time for economic reasons'').

ii. the percentage of people who currently are neither working
nor looking
for work but indicate that they want and are available
for a job and have
looked for work sometime in the past 12 months (termed
``marginally at-
tached to the workforce.'') Discouraged workers, a
subset of the margin-
ally attached, have given a job-market related reason
for not currently
looking for work.

iii. The percentage of people who are unemployed, equivalent to
the U-3
measure.

These components of the U-6 measure are calculated as a percent of
the labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor
force.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Unlike the employment-population ratio (EPOP), the U-6
measure depends on an individual accurately defining what wanting and
being available for a job means to them. While EPOP is less subjective,
the U-6 data more accurately reflects the ABAWD population. EPOP
includes longer-term discouraged workers but does not distinguish them
from retired persons or others who are not available to work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We oppose the proposed rule's heavy and exclusive reliance on the
U-3 measure for two of its three core standards. The U-3 data tends to
be biased downward as a reflection of available jobs, because it does
not include those who are part-time due to a lack of available work or
who are discouraged for a job-market related reason. Therefore, the U-3
measure overstates the degree of recovery in the job market.
The U-6 measure is distinguished from the U-3 by just two subsets
of workers: workers who are part-time for economic reasons and workers
who are marginally attached to the workforce. The impact of including
these two subsets can be demonstrated by calculating a ratio of the U-6
to U-3 measure: The U-6 measure of labor underutilization is
significantly higher than the U-3 and the ratio varies geographically.
As illustrated by graphic 1 in the appendix, some states have
significantly lower numbers of workers who are part-time for economic
reasons and/or marginally attached to the workforce than other states.
Moreover, the U-3 measure does not accurately represent a large
subset of individuals subject to the SNAP time limit. According to the
USDA Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), more than 31 percent of
nonelderly adult SNAP recipients were employed in an average month of
2016. Many of these SNAP recipients were subject to the time limit who
were employed part-time for economic reasons. A portion of the
remaining 69 percent of non-elderly adult SNAP recipients were
discouraged workers who had not looked for work in the past 4 weeks for
job-market related reasons. Both subsets of individuals subject to the
time limit are directly captured in the U-6 measure, but not in the U-
3.
Exclusion of these subsets of individuals disproportionately
impacts protected classes, who have higher rates of part-time
employment for economic reasons and discouraged workers. Please see the
Civil Rights Impact section below for a further discussion of this
impact.
If the Department bases waivers exclusively on U-3 unemployment
rates, it will not count these individual subsets in a waiver review
even though lack of sufficient jobs has impacted their employment
status. If BLS data is to impact individuals' access to SNAP, it is
imperative to address the U-3 measure's weaknesses.
Development of Core Standards and Other Data and Evidence in
Exceptional Circumstances
While the 2018 Farm Bill requires waivers for SNAP time limit rules
to be responsive to recessions and areas with labor surpluses and
higher rates of unemployment, there are inherent challenges in defining
these economic conditions, including weaknesses in existing data sets,
complexities in defining recessions, and difficulty in using a single
data set averaged across different categories of people, industries and
geographic locations. As a result, many researchers use qualitative
data to support an understanding of employment challenges. For example,
the recognized agency for defining recessions, the National Bureau of
Economic Research, does not use a single formula or data set for a
definition of a recession.
We oppose the proposed exclusion of additional data outside of the
U-3. Additional data can support a picture of the strength of the labor
market. For example, the BLS employment-population ratio, which
measures employed persons as a percentage of the entire
population,\101\ includes individuals who are employable but have not
looked for a job in more than a year. In periods of severe and long-
term economic recessions, the number of individuals in this category
will grow and the employment-population ratio will paint a clearer
picture of the strength of the labor market than other measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ EPOP uses the relationship between the ratio of the monthly
Current Employment Statistics Survey (CES) employment to the population
and the ratio of the Current Population Survey (CPS) employment to the
population. EPOP also includes trend and seasonal components to account
for movements in the CPS not captured in the CES series. The seasonal
component accounts for the seasonality in the CPS not explained by the
CES (for example, agricultural employment movement), while the trend
component adjusts for long-run systematic differences between the two
series (for example, during expansions, the CES grows faster than the
CPS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, Census Bureau data should be an option for waiver
applications, particularly for sub-state areas. BLS has ``concluded
that data users often are better served by sub-state area data from the
Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS). Data from the ACS
provide more extensive geographic and demographic coverage, and have
smaller sampling errors.\102\ The Census Bureau's ACS sample size is 30
times larger than that of BLS, which accounts in large part for its
increased accuracy.\103\ In 2013, the numbers of persons the ACS
classified as `employed,' `unemployed,' and `not in the labor force'
for the nation were all higher than the official CPS estimates. The ACS
unemployment rate was 8.4 percent, compared to the CPS annual average
of 7.4 percent.'' \104\ The variation in this one example reflects the
challenge of standardizing the U-3 measure instead of allowing Census
data to be used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ More information is available at: ``Notes on Using Current
Population Survey (CPS) Subnational Data,'' U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, June 2018, https://www.bls.gov/lau/notescps.htm.
\103\ More information is available at: ``Fact Sheet: Differences
Between the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS ASEC),'' U.S.
Census Bureau, May 2016, https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/
poverty/guidance/data-sources/acs-vs-cps.html.
\104\ More information is available at: ``American Community Survey
(ACS) Questions and Answers,'' U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, April
2017, https://www.bls.gov/lau/acsqa.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, data on lack of jobs in declining occupations or
industries is critical in assessing whether there are enough jobs, and
should continue to be considered in waiver determinations. While a
population may as a whole remain employed, a large subset may be
significantly affected by declining occupations. This is expected to be
the case, for example, when transportation evolves toward self-driving
vehicles. While participation in WIOA's dislocated worker program meets
SNAP time limit rules, there are inadequate opportunities for such
participation in the United States, with only 400,000 people served
nationwide in Federal Fiscal Year 2018.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ A total of 406,407 were served from October 1, 2017 to
September 30, 2018. More information is available, under quarterly
reports, at: WIOA Performance Results, U.S. Department of Labor,
February 2019, https://www.doleta.gov/performance/results/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rules would restrain SNAP from rapidly responding to
changing economic conditions. Notably, according to the Brookings
Institution, the most simulative type of spending during the Great
Recession was a temporary increase in the SNAP maximum benefit, which
was quicker to respond to deteriorating economic conditions than
Congressional action and more effective dollar for dollar than
increased spending on infrastructure and defense.\106\ Without the
mitigating effects of SNAP, the impact of recessions can escalate. The
USDA's Economic Research Service uses the Food Assistance National
Input-Output Multiplier (FANIOM) model to estimate the multiplier
effects from SNAP benefits at 1.79, which is a significant economic
boost. We strongly oppose any changes that dilute the impact of SNAP
benefits as an automatic stabilizer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Ryan Nunn, Lauren Bauer, et al.,
Nine Facts About the Great Recession and Tools for Fighting the Next
Downturn, The Brookings Institution, May 2016, https://
www.brookings.edu/research/nine-facts-about-the-great-recession-and-
tools-for-fighting-the-next-downturn/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic downturns are not exceptional circumstances and should not
be treated as such. The exceptional circumstances floor of ten percent
is far too high to reflect the lack of sufficient jobs in a community,
region, or country. On a national basis, the only time in the past 70
years that the average unemployment rate was above ten percent was in
1982-83. Yet from December 2007 through June 2009 the United States
experienced the most severe recession in the post-war period, with over
a four percent decline in gross domestic product (GDP).\107\ A floor
above ten percent is therefore highly unresponsive to nationwide
recessions and depressions. The 20 Percent Standard's use of a data
over a 24 month period is also unresponsive--the period is more an
indication of chronic economic depression than a new recession.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ More information from 1948 to present is available at:
Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, accessed March 2019, https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
lns14000000. The unemployment rate reached but did not exceed ten
percent in just 1 month of the Great Recession, October 2009. More
information on GDP is available at: GDP & Personal Income, U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis, accessed March 2019, https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/
index_nipa.cfm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This lack of responsiveness limits SNAP's ability to serve as an
automatic stabilizer and is therefore inconsistent with the goals
described in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference to address times of recession. If a recession took effect
tomorrow and the current unemployment rate of 3.9% (December 2018 BLS)
doubled, the number of persons newly unemployed would be about five
million across the United States. Many of these five million would be
individuals unable to access SNAP beyond the time limit, and the loss
of benefits would be detrimental to the economy.
Retaining the Extended Unemployment Benefits Qualification Standard
The Unemployment Insurance Extended Benefits (EB) program extends
individual unemployment compensation for an additional 13 weeks when a
state's insured unemployment rate (IUR) or total unemployment rate
(TUR) reaches at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for
the same 13 week period in each of the 2 previous years. There are two
other optional thresholds that states may choose. EBs may be triggered
if the state's IUR is at least 6%, or the TUR is at least 6.5% and is
at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in
either of the previous 2 years. An additional 20 weeks of benefits may
be triggered if the TUR is at least 8% and is at least 110% of the
state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous 2
years.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Julie M. Whittaker and Katelin P. Isaacs, Extending
Unemployment Benefits During a Recession, Congressional Research
Service, May 2013, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34340.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While these triggers are lower than the standard proposed for
waivers, many researchers have found that EB triggers are set too high,
which prevents many states from activating the program for extra weeks
of benefits above and beyond the standard 26 weeks.\109\ Moreover, the
trigger requires ever increasing unemployment rates in order to remain
triggered, which means that many states cycle out of the system too
early. Congress has regularly passed legislation to provide extended UI
benefits in states that do not meet the EB criteria, or else extended
benefits nationwide. Congress established temporary programs of
extended UI benefits in 1958, 1961, 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 2002, and
2008. In the Great Recession, Congress created a temporary program
nationwide. The need for actions of Congress demonstrate that EB
qualification as a core standard for approval is not adequate for
states with high unemployment rates that are not rising rapidly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ Unemployment Insurance Trigger 101: Is the Trigger System
Working?, Center for American Progress, February 2010, https://
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/02/pdf/
ui_101.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establishing a Floor for Waivers Based on the 20 Percent Standard
We strongly oppose the use of a floor for waivers. The 20 percent
standard is an adequate relative measure that demonstrates that an area
of the country is in a more difficult economic position than the rest
of the country.
The Department seeks to create a fixed floor at seven percent, well
above the natural rate of unemployment. We believe a floor at any level
above the natural rate of unemployment is unnecessary, arbitrary and
needlessly disadvantages members of protected classes, as described in
the Civil Rights Impact section below. In addition, it would subvert
the intent of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 to permit waivers
in labor surplus areas.
Further, there is significant disagreement amongst respected
economists about the exact number for the natural rate of unemployment.
While a five percent natural rate of unemployment seemed to be the norm
at one point, the evidence has shifted in the past twenty years. If the
natural rate is defined in part by the point at which unemployment
leads to inflation, then the current unemployment rate of 3.9 percent
is arguably above the natural unemployment rate, according to Jared
Bernstein, President Clinton's former economic advisor. ``While
inflation is picking up a bit, it has been very low for a very long
time, unresponsive to falling unemployment, and no one is arguing that
it is . . . spiraling up in response to a full-capacity economy.''
\110\ A selection of a five percent rate is arbitrary given the lack of
consensus by experts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ Jared Bernstein, ``I've Come to Believe That `Are We at Full
Employment?' Is the Wrong Question,'' The Washington Post, May 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/05/24/ive-
come-to-believe-that-are-we-at-full-employment-is-the-wrong-question/
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c249a3003278.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restricting Statewide Waivers and Combined Areas
We oppose elimination of the option of statewide waivers as well as
waivers for areas that are not economically tied together, due to the
administrative complexities of implementing this change. There are 63
counties or county equivalents on average per state; Texas has the most
counties at 254. Some states have chosen to submit statewide waivers to
avoid the administrative burden of creating dual systems for those SNAP
recipients who are or are not subject to time limits. Under the
proposed rules, states will need to collect data for each county or
Labor Market Area in order to submit a waiver request. States will then
have to set up dual systems and train caseworkers to treat SNAP
recipients differently based on their county of residence. This adds to
caseworker confusion and potential error. States will also need to
train SNAP E&T service providers to treat SNAP recipients differently
based on their residence.
In addition, we oppose eliminating combined areas that fall outside
of Labor Market Areas. The areas covered by Workforce Development
Boards are not always consistent with Labor Market Areas; some include
multiple counties, including some outside of Labor Market Areas, while
others are smaller than a county. The proposed rules will make planning
more difficult given the inability to group areas consistent with
Workforce Development Boards.
Finally, we oppose the elimination of waivers in sub-county areas.
Many counties in the U.S. have extreme disparities in the labor market
in different geographic areas. Traveling to jobs with an adequate labor
supply may not be feasible for many low-income SNAP recipients. For
example, traveling from rural Gorman to Long Beach in the most populous
county in the United States, Los Angeles, takes about 2 hours by car
and is not possible via public transportation. The proposed rules do
not account for the immense variety in local conditions that can make
finding a job nearly impossible for many people.
Ending ``Carryover'' Exemptions
Current law allows unused exemptions to carry over and accumulate
from one year to the next. Up until now, states understood these
exemptions to be ``earned'' and made decisions about whether to use the
exemptions in a given year based on a good faith assumption of FNS'
continued allowance of carryover exemptions. Past and recent FNS
Memoranda on the subject, including the most recent ``SNAP--FY 2018
ABAWD 15 Percent Exemptions Totals, Adjusted for Carryover,'' clearly
demonstrates FNS approval of carryover exemptions to date.
We strongly oppose the use of a carryover formula in which the
current year is adjusted based on the number of exemptions earned in
the preceding fiscal year minus the number of exemptions used in the
preceding fiscal year. The formula penalizes states for using carryover
from the previous year by subtracting any used carryover amount from
earned exemptions. We do not believe penalties for the use of carryover
was the intent of the act. As can be seen in Example 2 (Varied
Exemption Use) of the NPRM, the number of exemptions after adjustment
becomes highly erratic as well as difficult to track under the proposed
formula. The formula also incentivizes states to use their full amount
in the year earned rather than prudently reserving exemptions for a
downturn in the economy. Overall, we hold that the proposed method of
calculating exemptions would create confusion, discourage the use of
exemptions, and increase errors.
Civil Rights Impacts under the Civil Rights Impact Analysis
The Department has stated that in accordance with the Department
Regulation 4300-4 Civil Rights Impact Analysis, implementation of
mitigation strategies and monitoring by the Civil Rights Division of
FNS will lessen the disproportionate impacts of ``certain protected
groups due to factors affecting rates of employment of members of these
groups.''
There are two main CRIA challenges to the NPRM. A reduction in
waivers and the resulting loss in SNAP benefits will disproportionately
affect certain protected classes based on (a) their disproportionate
rate of unemployment and under-employment, as stated in the NPRM; and
(b) an inadequate method for determining lack of sufficient jobs, a
criterion for approving waivers.
Disproportionate Rate of Unemployment and Under-Employment
We strongly oppose further restrictions to waivers due to their
disproportionate impact on many protected classes including women,
Black people, Latinos, and people with disabilities. We do not believe
that mitigation strategies will be significant enough to address the
impact of increased food insecurity and poverty on protected classes.
Inadequate Methodology
The NPRM not only impacts protected classes disproportionately due
to unemployment factors, but it further impacts protected classes due
to the use of the U-3 measure, which excludes certain employment
statuses that are more common amongst certain protected classes. We
strongly oppose the NPRM for these reasons.
Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics illustrate the
disproportionate impact of the data excluded from the U-3 measure on
selected protected groups. For instance, as illustrated by BLS data in
graphics 2 and 3 in the appendix, Black individuals are more than twice
as likely than their White counterparts to have searched for work in
the previous year but not in the past 4 weeks (see graphic 2), and
Latinos are 66 percent more likely than Whites to work part-time for
economic reasons (see graphic 3). Also, women are 38 percent more
likely than men to work part-time for economic reasons.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Labor Force Statistics from the
Current Population Survey, A-18. Employed and Unemployed Full- and
part-time workers by age, sex, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity''
https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea18.htm; and Bureau of Labor
Statistics ``Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2017,
Table 15. People in the Labor Force and Not in the Labor Force by
Selected Characteristics, 2017 annual averages'' https://www.bls.gov/
opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2017/home.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we urge the Department to withdraw the proposed
regulation in its entirety. As anti-poverty experts, we believe that
the proposed changes will not incentivize or equip people with what
they need to seek and maintain work, and will also have profound and
damaging consequences for the well-being and long-term success of
struggling workers and their families. We encourage the Department to
dedicate its efforts to advancing policies that truly support economic
security, self-sufficiency, and a stronger future for the United States
by promoting--rather than undermining--the ability of unemployed and
underemployed workers, their families, and their communities to thrive.
Further, the proposed rule does not provide the analytical
information needed to justify the policy change and to evaluate the
proposed rule's likely impacts. Because of the deficiencies in
reasoning and analysis, the proposed rule fails to answer basic
questions related to the impact of the change and the people whom the
proposed rule would affect. All in all, the proposed rule does not
contain the information and data necessary to fully evaluate the
proposal or to comment on key aspects on the Department's justification
for the rule.
Last, our comments include citations to supporting research and
documents for the benefit of the Food and Nutrition Service in
reviewing our comments. We direct FNS to each of the items cited and
made available to the agency through active hyperlinks and as
attachments, and we request that these, along with the full text of our
comments, be considered part of the formal administrative record on
this proposal.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments. Contact
Elizabeth Lower-Basch ([email protected]) and Renato Rocha
([email protected]) with any questions.
appendix a: graphics referenced in comment
Graphic 1: Ratio of U-6 to U-3 Measures by State

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Powered by Bing.
GeoNames, HERE, MSFT.
Source: BLS, Alternative measures of labor under-utilization
by state, fourth quarter of 2017 through third quarter of 2018
averages.
Graphic 2: Data Excluded from U-3 Measure and Included in U-6 Measure:
Unemployed Who Searched for Work in Previous Year but Not in
Past 4 Week

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: BLS, People in the labor force and not in the labor
force by selected characteristics, 2017 annual averages.
Graphic 3: Data Excluded from U-3 Measure and Included in U-6 Measure:
Part-Time for Economic Reasons

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: BLS, Employed and unemployed full- and part-time
workers by age, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity,
December 2018.
appendix b: contributors to clasp's public comment
Listed Alphabetically
Kisha Bird is CLASP's director of youth policy. Ms. Bird works to
expand access to education, employment, and support services for low-
income and opportunity youth. She is an expert in Federal youth policy
and helps ensure national legislation has maximum impact for youth of
color. Before joining CLASP, Ms. Bird was director of the Pennsylvania
Statewide Afterschool/Youth Development Network, working to make
quality education and afterschool programs accessible to young people.
Prior to that, she was a program officer at the Philadelphia
Foundation, where she helped develop and manage the Fund for Children,
Youth Advisory Board, and discretionary grants process. She also has
direct service experience, working in various community settings with
children, youth and families. Ms. Bird holds a master of social service
and master of law and social policy from Bryn Mawr College Graduate
School of Social Work and Social Research. Additionally, she earned a
bachelor's in sociology from Spelman College.
Whitney Bunts is a policy analyst with CLASP's youth policy team,
with a focus on juvenile justice, mental health, racial equity, and
Opportunity Youth. Whitney has a competence in education policy,
opportunity, at-risk, LGBTQ+ youth, racial equity, system dynamics, and
evaluation. Preceding her career at CLASP, Whitney was a graduate
student at Washington University in St. Louis. During her time in grad
school, she interned for the 22nd District Circuits Attorney Office as
a Victim Services Advocate. In this role, she educated victims on the
criminal and juvenile justice process, while partnering with
prosecutors to advocate for their rights. Additionally, she served as
Policy Associate Intern at Covenant House Missouri. As an intern she
had the opportunity to update, revise, and align their policies with
the Housing First Federal policy. Additionally, she facilitated
workshops to build racial equity and inclusion within the organization
using System Dynamic tools. As a student, Whitney was a Graduate Policy
Scholar, served on the Student Coordinating Council and Graduate
Professional Council, and was selected for the ``Excellence Award for
Activism.'' Prior to attending graduate School, Whitney served as a
City Year AmeriCorps member where she tutored and mentored hundreds of
high school students in reading and writing. She holds a Master of
Social Work, with a concentration in Children, Youth & Families, and a
specialization in Policy and System Dynamics from Washington University
in St. Louis. Additionally, she has a double bachelors in political
science and psychology from Georgia State University.
Aimee Chitayat is a consultant for CLASP's Income and Work Supports
team. As Principal of AC Strategic Solutions, she has led efforts to
expand SNAP Employment and Training (E&T) since 2007. Aimee developed
the first SNAP E&T third-party partner programs implemented in
California--the Fresh Success intermediary model and the county-based
Cal Success model--and designed innovative policies, procedures, tools,
and templates for their implementation. She provides intensive training
and technical assistance on SNAP E&T to community colleges, community-
based organizations, social enterprises, counties and statewide
intermediaries throughout the country. She supported New Jersey in
drafting successful legislation for a SNAP E&T program and provided
oversight to the USDA's SNAP E&T Pilot Project in Fresno County as a
consultant to the California Department of Social Services. She
developed, supported, or commented on numerous state and national bills
and policy clarifications on SNAP and SNAP E&T. She earned her Master
of Social Welfare from the University of California Berkeley and her
undergraduate degree from Brown University.
Parker Gilkesson is a policy analyst with CLASP's Income and Work
Support team. She works with low-income and work support programs with
a focus on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Parker
is a subject matter expert in social policy, benefit eligibility, human
services delivery, racial equity, and state and local policy regarding
SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid. Prior to joining CLASP, Parker began her
career as a Human Services Specialist in Mecklenburg County, Charlotte,
NC. In this role, she worked directly with recipients receiving
Medicaid, TANF, and SNAP to determine their eligibility for low-income
and work support programs. She has other experience including TANF
policy research, cancer research, public health, public service, and
nonprofits. Parker holds a Master of Public Policy, with a
concentration in Public Administration from Liberty University and a
Bachelors in Health Education, Maternal and Child Health from Howard
University. Furthermore, Parker believes in the importance of bridging
the gap between policy analysis and policy effectiveness. She is very
passionate about social change taking place within our communities,
therefore, Parker aspires to be a part of the equation to solve poverty
and inequities in health and social welfare among citizens of the
United States.
Madison Hardee is a senior policy analyst/attorney at CLASP, where
she focuses on issues affecting access to health care and public
benefits for immigrants and mixed-status families. Ms. Hardee coleads
the Protecting Immigrant Families, Advancing Our Future Campaign in
collaboration with the National Immigration Law Center. Prior to
joining CLASP, Ms. Hardee spent 5 years as an attorney with Charlotte
Center for Legal Advocacy, where she provided direct legal
representation to low-income clients across public benefit programs and
saw first-hand how programs like Medicaid, SNAP and SSI reduce economic
hardship, improve health, and increase stability. She successfully
challenged state agency decisions and identified several areas for
systemic advocacy. Working together with partner organizations, Ms.
Hardee negotiated significant changes to Medicaid and ACA eligibility
policies, providing access to health care for tens of thousands of low-
income immigrants. Ms. Hardee holds a Juris Doctor from Tulane Law
School and a bachelor's degree in public health from George Washington
University. In 2016, she was presented with the New Leader in Advocacy
Award by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
Elizabeth Lower-Basch is director of CLASP's income and work
supports team. Her expertise is Federal and state welfare (TANF)
policy, other supports for low-income working families (such as
refundable tax credits), systems integration, and job quality. From
1996 to 2006, Ms. Lower-Basch worked for the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services. In this position, she was a lead welfare policy
analyst, supporting legislative and regulatory processes and managing
research projects. She received a Master of Public Policy from Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government.
Judy Mortrude is a senior policy analyst with CLASP's Center for
Postsecondary and Economic Success. Ms. Mortrude has more than 30
years' experience developing, delivering, and evaluating workforce
education, particularly with low-literacy and high-barrier populations.
She has been a classroom teacher, school administrator, and state
agency staff. Currently, Ms. Mortrude supports cross-agency state teams
as they scale and sustain integrated education and training career
pathway policies and practices; focus attention on racial and economic
equity; and build two-generational strategies. Additionally, she
analyzes Federal adult and post-secondary education policy and supports
organizations like the National Coalition for Literacy and the Open
Door Collective.
Renato Rocha is a policy analyst within CLASP's Income and Work
Supports team. He focuses on issues regarding work reporting
requirements across benefit programs as well as access to public
benefits for immigrant families. Prior to CLASP, Renato was an economic
policy analyst at UnidosUS (formerly National Council of La Raza),
where he conducted analysis of consumer protection, budget, tax,
disaster relief, and labor issues that impact the well-being of Latino
and immigrant communities. In graduate school, he also had the
opportunity to work at the National Immigration Law Center, where he
analyzed policy issues affecting deferred action recipients. Renato
holds a Master in Public Affairs from Princeton University's Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and a B.A. in
Politics from Occidental College. In 2013, Renato served as a Fulbright
Public Policy Initiative Fellow to Mexico.
Darrel Thompson is a research assistant with CLASP's Income and
Work Supports team. He provides research support and analysis on
various low-income and work support programs. Prior to joining CLASP,
Darrel interned at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the
Lou Frey Institute of Politics and Government. He holds a bachelor's
degree in political science from the University of Central Florida.
Isha Weerasinghe is a senior policy analyst focused on mental
health and sits in CLASP's youth team. She works on how CLASP's issue
areas impact individuals' mental health, with a specific focus on
youth, young adults, and mothers. Ms. Weerasinghe previously worked as
the Director of Policy and Advocacy at the Association for Asian
Pacific Community Health Organizations (AAPCHO), where she focused on
the intersections of how Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific
Islanders (AA&NHPIs) can better access linguistically concordant and
culturally appropriate care. She also did a great deal of coalition
building and provided policy guidance nationally, for AA&NHPI-serving
community health centers and AA&NHPI-serving organizations, in health
access and equity. Ms. Weerasinghe has done community based
participatory research, as well as local and state policy advocacy in
her work at New York University's Center for the Study of Asian
American Health (CSAAH), working within New York City and New York
state. Over the past 8 years, she has done extensive coalition work and
policy advocacy on the impacts of hepatitis B in the United States.
Isha has a bachelor's in arts degree in biology from Bryn Mawr College,
and a master's in science degree in health policy and demography from
the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Carrie Welton is a policy analyst on the income and work supports
team. Her work focuses on advocating for policy reforms that improve
the lives of people with low income and communities of color using a
racial equity lens. This includes improving access to public benefit
programs for post-secondary students and student parents to advance
their academic success. She also advocates for policy reforms that
strengthen the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Child Tax Credit
(CTC). Previously, Ms. Welton spent 3 years at the W.K. Kellogg
Foundation on the national Education and Learning team focused on early
childhood systems alignment. In addition, she spent 4 years at the
Kellogg Company conducting research and providing strategic direction
to inform the organization's government relations and lobbying efforts.
Ms. Welton also served on the state board of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Michigan, furthering the civil liberties and
civil rights of residents. As a member of the executive committee, she
provided fiduciary, strategic, and generative leadership to the
organization. She earned her Master of Public Administration from the
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan
and her undergraduate degree in Public Law from Western Michigan
University.
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Jimmy Panetta, a Representative in
Congress from California; Authored by Abby J. Leibman, President and
Chief Executive Officer, MAZON: A Jewish Response to Hunger
March 19, 2019

Chief, Certification Policy Branch,
SNAP Program Development, USDA Food & Nutrition Services,
Alexandria, VA 22302

Re: Proposed Rule: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP):
Requirement for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents RIN
0584-AE57

To Whom It May Concern:

On behalf of MAZON: A Jewish Response to Hunger, I am pleased to
submit these comments in opposition to public notice FR Doc. 2018-
28059. Based on our organization's many years of expert involvement in
anti-hunger related issues, we submit for your consideration these
comments focused on whether USDA should reconsider certain rules that
govern--and restrict--the current waiver standards for able-bodied
adults without dependents (ABAWDs) who participate in the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).

We unequivocally oppose the proposed rule change, which would
restrict states' flexibility to provide vital nutrition support to
people who struggle to feed themselves and their families.

Inspired by Jewish values and ideals, MAZON is a national advocacy
organization working to end hunger among people of all faiths and
backgrounds in the United States and Israel. For more than 30 years,
MAZON has been committed to ensuring that vulnerable people have access
to the resources they need to be able to put food on the table. MAZON
is a leading voice throughout the country on anti-hunger issues,
especially those that involve populations or problems that have been
previously overlooked or ignored--this includes food insecurity among
veterans, currently-serving military families, seniors, rural and
Native American communities, and college students. In fact, MAZON has
already commented on similar draconian proposals, as evidenced by the
attached letter we submitted on April 4, 2018 regarding RIN 0584-AE57.
It is with this experience and focus that we address the proposed
rule.
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is the
cornerstone of our nation's nutrition safety net, and most SNAP
recipients who are able to work do, in fact, actually work. Under
current law, childless adults ages 18 to 49 are restricted to only 90
days of SNAP benefits in 3 years unless they can prove they are working
or participating in an employment and training program for 80 hours per
month. States currently have flexibility to request waivers from this
harsh and arbitrary time limit for communities that face high
unemployment or insufficient job opportun[i]ties. USDA's proposed rule
change severely limits this critically important and common-sense
flexibility that is utilized by the majority of states.
Harsher limitations on accessing SNAP ignore the complex realities
of low-income families. This decision to restrict waivers will
exacerbate already difficult circumstances, not alleviate them.

Needless and Egregious Harm to the American People
This proposed rule change will have a devastating impact on
Americans of all walks of life. Working-age adults without minor
children are by no means a monolithic population. Approximately 45% are
female, and of them, nearly \1/3\ are over the age of 40. Roughly \1/2\
of ABAWDs are Caucasian, \1/3\ African American, and 10% Latina.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/who-are-the-low-
income-childless-adults-facing-the-loss-of-snap-in-2016.
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Rural Americans
Rural areas often face unique barriers to achieving food security
including a lack of public transportation, scarcity of childcare
services, lower educational attainment, fewer economic opportunities
and higher unemployment rates than urban areas.\2\ With the largest
proportion of SNAP participants, rural counties and small metropolitan
areas are more dependent on SNAP than urban counties. Of the top 100
counties that participate in SNAP, 85 are rural.\3\ There is stunning
evidence that this proposed rule change would cause extraordinary harm
to rural communities in southern states.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/90556/eib-
200.pdf.
\3\ https://www.dailyyonder.com/geography-food-stamps/2018/12/31/
25422/.
\4\ https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/
publications/proposed-changes-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-
program-waivers-to-work-related-time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a recent speech about the need for economic development in high-
poverty rural communities, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank Jerome
Powell explained that rural areas ``generally lack diverse industries
and employment options and often have suffered from decline in a
traditional industry.'' \5\ While current data show a strong economy
nationally, this is not true for rural America where poverty remains a
persistent challenge.\6\
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\5\ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-powell-analysis/in-
rural-mississippi-still-waiting-on-recovery-idUSKCN1Q30JH.
\6\ https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
powell20190212a.htm.
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The Working Poor
We also know that the majority of SNAP recipients who can work do
work. Among those who would be harmed by this proposed rule, roughly
75% worked the year before and/or the year after receiving SNAP. Many
of these people continuously experience periods of work and
unemployment, stuck in a devastating cycle of inconsistent low-skill,
low-wage jobs that are unable to lift anyone out of poverty.\7\ The
individuals most at risk of losing SNAP benefits under the proposed
rule are workers who experience normal labor market fluctuations and
those who should be eligible for exemptions but often do not receive
them.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/who-are-the-low-
income-childless-adults-facing-the-loss-of-snap-in-2016.
\8\ http://www.hamiltonproject.org/blog/
workers_could_lose_snap_benefits_under_trumps_
proposed_rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ample evidence suggests that harsh SNAP time limits fail to
``increase self-sufficiency, well-being, and economic mobility'' as
intended.\9\ In fact, we know that the vast majority of people
subjected to these time limits remained poor or even became poorer.\10\
Even among conservative policy experts who support the principle of
work requirements, poorly-designed policies like this proposed rule
raise concerns and are considered to be unreasonable, unrealistic,
untested, and clearly designed to cut caseloads and costs--not provide
needed assistance and a pathway to self-improvement for those who are
struggling.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-
order-reducing-poverty-america-promoting-opportunity-economic-mobility/

\10\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/work-
requirements-dont-cut-poverty-evidence-shows.
\11\ https://mlwiseman.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
Farmbill.120118.pdf.
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U.S. Veterans
We are deeply concerned by the evidence that this proposed rule
change would severely impact veterans who often face unique challenges
in securing full-time work and may require more than 3 months to secure
employment.
An estimated 1.4 million veterans live in households that
participate in SNAP.\12\ Evidence suggests that veteran households
participate in SNAP at lower rates than non-veteran households,
indicating that there are thousands who qualify but have not applied
for this essential lifeline.\13\ Post-9/11 veterans have nearly double
the average rate of food insecurity \14\ and recent scholarship has
raised concerns about the high rate of food insecurity and resultant
health impacts for women veterans.\15\ We know that many veterans
return from combat with disabilities, sometimes undiagnosed or not
fully recognized, that make it more difficult to maintain gainful
employment and provide food for themselves and those who rely on them,
even if they do not meet the definition of ``dependent.'' Households
with a disabled veteran are nearly twice as likely to be food-insecure
as households that do not have someone with a disability.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-helps-
almost-15-million-low-income-veterans-including-thousands-in.
\13\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-helps-
almost-15-million-low-income-veterans-including-thousands-in.
\14\ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24806818.
\15\ https://www.whijournal.com/article/S1049-3867(17)30419-X/
abstract.
\16\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-helps-
almost-15-million-low-income-veterans-including-thousands-in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Blue Star Families 2018 Military Family Lifestyle Survey--the
largest and most comprehensive survey of active duty service members,
veterans, and their families--found employment to be one of the top
three issues of primary concern among veterans.\17\ Veterans often
struggle to find jobs that match their skills, especially if they have
little work experience beyond military service. They might also face
discrimination from employers, particularly if they have a mental or
physical disability. Furthermore, many recently transitioning veterans
take temporary jobs but struggle to find full-time sustained work that
is a good fit for their skills and experience--these veterans will not
be able to regularly report 20 hours of work per week in order to
receive SNAP benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ https://bluestarfam.org/survey/.
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In addition to employment concerns, veterans who are awaiting a
disability determination face enormous challenges in making claims
through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs['] (VA) daunting claims
process, where delays and multiple appeals are commonplace. During this
waiting period, many veterans who cannot work are also unable, or
limited in their ability, to access Federal assistance.
The State of Maine offers a deeply concerning example of the
harmful impacts of this proposed rule change on veterans. In 2014,
Governor Paul LePage chose not to request a SNAP waiver for working-age
adults without minor children, for which the State of Maine was
eligible. As a result of this action, many thousands of Maine residents
were stripped of access to needed nutrition assistance from SNAP,
including an estimated 2,800 veterans affected by these harsh time
limits, many of whom continue to face unemployment and must turn to the
charitable food sector to meet their basic needs.
We urge USDA to consider the story of Tim Keefe, a veteran living
in Maine whose story provides a personal and painful glimpse of the
impact of this proposed rule change. When Governor Le Page decided not
to seek a waiver for the ABAWD SNAP time limit, Tim lost his access to
SNAP--one of the only supports that helped him get by as he was
desperately trying to find employment. He became homeless and reported
feeling ``like a cave man.'' \18\ Tim resorted to eating squirrels that
he caught to survive the brutal Maine winter, taking a great toll on
his health and well-being. He eventually was able to qualify again for
SNAP assistance when he turned 50. The SNAP benefits he receives now
are a lifeline for Tim and enable him to regularly put food on the
table once again.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ https://bangordailynews.com/2017/06/03/politics/i-felt-like-a-
caveman-how-work-requirements-for-state-benefits-hurt-one-maine-man/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sadly, Tim's story is not unique to the veteran experience in
America. Veterans regularly need temporary supplemental nutrition
assistance precisely because they frequently find themselves in periods
of transition. It does not matter whether they are recently returning
from service or have already long contributed to our workforce. Nobody
deserves to be destabilized by hunger while trying to get back on their
feet. Ensuring that all veterans have access to adequate and nutritious
food is critical, and providing such access to veterans is the least
this nation owes to its returning servicemembers who have made such
great sacrifices in service to our country.
Exacerbated Hunger Among Native Americans
As the first non-Native member of the Native Farm Bill Coalition,
MAZON is deeply concerned about the profound harm this proposed rule
change will have on American Indian and Alaska Native individuals. We
know that one in four Native Americans is food-insecure (double the
national average of one in eight), and this assault on SNAP eligibility
clearly will exacerbate hunger and poverty in this particularly
vulnerable and frequently overlooked population.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ http://www.nativepartnership.org/site/DocServer/2017-PWNA-
NPRA-Food-Insecurity-Project-Grow.pdf?docID=7106.
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Despite reports of high employment on a national scale,
unemployment rates on reservations remain dangerously high, in some
cases as high as 21%, and in some communities much higher.\20\ For
these communities, waivers for SNAP time limits literally save lives,
especially considering the geographic isolation and the impact still
felt today by historic violation of treaties with multiple Tribes,
generations of discrimination, forced attempts of assimilation, and
state-sponsored genocide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-05/where-u-s-
unemployment-is-still-sky-high-indian-reservations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Denying states the ability to apply for waivers will further strain
the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR) which
serves American Indians and Alaska Natives living on reservations or in
designated Tribal areas. In 2018, FDPIR served an average of 87,216
participants--mostly low-income individuals and families, working
adults, children, people with disabilities, and seniors.\21\ FDPIR was
designed as an alternative to SNAP and serves some overlapping
populations on Tribal reservations, so changes to SNAP eligibility
policies will impact FDPIR.\22\ Because FDPIR's funding is capped at a
fixed dollar amount, there is a real concern about the exhaustion of
FDPIR funds in the event of a spike in participation caused by
individuals cut off from SNAP benefits due to the proposed rule
change.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/pd/
fdpart.pdf.
\22\ https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/
StudyofFDPIR.pdf.
\23\ https://www.phi.org/uploads/files/FDPIR%20Module%20-
%20CCRWF%20Nutrition%20
Primer.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Greene Trottier, a member of the Spirit Lake Sioux Nation and
President of the National Association of FDPIR, recently testified
before the U.S. House Committee on Natural Resources about the impacts
of the recent partial government shutdown on Indian Country and the
importance of FDPIR to Tribal members. In a compelling portion of her
testimony, Ms. Trottier recounted how FDPIR was impacted by changes to
SNAP benefits in 2013:

We know from experience that any time SNAP benefits are
reduced or taken away, our program [FDPIR] sees an immediate
rise in applications as people seek to feed themselves and
their families. In some cases there is a 25 percent increase in
participation [ . . . ] when SNAP benefits are reduced. We saw
this in October 2013, when the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) expired and SNAP benefits were reduced.
In the month after ARRA's expiration, we saw an immediate rise
in participation across FDPIR sites in all our regions.
Unfortunately, this rise in participation does not come with
increased funding. We must try to do more with less.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ https://naturalresources.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
Mary%20Greene%20Trottier-Testimony.pdf.

We cannot count on FDPIR to meet the needs of every food-insecure
Native American. Of the 573 Tribes recognized by the Federal
Government, FDPIR operates among only 276 Tribes. SNAP is the only
option available to alleviate food insecurity in 297 Tribal
communities.\25\ Furthermore, since FDPIR exclusively applies to Tribes
recognized by the Federal Government, the hundreds of Tribes recognized
by states alone and not by the Federal Government are already unable to
utilize the limited amount of funding available that exists for FDPIR
to supplement loss of access to SNAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/fdpir/pfs-
fdpir.pdf.
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Finally, the Federal Government must adequately and appropriately
consult with all federally-recognized Tribes to ensure meaningful and
timely input on legislative proposals, policy matters and regulatory
changes that have Tribal implications. Consultations and related
efforts to improve operation and administration of Federal nutrition
programs operating in Indian Country stem from a recognition that the
U.S. has a solemn obligation to support Tribal sovereignty and protect
the well-being of these communities at a level comparable to non-
Natives. USDA's proposed rule change will have a substantial direct and
disproportionate impact on Native communities, on and off reservations.
Accordingly, before moving forward with this rulemaking proposal, our
government has a duty to consult with Tribal sovereigns about this
proposed rule change and to consider their concerns and recommendations
about how to mitigate potential negative impacts on Native
communities.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/11/09/00-29003/
consultation-and-coordination-with-indian-tribal-governments.
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College Students
The proposed rule change denies SNAP access to certain post-
secondary students without dependents, as well as noncustodial student-
parents who are enrolled less than part-time. When these students are
denied the ability to document hours of countable work-related
activities while otherwise not being exempt, the Federal Government
will be harming one of the greatest sources of our workforce
development by making students food-insecure and decreasing their
ability to complete coursework.
A new report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found
that a shocking 39% of all undergraduate students in the country--
almost 7.3 million--are at risk of hunger because of low household
income.\27\ Unfortunately food insecurity often prevents students from
completing degrees and credentials because they are too hungry to
learn. Stable part-time work remains elusive to this student
population, many of whom participate in SNAP to ensure that they can
cover basic needs because of inconsistent schedules, low wages, and
lack of benefits.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ https://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-19-95.
\28\ https://www.jff.org/resources/alleviating-poverty-opportunity-
youth/.
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There is already confusion about SNAP eligibility for students, and
this proposed rule change will only worsen the situation. This
confusion will also increase difficulty for higher education
administrators and state regulators in identifying clear eligibility
determinations for students.
Subversion of Democracy
Not only would this proposed rule cause unprecedented harm to
already struggling populations in America, it is an unprecedented
undermining of our democracy itself.
At a time of unprecedented political polarization, it is notable
that the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, commonly referred to as
the farm bill, was reauthorized with historic bipartisan margins of
support by votes of 369-47 in the House of Representatives \29\ and 87-
13 in the Senate.\30\ As a result of thoughtful and engaged debate and
deliberation, Congress agreed that significant changes to the SNAP
ABAWD waivers were unwarranted and unwise--the bill instead strengthens
ten pilot programs that are currently examining best practices for SNAP
employment and training. In stark contrast, this arbitrary new proposed
rule change was announced on the same day that President Trump signed
the farm bill into law. Designed to curtail SNAP participation, the
Administration's proposal contradicts express Congressional intent and
is a callous and calculated attempt to circumvent the democratic
process as evidenced clearly in the carefully-negotiated final farm
bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2018/roll434.xml.
\30\ https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/
roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115
&session=2&vote=00259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule change could not be more out of touch with the
reality of struggling American workers and families. USDA should focus
on implementing the 2018 Farm Bill provisions that will help Americans
get back to work, not resort to rulemaking that is a slap in the face
to Democracy and jeopardizes critical nutrition assistance for those
who need help to put food on the table.
By USDA's own estimate, the proposed rule change would result in
755,000 people losing access to life-saving nutrition benefits.\31\ The
proposal completely ignores the realities of people who are willing to
work but face inconsistent work hours, lack access to reliable
transportation, live in areas where the economy has been slow to
recover from the Great Recession, or are unable to access employment
and training programs--all of whom could fail to meet the burdernsome
work reporting requirements imposed on SNAP recipients.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-
administration-aims-to-toughen-work-requirements-for-food-stamps-
recipients/2018/12/20/cf687136-03e6-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2
fcc9e4_story.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Administration's stated goal of subjecting more working-age
adults without minor children to time limits for SNAP benefits is a
tactic designed to cause more hardship to the very people USDA claims
to help. The current SNAP eligibility restrictions are already punitive
as is, with waivers intended for parts of the country where jobs and
training opportunities are not readily available. Restricting states'
ability to issue waivers will unrealistically penalize people and
increase hunger--the very opposite of SNAP's intended purpose.
Importantly, the 2018 Farm Bill lowered the number of people that
states can exempt from SNAP time limits. The new law limits states to
exempting only up to 12% (down from 15%) of adults subject to current
SNAP time limits, which clearly marks the intent by Congress for policy
adjustments concerning state waivers for SNAP time limits. However, the
USDA proposed rule change would prohibit states from carrying over any
unused percentages from year to year, which could result in penalizing
those states in years when their economies take a downward turn and
more families struggle to put food on the table.
State Flexibility
The proposed rule change directly assaults states' flexibility and
ability to devise meaningful workforce development programs that
actually empower SNAP recipients to find and sustain stable work.\32\
Waivers help states provide reprieve for communities with high
unemployment and limited capacity for civil society to support and
empower SNAP recipients.\33\
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\32\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/waivers-add-key-
state-flexibility-to-snaps-three-month-time-limit.
\33\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/waivers-add-key-
state-flexibility-to-snaps-three-month-time-limit.
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Every state except Delaware has at some point requested to waive
time limits on SNAP since the adoption of the 1996 welfare reform law--
this fact demonstrates that states need a certain amount of flexibility
in order to ensure that individuals and families can try to stave off
hunger when they fall on hard times. In fact, 33 states, the District
of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands are currently approved for
statewide or partial time limit waivers, again affirming that there is
a genuine need for states to have the flexibility to address their
unique economic circumstances.\34\
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\34\ https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/abawd-waivers.
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Charity Alone Cannot End Hunger
The charitable food sector invests a mighty $5 billion per year to
meet emergency hunger needs, however the Federal Government--mostly
through SNAP--provides the vast majority of all food assistance in this
country. Additionally, SNAP and similar programs pump $5.8 billion per
month, or $70 billion per year, into the U.S. economy.
Stripping people of critical SNAP benefits will directly impact the
charitable food system, which is already strained. The recent
unprecedented government shutdown revealed that many Americans are
living paycheck to paycheck, with limited savings in the event of
economic hardship. With thousands of people--including Federal
workers--turning to the charitable food sector to meet their basic
needs, the shutdown also illuminated the vital importance of our
Federal nutrition safety net. What happens when 755,000 low-income
people are kicked off the meager support SNAP currently provides? To
expect an extraordinarily generous philanthropic sector to increase its
expenditures by even a fraction of the twenty-fold difference it holds
with our government's ability to be a solution is woefully unrealistic
and dangerous.\35\
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\35\ https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/private-charity-no-
match-for-federal-poverty-aid-experts-say/.
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Charities cannot make up the difference.
SNAP Strengthens Our Economy
We know that SNAP fuels economic growth in this country. Retailers
of all sizes benefitted from the $63 billion redeemed in 2017 through
SNAP funds.\36\ Based on the most recent data available, 10% of all
food consumption dollars comes from SNAP.\37\ Firms that accept SNAP
experienced an average 4% increase in business between 2013-2017.\38\
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\36\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-boosts-
retailers-and-local-economies.
\37\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-boosts-
retailers-and-local-economies.
\38\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-boosts-
retailers-and-local-economies.
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Without SNAP, our economy would lose between 0.53% and 1.03% of
GDP.\39\ In fact, every SNAP dollar spent expands the economy by
$1.70.\40\ By removing 755,000 people from SNAP, USDA's proposed rule
change would result in a self-inflicted wound on our economy that would
be felt in every state and the District of Columbia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ https://www.marketwatch.com/story/prolonged-shutdown-could-
slash-gdp-along-with-food-stamps-economist-says-2019-01-07.
\40\ https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-boosts-
retailers-and-local-economies#ftn6.
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Invest in Evidence-Based Solutions
SNAP is first and foremost a food security program, not a catalyst
for workforce development. It remains unclear how restricting SNAP
benefits would help people find and sustain gainful employment. Placing
more stringent restrictions on struggling Americans will not help
anyone find gainful employment. A more meaningful way to encourage work
among SNAP recipients would be to invest in effective job training
programs with robust case management to help individuals successfully
overcome barriers to employment--especially for people in rural areas,
on or near Indian reservations, and in economically-distressed
communities.
USDA has already invested in pilot employment and training programs
in ten socioeconomically and geographically diverse states.\41\ Among
the most successful of these programs is the partnership with the
Washington State Department of Social and Health Services Resources to
Initiate Successful Employment (RISE) project. RISE empowers and serves
individuals receiving SNAP who face significant barriers to
employment--this includes veterans, people experiencing homelessness,
individuals with limited English proficiency, and non-custodial parents
with child support obligations. Case managers employed by community
colleges and community-based organizations help lower barriers to
employment by leveraging housing resources, working with the Division
of Child Support for clients who are delinquent in child support
payments, and creating accelerated training strategies and job
placements within in-demand or high growth industries.\42\
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\41\ https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-
ET-Pilot-Summaries.pdf.
\42\ https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-
ET-Pilot-Summaries.pdf.
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Washington's RISE program played a critical role in the state's
workforce development efforts, empowering over 40,000 people with
employment, training, and support services in the Greater Seattle
Area.\43\ Of the individuals enrolled in the program between 2009 and
2011, 71% were employed with a median hourly wage of $11 per hour and
over $33 million was generated for the community-based organizations
and community colleges to deliver the program training.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ https://www.nationalskillscoalition.org/resources/
publications/file/Washington-SNAP-brief-web_FINAL.pdf
\44\ https://www.nationalskillscoalition.org/resources/
publications/file/Washington-SNAP-brief-web_FINAL.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. would be far better served by replicating this program's
success across the country instead of pulling the rug out from under
vulnerable Americans while they are already experiencing hardship.
Conclusion
MAZON is deeply concerned that the Administration is going down a
dangerous path of proposed rulemaking that seems intended to discourage
SNAP use without any meaningful alternatives to economic empowerment.
If adopted, this proposed rule change would hurt hundreds of thousands
of SNAP recipients--veterans, Native Americans, college students, and
people living in rural and remote communities, and other vulnerable
sectors of our nation--all of whom are vital to our collective strength
and success. MAZON urges USDA to rescind this proposed rule change and
instead dedicate resources toward strengthening employment and training
opportunities to help people find pathways to sustainable and
meaningful employment.
If the purported goal of this proposed rule change is to ``increase
self-sufficiency, well-being, and economic mobility,'' this
Administration's actions are misguided and its priorities
troubling.\45\ I would refer you to the comments submitted on behalf of
MAZON on April 4, 2018 in response to the Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking regarding SNAP and requirements and services for ABAWDs
(included with these comments), which included recommendations about
how to improve SNAP and better help those who struggle with food
insecurity in this country.
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\45\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-
order-reducing-poverty-america-promoting-opportunity-economic-mobility/

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We remain unwavering in our opposition to this proposed rule
change, which makes an end-run around Congressional intent and would
severely curtail states' flexibility to provide life-saving nutrition
support to their residents who struggle to feed themselves and their
loved ones.
Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Abby J. Leibman, President and Chief Executive Officer.
attachment
April 4, 2018

Ms. Sasha Gersten-Paal,
Chief, Certification Policy Branch,
SNAP Program Development, USDA Food & Nutrition Service,
Alexandria, VA

Re: Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program: Requirements and Services for Able-
Bodied Adults Without Dependents RIN 0584-AE57

Dear Ms. Gersten-Paal,

On behalf of MAZON: A Jewish Response to Hunger, I am pleased to
submit these comments regarding input requested about whether USDA
should reconsider certain rules that govern the 3 month time limit on
childless adults for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP).
Inspired by Jewish values and ideals, MAZON is a national advocacy
organization working to end hunger among people of all faiths and
backgrounds in the United States and Israel. For more than 30 years,
MAZON has been committed to ensuring that vulnerable people have access
to the resources they need to be able to put food on the table. MAZON
is a leading voice throughout the country on anti-hunger issues,
especially those that involve populations or problems that have been
previously overlooked or ignored--this includes food insecurity facing
veterans, currently serving military families, seniors, Native
Americans, and college students.
The Jewish community has a rich tradition of asking questions and
wrestling with different perspectives in order to discover the meaning
and truth about an issue. However, asking the right questions is
critical in the pursuit of understanding. We are concerned that the
focus for USDA's solicited input to inform the proposed rulemaking is
misdirected, and the questions being asked will not advance the stated
goals of addressing food insecurity and helping people move out of
poverty. In short, they are not the right questions.
SNAP is first and foremost a food security program, not a catalyst
for workforce development. The framing of this request for public
comments that links the goal of addressing food insecurity with
``helping able-bodied SNAP recipients obtain and maintain employment
and aligning program regulations with the President's Budget proposals
related to ABAWDs'' misconstrues the purpose of the SNAP program and
approaches the issue using an incorrect premise, ensuring that
recommendations will not be responsive to the actual goals of this
long-standing program. This request for comments does not inspire us to
provide suggestions, input, and answers; instead, it has only provoked
more questions:

How would placing more stringent time limits on able-bodied
adults without dependents (ABAWDs) receiving SNAP actually help
people to find and sustain gainful employment? What is the
evidence and data to support this notion? What data exists to
show how severe time-limits have contributed to employment for
recipients of SNAP and other Federal assistance programs?

Why is the focus for USDA's inquiry on processes and
procedures affecting ABAWDs and not on additional investments
to ensure access to employment and training opportunities to
help move them towards self-sufficiency? Why does this inquiry
not address the importance of case management and other
supports that take into consideration the real circumstances
and challenges faced by unemployed individuals that have not
only demonstrated efficacy but are designed to make the
transition to employment much more effective?

Why do states have the option to offer Employment and
Training (E&T) on a voluntary basis to certain or all SNAP
participants but are not mandated to do so, and why does this
request for comments not seek insights about whether this
policy should be reconsidered?

Does USDA recognize that ABAWDs are by no means a monolithic
population, including veterans, college students, those
suffering from mental health challenges, and individuals
formerly in the foster care system? How does USDA envision
ensuring the employment of this diverse and complex population
in 3 months or fewer? What considerations do USDA and states
currently make to account for the diverse circumstances and
challenges by unemployed ABAWDs trying to find employment? What
more could USDA and states do to recognize and address the
needs of this diverse population?

What is USDA doing to increase employment, training, and
workforce participation among ABAWDs in collaboration with
other Federal agencies that have more experience and expertise
in these areas? Why is so much burden to increase employment
being placed on SNAP, which is a nutrition assistance program
not an employment training program?

Why is USDA seeking input on these questions now, when the
results of the SNAP E&T pilot programs called for in the last
farm bill are not yet available? Would it not be more prudent
and helpful to consider the data, best practices, and lessons
learned from those pilot programs before seeking to make policy
and programmatic changes? Would making such changes without the
benefit of the results of these pilot programs be considered
irresponsible and a disservice to the SNAP program and the
millions of Americans who receive vital assistance from it?

Does USDA truly believe that the receipt of SNAP benefits
prevents unemployed ABAWDs from seeking and securing gainful
employment? Does USDA believe that revoking SNAP benefits after
a 3 month time period will notably increase employment rates
for ABAWDs? What is the evidence to support these beliefs?

Does USDA believe that hunger is the best motivator for
self-improvement? Is government-imposed hunger--forcing people
off needed benefits without adequate training or
opportunities--an appropriate function of the Federal
Government? What are the moral justifications for this policy?

While we welcome the chance to address opportunities for
improvement of the SNAP program, we fail to understand the singular
focus on ABAWDs, which completely ignores the complex realities of
their lives, the economic circumstances of the diverse regions of this
country, and the lack of data to support cutting them off from
nutrition assistance. The rhetorical framing of these proposals, and
the proposals themselves, seek to punish struggling Americans with
harsh penalties for conditions beyond their control. MAZON hopes that
USDA can answer our questions to help provide greater clarity and
vision to the proposed changes to SNAP. We hope that USDA can take a
step back to ask the right questions about how to improve SNAP and
better help those who struggle with food insecurity in this country.
Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Abby J. Leibman, President and Chief Executive Officer.
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Jimmy Panetta, a Representative in
Congress from California; Authored by Keith Carson, Vice President,
Board of Supervisors, District 5; Chair, Personnel, Administration and
Legislation (PAL) Committee
March 29, 2019

Certification Policy Branch,
SNAP Program Development Division,
Food and Nutrition Service, USDA,
Alexandria, Virginia

RE: Proposed Rule: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP):
Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents RIN
0584-AE57

Dear Certification Policy Branch:

The County of Alameda, California (``Alameda County'' or the
``County'') submits these comments in response to the February 1, 2019
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (``NPRM'' or ``proposed rule'') from the
Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) on the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program that proposes changes to the
able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWD) state waivers. This
includes rejecting the proposed seven percent unemployment floor for
the 20 percent standard, limitation of applicable data to only that
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), limitation of waiver
applicability to only the fiscal year in which it is implemented,
restriction on regions that can be combined for a waiver application,
the elimination of historical seasonal unemployment as a criterion for
approval, and restricted use of the 15 percent exemptions. The County
of Alameda strongly opposes these proposed changes and urges FNS to
immediately withdraw the proposed rule.
The Alameda County Social Services Agency (ACSSA) administers
eligibility for CalFresh (the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program, or SNAP) and the SNAP Employment and Training (SNAP E&T)
programs. SNAP plays a critical role in addressing hunger and food
insecurity in our community. It is the first line of defense against
hunger for low-income residents. SNAP drives over $11 billion in total
economic activity annually in California and the proposed rule would
harm our local economies, retailers and agricultural producers by
reducing the amount of SNAP dollars people have to spend on food.
Approximately 99,180 individuals receive nutritional support through
SNAP in Alameda County.
Under the current rules, an Able-Bodied Adult Without Dependents
(ABAWD) is a non-assistance CalFresh/SNAP recipient age 18 to 49 who is
able-bodied without dependent children. ABAWD eligibility for CalFresh/
SNAP is time limited to any 3 full months of benefits in a 36 month
period unless the individual: (1) satisfies the ABAWD work requirement;
(2) is exempt from the ABAWD time limit; (3) qualifies for an
additional 3 consecutive month period of eligibility; (4) receives a 15
percent exemption; or (5) lives in a county or area with a waiver of
the ABAWD time limit. Many ABAWDs subject to the time limit face
significant barriers and struggle to find and maintain employment. As a
result, the work requirement functions more as a time limitation, and
individuals categorized as ABAWDs simply lose nutritional support at
the end of 3 months.
A county, multi-county region, area within a county, or an entire
state can be approved for a waiver of the ABAWD time limit if it meets
federally established criteria regarding high unemployment or lack of
sufficient jobs. Alameda Comity has had a waiver for ABAWD eligibility
since May 2008, when a statewide waiver was approved at the start of
the recession. The County previously operated under a waiver from
December 1996 through August 1997. While the State of California no
longer holds a statewide waiver, Alameda County is operating CalFresh/
SNAP with a regional ABAWD waiver until August 31, 2019. The waiver has
permitted ABAWD CalFresh/SNAP recipients to continue receiving
nutritional support during times when jobs have been scarce, the
unemployment rate [is] higher than the national average, and the job-
to-employment ratio [is] historically low. The County also operated
under a 15 percent exemption for ABAWDs for Fiscal Years 2000-2007.
California has structured the use of exemptions such that
exemptions can be used to encourage individuals to engage in employment
and training activities. For example, exemptions could be used for
individuals living in rural areas who may require additional time to
engage in job search activities, or for those individuals who are
engaged in employment and training but may happen to not meet the hours
needed during a given month, for example if an individual falls ill for
a day and therefore falls short of meeting the hourly requirement in
the month.
Establishing a Lower Unemployment Floor
One of the proposals is to set a floor of seven percent
unemployment for which the 20 percent standard for regional waivers
would be considered. The NPRM requests comments on setting the floor at
six, seven, or ten percent. Given that the ``natural rate of
unemployment'' cited in the NPRM is five percent, Alameda County is of
the position that the proposed floors are higher than what is
reasonable to meet the waiver's intention: to provide relief for those
areas where unemployment rates limit one's ability to find a job and
meet ABAWD work requirements. The theory of a natural rate of
unemployment is debated by economists, and is impacted by the larger
conditions of the economy--meaning it does not stand at a steady rate.
There is not one agreed-upon steady figure for the current natural rate
of unemployment, and of recent estimates, five percent is on the higher
side. If the natural rate were actually closer to four percent, as some
economists and Federal Reserve Banks have argued, then a seven percent
floor for the 20 percent standard would require an unemployment rate 75
percent higher than the natural rate for waiver eligibility. This means
that in an economic downturn, regions would need to lose more jobs than
the market provides--leaving more workers out of work--before they may
be potentially eligible for an ABAWD waiver. Because the natural rate
of unemployment is one that fluctuates with the larger economy, Alameda
County believes setting a constant floor in relation to a proposed
constant estimate of the ``natural rate'' for the consideration of
ABAWD waivers is inappropriate. It is potentially due to these
fluctuations that the original ABAWD guidance following the 1996
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) did not set a ``floor''; rather, the regulations set regional
waiver eligibility in relation to the national unemployment average.
This relationship between a state or region and the national average
better estimates the actual job losses or gains that impact individuals
within the region as they seek employment. Alameda County believes the
20 percent standard should maintain the relationship between the state/
region unemployment rate and the national unemployment rate.
The NPRM notes that with the current relational metric for the 20
percent standard, 44 percent of ABAWDs live in waived areas. A seven
percent standard would reduce this to 11 percent of ABAWDs, six percent
standard to 24 percent, and a ten percent standard to only two percent
of ABAWDs. All proposed floors would result in a dramatic loss of
nutritional support for individuals who are eligible for SNAP.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the Oakland-Hayward-
Berkeley division, which encompasses much of Alameda County, had a
civilian labor force of 1,449,098 in November 2018. To achieve a seven
percent unemployment rate, more than 60,190 jobs would need to be lost.
To achieve a ten percent unemployment rate, more than 103,660 jobs
would need to be lost. These would be significant changes to the local
economy, causing considerable harm to the most vulnerable as the
economy loses jobs, and due to strict waiver requirements if the NPRM
becomes finalized, ABAWDs would be ineligible for CalFresh/SNAP
benefits appropriate to local and individual needs. If the intention is
to remove beneficiaries from the program, then setting one of these
floors would meet that intention. However, the goal stated in the Food
and Nutrition Act of 2008 is ``the policy of Congress, in order to
promote the general welfare, [is] to safeguard the health and well-
being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among
low-income households.'' A proposal to restrict state ABAWD waivers,
such as proposed by this NPRM, was rejected by Congress during the
recent reauthorization of the farm bill in fall 2018; therefore, this
NPRM exceeds Congressional intent.
Limiting State Waiver Areas To Those Designated As a Labor Market Area
(LMA)
The NPRM includes a proposal to limit the areas states could group
together for a state waiver to those that are [designated] as a Labor
Market Area (LMA) by the Federal Government. The NPRM justifies this
proposal by stating that the limitation ensures that only areas that
are economically tied together are grouped together. Alameda County
believes that this proposal is significantly too narrow. For example,
the LMA that includes much of Alameda County is the San Francisco-
Oakland-Hayward Metropolitan Statistical Area. Due to a jobs/housing
imbalance throughout much of the San Francisco Bay Area, County to
County Commute Estimates compiled by the Employment Development
Department illustrate that the MSA is insufficient. These estimates
show that 235,311 workers commute to jobs in Alameda County from--
Contra Costa (92,797), Santa Clara (38,339), San Joaquin (26,121), San
Francisco (22,009), San Mateo (13,417), Stanislaus (8,198), and nearly
a dozen other counties in the vicinity. Similarly, 227,757 workers who
reside in Alameda County commute to jobs outside the County to--San
Francisco (71,861), Santa Clara (64,696), Contra Costa (39,883), San
Mateo (34,369) and nearly a dozen other counties in the vicinity.\1\
The Bay Area is significantly larger than the traditional nine county
Bay Area, as ``super-commuters'' from regional counties travel to
polycentric urban centers throughout the region to reach their place of
employment. Restricting ABAWD waivers to LMAs would significantly
underestimate the impact of labor market shifts in Alameda County's
multi-county relationships. Job losses in any of the neighboring LMAs
would directly impact workers who live in Alameda County. With the
proposal in the NPRM, these workers would not have their job losses
included in ABAWD waiver consideration.
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\1\ State of California Employment Development Department, ``County
to County Commute Patterns,'' https://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/
data/county-to-county-commute-patterns.html.
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Limiting the Duration of Waivers
Alameda County has concerns about the NPRM proposal to limit ABAWD
waivers to the fiscal year in which they are implemented. Processing
time for waiver applications could limit the applicability of the
waiver. For example, the current ABAWD waiver under which Alameda
County operates was submitted September 18, 2017. FNS action did not
occur until July 2, 2018--nearly 10 months later, and into a new fiscal
year--with the waiver applying to September 1, 2018 through August 31,
2019. If the NPRM were finalized as written, this waiver may have only
been applicable for 1 month: through September 2018. We are concerned
that with lengthy processing timelines, ABAWD waivers may be approved
only for a matter of months per application, rather than providing
relief for a year, as has been regular practice. County processes would
be considerably complicated by this move, as a new waiver or end of a
waiver changes ABAWD eligibility practices for workers throughout the
agency. Significant staff time would be used to update systems and
practices for each time-restricted waiver. Eliminating statewide
waivers would result in a significant administrative burden in
California which will not help save or reduce costs. The elimination of
the waiver would require additional staff time and training to engage
the ABAWD caseload to encourage participation in employment and
training activities.
Harm to Individuals, Families and Children, and Impact to Local
Economies
The goal for SNAP recipients to achieve self-sufficiency is
predicated on the ability of local economies to provide adequate
opportunities for gainful employment. Though the national unemployment
rate has recovered from the Great Recession, many individuals in a wide
variety of regions continue to struggle finding steady work that makes
ends meet. The employment-to-population ratio, as tracked by BLS, has
not yet recovered to pre-recession levels. The ABAWD waivers provide
relief for these individuals, so that their ability to purchase
adequate food necessary for their well-being is not negatively impacted
by factors outside of their control. Nationwide, USDA data show that
the individuals impacted by ABAWD waivers have an average monthly
income of approximately 17 percent of the poverty line.\2\ These
individuals typically qualify for no other income support. This rule is
harsh and unfair. It harms vulnerable people by denying them food
benefits at a time when they most need it and, yet does not result in
increased employment and earnings. By time-limiting food assistance to
this group, Federal law has shifted the burden of providing food to
these unemployed individuals from SNAP to states, cities, and local
charities. Removing nutrition support does not enable these individuals
to secure employment, or work more hours. It does not increase self-
sufficiency; instead, the proposed policy change only causes harm to
those most in need.
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\2\ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, ``More than 500,000
Adults Will Lose SNAP Benefits in 2016 as Waivers Expire,'' March 2016.
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/more-than-500000-adults-
will-lose-snap-benefits-in-2016-as-waiversexpire#_ftn3.
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In Alameda County, there are approximately 167,000 food-insecure-
households.\3\ While a two-working-parent family with two children
needs $97,000/year to make ends meet,\4\ the annual income of 40% of
the households served by the Alameda County Community Food Bank is
$10,000/year or less.\5\ It has been demonstrated that individual,
household, and societal costs of food insecurity are high. Food-
insecure households are sometimes unable to afford balanced, healthy
meals, putting them at increased risk of diet-related disease such as
diabetes and obesity. Further, food-insecure children are at higher
risk of being hospitalized, iron deficient, obese, have lower tests
scores than their peers, have greater difficulty getting along with
other children, and may have impaired social development. Food
insecurity also places a burden on our health care and safety net
systems--systems in which millions of households run short of money for
food at the end of each month. Being food-insecure is correlated to a
nearly 50% increased likelihood of being in the top 5% of health care
users, and it is estimated that food insecurity costs the U.S. health
system $160 billion per year in poor health outcomes and additional
health care.\6\
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\3\ California Food Policy Advocates, ``Nutrition & Food Insecurity
Profile--Alameda County,'' July 2016. https://cfpa.net/county-profiles/

\4\ California Budget and Policy Center, ``Making Ends Meet Fact
Sheet: Alameda County Monthly Family Budget,'' 2017. https://
www.calbudgetcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Fact-Sheet_Making-Ends-Meet-
2017_AlamedaCty.pdf.
\5\ Alameda County Community Food Bank, ``2014 Hunger Alameda
County Uncovered,'' 2014. https://www.accfb.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/08/ACCFB-HungerStudy2014-smaller.pdf.
\6\ Bread for the World Institute, ``The 2016 Hunger Report by the
Numbers,'' 2016. http://hungerreport.org/2016/wp-content/uploads/2015/
12/HR2016-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
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Because SNAP is so important for low-income and food-insecure
children, children under the age of 18 and the adults who live with
them are technically exempt from the 3 month time limit for SNAP.
However, though current rules around the SNAP time-limit explicitly
exempt adults who have a dependent child under the age of 18 or live in
a household with children under 18, this definition may not allow for
the complex financial arrangements that low-income families utilize to
put food on the table. Alameda County represents the interests of
vulnerable children who as a result of this rule will experience a
reduction in important resources that help meet their basic needs, even
though FNS does not account for this in its cost-benefit analysis. This
includes:
Children with non-custodial parents: Poverty is a troubling reality
for custodial and noncustodial parents. The most recent available data
from 2015 suggests that 3.5 million custodial parents live below the
poverty line, making access to food assistance all the more important
for them and their children.\7\ Thus, some 4.5 million poor and low-
income custodial parents who rely on child support payments from non-
custodial parents (NCPs) also utilize SNAP to put food on the table for
their children.\8\ Yet NCPs are often themselves low-income, with 2.1
million living below the poverty line in 2015, and 1.5 million
accessing SNAP to supplement their resources to afford child support
payments.\9\ Because NCPs are not exempt from the ABAWD time-limit, the
proposed rule not only threatens them, but their children. An under-
employed or unemployed NCP who loses SNAP may need to divert his or her
income from child support payments in order to stay afloat financially,
which would be particularly devastating given that child support
represents more than \1/2\ of the income of the families in poverty who
receive it.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, ``How Many Families
Might be Newly Reached By Child Support Cooperation Requirements in
SNAP and Subsidized Child care, and What Are Their Characteristics?'',
July 2018, https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-report/how-many-families-might-be-
newly-reached-child-support-cooperation-requirements-snap-and-
subsidized-child-care-and-what-are-their-characteristics.
\8\ U.S. Census Bureau, ``Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their
Child Support: 2015 Current Population Survey,'' April 2016, Table 4,
https://www2.census.gov/programssurveys/demo/tables/families/2015/
chldsu15.pdf.
\9\ Ibid. at 7.
\10\ Heather Hahn, ``Navigating Work Requirements in Safety Net
Programs: Potential Pathways for Parents,'' The Urban Institute,
January 2019, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/
99479/navigating_work_requirements_in_safety_net_programs_0.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Children whose extended family members provide financial support:
Some low-income children may rely on food, financial assistance, or
free childcare from extended family members, family friends, or a
parent's significant other who do not live with them but use SNAP to
supplement their income. Households that are the most financially
precarious are the most likely to rely on such transfers to make ends
meet. Considering that financially precarious households are often
embedded together within the same networks, they likely received money
or assistance from others who are also struggling economically.\11\ If
ABAWDs in these networks lose SNAP benefits due to tightened state
waiver rules, it would disrupt their ability to lend that crucial
assistance to low-income children.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The Pew Charitable Trusts, ``Extended Family Support and
Household Balance Sheets: Getting by with a little help from friends
and relatives,'' March 2016, https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/
2016/03/fsm_kinshipbrief.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Youth aging out of foster care and unaccompanied homeless youth:
Youth in foster care and unaccompanied homeless youth
disproportionately experience significant barriers to obtaining a high
school diploma, entering college, obtaining a driver's license,
accessing health insurance, maintaining housing stability, and
obtaining steady employment. SNAP plays a significant role in the
health and well-being of youth aging out of care and unaccompanied
homeless youth with no support systems. Former foster youth often
experience poor nutrition and food insecurity, and SNAP benefits help
to address this problem and increase the likelihood of healthy adult
outcomes.\12\ However, because former foster youth and unaccompanied
homeless youth often meet the definition of an Able-Bodied Adult
Without Dependents, they face obstacles accessing this critical
assistance and would likely disproportionately suffer under tightened
state waiver requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Megan Martin, Shadi Houshyar, Alexndra Citrin, DeQuendre
Neeley-Bertrand, DeQuendre and Raquan Wedderburn, ``Supporting Youth
Aging Out of Poster Care through SNAP,'' The Center for the Study of
Social Policy, 2014, https://www.cssp.org/policy/2016/supporting-youth-
aging-out-of-foster-care-through-SNAP.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department provides little analysis to explain its conclusions
about the impacts the changes would have on individuals and population
groups nor of realistic plans to avert harm from those changes. USDA
merely asserts its expectation that \2/3\ of those individuals made
newly subject to the time limit ``would not meet the requirements for
failure to engage meaningfully in work or work training.'' By the
Administration's own calculations, the proposed rule would take food
away from 755,000 low-income Americans, cutting food benefits by $15
billion over 10 years. The Administration does not estimate any
improvements in health or employment among the affected population.
Moreover, while the Department concedes that the proposed changes
``have the potential for disparately impacting certain protected groups
due to factors affecting rates of employment of these groups, [it]
find[s] that implementation of mitigation strategies and monitoring by
the Civil Rights Division of FNS will lessen these impacts.'' But no
explanation of the mitigation strategies and monitoring is provided,
leaving no opportunity for the public to comment on whether the
acknowledged disparate impact will in fact be mitigated.
The economic impact of such a drastic change in ABAWD rules has an
enormous economic impact not only on California as a state, but on
local California communities and counties as well. Based on USDA
Economic Research Service analysis, it is estimated that each $1 in
Federal SNAP benefits generates $1.79 in economic activity. Those
dollars help many food retailers operating on thin margins to remain in
business; something that improves food access for all residents.
Conclusion
For all of these reasons, Alameda County strongly opposes the
proposed rule that would expose even more people to the arbitrary food
cutoff policy by limiting state flexibility regarding area waivers and
individual exemptions. Furthermore, we urge you to immediately withdraw
the proposed rule.
Sincerely,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Keith Carson,
Vice President, Board of Supervisors, District 5;
Chair, Personnel, Administration and Legislation (PAL) Committee.

CC:

California Congressional Delegation;
Members, Board of Supervisors;
Donna Ziegler, Alameda County Counsel;
Lori Cox, Director, Social Services Agency;
Colleen Chawla, Director, Health Care Services Agency;
C.J. Lake, LLC;
County Welfare Directors Association of California.
______

Submitted Comment Letter by Hon. Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in
Congress from Florida
February 19, 2019

Hon. Sonny Perdue,
Secretary of Agriculture,
U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary Perdue,

We write to thank you for the United States Department of
Agriculture's (USDA) recent notice of proposed rulemaking regarding
work requirements for able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWD)
recipients of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), RIN
0584-AE57, and to urge our support for promulgation of the rule as
proposed. At a time when our nation is seeing historic economic growth,
including generationally-low unemployment rates, this proposed rule
will allow our country to continue to thrive by restoring integrity to
SNAP and by moving the American people toward complete self-
sufficiency, thereby saving American taxpayers billions of dollars.
As you may know, SNAP was originally intended to give hard-working
Americans a second chance should they encounter a difficult stretch in
life--it was never intended to become one's livelihood, or their so-
called ``way of life.'' In spite of this, since our last welfare reform
legislation in 1996, the program has repeatedly shifted from these
first intentions, and has continually been weakened by increased
administrative flexibility.
This flexibility has allowed state governments to abuse their power
and evade the reasonable work requirements that SNAP utilizes to ensure
that recipients don't take advantage of the current system. These
requirements obligate ABAWDs, who are non-disabled and between the ages
of 18 and 49, to work or participate in an employment program for at
least 20 hours a week to continue to receive benefits for more than 3
months over a 36 month period.
However, under the current law, state governments may waive these
requirements in areas where the unemployment rate is above the national
average. Given our nation's strong economy, this can include areas with
unemployment rates under five percent--a rate that is conventionally
considered as full employment. Additionally, states are allowed to
grant partial state waivers by grouping together areas with similar
labor markets, which allows a state to gerrymander areas for waiver
purposes, thus potentially authorizing waivers for the entire state.
Also, states may exempt up to 15 percent of their ABAWDs. However,
should the states not use these exemptions, they are able to hoard them
for use in future years, which has resulted in certain states
accumulating hundreds of thousands of exemptions. All of this has led
to an abdication of SNAP's original purpose and has disincentivized
self-sufficiency, which resulted in 3.8 million individual ABAWDs on
SNAP in 2016, of which 2.8 million were not working at all.
The USDA's proposed rule would help to fix this significant problem
by implementing several common-sense reforms to the current work
requirement waiver laws. These include raising the necessary
unemployment threshold for local area work requirement waivers to seven
percent unemployment, ending the states' ability to gerrymander waiver
districts by only granting partial state waivers for areas that are
``economically tied,'' ending the states' ability to accumulate and
carryover work requirement exemptions for more than 1 year, and
increasing SNAP administrative efficiency by setting clearer standards
for allowable waivers.
These reforms would save hard-working American taxpayers $15
billion over a 10 year period and would help to reestablish the true
goal of the SNAP program, to help hard-working Americans in their
attempts to gain self-sufficiency. As such, we support the USDA's
proposed rule and urge you to promulgate this rule in its current
proposed version, to ensure our nation's continued success.
Thank you,

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Hon. Kevin Hern,
Member of Congress;

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Hon. Tom Cole, Hon. Markwayne Mullin,
Member of Congress; Member of Congress;

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Member of Congress; Member of Congress;

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Member of Congress; Member of Congress;

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Member of Congress; Member of Congress;

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Member of Congress; Member of Congress;

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Hon. Michael C. Burgess, Hon. Bob Gibbs,
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Hon. John Ratcliffe, Hon. Kelly Armstrong,
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Hon. Ralph Norman, Hon. Ron Wright,
Member of Congress; Member of Congress;

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Hon. Scott Perry, Hon. Roger W. Marshall,
Member of Congress; Member of Congress;

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Hon. Mo Brooks, Hon. Alexander X. Mooney,
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Hon. Guy Reschenthaler, Hon. Michael Cloud,
Member of Congress; Member of Congress;

______

Submitted Questions
Questions Submitted by Hon. Dusty Johnson, a Representative in Congress
from South Dakota
Response from Karen Cunnyngham, Associate Director, Mathematica Policy
Research
Question 1. Ms. Cunnyngham, does your analysis investigate the
potential positive income, reduction in poverty, and overall quality of
life improvement for individuals who newly obtain employment because of
the rule change? If so, is this available as a supplement to your
previously released analysis?
Answer. My analysis relies on objective, rigorously derived
estimates of the effects of changes to SNAP, and unfortunately, such
data pertaining to people who newly gain employment as a result of
changing ABAWD work requirements is not available. As such, my analysis
does not address this issue directly. But these are important
questions, and research on quality-of-life improvement using rigorously
collected evidence would be an important contribution to the policy
discussion.

Question 2. Ms. Cunnyngham, your written testimony mentioned that
access to a good SNAP employment and training program could help SNAP
participants meet the work requirements. The 2018 Farm Bill clarified
the programs that can count for meeting SNAP E&T. What estimates have
you (or others) done on SNAP participants' access to all types of E&T
programs, and on the overall ability of those programs to help
participants comply with any changes in the SNAP waiver rules?
Answer. Under a contract for the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Mathematica is currently testing innovative strategies to increase
employment and earnings among SNAP participants and reduce their
dependence on SNAP and other public assistance programs. This study was
mandated in the 2014 Farm Bill, which authorized grants for up to ten
pilots (or demonstration projects). The ten pilots offer diverse
services and target different groups of SNAP participants in various
geographic locations. Mathematica's random assignment impact analysis
will give policymakers insight into effective strategies for increasing
employment and earnings; decreasing public assistance; and positively
influencing other outcomes of interest, including food security,
health, and housing. The impact analysis will also help us understand
whether any of these outcomes vary for different types of SNAP
participants. In addition, the evaluation includes the following: (1)
an implementation analysis that will document the operation of each
pilot and provide context for interpreting and understanding observed
impact both within and across pilots; (2) a participation analysis that
will examine the characteristics and service paths of pilot
participants and control group members and determine whether the
pilots, the services they offer, and the requirements they impose
affect individuals' decisions about whether to apply for SNAP; and (3)
a cost-benefit analysis that will estimate the return on each dollar
invested in providing E&T services. Interim study findings are set to
be released in late 2019, and we would be happy to provide your office
a copy of our findings.
On the question of what access participants have to SNAP E&T
services, Mathematica studied the characteristics of SNAP E&T several
years ago. This was a nationally representative study of E&T
participants and providers that documented the services available and
received. The full report, with an executive summary, can is available
at https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/
SNAPEandTCharacteristics.pdf.

Question 3. Ms. Cunnyngham, did the estimates of the number of
individuals affected by the proposed ABAWD rule changes or any of your
estimates attempt to differentiate the reasons an individual might be
impacted?
Answer. Drilling down on individual motivations, behavioral
insights, or other reasons individuals might or might not be impacted
by the proposed rule change is not possible with the data we used for
our analysis. Currently, we can only speak to the circumstances, not
the ``why'' behind the circumstances. Additional data, however,
possibly provided at the state and local levels, could help explain
why.
Response from Sam Adolphsen, Vice President of Executive Affairs,
Foundation for Government Accountability
Question 1. Mr. Adolphsen, how is one declared able-bodied? Can you
provide various state examples of the eligibility process that
determines such a classification?
Answer. The term ``able-bodied'' in relation to the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), or food stamps, is a term found in
Federal Food Stamp regulations at 7 CFR, Subchapter C.\1\ The relevant
portion of food stamp law, U.S. Code Title 7, Chapter 51, and Section
2015, contains a work requirement for able-bodied adults on the program
and defines those individuals as between ages 15 and 60 who are
``physically and mentally fit.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/7/subtitle-B/chapter-II/
subchapter-C.
\2\ https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the eligibility process for receipt of the food stamp
benefit, a state worker from the administering agency will use the
application process to determine if the applicant is in fact an able-
bodied adult subject to the work requirement in Section 2015. They will
further determine if they are an Able-Bodied Adult Without Dependents
(ABAWD) subject to a separate requirement in Section 2015(o). In either
case, the applicant or participant can demonstrate they are unable to
meet the requirement through a note from a doctor or social worker at
any point. Recent guidance from Food and Nutrition Services has also
allowed eligibility workers to make this determination of unfitness in
certain extreme cases.

Question 2. Florida is one of many states focused on work-oriented
reforms, and a new report shows the incredible impact they're having on
the state. Since the state implemented a food stamp work requirement in
2016, nearly 94 percent of able-bodied, childless adults have left
Florida's food stamp program. Those who left the program found work in
over 1,104 industries--in nearly every corner of Florida's economy.
Even better, 70 percent of those who initially found work in the fast
food industry or at a temp agency left those industries within 1 year.
Work requirements aren't just helping people climb out of dependency in
Florida--they're helping them climb the economic ladder to better
opportunities and bigger paychecks. Mr. Adolphsen, how can we replicate
this in other states who may find it difficult or not cost-efficient to
enforce work requirements and engage recipients?
Answer. The results of work requirements for ABAWDs in the food
stamp program in Florida were outstanding, as noted in the question.
However, we know this is impact is not isolated only to Florida. Both
Kansas and Maine implemented the same work requirement in 2014, and in
subsequent studies, each of those states found results similar to
Florida--incomes of those former participants in the program more than
doubled in just 1 year. Furthermore, Kansas and Maine did not report
any additional administrative burden or cost as a result of
implementing the work requirement. In all three states, enrollment in
the program dropped significantly as a result of the reform, and since
most administrative costs are driven by caseloads, there is strong
evidence to believe this type of reform can actually drive down
administration burden.
In fact, California, which has not implemented the work requirement
for ABAWDs in almost the entire state, has the second highest
administrative cost per case in the country at $68.52 per case, per
month. That is more than double the national average of $29.98.
Meanwhile Florida's cost per case, per month is the lowest in the
nation.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/FY16-
State-Activity-Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, most states' systems are already set up to handle the
ABAWD work requirement, since it has been a part of food stamp law
since 1996, and until the mid-2000s, most states were enforcing the
requirement in at least part of their state. This means that most
states simply have to turn that feature back on within their computer
systems. While there are significant Employment and Training funds
available to states to assist ABAWDs with work activities or training,
there is no required number of ``slots'' that must be funded or
staffed, so states have flexibility in this area, ensuring that it is
not a legitimate obstacle to re-instating the requirement.

Question 3. Mr. Adolphsen, we know the Foundation for Government
Accountability has written on these waiver abuses and the proposed
rulemaking. Your written testimony stated this proposed rule would help
address waiver abuse. Do you have additional recommendations to the
Department's solution?
Answer. The proposed rulemaking is essential to ensuring that
waivers are no longer abused. However, the rulemaking leaves in place
some key loopholes that could easily be exploited by states that are
more focused on keeping people on food stamps than helping them get
back to work. To ensure that this gaming of the system cannot take
place, the rule should be adjusted in several key ways.
The proposed rule will still allow for the combining of certain
areas for the purposes of applying for a waiver. This could mean that
some counties, for example, with low unemployment, can still be grouped
with higher-unemployment counties in a way that would result in both
receiving a waiver, even though the lower unemployment county would not
qualify on its own. The rule should require each individual area,
county, or city, to qualify on its own without combination with a
separate area.
Making sure that areas that are within commuting distance of
available jobs do not qualify for a waiver could strengthen the rule
further. The USDA has defined certain ``commuting zones'' that more
accurately capture the commuting patterns within the country. The rule
should require that, even if a county qualifies itself for a waiver, if
the area is within commuting distance to available jobs in another
county, it should not receive a waiver.
The rule could also be strengthened by using a ten percent
unemployment rate as the floor for any waiver. Congress very clearly
set ten percent unemployment as the chosen mark for approval of the
waivers in the original work requirement law, and it would return the
waivers to their original intent of being employed only in truly
economically disadvantaged areas.
There are three final changes that could improve the rule:

First, current regulations exempt from the work requirement
ABAWDs who reside in a household with a sibling under 18. The
intent of the law is to exempt caretakers or parents of
children under 18, not anyone who resides in the household.
This loophole should be closed in this rule.

Second, regulations currently exempt 50 year olds from the
work requirement. The law exempts those individuals ``over 50
years old'' but regulations exempt anyone over 49 years old.
The Office of Inspector General has recommended this be fixed,
and it should be changed in this rule.

Third, regulation includes language that ``requires'' the
Secretary of USDA to approve ABAWD work requirement waivers
when certain criteria are met. However, the law states only
that the Secretary ``may'' approve waivers in these cases. The
rule should return this discretion to the Secretary as Congress
intended.

Question 4. The 2018 Farm Bill allows states to exempt up to 12% of
their ABAWDs, per month, for myriad reasons. How can states more
effectively use this allowance to capture the appropriate exceptions,
as opposed to waiving larger areas and more people from the work
requirement?
Answer. The use of this particular exemption is often ignored in
the discussion about the larger geographic waivers. Although some
proponents of the current waiver structure treat the new rule as if it
will eliminate waivers altogether, it will not. The rule would simply
move the standards for qualifying back towards Congressional intent of
approving them only in economically-disadvantaged areas.
Further, even taken to the extreme and assuming there are No
geographic waivers, states still have the option to exempt 12 percent
of their ABAWD caseload. This presents states with a much more targeted
opportunity to exempt individuals from the work requirement when there
is a true need to do so. A prime advantage of this for states is that
there is no requirement to complete the administrative process or
management of a geographic waiver. The state can simply deploy these
exemptions as they deem necessary.
A good example of how these 12 percent exemptions might be used is
in the case of major and sudden job loss in the state. For example, if
a large employer decides to suddenly leave town, the state may use
these exemptions for the specific people impacted by layoffs. This
allows for rapid response and individual targeting, instead of the
heavy handed and administratively burdensome geographic waiver
approach.

Question 5. The House-passed farm bill included language that would
have mandated the collection of integral data related to SNAP
households. Data collection had long been a focus of the hearing
series, with many bipartisan witnesses stating that there is a reality
in SNAP: limited data. This data collection would have debunked claims
about recipient households and would have informed future policy based
on facts rather than (tiny) sample-based assumptions. As an example,
most assumptions are based on a survey of \1/4\ of one percent of SNAP
households (52,000 households of 20.8 million). Per The Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, this provision was seen as one that
``unnecessarily puts personal information for tens of millions of
Americans at risk.'' Mr. Adolphsen, did FGA support this data
collection? Would it have mitigated the concerns that there is no data
on ABAWDs?
Answer. FGA does support the collection of better data to ensure
proper evaluation and management of the program. For example, several
witnesses at the recent hearing on ABAWDs were relying heavily on
extrapolations of survey data to promote their viewpoint. Our research
has tracked the actual experiences of more than 500,000 individuals,
following their progress from welfare to work, and looking at each
person's actual increase in income.
While there could be better data collection, the assertion put
forth that we ``do not know who these ABAWDs are'' is also not entirely
accurate. We have enough data available to know that ABAWDs are mostly
male, mostly young, and most are not working at all. We know for sure
that they are not part-time or full-time students, and we know that
they are not working in the seven million available jobs. We know this
in particular because if an ABAWD works even in a minimum wage job
full-time, they will be out of poverty and off of welfare. Improved
data will help all interested parties better analyze this important
program.
Response from Lisa Hamler-Fugitt, Executive Director, Ohio Association
of Foodbanks
Dear Honorable Dusty Johnson, Ranking Minority Member:

Thank you for your time and interest in the Ohio Association of
Foodbanks SNAP Work Experience Program that serves only work-mandated
recipients who are considered unemployed and underemployed Able-Bodied
Adults without Dependents in Franklin County, Ohio. It is my pleasure
to provide you with our responses to the questions I received from
Jennifer Yezak, via email on April 17, 2019.
Question 1. Ms. Hamler-Fugitt, your written testimony mentions the
myriad ``self-reported'' issues individuals categorized as ``able-
bodied'' disclose. At what point in this assessment do you engage with
medical service providers to either support or dispute such claims?
What is the process once you engage with those medical service
providers?
Answer. When a SNAP work-mandated recipient states during their
assessment that they have a disability and/or limitation, and the
County SNAP Caseworker did not document the disability, the
Association's Work Assessment Specialist directs the SNAP recipient to
go back to their County SNAP Caseworker to secure the ``Franklin County
ABAWD Employability Form'' (attached). The SNAP recipient is then
required to locate a doctor or medical professional to complete the
form on their behalf.
The Association's Work Assessment Specialist encourages the SNAP
recipient to apply for Medicaid, if they are without health care
coverage, and provides them with a list of free medical clinics if they
don't currently have a doctor. It is the responsibility of the SNAP
recipient to locate and secure the medical service provider that will
assess and document their medical condition and who is willing to
complete the form, documenting the recipient's inability to work. It is
becoming more difficult to locate medical professionals who are willing
to complete these assessments and complete the paper work for free. We
have had a number of SNAP recipients report that the local medical
providers are charging $20 to complete the form in addition to the cost
of an office visit.
These costs are prohibitive for an unemployed SNAP recipient that
has no income and is not covered by health insurance.

Question 2. Ms. Hamler-Fugitt, your testimony presents a variety of
circumstances that should void ABAWDs from work, and four reasons to
withdraw the proposed rule. USDA made it a point--multiple times--to
ask for additional feedback in both the ANPRM and the NPRM. Do you have
suggestions that can be handled via rulemaking as to how to hold states
accountable, engage ABAWDs in the labor force, and work to move
individuals to personal autonomy?
Answer. USDA does not mandate that states provide SNAP work-
mandated recipients with education, training, Work Force Investment
Act, SNAP Employment and Training or any workforce supports. The
Franklin County Department of Job and Family Services (FC[D]JFS)
contracts with the Association to provide these services to SNAP work-
mandated recipients who reside in Franklin County, Ohio.
The Ohio Association of Foodbanks supports work by providing
assignments and placements at over 50 nonprofit and faith-based
organizations to help recipients meet their work requirements when they
are unable to secure paid employment or a slot to participate in a
qualifying education and training program.
In our experience there is significant evidence that restricting
time limit waivers increases the direct cost to the state and county
agencies, places an additional administrative burden on the SNAP
recipients, and likely decreases the number of families who are able to
get the food assistance they need. In fact, without additional funding
from Congress, this rule is a significant unfunded mandate on state and
local governments. Programs with lower administrative burdens reach
more eligible people than programs that make participants jump through
hoops to get help meeting their basic needs.
The proposed rule change would make it harder for states to obtain
and implement area waivers by dropping statewide waivers except when a
state triggers extended benefits under unemployment insurance. It would
unduly limit the economic factors considered in assessing an area's
eligibility for a waiver (e.g., by no longer allowing employment to
population ratios that demonstrate economic weakness to qualify areas
for waivers). It would undermine efficient state implementation of area
waivers by limiting their duration to 12 months and delaying their
start dates until after USDA processes the request. In addition, the
proposed rule would remove states' ability to use exemptions
accumulated prior to the rule's implementation as well as limit the
time states have to use exemptions they receive in the future.
USDA provides little analysis to explain its conclusions about the
impacts the changes would have on individuals and population groups nor
of realistic plans to avert harm from those changes. Instead it merely
asserts its expectation that \2/3\ of those individuals made newly
subject to the time limit ``would not meet the requirements for failure
to engage meaningfully in work or work training.'' Moreover, while USDA
concedes that the proposed changes ``have the potential for disparately
impacting certain protected groups due to factors affecting rates of
employment of these groups, it finds that implementation of mitigation
strategies and monitoring by the Civil Rights Division of FNS will
lessen these impacts.'' But no explanation of the mitigation strategies
and monitoring is provided, so there is no opportunity for us to
comment on whether the acknowledged disparate impact will in fact be
mitigated.
The time limit proposal goes around Ohio's Governor and lawmakers
and the rest of Congress, which just concluded a review and
reauthorization of SNAP in the 2018 Farm Bill and did not make the
changes proposed. The rules governing areas' eligibility for waivers
and individual exemptions have been in place for nearly 20 years. In
that time, the waiver rules have proven to be reasonable, transparent,
and manageable for states to operationalize.
We strongly oppose the proposed rule that would expose even more
Ohioans to the SNAP food cutoff policy, increase hunger and food
insecurity and harm our state and community.

Question 3. Per your website, Feeding America's mission is to feed
America's hungry through a nationwide network of food banks and to
engage the United States in the fight to end hunger. Feeding America
also ``works hard to protect and promote government programs that help
families facing hunger.'' SNAP is one of those programs, which also
includes an emphasis on work and self-sufficiency. Feeding America has
over $2.8 billion in revenues, distributes over $2.7B of that in grants
and other ``assistance;'' what is Feeding America doing to promote
work, personal goals, self-sufficiency, and a lifetime of independence?
Answer. The Ohio Association of Foodbanks a separate 501(c)(3) and
is a partner state Association of Feeding America. The Association is
unable to respond to this question and we have referred it on to
Feeding America.
For additional information about the Ohio Association of Foodbanks,
the following link is to our 2018 Annual Report, which provides an in-
depth account of Ohio's hunger relief network and the programs and
partners that drive our mission to provide food and other resources to
people in need: http://ohiofoodbanks.org/docs/publications/
SFY2018_annual_report.pdf.*
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* The document entitled, Ohio Association of Foodbanks: Annual
Report 2018, is retained in Committee file.

Question 4. Feeding America's website states that over 46 million
people benefit from their services. That's over 14% of our nation. We
have spent decades and trillions of dollars fighting poverty. It is
obvious that some, if not all, of the over 80 social welfare programs
are not working. What, in your opinion, has worked? What is not
working? What are the efficiencies that can be most easily achieved to
improve the program in the near term?
Answer. The Ohio Association of Foodbanks a separate 501(c)(3) and
is a partner state Association of Feeding America. Our efforts in Ohio
fed one in six hunger Ohioans last year.
I appreciate the question of whether there are ways to improve
efficiencies in government programs. It is, and has always been,
crucial that each tax dollar is spent wisely and prudently. While I
have thoughts to share, my responses only focus on Federal nutrition
programs.
Programs with overlapping purposes or services do not necessarily
mean that families are receiving more help than they need. Too often,
the programs and supports available to families and seniors do not
reach them or fail to address the enormous problems so many families
and individuals face in this economy. This is typically because the
programs are difficult to access due to confusing rules and
requirements and because many key services, such as housing, child
care, and job training, have fixed funding and cannot respond to
increased need, particularly during a weak economy. When key programs
do reach Ohioans, they are a powerful weapon against poverty and
hardship. We must do more to improve how programs and agencies work
together to ensure that these programs are accessible to the families
and individuals they are intended to serve.
However, there are some real-world realities that I want to
highlight. For one, it is crucial to recognize that program overlap
does not always mean duplication. People who struggle to afford an
adequate diet may be better served by different types of programs and
rarely are the value of benefits provided by any one given program
sufficient to support the food needs of an individual or family.
For example, SNAP works, yet the benefits fall far short of what a
family requires and do not last the whole month. Thus, families that
receive SNAP may also turn to food banks to fill in the gaps. A recent
study found that in Ohio, low-income families continued to be food-
insecure despite accessing several food assistance programs. For
example, 42% of the households standing in our food lines receiving
SNAP benefits in the study were at risk of hunger and another 42% had
cut back on the number or size of their meals. Additionally, among
households with children ages 0-3 years, 58% participate in the Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).
Among households with school-age children, 63% and 55%, respectively,
participate in the Federal school lunch and school breakfast programs
and 14% participate in the summer food program.
These benefits are provided to families that ask for help and these
families have to exert a significant amount of effort in order to
access and maintain these benefits. So, it is crucial that we recognize
that the food assistance programs that we already have do not provide
enough to meet all the nutritional needs of families.
A simple recommendation is that Congress increase the SNAP benefit
to the low-cost and moderate food program. In addition, automatically
enroll low-income seniors, persons with disabilities, and families with
children into the SNAP program.
The fact that food insecurity (or risk of hunger) remains at a high
level confirms that too few, not too many, resources are being made
available for the families that need them.
That said, I recommend that Congress enact policies that simplify
and streamline eligibility rules so that families who participate in
one program can be easily enrolled into all the other low-income
programs for which they are eligible. For example, states and school
districts have been working to cut red tape and streamline enrollment
into the school lunch program by automatically enrolling children from
families receiving SNAP and TANF through a process known as direct
certification. Children in households receiving SNAP benefits are
eligible for free school meals and school districts are required to
work with the SNAP administrators to enroll them automatically, using
the direct certification process noted above. Parents who have already
completed a lengthy and detailed SNAP application should not have to
complete another application; schools should not have to process
unnecessary paperwork.
This same method of simplifying and streamlining eligibility should
apply to low-income seniors on Social Security who are receiving
assistance and extra help with Medicaid part D. A hungry senior is not
a healthy senior and I recommend that Congress enact policies that
would allow states to auto-enroll seniors on low, fixed incomes into
the SNAP and Commodity Supplemental food Programs, without requiring
these seniors to complete multiple applications for critical food
assistance.
Recommendations:

Congress should facilitate the ability for states to
integrate streamlined enrollment of eligible people across
several key programs: SSI/SSDI, Medicaid, Medicare and Domestic
Food Programs. This could be supported by allowing for data
sharing and interconnected data systems and providing the
Social Security Administration with the ability and mandate to
directly enroll low-income seniors and person with disabilities
in all Federal nutrition programs for which they are eligible.

Recipients of Unemployment Compensation should be notified
about Federal employment and training programs that are
available to them for additional education to enhance their
skills.

The United States Department of Agriculture should require
states to provide a comprehensive plan for how they will ensure
that eligible individuals will be enrolled in all domestic food
programs rather than individual, program-specific efforts. In
support of that effort, USDA could provide information to
states and localities about how best to cross-leverage their
outreach efforts.

The Federal Government should measure states' success with
enrolling eligible individuals in a core package of programs,
such as SNAP, Medicaid, and school meals, rather than assess
participation by individual programs. Agencies could establish
a national standard for multi-benefit application assistance
programs and create incentives and funding to maximize
participation by eligible low-income families and individuals
in income-enhancing programs. States and local governments that
create seamless enrollment systems to connect those most in
need to available supports should be recognized and rewarded.
Their best practices could be promoted in other locations.

Expand efforts and resolve to strengthen and create
interdepartmental coordination, universal application, single
agency consolidation and facilitate streamlining of public
benefits, eligibility and applications processes. These efforts
will free up administrative funding that can be directed to
increasing benefits levels and support expansion of eligibility
standards.

Question 5. USDA provided Regional Directors with a memorandum on
November 19, 2015 that explicitly speaks to how states can better
assess an individual's fitness for work ``methodically and
comprehensively.'' The memorandum goes on to say that Federal rules
(CFR 273.24) allow states this flexibility to prevent placing
unnecessary burden on individuals who are clearly unfit for employment.
Ms. Hamler-Fugitt, where do you see the breakdown in this process?
Answer. CFR 273.24 pertains to General eligibility guidelines to
states, and in my experience, states err on the side of more rules, not
less when defining their policies. In addition, there is no
Congressional oversight, no Federal funding, no administrative
oversight, no national standards and no penalties on states that refuse
and fail to comply with this Federal rule. Might I recommend that
Congress request a GAO report be completed on how states have or have
not implemented CFR 273.24. Another Congressional action that may be
warranted is a review and report by state on the number of work,
training, and work fair slots and programs are operating in each county
in every state. This would provide Congress with baseline information
about the capacity or lack thereof to provide these program services to
SNAP recipients that are subject to the time limits.

In closing, food insecurity remains at very high levels, which
confirms that too few, not too many resources are being made available
to struggling families who desperately need them. SNAP is one of the
MOST efficient ``welfare'' programs out there. Tens of millions of the
people served in emergency hunger relief are not eligible for ``social
welfare programs'' and not considered to be ``living in poverty'' under
Federal guidelines, yet nonetheless they can't afford to put food on
the table. These are merely nutrition programs. SNAP should continue to
exist because proper nutrition is critical to the healthy livelihoods
of every person. Other programs should address employability
separately. SNAP is not a jobs program. It is not funded as a jobs
program.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I would be
pleased to respond to any additional questions that you might have. I
can be reached either my email at Redacted or my telephone at Redacted.
Best regards,

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Lisa Hamler-Fugitt,
Executive Director.
attachment

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Response from Jay C. Shambaugh, Ph.D., Director, The Hamilton Project,
and Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution;
Professor of Economics, George Washington University
Dear Representative Johnson,

Thank you for the questions regarding my testimony. I appreciate
your interest in this important topic and welcome the opportunity to
share thoughts on these issues. I answer the questions below.
Best regards,

Jay Shambaugh.

Question 1. Mr. Shambaugh, if the Administration were loosening the
ability of states to receive waivers, or relaxing the data criteria
that should be used, would you have concerns about whether it is within
the purview of the Administration to make changes to ABAWD waiver
regulations? Is there any evidence that this Administration's
interpretation of the phrasing of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 of
``does not have a sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for
the individuals'' is inappropriate and not within an allowable range of
possible regulatory interpretations?
Answer. Given that SNAP is a highly effective automatic stabilizer,
proposals that change the conditions by which economically distressed
places become eligible for work requirement waivers should be held to
the highest evidentiary standards. The concerns expressed in my
testimony did not relate to USDA's jurisdiction or purview to implement
regulatory changes, as such matters span beyond my research and
academic expertise. What my testimony did, however, discuss in detail
was the lack of evidence supporting the change. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture's (USDA) Proposed Rule does not meet an evidentiary
standard and would weaken SNAP's responsiveness to an economic downturn
without increasing labor force participation rates. The USDA and its
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) fail to fully consider the costs and
benefits of the proposed rule, including the costs and benefits under
alternative economic conditions.
The USDA and the RIA do not consider the benefits to program
participation for individuals nor SNAP's role as an automatic
stabilizer when weighing proposed changes. The rule is likely to push a
considerable number of current beneficiaries who are either in the
labor market or unable to work off the SNAP rolls while failing to
expand for newly eligible participants at the onset of a recession. It
does so absent evidence that labor force attachment among ABAWDs would
increase as a result of this proposal even in a strong economy and
without consideration to the costs both for individuals and the economy
in any circumstance. Given the importance of SNAP in a recession, it
seems impossible to change how waivers work without considering the
effects of the policy change under a range of economic circumstances.
The proposed rule and the RIA do not factor in such considerations.

Question 2. Mr. Shambaugh, your written testimony states that the
vast majority of ABAWDs are in the labor force. The recently released
Characteristics of SNAP Households shows that just over 31% of ABAWDs
have any countable earned income, meaning less than 32% work. Why the
discrepancy? Even if the majority of ABAWDs work at some point, if the
majority are not working while on SNAP than at any given point in time,
it seems that the majority are not working, correct?
Answer. Because states are not required to provide precise numbers
on ABAWDs, the administrative data reports are also not precise. The
Characteristics of SNAP Households Table 3.3 from which the 31 percent
number is taken is for ``Adults age 18 to 49 without disabilities in
childless households.'' ABAWDs are a subset of this larger group, as
some in this group have been identified as not being an ABAWD by the
eligibility caseworker or Quality Control reviewer. When President
Trump's White House Council of Economic Advisors used the Quality
Control data to look at the average monthly employment rate, which is
lower than the rate of those in the labor force because it does not
consider those seeking work, they found that 38 percent were working in
a given month in 2017 (Economic Report of the President, March 2019, p.
464).
More importantly, these monthly snapshots do not capture the full
picture of labor force engagement of those on SNAP. As our work has
shown, the monthly snapshot provides an incomplete picture due to the
volatility of the low wage labor market.
In fact, when looking at an extended period, we have found that 75
percent of 18-49 year old adults without dependents and without
disability income who are SNAP beneficiaries are in the labor force at
some point over a 2 year period. Using the same method with a slightly
different sample (18 to 64 year olds as opposed to 18 to 49 year olds),
The 2019 Economic Report of the President found that about 70 percent
of those who were non-disabled working-age SNAP recipients in December
2013 worked at some point from January 2013 to December 2014 (p. 463).
As noted in our research, the majority of those not working in a
given month who do work at other times are not working because of
``work-related reasons'' such as problems finding hours, the loss of a
job, closure of an employer, etc. These people are trying to work. They
may not have income every month, but they are actively engaged in the
labor force.

Question 3. According to the American Enterprise Institute, many
scholars and public policy professionals are moving away from using
survey data to inform policy. AEI continues to say that these
individuals cite a lack of reliability and the importance of comparing
self-reported data to administrative data. Mr. Shambaugh, what do you
envision as the best data to capture the information discussed at the
hearing?
Answer. There is value in both administrative data and surveys.
Surveys are a critical tool to complement administrative data sources
and are vital to providing valid evidence for the policy debate. In
particular, surveys can provide evidence about why people are behaving
as they are, what keeps them from working, what their health status is,
among many other crucial pieces of information. As we have said, the
data that we have used to analyze policy issues regarding work
requirements have also been employed by the White House Council of
Economic Advisors in its most recent Economic Report to the President.
While data is a critical input, research design is more so.
Research conducted this year by Jeehoon Han (University of Chicago) and
Timothy Harris (Illinois State University for the W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research) used administrative data, survey data, and a
quasi-experimental research design to identify the effect of SNAP work
requirement waivers on caseload levels and employment outcomes. Han
finds no negative effect of place-based work requirement waivers on
employment and no positive effect of the reimposition of work
requirements on employment. These findings are consistent with work
requirements having no effects on employment. Harris typically finds an
extremely small (less than one percent) but statistically significant
impact of work requirements on employment, but even the most generous
specifications find the number incentivized to work is far smaller than
those removed from the program. Crucially, they compare those facing
work requirements to those who do not, giving a valid comparison of
treatment and control groups.
By contrast, we urge policymakers to be cautious in their review of
published research using administrative data that does not employ a
research design for causal inference. These studies, including one
referenced repeatedly during the Subcommittee's April 3 hearing, do not
identify treatment and control groups, incorrectly sample the study
population, and do not account for factors that would otherwise explain
their findings like work history before and while on the program.
Because they fail to design their studies correctly, the administrative
data employed cannot answer the research question asked.
In [addition] to using administrative data and survey data in our
research, The Hamilton Project has produced evidence in support of the
Federal statistical agencies role in collecting data that supports
economic growth and evidence-based policy. In a March 2017 report
published jointly by the American Enterprise Institute and The Hamilton
Project, the organizations supported government-collected data,
including surveys. In particular, this report notes that research based
on surveys is used not only by researchers, but by private businesses
(see Chapter 1: Businesses).
The report can be found at: http://www.aei.org/publication/in-
order-that-they-might-rest-their-arguments-on-facts-the-vital-role-of-
government-collected-data/.*
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* The document entitled, ``In Order That They Might Rest Their
Arguments on Facts'': The Vital Role of Government-Collected Data, is
retained in Committee file.

Question 4. Mr. Shambaugh, as an economist you understand the
difficulties in compiling longitudinal data on ABAWDs that would
provide improved information on the status and situation that
contribute to ABAWDs enrolling in and staying enrolled in SNAP? What
can USDA do right now that would provide policymakers, states, and
nonprofits serving the ABAWD population with even better information on
what this group needs to receive the services they need and obtain
employment if possible?
Answer. I agree that in order to better understand the needs of the
ABAWD population and to improve their labor market outcomes,
longitudinal data that includes demographic, casework, and employment
information on ABAWDs would provide improved descriptive information
for oversight and policymaking. For example, identifying volatility as
a key feature of the low-wage labor market and the longer-term outcomes
for those who failed to meet a work requirement can only be done with
longitudinal data.
At present, using available information to better describe who
ABAWDs are and addressing screening procedures to limit exposure to
work requirements only to those who the law feels should face a work
requirement are the best first steps. There should be improved
screening mechanisms for disability and individual barriers to work.
States have used individual exemptions to shield a variety of
vulnerable populations from work requirements, such as victims of
domestic abuse, veterans, and those who have aged out of the foster
care system. This could be done more systematically with point-in-time
information.

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